Dr. Paul M.

Livingston

Agamben, Badiou, and Russell ABSTRACT: Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou have both recently made central use of set-theoretic results in their political and ontological projects. As argue in the paper! one of the most important of these t"o both thin#ers is the parado$ of set membership discovered by %ussell in &'(&. %ussell)s parado$ demonstrates the fundamentally parado$ical status of the totality of language itself! in its concrete occurrence or ta#ing-place in the "orld. *he parado$ical status of language is essential to Agamben)s discussions of the +coming community!, +"hatever being!, sovereignty! la" and its force! and the possibility of a reconfiguration of political life! as "ell as to Badiou)s notions of representation! political intervention! the nature of the subject! and the event. document these implications of %ussell)s

parado$ in the te$ts of Agamben and Badiou and suggest that they point the "ay to"ard a reconfigured political life! grounded in a radical reflective e$perience of language.

KEYWORDS: Agamben! Badiou! %ussell! %ussell)s Parado$! -et *heory! Linguistic Being

-ometime in &'(&! the young Bertrand %ussell! follo"ing out the conse.uences of an earlier result by /antor! discovered the parado$ of set membership that bears his name. ts conse.uences have resonated throughout the t"entieth century)s attempts to employ formal methods to clarify the underlying structures of logic and language. But even beyond these formal approaches! as has been clear since the time of %ussell)s discovery! the .uestion of self-reference that the parado$ poses bears deeply on the most general problems of the foundations of linguistic meaning and reference. %ecently! through an interesting and suggestive philosophical passage! the implications of %ussell)s parado$ have also come to stand at the center of the simultaneously ontological and sociopolitical thought of t"o of today)s leading 1

+continental, philosophers! Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou. *racing this passage! as shall argue! can help to demonstrate the ongoing significance of the +linguistic turn, ta#en by critical reflection! "ithin both the analytic and continental traditions! in the t"entieth century. Additionally! it helps to suggest ho" a rene"ed attention to the deep aporias of language)s reference to itself holds the potential to demonstrate fundamental and unresolved contradictions at the center of the political and metaphysical structure of sovereignty.

n its most general form! %ussell)s parado$ concerns the possibility of constructing sets or groupings of any individual objects or entities "hatsoever. -ince the operation of grouping or collecting individuals under universal concepts or general names can also be ta#en to be the fundamental operation of linguistic reference! it is clear from the outset that the parado$ has important conse.uences for thin#ing about language and representation as "ell. n its historical conte$t! %ussell)s formulation of the parado$ bore specifically against 0rege)s logicist attempt to place mathematics on a rigorous basis by positing a small set of logical and set-theoretical a$ioms from "hich all mathematical truths could be derived. 1ne of the most centrally important and seemingly natural of these a$ioms "as 0rege)s +universal comprehension principle, or +Basic La" 2., *he principle holds that! for any property nameable in language! there is a set consisting of all and only the things that have that property. 0or instance! if basic la" 2 is true! the predicate +red, should ensure the e$istence of a set containing all and only red things3 the predicate +heavier than 4( #g., should ensure the e$istence of a set containing all and only things heavier than 4( #g.! and so on. As things stand! moreover! there is no bar to sets containing themselves. 0or instance the property of being a set containing more than five elements is a perfectly "ell-defined one! and so according to 0rege)s principle! the set of all sets that contain more than five elements ought to e$ist. But since it has more than five elements! the set so defined is clearly a member of itself. n this case and others li#e it! self-membership poses no special problem. But as %ussell "ould demonstrate! the general possibility of self-membership actually proves fatal to the natural-seeming 2

universal comprehension principle. 0or if the comprehension principle held! it "ould be possible to define a set consisting of all and only sets that are not members of themselves. 5o" "e may as# "hether this set is a member of itself. f it is a member of itself! then it is not! and if it is not a member of itself! then it is. *he assumption of a universal comprehension principle! in other "ords! leads immediately to a contradiction fatal to the coherence of the a$iomatic system that includes it. %ussell)s demonstration of the parado$! "hich left 0rege +thunderstruc#!, led him also to abandon the universal comprehension principle and to reconsider the most basic assumptions of his a$iomatic system. & 6e "ould subse.uently "or# on the reformulation of the foundations of set theory! given %ussell)s demonstration! for much of the rest of his life3 it is not clear! indeed! that he ever recovered from the shoc# of %ussell)s remar#able discovery. n the &'(7 paper "herein %ussell publici8ed the parado$ and offered his first influential attempt to resolve it! he points out its #inship to a variety of other formal and informal parado$es! including the classical +liar, parado$ of 9pimenides! the parado$ of the /retan "ho says that all remar#s made by /retans are lies.4 *he parado$ of the /retan shares "ith %ussell)s the common feature that %ussell calls self-reference: n all the above contradictions ;"hich are merely selections from an indefinite number< there is a common characteristic! "hich "e may describe as self-reference or refle$iveness. *he remar# of 9pimenides must include itself in its o"n scope = n each contradiction something is said about all cases of some #ind! and from "hat is said a ne" case seems to be generated! "hich both is and is not of the same #ind as the cases of "hich all "ere concerned in "hat "as said. >
1

-ee 0rege)s letter to %ussell of 44 ?une! &'(4! reprinted and translated in 0rege ;&'7(<. %ussell ;&'(7<. *he other parado$es said by %ussell to share roughly the same structure are: Burali-0orti)s

contradiction concerning the ordinal number of the si8e of all ordinals! a set of parado$es concerning the definability of transfinite ordinals! integers! and decimals! and an analogue to %ussell)s parado$ concerning the +relation "hich subsists bet"een t"o relations % and - "henever % does not have the relation % to -.,
3

%ussell ;&'(7<! p. @&.

9ach of the parado$es he discusses results! as %ussell suggests! from the attempt to say something about a totality ;"hether of propositions! sets! numbers! or "hatever< and then to generate! by virtue of the definition of this totality itself! a case "hich! being a case! appears to fit "ithin the totality! and yet also appears not to. *hus the remar# of the /retan! for instance! attempts to assert the falsehood of all propositions uttered by /retans3 since the scope of "hat it refers to includes itself! the parado$ results. A -imilarly! in %ussell)s o"n parado$! the apparent possibility of grouping together all sets "ith a certain property ;namely! not being self-membered< leads directly to contradiction. Putting things this "ay! indeed! it is clear that the parado$ in its general form affects the coherence of many #inds of totality that "e might other"ise suppose to be more or less unproblematic. *he totality of the thinkable! for instance! if it e$ists! presumably also has thin#able boundaries. But then "e can define an element of this totality! the thought of the boundaries themselves! that is both inside and outside the totality! and contradiction results. 9ven more fatefully for the projects of linguistic philosophy in the t"entieth century! "e may ta#e language itself to comprise the totality of propositions or meaningful sentences. But then there "ill clearly be meaningful propositions referring to this totality itself. -uch propositions include! for instance! any describing the general character or detailed structure of language as a "hole. But if there are such propositions! containing terms definable only by reference to the totality in "hich they ta#e part! then %ussell-style parado$ immediately results. By "ay of a
4

As has been objected! it is not immediately obvious that the Liar parado$ involves covert reference to a totality.

%ussell)s o"n "ay of assimilating it to the form of his o"n parado$ involves ta#ing the remar# of the /retan to .uantify over all propositions uttered by /retans! but it is not apparent that it must ta#e this form! ! since it may also be put as the parado$ of the /retan "ho! employing inde$icals or deictic pronouns! says +9verything say is false, or simply +*his sentence is false., 5evertheless! Priest ;4((>< has argued that putting the Liar sentence in a form that portrays it as ma#ing reference to a totality of propositions both conveys its actual underlying logic and demonstrates its similarity of structure to the other formal and +semantic, parado$es. More generally! for all of these parado$es! self-referential formulations involving dei$is are readily convertible into formulations involving the totalities that %ussell identified as problematic! and vice-versa. 0or more on the relationship of dei$is and selfreference! see the discussion in section belo".

fundamental operation of self-reference that is both pervasive and probably ineliminable on the level of ordinary practice! language)s naming of itself thus invo#es a radical parado$ of non-closure at the limits of its nominating po"er.B n each case! the arising of the parado$ depends on our ability to form the relevant totality3 if "e "ish to avoid parado$! this may seem to suggest that "e must adopt some principle prohibiting the formation of the relevant totalities! or establishing ontologically that they in fact do not or cannot e$ist. *his is indeed the solution that %ussell first considers. Because the parado$ immediately demands that "e abandon the universal comprehension principle according to "hich each linguistically "ell-formed predicate determines a class! it also suggests! according to %ussell! that "e must recogni8e certain terms C those "hich! if sets corresponding to them e$isted! "ould lead to parado$ C as not in fact capable of determining sets3 he calls these +non-predicative., *he problem no" "ill be to find a principle for distinguishing predicative from non-predicative e$pressions. -uch a principle should provide a motivated basis for thin#ing that the sets "hich "ould be pic#ed out by the non-predicative e$pressions indeed do not e$ist! "hile the sets pic#ed out by predicative ones are left unscathed by a more restricted version of 0rege)s basic la" 2. %ussell! indeed! immediately suggests such a principle: *his leads us to the rule: DEhatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection)3 or! conversely: D f! provided a certain collection had a total! it "ould have members only definable in terms of that total! then the said collection has no total.) @ *he principle! if successful! "ill bar parado$ by preventing the formation of the totalities that lead to it. 5o set "ill be able to be a member of itself! and no proposition "ill be able to ma#e reference to the
5

/f. Priest ;4((><. n one of the first influential articles to interpret %ussell)s parado$! 0. P. %amsey ;&'4B< argued

for a fundamental distinction bet"een +formal, parado$es li#e %ussell)s! "hose statement! as he held! involves only Dlogical or mathematical terms) and the +semantic, parado$es such as the Liar! "hich involve reference to +thought! language! or symbolism., But as Priest argues! there is no reason to thin# this is a fundamental distinction if the parado$es on both sides can indeed be given a unified form.
6

%ussell ;&'(7<! p. @>.

