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QUINO VS CA Bernarda and Rosario Galan sold their agricultural land with an area of 2.

3926 hectares situated in Basak, Compostela, Cebu, to spouses Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan for P2,000.00. More than a decade later, or on 30 October 1986, petitioner Aniceto Quio filed a complaint for redemption of the property against the vendees claiming that he had been instituted as tenant thereon by the Galans since 1951; consequently, he had the right to be notified in writing of the owners' intention to sell the property to enable him to exercise his right of preemption under Sec. 11 of RA No. 3844 2 but that notwithstanding the Galans had not informed him of the sale. He claimed that he learned of the transaction only on 1 September 1986 when he found out that the Leornardos were already the new owners. He therefore prayed that he be allowed to redeem the property and consigned the purchase price with the trial court on the same day he filed his complaint. Meanwhile, on 4 November 1986 the Leonardos sold the property to private respondent Jose Bitoon for P30,000.00. On 12 November 1986 petitioner filed another complaint against the same spouses for injunction with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin his ejectment from the property. During the pendency of the case, Antonio Leonardo Sr. died. His childred, private respondents Purificacion L. Canson, Editha G. Leonardo, Carmelita L. Mori, Josefina L. Bais, Aida L. Collyer, Antonio G. Leonardo, Rudolfo G. Leonardo, Roberto G. Leonardo and Teresa L. Ragner, were substituted in his stead as co-defendants. Something thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the counsel of respondent Bitoon dated 24 November 1986 notifying him of the transfer of ownership of the land to his client. As no supporting document was attached to the letter to bolster counsel's claim, petitioner went to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building and obtained on 2 March 1987 a copy of the pertinent deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon. On 27 July 1987 petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading Jose Bitoon as additional defendant. However, on 8 October 1990 the trial court dismissed the original as well as the amended complaint after finding that majority of the esential requisites of tenancy relationship between the parties did not exist. 3 The Court of Appeals however arrived at an entirely different evaluation of the evidence. 4 On 5 August 1994 it held that all the essential requisites for tenancy relationship were present, and being a tenant petitioner was entitled to the rights of preemption and redemption under Secs. 11 and 12, respectively, of RA No. 3844. Nevertheless it noted a stumbling block to petitioner's complete victory thus Be that as it may, since the land in question had already pass(ed) on to defendant-appellee Jose Bitoon, and plaintiff-appellant's quest against defendant-appellees spouses Antonio Leonardo and Josefa Galan may be considered moot and academic under RA 3844, Section 10, defendant-appelle Jose Bitoon having been subrogated to the rights and obligations of his predecessors-ininterest, his obligation under the law to the tenant-plaintiff continues and subsists, that if he decides to sell the land, then

plaintiff-appellant can still exercise his rights under the law


(Velasquez v. Nery, 211 SCRA 28, emphasis supplied).
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The appellate court decreed thus 1. declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan and thereafter of their successor-in-interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr. substituted by his (nine) children and in turn of the present owner, respondent Bitoon.; 2. ordering respondent Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by him; 3. ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return to petitioner the amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) which he consigned with the trial court as redemption price for the land in question, covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986; and, 4. no pronouncement as to costs. 6 On 23 November 1994 respondent Court of Appeals denied reconsideration. 7 The issue then is whether respondent Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner could not redeem the property from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to sell it on the strength of the ruling in Velasquez v. Nery. 8 Petitioner asserts that Velasquez is inapplicable because of the difference in factual circumstances. In that case, the sale made by the landowners to a third party was by virtue of a court order and not as envisioned under Sec. 11 of RA No. 3844. In other words, the right of the tenants therein to preemptively purchase was not violated. Hence the right of redemption was unavailing to them. For a better understanding of the controversy, it is essential to discuss first the statutory right of redemption and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 as amended by RA No. 6389 provides Sec. 12. Lessee's right Redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price consideration . . . . The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Deaprtment of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale . . . . The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale . . . . Simply stated, in the event that the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter is granted by law the right to redeem it within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice in writing and at a reasonable price and consideration. Petitioner was not notified of the first and second instances of sale of the property apparently because all the respondents disputed petitioner's assertion that he has been a tenant thereon since 1951. These instances of sale without notification gave rise to his right to redeem the property as lessee although no longer from the Leonardos but from its present owner, respondent Bitoon. A letter dated 24 November 1986 from the counsel of respondent Bitoon was received by petitioner informing him that the ownership of subject property has been transferred to respondent Bitoon. However the counsel did not bother to furnish petitioner with the supporting documents which is why petitioner did not readily believe what was written in the letter. Petitioner had to proceed to the Notarial

