Whitrow andPopper on the Impossibility of an Intfinite Past I65 thereis no firstor last moment), then discrete lineartime1has the

ordertype Ct)*+Ct) of the set of negative and positiveintegers.If, on the otherhand,it is false (andthereis no firstor lastmoment) then discrete lineartime canbe split up intoa plurality of disjoint segments eachof order type coek+@. Eachsegment then corresponds to a 'stateof the universe' of infiniteduration. Underthese conditions, however, no eventin a givensegment is finitelyaccessible (in time) froman eventin any othersegment.Thus fromthe standpoint of an observer stationed in a givensegment, the objective existence of anyother segmentmust seemhighlydubious.It wouldtherefore seem reasonable for such an observer (e.g. oneself)to 'confine attention' to the segmentin whichhe is situated, and therebyaccept the finite accessibility hypothesis (and, a fortiori,the Tristram Shandythesis)as a plausible assumption-albeit not provable a priori about discretelineartime. Even with this hypothesis,however,it is still logically possible fortimeto haveneither a beginning noranend.
JOHN BELL

London School of Economics andPolitical Science

RE FERENCE S POPPER, K. R. [I978]: 'On the possibility of an infinite past: a reply to Whitrow',British gournalfor the Philosophy of Science,29, 47-48. RETSSELLS B. [I937]: ThePrinciples of Mathematics, Second Edition, CambridgeUniversity Press. W'HITROW, G. J. [I978]: 'On the impossibilityof an infinite past', British3fournal for the Philosophy of Science,29, 39-45.

WHITROW AND POPPERON THE:IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN INFINITE PAST It is gratifying to findDrsWhitrow andPopper re-opening the debate onwhether it is philosophically tenableto hold that our universe is temporally infinitein the past.2 Evena littleresearch in this fieldreveals thatthe question is anything but settled, and the issues involvedare so grippingthat they meritfurther
* * a

oIscusslon.

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Whitrow'snecessarily abbreviated history of the argumentagainstinfinite temporal regression correctly tracesits rootsto JohnPhiloponus (d. 580?);but it omits what is undoubtedly the most significant phase of the argument's
By 'discretelineartime' I mean lineartime divided into successiveintervals of constant duration,e.g. hours or days. It is assumedthat the temporalorderingof these intersals is discrete)i.e. each intervalwith predecessorshas an immediatepredecessor,and each intervalwith successorshas an immediatesuccessor. 2 Whitrow [I978], pp. 39-45; Popper [I978], pp. 47-8. The problem had been earlier discussedby Scriven [I954-5], pp. I8I-90; Whitrow [I954-5], pp. 2I5-25; and Schlegel [I954-5], pp. 226-36. On the debate, see further Ellis [I955], pp. 32-7; Swinburne [I966], pp. I25-38; and Bird [I966], pp- I39-50-

I 66 William LaneCraig history,namely,its formulation and development by the medieval Arabicand Jewishphilosophers.l Anxiousas they wereto vindicate contra Greek philosophicalthoughtthe Biblicaland Qur'anic doctrineof creation, these thinkers employedPhiloponus's arguments in numerous forms.2 The most significant Arabicproponents of the argument were perhapsthe philosopher al-Kind (80I-873) and the theologian al-Ghizall(I058-IIII); of the Jewishthinkers one wouldprobably nameSaadia ben Joseph(882-942)as the mostimportant.3 These thinkers employed basically two sortsof arguments to demonstrate the temporal finitudeof the universe.First,the argument fromthe impossibility of the existence of an actualinfinite: An actualinfinitecannotexist. An infinitetemporal regress of eventsis an actual infinite. .-. An inISnite temporal regress of eventscannotexist. Second,the argument fromthe impossibility of completing an actualinfinite by successive addition: An actual infinitecannotbe compIeted by successive addition. The temporalseries of past events has been completedby successive addition. .I. The temporal seriesof pasteventscannotbe an actual infinite. These arguments becamethe centreof a hotlydisputed controversy in Arabic, Jewish,andfinallyChristian medieval thought.4 The secondformof the argumentultimately became immortalised, as Whitrow notes,in the thesisof Kant's firstantimony concerning time.5
Z

