Preferred Citation: Earman, John, editor. Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science.

Berkeley: University of California Press, c1992 1992. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft%f&9n9''

Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations

Essays in the Philosophy of Science Edited by John Earman
UNIVERSI ! OF "#$IFORNI# %RESS

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

& '(() he Re*ents of the Uni+ersity of "alifornia

Preferred Citation: Earman, John, editor. Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1992 1992. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft%f&9n9''

IN RO,U" ION
(he present vol)me contains papers delivered in the t*enty+seventh, t*enty+ei"hth, and t*enty+ninth ann)al ,ect)re -eries .19/0119/92 sponsored !y the University of Pitts!)r"h3s Center for the Philosophy of -cience. (he a)thors *ill !e immediately reco"ni4ed as amon" the leadin" li"hts in c)rrent philosophy of science. (h)s, taken to"ether, the papers provide a "ood sample of *ork !ein" done at the frontiers of research in philosophy of science. (hey ill)strate !oth the contemporary reassessment of o)r philosophical herita"es and also the openin" of ne* directions of investi"ation. (he !rief remarks that follo* cannot hope to do 5)stice to the rich and re*ardin" fare to !e fo)nd herein !)t are s)pposed to serve only as a men).

Inference and -ethod

-t)dents in philosophy of science )sed to !e ta)"ht to respect the distinction !et*een 6the conte7t of discovery6 and 6the conte7t of 5)stification.6 (he philosophy of science .so the story *ent2 is concerned *ith the latter conte7t !)t not the former. 8t seeks to provide principles for eval)atin" scientific hypotheses and theories once they are form)lated, !)t it m)st remain modestly silent a!o)t the process of discovery since hypotheses and theories are free creations of the h)man mind and since the creative process is the st)ff of psycholo"y, not philosophy. (he discovery 5)stification distinction is no* )nder press)re from several directions, one of *hich stems from *ork in artificial intelli"ence and

formal learnin" theory. 9ranted that scientists do in fact arrive at theories !y a process of ")ess*ork, int)ition, or *hatever, it remains to ask *hat tr)e theories can !e relia!ly discovered !y *hat proced)res. :ore specifically, for a specified kind of theory and a specified class of possi!le ; viii ; *orlds, does there e7ist a proced)re .rec)rsive or other*ise2 s)ch that for every possi!le evidence se<)ence from any of the possi!le *orlds the proced)re event)ally finds every tr)e theory of the "iven type and event)ally avoids every false theory of the "iven type= 8n their contri!)tion, Clark 9lymo)r and >evin >elly sho* ho* to make s)ch <)estions precise, and for some precise versions they provide precise ans*ers. B)t as they note, a host of s)ch <)estions remain !e""in" for f)rther investi"ation. Jaakko ?intikka3s contri!)tion dra*s o)t some of the implications for ind)ction of his interro"ative model of in<)iry. (his model concept)ali4es scientific in<)iry as a "ame played !y a scientist a"ainst @at)re. (he scientist3s "oal is to derive a concl)sion C from a startin" premise P. (o reach this "oal, the scientist is allo*ed t*o kinds of moves: an interro"ative move in *hich a <)estion is p)t to @at)re and an ans*er received, and a ded)ctive move in *hich he dra*s lo"ical conse<)ences from P and the ans*ers received to interro"ative moves. A very strikin" feat)re of this model is the a!sence of any place for ind)ction as it is traditionally conceived. ?intikka ar")es that ?)me3s classic pro!lem of ind)ction is an artifact of the mistaken ass)mption that the only ans*ers @at)re "ives to <)eries are in the form of atomic .i.e., <)antifier+free2 sentences. ?intikka sides *ith the vie*, tracea!le to @e*ton and !eyond @e*ton to Aristotle, that o!servation and e7periment provide )s *ith propositions that possess a si"nificant "enerality. (he resid)al, non+?)mean pro!lem of ind)ction, as ?intikka conceives it, consists in e7tendin" the scopes of and )nifyin" the "eneral tr)ths received from @at)re. Accordin" to the te7t!ooks, modern science esche*s Aristotelian nat)res in favor of la*s of nat)re constr)ed as codifications of re")larities. 8n her provocative contri!)tion @ancy Cart*ri"ht contends that this common *isdom is fla*ed, for in her vie* la*s of nat)re are a!o)t nat)res. (h)s, for Cart*ri"ht, @e*ton3s la* of "ravitation doesn3t say *hat forces !odies act)ally e7perience !)t rather *hat forces it is their nat)re, as massive o!5ects, to e7perience. (he e7ceptionless re")larities re<)ired !y the empiricist acco)nt are rarely fo)nd, she contends, and *here they are fo)nd they res)lt from arran"ements that allo* sta!le nat)res to !e manifested. Cart*ri"ht s)pports her neo+Aristotelian conception of la*s !y ar")in" that it makes more sense of e7perimental methodolo"y and ind)ctive proced)res than the more pop)lar empiricist vie*. 8f empiricism is the vie* that no matter of fact can !e kno*n a priori, then ?)me *as not an empiricist. Bor, as Bar!ara and 9erald :assey sho* in their contri!)tion, ?)me3s acco)nt of animals attri!)tes to them fact)al kno*led"e *hich is not learned from e7perience !)t *hich is imparted to them !y 6the ori"inal hand of @at)re.6 ?)me co)ld !e said to remain an empiricist insofar as he denies that h)man !ein"s have speciali4ed innate co"nitive fac)lties or instincts as opposed to "enerali4ed instincts, s)ch as the ind)ctive propensity. B)t the distinction !et*een speciali4ed and "enerali4ed propensities is va")e and, th)s, the !o)ndaries of empiricism are f)44y. 8f @elson 9oodman is ri"ht, ; i7 ; *e are endo*ed *ith the propensity to pro5ect 3"reen3 instead of 3"r)e.3 And @oam Chomsky has championed the vie* that *e are endo*ed *ith comple7 propensities to map lin")istic evidence to lin")istic kno*led"e. Co s)ch propensities, *hich are at once special and "eneral, lie inside or o)tside the !o)ndaries of empiricism=

,o"ical positivism is a failed pro"ram. B)t its real shortcomin"s are <)ite different from those !esettin" the caricat)res that dot the potted histories of philosophy. Bor e7ample, the leadin" lo"ical positivists .apart from -chlick2 did not s)!scri!e to the naive empiricism of a ne)tral o!servation lan")a"eD indeed, as :ichael Briedman notes in his contri!)tion, the theory+ladenness of o!servation *as e7plicitly emphasi4ed !y Carnap and others. Briedman ar")es that the )ltimate shortcomin" of positivism as em!odied, say, in Carnap3s Logical Syntax of Language lay in its fail)re to esta!lish a ne)tral frame*ork from *hich alternative lan")a"es or frame*orks co)ld !e 5)d"ed. Briedman traces this fail)re to 9Edel3s incompleteness theorems and ar")es that the demise of Carnap3s pro"ram does not promote relativismFas e7pressed !y a notion of tr)th relativi4ed to a frame*orkF!)t p)lls the r)" o)t from )nder this and other fashiona!le relativisms. 8f asked to list the most important accomplishments of t*entieth+cent)ry philosophy, the ma5ority of the profession *o)ld s)rely "ive prominent place to G)ine3s slayin" of one of t*o do"mas of empiricismFthe e7istence of the analytic1synthetic distinction .that is, a principled distinction !et*een tr)ths of meanin" and tr)ths of fact2. (his accomplishment *o)ld not appear on @oam Chomsky3s list. 8ndeed, in his paper for this vol)me, Chomsky ar")es that G)ine3s res)lt is, ironically, an artifact of an overly !ehavioristic and a too narro*ly positivistic conception of ho* the scientific investi"ation of lan")a"e sho)ld and does proceed. 8n partic)lar, he claims that the strict)res imposed !y G)ine3s paradi"m of 6radical translation6 are not accepted in and *o)ld )ndermine the process of in<)iry in the nat)ral sciences.

heories and Explanation

(he theories of modern science tell stories of )no!serva!le entities and processes. -cientific realists contend that these stories are not to !e read as fairy tales and that o!servational and e7perimental evidence favora!le to a theory is to !e taken as evidence that the theory "ives )s a literally tr)e pict)re of the *orld. Hichard Boyd, one of the leadin" e7ponents of scientific realism, has in the past !een concerned to com!at the lo"ical empiricists and their heirs *ho .*ith some nota!le e7ceptions s)ch as ?ans Heichen!ach2 contend that scientific theories are to !e read instr)mentally or else that *e are never *arranted in acceptin" a theory e7cept as !ein" ade<)ate to savin" the phenomena. ?ere Boyd is concerned *ith the more el)sive and insidio)s opponent of realism *ho contends that the very notion of 6the *orld6 to *hich theories can ;7; s)cceed or fail in correspondin" is a del)sion since science is the social constr)ction of reality. -ome forms of constr)ctivism have !een s)ccessf)lly ans*eredD for e7ample, those that take their c)e from >)hnian incommens)ra!ility can !e re5ected on the !asis of a ca)sal theory of reference. Ither more s)!tle forms of constr)ctivism remain to !e ans*ered. Boyd3s contri!)tion is aimed at identifyin" the most interestin" of these forms and sho*in" that the 6philosophical packa"e6 in *hich they come *rapped cannot !e reconciled *ith the content and proced)res of science. Ciderik Batens "ives a reso)ndin" 6@o6 to his <)ery 6Co Je @eed a ?ierarchical :odel of -cience=6 8n place of !oth hierarchical and holistic models he proposes a conte7t)alistic approach in *hich pro!lems are al*ays form)lated and attacked *ith respect to a locali4ed pro!lem+solvin" sit)ation rather than *ith respect to the f)ll+kno*led"e sit)ation. In Batens3s acco)nt, methodolo"ical r)les as *ell as empirical assertions are conte7t)al. (his has the interestin" conse<)ence that no a priori ar")ments can demonstrate the s)periority of science to astrolo"yD rather the s)periority has to !e sho*n on a case+!y+case !asis in a ran"e of concrete pro!lem+solvin" conte7ts.

Jhat *as once the 6received vie*6 of scientific theories, *hich emphasi4ed the representation of scientific theories as a lo"ically closed set of sentences .)s)ally in a first+order lan")a"e2, has "iven *ay to a 6semantic6 or 6str)ct)ralist6 vie*, e7po)nded in different versions !y Patrick -)ppes, Joseph -need, Bredrick -)ppe, Bas van Braassen, and others. B)t *hat e7actly is the difference !et*een these t*o *ays of )nderstandin" theories= And *hat e7actly *as *ron" *ith or lackin" in the older vie*= 8n his contri!)tion Hichard 9randy ar")es that the proponents of the semantic vie* are offerin" not so m)ch a ne* acco)nt of theories per se as a ne* acco)nt of the epistemolo"y and application of theories. 8n his contri!)tion -need responds to critics *ho char"e that the semantic+str)ct)ralist reconstr)ctions of theories are inade<)ate !eca)se they fail to provide syntactic representations of cr)cial items. By providin" syntactic form)lations of 6la*likeness,6 6theoretical concepts,6 and 6constraints,6 -need paves the *ay for a reconciliation of the old and ne* vie*s of theories, and at the same time he opens )p a ne* aven)e of research !y connectin" his str)ct)ralist acco)nt *ith previo)s *ork on data !ases. 8n his contri!)tion ?ilary P)tnam e7plains *hy he has a!andoned a vie* he helped to artic)late and pop)lari4eFthe comp)tational or f)nctional characteri4ation of the mental. ?e contin)es to hold that mental states cannot !e strai"htfor*ardly identified *ith physical states of the !rain. B)t he no* proposes to t)rn the ta!les on his former self !y e7tendin" his o*n ar")ments, previo)sly deployed to sho* that 6soft*are6 is more important than 6hard*are,6 to sho* that mental states are not strai"htfor*ardly identical *ith comp)tational states of the !rain. Jhat does P)tnam propose as a replacement for f)nctionalism= -ome hints are to !e fo)nd in the present paper and in his !ook Representation and Reality .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19//2, ; 7i ; !)t for a complete ans*er the reader *ill have to stay t)ned for f)rther developments. ?artry Bield is more san")ine a!o)t another ma5or 6ism6Fphysicalism. ?e tries to chart a co)rse !et*een the -cylla of form)latin" the doctrine in s)ch a stron" form as to make it *holly impla)si!le and the Chary!dis of makin" it so *eak as to have no methodolo"ical !ite. (he form of physicalism that Bield takes to !e *orthy of respect is alon" the lines of red)ctionism, assertin" .very ro)"hly2 that all "ood e7planation m)st !e red)ci!le to physical e7planation. ?e ar")es that *eaker versions of physicalism, s)ch as s)pervenience, that lack the e7planatory re<)irement fo)nder on the Chary!dis. Jhat remains to !e specified to make physicalism a definite thesis is the red)ction !ase: *hat are the considerations in virt)e of *hich a science or a theory is properly classified as !ein" part of physics= JI?@ EAH:A@ U@8KEH-8(L IB P8((-BUH9? ;1;

%#R I. INFEREN"E #N, -E /O,

;#;

One. horou*hly -odern -eno

"lar0 1lymour and 2e+in 2elly

'. Introduction
(he Meno presents, and then re5ects, an ar")ment a"ainst the possi!ility of kno*led"e. (he ar")ment is "iven !y :eno in response to -ocrates3 proposal to search for *hat it is that is virt)e: :eno: ?o* *ill yo) look for it, -ocrates, *hen yo) do not kno* at all *hat it is= ?o* *ill yo) aim to search for somethin" yo) do not kno* at all= 8f yo) sho)ld meet *ith it, ho* *ill yo) kno* that this is the thin" that yo) did not kno*=M1N :any commentators, incl)din" Aristotle in the Posterior nalytics , take :eno3s point to concern the recognition of an o!"ect , and if that is the point there is a direct response: one can reco"ni4e an o!5ect *itho)t kno*in" all a!o)t it. B)t the passa"e can also !e )nderstood strai"htfor*ardly as a re<)est for a discerni!le #ar$ of tr)th, and as a cryptic ar")ment that *itho)t s)ch a mark it is impossi!le to ac<)ire kno*led"e from the instances that e7perience provides. Je *ill try to sho* that the second readin" is of partic)lar interest. 8f there is no mark of tr)th, nothin" that can !e "enerally discerned that tr)e and only tr)e propositions !ear, :eno3s remarks represent a cryptic ar")ment that kno*led"e is impossi!le. Je *ill "ive an interpretation that makes the ar")ment validD )nder that interpretation, :eno3s ar")ment demonstrates the impossi!ility of a certain kind of kno*led"e. 8n *hat follo*s *e *ill consider :eno3s ar")ment in more detail, and *e *ill try to sho* that similar ar")ments are availa!le for many other conceptions of kno*led"e. (he modern :eno ar")ments reveal a diverse and intricate str)ct)re in the theories of kno*led"e and of in<)iry, a str)ct)re *hose e7ploration has 5)st !e")n. Jhile *e *ill attempt to sho* that o)r readin" of the ar")ment fits reasona!ly *ell ;%; *ith Plato3s te7t, *e do not aim to ar")e a!o)t Plato3s intent. 8t is eno)"h that the traditional te7t can !e ela!orated into a systematic and challen"in" s)!5ect of contemporary interest.M2N

). he -eno
8n one passa"e in the Meno , to ac<)ire kno*led"e is to ac<)ire a tr)th that can !e "iven a special logical for# . (o ac<)ire kno*led"e of virt)e is to come to kno* an appropriate tr)th that states a condition, or con5)nction of conditions, necessary and s)fficient for any instance of virt)e. Plato3s -ocrates *ill not accept lists, or dis5)nctive characteri4ations. -ocrates: 8 seem to !e in "reat l)ck, :enoD *hile 8 am lookin" for one virt)e, 8 have fo)nd yo) to have a *hole s*arm of them. B)t, :eno, to follo* )p the ima"e of s*arms, if 8 *ere askin" yo) *hat is the nat)re of !ees, and yo) said that they are many and of all kinds, *hat *o)ld yo) ans*er if 8 asked yo): 6Co yo) mean that they are many and varied and different from one another in so far as they are !ees= Ir are they no different in that

re"ard, !)t in some other respect, in their !ea)ty, for e7ample, or their si4e or in some other s)ch *ay=6 (ell me, *hat *o)ld yo) ans*er if th)s <)estioned= :eno: 8 *o)ld say that they do not differ from one another in !ein" !ees. -ocrates: -)ppose 8 *ent on to say: 6(ell me, *hat is this very thin", :eno, in *hich they are all the same and do not differ from one another=6 Jo)ld yo) !e a!le to tell me= :eno: 8 *o)ld. -ocrates: (he same is tr)e in the case of the virt)es. Even if they are many and vario)s, all of them have one and the same form *hich makes them virt)es, and it is ri"ht to look to this *hen one is asked to make clear *hat virt)e is. Ir do yo) not )nderstand *hat 8 mean= (here is somethin" pec)liarly modern a!o)t the Meno . (he same re5ection of dis5)nctive characteri4ations can !e fo)nd in several contemporary acco)nts of e7planation.M#N Je mi"ht say that -ocrates re<)ires that :eno prod)ce an appropriate and tr)e )niversal !iconditional sentence, in *hich a predicate si"nifyin" 3is virt)o)s3 flanks one side of the !iconditional, and a con5)nction of appropriate predicates occ)rs on the other side of the !iconditional. ,et )s so say. @othin" is lost !y the anachronism and, as *e shall see, m)ch is "ained. -tatements of evidence also have a lo"ical form in the Meno . Jhether the topic is !ees, or virt)e, or "eometry, the evidence -ocrates considers consists of instances and non+instances of virt)e, of "eometric properties, or *hatever the topic may !e. Evidence is stated in the sin")lar. (he task of ac<)irin" kno*led"e th)s ass)mes the follo*in" form. Ine is presented *ith, or finds, in *hatever *ay, a series of e7amples and non+e7amples of the feat)re a!o)t *hich one is in<)irin", and from these e7amples a tr)e, )niversal !iconditional *itho)t dis5)nctions is to !e prod)ced. 8n the ;&; Meno that is not eno)"h for kno*led"e to have !een ac<)ired. (o ac<)ire kno*led"e it is ins)fficient to prod)ce a tr)th of the re<)ired formD one m)st also $no% that one has prod)ced a tr)th. Jhat can this re<)irement mean= -ocrates and :eno a"ree in distin")ishin" kno*led"e from mere tr)e opinion, and they a"ree that kno*led"e re<)ires at least tr)e opinion. :eno thinks the difference !et*een kno*led"e and tr)e opinion lies in the "reater relia!ility of kno*led"e, !)t -ocrates insists that tr)e opinion co)ld, !y accident as it *ere, !e as relia!le as kno*led"e: :eno: . . . B)t the man *ho has kno*led"e *ill al*ays s)cceed, *hereas he *ho has tr)e opinion *ill only s)cceed at times. -ocrates: ?o* do yo) mean= Jill he *ho has the ri"ht opinion not al*ays s)cceed, as lon" as his opinion is ri"ht= :eno: (hat appears to !e so of necessity, and it makes me *onder, -ocrates, this !ein" the case, *hy kno*led"e is pri4ed far more hi"hly than ri"ht opinion, and *hy they are different. -ocrates ans*ers each <)estion, after a fashion. (he difference !et*een kno*led"e and tr)e opinion is in the special tie , the !indin" connection, !et*een *hat the proposition is a!o)t and the fact of its !elief. And opinions that are tied in this special *ay are not only relia!le, they are lia!le to stay, and it is that *hich makes them especially pri4ed: -ocrates: (o ac<)ire an )ntied *ork of Caedal)s is not *orth m)ch, like ac<)irin" a

r)na*ay slave, for it does not remain, !)t it is *orth m)ch if tied do*n, for his *orks are very !ea)tif)l. Jhat am 8 thinkin" of *hen 8 say this= (r)e opinions. Bor tr)e opinions, as lon" as they remain, are a fine thin" and all they do is "ood, !)t they are not *illin" to remain lon", and they escape from a man3s mind, so that they are not *orth m)ch )ntil one ties them do*n !y an acco)nt of the reason *hy. And that, :eno my friend, is recollection, as *e previo)sly a"ree. After they are tied do*n, in the first place they !ecome kno*led"e, and then they remain in place. (hat is *hy kno*led"e is pri4ed hi"her than correct opinion, and kno*led"e differs from correct opinion in !ein" tied do*n. Plato is chiefly concerned *ith the difference !et*een kno*led"e and tr)e opinion, and o)r contemporaries have follo*ed this interest. (he recent foc)s of epistemolo"y has !een the special intentional and ca)sal str)ct)re re<)ired for kno*in". B)t :eno3s ar")ment does not depend on the details of this analysisD it depends, instead, on the capacity for tr)e opinion that the capacity to ac<)ire kno*led"e implies. (hat is the capacity to find the tr)th of a <)estion, to reco"ni4e it *hen fo)nd, to stick *ith it after it is fo)nd, and to do so %hate&er the tr)th may !e. -)ppose that -ocrates co)ld meet :eno3s rhetorical challen"e and reco"ni4e the tr)th *hen he met it: *hat is it he *o)ld then !e a!le to do= -omethin" like the follo*in". 8n each of many different i#agina!le .*e do not say possi!le save in a lo"ical sense2 circ)mstances, in *hich distinct claims a!o)t ;0; virt)e .or *hatever2 are tr)e, )pon receivin" eno)"h evidence, and considerin" eno)"h hypotheses, -ocrates *o)ld hit )pon the ri"ht hypothesis a!o)t virt)e for that possi!le circ)mstance, and *o)ld then .and only then2 anno)nce that the correct hypothesis is indeed correct. @ever mind 5)st ho% -ocrates *o)ld !e a!le to do this, !)t a"ree that, if he is in the act)al circ)mstance capa!le of comin" to kno*, then that capacity implies the capacity 5)st stated. >no*led"e re<)ires the a!ility to come to !elieve the tr)th, to reco"ni4e *hen one !elieves the tr)th .and so to !e a!le to contin)e to !elieve the tr)th2, and to do so *hatever the tr)e state of affairs may !e. -o )nderstood, :eno3s ar")ment is valid, or at least its premises can !e pla)si!ly e7tended to form a valid ar")ment for the impossi!ility of kno*led"e. (he lan")a"e of possi!le *orlds is convenient for statin" the ar")ment. Bi7 some list of predicates K, P1, . . . , Pn, and consider all possi!le *orlds .*ith co)nta!le domains2 that assi"n e7tensions to the predicates. 8n some of these *orlds there *ill !e tr)e )niversal !iconditional sentences *ith K on one side and con5)nctions of some of the Pi or their ne"ations on the other side. (ake pieces of evidence availa!le from any one of these str)ct)res to !e increasin" con5)nctions atomic or ne"ated atomic form)las sim)ltaneo)sly satisfia!le in the str)ct)re. ,et -ocrates receive an )n!o)nded se<)ence of sin")lar sentences in this voca!)lary, so that the se<)ence, if contin)ed, *ill event)ally incl)de every atomic or ne"ated atomic form)la .in the voca!)lary2 that is satisfia!le in the str)ct)re. ,et % ran"e over *orlds. Jith :eno, as *e have read him, say that -ocrates can come to kno* a sentence, -, of the appropriate form, tr)e in *orld % , only if .i2 for every possi!le se<)ence of presentation of evidence from *orld % -ocrates event)ally anno)nces that - is tr)e, and .ii2 in every *orld, and for every se<)ence from that *orld, if there is a sentence of the appropriate form tr)e in that *orld, then -ocrates can event)ally consider some tr)e sentence of the appropriate form in that *orld, can anno)nce that it is tr)e in that *orld .*hile never makin" s)ch an anno)ncement of a sentence that is not tr)e in that *orld2, and .iii2 in every *orld, and for every se<)ence from that *orld, if no sentence of the appropriate form is

