A THEORY OF COMPLEXES*

It is vain to do with more What can be done with fewer. Entities must not be multiplied Beyond necessity. --William of Occam It is vain to try to do with fewer What requires more. Entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy. --Karl Menger

ABSTRACT: In A Theory of Complexes, the simple form of the pure theory of identity found in logic books is subordinated to a complex form of the theory whose background ontology is one of structured individuals, or complexes. In the complex form: The axioms of the simple form proceed from principles more basic. The semantic difference between a = b and a = a supervenes on features of a and b.1 Identicals such as nine and the number of planets differ in their modal properties and relations.2 'A Theory of Complexes' puts into question: the privileging of FOL individuals, the expressive completeness of FOL, and ontology-free logic.

* 1

Epistemologia 19.1 (1996): 85-112 See "The Paradox of Identity." Epistemologia 19.2 (1996): 207-226. 2 Let X = X But Not Necessarily, unpublished ms.

1.1 Introduction3 In his review of Errol Harris's An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel,4 John E. Smith highlights what is mainly at issue between the Hegelian conception of logic and the formalist conception favored by modern empiricism and many forms of analytic philosophy. The Hegelian holds logic to be "internally related at every level to the real content it articulates" (463). In contrast, the formalist pegs logic as neutral--both with respect to "the nature of things" and to "what there is" (ibid.). How fares the logic of identity in this dispute? Is identity neutral, both to "the nature of things" and to "what there is"? Or is the complexity of this relation a legacy of its terms? From a formalist standpoint, the identity-relation is indifferent to the nature of its terms: what a particular is (qua value of a variable) has no bearing on its relation to itself. Unrelated to the things it relates, identity thus has its nature imposed from without--by classical axioms which appear in the guise of empirical observations or arbitrary stipulations, or as the inexpugnable avatars of a Self-Certifying Logical Truth. In contrast, from the (broadly) Hegelian standpoint of 'A Theory of Complexes', the properties of identity have their source in the kind of entity over which individual variables range: a particular--the particular-cum-complex--which, unlike the denatured simple of Russell, Bergmann, Allaire, et al.,5 is ontologically differentiated and logically complex. The intrinsic features of this particular ground a minimal identity relation,6 which ramifies classically and non-classically.7 These features also ground a difference between formal and material identity which sets 'a = a' and 'a = b' apart in cognitive content. Such properties of identity are thus not external to its terms, as in formalist treatments. Here they are engendered instead by features of the entity which identity self-relates.

I am grateful to Paul Schachter, John Olney, and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper--and to the College of Humanities of the University of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras for reductions in load which helped make completion of this paper possible. 4 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, V. 36, No. 4, Dec. 1985: 459-465. 5 Such a particular is as portrayed by John Baker, in Particulars: Bare, Naked, and Nude, ( Nous, V. 1, No. 2, May 1967: 211-212): Particulars are nude in that they have no natures, that is, they are not necessarily connected to any specific property or set of properties. A nude particular has no nature, and is to be distinguished from the naked particular which has no properties. Those who claim that there are bare particulars, Russell, Bergmann, Allaire, et al., claim that they are nude of natures... (211) 6 By a minimal identity-relation I understand one whose properties--symmetry, transitivity, weak reflexivity, indiscernibility for identicals and identity for self-idenical indiscernibles--are criterial for identity. 7 The classical relation being strongly reflexive, indiscernibles are identical. In contrast, in the non-classical relation identity is partially irreflexive, and so some indiscernibles are not identical.

A theory of the particular-cum-complex encapsulates a theory of its constituents: haecceities8 and individuals.9 To HI, a theory of haecceities and individuals, I now turn. 1.2.0 The Language of HI HI is developed within a first-order, multi-sorted language L. Among its primitive signs, L counts two predicate constants, (1.1) "ex" for exemplification (1.2) "=" for identity three sorts of variables, (2.1) variables for individuals: u, v, w, x, y, z, u1, u2, ..., ui, ... (2.2) variables for haecceities: U, V, W, X, Y, Z, U1, U2, ..., Ui, ... (2.3) variables for particulars: u, v, w, x, y, z, u1, u2,...,ui, ... the usual sentential connectives, (3.1) , , &, v, and the universal and existential quantifiers. (3.2) ,

In the metalanguage of L, t1, t2, ..., ti range over individual variables; T1, T2, ..., Ti over haecceity variables; t1, t2, ..., ti over particular variables; and , , , ... over expressions. A formula of L is any expression provided for by the following conditions: (4.1) ti ex Tj, ti = tj and Ti = Tj are atomic formulas. (5.1) Every atomic formula is a formula. (5.2) If is a formula, is a formula.

Pick any particular. Corresponding to your particular is a property that, as established by T46 (see section 1.4.6.1), only your particular has if anything does. This property is a haecceity. My notion of a haecceity and Adams's (1979, 1981) notion of a thisness are compared in note 24. 9 A haecceity needs a support, or substratum, if it is to belong to an actual thing. An entity which can be such a support, or substratum, is an individual.

(5.3) If and are formulas, (

), ( v ), ( & ) and (

) are formulas.