totality of propositions of "hich it is a member3 therefore no %ussell-style parado$ "ill arise. 5evertheless! there is! as %ussell notices! good reason to doubt "hether any such principle is even itself formulable "ithout contradiction: *he above principle is! ho"ever! purely negative in its scope. t suffices to sho" that many theories are "rong! but it does not sho" ho" the errors are to be rectified. Ee can not say: DEhen spea# of all propositions! mean all e$cept those in "hich Dall propositions) are mentioned)3 for in this e$planation "e have mentioned the propositions in "hich all propositions are mentioned! "hich "e cannot do significantly. t is impossible to avoid mentioning a thing by mentioning that "e "on)t mention it. 1ne might as "ell! in tal#ing to a man "ith a long nose! say: DEhen spea# of noses! e$cept such as are inordinately long)! "hich "ould not be a very successful effort to avoid a painful topic. *hus it is necessary! if "e are not to sin against the above negative principle! to construct our logic "ithout mentioning such things as Dall propositions) or Dall properties)! and "ithout even having to say that "e are e$cluding such things. *he e$clusion must result naturally and inevitably from our positive doctrines! "hich must ma#e it plain that Dall propositions) and Dall properties) are meaningless phrases. F *he attempt e$plicitly to e$clude the totalities "hose formation "ould lead to parado$ thus immediately leads to formulations "hich are themselves self-undermining in mentioning the totalities "hose e$istence is denied. 9ven if this problem can be overcome! as %ussell notes! the prohibition of the formation of totalities that include members defined in terms of themselves "ill inevitably lead to problems "ith the formulation of principles and descriptions that other"ise seem .uite natural. 0or instance! as %ussell notes! "e "ill no longer be able to state general logical laws such as the la" of the e$cluded middle holding that all propositions are either true or false. 0or the la" says of all propositions that each one is either true or false3 it thus ma#es reference to the totality of propositions! and such reference is e$plicitly

%ussell ;&'(7<! p. @>.

to be prohibited.7 -imilarly! since "e may ta#e Dlanguage) to refer to the totality of propositions! it "ill no longer be possible to refer to language in a general sense! or to trace its overall principles or rules as a "hole.'

II *he attempt to bloc# the parado$ simply by prohibiting the e$istence of the relevant totalities! therefore! ris#s being self-undermining3 moreover! it demands that "e e$plicitly bloc# forms of reference ;for instance to language itself< that seem .uite natural and indeed ubi.uitous in ordinary discourse. Another strategy is the one %ussell himself adopts in the &'(7 paper! and has indeed been most "idely adopted in the subse.uent history of set theory: namely! that of constructing the a$iomatic basis of the theory in such a "ay that the formation of the problematic totalities "hich "ould lead to parado$ is prohibited by the formal rules for set formation themselves. *he attempts that follo" this strategy uniformly ma#e use of "hat %ussell calls a +vicious circle, principle: the idea is to introduce rules that effectively prohibit the formation of any set containing either itself or any element definable solely in terms of itself! and thereby to bloc# the vicious circle that seems to result from self-membership. &( *he first! and still most influential! such attempt is %ussell)s o"n +theory of types., *he theory aims to preclude self-membership by demanding that the universe of sets be inherently stratified into logical types or levels. According to the type theory! it is possible for a set to be a member of another! but only if the containing set is of a higher +type, or +level, than the one contained. At the bottom of the hierarchy of levels is a basic
8

%ussell ;&'(7<! p. @>. +Ehatever "e suppose to be the totality of propositions! statements about the totality generate ne" propositions

"hich! on pain of contradiction! must lie outside the totality. t is useless to enlarge the totality! for that e.ually enlarges the scope of statements about the totality. 6ence there must be no totality of propositions! and Dall propositions) must be a meaningless phrase., ;%ussell ;&'(7<! p. @4.<
10

+=fallacies! as "e sa"! are to be avoided by "hat may be called the Dvicious-circle principle)3 i.e.! Dno totality

can contain members defined in terms of itself)., ;%ussell ;&'(7<! p. FB<

+founding, or +elementary, level consisting of simple objects or individuals that no longer have any elements3 at this level no further decomposition of sets into their elements is possible. && n this "ay it is prohibited for a set to be a member of itself3 similarly! it is possible for linguistic terms to ma#e reference to other linguistic terms! but in no case is it possible for a linguistic term or e$pression to ma#e reference to itself! and the parado$ is bloc#ed. Another attempt to prevent the parado$! along largely similar lines! is due to Germelo! and is preserved in the a$iomatic system of the standard +G0/, set theory. Germelo)s a$iom of +regularity, or +foundation, re.uires! of every actually e$isting set! that its decomposition yield a most +basic, element that cannot be further decomposed into other elements of that set or of its other elements. n this "ay! the a$iom of foundation! li#e %ussell)s type theory! prohibits self-membership by re.uiring that each set be ultimately decomposable into some compositionally simplest element.&4 0inally! a third historically influential attempt! tracing to Brou"er! prohibits self-membership by appealing to the constructivist intuition that! in order for any set actually to e$ist! it must be built or constructed from sets that already e$ist. n this "ay! no set is able to contain itself! for it does not have itself available as a member at the moment of its construction. &> *hese devices all succeed in solving the parado$ by precluding it on the level of formal theory3 but the e$tent of their applicability to the ;apparent< phenomena of self-reference in ordinary language is eminently .uestionable. 6ere! in application to the ability of language to name itself! they seem ad hoc and are .uite at odds "ith the evident commitments of ordinary speech and discourse. 0or instance! it
11

%ussell ;&'(7<! pp. FB-F@. 0or the original formulation! see Germelo ;&'(7<. *his intuition is also e$pressed in Germelo)s +a$iom of separation!, "hich holds that! given any e$isting set! it is

12

13

possible to form the subset containing only the elements bearing any specific property. 5evertheless! since this a$iom only allows the e$istence of certain sets ;and does not prevent anything< it does not by itself prevent the e$istence of self-membered and +non "ell-founded, sets. 0or the theory of such sets that results if "e allo" the rela$ation of the a$iom of foundation! see Ac8el ;&'77<. 0or discussion of these "ays of resolving %ussell)s parado$! see also Badiou ;4((A<! pp. &FF-7F.

seems evident that e$pressions and propositions of ordinary language can refer to language itself3 any systematic consideration of linguistic meaning or reference! after all! re.uires some such reference. Moreover! even beyond the possibility e$plicitly to name or theorize language as such! the problematic possibility of linguistic self-reference is! as %ussell)s analaysis itself suggested! already inscribed in everyday speech by its ordinary and scarcely avoidable recourse to deixis C that is! to inde$ical pronouns such as +this!, + !, +here!, and +no"., *he presence of these pronouns inscribes! as a structural necessity of anything that "e can recogni8e as language! the standing possibility for any spea#er to ma#e reference to the very instance of concrete discouse in "hich she is currently participating! as "ell as! at least implicitly! to the ;seeming< totality of possible instances of discourse of "hich it is a member. Accordingly! even if "e may ta#e it that the restrictive devices of %ussell! Germelo and Brou"er have some justification in relation to a universe of entities that are inherently separable into discrete levels of comple$ity! or ultimately founded on some basic level of logical simples! it is unclear "hat could motivate the claim that ordinary language actually describes such a universe! or demand that "e purge from ordinary language the countless deictic devices and possibilities of self-reference that seem to demonstrate that it does not. 9ven more generally! it seems evident not only that "e do constantly ma#e reference to language itself in relation to the "orld it describes! but that such reference indeed plays an important and perhaps ineliminable role in determining actual occurrences and events. 0or in conte$ts of intersubjective practice and action! "e do not only transparently use language to reflect or describe the "orld3 at least some of the time! "e refer to language itself in relation to the "orld in order to evo#e or invo#e its actual effects. -uch reference occurs "herever linguistic meaning is at issue! and is as decisive in the course of an ordinary human life as such meaning itself. n prohibiting self-reference! the devices that attempt to bloc# parado$ by laying do"n a$iomatic or ontological restrictions thus seem artificially to foreclose the real phenomena "hich! despite their tendency to lead to parado$! may indeed tend to demonstrate the problematic place of the appearance in the "orld of the linguistic as such. -ee#ing to preclude the possibility of formal contradiction! they foreclose the aporia that may seem to ordinarily render reference 9

to language both unavoidable and parado$ical: namely that the forms that articulate the boundary of the sayable! and so define preconditions for the possibility of any bearing of language on the "orld! again appear in the "orld as the determinate phenomena of language to "hich ordinary discourse incessantly ma#es reference. f the strategies of %ussell! Germelo! or Brou"er could be successful! both the occurrence of parado$ and the phenomena of linguistic self-reference from "hich it arises could effectively be prohibited on the level of the sayable! ruled out by a privileged description of the structure of entities or a stipulative stratification of the levels of language. f! ho"ever! as the seeming ubi.uity of these phenomena suggests! there is no motivated or natural "ay! consistent "ith the seeming commitments of ordinary language! to prohibit linguistic self-reference! then the possibility of parado$ "ill remain pervasive on the level of ordinary language despite all attempts to prohibit it. *he parado$ of selfreference indicates the necessary failure of any attempt to enclose the totality of language "ithin a universal concept! or subsume its phenomena under a common name. But the necessary failure of the attempt to state the prohibition of the parado$ on the level of the sayable "ill at the same time demonstrate! as the source of this necessity! the parado$icality of language itself. As %ussell)s analysis already suggested! the root of this parado$ical status of language is its capacity to refer to itself! both e$plicitly and in the ordinary operations of dei$is "hich inscribe! in any natural language! the constant possibility of reference to the very ta#ing-place of concrete discourse itself. n a far-ranging &''( analysis! Giorgio Agamben treats the "orldly e$istence of language! as it is revealed through the endurance of the parado$es of self-reference! as the potential site of a +community, of singulars that "ould no longer be definable either in terms of a commonly shared identity or the subsumption of individuals under the universality of a concept.&A *he underlying basis of this +coming community, is the possibility of grasping and appropriating the parado$es of linguistic meaning: *he fortune of set theory in modern logic is born of the fact that the definition of the set is simply the definition of linguistic meaning. *he comprehension of singular distinct objects m in a "hole
14

Agamben ;&''(a<! p. &.

