Jack L. Dull - Anti-Qin Rebels No Peasant Leaders Here

Anti-Qin Rebels: No Peasant Leaders Here Author(s): Jack L. Dull Source: Modern China, Vol. 9, No.
3, Symposium: Peasant Rebellions in China (Jul., 1983), pp. 285-318 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188992 . Accessed: 23/09/2013 15:40
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Anti-QinRebels
No Peasant Leaders Here JACKL. DULL
University of Washington
Was the Qin dynasty The overthrown by peasant uprisings? of Chen standardanswerto thatquestionconjuresup a picture Sheng,an agricultural laborer who,without weapons,ledthefirst of a swarmof uprisings thatwereto engulf the Qin regime and lead finally to thefounding oftheHan dynasty. Chen Shengwas ofpeasantorigins and thefollowers of manyleaderswhotook to thebattlefields wereundoubtedly peasants.We cannotprovethe latter point,forwe knownextto nothing about thecomposition of the armiesthatopposed the Qin and theneach other.But it seems reasonableto assume thatthe armiesof a fundamentally agrarian wouldhavebeenmadeup ofpeasants.We do not society knowwhatmotivated mostofthesepeasantsto enter rebelarmies werenotsimply hencewe (assuming they dragoonedintoservice); cannotcomment on peasantmotivation. evidentially This article focuseson theleadersoftheperiodaboutwhomwedo havesome information. Ifthestandard to theopening answer questionwerevalid,there would be no need to reopen the case. A criticalreviewof the
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wishto thankStevenDickinson for his workon thedraft translationof theShuihudiQinmuzhujian (whichis citedin thisarticle).
Modern China, Vol. 9 No. 3, July1983285-318 Inc. 1983 Sage Publications,
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evidence will show, however,that the typicalimage of Qin dynastypolicies is wrong,and that the alleged natureof the mustbe reconsidered. Our case derives from anti-Qin opposition the examples usually cited to prove that the Qin regimewas ofmanpower and and unfeeling in itsmobilization irresponsible examples do not initstax policies.After demonstrating thatthese warrantthe usual interpretations, we shall consider general commenstatements and near contemporary by contemporary and finally considercases of theleadersthemselves. tators,
CONSCRIPTION theQin regime was One ofthecommonly madecharges against ofmanpower formilitary dutyand for itsexcessivemobilization originates construction projects.A famouscase thatapparently in the in theShiji biography ofChen Shengmaybe incapsulated following quotation:
ofCh'in[209 B.C.], in Duringthefirst yearoftheSecond Emperor ofninehundred theseventh month, an order camefora force men from the poor side of town to be sent to garrisonYu-yang [Watson,1961.I, 19; emphasisadded].
on the Roughlythesame Chinesepassage appearsin thetreatise "mobilized economyin Ban Gu's Hanshu: the Qin government on] theleft families sideofthe[village]gateways living [menfrom to guard the frontiers" (Swann, 1950: 147; her brackets,my to convince Liu An, emphasis).In the120sB.C., Wu Bei,intrying theKingofHuainan,notto rebelagainsttheHan throne pointed undertheHan werenotcomparableto those out thatconditions thattheQin includedtheassertion underthe Qin; his argument on theleft ofthoseliving side of had ordereda summons regime the villagegates. This example has been acceptedin nearlyall in itsdownfall oftheQin dynasty and thefactors studies modern (see, for example, Yoshinami, 1978: 455-457; and He, 1955: 24-25).
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discussion. Thereare two aspectsofthispassage thatwarrant side ofthevillage"(luzuo);we is themeaningof"theleft The first The second themeaning oftheterm. can onlyspeculateregarding in thefullcontextofthe whenconsidered aspectis thattheterm, To put it the accepted interpretation. passage, does not justify is wrong. bluntly, the acceptedinterpretation means to the leftof thegate, as a villageor a Luzuo literally have felt compelledto elaborateon ward,butthecommentators the term. One commonly cited "explanation" is that other theQin simply havingbeenexhausted, ofconscriptees categories sideoflaneswereto be thatall thosewho livedon theleft ordered this after was overthrown drafted. Since theQin dynasty shortly mobilization,it was never able to call up those on the right (Swann, 1950: 147, n. 126 whereshe paraphrasesYing Shao's have assumed that some Other commentators commentary). of on the a village gate and have lived left side discretegroup soughtto "explain"thepassage. This interpretation accordingly thattherich assumes(in spiteofno evidencefortheassumption) side ofvillagelanes; thatthepoor lived people livedon theright and thatonlytherichweresupposedto serve.But so on theleft, manyoftherichhad alreadybeencalled up thatthestatehad to that turnto the poor. It is on the basis of this interpretation luzuo as "the poor side of thetown"(see Watson has translated above; see also He, 1955: 24-25; Shiji, 1934:48, 3 givesall these has it thatthosewho were explanations).A finalunderstanding livedon theleft, butsinceall thoseon conscription exemptfrom to turn to those thestatewas forced theright had alreadyserved, on the left.As He Ciquan points out, eitherof the lattertwo leads to theconclusion thatpeoplewhooughtnotto explanations have had to servehad been called up. All threeof these interpretations have one commonfeature: The firstone in they suggest a massive conscriptioneffort. but to a limitedextentthe othersas well, lead the particular, readerto believethat about 50% of the adult male population of households on both (assumingtherewas equal distribution The roadsofthe forduty. sidesofthestreet) was beingsummoned empire would have been clogged with conscripts.Watson's
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translation further aggravates thesituation by implying thatall came fromChen Sheng'svillage.The totalforce 900 conscripts sentto Yuyangconsisted ofthatmanymen,butthetextdoes not suggestthattheyall came fromthe same place. Indeed, Chen Sheng and Wu Guang are described as comingfrom two rather distant places.The idea ofconscripting almostone halfthemale populationwas acceptedbecause manypeople werewillingto believetheworstabout theQin. Certainly Wu Bei thought that irresponsible behavioras reflected in thisorderdistinguished the Qin from the Han, and that although the Qin was easily overthrown, Wu Bei's patronoughtnotto attempt to riseagainst the Han. When we considerthisphrasein the contextof thefullShiji passage,we see thatit is quiteunlikely thatanyofthepreceding interpretations are warranted. The next sentencein the Shiji biography ofChen Shengreads:"Chen She and Wu Guangwere statement converts an asininepolicyofconscription at therateof 50% oftheeligiblepopulaceintoa reasonablecall formenbased is a rotation upon rotation. Whatwe glimpse imperfectly system in whichthose who lived on the left(whatever thatmay mean beyondtheobvious) and thosewho livedon theright alternated irn to conscription responding orders(thereis thepossibility that thissystem existed onlyinChenSheng'svillage).Butthere was an additional, important,and often overlooked, aspect of the system: Amongthosewholivedon theleft, for there example, was a further rotation to whichturns system, according weretaken. Chen Shengwas conscripted because bothconditions weremet: he livedon theleft and histurn had comeup. Thus,inspiteofthe withwhichthe"left frequency side ofthelane" case is cited,it is withoutfoundation.Chen and the othersin his group were summonedaccordingto whatseemsto have been the standard conscription system.We may also add the following historiographicalnote: Ban Gu, in writing his Hanshu, oftencopied from material theShijion a wordforwordbasis,buthetoo omits the passage thatwould indicatethattherewas nothing excepamong those whose turn it was to go. "This crucially important
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tional in the mobilization of Chen Sheng (Ban Gu, 1962: 31/1786). One otherexample of anti-Qinpropaganda based upon its allegedconscription policieswillhelp to clear away moreof the dismalfogengulfing thisshort-lived Much has beenmade regime. of the terrible costs involvedin the construction of the Afang palace complex(left at thetimeoftheFirstEmperor's incomplete death)and inthebuilding oftheFirstEmperor's tomb.I shallnot (indeed,I cannot)arguethatthepalace project was simpleorthat the tomb was cheap. What can be demonstrated is thatneither themobilization oflarge-scale projectrequired corveeforces.In the first year of the Second Emperor'sreign(209 B.C.) after a touroftheeasternpartoftheempire, completing theemperor notedthatworkhad been suspendedon the Afangpalace while theearthwas beingreturned to thetomboftheFirstEmperoron Mount Li. He observedthat not completing the Afangpalace would be tantamount to admitting thatthe FirstEmperorhad made a mistakein ordering the project.Since the workon the FirstEmperor's tombwas largely complete, he ordered thatwork resumeon the palace complex. In the "Annals" of the Second Emperor, thisorderis followed three entries laterbytherecord of Chen Sheng initiating his rebellion(Shiji 6/73-74). Since Han times, resumptionof work on the palace has been closely associatedwithChen's rebellion.Furthermore, in thefollowing year, some of the rebels had moved precariously close to the capital.The emperor, belatedly aware ofthethreat posed bythe approaching rebels, soughtadviceamonghisministers. This was theresponseof Zhang Han, the PrivyTreasurer:
The bandits have already become numerousand are powerful. is no timeto mobilizetroopsinnearby Now there prefectures. The convict laborers (tu) on MountLi arenumerous. I request thatyou pardon themand providethemwithweapons in orderto attack [the bandits].The Second Emperorgranted a generalpardon to theempireand commissioned Zhang Han as general.He attacked and smashed[the rebel]army[Shiji, 6/75].
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The foregoing information warrants thefollowing conclusions. First,in spite of the emperor'sorder,eitherworkhad not yet resumed on theAfangPalace, or itwas still progressing slowly for Zhang Han specifically refers to the laborersstillengaged in finishing theFirstEmperor's tomb.Second,thelaborforcethat had workedon theAfangPalace and thenon thetombwerenot conscriptlaborersat all; theywereconvicts.Thus, it is highly unlikely thatan orderconscripting labor foreither thetombor the palace was ever issued. Third, we mightnote the rather conservative policy regarding the use of labor on these two projects. In 212 B.C. whenworkwas begunon theAfang palaces, a convict laborforce (tuxingzhe) of700,000was setto work, some on the palaces and some on the tomb (Shiji, 6/54). When the died twoyearslater, emperor have simply thegovernment might thelaborers on thetombinorder to complete augmented working it as rapidly as possible.Instead,thoseconvict laborers working on thepalaces weretransferred to thetombsite.Furthermore, in is discussed, thesame yearworkon bothprojects theShiji notes thatwhen30,000families weremovedto thetombtownand an additional50,000families weremovedto Yunyang (theterminus of one of the new highways),both groups of familieswere exemptedfromcorveedutyfor 10 years.Such policieshardly a regime a supposedly seemto characterize with insatiable hunger formanpower. In sum,thespecific cases ofQin conscription practices do not revealthepolitically foolish and humanly destructive policiesthat oftheallegedly we have longacceptedas characteristic heartless Qin. To the contrary, the summonsthatfatefully nettedChen to Sheng seems to have been based upon a measuredattempt share conscriptionobligations among the general populace. the human labor used in the huge construction Furthermore, labor butconvictlabor. Workon the projectswas notconscript second project did not entail a new massive summons of of human resources manpower,but rathera cautious shifting to acceptthe to another. It is thusdifficult from one undertaking notionthatQin conscription policiescreatedinordinately heavy burdenswhichweredecisivecauses in thedownfallof the Qin dynasty
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TAXES amountofmaterial we haveon the limited A review ofthevery indicates thatwecan probably notlook to it foran Qin tax system explanationof the rebellions againstthe Qin. We shall beginby repeating some of the usual chargesmade againstthe Qin and theevidence. thenscrutinize was the The mostcondemnatory chargeagainsttheQin regime tax load itforcedupon itspeople. The locus classicus staggering of this chargeis in the "Treatiseon Food and Money" of the we read: Qin Shihuang Hanshu where,in Swann's translation, "collected (ca. 212 B.C.) much more than a half[that is, twothirds oftheproductsofthepeople as military] taxfu" (Swann, The commentators 1950:147;herparensand brackets). agreethat the taiban,Swann's"muchmorethana half,"meanstwo-thirds; is to Han Gaozu's same expression used in Shiji (7/66) to refer possessionoftwo-thirds oftheempire whenhisenemy Xiang Yu heldtheremainder. Swann'sinsertion oftheword"military" may be valid, but as it is irrelevant for our purposes,we shall not discussit.The meaning ofthepassageis clear:theQin government collected taxes, fu, at the rate of approximately 66% of the farmer's produce.This famousstatement, referring to one ofthe mostsolidly entrenched oftheQin regime, characteristics is utter nonsense.It tellsus a greatdeal aboutthepeoplewhofabricated a repugnant imageoftheQin, butit tellsus nothing about theQin tax system. There are severalreasons whythisstatement is of no value. fora peasantfamily First, to subsist on onlyone-third ofitscrops, havingsurrendered two-thirds in taxes,would assumean exceptionallyhighlevelofproductivity or ancillary sourcesofincome on a broad scale; thereis no hintthatsuch conditions existed. taxrateis incompatible Second,thisasserted with other economic features of the period.Dong Zhongshuinforms us thatlandless peasantshad to pay50% oftheir produceas rent to richlandlords (Swann, 1950: 182). Assumingthatlandlords,not renters, were responsible fortaxes,no one would wantto be a landlord;they wouldlose money every yearas rent incomeprovedinsufficient to pay thetax bill. Dong Zhongshu'stestimony regarding the50%
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Dong was not above rentalrateshouldprobablybe discounted. of the supposedly (such as his poignantdescription hyperbole land on which enough not own who did peasant Chinese typical Lin to stand an awl) nor was he above historicalfabrication: makes the verystrongcase that it was Dong who Jianming created the historical"fact" that Qin abolished the well-field (Lin, 1981: 204-205,n. 23). Thus, tenantsperhapspaid system rentat a rateclose to 50% but it is unlikely-simplyon logical grounds-thatthetax ratecould havebeencloseto 66%. The Qin was morecomplexthan Ban Gu's allegationwould tax system in lead us to believe.We turnnow to some detailsof thesystem notionofthetax rateof thisexaggerated to rest orderto layfully 66%, although we must admit at the onset that we cannot thepreciserates. determine collecteda tax on grainproducedand a poll The Qin regime in 408 B.C. by Duke Jian tax. The graintax (zu) was instituted tianzu,land tax,in (Shiji, 15,42). Dong Zhongshuuses theterm to thistax (Swann, 1950:182;Ban Gu, 1962:24A/1137). referring Over half a century later,in 348 B.C. when Shang Yang was levied a poll tax (fu) was first his famousreforms, inaugurating by (Ban Gu, 1962: 15/68).That thefuwas a poll tax is indicated "mouth"or per capita Dong's use of the termkoufu-literally, tax (Swann, 1950: 182; Ban Gu, 1962:24A/1137) and also by a by Shang Yang. Underhis guidancea law special law instituted decreed:"Those families people,min] [literally: was issuedwhich do notdivideinto havetwoor moreadultmalesand which which fudoubled"(Ban Gu, 1962: separate[households]willhavetheir 68/8; see also Lin, 1981: 190-191;Duyvendak,1928: 15; Ch'u, doubt: Fu 1972:252). The usage offuinthispassage leaveslittle also paid a tax was a poll tax. And,in additionto it, Qin farmers on thegrainthey produced.Whatweretheratesforthesetaxes? them.Dong tellsus thattheland of no We have way determining on sales of statemonopolizedsalt tax, poll tax, and the profits as comparedto thatof the peasant'sburden, and ironincreased ancientpeasants,twentyfold (Swann, 1950: 182). Still,thisdoes not answerour question.
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The evidence for a land tax (zu) and a poll tax (fu), even withoutknowledgeof the rates,allows us to dismissBan Gu's thefutax of66%. This rateis highenoughto statement regarding be dismissed out of hand as anti-Qinpropaganda. The dual system ofzu and fusuggests thatBan's chargewas notbasedupon any analysisof the Qin tax system, but was littlemore than a wildly exaggerated charge. Lest we appear to be too harshinjudgingBan Gu, wenotethat he was not thecreatorofthesupposed66% tax rate;itis already found in the Huainanzi (T'ang, 1975: 197, citing Huainanzi, "Binglue"chapter, ofQin policiesand Shang 444-445).In defense to the law quoted above, thatis, Yang we also draw attention those familiesthathad two or more adult males had theirpoll taxes doubled when the adult sons did not found theirown households.That is,thestatedid notrequire each adultmalein a householdto pay thepoll tax. Another false image of the Qin may have come fromthe "Annals" of the Second Emperor.There, in the translation of Yang and Yang (1979: 189),we findthefollowing: As there tofeed inthecapital were mouths many andnotenough provisions, grainand fodder wereleviedfrom the provinces, were transport workers to supply ordered their ownrations, and allgrain three within 1i ofHsienyang hundred wascommandeered. Chavannes rendersthe last clause more literally with"A trois centsli a la ronde de Hien-yang, (le peuple) ne put mangerses moissons,"and thenexplains in a footnote that"Parce qu'elles avaienteterequisitionnees"(Chavannes, 1967:11,203-204and fn. Unless one has an insatiable desire to condemn the Qin blindacceptance dynasty, ofthisstatement is exceedingly difficult or flatly impossible.The possibility thatthegovernment had the power-toconfiscate all grainor even thatit thought thatit had thatpoweris nil.Theremustbe a better explanationthantheone givenin thesetranslations.