(5.4) If is a formula, ti and ti are formulas.10 1.2.1 Variable-binding in L11 The logic of L departs from that of conventional, single-sorted, first-order languages in its definition of variable-binding and formulation of the Quantifier Rules. An occurrence of a variable ti/ti/Ti within a formula is a bound occurrence of ti/ti/Ti in if, and only if, it occurs within some part of which is a formula of the form ti or of the form ti. Otherwise, that occurrence is a free occurrence of ti/ti/Ti in . If a formula ti or ti occurs within a formula (or is the formula itself), then the scope in of that occurrence of the quantifier ti or ti is the formula ti or ti itself. 1.2.2 Quantifier Rules in L The rule of Universal Instantiation sanctions the move from a formula: (1) ti(... ti/ti/Ti ...)12 to a formula: (2) (... tj/tj/Tj ...) where (2) results from replacing every occurrence of ti/ti/Ti free in: (3) (... ti/ti/Ti ...) by occurrences of tj/tj/Tj free in (2). UI thus sanctions the move from: (4) to: (5) (6) (7) v(v ex U v(v ex W v(v ex X u ex U) w ex W) x ex X) u v(v ex U u ex U)

10

In L, the particular variables u, v, w, x, y, z, u1, u2, ..., ui, ..., occur only in quantifier expressions, binding individual and haecceity variables as indicated in (1.2.1). 11 My treatment of variable-binding in L is an adaptation of the treatment of variable-binding for first-order predicate logic in Rogers (1971). 12 is possibly null.

in each of which generically identical, individual and haecceity variables u/U free in, (8) v(v ex U u ex U)

have been replaced by other, or perhaps the same, generically identical, individual and haecceity variables ti/Ti free in: (9) v(v ex Ti ti ex Ti)

UI does not, however, sanction the move from (4) to (10) v(v ex W x ex W),

for (10) results from replacing generically identical, individual and haecceity variables u and U in (5), by the generically distinct x and W in (10). The rule of Existential Instantiation sanctions the move from a formula: (11) ti(... ti/ti/Ti ...)

to a formula: (12) (... tj/tj/Tj ...) where (12) results from replacing every occurrence of ti/ti/Ti free in: (13) (... ti/ti/Ti ...) by occurrences of tj/tj/Tj free in (12), which do not occur free in any earlier line of a proof. 1.2.3..The Postulates of HI P1-P3 describe the relations of haecceities and individuals which determine the properties of identity in the realm of individuals. P1 wxyz((w ex Y & x ex Y) (w ex Z x ex Z))

(If individuals co-exemplify any haecceity, they exemplify the same haecceities. ) P2 xy(x = y z(x ex Z & y ex Z))

(Individuals are identical just in case they co-exemplify some haecceity.)

P3

xy(x ex Y

y ex Y)

(If x exemplifies Y, y exemplifies Y.) P4-P6 describe relations of individuals and haecceities which determine the properties of identity in the realm of haecceities. P4 wxyz((y ex W & y ex X) (z ex W z ex X))

(If haecceities are co-exemplified by any individual, they are exemplified by the same individuals.) P5 xy(X = Y z(z ex X & z ex Y))

(Haecceities are identical just in case they are co-exemplified by some individual.) P6 xy(x ex Y x ex X)

(If x exemplifies Y, x exemplifies X.) 1.2.4..Identity in HI P1-P6 found an identity relation which is weakly reflexive, symmetric, and transitive; T1* x( y(x = y) (x = x))13

(Identity is weakly reflexive.) T2* xy(x = y y = x)

(Identity is symmetric.) T3* xyz((x = y & y = z) (Identity is transitive.) identicals that are indiscernible; and indiscernibles that are identical if self-identical. x = z)

13

Let (ti,Tj/Ti,tj) be the result of replacing ti and Tj everywhere in by Ti and tj, and then replacing every resultant occurrence of Tk ex tl by tl ex Tk. The asterisk ("*") will then be understood to indicate that T1(ti,Tj/Ti,tj), which makes identity weakly reflexive for haecceities, is also a theorem.

T4*

xyz(x = y

(x ex Z

y ex Z))

(Identicals are indiscernible.) T5* xy((x = x & y = y) ( z(x ex Z y ex Z) x = y))

(Self-identical indiscernibles are identical.) P1-P6 thus found a minimal identity relation.14 From P2 it follows that an individual is self-identical just in case there is some haecceity it exemplifies; and from P5, that a haecceity is self-identical just in case there is some individual it is exemplified by. T6* x(x = x y(x ex Y))

Hence, every individual is self-identical just in case every individual exemplifies; and every haecceity is self-identical just in case every haecceity is exemplified. T7* x(x = x) x y(x ex Y)

From T5*-T7*, it also follows, moreover, that indiscernibles are identical just in case every individual exemplifies and every haecceity is exemplified. T8* xy( z(x ex Z y ex Z) x = y) x y(x ex Y)

The ontological scaffolding provided by P1-P6 thus lends itself to further specification. Is every haecceity exemplified? Does every individual exemplify? In view of T9*,15 we have here not two questions but one. T9* x y(y ex X) x y(x ex Y)

(If every haecceity is exemplified, every individual exemplifies.) 1.2.5 Extending HI 1.2.5.1 HI+ A world in which every individual exemplifies--and every haecceity is exemplified--is described by adding P10 to the postulates of HI, yielding the theory HI+. P10 x y(y ex X)

14 15

By a minimal identity relation, I understand an identity relation whose properties are criterial for identity. T9(ti,Tj/Ti,tj) specifies that every individual exemplifies only if every haecceity is exemplified.