10

M is nothing but the name. 6ence the ine$tricable parado$es of classes! "hich no Dbeastly theory of types) can pretend to solve. *he parado$es! in effect! define the place of linguistic being. Linguistic being is a class that both belongs and does not belong to itself! and the class of all classes that do not belong to themselves is language. Linguistic being ;being-called< is a set ;the tree< that is at the same time a singularity ;the tree! a tree! this tree<3 and the mediation of meaning! e$pressed by the symbol ! cannot in any "ay fill the gap in "hich only the article succeeds in moving about freely.&B f the totality of language cannot! on pain of parado$! be named! and yet its naming cannot be prohibited by any mandate or stipulation on the level of the sayable! then its appearance in the "orld "ill recurrently define the place of a fundamental gap or aporia bet"een the general name and the individual things it names. n the case of any particular thing! if "e should attempt to describe its +linguistic being, or its capability of being-named! "e "ill then find! as a result of %ussell)s parado$! that this capacity is itself unnameable. *he very condition for the nameability of any thing is its liability to be grouped "ith li#e others under a universal concept! but this condition is! by dint of the parado$ itself! "ithout a general name. *he parado$ thus reveals! behind the possibility of any belonging of individuals to a universal set in terms of "hich they can be named! the parado$ical nonbelonging of the name itself. t is in terms of this nonbelonging that Agamben describes the +"hatever being, or quodlibet ens that! neither object nor concept! defines the being of a singularity as simply the being-such ;quale< of any thing: Whatever does not = mean only = +subtracted from the authority of language! "ithout any possible denomination! indiscernible,3 it means more e$actly that "hich! holding itself in simple homonymy! in pure being-called! is precisely and only for this reason unnameable: the being-inlanguage of the non-linguistic.&@

15

Agamben ;&''(a<! p. '. Agamben ;&''(a<! p. FB.

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Defined by the non-belonging of the name to the totality it names! +"hatever being, is not! according to Agamben! either universal or particular3 instead it characteri8es any singularity in a "ay that +reclaims, it from belonging to any class or set in order that it can simply be such as it is. n thus escaping the +antinomy of the universal and the particular!, its place is a#in to that of the paradigm or example in relation to the category it e$emplifies.&F *he e$ample used to illustrate or demonstrate a general category stands! in parado$ical fashion! for the entirety of that category despite being itself nothing more than an indifferent element among others. *hus being neither simply inside nor outside the category it e$emplifies! but rather bearing "itness to it through its indifferent membership! the e$ample demonstrates! according to Agamben! the +empty space, of a purely linguistic #ind of being in "hich singulars are not defined by any property other than their pure being-called! their pure entry into language. *he community or communication of singularities "ithout identity in the empty space of the e$ample is therefore! according to Agamben! the unfolding of a +linguistic life, that is both +undefinable, and +unforgettable3, subtracted from any identity or belonging to particular classes! its e$emplars appropriate to themselves the identifying po"er of language itself. &7 n this appropriation they define! according to Agamben! the potentiality of the community to come! a community of beings "ithout discernible identity or representable common properties. rrelevant to the -tate and so incommensurable "ith its logic! the possibility of this community "ill define the political or post-political struggles of the future for a redeemed human life that is simply its o"n linguistic being. &' *he implications of %ussell)s parado$ and the associated issues of self-reference therefore allo" Agamben to characteri8e the significance of the t"entieth century)s determinate philosophical recourse to language as that of the discovery or revelation of something li#e a universal presupposition to all discourse "hose problematic e$istence nevertheless mar#s the limit or threshold of the concept of identity
17

Agamben ;&''(a<! pp. 7-&(. Agamben ;&''(a<! p. '. Agamben ;&''(a<! p. 7A.

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as it has traditionally organi8ed political and philosophical thought. 4( Eith this revelation! the singularity of every being)s being-such! mar#ed obscurely in the +as such, that! according to an established phenomenological discourse! defines the structure of apophansis! comes to light as an e$plicit determination of the being of every being.4& *he basis of this revelation is simply the disclosure of language itself as that "hich! as Agamben puts it in a series of te$ts! has no name of its o"n. 44 *he conse.uent anonymity of linguistic being defines the nameless presupposition of the name! the bare belonging of singulars as such that preconditions every possible naming of them. *he anonymous place of this precondition! "hich never defines a real predicate of beings! can then be seen! Agamben suggests! as that of "hat a traditional philosophical discourse recogni8es as transcendence! or as the hitherto obscure basis for Plato)s identification of the idea as the anonymous po"er that defines each singular thing! not indeed as individual thing under the unity of the concept! but indeed as +the thing itself., 4>
20

Agamben puts it this "ay in Agamben ;&'7Aa<: +/ontemporary thought has approached a limit beyond "hich a

ne" epochal-religious unveiling of the "ord no longer seems possible. *he primordial character of the "ord is no" completely revealed! and no ne" figure of the divine! no ne" historical destiny can lift itself out of language. At the point "here it sho"s itself to be absolutely in the beginning! language also reveals its absolute anonymity. *here is no name for the name! and there is no metalanguage! not even in the form of an insignificant voice= *his is the /opernican revolution that the thought of our time inherits from nihilism: "e are the first human beings "ho have become completely conscious of language=, ;p. AB<.
21

/f. 6eidegger ;&'4F<! section >>. n other places! Agamben has specified the reason for this as "hat he calls! adapting a story from Le"is /arroll)s

22

Through the Looking Glass! the +Ehite Hnight)s parado$., According to the parado$! it is impossible for +the name of an object ItoJ be itself named "ithout thereby losing its character as a name and becoming a named object=, ;Agamben &''(b! p. @'.< *he difficulty may be seen to be! as "ell! the root of the problem that 0rege found "ith referring to the concept +horse., *he ordinary device of naming names by .uoting them does not solve the problem3 see discussion by %each ;&'>7< and Anscombe ;&'BF<.
23

/f. Agamben ;&'7Ab<.

13

As Agamben clarifies in the &'F' te$t Language and eath! the empty place of language is mar#ed incessantly! in language)s everyday praxis! by the presence of those inde$ical and demonstrative e$pressions that ?a#obson! dra"ing on Beneveniste)s earlier analysis! termed +shifters., 4A According to ?a#obson! these pronouns ;such as +this!, + !, +here!, and +no"!,< have no proper meaning of their o"n! since their meaning shifts or alters on each ne" occasion of use. %ather! their significance in each case depends on the concrete conte$t of their utterance! on the actual linguistic performance or instance of concrete discourse in "hich they figure. t is in this sense! according to Agamben! that the constant occurrence of shifters in ordinary discourse bears "itness! "ithin that discourse! to the problematic ta#ing place of language itself: *he proper meaning of pronouns C as shifters and indicators of the utterance C is inseparable from a reference to the instance of discourse. *he articulation C the shifting C that they effect is not from the nonlinguistic ;tangible indication< to the linguistic! but from langue to parole. Dei$is! or indication C "hich "hich their peculiar character has been identified! from anti.uity onKdoes not simply demonstrate an unnamed object! but above all the very instance of discourse! its ta#ing place. *he place indicated by the demonstration! and from "hich only every other indication is possible! is a place of language. ndication is the category "ithin "hich language refers to its o"n ta#ing place.4B *he constant presence of shifters "ithin ordinary discourse thus bears "itness! according to Agamben! to the problematic capacity of ordinary language to ma#e obli.ue reference to its o"n ta#ing-place! to that constant presupposition for the possibility of sense that Eestern philosophy! Agamben suggests! has also long figured as +being.,4@ t is in this connection bet"een the demonstrative and the ta#ing-place of
24

?a#obson ;&'F&<3 Benveniste ;&'FA<. n the conte$t of analytic philosophy! Haplan ;&'7'< has argued for a similar conte$t-dependence of the reference of inde$ical and demonstrative terms.
25

Agamben ;&'F'<! p. 4B.

26

+Linguistics defines this dimension as the putting into action of language and the conversion of langue into parole. But for more than t"o thousand years! throughout the history of Eestern philosophy! this dimension has been called being! ousia = 1nly because language permits a reference to its o"n instance through shifters! something li#e being and the "orld are open to speculation., ;Agamben ;&'F'<! p. 4B<

14

language itself that Agamben sees the ultimate significance of 6eidegger)s definition of our o"n #ind of being as +Da-sein, as "ell as 6egel)s description! at the beginning of the !henomenology! of the demonstrative form of +sense-certainty, as the origin of the entire dialectic of universality and particularity. n both cases! the linguistic structure of the deictic ma#es possible reference to the pervasive dimension of latency that itself preconditions any possibility for the articulation of sense. *he linguistic reflection that reveals this dimension as that of linguistic being! or of the actual ta#ing-place of concrete discourse itself! then also reveals the place of this precondition as that of the very parado$es of self-reference that %ussell first demonstrated. Li#e the e$ample! dei$is bears pervasive "itness! "ithin ordinary language itself! to the parado$ical status of "hat is constantly presupposed in the everyday production of any #ind of meaningful speech "hatsoever! yet must remain itself remain incapable of successful designation: the +place, of language itself! the passage from abstract langue to concrete parole in the ever-rene"ed practice! use! or +application, of language in the concrete instance of discourse. n ta#ing up the radical effects of this problematic appearance of linguistic being in the "orld! Agamben can thus cite the demonstrative structures of dei$is and the e$ample as parado$ical mar#ers of "hat underlies and founds the possibility of naming itself3 together they offer an ongoing structural reminder "ithin the order of the universal and the particular of the unthemati8able operation or function that founds this order itself. n summoning a representative that is fully individual and yet stands for the "hole universal class! the structure of the e$ample is that of a #ind of +e$clusive inclusion!, a demonstration of the general structure of inclusion "ithin "hat is normal that nevertheless operates by e$cluding the e$emplary! in the very moment of demonstration! from the normal case. ts e$act inverse is then "hat Agamben else"here calls the +e$ception., Ehereas the e$ample demonstrates membership by choosing an individual member that it simultaneously e$cludes! the e$ceptional demonstrates nonmembership or e$clusion by reference to the class from "hich it is e$cluded. n "omo #acer ;&''B<! Agamben ta#es up the structural conse.uences of this symmetry for the .uestion of the founding of the linguistic operation of set membership itself:

15

0rom this perspective! the e$ception is situated in a symmetrical position "ith respect to the e$ample! "ith "hich it forms a system. 9$ception and e$ample constitute the t"o modes by "hich a set tries to found and maintain its o"n coherence. But "hile the e$ception is! as "e sa"! an inclusive exclusion ;"hich thus serves to include "hat is e$cluded<! the e$ample instead functions as an exclusive inclusion. *a#e the case of the grammatical e$ample ... the parado$ here is that a single utterance in no "ay distinguished from others of its #ind is isolated precisely insofar as it belongs to them ... Ehat the e$ample sho"s is its belonging to a class! but for this very reason the e$ample steps out of its class in the very moment in "hich it e$hibits and delimits it ;in the case of a linguistic syntagm! the e$ample thus sho"s its o"n signifying and! in this "ay! suspends its o"n meaning ... *he e$ample is thus e$cluded from the normal case not because it does not belong to it but! on the contrary! because it e$hibits its o"n belonging to it ... *he mechanism of the e$ception is different. Ehile the e$ample is e$cluded from the set insofar as it belongs to it! the e$ception is included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong to it ... And just as belonging to a class can be sho"n only by an e$ample -- that is! outside of the class itself -- so non-belonging can be sho"n only at the center of the class! by an e$ception.4F n other "ords! "hile both e$emplarity and e$ceptionality depend on a crossing of the traits of belonging and non-belonging! and thus demonstrate the parado$ at the basis of the operation of grouping or the property of belonging itself! they do so in inverse fashion! evincing the po"er involved in grouping or naming from opposite directions. Ehereas the e$ample e$hibits its o"n belonging to the set by being an indifferent element that is parado$ically singled out as non-indifferent by the very act of e$emplification! the e$ception e$hibits its non-belonging to the set by the very fact of its not being indifferent to it! by being an e$ception to the very set that it is e$cepted from.

27

Agamben ;&''B<! pp. 4&-44.

16

n the crossing that they both thus involve bet"een the universal and the particular! both help to demonstrate the normally obscure but inherent complication of the operation of set grouping itself. Li#e the parado$es of linguistic self-reference! they bear "itness to a constitutive po"er of the name in presenting things that ordinarily hides itself in the order of things presented. *his po"er is the po"er of language! or of the ordinary constitution of the common that groups distinct individuals under general names and subsumes individual cases under concepts. Agamben sees in this po"er of grouping "hose basic ambiguities are sho"n by the opposed figures of the e$ception and the e$ample! indeed! not only the basic operation of linguistic naming but the underlying basis of the force of law itself. 0or the originary po"er of language to subsume individuals under general concepts! beyond ma#ing possible the linguistic naming of anything at all! also underlies the application of la"s! rules! or norms ;"hich are naturally general in their scope< to the particular cases of fact or action that fall under them. 6ere! as Agamben emphasi8es! the operation of force depends not simply on any general logical or conceptual function that itself could be specified in abstract terms! but on the actual activity of a spea#ing subject in passing from the abstract rule to the particular case: *he concept of application is certainly one of the most problematic categories of legal ;and not only legal< theory. *he .uestion "as put on a false trac# by being related to Hant)s theory of judgment as a faculty of thin#ing the particular as contained in the general. *he application of a norm "ould thus be a case of determinant judgment! in "hich the general ;the rule< is given! and the particular case is to be subsumed under it. ; n reflective judgment it is instead the particular that is given! and the general rule that must be found.< 9ven though Hant "as perfectly a"are of the aporetic nature of the problem and of the difficulty involved in concretely deciding bet"een the t"o types of judgment ;as sho"n by his theory of the e$ample as an instance of a rule that cannot be enunciated<! the mista#e here is that the relation bet"een the particular case and the norm appears as a merely logical operation.

17

1nce again! the analogy "ith language is illuminating: n the relation bet"een the general and the particular ;and all the more so in the case of the application of a juridical norm<! it is not only a logical subumption that is at issue! but first and foremost the passage from a generic proposition endo"ed "ith a merely virtual reference to a concrete reference to a segment of reality ;that is! nothing less than the .uestion of the actual relation bet"een language and "orld<. *his passage from langue to parole! or from the semiotic to the semantic! is not a logical operation at all3 rather! it al"ays entails a practical activity! that is! the assumption of langue by one or more spea#ing subjects and the implementation of that comple$ apparatus that Benveniste defined as the enunciative function! "hich logicians often tend to undervalue. 47 *he operation of the application of la"! referred by Hant to a faculty of judgment capable of mediating bet"een the general and the particular! thus depends in each case on the same structure of subsumption that defines linguistic being as such. n both cases! the movement from the general to the particular depends on the appropriation of a po"er of grouping that allo"s the passage from the abstract structure of langue! the system of rules constituting and governing language as such! to the concrete reality of actual speech and decision. *he inverse structures of the e$ample and the e$ception! in demonstrating the parado$ical basis of this po"er! also help to sho" ho" its concrete e$ercise! in each particular case! depends upon an obscure operation of praxis that is normally concealed "ithin the ordinary spea#ing of language or functioning of the la". *he reflection that demonstrates the parado$ical foundations of this operation by mar#ing its place! then! also points out the problematic practical basis of the specifically constituted po"er that underlies the force of the la" in each particular case. 4' n Language and eath! Agamben! again follo"ing Benveniste! connects this necessary +enunciative function, carried out by the subject in the movement from abstract langue to concrete parole C or from the abstract la" to its concrete instance C to the parado$ical place of the ta#ing-place of
28

Agamben ;4((><! p. >'. Derrida +0orce of La",

29

18

language! as indicated! if obscurely! by the deictic pronouns. t is only by "ay of the capacity for dei$is! for saying +here!, +no"!, and above all + !, that a subject indicates its o"n assumption of the enunciative function! its o"n parado$ical capacity ;"hich remains "ithout name< to move from the abstract reality of the rules of langue to the actuality of their real application in concrete discourse. n this "ay! for Agamben! the problem of the nature of language is lin#ed! on a fundamentally semantic level! "ith the problem of the constitution and nature of the subject "ho spea#s. >( *hat the enunciative function assumed by the subject in moving from the generality of abstract rules to the particularity of individual cases cannot be subsumed to a purely logical function means! as "ell! that the problem of the application of general rules! norms or structures C "hat can also be seen as the fundamental .uestion of the normativity of rules in their application to concrete cases C cannot be foreclosed by any purely logical analysis. >& *his application! "hether conceived as a matter for concrete! individual decision in each particular case! or as founded upon the pre-e$isting force or authority of more general la"s or reasons! al"ays involves the concrete ta#ing place of language "hose problematic status the parado$es of linguistic self-reference ma#e clear. *his necessary lin# of the enunciative function to the problems of linguistic being also helps to clarify the deep analogy that Agamben asserts bet"een the linguistic po"er of naming and the normative force of la" in relation to concrete judgment. n both cases! the passage from generality to particularity amounts to the concrete occurrence of language! its parado$ical ta#ing-place in the space obscurely indicated! "ithout proper name! by dei$is and the other parado$ical phenomena of linguistic selfreference. 6ere! in relation to the passage from abstract! synchronic langue to concrete! diachronic parole! the subject)s po"er of naming! assumed ane" in each case of the subject)s assumption of the enunciative function! is simply the more general form of "hat appears in a more narro"ly legalistic or
30

0or more on the problems of the first-person pronoun in relation to the ;originally ndo-9uropean< grammar underlying discussion of the +self!, see Agamben ;&'74<.
31

*he problem here is also evidently closely related to the problem of the relationship bet"een rules and their application that Eittgenstein poses in the !hilosophical $nvestigations! and to "hich the famous +rule-follo"ing considerations, respond. 6ere as "ell! the problem of the relationship bet"een linguistic rules and their use bears deep conse.uences for our understanding of the structure of the thin#ing and spea#ing subject.

19

political register as the subject)s capacity to decide on the correct or justified application of a la"! norm! or principle to the ne" case at hand. Ehether "hat is at issue is the e$plicit rendering of legalistic decision or the less e$plicit movement from general rules or principles conceived as normative for linguistic meaning to the reality of their application in concrete discourse! the crossing of this gap involves the subject)s parado$ical capacity to accomplish the passage from abstract generality to concrete particularity! to accomplish the ta#ing place of language itself. *he parado$es of linguistic being mar# the place of this ta#ing place as void! and so demonstrate the inherently parado$ical and unstable linguistic foundations of the po"er of the subject considered capable of spea#ing! reasoning! and rendering judgment. Ee have seen that! according to Agamben! the structure of the e$ample! in

operating as a #ind of +e$clusive inclusion!, also offers to demonstrate the parado$ical crossing of the general and the particular in "hich any possibility of grouping particulars into types! or deciding on their status! is ultimately grounded. But it is in terms of the inverse structure! that of the e$ception! that Agamben is most directly able to specify and develop a far-ranging and topical analysis of sovereign power in its underlying constitution! limits! and effects. n "omo #acer and the more recent #tate of %xception! Agamben develops the connection first dra"n by /arl -chmitt bet"een sovereignty and e$ceptionality. According to -chmitt! the sovereign po"er defines the space of the political by its po"er of deciding on the exceptional case.>4 *he ordinary application of la" depends on the constitution of an order of normality in "hich the la" is conceived as applicable. But for this order to be founded! it is first necessary! according to -chmitt! for a sovereign po"er to constitute itself as sovereign by deciding on "hat counts as normal and "hat counts as e$ceptional. >> *his implies! as "ell! that it remains a
32

