The impact of relevance marketing on credit collections within an emerging market micro finance institution (MFI)

Marc Joubert

Abstract The development and implementation of a marketing campaign aimed at reducing the number of drop off accounts purported to prove that customers incentivised to remain current are less likely to default on their loan repayments than customers not incentivised to remain current. The results of the six month initiative show positive, albeit inconsistent results in reducing the number of drop off accounts.

Introduction
In 2006, Mohammed Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the same year saw MFIs reach around one hundred and thirty million customers worldwide (Daley -Harris 2007). Lending to the poor has become such big business that it now occupies entire sectors in most, if not all, economies. This alternative financial sector, also called fringe banking (Caskey 1994), bootstrap capital (Servon 1999) or microcredit has relegated the poor and near-poor to expensive and, in many cases, poorly regulated alternatives (Drysdale & Keest 2000). For the most part, microcredit operations in many emerging markets are conducted through non-banking institutions or MFIs. Standard and Poors defines an MFI as an organisation providing small loans and financial services to low income and/or financially underserved clients, and conventional wisdom has held that for many years, MFIs have had a significant impact on poverty alleviation around the
1

world (Toye 1993; Yunus 1994; McPherson 1996; Mead & Liedholm 1998; Murdoch 1999; Weber 2002; Zohir and Matin 2004; Bakhtiari 2006; Hietalahti & Linden 2006; Cuong 2007; Mondal 2009). As such, and in particular reference to Africa, Mwenda & Muuka (2004) view MFIs as becoming more and more critical to Africas quest for solutions to the continents development challenge. African MFIs find themselves in a precarious position where the market is becoming more competitive due to the increased competition from commercial banks like Standard Bank through its Stanbic Bank operation, Deutsche Bank, and Citi Bank and global networks such as ACCION, FINCA, BRAC, ASA, Advans, and MicroCred. This along with the fact that, globally, MFIs have started moving from predominantly non-profit models to for-profit models (Navajas, Conning, and Gonzalez-Vega 2003; Schreiner 2004), means that MFIs must find ways of becoming more competitive and relevant if they are to remain sustainable. For the purposes of this paper, sustainability is broadly defined as the ability to cover costs and to continue operations without resorting to gifts, subsidies and debt relief or without keeping depositors savings illiquid (De Crombrugghe, Tenikue, and Sureda 2008). The impact of these large financial institutions showing interest in microfinance means an increase in access to credit for the poor and lower income individuals which in turn compounds the challenges faced by MFIs, such as; access to funding or subsidisation (Pollinger, Outhwaite, and Cordero-Guzman 2007), cost reduction (Caudill, Gropper, and Hartarska 2009), interest rates, regulation, outreach (Johnston, Yeargin, Brundige, and Payne 2006 and Karlan & Zinman 2008), and increased relevance through product diversification (Turvey & Kong 2009).

Purpose
Sustainability impacts on and could threaten the very existence of an MFI and in the case of a growing South African MFI concerning itself with the business of microlending, the level of non-paying loans is a serious cause for concern that is impacting on the future sustainability of the organisation. The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of marketing related incentives on customer loan repayment behaviour. The aim is to show that customers incentivised to remain current are less likely to default on their loan repayments than customers not incentivised to remain current in the belief that improved loan repayment will improve the long-term sustainability outlook of the organisation.

Background and Theory

Microfinance, specifically micro-credit, operates on two basic levels; either a joint liability level or individual liability level. Joint liability or group liability is the traditional association when referring to microfinance and is often cited as a key innovation responsible for the expansion of access to credit for the poor in developing countries (Gin & Karlan 2008). The original model of collateral free micro-credit began as a group-based initiative through Kaligram Krishi Bank in Bangladesh at the beginning of the twentieth century (Mondal 2002) and has undergone numerous modifications. The original model as conceived by Rabindranath Tagore required the borrower to belong to a group of five individuals, who would guarantee repayment of each loan before being offered a new loan. Subsequent models
3

