PADDINGTON ZONE SUBSTATION TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION AND FIRE ON MONDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2000

REPORT AND FINDINGS

7 December 2000

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1. CONTENTS
1. CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................... 2 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................... 3 3. PADDINGTON ZONE SUBSTATION DETAILS ................................................................................... 4 4. THE FIRE EVENT AND CONSEQUENT ELECTRICAL ISOLATION OF PADDINGTON ZONE SUBSTATION ............................................................................................................................................... 6 4.1. The Initial Explosion and Fire ......................................................................................................... 6 4.2. Protection System Operations...................................................................................................... 12 4.3. Initial Response from EnergyAustralia and the Fire Brigade ....................................................... 13 4.4. The Fire Spreads to Damage the Building and Equipment.......................................................... 13 4.5. Remote Control Facilities ............................................................................................................. 14 5. RESTORATION OF SUPPLY ............................................................................................................. 14 5.1. Incident Management ................................................................................................................... 14 5.2. Damage Assessment ................................................................................................................... 14 5.2.1. Assessment of Structural Damage ....................................................................................... 14 5.2.2. Assessment of Transformer Damage ................................................................................... 14 5.2.3. Assessment of Feeder Damage............................................................................................ 15 5.3. Restoration of Supply ................................................................................................................... 15 5.4. Progressive Firming of Supply Capability .................................................................................... 16 5.5. Customer Management................................................................................................................ 16 6. OTHER ISSUES .................................................................................................................................. 17 6.1. Likelihood of Similar Fires ............................................................................................................ 17 6.2. Fire Mitigation Measures .............................................................................................................. 17 6.2.1 Paddington Fire Mitigation .................................................................................................... 17 6.3. Oil Spill Containment Program ..................................................................................................... 17 6.4. Maintenance Aspects ................................................................................................................... 18 6.5. Costs ............................................................................................................................................ 18 7. ACTIONS............................................................................................................................................. 19 8. APPENDIX........................................................................................................................................... 20 8.1. Protection System In Operation at Paddington ............................................................................ 20

