ELPIDIO P. TIONG, Complainant, vs, ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO, Respondent. A.C. No.

4428 December 12, 2011 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Elpidio P. Tiong against Atty. George M. Florendo for gross immorality and grave misconduct. The facts of the case are as follows: Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise engaged in the assembly and repair of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged the services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their businesses whenever complainant would leave for the United States of America (USA). Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed in the afternoon of May 13, 1995 when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the two. Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love you, I'll call you later". When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement with respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to their love affair that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship. Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City, respondent and complainant's wife, Ma. Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before their respective spouses. On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty.Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit2 attesting to their illicit relationship and seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness, as follows: "WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City and of legal age and MA. ELENA T. TIONG, likewise a resident of Baguio City, of legal age, depose and state: We committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to May 13, 1995 and we hereby ask forgiveness and assure our spouses that this thing will never happen again with us or any other person. We assure that we will no longer see each other nor have any communication directly or indirectly. We shall comply with our duties as husband and wife to our spouses and assure that there will be no violence against them. That any behaviour unbecoming a husband or wife henceforth shall give rise to legal action against us; We shall never violate this assurance; We, the offended spouses Elizabeth F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our spouses and assure them that we will not institute any criminal or legal action against them because we have forgiven them. If they violate this agreement we will institute legal action.

This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies and each party has been furnished a copy and this document shall have no validity unless signed by all the parties. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th day of May 1995 at Baguio City, Philippines. (SIGNED) (SIGNED) GEORGE M. FLORENDO ELPIDIO TIONG (SIGNED) (SIGNED) MA. ELENA T. TIONG ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO" Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23, 1995 charging respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer3, respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the defense of pardon. In the Resolution4 dated September 20, 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and decision. Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation5 dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution6 dated October 19, 2007. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration7 therefrom was denied in the Resolution8 dated June 26, 2011. Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue whether the pardon extended by complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15, 1995 is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral conduct. After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD except as to the penalty imposed. The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus: "CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.9 Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment. In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion" 10 considering that it lasted for two (2) years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone conversation on March 13, 1995. Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession.11 Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 1712 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.13 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned conduct because he and Ma. Elena had already been pardoned by their respective spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit14. The Court disagrees. It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. 15 Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.16 However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents. A.C. No. 6593 PER CURIAM: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states: 1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido; xxxx That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x xxxx That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints. x x x x

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not

only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer. In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her. In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline: First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings [6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity [7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit. Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9] Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. [10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.[11]

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ( Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states: x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint. Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007. Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules. Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation. In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido. THE COURTS RULING After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia. General Considerations Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. [15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19] Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido). Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. [21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22] In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages. In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent. In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty,

justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar. Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree. First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive. Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship. Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime. Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage. Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter. Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid. Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place. Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years. Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession. He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, [29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships. The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34] Atty. Valencia We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality: x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.[35] Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. [36] To have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the

public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other. Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law. We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief. The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values. Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the

lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage. We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession. Conclusion Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason. In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42] We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character. In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: (1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009 ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent VELASCO, JR., J.: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy

the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.[1] As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.[2] This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5] For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots. The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place: x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result. No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide: Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts. As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. Iwould rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.) A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them. To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them. At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.) The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things: (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; x x x x (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9] In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines: x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts. Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that: A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.[13] The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14] Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misco nduct, whichalbeit

unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.[16] This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition. We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary nonaccountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21] Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court. WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 7199 [Formerly CBD 04-1386] July 22, 2009

FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent. CARPIO MORALES, J.: Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name CDO, filed a Verified Complaint[1] for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as Batas Mauricio (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TOROand HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors. The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows: On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread. Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, outrageous. Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media. Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12[2] which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down. Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to hisBATAS Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program. The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN[3] seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.[4] Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract[5] asking complainant to advertise in the tabloidBalitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile[6] of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000. As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 atP15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.[7] On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows: OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? [8] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied) And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN![9] which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.[10] Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:[11] (a) Uod sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);[12] (b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);[13] (c) Pagpapatigil sa CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);[14] (d)Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);[15] (e) Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);[16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);[17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);[18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards, Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);[19] (i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP, Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);[20] (j)May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);[21] (k) Desperado na ang CDO,Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);[22] (l) Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);[23] (m) Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);[24] (n) Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).[25] In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.[26]

And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the same baseless and malicious allegations/issues against it.[27] Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.[28] In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,[29] alleging: x x x x 2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City? x x x x 2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen? 2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his complaint? x x x x 8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them? 9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system; 10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think? 11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;[30] And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction[31] which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein corespondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged: x x x x

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.[32] (Emphasis supplied) x x x x Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,[33] before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof. The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against complainant[34] and to malign complainant through his television shows. Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:[35] I. xxxx

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads: Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products. Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004. Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint). The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

II.

xxxx

In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said pleading, respondent made the following statements: x x x x The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.

have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[36] (Underscoring supplied) The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years. The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken. The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,[37] which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program. He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz: CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language. Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:[38] To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with

III.

The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. x x x x

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant. However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids. Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in to respondents request that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said Kasunduan and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could

countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.[39] (Underscoring supplied) By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.[40] The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[41] the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,[42] only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months. On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant. Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.[43] To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient. WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts. SO ORDERED. [A.C. No. 7269, November 23, 2011] ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, RESPONDENT. The Case Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged th at he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer[1] presented as proof by NoeLacsamana was forged. The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline In its Report and Recommendation,[2] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP -CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmentes designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him. The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmentes allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report. The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,[3] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmentes suspension to six months. Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report[4] from the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by

one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes motion for reconsideration. The Issue The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law. The Ruling of this Court We agree with the IBP. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. [5] The Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.[6] The Court explained: The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. [7] In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP -CBD noted that Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left. We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order[8] of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in

Busmentes

office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents. Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint Counter Affidavit[9] submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that: a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila. b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila. c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente; e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings; f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit: 1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; 2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party; 3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false; 4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts. And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case. g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty.

YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.](Emphasis supplied) The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso. Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months. WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED. Adm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004 ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant, vs, ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, Respondent. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, [1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National Statistics Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7] another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome. On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents illegal activities and transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondents good name and reputation. The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that herCristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[10] The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000. Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainants employment after receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless. The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico. During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a Reply to respondents Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11] In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card [13] signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents husband even appeared in court hearings. In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[14]

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15] Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP. In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded. In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely. We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP. At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared: The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the

court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed accordingly. The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings. We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows: Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law. In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession. At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation. The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group. The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege

subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[21] WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorios record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts. SO ORDERED.

On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition: "PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF "THE HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO "In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit: "1. The validity of the attached Resolution. "2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution. "3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution. "These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment of the proposed project. "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and appropriate action for the sake of public interest." On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified.Fourth, squatting in government property is considered a "nuisance per se". Respondent judge ruled: "With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours)." Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96. Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution. On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, "Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi" ("Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him"). On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis. On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to "gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence." Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that "the respondent judge is in his pocketbecause he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent judge) a lot of things ("dacal naku a regalo kaya"). On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course.

