Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Carl Cockburn, Former Consular Section Chief, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, State
Department
Type of event: Interview (Folder A Track 5)

Date: 10-29-03
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Tom Eldridge/Janice Kephart-Roberts
Team Number: 5
Location: Room 7262, Department of State
Participants - Non-Commission:

Name Agency/Title
Carl Cockburn Consular Officer, Manila

Paula Barton Asst. Legal Counsel 202-647 -2227

Participants - Commission:
Tom Eldridge Counsel Team 5 202-401-1686
Janice Kephart-Roberts Counsel Team 5 202-401-1705

Documentslhandouts received by the Commission: None

Other contacts referred to: None

TEXT:

Mr. Cockburn's Background.

Cockburn has a BA from Wilberforce University, and a Masters in public administration

from the Univ. of Dayton.
C joined DOS in 1984 after working for Sears and GM.
He served in:
Mexico City 1984-Dec 1985
Stockholm July 1986 to Aug 1988 (vice consul)
DOS HQ 1988-1989 as Staff Asst. to the Int'l Org. Bureau
DOS HQ 1989-1991 Central American Affairs

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• Burma 1991-1993
Colombia 1993-1995
Zimbabwe 1995-1998
Chief consul section Jeddah aug/sept 1998- Aug. 2000
DOS Caribbean Affairs 2000-2002
Manila Sept 2002-current (until 2005)

Jeddah Consulate
We asked Mr. Cockburn to describe the Jeddah consulate. He said it was a "consitutent
post," reporting to embassy Riyadh. Above him was the Consul General, who reported to
the ambassador. His consul general for two years was Steven Buck. Jeddah has 40 USG
employees based there. After Buck, the CG was Richard Baltimore. There was no
deputy to the CG. Historically, the chief of the consular section served as deputy to the
CG. "and that was role I played." I

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..... ------- ...1' This was the universe of persons making visa
decisions there.

• We asked Cockburn about political pressure to issue visas. Cockburn said, "there were
times when someone trying to bring political pressure to bear on visa cases, we guarded
our turf."

We asked Cockburn to describe visa policy in Jeddah. He said it was "similar to rest of
the world." Cockburn said that, to some people, Saudi Arabia is considered to have a
more developed character, "and our adjudications were based on factthat most had
financial means to travel and attachments to our country not great so therefore not likely
to overstay or break US immigration law." But, Cockburn said, all third country
nationals (TCNs) were interviewed, and there were instances of fraud. There were some
TeNs who had SA passports, and they learned to differentiate them from real Saudis,
"and we'd cull those out." Cockburn stated that.TCNs were bad risks for being intending
immigrants to the U.S. because they were not treated well in SA.

Other types of fraud they saw among TCNs were Saudi Nationals who sought visas for
their TCN servants under the guise that they wanted them to accompany them on their
trip, but really intending to get them to the U.S. where they would disappear.

Cockburn also said that there definitely "were a lot of poor Saudis, and we' d scrutinize
them as well."

We asked him whether the Saudi visa policy was "Interview by exception": Cockburn

·.e said that was the general concept at time ble of resource limits. "In Jeddah, we worked
out of a trailer, because of security concerns. It was not the best of situations," said

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• Cockburn. Cockburn said it was un leasant in hot weather. Also, there was a lot of
pressure ..... 9 l_l_l_A_g_en_c_Y_I_n_t e_r_na_l_M_a_t_te_r_s ..1

Cockburn agreed that it was his understanding that section 214 (b) didn't really apply to
SA nationals. It was assumed that most Saudi Arabians would qualify for a NIV because
they had the means and had a propensity to return to SA.

Cockburn did say, however, ''we interviewed all students ... and that was personal to
me." Cockburn related that he came to the U.S. as a student from another country. He
thought student visa applicants should be qualified to attend school) and should not get a
visa just because they had money.

They also interviewed returning students. They would ask for students' report cards and
observed that the women usually worked harder than the men and kept their status.
Cockburn said they would not renew the visas of non-performing students even if they
came from a prominent family. "I didn't think U.S. was just a good place just to hang
out, " said Cockburn.

Cockburn did say they received pressure to approve visas for students from Congress,
and from people at posts. The pressure, said Cockburn would come in a call or note from
a person's contact in the consulate or embassy or from someone who knew a consular

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officer socially. Sometimes, the person had no previous connection with the CO but
would advocate nonetheless. They would tell you that "the kid would try more. "
Cockburn also was aware that schools were going to Congress and advocating for their
applicants to try and put pressure on the State Department. Particular schools that
engaged in these practices included some in Arizona, and some southern schools who
traditionally hosted a lot of Saudi students.

