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Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance Author(s): Caroline Hodges Persell, Adam Green and Liena
Gurevich Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 203-230 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/685063 . Accessed: 06/11/2013 02:48
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2001
Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Caroline Hodges Persell,' 2 Adam Green,1 and Liena Gurevich1
The idea that civil society is declining has been much discussed recently,for example, by Fukuyama (Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York:Free Press, 1995) and Putnam (The American Prospect 13 (Spring):35-42, 1993; Nobel Symposium, Uppsala, Sweden, August 27-30, 1994; PS: Political Science and Politics, December: 664-683). At the same time, another stream of research suggests that racial tolerance is increasing through time (Quillian, American Journal of Sociology 101 (3):816-860,1996; Firebaugh and Davis, American Journal of Sociology 94 (2):251-272. This paper combines ideas from several intellectual traditions to suggest that economic conditions may affect civil society, which in turn may influence social tolerance. These ideas are explored, using multivariateanalysis ofpooled General Social Survey datafrom 1972 to 1994. The resultssuggest that thefabric of civil society and economic conditions may contribute somewhat to espoused tolerance. Greater economic security, together with the attitudesfostered by a vibrant civil society including greater trustand less anomia, appear to increase espoused social tolerance. Period effects and the effects of other demographic factors remain strongly related to expressions of tolerance. While alternative interpretations may be offered depending on whether the interaction terms, Year x Education or Cohort x Education, are included in the analysis, the high correlation between the two suggests that these interpretationscannot be seen as oppositional. Finally and most important, the analysis reveals many parallels between espoused racial and homosexual tolerance, suggesting a more generalizable model of social tolerance.
KEY WORDS: civil society; racial tolerance; homosexual tolerance.
1Department of Sociology, 269 Mercer Street, 4th Floor, New York University, New York, New York 10003. 2To whom correspondence should be addressed; e-mail: caroline.persell@nyu.edu. 203
0884-8971/01/0600-0203$19.50/0 ? 2001 Plenum Publishing Corporation
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Persell, Green, and Gurevich
INTRODUCTION The problem of building and sustaining democratic societies and the importance of civil society for that process has captured the attention of concerned citizens, social philosophers, and social scientists in Western Europe and the United States for decades at least (see Cohen and Arato, 1992; Gellner, 1994; Habermas, 1989; Putnam, 1995a; and Wolfe, 1989, among others). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989-90, civil society has been a central concern in Eastern Europe as well (see, e. g., Havel, 1994; Ignatieff, 1995; Seligman, 1992; Walzer, 1991). This paper examines several traditions of social theory and research, with the goal of proposing and analyzing a set of relationships between economic conditions, civil society, and social tolerance. While a number of theorists have suggested ways in which civil society may be linked to economic conditions or to social tolerance and some social researchers have linked economic conditions with tolerance, our goal is to synthesize these previously unconnected theoretical and empirical writings in a model suggesting the interrelationships between economic conditions, civil society, and espoused tolerance. First, we define these very general concepts and discuss the most relevant theoretical and empirical work dealing with them. Then we build on existing research and theory to postulate a theoretical model of how these conceptual elements may be interrelated. Finally, we operationalize the concepts, suggest our empirical expectations, and use General Social Survey (GSS) data to analyze those expectations.
DEFINITIONS, RELEVANT THEORY, AND RESEARCH Social life in modern societies may be usefully conceptualized as consisting of three spheres-the state, the economy, and civil society. This delineation is developed in Persell (1994) and Wolfe (1989). As Gellner (1994) and Persell (1994) stress, these three spheres are interdependent and the integrity of each sphere can be seen to depend on the vitality of the other two. A strong and growing economy is needed to sustain humanitarian ideals because societies concerned only with survival tend to develop highly centralized, tyrannical modes of administration, with the economy and polity merged (Gellner, 1994). The state mitigates some of the most glaring inequalities, facilitates communication between diverse groups in society, and helps to forge a common national framework. Further, Walzer (1991) notes the critical support that state institutions provide for institutions of civil society
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(in the tax exempt status of schools, e.g.). Each of the three legs of the "social tripod" (Persell, 1994) need to be strong, in order to support the other two and to provide some necessary checks and creative tension vital to the maintenance of a democratic system. Models of democratic societies premised on institutional balance between the three spheres are well-represented in prior theoretical work. Gellner, for instance, argues that the intersection of their competing force fields creates neutral spaces where individuals can step out of total world orders and find freedom (Gellner, 1994). As Messner notes, "the fundamental problem of social organization in the advanced capitalist societies is that of maintaining a balance between the market economy and noneconomic institutions" (Messner, 1996:1), or what Rosenfeld and Messner (1995) call the "institutional balance of power," an issue originally articulated by Polanyi (1957). These authors have explicitly emphasized the importance of preserving a power balance among the three spheres. The concept of institutional balance implies a relatively equal and interactive exercise of power among the three spheres. For example, one can imagine the swift disintegration of the social system if market institutions were left unrestrained by political forces. While the economy needs to be free and relatively independent of politics, it cannot be completely unchecked and unconstrained or it would destroy any semblance of social order. Cohen and Arato (1992) see civil society as being in tension with market and state systems, and as providing a set of institutions, practices, and beliefs that can help to dampen the penetration of overly rationalized and administrative state and market logics into the lifeworld. With a particular focus on Eastern Europe, they see civil society as a pivotal arena for the construction and articulation of normative projects, thus providing fertile soil from which contemporary social movements spring. For Cohen and Arato, the mobilization of normative projects through social movements characterizes a healthy civil society and the promotion of tolerance and justice. The multiplicity of networks and associations in civil society leads to consensual, negotiated, and provisional social orders. As Gellner suggests, the "pluralism contained in the notion of civil society" restrains both unchecked political control of the economy and unchecked economic power (Gellner, 1994). The pluralism of civil society thus serves to counteract excessive tendencies toward centralism in modern states. In ideal democratic societies, each institutional sphere offers essential supports for the other two, while providing key checks that prevent any one from becoming totally dominant. We cannot test the full scope of these general claims here but we can analyze portions of them, specifically some hypothesized relationships between economic conditions, civil society, and social tolerance. Each of these
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concepts has been the subject of considerable thought and research, and various scholars have suggested ways in which they may be interrelated. Civil Society Civil society is a concept that has been much discussed and variously defined by social theorists and observers. In the broadest possible terms, Gellner (1994) describes civil society as one form of social order, among other forms. Seligman (1992) suggests that the concept does little to go beyond the ideas of democracy or citizenship, particularly as developed by Marshall (1964) with his idea of civil, political, and social forms of citizenship. However, because of the historical baggage the term "democracy" carries in Eastern Europe (e.g., as in People's Democracy), "civil society" is a less encumbered term there, as Seligman (1992) notes. We think it helps to use separate terms for political institutions and actions (such as voting) and nongovernmental institutions of civil society and certain cultural attitudes. Therefore, we do not accept Seligman's suggestion that "democracy" and "civil society" can be used interchangeably. Civil society has both institutional and qualitative dimensions. Institutionally, civil society consists of all the associations to which people belong, including families, religious organizations, social movements, parent-teacher associations, neighborhood associations, sports leagues, labor unions, volunteer groups, professional or occupational associations, clubs, support groups, and so forth. Although these associations entail connectedness and commitment to others that is not based solely on instrumentalism, the networks and bonds forged by such memberships are vital for communities, for the prevention of crime (Coleman, 1988; Furstenberg and Hughes, 1994; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson and Laub, 1990), for the education and development of young people (Furstenberg and Hughes, 1994), for promoting tolerance of social differences (as suggested by Cohen and Arato, 1992), and for economic growth (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam et al., 1995). Civil society also contains a qualitative dimension that includes social attitudes such as loyalty and trust, social practices such as civility and cooperation, and the health and safety of members of a society. It is important to stress that civil society is not a monolithic or homogeneous concept that posits a single moral vision although the writings of some, such as Alexander and Smith (1993:161), might suggest this when they say that the goal of civil society is "the moral regulation of social life." It is not clear whether they mean a single morality, or multiple moralities. Other theorists who discuss the concept stress the pluralistic, diverse nature of civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Gellner, 1994).