1).
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In fact,the textgivenin thelongerversionabove has caused problems formanycommentators. Takikawa(1934), quotingan earlierJapanesecommentator, agreeswiththe renditions given above (Shiji,6/74). In hiscommentary on theZizhztongiian, Hu Sanxingpointsto difficulties in thefirst partof thepassage and seemsto agree withthe quoted translators regarding the latter partofthepassage(ch. 7, p. 50). On theother hand,Fang Bao, an earlyQing classicist, offers a verydifferent interpretation-one thatmakesperfectly good sensewithout leadingto theconclusion that theQin government was attempting to commandeer all grain li oftheQin capital.The fullpassage(Shiji, within three hundred as follows: 6/74) as interpreted by Fang, maybe rendered Those who had to be fedweremany and provisions werenot sufficient for downward allocation.The commanderies and prefectures intransporting pulse(or beans, shu),millet (su),hay (chu), and straw (gao) wereall ordered to provide their own rations. Within three who hundred liofXianyang, [they, i.e.,those were toeattheir transported grain] notpermitted grain [the grain were they transporting]. Whatthepassagemeansis thatuntil thenpeoplewhotransported took their thegrainthey wereshipping graineither rations from to the capital, or they received their rations from central government storehouses. the commanderies and the Hereafter, fromtheirown resourceswere to bear the cost of prefectures shippingthe grain and other supplies. The passage cannot possibly mean that the central government had decided to li of thecapital. confiscate all grainwithin threehundred As in the cases of conscription, the specific examples of tax collectionrates and procedurescan not stand close scrutiny without or propagandistically collapsingas fabrications induced of the material.There are, however, misreadings some general statements that must also be considered.They are somewhat moreconvincing than the specific cases, ifforno otherreason than the fact than theyare not as outlandishnor as patently refutable.
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GENERAL INTERPRETA TIONS OF QIN POLICIES
We shall consider three examples of general interpretive is by thatbear on the downfallof the Qin. The first statements of Chen the Lu ministerial contemporaries Sheng; second,by Jia, one of Han Gaozu's advisors; and the thirdis fromJia Yi's renowned "Faults of Qin." As the numberof rebelsincreasedand as more government of the Qin capital to attack troops were sent fromthe vicinity theSecond Emperor them, thethree ministers admonished highest as follows: is becauseof thebitterness That thebandits of are numerous and construction and becausepoll conscription, transportation, and land taxesare great a haltto theAfang (da). We request ofmilitary onandshipments to Palacework andreduction service thefour frontiers [Shiji, 6/77]. The emperor's ofthree was to orderthearrest response ministers; two of them committedsuicide, and the third, Li Si, was imprisoned, tortured, and finally executed.What is noteworthy in the jointly offeredadvice is that whereas the ministers acknowledgeheavytaxes and levies,their recommendaspecific tionsareto haltworkon thepalace complexand to reducecertain otheractivities to frontier relating areas. Presumably, had their advice been followed,therewould have been some reduction in corvee duties and in the land and poll taxes as these imposts pertained to construction workand border matters. Butthisis not a call forsweeping in exactions. reductions Lu Jiahad longbeena follower ofHan Gaozu inthelatter's rise to power, and he had served the Han founderas a foreign diplomat. Lu wantedthe Han regimeto operate accordingto Confucian principles, and frequently urged Gaozu to rule by benevolence and righteousness, drawinghis lessons fromthe classics of poetry and history. Gaozu ordinarily did notrespond to thiskindof advice. After warmly one such haranguehad left Gaozu illat ease and displeased, theemperor ordered Lu Jiato try
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to write a pieceon whyQin had losttheempire and Han had won it. The resultwas the Xinyu (New Sayings) (Shiji, 97/12-17; Watson, 1961: I, 275-278). For our purposes, Lu's piece is disappointing. First,at least half the chaptersdo not pertain eitherto the fall of the Qin or the riseof the Han. Second, his comments on thefalloftheQin are diffuse and lackinganykind of analytical rigor.Severalpointsmade by Lu are, nevertheless, worth noting. Lu Jia emphasizedthe role of the Second Emperorin his comments on thefalloftheQin. In thefirst heproduceda chapter strikingparallel when he observed that Duke Huan of Qi (contrary to what Menciuswould lead us to believe)"esteemed virtue and thereby theSecond Emperor becamehegemon; ofQin esteemed punishments and perished" (Lu Jia,p. 3). In thesecond chapter, theSecond Emperor was likened to thelastrulers ofthe Xia and Shang dynastiesregarding calamities(p. 4). On the thatassertion surface, maynotmake muchsense,butin thelast chapter thatQin kings muchbad luck (p. 21), Lu suggests suffered due to their lackofbenevolence and righteousness. Chapter three, "Fuzheng"("AidingintheAdministration'), thecharge reiterates thattheSecond Emperor reliedexcessively on punishments and thenattributes thefallofQin to Zhao Gao (thepolitically domineeringeunuch), and Li Si (one of the chancellors).Lu Jia admonisheshis imperialreaderthatthe successful ruleris one whoreliesupon sages,notmensuchas Zhao Gao and Li Si (p. 5). Byimplication, theQin failedbecausetheSecond Emperor tried to relyupon thesetwo men. Not untilChapterfour,"Wu-wei" ("Non-action"),is the FirstEmperorsingledout forattention. There,Lu refers to thecruelpunishment thattheFirstEmperor in order to restrain createdoftearing people apartwith carriages evil(in spiteofthefact thatShangYang was presumably executed in thismannerabout a century beforethe founding of the Qin empire), his building of the Great Wall, and his military "It is notthat campaigns.Lu summarized hispositionas follows: Qin did notwantto govern thereasonthey well.However, lostit (i.e., the empire) is that their undertakings were cruel and numerous, and their use ofpunishments was too extreme" (p. 7).
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Thus, Lu Jia,a man who had livedundertheQin empireand who had foughtagainst it, does not, except belatedlyand in generalterms, attribute thedownfalloftheregime to hightaxes and excessivecorvee.Rather, he focusesattention on theSecond Emperor'sharshpunishments and on hisfailure to relyon good ministers. In a much less focused way he refers to the First Emperor'sprojects,military campaigns,and use of the law. If is a validgeneralization there thatcan be derived from Lu's text, it is thatthere was a general ofillwilldirected feeling lesstoward the Qin dynasty than towardthe Second Emperor.If thisinterpretation is correct,then a search for the specificcauses of the regime'sdownfall-such as hightaxes-will not be successful. Theredoes however, seemto havebeen a vagueenmity bornofa complexset of factors: taxes (althoughtheywerenot as highas they aresometimes madeoutto be), corveeobligations (although not as exactingas theyare sometimes made out to be), harsh punishments (althoughthe impact of these is verydifficult to judge), and perhapsmostimportantly thesensethatthegovernmentdid not have theinterests ofitssubjectsat heart.In thislast respect, Lu Jia'sfamousquestionto Han Gaozu is based upon an accurateassessment ofthefalloftheQin dynasty and ofwhatthe Han dynasty would have to do to survive:"Your Majestymay have won it on horseback,but can you rule it on horseback?" Benevolence and righteousness (valuesthatbothsubject and ruler can share),notmilitary might and harshlaws(benefitting onlythe ruler), willassurelengthy possessionoftheempire (Shiji, 97/16; Watson, 1961: I, 277-278). JiaYi's "Faults ofQin" istoo longto be summarized indetailin thisarticle, butthemajorpoints ineach ofthethree sections ofthe essayareworth noting. (The first partofJia'sessayis translated in deBary,1960: 150-152;all three partsare in Chavannes,1967:11, 219-236;the de Baryversionhas been reprinted in Birch,1965: 46-48 and in Li, 1975: 316-319,eventhoughthisfirst partis the least detailedand leastsignificant of thethree.Chineseversions are widelyavailable; I have used Shiji,6/91-114.) The first part of Jia Yi's "Faults" tracesthe rise of the Qin, notingQin Shihuang'sexpansionoftheempirein thesouthwest