tr)e in the *orld, then -ocrates refrains from anno)ncin" of any sentence of that form that it is tr)e. :eno3s ar")ment is no* a piece of mathematics, and it is strai"htfor*ard to prove that he is correct: no matter *hat po*ers *e ima"ine -ocrates to have, he cannot ac<)ire kno*led"e, provided 6kno*led"e6 is )nderstood to entail these re<)irements. @o hypotheses a!o)t the ca)sal conditions for kno*led"e defeat the ar")ment )nless they defeat the premises. -kepticism need not rest on empirical reflections a!o)t the *eaknesses of the h)man mind. (he impossi!ility of kno*led"e can !e demonstrated a priori. Jhatever se<)ence of evi+ ;'; dence -ocrates may receive that a"rees *ith a hypothesis of the re<)ired form, there is some str)ct)re in *hich that evidence is tr)e !)t the hypothesis is falseD so that if at any point -ocrates anno)nces his concl)sion, there is some ima"ina!le circ)mstance in *hich he *ill !e *ron". Je sho)ld note, ho*ever, that in those circ)mstances in *hich there is no tr)th of the re<)ired form, -ocrates can event)ally come to kno* that there is no s)ch tr)th, provided he has an initial, finite list of all of the predicates that may occ)r in a definition. ?e can anno)nce *ith perfect relia!ility the a!sence of any p)rely )niversal con5)nctive characteri4ations of virt)e if he has received a co)ntere7ample to every hypothesisFand if the n)m!er of predicates are finite, the n)m!er of hypotheses *ill !e finite, and if no hypothesis of the re<)ired form is tr)e, the co)ntere7amples *ill event)ally occ)r. 8f the relevant list of predicates or properties *ere not provided to -ocrates initially, then he co)ld not kno* that there is no kno*led"e of a s)!5ect to !e had.

3. 4ea0enin* 2no5led*e
-kepticism has an ellipsis. (he content of the do)!t that kno*led"e is possi!le depends on the re<)isites for kno*led"e, and that is a matter over *hich philosophers disp)te. Hather than s)pposin" there is one tr)e acco)nt of kno*led"e to !e "iven, if only philosophers co)ld find it, o)r disposition is to in<)ire a!o)t the possi!ilities. I)r notion of kno*in" is s)rely va")e in *ays, and there is room for more than one interestin" do7astic state. A!o)t the conception of kno*led"e *e have e7tracted from :eno there is no do)!t as to the ri"htness of skepticism. @o one can have that sort of kno*led"e. Perhaps there are other sorts that can !e had. Je co)ld restrict the set of possi!ilities that m)st !e considered, eliminatin" most of the possi!le *orlds, and make re<)irements .i2, .ii2, and .iii2 apply only to the red)ced set of possi!ilities. Je *o)ld then have a revised conception of kno*led"e that re<)ires only a red)ced scope , as *e shall call the ran"e of str)ct)res over *hich -ocrates, or yo) or *e, m)st s)cceed in order to !e co)nted as a kno*er. (his is a reco)rse to *hich *e *ill have event)ally to come, !)t let )s p)t it aside for no*, and consider instead *hat mi"ht other*ise !e done a!o)t *eakenin" conditions .i2, .ii2, and .iii2. Plato3s -ocrates emphasi4es this difference !et*een kno*led"e and mere tr)e opinion: kno*led"e stays *ith the kno*er, !)t mere opinion, even tr)e opinion, may flee and !e replaced !y falsehood or *ant of opinion. (he evident thin" to consider is the re<)irement that for -ocrates to come to kno* the tr)th in a certain *orld, -ocrates !e a!le to find the tr)th in each possi!le *orld, and never a!andon it, !)t not !e o!li"ed to anno)nce that the tr)th has !een fo)nd *hen it is fo)nd. Jhatever the relations of ca)se and intention that kno*led"e re<)ires, s)rely :eno re<)ires too m)ch. ?e re<)ires, as *e have reconstr)cted his ar")ment, that *e come to !elieve thro)"h a relia!le proce+

;/; d)re, a proced)re or capacity that *o)ld, *ere the *orld different, lead to appropriately different concl)sions in that circ)mstance. B)t :eno also re<)ires that *e kno* *hen the proced)re has s)cceeded, and that seems m)ch like demandin" that *e kno* that *e kno* *hen *e kno*. >no*in" that *e kno* is an attractive proposition, !)t it does not seem a prere<)isite for kno*led"e, or if it is, then !y the previo)s ar")ment, kno*led"e is impossi!le. 8n either case, the properties of a *eaker conception of kno*led"e deserve o)r st)dy. (he idea is that -ocrates comes event)ally to em!race the tr)th and to stick *ith it in every case, altho)"h he does not kno* at *hat point he has s)cceeded: he is never s)re that he *ill not, in the f)t)re, have to chan"e his hypothesis. 8n this conception of kno*led"e, there is no mark of s)ccess. Je m)st then think of -ocrates as con5ect)rin" the tr)th forever. -ince -ocrates did not live forever, nor shall *e, it is !etter to think of -ocrates as havin" a procedure that co)ld !e applied indefinitely, even *itho)t the livin" -ocrates. (he proced)re has mathematical properties that -ocrates does not. Bor -ocrates to kno* that - in *orld % in *hich - is tr)e no* implies that -ocrates3 !ehavior accords *ith a proced)re *ith the follo*in" properties: .iO2 for every possi!le se<)ence of evidence from *orld % , after a finite se"ment is presented, the proced)re con5ect)res - ever after, and .iiO2 for every possi!le se<)ence of evidence from any possi!le *orld, if a sentence of the appropriate form is tr)e in that *orld, then after a finite se"ment of the evidence is presented the proced)re con5ect)res a tr)e sentence of the appropriate form ever after. (hese conditions certainly are not s)fficient for any do7astic state very close to o)r ordinary notion of kno*led"e, since -ocrates3 !ehavior may in the act)al *orld accord *ith a proced)re satisfyin" .iO2 and .iiO2 even *hile -ocrates lacks the disposition to act in accord *ith the proced)re in other circ)mstances. Bor kno*led"e, -ocrates m)st have s)ch a disposition. B)t he can only have s)ch a disposition if there e7ists a proced)re meetin" conditions .iO2 and .iiO2. 8s there= 8f the lo"ical form of *hat is to !e kno*n is restricted to )niversal !iconditionals of the sort Plato re<)ired, then there is indeed s)ch a proced)re. 8f -ocrates is )na!le to ac<)ire this sort of kno*led"e, then it is !eca)se of psycholo"y or sociolo"y or !iolo"y, not in virt)e of mathematical impossi!ilities. -kepticism a!o)t this sort of kno*led"e cannot !e a priori. (here is no "eneral ar")ment of :eno3s kind a"ainst the possi!ility of ac<)irin" this sort of kno*led"e. (he *eakenin" of kno*led"e may !e )n+Platonic, !)t it is not )nphilosophical. Brancis Bacon3s 'o&u# Organu# descri!es a proced)re that *orks for this case, and his conception of kno*led"e seems ro)"hly to accord *ith it. John -t)art :ill3s canons of method are, of co)rse, simply pirated from Ba+ ;9; con3s method. ?ans Heichen!ach )sed nearly the same conception of kno*led"e in his 6pra"matic vindication6 of ind)ction, altho)"h he ass)med a very different lo"ical form for hypotheses, namely that they are con5ect)res a!o)t limits of relative fre<)encies of properties in infinite se<)ences. -o *e have a conception of kno*led"e that, at least for some kinds of hypotheses, is not s)!5ect to :eno3s parado7. B)t for *hich kinds of hypotheses is this so= Je are not no* captivated, if ever *e *ere, !y the notion that all kno*led"e is definitional in form. Perhaps even Plato himself *as not, for the slave !oy learns the theorem of Pytha"oras, *hich has a more complicated lo"ical form. Je are interested in other forms of hypotheses: positive tests for diseases, and tests for their a!senceD collections of tests one of *hich *ill reveal a condition if it is present. @or are o)r interests confined to

sin"le hypotheses considered individ)ally. 8f the property of !ein" a s<)amo)s cancer cell has some connections *ith other properties amena!le to o!servation, *e *ant to kno* all a!out those connections. Je *ant to discover the *hole theory a!o)t the s)!5ect matter, or as m)ch as *e can of it. Jhat *e may *ish to determine, then, is *hat classes of theories can come to !e kno*n accordin" to o)r *eaker conception of kno*led"e. ?ere, as *e )se the notion of theory, it means the set of all tr)e claims in some fra"ment of lan")a"e. Jantin" to kno* the tr)th a!o)t a partic)lar <)estion is then a special case, since the <)estion can !e form)lated as a claim and its denial, and the pair form a fra"ment of lan")a"e *hose tr)e claims are to !e decided. Jhat *e *ish to determine is *hether all of *hat is tr)e and can !e stated in some fra"ment of lan")a"e can !e kno*n. Either the possi!ility of kno*led"e depends on the fra"ment of lan")a"e considered or it does not. 8f it does, then many distinct fra"ments of lan")a"e mi"ht !e of the sort that permit kno*led"e of *hat can !e said in them, and the classification of fra"ments that do, and that do not, permit s)ch kno*led"e !ecomes an interestin" task. Bor *hich fra"ments of lan")a"e, if any, are there valid ar")ments of :eno3s sort a"ainst the possi!ility of kno*led"e, and for *hich fra"ments are there not= (hese are strai"htfor*ard mathematical <)estions, and their ans*ers, or some of their ans*ers, are as follo*s: Consider any first+order lan")a"e .*itho)t identity2 in *hich all predicates are monadic, and there are no sym!ols taken to represent f)nctions. (hen any tr)e theory in s)ch a lan")a"e can !e learned, or at least there are no valid :enoan ar")ments a"ainst s)ch kno*led"e. 8f the lan")a"e is monadic !)t *ith identity, or if the lan")a"e contains a predicate that is not monadic, then neither the fra"ment that consists only of )niversally <)antified form)las, nor the fra"ment that consists only of e7istentially <)antified form)las, nor any part of the lan")a"e containin" either of these fra"ments, is s)ch that every tr)e theory in these fra"ments can !e kno*n. 8n each of the latter cases an ar")ment of :eno3s kind can !e constr)cted to sho* that kno*led"e is impossi!le. ; 1$ ;

6. imes for #ll hin*s

(he *eakened conception of kno*led"e is still very stron" in at least one respect. 8t re<)ires for the possi!ility of kno*led"e of an infinite *ealth of claims that there !e a time at *hich all of them are kno*nFthat is, a sin"le time after *hich all and only the tr)ths in a fra"ment of lan")a"e are con5ect)red. Je mi"ht instead )sef)lly consider the follo*in" circ)mstance: Jhen investi"atin" hypotheses in a fra"ment of lan")a"e, -ocrates is a!le, for each tr)th, event)ally to con5ect)re it and never s)!se<)ently to "ive it )pD and -ocrates is also a!le, for each falsehood, event)ally not to con5ect)re it and never after to p)t it for*ard. Plato3s -ocrates ill)strates that the slave !oy can 6recollect6 the Pytha"orean theorem from e7amples and appropriate <)estions, and pres)ma!ly in Plato3s vie* the slave !oy co)ld !e made to recollect any other tr)th of "eometry !y a similar process. B)t neither the ill)stration nor the vie* re<)ires that the slave !oy, or anyone else, event)ally !e a!le to recollect the *hole of "eometry. (here may !e no time at *hich -ocrates kno*s all of *hat is tr)e and can !e stated in a "iven fra"ment of lan")a"e. Let the disposition to follo* a proced)re that *ill event)ally find every tr)th and event)ally avoid every falsehood is s)rely of f)ndamental interest to the theory of kno*led"e. Call a proced)re that has the capacity to conver"e to the *hole tr)th at some moment, as in the disc)ssion of the previo)s section, an EA learnin" proced)re, and call an AE learner a proced)re that for each tr)th has the capacity to conver"e to that tr)th !y some moment, and for each

falsehood avoids it ever after some moment. Every EA learner is an AE learner, !)t is the converse tr)e= Ir more to the point, are there fra"ments of lan")a"e for *hich there are AE proced)res !)t no EA proced)res= (here are indeed. Consider the set of all )niversal sentences, *ith identity, and *ith any n)m!er of predicates of any arity and any n)m!er of f)nction sym!ols of any arity. By the ne"ative res)lt stated previo)sly, there is no EA proced)re for that fra"ment of lan")a"e, no proced)re that, for every .co)nta!le2 str)ct)re, and every *ay of presentin" the sin")lar facts in the str)ct)re, *ill event)ally con5ect)re the theory .in the lan")a"e fra"ment2 tr)e in that str)ct)re. B)t there is an AE proced)re for this fra"ment. 8f, for kno*led"e a!o)t a matter, -ocrates is re<)ired only to have a disposition to follo* an AE proced)re for the lan")a"e of the topic, then no :enoan ar")ment sho*s that -ocrates cannot ac<)ire kno*led"e, even if -ocrates does not kno* the relevant predicates or properties !eforehand. (he improvement does not last. 8f *e consider the fra"ment of lan")a"e that allo*s )p to one alternation of <)antifiers, *hether from )niversal to e7istential or from e7istential to )niversal, it a"ain !ecomes impossi!le to ac<)ire kno*led"eD there are no AE proced)res for this fra"ment that are imm)ne from ar")ments of :eno3s kind. ; 11 ;

7. ,isco+ery and Scope

Jhether *e consider EA discovery or AE discovery, *e soon find that ar")ments of :eno3s kind s)cceed. (he same sort of res)lts o!tain if *e f)rther *eaken the re<)irements for kno*led"e. Je mi"ht, for e7ample, a!andon Plato3s s)""estion that *hen a tr)th is kno*n it is not s)!se<)ently for"otten or re5ected. Je mi"ht then consider the re<)irement that -ocrates !e disposed to !ehave in accordance *ith a proced)re that, as it considers more and more evidence a!o)t a <)estion, is *ron" in its con5ect)res only finitely often, is correct infinitely often, !)t may also s)spend 5)d"ment infinitely often. Isherson and Jeinstein have sho*n that even *ith this remarka!ly *eak conception there are <)estions that cannot, in senses parallel to those a!ove, !e kno*n. Ir *e mi"ht allo* vario)s sorts of appro7imate tr)thD for many of them, ar")ments parallel to :eno3s are availa!le. (he conceptions of kno*led"e *e have disc)ssed place "reat emphasis on relia!ility . (hey demand that *e not come to o)r tr)e !eliefs !y chance !)t in accordance *ith proced)res that *o)ld find the tr)th no matter *hat it mi"ht !e, so lon" as the proced)res co)ld !e carried o)t. Jhat the :eno ar")ments sho* is that in the vario)s senses considered, for most of the iss)es that mi"ht invite discovery, proced)res so relia!le do not e7ist. (he antiskeptical response o)"ht to !e principled retreat. 8n the face of valid ar")ments a"ainst the possi!ility of proced)res so relia!le, and hence a"ainst the possi!ility of correspondin" sorts of kno*led"e, let )s consider proced)res that are not so relia!le, and re"ard the do7astic state that is o!tained !y actin" in accord *ith them as at least somethin" !etter and more interestin" than accidental tr)e !elief. Bor each of the re<)irements on kno*led"e considered previo)sly, and for others, *e can ask the follo*in" kind of <)estion: Bor each fra"ment of lan")a"e, *hat are the classes of possi!le *orlds for each of *hich there e7ists a proced)re that *ill discover the tr)ths of that fra"ment for any *orld in the class= (he <)estion may !e too hard to parse. ,et )s define it in pieces. ,et a discovery pro!lem !e any .rec)rsive2 fra"ment B of a formal lan")a"e, to"ether *ith a class > of co)nta!le relational str)ct)res for that fra"ment. Ine s)ch class > is the class of all co)nta!le str)ct)res for the lan")a"e fra"ment, !)t any s)!sets of this class may also !e considered. A discovery proced)re for the discovery pro!lem

is any proced)re that, for every k in > and every presentation of evidence from k, 6conver"es6 to all of the sentences in B that are tr)e in k. 6Conver"ence6 may !e in the EA sense, the AE sense, or some other sense alto"ether .s)ch as the *eak conver"ence criterion considered t*o para"raphs previo)sly2. Jhat the res)lts *e have descri!ed tell )s is that for many fra"ments B, if > is the set of all co)nta!le str)ct)res for B, then there are no discovery proced)res for pairs PB, >Q. (hat does not imply that there are no discovery proce+ ; 12 ; d)res for pairs PB, >3Q *here >3 is some proper s)!set of >. :)st it !e that for kno*led"e, tr)e !elief has !een ac<)ired in accordance *ith a proced)re that *o)ld lead to the tr)th in e&ery ima"ina!le se<)ence= -)ppose *e think of in<)iry as posin" discovery pro!lems, a <)estion or <)estions, and a class of possi!le *orlds or circ)mstances that determine vario)s ans*ers to the <)estion. Cependin" on *hich *orld or circ)mstance is o)rs, different ans*ers *ill !e tr)e. -)ccessf)l in<)iry, *hich leads to some kind of kno*led"e, accords *ith a proced)re that *ill conver"e to the tr)th of the matter, *hatever it may !e, in each of these possi!le circ)mstances. 8t is possi!le for proced)res to have the capacity to find the tr)th in each of a class of circ)mstances *itho)t havin" the capacity to find the tr)th in every ima"ina!le circ)mstance. Jhen attention is restricted to a discovery pro!lem that contains a restricted class of possi!le *orlds of circ)mstances, that restriction constit)tes a kind of !ac$ground $no%ledge !ro)"ht to in<)iry. (he !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e says that the act)al circ)mstance is one of a restricted class of circ)mstances or possi!le *orlds. (he theory of recollection, Plato3s sol)tion to :eno3s parado7, claims that in<)iry is cond)cted *ith a special sort of !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e, stamped in the so)l !efore !irth. (*o different reconstr)ctions of Plato3s sol)tion fit the story, and *e offer them !oth *itho)t choosin" !et*een them. 8n the first acco)nt, the correct definitions are stored in the so)l and need only !e !ro)"ht to mind. (he presentation of e7amples and the process of recollection event)ally !rin"s forth the tr)th, and provides kno*led"e, not !eca)se the process )sin" that same !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e *o)ld s)cceed no matter ho* the *orld .or rather the forms2 mi"ht ima"ina!ly !e, !)t !eca)se there is a ")arantee that the *orld .or, rather a"ain, the forms2 accords *ith kno*led"e the so)l possesses. (he !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e is so complete that no inference from e7amples is re<)iredD e7amples only ease access to kno*led"e *e already have. 8n the second acco)nt a complete list of definientia , each characteri4in" a distinct form, is stored in the so)l. An in<)iry into the nat)re of virt)e m)st then match instances of the )sa"e of 6virt)e6 *ith the appropriate definiens in the list. 8n this case the process of recollections involves an ind)ctive inference from partic)lar e7amples to a )niversal !iconditional connectin" a definiens in the list *ith a term denotin" the s)!5ect of in<)iry. In the ass)mptions that no t*o forms are s)ch that the same individ)als participate in !oth, and that there are only finitely many forms, -ocrates can event)ally con5ect)re the form of virt)e, kno* that his con5ect)re is correct, and can do so no matter *hich definiens in the list happens to represent the form of virt)e. In either reconstr)ction, Plato3s reply to :eno3s parado7 has t*o aspects, and the slave !oy3s rediscovery of the theorem of Pytha"oras ill)strates each of them. Birst, kno*led"e may !e had !y means other than the means of in<)iry. 8t may !e inherited, innate, stamped on the so)l, and not ac<)ired !y "eneral+