have modified the level of group involvement resulting in the formation of villages, associations or centre structures comprising between twenty to forty individuals. These models operate on the premise that the entire group within a specific community are responsible for the loans given to individuals within the group. Based on homogenous matching, this model; where group members have an incentive to screen other clients so that only trustworthy individuals are allowed into the program (Gin & Karlan 2009), has proven to work well not only with the poorest of lenders (Vigenina & Kritikos 2004) through its reliance on peer pressure and group monitoring to ensure that individuals repay their loans. The reluctance to default on loan repayment is based either on the principle of shame (Karim 2008) or that of lender of last resort from the perspective that defaulters will have no alternative finance options available to them. The group model, as popularised by Grameen Bank, is currently used in developing countries around the world (Dalglish & Matthews 2009), and shows varying degrees of success; from the sixty three percent repayment rate as highlighted in an Indian study conducted by Deininger and Liu (2009) to the success of a ninety five percent repayment in a Bolivian study (Schreiner 2004) to that of Grameen Bank as demonstrated through its 98 percent rate of recovery. (Karim 2008) Individual lending, traditionally the domain of banks and non-banking institutions, has started gaining more favour among MFIs (Lehner 2008; Gin & Karlan 2009). The major difference in individual lending lies in the need for and use of traditional credit screening methodologies and technologies, the requirement of collateral in some cases and the reliance on some form of individual monitoring by the MFI, with much of the theory in this regard pointing to the critical nature of individual monitoring (Zeitinger 1996; Armendriz de Aghion & Murdoch 2000; Dellien, Burnett, Gincherman, and Lynch
4

2005; Gangopadhyay & Lensink 2007; Champagne, Tjossem, Ohman, Pikholz, and Cracknell 2007). Individual lending, where the individual is solely responsible for the repayment of the loan via a loan officer, or by depositing directly into the bank account of the MFI, works on a similar premise to group lending; that of incentivisation and/or fear. Repayment of loans, in most cases, results in ongoing access to additional funds while failure to repay loans results in the sale of any collateral, repossessions or even legal action. The literature on the analysis between group and individual lending is substantially weighted in favour of group lending, however, that which exists on a comparative basis shows that there is no statistically significant difference in loan repayment when comparing group lending to individual lending (Greif 1994; Gin & Karlan 2009) suggesting that the monitoring differences in group versus individual lending may be unimportant. In fact in a study conducted in Georgia (Vigenina & Kritikos 2004), not only were the findings consistent with the above statement in so far as it found that a combination of individual and group loans should be offered by MFIs as there is no better design, the study suggested that individual and group liability offerings should be offered as a product suite as they dovetail the micro -finance movement. According to the World Bank, the average return on assets (ROA) for group-based models, this includes village banks and solidarity groups, is negative while individual lending shows a positive, albeit small, ROA. Irrespective of the level of operation, customers defaulting on loan repayments, impacts on the sustainability and could potentially result in the eventual closure of an MFI whose core business is credit extension. The literature on loan repayment performance, particularly with regards to payment arrangements and incentives for contractual repayment behaviour, is limited and that which does exist 5

showing factors affecting repayment performance - varies greatly in its results (Ahlin & Towsend 2007; Cull, Demirg-Kunt, and Murdoch 2006). Non payment is a business risk, with repayment performance relying on the existence of an efficient credit management policy; commencing with a reliable scoring model, to agreements clearly stating the terms of the loan and its repayment through to ongoing regular contact with the individual, irrespective of the level of liability.

The recent global credit crisis resulted in South Africa, a developing country and an emerging market, experiencing its first recession in seventeen years. Commencing in the first quarter, 2009 was characterised by rising unemployment, low imports and exports, and contracting economic activity (Financial Mail, 18 December 2009). This led to an increase in default rates due to the fact that a growing number of customers could not keep up payments on their financial obligations. This despite the fact that, financial trend surveys conducted by the Bureau of Market Research (CFVI Fourth Quarter), a South African research institute involved in socioeconomic research since 1960, showed that customers ability to service their debt had improved more that 10 percent during the past twelve months.

