Professional Documents
Culture Documents
China’s rapidly expanding presence in Sub-Saharan Africa1 has been making headlines
and sparking debate within foreign policy and international aid communities, fundamentally
altering the framework through which Western countries and international organizations
approach African development. While bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China
and African nations date back to Premier Zhou Enlai’s speeches on the struggle of African
nations for independence at the First Asia-Africa Conference in April 1955,2 only within recent
years has Sino-African relations leapt forward so dramatically, capped by China’s “Year of
Africa” in 2006 and the success of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in
November that year. On a political level, countless meetings and visits at the ministerial level
and higher have taken place within the past decade including several multi-state tours of Africa
by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and their predecessors.3 In terms of economic
activity, trade between China and Africa has jumped from a mere $3 billion in 1995 to nearly
$107 billion in 2008, making China the continent’s second-largest trading partner ahead of
former colonial power France, 4 and is predicted to exceed U.S.-African trade within five years.5
1
Henceforth, Sub-Saharan Africa will simply be referred to as ‘Africa’ as this paper does not cover China’s policy
towards Egypt, Lybia, Algeria, nor any other Northern African states.
2
Fernando, Sithara, “Chronology of China-Africa Relations,” China Report, Vol. 43, 2007, p. 363
3
Ibid.
4
“China-Africa trade up 45% in 2008 to $107 bln,” Xinhua, Feb. 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
02/11/content_10803769.htm.
5
Harman, Danna, “China boosts African economies, offering a second opportunity,” Christian Science Monitor, Jul.
16, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/centennial/timeline/2008/07/china-boosts-african-economies-offering-a-
second-opportunity/.
China has become a leading source of foreign direct investment in Africa among developing
countries with a seven-fold increase in FDI outflows to Africa between 2003 and 2006 to 48
countries.6
Given the shockwave effect of China’s resurgent presence in Africa, two strictly
dichotomous views of China’s role in the region have arisen. At one end of the spectrum is the
prevailing sentiment among many Western governments and international organizations that
China’s policies of unconditional aid and relations with pariah states undermine current efforts
by such groups as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank,
and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to improve governance
and human rights issues in African countries through conditionality. Criticism from these groups
as well as United States politicians, human rights activists, celebrities, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) with vested interests characterizes China as a supporter of corrupt regimes
that operate through violence and severely damage Africa’s prospects for development.7 At the
other end of the spectrum is a still nascent but growing body of literature proclaiming China’s
activities in the region as Africa’s last chance for development after decades of failed aid policies
by the West.8 Some go further, arguing Western aid efforts have on net harmed Africa by
6
As a fraction of Africa’s total FDI stock, Chinese investment accounts for less than 1 percent, far behind well-
established investor countries in North America and Europe. OECD Investment Policy Reviews: China 2008,
Chapter 3: China’s Outward Direct Investment, p. 3-4.
7
See especially the New York Times editorial “Patron of African Misgovernment,” New York Times, Feb. 19, 2007.
8
Rotberg, Robert I., China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Brookings Institution Press, 2008; Broadman,
Harry G., Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, World Bank Publications, 2007.
9
Moyo, Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 2009; Collier, Paul, “Dead Aid, by Dambisa Moyo: Time to turn off the aid tap?” The Independent, Jan. 30,
2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/dead-aid-by-dambisa-moyo-1519875.html;
Spears, Collin, “The Chinese-African Relationship: Can Sub-Saharan Africans Think?” Brooks Foreign Policy
Review , Apr. 20, 2009, http://brooksreview.wordpress.com/2009/04/20/the-chinese-%E2%80%93-african-
relationship-can-sub-saharan-africans-think/.
2
The position of this paper is that neither confrontation nor wholesale acceptance of
China’s actions in Africa represents an optimal strategy for engaging China in the region.
Instead, in the best interests of African development, Western developed countries and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) should seek to incorporate China’s African policies into
motivations. Rather than blindly criticizing Chinese actions, the West and IGOs should seek to
understand reasoning and underlying logic behind its policies and focus on areas of common
ground upon which constructive collaboration can develop. This paper first covers China’s
broader motivations for involvement in Africa and then analyzes specific cases where an
understanding of China’s motivations provides opportunities for cooperation that benefit all
First, we must take a moment to understand China’s key motivations for its policies in
Africa. China’s primary goals in engaging with African states can be divided generally into
political, economic, and reputational goals. China’s political goals include the accretion of
diplomatic capital in international politics, winning away Taiwan’s remaining allies and partners,
and generally finding more friends among developing countries to balance politically against
Western interests in the international community. China’s friendship with many African states
has given China more political clout in major IGOs with real implications for the advancement
of key Chinese interests. Within the UN, African states comprise half of the non-aligned member
nations and a third of all member nations in the General Assembly. 10 The support of many of
these African nations has been crucial to several Chinese diplomatic victories dating back to the
10
He Wenping, “The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007, p. 27.