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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At 4.11pm on Monday 20th November, the electrical insulation in a link box on transformer number 3 at Paddington zone substation failed, causing an explosion. The explosion tore open the top of the link box, releasing burning transformer oil on to the ground behind the transformer. The fire entered the substation building through a cable opening in the wall, and through an access doorway located behind the transformer, in to the cable sub-basement. The fire then spread to the cable basement, affecting the majority of cables and damaging the switchgear that the cables were connected to. Some roof damage also ensued, but, as the roof was steel mounted on a steel frame, it did not sustain a fire. Radiant heat and blast barriers installed between the transformers proved to be effective in preventing the spread of fire to other transformers, although an adjacent transformer suffered minor damage from the impact of a steel cover which travelled a short distance from the failed number 3 transformer due to the explosion. The diagram at the end of this Section shows the arrangement of Paddington zone substation and the location of the explosion and fire. Protection and control systems operated correctly to disconnect the failed transformer number 3 from supply. At 4.22pm, transformer number 4 also tripped off due to short circuiting of its control and protection wiring caused by the fire. Finally, it became necessary to electrically isolate Paddington zone substation for the safety of fire fighting personnel. The remaining 33kV feeder still supplying Paddington zone substation was isolated at the Surry Hills sub-transmission supply point at 4.44pm. This was carried out by remote control from the Head Office System Control Room. The resulting supply interruption affected approximately 20,000 customers. By 11.30pm that night, supply was restored to over 5,000 customers by switching to existing interconnectors from four adjacent zone substations. A number of other critical hospital and high rise customers also had supply restored by the installation of generators before 9am the following morning. In excess of 5,000 additional customers had supply progressively restored from 9am on Tuesday 21st. The remaining customers had supply restored between midnight and 1.00 pm on Wednesday 22nd after the repair and restoration of a transformer (transformer number 4) and an 11kV group of switchgear which were damaged by the fire. Supply has now been made more secure through recommissioning transformer number 2 by replacing 33,000 volt, 11,000 volt and secondary cables, and by the restoration of the majority of the 11,000 volt circuit breakers. A new transformer has also been placed on site to replace transformer number 3, which has now been removed. The replacement transformer will be placed into service in December. This will allow reinstatement of the automatic back-up system, bringing the substation to pre-fire levels of reliability. Paddington's transformer number 3 was damaged beyond repair by the explosion and by the fire. The cables in the cable basement below the 11,000 volt switchgear were extensively fire damaged, and both sets of 11,000 volt circuit breakers ("switchgear") located on the floor above the cable basement were damaged by soot, heat and water. Soot and water also damaged auxiliary equipment in adjacent rooms. The 11,000 volt switchgear was new and, in common with all new 11kV switchgear used by
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EnergyAustralia, contains no flammable liquids or compounds. The switchgear therefore did not catch fire. The transformer explosion was caused by a flashover inside a 33,000 volt link box, which is attached to the back of the transformer. The most likely reason for the failure was tracking across an insulating barrier board that had become moist due to frequent exposure to the atmosphere and humidity associated with recent work on the transformer. All scheduled maintenance was up to date on the failed transformer. A representative of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) attended the site, and no oil was found to be discharging. The total direct cost of the incident is expected to be approximately $1 million. 3. PADDINGTON ZONE SUBSTATION DETAILS Paddington zone substation is located in Young Street, Paddington. The recorded commissioning date for the zone is 1940, although much of the equipment was installed or replaced subsequently. The roof is built of steel on a steel frame, with fibreglass insulation. Despite being lashed by the fire, the roof, which was recently replaced, did not burn. The building contains two groups of 11,000 volt duplicate busbar switchgear, and protection & control equipment. The transformers are housed in individual outdoor bays separated by brick walls in an open yard adjacent to one side of the building. The substation has been developed and augmented during its lifetime. The building has been modified from time-to-time to meet the changed requirements. Most recently, all of the 11kV switchgear was replaced, and extensive building work was done in conjunction with the replacement. Ironically, the old switchgear, which had only just been decommissioned, was in another building, and was untouched by the fire. Paddington zone substation takes supply from Surry Hills sub-transmission substation through three 33kV cables, which run to the three 33kV /11kV tail-ended transformers at Paddington. Each transformer has a nominal rating of 26 MVA. The zone substation normally supplies approximately 20,000 customers through 113 11,000 to 415 volt distribution centres in the areas of Paddington, Rushcutters Bay, Potts Point, Elizabeth Bay, Darling Point, Woollahra and Centennial Park. Paddington zone substation is centrally located and has some 11kV system interconnections available to four adjacent zone substations, those being Darlinghurst, Zetland, Double Bay and Waverley.

Figure 1 - Transformer Bay & Switchroom Elevation

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Figure 2 - Switchroom Elevation (behind transformers)

Figure 3 - Plan View of Transformer Bays and Switchroom

Figure 4 - End View of Switchroom & Transformer Bays

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Figure 5 - Transformer No.3 following the fire

4. THE FIRE EVENT AND CONSEQUENT ELECTRICAL ISOLATION OF PADDINGTON ZONE SUBSTATION 4.1. THE INITIAL EXPLOSION AND FIRE At 4:11 pm on Monday 20 November, transformer number 3 experienced an explosion inside the 33kV cable link box. There were no other associated system events recorded at the time. The link box is a steel housing welded to the top and back of the transformer and fitted with bulkhead type bolted covers. It is filled with insulating oil through a pipe system from a conservator tank located above the transformer. The oil feed is via a low oil (Bucholz) relay, which sends an alarm if the oil level gets low. The link box contains three flexible connectors (one for each phase), that are used to disconnect the incoming 33kV cables from the transformer windings. The diagram at the end of this section shows the link box arrangement. The explosion is believed to have resulted from a flashover across the busbar support barrier (see the figures below) either between two of the 33kV busbars, or from one of the busbars to the side of the link box. It is believed that the busbar support barrier had become moist due to recent exposure to the atmosphere during work involving the transformer. The moisture compromised the insulating properties of the barrier, which was then subject to electrical tracking, and ultimately failed. The explosion created extreme pressure inside the link box, which caused the link box lid to blow off and oil in the link box to be ignited. The link box arrangement is shown below:

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Figure 6 - Link Box - Side View

Figure 7 - Link Box Top View

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Figure 8 - Failed Link Box from above showing copper bars and flexible braids.