The organisation under review is a South African MFI concerning itself with the business of short-term and long-term unsecured micro-lending, a category of financial services to low income customers. The modus operandi of the organisation is to offer individual loans to customers on the basis that they comply with the following minimum criteria: Potential customers are required to be South African citizens, have a bank account, and earn at least R2,000 ($270) per month
6

In order to validate the above requirements, customers are required to furnish proof of the above criteria by supplying copies of the following documentation, namely; Copy of their South African identity document, Three consecutive months bank statements, and Their latest payslip

The above information, along with certain demographic and financial information as mandated by the National Credit Act, No. 34 of 2005 (NCA) and as regulated by the National Credit Regulator (in terms of NCA Chapter 2, Part A) - allows the MFI to assess affordability and determine whether either a short-term or longer term unsecured loan will be approved and ultimately disbursed to the individual. Up until October 2009, the organisation had experienced contractual arrears of 26.6 percent of the capital at risk (CAR) averaged over the preceeding six months. Given that a credit collections strategy was in place utilising traditional approaches such as self collection, use of external debt collectors and ultimately the legal system, the business required an intervention that would mitigate the business risk of lower than expected loan repayment rates. There have been many suggestions on the use of risk reducing initiatives to ensure loan repayments and in so doing ensure the sustainability of MFIs. Baumann (2004) points to the improved overall organisational cost-efficiency and productivity, Schreiner (2004) suggests the use of predictive scoring models to cut the cost of judging the credit risk of the self-employed poor, a case study by Hartungi (2007) of BRI village units in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, showed how the use of innovative collateral choices not only made credit an interesting proposition but also served as compensation in the event of any repayment issues. Another suggestion emanates from China where Turvey and Kong (2009) point to the potential of using insurance in the form of crop, weather
7

and pricing insurance as financial leverage. As a result, the marketing department was approached to develop a marketing initiative that would assist in the drive towards ensuring the ongoing repayment of loans by current customers - current customers being defined as not having defaulted on loan repayments. If according to the Boone and Kurtz (1998) definition, marketing is the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, services, organizations, and events to create and maintain relationships that will satisfy individual and organizational objectives, then the problem required the marketing department to entice ongoing commitment from current customers toward loan repayment ultimately benefiting all of the MFIs six groups of stakeholders as highlighted by Schreiner (1998). Figure 1 shows how, according to Pollinger, Outhwaite, and Cordero-Guzman (2007), marketing drives the business model in terms of the volume of potential borrowers that an MFI is able to access and the pool of loans it can develop. FIGURE 1: Relationship-Based Financing Schematic for Microfinance Institutions

Marketing

Origination

Monitoring

Costs

Source: Adapted from Pollinger, Outhwaite and Cordero-Guzman (2007)

From a literature review, there has been much written on the correlation between marketing activities and various aspects of business performance, namely; sales (Jagpal 1981; Tellis & Weiss 1995; Kapil & Shoemaker 2004; Mumel, Hocevar, and

Snoj 2007); profitability (Srinivasan & Anderson 1998; Reid 2003); customer retention (Lewis 2004; Mumel, Hocevar, and Snoj 2007). In line with the recommendations as outlined in the collaborative global report From Exclusion to Inclusion through Microfinance, MFIs need to recognises that, as an organisation which offer access to financial services, we serve a unique target market requiring innovation in reaching and serving this audience with relevant products and services as suggested by Turvey and Kong (2009) following their study of 400 farm households in Shaanxi Province, China. With this notion in mind and given the lower cost of better retention in comparison to better acquisition (McDonald & Wilson 2002) and in conjunction with the four Cs: Cost, Convenience, Communications and Consumer wants and needs as outlined by Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn (1993), the over-arching business strategy of creating a compelling market customer value proposition was applied to improving the quality of life of our customers by offering a relevant and targeted incentive plan as a reward for ongoing contractual repayment behaviour.