Agamben ;&''B< pp. &B-&F3 cf. -chmitt ;&'>A<! pp. &'-44. +*he e$ception is that "hich cannot be subsumed3 it defies general codification! but it simultaneously reveals a

33

specifically juristic element C the decision in absolute purity. *he e$ception appears in its absolute form "hen a situation in "hich legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about. 9very general norm demands a normal! everyday frame of life to "hich it can be factually applied and "hich is subjected to its regulations. *he norm re.uires a homogenous medium. *his effective normal situation is not a mere Dsuperficial presupposition) that

20

permanent and structurally necessary prerogative of the sovereign to decide "hen facts or circumstances demand the suspension of the entire normal juridical order. t is! indeed! the sovereign)s po"er to decide "hen an e$ceptional case of facts or +emergency, circumstances justifies the suspension of the entire order of la" that mar#s the sovereign)s original and founding position as simultaneously both inside and outside the order of la" "hich it founds.>A *his parado$ical position of the sovereign "ith respect to the order of the la" actually ma#es possible! according to -chmitt! the application of the la" to pass judgment on particular facts in each particular case of the la")s +ordinary, functioning. >B *his functioning re.uires in each case! a passage from the abstract universality of the legal norm to its determinate! concrete application! and the possibility of this passage cannot be ensured by the norm itself. t relies! instead! on the essential capacity of the sovereign to decide! to constitute the particular case as subject to the la" or e$ceptional to it by determining "hether and ho" the la" is to be applied to it. n -chmitt)s analysis! the maintenance of the
a jurist can ignore3 that situation belongs precisely to its immanent validity. *here e$ists no norm that is applicable to chaos. 0or a legal order to ma#e sense! a normal situation must e$ist! and he is sovereign "ho definitely decides "hether this normal situation actually e$ists., ;-chmitt &'>A! p. &><.
34

+I*he sovereignJ decides "hether there is an e$treme emergency as "ell as "hat must be done to eliminate it.

Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system! he nevertheless belongs to it! for it is he "ho must decide "hether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety., ;-chmitt &'>A! p. F<.
35

+9very concrete juristic decision contains a moment of indifference from the perspective of content! because the

juristic deduction is not traceable in the last detail to premises and because the circumstance that re.uires a decision remains an independently determining moment = *he legal interest in the decision as such = is rooted in the character of the normative and is derived from the necessity of judging a concrete fact concretely even though "hat is given as a standard for the judgment is only a legal principle in its general universality. *hus a transformation ta#es place every time. *hat the legal idea cannot translate itself independently is evident from the fact that it says nothing about "ho should apply it. n every transformation there is present an auctoritatis interpositio., ;-chmitt &'>A! p. >(<

21

order of la" even in the most ordinary cases is thus revealed as dependent upon the e$istence of an absolute and pure po"er of decision that first constitutes that order. At the same time! the sovereign is able to preserve this po"er only by reserving to itself the po"er to ;under certain circumstances< suspend the la"s and thereby decide in favor of the e$istence of the +state of e$ception!, or +emergency, in "hich its po"er again operates directly "ithout proceeding through the mediation of constituted la"s. >@ A typical e$ample of this suspension of the ordinary rule of la" C "hich! once performed! tends to become irreversible C can be found in 6itler)s &'>> suspension of the articles of the Eeimar /onstitution protecting personal liberties! "hich essentially created the 5a8i state. >F But in the politics of the t"entieth century! the total or partial suspension of the rule of la" in favor of the state of e$ception is not! Agamben suggests! limited to those states identifiable as +totalitarian!, but has become +one of the essential practices, of a "ide variety of states! including those that describe themselves as democratic. >7 /ontemporary politics! Agamben suggests! indeed tends to ma#e the +state of e$ception, increasingly ubi.uitous and thereby constitute the space of the political as a gro"ing 8one of indeterminacy or ambiguity bet"een +public la" and political fact., Eithin this 8one! the application of la" to the determination and control of life becomes both pervasive and radically indeterminate! leading to the

36

+/onfronted "ith an e$cess! the system interiori8es "hat e$ceeds it through an interdiction and in this "ay

Ddesignates itself as e$terior to itself) = *he e$ception that defines the structure of sovereignty is! ho"ever! even more comple$. 6ere "hat is outside is included not simply by means of an interdiction or an internment! but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical order)s validity C by letting the juridical order! that is! "ithdra" from the e$ception and abandon it. *he e$ception does not subtract itself from the rule3 rather! the rule! suspending itself! gives rise to the e$ception and! maintaining itself in relation to the e$ception! first constitutes itself as a rule. *he particular Dforce) of la" consists in this capacity of la" to maintain itself in relation to an e$teriority., ;Agamben &''B! p. &7<
37

Agamben 4((4! p. 4. Agamben 4((4! p. 4.

38

22

contemporary situation of +global civil "ar, in "hich state po"ers struggle both to produce and to control the +bare life, of the living being as such. *he parado$ical structure of sovereignty! upon "hich is founded its po"er to determine the distinction bet"een the normal and the e$ceptional! la" and fact! is in fact formally identical to the %ussell parado$. *he sovereign! on -chmitt)s analysis! is that "hich must be able to decide! in each possible case of fact or action! on the normalcy or e$ceptionality of the particular case. But in reserving to itself the po"er to declare a state of e$ception! and thus to suspend the entirety of this order! the sovereign demonstrates its e$ceptional position "ith respect to the entirety of ordinary distinction bet"een normalcy and e$ceptionality itself. *he very po"er to choose is neither normal nor e$ceptional3 li#e the %ussell set! it both includes and does not include itself. >' t follo"s that the very po"er that decides bet"een the normal and the e$ceptional! and hence applies the la" to determinate cases! rests on a foundation of parado$ even in its most ordinary operation. *he seeming prohibition of this parado$!
39

More rigorously! "e can put the parado$ this "ay. Eithin a specific legal order! consider the set of all normal

and e$ceptional acts3 call this 1. *hen for every subset $ of 1! let d;$< be the act that decides! of each element of $! "hether it is normal or e$ceptional. ;Ee can thin# of d;$< as the +decider, for $! the act of enacting the la" or prescription that decides normalcy "ithin $<. *hen "e have the follo"ing conse.uences: &< 4< 0or any $! d;$< is not an element of $ IA%GLM95*: 5o act can decide its o"n normalcy.J 0or any $! d;$< is an element of 1 IA%GLM95*: *he act that decides normalcy is itself an actJ

5o"! "e consider the application of the +decision, operation to the totality of the legal order. *his application is the sovereign)s po"er to +decide on the state of e$ception!, suspending the entire legal order! "hich is also! on -chmitt)s analysis! the original foundation of such an order. Ee can symboli8e the sovereign decision on the totality of the legal order as d;1<. 5o"! "e have: d;1< is not an element of 1 by ;&<3 but d;1< is an element of 1! by ;4< ;/ontradiction<. *his formulation derives from discussions "ith *im -choettle and is influenced by the + nclosure -chema, of Priest ;4((><.

23

"ithin a specific! constituted legal order! ma#es it possible for la" to function "ithout its parado$ical foundations coming to light. /orrespondent to the gesture of %ussell! Germelo! and Brou"er! the stipulative or a$iomatic sovereign interdiction of the parado$ ma#es it possible for the ordinary operation of decision or grouping to appear to function routinely "ithout the fundamental instability that actually underlies the normal order appearing as such. At the same time! the actual ineliminability of the underlying parado$ is nevertheless sho"n in the arbitrariness and lac# of motivation of this interdiction itself. Lnder the condition of an actual e$ercise of the po"er that the sovereign al"ays reserves to itself ;that is! an actual declaration of the state of emergency or e$ception< the parado$ical structure underlying sovereign po"er again comes to light e$plicitly and comes to determine the field of politics as a gro"ing 8one of indistinction bet"een la" and fact. *he basis of the sovereign po"er in its capacity to decide on the e$ception! once laid bare! thus also evinces! behind the ordinary operations of set membership or grouping that constitute the individual as a member of the category to "hich it belongs! a more comple$ and parado$ical structure of force. Because of the "ay in "hich the e$ceptional both structurally interrupts and founds the ordinary logic of subsumption or application according to "hich la"s apply to particular instances or cases at all! it inscribes a fundamental aporia at the center of the ordinary application of la" that can be obscured only through an interdiction that itself must ultimately appear as groundless. *his aporia! as Agamben suggests! is the same as the parado$ of the foundation of language as a system in relation to the determinate instances of its speech. Ehereas sovereignty! by reserving to itself the po"er to decide on the state of e$ception! stabili8es the sphere of la" by parado$ically including itself in! and removing itself from! the scope of the la")s application! the ordinary use of language to describe language itself points to the parado$ at the basis of all ordinary linguistic use or application. A( *he structure of this basis is again
40

+Ee have seen that only the sovereign decision on the state of e$ception opens the space in "hich it is possible to

trace borders bet"een inside and outside and in "hich determinate rules can be assigned to determinate territories. n e$actly the same "ay! only language as the pure potentiality to signify! "ithdra"ing itself from every concrete instance of speech! divides the linguistic from the nonlinguistic and allo"s for the opening of areas of meaningful

24

discernible in the problem of the sovereign po"er)s application to itself3 here! "hat is parado$ical is precisely the seeming capacity of language to refer to the principles and rules of its o"n use. A&

IV

speech in "hich certain terms correspond to certain denotations. Language is the sovereign "ho! in a permanent state of e$ception! declares that there is nothing outside language and that language is al"ays beyond itself. *he particular structure of language has its foundation in this presuppositional structure of human language. t e$presses the bond of inclusive e$clusion to "hich a thing is subject because of the fact of being in language! of being named. *o spea# IdireJ is! in this sense! al"ays to Dspea# the la"!) ius dicere. ;Agamben &''B! p. 4&<
41

Again! "e can e$press this parado$ using the formal symbolism of set theory. 0or any sentence or set of

sentences $! let d;$< be a sentence that e$presses a criterion for the meaningfulness of everything in $3 such a sentence! for instance! might e$press a rule determining "hich of the sentences "ithin $ are meaningful and "hich are meaningless! or "hich are applicable or usable in a given situation and "hich are not. 5o"! consider the set of all sentences3 call this L ;for +language,<. *hen "e have! as before ;cf. note 4><: &< 0or any $! d;$< is not an element of $ IA%GLM95*: 5o sentence can decide its o"n

meaningfulness.J 4< 0or any $! d;$< is an element of L IA%GLM95*: *he sentence that decides meaningfulness is itself

a sentence.J *hen! as before d;L< is not an element of L by &3 but d;L< is an element of L by 4 ;/ontradiction<. Any sentence that! referring to the totality of language! appears to determine a criterion or rule of meaningfulness for terms in the language as a "hole! cannot itself be either meaningful or meaningless. *his "ay of formulating the parado$ has clear implications for our understanding of the history of t"entieth-century attempts to analy8e language by describing the structure of its constitutive rules or practices. 0or more on this history! see Livingston ;4((7<.