(All haecceities are exemplified.) In HI+, identity is totally reflexive and indiscernibles are identical, and so HI+ is a classical extension of HI. T10* x(x = x)

(Identity is totally reflexive.) T11* xy( z(x ex Z y ex Z) x = y)

(Indiscernibles are identical.) 1.2.5.2 HIIn contrast, a world in which not every individual exemplifies--and not every haecceity is exemplified--is described by adding P10'16 to the postulates of HI. P10' x y(y ex X) (Some haecceity is not exemplified.) In the resulting theory HI-, identity is partially irreflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical. HI- is thus a non-classical extension of HI. T10'* x(x = x) (Identity is partially irreflexive.) T11'* xy( z(x ex Z y ex Z) x = y)

(Not all indiscernibles are identical.) 1.2.6 The ontological significance of HI, HI+, and HIThe reciprocal connections of individuals and haecceities in HI scaffold properties of identity which, perhaps because they resist analysis in classical terms, have generally been taken to be self-evident--and ontology-free. In HI, however, that identity is weakly reflexive, identicals indiscernible, and indiscernibles identical if self-identical are propositions which rest upon yet more basic ontological principles. Thus, the notoriously "self-evident" dictum that everything is what it is divulges, upon analysis, ontological conditions whose satisfaction depends not on a logician's fiat but on the way the world is. These

16

' is the contradictory negation of .

conditions hold in HI+, in which every haecceity is exemplified and every individual exemplifies, so that identity is totally reflexive and indiscernibles are identical. HI- posits, in contrast, a world populated by unexemplified haecceities and non-exemplifying individuals, in which identity is not totally reflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical. Which of these worlds is ours? Ask not Logic, for Logic will not decide. But I promised an account of the properties of the identity relation as this applies to particulars. So far we have seen nought but individuals and haecceities. The road to particulars is from individuals and haecceities by way of complexes. To a theory of complexes I now turn.

HI Identity is weakly reflexive: T1* Yes

HI+ Yes

HIYes

Identity is symmetric: T2*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identity is transitive: T3*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identicals are indiscernible: T4*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Indiscernibles are identical if self-identical: T5*

Yes

Yes

Yes

There are unexemplified haecceities.

---

No P10 No P10 Yes T10* Yes T11*

Yes P10' Yes P10' No T10'* No T11'*

There are 'bare' individuals.

---

Identity is totally reflexive.

---

Indiscernibles are identical.

--

IMPORTANT THEOREMS

1.3..A Theory of Complexes 1.3.1 The Language L' The theory C of complexes is developed within L', a first-order language which contains L. In addition to the relational constants and variables of L, the symbols of L' include: (1.3) "emb" for embodiment17 and "cont" for containment.18 (1.4) an operation symbol: . (2.4) variables for complexes, as specified by the rule: if ti is an individual variable and Tj a haecceity variable, ti.Tj is a complex variable. In addition to the atomic formulas of L, L' also includes atomic formulas, as provided for by: (4.2) ti.Tj emb Tk, ti.Tj cont tk, and ti.Tj = tk.Tl are atomic formulas. The definition of variable-binding and formulation of Quantifier Rules in L' is as in L. 1.3.2..The Theory C To the postulates of HI, C subjoins P7-P9. P7 wxyz(w.X = y.Z (w ex X & w ex Z & y ex X))

(w.X and y.Z are identical iff w exemplifies X and Z, and y exemplifies X.) P8 xyz(x.Y emb Z (x ex Y & x ex Z))

(x.Y embodies Z iff x exemplifies Y and Z.) P9 xyz(x.Y cont z (x ex Y & z ex Y))

(x.Y contains z iff x and z exemplify Y.) P7 determines when complexes are identical; P8, when a complex embodies a haecceity; and P9, when a complex contains an individual. In so doing, P7-P9 determine, together with P1-P6, the properties of identity as this relation applies to complexes.

17

Embodiment relates a particular to an haecceity just in case there is some complex to which the haecceity and constituents of the particular belong (see T48, section 1.4.6.2). 18 Containment relates a particular and an individual just in case there is some complex to which the individual and constituents of the particular belong (see T49, section 1.4.6.2).

10

1.3.3 Identity in C Identity in C is weakly reflexive, symmetric, and transitive for individuals and haecceities ( T1*-T3*) and complexes (T12-T14); identicals are indiscernible (T4*, T15#); and indiscernibles are identical if selfidentical (T5*, T16#). C thus grounds a minimal identity relation. T12 wx( yz(w.X = y.Z) w.X = w.X)

(Identity is weakly reflexive for complexes.) T13 wxyz(w.X = y.Z y.Z = w.X)

(Identity is symmetric for complexes.) T14 uvwxyz((u.V = w.X & w.X = y.Z) (Identity is transitive for complexes.) T15# uvwxy(u.V = w.X (u.V emb Y w.X emb Y))19 u.V = y.Z)

(Identical complexes are indiscernible.) T16# uvwx((u.V = u.V & w.X = w.X) ( y(u.V emb Y w.X emb Y) u.V = w.X))

(Self-identical complexes are identical if indiscernible.)20 1.3.4 Reflexivity and Complexes In HI+, obtained by subjoining P10 to the postulates of HI, identity was totally reflexive for individuals and haecceities. However, subjoining P10 to the postulates of C does not suffice to make identity totally reflexive for complexes. Thus, from P7 it follows that any complex is self-identical just in case the individual and haecceity which constitute it are such that the individual exemplifies the haecceity: T18 xy(x.Y = x.Y x ex Y)