; 1# ; i4ation from e7amples "iven in this life. -econd, "iven s)ch prior kno*led"e the task of discovery or the ac<)isition of kno*led"e is reconceived and !ecomes feasi!le, for the in<)irer need not !e a!le to fi7 )pon the tr)th in every ima"ina!le circ)mstance, !)t only in those circ)mstances consistent *ith prior kno*led"e.M%N Plato has little to say in the Meno a!o)t *hat so)ls do that "ives them the kno*led"e *e recollect in s)ccessf)l in<)iry. Je .or o)r so)ls2 have !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e thro)"h a ca)sal process that is not itself in<)iry. Je co)ld instead entertain the tho)"ht that *e ac<)ire !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e thro)"h in<)iry cond)cted in o)r past lives. (he second alternative raises a n)m!er of interestin" <)estions. Jhen *e in<)ire into a <)estion, the discovery pro!lem *e address depends )pon o)r kno*led"e. (he class of alternative circ)mstances, and th)s alternative ans*ers, that need !e considered is !o)nded !y o)r prior kno*led"e. 8f *e kno* nothin", it is the class of all ima"ina!le circ)mstancesD if *e kno* a "reat deal, the class of alternative circ)mstances may !e <)ite small. -)ppose as *e "o thro)"h life .or thro)"h a se<)ence of lives2 *e form con5ect)res a!o)t the ans*ers to vario)s <)estions, and *hile *e reserve the ri"ht to chan"e these con5ect)res )pon f)rther evidence, in the mean*hile *e )se them as tho)"h they *ere !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e for still other <)estions. -ho)ld evidence later arrive that ca)ses )s to a!andon o)r con5ect)res, *e *ill also have to reconceive the discovery pro!lems in *hich *e had taken those con5ect)res as !ack"ro)nd kno*led"e.M&N -ince *e are not only )ncertain *hat discovery pro!lems *e shall face, !)t more profo)ndly, *e may !e *ron" in o)r constr)al of the discovery pro!lems *e presently face, it *o)ld seem only pr)dent to rely on learnin" proced)res that have the *idest possi!le scope. Je kno* from *hat has "one !efore that :eno3s ar")ment, and derivatives of it, sho* that there is no proced)re ade<)ate for all discovery pro!lems, !)t some proced)res may do !etter than others. Je can characteri4e a dominance relation !et*een discovery proced)res: Proced)re A dominates proced)re B provided A solves .in *hatever sense may !e specified2 every discovery pro!lem B solves, !)t not vice versa. A proced)re is then #axi#al if no proced)re dominates it. Je mi"ht then take pr)dence to re<)ire that o)r manner of in<)iry accord *ith a ma7imal proced)re. -ome second tho)"hts are called for. 8n the *ell+st)died case in *hich *hat is to !e learned is not a theory !)t a lan")a"e, it is kno*n that every ma7imal proced)re solves the discovery pro!lem that consists of learnin" any finite lan")a"e on a fi7ed voca!)lary, !)t no proced)re solves any lar"er pro!lem, posed !y any lar"er class of lan")a"es on that same voca!)lary. (here is no ma7imal proced)re that identifies even one infinite lan")a"e. Bor pro!lems that concern the learnin" of theories, one sho)ld e7pect somethin" analo"o)s: the ma7imal proced)res *ill !e very sparse and *ill fail to solve discovery pro!lems that are readily solved !y other methods. ; 1% ; -ince, in all likelihood, *e cannot fi7 !eforehand on ma7imal methods, pr)dence can only recommend somethin" more modest. Jhen *e reco"ni4e that one discovery proced)re dominates another then, ceteris pari!us , it is pr)dent to )se the dominant proced)re rather than the dominated proced)re. Jhether that is a sensi!le or feasi!le recommendation depends on the dominance str)ct)re of discovery proced)res. 8f, for e7ample, there is a readily descri!ed infinite chain of proced)res, later mem!ers of the se<)ence dominatin" all earlier mem!ers, then the recommendation *o)ld "ive )s a task *orthy of -isyph)s. Je *o)ld ever !e chan"in" one proced)re for another, *itho)t rest and *itho)t end. -ometimes, m)ch as the e7istentialists say, the !est thin" to do is to stop preparin" to make in<)iries and make them.

8. /ypermodern -eno
:ethodolo"y amo)nts to recommendations restrictin" proced)res of in<)iry. Any s)ch restriction can !e tho)"ht of as determinin" a class of proced)res, those that satisfy it. Besides methodolo"y, psycholo"y is another so)rce of restrictions on proced)res, and comp)tation theory still another. Bor e7ample, *e mi"ht no*adays s)ppose that the discovery proced)res availa!le to )s, even *ith the aid of machines, m)st !e co#puta!le proced)res, and invokin" Ch)rch3s thesis, restrict o)r attention to the class of ()rin" comp)ta!le proced)res for in<)iry. Bor any restriction on discovery proced)res, the precedin" disc)ssion sho)ld s)""est the follo*in" sort of <)estion: Jhat ar")ments of :eno3s sort can !e made a"ainst all proced)res of this class= :ore e7actly, for any restriction on discovery proced)res, does the restriction also limit the class of discovery pro!lems that can !e solved= Bor !oth the EA and AE conceptions of s)ccessf)l in<)iry, the re<)irement that proced)res !e comp)ta!le limits the class of discovery pro!lems that can !e solved. (here are discovery pro!lems that can !e solved !y EA proced)res !)t not !y any comp)ta!le EA proced)res, and there are discovery pro!lems that can !e solved !y AE proced)res !)t not !y any comp)ta!le AE proced)res. :ethodolo"ical principles that are often re"arded as !eni"n also limit discovery *hen they are imposed in com!ination *ith the re<)irement of comp)ta!ility. A consistency principle applies to proced)res that al*ays con5ect)re theories consistent *ith the evidenceD a conservative principle applies to proced)res that never chan"e a c)rrent con5ect)re )ntil ne* evidence contradicts it. Either of these re<)irements, in com!ination *ith the re<)irement of comp)ta!ility, restricts the class of discovery pro!lems that can !e solved. 8t is easy to see that reverse is not tr)e. (hat is, for every conservative, consistent, comp)ta!le proced)re, there is an inconsistent or )nconservative .or !oth2 proced)re *hose scope incl)des all discovery pro!lems that can !e solved !y the first proced)re. Jhen *e investi"ate the restrictions on relia!ility that are implicit in meth+ ; 1& ; odolo"ical restrictions, *e are entertainin" recommendations to hop from one proced)re to another. (he pict)re of in<)iry sketched in the previo)s section s)""ests the same thin" for different reasons: as *e reconceive the discovery pro!lems *ith *hich *e are faced, *e may chan"e o)r minds a!o)t *hich methods are appropriate. 8n that spirit, some philosophers have recommended methodolo"ical principles on empirical "ro)nds: proced)res that accord *ith the principles have *orked in the past.M0N (he effect of hoppin" from one proced)re to another can only !e itself some proced)re for discovery that mimics other proced)res *hen "iven vario)s pieces of evidence. Brom the inside, a hoppin" proced)re may feel different from a proced)re that does not hop, !)t !ehaviorally, the disposition to hop from proced)re to proced)re as evidence acc)m)lates simply is a proced)re, located some*here in the vast orderin" of possi!le discovery proced)res. Hecommendations a!o)t *hen and ho* to chan"e proced)res as evidence acc)m)lates th)s amo)nt to restrictions on accepta!le proced)res, and form part .th)s far an )ninvesti"ated part2 of methodolo"y as *e have 5)st constr)ed that s)!5ect. Cespite these caveats, if *e are familiar *ith only a small set of methods, as seems to !e the case, hoppin" amon" them can constit)te a !etter proced)re. Hecommendations a!o)t preferences amon" proced)res may also come from the st)dy of the scope of proced)res, !)t that st)dy cannot !e al"orithmic. (here is no comp)ta!le f)nction that *ill tell )s, for all ordered pairs of indices of discovery proced)res, *hether the first mem!er of the pair dominates the second. Je are instead landed some*here *ithin the analytical hierarchy of rec)rsion theory, and 5)st

*here it is that *e have landed is an open <)estion. (he "eneral notion of hoppin" amon" proced)res s)""ests an apparent parado7: Can an effective proced)re that hops amon" proced)res hop from itself to some other proced)re= Can it hop !ack to itself= 8n a sense it can. 8f *e think of a hoppin" proced)re as a pro"ram that sim)lates other pro"rams, then .!y the rec)rsion theorem2 it can at vario)s sta"es p)rs)e a sim)lation of itself, or cease to sim)late itself, and th)s accept or re5ect itself as a method. If co)rse, no proced)re can !eha&e differently than it does.

9. Real $earnin*
-ome people may think that res)lts and <)estions s)ch as those *e have derived from the :eno parado7 are remote from real concerns a!o)t the ac<)isition of kno*led"e. Ine mi"ht complain that these are all for#al res)lts, and !eca)se of that, for some reason mysterio)s to )s, of no !earin" on real science and its philosophical st)dy. (he st)dy of the connection !et*een lo"ical form and the possi!ility of s)ccessf)l in<)iry, in vario)s senses, strikes )s as !oth theoretically interestin" and profo)ndly practical. Bor every <)estion that has ; 10 ; a lo"ical form, or at least a tolera!le variety of possi!le lo"ical forms amon" *hich *e may !e )ndecided, these st)dies address the prospects for comin" to kno* the ans*er. Pro!lems of a similar kind a!o)nd in the sciences, and <)estions .*hose ans*ers are in many cases )nkno*n2 a!o)t the e7istence of :enoan ar")ments a"ainst the ac<)isition of kno*led"e affect very practical iss)es a!o)t proced)res of in<)iry. Je *ill "ive a fe* ill)strations.

9:'. $an*ua*e $earnin*

Consider a child learnin" its first lan")a"e. -omeho*, *ithin a fe* years, the child comes to !e a!le to prod)ce and to reco"ni4e "rammatical sentences in the native lan")a"e, and to distin")ish s)ch sentences from )n"rammatical strin"s. 9rammatical sentences of any possi!le lan")a"e can !e re"arded as concatenations of sym!ols from some finite voca!)lary. 8f *e fi7 the finite voca!)lary, then the n)m!er of distinct sets of strin"s !)ilt from that voca!)lary is of co)rse infinite, and in fact )nco)nta!ly infinite. -)ppose, ho*ever, *e make the reasona!le ass)mption that if a collection of strin"s is the collection of "rammatical strin"s of some possi!le h)man lan")a"e, then the collection is rec)rsively en)mera!le. (hat is, for any set of strin"s of this kind there is a comp)ta!le f)nction s)ch that, if a strin" is in the collection, the comp)ta!le f)nction *ill determine that it is. -o, restrictin" attention to the lan")a"es that can !e !)ilt on some partic)lar voca!)lary, the collection of possi!le nat)ral lan")a"es is restricted to the rec)rsively en)mera!le sets of strin"s made from that voca!)lary. Bor each rec)rsively en)mera!le set there is a pro"ram, act)ally an infinity of different pro"rams, that *hen "iven an ar!itrary strin" *ill comp)te 6yes6 if and only if the strin" is in the set .and *ill not ret)rn anythin" other*ise2. (he rec)rsively en)mera!le sets can !e effectively inde7ed in many different *ays, so *e can ima"ine each possi!le lan")a"e to have a name that no other possi!le lan")a"e has, and in fact *e can ima"ine the name 5)st to !e a pro"ram of the kind 5)st mentioned. Ine *ay to think of the child3s pro!lem is this: on the !asis of *hatever evidence the environment provides, the child forms a se<)ence of pro"rams that reco"ni4e a se<)ence of lan")a"es, )ntil,

event)ally, the child settles on a pro"ram that reco"ni4es the act)al nat)ral lan")a"e in the child3s environment. Psycholo"ical investi"ation s)""ests that children )se positi&e evidence almost e7cl)sively. (hat is, the evidence consists of strin"s from the lan")a"e to !e learned !)t does not incl)de evidence as to *hich strin"s are not in the lan")a"e. Jith this settin", d)e essentially to E. :ark 9old,M'N an important aspect of h)man development is made formal eno)"h to permit mathematical investi"ations to !ear on iss)es s)ch as the characteri4ation of the collection of possi!le h)man lan")a"es. Bor a lan")a"e to !e possi!le for h)mans, h)mans m)st !e ; 1' ; capa!le of learnin" it. Ass)min" that any possi!le h)man lan")a"e co)ld have !een learned !y any one h)man, it follo*s that the collection of possi!le h)man lan")a"es m)st !e identifia!le, or learna!le, in the sense that for every lan")a"e in the collection a h)man child, if "iven appropriate positive evidence, can form a pro"ram that reco"ni4es that lan")a"e. (here are s)rprisin" res)lts as to *hich collections of lan")a"es are, and are not, learna!le. 9old himself proved that any collection containin" all finite lan")a"es and at least one infinite lan")a"e cannot !e identified. 8mposin" psycholo"ically motivated constraints on the learner, Isherson and Jeinstein have ar")ed that any learna!le collection of lan")a"es is finite. A *ealth of technical res)lts is no* availa!le a!o)t lan")a"e learnin".

9:). Statistical Inference

Ine of the principal statistical tasks is to infer a feat)re of a pop)lation from feat)res of samples dra*n at random from that pop)lation. Ine can vie* an ideal statistician as dra*in" ever lar"er samples and )sin" the statistical estimator to ")ess the val)e of the <)antity of interest in the pop)lation. -ome of the )s)al desiderata for statistical estimators are fo)nded on this pict)re. Bor e7ample, it is desired that an estimator !e consistent , meanin" that *hatever val)e the <)antity has in the pop)lation, for any positive epsilon the pro!a!ility that the estimate of the <)antity differs from the tr)e val)e !y more than epsilon approaches 4ero as the sample si4e increases *itho)t !o)nd. (his is clearly a conver"ence criterionD it implicitly considers a family of possi!le *orlds, in each of *hich the <)antity of interest has a distinct val)e. Jhen the <)antity is contin)o)s, there *ill !e a contin))m of s)ch possi!ilities. A consistent estimator m)st, "iven increasin" samples from any one of these possi!le *orlds, conver"e *ith pro!a!ility one to a characteri4ation of the val)e the <)antity has in the *orld from *hich the data are o!tained.

9:3. "ur+e Fittin*

Every <)antitative empirical science is faced *ith tasks that re<)ire inferrin" a f)nctional dependency from data points. >epler3s task *as to determine from o!servations of planetary positions the f)nction "ivin" the or!its of planets. Boyle3s task *as to infer the f)nctional dependency of press)re and vol)me from meas)res on "as samples. (hese sorts of challen"es can )sef)lly !e vie*ed as discovery pro!lems. Cata are "enerated !y a process that satisfies an )nkno*n f)nctional dependency, !)t the f)nction is kno*n .or ass)med2 to !elon" to some restricted class of f)nctions. 8n principle, more data points can !e o!tained *itho)t !o)nd or limit, altho)"h in practice *e may lose interest after a *hile. 8n real cases, the data are s)!5ect to some error, !)t somethin" may !e kno*n a!o)t the errorFits !o)nds, for e7ample, or its pro!a!ility

; 1/ ; distri!)tion. (he scientist3s task is to ")ess the f)nction from finite samples of data points. (he con5ect)re can !e revised as more evidence acc)m)lates. :any proced)res have !een proposed for this sort of discovery pro!lem. ?arold Jeffreys,M/N for e7ample, proposed a proced)re that )ses Bayesian techni<)es to"ether *ith an en)meration of the polynomial f)nctions. @ineteenth+cent)ry comp)tational desi"ns, s)ch as Ba!!a"e3s, )sed differencin" techni<)es for comp)tin" polynomials, techni<)es that co)ld .in the a!sence of error2 !e t)rned ro)nd into discovery proced)res. :ore recently ,an"ley et al.M9N have tried doin" e7actly that, and have descri!ed a n)m!er of other proced)res for inferrin" f)nctional dependencies from sample data. Bor any of these proced)res, and for others, the foremost <)estions concern relia!ility. Bor any proced)re *e can and sho)ld ask )nder *hat conditions the con5ect)res *ill conver"e to an appropriate f)nction. Je can ask s)ch <)estions for many different senses of conver"ence, and for many different acco)nts of *hat makes a f)nction .other than the correct one2 appropriate, !)t *e sho)ld certainly try to form)late the iss)es and ans*er them. Kery little *ork of this kind has !een doneD neither Jeffreys nor ,an"ley and his colla!orators characteri4e e7actly *hen their proced)res *ill s)cceed, altho)"h in !oth cases it is easy eno)"h to find many classes of f)nctions .e."., classes incl)din" lo"arithmic, e7ponential, and similar transcendental f)nctions2 for *hich the proced)re *ill fail in the lon" r)n. A more systematic st)dy has !een done for a related class of pro!lems in *hich the data are finite pieces of the "raph of a rec)rsive f)nction, and the discovery task is to identify the f)nction !y ")essin" a pro"ram that comp)tes it.M1$N

9:6. 1eneratin* Functions

Ine of the characteristic kinds of discovery tasks, at least in the physical sciences, is the discovery of "eneratin" f)nctions. (he idea is easiest to )nderstand thro)"h an e7ample. Jhen monatomic "ases are heated they emit li"ht, !)t only li"ht of certain definite fre<)encies. Bor e7ample, *hen atomic hydro"en emits li"ht, the spectr)m contains a series of lines follo*in" a line *hose *avelen"th is 0&0# an"stroms. 8n addition, the spectr)m of hydro"en contains a n)m!er of other series of lines. (he spectral likes of other elements, nota!ly the alkaline earth and alkali metal elements, can also !e arran"ed in vario)s series. ?ere is a kind of discovery pro!lem: "iven that one can o!tain the spectr)m of s)ch a "as, and can identify lines as lines of a common series, *hat is the f)nction that determines the fre<)encies .or *avelen"ths2 of the lines in the series= Bor the principal hydro"en series, Balmer solved this pro!lem in 1//&. Balmer3s form)la is 1 l R H .1 % 1 1 n2 2 *here n is an inte"er "reater than or e<)al to #, l is the *avelen"th, and H is a ; 19 ; constant .the Hyd!er" constant2. Balmer "enerali4ed his form)la to "ive a parametric family 1 l R H .1 m2 1 1 n2 2 for *hich series for m R 1, #, %, and & have !een fo)nd. Balmer3s form)las "ive a collection of discrete val)es for a contin)o)s <)antity, in this case the *ave

n)m!er, and they specify that collection !y "ivin" a .partial2 f)nction of the positive inte"ers. (here are other famo)s discoveries in the nat)ral sciences that seem to have an analo"o)s str)ct)re. (he central <)estion in chemistry in the nineteenth cent)ry *as the relia!le determination of the relative *ei"hts of atoms. Alternative methods yielded conflictin" res)lts )ntil in 1/&9 Canni44aro noted that the relative vapor densities of compo)nds form seriesD for e7ample, all compo)nds of hydro"en form a series, as do all compo)nds of o7y"en, and so forth, for any element. If the contin))m of possi!le val)es for compo)nds of hydro"en, only a discrete set of val)es is fo)nded, and Canni44aro discovered that the vapor density of any hydro"en compo)nd is divisi!le !y half the vapor density of hydro"en "as. Analo"o)s res)lts held for compo)nds of other elements. Canni44aro3s discovery *as of cr)cial importance in p)ttin" the atomic theory on a so)nd !asisD Balmer3s discovery formed the cr)cial evidence for the early <)ant)m theory of matter. Je can ima"ine a scientist faced *ith the follo*in" kind of pro!lem: an infinite !)t discrete series of val)es of a contin)o)s <)antity is "iven !y some )nkno*n f)nction of a po*er of the inte"ers, 8n , or of the positive inte"ers, !)t the f)nction may !elon" to a kno*n class of f)nctions of this kind. (he scientist can o!serve more and more mem!ers of the series, *itho)t !o)nd, and can form a series of con5ect)res a!o)t the )nkno*n f)nction as the evidence increases. (he properties of discovery pro!lems of this sort have not !een investi"ated either in the scientific or in the philosophical literat)reD and aside from the o!vio)s proced)re of lookin" for common divisors of val)es of a <)antity, *e kno* of no discovery proced)res that have !een proposed.

9:7. heoretical ;uantities and Functional ,ecompositions

8f yo) have only a n)m!er of resistance+free !atteries, *ires of varyin" !)t )nkno*n resistances, and a device for meas)rin" c)rrent thro)"h a circ)it, yo) can discover Ihm3s la*, that volta"e in a circ)it e<)als the c)rrent in the circ)it m)ltiplied !y the resistance in the circ)it, even tho)"h yo) have no device to meas)re volta"e or resistance, and even tho)"h at the !e"innin" of the in<)iry yo) have no !elief that there are properties s)ch as volta"e and resistance. Pick a *ire to serve as standard, and let the c)rrent thro)"h each circ)it *ith each !attery serve to meas)re a property of each !attery. Pick a ; 2$ ; !attery to serve as standard, and let the c)rrent thro)"h each circ)it *ith each *ire and that !attery serve to meas)re a property of each *ire. Lo) *ill then find, !y simple c)rve fittin", that the relations !et*een these t*o properties and the c)rrent is descri!ed !y Ihm3s la*. ,an"ley et al. "ive a discovery proced)re that solves this pro!lem. B)t *hat is the "eneral form of the pro!lem= Consider any real .or rational, or inte"er as the case may !e2 val)ed f)nction of n+t)ples of nominal varia!les. 8n the circ)its considered previo)sly, for e7ample, c)rrent 8 is a f)nction of each pair of val)es for the nominal pair .!attery, *ire2. 8n "eneral *e have B .S1 , . . . , Sn 2, ,et B !e e<)al to some composition of f)nctions on s)!sets of the nominal varia!les. Bor e7ample, 8 .!attery, *ire2 R K .!attery2 O H .*ire2, *here O is m)ltiplication. A discovery pro!lem consists of a set of f)nctions on s)!sets of t)ples of nominal varia!les, and for each t)ple and set of f)nctions, a f)nction that is a composition of .i.e., some f)nction of2 that set. (he learner3s task is to infer the decomposition from val)es of the composite f)nction. Evidently a lot of clever science consists in solvin" instances of pro!lems of f)nctional decomposition, and th)s discoverin" important !)t initially )nmeas)red properties. (he properties of discovery

pro!lems of this kind, and of al"orithms for solvin" them, are almost completely )nst)died.