Division of the Capitol Building on 2 March 1987 to secure a copy of the deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon. The purpose of the written notice required by law its to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for redemption will start running. 9 The letter received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption from receipt of the authentic document on 2 March 1987. The amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180) days. The preceding discussion leads us to the requirement concerning reasonable price and consideration. An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. 10 It must be stressed however that in making a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifest his desire to purchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. 11 As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration. 12 Petitioner consigned the amount of P2,000.00 paid by the Leonardos to the Galans. However when he amended his complaint by impleading respondent Bitoon, he did not increase the amount consigned as would have made it equivalent to P30,000.00, representing payment by the second vendee. In this regard, petitioner submits that he is not required to consign the latter amount since that would put an additional burden on a tenant seeking redemption. After all, he would be paying whatever amount be finally determined by the trial court as reasonable price and consideration. It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time. 13 Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of the requirement of the law and leaves the Court with no choice but to rule against him. With the foregoing ratiocination, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of whether petitioner may redeem the property from respondent Bitoon. Nevertheless,

we shall pursue the discussion thereon if only to rectify some points. In Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses, in a nutshell, were agricultural lessees of the property owned by the Nery spouses and the Lorenzos. Later, the owners filed an action for partition before the trial court. In a compromise agreement, they agreed to sell the property to Delta Motor Corporation. Having received information about the impending sale, the Velasquez spouses filed an action for redemption before the then Court of Agrarian Relations. Subsequently, the sale materialized. Unfortunately, the redemption case was dismissed due to lack of interest to redeem the property at its acquisition price. The appeal before respondent court and the petition before this Court met the same fate. However, we also noted that the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was not a party to the case had in the meantime extrajudicially foreclosed the property. By way of obiter dictum we stated Because of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject by the Philippine National Bank, the present case has become moot and academic with regard to petitioners claim against Delta Motor Corporation. It is now the PNB or its subsequent transferees from whom the petitioners must redeem, if and when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future . . . . Respondent appellate court must have taken out of context our statement therein when the former ruled that "if respondent Bitoon decides to sell the land then petitioner can still exercise his rights under the law." The phrase in the Velasquez case that "if and when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future" logically refers to "its subsequent transferees" only, and not as a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption as what respondent court perceived it to be. To further stress the matter, the ruling of respondent court overlooks the essence of redemption provided in the amended Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 which, as previously mentioned, grants to the lessee such right in case the property is sold to a third person without his knowledge. Since that situation obtained in Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses had the right to redeem the property from the PNB as new owner. The circumstances that the property was sold to a third person without the knowledge of the lessee provides the source from which the right of redemption springs. Analyzing this right, it may be stated that such right works only one way in favor of the redemptioner. For he can compel the purchase to sell but he cannot be compelled to buy. Supposing the lessee failed to redeem the property and the purchaser decided to sell or alienate it without notifying the former, the property may be redeemed from the subsequent transferee because another essence of the right of redemption is that it attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law. 14 The plain import of the obiter dictum in the Velasquez case is that the Velasquez spouses may redeem the property from the PNB as new owner, or should PNB decide to sell the property they may redeem the same from its transferee. Thus, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, Velasquez is applicable but not as so applied by respondent court; instead, it should have based its main ruling lack of interest to redeem the property at the acquisition price paid by respondent Bitoon. Hence we reiterate that, for of petitioner to consign the entire redemption price, there was no valid exercise by him of his legal right to redeem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals (1) declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan and thereafter of their

successor-in-interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan, and in turn, of the present owner respondent Bitoon; (2) ordering respondent Jose Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by him; (3) ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return to petitioner the amount of of P2,000.00 which he consigned as redemption price for the land in question covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986, with no pronouncement as to costs, is AFFIRMED.

Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA FACTS: Maxima Castro, 70 years old. ignorant and unlettered, obtained a P3,000.00 loan from petitioner bank with the help of Severino Valencia who arranged everything regarding the loan and supplied the bank with the personal data required for her loan. On the same date Castro got her loan, the Valencia spouses also obtained a P3,000.00 loan from petitioner and caused Castro to affix her signature as co-maker in their promissory note. The two loans were secured by a real estate mortgage on Castro's house and lot. Consequently, the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the property sold at public auction on the day following the scheduled date which was declared a special public holiday. In the meantime, Castro had filed a complaint against petitioners, among others, claiming that the Valencias had fraudulently induced her to sign as co-maker and to constitute a mortgage on her property to secure the spouses's loan. Castro deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of P3,383.00 in full payment of her personal P3,000.00 loan plus interest. The trial Court declared void: (I) the questioned promissory note as against Castro; (2) the mortgage contract in so far as it exceeded Castro's personal loan; and (3) the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of Castro's property. The trial Court also ordered the application of the amount deposited by Castro to her personal loan plus interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. The Supreme Court held, that the questioned contracts are void because substantial mistake vitiated the consent of both Castro and the bank as a result of fraud upon Castro and misrepresentation to the bank inflicted by the Valencias; that the consignation made by Castro even prior to offer or tender of payment is valid under considerations of equity; and that the auction sale held on the day succeeding the day fixed by the deputy sheriff (which was declared a special public holiday) without the notices of the sale on that day being posted as prescribed in Section 9, Act 3135 is null and void.

Question is, likewise, raised as to the propriety of respondent court's decision which declared that Castro's consignation in court of the amount of P3,383.00 was validly made. It is contended that the consignation was made without prior offer of tender of payment to the Bank, and is therefore, not valid. In holding that there is a substantial compliance with the provision of Article 1256 of the Civil Code, respondent court considered the fact that the Bank was holding Castro liable for the sum of P6,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum, while the amount consigned was only P3,000.00 plus 12% interest; that at the time of consignation, the Bank had long foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and the sale of the mortgaged property had already been scheduled for April 10, 1961 for non-payment of the obligation, and that despite the fact that the Bank already knew of the deposit made by Castro because of receipt of the deposit was attached to the record of the case, said Bank had not made any claim of such deposit, and that therefore, Castro was right in thinking that it was futile and useless for her to make previous offer and tender of payment directly to the Bank only in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00 plus 12% interest. Under the foregoing circumstances, the consignation made by Castro was valid, if not under the strict provision of the law, under the more liberal considerations of equity. llcd

CONSIGNATION

ERCILLO VS CA This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP10524 which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX affirming the judgment of the City Court of Quezon City. The facts of the case are as follows: Private respondents spouses Benjamin Cifra and Lutgarda Cifra leased an apartment building located at 11-C Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City, to herein petitioners spouses Teofilo Ercillo and Teresita Ercillo at a monthly rental of P140.00 payable within the first five (5) days of the month at the residence of private respondents. On November 23, 1976, private respondents filed an action for unlawful detainer with the City Court of Quezon City. It was alleged in the complaint that the petitioners failed to pay the rentals for the month of August, 1976 up to the filing of the complaint; that private respondents demanded from petitioners payment of the accrued rentals and the surrender of the possession of the leased premises to them before the complaint was filed and that the petitioners neither paid the accrued rentals nor surrendered the possession of the leased premises. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they never defaulted in the payment of their rentals; that private respondents refused to accept their payments; that they deposited the payments with the Family Savings Bank, Account No. 419022473, in the name of Mrs. Teresita Ercillo or Mrs. Lutgarda Cifra and that the petitioners were advised by the former of the said deposit. prcd Sometime also in November, 1976, the private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners with the Office of the Civil Relations (OCR), Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The petitioners then withdrew the rentals deposited with the Family Savings Bank and deposited the money and the accruing rentals with the