19

Let (ti,Tj//Ti,tj) be obtained from by simultaneously replacing ti and Tj everywhere in by Ti and tj, "cont" and "emb" by "emb" and "cont", and then Tk.tl by tl.Tk. The symbol "#" will then be understood to indicate that T15(ti,Tj//Ti,tj), which makes complexes indiscernible in respect of the individuals they contain, is also a theorem. 20 From T16# it follows that every pair of indiscernible complexes is identical just in case every complex is selfidentical, T17# uvwx( y(u.V emb Y w.X emb Y) u.V = w.X) uv(u.V = u.V)

a principle which, in view of T5*, holds as well for individuals and haecceities.

11

Hence every complex is self-identical just in case every individual exemplifies every haecceity: T19 xy(x.Y = x.Y) xy(x ex Y)

Moreover, it follows--from P2, P6 and T4*--that every individual exemplifies every haecceity just in case some haecceity is such that every individual exemplifies it: T20 xy(x ex Y) x y(y ex X)

Therefore, for identity to be totally reflexive for complexes, not only must every haecceity be exemplified, but some haecceity must be universally exemplified: T21 xy(x.Y = x.Y) x y(y ex X)

Identity in C is thus not totally reflexive for complexes unless no two complexes are distinct. T22 wx(w.X = w.X) wxyz(w.X = y.Z)

P10 thus fails to make identity totally reflexive for complexes generally (although it does make identity totally reflexive for individuals and haecceities). But P10 does make identity totally reflexive for complexes w.W, x.X, y.Y, z.Z,..., whose constituents correspond. T23 T24 x( y(y ex X) x y(y ex X) x.X = x.X) x(x.X = x.X)

I will refer to these as C-complexes. 1.3.5 Extending C 1.3.5.1 C+ The theory C+ is obtained by subjoining P10 to the deductive apparatus of C. In C+, identity is partially reflexive for complexes, T25 xy(x.Y = x.Y)

but totally reflexive for individuals and haecceities (T10*), and for C-complexes: T26 x(x.X = x.X)

Therefore, in C+ individuals and haecceities (T11*) and C-complexes are identical if indiscernible: T27# xy( z(x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X = y.Y)

12

1.3.5.2 CIn C-, obtained by subjoining P10' to the deductive apparatus of C, identity is partially irreflexive for individuals and haecceities (T10'*), and for C-complexes and complexes. T26' x(x.X = x.X) T28' xy(x.Y = x.Y)21 Consequently, in C- not all individuals and haecceities (T11'*), or C-complexes and complexes, are identical if indiscernible. T27'# xy( z(x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X = y.Y) w.X = y.Z)

T29'# wxyz( v(w.X emb V

y.Z emb V)

21

The following is also a theorem of C: xy((x.Y = x.Y) wz(x.Y = w.Z)) A complex which is not self-identical is thus diverse from every complex.

13

C Identity is weakly reflexive: T1*/T12 Identity is symmetric: Identity is transitive: T2*/T13 T3*/T14 T4*/T15# Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ---

C+ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes T10*

CYes Yes Yes Yes Yes No T10'* No T10'* No T26' No T28' No T11'* No T11'* No T27'# No T29'#

Identicals are indiscernible:

Self-identical indiscernibles are identical: T5*/T16# Individuals

Identity is totally reflexive.

Haecceities

---

Yes T10*

C-complexes

---

Yes T26

Complexes Individuals

-----

--Yes T11*

Indiscernibles are identical.

Haecceities

---

Yes T11*

C-complexes

---

Yes T27#

Complexes IMPORTANT THEOREMS

---

---

1.4 C-complexes and Particulars In classical identity theory, identity is totally reflexive, symmetric and transitive, identicals are indiscernible, and indiscernibles identical. Two other theories suggest themselves here, a restriction of the classical theory, minimal identity theory, in which it cannot be established that identity is totally reflexive or that indiscernibles are identical; and a deviation of the classical theory, which I shall refer to as non-classical identity theory, in which identity is partially irreflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical. Classical and non-classical identity theory both include and extend the minimal theory. They include it because every thesis of the minimal theory is also a thesis of the classical and non-classical theories: in the minimal, classical and non-classical theories, identity is symmetric, transitive, and weakly reflexive; identicals are indiscernible, and self-identical indiscernibles are identical. They extend it because the classical and non-classical theories each have theses that are not theses of the minimal theory. In the classical but not the minimal theory, identity is totally reflexive and indiscernibles are identical; in the non-classical but not the minimal theory, identity is partially irreflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical.22 C-complexes in C provide a model for minimal identity theory: a domain in which identity is symmetric (T13), transitive (T14), and weakly reflexive (T12), identicals are indiscernible (T15#), and self-identical indiscernibles are identical (T16#). C-complexes in C+ provide a model for classical identity theory: a domain in which identity is symmetric, transitive, and totally reflexive (T26), identicals are indiscernible, and indiscernibles are identical (T27#). Finally, C-complexes in C- provide a model for non-classical identity theory: a domain in which identity is symmetric, transitive, and partially irreflexive (T26'), identicals are indiscernible, but not all indiscernibles are identical (T27'#). C-complexes may thus be taken as the values of particular variables in each of the aforementioned theories, 23 and C, C+ and C- may be enriched, as in the theory P and its extensions, by treating C-complexes as particulars.24