Figure 9 - Failed Link Box Lid

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Figure 10 - View down on the rear of a healthy link box

Figure 11 - Close up of healthy link box cable bushings, braids, copper bars and barrier board

The fire entered the cable sub-basement area through a hatch located behind the transformer, and through the wall openings through which the transformer's 11,000 volt cables pass. The fire then propagated via the burning cables up in to the cable basement area and finally up in to the back of the 11,000 volt switchgear.
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Figure 12 - Transformer Bay No. 3 with the transformer removed, showing wall openings to cable sub-basement area.

The fire destroyed the number 3 transformer. Of the remaining two transformers, number 2 was rendered inoperative as a result of the destruction of its 33kV, 11kV and control and protection cabling, while transformer number 4 had its 11,000 volt and secondary cables destroyed. There is no number 1 transformer in service at Paddington. All but five of the outgoing 11,000 volt feeder cables were also destroyed by the fire. Much of the 11,000 volt switchgear was damaged around where the burning cables entered the cable end boxes, but the switchgear itself did not catch fire.

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Figure 13 - Substation 11,000 volt switchroom located directly above the cable basement area

Figure 14 - Rear of damaged 11,000 volt circuit breaker panels

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Figure 15 - Part of the Cable Basement area

4.2. PROTECTION SYSTEM OPERATIONS Electrical protection equipment operated correctly at the time of the explosion (4.11 pm), to de-energise number 3 transformer by tripping the associated 33kV circuit breaker on feeder 381 at Surry Hills and the number 3 transformer 11kV circuit breaker at Paddington. The de-energisation interrupted approximately 10,000 customers. The de-energisation was effected 0.1 seconds after the electrical failure, which is the fastest time possible. A transient recorder installed at Homebush saw the system voltage dip, and its output is shown below:

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At 4.22pm, transformer number 4 was also de-energised by its protection equipment. Also at 4.22pm, a fault limiting reactor located at Paddington, but supplying
Waverley, tripped off due to burnt secondary wiring. Because this reactor only supplies a back up transformer at Waverley, no additional interruptions were caused.

At 4:44pm EnergyAustralia's System Operator switched off the remaining transformer at Paddington to enable fire fighting, by remotely opening the feeder 382 circuit breaker at Surry Hills. This interrupted all remaining customers fed from Paddington. 4.3. INITIAL RESPONSE FROM ENERGYAUSTRALIA AND THE FIRE BRIGADE The first signal to EnergyAustralia was via the SCADA system at the time of the explosion (4:11 pm), indicating that number 3 transformer had tripped off. At 4.13pm, EnergyAustralia's control room received an alarm via SCADA from the smoke detectors installed at Paddington, indicating that a fire was burning. The fire brigade received their first call at 4.16pm, and attended the fire. The transformer fire was extinguished within 30 minutes, and the fire brigade then kept hoses on the transformer to keep it cool. The second area that the fire brigade attended to was the cable basement and sub-basement, and the 11,000 volt switchroom. They had difficulty in accessing the fire in this area, and had to wait for EnergyAustralia personnel to de-energise the switchgear and isolate the busbars. The cables had to be earthed at locations remote from the substation. This second stage of fire fighting in the cable basement and sub-basement areas took between 90 minutes and 2 hours. The fire brigade had difficulty seeing what was happening in this area. Fire brigade personnel took turns in accessing the cable jointing area to extinguish the fire, using a single 38mm diameter hose. The fire brigade placed the stop call at 8.41pm. 4.4. THE FIRE SPREADS TO DAMAGE THE BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT. The fire walls around the transformer withstood the fire, and no structural members, other than a fascia board, were damaged by the fire (although the fire brigade did damage the roof when they broke through it in order to gain access and to release smoke in the switch-room). However, the damage from the fire was not contained to just the failed transformer. A number of cables from transformer number 2 were run behind the failed transformer, and these were damaged by the flames from the burning oil that flowed down behind the failed transformer. In addition, fire entered the cable sub-basement (located below the cable basement) through a doorway and through a cable entry portal at the back of the transformer bay. A second doorway slightly higher up in the back of the same transformer bay was in place and withstood the fire. This second doorway was also bricked up behind the door in conjunction with the recent switchgear replacement work, in order to improve the substation's fire rating.

