THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No.

L-14355, October 31, 1919 FACTS The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation? The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner alleged that for the purpose of constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue, Man ila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo. The defendants the Chinese Community of Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado alleged in their Answer (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered wit h sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. One of the defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land, wit hout cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed. The Honorable Simplic io del Rosario, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liab ility under the complaint, wit hout any finding as to costs. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the cit y of Manila) provides that "the cit y (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." ISSUE Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private property for public use HELD No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act No. 2711, or the Charter of the City of Manila states that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. When the application to condemn or appropriate property is made directly to t he court, the question of necessity should be raised (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. [72 Ohio St., 368]). The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly wit h in the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery A ssociation vs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.) Whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great

concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered by Tambunting to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. RATIO/DOCTRINE [1] The taking of private property for any use, which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.) To justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain) where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the purpose of the incorporation, the party claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise (New Cent ral Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. [37 Md., 537, 564]). [2] The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporatio ns and other entities wit hin the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused wit h the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entit y attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. [3] The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it . When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance wit h the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance wit h law. [4] The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes wit h that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of th e law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)

City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilip ino

Police Power Not Valid ly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entit led ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at

least six (6) percent of the total area of t he memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian Reform on November 22, 2010 The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petit ioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constit utional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Art icle VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistib le demands of t he public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCILOF MANDALUYONG CITY,G.R. No. 156684April 6, 2011 FACTS

The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meterssituated between Nueve de Febrero Street andFernandez Street in Barangay Mauway,Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest theyrented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and onlysource of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted ResolutionNo. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to takethe necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for thepurpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving cityinhabitants. ISSUEWhether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused i ts discretion in adoptingResolution No. 552. HELDNo. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is alaw that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from aresolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to sayin the light of attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from aresolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of thesentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possessesa general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally,the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but notfor a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion throughthe resolution, therefore, theSangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused i ts discretion, least of all gravely, for itsexpression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.

Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990) F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein -Del Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief ask ed for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied t he motion. Appeal. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petit ioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petit ioner not only by voluntary negotiation wit h the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-69620 September 24, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO PATOG y PARAAN and ARNOLFO OLSIM y BUSTILLO, defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V finding appellants ARNOLFO OLSIM and ALFREDO PATOG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted sale of marijuana and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to pay costs according to their proportionate shares. The amended information filed against the appellants alleged: xxx xxx xxx That on or about the 28th day of March, 1984, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused (Alfredo Patog, Arnulfo Olsim and James Balisong), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell one (1) kilo of marijuana dried leaves at Pl,000.00 to an undercover agent without authority of law to do so, in violation of the aforecit ed Section (Section 21, Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425). The prosecution's evidence upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is summarized by the said court as follows: Sgt. Glenn Logan and Sgt. Pacifico Mugar, both members of the PC Narcotics Command, Regional Unit I, testified that on March 28, 1984, they, together with CIC Charlie Duatin, were constituted by their superior officer into a team to entrap suspected marijuana push ers at the vicinity of Carantes Street Baguio City. Logan was to pose as a buyer of the stuff while Mugar and Duatin were to back him up. The three thus proceeded to the designated place in the company of a civilian informer. There, the informer introduced Logan to a certain Boyet, who, by then, had already been reputed to be a broker in the sale of the prohibited drugs. Boyet's full name is Arnulfo Olsim. Logan asked Olsim ff the latter bad some marijuana for sale. Olsim replied in the affirmative and quoted the price at P1,000.00 a kilo. Olsim further informed Logan that he Olsim would first get a sample from the owner for Logan to see. That was about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. At about 2:30, Olsim returned and handed to Logan a stalk of dried marijuan a flowering top wrapped in tin foil (Exhibit "F"). After examining the sample, Logan ordered a kilo of the stuff. Olsim wanted the payment to be advanced but Logan suggested that the owner be brought to him and he would pay only after delivery shall have been effected. Olsim once more left and went back at about 5:20 on board a Cimarron passenger vehicle with two companions who turned out to be Alfredo Patog and James Balisong. Balisong was driving the vehicle and Patog was seated beside him while Olsim was at the backseat. They parked beside the Baguio Park Hotel and invited Logan to join them in the vehicle. Olsim introduced Patog and Balisong as the owners of the marijuana. Thereupon, Logan asked for the marijuana. Patog pulled out a whit e plastic shopping bag (Exhibit "E-1") from his seat and handed it to Logan while Balisong demanded the payment. Instead however of paying, Logan signalled Mugar and Duatin and they apprehended the three-Patog, Balisong and Olsim.