KANT

S THESIS

Whitrow hascontended thatthe argument presented in Kant's thesisis basically soundand has offered his own versionof the proof.But sinceWhitrow's own version appears to me to be somewhat less satisfactory thanKant'sandsinceit is only the latterthat Popperdirectlycriticises, I shall confinemy comments to the argument contained in the antinomy itself. It is noteworthy that Poppersummarises Kant'sthesis as arguing that 'an actualinfinityof instants' cannotelapse.6 Onemightbe tempted to regard this as a minorslip, exceptthatPopper goes on to clarify thatKant'sargument can only therefore establish that 'timemusthavea beginning, ratherthan that the worldmust have a beginningin time'.7Now this is simplyfaultyhistorical exposition. A closeexamination of the antinomy makesit evidentthat Kantis not arguing for a beginning of timeitself,butfor a beginning of the universe in
See Craig [forthcoming]; Sturch [Ig70], pp. sg-I20a; al-Alousl [I965]; and Blanchet [I976], pp. I I-2I. 2 See Davidson tI969], pp. 357-9I and Sambursky[Ig72], pp. 35I-3. 3 On al-Kindl, see al-Kindl [I974], pp. 67-75; Rescher and Khatchadourian [I966], pp. 426-33; Shamsi [I975], pp. 123-44. On al-Ghazall, see al-Ghazall [I958], pp. 243; al-Ghazall [Ig62], pp. I5-I6; al-Ghazall [I965], pp. 95-I22. On Saadia, see Saadia [I948], pp. 4I 4. 4 See Craig tI977], PP. 26I-79. 6 Kant [Ig29], p. 386 6 pOpper [I978], p 47 7 Ibid.

Past

- * - 5, -4, Any 3, 2,

I, given o

moment

Past of an Infinite on theImpossibility andPopper Whitrow

I67

sense as a conNewtonian time. Kant here conceivesof time in an absolute, of events.l tinuumin whicheventsexist, but whichitself existsindependently wherehe speaksof time's still This is even more evidentin the antithesis, not concerns, existingpriorto the beginningof the world.2Kant'sargument thatin the viewof timesuggests of time,butstatesof things,andKant's instants by the seriesof events. statesas determined of temporal thesis he is speaking in time, andthus by the eventsoccurring The statesof time aredifferentiated state. Kant's temporal priorto the firsteventwouldexist an undifferentiated couldneverariseif it were event/state to provethatthe present thesisattempts of events/states. by an infinitenumber preceded for he asserts of the thesisis equallymistaken, secondclarification Popper's that there cannot rests on the assumption Kant'sargument that 'Obviously, he shareswith infinity;an assumption or "actual" exist . . . a "completed" This assertionaccuratelydescribesthe first sort of argument Aristotle.'3 but it has nothingto do withthe by the ArabicandJewishthinkers, employed does not by Kant.The secondargument second,whichis the versionadopted it deniesthatan rather infinite; of an actual of the existence denythe possibility The principle addition. by successive or completed canbe formed infinite actual presupposes is thatthe conditioned to eachthesisin Kant'santinomies common is: of argument pattern andthe common all its conditions, arecomplete. can only arisewhenits conditions The conditioned If they areinfinitethey canneverbe complete. .fi.They cannotbe infinite.4 not just in Kant'sthesisis how an actualinfinitecan beformed, The problem aboutfutureevents, whetherit can exist. That is why there is no antinomy of the present nor is it the condition since this seriescan neverbe completed event.5
3