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and wealth, and in thenorth. Chen Sheng,lackingbothprestige easilybecauseit lacked was able to bring down theQin dynasty and because its rulersdid not benevolenceand righteousness, thepowersto subdueand thepowersneeded distinguish between that rather vaguely to maintain theempire. Thus,JiaYi suggests the strain in creatingthe empire was perpetuatedafterits founding,whereas benevolentand righteouspolicies in that In otherwords, second stagewould have allowed it to perdure. us with Jia'sanalysisinthefirst partofhisessaydoes notprovide oftheQin. specific data to accountfortheease oftheoverthrow that Part two of thisfamousessay beginswiththe assertion peace people eagerlyacceptedQin rule because it reestablished did and orderand made people feelsecure.But theQin founder not alterhis administration to reflect the new tasks at handtheempirehe had gained.JiaYi thenoffers namelymaintaining an insightful observationthat helps to explain some of Chen Sheng'sbehavior:
their necksto nonedid notstrain WhenErshicame to thethrone The cold found advantagein their observehis administration. the hungry foundtastytheirlees of liquor and coarse clothing; is a resource fora theirhusksofgrain.The wailingof theempire to theease withwhicha weariedpeoplemay newruler. This refers be made benevolent.
Jia then lists nine policies the Second Emperormighthave the loss of theempire.The pursuedthatwould have prevented Jia attachedto the allegedheavytaxes and relative importance ofthisitemas eighth corveeis revealedin hisranking demanding on his list. Jia assertsthat the Second Emperorshould have that rulerand subjectshould employedthe loyal and worthy; have been of one mind so that the rulerwould have shown in theempire;thathe should have concernforthegriefstricken corrected the faultsof the preceding ruler;thathe should have created fiefs;that he should have moderatedthe punishment system;and so on. Taxes and corvee were only one of many ofJia Yi, theSecond Emperor.In thethinking problems facing The chargesleviedby theywerenotamongthemostimportant.
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Jia indicatethattheseproblems werefelt in all levelsof thestate and society. in thefollowing Jia generalizes statement: both evilandfalseness andsuperiors andinferAfterwards, arose, iorsdeceived eachother. Thosewhowere were numerpunished ous. . From theruler tothemasses, andministers down people oftheir borean awareness owndanger; . . nonewere satisfied in their positions, andtherefore were they easily mobilized. distrust and enmity was sharedbythegoverned Thus,a pervasive and the governors.These characteristics, as we shall see, are important in accountingfor the natureof the rebellionsthat sweptaway theQin dynasty. The thirdpart of Jia's piece focusesinitially on Ziylng,the hapless thirdand final rulerof the Qin empire,and reiterates someoftheearlier themes. therebellion was well ByZiying's time, but Qin forces"did not maintaintheirdefensesnor underway, close thepasses,long lances piercedno one and strong bows did not shoot." The inadequacy of the Qin defenses created a paradox. The Qin kingdom (i.e., the preimperialQin) had repeatedly withstoodthe attacks and combined forcesof the otherstatesto itseast. Now, however, thetidefrom theeast was so overwhelming thatnot even the territory of the originalQln state could be preserved. Large-scalepopular illwillcombined withwidespread official distrust to bring about theutter destructionof theQin. Our surveyof the data has thusfarallowed us to reach two conclusions.First,the specific chargesbrought againstthe Qin are invalid. They are unfounded propaganda; they are not designedto explain whythe Qin fell(althoughhistorically they have beenacceptedas explanations) butto serveas objectlessons for Han and later rulers. That the specificcharges are not adequategrounds forexplaining why theQin fellis also suggested bythethreegeneralinterpretations oftheproblems facedbythe lateQln. Although Li Si, Lu Jiaand JiaYi all refer to heavytaxes and corvee,none of themarguesthatthesefactors wereinstrumentalin the fall of the Qin. Our second conclusion is most evidentfromthe writings of Lu Jia and Jia Yi, both of whom
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Han and who were wroteduringtheearlyyearsof theWestern Theydrawattention propagandatrend. intheanti-Qin important for support intherealmofgeneral Qin failings defined to vaguely theregime. forces. to theleadersoftheanti-Qin ourattention We nowturn Chen of interpretation In doingso, we shallsee thatthestandard to the I refer interpretation" By"standard wrong. Shengis simply Chen thattreats and modern) (bothtraditional copious literature launchedagainstthe Sheng as the leader of a peasant uprising cruel and wicked legalistic Qin dynasty(see, for example, Yoshinami,1978;He, 1955;and "Chen Sheng"in theCihai,1979, a surveyof the major leaders in the 1982: 428). Furthermore, to does not revealan ardentdetermination anti-Qlnmovement selfeliminateQin inequitiesbut ratherreveals opportunistic This reflects trendsthathad the meritocratic aggrandizement. severalcenturiesbeen slowlyevolvingduringthe preceding low) (indeed,rather thatallowed menof nonaristocratic trends society competitive to moveup in thedemandingly social origins social of the time. Finally,we shall also see a ratherdifferent oftheold social and political theremnants namely, phenomenon: to power. Both social themselves orderwho wantedto restore elements,the old elite and the nonelite,shared the common the autonomousstatesthathad politicalaim of reestablishing absorbed into the and incompletely been overrun, obliterated, local was incomplete, process Becausetheabsorption Qin empire. werestillstrongand could serveto rallysome of the identities and thesocialorigins rebelleaders.We shallproceedbyreviewing of the the leaders of activities period. major theearlyrebel
CHEN SHENG AND WU GUANG: CREATING AN OPPORTUNITY
to byhiszi Chen referred ofChen Sheng(often The biography Ban Gu, inWatson,1961:1,19-33; She) intheShiji(48; translated Once while Chen'syouth: withan anecdotefrom 1962:31) begins withhiredlaborers,he ceased his plowing,ascendeda working
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said, "If I becomerichand hilland, sighing deeplyand lengthily, the restof you" (Watson, 1961: I, 19). noble, I shall not forget be "If any of us becomerich translation might (Perhaps a better each other.')The laborerslaughingly and noble,letus notforget "If one plows as a hiredhand,how can one become responded, thatChenSheng'syouth suggests richand noble!" Otherevidence After he became kingsome of his old was spend withlaborers: at hiscourtwas not soughthimout.Theirvulgarpresence friends and ill-bred" appreciated.One guestwas describedas "ignorant and his ancedotes about Chen Sheng's life in the old days allegedly degraded the king's dignity.Chen Sheng had him beheaded. As we shall see, thereis some reason to believethat whateverChen did betweenhis youthas a hiredhand and his earlyrebelcareer,he probablydid not remaina simplepeasant of the anecdote that opens Chen's laborer. The significance ambition, or,as he is, ofcourse,to revealhisyouthful biography put it afterthe laborers laughed at him, "How can finches of a swan!" theambitions understand In 209 B. C., Chen Sheng and Wu Guang wereconscripted, along with900 othersto servegarrisondutyat Yuyang (near under modernBeijing).Chen and Wu weremade sectionchiefs forleadingtheconscripts who wereresponsible theQin officials The selectionforthis(albeit low) position to theirdestination. (see thesetwomenhad somestatusamongtheconscripts suggests below, the case of Xiang Liang) or in the eyes of the Qin unawareofwhatthatstatusmay butwe are totally commanders, have been. The geography to tellsus theextent of Chen Sheng'srebellion with initiated whichthe rebellionwas an impulsivemovement Chen was fromYangchengwhichwas littleor no forethought. located near the modernLuoheshi, Henan. Wu Guang's home Taikang,Henan. was about 70 kmawayinYangxia,nearmodern Thereis no reasonto believeChenand Wu had knowneach other of the We do not knowtheextent beforetheywereconscripted. whichthe900 conscripts area from wereraised,butwe do know (xiang), near present-day the rebellionbegan in Daze district Guzhen,Anhui.Chen was thenat least240 kmeast ofhis home;