The contents (Exhibit "E") of the bag were later on examined at the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Dangwa (Exhibit "D") and they were determined by Forensic Chemist Carlos Figueroa to be a 0.9 kilo of dried marijuana flowering tops (Exhibit "C"). The lower court rendered it s decision against Arnolfo Olsim and Alfredo Patog only, as James Balisong remained at large. The appellant Patog raised the following assignment of errors in this appeal: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THAT BOTH ACCUSED OLSIM AND PATOG ARE PARTICIPANTS IN A CONSPIRACY TO SELL MARIJUANA TO SGT. LOGAN. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT ACCUSED ALFREDO PATOG REALLY LOANED P300.00 TO BALISONG; SO MUCH SO, THAT PATOG READILY CONSENTED TO MEET BALISONG SOMEWHERE IN ORDER THAT HE COULD RECEIVE PAYMENT OF WHAT HE LOANED TO HIM. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED ALFREDO PATOG WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO PROVE THAT HE DID SELL OR DISPATCH IN TRANSIT ANY MARIJUANA TO THE SUPPOSED BUYER. IV THAT THE INCULPATORY FACTS IN THIS CASE ARE NOT CLEAR CUT AND ARE SUBJECT OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INNOCENCE OF ACCUSED PATOG AND THE OTHER CONSISTENT WITH HIS GUILT, AND THEREFORE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT FULFILL THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY AND IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION. Appellant Olsim raised is assignment of errors in his behalf I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION AND THAT OF THE DEFENSE. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT OLSIM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE FACT THAT WITHOUT THE INDUCEMENT HEREIN APPELLANT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CRIME CHARGED. Both appellants question the failure of the trial court to appreciate their respective defenses. The lower court held: The Court has found no cogent reason to doubt the narration Of the prosecution of what had happened. it has all the earmarks of sincerity to the truth. It bears no exaggeration or fabrication.