A.C. No. 5355 December 13, 2011 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent. Per Curiam: The Case This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco. In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco,1 dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court. The Facts We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136,2 as follows: Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as "Gozun") was in open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his parents. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot. On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating: "RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic). On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution No. 26-96.

On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10) days from notice. On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that the case be dismissed. On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge.3 A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a firstlevel court.4 The Court also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless.5 It described respondents acts as biased and "maleficent" and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the service,6 viz: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.7 A.C. No. 5355 Disbarment On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent.8 In its Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.9 On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment against him.10 On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment,11 appealing for understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion "honestly and in good faith";12 and that his actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive.13 He further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.14 On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the case.15

IBPs Report and Recommendation The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents partici pation. On 03 October 2003, the investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation16 finding justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent.17 She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation.18 On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 of the Report and Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have been deprived of due process.20 In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and contended that the case should have been dismissed.21 Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).22 On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration23 wherein he implored the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the former had already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge.24 Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first Motion for Reconsideration. On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525,25 which adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the recommendation to disbar respondent. On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011.26 The Courts Ruling The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP. The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures. Gross Misconduct In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.27 citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,28 this Court explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local

governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith.29 We find his statements hard to believe. The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vicemayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows: COMM. SANSANO: You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the respondent? WITNESS: (Mr. Batu) I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any instance that I was with him. COMM. SANSANO: But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the respondent also in his office? WITNESS: There was no other visit, Your Honor. COMM. SANSANO: So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office? WITNESS: Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso. COMM. SANSANO: Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan? WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 30 The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and its protection from undue influence, whether from private or from public interests.31 In Edao v. Judge Asdala,32 we explained the rationale behind this imposition: As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states: Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:

In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to "the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made." As such, judges must ensure that their "conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary." In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary. Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image of impartiality.33 Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not properly observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court. Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar. A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a "legal opinion," but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings. What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench and the bar are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission. When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us. As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders.34 As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.35 Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law.

Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.36 In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice. Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We answer in the affirmative. In Collantes v. Renomeron,37 we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer: As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: "A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.' xxx xxx xxx "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278). Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,38 we ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath. We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun. In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment proceedings motu proprio.39lavvphil Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,40 we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and their purpose in this wise:

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.lawphi1 Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is not exonerated. WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses: 1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 4955 September 12, 2011 ANTONIO CONLU, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR., Respondent. VELASCO, JR., J.: Before the Court is a complaint1 for disbarment with a prayer for damages instituted by Antonio Conlu (Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and dereliction of sworn duty. Antonio was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1048, a suit for Quieting of Title and Recovery of a Parcel of Land commenced before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Silay City, Negros Occidental.2 He engaged the services of Atty. Ireneo to represent him in the case. On March 16, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment3 adverse to Antonio. Therefrom, Atty. Ireneo, for Antonio, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat the recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. The CA, per its Resolution of February 10, 1997, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellants brief within the reglementary period. Antonio got wind of the dismissal from his wife who verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila. When confronted about the dismissal action, Atty. Ireneo promised to seek reconsideration, which he did, but which the appellate court later denied for belated filing of the motion. In that motion4 he prepared and filed, Atty. Ireneo averred receiving the adverted February 10, 1997 CA Resolution5 only on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who initially received a copy of said resolution was not so authorized. However, the CA denied the motion for having been filed out of time. As the CA would declare in a subsequent resolution dated December 3, 1997, there was a valid receipt by Atty. Ireneo, as shown by the registry return card with his signature, of a copy of the CAs February 10, 1997 Resolution. Accordingly, as the CA wrote, the motion for reconsideration of the February resolution which bore the mailing date May 8, 1997 cannot but be considered as filed way out of time.

In light of these successive setbacks, a disgusted Antonio got the case records back from Atty. Ireneo and personally filed on October 13, 1997 another motion for reconsideration. By Resolution of December 3, 1997, the CA again denied6 this motion for the reason that the prejudicial impact of the belated filing by his former counsel of the first motion for reconsideration binds Antonio. Forthwith, Antonio elevated his case to the Court on a petition for certiorari but the Court would later dismiss the petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the denial. Such was the state of things when Antonio lodged this instant administrative case for disbarment with a prayer for damages. To support his claim for damages, Antonio asserts having suffered sleepless nights, mental torture and anguish as a result of Atty. Ireneos erring ways, besides which Antonio also lost a valuable real property su bject of Civil Case No. 1048. Following Atty. Ireneos repeated failure to submit, as ordered, his comment, a number of extensions of time given notwithstanding,7 the Court referred the instant case, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4955, to its Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Acting on OBCs Report and Recommendation8 dated November 23, 2000, the Court, by Resolution of January 31, 2001, directed Atty. Ireneo to show cause within ten (10) days from noticelater successively extended via Resolutions dated July 16 and 29, 2002why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment and to comply with the filing of it. In separate resolutions, the Court (a) imposed on Atty. Ireneo a fine of PhP 2,000;9 (b) ordered his arrest but which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) cannot effect for the reason: "whereabouts unknown"; 10 (c) considered him as having waived his right to file comment; and (d) referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report, investigation and recommendation.11 At the IBP, Atty. Ireneo desisted from addressing his administrative case, his desistance expressed by not attending the mandatory conference or filing the required position paper. On the basis of the pleadings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Ireneo liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with warning. The salient portions of the investigating commissioners Report and Recommendation 12 read as follows: Uncontroverted and uncontested are respondents inability to file appellants Brief, his futile attempts to mislead the Court of Appeals that he did not personally received [sic] the resolution of dismissal. His filing of the Motion for Reconsideration five (5) months late. [sic] Aggravated by his failure to file his comment in the instant administrative complaint despite his numerous motions for extension to file the same. [sic] He is even adamant to comply with the show cause order of the bar confidant. The series of snobbish actuations in several resolution of the Supreme Court enjoining him to make the necessary pleading. [sic] By Resolution No. XVIII-2008-523, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and recommendation of the CBD.13 We agree with the inculpatory findings of the IBP but not as to the level of the penalty it recommended. Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the performance of his duty as Antonios counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellants brief before the CA. He failed, in short, to exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonios right. Antonio, by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonios interest, if not to secure a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause of a c lient, lawyers, regardless of the importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them. 14 And to add insult to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to

know about the outcome of his appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost. It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty.15 The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence.16 This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively providing: CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxxx Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Antonio was not abhorrent enough, Atty. Ireneo tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty. Ireneos signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to stress, Atty. Ireneo had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01, which provide: CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxxx CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphasis supplied.) We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Ireneos defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension. But the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located. The Courts patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyers impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial and speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to the Court by now is that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the process, delay the resolution of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one, but without the intention to so submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Courts processes, if not its liberality . This cannot be tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo can neither defeat this Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his