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A central feature of civil society is the concept of social capital, used first by Jacobs (1961:138), developed by Coleman (1988), and explored empirically by Putnam (1993, 1995b, 1996a,b). Social capital inheres in such human relationships as marriage, associational memberships, and friendships. The density and frequency of these social relations promote trust, adherence to group norms, cooperation, and reciprocity (Coleman, 1988:97-100; Putnam, 1993, 1995a). In these associations, people build relationships of trust and mutual aid. Trust, a key ingredient of civil society, is vital for sustaining economic wellbeing (Fukuyama, 1995:12;Granovetter, 1985; Putnam et al., 1995). Without involvement in civic associations, Bellah and Sullivan warn, "the ethos of self-advancement has been able to work itself out with fewer constraints.... Inability to commit oneself to or believe in anything that transcends one's own private interests leads to the weakening of commitment in family and community and the self-absorption that is called 'narcissism"' (Bellah and Sullivan, 1981:45). Economic Conditions To the extent that civil society is interdependent with particular economic contexts, it becomes necessary to assess economic conditions and their possible effects on the qualitative and institutional dimensions of civil society. Gellner (1994), for instance, suggests that economic growth is a precondition for civil society and that societies concerned with survival are less likely to foster a rich civil society than are societies concerned with the improvement of production.3 Others (Bellah et al., 1991; Bellah and Sullivan, 1981) posit that economic decline has negative effects on civil society and individuals. As they note, "Poverty is not a condition of effective citizenship" (Bellah and Sullivan, 1981:41). What unites both frameworks is the notion that where people have a sustainable economic existence they will be more inclined to participate in community-based associations and institutions, freed from an incessant concern with material well-being. There is no question that economic conditions are changing dramatically in the industrialized nations, and particularly in the United States. The United States has been moving from manufacturing to service work, toward greater job insecurity, and increasing income and wealth inequality (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Krugman, 1992; Levy, 1998; Mishel, 1995; Persell, 1997; Wolff, 1995).
3Such an assertion is quite consistent with the observations of the Ik described by Turnbull (1972) and of the Ojibwan of Grassy Narrows, Ontario, Canada, studied by Shkilnyk (1985), both societies in decline.
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Social Tolerance High among the values and imperatives of democratic societies, especially ones as diverse as the United States, is social tolerance for persons and groups perceived as different. Complete social tolerance would entail full recognition and acceptance of the identity and uniqueness of differences that are seen as not reducible to invisibility by their bearers. In the absence of complete acceptance, a lesser level of tolerance would include the willingness to grant equal legal and political rights to someone seen as different and an unwillingness to openly express intolerant attitudes. (See Vogt, 1997, for a good discussion of the dimensions of tolerance). This lesser level may be seen as the minimum tolerance threshold needed for the operation of a democratic society. EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS Given our hypothesis that economic conditions affect civil society, we expect that individuals experiencing greater economic distress are more likely to be consumed with self-interested, instrumental activities, and would therefore have fewer associational connections, and would express lower trust and higher levels of anomia,4 consistent with Bellah and Sullivan's notions (Bellah and Sullivan, 1981). Such individuals are also more likely to reveal lower levels of espoused social tolerance, as suggested by Case et al. (1989), Gibson (1992), and Ostheimer and Ritt (1982:382). Several social analysts, most visibly Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1995b, 1996a,b), have suggested recently that civil society is declining in the United States. Putnam uses a wide array of indicators-associational memberships, voting behavior, marriage rates, among others-and finds significant declines in all of them through time.5 Putnam's provisional
4The notion of anomia (from the original "anomie") is used here in its broadest sense, and more in the Mertonian (Merton, 1968) than in the Durkheimian conception. Whereas Durkheim refers to the literal lack of common norms setting limits on human desires and aspirations (Durkheim, 1951), Merton stresses the discrepancy between broad societal goals and the availability of the means for their achievement (Merton, 1968). Drawing on both theoretical traditions, research regarding the impact of anomie on social existence has variously employed the term to reflect despair, hopelessness, and discouragement (Austin and Stack, 1988:358; Dodder and Astle, 1980:334) or, alternatively, political cynicism and lack of faith and confidence in societal institutions and official figures (Ostheimer and Ritt, 1982:377-378). In this paper, we see anomia as a "synthetic" concept reflecting alienation from both societal institutions and fellow human beings (see variable description later). 5Not everyone accepts Putnam's argument that civil society has declined. Schudson (1996), for example, thinks that Putnam has not yet proved a decline in civic participation. To support his claim, however, Schudson broadens the definition of civic participation considerably to
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explanation for the decline is a generational one, with the development of TV in postwar America contributing to the decline. In contrast, social thinkers who see civil society as interdependent with the economy and the state look more to changes in the balance of power among the three major spheres, especially to changes in economic and political conditions as possible explanations for a decline. Skocpol (1996), for example, accepts Putnam's assertion of a decline, but takes issue with the causes and instead suggests changes in the structure of political life, the role of professional elites, and possible cultural splits between generations. We will not explore the importance of political democracy or the role of the state in this paper, in part because there is little variation in political democracy in the time period covered by the GSS, especially if Skocpol (1996) is right that the key political changes occurred in the 1960s. We do, however, question Putnam's provisional explanation and we offer an alternative explanation rooted in changing economic conditions. If there are direct connections between economic conditions, civil society, and social tolerance, we would expect that expressions of tolerance would be declining, unless there are significant countervailing forces at work. One such countertrend could be education, because educational levels in the population were also increasing from 1971 to 1994 and educational levels are highly related to expressions of social tolerance, at least among younger cohorts (Quillian, 1996). Steeh and Schuman's work reveals "that there is no indication of decreasing tolerance among cohorts coming of age in the 1980s" (Steeh and Schuman, 1992:340), suggesting that some factor, perhaps