Cockburn said that, while he would get correspondence urging the issuance of visas from
Congress about three times per week, he never got a call or letter from a Congressman
objecting to his having issued a visa.

Cockburn rejected the view that Saudi Arabia was a "de facto visa waiver country." He
said he never heard that phrase used, andthat he wouldn't believe it should be considered
one because in fewer than 20 years, the Saudi per capita income went from that of
Switzerland to that of a third world country. Cockburn commented that he was surprised
when he got there. "I thought it would be vastly more developed than it was."

Cockburn said that his view of the economic situation in SA did affect how he ran the
visa process. Cockburn was certain that they interviewed more Saudi applicants in
Jeddah than in Riyadh. He said that they could "dispose of third coun~ nationals easily,
but the Saudis would argue." Cockburn describeqi las "both students
of the region and interested in the politics and r~llgion." Cockburn said Jeddah w~

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interesting race fo.rthem because it incol)'Or~ed a l~t of Muslim acti~sm, s~9JatL......J
I s~:' this as a both an academic and practical way of learning.about the
.. . .-i .>:

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....<
..:~.. -
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region. Cockburn also said tha~ Lsed the visa process to educate
themselves about religious practices in the region."

Cockburn said that Mecca and Medina were in the Jeddah visa district, so people on the
Hajj would come to that consulate to attempt to secure a U.S. visa, and US persons going
on the Hajj were "a big part of our work" - citizen services.

Cockburn said his role in visa adjudication was to approve the applications that were
"easy" and did not need interviews. For example, he handled the older and family types.

Religious extremists in Jeddah

We asked, did you see examples of persons who were extremists coming in? Cockburn
said he did, although he said "I would've looked at them differently now." Cockburn
said they did "see people who would express anti-West or anti-US views, and these
would be shown through interviews, and sometimes they'd have to come back. We saw
them as religious extremists, not as terrorists." Cockburn said that, as to these visa
applications, "we'd make determinations on a case by case basis." Cockburn expressed
the view that sometimes they felt that "maybe this guy would change his mind" ifhe
came to the U.S. On the other hand, Cockburn said, sometimes they concluded that "he
shouldn't come at all." Many of these extremist applicants were religious students and

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were usually invited to U.S. by a U.S. mosque and were seeking a BIIB2 visa. Cockburn
said that they probably also issued visas when he was there to religious workers applying
either for a visa as an ordained minister or for an immigrant visa. "We probably issued
some of these, but I don't remember."

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Denials based on terrorist affiliation

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****Cockbum noted that they were well aware that UBL's home was in SA, and there
was a lot of effort being put into catching him and his associates. He said UBL and
terrorism was a constant theme. "Some people got tired of hearing about UBL. We were
a1ways kind of looking out. I wasn't privy to that information we have now then, but we
were generally aware."

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 9/11 Agency Internal Matters

• With regard to watchlisting, Cockburn said that "occasionally there would be a 00 and
we'd refer back [to State]."

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Refusal Rates

He had no discussions with his consular officers about their refusal rates. "I
great officers, and I never told them they were issuing too many refusals."
haU

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Interview Policy

Cockburn agreed that they (CA) should interview more applicants, but the interviews'
value depended in part on the degree of training received. Therefore, more training to
make these interviews useful would be a good idea. He also said they needed better
cooperation among agencies. Cockburn felt that sometimes more interviewing can help,
but he felt the usefulness was limited in cases where the applicant was a good liar, or the
interviewer was not a seasoned consul.

***Awareness ofUBL at post

We asked about his awareness ofUBL activity in his post area. He said "We were in a

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hrea ost and center of eat concern." He cited the facts

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He also mentioned the experiences of

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• Iranians in Mecca being involved in violent activities and of young Saudis revolting
against their government as evidence of extremist activity near Jeddah. However, he said
'they "didn't see the young Saudi going to Afghanistan per se." Rather, their awareness
of these things often came from reading newspapers, watching CNN, and reviewing
overseas cables on threats intelligence agencies said existed.

Awareness of threat to U.S.

Cockburn did not recall ever seeing information suggesting there was a threat to the U.S.,
or that SA nationals posed a threat to the U.S. Rather, people would often speak about
the embassy as a target.

Ever concerned that we should deny visa blc could pose threat to US? Yes, for me
personally, but not a DOS policy.

We asked if they ever had a travel agency referral program when he Was there.' He said
no, and further added that he didn't think one would work because the applicants from
SA had intermixed SA nationals (who did not need great scrutiny) and their domestic
help applying with them (who did).