9:8. <Underdetermination,< or #ns5erable and Unans5erable ;uestions

A scientist often has in mind a partic)lar <)estion to *hich an ans*er is *anted. (he aim is not to find the *hole tr)th a!o)t the *orld, !)t to find the ans*er to one partic)lar <)estion. (here is a tradition in philosophy, in physics, and even in statistics of considerin" conte7ts in *hich partic)lar <)estions cannot !e ans*ered. Philosophers talk a!o)t 6)nderdetermination6 in s)ch conte7ts, *hereas physicists tend to talk a!o)t similar iss)es in terms of 6physical meanin"f)lness6 and statisticians in terms of 6identifia!ility.6 (he e7amination of s)ch iss)es is in str)ct)re very m)ch like 9old3s consideration of classes of lan")a"es that cannot !e identified. Ar")ments consider a collection of alternative str)ct)res of some kind, characteri4e the evidence "enerated from any str)ct)re, and esta!lish that even 6in the limit6 some str)ct)res in the collection cannot !e distin")ished. Consider a <)estion a!o)t the shape of space: *hat is its "lo!al topolo"y= 8n relativity, the evidence *e can "et at any time a!o)t that <)estion is !o)nded !y o)r past li"ht coneD the discriminations *e can make at any time are then determined !y the data in that li"ht cone and *hatever "eneral la*s *e possess. (he "eneral la*s can !e tho)"ht of as simply restrictin" the possi!le classes of space+time models. As time "oes !y, more and more of the act)al )niverse is in the past of an ima"inary, immortal o!server. Are there collections of relativistic models for *hich s)ch an o!server can ne&er determine the ; 21 ; "lo!al topolo"y of space= 8t t)rns o)t that there are, and some of them are not too diffic)lt to pict)re. 8ma"ine that space is a three+dimensional sphere, and that space+time is an infinite se<)ence of three+ dimensional spheres. -)ppose the radi)s of the sphere e7pands as time "oes on. At any moment the past li"ht cone of an o!server may incl)de, at each past moment, some !)t not all of the sphere of space at that past moment. 8f the radi)s of space e7pands fast eno)"h, then at no moment *ill the past li"ht cone incl)de all of space. @o* consider another space+time made mathematically from the first !y identifyin" the antipodal points on the sphere of space at each moment. (he shape of space *ill !e different in the t*o space+times. (he sphere is simply connected: any closed c)rve on the s)rface of a sphere, even a three+dimensional sphere, can !e contracted smoothly to a point. (he pro5ective space o!tained !y identifyin" antipodal points on the sphere is not simply connected. (he t*o spaces have different topolo"ies. @o* ima"ine that space e7pands *ith s)fficient rapidity that the past li"ht cone of any point never reveals *hether one is in the spherical space of the pro5ective space. :any other classes of indistin")isha!le spacetimes have !een descri!ed.M11N

9:9. Indistin*uishability by a "lass of %rocedures

8ss)es of distin")isha!ility also arise in settin"s that are remote from cosmolo"y. 8n the social sciences, en"ineerin", and parts of !iolo"y and epidemiolo"y, *e often rely on statistical models of ca)sal relations. Iften an initial statistical model is tho)"ht to !e in error, and a variety of al"orithmic or <)asial"orithmic techni<)es have !een developed to find revisions. Bactor analysis is one *ayD proced)res that modify an initial model !y means of 6fittin" statistics6 are anotherD proced)res that try to match the empirical constraints entailed !y a model *ith those fo)nd in the data are still a third.

Bor each of these kinds of proced)res the discovery frame*ork poses a relevant <)estion: Bor *hat classes of models can the proced)re s)cceed in identifyin" in the limit= Jhat are the collections of models s)ch that, "iven data "enerated from any one model in the collection, as the si4e of the sample increases *itho)t !o)nd the proced)re *ill identify the model that act)ally "enerated the data= -ometimes a variety of proced)res share a feat)reD either they share a limit on the information they consider in formin" a hypothesis, or they share a limit on the hypotheses they consider. 8n the latter case it is perfectly o!vio)s that certain classes of models cannot !e identified. 8n the former case, findin" o)t *hat classes of models can and cannot !e identified may take some *ork. (he discovery paradi"m emphasi4es the importance of the *ork.

=. "onclusion
(here is a lot of str)ct)re !ehind the *ords that translators have "iven to Plato3s :eno and to Plato3s -ocrates. (he str)ct)re is, *e hope, pla)si!ly ; 22 ; attri!)ted even tho)"h it is remarka!ly modern. (hat sho)ld !e of no s)rprise to those *ho think philosophy really addresses end)rin" <)estions, and *ho think the <)estions of kno*led"e had the same force and )r"ency for the ancients as for o)rselves.

5o. he "oncept of Induction in the $i*ht of the Interro*ati+e #pproach to In>uiry

Jaa00o /inti00a

'. he Interro*ati+e -odel

(his paper is a part of a lar"er enterprise. 8n the last fe* years 8 have developed an essentially ne* approach to in<)iry, prominently incl)din" scientific in<)iry.M1N (his approach can !e "iven the form of a model .or, more appropriately, a m)ltidimensional spectr)m of models2 of in<)iry, *hich 8 propose to call the interrogati&e #odel of in(uiry . 8t can !e )sed to )nderstand a *ide variety of phenomena and to solve a variety of pro!lems. 8n this paper 8 *ill st)dy one partic)lar concept that can !e p)t into an interestin" systematic and historical perspective !y means of the interro"ative model, namely, the concept of induction .M2N 8n the st)dy of this notion the interro"ative model of in<)iry t)rns o)t to !e especially )sef)l. Amon" other concl)sions, *e shall find interestin" reasons for assi"nin" ind)ction in the accepted sense of the *ord a rather lo*ly place on the map of scientific methodolo"y. At the same time, the interro"ative model helps )s to )ncover a historically earlier sense of ind)ction *hich in o)r days is virt)ally for"otten and to assi"n to it an important role in the scientific process. 8 *ill ass)me familiarity *ith the main ideas of the interro"ative model. (here is in fact relatively little to !e familiar *ith, as the main ideas on *hich this model is !ased are e7tremely simple. (he model can !e descri!ed in "ametheoretical terms.M#N (he model takes the form of a "ame *hich an ideali4ed

scientist, called the In(uirer , plays a"ainst 'ature on a fi7ed model .)niverse of disco)rse2. (his model or 6*orld6 in practice is )s)ally o)r act)al *orld or some part of it. .-)ch parts as can serve as models of theories are often called in physics independent or isolated systems.2 (he "ame starts from a theoretical premise (. (he 8n<)irer is tryin" to derive a preset concl)sion C from (. At each sta"e, the 8n<)irer has a choice !et*een a deducti&e #o&e , in *hich a lo"ical ; 2% ; concl)sion is dra*n from *hat the 8n<)irer has reached already, and an interrogati&e #o&e , in *hich the 8n<)irer p)ts a <)estion to @at)re and re"isters the ans*er, *hen forthcomin", as an additional premise. -peakin" of s)ch <)estions is *hat pres)pposes that a model of the com!ined lan")a"e of ( and C is "iven to *hich the <)estions pertain. @at)re3s ans*ers are ass)med to !e tr)e in this model. 8n the applications contemplated here, 6<)estions p)t to @at)re6 are typically intended to !e o!servations and e7periments. 8n different varieties of the model, different ass)mptions are made as to *hat kinds of <)estions @at)re can ans*er. Ine important dimension is represented !y different restrictions on the lo"ical comple7ity of the availa!le ans*ers, as meas)red !y the n)m!er of <)antifier kind chan"es .i.e., chan"es from an evidential to a )niversal <)antifier or vice versa2 in the <)antifier prefi7 of the ans*er. G)antifier+free ans*ers are called A$ R E$ ans*ers. AnT1 +ans*ers have a prefi7 of the form .) 71 2 .) 72 2 . . . .) 7k 2 T an En +prefi7, and EnT1 +ans*ers have a prefi7 of the form .* 71 2 .* 72 2 . . . .* 7k 2 T an An +prefi7. A2 +prefi7es *ill also !e called AE+prefi7es. Hestrictin" @at)re3s ans*ers to the A$ R E$ case is tantamo)nt to restrictin" ans*era!le <)estions to yes+or+no <)estions concernin" the tr)th or falsity of atomic propositions in :. (he restriction that limits @at)re3s ans*ers to this case 8 have called the to#istic Postulate . At first si"ht, it seems to characteri4e the lo"ic of empirical sciences. Bor @at)re *ill not tell )s in one fell s*oop *hat happens al*ays and every*here. All that she *ill directly inform the 8n<)irer of is *hat happens in partic)lar casesFin partic)lar o!servations or meas)rements. And this restriction is precisely *hat the Atomistic Post)late is calc)lated to capt)re. 8t can in fact !e ar")ed that practically all recent philosophy of science has !een !ased on the Atomistic Post)late, tacitly if not e7plicitly.M%N Let this post)late is )naccepta!le, for *hen a controlled e7periment is constr)ed as @at)re3s ans*er to the 8n<)irer3s <)estion, the lo"ical comple7ity of the ans*ers is at least of the AE variety. ?ence the lo"ic of e7perimental sciences .as distin")ished from p)rely o!servational sciences2 is an AE lo"ic rather than one characteri4ed !y the Atomistic Post)late. M&N (his res)lt prompts a ma5or reeval)ation of contemporary philosophy of science. (he present paper is a part of that reeval)ation.

). "on+entional Induction %lays No Role in the Interro*ati+e -odel

(he first o!servation that can !e made here is that ind)ction in o)r acc)stomed t*entieth+cent)ry sense play a!sol)tely no role in the ori"inal interro"ative model. 8n this sense, ind)ction means, in the first place, inference from partic)lar cases to "eneral tr)ths and, secondarily, inference from partic)lar cases to other partic)lar cases. 8 shall here disre"ard the latter aspect, for the ; 2& ;

follo*in" reason: 8f inferences from partic)lars to partic)lars satisfy certain conditions, the principles accordin" to *hich they are made are lo"ically e<)ivalent to principles "overnin" inferences from partic)lars to "enerali4ations.M0N ?ence it s)ffices for most p)rposes to consider only inferences from partic)lar instances to "eneral la*s. As the reader can ascertain, there is in the ori"inal interro"ative model a!sol)tely no slot for the kind of inference that ind)ction is s)pposed to !e. (he only inferences that take place in an interro"ative in<)iry are ded)ctive. (he other moves .other than ded)ctive ones2 incl)de in the first place interro"ative ones. 8n them, no inferences are dra*n. 8nstead, a <)estion is addressed !y the 8n<)irer to @at)re and .dependin" on conditions that are defined *hen the interro"ative model is f)rther specified2 ans*ered !y @at)re. 8n some varieties of the model, the 8n<)irer can, instead of an interro"ative or a ded)ctive move, perform a definitory move .introd)ce a ne* concept !y an e7plicit definition2 or stren"then the concl)sion to !e proved .assertoric move2. B)t in none of these e7tensions of the interro"ative model is anythin" like an ind)ctive move possi!le. (he ori"inal )nreconstr)cted interro"ative model of in<)iry hence already leads to a remarka!le res)lt. 8t sho*s that it is possi!le to develop a rich and realistic model of at least some central aspects of the scientific enterprise *itho)t as m)ch as mentionin" ind)ction. fortiori , if the interro"ative model sho)ld t)rn o)t to !e, not only the tr)th and nothin" !)t the tr)th, !)t the *hole tr)th, ?)me3s pro!lem *o)ld play no role *hatsoever in a serio)s theory of the scientific method and of the scientific process. Jhat is especially interestin" here is that the most important e7tensions of the ori"inal interro"ative model also fail to vindicate the received concept of ind)ction. 8 cannot e7amine these e7tensions in detail here. (he main idea is nevertheless easy to appreciate.M'N 8nstead of ass)min" that the ans*ers "iven !y @at)re are al*ays tr)e, it can !e ass)med that each s)ch ans*er is tr)e only *ith a certain pro!a!ility. (his does not yet specify a )ni<)e model, for it does not tell )s ho* the pro!a!ilities of a tr)e ans*er on different occasions depend on .or are independent of2 one another. By choosin" these pro!a!ilities in different *ays *e can adapt the interro"ative model to different evidential sit)ations. Bor instance, if @at)re3s ans*ers to repetitions of one and the same <)estion are independent of one another, the !est *ay for the 8n<)irer to ascertain that @at)re3s ans*er is veridical may !e to repeat the same <)estion and hope for the same ans*er. (his corresponds to a scientific sit)ation in *hich an e7periment or o!servation does not involve a systematic !ias or other systematic mistakes. 8t may happen, ho*ever, that an ans*er !y @at)re to a "iven <)estion makes it likely that @at)re sho)ld "ive the same ans*er to its repetitions. (hen the !est strate"y for ascertainin" @at)re3s veracity may very *ell !e to try to derive the same concl)sion !y an alto"ether different line of reasonin". 8n this ; 20 ; *ay, the famo)s old idea of the consilience of scientific inference can !e e7plained and vindicated.M/N 8n all these different sit)ations, ho*ever, *e are still dealin" *ith ded)ctive rather than ind)ctive reasonin". :ore acc)rately, *e are dealin" *ith strict inferences from merely pro!a!le premises. (he is diametrically opposite to typical cases of ind)ctive inference, *hich are non!indin" inferences from .typically ind)!ita!le2 premises. 8t is seen, not only that ind)ctive inferences are not incorporated in the e7tended interro"ative model, !)t that there is no place for them in the interro"ative model or in any of its most nat)ral e7tensions.

3. he %roblem of Induction and the #tomistic %ostulate

Ine can say m)ch more here, ho*ever. 8ndeed, one can p)t the entire concept of ind)ction in a sharper historical relief. (he concept of ind)ction "oes !ack to Aristotle3s idea of epagoge .M9N 8ndeed, the ,atin term inductio *as first introd)ced as a translation of epagoge . 8t is far from clear, ho*ever, that epagoge really is the same idea as o)r received concept of ind)ction, and it *ill !e ar")ed !elo* that it is not. 8n any case, the 6pro!lem of ind)ction,6 !y *hich every!ody means the pro!lem of "ustifying ind)ction, *as only thr)st to the forefront of philosophical disc)ssion almost t*o tho)sand years after Aristotle !y Cavid ?)me.M1$N Jhy the time la"= Jere pre+?)mean philosophers too conf)sed or too naive to appreciate the importance of the pro!lem of ind)ction= 8 don3t think that they *ere. 8t can !e sho*n, if 8 am ri"ht, that the ascendancy of 6?)me3s Pro!lem6 of ind)ction is part and parcel of the same pro!lem sit)ation as contemporary philosophers3 virt)ally )nanimo)s ass)mption of the Atomistic Post)late. 8n fact, this is a nat)ral occasion to p)t the entire concept of ind)ction into an overall historical perspective. Birst, it can !e seen *here the idea of ind)ctive inference as an essential in"redient of the scientific process comes from. 8t is one possi!le reaction to the pro!lem sit)ation created !y the ass)mption of the Atomistic Post)late. 8f this post)late is adopted, then a scientific theory .e."., the initial theoretical premise (2 cannot itself !e derived !y means of the interro"ative proced)re *itho)t an e<)ally stron" or stron"er theoretical premise. Bor no nontrivial "eneral la*s can !e ded)ced from partic)lar propositions, for instance, from @at)re3s ans*ers to <)estions concernin" partic)lar cases or partic)lar sit)ations. ?ence, the s)""estion "oes, the t*o kinds of steps of the interro"ative proced)re, <)estions and ded)ctive inferences, have to !e s)pplemented !y a third kind of step. (his step is calc)lated to lead )s from @at)re3s partic)lar ans*ers to "eneral tr)ths. And it is this role of "enerali4in" steps that ind)ctive inferences are s)pposed to play. ; 2' ; At the moment 8 am not disc)ssin" the intrinsic merits or demerits of this idea. Jhat is relevant here is a simple historical prediction .or retrodiction2 that can !e !ased on my dia"nosis of the rationale of the "eneral idea of ind)ctive inference. Jhat follo*s from my analysis is that, for those philosophers and scientists *ho did not adopt that Atomistic Post)late, o)r received idea of ind)ction *as not likely to play the same role as it does for )s. 8t *as not needed as a s)pplement to ded)ctive inference. (here did not e7ist for s)ch philosophers any ?)mean pro!lem of 5)stifyin" ind)ction, for ind)ction in o)r sense co)ld lar"ely !e dispensed *ith. 8f s)ch thinkers )sed the idea of ind)ction, it *as in some different kind of role alto"ether. 8n partic)lar, it can !e e7pected that philosophers and methodolo"ists *ho do not !elieve in the Atomistic Post)late *ill not a!ide !y the c)rrent idea of ind)ction as an inference from partic)lar cases to a "enerali4ation. Bor, in the face of the Atomistic Post)late, it *as precisely this kind of "enerali4ation that ind)ction *as s)pposed to mediate. 8f yo) don3t accept the post)late, yo) don3t need ind)ction for this p)rpose. ,ike*ise, it is clear that the central role of 6the pro!lem of ind)ction6 is d)e to philosophers3 adoption of the Atomistic Post)late.M11N ?ence this pro!lem of 65)stifyin" ind)ction6 can !e e7pected to occ)py only those philosophers *ho have tacitly accepted the post)late. (his o!servation helps in fact to e7plain *hy 6?)me3s Pro!lem6 !ecame a central pro!lem in philosophy *hen it didFand also ho*, as 8 *ill sho* !elo*.

@o*, as a matter of historical fact, the Atomistic Post)late *as not adopted in the earlier tradition of philosophy and science from Aristotle to @e*ton .incl)sive2, tho)"h for different reasons in the case of different historical fi")res. 8n the Aristotelian tradition, even perception can "ive )s forms, *hich are already !y themselves "eneral concepts. :oreover, their presence in the so)l ipso facto implied accordin" to Aristotle a*areness of certain "eneral la*s, namely, those la*s that specify *hat forms necessarily accompany the "iven ones.M12N .(hinkin" of a certain form is for Aristotle to have it reali4ed in one3s so)l. ?ence *hat necessarily accompanies this form is also a)tomatically present in the so)l, that is, is also necessarily tho)"ht of.2 (his re5ection of the Atomistic Post)late !y Aristotle is seen in other *ays, too. Another indication is the fact, !ro)"ht o)t !y 9. E. ,. I*en and others, that the phaino#ena and endoxa *hich a theory *as s)pposed to acco)nt for accordin" to Aristotle, *ere not all partic)lar facts !)t co)ld incl)de "eneral la*s.M1#N 8n @e*ton, his reason for dispensin" *ith the Atomistic Post)late is different. 8t is @e*ton3s firm !elief in the e7perimental method as !ein" a!le to "ive the 8n<)irer "eneral la*s as ans*ers to e7perimental 6<)estions p)t to nat)re.6M1%N ?ence ind)ction in o)r contemporary sense *as not needed !y @e*ton. 8n either type of case, ind)ction can therefore !e e7pected to amo)nt to ; 2/ ; somethin" essentially different from o)r post+?)mean conception. A *idespread fail)re to appreciate this historical fact has in my 5)d"ment serio)sly impaired philosophers3 )nderstandin" of the early history of the concept of ind)ction. 8 don3t think that most philosophers or historians really have a realistic idea of *hat Aristotle or @e*ton meant !y ind)ction.