POPPER S CRITIQUE

then the set of all past that if the worldhas existedforever, Popperresponds infinite. eventsis actuallyinfinite,but the seriesof past eventsis potentially in the eventsfrom any momentbackwards This may be seen by numbering infinite: a potential time,thusforming

addition Thus, the problemof an actualinfinitebeing formedby successive arisesonly if we illicitlyassumea pointinfinitely doesnot arise.This problem moment. at the present in the pastandthen askhowwe arrived distant by criticsof Kant'sthesis,6 repeated whichhas beentirelessly This response,

P.42: 'The thesis of the first antinomy asserts the finitude of the 1 See al-Azm [I972], world series in time and not of the temporalcontaineritself.' Cf. Martin'sjudgment: 'In this empty time before the beginning P.397. 2Kant CI929], P.48.) of the world there was the passageof time, but no events.' (Martin [I955], P 209. 4Ewing [I950], P.47. 3Popper [I978], P.387. 5Ibid., p. 6. See Kant's relevantcommentsin Kant [I929], PP. P.3; Swinburne[I968], Broad [I955], PP.I70-I; 6For example, see Russell [I929], s.v. 'Infinity in Mathematicsand Logic' of Philosophy, Encyclopedia 298-9;

Any Past given ------- moment Any-----given

Future moment

LaneCraig x68 William the seriesof pastevents in error.Regarding to me to be fundamentally appears at any givenmomentand infiniteis possibleonly by beginning as a potential progressing intothe past.Butthe seriesof eventsitselfis really regressing mentally Thus, with eachnew eventthathappens. in time,in the sensethatit increases by the realseriesof events,if infinite,wouIdbe an actualinfinitecompleted addition: successive ***, 5, 4, -3, -2,
-I, O

of the series withthe realprogress of counting regress confuses the mental Popper only shows that if the series from the presentbackwards itself. Numbering an infinite of pastevents,thenwe candenumerate therearean infinitenumber of is, how can this infinitecollection numberof past events.But the problem Kant does not assumean events come to be formedby successiveaddition? the veryfactthatthe serieshasan Onthe contrary, distant beginning. infinitely hada If the seriesreally it so inconceivable. is whatmakes endbutno beginning infiniteX of it as a potential conceive butno end,thenwe couldrightly beginning, as we do the future:
O, I, 2,

3, 4, 5, **s

series. it is an indefinite Such a seriesis alwaysfinite,but alwaysincreasing; infiniteand not for it is ex hypothesi But the past may not be so regarded, infinite, the seriesof past To be a potential direction. in a backwards increasing But by mentally backwards. growing eventswouldhaveto be finite,but always in time,is the realseriesitselfsomehow andregressing at the present beginning butanendintoa backward-growing froma serieswithno beginning transformed the seriesdoes conceive but no end?How we mentally serieswith a beginning of the seriesitselfas one hax7ing character not in anywayaffectthe ontological but an end, or in otherwords,as an actualinfiniteformedby no beginning addition. successive If criticism. fromPopper's emergesunscathed therefore, Kant'sargument, there were an infinitenumberof eventspriorto the presentevent,then the since an actualinfinitecannotbe formedby presenteventcouldneverarrive, successiveaddition.Therefore,the series of past events must be finite; in beganto exist. otherwords,a finitetime ago,the universe
4

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

to mustbe finiteappears that the seriesof pastevents/states Kant'sargument confirmation remarkable receives argument be sound.This purelyphilosophical the expansionand thermotheoriesconcerning from currentastrophysical thesenot allegation, to Popper's Contrary of the universe.l properties dynamic
[I97I]; see Peebles[I97I]; Sciama fromsingularity, of the universe On the expansion Gott,et al. [I974], pp. 543-53; Weedman pp. I55-86; Harrison [I973], [I972]; Weinberg pp. 28-49. [I976], andNovikov andZel'dovich pp. 227-62; [I976], of a finite past, see Schlegel[I 968], pp. 500-23; indicators On thermodynamic Davies[I974], pp. I03-4, I88-9I; Landsberg pp. 40I-2; [I973], andZel'dovich Novikov andPark[I975], pp. 485-95; andZwart[I976], pp. 93-II9.