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The door to the cable sub-basement had been removed in order to facilitate access to the underfloor area during cabling works associated with the recent switchgear replacement. The switchgear replacement work was extensive, involving significant civil and electrical construction activities and finalisation of site civil works was imminent. It is likely that the door would have been restored and cable entries sealed in accordance with the architect's design in the near future. The resulting fire in the cable sub-basement and cable basement caused severe damage to the majority of 11,000 volt cables. It also caused heat damage to the majority of 11,000 volt circuit breaker cable end boxes, and soot and water damage to all of the 11,000 volt equipment, and to control and protection equipment housed in the control room. 4.5. REMOTE CONTROL FACILITIES EnergyAustralias remote control facilities (SCADA), installed to zone and subtransmission substation, proved to be of immense value in assisting a fast response to this failure. Benefits included immediate notification of the event, remote tripping at Surry Hills of remaining supply to Paddington so that fire fighting could proceed, and monitoring of loads in feeders from adjacent zone substations. 5. RESTORATION OF SUPPLY 5.1. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT Incident management and response teams were built up from 4.30 pm. The Incident Crisis Centre was established at Head Office Building adjacent to the System Control Room. Duty managers from groups within EnergyAustralia resourced the Centre throughout the period of the interruption. The Call Centre operated from its locations in Sydney and in Wallsend. Regular contact was maintained with the Media and, for the duration of the fire, with the Fire Brigade. Recorded telephone messages were used to assist in managing the customer interface. These messages were revised on a regular basis. 5.2. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

5.2.1. Assessment of Structural Damage After the fire was extinguished, the building had to be cleared of smoke, and the damage assessed before work inside the building could commence. This work was carried out by one of EnergyAustralia's Civil Engineers. 5.2.2. Assessment of Transformer Damage Transformer number 3, manufactured in 1968 by Tyree, was damaged beyond repair. Because transformer number two was manually interrupted a short time prior to extinguishment of the fire, it was believed that the transformer would be serviceable. No damage had occurred prior to switch off, and the transformer fire was extinguished only a short time later. However, when access was gained to the cable basement after 10pm, the magnitude of the fire in the cable basement became apparent, and it was evident that the cables had been damaged significantly some time after the transformer was switched off, and that the interruption was going to be of a long duration.