3
1971 UN resolution that switched official recognition from the ROC to the PRC as one of the
five permanent members of the Security Council to the 2004 blocking of a U.S.-led effort to
sanction China for its human rights record.11 Cooperation between China and African nations in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has resulted in successes in trade regulations. More
recently, in 2005 China and several African nations worked together to force the U.S. to cancel
its cotton subsidy among others, which directly impacted African and Chinese competitiveness in
In particular, the struggle over African recognition and political support has been a key
diplomatic component of the PRC’s extensive campaign to isolate Taiwan and compel the island
the Communist Party lost in the Chinese Civil War to rejoin the mainland under a “One China”
policy. Since the passing of UN Resolution 2758 recognizing the PRC as China’s only legitimate
government representative, many countries have adopted the “One China” policy and many
others have severed official diplomatic relations with the ROC. Diplomatic recognition by
smaller developing nations has been of particular strategic interest to the PRC given their
economic size and their propensity for accepting aid packages in exchange for an end to official
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This strategy of deal-making has proven to be effective in the
cases of Dominica in 200413 and Grenada in 2005,14 for example, and has also played a role in
China’s efforts in Africa. A recent string of diplomatic victories in Africa backed by aid packages
11
Ibid; United Nations General Assembly—Twenty-Sixth Session, 1976th Plenary Meeting, Resolution 2758, Oct.
25, 1971.
12
He, 2007, p. 38.
13
Painter, James, “Taiwan’s Caribbean Headache,” BBC News, Mar. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3583733.stm.
14
“Grenada picks China over Taiwan,” BBC News, Jan. 21, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4190295.stm.
4
including Senegal’s change of diplomatic recognition in 2005,15 Chad’s switch in 2006,16 and
Malawi’s switch in 200817 has left Taiwan with only a four remaining de jure supporters in the
region.18 As a result of this campaign, repeated efforts by the ROC to gain recognition and
influence in the UN and other IGOs has resulted in a consistent lack of support by other member
nations. Taiwan’s annual petitions from 1993 onwards for recognition as a member nation in the
UN General Assembly have all been denied and often fail to make the agenda due to lack of
tapping a vast wealth of resources to fuel China’s economic growth and the cultivation of new
markets for Chinese goods, among others. The country’s tremendous economic growth since the
start of its reform policies in 1978 and its commensurably tremendous appetite for raw materials
and energy resources has naturally led China to build strong relationships with the world’s
primary raw materials exporters. While the positions of numerous Western governments and
corporations have been deeply entrenched in such strategically important regions as the Middle
East, Africa’s export potential still remains relatively open to development and provides China
with an opportunity not only to diversify its resource trading partners but also to fill in a vacuum
in Western influence. Already African oil exports to China as a fraction of China’s total imported
oil has leapt from one-quarter to almost one-third since 2004.20 While competition with Western
15
“Senegal recognizes China,” Taipei Times, Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/
archives/2005/10/26/2003277422.
16
“Taiwan breaks off diplomatic ties with Chad,” Forbes, Aug. 6, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/
2006/08/06/afx2929963.html.
17
Wu, Debby, “Malawi drops ties with Taiwan for China,” USA Today, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/world/2008-01-14-3462575361_x.htm.
18
He, 2007, p. 24.
19
“Taiwan’s UN Campaign,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/
ct.asp?xItem=26680&ctNode=1028&mp=6.
20
Hanson, Stephanie, “China, Africa, and Oil,” Council on Foreign Relations, Jun. 6, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/.
5
interests in key exporting nations such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea will only intensify as
global demand for oil and other resources increases over the years, China has already established
itself as a key player in the region given its heavy investment and political efforts as well as its
willingness to deal with countries avoided by the West due to human rights issues such as Sudan,
As Africa’s second-largest trading partner, China also exported over $50 billion of
equipment, manufactured goods, and other products to the continent in 2008, slightly less than
total imports from Africa in the same year. 22 In spite of clear challenges such as weaker market
institutions, Africa represents a potentially lucrative and relatively untapped market for Chinese
goods and an opportunity for Chinese producers to grow and diversify end markets as the U.S.
and EU represent mostly saturated markets recently laid low by the global recession. Moreover,
contrary to common opinion, China’s export of low-end consumer products accounts for no more
than a fifth of total exports to any one African country except Uganda, and Chinese exports
thrive most in African markets for machinery, electronic equipment, and other industrial-related
items.23
Lastly, a country’s image and projection of soft power can be a vital asset or crippling
liability, and for a rising global power like China with a reputation still in flux and position in the
world order hotly debated, image is of paramount importance. In Africa, China finds a unique
relations with the Third World, establishing China as the leader of an alternative model to the
Western monopoly on the current world order. While China’s policy in this regard has shed the
21
Shinn, David H., “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=34.