22

The class of wffs of the classical theory and the non-classical theory coincide. However, the theorems of these theories differ, the Reflexive Law of Equality and logically equivalent principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles being provable in the former, while their contradictory negations are provable in the latter. Non-classical identity theory is thus a deviation, as Susan Haack defines "deviation" in her (1974), of classical identity theory. 23 The individual variables of classical identity theory I refer to as particular variables, a particular being construed here as an entity whose constituents are individuals and haecceities. 24 C-complexes in C, C+ and C- are intended both as realizations of minimal, classical and non-classical identity theory, and as schematizations of contrasting systems of real relations of particulars and their constituents. Ccomplexes thus constitute a model in both senses Jean Ladrire distinguishes for this term in his (1979). For Ladrire, a model is: ...une construction idale, intermdiaire entre une thorie au sens strict (considere comme ensemble de

14

1.4.1 The Language of P P is developed within L*, a first-order language obtained by adding to the formation rules of L' the clause (4.3). (4.3) ti emb Tj, ti cont tj, ti = tj, ti = tj.Tk and tj.Tk = ti are atomic formulas. The definition of variable-binding and formulation of the Quantifier Rules in L* is as in L' and L. 1.4.2 The Deductive Apparatus of P P augments the deductive apparatus of C by the inference rules I1 and I2. I1: From to infer , where results from by substituting t for t.T at one or more places of its occurrence. I2: From to infer , where results from by substituting t.T for t at one or more places of its occurrence. I1 and I2 license the translation of an assertion about t.T/t into one about t/t.T. The warrant for I1 and I2 is that the C-complex t.T and particular t are one and the same entity. In HI, the properties of identity are determined by the reciprocal relations of individuals and haecceities. In C, the properties of identity are determined by the reciprocal relations of individuals, haecceities and complexes. In P, particulars are C-complexes, and so the properties of identity (as this applies to particulars) are determined by the reciprocal relations of individuals, haecceities, and C-complexes. 1.4.3..Identity in P For particulars in P, as for individuals and haecceities in HI and complexes in C, identity is weakly reflexive (T30), symmetric (T31) and transitive (T32); identicals are indiscernible (T33#); and self-identical indiscernibles identical (T34#). T30 T31 T32 x( y(x = y) xy(x = y x = x)

y = x) x = z)

xyz((x = y & y = z)

propositions munie d'une structure dductive) et un domaine concret dont il s'agit d'analyser le fonctionnement... (p. 183)

15

T33# xyz(x = y

(x emb Z

y emb Z)) ( z(x emb Z y emb Z) x = y))

T34# xy((x = x & y = y)

As in HI and C, moreover, in P it cannot be established whether identity is reflexive or indiscernibles are identical. For the self-identity of a particular is bound up in P with the unity of the individual and haecceity which constitute it. T35 x(x = x x ex X)

This unity depends in turn upon a haecceity's being exemplified, T36 x(x ex X y(y ex X))

so that every particular is self-identical, and identity totally reflexive if, and only if, every haecceity is exemplified. T37 x(x = x) x y(y ex X)

However, whether every, or any, haecceity is exemplified is not specified in P, for P specifies just those relations of indivi-duals and haecceities which ground properties that are criterial for identity. Consequently, whether identity is totally or partially reflexive--or indiscernibles are identical--cannot be established in P. For these properties differentiate species within a genus without being relevant to the genus itself. 1.4.4 Extending P In discussing the different species of identity, it will be useful to distinguish classical particulars/individuals/haec- ceities/complexes from non-classical ones. Definition 1: ti/ti/Ti is classical iff tj(ti/ti/Ti = tj/tj/Tj) Definition 2: ti.Tj is classical iff tkti(ti.Tj = tk.Ti) Definition 3: ti/ti/Ti is non-classical iff tj(ti/ti/Ti = tj/tj/Tj) Definition 4: ti.Tj is non-classical iff tkti(ti.Tj = tk.Ti) From the foregoing it follows that every particular/individual/haecceity/complex is either classical or nonclassical, and that none is both. 1.4.4.1 P+ P+ is obtained by subjoining P10 to the postulates of P.

16

P10

x y(y ex X) (Every haecceity is exemplified.)

Theorems of P+ include: T38 x(x = x) (Identity is totally reflexive for particulars.) T39# xy( z(x emb Z y emb Z) x = y)

(Indiscernible particulars are identical.) T40 x y(x = y) (Every particular is classical.) T41 xywz(x.Y = w.Z) (Some complex is classical.) 25

25

A comparison of P-- and P-+ may here be of interest. In P--, no haecceity is exemplified (see P10'*). As a result, there are no classical individuals or haecceities. Therefore, in view of P7 there are no self-identical complexes--and hence, because identity is weakly reflexive--no classical complexes. Moreover, every complex in P-- is nonclassical for the same reason: its constituents are non-classical. However, this is not the case in P-+, where a complex can be non-classical for either of two reasons. A complex is non-classical, by P7, if one--or both--of its constituents are non-classical. Non-classical constituents are thus sufficient to make a complex non-classical. But non-classical constituents are not a necessary feature of a non-classical complex. Consider the particulars Saul Kripke and the author of Waverley. The constituents of Saul Kripke include an individual, saul kripke, and a haecceity, SAUL KRIPKE; and the constituents of the author of Waverley include the author of waverley and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY. Now saul kripke exemplifies SAUL KRIPKE, and the author of waverley exemplifies THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY. Therefore, saul kripke and SAUL KRIPKE, and the author of waverley and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY are classical. However, saul kripke does not exemplify THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY, for saul kripke and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY are not one in substance. Therefore, although saul kripke and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY are classical--that is, exist; the complex saul kripke.THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY is non-classical--that is, does not exist. Although non-classical constituents are sufficient to make a complex non-classical, they are thus not necessary.