On the other hand, the versions of Olsim and Patog are far from credible. ... Olsim denies his role in the transaction between Balisong and Sgt. Logan as described by the prosecution witnesses. He gives the following narration to support his contention that his involvement in the deal was due to the instigation of Sgt. Logan: xxx xxx xxx ... [A]t the time of the incident he was waiting for his mother at Carantes Street, Baguio City. He was not selling any "stuff" (marijuana). Neither was he offering something for sale to somebody nor was he in possession of any prohibited drugs. While waiting, an unidentified student approached Olsim It was about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. The student asked him if he knows somebody selling the 'stuff'. Olsim told the student that he does not know of anyone. But the latter begged of him to look for one. Then, the student invited Olsim to see the former's cousin at the Baguio Park Hotel The student's cousin turned out to be Sgt. Logan whom Olsim did not know to be a peace officer. Sgt. Logan too asked Olsim to look for a seller of marijuana. He wanted to buy a kilo of marijuana at P1,000.00. Because of the insistence of Sgt. Logan, appellant Olsim made efforts to look for a seller. He found one named James Balisong. And at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of same date appellant Olsim brought James Balisong accompanied by Alfredo Patog to Logan on board a cimarron (sic) car at Tomas Claudio Street, just beside the Baguio Park Hotel Alfredo Patog, upon instruction from James Balisong, got the plast ic bag containing marijuana from the back seat of the car and handed it to Logan. James Balisong asked Logan to hand over the P1,000.00. Instead, Logan gave the pre arranged signal to the back-up team and arrested the suspects. Logan did not give the amount that the accused were asking. ... Patog denies any involvement in the deal alleging that he was completely unaware of the transaction. He alleges that. xxx xxx xxx ... On March 28, 1984, at about 2:00 P.M. he was at home resting, that after sometime, James Balisong whose Ford Fiera vehicle he used to ride came to his house to borrow P300.00 and he loaned him the said amount after asking him what purpose win he use the money and Balisong said: "Don't ask me that because I am going to pay you a little later." He got the money from his wife and Balisong told Patog he shall see him at the Empire Cinema but Balisong was not there but he waited for him up to 5:15 that same afternoon (TSN, pp. 2 -4) hearing of September 10, 1984). When Balisong arrived Patog asked him about his money and Balisong told him to ride in the vehicle because they are going to Baguio Park Hotel to meet a friend and he rode wit h him; that upon arrival at said place, he saw Balisong talking with two persons whose names he does not know; that while Balisong was inside the jeep the two persons were outside beside him that they talked for about 10 minutes and Balisong told him to get a plastic bag and he got one and gave it to the person wit h whom Balisong was talking, that after handing the bag to said person, Balisong asked for the P1,000.00; then Patog told Balisong. "Let's go because I'm going somewhere," but the person with whom Balisong was conversing with held him. (TSN, pp. 4 -6, infra). When he was held, Patog protested by saying "What I have done?"; that he was told: He (Patog) made a big mistake Thereafter, they were brought to the NARCOM at the City Camp, Baguio; and the PC officers were urging him to admit but he did not admit anything. (TSN, pp. 6 -7. infra.). The issues raised are factual. They center on what actually transpired. The trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defense focusses on the credibility of the wit nesses. When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, we have always accorded the highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court (People v. Jones, 137 SCRA 166; People v. Egas, 137 SCRA 188; People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496), unless the court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if consid ered, might affect the result of the same (People v. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280). The case at bar is no exception to the rule.

Moreover, as held in People v. Gamayon, (121 SCRA 642), we give credence to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially as they happen to be police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Logan, Mugar and Duatin were members of the PC Narcotics Command who were constituted into a team precisely to operate against marijuana pushers in the area where the crime was committed. There is nothing in the records to suggest that they were motivated by any reason other than to accomplish their mission. Where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People v. Campana, 124 SCRA 271). On the specific issue of whether the case involved entrapment or instigation, appellant Olsim contends that he did the act not out of his own volition but upon the instigation of Sgt. Logan. Accordingly, he alleges that he should be exempt from criminal liab ility. The contention is w it hout merit. In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan; whereas, in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would -be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co -principal. Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted (People v. Valmores, 122 SCRA 922). Olsim, in the early part of his testimony, de nied knowing anyone who sells marijuana. Yet when asked to look for one, he was able to find a seller on the very same day. Furthermore, we agree with the lower court that Balisong would not have readily admitted to Olsim that he (Balisong) had marijuana available for sale if Balisong did not know and trust him very well. As a matter of fact, Olsim alias "Boyet" was reputed to be a broker in the sale of prohibition drugs. He was approached because of his reputation. Therefore, we sustain the trial court's finding that Olsim's pose that he was instigated, first by the unidentified student and then by Sgt. Logan is without factual and legal basis. The mode of detection and arrest resorted to was entrapment which is perfectly legal. With respect to Patog, his alib i that he was with Balisong at the time of the incident to collect a P300.00 debt which he loaned earlier that same day is not credible. Not only his manner of testifying but the attendant circumstances made his testimony unbelievable to the trial court . Patog himself admits that he and his wife were jobless save for the fact that his wife buys and sells bananas. The trial court found it hard to believe that Patog would readily part with P300.00, a considerable sum for him at the time, to someone who is not even a relative and whom he knows only because he (Patog) usually rides in his Ford Fiera. We also agree wit h the lower court that it is unthinkable that Balisong the borrower, would unnecessarily burden Patog with the inconvenience of following the fo rmer to the city proper later the same day for the repayment of the loan instead of Balisong going back in his vehicle to pay. The it is also strange that upon seeing Patog at the designated place, Balisong would ask him to ride at the backseat of the vehicle when it would have been more natural for them to sit beside each other in front, they being the only persons on board and whose only purpose was to effect payment of a debt. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438). The question that then presents itself is whether the appellants conspired to sell marijuana t o Sgt. Logan. This issue is important in ascertaining the proper penalty to mete out. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) to the instant case are: Sec. 4. Sale, Administration Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. -The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from 20 thousand to thirty thousand pesos, shag be imposed upon any person, who, unless, authorized by law, shall sell administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or