The Analysis
In order to commence with our investiagation, few key issues needed to be answered; firstly, what would constitute a relevant customer offer and secondly, would it be compelling enough to be a value proposition good enough to induce ongoing loan repayment? An analysis of the customer and their situation, more specifically, an analysis of the customers bank statements revealed that a high proportion of existing customers had
9

at least one insurance policy reflecting on their monthly bank statements. The specifics of the particular insurance policy in each case are unknown; however, information from the Johannesburg Poverty and Livelihood Study (JPLS) showed that the m ost frequent life changing event was the death of a member of the household or of someone closely related to the household. TABLE 1: Households with Deceased Members Researched Regions within the City of Johannesburg Region A Region B Region C Region D Region E Region F Region G Region H OVERALL
Percentage of households with one or more deceased during the past 12 months

5% 2% 5% 15% 11% 10% 16% 15% 10%

Source: Adapted from the Johannesburg Poverty and Livelihood Study (2008)

As a result and in conjunction with insight from our insurance partner, we developed the idea of offering all contractual customers a microinsurance product in the form of a free R5,000 funeral plan, which in the event of the loan account holder passing away, the remaining family members would receive a benefit a R5,000 towards the funeral of the departed. The offer and its benefits would exist for the entire duration of the loan but would be suspended should the customer fail to make their required monthly loan payment; the benefit would however be reinstated once the loan account was up-todate. Cohen and McCord (2003) describe microinsurance as a system of protecting poor people against specific shocks using risk pooling in return for regular affordable premium payments proportionate too the likelihood and cost of the risk involved.
10

Appropriate delivery mechanisms, procedures, premiums, and the coverage, define microinsurance policies that respond to the limited and variable cash flow of low-income households, and the often unstable economic environment in which they live . Because financial resources available to the poor are so limited, Roth, McCord, and Liber (2007) comment that poor people can experience great financial disruption when unexpected events befall on them. Even small sums insured can ensure some protection and peace of mind (and dignity) for a poor person. In order to validate the hypothesis of customers incentivised to remain current are less likely to default than customers not incentivised to remain current, the following data was collected: The total number of current accounts per month, and The total number of drop off accounts per month - drop off accounts are defined as current accounts that have defaulted on repayments in the last month. The data was sourced from account repayment information six months prior to implementation of the marketing initiative. The time period analysed is April 2009 to September 2009, and six months after implementation of the marketing initiative, October 2009 to March 2010. The first analysis looks at identifying the rate of change of drop off accounts before the implementation of the incentive plan while the second analysis identifies the rate of change of drop off accounts after the implementation of the incentive plan. The determination of success or failure of the hypothesis was the outcome of a test of the statistical significance of the difference between the rates of change of drop off accounts pre-implementation and post-implementation.

11

Analysis of the number of drop off accounts post-implementation versus preimplementation reveal the following statistics: Month One a nine percent reduction in drop off accounts against a total base growth of seventeen percent, Month Two - a thirty-nine percent increase in drop off accounts against a total base growth of fourteen percent, Month Three - a twelve percent increase in drop off accounts against a total base growth of seventeen percent, Month Four - a sixty percent increase in drop off accounts against a total base growth of nineteen percent, Month Five - a two percent reduction in drop off accounts against a total base growth of fourteen percent, and Month Six - a nine percent increase in drop off accounts against a total base growth of twelve percent. The average drop off rate for the six months prior to implementation of the marketing initiative is seven hundred and sixty two accounts while in the six months after the implementation of the marketing initiative, the average drop off rate is one thousand and twenty six accounts growth of thirty five percent on a total base growth of sixteen percent. Interestingly, table 2 shows that in a six month comparison reflecting postimplementation versus pre-implementation versus previous year;
12

 comparing post-implementation to pre-implementation, four of the six months post-implementation show slightly reduced drop off percentages, and comparing post-implementation this year (TY) to same period last year (LY), two of the six months post-implementation show reduced drop off percentages. TABLE 2: Drop Offs as a Percentage of Total Base Previous Year Month Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Percent 2.3% 4.0% 8.4% 2.8% 3.5% 3.0% Pre-Implemantation Month Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Percent 3.8% 2.9% 5.1% 3.6% 3.5% 4.1% Post-implementation Month Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Percent 3.0% 4.1% 5.0% 7.4% 2.9% 3.8%

Analysing the drop off accounts before the implementation of the marketing initiative the results show a 0,0086 change in slope with an average of 0.0375 that has a standard deviation of 0.0077. The analysis of the drop off accounts after the implementation of the marketing initiative, show a change in slope of 0.0186 with an average of 0.0434 and standard deviation of 0.0167. The difference in the rates of change of drop off accounts pre-implementation and post-implementation are negligible, amounting to a slope of 0.0391 and a mean of 0,3575 which are not statistically significant.