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Wu Guang, 210 km southeastof his. Since theirdestination, oftheir Yuyang,was northeast homes,itis strange thatthey were ofDaze, unlesswe assumethe900 mancontingent in thevicinity a largearea and massednearDaze. FromDaze was drawnfrom the routewould have been over 750 km due northto Yuyang. (The geographical materials aretakenfrom Zhongguolishi dituji, 1975:9-10,36-37).The data is suggestive ofthefollowing points: for Chen and Wu werenotknownto each other untilthey setoff Yuyang-that is,they had notplotted lengthily before their great their and sincetheuprising undertaking; beganfarfrom homes, orrelatives to aid them friends they could notrely uponlong-term in theirendeavor.Chen's biographypointsout thathe had to choose leadersfrom the areas in whichhe was operating. Thus, unlikeHan Gaozu, Chenhad no smallcore ofreliable followers. His movement theveryoutset. was weak from Whilebivouackedin Daze district, a heavyrainmadetheroad and thuscausedthegroupto be latefor impassable itsrendezvous. The Shiji tellsus that"Those who misseda rendezvous would to thelaw all be beheaded."Onlyslightly latertheShiji according of the same has Chen Sheng informing his would-befollowers direfateforthosewhoviolatedQin law. We needto ask ourselves thesame questionwe asked in thecase of the66% tax rate:Is it likely that such a statementis valid? Is it possible that a would execute, in this case, 900 men because a government a schedule? had prevented them from rainstorm maintaining Is it likelythat theywould be punishedas a group?I findit most is some evidence(albeitnotas compelling and there unlikely, as thatsuch was not the case. We now know would be preferred) ofa law code oftheQin kingdom from theremnants (nottheQin empire,but I am assumingthe same law applied in both the preimperialand imperial periods) that these statements are for officials whose wrong. The Qin law decreed a reprimand three to fivedays late forcorveeduty;a corveelaborersarrived fineof one shieldforthosewhose laborersweresix to tendays late; and a fineof a suit of armorif over ten days late. These in chargeof the punishments applyto theleaders-the officials
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group-not to thechiefs (such as Chen Sheng)whowereselected from within the group and could not have applied to the conscripts themselves (ShuihudiQinmu,1978:76). The samelaw in case of goes on to say thatcorveelaborerscould be dismissed the law paraphrasedhere applies to heavy rain. Admittedly, conscripts, and military punishments corveelabor,notto military might have been moresevere.But we can assumethatevenChen Sheng did not believethatthe law would be invariably applied: the second timehe invokedit he is reported to have said "For we shall all be executed.If you manage missingthe rendezvous notto be executed, 60% to 70% ofyou willdie in garrison duty." What thencan we make of thissupposed triggering mechanism thatwas theproximate cause of theanti-Qinuprising? At leastthree ofthetardiness data are possible. interpretations First,the law specifying executionexisted,and Chen and his followersacted on the assumptionthatit would be invokedin their case. On thebasis ofthegrounds givenabove, I am strongly inclined to disregardthis possibility.Second, the threat of executionwas fabricated by Sima Qian (or sourceson whichhe drew). I am inclinedto reject this possibilityon grounds of If Sima Qian had createdthisevidence, inconsistency: he would not have statedthatthelaw would be applied and thenhave had Chen Sheng state that the law mightbe applied. Third,Chen intojoining Sheng himself-in orderto pressurethe conscripts him-argued thatthey weregoingto be killed (i.e.,executed) even ifthey did notjoinhisuprising. Accordingly, it is likely thatsucha law did notexist,butthatChen assertedthatit did. It is equally likelythattheeffectiveness of his argument dependedupon the rigorously applied Qin penal system. but decided Chen Sheng and Wu Guang consideredflight, we shalldie. If courseof action:"Now ifwe flee, upon a different we undertake a greatplan,we shalldie. It's deatheither way.But we could riskdeathfora kingdom."(Compare Watson, 1961,I, and in to die fighting forourcountry?" 20: "would it notbe better to win a his alternativetranslation in n. 4, "die fighting werenotknown kingdom.')Thus thesetwomen-who probably
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until toeach other werecalledup formilitary they wereboth duty, farfrom their homes,and werewithout anysignificant following to to forthemselves. -decided attempt createa kingdom Chen Shengexplainedto Wu Guang howtheyshouldinitiate their He does so on grounds uprising. thatwouldhavebeenquite familiar to EricHobsbawn:thatis,Chenproposedto pass himself offas the"good king."Chen'sstatement readsas follows:
The worldhas long suffered undertheQin. I have heardthatthe is a younger Second Emperor son and oughtnotto haveascended thethrone. is the The one who oughtto have ascendedthethrone PrinceFusu. BecauseFusu had repeatedly admonished theformer emperor,the former emperorhad sent him out to command armies.Now some have heardthatthough he was without crime, theSecond Emperor has killedhim.Manyofthecommoners have heardthatheis worthy butthey do notknowthatheis dead. Xiang Yen is a Chu generalwho repeatedly earnedmerit and who was kindto histroops.The peopleofChu havea tender forhim. regard Some thinkthat he has died; some, that he has fled. Now, call ourselves PrinceFusu certainly, usingour group,ifwe falsely and Xiang Yen and issue a call to theworld,manywillrespond. Wu Guang considered himto be correct.
Several generalizationscan be made on the basis of the preceding quotation.First, Chenand Wu believed their potential followersdid not feel the Qin regimewas doomed; to the theirappeal was based upon thegood name of a Qin contrary, prince.This is important forit containsimplicitly a themethat intotheearly oftheHan: The Qin did was to be perpetuated years notdeserve to fall.Han Gaozu and hisadvisers (as wehaveseenin thecase of Lu Jia) could notunderstand the why Qin had fallen. As we have also seen,thetraditional imageof theQin thathas been transmitted sinceearlyHan did not emergeuntilthe Han was about a generation it to say thatChen old. Suffice dynasty Sheng thoughthe could draw upon a reservoirof positive theQin ruling house.Second,whatever political capitalregarding Chen'sbackground and position that mayhavebeen,itis unlikely he was the simple peasant laborer describedin the opening anecdote in his biographyby the timeof his uprising;in this
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quotationwe see thathe had information aboutcourtpolitics that was not generallyknown. This suggeststhat,throughmeans unknownto us, he had access to information that was being circulated in elitecirclesat thetime. Chen and Wu sought to influence some of the conscripts through a mysteriousrevelation. They wrote on silk with cinnabar the followingmessage: "Chen shengwang" whichis usuallytranslated "Chen Shengwillbe king" butwhich could also be interpreted "Chen (a state or a surname)will vanquish the ruler."The piece of silkwas placed in thebellyof a fishthatwas purchasedby one of the conscripts the strange who discovered message when the fish was being prepared and presumably treatedit as a revelation.That nightWu Guang added to the ina thicket messagebyhiding neara temple with a torch partially concealed under a basket. From the flickering lightcame the soundofa foxcallingout"GreatChu willrise;ChenShengwillbe king."The nextday wordofthisincident spreadthroughout the camp and the conscripts took note of Chen Sheng, who (it is to recall) would not have been knownto mostof the important conscripts. Two aspectsofthesedevelopments deserve comment. themessagethey First, hid in thefish revealsthatChen or Wu or bothofthemwereapparently literate-certainly literate enough to write Chen's name as part of a political message. This the notion that Chen was not a simple peasant. strengthens Second, the politicalmovement for the first timerefers to the restorationof the state of Chu; the rebels are no longer associating themselves onlywith theQin PrinceFusu and theChu generalXiang Yan. As we note below,however, theissueof the is blurred. politicalentity Chen and Wu killed the Qin commandersof the group of conscripts, and Chen haranguedthegroupas follows: We haveencountered this rainstorm and wehaveall missed our rendezvous. Formissing the rendezvous weshall allbeexecuted. If you manage notto be executed, 60% to 70% ofyouwilldie in garrison dutyIfyoustout menareunwilling to risk death, then that endsit. Butifyouarewilling torisk death, then letusdo itfor
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and chancellors are made, greatfame.Kings,marquises, generals not born. [I am indebtedto Watson, 1961. I, 21, for the last sentence].