22
“China-Africa trade up 45% in 2008 to $107 bln,” Xinhua, Feb. 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2009-02/11/content_10803769.htm.
23
Sautman, Barry, Yan Hairong, “The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment, and the China-in-Africa Discourse,”
unpublished manuscript, 2007.
6
ideological bend of Mao’s foreign policy agenda, the sense of broader leadership and return to
global influence that extends from China’s national pride is an unmistakable factor driving
China’s actions abroad, particularly in relation to developing countries. Much has been written
on China’s expanding soft power initiatives24 and the role of global status as a driving force
behind Chinese foreign policy,25 and China has cultivated a largely positive reputation among
developing African countries built on more than half a century of successful political, economic,
medical, and educational programs in the region. Many African heads of state including
Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, have explicitly
activity in Africa may represent a second chance to breaking out of poverty traps, resource
curses, and the chronic affliction of poor governance. After a review of China’s primary
motivations for involvement in the region, we can now begin to examine the ways in which
Chinese interests can be directed and incorporated into models for engagement with China to set
Africa on a concrete track to sustainable economic growth and the development of key
institutions that will allow African nations to solve their problems internally.
24
See especially Kurlantzick, Johsua, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, Yale
University Press, 2008; Whitney, Christopher et al, “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of
Opinion,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008.
25
Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations, Cambridge University Press,
2008.
26
Fei Liena et al, “China’s involvement in African’s infrastructure development has fundamental, transformative
impact says Ethiopian PM,” Xinhua, Jan. 29, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
01/29/content_10731854.htm; “Special Report: Africa-China Trade 2008,” Financial Times, Jan. 24, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/reports/africachinatrade2008.
7
One prominent example of a common basis for cooperation is investment and other
economic activity in transparent infrastructure projects that observably benefit the public good.
In discussions of China’s economic relations with African nations, Chinese investment in African
infrastructure and other public goods is sometimes mentioned but often overshadowed by
concerns over resource extraction and human rights issues. The fact of the matter is the Chinese
government and large national banks and corporations such as the Export-Import Bank of China
(China Exim Bank) have invested heavily in major infrastructure projects in the region such as
the Merowe High Dam in Sudan that will double the country’s power generation capacity.27 In
2006 alone, China committed to investing more than $7 billion in African infrastructure projects,
far outpacing aid and investment efforts from the West according to a 100-page World Bank
report.28 Even in countries where China is accused of pure resource extraction, China has in fact
helped such countries leverage their resource endowments to obtain loans for development such
as in the case of oil-rich Angola which received multiple billion-dollar oil-backed loans from
China in January 2005, March 2006, and March 2009 for infrastructure investment.29
Undoubtedly, a more scrupulous review of these individual projects will reveal problems such as
corruption, environmental impact, and labor issues typical of endeavors of this scale, but
relatively speaking infrastructure investment is unique in its inherently greater transparency and
direct benefit to the public good, which has made it a primary focus of the World Bank’s lending
strategy. Given China’s proven willingness to invest in such projects, Western countries and
IGOs should encourage and support China’s efforts in this area through direct cooperation as
well as a pooling of resources and accumulated knowledge. To this end, the World Bank and
27
Bosshard, Peter, “China’s Role in Financing African Infrastructure,” International Rivers Network, 2007, p. 11
28
Foster, Vivien, et al, “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Africa,” The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008.
29
“China-Africa Trade Links,” Reuters, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL01887144;
“Angola wins new billion-dollar loan from China,” AFP, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/
afp/article/ALeqM5i0hpgnhmj3GYfBFS8IbzAJ1WDf5w.
8
comparably-sized China Exim Bank signed a cooperation agreement in 2007 with an initial
growth and improved quality of life including agriculture, healthcare, and education. Prominent
comprehensive $5 billion loan package to the Democratic Republic in Congo in 2007 that would
finance the creation of 31 hospitals, 145 smaller health centers, 2 universities, and 5,000 units of
government housing.31 While quality control is perhaps more difficult on projects that involve
logistical issues beyond civil engineering, the significance and observable returns on investment
of these non-physical infrastructure projects cannot be ignored in any serious development and
China’s officially stated policy towards the region and China’s broader motivations. This type of
conspicuous development assistance strengthens China’s direct bonds with African nations and
helping fellow developing countries. Besides these reputational issues, Chinese banks and
effectiveness, and generally realizing a proper return on their investments. Already, official
statements and policies have been promulgated by the central government sternly admonishing
irresponsible corporate practices not only to protect China’s image abroad but also to protect
30
Wroughton, Leslie, “China’s exim-bank, World Bank to cooperate on Africa,” Reuters, May 21, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN2136700620070522.