13

Findings
Following on from the analysis of the performance of the marketing initiative and its impact on the drop off accounts, the findings are inconclusive for the following reasons: Insufficient data six months of data is insufficient in order to prove conclusively whether customers incentivised to remain current are less likely to default than customers not incentivised to remain current, especially when one considers the erratic results of the first four months, in the post-implementation versus preimplementation comparison, and the relatively consistent positive results of the last two months, namely February and March 2010. Timing of the initiative may have been a contributing factor in not being able to prove the hypothesis. The months of December and January are historically bad months for loan repayments, considering that December and January are the Holiday and Back-to-School seasons for most, if not all, of the customers concerned. This period seriously impacts on the ability of individuals to honour their financial commitments which has been further compounded by the recent recession. However, this fact was considered at the inception of the initiative with the view that its implementation would have a positive impact on loan repayments during these notoriously bad repayment months. The significant reduction in December drop offs (TY versus LY) suggests that the customer value proposition is relevant and that the initiative needs more time to prove itself.

14

Conclusion
The paper goes some way towards showing that, despite evidence to suggest that the customers outlook is improving post-recession, along with all the measures that this MFI was implementing; there is still huge reluctance on the part of customers to deliver on their financial commitments and that marketing has not yet proven itself as being a significant contributor in the role of inducing commitment to ongoing loan repayments. In terms of the future on issues around arrears and the repayment of loans to MFIs, there is some literature on how scorecard data could have some predictive power.can flag high-risk cases (Schreiner 2004), this information is critical in ensuring that the risks of non-payment are reduced upfront. Ongoing monitoring of loan performance has also been highlighted as an important driver for loan repayment. Further literature exists regarding the performance measures and mechanisms that could be adopted to assist in payment performance; however, most focuses on the stick approach with very little emphasis being given to the possibilities of the carrot approach. The impact of offering relevant incentives for the ongoing repayment of loans has not, as yet, been proven at an individual lending level and poses a rather interesting question, as to whether the impacts of targeted and relevant incentivisation would be greater, not just in regard to loan repayments but also in the area of social upliftment, if applied at a group lending level. As with all researched initiatives, many questions persist as to whether these findings will hold in other environments, in other cultures and with other lenders. The implications for practitioners intent on using relevant incentive marketing initiatives to encourage ongoing customer loan repayment may yet prove to be significant and as such requires further investigation.

15

REFERENCES
Ahlin, C. and Townsend, R. (2007). Selection Into and Across Credit Contracts: Theory and Field Research, Journal of Econometrics, 2007, 136, p 665-698 Armendriz de Aghion, B. and Murdoch, J. (2000). Microfinance beyond Group Lending, Economics of Transition 2000, 8, p 401-420 Bakhtiari, S. (2006). Microfinance and Poverty Reduction: Some International Evidence, International Business & Economics Research Journal, 2006, Vol. 5, # 12. Baumann, T. (2004). Pro-poor microcredit in South Africa: cost-efficiency and productivity of South African pro-poor microfinance institutions, Development Southern Africa, Vol.21, No. 5, Dec 2004. Boone, L. E. and Kurtz, D. L. (1998). Contemporary Marketing Wired, Dryden Press Caskey, J. P. (1994). Fringe banking: Check-cashing outlets, pawnshops, and the poor, New York, Russell Sage Foundation. Caudill, S. B., Gropper, D. M. and Hartarska, V. (2009). Which Microfinance Institutions are becoming more cost effective with time? Evidence from a Mixture Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 41, No 4, June 2009. Champagne, P., Tjossem, P., Ohman, T., Pikholz, L. and Cracknell, D. (2007). Toolkit for Individual Lending for Credit Managers, ShoreCap Exchange Corporation, 2007 Cohen, M. and McCord, M. J. (2003). Financial Risk Management Tools for the Poor, MicroInsurance Centre Briefing Note #6. Consumer Financial Vulnerability Index, Fourth Quarter 2009, a collaboration of FinMark Trust and The Bureau of Market Research, Unisa Cull, R., Demirg-Kunt, A. and Morduch, J. (2006). Financial Performance and Outreach: A Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3827, February 2006 Cuong, N. V., Pham, M. T and Minh, N. P. (2007). Poverty Targeting and Impact of a Governmental Micro-Credit Program in Vietnam, PMMA Working paper 2009 - 29 Daley-Harris, S. (2007). State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2007, Microcredit Summit Campaign, Washington, 2007. Dalglish, C. L. and Matthews, J.H. (2009). Designing self sustaining support for microenterprises in sub-Saharan Africa: a pilot, in Global Forum 2009: Business as an Agent of World Benefit, Case Western Reserve University
16