25

n Agamben)s te$t! the parado$es of self-reference therefore tend to demonstrate the place of that +linguistic being, "hich! in problemati8ing the order of the universal and the particular! also defines the position from "hich this order can be seen as founded on a fundamentally parado$ical gesture of prohibition. n his o"n comprehensive ontological and meta-ontological project! Alain Badiou! in a

fashion that is at once both deeply parallel to and nevertheless at odds "ith Agamben)s result! has similarly theori8ed the real occurrence of linguistic self-reference as decisive in producing the intercession of the singular being of the indiscernible C "hat Badiou terms the event C into the determinate order of the universal and the particular. A4 Li#e Agamben! Badiou considers this order to be constituted by the operation of set grouping. Badiou calls this operation the +count-as-one., 0or Badiou! collection in a set indeed underlies any presentation "hatsoever3 any individual being is presentable only insofar as! and because! it can be counted as an element in a larger set. *he formal apparatus of set theory allo"s Badiou! moreover! to distinguish bet"een presentation and representation! by means of "hich any element appears under the heading of this or that identity. 0or if a set contains a number of elements! it is also possible to regroup these elements into a number of subsets or +parts, of the initial set. 0or instance! the set that contains Alain! Bertrand! and /antor has just those three elements! but it has eight subsets or parts. *he set containing only Alain and Bertrand is one of these parts3 another is the set containing only /antor. *he set of all these subsets is termed the power set of the initial one. 0or Badiou! an item is represented if and only if it is an element of the po"er set! or in other "ords if and only if it "as a subset ;rather than simply an element< of the initial set. n ta#ing the po"er set! the original elements are

recounted in a faithful but nevertheless productive "ay into the subsets defined by all of their possible groupings. *he operation of grouping together the subsets of the initial! presenting set thus can be ta#en to produce all the possibilities of their representation. *his distinction bet"een presentation and representation in terms of the apparatus of set theory proves essential to Badiou)s definition of the event as that "hich! .uite heterogeneous to the order of being! nevertheless can under certain determinate conditions intercede "ithin it and produce the genuine
42

Badiou ;&'77<.

26

novelty of historical change or action. 9$ploiting a deliberate and suggestive political metaphor! he calls the representative re-counting or po"er set of an initially given situation the +state, of that situation: it contains "hatever! given the elements initially presented in a situation! can then be re-counted and represented as a one in representation. t is possible to demonstrate that the po"er set! or representative recounting! "ill al"ays contain more elements than the original set3 in this sense there is! according to Badiou! al"ays a certain potentially productive e$cess of representation over presentation! of that "hich is re-counted by the state over "hat is simply presented. A central a$iom of Badiou)s entire project is the identification of ontology itself "ith mathematical set theory. *he a$ioms or principles of set theory that found mathematics "ill! according to Badiou! amount to a formal theory of "hatever simply is. *his identification proves essential not only to his description of the form and limits of a +fundamental ontology, of being! but to defining the possibility of the event as that "hich! heterogeneous to being! nevertheless can occasionally intervene in it to bring about radical historical change. As "e shall see! the underlying structural #ey to the possibility of the event is! in fact! the actual possibility of self-membership or self-reference "hich is prohibited by the fundamental a$ioms of set theory! and so defines! if it ta#es place! a position essentially outside the scope of the ontological order they define. Eithin the universe of ontology thus defined! both %ussell)s parado$ and the phenomena of selfmembership or self-reference that lead to it are! as "e have seen! barred by fundamental a$ioms. Germelo)s a$iom of foundation re.uires that every set be ultimately decomposable into some compositionally simplest element3 in no case! then! is it possible for a set to contain itself or any set defined in terms of itself. Along similar lines! 0rege)s original a$iom of comprehension! "hich held that there is a set corresponding to every linguistically "ell-formed predicate! is replaced "ith the more limited +a$iom of separation!, "hich holds only that! given any "ell-formed predicate! "e can dra" out all and only the elements that fall under the predicate from within an already existing set3 it "ill accordingly be impossible to derive from the apparent formulability of predicates of self-membership the e$istence of any parado$ical set. n this "ay the threat of parado$ is bloc#ed "ithin an a$iomatic system 27

that! as Badiou suggests! may also be ta#en to capture the fundamental structures underlying the being of "hatever simply is. *he a$ioms of foundation and separation that most directly bloc#! "ithin ontology! the %ussell parado$ from arising do so by demanding that! in order for a set to be formed! there must already be some other e$isting being or beings from "hich it can be composed. *hey thus e$press! according to Badiou! the necessity that! in order for any determinate thing to be presented! there must already be something else3 their role in the fundamental a$iomatics of set theory demonstrates that the description of "hatever is cannot establish! but must simply presuppose behind the description of "hatever is! a more fundamental +there is=, of being itself.A> *he simplest such element demanded by the a$ioms of set theory is the so-called empty set! the set containing nothing3 its e$istence and uni.ueness are assured by another fundamental a$iom. *he empty set! in containing nothing! is the compositionally simplest element that assures that there is something in e$istence already! before anything else can be named or constructed. n this sense! Badiou suggests! the empty set! "hat "e may ta#e to be the +name of the void!, sutures or ties the universe of set theory to the basic assumption of being! thus constituting the order of ontology. *he introduction of this name depends! ho"ever! on a fundamental act of selfreference or auto-nomination: 5aturally! because the void is indiscernible as a term ;because it is a not-one<! its inaugural appearance is a pure act of nomination. *his name cannot be specific3 it cannot place the void under anything that "ould subsume it C this "ould be to reestablish the one. *he name cannot indicate that the void is this or that. *he act of nomination! being a-specific! consumes itself! indicating nothing other than the unpresentable as such. n ontology! ho"ever! the unpresentable occurs "ithin a presentative forcing "hich disposes it as the nothing from "hich everything proceeds. *he conse.uence is that the name of the void is a pure proper name! "hich indicates itself! "hich does not besto" any inde$ of difference "ithin "hat it refers to! and "hich autodeclares itself in the form of the multiple! despite there being nothing "hich is numbered by it.
43

Badiou ;&'77<! p. AF.

28

1ntology commences! ineluctably! once the legislative deas of the multiple are unfolded! by the pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper name. *his name! this sign! inde$ed to the void! is! in a sense that "ill al"ays remain enigmatic! the proper name of being. AA Eithin the universe of "hat is! the empty set preserves a #ind of mute reminder of "hat founds e$istence! the bare auto-nomination that introduces a first element from "hich everything else can be built. *he a$ioms that bloc# %ussell)s parado$ by prohibiting self-reference "ithin ontology thus nevertheless necessarily introduce a non-specific element that can only have come to e$ist through a parado$ical selfnomination. *his element! summoning forth e$istence from the void! preserves in ontology the mar# of "hat precedes or e$ceeds it! the nothing that cannot be presented as such in any of its multiples. n this "ay the po"er of auto-nomination to call forth e$istent sets! though e$plicitly prohibited "ithin ontology by its fundamental a$ioms! nevertheless proves essential in grounding its most basic presupposition! the presupposition of a +there is=, of being prior to any determinate set or property. Beyond this! according to Badiou! the name)s po"er of self-reference! prohibited "ithin ontology! "ill indeed prove to be the most essential single characteristic that mar#s the self-refle$ive structure of the event "hich! beyond being! nevertheless occasionally intervenes "ithin it. Eithin ontology! as "e have seen! the a$ioms of foundation and separation guarantee the e$istence! in the case of each e$istent set! of a simplest or most basic element. n the doctrine of the event! ho"ever! this constraint is suspended. f "e rela$ it! sets can indeed be infinite multiplicities that never +bottom out, in a compositionally simplest element. *his infinite multiplicity is in fact! according to Badiou! essential to the event)s production of novelty. 0or the schema that portrays the infinite potentiality of the event brea#s "ith the a$iom of foundation by explicitly asserting that the event is a member of itself. *his self-membership "ill

simultaneously ma#e the event indiscernible to ontology and assure the role of a parado$ical selfnomination in calling it forth from "hat must appear to ontology to be the void.AB 0or the event is not simply constituted out of already e$isting elements! but rather! in recounting these already e$isting elements! calls itself into e$istence through its o"n po"er of auto-nomination.
44

Badiou ;&'77<! p. B'.