Whitrow andPopper on theImpossibility of an Infinite Past

I 69

only ensurethe existenceof a universal time reckoned fromthe originof the universeseveralbillionyears ago until now, but also of physicaland causal continuityof the series of past events back to the point of singularity and absolute origin.
WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

Universitat Munchen
REFERENCES AL-ALOUSt, M. H. E. [I965]: The Problemof Creationin Islamic Thought.Baghdad:
National Printing and Publishing Co.

AL-AZM, S. L. [I972]: The Origins of Kant's Argumentsin the Antinomies.Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

AL_GHAZALI [I958]: Tahafut al-Falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers) (translated

by S. A. Kamali). Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress.

AL_GHAZALI [I965]: 'The Jerusalem Tract' (translated and edited by A. L. Tibasi). IslamicQuarterly, 9, PP. 95-I22. AL-GHAZALI [I962]: Kitab al-Iqtisad(with a Foreward by I. A. vubukcu and H. Atay3.
Ankara: University of Ankara Press.

AL-KINDI [I9741: Al-Kindt's Metaphysics:A Translation of Ya'qubibn Ishaq al-Kindi's Treatise 'On First Philosophy'(with an Introduction and Commentary by Alfred
L. Ivry). Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. BIRD, J. H. [I966]: 'The Beginning of the Universe', The AristotelianSociety, 40, pp.

I39-50 BLANCHET, L.-12. rI976]: 'L'infinidans les pensees3fuiveet Arabe>,Laval theologique et philosophique, 32, PP. I I-2I. BROAD, C. D. [I955]: 'Kant's Mathematical Antinomies', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,40, PP. I-22. CRAIG, W. L. [I977]: 'The Cosmological Argument and Infinite Temporal Regression', Archivfur Geschichte derPhilosophie, 59, PP. 26I-79. CRAIG, W. L. [forthcoming]: The Kalam Cosmological Argument. London and New York:
Macmillan and Barnes and Noble.

DAVIDSON, H. A. [I969]: 'John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation', 3tournal of the AmericanOrientalSociety, 89, PP. 357-9I. DAVIES, P. C. W. [I974]: The Physics of Time Assymetry.London: Surrey University Press. ELLIS, B. [I955]: 'Has the Universe a Beginning in Time?' Australasianyourtlalof Philosophy33, PP. 32-7. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. S.v. 'Infinity in Mathematics and Logic', by James Thomson. EWING,A. C. [I950]: A Short Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'.2nd edn.
London: Methuen and Co.

GOTT, J. R.; GUNN J. E.; SCHRAMM, D. N. and TINSLEY, B. M. [I974]: 'An Unbound Universe?' Astrophysical 3tournalI94, PP. 543-53. HARRISON, E. R. [I973]: 'Standard Model of the Early Universe', Annual Reviezvof Astronomy and AstrophysicsII, PP. I55-86. KANT, I. [I929]: Immanuel Kant's 'Critique of PureReason'(translated by Norman Kemp
Smith). London: Macmillan and Co. LANDSBERG, P. T. and PARK,D. [I975]: 'Entropy in an oscillating universe', Proceedings of the Royal Societyof London Series A, 346, pp. 485-95. MARTIN, G. [I955]: Kant'sMetaphysics and Theory of Science(translated by P. G. Lucas). Manchester: Manchester University Press; reprint edn. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, I974. NOVIKOV, I. D. and ZEL DOVICH, YA. B. [I973]: Physical Processes near Cosmological Singularities', AnnualReviewof Astronomy and Astrophysics, II, PP. 40I-2. PEEBLES, P. J. E. [I97I]: Physical Cosmology.Princeton Series in Physics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