De Crombrugghe, A., Tenikue, M. and Sureda, J. (2008). Performance analysis for a sample of microfinance institutions in India, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 79:2 Deininger, K. and Liu, Y. (2009). Determinants of repayment performance in Indian micro-credit groups, Policy Research Working Paper 4885, The World Bank, Development Research Group, Mar 2009. Dellien, H., Burnett, J., Gincherman, A and Lynch, E. (2005). Product Diversification in Microfinance: Introducing Individual Lending, Womens World Banking Report, New York, 2005 Drysdale, L., and Keest, K. E. (2000). Focus Edition: The Usury Law Debate. South Carolina Law Review, Spring, p 590-669. Financial Mail (2009). Economic Outlook: Optimism and hard facts. <http://secure.financialmail.co.za/09/1218/features/gfeat.htm>. Accessed on Feb. 16, 2010. From Exclusion to Inclusion through Microfinance, A Collaborative Report by Microfinance Centre, European MicroFinance Network, and Community Development Finance Association, April 2007. Gangopadhyay, S. and Lensink, R. (2007). Delegated Monitoring and Moral Hazard in Underdeveloped Credit Markets, Working Paper: University of Groningen, 2007 Gine, X. and Karlan D. S. (2008). Peer Monitoring and Enforcement: Long Term Evidence from Microcredit Lending Groups with and without Group Liability, Jan. 2008 Gine, X. and Karlan D. S. (2009). Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups, Nov. 2009 Government Gazette, Republic of South Africa, Vol. 489, 15 March 2006. The National Credit Act, No. 34 of 2005. Greif, A. (1994). "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy 102(5), p 912-950. Hartungi, R. (2007). Understanding the success factors of micro-finance institutions in a developing country, International Journal of Social Economics, 2007, Vol. 34, Issue 6, p 388-401. Hietalahti, J. and Linden, M. (2006). Socio-economic impacts of microfinance and repayment performance: a case study of the Small Enterprise Foundation, South Africa, Progress in Development Studies 6, 3 (2006) p.201-210. Jagpal, S. H. (1981). Measuring Joint Advertising Effects in Multiproduct Firms, Journal of Advertising Research, Vol. 21, No. 1, p 65 -69.
17