whereabouts.17 Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. xxxx Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphil A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license.18 Considering, however, the serious consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon a clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,19 the Court penalized a lawyer who failed to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings, such as position papers, leading to the dismissal of the case with six months suspension. In Soriano v. Reyes,20 We meted a one-year suspension on a lawyer for inexcusable negligence, the latter having failed to file a pre-trial brief leading to the dismissal of the case and failure to prosecute in another case, and omitting to apprise complainant of the status of the two cases with assurance of his diligent attention to them. In this case, Atty. Ireneo should be called to task for the interplay of the following: his inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of Antonios appeal, coupled by his lack of candor in not apprisin g Antonio of the status of his appealed case; his attempt to mislead the CA in a vain bid to evade the consequence of the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration; and, last but not least, his cavalier disregard of the Courts directives primarily is sued to resolve the charges brought against him by Antonio. We deem it fitting that Atty. Ireneo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, up from the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This should serve as a constant reminder of his duty to respect courts of justice and to observe that degree of diligence required by the practice of the legal profession. His being a first offender dictates to large degree this leniency. The prayer for damages cannot be granted. Let alone the fact that Antonio chose not to file his position paper before the IBP-CBD and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily prove his claim for damages, a proceeding for disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil action; it is undertaken and prosecuted for public welfare. It does not involve private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.21 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is declared GUILTY of inexcusable negligence, attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to lawful orders of the Court. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006 RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent. CORONA, J.: Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.1

Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said: And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied) Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments. On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" 9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11 In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13 This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14 There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. 15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state: CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."17 Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.18

The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial," 21perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end. Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x. The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law. At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24 Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court. WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS.He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate General's Service. SO ORDERED. A.M. No. RTJ-09-2204 October 26, 2009 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2137-RTJ) JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC, Complainant, vs. Judge DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando City, Pampanga, Respondent. BRION, J.:

We rule on the complaint dated November 11, 20041 of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (complainant) of Pampanga, charging Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan (respondent), of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando City, Pampanga, with partiality, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in the handling of Criminal Case Nos. 12726 to 12728 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Salvador Totaan and Flordeliz Totaan (for: Violation of R.A. 3019 and Falsification of Public Documents)." The Complaint The complainant alleged that during the initial pre-trial conference on June 16, 2003, the respondent asked the lawyers of the parties "to approach the bench and suggested that the cases be settled because she did not want the accused (the spouses Totaan) to be administratively suspended."2 The respondents action came after she had issued an order (dated June 9, 2003) administratively suspending the accused pendente lite. The complainant further alleged that the respondent strongly requested the complainants counsel, Atty. Stephen David, to exert all efforts to convince the complainant and his family to settle the cases. At the continuation of the pre-trial, the respondent told the counsel for the accused, "I will give you the option to choose your date. Do you want a speedy trial of the cases because of the suspension? If you want it weekly, the court can accommodate you." At the same hearing, the "Court directed Atty. Cui-David to be prepared for the hearing of these cases considering that the accused have [sic] been suspended upon motion of the Private Prosecutor."3 Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Atty. Lanee David), wife of Private Prosecutor Stephen David, was co-counsel for complainant in the criminal cases. Their law firm, David Tamayo & Cui-David Law Offices, entered its appearance as counsel for the complainant on December 14, 2004.4 The complainant also alleged that the respondent had been taking the cudgels for the accused with her constant reminder about her desire to "fast track the cases," cautioning that the accused had been suspended at the private prosecutors instance; she only ceased talking about the suspension of the accused when Atty. Lanee David called attention to the fact that the Order of June 9, 2003 suspending the accused had not been implemented as of the January 8, 2004 hearing; the respondent then answered that it was for the prosecution to check the record to see whether the suspension order had been served and implemented.5 The complainant bewailed the respondents inaction on the suspension order despite the counsels reminders, in contrast with her persistence in requiring Ma. Hazelina Militante (Atty. Militante), the Ombudsman Investigator (who recommended the filing of charges or information against the accused), to appear in court even after Atty. Militante had asked to be excused from testifying since the substance of her testimony could very well be covered by official documents. The respondent ignored Atty. Militantes explanation and instead directed Atty. Lanee David to furnish Atty. Militante a copy of her Order dated December 16, 2003 requiring Atty. Militante to explain why she should not be cited in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of the court. Also, the complainant claimed that aside from showing partiality, bias, concern, sympathy and inclination in favor of the accused, the respondent humiliated Atty. Lanee David in open court; specifically, on November 3, 2003, the respondent gave the parties lawyers the option to choose the date; after Atty. Juanito Velasco, counsel for accused, gave his chosen date (December 16, 2003), the respondent told Atty. Lanee David to make herself available on this date despite any scheduled hearing in other cases. Finally, the complainant alleged that the bias, partiality, prejudice and inclination of the respondent for the accused culminated in her order on the demurrer to evidence dated September 10, 20046 dismissing the charges against the accused despite the fact that the prosecution was able to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence the irregularities committed by the accused, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Salvador Totaan and Senior Agrarian Reform Technologist Flordeliz Totaan; they processed and approved the applications of at least thirteen (13) persons who were not qualified to become farmer-beneficiaries as they were neither farmers nor residents of the barangay or the municipality where the subject property is located, in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). The complainant submitted to the Court the order on the demurrer to evidence and pertinent records of the case as the res under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and asked the Court to discipline

the respondent even without formal investigation, in line with the Courts ruling in Consolidated Bank and Trust Company v. Capistrano.7 The Respondents Comment The respondent submitted her comment on December 23, 20048 in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated November 30, 2004. The respondent pointed out that an examination of the complaint would readily show that it was prepared by the private prosecutors, Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David, who wove a tale of lies and distortions regarding the proceedings to cover up their own shortcomings as lawyers; had they performed their duty as officers of the court and members of the bar, they would have informed the complainant that they lost because of their blunders in the prosecution of the cases. While she admitted having asked both private prosecutor Stephen David and defense counsel Juanito Velasco to approach the bench at the pre-trial of the cases, she claimed that the conference with both counsels was to save Atty. Stephen David from embarrassment, as he could not answer the courts queries on the civil aspects of the case. She denied brokering a settlement of the cases; had she done so, she would not have issued the suspension order. She also denied fast-tracking the hearing of the cases in favor of the accused; her only objective was to have a weekly hearing and for this purpose, she instructed Atty. Lanee David to be prepared; it was her habit to act fast on all cases before her sala. The respondent likewise denied the charge of partiality for her failure to act on the suspension of the accused, contending that it was the duty of the private prosecutors to file a motion to cite the responsible heads of the government agencies for indirect contempt for their failure to implement lawful orders of the court. She claimed that in the absence of such motion, she assumed that the accused had already been preventively suspended. In Atty. Militantes case, the respondent explained that there was a misunderstanding between the private prosecutors and the Ombudsman Investigator; she therefore sought Atty. Militantes appearance to find out the truth. She desisted from issuing another subpoena to Atty. Militante in view of the plea of Atty. Lanee David that Atty. Militante would no longer be called as a witness; she also wanted to avoid an open confrontation between the two lawyers. Lastly, and in reply to the charge of unfair treatment, the respondent maintained that if ever she called the attention of and might have slighted Atty. Lanee David, the reason for her action was the latters appearance in court without preparation, to the prejudice of the accused and the government. Related Incidents In a supplemental complaint dated December 14, 2007,9 the complainant charged the respondent with conduct unbecoming a judge for her denial of the private prosecutors motion for her inhibition on the ground that the motion did not comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 (three-day notice rule, ten-day notice of hearing, and proof of service) of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The complainant claimed that the motion is non-litigable in nature and is an exception to the three-day notice rule. Thereafter, the parties filed additional pleadings the Opposition (dated January 10, 2005) to the Comment of the respondent dated December 21, 2004,10 and a Rejoinder to the Complainants Opposition dated January 21, 2005.11 The complainant harped on the respondents refusal to answer the serious charges of partiality, abuse of authority, and conduct unbecoming of a judge leveled against her. While the pleadings were essentially reiterative of previous allegations, they are significant because of the respondents rejoinder where she requested that the complainant be made to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court, and Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David be required to show cause why they should not be administratively sanctioned as members of the bar and as officers of the Court pursuant to A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC.12 In its Report dated June 2, 2005,13 the OCA disclosed that the complainant had filed a special civil action forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) raising the same issues in the complaint questioning the validity of the order granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused Totaans.14 At the OCAs recommendation, the Court (Third