6. Experimental ;uestions and heir %resuppositions

8n spite of all this, the interro"ative model nevertheless assi"ns to a some*hat different .!)t historically a)thentic2 concept of ind)ction an e7tremely interestin" role. 8n order to see this, a startin" point is offered !y the lo"ical sit)ation o)tlined in my paper, 6Jhat 8s the ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry=6M1&N Jhen carried f)rther, this analysis nat)rally, not to say inevita!ly, leads to f)rther insi"hts. 8n the earlier disc)ssion, the reader *as pro!a!ly !othered !y the <)estion as to ho* m)ch ne* force ans*ers to AE <)estions .and to more complicated <)estions2 really "ive )sFand *hat kind of information they do yield. Bor from the perspective )sed there it may le"itimately look as if the pres)ppositions of the <)estions in <)estion are so stron" that they are )nlikely even to have !een esta!lished in a realistic sit)ation of in<)iry and so stron" that ans*ers to them *ill yield relatively little ne* information any*ay. Jitness, for e7ample, the <)estion *hose pres)pposition is:

(he lo"ic of s)ch sentences alone is almost tantamo)nt to the entire second+order lo"ic.M10N ?ence the step from the pres)pposition .12 of a <)estion p)t to @at)re to its ans*er

or even to the desiderat)m

appears not to add terri!ly m)ch ne* force to *hat the 8n<)irer already has. :oreover, it is clear that the force of the pres)pposition .12 is lar"ely d)e to the fact that it codifies certain independencies !et*een different e7perimental varia!les. @o* *e normally think that s)ch independencies can only !e esta!lished e7perimentally. (his e7pectation seems to me 5)stified. B)t ho* can any e7periment esta!lish s)ch independencies if they m)st have !een fo)nd and incorporated into the pres)pposition of a <)estion !efore the e7perimental <)estion is p)t to @at)re and ans*ered !y her= (hese are "en)ine pro!lems, and they force )s to have another look at the most !asic ideas on *hich the interro"ative model is !ased. :ore specifically, ; 29 ; *e m)st have some second tho)"hts a!o)t the role of pres)ppositions. Hi"ht from the !e"innin", 8 co)ld have !)ilt the model in a sli"htly different *ay. 8 co)ld have eliminated the role of the pres)pposition of a <)estion alto"ether as a prere<)isite to askin" the <)estions. If co)rse, 8 m)st then allo* the ans*erer to respond, even *hen the <)estion does other*ise <)alify as an ans*era!le one, !y re5ectin" its pres)pposition rather than !y providin" the 8n<)irer *ith an ans*er to it.M1'N (his r)le chan"e seems to res)lt in a !etter model of scientific in<)iry than the previo)s one, at least in many applications. 8t "oes some distance to*ard solvin" the pro!lems 5)st pointed o)t. ?o*ever, a little !it more has to !e said of the fail)res of the pres)pposition of a <)estion in different cases. Bor a propositional <)estion,

the fail)re of the pres)pposition

makes the <)estion completely otiose, and like*ise for simple *h+<)estions. B)t consider a <)estion *hose pres)pposition is:

-)ch a pres)pposition fails if for so#e val)es of 7 no y satisfies -M7, yN. (hen the 8n<)irer o)"ht not to ask *hich y does the 5o! for those fr)itless val)es of 7. B)t there is no harm in askin" the <)estion for other val)es of 7. And even more so if the pres)pposition .02 is tr)e !)t has not !een sho*n to !e tr)e for some val)es of 7. (his sho)ld not !ar the 8n<)irer from raisin" the <)estion. 8n s)ch cases, @at)re3s response to a <)estion *hose pres)pposition )sed to !e .02 is nat)rally taken to !e of the same form

as !efore, *ith f s)ch as to s)stain the e7istential "enerali4ation from

e7cept that f can no* !e a partial f)nction, that is, defined only for some val)es of 7. (his can !e e7pressed in the )s)al notation !y t)rnin" the reply ./2 .min)s 6>62 into a conditional one:

8nstead of 5)st one interval, *e can of co)rse in principle have in .1$2 several different nonoverlappin" intervals. (his, then, is *hat is nat)ral to ; #$ ; think of as @at)re3s ans*er to an AE+type <)estion. 8 shall ass)me in the follo*in" that this is *hat @at)re3s ans*ers are like. @at)re3s reply may also incl)de a re5ection of the pres)pposition for certain val)es of 7:

8 shall i"nore this possi!le component of @at)re3s response in *hat follo*s, ho*ever. 8t is the less important and less interestin" part of the reply. (h)s it is seen that the nat)ral *ay of definin" the interro"ative model is to allo* the 8n<)irer to p)t AE <)estions to @at)re even *hen the pres)pposition is not esta!lished. @at)re3s reply is not the ne"ative of the .former2 pres)pposition, even *hen it is false. Hather, it is a restricted f)nctional dependence like .1$2.

7. Induction as the as0 of Extendin* $imited 1enerali?ations

Brom *hat has !een said, it is seen that there is an important dimension of the pro"ress of scientific in<)iry *hich *e have not yet considered and *hich has not !een considered very often in recent philosophy of science. 8t is not, strictly speakin", any lon"er an application of the interro"ative model. ?o*ever, its importance is in effect predicted !y the interro"ative model in the li"ht of the remarks 5)st made. (his dimension concerns the e7tension of a "enerali4ation like .1$2 to f)rther val)es of 7, that is, a step from .1$2 to

*here 71 3 P 71 , 72 P 72 3. :ore "enerally, the 8n<)irer has a n)m!er of partial "enerali4ations

.i R 1, 2, . . . , k2, *here the intervals 7i1 P 7 P 7i2 are ass)med not to overlap. (hese may have !een esta!lished in part as .partial2 ans*ers to the same <)estion, and in part as .partial2 ans*ers to different <)estions.

(he dimension 8 have in mind is no* t*ofold: .i2 the 8n<)irer is tryin" to e7tend a "enerali4ation like .1$2 or .1#2 to lon"er intervals, perhaps to an )nrestricted "enerali4ationD and .ii2 the 8n<)irer is tryin" to )nify the different partial dependences .la*s, f)nctions2 fi .72 into one la*, for e7ample, into one and the same mathematical la*. (his d)al dimension is the foc)s of this paper. 8 have sho*n *hy it is important from the systematic vie*point offered to )s !y the interro"ative model. 8 *ill ret)rn to this systematic si"nificance later in this paper. (he main historical thesis 8 am proposin" also concerns the same dimension. Jhat ; #1 ; this thesis says is that the "enerali4ation and reconciliation task this dimension deals *ith is *hat *as earlier meant !y ind)ction.

8. Ne5tonian Induction
(his historical thesis deserves a fe* comments and e7planations. 8ndeed, @e*ton3s idea of ind)ction is seen from his famo)s methodolo"ical statement in the Optic$s : As in mathematics, so in nat)ral philosophy, the investi"ation of diffic)lt thin"s !y the method of analysis o)"ht ever to precede the method of composition. (his analysis consists in makin" e7periments and o!servations, and in dra*in" "eneral concl)sions from them !y ind)ction, and admittin" no o!5ections a"ainst the concl)sions !)t s)ch as are taken from e7periment, or other certain tr)ths. Bor hypotheses are not to !e re"arded in e7perimental philosophy. And altho)"h the ar")in" from e7periments and o!servations !y ind)ction !e no demonstration of "eneral concl)sions, yet it is the !est *ay of ar")in" *hich the nat)re of thin"s admits of, and may !e looked )pon as so m)ch the stron"er !y ho* m)ch the ind)ction is more "eneral. And if no e7ception occ)r from phenomena, the concl)sion may !e prono)nced "enerally. B)t if at any time after*ard any e7ception shall occ)r from e7periments, it may then !e"in to !e prono)nced *ith s)ch e7ceptions as occ)r. By this *ay of analysis *e may proceed from compo)nds to in"redients and from motions to the forces prod)cin" them, and in "eneral from effects to their ca)ses and from partic)lar ca)ses to more "eneral ones, till the ar")ment end in the most "eneral. (his is the method of analysisD and the synthesis consists in ass)min" the ca)ses discovered and esta!lished as principles, and !y them e7plainin" the phenomena proceedin" from them and provin" the e7planations.M1/N ?ere *e can see the kind of concept of ind)ction 8 propose to call the @e*tonian one at *ork. 8nd)ction in this sense of the *ord occ)pies a niche in the scientific proced)re indicated !y the analysis carried o)t earlier in this paper. 8nd)ction is, in the simplest case, the step from a limited "enerali4ation of the form .1$2 to a less restricted "enerali4ation .122. 8n the e7treme .ideal2 case, the entire restriction .antecedent2 in .1$2 is eliminated. (his optimal case is *hat @e*ton descri!es as sayin": 6And if no e7ception occ)r from phenomena, the concl)sion may !e prono)nced "enerally.6 Jhat distin")ishes a @e*tonian ind)ctive step from ind)ctive inference in the t*entieth+cent)ry sense is that its startin" point is not a n)m!er of partic)lar propositions !)t propositions *hich, lo"ically speakin", normally possess already limited "enerality. Bor, as 8 have ar")ed else*here, e7periments co)ld accordin" to @e*ton yield as their res)lt a "eneral la*.M19N .(his is amon" other thin"s seen from @e*ton3s practice of resortin" to res)lts of e7periments in provin" "eneral theorems and solvin" "eneral pro!lems in his Optic$s .2 8nd)ction th)s in+

; #2 ; creases the "enerality of the propositions the 8n<)irer has esta!lished, !)t in an entirely different sense from the t*entieth+cent)ry idea of ind)ction as an inference from the partic)lar to the "eneral. Bor in @e*tonian ind)ction, the increase in "enerality is one of de"ree, not of kind. @e*ton is in fact <)ite consistent in speakin" of ind)ction as a *ay of ar")in" from 6o!servations and e7periments.6 9iven his conception of e7periment, this means that the startin" point of an ind)ctive step can already possess .limited2 "enerality. 8t is not clear in *hat sense a @e*tonian ind)ction is an inference, either. 8n principle, the e7tension of the scope of a "enerali4ation can take place e7perimentally. (his is not *hat @e*ton means, ho*ever. Bor he says that 6altho)"h the ar")in" from e7periments and o!servations !y ind)ction !e no demonstration of "eneral concl)sions, yet it is the !est *ay of ar")in" *hich the nat)re of thin"s admits of.6 Jhat @e*ton has in mind is a fact of scientific life familiar to all e7perimentalists. Even tho)"h a controlled e7periment .or e<)ivalent2 can esta!lish a "enerali4ation, the act)al ran"e over *hich the controlled varia!le can !e varied is typically very narro*, indeed so narro* that the res)ltin" restricted "enerali4ation is )seless in st)dyin" other phenomena )nless it can !e f)rther "enerali4ed !y *idenin" its scope .as is the step from .1$2 to .122 a!ove2, even !efore other e7periments and o!servations have !een made to help )s e7tend it. (his implies that ind)ction in the sense of *idenin" the scope of a "enerali4ation is a corri"i!le step of ar")ment in a sense *hich, for e7ample, @at)re3s limited+scope ans*er to an e7perimental <)estion is not. 8 *ill ret)rn to this point later. At the same time, the <)otations from @e*ton sho* ho* temptin" it mi"ht easily seem to !e to assimilate @e*tonian ind)ction to o)r latter+day namesake conception. 8t is indeed possi!le that @e*tonian ind)ction *as intended to comprise as a de"enerate special case steps from partic)lar meas)rement res)lts to a "enerali4ation. B)t this temptation is nevertheless misleadin". 8t has in some cases even misled translators. Bor instance, this is ill)strated !y the :otte+Ca5ori translation of Principia *here one of the cr)cial sentences is made to disa"ree *ith o)r interpretation: 8n this Me7perimentalN philosophy partic)lar propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and after*ards rendered "eneral !y ind)ction.M2$N B)t there is no 6partic)lar6 in the ori"inal, and the net)ral term 6inferred6 is a !ad s)!stit)te for @e*ton3s e7plicit *ord for ded)ction: 8n hac philosophia propositiones ded)c)nt)r e7 phaenomenis, U redd)nt)r "enerales per ind)ctionem.M21N (he correct translation th)s "oes some*hat as follo*s: 8n this philosophy, propositions are ded)ced from phenomena and rendered "eneral !y ind)ction. ; ## ; 8f anythin", @e*ton3s terminolo"y s)pports my interpretation, for a 6proposition6 normally meant in an a7iomatic conte7t of his day a general proposition. Earlier in this paper, *e sa* that for Aristotle, phenomena co)ld !e the so)rce of "eneral tr)ths .or "eneral !eliefs2 and not 5)st partic)lar ones. (he same is no* seen to !e tr)e of @e*ton. Bor instance, in speakin" of his la*s of motion .*hich of co)rse are s)pposed to !e "eneral tr)ths par exellence 2 @e*ton, on one occasion *rites:

(hese Principles are deduced fro# Phaeno#ena and made "eneral !y 8nd)ction.M22N Memphasis addedN -ince @e*ton )ses 6ded)ce6 in a fairly strict sense, this makes sense only if @e*ton3s 6Phaenomena6 are already "eneral. -imilar evidence is easily fo)nd else*here. .Cf. also *hat *as esta!lished a!ove.2 (h)s those fe* hardy so)ls *ho have maintained that @e*ton3s methodolo"y *as an 6ind)ctivist6 one may after all have somethin" "oin" for them. B)t, of co)rse, @e*ton *as speakin" of 6ind)ction6 in a sense different from theirs.

9. Ne5ton and -athematical -odelin*

(here is yet another similarity !et*een @e*ton and Aristotle *hich has not !een )tili4ed in the literat)re on @e*ton. 8t is the role of ind)ction in esta!lishin" the first principles of science in Aristotle. (he *ay this oversi"ht has pointed historians3 and philosophers3 attention in a *ron" direction is seen in the vie*s of those commentators *ho constr)e @e*ton3s method as a constr)ction of mathematical models.M2#N (his idea has !een enco)ra"ed !y @e*ton3s relatively sparse mention of e7periments and o!servations in the early !ooks of the Principia . (his seems to differentiate his proced)re from that prescri!ed !y the interro"ative model, *hich apparently s<)ares !etter *ith *hat @e*ton does in the Optic$s . (he ans*er is that @e*ton ass)mes that most of the pertinent <)estions had !een p)t to @at)re !efore the definition and a7ioms .la*s of motions2 are form)lated. Je have in fact seen that @e*ton claimed in so many *ords that those la*s .principles2 *ere 6ded)ced from Phaenomena U made "eneral !y 8nd)ction.6M2%N ?ence the principles of the Principia do not 5)st define a mathematical model. (hey are themselves not only someho* inspired !y e7perience, as in any old mathematical model, !)t in fact derived from phenomena, @e*ton claims. (his distin")ishes @e*ton3s proced)re from typical hypothetico+ded)ctive model constr)ction, and it is *ell in keepin" *ith the Aristotelian conception of a partic)lar empirical science. (hat @e*ton himself looked )pon the Principia in this *ay is amply demonstrated !y evidence. (he follo*in" is a part of @e*ton3s self+description of *hat he did in the Principia : ; #% ; (he Propositions in the follo*in" !ook *ere invented !y Analysis. B)t considerin" that the Ancients .so far as 8 can find2 admitted nothin" into 9eometry !efore it *as demonstrated !y Composition 8 composed *hat 8 invented !y Analysis to make it 9eometrically a)thentic U fit for the p)!lick. And this is the reason *hy this Book *as *ritten in *ords at len"th after the manner of the Ancients *itho)t Analytical calc)lations. B)t if any man *ho )nderstands Analysis *ill red)ce the Cemonstrations of the Propositions from their composition !ack into Analysis .*hich is very easy to !e done,2 he *ill see !y M*hatN method of Analysis they *ere invented. MAndN !y this means the :ar<)ess de l3?ospital *as a!le to affirm that this this MsicN Book *as Mpres<)e to)t de ce Calc)l.N almost *holly of the infinitesimal Analysis.M2&N And here is another @e*tonian self+description, this time anonymo)s: By the help of the ne* Analysis :r. @e*ton fo)nd o)t most of the Propositions in his Principia Philosophiae : !)t !eca)se the Ancients for makin" thin"s certain admitted nothin" into 9eometry !efore it *as demonstrated synthetically, he demonstrated the

Propositions synthetically, that the -ysteme of the ?eavens mi"ht !e fo)nded )pon "ood 9eometry. And this makes it no* diffic)lt for )nskillf)l :en to see the nalysis !y *hich those Propositions *ere fo)nd o)t.M20N

=. Induction and "oncept Formation

Already at the sta"e of analysis *e have reached, a s)""estive resem!lance !et*een @e*tonian and Aristotelian ind)ction is !e"innin" to emer"e. Bor Aristotle, the pro!lem of ind)ction *as not first and foremost a pro!lem of inference from partic)lars to a "enerali4ation. 8t *as a pro!lem of concept formation.M2'N Partic)lar cases *ere steppin"+stones to the concepts or forms 6ind)ced6 to !e reali4ed in the so)l. Ince they are formed, the la*s "overnin" them are o!vio)s. .(his is very closely related to Aristotle3s re5ection of the Atomistic Post)late.2 ?ence there is no s)ch pro!lem as the 5)stification of ind)ction for Aristotle. Bor @e*ton, too, the cr)cial step *as the formation of the mathematical la* on the !asis of an e7periment. (he e7tension of this la* to other cases is a lesser pro!lem, and a pro!lem that is at least partly mathematical .and hence concept)al2 in nat)re, as *e shall see later. (his similarity is not accidental, and it can !e deepened !y notin" other points of contact !et*een @e*ton and Aristotle.

(. /ume -isinterpreted Ne5ton

-ome li"ht on the history of the pro!lem of ind)ction in thro*n !y its ori"in. 8t *as made a centerpiece of epistemolo"y and philosophy of science !y ?)me. @o* ?)me3s approach to methodolo"ical matters is characteri4ed concisely as a misinterpretation of @e*ton3s methodolo"y. ?)me *anted to introd)ce *hat he called the e7perimental method into philosophy.M2/N Bor ?)me, ho*+ ; #& ; ever, the term 3e7perimental3 *as merely a near+synonym of 3empirical3, as one can easily sho*.M29N 8n "eneral, the "ood Cavid did not have any idea of a "en)ine controlled e7periment. 8n partic)lar, ?)me totally failed to )nderstand @e*ton3s idea that an e7periment can yield "eneral la*s .dependencies2. 8nstead, he firmly ass)med the Atomistic Post)late. ?ence the lo"ico+methodolo"ical reasons *hich 8 sho*ed to )nderlie the modern .post+?)mean2 preocc)pation of philosphers *ith 6?)me3s Pro!lem6 are e7emplified in an act)al historical settin" !y the ori"inator of this alle"ed pro!lem himself. 8 *ill ret)rn later to the relation of ?)me3s pro!lem to @e*ton3s e7plicitly ackno*led"ed admission of the corri"i!ility of ind)ction.

'@. Reconcilin* ,ifferent %artial 1enerali?ations

All this nevertheless amo)nts to treatin" only the simplest kind of ind)ctive task, namely, the task of e7tendin" a "enerali4ation esta!lished for one interval of val)es of the controlled varia!le. .Cf. .12 a!ove.2 8n the "eneral case, the 8n<)irer faces the task of not only e7tendin" one interval !)t com!inin" different kinds of f)nctional dependence fo)nd to o!tain over different .nonoverlappin"2 intervals. 8n this case, the pro!lem is not simply e7tendin" a "enerali4ation !)t also reconcilin" *ith other partial "enerali4ations. 8 *ill refer to this second aspect as the reconciliation pro!lem.

(his kind of reconciliation pro!lem is not atypical in the history of science. A reader may in fact have here a dV5W v) e7perience. Bor consider the pro!lem sit)ation *hich Planck faced and *hich 8 )sed as an e7ample in the paper, 6Jhat 8s the ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry=6M#$N (his pro!lem sit)ation is precisely one of reconcilin" partial "enerali4ations *ith one another. Another important case in point is perhaps Einstein3s discovery of the special theory of relativity, *hich may !e considered a "rand reconciliation of @e*tonian mechanics and :a7*ell3s theory of electroma"netism. Ither e7amples are easily fo)nd in the act)al history of science.M#1N 8n @e*ton3s o*n case, the com!ination and reconciliation pro!lem is perhaps instantiated !y his discovery of the la* of "ravitation. @e*ton had several ran"es of t*o+!ody systems to "enerali4e from, incl)din" those formed !y fallin" terrestrial !odies and the earthD !y the earth and the moonD and !y the s)n pl)s a planet o!eyin" >epler3s la*s. 8n this case, the reconciliation consisted mainly in ascertainin" that the same "ravitational constant *as o!tained in all the cases, for the la*s themselves *ere of the same inverse+s<)are form. (his kind of reconciliation task is an important variety of ind)ction in the @e*tonian sense of the *ord. 8t represents a pro!lem sit)ation *hich has played a ma5or role in the development of science and *hich is therefore *orth a st)dy in its o*n ri"ht. ; #0 ;

''. he Reconciliation %roblem and #ristotelian Induction

Before st)dyin" the str)ct)re of the reconciliation pro!lem, it is in order to point o)t a remarka!le similarity !et*een an ind)ctive reconciliation of different restricted mathematical la*s and Aristotelian ind)ction. 8 have analy4ed in detail Aristotle3s conception of epagoge in an earlier paper.M#2N -ince ind)ction *as calc)lated to esta!lish at least some of the first premises of a science accordin" to Aristotle, and since those first premises *ere identified !y Aristotle *ith definitions, the process of ind)ction in Aristotle m)st !e the same as a search for a definition. @o* Aristotle "ives a vivid e7ample of the search for a definition in Posterior nalytics B 1#. (he notion to !e defined there is #egalopsychia , an interestin" notion that is likely to intri")e any st)dent of 9reek moral philosophy in its o*n ri"ht. @o* ho* is it that Aristotle proposes to look for a definition of #egalopsychia = ?ere is his description: 8 mean, e.". if *e *ere to seek *hat #egalopsychia is *e sho)ld in<)ire, in the case of some #egalopsychia *e kno*, *hat one thin" they all have as s)ch. Bor instance, if Alci!iades is #egalopsychos , or Achilles and A5a7 are #egalopsychoi , *hat one thin" do they all have= 8ntolerance of ins)ltsD for one made *ar, one *a7ed *roth, and the other killed himself M!eca)se of this intoleranceN. A"ain in the case of others, e.". ,ysander and -ocrates. Jell, if here it Msc. the common characteristic that makes them #egalopsychoi N is !ein" indifferent to "ood and !ad fort)ne, 8 take these t*o thin"s and in<)ire *hat !oth indifference to fort)ne and not !rookin" dishono)r have that is the samN . . . then *e m)st a"ain in<)ire if *hat *e have no* "ot have anythin" that is the same .*ith still other cases2 F)ntil *e come to a sin"le acco)ntD for this *ill !e the definition of the o!5ect.M##N (he analo"y *ith the reconciliation pro!lem is strikin". Jhat Aristotle is in effect sayin" is that one first has to esta!lish a n)m!er of restricted "enerali4ations, each specifyin" the definin" characteristic of #egalopsychia in one type of case. (he task of findin" the definition of #egalopsychia then consists in reconcilin" these partial "enerali4ations, that is, in findin" *hat .if anythin"2 the different partial

definitions have in common. 8n my paper 6Aristotelian 8nd)ction6 8 sho*ed that the str)ct)re of this kind of definition seekin" is precisely the same as the so+called syllo"istic ind)ction Aristotle descri!es in Prior nalytics B 2#.M#%N (he differences !et*een a typical Aristotelian ind)ction and the ind)ctive reconciliation pro!lem are also clear. Birst, for Aristotle the partial "enerali4ations to !e inte"rated *ith one another are not esta!lished e7perimentally, !)t !y e7aminin" o)r o*n reasons for callin" a class of people #egalopsychoi . -econd, the partial "enerali4ations in <)estion are typically <)alitative and not <)antitative. ?o*ever, neither of these differences affects essentially the similarity of the t*o reconciliation pro!lems. ; #' ; ?ere *e have an interestin" "limpse of *hat the cash val)e of the term 3ind)ction3 .or epagoge 2 really *as in pre+?)mean philosophy of science. 8t is especially interestin" historically to see that the Aristotelians of the early modern period e7plicitly connected Aristotle3s epagoge *ith his description of the search of a definition in Posterior nalytics B 1# and other*ise interpreted epagoge alon" the same lines 8 have done. 8t is also kno*n that the yo)n" @e*ton read the Organon as *ell as the Aristotelian methodolo"ists of his day. Jhat historical insi"hts a st)dy of his note!ooks mi"ht yield remains to !e seen.