Johnston, T. C., Yeargin, A. A., Brundige, T. and Payne, T. (2006). Reaching Underserved Borrower Prospects: A Case Of A Small Rural Bank, Journal of Business Case Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4. 4th Qtr 2006. Kapil, B. and Shoemaker, R. (2004). The Effects of Free Sample Promotions on Incremental Brand Sales, Marketing Science, Vol. 23, No.3, p 345-363. Karim, L. (2008). Demystifying Micro-credit: the Grameen Bank, NGOs and Neoliberalism in Bangladesh, Cultural Dynamics. 2008. Karlan, D. and Zinman, J. (2008), Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, Jan 2008 Lehner, M. (2008). Group Lending versus Individual lending in Microfinance, Munich Discussion Paper 2008-24, Department of Economics, University of Munich. Lewis, M. (2004). The Influence of Loyalty Programs and Short-Term Promotions on Customer Retention, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 41, p 281292. McDonald, M and Wilson, H. (2002). The New Marketing, Oxford, ButterworthHeinemann McPherson, M.A. (1996). Growth of micro and small enterprises in Southern Africa, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.48, 253-277. Mead, D.C. & Liedholm, C. (1998). The dynamics of micro and small enterprises in developing countries. World Development, Vol 26, No.1. Mondal, W. I. (2002). Microcredit and Microentrepreneurship. Collateral Free Loan at Work in Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh: Academic Press. Mondal, W.I. (2009). Poverty Alleviation and Microcredit in Sub-Saharan Africa, International Business & Economics Research Journal. Jan 2009, Vol 8, No.1. Morduch, J. (1999). The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, p 15691614. Mumel, D., Hocevar, N. and Snoj, B. (2007). How Marketing Communications Correlates With Business Performance, Journal of Applied Business Research, Vol. 23, No. 2 Second Quarter 2007. Mwenda, K. K. and Muuka, G. K. (2004). Towards best practice for micro finance institutional engagement in African rural areas: Selected cases and agenda for action, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 31, Iss.1/2. Navajas, S., Conning, J. and Gonzalez-Vega, C. (2003). Lending Technologies, Competition and Consolidation in the Market for Microfinance in Bolivia. Journal of International Development, 15, p 74770.
18

Pollinger, J. J., Outhwaite, J. and Cordero-Guzman, H. (2007). The Question of sustainability for Microfinance Institutions, Journal of Small Business Management. 2007, 45(1), p 23-41. Reid, M. (2003). IMC performance relationship: further insight and evidence from the Australian marketplace, International Journal of Advertising, Vol. 22, No. 2, p 227-248. Roth, J., McCord, M. J. and Liber, D. (2007). The Lanscape of Microinsurance in the Worlds 100 Poorest Countries, The MicroInsurance Centre, LLC, 2007 Schreiner, M. (1998). The Measurement of the Performance of Microfinance Organizations for Different Groups of Stakeholders, Seminar on New Development Finance, Frankfurt, Sept. 2126. Schreiner, M. (2004). Scoring Arrears at a Microlender in Bolivia, Center for Social Development. Apr. 2004 Schultz, D. E., Tannenbaum, S. and Lauterborn, R. F. (1993). Integrated Marketing Communications, Chicago, NTC Business Books Servon, L. (1999). Bootstrap Capital: Microenterprises and the American Poor. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution. Srinivasan, S. S. and Anderson, R.E. (1998). Concepts and strategy guidelines for designing value enhancing sales promotion, Journal of Product & Brand Management, Vol.7, No.5, p 410-420. Standard & Poors, Ratings Direct: A Global Ratings Methodology for Microfinance Institutions may help the industry, Nov 2006 Tellis, G. J. and Weiss, D. L. (1995). Does TV advertising really affect sales? The role of measures, models, and data aggregation. Journal of Advertising, Vol. 24, No. 3, p 1-3. Turvey, C. G. and Kong, R. (2009). Business and financial risks of small farm households in China, China Agricultural Economic Review, 2009, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p 155-172 Toye, J. (1993). Dilemmas of Development. Oxford, Blackwell Press. Vigenina, D. and Kritikos, a. S. (2004). The Individual Micro-lending Contract: Is it a Better design than Joint-liability? Evidence from Georgia, Economic Systems 28, p 155-176. Weber, H. (2002). The imposition of a global development architecture: the example of microcredit, Review of International Studies, 28.

19

World Bank (2010). Finance and Private Sector Research <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROG RAMS/EXTFINRES/0,,contentMDK:21171507~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~the SitePK:478060,00.html.> Accessed on Apr. 25, 2010. Yunus, M. (1994). Grameen Bank As I see It. Dhaka, Grameen Bank. Zeitinger, C. P. (1996). Micro-lending in the Russian Federation, In: Levitsky J (Ed.), Small Business in Transition Economies. ITDG Publishing: London, 1996. P 85-94 Zohir, S. and Matin, I. (2004). Wider Impacts of Microfinance Institutions: Issues and Concepts. Journal of International Development, 16, p 30130.

20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.