shall act as a broker in any such transactions. ... (As amended by P. D. No. 1675, February 17, 1980). Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. -The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs; xxx xxx xxx It is a well-settled rule that conspiracy does not have to be proved by direct evidence but may be decided from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed (People v. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488; and People v. Balane, 123 SCRA 614). It is not denied by the appellants Olsim and Patog that they were with Balisong at the time of the attempted sale of marijuana. It was Olsim who acted as middleman between Sgt. Logan and Balisong and it was Patog who gave the plastic bag containing the marijuana to Sgt. Logan. Patog denies knowing the contents of the bag. Even assuming we lend credence to Patog's testimony that he sat at the back of the Fiera, there was no reason for Balisong to ask him (Patog) to give the plastic bag which was under the front seat if he was just an innocent passenger, when Balisong could have easily gotten the bag itself. Conspiracy is, therefore, established as there is evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (Gomez v. Intermediate Ap pellate Court, 135 SCRA 620). The entire concatenation of events from the time Logan asked for marijuana to buy, up to the arrest of the accused sustains the finding of conspiracy.

G.R. No. 138896 Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor on June 24, 2011

Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Expropriation BP 129

In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected tit le to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.

HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisd iction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

What are the two phases of expropriation cases?

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exe rcise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned wit h the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is d one by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . . It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise o f eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Visayan Refining Company et. al vs. Camus et. al G.R. No. L-15870 December 3, 1919 Street, J. FACTS: Upon the direction of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General filed a complaint wit h the CFI (Rizal) in the name of the Government of the Philippines for the condemnation of a certain tract of land in Paranaque for military and aviation purposes. The petitioners herein are among the defendants named. Likewise, it was prayed that the court will give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated after the necessary deposit (provisional)

of P600, 000.00 as the total value of the property. Through the order of the public respondent, Judge Camus, the prayer was granted. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrer questioning the valid ity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no law authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved for the revocation of the order on the same ground stated and with additional allegation that the deposit had been made without authority of law since the money was taken from the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by previous statutes for the use of the Militia Commission and t he authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain could not be found in those statutes. The demurrer and motion were overruled and denied respectively by Camus. This prompted the petitioners to file this instant petit ion to stop the proceedings in the CFI. ISSUE: Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation proceedings in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain? RULING: Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general authority to exercise the power of eminent domain as expressly conferred by Section 63 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902). It says that the Philippine Government is authorized to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right to eminent domain. The same is subject to the limitation of due process of law. In consonance wit h this, Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government General the power to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction. There is no question as to the Governor Generals authority to exercise this power. However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two limitations, namely, that the taking shall be for public purpose and there must be just compensation. Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was for military and aviation purposes. This considered a public purpose given the importance of the military and aviation in the operation of the State. As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at that time there was no law requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. The deposit was made, despite the absence of said law, to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. This is in conformity with the just compensation requirement. Given these reasons, the proceedings were made in accordance with law. DISPOSITION Petition is denied. Proceedings of the lower court were in all respects regular and within the jurisdiction of the court.

Gr no. 107916

Moday vs Court of Appeals on June 24, 2011 Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the St ate, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or ord er is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB re solution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998 J. Panganiban

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts: Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didnt accept . The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.

According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local GovernmentCode); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petit ioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable . The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues: 1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. 2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: 1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entit ies and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Sec 19, RA 7160 A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power ofeminent domain : 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domainpursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance wit h the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is d ifferent from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature . If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction. When the legislature interferes wit h that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation . Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. 2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use whenever they need it . While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case .

In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exerciseeminent domain is not dimin ished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise it s right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with.