Division) issued a Resolution on July 11, 200515 provisionally dismissing the complaint for being premature, without prejudice to the final outcome of the case with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 8911), and deferring action on the complaint of the respondent against Attys. Stephen and Lanee David until a decision is rendered in the CA case. The Court denied the complainants partial motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 12, 2005 .16 On July 5, 2007, the respondent filed a manifestation with the information that the CA had rendered a decision in CAG.R. SP No. 8911 denying the complainants petition.17 On July 23, 2007, she received a copy of the CA resolution denying the complainants motion for reconsideration. The respondent reiterated her prayer that Attys. Stephen and Lanee David be sanctioned as members of the bar. In a Resolution dated June 2, 2008, the Court (Second Division) required Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for violation of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC and the Code of Professional Responsibility.18 On June 27, 2008, the respondent filed a manifestation and motion stating that the Court, in a Resolution dated January 16, 2008, denied the complainants petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 178703 assailing the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 8911.19 Accordingly, the respondent prayed for the permanent dismissal of the present administrative matter and requested that her complaint against Attys. Stephen and Lanee David be acted upon and given due course. On July 17, 2008, Attys. Stephen and Lanee David submitted their explanation.20 The two lawyers disputed the respondents claim that they orchestrated the filing of the complaint. They stressed that it was the complainants decision to file the case against the respondent, in the same manner that it was his decision to prosecute the accused despite the respondents request that the complainant withdraw the cases against them. They contended that since the matter brought before the court involves conduct violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the final outcome on the merits of the case filed before the CA and this Court should not be determinative of the innocence or guilt of the respondent on the administrative charges against her. Attys. Stephen and Lanee David insisted that the reason the complainant filed the administrative case against the respondent is the respondents bias and favoritism towards the accused Totaans, shown by the respondents request for Atty. Stephen David to ask his client (the complainant) to withdraw the case against the accused; after the respondent was informed of the decision of the complainant to proceed with the cases, the attitude of the respondent toward them changed and her actuations became harsh. Because of the respondents bias and favoritism towards the accused, they were compelled to move for the respondents inhibition from the case against the accused Totaans. Attys. Stephen and Lanee David further explained that the respondents complaint against them may be attributed to their zeal and enthusiasm in prosecuting their clients case; this notwithstanding, they endeavored to observe discipline and self-restraint, and to maintain their high respect for the court and for the orderly administration of justice. On July 29, 2008, the respondent filed her comment to the explanation of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David. 21 She pointed out that the comment was a mere rehash of the allegations in the complaint against her, for which reason she was repleading all her statements in her previous submissions22 controverting the two lawyers baseless and malicious averments. On December 17, 2008, the Court (Second Division) resolved to dismiss the administrative complaint against the respondent and to require Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to show cause why they should not be disciplined or held in contempt for violating A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC.231avvphi1 In a Resolution dated June 22, 2009,24 the Court took note of the following: 1. the manifestation filed by Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David that they were adopting the explanation they submitted pursuant to the Courts Resolution of June 2, 2008, as compliance with the Resolution dated December 17, 2008; and 2. the manifestation and motion of the respondent that her complaint against the lawyers David be deemed submitted for resolution. On the same day, the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.25

The OCA Report On August 13, 2009, the OCA submitted its report with the recommendation that Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David be found guilty of indirect contempt for violating A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC and be fined P1,000.00 each. The OCA found that the administrative complaint against the respondent could not have been filed without the active prodding and instigation of the two lawyers. The OCA noted that the complainant never personally appeared during the hearings of Criminal Case Nos. 12726 to 12728 where Attys. Stephen and Lanee David represented him. The OCA concluded that Attys. Stephen and Lanee David were the primary sources of the allegations in the complaint which involved intricate courtroom proceedings that the complainant did not personally witness. The OCA faulted the two lawyers for their continued emphasis in their July 17, 2008 explanation on the respondents alleged "questionable behavior and conduct" despite the CA decision of May 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 8911 affirming the respondents findings in her order of September 10, 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 12726 to 12728. The Courts Ruling In view of our dismissal of the administrative complaint filed by complainant against the respondent, 26 only the issue of the liability under A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David remains to be resolved. We find the recommendation of the OCA to be in order; Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and protected conduct as members of the bar and as officers of the court in the filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent. As the OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he never really appeared in court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the complaint which spoke of intricate courtroom proceedings. The complainant thus relied primarily on the information relayed to him by his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the two lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations in their clients complaint. Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainants dependence on Attys. Stephen and Lanee David for the substance of the complaint. They were his lawyers and therefore had the duty to report to him on the proceedings in court and the progress of the cases they were handling. Nonetheless, as officers of the court, counsels are expected to be as truthful and as objective as possible in providing information to their client regarding developments in the courtroom. Needless to say, they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court.27 In these regards, Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting. A close and careful reading of the case record shows that the two lawyers made it appear in their report to their client that the respondent unduly made it difficult for Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to prosecute the criminal cases and exhibited bias and partiality for the accused. The complainant bewailed: (1) the respondents attempt to have the cases settled in an "off-the-record" huddle with the parties lawyers because she did not want the accused to be administratively suspended,28 and (2) the respondents order to "fast track" the cases because the accused had been suspended upon motion of the private prosecutors. The complainant then narrated the instances when his lawyers were allegedly given a hard time and subjected to indignities by the respondent in her desire to fast track the criminal cases. What we see from the records, however, is a different situation that belied the complainants charges against the respondent. From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find sufficient justification for the conclusion that the information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their client was patently misleading and slanted "to cover up their gross shortcomings as lawyers," as the respondent aptly put it.29 To quote from the records of the pre-trial of November 3, 2003: COURT: No surprise in my court. You better tell the name, who will be your witness. Your cases are very serious in nature, there would be no surprise. Reveal your witnesses now. ATTY. DAVID: Because I am only a collaborating counsel in these cases. COURT: Are you not prepared?