29

*o demonstrate ho" this "or#s! Badiou develops the e$ample of the 0rench %evolution. *he name +*he 0rench %evolution, encloses or refers to a vast variety of the individual +gestures! things! and "ords, that occurred in 0rance bet"een &F7' and &F'A. But its ability to determine these various and multiple facts and circumstances as counting as one in the unity of an event depends! as "ell! on the moment at "hich the revolution names itself! and so calls itself into e$istence as the event it "ill have been: Ehen! for e$ample! -aint-?ust declares in &F'A that Dthe %evolution is fro8en)! he is certainly designating infinite signs of lassitude and general constraint! but he adds to them that one-mar# that is the %evolution itself! as this signifier of the event "hich! being .ualifiable ;the %evolution is Dfro8en)<! proves that it is itself a term of the event that it is. 1f the 0rench %evolution as event it must be said that it both presents the infinite multiple of the series of facts situated bet"een &F7' and &F'A and! moreover! that it presents itself as an immanent resume and one-mar# of its o"n multiple = *he event is thus clearly the multiple "hich both presents its entire site! and! by means of the pure signifier of itself immanent to its o"n multiple! manages to present the presentation itself! that is! the one of the infinite multiple that it is. A@
45

+ n the construction of the concept of the event = the belonging to itself of the event! or perhaps rather! the

belonging of the signifier of the event to its signification! played a special role. /onsidered as a multiple! the event contains! besides the elements of its site! itself3 thus being presented by the very presentation that it is. f there e$isted an ontological formali8ation of the event it "ould therefore be necessary! "ithin the frame"or# of set theory! to allo" the e$istence! "hich is to say the count-as-one! of a set such that it belonged to itself: a a = -ets "hich belong to themselves "ere bapti8ed e$traordinary sets by the logician Miramanoff. Ee could thus say the follo"ing: an event is ontologically formali8ed by an e$traordinary set. Ee could. But the a$iom of foundation forecloses extraordinary sets from any existence& and ruins any possibility of naming a multiple-being of the event. 6ere "e have an essential gesture: that by means of "hich ontology declares that the event is not., ;Badiou &'77! pp. &7'-'(<.
46

Badiou &'77! p. &7(.

30

*he event)s occurrence "ill therefore depend on its grouping together or re-counting as one both various elements of the situation in "hich it intervenes ;Badiou calls the set of these elements the event)s site< and! by a fundamental operation of auto-nomination! it itself. According to Badiou)s schema! given any evental site M! the event for that site can therefore be defined thus: ex N O$ M! ex PAF *he event is the set composed of! on the one hand! all the elements of its site! and on the other! itself. *he self-inclusion of the event allo"s it to summon forth a novelty previously indiscernible to the situation! to designate itself and so to call itself into e$istence as "hat "ill have ta#en place! its o"n appearance in the historical situation its occurrence "ill have transformed. *he self-inclusion or self-reference of the event also proves essential to ans"ering the .uestion Badiou ne$t ta#es up! namely "hether the event "ill already have been presented as a term in the situation in "hich it intervenes. *he .uestion is a decisive one3 because of the event)s logic of self-inclusion! the ans"er to it "ill determine the happening of the event itself! "hether it "ill have ta#en place "ithin the situation or "hether it "ill remain forever e$terior to "hat is. But also because of this logic of selfinclusion! nothing on the level of the e$istent situation can! by itself! decide this decisive .uestion. 0or any element presented in the already e$isting situation to be the event! it "ould have to be clear that it includes itself. But this is just "hat cannot be clear on the level of the situation. t is possible only! as Badiou argues! to trace the conse.uences of the t"o divergent hypotheses! that the event "ill! or "ill not! have ta#en place in the situation.A7 f the event does ta#e place! then it "ill be singular in the situation. 0or it presents the elements of its site! and these elements are not individually presented in the situation itself. *he event! if it "ill have ta#en place! is therefore nevertheless not represented3 it is indiscernible to the state and its representative re-counting. %ecounting or representation can never verify its having
47

Badiou &'77! p. &F'. Badiou &'77! p. &7&.

48

31

ta#en place3 nothing representable on the level of the situation "ill be able to demonstrate it as being the event that it is. 5evertheless! on the assumption that it does ta#e place! its having ta#en place "ill allo" it to add itself to its site! +mobili8ing, the elements of this site in a "ay that is essentially indiscernible to representation. t remains! ho"ever! perfectly consistent to maintain the opposite hypothesis: that the event has not ta#en place! that it has not been presented in the situation. f this is the case! then the event presents nothing that is also presented in the situation ;not even itself<3 so from the perspective of the situation! it presents only the void. 1n this hypothesis! nothing "ill after all have ta#en place3 if the signifier or name of the event nevertheless succeeds in being spo#en! in adding itself to the situation! nothing "ill be named by it. A' n either case! "hether "e assume the event to have ta#en place or not! the .uestion of "hether it "ill have ta#en place cannot be settled in any regular "ay from the perspective of the situation. t follo"s! according to Badiou! that +only an interpretative intervention can declare that an event is presented in a situation.,B( -uch an intervention "ill amount to a decision on "hat is! from the perspective of the situation! undecidable3 it "ill itself force the ta#ing-place of the event that it itself calls into e$istence. t operates by dra"ing from the evental site an anonymous or indifferent +name, or signifier! "hich is then declared to be the name of the event itself. -uch an operation of decision or interpretative intervention "ill thereby summon the event into e$istence from "hat seems to be! from the perspective of the situation! only the void3 it amounts to +the arrival in being of non-being! the arrival amidst the visible of the invisible.,B& 6aving thus been introduced! the event)s e$istence "ill also elicit various conse.uences! no" ;because of the event< presented in the situation itself. Badiou terms the operation of tracing out these conse.uences! or recogni8ing them "ithin the situation! fidelity. 0inally! in a radical inversion of traditional substantialist or transcendental theories! the operator of fidelity! "hat traces or discerns the infinite conse.uences of the event "ithin the situation! is termed the sub'ect.
49

Badiou &'77! pp. &7&-7>. Badiou &'77! p. &7&. Badiou &'77! p. &7&.

50

51

32

As Badiou recogni8es! the biggest possible threat to the doctrine of the event! thereby defined! "ill be posed by the claim that the event)s parado$ical self-nomination is indeed impossible. A systematic basis for this objection can indeed be found in the orientation of thought that Badiou! generali8ing the program of Brou"er and 6eyting! calls constructivism. *he essential intuition of constructivism is that "hat can be said to e$ist at all is controlled and determined by "hat is nameable in a "ell-defined language: Ehat the constructivist vision of being and presentation hunts out is the Dindeterminate)! the unnameable part! the conceptless lin# = Ehat has to be understood here is that for this orientation in thought! a grouping of presented multiples "hich is indiscernible in terms of an immanent relation does not exist. 0rom this point of vie"! the state legislates on e$istence. Ehat it loses on the side of e$cess it gains on the side of the Dright over being). *his gain is all the more appreciable given that nominalism! here invested in the measure of the state! is irrefutable. 0rom the Gree# sophists to the Anglo--a$on logical empiricists ;even to 0oucault<! this is "hat has invariably made out of it the critical C or anti-philosophical C philosophy par e$cellence. *o refute the doctrine that a part of the situation solely e$ists if it is constructed on the basis of properties and terms "hich are discernible in the language! "ould it not be necessary to indicate an absolutely undifferentiated! anonymous! indeterminate partQ But ho" could such a part be

indicated! if not by constructing this very indicationQ *he nominalist is al"ays justified in saying that this counter-e$ample! because it has been isolated and described! is in fact an e$ample = 0urthermore! "ithin the constructivist vision of being! and this is a crucial point! there is no place for an event to take place.B4 0or the constructivist! the universe of e$istents is limited to that "hich can already be named among "hat already e$ists. *he po"er of the event)s faithful operator to discern the indiscernible! to pic# out the
52

Badiou ;&'77<! pp. 477-7'.

33

anonymous part of the situation that "ill be named as the event! and so called into e$istence! is thereby e$plicitly precluded. *he constructivist orientation can! moreover! be schemati8ed precisely3 it allo"s for the construction of a universe of sets "hich! though infinite! are restricted to the condition that each e$isting set must be constructible out of already e$isting ones by means of the predicates already e$isting in a language. -ome"hat in the spirit of %ussell)s theory of types! the constructivist orientation therefore prohibits %ussell)s parado$ by prohibiting the construction of any self-membered set. f its claims about being and language are correct! there "ill never have been any event! since no set "ill have the event)s almost parado$ical structure of self-membership. *he remaining burden of Badiou)s analysis in (eing and %vent is therefore to demonstrate the limitations of the constructivist orientation by demonstrating rigorously the possibility of the event)s autonomination of "hat is indiscernible to ontology. 6e accomplishes this by invo#ing the technically formidable apparatus of +forcing, developed by /ohen in &'@>. Eith this apparatus! it is possible to demonstrate the e$istence! given any universe of sets and the language that names them! of an indiscernible set "hich! though it e$ists! is absolutely unnameable by any predicate or combination of predicates of the language. *he demonstrable e$istence of the indiscernible allo"s the faithful action of the subject! overcoming constructivism! to +force, the event at the point of its unrecogni8ability! to summon forth the self-nominating event from the void and trace its radical conse.uences in the "orld.

V n "omo #acer! in an e$plicit discussion of the set-theoretical frame"or# of Badiou)s thought of the event! Agamben describes its implications in terms of the essential excess or surplus of representation over presentation! an e$cess "hich also figures in the everyday life of language as a constitutive e$cess of sense over reference:

34

Badiou)s thought is = a rigorous thought of the e$ception. 6is central category of the event corresponds to the structure of the e$ception = According to Badiou! the relation bet"een membership and inclusion is also mar#ed by a fundamental lac# of correspondence! such that inclusion al"ays e$ceeds membership ;theorem of the point of e$cess<. *he e$ception e$presses precisely this impossibility of a system)s ma#ing inclusion coincide "ith membership! its reducing all its parts to unity. 0rom the point of vie" of language! it is possible to assimilate inclusion to sense and membership to denotation. n this "ay! the fact that a "ord al"ays has more sense than it can actually denote corresponds to the theorem of the point of e$cess. Precisely this distinction is at issue both in /laude Levi--trauss)s theory of the constitutive e$cess of the signifier over the signified = and in 9mile Benveniste)s doctrine of the irreducible opposition bet"een the semiotic and the semantic. *he thought of our time finds itself confronted "ith the structure of the e$ception in every area. Language)s sovereign claim thus consists in the attempt to ma#e sense coincide "ith denotation! to stabili8e a 8one of indistinction bet"een the t"o in "hich language can maintain itself in relation to its denotata by abandoning them and "ithdra"ing them into a pure langue ;the linguistic Dstate of e$ception)<.B> Ee can understand the e$cess of signification that Agamben describes as the incapability of the meaning or sense of any term ever to finally be e$hausted by any ;finite< number of its instances in concrete speech. t underlies the perennial and constitutive failure of parallelism bet"een signifier and signified in "hich structuralists and post-structuralists! dra"ing out the conse.uences of -aussure)s structuralist picture of language! have located the very life of language itself. BA Although in a certain sense a direct conse.uence of -aussure)s original segmentation of the totality of language into the t"o parallel but distinct strata of signification and denotation! the positive structural possibility of such a failure "as first
53

Agamben ;&''B<! p. 4B.