include, for example, writing checks to special interest groups and class-action lawsuits. We reject this broadening and agree with Putnam (1996b:27) that including financial contributions leads to a very "constricted notion of citizenship." Paxton (1999) analyzes multiple indicators of social capital over a 20-year period, and finds that trust in individuals has declined, although general trust in institutions has not declined nor has membership in groups declined. Moreover, Paxton underscores Wuthnow's observation (Wuthnow, 1998) that declines in the associational component of social capital have been concentrated in the most marginalized and disadvantaged segments of the population, an important point worthy of further research. In 1996, Helliwell and Putnam (1996) published a correction reporting an error in the GSS data series as published and distributed for the years 1989-94. They found that in the GSS for 1989-94, "the entry for 'number of group memberships' (MEMNUM) mistakenly excludes memberships in 'service clubs' (such as Rotary clubs) and 'school service groups' (such as parent-teacher associations). Correcting this error increases, by approximately 15%, the number of reported group memberships per capita during these years. As a result, the corrected aggregate number of group memberships per capita reported in the GSS (weighted to represent American adults, but not adjusted to compensate for rising educational levels) shows only a slight decline over the period 1974-1994" (Helliwell and Putnam, 1996). They note further that the error in the GSS time series does not change other measures of civic disengagement reported by Putnam (1995a,b, 1996a,b), such as political engagement, time budgets, social trust, and membership in specific organizations.
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education, may mitigate the hypothesized dampening effects of economic distress and lessened civil society on tolerance. We expect that people experiencing one or more forms of economic distress will have fewer types of associational memberships, lower levels of trust, higher levels of anomia, and will be less likely to espouse tolerance toward African Americans or homosexuals, two frequently stigmatized social groups. These expectations are consistent with Ostheimer and Ritt's findings (Ostheimer and Ritt, 1982) that economic "losers" (i.e., people experiencing economic distress measured by a change for the worse in their financial situation in the last few years) had fewer associational memberships than "non-losers," and expressed less interpersonal trust, less confidence in government, and more political cynicism (anomia). Boor (1982) also found that perceived change for the worse in one's financial situation was related to higher rates of anomia. We expect that people with more types of associational memberships will express higher levels of trust, lower levels of anomia, and higher levels of tolerance, when other factors are held constant. These expectations are consistent with Putnam et al.'s observation (Putnam et al., 1995) that communities with a greater density of associational and informal connections have higher levels of trust and cooperation than communities with fewer associational ties, and with Granovetter's observation that "trust is generated and malfeasance discouraged when agreements are 'embedded' within a larger structure of personal relations and social networks" (Granovetter, 1985:490). These expectations are also consistent with Cohen and Arato's view that civic experience is a primary way that individuals develop a "conception of civic virtue, learn to tolerate diversity, to temper fundamentalism and egoism, and to become able and willing to compromise" (Cohen and Arato, 1992:7). The public and associational spheres of civil society provide the terrain where people can "learn to value differences" (Cohen and Arato, 1992:23). Thus, we expect that people who are more involved in both formal and informal social relationships in civil society will express higher levels of trust and lower levels of anomia and intolerance. However, another expectation can also be advanced. If people tend to associate primarily with others who hold intolerant world views, that could lead to a hardening of intolerant attitudes. The Klu Klux Klan or militia groups, for example, are forms of voluntary associations. Given that trust and anomia are proposed as mediating links between economic conditions, associational memberships, and tolerance, we lean toward the expectation that when levels of trust are higher, espoused tolerance will also be higher. We also expect that people with higher levels of anomia will be less likely to espouse tolerant attitudes. The key variables and their proposed relationships are presented schematically in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Hypothesized relationships among variables in the model.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND MEASURES To test the model in Fig. 1, we need operational measures of the major variables and measures of relevant control variables. We examine data from the GSS, 1973-94, to develop multivariate models for analyzing whether individuals experiencing greater financial hardships are less engaged in civil society, express less trust and more anomia, and are less tolerant than individuals experiencing less economic distress. The GSS is "an almost annual, 'omnibus,' personal interview survey of U.S. households conducted by the National Opinion Research Center" (NORC) with English-speaking persons over 18 years of age. It switched to a biennial design in 1994. NORC uses a national area probability sample of noninstitutionalized adults, ensuring a sample that is representative of the general population. In our study we pooled the years of the survey to create as large a sample as possible. Consequently, the analysis spans a range of 22 years, from 1972 to 1994 (with the exception of 1979,1981, and 1992, years in which the GSS was not administered), and the pooled sample consists of 32,380 cases. Most variables in the statistical analysis contain information for most years of the survey; however, some of the questions were administered selectively in only a few years. Because of this problem of missing information, we employ "pairwise" deletion in our regression procedures.6
6The problem of using pairwise deletion and the ensuing issue of data loss in these models concerned one of the paper's reviewers. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand what contributes to the data loss and whether the reasons for such loss undermine the validity of the inferences drawn. If there were considerable data loss because people refused to answer certain questions, that could be very problematic, because nonresponders might differ in significant, but unknown, ways from responders, introducing the possibility of bias. To consider this possibility we analyzed the number of respondent-generated "no answer" responses to
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Economic Conditions At the individual level, economic conditions can be conceptualized as a change in individuals' financial situations over time; individuals' perceived job security; their unemployment history; their relative financial position, that is, where they see themselves compared to others; and finally their absolute financial position. Accordingly, six questions from the GSS are used to tap an individual's economic situation. FINSTRES is a composite measure designed to gauge respondents' perceptions of financial distress, based on three GSS variables, FINRELA, FINALTER, and SATFIN. FINRELA asks, "Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?" Responses were coded 1 (above average), 2 (average), and 3 (below average). FINALTER asks, "During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?" Responses were coded 1 (better), 2 (same), and 3 (worse). SATFIN reads, "We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?" Responses were coded 1 (satisfied), 2 (more or less satisfied), and 3 (not at all satisfied). The three variables were combined additively to form the composite. All were dummy variables with the negative response coded as 0 and the positive response coded as 1. The specific associations were as follows: membership in a church group, farm organization, fraternal group, school fraternity, hobby club, literary or art group, nationality group, political club, professional society, school service, service group, sports club, labor union, veteran group, youth group, and membership in any other group. The resulting scores range from 0 (none) to 16. The index was computed from 16 variables and needed to have at least 14 valid answers per case to be included because in some years not all questions were asked, but generally at least 14 of the possible 16 were asked.7
