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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Background briefing on Afghanistan and the Taliban

Type of event: Briefing
Date: August 1, 2003
Special Access Issues: None--Unclassified
Prepared by: A. Albion
Team Number: 3
Location: K Street, Conference Room
Participants - Dr. Larry Goodson, US Army War College
Participants - Commission: Alexis Albion, Scott Allan, Tom Dowling, Nicole
Grandrimo, Mike Hurley, Yoel Tobin

Dr. Goodson addressed the following areas:

1. The Rise of the Taliban and al Oaeda

• Goodson dates the foundations of the Taliban to the culture wars (Islamism vs.
modernization) of the mid-late 1960s at Kabul University, which themselves grew out of two
critical points in Afghanistan's history:
1) The struggles of the 1920s between modernizing forces and resistance to modernization;
and
2) The period of post-British withdrawal from the region in the early 1950s, and what
Goodson characterized as the U.S. decision not to step in but rather to leave Afghanistan
to the Soviets.
• 1960s sees the emergence of Islamism, spiking again with the Iranian revolution.
• After 1979 Islamism and Soviet expansionism into the region are two major r'egional areas of
concern for the U. S.
• Afghan-Soviet war leads to a number of transformative factors in the region:
1) Involvement of Arabs in the war:
--Arab fighters in Afghanistan seen as "completely useless" and largely disliked by
Afghans, mostly kept in camps not far from Pakistan border and kept out of most of the
fighting;
--Influx of Arab money (from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE), tending to fund Islamist
projects (mosques & madrasas); Saudi money (through NGOs) continued after the war as
they sought to counter Iranian ambitions in Afghanistan.
2) Socioeconomic changes that transform traditional society:
--Traditional Afghan social structures disrupted and new, (artificial) structures emerge,
ego tribal elders replaced by younger elites with different sources of authority (mullahs;
military leaders);

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--Refugee camps: an artificial environment; increasingly radical version of Islamic

teaching being taught to refugee children; stricter adherence to some tribal practices (eg.
veiling of women).
• The Taliban itself grows out of both the Afghan-Soviet war (and the involvement in it of
Arab radicals) as well as regional factors (rise of Islamism in South Asia and the Middle
East), eventually laying the foundation for al Qaeda.
• In 1997, Taliban "shifts" to the right, controlled by Mullah Omar.

2. Pakistan as a Critical Factor in the Rise of the Taliban

• Afghan-Soviet war changes the strategic calculus for Pakistan with respect to Afghanistan.
-- Pre-1979, Pakistan views Afghanistan as an area to be denied to India; lSI is only
moderately engaged in Afghanistan, conducting small operations (but opening the door
for greater engagement);
-- With start of the war, Pakistan becomes fully engaged, and plays the U.S. for whatever
it can get.
• Involvement of lSI: "the war is an lSI show":
-- lSI officers run the resistance in Afgh., fighting, training and distributing CIA
weapons;
-- Individual relationships of trust between lSI, key Afghans and Afghan Arabs develop
across the porous Pashtun border over a number of years; familiar connections on both
sides of the border;
-- Unique border relationship continues today: field grade and lower lSI officers probably
know where 2nd tier al Qaeda officers are.
• By the late 1980s, Pakistan had invested an enormous amount in Afghanistan:
-- shift in geo-strategic thinking (Afgh. as area of direct Pakistani involvement);
-- quiet, forward engagement (training, armed support);
-- deleterious side-effects on Pakistan politics, economy and society:
-- deeper sectarianism,
-- upset of ethnic balance (huge influx of Afgh. refugees),
-- rampant heroin problem,
-- corruption in government,
-- deepening Islamization. -~1_· .