ATTY. DAVID: We will present one more witness, your Honor, because I am going to ask the complainant witness if he is ready to testify. COURT: Why did you not ask him before the pre-trial conference today? ATTY. DAVID: Actually my collaborating counsel, Atty. David, who is my husband, was the one who talked with the complainant, your Honor. COURT: So you are not prepared for the pre-trial conference today? ATTY. DAVID: I am sorry for that, your Honor. May we just request for the continuation of the pre-trial next time. xxx COURT: Where is your husband? ATTY. DAVID: He is not actually feeling well, your Honor, that is why I am here. COURT: You are supposed to be prepared when you appear in my Court. ATTY. DAVID: I am sorry for that, your Honor. COURT: Upon your motion, these cases had been suspended. The delay is attributable to your nonpreparation. xxx COURT: You know the Court gets peeved with this kind of manifestations from lawyers. I supposed you to be prepared, to be fair to all. ATTY. DAVID: Ill promise I will be prepared next time, your Honor. COURT: And tell your husband that he should be prepared. I will not tolerate postponements.30 The hearing on December 16, 2003 further disclosed: COURT: I will warn the prosecution that if you fail to present your witness on January 8, 2004, I have no qualms in dismissing the cases with prejudice. I request that the subpoena be served personally to these people as an officer of the Court. ATTY. DAVID: We will do that your Honor. xxx COURT: Atty. Velasco, do you have any manifestation? ATTY. VELASCO: Considering the confession of the prosecution that she is not ready to present any of her witnesses this afternoon, may we move to (____)31 the cases invoking the right of the accused to a speedy trial. COURT: I give the prosecution one last opportunity even without your motion x x x I hope this will not happen again.32 Based on these proceedings, we find no evidence supporting the administrative complaint against the respondent. The allegations in the complaint were unfounded and baseless and should be dismissed, as the Court did in the Resolution dated December 17, 2008.33 Other than the bare allegations of the complainant, no proof was presented to corroborate the charge that the respondent sought to have the criminal cases settled; neither was there a showing that the respondent fast tracked the cases to favor the accused. As we already stated above, given that the complainant never appeared in court, it is reasonable to conclude that the two lawyers crafted the complaint and incorporated therein all the unfounded accusations against the respondent in order to conceal their inadequacies in the handling of their clients cases. To say the least, the complaint was most unfair to the respondent who, as the record shows, was simply keeping faith with her avowed objective of expediting the proceedings in her court by, among other measures, requiring lawyers to be prepared at all times and to be fair and candid in their dealings with the court. The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did "is just a consequence of their commitment to their client x x x" can hardly exculpate them.34 As the Court held in Racines v. Judge Morallos, et al.,35 "a clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective

that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice." In Alfonso L. Dela Victoria v. Maria Fe Orig-Maloloy-on,36 we had occasion to state: "Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of their litigation and their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsel and the courts." Attys. Stephen and Lanee David miserably failed to come up to the standards of these rulings. Accordingly, they are liable under A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC and should be held in indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Considering that they have no previous derogatory record, we deem a fine of P2,500.00 each to be the appropriate penalty for their infraction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby declare Attys. Stephen L. David and Lanee S. Cui-David GUILTY of Indirect Contempt for violation of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, and accordingly impose on each of them the FINE of Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) with the STERN WARNING that a commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT" LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors 1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision. With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic. The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only. CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decisions reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyones attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Courts proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents own non -observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court. To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case. Antecedent Facts and Proceedings On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds: I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorab le Courts (sic) assertion that the Executives foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4 II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5 On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for

the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that: I. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURTS JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITIONS CLAIMS.7 They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8 According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11 On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13 On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roques column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddles response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Kus blog entry in this wise: The newspapers16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here: http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/ The motion suggests that the Courts decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today. Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the courts jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Courts decision is available here:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17 On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18 In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit: Your Honours: I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days. Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Courts Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee. In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article. I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter. With respect, (Sgd.) Dr. Mark Ellis20 In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21 On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreaks website22 and on Atty. Roques blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Laws bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said colleges website.27 On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read: The Honorable Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines Through: Subject: Hon. Renato Chief Justice C. Corona

Statement of faculty from the UP College of Law on the Plagiarism in the case of Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors: We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc. Respectfully, (Sgd.) Marvic M.V.F. Leonen Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.) The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here: RESTORING INTEGRITY A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System. In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another persons work as ones own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone elses ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice. A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Courts and no longer just the ponentes. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself. So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court. It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the primary sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources. It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land. But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,"

the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution bytransforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive. The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake. The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts. The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics. With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that: (1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court; (2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents through dubious means; (3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate; (5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication. Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010. (SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN Dean and Professor of Law (SGD.) FROILAN Dean (1978-1983) (SGD.) MERLIN Dean (1995-1999) REGULAR FACULTY (SGD.) Professor CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY Assistant Professor (SGD.) EVELYN Assistant Professor (SGD.) GWEN Assistant Professor (SGD.) SOLOMON Assistant Professor (SGD.) ROMMEL Assistant Professor L. BATONGBACAL M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO Dean (1989-1995) A. AGABIN

(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA (SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA

(SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29 (Underscoring supplied.)

(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams letter here: Glasgow, 18 August 2010 Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230) Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice Your Excellency, My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court. The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Courts Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing. I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgments cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my books central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the very mysterious concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309). With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support as it seemingly has the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Courts Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it. On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court. I remain Sincerely yours (Sgd.) Christian J. Tams31 In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares exhibits during the August 2 6, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32 It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to

M.

MAGALLONA

(SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY Associate Dean and Associate Professor (SGD.) DANTE Associate Professor B. GATMAYTAN

(LEO)

D.

BATTAD

G.

DE

VERA

(SGD.) THEODORE Assistant Professor (SGD.) FLORIN Assistant Professor LECTURERS T.

O.

TE

F.

LUMBA

HILBAY

J.