the variables in our models. The highest percent of such "no answer" responses was 0.5% (half of 1%) for the variable Finalter. For all other variables the "no answer" response ranged from 0.1% to 0.3%. The largest single reason, by far, for excluding cases from the analysis was because a particular question was not asked in a given year. We believe that this may be seen as a random reason for exclusion, rather than a reason that could create bias, and therefore we believe it does not undermine the meaningfulness of our conclusions. Using pairwise deletion means that slightly different samples are used for each variable in the regression, a fact that affects their comparability. However, when we tried to conduct the analysis using listwise deletion there were too few cases to compute the regressions. 7We considered a reviewer's suggestion that the proportion of the total number of responses reported would be a better measure of associational memberships than would the sum of responses because it is a good idea in principle. However, the number of people reporting more than 12 responses was exactly 10, or much less than 1% of the total, and 99.7% of
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SOCOMMUN is an ordinal variable measuring how often the respondent spends a social evening with someone who lives in the neighborhood. Response categories were recoded so that the greatest amount of social contact with neighbors was coded as 6 (several times a week), while the least amount of social contact was coded as 1 (never). SOCFREND indicates how often the respondent spends a social evenwith friends who live outside the neighborhood. Measured ordinally, ing responses were recoded so that the greatest amount of social contact outside the neighborhood was coded as 6 (several times a week), while the least amount of social contact was coded as 1 (never). SOCBAR is an ordinal variable measuring how often the respondent visits a bar or tavern. Like SOCOMMUN and SOCFREND, SOCBAR was recoded so that the greatest frequency of attendance at a bar or tavern was coded as 6 (several times a month) and the least frequency of visiting a bar or tavern was coded as 1 (never). Especially for people who live in small or crowded dwellings, bars are a place where they can associate informally with others. Thus this measure provides one indicator of informal socializing. TRUST is a variable indicating respondent's perceptions of whether people can be trusted. The question was, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Responses were recoded into can't trust (0) and can trust (1). Responses from the intermediate category, "depends," of the original GSS question were coded as missing values, since there were too few (N = 819) to create an ordinal level measure with reasonably equal numbers of cases in each category. Two variables-ANOMIA5 and ANOMIA7-are used to tap perceptions of social conditions and societal institutions. ANOMIA5 is measured by agreement (coded 1) or disagreement (coded 0) with the statement that "the lot of the average man8 is getting worse," and ANOMIA7 is measured by agreement (coded 1) or disagreement (coded 0) with the statement that "officials are not interested in the lot of the average man."9 The measures
respondents reported nine or fewer types of memberships. For this reason, we decided it was unnecessary to change the measure used. 8The GSS began in 1972, which undoubtedly affected how this question was worded. 9We use only these two indicators of civil society even though the GSS makes available seven variables measuring various aspects of anomia (ANOMIA3 through ANOMIA9). Our reasoning is as follows: First, ANOMIA5 and ANOMIA7 are available for all years of the survey, but the only other question asked during all years is ANOMIA6, which asks the respondent to agree or disagree with the statement "It is not fair to bring a child into this world." We feel that ANOMIA6 is measuring something other than anomia as defined for the purposes of this paper. It is questionable whether this measure can be seen as related to civil society. The other four measures of anomia (ANOMIA 3, 4, 8, and 9) were asked in only 3 years of the survey (1973, 1974, and 1976) and, as with ANOMIA6, we think that they represent aspects of anomia that extend beyond the stated purposes of this paper.
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were not combined into a single index of anomia, because the Cronbach Alpha for the two was only .40. Social Tolerance Social tolerance has usually been measured by variables indicating attitudes toward members of different social groups. There are several problems with measuring tolerance in this way. When attitudes are assayed through survey research, there is the problem of bias toward answers seen as more socially acceptable. As people move in more diverse social circles or as they get more education, they may feel social pressure to express more tolerant attitudes toward persons of different races or sexual orientations, regardless of what they really think. For example, Schuman and Presser (1977) suggested that "response bias probably inflated the positive effects of education" on tolerance (cited in Wagner, 1986:48). The measurement of social tolerance is rendered additionally problematic by the way a professed commitment to the universalistic ideas of equality may not be consistent with the way a person acts when confronted with real "flesh and blood" people, or when a person feels threatened in some way by someone perceived as different (see Case et al., 1989). For these reasons, in this paper we try to tease out some of the broader social conditions under which people may be more or less likely to espouse tolerant attitudes. The reduction of open statements of intolerance, in our view, is a step toward social tolerance, at least at a threshold level. We do not know how someone who expresses tolerant or intolerant attitudes will behave. However, we believe that the overt expression of intolerance does indicate deep-seated resentment of differences irrespective of behavior. Social tolerance has often been studied with reference to African Americans and to homosexuals. Tolerance toward blacks is commonly operationalized with items referring to the degree of willingness (by whites) to invite a black person to dinner, to support interracial marriage, and to vote for a black president. Attitudes toward school desegregation, busing, and neighborhood desegregation may also be used to measure tolerance (Case et al., 1989; Tuch, 1987).10 The degree of tolerance toward homosexuals
1?Some researchers also use questions regarding governmental intervention to help minorities. In such research, the degree of support for governmental intervention to improve the lot of previously disenfranchised groups such as blacks, is ascertained (Steeh and Schuman, 1992). We believe it is problematic to treat these measures as indicators of personal feelings of intolerance or acceptance, since they involve more intricate political and ideological issues. As Firebaugh and Davis note (1988), the variables that refer to the support of governmental programs constitute measures of "symbolic racism" rather than measures of traditional antiblack prejudice, and the two ways of measurement must be carefully distinguished in drawing conclusions about the persistence and decline of racism (Firebaugh and Davis, 1988:259,260).