OCR. When the action for ejectment was pending with the City Court, the petitioners deposited the rentals with the said court. After trial, the City Court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of the decision provides: "WHEREFORE, . . . this Court finds the material allegations in the complaint filed in this case to be duly proved with convincing and satisfactory evidence and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants spouses TEOFILO ERCILLO and TERESITA ERCILLO, as follows: "1. Ordering defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises located at 11-C Purdue Street, Cubao Quezon City and restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; "2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the sum of P1,680.00 representing accrued monthly rentals for the period August, 1976 to July, 1977 at P144.00 a month; "3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the further sum of P144.00 a month commencing on August 1, 1977 and every month thereafter until they and all persons claiming rights under them finally vacate the premises and restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; "4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the sum of P1,500.00, as and for attorney's fees; and "5. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the cost of the suit. "The counter-claim interposed by the defendants is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. "SO ORDERED." (pp. 14-15, Rollo). On appeal to the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Quezon City, the decision of the City Court was affirmed in toto. The petitioners filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on September 6, 1980 (pp. 14-18, Rollo). The decision of the Court of Appeals stated: "Since the consignation of the accrued rentals with the Court was made only during the pendency of the ejectment case, although they (petitioners) had effected deposits with the Office of the Civil Relations, which office as opined by the trial court, "is not a judicial authority," such act could not have and did not have the effect of discharging petitioners' obligation in the payment of rentals. LibLex "Thus, no judicial consignation having been made in accordance with Art. 1256, 1257 and 1258 of the New Civil Code; "WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. "SO ORDERED." (p. 18, Rollo) On December 1, 1980, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court. The petitioners contend that respondent Court of Appeals committed a legal error when it ruled that the deposit of the rentals with the bank did not release the petitioners from their obligation to pay the rentals and that LOI 768 which took effect only on November 16, 1978 cannot apply to this case which was filed on November 23, 1976. The petition is devoid of merit. The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the private respondents had a valid ground for ejecting petitioners. The ground raised by private respondents in ejecting petitioners from the leased premises is the latter's failure to pay rents due. There is no question that this is one of

the grounds by which a lessor may judicially eject the lessee under Article 1673 of the New Civil Code. Further, Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that a lessor or his legal representative shall bring an action against a lessee for failure to pay rent due only after the lessee shall have failed to pay such rent for a period of fifteen days after a written demand therefor had been made. Private respondents assert that there was no payment of the rent due within the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by the rules nor even after the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period after a written demand to pay and to vacate was made on petitioners. The petitioners, for their part, assert that their obligation to pay rent had been extinguished in view of their consignation of the rent due with the bank after the private respondents refused to accept them. The law on tender of payment and consignation as a mode of extinguishing an obligation is covered by Article 1256, Article 1257 and Article 1258 of the New Civil Code. "Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. "xxx xxx xxx "Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. "The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment. "Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases. "The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof." It is the requirement under Article 1258 which had not been strictly complied with by petitioners. What the law requires is the deposit of the thing due at the disposal of judicial authority before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case. The deposit of the rentals with the bank is not the consignation contemplated by law. Depositing the rentals in the bank does not place such rental at the disposal of the judicial authority. LibLex Petitioners argue further that since the case is still pending, the full legal effect of P.D. 20 together with its implementing Instructions, LOI 768, should be made to apply in this case. P.D. 20, issued on October 12, 1972, amended Republic Act No. 6359 regulating rentals for dwelling units. It was not until November 16, 1978 when Letter of Instruction No. 768 was issued implementing P.D. 20. It provided, among others: "3. The following shall not constitute grounds for judicial ejectment of lessees: "a) That the lessee has failed to pay any increased rental not mutually agreed upon; provided, that in case of refusal of the lessor to accept payment of the rent previously agreed upon, the lessee shall either consignate the amount in court or deposit the said amount in a bank for the account of the lessor." Petitioners seek shelter under this provision. However, it should be noted that LOI 768 which allows the deposit of accrued rentals in a bank as an alternative to consignation in court of rental payments which the lessor refuses to accept, was issued only on