CASIS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA (SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO

(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC

have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37. The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33 In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement: Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads: An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.) In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that: While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty s less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.) Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members

of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.37 Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38 In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter. Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the following pleadings: (1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1); (3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1); (4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and (5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch. Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez) Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law, and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel" 40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolutions findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment that respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have violated Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41 By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points: (a) Respondents alleged noble intentions In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes 42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our law schools."47 Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an institutional attack x x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs." 48 They further clarified that at the

time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation." 49 According to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Courts indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue. (b) The "correctness" of respondents position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D., 53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law" by Michael OFlaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54 (c) Respondents belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue" In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically: (i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56 (ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57 (iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58 (iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59 (v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60 (vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61 (vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinans call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62 (viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63 (ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges

Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010;64 and (x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65 In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis. (d) Freedom of expression In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69 (e) Academic freedom In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty members field of study wit hout fear of reprisal. It is respondents view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to ones conduct."71 In closing, respondents Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit: Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.73 On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus: WHEREFORE: A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that: 1. the foregoing be noted; and 2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be rendered: 1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and 3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74 Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments. Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75 Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement. On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught. Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78 Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79 In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case" 83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondents mind when he signed the Statement."84 Unlike his

colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that: 13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal anothers work and to pass it off as ones own.85 (Emphases supplied.) Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful." 86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court. Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows: pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I. official file copy of the Deans Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87 For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court. On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus: 2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed drafts signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being. 2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Courts Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. 2.4. Dean Leonens staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Deans Office to sign the document or had it brought to th eir classrooms in the

College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they could manage. 2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88 According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90 With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendozas name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that: 2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justices name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II. 2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.) Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93 However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendozas signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired: 2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the deans staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The deans staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him. 2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week. 2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94 According to the Dean: 2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity

Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95(Emphases supplied.) With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovits name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonens August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that: Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonens staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96 Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statements] essential nature as a live public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99 In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latters information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102 Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo. Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation) For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that [d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:

Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110 ISSUES Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows: 1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression? 2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents academic freedom as law professors? 3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? 4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03? 5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)? DISCUSSION The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression. It is respondents collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the Courts decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors dissenting view o n what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue." This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement. To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" 111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit: Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.) To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents freedom of expression when it stated that: While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.) Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents submissions, this Court has held that the right t o criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency. As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration: We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.) The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held that: [I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never

sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution. There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.) Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle: As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.) Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court. Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Courtindefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus: He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that "x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."121 It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority.

However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision: But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." As Mr. Justice Field puts it: "x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. "The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) xxxx In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that: [T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following: The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x. xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence. In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus: As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar: It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared: Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665). xxxx Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen: But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. xxxx Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x. xxxx Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180,

and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]). Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state: The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in h is pleadings must be dignified.128 Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that: From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.) One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit: Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice,

within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.) For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest. The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic freedom. It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts. Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof. The Courts rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13. Having disposed of respondents main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions. With respect to good faith, respondents allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue. The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the

courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition." That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same: And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts. xxxx (3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their own administrative case. Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive. This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations. As for the claim that the respondents noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Courts consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness. Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in our country. With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo: In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense: "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." ( In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.) Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice. With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of

discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquezs Compliance satisfactory. As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness. The Courts ruling on Dean Leonens Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10. To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement. In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."140 To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonens implied view that the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statements persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case. Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonens predicament is the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonens account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the deans office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I. The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for the Courts consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor. Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonens explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officers claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonens proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not. We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure. We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time. In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonens Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonens professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10. Respondents requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 107-17-SC are unmeritorious. In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-717-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonens separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautistas Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 141 It is this group of respondents premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious. Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majoritys purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution. However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit: SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed. As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We have held that: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.) In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.) In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court Br. 81, Romblon On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that: [I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability. In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court

held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record. xxxx These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146 (Emphases supplied.) Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing. Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case. To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge. Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession. We find it significant that in Dean Leonens Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statements principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents claim that i t is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution. If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines

regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken. Thus, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10 -717-SC should be denied for lack of merit. A final word In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong. WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows: (1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory. (2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. (3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. (4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. (5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10 -7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 6567 April 16, 2008 JOSE C. SABERON, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, respondent. CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition2 against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the bank's registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to return various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests. Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses3 to the Petition stating, inter alia, 5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain x x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder5 to complainant's Reply. Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis," complainant filed the present complaint. Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife in behalf of "her children" had been paid in full, hence, there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals. Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife and "her children" who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property. In his Comment6 to the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there was "nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise improper" in the way he used the word "blackmail" to characterize the suit against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other party. By Resolution of March 16, 2005,7 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,8 IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word "blackmail" connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that person's act as blackmail. Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his client's claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows: A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 159 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were "unnecessary and irrelevant to the case," respondent went "overboard and crossed the line" of professional conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30 days. By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,10 the IBP Board of Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Complaint1

The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records of the case to this Court. 11 Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B12 of the Revised Rules of Court. Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be "reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based." Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral turpitude. In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer objected to by complainant. Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against his clients. That being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or initiatory pleading. Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious imputations of wrongdoing against his clients the bank for allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for misrepresenting himself as a Filipino. Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language was used, he was only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainant's indignation for which he asked the latter's and this Court's clemency. In his Reply,13 complainant counters that respondent's Comment reveals the latter's propensity to deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondent's claim that the administrative complaint was a "harassing act," deducible from the "fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner," is bereft of factual basis. Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him and his wife. Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent's entreaty for clemency. This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.14

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.15 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.16 On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.17 In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified.18 It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before a court but before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,19 thus: Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.20 The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar. Respecting respondent's argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.21 True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.22 The test of relevancy has been stated, thus: x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x x x. 23 Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the ascription of 'blackmail' in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin's alleged alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of the further allegation that the Petition was "another in a series of blackmail suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain." Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so, considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their grievances. Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a "Notice of Resolution" was transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on January 18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in which it: RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the IBP Board of Governors' decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the same is based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the reason for the decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has reached the judgment through the process of legal reasoning.24 With regard to complainant's plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges.25 Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit respondent's disbarment. In light of respondent's apologies, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct. WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 8920 September 28, 2011 JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant vs. ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent. BRION, J.: Before us is the resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City. Background Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment [2] with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 11[3] and 12[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite me![5] Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you![6] Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time. After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you! He kept on shouting, I am not afraid of you! and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.[7] Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.[8] Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case. Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The respondent filed his Answer,[9] essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected him.[10] We quote from his Answer: 23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once inside the court room when he was lambasting me[.] It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT making it an impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.] xxxx 28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he will have the

room to humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).

Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed. The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners Report,[11] Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would be submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009. Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:[12] At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated the following: Court: Do not shout. Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting. Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to appear before my court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3) (NOTE: The underlined words we are very sorry [ were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was saying the quoted portion of the TSN) That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge. Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure? * Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008) It was observed that the judge uttered the following: Court: Do not shout. Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

24.

25.