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is commonly measured by combining items referring to the civil rights of gay people, such as the right to speak in the community or to teach in universities (Gibson, 1992; Gibson and Tedin, 1988; Ostheimer and Ritt, 1982). Racial tolerance was measured here by combining indicators of attitudes toward African Americans and computing mean scores of responses to three or more of the following five questions: RACPUSH: "(Negroes/ Blacks) shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted" (0 = agree, 1 = disagree); RACSEG: "White people have a right to keep (Negroes/Blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (Negroes/Blacks) should respect that right" (0 = agree, 1 = disagree); RACSCHOL: "Do you think white students and (Negro/Black) students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?" (Recoded as 0 = segregated, 1 = nonsegregated); RACMAR: "Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites?" (Recoded as 0 = yes, 1 = no), and RACDIN: "How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a (Negro/Black) friend home to dinner?" (Recoded as 0 = will strongly or mildly object and 1 = will not object). The racial tolerance index (RACTOT) was constructed after performing a factor analysis that included these five variables along with multiple other measures of traditional anti-black prejudice, such as likelihood of voting for a black president (RACPRES in GSS) and support for busing programs (BUSING), among others. A 3-factor solution produced loadings for RACSEG, RACMAR, RACDIN, RACSCHOL, and RACPUSH, which were moderately high in magnitude (.681, .673, .666, .637, and .599, respectively). For 1972, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1985, the index is constructed with all five items (Cronbach's a = .73). For 1973, RACDIN, RACPUSH, and RACMAR are used (Cronbach's a = .59). For 1994, the index is based on the variables RACPUSH, RACSEG, and RACMAR (Cronbach's a = .64). For each of the three composite measures, the mean scores were computed. The 5-item and the 3-item indices are highly correlated (r = .843, .867, and .883). This was tested for the years where all five items were available. (See Appendix A for a correlation matrix of the indices). Scores on the RACTOT range from 0, indicating the least tolerance, to 1, indicating the highest espoused racial tolerance. (See Appendix B for a frequency distribution on the RACTOT). In this study, two indicators of attitudes toward homosexuals were combined to construct an index of tolerance toward homosexuals. HOMINDEX is a composite measure combining responses to the following GSS questions: SPKHOMO: "Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak or not?" (Recoded as 0 = not allow, 1 = allow). COLHOMO: "Should such a person
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(see above) be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?" (0 = not allow, 1 = allow). HOMINDEX was constructed following the results of a factor analysis that included three variables: SPKHOMO, COLHOMO, and a third indicator of tolerance, HOMOSEX (homosexual sex is O.K.). A 1-factor solution resulted, where COLHOMO and SPKHOMO produced high loadings (.884 and .864, respectively), while HOMOSEX did not load high. Responses to the two high-loading variables were then combined into an additive index of tolerance for homosexuals, and each variable was given equal weight (Cronbach's a = .81). Scores on HOMINDEX range from 0 (relatively lower tolerance) to 2 (relatively more tolerance). Control Variables The most developed research tradition bearing on the model in Fig. 1 draws on studies of tolerance, although Putnam's empirical analyses of factors affecting participation in civil society is also relevant (Putnam, 1995a,b). These two streams of research suggest a number of important control variables. Because we are pooling all available years of the GSS, the first control variable must be the YEAR in which the survey was conducted, as well as the respondents' AGE when they answered the GSS survey (range = 18-89). The importance of both year and age is underscored by the work of Steeh and Schuman (1992). Additionally, the respondent's year of birth is captured in the COHORT variable (range = 1883-1976) and is included in order to tap cohort effects, shown in past research to be directly related to racial tolerance independent of age (Firebaugh and Davis, 1988; Quillian, 1996). Firebaugh and Davis (1988), for instance, found that the replacement of older, more prejudiced cohorts with younger, less prejudiced ones was important for explaining the decline of racial prejudice in recent decades.11 Moreover, it is essential to consider the possibility of period effects.12There were too few cases to conduct separate analyses for each year of the GSS, and certain independent variables were not present in all years. Therefore, we created interaction terms for year and the predictor variables in the model, dropping those terms with a high degree of collinearity.13
1lAs one anonymous reviewer noted, "the only kind of recent decline (or leveling off) of tolerance I know of in the GSS is a decline in tolerance for the civil liberties of racists." This comment underscores the importance of year and cohort as control variables for both measures of espoused tolerance studied here. 12Wethank David Greenberg and an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point. 13Collinearity was assessed using the variable inflation factor (VIF) computed by SPSS in the regression diagnostics routine. Variables with a VIF of more than 2.00 were considered to show collinearity and were dropped from further analyses.