17

1.4.4.2 PP- is obtained by subjoining P10' to the postulates of P. P10' x y(y ex X) (Not every haecceity is exemplified.) Theorems of P- include: T38' x(x = x) (Identity is partially irreflexive for particulars .) T39'# xy( z(x emb Z y emb Z) x = y)

(Not all indiscernible particulars are identical .) T40' x y(x = y) (Some particular is non-classical.) T42' xy wz(x.Y = w.Z) (Some complex is non-classical.) 1.4.5 Extending P+ and P1.4.5.1 P++ P++ is obtained by subjoining P10* to the postulates of P. P10* x y(y ex X)

(Some haecceity is such that every individual exemplifies it.) Theorems of P++ include: T28 xy(x.Y = x.Y) (Identity is totally reflexive for complexes.) T29# wxyz( v(w.X emb V y.Z emb V) w.X = y.Z)

(Indiscernible complexes are identical.)

18

T42

xy wz(x.Y = w.Z) (Every complex is classical.)

1.4.5.2..P-P-- is obtained by subjoining P10'* to the postulates of P. P10'* x y(y ex X) (No haecceity is exemplified.) Theorems of P-- include: T43' x(x = x) (Identity is totally irreflexive for particulars.) T25' xy(x.Y = x.Y) (Identity is totally irreflexive for complexes.) T44' xy(x = y) (There are no classical particulars.) T41' xywz(x.Y = w.Z) (There are no classical complexes.) 1.4.5.3 P-+ P-+ is obtained by subjoining P10'*' to the postulates of P-. P10'*' x y(y ex X) (Some haecceity is exemplified.) Theorems of P-+ include: T43 x(x = x) (Identity is partially reflexive for particulars.)

19

T25

xy(x.Y = x.Y) (Identity is partially reflexive for complexes.)

T44

xy(x = y) (Some particular is classical.)

T41

xywz(x.Y = w.Z) (Some complex is classical.)

1.4.5.4 P+P+- is obtained by subjoining P10*' to the postulates of P+. P10*' x y(y ex X) (No haecceity is exemplified by every individual.) Theorems of P+- include: T28' xy(x.Y = x.Y) (Identity is partially irreflexive for complexes.) T29'# wxyz( v(w.X emb V y.Z emb V) w.X = y.Z)

(Not all indiscernible complexes are identical.) T42' xy wz(x.Y = w.Z) (Some complex is non-classical.) 1.4.6..The Primitive Notions and Relations of P 1.4.6.1..Haecceities and Individuals P1-P9 specify conditions that every individual, haecceity and complex must satisfy. These conditions make haecceities identity properties,26 for from P1-P9 it follows that embodying Y is necessary and

26

Between my haecceity and Robert Adams's (1979, 1981) thisness there are two key differences. First, a thisness depends for its features upon Adams's conception of what a thisness is. In contrast, every feature of a haecceity-including its being an identity property--is engendered by the mutual relations of complexes and their constituents.

20

sufficient for identity-with-y: T46 xy(x emb Y x = y)

Just as it follows from P1-P9 that embodying Y is necessary and sufficient for identity with-y, it also follows that containing y is necessary and sufficient for identity-with-y: T47 xy(x cont y x = y)

Haecceities and individuals, and embodiment and containment, are thus dual with respect to T46 and T47. 1.4.6.2 Embodiment and Containment A particular embodies a haecceity just in case there is some complex to which the haecceity and constituents of the particular belong: T48 xy(x emb Y wz(w.Z emb X & w.Z cont x & w.Z emb Y))

Likewise, a particular contains an individual just in case there is some complex to which the individual and constituents of the particular belong. T49 xy(x cont y wz(w.Z emb X & w.Z cont x & w.Z cont y) )

1.5 Concluding Remarks The theory of the particular-cum-complex puts in question: (a) ontology-free thematizations of the identity relation, (b) the Reflexive Law of Equality (hereafter RLE),27 and (c) set-theoretic monist restrictions on the interpretation of the individual variables of classical identity theory. (a) The truths of classical identity theory are here engendered by an entity which appropriates for logic the essence of the particularity of particular things. Every particular thing is both a that and a

While the features of a thisness are thus the artefacts of arbitrary legislative postulation, the features of a haecceity are conferred upon it by the role it plays in the system of complexes. Second, Adams makes it clear that a thisness is not "a special sort of metaphysical component of [a particular]": I am not proposing to revive this aspect of [Scotus'] conception of a haecceity, because I am not committed to regarding properties as components of [particulars]. (1979: 7) But a haecceity retains this feature of its Scotian progenitor, for any haecceity and individual constitute a complex-the existence of which, but not whose being, depends upon the individual and haecceity being one in substance: T45
27

xy( wz(x.Y = w.Z)

x ex Y)

And therewith, the logically equivalent principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.