BA

35

described in detail by Levi--trauss in connection "ith his analysis of social phenomena as dra"ing upon an irreducible and structurally necessary +surplus, of signification over the signified. BB n the &''(

article !ardes! Agamben describes ?ac.ues Derrida)s comple$ deconstruction of the metaphysics of the sign as arising from a certain problematic experimentum linguae! or e$perience "ith language! that itself arises from the structural necessity of such an e$cess of signification! "hereby +intentionality al"ays e$ceeds intent and signification al"ays anticipates and survives the signified., B@ *he problematic and +undecidable, status of some of Derrida)s central terms! +diffRrance!, +supplement!, and above all +trace!, Agamben suggests! arises directly from this e$cess! and yields the comple$ strategy of deconstruction in its reading of the tradition of metaphysics as committed to its foreclosure. 1nce again! the central parado$ to "hich these terms respond is one of the failure of linguistic self-reference: that there is! as Agamben puts it! no +name of the name!, and hence no possibility for straightfor"ardly describing the ta#ing-place of language itself. BF Agamben treats this overriding parado$ of linguistic being as calling for the replacement of the metaphysical conception of the sign! and the grounding concept of +meaning, that runs through Eestern metaphysics! "ith Derrida)s comple$ critical deployment of +undecidable, terms that are themselves problematically self-referential. B7 *hus! the project of deconstruction or +grammatology, inscribes the concepts of the undecidable! "hich! naming
55

-ee! e.g.! Levi--trauss &'B(. -omething similar is discussed in Lacan ;&'BF<.

56

Agamben ;&''(c<! p. 4&4. *he implications of Levi--trauss)s notion of the e$cess of signification for the project of deconstruction are discussed in detail in Derrida ;&'@@<.
57

Agamben ;&''(c<! pp. 4&>-&A. +Ehat is unnameable is that there are names ;+the play "hich ma#es possible nominal effects,<3 "hat is

58

nameless yet in some "ay signified is the name itself. *his is "hy the point from "hich every interpretation of Derrida)s terminology must depart = is its self-referential structure =Deprived of its referential po"er and its univocal reference to an object! the term still in some manner signifies itself3 it is self-referential. n this sense! even Derrida)s undecidables ;even if they are such only Dby analogy)< are inscribed in the domain of the parado$es of self-reference that have mar#ed the crisis of the logic of our time., ;Agamben &''(c! p. 4&&<.

36

the unnameable constitutive e$cess of signification that is itself a mar# of the parado$ of linguistic being! are themselves! parado$ically! neither concepts nor names. B' *his positive re-inscription of the

undecidable in the very place of language "hich formed the locus of the claim of metaphysics to decide sense is! according to Agamben! the #ey to any possibility of thin#ing its transformation and closure. Deconstruction)s fundamental recognition of the constitutive e$cess of signification over the signified! "hat Derrida figures in parado$ical fashion "ith his terminology! therefore provides the basis for any possibility of an intervention that transforms and opens the closure of the metaphysical concept of the sign and the metaphysical picture of meaning that it has long organi8ed. 0or both Badiou and Agamben! then! the ;seeming< phenomena of linguistic self-reference remain! even if prohibited or rejected as impossible or meaningless "ithin the constituted order of "hat can be said! permanent mar#ers of the parado$ical structure of the constituting basis of this order itself. Eithin the order of ontology! metaphysics! or the sayable! self-reference "ill never really have ta#en place! for its ta#ing place "ill immediately lead to contradiction and so to the destruction of the consistency of any a$iomatic that attempts to define this order. *he name "ill have no name3 language "ill not e$ist in the "orld for it "ill be impossible for language to name itself. 5evertheless the very sentences that "ould articulate this impossibility themselves fall victim to the unsayability of the original prohibition that! ruling out self-reference! itself made the order of the sayable possible. Li#e %ussell)s o"n attempt to introduce a theory of types or Germelo)s introduction of the a$ioms of set theory that rule out self-reference! the a$iomatic prohibition of self-reference that founds the possibility of meaningful language is itself revealed as unstateable. t "ill al"ays be possible! by means of the introduction of

determinate rules or prohibitions! to guarantee that linguistic self-reference and %ussell)s parado$ do not +really, arise3 but as soon as the prohibition has sense! its negation is also conceivable! and "e begin to glimpse the underlying parado$icality of the founding structure of the order of the sayable itself.

59

+The concept )trace* is not a concept ;just as Dthe name +diff+rance, is not a name)<: this is the parado$ical thesis that is already implicit in the grammatological project and that defines the proper status of Derrida)s terminology. ;Agamben &''(c! p. 4&><.

37

0rom this perspective! the sovereign decision that constitutes language and continues to underlie its usual functioning is no" visible as the ultimately futile attempt to guarantee a stable passage from the universal to the particular through a constitutive prohibition of self-reference. *he prohibition calls forth the order of the universal and the particular! constituting the norm through its decision on the e$ception. But the trace of the underlying parado$ remains in the crossing bet"een the universal and the particular sho"n by the inverse structures of the e$ception and the e$ample! in the constitutive and ineliminable e$cess of sense over reference in the everyday use of language! in the uneforeclosable openness of linguistic rules or la"s to their concrete application! in the everyday phenomena of dei$is! and most decisively in the ordinary appeals and e$pressions in "hich language seems regularly and parado$ically to name itself! to ma#e reference to the e$istence of a totality that "ill never have been given! on pain of parado$! "ithin the order of "hat is. n this "ay! Badiou and Agamben)s common recourse to %ussell)s parado$ in gesturing to"ard the parado$ical structure of the sovereign or a$iomatic decision that founds the order of the sayable suggests a surprising and ne" "ay of recovering at least one important result of the t"entieth century)s distinctive philosophical turn to language. -pecifically! by returning to the parado$ that inaugurates the linguistic turn by mar#ing the site of language)s self-reference as the void site of contradiction! they suggest a reading of the t"entieth century)s recourse to language as having formally and rigorously defined the empty place of that "hich remains indiscernible to the order of universals and particulars! "hat remains inscrutable in the order of "hat is. *he most ordinary reference to +language, can then be seen as signaling the latency! "ithin each everyday moment of discourse! of the parado$ical event of linguistic being. And the philosophical discourse that systematically reflects on the determinate form of language! the order of its terms and the logic of its structure in relation to the "orld that it grasps or names! "ill mar# this void place incessantly! tracing it in the negative mode of contradiction and parado$ that defines its major results. n historical retrospect! the t"entieth-century attempt to grasp language as a determinate philosophical resource and a distinctive object of investigation al"ays had its basis in a problematic 38

attempt to separate language itself! as an abstract structure of rules! from the concrete instances of speech they "ere also seen as determining. @( *he most significant results of this sustained in.uiry! largely negative in character! have recurrently demonstrated the essentially aporetic character of this conception! the ultimate incapability of theoretical reflection to e$plicate the passage from universal rule to concrete fact that ta#es place at every moment of language)s everyday life. @& *he common root of all of these

parado$ical results is the failure of linguistic self-reference3 the results that demonstrate this failure also sho" the necessary absence of a metalanguage "ith "hich to describe the passage from language to speech. *hus! even if! as Badiou has repeatedly suggested! the thought of the event demands a fundamental brea# "ith the nominalist or critical methods of a +criti.ue of language, that "ould! in tracing and defining the bounds of sense! limit the real to "hat can be named in a tractable language! the results of those critical methods may nevertheless be seen as demonstrative! in a different direction! of the +political, implications of the problematic being of language in its everyday life. At the aporetic end of constructivism)s attempt to submit the being of "hat is to the authority of a describable language! the parado$ of self-reference instead demonstrates language as that "hich cannot be delimited since its is already at and beyond its limits in the most everyday instances of concrete speech. t "ould then be the surprising result of the t"entieth-century criti.ue of language ;one largely unmar#ed by the current analytic practitioners of its methods! if not "ithout precedent in the tradition)s o"n original concern "ith the relationship of the logical structure of language to everyday life and praxis< to have demonstrated! if only in the negative modes of the failure and non-passage of its most typical guiding theoretical picture! the possibility of an everyday linguistic life that remains unrecogni8able to the la" and impervious to its force.

60

0or more on the history and foundations of this attempt! see Livingston ;4((7<! especially chapters & and '. *hese negative results include not only %ussell)s parado$ and the t"o incompleteness theorems of GSdel! but also

61

Tuine)s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and Eittgenstein)s Drule-follo"ing) parado$.

39

Works Ci ed

Ac8el! P. &'77. -on-Well-.ounded #ets. /L- Lecture 5otes! no. &A: -tanford.

Agamben! G. &'7(. Language and eath/ The !lace of -egativity. *ransl. by Haren 9. Pin#us "ith Michael 6ardt. Minneapolis: Lniversity of Minnesota Press! &''&.

Agamben! G. &'74. +U-e: 6egel)s Absolute and 6eidegger)s 9reignis., %eprinted in !otentialities/ 0ollected %ssays in !hilosophy. 9d. And *ranslated by Daniel 6eller-%oa8en. -tanford! /A: -tanford L. Press! &'''.

Agamben! G. &'7Aa. +*he dea of Language., %eprinted in !otentialities/ 0ollected %ssays in !hilosophy. 9d. And *ranslated by Daniel 6eller-%oa8en. -tanford! /A: -tanford L. Press! &'''.

Agamben! G. &'7Ab. +*he *hing tself., %eprinted in !otentialities/ 0ollected %ssays in !hilosophy. 9d. And *ranslated by Daniel 6eller-%oa8en. -tanford! /A: -tanford L. Press! &'''.

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