I70 WillionLaneCraig
POPPER, K. R. [I978]: 'On the Possibility of an Infinite Past: a Reply to Whitrow', British3ronrnalfor the Philosophy of Science,29, pp. 47-8. RESCHER, N. and KHATCHADOURIAN, H. [I966]: 'Al-Kindi'sEpistle on the Finitude of the Universe', Isis, 57, PP. 426-33. RUSSELL, B. [I929]: Our Knowledge of the External World.2nd. edn. New York: W. W. Norton alld Co. SAADIA GAON[I948]: The Book of Beliefs and Opinions(translatedby S Rosenblatt). New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. SAMBURSKY, S. [I972]: 'Note on John Philoponus Rejection of the I-nfinite, in S. M. Stern, A. Houraniand V. Brown(eds.):IslamicPhilosophy and the ClassicalTradition. Columbia,S.C.: University of South CarolinaPress. SCHLFGEL, R. [I954-5]: 'The Age of the Universe', British Xournalfor the Philosophyof Scienee,5, PP. 226-36. SCHLEGEL, R. [I968]: 'Time and Thermodynamics',in J. T. Fraser(ed.): The TFoicesof Time.London: Penguin Press. SCIAMA, D. W. [I97I]; ModernCosmology. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. SCRIV, M. [I954-5]: 'The Age of the Universe', British3fournal for the Philosophyof Science,5, PP. I8 I-90. SHAMSI, F. A. [I975]: 'Al-Kindi's Epistle on What Cannot Be Infinite and of What Infinity May Be Attributed',IslamicStudies,I4, PP. I23-44. STURCH, R. L. [I970]: 'The CosmologicalArgument'.Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University. SWINBURNE, R. G. [I966]: 'The Beginning of the Universe', TheAristotelianSociety,40, PP. I 25-3 8. SWINBURNE, R. G. [I968]: Space and Time.London: Macmillan. WEEDMAN, D. [I976]: 'Seyfert Galaxies,Quasarsand Redshifts',Quarterly 3'ournal of the Royal Astronomical Society, I7, PP. 227-62. WEINBERG, S. [I972]: Gravitationand Cosmology. New York: Wiley. WHITROW, G. J. [I954-5]: 'The Age of the Universe', British3tournal for the Philosophy of Science,5, PP. 2I 5-25. WHITROW, G. J. [I978]: 'On the Impossibilityof an InfinitePast', British3tournal for the Philosophy of Science,2f9,PP. 39-45. ZEL DOVICH, YA. B. and NOVIKOV, I. D. [I976]: 'Contemporary Trends in Cosmology, Soviet Studiesin Philosophy,I4, PP. 28-49. ZWART, P. V. [I976]: AboutTime.Amsterdam and Oxford:North-HollandPublishingCo.

GENERALRELATIVITY AND THE LENGTH OF TEIE: PAST In a reeentissue of this 70urnal G. J. Whitrow [I978] argues, on the basisof purelya priorior eoneeptual considerations, that the universemust have a finite past. But he also takescomfortin the faet that, 'Aeeording to eurrent views, theoretieal world models ... basedon generalrelativity must eontain singularities, e.g. an initialsingularity eorresponding to an epoeh of "worldcreation" at a finitepastepoeh.[And]"world creation" signifies a finitepast.To elaimmorethanthat takesus beyondseieneeinto theology.' (Whitrow [I978], p. 358). However,I thinkWhitrow is wrongin takingeomfort in generalrelativity. Firstof all,rather thansupporting theviewthatthe pastmust be finite,aeeording to generalrelativity there are eireumstanees underwhieh the past would be infinite. And seeondly, the so ealled'initial' singularity mentioned by Whitrow doesnotimply a finitepast.Let us diseussthesein turn. I. If we assume thatthelarge sealestrueture of theuniverse eanbe represented by one of the Robertson Walker models(spaeeis isotropie and homogeneous, so thatthe 3 dimensional spatial metrieis of the formR(t)2da2, da independent