21

what, an existence and a content. And every particular thing manifests both the individual and the universal. So every particular thing suggests the particular-cum-complex as a(n) (onto)logically proper simulacrum for its particularity. But the unity and interconnection of the logically pertinent elements of every particular's particularity, as embodied in the mutual relations of a particular-cumcomplex, are irretrievably lost to ontology-free thematizations of the identity relation. For the point of departure for such thematizations is the supposition that the nature of a particular is not to have a nature.28 (b) From individuals and haecceities one can construct (i) a classical particular-cum-complex, which demonstrably satisfies the usual axioms of classical identity theory, including RLE; x(x = x) and, (ii) a non-classical particular-cum-complex, which demonstrably satisfies the other classical axioms,29 together with a weak reflexivity principle, x( y(x = y) and the contradictory negation of RLE: x(x = x) But the validity of RLE depends on its applicability to classical and non-classical objects. So RLE is not valid.
REMARK. For bA--where b is an individual variable of classical quantification theorycome out true under every interpretation.30 Consequently, (1) " x(x = x)" is valid iff "x = x" is valid. For A to be satisfiable, A must come out true under at least one interpretation. Consequently, -to be valid, A must

(x = x))

28

The conception of a natured particular clashes with a fundamental trait, according to Andr Lichnerowicz (1972), of contemporary mathematical thought: "l'absence de toute mtaphysique de l'identit et de la chose en soi" (p. 1502). A kindred anti-metaphysical strain in neo-positivist philosophy of logic has perhaps been responsible for the reluctance of linguistically-oriented analytical philosophers to posit a logical nature for particulars, these tending to be regarded, as Manuel Sacristn points out (1984), as "individuos puntuales sin intrincacin ontolgica" (p. 249). 29 Except for the strongly classical principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, to which RLE is logically equivalent. 30 This and the ensuing remarks are based on section 48.0 of Gerald Massey's (1970).

22

(2) "x = x" is valid iff "(x = x)" is not satisfiable. Therefore, (3) " x(x = x)" is valid iff "(x = x)" is not satisfiable. But A is satisfiable iff for some domain D, A is satisfiable in D. Moreover, for any domain D, A is satisfiable in D iff there is a true interpretation of A wherein D is the Universe of Discourse. Consequently, (4) " x(x = x)" is valid iff for no domain D is there a true inter-pretation of "(x = x)" wherein D is the Universe of Discourse. But the entities which realize P-- constitute just such a domain; and with respect to this domain--on classical assumptions, the "empty" domain--there is a true interpretation of "(x = x)". So the vaunted 'soundness' of classical predicate logic with identity goes by the board, for the contradictory negation of the Reflexive Law of Equality is satisfiable by means of a construction from individuals and haecceities, of whose mathematical existence there can be little doubt.31

(c) Set-theoretic restrictions on the interpretation of particular variables exclude objects which do not satisfy RLE, among them non-classical particulars and other such complexes. But these objects are consistently thinkable. Moreover, they play, as I will show in sequels to this paper,32 an indispensable role in the unification of identity theory. Complexes thus challenge set-theoretic restrictions on the interpretation of particular variables which have held logical semantics in thrall for half a hundred years. 33

31

The mathematical existence of such entities I take to turn upon the following stipulations of Hilbert (as stated by O. Becker (1927) and cited by Fernando Gil (1971)): Df. 1: on appelle mathmatiquement existants les objectits dont on fait le thme ("Thema") d'une thorie mathmatique et qui peuvent fonctionner sans contradiction dans cette thorie. Df. 2: on appelle mathmatiquement existants les objets qu'avec des moyens dtermins avec prcision peuvent tre construits partir de points de dpart fonds. 32 The particular-cum-complex will there be shown to make sense of contingent identity and modal discernibility, and provide an ontological foundation for existence and non-existence as modes of being of particulars. 33 The only argument of which I am aware for these restrictions is Georg Kreisel's argument in his (1969, 1971) that "true in all models" and "true in all set-theoretic models" are extensionally equivalent. But Kreisel's argument rests on the "intuitive validity" of the axioms of predicate logic with identity; and as I suggest here, RLE is not valid. For Tory restatements of Kreisel's argument, see John Etchemendy (1990: 144 f) and Daniel Quesada (1985: 154 f). For a contrasting view, see 'The Paradox of Identity,' Appendix One (forthcoming, this journal).

23

P+ Identity is totally reflexive. Particulars Complexes Identity is partially reflexive. Particulars Complexes Identity is partially irreflexive. Particulars Complexes Identity is totally irreflexive. Particulars Complexes Indiscernible are identical. Particulars Yes T38 --Yes T38 Yes T25 No T38 --No T38 No T25 Yes T39# --Yes T40 --No T40 No T41

P++ (Yes) Yes T28 (Yes) (Yes) (No) No T28 (No) (No) (Yes)

P+(Yes) No T28' (Yes) (Yes) (No) Yes T28' (No) (No) (Yes)

PNo T38' No T28' ----Yes T38' Yes T28' ----No T39'# No T29'# No T40' No T42' -----

P-(No) (No) No T43' No T25' (Yes) (Yes) Yes T43' Yes T25' (No)

P-+ (No) (No) Yes T43 Yes T25 (Yes) (Yes) No T43 No T25 (No)