orders, and Chenand Wu Theirfollowers agreedto abidebytheir PrinceFusu and Xiang Yan themselves thenfalsely proclaimed ofthepeople."The battle cry thereby "according with thedesires as sacrifices was "GreatChu!" After erecting an altarand offering Chen and Wu led their troops theheads oftheQin commanders, small-scale intobattle.Onlyafter theinitial rather campaigns, the withlocal capture of the major cityof Chen, and conferring leaders and powerfulfamiliesdid Chen and Wu give up the with Fusu and Xiang Yan and announce the identification restoration of thestateof Chu. Chen became King of Chu with titleZhang-Chu, of Chu." thereign "Magnifier We maysummarize theChenShengcase as follows: Chenmay have beena peasantin hisyouth, butwas probably educatedand as a man of literate. He was recognized bytheQin commanders theforce somestatusand thusputinchargeofunits of900 within to information from thecapital,information men.He was privy not known to most of the commonersof the area. His first of favorableimpression politicalactionsdrewupon a generally offas the"good theQin ruling house as he triedto pass himself emperor. Onlyafter consultaking"who would ruleas a worthy theChu throne did he restore and place himself tionwithothers was twofold: upon it. His majormessageto hiscoreoffollowers forviolationof theQin laws or in of deatheither (1) The threat of serviceon thenorthern and (2) thepromise frontier; military to highpositions becauseoftheopportunities advancement proThe latter vided by thecivilwar thatwas thenunderway. point politicaland social situawould have fitin wellwiththecurrent families wereclearly tionsincetheold ruling beingpushedaside, one's positionin societymore and and meritwas determining themultistate more. Finally,theultimate appeal was to restore era. Chu would rise again, and the systemof the preimperial ownfamiliar stateinstead peoplewouldbelongoncemoretotheir In very thatmeantone might ofto a largeempire. terms, practical
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have to servecorveein Chu, but one would notbe sentoffto an frontier outposton thenorthern of theempire.
XIANG LIANG AND XIANG YU: STEALING AN OPPORTUNITY
son of the greatChu general Xiang Liang was the youngest Xiang Yan who had culminated a long line of Xiang men who wererenownedin Chu fortheirmartialskills(Shiji 7 [Watson, 1961. I, 37-74]; Ban Gu, 1962: 31). Xiang Yu (Yu was his zi; his givenname:Ji)was Liang'snephewand was apparently raisedby Liang. Xiang Yu became Han Gaozu's mostpowerful contender forthethrone ofChina,butwe willnotconsider thatphase ofhis careersincewe are concerned withthe initialstepstakenby the twoXiangmenas rebels, notwith Yu's final for battles thethrone. studiedwriting buthedid notsucceedin Xiang Yu inhisyouth it; he gaveitup to study buthe was notsuccessful swordsmanship, at this either.He convincedhis uncle to teach him the art of warfare and managedto gaina general ofit,buthe understanding never hisstudies. completed Thus,XiangYu had therudiments of and came froma different literacy thanthatof the background averagepeasant. Xiang Liang was once implicated in a crimeand arrested, but he was able to haveajailer write to thejailerwhowas holding him in order to have him released. (Both jailers were later to be rewarded withhighpositionsunderXiang Yu.) The charges were thatthe Xiang family dropped suggesting had reasonablygood connections withlocal officials. Later,Xiang Liang killeda man and fledto Wu to escape the vengeanceof the man's family, takingXiang Yu withhim.The local notables(literally, worthies and officials, xian shidafu)all consideredthemselves inferior to Xiang Liang. Whenever there was a largecorveeprojector funeral, Liang was placedincharge. Liang usedtheseoccasionsto sizeup thepeoplewhoserved under himand to introduce to themthemilitary arts,apparently referringto disciplined obedienceto orders.Possibly,we see herethe
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kindoflocal contacts ChenShengand Wu Guanghad before they weresummoned to duty. Xiang Yu's imperialaspirationsfirst surfaced whenQin Shi Huangdivisited Kuaiji. As Yu and hisunclewatched theimperial progress, Yu observed,"That guy could be replaced!" Xiang Liang-fearing utterances of thatkindcould lead to the whole lineagebeingexecuted-clapped his hand overYu's mouth, but from thattimeheldhimin higher regard. In theninth lunarmonthof 209 B.C., thesecondmonthafter Chen Shenghad begunhis uprising, Yin Tong, theranking Qin official in Kuaiji propositioned Xiang Liang:
"All of thearea westof theYangzi has rebelled.This is thetime whenHeavenwillcause Qin to perish. I haveheardthatthosewho are first willgovern others and thosewhocome after themwillbe governed by others.I wishto mobilizetroopsand have you and Huan Chu command them." Huan Chu at thetime was inhiding in a swamp. Liang responded, "Huan Chu has fled;no one knows wherehe is exceptXiang Yu."
Liang thenhad Yu called in to theoffice at Xiang Liang's where, signal,he beheadedYin Tong. Liang seizedthesevered head and donned the official'sseal of office.A large numberof staff members were killed and the restsubmitted. Liang thensummonedthelocal notablesand officials whomhe had longknown and announcedhisgreatundertaking. Because he had theseal of he the could mobilize of the subordinate office, troops prefectures and he placedthelocal notablesincommandofunitsofthe8,000 trainedsoldiershe had gathered. Thus, unlikeChen Shengwho a fewhundred theXiangleaderstook had to start with conscripts, men. to thefieldwitha sizable forceof trained a variety of The Xiang Liang and Xiang Yu story introduces is theresidual there attached elements. noteworthy First, prestige was undoubtedly to the name Xiang. The family a background factorin thekindof informal powerrelationships Xiang Liang was able to generate.Second, Xiang Yu was clearly(if imperhisunclewas also educated;certainly educated.It is likely fectly)
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ofcontrolling theadministrative he appreciated fully significance the seals of office. Third,thereis the criminalelement.Xiang Liang (and hischarge, Yu) werein Wu becauseLiang had killeda case leadingto his man and had earlierbeen involvedin another arrest.Huan Chu, whose serviceswere desiredby the ranking some kindofcrimeand local official, had apparently committed was in hidingin a swamp.Subsequentexamplesofrebelsofthis periodindicatethatcriminal was commonamongthem. activity Fourth,Yin Tong-the imperialappointee on the scene-was elsewhere in anxious to take advantageoftheemerging rebellion the empirein orderto launch his own uprising; thatis, he was totallylacking in a sense of loyaltyto the Qin dynasty.And finally, Xiang Liang did not lead a peasant uprising: He used officialproceduresfor authenticating bureaucratic orders(the seal of office)to mobilizeregularunitsof troops. Chen Sheng of opportunity createda target thatneither theambitiousXiang men nor the power-hungry local official could overlook.
HAN GAOZU: POLITICAL REDEMPTION OFA WANTED MAN
Liu Bang (posthumously knownas Han Gaozu, thedesignation thatwill hereafter be used, the anachronism notwithstandwho founded ing) is oftentreatedas one of thetwo commoners Chinese dynasties-the other one being Zhu Yuanzhang, the founderof the Ming. If by "commoner"one means neither an nor a personof highcivilor military aristocrat thenHan office, Gaozu maybe countedas a commoner. But ifbycommoner one meanssomeonewith little or no education, someonewhowas not an official, someonewho labored in thefields, thenHan Gaozu was not a commoner.He and othermembers of his family were educated, and Han Gaozu had passed the local examination which qualified him for service in the Qin sub-bureaucratic structure.
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oftheflagof The standardaccountof Han Gaozu's unfurling rebellion-an account positionedin the Hanshu to suggesthis as a canton actionsantedatedChen Sheng's-has him serving chiefwho was orderedto lead corveelaborersto work on the 8 [Watson, 1961: I, 77-119]; tomb of the FirstEmperor, (S,hiji, Ban Gu, 1962: 1A-i B; [Dubs, 1938:I, 27-50]).Whensome ofthe laborersescaped, Gaozu-fearing he would be punishedas the officialresponsiblefor them-freed the othersand became a tombwas rebel.We have notedalreadythattheFirstEmperor's builtby convictlaborers,not conscripts. Hence, this account, conveying an image of Gaozu as a man who rose in righteous his wrathagainsttheharshlaws oftheQin stateand explaining is highlysuspicious.Gaozu was indeed in statusas a fugitive, but not because of hiding whenChen Sheng began his uprising, A careful readGaozu's righteous oppositionto his Qin masters. interpretation. ingof theevidenceprovidesan alternative the low positionof cantonchief, violated Gaozu, occupying and local Qin law whenhe injuredXiahou Ying, a close friend while engagingin horse-play.Someone reportedthe official, and a formal case was opened.Qin law incident to local officials, was more strictregardingofficialsthan commoners;hence, his crimemay have called for because Gaozu was an official, Gaozu deniedthathe had injuredhis friend severepunishment. Gaozu's position.Later, the case was and the latterbuttressed for over a year,and reopened,Xiahou Ying was incarcerated he was subjected to torture. adhered to hisoriginal story although in the to into in of the case took go hiding Gaozu advantage delays from the WhileGaozu was inhiding themountains and marshes. Chen Sheng began his uprising. Gaozu, seizingthe authorities, theaid ofXiahou Ying, came out ofhiding and,with opportuity, seat of the took the cityof Pei, the major townand prefectural commited area. After thesurrender ofPei, Gaozu was thoroughly ofChina. lead himto thethrone to thestruggle thatwouldfinally of Pei was aware of notein passingthattheprefect We might Chen Sheng's rebellion.He also knewthatin othertownsand officals had been killed in and prefectural cities,commandery He considered leadwarfare. to ChenSheng'sspreading response