(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008) Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant. Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other. Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant. Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to be called. They must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him not to shout. The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows: Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00. Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance of the law. Court: Yes, proceed. (NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom) Court: Next case. Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746. (Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom) Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished) Court: The next time Atty. Battung: We would like to clear Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see me, see me after the court. Next case. Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al. (nothing follows)

Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct. With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice. Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded. The Courts Ruling We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent. Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature and posi tion in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months suspension. We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense. In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor,[14] we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132826 September 3, 2009 ROLANDO SAA, Petitioner, vs. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITY and ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA, Respondents. CORONA, J.: Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty. Venidas act of filing two cases 1 against him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice.2 In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,3 Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him. In his belated and partial compliance4 with the February 17, 1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,5 Atty. Venida still did not file his complete comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution6 requiring Atty. Venida to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution. Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment7 on September 4, 1995 which, without doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saas adversaries.8 The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997, Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.9 It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.10 The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating commissioners report and dismissed the complaint.11 Saa filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.12 Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari. 13 He ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint. According to him, the investigating commissioners report did not at all mention the dismissal of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases was admitted by the parties. The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was therefore grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures. We disagree. Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 14 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. 15 A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because a party affected disagrees with it. There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand. Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to comply with various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes.16 Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 1217 and Rules 1.0318 and 12.0419 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our May 17, 2004 resolution.20Despite the 30-day deadline to file his memorandum,21 he still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he continually ignored our directives for him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004 resolution.22 Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment). His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his omissions. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the l awyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 23 We reiterate our ruling in Catu v. Atty. Rellosa:24 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.1avvphi1

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. A.M. No. 03-7-170-MCTC July 14, 2009 RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, JIMENEZSINACABAN, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL/JUDGE PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ. RESOLUTION Per Curiam: On February 26 to 28, 2003, a judicial audit of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jimenez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge Priscilla Hernandez, was conducted. As a result, a resolution dated August 13, 20031 was issued directing respondent to: 1) submit her explanation on her failure to regularly report for work at the 4th MCTC, Jimenez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental and why she reports for work only in the afternoon of her scheduled dates of hearings in said court; 2) submit her explanation on her failure to decide [nine civil cases and 16 criminal cases] 2 and to decide the same within 30 days from notice; 3) submit her explanation on her failure to resolve the pending incidents in [three civil cases and one criminal case]3 and to resolve the same within 30 days from notice; 4) submit her explanation on her failure to resolve the preliminary investigation in [six criminal cases] 4 and to resolve the same within 30 days from notice; 5) submit her explanation on her failure to take further action on [11 civil cases and 19 criminal cases] 5 and to take appropriate action thereon within 30 days from notice; 6) submit her explanation on her failure to transmit the resolutions and case folders in [two criminal cases]6to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Misamis Occidental within the 10-day period in violation of Section 5, Rule 11 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and 7) submit her explanation on the apparent loss of [records of one civil case and two criminal cases].7 However, respondent failed to comply with these directives.8 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)9 issued a memorandum dated October 18, 2004 directing her anew to comply with the same but there was no response. 10In this Courts resolution dated October 3, 2005, she was directed to show cause why she should not be administratively dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the August 13, 2003 resolution.11 Meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, a second audit was conducted on the 4th MCTC of Jimenez-Sinacaban, as well as on the 5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela, Misamis Occidental where respondent was also Acting Presiding Judge.12The OCA reported its findings in its Memorandum dated January 6, 2006:13 In summary, out of the 130 caseload of this court at the time of the second audit, [10] criminal and civil cases have unresolved pending incidents, [27] criminal and civil cases are still undecided despite the lapse of the [90-day] reglementary period, [one] civil case which the court failed to take any action from the time of its filing and [ 47] criminal and civil cases without further action or setting for a considerable length of time or a total of [ 85]problematic

cases. Thus, only [34.616%] of cases are moving and [65.384%] of these cases need the required appropriate action from [respondent]. [Respondent] is complemented with [seven] staff members headed by Mr. Michael Angelo O. Saa, Court Interpreter who acts as the courts Officer-in-Charge. The team was not able to audit the [five] criminal and [seven] civil cases which according to Mr. Michael Saa were in the possession of [respondent]. xxx xxx xxx Aside from these cases, [two civil cases and eight criminal cases]14 included in the first audit, were also not presented to the second audit team. Verification from the courts Monthly Report of Cases starting from January 2004 to August 2005 (excepting June 2005 wherein the court did not submit any report) failed to show that these cases were either decided, disposed of, archived or in any way acted upon by the court. It was also noted that no orders were issued in some cases that would indicate whether or not these cases are being tried under the New Rules on Summary Procedure, the folders/rollo/expediente are not paginated; the marked exhibits are not signed and dated; the minutes are not properly filled up (without indicating the personal circumstances and the substance of the testimonies of witnesses), the certificates of arraignment are unsigned by the accused and his/her counsel and the docket books need to be updated. It is quite manifest that [respondent], instead of acting on the cases subject of the adverse findings of the first audit, continuously added unacted cases to her file. xxx xxx xxx In a letter dated April 14, 2005, Atty. Benjamin C. Galindo, then a Sangguniang member of the Municipality of Jimenez during the May 2004 elections, reminded the [OCA] that the audit of the [MCTCs] in Jimenez-Sinacaban and AloranPanaon was made upon the request of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Misamis Occidental Chapter) wherein [respondent] was directed "to resolve some [70] pending cases in her sala which remained undecided long after the [90] day period" per memorandum of the court. Even the Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution requesting [respondent] to decide these cases which remains unheeded.15 xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis in the original) Regarding the first audit of the 5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela, the findings were as follows: An analysis of the data above shows that out of the 186 pending cases at the time of [audit,] there are [11] criminal and civil cases with unresolved motions, [33] undecided criminal and civil cases submitted for decision, [six] unacted criminal and civil cases and [64] criminal and civil cases without further action or setting or a total of one hundred fourteen [114] cases or [61.29%] of the courts total case load need to be acted upon by respondent. [Respondent] is complemented with [eight] staff members headed by Ms. Merilla O. Adecir, Clerk of Court II. [Respondent] holds hearings in both courts only in the afternoons claiming the non-availability of prosecutors and public attorneys. However, she was not able to explain her failure to report to the courts concerned during mornings. Further findings of the team show that case records/rollo are not chronologically arranged; documents/pleadings received are not properly stamped as to date, time and staff who received the same; marked exhibits are not initialed by the interpreter; certificates of arraignment are unsigned by accused and his/her counsel; and some cases have no orders indicating whether or not these cases are governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure as mandated by Section 2 thereof.16 xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis in the original) The OCA, in its recommendation, stated: [Respondent] was appointed Presiding Judge [of MCTC], Jimenez-Sinacaban on October 29, 1993 and assumed her duties on December 1, 1993 per her service [record]. In connection with her designation as Acting Presiding Judge of the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela], records were unavailable as to her exact date of assumption although according to [Ms. Merilla O. Adecir], [respondent] assumed as Acting Presiding Judge of the 5th MCTC on August 1, 1994.