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Because Quillian (1996:846) found an interaction effect between education and birth year such that the effect of education on reducing prejudice increases over birth cohorts, we created and used an interaction term, COHED, consisting of COHORT x EDUC. He also notes that AGE, COHORT, and YEAR are linearly dependent and therefore all three cannot be used in an analysis at one time. Because the educational level of the U.S. population has increased dramatically over the time covered by the GSS, mostly among younger cohorts, it is particularly important to retain year as a control variable. EDUC provides an interval measure of respondent's highest year of school completed, ranging from 0 (no schooling) to 20. Numerous researchers since Stouffer (1955) have found the educational level of respondents to be significantly related to tolerance, including Case et al. (1989), Gibson and Tedin (1988), Jackman and Muha (1984), Nunn et al. (1978), and Quillian (1996), although they do not always agree on how to interpret this relationship. Education is related to higher espoused tolerance regardless of how tolerance was measured. Hence educational level is an extremely important control variable. Tuch (1987) identified three contextual variables as especially important for racial tolerance, namely REGION, dichotomized here into South (coded 1) and non-South (coded 0); RES16, an ordinal variable indicating the size of the community in which the respondent lived at age 16 (response categories range from 1 = country, nonfarm to 6 = city greater than 250,000); and CMYSIZE (SIZE in GSS), an interval variable indicating the size of the respondent's community in thousands at the time of the interview. The range of community sizes was from 0 to 7,895,000. Stephan and McMullin (1982) found that urbanism was significantly and positively associated with tolerance toward homosexuals as well as other target groups. Research on gay tolerance by Gibson and Tedin (1988) suggests that REGION was important for gay tolerance as well as racial tolerance. RACE is a dichotomized variable indicating respondent's selfidentification (0 = black, 1 = white). RACE (being white) was found by Gibson and Tedin (1988) to have a small but significant relationship with gay tolerance. The racial tolerance analysis is performed on whites alone, since it is their attitudes toward blacks that are being measured. SEX is a dichotomized variable (interviewer coded) with 0 = female, 1 = male. SEX (being male) was found by Gibson and Tedin (1988) to have a small positive bivariate relationship with support for the political repression of homosexuals. Finally, because Putnam (1995b) suggests the effects of television as a partial explanation for reduced associational memberships, we include TVHOURS as the best available measure of that variable. TVHOURS is
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an interval measure indicating the average number of hours the respondent watches television per day. The range is 0-24, with 95% of respondents watching 6 h or less per day. RESULTS In order to assess the expected relationships, we employ OLS regression procedures in which we regress the dependent variables on the relevant independent and control variables. Racial Tolerance Among whites, the strongest effects (Table I) are from the factors considered control variables. We see evidence for what might be called the Quillian (1996) education effect, in that education is more strongly related
Table I. Racial Tolerance by Economic Conditions, Indicators of Civil Society, and Control Variables (Including Cohort x Education)a Variables Economic conditions Unemployment Real income Job security Financial distress Civil society Year x Trust Socialize with friends ANOMIA7 ANOMIA5 Married or widowed Frequent bars Associational memberships Socialize with neighbors Control variables Cohort x Education Year of survey Region Residence at age 16 Sex (male) TV hours Community size Constant b .006 .000 .013 .005 .001 .016 -.044 -.031 -.037 .009 .003 -.002 .000 .010 -.113 .015 -.024 -.005 .000 -.579 .082*** .060*** .029* .023 .084*** .071*** -.060*** -.045** -.049** .048** -.015 -.013 .244*** .194*** -.152*** .064*** -.035* -.029* .015 T value 5.377 3.504 1.979 1.396 5.562 4.525 -3.985 -2.972 -3.056 2.959 -0.941 -0.877 13.928 13.013 -10.409 4.251 -2.353 -1.926 1.024 -7.616***
Note. R2 = .265; deletion = pairwise; adjusted R2 = .261. aWhites only (N = 3,650); OLS regression, full model. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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to espoused tolerance among younger cohorts (Cohort x Education), even when year of the GSS survey is constant. Quillian suggested this might be due to changes in the content of education, especially college education, in recent years. Even with Cohort x Education held constant, younger respondents are more likely to espouse racial tolerance than older ones, and respondents in more recent years of the GSS espouse higher levels of tolerance than do respondents in earlier years. Consistent with the findings of Quillian (1996) and Firebaugh and Davis (1988), we find that non-Southern residents (REGION) are more likely to espouse racial tolerance. People who lived in larger communities at age 16 are also somewhat more likely to express tolerance than people who lived in smaller communities at age 16, and women are slightly more likely to espouse tolerance than do men. The amount of television watched by respondents has a very small but significant negative effect on the expression of tolerance. With the other controls in the model, current community size has no significant effect on espoused racial tolerance. The addition of economic and social factors, as suggested by our earlier theoretical discussion, increases the explanatory power of the model somewhat. Among whites, some indicators of their economic situations have small but significant direct effects on racial tolerance. People who have been unemployed in the last 10 years espouse more racial tolerance than those who have not been unemployed, as do people with higher real incomes, and people who enjoy higher job security. Financial distress, however, has no significant direct relationship to espoused racial tolerance. Several indicators of civil society are significantly related to higher levels of espoused tolerance. We know from earlier analyses that trust has a substantial and significant impact on racial tolerance. People who express higher levels of trust are also more likely to espouse higher levels of racial tolerance. However, trust has been declining through time. The interaction term, Year x Trust,has a positive effect on tolerance, suggesting that in more recent years, people who indicate greater trust are more likely to espouse racial tolerance than people expressing less trust. People who express more anomia of either kind are also less likely to espouse tolerant attitudes toward African Americans. People who socialize more often with their friends are somewhat more likely to espouse racial tolerance than people who associate less often with their friends, as are people who frequent bars more often, and people who are not married or widowed (Table I). Neither associational memberships nor socializing with neighbors is significantly related to espoused racial tolerance. This model for whites explains 26.1% of the variance in espoused racial tolerance. The control variables alone explain 22.6% of the variance. Adding economic variables raises the variance explained to 23.5% and the addition
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of civil society variables increases the variance explained to 26.1%, an increase of 3.5% in the variance explained over the model with control variabels alone. There is a further complexity, however. Three variables-year of survey, cohort, and education-are all strongly related to each other. Younger cohorts are getting more education in recent years, and each of those three factors is related to greater tolerance. However, the older people who have more education appear to be less willing to express intolerant attitudes in more recent years. Table I indicates a strong effect from the interaction term Cohort x Education. A competing interpretation is that there is a period effect, which could be measured by the interaction term Year x Education. Year x Education and Cohort x Education are so highly correlated (r = .954) as to be almost interchangeable. What differs depending on which is used is the interpretation given to the results. When Year x Education is substituted for Cohort x Education in Table II, respondents with more education espouse more tolerance in more recent years of the GSS, even when cohort is held constant. This means that education is more strongly related to espoused tolerance in more recent years, even among older respondents. This is a somewhat different interpretation than that of Quillian's. He suggested that the content of the education received by younger birth cohorts heightened their racial tolerance. When the variable Year x Education is used, it appears that more educated respondents regardless of their age are more likely to espouse tolerance in more recent years of the GSS survey than they were in earlier years. Thus, instead of suggesting, as Quillian does, that the changing content of education especially in the social sciences might explain the interaction of cohort and education, an alternative interpretation is that more educated respondents may be more attuned to changing norms about expressions of tolerance through time. Such an interpretation is consistent with the view advanced by Jackman and Muha (1984:760), that dominant groups (i.e., more educated) "learn how to respond to subordinate-group demands with symbolic, rather than substantive, concessions." We believe there is evidence supporting both a cohort and a period interpretation. Because the two interaction terms are so highly related, the interpretations need not be seen as oppositional, but as different ways of viewing the same phenomenon. Cohort (year of birth) remains independently related to espoused tolerance, meaning that younger respondents express more tolerance than older ones. Region remains significantly related, with non-Southerners expressing more racial tolerance than Southern residents. Year x Trust is positively related to espoused racial tolerance, suggesting that in more recent years, trusters are even more likely to espouse racial tolerance than are nontrusters,
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with this effect being stronger than it was for earlier years of the survey, consistent with Table I. Several other indicators of civil society have small positive and significant effects on racial tolerance. People expressing higher levels of both types of anomia express lower levels of racial tolerance. Respondents who socialize more often with their friends are slightly more likely to espouse higher levels of social tolerance than those who socialize less, consistent with Table I. The other indicators of civil society are not significantly related to social tolerance, a slight change from Table I. As was the case in Table I, the same three indicators of a respondent's economic situation have small significant effects on espoused tolerance. Those with higher incomes espouse more tolerant attitudes, as do those who have been unemployed compared to those who have not (although the beta is smaller in Table II). Respondents feeling greater job security are slightly more likely to espouse higher levels of tolerance than those feeling less security.