'). he Structure of a Reconciliation %roblem

8t is no* in order to disc)ss the reconciliation pro!lem in its o*n ri"ht. Jhat is the str)ct)re of ind)ction in the sense of reconciliation of different partial "enerali4ations= 8f a simple ans*er *ere forthcomin", *e *o)ld )nderstand the nat)re of scientific discovery m)ch !etter than *e act)ally do. Certain thin"s can nevertheless !e said. (he task is to transform the different mathematical la*s to a form *here they can !e seen to !e special cases of a more "eneral re")larity. Bor instance, *hat Planck did *as to ar")e that the Haylei"h+Jeans la* amo)nts essentially to

*here - is the entropy of an oscillator and U the ener"y.M#&N 8n contrast, Jien3s la* "oes to"ether *ith the different la*, namely:

Planck reconciled the la*s .1%2 and .1&2 !y re"ardin" them as special cases of:

Bor small val)es of U this red)ces to Jien3s la* and for lar"e val)es of U essentially to the Haylei"h+ Jeans la*, *hich had !een e7perimentally esta!lished !y H)!ens and >)rl!a)m. Ince a"ain, the final reconciliatory step appears !oth trivial and ar!itrary. Jammer says that this step, 6tho)"h mathematically a mere trifle, *as one of the most si"nificant and momento)s contri!)tions ever made in the history of physics.6M#0N (he si"nificance is of co)rse not d)e to this one step !)t is in the line of tho)"ht that led Planck to a point *here the competin" partial "eneral+

; #/ ; i4ations are directly compara!leFor, rather, directly reconcila!le. -)ch a line of tho)"ht normally takes the form of a mathematical manip)lation of the la*s in <)estion. B)t s)ch a manip)lation of mathematical form)las m)st !e ")ided !y an insi"ht into the act)al physical sit)ation. Bor instance, *e can ask: ?o* did Planck "et from the ori"inal e7perimentally esta!lished radiation la*s to the simple e<)ations .1%2 and .1&2, *hich are not directly verifia!le= 8n order to reach these e<)ations, Planck has amon" other thin"s to introd)ce a ne* concept, the concept of entropy, *hich he sh)nned earlier !)t *hich he no* fo)nd himself forced to )se. And this reliance on the concept of entropy is not 5)st a facet of clever manip)lation of mathematical e7pressions. 8t reflects Planck3s ne*fo)nd respect for statistical concepts in the analysis of physical sit)ations. Unmistaka!ly, s)ch a com!ination of mathematical and physical considerations has somethin" of the character of concept)al analysis. -mall *onder, therefore, that Planck3s line of tho)"ht led to a momento)s ne* concept, namely, that of a <)ant)m of ener"y. Perhaps it is not too far+fetched to say that a physicist has to have some "rasp of *hy each of the limited "enerali4ations to !e reconciled holds in its ran"e, 5)st as Aristotle ass)med that in o)r search for a definition of #egalopsychia *e have to kno*, for each of the restricted ran"es of cases *e re"ard as steppin"+stones to*ard a definition, *hy mem!ers of that class are called #egalopsychoi : -ocrates and ,ysander !eca)se of their indifference to "ood and !ad fort)ne, Alci!iades and A5a7 and their ilk !eca)se of their intolerance to ins)lt, and so on. (hese o!servations also p)t in an interestin" perspective the )se of mathematics in an e7perimental science like physics. (hey sho* that the role of mathematics is far s)!tler than is )s)ally spelled o)t. :athematics is not 5)st an aid in re"isterin" the o)tcomes of e7periments. 8t is a tool, al!eit not a mechanically applica!le tool, that can !e )sed to analy+e a physical phenomenon. :asterin" the mathematics )sed in a physical theory is very closely related to masterin" the !asic physical concepts of this theory. .J)st think of *hat a cr)cial !reakthro)"h von @e)mann3s *ork on the mathematical principles of <)ant)m theory *as for the act)al development of this !ranch of physics.2 8n partic)lar, the e7perimentation *ith mathematical e<)ations *hich is calc)lated to !rin" the different mathematical la*s .empirical "enerali4ations2 )nder the same roof inevita!ly takes on somethin" of the character of concept)al analysis of the relevant physical sit)ation. (he s)!tlety of the reconciliation pro!lem sho*s ho* far a cry act)al scientific ar")mentation is from the ind)ctivist paradi"m of makin" "enerali4ations from partic)lar cases. By the same token, it sho*s ho* m)ch interestin" ar")mentation is left )ntreated !y the hypothetico+ded)ctive conception of science. Admittedly, there is a certain similarity !et*een a reconciliation pro!lem and the pro!lem of esta!lishin" an ind)ctive "enerali4ation in the t*entieth+cent)ry sense of the term. 8n !oth )ses, an in<)irer moves from special cases to ; #9 ; a more "eneral proposition. (here nevertheless are important differences !et*een the typical forms of modern ind)ction and of the task of fittin" several restricted la*s )nder a more "eneral one .in the sense of a la* defined for a lar"er ran"e of ar")ment val)es2. Bor one important thin", the restricted la*s have to !e reinterpreted in the reconciliation process. (hey cannot simply !e considered instances of a "enerali4ation. Bor this reason, the reconciliation pro!lem cannot, for e7ample, !e dealt *ith !y

means of e7istin" ind)ctive lo"ics.

'3. he Uncertainties of Induction

@e*ton ackno*led"es that ind)ction in his sense is not an incorri"i!le step: And altho)"h the ar")in" from e7periments and o!servations !y ind)ction !e no demonstration, yet it is the !est *ay of ar")in" *hich the nat)re of thin"s admits of.M#'N 8t is of interest to ask, ho*ever, *hat in practice is the so)rce of the )ncertainty of a @e*tonian .step of2 ind)ction. Coes the so)rce of tro)!le perhaps lie in )ne7pected discontin)ities of nat)re= An e7periment can esta!lish a precise mathematical f)nction. 8f this f)nction is analytic, it has a (aylor e7pansion. (hat means that its !ehavior for the entire ran"e of val)es for *hich it is defined !y the same (aylor series is determined !y its !ehavior in an ar!itrarily small nei"h!orhood of any point for *hich it is defined. ?ence the kind of e7tension that is involved in 6e7trapolatin"6 an analytic f)nction seems to !e a p)rely mathematical operation, and not con5ect)ral at all. (he only possi!le so)rce of tro)!le seems to !e hidden discontin)ities of the f)nction or of its derivatives o)tside the ran"e of cases in *hich it has e7perimentally !een fo)nd to hold. 8t t)rns o)t, ho*ever, that this is not the only or even the main so)rce of the )ncertainty of @e*tonian ind)ction. Consider, for instance, Planck3s pro!lem sit)ation. (he t*o radiation la*s he *as tryin" to reconcile of co)rse co)ld not !e considered precise special cases of a more "eneral la*. Hather, they *ere "ood appro7imations to the "eneral la* for different ran"es of val)es, so "ood, indeed, that appro7imation fell *ithin the ran"e of o!servational error. ?ence the lo"ic of @e*tonian ind)ction appears to !e ine7trica!ly intert*ined *ith the notions of appro7imation and of the mar"in of e7perimental or o!servational error. (his is not the case lo"ically speakin", ho*ever. ,o"ically, the pro!lem of ind)ctive reconciliation of partial la*s can arise and have the same lo"ical properties also *hen the appro7imative character of the partial la*s plays no role. Bor instance, @e*ton kne* that >epler3s la*s co)ld not !e completely acc)rate, !eca)se of the "ravitational infl)ence of different planets on one another3s movements. ,ike*ise, the or!it of the moon aro)nd the earth *as kno*n !y him to !e s)!5ect of the s)n3s pert)r!atory infl)ence. B)t the ; %$ ; lo"ical pro!lem of reconciliation *o)ld have !een the same even if he had in !oth cases !een a!le to o!serve p)re t*o+!ody systems. 8n Planck3s case, the t*o radiation la*s are like*ise appro7imations only. ?o*ever, they *o)ld !e precise la*s if *e co)ld p)sh the val)e of one of the varia!les to its limitin" val)es .4ero and infinity, respectively2. ?ence *hat the cr)cial 5)d"ment+call typically is in a @e*tonian ind)ction is an independence or near+ independence ass)mption. 8t has to !e ass)med either that the f)nctional dependence that has !een esta!lished is independent of f)rther 6hidden varia!les6 or else that it is so nearly free from f)rther factors that it can !e considered the precise la* for a s)ita!le special case or ran"e of val)es. Ince a"ain, the so)rce of lo"ical stren"th in scientific inference t)rns o)t to lie in esta!lishin" or ass)min" f)nctional independence. (his is in keepin" *ith *hat *as fo)nd in my paper 6Jhat 8s the ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry=6M#/N ?ence the lo"ic of @e*tonian ind)ction is not essentially dependent on the <)antitative character of the

partial la*s that have !een esta!lished or on their character as appro7imations. 8n principle, a similar pro!lem sit)ation can arise in a theory e7pressi!le in a first+order lan")a"e. @otice also that this kind of )ncertainty of @e*tonian ind)ction is rather different from the "eneral )ncertainty to *hich ?)me called philosophers3 attention. Amon" other o!servations, *e can no* see that Popper3s criticism of @e*ton3s claim for havin" derived his la* of "ravitation from phenomena is *itho)t any force *hatsoever.M#9N Popper !ases his criticism on the fact that >epler3s la*s, *hich *ere the startin" point of @e*ton3s line of tho)"ht, cannot !e strictly tr)e if @e*ton3s la* of "ravitation holds, for they do not allo* for the "ravitational interaction !et*een different planets. ?o* co)ld @e*ton possi!ly have derived the tr)e la* of "ravitation from false empirical "enerali4ations, Popper asks= Let *e have seen that the merely appro7imate character of >epler3s la*s is completely !eside the point in eval)atin" the kind of 6ind)ctive6 reasonin" @e*ton )sed. 8t *as perfectly possi!le for him to think of >epler3s la*s as holdin" strictly for certain t*o+!ody systems. Bor those systems, the la* of "ravitation *as, strictly speakin", implied !y the la*s of motion of a planet. (he ind)ctive step *as then to note that the res)ltin" la*, esta!lished so far only for a certain ran"e of t*o+!ody systems, a"rees *ith other partial "enerali4ations esta!lished for other ran"es of cases. Popper3s criticisms sho* merely that he has not !e")n to )nderstand @e*ton3s act)al conception of scientific inference in "eneral and of the role of ind)ction in science in partic)lar.

hree. #ristotelian Natures and the -odern Experimental -ethod

Nancy "art5ri*ht

'. /istorical Aac0*round

Ine of the "reat achievements of the scientific revol)tion, accordin" to its adherents, *as the !anishment from modern science of the Aristotelian schemes of e7planation *hich had dominated -cholastic st)dies. Aristotle *as derided as a c)ttlefish, a s<)id: the ink he dischar"ed cast everythin" into o!sc)rity. Consider one typical case, Pierre 9assendi in his Exercises against the ristotelians .102%2. 9assendi complains that Aristotelian e7planations fail to e7plain. A!o)t the definition of motion as 6the act of !ein" in potentiality insofar as it is in potentiality,6 he remarks: 69reat 9odX 8s there any stomach stron" eno)"h to di"est that= (he e7planation of a rather familiar thin" *as re<)ested, !)t this is so complicated that nothin" is clear anymore . . . (he need for definitions of the *ords in the definitions *ill "o on ad infinitu# 6 .!ook 2, e7ercise %, article %2. (he scientific revol)tionaries favored the certainty of mathematics to the am!i")ity of -cholastic acco)nts. :athematics *as 6!)ilt on clear and settled si"nification of names, *hich admit of no am!i")ity.6 (his remark comes from Joseph 9lanvill, *hose defense of modern tho)"ht in Scepsis Scientifica earned him a place in the Hoyal -ociety in 100%. In 9lanvill3s acco)nt, Aristotle *as e7actly the opposite: 6Peripatetic philosophy is liti"io)s6D its acco)nts are 6circ)lar6D and its terms are 6empty,6 6am!i")o)s,6 and lackin" 6settled, constant si"nification.6 (he science of the -cholastics *as involved in endless <)arrels a!o)t *ords and very little act)al investi"ation, in lar"e part !eca)se it tried to e7plain the !ehavior of thin"s !y reference to their nat)res. B)t kno*led"e of nat)res, accordin" to the ne* empiricists of the scientific revol)tion, is forever !eyond o)r "raspD it is divine, not h)man. As 9assendi ar")es, it is not possi!le for mere h)mans to kno* 6that somethin" is !y

nat)re and in ; %& ; itself, and as a res)lt of !asic, necessary infalli!le ca)ses, constit)ted in a certain *ay6 .!ook 0, article 12. Hather, 6it can only !e kno*n ho* a thin" appears to one or another6 .!ook 0, article 02. 8t is on acco)nt of this t*ofold fact that the Aristotelians "ot into )seless de!ates over meanin"s: on the one hand, nat)res stood at the core of e7planation for themD on the other, these nat)res *ere intrinsically )nkno*a!le. Accordin" to the empiricists, then, the Aristotelians inevita!ly resolved thin"s into <)alities that *ere occ)ltD they co)ld never !e "en)inely )nderstood !)t only "rasped !y definition. 8nvaria!ly this leads to a total circ)larity of e7planation. (he favored e7ample is that of "ravity. 9lanvill tells )s: (hat heavy !odies descend !y "ravity is no !etter acco)nt than *e *o)ld e7pect from a r)sticD that "ravity is a <)ality *here!y a heavy !ody descends, is an impertinent circle, and teaches nothin". .Scepsis Scientifica , chap. 2$2 Bor the empiricists, *e m)st thro* over this attempt to fo)nd science on occ)lt nat)res and instead !ase everythin" on the kinds of <)alities that appear to )s in e7perience. Even here there is a dan"er that *e may !ecome too am!itio)s, and 9lanvill *arns: 68f *e follo* manifest <)alities !eyond the empty si"nification of their names, *e shall find them as occ)lt as those *hich are professedly so6 .Scepsis Scientifica , chap. 2$2. :ost modern acco)nts in the philosophy of science take it that the attempts of the scientific revol)tion to !anish nat)res from science *ere s)ccessf)l. (he idea of nat)res operatin" in thin"s to determine their !ehaviors *as replaced !y the concept of a la* of nat)re. ?ere is a short history, told !y a modern+day empiricist, to ill)strate: A<)inas *as at pains to contest a precedin" scholastic vie* that everythin" *hich happens, does so !eca)se it is directly and individ)ally *illed !y 9od. (his *o)ld seem to make science a pointless enterpriseD accordin" to A<)inas it also deni"rates creation. Let theolo"y points to 9od as )ltimate ca)se. (he reconciliation A<)inas offered *as this: to e7plain *hy phenomena happen as they do, re<)ires sho*in" *hy they m)stD this necessity ho*ever derives from the nat)res of the individ)al s)!stances involvedF*hich themselves are as they are !eca)se of 9od3s ori"inal desi"n. (h)s the necessity does derive ulti#ately from 9od3s decrees for the *orld as a *hole, made at the point of creationF!)t derives proxi#ately from the local conditions and characters in the Aristotelian pattern . . . . . . if *e look more closely at the seventeenth cent)ry *e see an insistence, even more adamant than A<)inas3, )pon the a)tonomy of physics from theolo"y. Cescartes insists on it most strin"ently . . . (he ,rang nach utono#ie of physics, even as developed !y s)ch theolo"ical thinkers as Cescartes, @e*ton, and ,ei!ni4, needed an intermediate link !et*een 9od3s decree and nat)re. A<)inas had needed s)ch a link to e7plain pro7imate ca)sation, and fo)nd it in the Aristotelian s)!stantial forms .individ+ ; %0 ; )al nat)res2. Bor the seventeenth cent)ry another kind *as needed, one that co)ld impose a "lo!al constraint on the *orld process. 8n "eneral terms, this link *as provided !y the idea

that nat)re has its inner necessities, *hich are not mere facts, !)t constrain all mere facts into a )nified *hole. (he theolo"ical analo"y and dyin" metaphor of la* provided the lan")a"e in *hich the idea co)ld !e co)ched. .Bas van Braassen, La%s and Sy##etry MI7ford: Clarendon Press, 19/9N, %102 :y thesis here is that this story is distorted .at least as it applies to modern e7perimental science2. Je have not replaced natures !y la%s of nature . Bor la*s of nat)re are typically a!o)t nat)res, and *hat they prod)ce. Hather, *hat *e have done is to replace occ)lt po*ers !y po*ers that are visi!le, tho)"h it may take a very fancy e7periment to see them. (his is already apparent in Brancis Bacon. Bacon still employs the Aristotelian idea of nat)res or essences, !)t for him these are not hidden. Bacon looks for the e7planatory essences, !)t he looks for them amon" <)alities that are o!serva!le. Consider his h)nt for the essence of heat. ?e makes lar"e ta!les of sit)ations in *hich heat occ)rs, in *hich it is a!sent, and in *hich it varies !y de"rees. 68nstances a"reein" in the Borm of ?eat6 .'o&u# Organu# , 102$2 incl)de, for instance, rays of the s)nD damp, hot *eatherD flamesD horse d)n"D stron" vine"arD and so forth. (hen he looks to see *hat other <)ality is al*ays present *hen heat is present, and al*ays a!sent *hen heat is lackin". 8n this *ay, he finds the tr)e, simple nat)re that consit)tes heat: motion. (he point is that Bacon still hopes to find the nat)re of heat, !)t amon" visi!le, not occ)lt, <)alities. :odern e7planation similarly relies on nat)res, 8 *ill ar")eD the modern nat)res are like Bacon3s and )nlike those of the -cholastics, in that they are attri!)ted to o!serva!le str)ct)res and <)alities. 9enerally they differ from Bacon3s in that they do not lie on the s)rface and are not to !e o!served *ith the naked eye. Hather, *e often need very s)!tle and ela!orate e7periments in order to see them. :odern science insists that *e fo)nd e7planation on e7perimentally identifia!le and verifia!le str)ct)res and <)alities. B)t, 8 maintain, *hat *e learn a!o)t these str)ct)res and <)alities is *hat it is in their nat)res to do. Jhat *e have done in modern science, as 8 see it, is to !reak the connection !et*een *hat the e7planatory nat)re isF*hat it is, in and of itselfFand *hat it does. An atom in its e7cited state, *hen a"itated, emits photons and prod)ces li"ht. 8t is, 8 say, in the nat)re of an e7cited atom to prod)ce li"ht. ?ere the e7planatory feat)reFan atom3s !ein" in the e7cited stateFis a str)ct)ral feat)re of the atom, *hich is defined and e7perimentally identified independently of the partic)lar nat)re that is attri!)ted to it in this case.M1N 8t is in the nat)re of the e7cited atom to emit li"ht, !)t that is not *hat it is to !e an atom in an e7cited state. Bor modern science, *hat somethin" really isFho* it is defined and identifiedFand *hat it is in its nat)re to do are <)ite separate thin"s. -o even a perfect and complete modern theory *o)ld never have the ; %' ; closed, ded)ctive str)ct)re that the Aristotelians envisa"ed. -till, 8 maintain, the )se of Aristotelian+ style nat)res is central to the modern e7planatory pro"ram. Je, like Aristotle, are lookin" for 6a ca)se and principle of chan"e and stasis in the thin" in *hich it primarily s)!sists6 .Physics 2.1.192!222, and *e, too, ass)me that this principle *ill !e 6in this thin" of itself and not per accidens .6 Let, even at this very c)rsory level of description, *e differ from Aristotle in three important *ays. Birst, as in my e7ample of an atom in an e7cited state, *e assi"n nat)res not to s)!stances !)t rather to collections or confi")rations of properties, or to str)ct)res. -econd, like the early empiricists and the mechanical philosophers of the scientific revol)tion, modern physics s)pposes that the 6sprin"s of motion6 are hidden !ehind the phenomena and that *hat appears on the s)rface is a res)lt of the comple7 interaction of nat)res. Je no lon"er e7pect that the nat)res that are f)ndamental for physics *ill e7hi!it themselves directly in the re")lar or typical !ehavior of o!serva!le phenomena. 8t takes the

hi"hly controlled environment of an e7periment to reveal them. (hird, havin" made the empiricist t)rn, *e no lon"er identify nat)res *ith essences. As 8 have descri!ed in this section, in modern science *e separate o)r definition of a property from o)r characteri4ation of *hat kind of chan"e it nat)rally prod)ces. -till, *hen *e associate a partic)lar principle of chan"e *ith a "iven str)ct)re or characteristic, *e e7pect that association to !e permanent, to last so lon" as the str)ct)re is *hat it is. 8ndeed, it is this permanence of association that 8 *ill )nderline !y claimin" that modern science still st)dies Aristotelian+style nat)res. If co)rse, these are not really Aristotelian nat)res. Bor one thin", *e seem to share none of the concerns a!o)t s)!stance and individ)ation in *hich Aristotle3s concept *as em!edded. (here are a n)m!er of other differences as *ell. @evertheless, 8 call them 6Aristotelian6 !eca)se of the inheritance thro)"h the -cholastics to the 6@e* Philosophy6 of 9alileo, Bacon, and Cescartes. Jhat 8 *ill do in the remainder of this paper is: first, e7plain in more detail *hat this claim amo)nts to !y contrastin" it *ith a more standard empiricist acco)nt of la*s of nat)reD and second, provide one ar")ment in favor of the thesisFan ar")ment that says that one cannot make sense of modern e7perimental method )nless one ass)mes that la*s are !asically a!o)t nat)res. (he !asic point of vie* 8 )r"e here is similar to that *hich 8 have *ritten a!o)t at len"th in 'ature-s .apacities and /heir Measure#ent .I7ford: I7ford University Press, 19/92, !)t the f)ndamental ar")ment is ne*.