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*Incomplete Applications

We asked why so many of the hijacker visa applications were allowed to be processed
even though they were so incomplete. Cockburn said that unfortunately, Saudis were
"very bad at filling out forms and didn't think they needed to." It was "a constant battle
to have people fill out applications completely. 1'd get a bundle of applications and circle
them and give them back to our local employees and have folks come back to fill in, but
usually the applicant didn't come back, and their employee would fill it back in." Often,
you would get an application containing the signature of applicant, but their employee
would do all the filling out, so generally the application was not even filled out in the
applicant's own handwriting.

According to Cockburn, the application states that the applicant is only responsible for
signing, but is not required to fill out. This was often the case with Saudi businessmen
because they rarely did anything themselves. Cockburn said he expected the Saudis to
fill out their applications, and sometimes he just wanted to know the applicant's business
("always a business man!") and address. Sometimes student applicants didn't fill out
where they were going, and "I'd look carefully at the 25 yr old applying as a student."

Sometimes, Cockburn said, the people who signed the applications as the adjudicators
(the State Department employee) weren't always the actual adjudicators. It was not

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unusual for someone other than the person most familiar with an application to sign off
on it, although Cockburn said, "I would expect him to have complete notes prior to
signing it."

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• Political pressure

Cockburn said he did have political pressure from Riyadh, but that this was the same as
"everywhere I've served," ~Ck~!m ~aJ~ed that the Fowler memo was sent to him
when he was way from post. . ~ ~. eplaced Cockburn as Chief of consular
section in Jeddah, and he was acting at time this memo was sent to him. Baltimore was
the CG in Jeddah (above Cockburn). The memo details accurately how the ambassador
sought to influence a case. After that, said Cockburn, "we locked the door to the
ambassador. " Cockburn said this was not really a pattern with the ambassador.
Cockburn said Fowler's priorities were to get the Saudis to be more supportive of the
U.S. efforts with regard to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, to cooperate on anti-UBL
efforts, and to be supportive on economic issues, and that Fowler "didn't want hassles on
visas." Ijust saw that as his issue and didn't let it influence my visa adjudications.
"That's why I'm not a senior officer," said Cockburn, implying that his frankness and
unwillingness to bend to political pressure had hurt his chances for promotion.

Child custody cases

We tried our best within the existing laws or agreements, said Cockburn, unfortunately,
SA adheres to none. Cockburn said he considered it a victory if they were able to contact

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the children and meet and speak: with them. He said they had not a lot of success, but that
they were able to help a young Saudi man - whose mother was American and who was a
U.S. citizen by birth -- get out.

Cockburn said he visited Riyadh about two times pre year, but that he did not like
Riyadh. The scrutiny was greater for one's work, and Jeddah was a more cosmopolitan
city.

Contact with lNS

There never was an INS person in Jeddah, nor was this really necessary; really the only
INS involvement was on refugees, mostly Somalis. State can approve refugee petitions
on behalf of the US (but not disapprove them). Regarding fraud training, "the INS came
through probably twice while Iwas there to train airlines on travel documents and we'd
sit in on the training." With regard to adjustments of status, "we got blue sheets back on
adjustment of status, and found a few Saudis there." The purpose of blue sheets is to
advise the post that a NIV recipient has sought an adjustment of status and to request
additional information from post. Not infrequently, it has been Cockburn's experience,
applicants will lie on their applications for an NIV - by, for example, stating that they are
single -- and then seek to adjust status when they arrive in the U.S. - stating that they are
married .

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•. , . .

• Suggestions on how to fight immigration fraud

Cockburn said it would help lower fraud if, on all adjustment of status applications, the
INS were obligated to learn what the NIV applicant had said on their visa application.
The above marriage lie is typical. Cockburn says this kind of thing is ''very demoralizing
to consular officers that these people lie, and then the U.S. rewards them by letting them
stay," rather than deporting them.

Cockburn said that in Manila, they got a lot of info from BClS on the IV status of persons
who have entered U.S., on violations of law involving those applying on IVs, and that
this information "affects our adjudication a lot." Be said their work with BCIS Bangkok
is very helpful, and that "things have improved a lot in information sharing since 9-11."
He added that the INS had always been slow because of backlogs, etc.

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Overall, Cockburn felt that the way to reduce immigration violations was to "use the INA
as it is written, not how it is interpreted." Cockburn said it was a constant source of grief
for him that a junior consular officer who applied the law would have to be "corrected"

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by him because, in his view, the FAM says differently than the law itself

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