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ing the youngmen of Pei and joining Chen. He was advised to suchas Gaozu. Whenhe summonthosewho had fledintohiding changedhis mindand decidedto remain loyalto theQin, he was thecity.Gaozu was then,accordingto this killedby menwithin account,welcomedintothecity. In sum,Gaozu was nota typical commoner and certainly nota of theQin house although peasant. He was an educatedservant WhenChen Sheng'srebelverylow on theladderofofficialdom. a lion brokeout,Gaozu was in hiding because he had committed had thought a prefect crime.Gaozu's first successwas scoredafter thesamecourseofactionas Yin Tong,that offollowing seriously is, turningagainst the dynastyand taking advantage of the moment forces. tojoin (in hopesofleading)someoftherebellious saw thespreading officials and former Thus, officials low-ranking forrapid advancement. disorderas an opportunity
ZHANG ER AND CHEN YU: SOCIO-POLITICAL REDEMPTION
OF WANTED MEN
BeforetheQin unification ofChina,Zhang Er was a "guest"of PrinceWuji oftheStateofWei. For reasonsnotgiven, Zhangwas forcedto go intohidingin Waihuang,a cityin thestateof Wei. Therehe married thedaughter ofa very wealthy manand received a handsomedowry thatallowedhimto support hisown"guests." He subsequently becameprefect ofWaihuang.ChenYu was also a native of the state of Wei but he traveledto Zhao and there marriedinto a wealthyfamily(Zhang and Chen share a biographyin Shiji, 89 [Watson,1961. I, 171-188]and Ban Gu, 1962: 32). After Qin conqueredWei, Zhang and Chen bothhad prices put on theirheads-probably because of theirprominence, not because theywereaccused of crimes.They fledtogether to the former stateof Chen wheretheyadopted pseudonyms and supported themselves as village gatekeepers.When Chen Sheng's forcesreachedChen, Zhang and Chen presented themselves to him. For a brief periodtheyservedas advisersto him,and then, on the basis of Chen Yu's contactswithprominent families in
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Zhao, theyweresentwithmilitary forcesto bringZhao under Attheir Wu Chenreestablished ChenSheng'scontrol. the urging ofZhao. Wu declaredhimself kingdom kingofZhao whenthey himthat "It is notnecessary thata manbe a descendant convinced of the rulersof the Six Kingdomsin orderto sit on a throne" (Watson, 1961: I, 176). We do not need to go into the tragic thatdevelopedbetween animosity Zhang Er and Chen Yu. Sufficeit to say thatChen Yu was killedin thecivilwar. Zhang Er became thekingof Chao and was succeededas kingby his son Han Gaozu's daughter. who married inthecivilwarout of Zhangand Chenwerebothmajorfigures whichtheHan dynasty But unliketheleaderswe have emerged. alreadydiscussed,theywereboth menof wealthwithexcellent in elitecircles.Neither connections joined the rebelliousmovement with ofhisown.Exceptthatboth followers joined therebels whilein flight from theauthorities and bothsoughttherestoration of one of the preimperial states(Zhao), theydiffer greatly from theotherleaderswe have looked at.
ZHANG LIANG: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR VENGEANCE
The last figure we considerwas of thehighest social statusof those under review.Zhang Liang (Shiji, 55 [Watson, 1961: I, 134-15 1]; and Ban Gu, 1962:40) was a descendant oftheMarquis of Liu ofthestateof Hann wherehisgrandfather and father had WhenthestateofHann was conqueredby servedas chancellors. to thestateofHann led himto use his Qin, Zhang'sfamily loyalty of theFirstEmperor.When wealthto attempt theassassination theattempt failed, Zhang Liang changedhisnameand wentinto hiding.He was joined in his fugitive lifeby Xiang Bo who was The two of themavoided captureforten wantedfor murder. years. When Chen Sheng began his uprising,Zhang Liang assembleda band of about a hundred followers and joined Han Gaozu. He was to outliveGaozu by manyyears,renowned as a man who excelledat devising schemesand strategies.
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fromour otherexamples in thathe was most Zhang differs with theold,preimperial elite.Unliketheothers, clearly identified he was strongly motivated politically froma veryearlyage, but his politicalmotivation was in no wayderivedfrom current Qin he reacted ofthe tax and corveepolicies;rather, to thedestruction had so long served.As a fugitive fromthe Qin statehis family police,he is like theotherrebelleaders.
CONCLUSIONS
We may now return to our originalquestion:"Was the Qin is To thatquestiontheanswer overthrown bypeasantuprisings?" is necessary. ChenShengwas appar"'no,"butsomequalification ofhimself as ofpeasantorigin, buthe probably did notthink ently Thereare clearly a peasantwhenhe began his movement. stages offas the in his leadershiprole. First,he soughtto pass himself Qin Prince Fusu; second,he made himself kingof the restored and perhapsenough Chu state. He had sufficient savoir-faire educationto adopt theserolesand expectacceptancein them. oftheCrownPrincewhom The first stageofhisidentity-that many people, he said, did not know was dead-opens up an setofproblems. Those problems to the entirely different pertain traditionaltarnishedimage of the Qin regime.If therewas a widely heldbelief thattheeviloftheQin regime and mostofwhat it stood formerited itsdemise,thenChen's notionofidentifying himselfwith the Qin Prince would have been foolish in the extreme. The imagethattheworldhas acceptedforalmosttwo millennia was nottheimagethatChen Shengand hiscontemporaries had in mind. The inherited image, as we have seen, was of the Han dynasty. createdafterthe founding The exorbitant taxes,thegrueling corvee,and otherallegations againsttheQin intraditional accountsare baseless.Chen Shengand perpetuated theothers did notriseup againstthoseabuses. To theextent that we can determine Chen's motivation, it seemsto have beentwofold. His first motivation-whichwas the mostimmediate and
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dutyon the personal-was to avoid servinga tour of military heimplied others to motivate Second, in order northern frontier. He oftheQin hewouldproducereforms. ruler that as therightful it. This but to modify the Qin regime, soughtnot to obliterate tallies with the comments of contemporary interpretation such as Li Si and Lu Jia. observers oftheQin dynasty interpretation thetraditional Ifweeliminate to drawupona as evil,and ifwecan showChenShengattempting with thenwe are left favorableimageoftheQin Heir Apparent, ofuprisings another question:How do we accountfortheswarm We might ask after Chen Shengtook to thefield? thatoccurred social different way:Arewedealingwith thequestionina slightly thatwas mobilizedforpoliticalpurposes?And, ifthe banditry werethepoliticalpurposes? latter is thecase, whatprecisely A recurrent hereis thatof the themeamongthecases treated we mightnote that Chen swamp dweller. (Parenthetically, called Daze, Big Swamp.) in a district Shengbegan his uprising Xiang Liang and Xiang Yu wereable to killYin Tong, thelocal of had knowledge official, because Yu presumably responsible whom Yin Tong the whereaboutsof Huan Chu-a fugitive ina marsh. and whowas then hiding wantedas an allyinrebellion before he and marshes" inthe"mountains Han Gaozu was hiding began his politicalrebellion.Zhang Liang was in hidingforten years,but we do not know wherehe and Xiang Bo wereliving. we might assumethatthese For wantofevidenceto thecontrary, while concealing men supportedthemselves throughbanditry but we do not knowwhatthe from thegovernment, themselves was. It wouldnothavebeengood politics ofthatbanditry nature to reveal raids and robberies forthe throneor for a historian Gaozu and Zhang Liang. Was committed by such men as Han We cannot the term? as Hobsbawn defines thissocial banditry answerthatquestion;the data are simplyinadequate. We can hintthatany of thatthereis not theslightest observe,however, whentheywerein theseleaderscommandedsizable followings thatat the mosttheremay have hiding.The evidencesuggests but not and marshes, been small-scalegangs in the mountains of social bandits. largenumbers