). Natures and the #nalytic -ethod

8n defendin" nat)res, 8 take my principal anta"onist to !e the modern empiricist acco)nt of la*s *hich rests on a distinction cr)cial to the tho)"ht of ,ocke, Berkeley, and ?)me: the distinction !et*een po*ers and sensi!le ; %/ ; <)alities. Accordin" to ?)me, po*ers are not accessi!le to )s thro)"h o)r senses, and hence m)st !e e7cl)ded from science. @o*adays, the distinction takes a sli"htly different form, !et*een the po*er thin"s have to !ehave in certain *ays, on the one hand, and the act)ally e7hi!ited !ehaviors, on the other. B)t modern empiricists in the ?)me tradition remain 5)st as ea"er as ?)me himself to re5ect po*ers. ,a*s of nat)re, they insist, are a!o)t %hat things do . 8 *ant to maintain, !y contrast, that f)ndamental la*s are "enerally not a!o)t *hat thin"s do !)t *hat it is in their nat)re to do. Consider Co)lom!3s la* of electrostatic attraction and rep)lsion. Co)lom!3s la* says that the force !et*een t*o o!5ects of char"e (1 and (2 is e<)al to (1( 2 r2 . Let, this is not the force the !odies e7perienceD they are also s)!5ect to the la* of "ravity. Je say that Co)lom!3s la* "ives the force due to their char"e. B)t this is no concept for an empiricist: Co)lom!3s is not the force that act)ally occ)rsD rather, it is a hypothetical po*er hidden a*ay in the act)al force. 8 think the !est acco)nt *e can "ive is in terms of nat)res. Co)lom!3s la* tells not *hat force char"ed particles e7perience !)t rather *hat it is in their nat)re, <)a char"ed, to e7perience. @at)res are somethin" like po*ers. (o say it is in their nat)re to e7perience a force of (1 (2 r2 is to say at least that they can e7perience this force if only the ri"ht conditions occ)r for the po*er to e7ercise itselfD for instance, if they have very small masses so that "ravitational effects are ne"li"i!le. 8t is also to say that their tendency to e7perience it persists, even *hen the conditions are not ri"htD for instance, *hen "ravity !ecomes important. G)a char"ed, they tend to e7perience a m)t)al force (1(2 r 2 D <)a

massive, they tend to e7perience a different force .0#1#2 r 2 2. Jhat particles that are !oth massive and char"ed act)ally e7perience *ill !e a f)nction of *hat they e7perience <)a char"ed and *hat they e7perience <)a massive. 8t is to mark this fact, the fact that char"e al*ays 6contri!)tes6 the same force, that 8 )se the Aristotelian notion of nat)re. B)t, as 8 remarked in referrin" to Bacon, these modern nat)res differ from Aristotle3s in one very central respect. Altho)"h it is in the nat)re of char"e to !e s)!5ect to a force of (1(2 r 2 , in the sense that this is *hat particles e7perience <)a char"ed, this nat)re does not in any proper Aristotelian *ay reveal the essence of char"e. Jhat char"e is depends on a lot of factors independent of Co)lom!3s la*. As 9erd B)chdahl p)ts it, there is a mere 6!r)te+fact connection6 !et*een *hat char"e is and ho* char"ed particles !ehave <)a char"ed .Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science MI7ford: Black*ell, 1909N2. Ine c)stomary response that ?)means make to the kinds of pro!lems 8 am raisin" is to resort to co)nterfact)als. (hey talk not in terms of act)ally e7hi!ited <)alities and !ehavior !)t in terms of possi!le <)alities and !ehaviors. Co)lom!3s la* "ives the force t*o !odies %ould e7perience if their masses *ere e<)al to 4ero. Brom an empiricist point of vie* this is a pec)liar kind of co)nterfact)al to find at the fo)ndation of o)r st)dy of motion, for it is one *hose antecedent can never !e instantiated. B)t that is not my principal concern. ; %9 ; 8nstead, 8 *ant to point o)t t*o other nonempiricist elements that are concealed in this acco)nt. (he first comes to li"ht *hen *e ask, 6Jhy do *e *ant the masses to "o to 4ero=6 (he ans*er: 6Beca)se *e *ant to find o)t *hat the total force *o)ld !e, *ere there no other forces at *ork.6 8t is the 6at *ork6 that one sho)ld notice. P)t in this !l)nt fashion, it s)""ests that the co)nterfact)al acco)nt itself is "ro)nded in ideas a!o)t po*ers and their operation, as no "ood ?)mean *o)ld allo*. -o the co)nterfact)al antecedent 6*ere the masses e<)al to 4ero6 is )sed instead. :y second concern !ecomes apparent *hen one asks the o!vio)s ne7t <)estion, 6Jhy do *e *ant to kno* *hat the force !et*een char"ed !odies *o)ld !e *ere no other forces at *ork=6 (his case is 5)st one partic)lar case amon" all conceiva!le ones, and a pec)liarly inconvenient one at that. Jhy, then, are these circ)mstances so special= (hey are special !eca)se these are the circ)mstances in *hich all the hindrances are stripped a*ay so that *e can find o)t *hat char"ed particles do 6on their o*n6Fthat is, *hat they do !y virt)e of !ein" char"ed. (his is ho* they *o)ld attract or repel one another *ere 6only6 char"e at *orkD and it is ho* they try to !ehave even *hen other factors impede them. Je discover the nat)re of electrostatic interaction !et*een char"es !y lookin" in some very special circ)mstances. B)t the char"e interaction carries that nat)re *ith it, from one circ)mstance to another. (hat is *hy *hat *e call the analytic #ethod in physics *orks: to )nderstand *hat happens in the *orld, *e take thin"s apart into their f)ndamental piecesD to control a sit)ation *e reassem!le the pieces, *e reorder them so they *ill *ork to"ether to make thin"s happen as *e *ill. Lo) carry the pieces from place to place, assem!lin" them to"ether in ne* *ays and ne* conte7ts. B)t yo) al*ays ass)me that they *ill try to !ehave in ne* arran"ements as they have tried to !ehave in others. (hey *ill, in each case, act in accordance *ith their nat)re.M2N (he talk of pieces and assem!ly is a metaphor. ?o* do the !ehaviors dictated !y different nat)res com!ine *hen they are constrained to operate to"ether= (here is no "eneral receiptD the ans*er is, at !est, s)!5ect+specific. 8n mechanics, a total force is constr)cted !y vectoral addition from the forces that each component tries separately to create. 8n the sim)ltaneo)s+e<)ation models of econometrics,

the nat)ral !ehavior of each independent mechanism is represented in a different e<)ationD *hen a n)m!er of mechanisms *ork to"ether, all the e<)ations m)st !e satisfied at once. (he *ay in *hich literal mechanical pieces f)nction to"ether is different a"ain. Je employ the method of analysis and synthesis to make predictions and to shape !ehavior to o)r o*n *ishes. 8n each case, *e e7ploit the fact that the pieces *hen assem!led to"ether each contin)e to 6contri!)te6 in accord *ith their nat)res. Jhat act)ally res)lts in a specific case is fi7ed not only !y the nat)res of the parts !)t also !y the r)les that dictate *hat happens in that domain *hen nat)res act to"ether. ; &$ ; (he analytic method is closely associated *ith *hat *e often call 9alilean ideali4ation. (o"ether ideali4ation and a!straction form a familiar t*o+tiered process that lies at the heart of modern scientific in<)iry. Birst, *e try to find o)t !y a com!ination of e7perimentation, calc)lation, and inference ho* the feat)re )nder st)dy !ehaves, or *o)ld !ehave, in a partic)lar, hi"hly specific sit)ation. By controllin" for, or calc)latin" a*ay, the "ravitational effects, *e try to find o)t ho* t*o char"ed !odies *o)ld interact if their masses *ere 4ero. B)t this is 5)st a sta"eD in itself this information is <)ite )ninterestin". (he )ltimate aim is to find o)t ho* the char"ed !odies interact not *hen their masses are 4ero, nor )nder any other specific set of circ)mstances, !)t rather ho* they interact <)a char"ed. (hat is the second sta"e of the in<)iry: *e a!stract the nat)re of the char"e interaction from ho* char"es !ehave in these specially selected 6ideal6 circ)mstances. (he key here is the concept 6ideal.6 In the one hand, *e )se this term to mark the fact that the circ)mstances in <)estion are not real or, at least, that they seldom o!tain nat)rally !)t re<)ire a "reat deal of contrivance even to appro7imate. In the other, the 6ideal6 circ)mstances are the 6ri"ht6 onesF ri"ht for inferrin" *hat the nat)re of the !ehavior is, in itself. Boc)sin" on the first aspect !y itself do*nplays o)r pro!lems. Je tend to think that the chief diffic)lties come from the small depart)res from the ideal that *ill al*ays !e involved in any real e7periment: ho*ever small *e choose the masses in tests of Co)lom!3s la*, *e never totally eliminate the "ravitational interaction !et*een themD in 9alilean e7periments on inertia, the plane is never perfectly smooth nor the air resistance e<)al to 4eroD *e may send o)r e7periments deep into space, !)t the effect of the lar"e massive !odies in the )niverse can never !e entirely eliminatedD and *e can perform them at cryo"enic temperat)res, !)t the conditions *ill never, in fact, reach the ideal. (he pro!lem 8 am concerned *ith is not *hether *e can "et the system into circ)mstances *here it can operate on its o*n !)t rather: *hat does it mean *hen *e say that the circ)mstances are ideal, or that the system is operatin" 6on its o*n6= Jhat is it that dictates *hich other effects are to !e minimi4ed, set e<)al to 4ero, or calc)lated a*ay= (his is the <)estion, 8 maintain, that cannot !e ans*ered "iven the conventional empiricist acco)nt of la*s. @o do)!t, in any partic)lar e7periment, the e<)ipment *e move a!o)t, the circ)mstances *e contrive, and the properties *e calc)late a*ay, are ones that can !e descri!ed *itho)t mentionin" nat)res. B)t in each case, *hat makes that arran"ement of e<)ipment in those partic)lar circ)mstances 6ideal6 is the fact that these are the circ)mstances *here the feat)re )nder st)dy operates, as 9alileo ta)"ht, *itho)t hindrance or impediment, so that its nat)re is revealed in its !ehavior. Until *e are prepared to talk in this *ay a!o)t nat)res and their operations, to fi7 some circ)mstances as felicito)s for a nat)re to e7press itself, and others as impediments, *e *ill have no *ay of determinin" *hich ; &1 ; principle is tested !y *hich e7periment. 8t is this ar")ment that 8 *ant to develop in the rest of this

paper.

3. /o5 ,o 4e 2no5 4hat 4e #re estin*B

Bor anyone *ho !elieves that ind)ction provides the primary !)ildin" tool for empirical kno*led"e, the methods of modern e7perimental physics m)st seem )nfathoma!le. Us)ally the ind)ctive !ase for the principles )nder test is slim indeed, and in the !est e7perimental desi"ns, *here *e have s)fficient control of the materials and o)r kno*led"e of the re<)isite !ack"ro)nd ass)mptions is sec)re, one sin"le instance can !e eno)"h. (he inference, of co)rse, is never certain, nor irrevoca!le. -till, *e proceed *ith a hi"h de"ree of confidence, and indeed, a de"ree of confidence that is )nmatched in lar"e+scale st)dies in the social sciences, *here *e do set o)t from information a!o)t a very "reat n)m!er of instances. Clearly, in these physics e7periments *e are prepared to ass)me that the sit)ation !efore )s is of a very special kind: it is a sit)ation in *hich the !ehavior that occ)rs is repeata!le. Jhatever happens in this sit)ation can !e "enerali4ed. (his pec)liar kind of repeata!ility that *e ass)me for physics e7periments re<)ires a kind of permanence of !ehavior across varyin" e7ternal conditions that is compara!le to that of an essence, altho)"h not as stron". Bor e7ample, *e meas)re, s)ccessf)lly *e think, the char"e or mass of an electron in a "iven e7periment. @o* *e think *e kno* the char"e or mass of all electronsD *e need not "o on, meas)rin" h)ndreds of tho)sands. 8n so doin", *e are makin" *hat looks to !e a kind of essentialist ass)mption: the char"e or mass of a f)ndamental particle is not a varia!le <)antity !)t is characteristic of the particle so lon" as it contin)es to !e the particle it is. 8n most e7periments *e do not investi"ate 5)st the !asic properties of systems s)ch as char"e, !)t rather more complicated trains of !ehavior. Cia"rammatically, *e may think of 9alileo3s attempts to st)dy the motions of !alls rollin" do*n inclined planesD or, entirely at the opposite end of the historical spectr)m, the attempts in -tanford3s 9ravity+Pro!e+B e7periment to trace the precession of fo)r "yroscopes in space, to see ho* they are affected !y the space+time c)rvat)re relativistically ind)ced !y the earth. ?ere, too, some very stron" ass)mptions m)st !ack o)r *illin"ness to dra* a "eneral concl)sion from a very special case. In the s)rface, it may seem that the license to "enerali4e in these cases can !e p)t in very local terms that need no reference to nat)res. Je re<)ire only the ass)mption that all systems so sit)ated as the one in hand *ill !ehave identically. B)t 8 think on closer inspection *e can see that this is not eno)"h. Je may !e"in to see *hy !y considerin" ?)me himself. ?)me maintained the principle 6same ca)se, same effect.6 Bor him, every occ)rrence is an e7em+ ; &2 ; plar of a "eneral principle. 8t is simply a "eneral fact a!o)t the *orld, al!eit one *e can have no s)re *arrant for, that identically sit)ated systems !ehave identically. ?ence for ?)me, the license to "enerali4e *as )niversal. B)t not for )s. Je cannot so easily s)!scri!e to the idea that the same ca)se *ill al*ays !e s)cceeded !y the same effect. ?)me ass)med the principle to !e tr)e, tho)"h not prova!le. ?e *orried that principles like this one co)ld only !e circ)larly fo)nded, !eca)se they co)ld have no evidence that is not ind)ctive. B)t no*adays *e <)estion not 5)st *hether o)r !elief in them can !e *ell+fo)nded !)t *hether they are tr)e. Even if *e *ere content *ith merely ind)ctive *arrant, in *hat direction does o)r evidence point= (he planetary motions seem re")lar, as do the s)ccessions of the seasons, !)t in "eneral, @at)re in the m)ndane *orld seems o!stinately chaotic. I)tside the s)pervision of a la!oratory or the closed casement of a factory+made mod)le, *hat happens in one

instance is rarely a ")ide to *hat *ill happen in others. -it)ations that lend themselves to "enerali4ation are very special, and it is these special kinds of sit)ations that *e aim to create, !oth in o)r e7periments and in o)r technolo"y. :y central thesis here is that *hat makes these sit)ations special is that they are sit)ations that permit a sta!le display of the nat)re of the process )nder st)dy, or the sta!le display of the interaction of several different nat)res. (he case is especially stron" *hen *e t)rn from fictional considerations of ideal reasonin" to considerations of act)al methodolo"y. ?ere <)estions of tr)e identity of circ)mstance drop a*ay. Je never treat complete descriptionsD rather *e deal *ith salient characteristics and rele&ant si#ilarities . (his is a familiar point. Lo) do not have to specify everythin". 8f the ri"ht com!ination of factors is fi7ed, yo) are in a position to "enerali4e. Let *hat makes a specific com!ination a ri"ht one= Jhat is the criterion that makes one similarity relevant and another irrelevant= Case !y case, after the fact, it seems *e can avoid an ans*er. Je need only say, 68n this case, *e have picked th)s+and+so set of factorsD and *e ass)me that so lon" as this partic)lar set of factors is fi7ed, the !ehavior that o!tains *ill !e "eneral.6 (his is the position *e arrived at a fe* para"raphs a"o. 8t provides a defense, of kinds, one !y one, of each "enerali4ation that *e are *illin" to make on the !asis of an e7perimental st)dy. B)t it provides no acco)nt of *hat *e do. E7periments are desi"ned *ith intense care and precision. (hey take hard *ork, and hard tho)"ht, and enormo)s creative ima"ination. (he 9ravity+Pro!e e7periment *hich 8 mentioned a!ove is an e7a""erated e7ample. 8t *ill only !e set r)nnin" t*enty yearsFt*enty years of fairly contin)o)s effortFafter it *as initiated, and it *ill have involved teams from thirty or forty different locations, each solvin" some separate pro!lem of desi"n and implementation. Jhat can acco)nt for o)r effort to make the e7perimental apparat)s "ust so and no other *ay= (ake the 9ravity Pro!e as a case in point. Each effort is directed to solve a specific pro!lem. Ine of the very first in the 9ravity Pro!e ; &# ; involved choosin" the material for the "yroscopes. 8n the end, they are to !e made of f)sed <)art4, since f)sed <)art4 can !e man)fact)red to !e homo"eneo)s to more than one part in 1$0 . (he homo"eneity is cr)cial. Any differences in density *ill introd)ce additional precessions, *hich can !e neither precisely controlled nor relia!ly calc)lated, and these *o)ld o!sc)re the nat)re of the "eneral+ relativistic precession that the e7periment aims to learn a!o)t. 8n this case, *e can ima"ine that the physicists desi"nin" the e7periment *orked from the dict)m, *hich can !e form)lated *itho)t e7plicit reference to nat)res, 68f yo) *ant to see the relativistic precession, yo) had !etter make the "yroscope as homo"eneo)s as possi!le,6 and they *anted to do that !eca)se they *anted to eliminate other so)rces of precession. B)t more than that is necessary. (he total desi"n of the e7periment m)st take acco)nt not only of *hat else mi"ht ca)se precession !)t also of *hat kinds of feat)res *o)ld interfere *ith the relativistic precession, *hat kinds of factors co)ld inhi!it it, and *hat is necessary to ens)re that it *ill, in the end, e7hi!it itself in some systematic *ay. Jhen all these factors are properly treated, *e sho)ld have an e7periment that sho*s *hat the nat)re of relativistic precession is. (hat is the form, 8 maintain, that the )ltimate concl)sion *ill take. B)t that is not the immediate point 8 *ant to make. Jhat 8 *ant to )r"e is that, !y desi"nin" the e7periment to ens)re that the nat)re of relativistic precession can manifest itself in some clear si"n, !y !lockin" any interference and !y openin" a clear ro)te for the relativistic co)plin" to operate )nimpededFaccordin" to its o*n nat)reF!y doin" 5)st this, the 9ravity+Pro!e team *ill create an e7periment from *hich it is possi!le to infer a "eneral la*. At the moment, the form of this la* is not

my chief concern. Hather, *hat is at stake is the <)estion, 6Jhat m)st !e tr)e of the e7periment if a "eneral la* of any form is to !e inferred from it=6 8 claim that the e7periment m)st s)cceed at revealin" the nat)re of the process .or some sta!le conse<)ence of the interaction of nat)res2 and that the desi"n of the e7periment re<)ires a ro!)st sense of *hat *ill impede and *hat *ill facilitate this. (he facts a!o)t an e7periment that make that e7periment "enerali4a!le are not facts that e7ist in a p)rely ?)mean *orld. 8t is, of co)rse, not really tr)e that my thesis a!o)t the correct form of nat)ral la*s is irrelevant to my ar")ment. P)t in the most simple+minded terms, *hat 8 point o)t is the apparent fact that *e can "enerali4e from a sin"le o!servation in an e7perimental conte7t 5)st !eca)se that conte7t is one in *hich all the relevant so)rces of variation have !een taken into acco)nt. (hen, after all, *hat 8 claim is that it is la*s in the form 8 commendFthat is, la*s a!o)t nat)resFthat determine *hat is and *hat is not relevant. (his sets the o!vio)s strate"y for the ?)mean reply: la*s, in the sense of )niversal or pro!a!ilistic "enerali4ations, determine the relevant factors an e7periment m)st control to ens)re that it is repeata!le. 8 *ill disc)ss this strate"y !riefly in ; &% ; the ne7t section. Before t)rnin" to it, tho)"h, 8 *ant to make some clarifications a!o)t the concept of "enerali4a!ility. 8 have !een )sin" the term 3"enerali4a!le3 and the term 3repeata!le3. Both can !e taken in t*o senses in this disc)ssion. 8 claim that the 9ravity Pro!e aims to esta!lish a "eneral la* a!o)t the nat)re of the co)plin" of a spinnin" "yroscope to c)rved space+time and there!y to learn somethin" a!o)t the tr)th of the "eneral theory of relativity. B)t alon" the *ay, as a !y+prod)ct, the e7periment *ill reveal, or instantiate, another considera!ly less a!stract la*, a la* that can far more readily !e cast into the conventional form of a )niversal "enerali4ation. (his is a la* to the effect that any f)sed+<)art4 "yroscope of 5)st this kindFelectroma"netically s)spended, coated )niformly *ith a very, very thin layer of s)perfl)id, read !y a -GU8C detector, ho)sed in a cryo"enic de*ar, constr)cted 5)st so . . . and spinnin" deep in spaceF*ill precess at the rate predicted. Je e7pect a la* like this to o!tain !eca)se *e e7pect the e7periment to esta!lish a sta!le environment in *hich *hatever happens *o)ld happen re")larlyD that is, *e e7pect the e7perimental res)lts to !e repeata!le. (his is a sense of repeata!ility internal to the e7periment itself: "iven that the e7periment is a "ood one, if it *ere to !e rer)n in the same *ay *ith the same apparat)s, it sho)ld teach the same lesson. Je need not demand that the re")larity instantiated !e e7pressi!le in some partic)lar lan")a"eFor in any lan")a"e, for that matterD nor, as ?arry Collins stresses ..hanging Order M,ondon: -a"e P)!lications, 19/&N2, need *e insist that the kno*led"e of ho* to !)ild the apparat)s !e e7plicit kno*led"e that co)ld !e read from the e7perimenter3s note!ooks or that co)ld !e *ritten in a 6ho*+to+!)ild+it6 man)al. M#N Let, if the e7periment is to !ear on the more "eneral concl)sion *hich *e, in the end, *ant to esta!lish, *e do *ant to insist on the re")larity. Bor part of *hat is meant !y the hypothesis that the co)plin" !et*een the "yroscope and the c)rvat)re has a special nat)re that !ears on the tr)th of "eneral relativity is that there is a proper, predicta!le *ay in *hich it *ill !ehave on its o*n, if only the circ)mstances are propitio)s. (o the de"ree that *e do)!t that the e7periment is repeata!le, to that de"ree at least m)st *e do)!t that the !ehavior *e see is a si"n of the nat)re *e *ant to discover. Altho)"h the "eneral .al!eit lo*+level2 la* that e7presses this first kind of repeata!ility is, it seems, a )niversal "enerali4ation of the conventional form, still the ar")ment 8 *ant to make for the necessity of some nonstandard forms in the !ack"ro)nd !ears on it 5)st as forcef)lly as on the more a!stract la* that seems directly to descri!e nat)res. As *ith the hi"her+level la*, so too, *ith the lo*er+level: if *e