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Ultimately, the interruption was further extended due to the need to join dissimilar cables (1000sq. mm paper to 630 sp. mm XLPE), and due to the extensive cleanout and testing required on the switchgear because of the soot and heat damage. The significance of the switchgear damage was not apparent until the early hours of Tuesday morning, when the switchgear had been partially stripped down and internally inspected. 5.2.3. Assessment of Feeder Damage Most cables and switchgear end-boxes were damaged by heat and soot from the burning cables. Fire entered the cable sub-basement area from behind transformer number 3. From there the fire spread along the transformer cables and in to the cable basement area, where all of the substation's 11,000 volt cabling is marshalled. The fire spread between the cables, causing extensive damage. Cabling to feeder panels nos. 15 to 18 was all that remained intact, while cabling to all other 11kV switchgear panels was destroyed. 5.3. RESTORATION OF SUPPLY A short term feeder restoration strategy was developed in the Crisis Centre. A transformer and switchgear restoration strategy was developed on site and augmented in the Crisis Centre. These strategies enabled some of the Paddington feeders, and ultimately one of the transformers to be re-energised. Restoration of customers who could not be supplied by switching was contingent on work at Paddington zone substation, involving assessment of structural and electrical damage, isolation of faulty and unserviceable equipment, completion of temporary network alterations, and returning to service of serviceable transformers and switchgear. All equipment also had to be tested prior to re-energisation. Joining of 11,000 volt cables was required to bypass the damaged 11,000 volt switchgear at Paddington substation, and to bring in to service four recently laid interconnectors to Double Bay zone substation. These interconnectors had just been laid as part of a program to allow the planned transfer of growing load from Paddington zone substation to Double Bay zone substation. Double Bay zone substation is also having its capacity increased in conjunction with these works. Early and progressive commissioning of the interconnectors enabled additional load to be restored throughout the 21st. In addition to the transformer cable difficulties, restoration was also hampered by a cable failure in a section of cable adjacent to the Hoddle Street substation. The cable had been reconnected for use as an interconnector, and a fault occurred was in an existing, undisturbed section of cable soon after the cable section was re-energised. Restoration was further hampered by an error in the phasing of another interconnector that had been placed in to service. The error meant that the jointing work had to be pulled apart and re-started. By approximately 6.30 am on Wednesday: all but 1,000 customers had supply restored, new control and protection cabling had been run between transformer number 4 and the transformer number 2 11kV switchgear,

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new cables had been run and connected for transformer number 4 fan and pump circuits, new 11,000 volt transformer tails had been run, joined and terminated from transformer number 4 to the previous transformer number 2 11kV switchgear, functionality tests had been carried out on the interconnected protection systems at Paddington and Surry Hills, faults on the battery circuits in the fire damaged section of the substation had been isolated, required battery circuits had been repaired, tested and returned to service, the transformer number 2 11,000 volt switchgear and transformer tails had been cleaned, inspected and high voltage tested, four new 11,000 volt underground interconnectors had been commissioned, substantial 11,000 volt cable jointing had occurred in the cable basement in order to bypass the damaged switchgear, and all remaining customers had supply restored by 1.10 pm on Wednesday, 22nd November, 2000.

5.4. PROGRESSIVE FIRMING OF SUPPLY CAPABILITY Although supply has been restored, many of the arrangements are temporary, with limitations in system capacity and without arrangements for back-up supply in the event of system faults. Progressive firming of supply capacity is continuing. To date: all 11,000 volt busbars have been cleaned, repaired, tested recommissioned, transformer Number 2 has been repaired, tested and recommissioned, transformer number 4 has been repaired, tested and recommissioned, most of the 11,000 volt circuit breakers and their associated cable end-boxes have been repaired and recommissioned, transformer number 3 has been replaced on site. re-cabling of transformer number 3, further cleaning and testing of the 11,000 volt switchgear, repair and commissioning of the remaining feeder circuit breakers, restoration of doors and fire blocking of openings, and replacement of temporary repairs with the permanent arrangement. and

Additional work still required includes:

It is anticipated that all but the last of the above will be completed before the end of the year. 5.5. CUSTOMER MANAGEMENT Major customers were contacted throughout the interruption, and were advised of anticipated restoration times.
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Staff were dispatched to personally advise customers, and especially small business customers, of the situation and anticipated restoration times. The call centre responded well to the outage. 6. OTHER ISSUES 6.1. LIKELIHOOD OF SIMILAR FIRES There have been few other transformer fires in recent decades. Those that have occurred have been due to a variety of causes. EnergyAustralia has had only one other substation building fire as a result of a transformer link box fault, which occurred 12 months ago at Chatswood. However, the link box and oil feed design at Chatswood were completely different to the link box and oil feed design at Paddington. The link boxes at Chatswood were small single phase units, with no barrier boards, and with no low oil alarm. The link boxes at Paddington were large three phase units, with barriers, and with large oil feed pipes located well below the Bucholz relay, which has low oil and gas generation signals. The failure mode is also different in both cases. 6.2. FIRE MITIGATION MEASURES