Taking into consideration her date of assumption, the adverse findings of the audit teams are clearly attributable to her gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence and dereliction of duty. To reiterate, out of the [27] criminal and civil cases submitted for decision in the 4th MCTC, Jimenez-Sinacaban, [four] were submitted for decision as early as 1996 and still remain undecided, [10] motions remain unresolved with at least [one] motion being filed as early as 1996 and out of the [47] cases that remain unacted upon, [six] cases remain at the preliminary investigation stage since 1996. With regard to the cases at the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela], cases should have been decided, resolved or set for hearing as early as 1996. Out of the [40] cases submitted for decision, [three] cases were submitted as early as 1996, in the [11] unresolved motions, [one] was filed as early as 1997 and of the [64] cases without further action or setting, [one] case remains at the preliminary investigation stage since 1997. Furthermore, a sampling of the consolidated certificates of service of [respondent[ in the 4th and 5th MCTCs failed to disclose that there were undecided cases submitted for decision and unresolved motions submitted for resolution. xxx xxx xxx With regard to [the] problematic state of cases in the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela] and the corresponding plight of the parties and their [counsels,] the revocation of the designation of [respondent] and the consequent designation of another in her [place] is not only appropriate but also imperative. xxx xxx xxx Considering the case loads of [the other] judges and the distance to the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela], Judge Teresita Saa may be designated as Acting Presiding Judge thereat.17 xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis in the original) It recommended that respondent be dismissed on grounds of gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence and dereliction of duty and that her designation as Acting Presiding Judge of the 5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela be revoked.18 Consequently, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 05-2006, respondents designation was revoked.19 Despite a long interregnum, respondent still did not comply with the Courts directives. Because of such inaction, the OCA, in its memorandum dated August 9, 2007, not only reiterated its earlier recommendation for respondents dismissal but also recommended her immediate suspension pending the resolution of this administrative matter. 20 As a result, the Court suspended respondent in a resolution dated October 10, 2007.21 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 19, 2007. She admitted her culpability in the delay of the disposition of cases but claimed as contributory factors the volume of her work and designations in other courts. She begged for the Courts compassion in the resolution of her motion.22 Her motion was denied in a resolution dated January 28, 2008.23 In the meantime, Judge Henry B. Damasing, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental, Branch 14, furnished the OCA a copy of his letter dated November 21, 2007 to respondent requesting her to forward or return certain records of seven criminal and eight civil cases in her possession. 24Later, records of one of the criminal cases were found in the 4th MCTC of Jimenez-Sinacaban.25 On the rest, respondent said nothing. Neither did she return the said case records.26 It was only on September 26, 2008 that the OCA was informed that respondent personally returned all the missing records except for one.27 Thus, the OCA again recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service. We approve the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Respondent continually failed to comply fully with the Courts directives. After several orders and reminders to submit her explanation, her one and only move was to file a two-page motion for reconsideration of the resolution ordering her suspension: Respondent admits her culpability in the delay of the disposition of the cases as reported, and begged for the courts compassion to consider the volume of her work as contributory factor for the delay. The respondent, aside from presiding at 4th [MCTC], Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, had also been designated presiding judge of 5th [MCTC] Clarin-Tudela from August 1995 to February 2005, respondent was also designated

presiding judge of Branch III MTCC Ozamiz City on January 27, 1998 until December 2000 as well as designated Executive Judge of MTCC Ozamiz City from November, 1998 to November, 2000. The [respondent,] after the revocation of all her [designations] to preside over the other courts, had been working for unclogging the caseload of the 4th [MCTC], Jimenez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. In support of this [allegation,] respondent attached a copy of the certification issued by the clerk of court to the fact that respondent had decided seventy-seven (77) cases over the period stated therein.28 As early as August 2003, the Court had already ordered respondent to explain and resolve the problems in her court. But it was only in November 2007, or three long years after when the Court finally suspended her, that she decided to give the Court a two-page motion. She never complied with the Courts directives, not even partially, and did not offer any reason for her non-compliance. She made a bare statement that she allegedly decided 77 cases from November 2006 to October 2007 but did not elaborate what these cases were. The Court will not tolerate the indifference of respondent judges to resolutions requiring their written explanations. An order or resolution of this Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.29 To do so shows disrespect to the Court, an act only too deserving of reproof.30 [Respondent] refused to heed the directives of this Court and the OCA to explain his shortcomings. Respondent ought to know that a resolution of the Court is not to be construed as a mere request not should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. At the core of the judges esteemed position is obedience to the dictates of law and justice. A judge must be first to exhibit respect for authority.31 Moreover, the findings of the OCA show that respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of her judicial duties. Despite the lapse of more than two years from the time the first audit was made, there was no improvement in the resolution of cases in her sala. At the time of the second audit, she had only 130 pending cases (indeed a light load by the usual standards) but more than half of those (65.384% or 85 cases) were unacted upon. Even respondent admitted that she was in delay but cited as excuse her designations in other courts resulting in a heavy caseload. This explanation is far from acceptable. She cannot hide behind the much-abused excuse of heavy caseload to justify her failure to decide and resolve cases promptly.32 She could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of the cases but she did not. That a judge had been given additional work as acting presiding judge in other courts, as in the case of Judge Ramos, cannot justify his failure to resolve any pending incident. In Casia v. Gestopa, we already held a similar contention as unmeritorious. We even reminded respondent judge therein that: . . . if his caseload prevented the disposition of cases within the reglementary period, all he had to do was ask from this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. The Court, cognizant of the caseload of judges and mindful of the difficulty encountered by them in the reasonable disposition of cases, would almost always grant the request.33 The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time they are submitted for decision.34 Respondent repeatedly ignored this mandate. She also violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.35 The Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.36 It undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary,37 lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.38 Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. 39 The raison d' etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.40 Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties are diligent and

prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. More than this, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly as time elapses between the original fact and its judicial determination. If the facts are not fully and accurately determined, then the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be right.41 Additionally, respondent was repeatedly asked to explain the whereabouts of certain missing case records. She never bothered to do so and worse, it took her five years to return such records. Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "[no] record shall be taken from the clerk s office without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules." Further, Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any public officer who removes, conceals or destroys documents or papers officially entrusted to him. With such heavy responsibilities, judges are therefore expected to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling the records of cases.42 Considering the gravity of respondents omissions and the absence of any explanation whatsoever on her part, her dismissal from the service is called for.43 The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them. 44 In this regard, respondent miserably failed.45 The wheels of justice would hardly move if respondent is allowed to continue working in the judiciary. 46Therefore, as recommended by the OCA, after a thorough judicial audit, and considering the unrebutted audit reports on record, the penalty of dismissal from the service is in order.471awph!1 For her repeated violations of Supreme Court directives and rules (a less serious offense punishable with suspension for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000), she is fined the maximum amount of P20,000. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,48 this administrative case against respondent as a judge based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.49 Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR): CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect for the law and legal processes. She also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and judicial officers.50 Respondent must always bear in mind that it is a magistrates duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary at all times. Respondents delay also runs counter to Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR which provides: CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. For such violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR, she should be further fined the amount ofP5,000. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez, Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jimenez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental is found LIABLE for gross neglect of judicial duty and gross inefficiency. She is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any government branch or instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled corporations. For her repeated violations of Supreme Court directives and Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, she is FINED P20,000.

Respondent is further hereby FINED P5,000 for her violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility payable within the same period stated above. She is STERNLY WARNED that commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to respondents records. SO ORDERED.