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It is fairly clear that Chen Sheng initiateda movement that to improvetheirlot on a narrowly gave men opportunities personal scale as well as on a grand politicaland historicalscale. the otherleaderswe have Withthe exceptionof Chen himself, wereeithermenwantedby thestateor menwho were surveyed The anti-Qin fleeing from warfare personalvengeance. provided forthesemento redeemthemselves unanticipated opportunities -to cease beingvillagegate guardsand to ascend the national their historical stage,or to escape from swampswiththehope of The a throne. who ascending leaders reachedthehighest stagesin weremeneagerforopportunities thesestruggles to turn their lives around-in spite of the risksinvolved-and to establishnew identities forthemselves. socio-political In additionto thoseinflight, wereother there actors important in thepoliticaldrama thatChen Shenginitiated. Local officials, such as Yin Tong, seized upon the spreadingdisorderas an to moverapidly opportunity intoleadership positions.It is likely thattheyanticipated, at theleast,carving out a piece ofterritory for themselvesor being in some other way rewardedby the ultimatevictor. Such men are important symbolsof the Qin regime's failureto instillconfidence and loyaltyin itself. These werethemenwho shouldhavemobilizedlocal forces to suppress thegrowing disorder;insteadtheyjoinedit. As Jia Yi noted,the absence of oppositionto the rebelswas in partdue to a lack of trust the Qin bureaucracy. within Anothergroup of actors consistedof membersof the old, preimperial, politicalelite;in thiscontextChen Sheng's second as King of Chu takes on great political significance. identity Chen, afterconsulting withlocal notables(people of the same nonpeasantsocial statusapproachedby Xiang Liang), declared therestoration ofthekingdom ofChu. The old eliteis represented in ourexamplesbyZhang Liang and Xiang Liang,buttheexamples could also includetheruling Tian family of thepreimperial stateofQi (Watson, 1961.I, 244-251), theWei family ofthestate ofWei (Watson, 1961:1, 189-190), and others. The collapseofthe Qin empireprovidedrulingfamilies of the late WarringStates and theirfollowers withopportunities to recreate themultistate
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of the worldin whichtheyhad rulingpower. Reestablishment the social have restored politicalorderwould naturally former did not Theirmotiviation thesemennowfought. orderforwhich it did as practices harshQin governmental deriveso muchfrom practicesin their governmental fromtheirdesireto determine states. former maybe viewedas a bundleof theQin empire In manyrespects on one rested basis ofQin legitimacy The fragile contradictions. us thattheQin empire Jia Yi (in informing such contradiction: off and ChenSheng(by passinghimself welcomed) was originally of theQin empire, to thelegitimacy as PrinceFusu) bothattest theempireand within distrust of pervasive but Jia Yi's reports bothrevealthe hewas serving to theregime Yin Tong's disloyalty It is evident. A social contradiction ofthatlegitimacy. instability crythatnobles is seen,on theone hand,in Chen Sheng'srallying are made not born,and in Zhang Er's encourageand ministers Wu was nota to Wu Chento becomekingofZhao although ment royal descendant.On the otherhand, the spreadingdisorder suchas theTian royalfamilies forformer providedopportunities the examplesreflect The former themselves. in Qi to reestablish and derives captured) be earned (or should status thatsocial belief centuries. trendsof the preceding fromthegeneralmeritocratic the old social and politicalorder, The lattercase exemplifies Finally,a and encouragesits restoration. based on inheritance, political ideal the of the nature contradiction regarding sharp bureauas a single Should China be administered orderemerges: ofautobya handful or shoulditbe administered craticempire, The natureof thepoliticalorderwas a pronomous kingdoms? issue in the long run and was probablythe important foundly was immediate catalystonce the rebellion and most important underway. apartdid notarise thattoretheQin empire The politicalforces oftheold multistthe as passing from so much from Qin cruelties was mutatismutandis, ate world. The "Great Chu" battlecry, theQin empire.Boththosewho came from repeatedthroughout of a the old elite and those who did not availed themselves
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commondesireto maintain as "menofQi" or "men old identities of Chu" in order to develop theirfollowings. This issue-not peasanttax and corveedissatisfaction-allowed stateafter state ofthepreimperial periodto be restored bytheanti-Qin It forces. was thispowerful in favorofpolitically movement "the restoring good old days"thatproducedthecollapseofthefirst The empire. importance of recreating thosestateswas evident in thekindof empire Han Gaozu created: kingdomswithinan empire,but kingdomswithout the old royalfamilies. Ultimately, Han Gaozu's geopoliticallegacywas to bedevilhis successors untilthose restored kingdoms werereducedto politicalnonentities.
REFERENCES
BAN GU (1962) Hanshu (Historyof the Han Dynasty).Shanghai:Zhonghuashuju. of ChineseLiterature, BIRCH, CYRIL [ed.] (1965) Anthology From EarlyTimesto the Fourteenth Century. New York: GrovePress. CHAVANNES, EDOUARD [trans.](1967) Les memoires histonquesde Se-ma Ts'ien (HistoricalMemoirsof Sima Qian), 5 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill. CH'U T'UNG-TSU (1972) Han Social Structure. Seattle:Univ. of Washington Press. Cihai bianji weiyuanhui[Cihai Editornal Committee](1979, 1982) Cihal. Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu chubanshe. deBARY, WILLIAM T. et al. [comp.] (1960) Sources of ChineseTradition.New York: Columbia Univ. Press. DUBS, HOMER H. (trans.](1938) The Historyof the FormerHan Dynasty,vol. 1. Baltimore:WaverlyPress. DUYVENDAK, J. J. L. (1963) The Book of Lord Shang. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. HE CIQUAN (1955) Qin Han shilue (Brief Historyof the Qin and Han Dynasties). Shanghai: Renminchubanshe. LI YU-NING [ed.] (1975) The FirstEmperorof China. WhitePlains,NY: International Artsand Sciences Press. LIN JIANMING (1981) Qinshi gao (Draft Historyof the Qin). Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe. LIU AN (n.d.) Huainanzi (Book of thePrinceof Huainan). 1-wen edition. LU JIA (n.d.) Xinyu(New Sayings).Shijie edition. Shiji. See Takikawa (1934). ShuihudiQinmu zhujian zhenglixiaozu [Small Group fortheOrdering of the Bamboo theQin Tomb at Shuihudi](1978) ShuihudiQinmuzhujian(The Bamboo Slips from Slips fromthe Qin Tomb of Shuihudi).Beijing:Wenwuchubanshe.
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SIMA GUANG (n.d.) Zizhi tongian (Comprehensive MirrorforAid in Government). Qimingedition. SWANN, NANCY LEE (1950) Food and Moneyin Ancient China. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. TAKIKAWA KAMETARO [ed. and comp.] (1934) Shiki kaichu kocho (Exegesis on theCollectedCommentaries ont he Shiji). Tokyo: 1-wen reprint. T'ANG HSIAO-WEN (1975) "A refutation of some Confucianfallaciesconcerning the causes ofthedownfall oftheCh'in Dynasty," pp. 191-206 in Li Yu-ning (ed.) The First Emperor of China. WhitePlains,NY: International Artsand SciencesPress. WATSON, BURTON [trans.](1961) Recordsof theGrand Historianof China. Translatedfrom theShih-chi of Ssu-maCh'ien,2 vols. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. YANG HSIEN-YI and GLADYS YANG [trans.](1979) SelectionsfromRecordsofthe Historianby Szuma Chien. Beijing:ForeignLanguagesPress. YOSHINAMI TAKASHI (1978) Shin-Kantaikokushi kenkyui (HistoricalResearchon theQin and Han Empires. Tokyo: Miraishai. ZhongguolishiditujiEditorialGroup[ed.] (1975) Zhongguolishidituji(HistoricalAtlas of China). Shanghai:Zhonghuadituxueshe.
Jack L. Dull is Associate Professor of Historyat the University of Washington where he teachescourseson earlyChinesehistory. He has editedseveralworks on thehistory of the Han dynasty.Currently, he is editinga volumeofpapers on legitimization in Chinesehistory to which he is contributing paperson theQinand Han.

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Anti-Qin Rebels: No Peasant Leaders Here Author(s): Jack L. Dull Source: Modern China, Vol. 9, No.

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

GENERAL INTERPRETA TIONS OF QIN POLICIES

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

CHEN SHENG AND WU GUANG: CREATING AN OPPORTUNITY

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull t ANTI-QIN REBELS

XIANG LIANG AND XIANG YU: STEALING AN OPPORTUNITY

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

HAN GAOZU: POLITICAL REDEMPTION OFA WANTED MAN

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

ZHANG ER AND CHEN YU: SOCIO-POLITICAL REDEMPTION

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

ZHANG LIANG: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR VENGEANCE

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983

Dull / ANTI-QIN REBELS

MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983

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