November 16, 1978. The action for ejectment, on the other hand was filed on November 23, 1976 or some two (2) years before the issuance of LOI 768 when the law in effect then was Article 1257 of the New Civil Code. Clearly, the private respondents had, at the time of the institution of the complaint, a valid ground for ejecting petitioners. LLpr ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. FRANCISCO VS BAUTISTA In Civil Case No. 501-V of the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch III, Valenzuela) which was an action for partition and reconveyance instituted by Maxima, Francisca, and Francisco, all surnamed Francisco, together with their respective spouses, against Julita, Romeo, Lorenza and Restituto, all also surnamed Francisco, and their respective spouses judgment was rendered on August 11, 1971 by Judge Juan de Borja the dispositive portion of which is as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Maxima Francisco entitled to 138 square meters and Francisca Francisco to 126 square meters from the portion sold to Restituto Francisco and Francisco Francisco to 360 square meters from the portion sold to Julita Francisco at a price of P11.00 per square meter, the same to be paid within thirty (30) days after this decision becomes final, otherwise plaintiffs shall loss all their rights to said portion, and after payment shall have been made defendants shall execute the proper deeds of conveyance in favor of plaintiffs . . ." (Emphasis supplied) This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on September 16, 1975. 1 No appeal was attempted from the Appellate Court's decision which consequently became final and executory on October 9, 1975, and was remanded to the Trial Court for execution. On January 12, 1976, the plaintiffs filed a motion for execution. The motion was denied by respondent Judge, Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, by Order dated February 2, 1976. 2 His Honor ruled that since the judgment had given the plaintiffs thirty (30) days from finality of decision within which to pay to the defendants the price of the areas respectively awarded to them at the rate of P11.00 per square meter; and since considerably more than thirty (30) days had elapsed since the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Trial Court, had become final, said plaintiffs had, in accordance with the judgment, lost "all their rights" to their portions. prLL The respondent Judge however later reconsidered and set aside his Order of February 2, 1976, on motion of the plaintiffs. This he did in an Order dated April 14, 1976 3 In said Order, he declared that upon the facts, the failure of the plaintiffs to effect payment within the appointed time could not be ascribed to their fault. His Honor found that ". . . plaintiffs' attempt to tender payment in accordance with the decision of this Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed on September 16, 1975 failed to materialize because plaintiff Restituto Francisco and his wife were in the United States and defendant Julita Francisco to whom plaintiffs tendered payment refused the same which resulted in their failure to comply with their obligation to pay within the period of thirty (30) days provided for in the decision, the Court considers plaintiffs' attempt to tender payment sufficient to comply with their undertaking. Art. 1186 of the New Civil Code provides that the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.'"