• Post-war conditions lead Pakistan to play the Taliban card:

-- Pakistan gives itself the credit for defeat of Soviets in Afgh. and fall of Soviet empire;
-- But in post-war period Afghanistan is in chaos and Pakistan is not benefiting from the
opening of ex-Soviet markets; .
-- Taliban emerges as pro-Pakistan, offering a degree of stability that will allow transit
trade and possibly a pipeline to go through Afghanistan;
• Taliban emerges as a vehicle by which Pakistan can make Afghanistan payoff its huge
investment in the region. Oil/gas in Central Asia was a secondary "downstream" issue.
• Was the Taliban its own indigenous movement or a creation of Pakistan? According to
Goodson, Taliban was an indigenous group (and not an lSI creation--though lSI had ties with
groups involved in Taliban). At some point early on, Pakistan made a conscious decision to
shift its support to the Taliban, which then grew into something less pliable than anticipated.

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3. U.S. Policy toward AfghanistaniTaliban

• 1989-1996: U.S. policy ofabandonmentldisengagement toward Afghanistan (and Pakistan);

-- mid-late 1994, rise ofTaliban and continued requests from Pakistan for U.S.
engagement in the region;
• 1996: U. S. begins to pay attention, because:
1) Taliban looks as if it can bring stability to the region, and consequently seems to have
some popular support;
2) Taliban is clearly being backed by the Paks and Saudis.
• By 1997, after Pakistan recognizes the Taliban government, U.S. is very close to doing the
same (existing predisposition to follow the Pakistan lead), but held back by the 4 issues
driving USG policy:
1) human rights issues, especially treatment of women (though Goodson sees this as a
symbolic issue only);
2) concern about opium-heroin production (though mainly a European and Pakistan
problem);
3) notion of necessity for broad-based government; involving all regional groups;
4) terrorism and UBL: a real strategic concern for the U.S.
-- Late 1990s, widely spread and believed rumors throughout the region that the U.S.
would target UBL if it could;
-- 1998-2001, rumors that U.S. had some kind of asset (human or electronic) by which it
was keeping its eye on UBL.
• 1998-2001, U.S. views Afghanistan/Taliban as a problem best managed by keeping it
contained:
-- USG takes a calculated decision to put UBL in a box unless there are opportunities to
target him that involve an acceptable risk (eg. cruise missile attacks); according to Goodson,
US population would not have supported "boots on the ground";
-- USG uses traditional methods (diplomacy, UN sanctions) to lean on Taliban-Taliban
responds to a limited extent. USG also pressures Saudis/ Paks to press the UBL issue with
the Taliban.
-- Note regional context: TalibanlUBL threat overshadowed by other South Asian concerns
within USG in late 1990s: India-Pakistan rivalry; Pakistan's internal instability; nuclear
threat; Kargil crisis. .
-- According to Goodson, UNOCAL did not have a decisive influence over Us..
policymakers.

4. Where Did We Go wrong?

• Taliban-al Qaeda nexus not fully understood by USG:

-- UBL primarily seen as financier of terrorism;
-- USG did not distinguish al Qaeda message from typical radical Islamic rhetoric;
-- Importance of internal shift within Taliban not appreciated:
> decline of moderate Mullah Rabbani faction and rise of hard line leaders by 200011,
with regional aspirations (Islamization);
> closer relationship between UBL and Mullah Omar; UBL gaining more influence over
Taliban leadership.

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-7 failure to perceive the 'newness' of the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus, ie. a break in the pattern of
state-sponsored terrorism toward new model of terrorism emerging from failed states.

• Afghanistan under the Taliban was not a state (and the Taliban was not a government) in the
sense understood by USG:
-- autonomous, sub-state actors-eg. family networks, cross-border tribal ties-incompatible
with strong central leadership;
--u.s. lacked people on the ground in the region, with regional expertise and specialization;
-7 range of instruments being used to try to influence the Taliban (eg. UN sanctions) had little
influence; were we pushing the levers in the right way?
-7 were we pushing the right levers? Eg. traditional approaches in Afghanistan to entice the local
population to cooperation with u.s. programs through payment (eg. crop substitution, buy-
back Stinger program) hadn't worked in the past-what made us think a bounty on UBL's
head would be any more successful? (Goodson thinks the bounty --$5M-was just too low).
-7 was the USG using a box of old tools--geared toward state-sponsorship of terrorism-to
dismantle a completely new model?

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