31
French, Howard, “The Chinese and Congo take a giant leap of faith,” The New York Times, Sep. 21, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/world/asia/21iht-letter.1.7595719.html.
9
workers and improve management.32 Such an alignment of interests among China, African
nations, and the West presents an unprecedented opportunity to establish a fundamental level of
Concurrently, there exist several salient issues of concern regarding China’s current
pattern of activity in Africa. An effective, appropriate response to these issues need not involve
direct conflict but can instead be resolved through a constructive understanding and channeling
of China’s dominant incentives. Two representative examples of such issues—China’s arms sales
to African governments with poor human rights records and the potentially negative impact of
public good more straightforwardly even under regimes with poor human rights records, arms
sales to problematic African governments such as the current regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe
are directly linked with increased violence and oppression in those respective areas.33 While
China’s arms sales to Sudan, for example, account for only 8 percent of total arms imports
according to China’s special envoy to Darfur Liu Guijin, China is still Sudan’s largest arms
supplier and wields substantial leverage in that regard.34 Despite these moral concerns, China has
a strong incentive to engage in arms trade and military training with these regimes in that such
32
Bosshard, 2007, p. 15.
33
Hanson, 2008, p. 7.
34
“China defends arms sales to Sudan,” BBC News, Feb. 22, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7258059.stm; Bristow, Michael, “China’s dilemma over Darfur,” BBC News, Feb. 13, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7242725.stm.
10
actions enhance China’s relations with these states, which also serve as political supporters in
IGOs. These states, categorically isolated by the West and international community at large, find
While pressure on the Chinese central government by the West may have yielded some
progress, such as over the Darfur issue leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and China’s
stance is independently dynamic and evolving,35 a more holistic approach to engaging China on
these issues could lead to greater progress. As discussed previously, China seeks to enforce an
image of solidarity and partnership with developing African nations in contrast to the unilateral,
often paternalistic actions of the West. At the same time, there is no evidence that China desires
to support violence and oppression; to the contrary, China has played a proactive role in helping
resolve the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, for example, by contributing Chinese engineers as part
of UN peacekeeping forces and sending in a seasoned diplomat as a special envoy to the region.36
Most prominently, President Hu urged Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir directly to
push harder on negotiations with Darfur rebels and cooperate more with the UN. 37 However, in
the face of harsh public criticism from the West, the Chinese government cannot be seen as
backing down and caving in to Western demands given the negative ramifications to China’s
reputation abroad as well as at home. The more the West pressures China, the more their efforts
may backfire and further entrench China in its current position. A more productive approach may
involve private negotiations and discussions with the Chinese government over an issue like
arms deals that can be drawn down quietly without eroding China’s image or even substantially
harming China’s relations with Sudan. This form of ‘quiet diplomacy’ has been advocated most
35
Downs, Erica S., “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Relations,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007, p. 17.
36
Heavens, Andrew, “Darfur rebels reject new Chinese peacekeepers,” Reuters, Nov. 25, 2007,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L24686432.htm.
37
De Montesquiou, Alfred, “China’s Hu Presses Sudan for Progress on Darfur,” The Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201753.html.
11
recently by newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the UN Susan Rice who believes such an
approach will work with China and Russia vis-à-vis their support for Mugabe’s regime in
Zimbabwe.38 China’s arms sales to Sudan and Zimbabwe are a valuable tool in winning political
capital and loyalty among these states, and efforts to persuade China to change its course must be
sufficiently powerful to dominate these strong incentives. But this type of approach may serve as
a workable, albeit imperfect, compromise that would move the arms deal issue forward without
Case Study #3: Mitigating the negative effects of Chinese exports on nascent
African industries
The phenomenal growth of trade between China and Africa, projected to exceed $100
billion by 2010, has materially benefited both sides, particularly given complementarities
between Africa’s vast resources and China’s manufacturing capabilities, but not without costs to
certain sectors of African industry.39 Leaving accusations of neo-colonial exploitation aside, the
importation of Chinese manufactured goods into African markets has sometimes left fledging
African industries such as textiles, clothing, and light electric appliances struggling to compete.