Table II. Racial Tolerance by Economic Conditions, Indicators of Civil Society and Control Variables (Including Year x Education)a Variables Economic conditions Real income Unemployment Job security Financial distress Civil society Year x Trust ANOMIA7 ANOMIA5 Socialize with friends Frequent bars Married or widowed Associational memberships Socialize with neighbors Control variables Year x Education Cohort Region Year of survey Residence at age 16 Sex (male) TV hours Community size Constant b .000 .031 .015 .004 .001 -.041 -.037 .016 .002 -.017 .001 .000 .000 .004 -.121 .004 .015 -.020 -.004 .000 -7.147 B .040* .040** .034* .019 .101*** -.055*** -.052*** .071*** .012 -.022 .004 -.016 .214*** .202*** -.162*** .073*** .064*** -.029* -.024 .018 T value 2.318 2.591 2.333 1.175 6.757 -3.715 -3.466 4.525 0.718 -1.368 0.245 -1.117 10.956 11.073 -11.230 4.196 4.297 -1.991 -1.599 1.240 -11.417***
Note. R2 = .285; deletion = pairwise; adjusted R2 = .281. aWhites only (N = 2,266); OLS regression, full model. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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The control variables alone explain 25.9% of the variance in espoused tolerance, the addition of economic variables increases the variance explained to 26.2%, and the further addition of the civil society variables raises the explained variance to 28.1%, an overall increase of 2.2% in the explained variance. This model explains slightly more of the variance than did the one in Table I, although the social and economic variables add somewhat less than they did in Table I. Homosexual Tolerance One of the questions that Quillian did not address is whether espoused racial tolerance is unique or whether similar factors also explain other forms of social tolerance. We explore this question using espoused homosexual tolerance as a dependent variable. Because the results are so similar for Year x Education and Cohort x Education, we present only the first of these interaction effects (Table III). While it is not appropriate to compare the size of the betas in two different analyses, we can say something about the relative importance of various factors for the two types of tolerance. With a few small exceptions, the story is remarkably parallel. Most of the same control, economic, and social factors are related to homosexual tolerance in ways that are similar to the racial tolerance model. The same three economic factors are significantly related to espoused homosexual tolerance as were related to racial tolerance. People with higher real incomes are somewhat more likely to espouse tolerance toward homosexuals than are people with lower incomes, even when education and other factors are held constant. People who have been unemployed in the last 10 years are somewhat more likely to express tolerance toward homosexuals than people who have not been unemployed, and people with greater job security are somewhat more likely to express tolerance than are people who feel less job security. Financial distress is not significant as was true for racial tolerance. Among the social variables, frequenting bars makes the biggest difference, although socializing with friends and neighbors also has somewhat different effects than for race. People who frequent bars more often are significantly more likely to espouse homosexual tolerance than people who frequent bars less often, while visiting bars was only weakly related to racial tolerance and only in the model given in Table I. People who socialize more frequently with their neighbors are somewhat less likely to espouse homosexual tolerance than people who socialize less often with their neighbors and this form of socializing was not significantly related to espoused racial tolerance in either of the models in Tables I and II. Socializing more often with friends has no significant effect on espoused homosexual tolerance,
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Table III. Homosexual Tolerance by Economic Conditions, Indicators of Civil Society, Control Variables, and Interaction Termsa T value b Variable T/ Economic conditions Real income Unemployment Job security Financial distress Civil society Frequent bars Year x Trust ANOMIA5 ANOMIA7 Socialize with neighbors Socialize with friends Associational memberships Married or widowed Control variables Year x Education Cohort Residence at age 16 Region Sex (male) Year of Survey Race (white) Community size TV hours Constant .000 .009 .004 .001 .006 .000 -.009 -.007 -.002 .001 -.006 -.048 .001 .006 .057 -.181 -.095 .005 -.078 .000 .007 -11.368*** .069*** .047** .040** .019 .123*** .054*** -.048*** -.039** -.038** .024 -.013 -.025 .251*** .132*** .099*** -.098*** -.054*** -.036* -.031* .021 .018 4.132 3.153 2.831 1.227 7.917 3.714 -3.310 -2.687 -2.714 1.571 -0.849 -1.637 13.288 7.410 6.926 -6.916 -3.862 -2.165 -2.125 1.500 1.296 -7.328
Note. R2 = .242; deletion = pairwise; adjusted R2 = .238. aN = 4,201; OLS regression, full model. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
while it had a small positive effect on racial tolerance in both models in Tables I and II. Year x Trust is significant for both types of tolerance, but was stronger for race than for homosexual tolerance. Of the control variables, Year x Education has the greatest effect on both types of tolerance, cohort has the next largest effect, and region is strongly related to both types of tolerance. As was the case with racial tolerance, residence at age 16 and year of survey are both significantly related to homosexual tolerance. Younger people are much more likely to espouse homosexual tolerance compared to older ones, people who lived in larger communities when they were 16 are more likely to express homosexual tolerance than people who lived in smaller communities, and non-Southerners are significantly more likely to express homosexual tolerance than are Southerners. People responding to the GSS in later years are slightly more likely to express tolerance than those responding earlier. All of these results for espoused homosexual tolerance parallel those for race, as does the effect of gender, with women being somewhat more likely than men to espouse
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both types of social tolerance. Race is not a variable in the racial tolerance analysis, but it has a small and significant effect on homosexual tolerance, with African Americans being slightly more likely than whites to espouse homosexual tolerance. When Tables II and III are compared, the same three control variables, namely marital status, community size, and the number of hours of television watched per day, are not significant for both types of social tolerance. Overall, the model explains nearly 24% of the variance in tolerance toward homosexuals (adjusted R2 = .238). The control variables alone explain 21.1% of the variance, adding the economic variables raises the adjusted R2 to .227, and including the civil society variables in a stepwise regression increases the adjusted R2to .238, an overall increase of 2.7% in the explained variance. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS Overall, the results show that several measures of economic situation have some small direct effects on racial and homosexual tolerance. Real income, having been unemployed, and job security are all positively, albeit modestly, related to both types of social tolerance. Unemployment is the most puzzling of these results. Possibly those who have been unemployed are more likely to have worked in more diverse situations or are more likely to appreciate vulnerability based on social events or characteristics and therefore be more likely to espouse greater tolerance. Informal socializing appears to have mixed effects on tolerance. People who socialize more often with their friends express more racial tolerance than people who socialize less often with friends, and people who frequent bars more often express more tolerance toward homosexuals than people who visit bars less. Yet, people who socialize more often with neighbors are slightly less likely to espouse tolerance for homosexuals than people who socialize less with their neighbors. These findings indicate that the fact of socializing by itself may be less decisive in shaping espoused tolerance than the substantive dimensions of social exchanges. Perhaps people who frequent bars more often meet people of diverse backgrounds and become more tolerant as a result, while people who socialize more often with neighbors meet a less diverse range of people. These results suggest that informal associations operate in complex ways, consistent with our mixed expectations about informal socializing. The effects of informal socializing very likely depend on the values and norms of the people with whom one associates, rather than on the fact of socializing itself. Contrary to previous research findings (Gibson and Tedin, 1988;Klassen et al., 1989; Peterson, 1992), African American respondents were slightly
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more likely to espouse tolerance toward homosexuals than were white respondents.14 Finally, the interaction term, Year x Education, had important effects on both forms of social tolerance. In sum, economic distress and indicators of engagement in civil society add modest explanatory power to the models of racial and homosexual tolerance above and beyond that offered by social and demographic factors such as year of survey, age of respondent, educational level, region, current community size, and community size at age 16. Thus, the results provide small but significant support for the view that economic conditions and the fabric of civil society may contribute somewhat to espoused tolerance. Greater economic security, together with the attitudes fostered by a vibrant civil society, including greater trust and less anomia, appear to increase expressed social tolerance. Economic conditions and indicators of engagement in civil society do not eliminate period effects and the effects of other social and demographic factors, since such factors remain significantly related to expressions of tolerance. We have noted the high correlation between Year x Education and Cohort x Education, and indicated how the interpretations suggested by the use of one rather than another term may diverge, although the two terms are very highly correlated. Finally and most important, we suggest the many parallels between espoused racial tolerance and homosexual tolerance, and bring out the factors that contribute small differences to the explanation of the two types of social tolerance. In this way we suggest what might be a more comprehensive model of espoused social tolerance. Suggestions for Future Research 1. There is a need for more research on the role of the state in mitigating the anomia and distrust related to economic distress. The state cannot affect civil society directly in very many ways, although it can promulgate an official ideology of tolerance and support for the rights of minorities. The state might also do more to mitigate the effects of economic distress caused by structural transformations in the economy, as European states and Japan try to do. 2. The GSS indicator of associational memberships is only a quantitative measure of the number of memberships of various types that a respondent has. It does not provide meaningful qualitative distinctions among types of memberships. Future work on civil society
14As we discuss elsewhere (Persell, Green, and Gurevich, in progress) this divergence from
earlier research appears to be due to whether homosexual tolerance is measured with a civil rights component (as is done here) or as an attitudinal response to homosexual behavior.
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would benefit from richer measures of associational involvement, sensitive to such qualitative dimensions of membership as commitment and depth of involvement. Moreover, ideally an indicator of associational memberships would distinguish groups promoting democratic values, inclusivity, and trust of others from those that do not. Indeed, the fact of membership itself may tell less about civil society than would the nature of an individual's commitment or the ideological values of the group. The importance of various qualitative dimensions of civic engagement and associational membership are underscored by Berman (1997). She found that Nazi party members joined and seized control over civic associations in the Weimar Republic. Berman argues and documents how the existence of large numbers of clubs, voluntary associations, and professional organizations both weakened German citizens' political involvement and provided a base from which the National Socialist German Workers' Party could launch its seizure of political power. 3. If attitudinal expressions of intolerance are related to declines in economic conditions and civil connectedness, might violent acts of intolerance such as gay bashing incidents or black church fire-bombings be related to economic conditions and civil connectedness as well? Might they even be related to other acts of violent intolerance as well, such as abortion clinic bombings or the shooting of doctors who perform abortions? As one anonymous reviewer speculated, extremists may see terrorism as a more acceptable option for them, apart from the fact (or even because of the fact) that they are out of step with a society in which people are increasingly likely to espouse tolerance publicly. Growing expressed tolerance may fuel the fury of the remaining few who are intolerant, as they fear their view is losing support. These and other questions await further research. APPENDIX A
Correlation Matrix of 5- and 3-Item Indices 3-items used in 1973 (RACPUSH, RACSEG, RACMAR) .908* 3-items used in 1994 (RACDIN, RACPUSH, RACMAR) .943*
RINTOT (5-item index): RACSEG, RACMAR, RACSCHOL, RACPUSH, RACDIN *p < .01.
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APPENDIX B
Frequency Distribution on the Racial Tolerance (RACTOT) Index Valid percent Value Frequency .00 (low) .20 .25 .33 .40 .50 .60 .67 .75 .80 1.00 (high) System missing 2,498 667 111 546 973 2,690 1,590 870 230 2,435 11,017 8,752 10.6 2.8 0.5 2.3 4.1 11.4 6.7 3.7 1.0 10.3 46.6 100.0
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Kurt Seidel for his significant research assistance on this project and David Greenberg and three anonymous reviewers for their most helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. REFERENCES
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Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance Author(s): Caroline Hodges Persell, Adam Green and Liena

Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2001

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Fig. 1. Hypothesized relationships among variables in the model.

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

Persell, Green, and Gurevich

Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social Tolerance

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