The respondent Judge accordingly RESOLVED ". . . to set aside. . . (the) Order of February 2, 1976 and plaintiffs are given a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order within which to tender payment to the defendants and/or deposit with the Office of the Clerk of Court the amount corresponding to the value of the parcel of land subject matter of this case after the same is segregated from the portion belonging to the defendants." The defendants moved, in their turn, for reconsideration of the Order of April 14, 1976. The motion was seasonably opposed by the plaintiffs, and thereafter denied by Judge Bautista, by Order dated July 2, 1976. It is these Orders of April 14, and July 2, 1976 that the petitioners would have this Court annul in the special civil action of certiorari at bar. The petitioners theorize that in rendering the Order of April 14, 1976, respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion because he had in effect substantially altered the final and executory judgment of his predecessor, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a court has plenary power to alter, modify or even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the decision becomes final, or before an appeal from that decision has been perfected. 4 However, after the decision has become final and executory, it can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. 5 This principle of immutability of judgments already final and executory has invariably been adhered to by this Court regardless of any occasional injustice, for the equity of a particular case must yield to the "overmastering need" of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. 6 Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. 7 It is these principles that petitioners invoke to nullify the questioned orders of the respondent Judge in this case. The facts here and the applicable principles, however, preclude such relief. Cdpr A distinction should be made between the jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment and its power to enforce it. The former ceases to attach when the judgment becomes final, while the judgment has become final for the purpose of its execution, 8 the propriety of its exercise rather than the jurisdiction to amend or modify being the real issue here. Now, in the execution proceedings in question, the court a quo found as a fact that plaintiffs were prevented from consummating the requisite tender of payment due to the absence of two of the defendants from the Philippines and the refusal of the third to accept such tender which, it is not seriously disputed, was attempted within the prescribed 30-day period from finality of the judgment. There is no cogent reason to disturb that factual conclusion, which therefore is binding and conclusive upon this Court. 9 This Court has held in several cases 10 that where a timely and valid tender of payment is made pursuant to the exercise of a right (not an obligation) it is sufficient, without consignation, to preserve such right. In Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca, 11 it was ruled that consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil Code is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said provision refers to consignation as one of the means for the payment or discharge of a "debt," whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor for the price of the leased premises. The lessee merely exercised a right of option and had no obligation to pay

said price until execution of the deed of sale in his favor, which the lessor refused to do. And in the fairly recent case of Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 12 which involved the exercise of the right to repurchase, the Court also held that ". . . In instances where no debt 15 due and owing, consignation is not proper. "We have ruled early that: 'Consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of payment is enough if made on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a retro to resell the property.' "Since the case at bar involves the exercise of the right to repurchase, a showing that petitioner made a valid tender of payment is sufficient. It is enough that a sincere or genuine tender of payment and not a mock or deceptive one was made. The fact that he deposited the amount of repurchase money with the Clerk of Court was simply an additional security for the petitioner. It was not an essential act that had to be performed after tender of payment was refused by the private respondent although it may serve to indicate the veracity of desire to comply with the obligation." The tender having been made, not so much to discharge an obligation as to enforce or exercise a right (to a reconveyance of the portions of law adjudged to them), no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle the private respondents to such reconveyance. Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in setting aside his Order of February 2, 1976 and giving said respondents a new period within which to tender payment to the petitioner and/or deposit the required amount in court. It may even be said that in view of the efficacy of said tender for the purpose of enforcing a reconveyance the grant of a fresh period within which to reiterate the same is superfluous and unnecessary. Cdpr Moreover, as previously shown, the rights and obligations of the parties arose from a judgment, not from contract and therefore the Civil Code requirements as to consignation are not applicable. 13 Thus, in case of refusal of a tender of the amount due on a judgment, the court may direct the money to be paid in court and when this is done, order satisfaction of the judgment to be entered. 14 The tender of payment of a judgment is not the same as tender of payment of a contractual debt and consignation of the money due from a debtor to a creditor. 15 The requisites of consignation under Art. 1256 et seq. do not apply to the former. It appearing that private respondents have already deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Valenzuela, Bulacan, the sum of P6,864.00 in accordance with the order of the court a quo dated April 14, 1976, and this as early as May 13, 1976, or six days after their receipt, thru counsel, on May 7, 1976 of said order, 16 approval of the consignation and discharge of private respondents' obligation are warranted. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the court a quo is hereby ORDERED to approve the consignation made by private respondents, and direct execution of the judgment in question so as to effectuate the reconveyance prescribed therein according to its terms.

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