6.2.1 Paddington Fire Mitigation The transformers at Paddington have radiant heat and blast barriers installed between them, as shown in the photographs. These barriers again proved to be effective in preventing the spread of fire from transformer number 3 to the adjacent transformers number 2 and number 4. The Paddington zone substation building had some recent fire mitigation measures installed, including a fire rated steel roof, and vacuum/air 11,000 volt switchgear. Both of these measures were successful in limiting the spread of the fire. 6.3. OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT PROGRAM EnergyAustralia is currently in the fourth year of a ten year $30 million oil containment program. EnergyAustralia has 190 zone and sub-transmission substations within our franchise region. A risk assessment was undertaken of all substations to create a priority list for oil containment refurbishment. Each substation has been given a priority rating from A to G based on adequacy of factors such as the existing oil containment system, proximity to waterways and the number of transformers. Priority A, Priority B and some Priority C listed substations have been modified to comply with EnergyAustralias design guidelines. New oil / water separators have been installed, existing tanks modified or new multi-stage tanks installed to achieve the required discharge limits. Paddington Zone Substation is a Priority G Substation and is due to be upgraded in another two to four years. Paddington Zone Substation has been given a Priority G listing because it has an existing (if older style) oil interception tank. The oil interception tank was designed to collect run-off from the four transformer foundations as well as the reactor. The oil containment sump is located just off the transformer roadway, close to the 11kV switchroom. Monitoring by the EPA and EnergyAustralia confirmed that no oil discharged from the site during the incident.

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6.4. MAINTENANCE ASPECTS Paddington transformer number 3 has been visited regularly for various aspects of maintenance. In the 1999/2000 period the transformer was worked on during 24/2/99, 27/7/99. 25/8/99, 12/2/00, 25/5/00, 2/8/00 and 7/8/00. The transformer was also recabled on the 11,000 volt side in conjunction with the switchgear replacement work. Additionally, the transformer links were opened to allow the 33,000 volt cables to be identified and tested when cable diversions were required for the construction of the Eastern Distributor. At the date of the explosion, there was no scheduled maintenance outstanding for transformer number 3. The last maintenance involving the link box was on 25 August 1999, when the transformer was tested following a tapchanger maintenance. There were no comments recorded on the maintenance report. 6.5. COSTS A preliminary estimate of direct costs related to this project is approximately as follows:Replacement transformer (includes civil works, cable connections, control cables, extra protection panels, commissioning costs) Building and yard clean-up, roof repair, temporary rearrangement of feeders, clean-up and testing of equipment, etc. Removal of old transformer no. 3 and installation of new transformer, including testing and re-termination of cables. SCADA re-arrangement and restoration, and other miscellaneous costs, say TOTAL DIRECT COSTS $400,000 $50,000 $50,000 $1,000,000 $500,000

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7. ACTIONS The failure has indicated areas where potential for improvement may exist. In particular: The types of barrier boards and the condition of barrier boards in transformer link boxes will be assessed on all transformers with barrier boards. Barrier boards will be replaced if necessary. The testing regime for cable link boxes will be re-assessed for potential improvement. All zone and subtransmission substations are being audited to identify any remedial fire mitigation opportunities, in line with the existing risk mitigation project. A risk mitigation program is to be rolled out based on the outcomes of the audits. Risk mitigation measures are to be implemented as appropriate, and include measures such as: ! Sprinklers and deluge systems ! Installation of fire barriers ! Removal of flammable material ! Fire stopping of openings ! Oil spread stopping and ! Acceleration of fault clearing times Early indications are that the risk mitigation program will cost in the order of M$100 for all zone and subtransmission substations. The program will take between 5 and 10 years to complete.

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8. APPENDIX 8.1. PROTECTION SYSTEM IN OPERATION AT PADDINGTON

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