G.R. No. 135087

March 14, 2000

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners1 pray for the reversal of the Order dated July 28, 1998 issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 entitled "City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S. Suguitan, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED and an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION is hereby issued declaring that the plaintiff, City of Mandaluyong, has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together with existing improvements thereon more specifically covered by Transfer Certificate Of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District II for the public use or purpose as stated in the Complaint, upon payment of just compensation. Accordingly, in order to ascertain the just compensation, the parties are hereby directed to submit to the Court wit hin fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, a list of independent appraisers from which the Court will select three (3) to be appointed as Commissioners, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court. SO ORDERED. 2 It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong Cit y issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994 3 authorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguit an located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 of fering to buy his property, but Suguit an refused to sell. 4 Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint 5 for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The case was docketed as SCA No. 875. Suguit an filed a motion to dismiss 6 the complaint based on the following grounds (1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the motion. On October 24, 1995, the trial court denied Suguit an's motion to dismiss. 7

On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995. 8 On July 28, 1998, the court granted the assailed order of expropriation. Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, 9 and not by means of a mere resolution. 10 Respondent contends, however, that it valid ly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court, was explained, thus: 11 . . . in the exercise of the respondent City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a " resolution " empowering the City Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and thereafter when the court has already determine[d] with certainty the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating funds for the payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. 12 Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation of expropriatio n proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the payment of just compensation, explaining that the resolution mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation case in court and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under section 19 of the Code. 13 The petition is imbued with merit. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. 14 It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. 15 Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constit utional recognition. 16 The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the governme nt, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. 17 Thus, our own Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." 18Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses 19 act as addit ional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individu al's right to private property, a constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty, 20 the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila vs.Chinese Community of Manila we said: 21 The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Gal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].) The statutory power of taking property from the owner wit hout his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctit y which all free constit utions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as

modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.) The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance wit h the terms of the delegating law. 22 The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;Provided , however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided , further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided , finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. 23 In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the national legislature. 24 The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the local government unit concerned: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 25 In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation 26 regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that 1998 case we held that: We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordin ance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised. Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages: (1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; (2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just comp ensation for the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court wit h the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 27 Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial find ing by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised it s power of eminent domain. Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. 28 Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is e ntitled. Neither is respondent's position improved by it s reliance upon Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR which provides that: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR, which is more apparent than real, in Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation, 29 which we quote hereunder: Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolut ion to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misp laced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it . It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance. Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power. It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary ordinance and thereafter reinstit uting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied wit h all other legal requirements. 30

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011 GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and Definite Offer) FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent municipality (now cit y) as having the right to expropriate petitioners property for the construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules

and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code) . Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was
offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted. ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate. HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance wit h the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. AURELLANO S. TIANGCO, LOURDES S. TIANGCO and NESTOR S. TIANGCO, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the annulment and sett ing aside of the Decision 1 dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53576, as reiterated in its Resolution 2 of December 2, 2005 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision modified that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, by increasing the amount of just compensation due the respondents in an expropriation case filed against them by the petitioner. The facts:

Herein respondents Aurellano, Lourdes and Nestor, all surnamed Tiangco, are the owners of a parcel of land wit h an area of 152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and registered in their names under TCT No. M17865 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner NPC is a government -owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undert aking the development and generation of power from whatever source. NPCs charter (Republic Act No. 6395) authorizes the corporation to acquire private property and exercise the right of eminent domain. 1awphi1.net NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property, across which it s 500Kv Kalayaan San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPCs Segregation Plan 3 for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents land, in such a manner that 33,392 square meters thereof will be left separated from 99,372 square meters of the property. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and coconut trees. On November 20, 1990, after repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed wit h the RTC of Tanay, Rizal a complaint for expropriation 4 against them. In time, the respondents filed their answer. On March 14, 1991, the trial court issued a Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take posse ssion of the area sought to be expropriated. In the same Order, the court directed the parties to nominate their respective commissioners, with a third member to be nominated and appointed by the court itself, to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to the respondents. As constituted in the manner thus indicated, the board of commissioners was composed of the following: for NPC, Atty. Restituto Mallo of its Legal Department; for the respondents, Mr. Basilio Afuang, a geodetic engineer and a real estate broker by profession; and for the court, Clerk of Court V Ms. Amelia de Guzman Carbonell. On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order directing NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer the amount of P81,204.00, representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the taking of possession thereof. On April 22, 1991, wit h NPC having complied with the deposit requirement, a writ of possession was issued in its favor. Thereafter, an ocular inspection of the premises was conducted and hearings before the board of commissioners were held, during which the Municipal Assessor of Tanay, Rizal was presented. He submitted a record of the Schedule of Values for taxation purposes and a certification to the effect that the unit value of the respondents property is P21,000.00 per hectare. On August 7, 1993, commissioner Basilio Afuang for the respondents filed his report. He pegged the price of the area sought to be expropriated at P30.00 per square meter or P582,690.00 5 in the aggregate; and for the improvements thereon, Afuang placed a valuation of P2,093,950.00. The figures are in contrast with the respondents own valuation of P600,600.00, for the area, and P4,935,500.00, for the improvements. On September 14, 1993, NPC filed an amended complaint to acquire only 19,423 square meters of the respondents property. The original area of 20,220 square meters initially sought to be expropriated under the original complaint turned out to be in excess of the area required. For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an easement of right -of-way over the respondents prop erty and that ownership of the area over which the right -of-way will be established shall remain with the respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in addition to the agreed or adjudged value of the improvements on the area, only an easement fee in an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the market value of the property as declared by the respondents or by the Municipal Assessor, whichever is lower, as provided for under Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938. 6 The court-appointed commissioner, Ms. Amelia de Guzman Carbonell, found that the risk and dangerous nature of the transmission line project essentially deprive the respondents of the use of the area. Nonetheless, she recommended that the determination of just compensation should be relegated to "expert appraisers." 7

From the evidence before it , the trial court made a determination that the market value of the property is P2.09 per square meter, or P40,594.07 for the entire 19,423 square meters needed by NPC, and not the P30.00 per square meter claimed by the respondents. Neit her did the trial court consider NPCs reliance on Section 3 -A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938, the court placing more weight on the respondents argument that expropriation would result in the substantial impairment of the use of the area needed, even though what is sought is a mere aerial right -of-way. The court found as reasonable the amount of P324,750.00 offered by NPC for the improvements, as the same is based on the official current schedule of values as determined by the Municipal Assessor of Tanay, Rizal. Hence, in its decision 8 of February 19, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area of 19,423 sq.m. covered by TCT No. M-17860 owned by the [respondents]; 2. Ordering the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvements on the land expropriated with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets supplied.) The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first time a document entit led "Bureau of Internal Revenue Circular of Appraisal," which shows that for the year 1985, lands in Barangay Sampaloc were valued atP30.00 per square meter; for the year 1992, at P80.00 per square meter; and for year 1994, at P100.00 per square meter. Respondents maintain that the price of P30.00 per square meter for the needed area of 19,423 square meters is the reasonable amount and should be the basis for fixing the amount of just compensation due them. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the BIR circular in question was belatedly filed and therefore NPC could not have opposed its presentation. From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, both NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA -G.R. CV No. 53576. The appellate court found merit in the respondents appeal, and disregarded the P2.09 per square meter valuation of the trial court, which was based on a 1984 tax declaration. Instead, the CA placed reliance upon a 1993 tax declaration, "being only two years removed from the time of taking." 9 The appellate court determined the time of taking to be in 1991. Thus, the greater value of P913,122.00 as declared in Tax Declaration No. 011-2667 dated July 23, 1993 should be the basis for determining just compensation. With regard to the value of improvements, the appellate court found NPCs valuation more favorable, being based on the current (1991) schedule of values for trees in the provinces of Rizal and Laguna. Hence, in its decision 10 of March 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment, to wit: WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80 dated February 19, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED and the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square meters of land affected is increased to P116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements thereon is likewise increased to P325,025.00, with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaintiff -appellee NAPOCOR. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. NPC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the appellate court in its resolution 11 of December 2, 2005. Hence, NPCs instant petition for review, submitting for our resolutio n only the following issues with respect to the amount of just compensation that must be paid the respondents for the expropriated portion (19,423 square meters) of their property:

1. Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation? 2. Should NPC pay for the value of the land being taken, or should it be limited to what is provided for under P.D. 938, that is, ten per cent (10%) of its market value as declared by the owner or the assessor (whichever is lower), considering that the purpose for which the p roperty is being taken is merely for the establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead transmission lines? There is no issue as to the improvements. Since the P325,025.00 valuation therefor is the very price set by the NPC commissioner, to which the corporation did not object but otherwise adopts, the Court fixes the amount ofP325,025.00 as just compensation for the improvements. We now come to the more weighty question of what amount is just by way of compensation for the 19,423 square meter po rtion of the respondents property. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. So it is that in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., 12 we ruled: Normally, the time of the taking coincides wit h the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the two determinations is correct. For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking the property. It was certainly unfair for the trial court to have considered a property value several years behind its worth at the time the complaint in this case was filed on November 20, 1990. The landowners are necessarily short changed, considering that, as a rule, land values enjoy steady upward movement. It was likewise erroneous for the appellate court to have fixed the value of the property on the basis of a 1993 assessment. NPC would be paying too much. Petitioner corporation is correct in arguing that the respondents should not profit from an assessment made years after the taking. The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay t he basis for the proper determination of just compensation. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 13 the Court ruled that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be substantial, full, ample and, as must apply to this case, real. This must be taken to mean, among others, that the value as of the time of taking should be the price to be paid the property owner. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. In this case, this simp ly means the propertys fair market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, or "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." 14 The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee; these values consist but one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. 15 The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner16 All the facts as to the condition of the property and it s surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be consid ered. 17 Neither of the two determinations made by the courts below is therefore correct. A new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing pronouncements.

Now, to the second issue raised by petit ioner NPC. In several cases, the Court struck down NPCs consistent reliance on Section 3 -A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938. 18 True, an easement of a right -of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neit her more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken. 19 While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, wit hout loss of title and possession. 20 However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land, in accordance with our ruling in NPC v. Manubay Agro-Industrial: As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. 21 The evidence suggests that NPCs transmission line project that traverses the respondents property is perpetual, or at least indefinite, in nature. Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact that the high -tension current to be conveyed through said transmission lines evidently poses a danger to life and limb; injury, death or destruction to life and property wit hin the vicinity. As the Court held in NPC v. Chiong , 22 it is not improper to assume that NPC will erect structures for its transmission lines within the property. What is sought to be expropriated in this case is, at its longest extent, 326.34 meters, and through it may be built several structures, not simply one. Finally, if NPC were to have its way, respondents will continue to pay the realty taxes due on the affected portion of their property, an imposition that, among others, merits the rejection of NPCs thesis of payment of a mere percentage of the propertys actual value. WHEREFORE, the instant petit ion is GRANTED in part in that the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 14, 2005 vis a vis the award of P116,538.00, as and by way of just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of the respondents property, is SET ASIDE, and the case is ordered REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation for the portion thus taken, based on our pronouncements hereon. The same decision, however, is AFFIRMED, insofar as it pertains to the award of P325,025.00 for the improvements, with legal interest from the time of actual possession by the petit ioner. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

S u n d a y, O ct o b e r 2 1 , 2 0 1 2 Republic Vs. PLDT Case Digest Republic Vs. PLDT 26 SCRA 320 G.R. No. L-18841

January 27, 1969

Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call priv ately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competit ion with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court ju dgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract wit h the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

Held: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.

City Of Baguio Vs. Nawasa Case Digest City Of Baguio Vs. Nawasa 106 Phil G.R. No. L-12032 August 31, 1959

Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said water works without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot be expropriated wit hout just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.13 83 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.

Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all wate r works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in s o doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.

The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al L-24440, March 28, 1968 FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that --

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga." Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstit utional because it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the capit al site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospit al and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds. ISSUES: Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property? Should the city pay for said properties? HELD: If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE. If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstit utional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on

Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State, ot herwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."