Compelling numbers including 250,000 layoffs in Nigeria due to the shuttering of 80 percent of
Nigerian textile factories caused in part by an dramatic influx of Chinese textile and clothing
products40 paint a troubling picture of private sector development, among the continent’s most
critical steps toward sustainable growth.41 The Chinese central government has duly
38
Kralev, Nicholas, “U.N. nominee wants ‘quiet diplomacy,’” The Washington Times, Jan. 15, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/15/un-nominee-wants-quiet-diplomacy/.
39
“Special Report: Africa-China Trade 2008,” Financial Times, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.ft.com/reports/
africachinatrade2008.
40
Alden, Chris, China in Africa, International African Institute, Royal African Society, Zed Books, 2008, p. 48-49.
41
Other factors such as uncontrolled currency inflation and pressure by international financial institutions (IFIs)
including the IMF to liberalize trade at an excessively rapid pace certainly played at least as important a role in the
collapse of certain African industries. Sautman, 2007, p. 18.
12
acknowledged the detrimental effects of such activity and, in response to a heavy surge in
unemployment in South Africa correlated with an 80 percent increase in Chinese textile and
clothing exports among other incidents, has declared a voluntary limit in June 2006 on related
Chinese exports to the region.42 In-depth country-specific studies have been conducted to
understand the effect of tariff reductions and strategic protectionist policies in insulating nascent
African private enterprises, revealing a delicate balancing between positive integration and
technology transfers with Chinese corporations and detrimental market crowding.43 Moreover,
these effects must be weighed against the benefits of greater purchasing power and a
consequently higher standard of living for the African consumer due to the increased
Ironically, the solution to this problem may lie within China’s own domestic policies for
dealing with foreign investment and private sector competition from foreign-owned enterprises.
As many multinational corporations operating within Chinese borders know well, the country
has strict rules regarding how foreign companies enter China including compulsory joint-venture
agreements with domestic firms in many cases and explicit technology transfer and domestic
worker employment agreements.44 FDI inflows to China reached $92 billion in 2008 at annual
growth rate of over 23 percent, and the Chinese government approved the establishment of 2,562
foreign-owned enterprises in December 2008 alone.45 The Chinese model of foreign commerce
regulation is built on this vast experience in dealing with foreign firms and comprises a
42
Li Suwan, “China will take the initiative to set limits on textile exports to South Africa,” Xinhua, Jun. 26, 2006,
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1038/4529560.html.
43
“Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy,”
International Monetary Fund, December 2005; Manson, Nwafor, “Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction in
Nigeria: Lessons from the Past,” Africa Institute for Applied Economics, Nigeria.
44
The author has had personal experience dealing with such issues having read through several hundred pages of
PRC commercial regulations while working at an international accounting firm in Beijing. See also
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/ and http://exporttochina.mofcom.gov.cn/wcn/.
45
“China’s FDI up 23.6% in 2008,” Xinhua, Jan. 15, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
01/15/content_10662757.htm.
13
meticulously designed system that ensures domestic enterprises gain directly from interactions
with foreign companies, a system that may be similarly effective in developing African countries
conditional on further research. IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank might consider
collaborating with commerce ministries and corporate groups in Africa in seeking “advice” from
the Chinese central government on the Chinese model of foreign investment and commercial
regulation. From China’s perspective, this would be an outstanding opportunity not only to
integrate further into African economies but also to assume a leadership role on an important
matter in an area of Chinese expertise. This approach, undoubtedly, has many complicating
African states, coordination problems with Chinese corporations whose incentives are not fully
aligned with that of the central government, and the very willingness of international
organizations to change old habits and reevaluate current policies. However, this approach may
overcome a more critical issue: cooperation among IGOs, Western and African governments, and
China that could represent Africa’s best chance for sustainable development.
The topics of whether China’s model of development is best for Africa or whether
China’s unconditional relations with Africa undermine Western aid efforts are difficult questions
that fall outside the purview of this paper. Instead, this paper has argued that there are perhaps
less high-profile issues on which the West and China can form some basis for consensus and
cooperation. The key to identifying and properly addressing such issues lies in a more nuanced
appreciation of China’s primary motivations for involvement in the region such as image-
building and the cultivation of soft power as well as often-cited political and economic goals. As
discussed in the case studies, infrastructure investment, arms trade reduction, and the protection
14
of African industries in the face of Chinese competition exemplify areas of overlapping interest
among all parties involved. Successful cooperation between China and the West in Africa has
profound implications for the future of African development after decades of mixed results and
unfulfilled promises. Moreover, Chinese and Western engagement in Africa serves as a test of
how well China and the developed world can work together to face global challenges that no
15