Complexes Every is classical. Particular Complex Every is nonclassical. Particular Complex

Yes T29# (Yes) Yes T42 (No) (No)

No T29'# (Yes) No T42' (No) (No)

(No) (No) (No) Yes T44' Yes T41'

(No) (No) (No) No T44 No T41

IMPORTANT THEOREMS

BE GLAD IT'S NOT DEVIANT Mephisto. Thomas. Thomas. Yes? Mephisto. Bet you a quarter meaning is reference. Thomas. Meaning is not reference. If it were, the cognitive value of 'a = a' would become essentially that of 'a =b', provided 'a = b' were true. What sets (true) 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart is not the reference of 'a' and 'b'--that is the same--but their sense. Extends hand. Gimme the quarter. Mephisto, puzzled. What is sense? Thomas. Sense...sense is...whatever it is about 'a' and 'b' that sets 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart in cognitive content. Mephisto. And what's that? Thomas, truculent. It's...it's sense! Mephisto, agitated. I know, I know, I know! I know what sense is! I know what sets true 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart! Thomas rolls eyes. Mephisto. I do, I do, I do! What sets them apart is they assert different things! Thomas, incredulous. Assert different things? Sacr Leibniz! How can they? Mephisto. If they do, they can. Right? Thomas. Right. Mephisto. Well, they do. So they can. Thomas, sighs.Look, 'a' refers to a and 'b' refers to b. Right? Mephisto. Right. Thomas. And a is b. Right? Mephisto. Right. Thomas, triumphant. So 'a = b' and 'a = a' assert the same thing! . Extends hand. Mephisto. You didn't say "right".

24

Thomas, reddening. Right? Mephisto. Wrong! Approaches Thomas. You wanna know why? Thomas, trapped. Why? Mephisto. In Thomas's ear. Because a and b are complexes!!! Thomas, mopping ear. Complexes? Agitated. What's a complex? Did Frege or Russell say something about complexes? Did Quine or Kripke? David Lewis didn't. His meanings were functions. Dreamily. Functions from functions from functions to functions from functions to functions... Agitated. Frege Futures are taking off. My What You Always Wanted to Know About Sense But Were Afraid to Ask is hot off the press. And--wouldn't you know it!--along comes some pigeon-toed, circle-squaring anti-Frege, who...(crosses himself) Mephisto, inspects feet. Pigeon-toed, yes. Eyes on Thomas. Circle-squaring, no. Thomas, with feeling. True 'a = b' says a = a, So does 'b = b'. That may seem fa-arcical, But dahling, it's cla-ahsical. Hey! I don't mean maybe, It's righteous G. Frege. Sound inconvenient? Be glad it's not deviant. Bub! Don't make me rough it, Take your complex and... Remembers bet. Now can I have my quarter?34

34

Will Mephisto pay for Thomas's Sinn? Or will Mephisto give Thomas no quarter? See 'The Paradox of Identity' (forthcoming, this journal).

25

Infernal Quiz in the Sociology of Knowledge ---To what might one attribute Thomas's attitude towards Mephisto? Mephisto is pigeon-toed. Mephisto spit in Thomas's ear. Mephisto is known not to referee. Mephisto is not on Thomas's list of preferred wisdom providers. Thomas has an Influential Friend in a High Place. Thomas is into E & R (exegetics and rehash). Thomas knows that logic is ontology-free. Complexes might ruin the transcendental part of Thomas's free lunch. Other (please specify)

26

References Adams, Robert: 1981, Actualism and Thisness, Synthese 49, 3-41. Adams, Robert: 1979, Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1, 5-26. Becker, O.: 1927, Mathem. Existenz, in Jhb. f. Phil. u. phenom. Forschung. Engel, Pascal: 1991, The Norm of Truth, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Etchemendy, John: 1990, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Gil, Fernando: 1971, La Logique du Nom, ditions de l'Herne. Greenberg, William J: 1982, Aspects of a Theory of Singular Reference, UCLA Ph.D. Dissertation (published in the Garland Series Outstanding Dissertations in Linguistics, 1985). Haack, Susan: 1974, Deviant Logic, Cambridge University Press, Boston. Kreisel, Georg: 1969, 'Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs,' in Jaakko Hintikka (ed.),.The Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford University Press, London, 78-94. Kreisel, Georg: 1971, Mathematical Logic: what has it done for the philosophy of mathematics? in Ralph Schoenman (ed.), Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century, Allen & Unwin, London, 1971. Ladrire, Jean: 1979, Le Logique et le rel, in Paul Weingartner and Edgar Morscher (ed.), Ontology and Logic, Duncker and Humbolt, Berlin, 157-184. Lichnerowicz, Andr: 1972, Mathmatique et transdisciplinarit, conomie et Socit, Tome VI, No. 8, 1497-1509. Massey, Gerald: 1970, Understanding Symbolic Logic, Harper & Row, New York. Quesada, Daniel: 1985, La Lgica y su filosofa, Editorial Barcanova, Barcelona. Rogers, Robert: 1971, Mathematical Logic and Formalized Theories, American Elsevier, New York. Sacristn, Manual: 1984, Apuntes de filosofa de la lgica, in Papeles de Filosofa, Icaria Editorial, Barcelona. van Heijenoort, Jean: 1985, Collected Papers, Bibliopolis, Napoli.

27