*ant to )nderstand *hy *e are entitled to accept this la* on s)ch a thin ind)ctive !ase as the 9ravity Pro!e3s fo)r "yroscopes, and if *e *ant to )nderstand the painstakin" details of desi"n the e7perimenters la!or over to prod)ce the conditions of the la*, *e *ill have to )se the idea of a nat)re, or some related non+?)mean notion. ; && ; 8ndeed, 8 *ant to make a fairly stron" claim here. 8n the order of "enerality, the lo*+level "enerali4ation a!o)t *hat happens in 5)st this kind of e7perimental set)p comes first, and the more a!stract claim a!o)t the "eneral nat)re of the co)plin" comes second. Je tend to think that the order of *arrant is parallel: the lo*+level "enerali4ation comes first and is most sec)reD the more a!stract la* derives *hat *arrant it "ets from the acceptance of the "enerali4ation. 8 *ant to )r"e that there is an aspect of *arrantin" for *hich this pict)re is )pside do*n. 8t is 5)st to the e7tent that *e ackno*led"e that the e7periment is *ell desi"ned to find o)t the nat)res of the interaction, descri!ed in the hi"her+ level la*, that *e are entitled to accept the lo*+level "enerali4ation on the !asis of the e7perimental res)lts.M%N (his is the central ar")ment *ith *hich this section !e"an. B)t it !ears repeatin" no* that the distinction !et*een lo*+level la*s, in the form of "enerali4ations, and hi"h+level a!stractions has !een dra*n. :ost sit)ations do not "ive rise to re")lar !ehavior. B)t *e can make ones that do. (o do so, *e deploy facts a!o)t the sta!le nat)res of the processes *e manip)late, and the circ)mstances that *ill allo* these nat)res either to act )nimpeded or to s)ffer only impediments that can have a sta!le and predicta!le effect. Jhen *e have s)ch a sit)ation, *e are entitled to "enerali4e from even a sin"le case. M&N (he philosophical )nderpinnin" that s)pports these claims is a more radical shift from the pict)re in *hich the conventional vie* of la*s is em!edded than 8 have admitted so far. (he conventional vie* sees la*s as )niversal "enerali4ations and th)s takes re")larities as "iven in @at)re, as the thin"s that @at)re sets, !y la*. 8 *ant to )r"e that not only m)st *e admit nat)res into o)r scientific *orld pict)re, contrary to ?)mean predilections, !)t in a sense *e m)st eliminate re")larities. (hese are, after all, very rareFat least *hen *e foc)s on <)antitatively e7act !ehavior of the kind *e st)dy in physicsM0N Fand *hen they occ)r, either nat)rally or as a res)lt of h)man contrivance, they can very pla)si!ly !e seen as the conse<)ence of partic)larly fort)nate arran"ements that allo* the processes involved to play o)t their sta!le nat)res in their occ)rrent !ehavior. Het)rn no* to the t*o senses of repeata!ility. (he first sense is internal to the specific e7periment and !ears on the lo*+level "enerali4ation that is instanced there. (he second sense crosses e7periments and !ears on the hi"h+level, a!stract principle that is esta!lished: the res)lts of an e7periment sho)ld !e repeata!le in the sense that the hi"h+level principles inferred from a partic)lar e7periment sho)ld !e !orne o)t in different e7periments of different kinds. 8n 'ature-s .apacities and /heir Measure#ent , this kind of repeata!ility played a central role in ar")in" for the a!stract character of o)r hi"h+level la*s in physics and for the claim that these a!stract la*s descri!e *hat 8 here call 6nat)res.6M'N ,o*+ level "enerali4ation is not eno)"h. 8t is too tied to the specific details of the partic)lar e7perimentD a "enerali4ation a!o)t *hat occ)rs there simply does not cover *hat occ)rs else*here. ; &0 ; Je mi"ht think that the pro!lem arises merely from the fact that the lan")a"e of these lo*+level la*s is not a!stract eno)"h: *e sho)ld not !e talkin" a!o)t *hat happens to a spherically homo"eneo)s !all of

f)sed <)art4, coated *ith a s)percond)ctor and spinnin", electroma"netically s)spended, in midair. Hather, *e sho)ld talk a!o)t a "yroscope, and ho* it precesses. -till the move to more a!stract lan")a"e *ill not permit )s to retain the simple, )npro!lematic form of a )niversal "enerali4ation. Bor *e do not *ant to record *hat all "yroscopes facin" a si"nificant space+time c)rvat)re do . Hather, *e *ant to record *hat part the c)rvat)re+co)plin" contri!)tes to ho* a "yroscope precesses, no matter *hat, in the end, vario)s and differently sit)ated "yroscopes do. As 8 descri!ed in section 2, that is the core of the analytic method. (he point is that *e *ant to learn somethin" from an e7periment that is transporta!le to entirely ne* sit)ations *here <)ite different circ)mstances o!tain. Je do that not !y constr)ctin" s)per+a!stract "enerali4ations !)t rather !y learnin" the nat)re of the pieces from *hich the ne* sit)ations are !)ilt. 8 *ill not d*ell on this ar")ment. :ore a!o)t it can !e fo)nd in 'ature-s .apacities . (he ar")ment 8 have *anted to make here is different. 8n 'ature-s .apacities , 8 ar")e that *e need somethin" like nat)res if *e are to "enerali4e in the second senseFto infer from the res)lts of one e7periment some kind of la* that can cover other sit)ations as *ell. ?ere, 8 *ant to )r"e that *e need the notion of nat)res to "enerali4e in the first sense as *ellFto infer from the res)lts of the e7periment some "eneral la* that descri!es *hat happens, 5)st in this e7perimental sit)ation, *henever the e7periment is r)n a"ain. Het)rnin" to the remarks at the !e"innin" of this section, 8 may p)t the point another *ay. ?o* do *e kno* *hich "enerali4ation, in this lo*+level sense, the e7periment is testin"= @ot every feat)re of it is necessary to ens)re its repeata!ility. (he ans*er re<)ires the notion of nat)res: the feat)res that are necessary are e7actly those *hich, in this very specific concrete sit)ation, allo* the nat)re of the process )nder st)dy to e7press itself in some reada!le *ay. @o *eaker acco)nt *ill do. Jitho)t the concept of nat)res *e have no *ay of kno*in" *hat it is that *e are testin".

6. 5o ObCections
8 have !een ar")in" that in order to )nderstand *hat makes e7periments special, *hat ens)res that *e can "enerali4e from them, *e m)st employ concepts rep)"nant to a ?)mean, s)ch as nat)re, po*er, impediment, operation. (he most o!vio)s responses for a ?)mean to make *o)ld !e either that the 5o! can !e e<)ally *ell done !y referrin" only to 6occ)rrent properties6 and their re")lar associations or else that this is a 5o! that does not need to !e done. a . Consider the first o!5ection. Je *ant to fi")re o)t *hat factors are relevantF*hat factors need to !e controlled in a "iven e7periment if that e7+ ; &' ; periment is to !e replica!le. 8ma"ine, for the sake of ar")ment, that *e have availa!le an entire re"ister of all la*like re")larities and that *e are not "oin" to <)i!!le a!o)t the fact that most of these are as forei"n to o)r *orld as )nicorns. ?o* are *e to deploy them= Jhat do *e do to determine from this re"ister *hether a "iven factor in o)r e7periment is relevant or not, and needs to !e controlled= 8 s)ppose the proced)re envisa"ed !y the ?)mean is, very ro)"hly, this: take all those la*s *hose conse<)ents descri!e the same kind of !ehavior .for e7ample, precessin" in a "yroscope2 as that of the la* *e *ish to infer from o)r e7perimentD any factor that appears in the antecedents of one of these la*s is a relevant factorFthat is, a factor that m)st !e controlled in any e7periment to test the la* at hand. B)t at *hich level of la* are *e to cond)ct o)r search= At the lo*er level, there are a very "reat n)m!er of la*s indeed. 9yroscopes of all shapes and materials and forms can precess, or fail to precess, in an inconceiva!le n)m!er of different determinate

*ays in a plentit)de of different circ)mstances. (he conditions are too n)mero)s. (hey "ive )s too many factors to control. I)r e7periments *o)ld !e )ndoa!le, and the la*s they entitle *o)ld !e narro*ed in scope !eyond all reco"nition. B)t there is a deeper pro!lem: ho* are these la*s to !e read= Bor the ?)mean, they m)st !e the so)rce of information a!o)t not only *hat factors are to !e controlled !)t in e7actly *hat *ay. Let they cannot tell )s that, for ho* a factor operates, at this very concrete level, is far too conte7t+dependent. 8 "ive some e7amples of this kind of conte7t dependence else*here.M/N B)t 8 think the point is easy to see. (o kno* e7actly *hat to do *ith the s)percond)ctin" coatin" in the 9ravity Pro!e, one needs to kno* a!o)t the detailed constr)ction of that partic)lar e7perimentD and the la*s one *ants to look at are not more la*s a!o)t precessions !)t rather la*s a!o)t s)percond)ctors. (he point is not *hether these f)rther la*s are ?)mean in form or not !)t rather, ho* is the ?)mean to kno* to look at them= Jhat is the prescription that sorts from amon" all the factors that appear in all the )niversal "enerali4ations tr)e in the *orld, *hich ones are to !e fi7ed, and ho*, in this partic)lar e7periment= Perhaps the ans*er comes one level )p. ?ere 8 think is *here *e "et the idea that there mi"ht !e a relatively small n)m!er of fi7ed, pro!a!ly artic)la!le, factors that are relevant. Je may think in terms of forces, ho* fe* in kind they areD or of lon" lists of ca)ses and preventives. Jhat is cr)cial is that at the a!stract level, conte7t seems irrelevant. Either it is or it is not the case that ma"netic fields deflect char"ed particlesD or that, as <)ant)m mechanics teaches, an inversion in a pop)lation of molec)les can ca)se lasin". Perhaps *e can even find a s)fficiently a!stract la* so that the pro!lem seems to evaporate. Bor e7ample, if *e are thinkin" of an e7periment *here the effect *e look for involves particle motions, *e t)rn to the la* B R ma, and that tells )s that *e m)st control all so)rces of force. 8n the "yroscope e7periment, the la* of ; &/ ; choice in this case *o)ld !e

*hich "ives the drift rate

of a "yrospin vector as a f)nction of the total tor<)e .0r 2 e7erted on the "yro alon" *ith its moment of inertia .82, and its spin an")lar velocity .%s 2. Brom this *e learn: control all so)rces of tor<)e e7cept that d)e to the relativistic co)plin", as *ell as any so)rces of deviation in the an")lar velocity and in the moment of inertia. (he diffic)lty *ith this advice is that it does not 5)stify the replica!ility *e e7pect )nless *e 5oin to it a commitment to sta!le po*ers of the kind 8 have !een callin" nat)res, or somethin" very m)ch like them. (o see *hy, ima"ine a sin"le s)ccessf)l r)n of the e7periment, s)ccessf)l in the sense that first, *e have indeed mana"ed to set the total net tor<)e, !arrin" that d)e to relativistic co)plin", e<)al to 4eroFor, as the 9ravity Pro!e hopes to do, at least to an order of ma"nit)de lo*er than that predicted for the relativistic effectD and second, it t)rns o)t that the o!served precession is 5)st that predicted. Je seem to have s)cceeded in "ivin" a p)rely ?)mean receipt for *hen to "enerali4e, and this case fits. Ho)"hly, *e can "enerali4e the <)antitative relation *e see !et*een a desi"nated inp)t .here the relativistic co)plin"2 and the precession act)ally o!served in a "iven sit)ation if that sit)ation sets the

remainin" net tor<)e e<)al to 4ero .or, more realistically, calc)lates it a*ay2, *here the rationale for pickin" net tor(ue 1 2 as the relevant feat)re comes from the 6?)mean association6 recorded in the f)nctional la* that descri!es the si4e of precessions. (he pro!lem is that this does not "et )s the detailed "enerali4ation *e e7pect .at the first, lo*er level2. (he 9ravity+Pro!e team has *orked hard to set the total net tor<)e e7tremely lo*, !y a lar"e n)m!er of specific hard+*on desi"nsD and they are entitled to think that the res)lts are replica!le in that e7perimental desi"n. Jhat the ?)mean prescription entitles them to is *eaker. 8t "ives them the ri"ht to e7pect only that on any occasion *hen the net nonrelativistic tor<)e is 4ero, the precession *ill !e the val)e predicted from the "eneral theory of relativity. B)t *e e7pect the more concrete "eneral claim to hold as *ell. Consider the ta!le of desi"n re<)irements for the "yroscope e7periment .dia"ram 12. (he ta!le tells ho* controlled each foreseea!le so)rce of tor<)e m)st !e in order for the total e7traneo)s precession to !e an order of ma"nit)de smaller than that predicted from the relativistic co)plin". Each s)ch so)rceF rotor homo"eneity, rotor sphericity, ho)sin" sphericity, optim)m preload, and so onFpresents a special desi"n pro!lemD and for each, the e7periment has a special sol)tion. Usin" f)sed <)art4 to "et ma7im)m rotor homo"eneity is, for e7ample, the startin" point for the sol)tion of the first pro!lem. Jhat all this caref)l plannin", honin", and calc)lation entitles )s to is a far more concrete "enerali4ation than the one a!ove a!o)t .near2 4ero ; &9 ;

Cia"ram #.1 Cesi"n He<)irements for a Helativity 9yroscope *ith ,imitin" Acc)racy of $.& Y 1$110 rad sec .$.# milliarc+sec year2 .Brom C. J. B. Everitt, coordinator, Report an a Progra# to ,e&elop a 0yro /est of 0eneral Relati&ity M-tanford, Calif.: J. J. ?ansen ,a!oratories, -tanford University, 19/$N.2 ; 0$ ; e7ternal tor<)e. Je are entitled to infer from a s)ccessf)l r)n that in any e7periment of this very specific desi"n, the o!served precession sho)ld !e that predicted !y the "eneral theory of relativity.M9N (he ta!le of re<)irements hi"hli"hts the analytic nat)re of this kind of e7periment, *hich 8 disc)ssed in section 2. Jhat happens if somethin" "oes *ron" *ith the rotor ho)sin" as it *as ori"inally planned, and the fa)lt cannot !e repaired= Jith a lot of effort, the Pro!e team *ill make a ne* desi"n and slot it into the old "eneral scheme, makin" appropriate chan"es. Beca)se *e are *orkin" in a domain *here *e tr)st analytic methods, a pec)liar kind of side*ays ind)ction is *arranted: from the s)ccessf)l r)n *ith the ori"inal desi"n pl)s o)r confidence in the ne* rotor ho)sin" and its placement, *e are entitled to infer a second, hi"hly specific 6lo*+level6 "enerali4ation to the effect that the precession in sit)ations meetin" the ne* desi"n *ill !e that predicted for relativistic co)plin" as *ell. A"ain, the ne* sit)ation *ill indeed !e one that falls )nder the 6?)mean6 "enerali4ation involvin" 4ero tor<)es. Jhat is missin" is the connection. (he ne* sit)ation is one of very small e7traneo)s tor<)eD !)t the e7pectation that it sho)ld !e cannot !e read from the re")larities of nat)re.

(he re")larity theorist is th)s faced *ith a dilemma. 8n lo*+level, hi"hly concrete "enerali4ations, the factors are too intert*ined to teach )s *hat *ill and *hat *ill not !e relevant in a ne* desi"n. (hat 5o! is properly done in physics )sin" far more a!stract characteri4ations. (he tro)!le is that once *e have clim!ed )p into this a!stract level of la*, *e have no device *ithin a p)re re")larity acco)nt to clim! !ack do*n a"ain. ! . (he second ar")ment is a more transcendental one. 8t does not attempt to sho* ho* it is possi!le to fi7 relevance in a *orld *itho)t nat)res !)t rather that it m)st !e possi!le to do so. 8 !orro* the form from ar")ments made !y Bas van Braassen and !y Arth)r Bine in de!atin" more "eneral <)estions of scientific realism. (he ar")ment pres)pposes that *e can make availa!le a p)re data !ase, cleansed of nat)res and their non+?)mean relatives. (he o!5ection "oes like this: 6Lo), Cart*ri"ht, *ill defend the desi"n of a "iven e7periment !y talkin" a!o)t *hat impedes and *hat facilitates the e7pression of the nat)re in <)estion. 8 take it this is not idle faith !)t that in each case yo) *ill have reasons for that 5)d"ment. (hese reasons m)st )ltimately !e !ased not in facts a!o)t nat)res, *hich yo) cannot o!serve, !)t in facts a!o)t act)al !ehavior, *hich yo) can. Ince yo) have told me these reasons, 8 sho)ld !e a!le to avoid the di"ression thro)"h nat)res and move directly to the appropriate concl)sions a!o)t relevance. (alk of nat)res may provide a convenient *ay to encode information a!o)t !ehaviors, !)t so lon" as *e insist that scientific claims !e "ro)nded in *hat can !e o!served, this talk cannot contri!)te any ne* information.6 B)t *hat a!o)t this decontaminated data !ase= Jhere is it in o)r e7peri+ ; 01 ; ence= 8t is a philosophical constr)ction, a piece of metaphysics, a *ay to interpret the *orld. If co)rse, *e cannot do *itho)t interpretation. B)t this constr)ction is far more removed from o)r everyday e7perience of the *orld as *e interact *ith it and descri!e it to others than are homely tr)ths a!o)t tri""erin" mechanisms, precipitatin" factors, impediments, and the like *hich mark o)t the domain of nat)res. Consider an adaptation of van Braassen3s o!5ection to ca)ses, *hich is a version of essentially the same ar")ment. (he o!5ection proceeds from the ass)mption that there is some defensi!le notion of a sensi!le property *hich is concept)ally and lo"ically distinct from any ideas connected *ith nat)res. Je are then confronted *ith a challen"e to e7plain *hat difference nat)res make: 68ma"ine a *orld identical *ith o)r o*n in all occ)rrences of its sensi!le <)alities thro)"ho)t its history. ?o* *o)ld that *orld differ from o)r *orld=6 In one readin", this ar")ment may !e a!o)t se<)ences not of properties in the *orld !)t of o)r e7periences of the *orld. (hese se<)ences are to remain the same, !)t *e are to ima"ine that they are not ca)sed in the )s)al *ay !y *hat is "oin" on in the *orld aro)nd )s. (his readin" cannot !e the one intended, tho)"h, since it does not c)t in the ri"ht *ay, revealin" special virt)es for descriptions like 3is red3 or 3is a 5et+stream trail3 in contrast *ith ones like 3has the po*er to relieve headaches3 or 3attracts others, <)a char"ed3. 8 mi"ht f)rther !e invited to inspect my e7periences and to notice that they are 6really6 e7periences of s)ccessions of color patches, say, *ith po*ers no*here to !e fo)nd. (he philosophical dialo")e alon" this line is *ell rehearsedD 8 merely point in the familiar directions. :y e7periences are of people and ho)ses and pinchin"s and aspirins, all thin"s *hich 8 )nderstand, in lar"e part, in terms of their nat)res. 8 do not have any ra* e7perience of a ho)se as a patch*ork of colors. Even *ith respect to colors, my e7perience is of properties like red, *hose nat)re it is to look specific *ays in specific circ)mstances. -ense data, or the gi&en , are metaphysical constr)cts *hich, )nlike nat)res, play no role in testa!le scientific claims. Ince there *as a hope to mark o)t amon" e7perience some ra* pieces !y )sin" an

epistemolo"ical yardstick: the 6real6 e7periences *ere the infalli!le ones. After a "reat deal of de!ate it is not clear *hether this criterion even lets in claims a!o)t felt painsD !)t it s)rely does not distin")ish claims like 3(he stripes are red3 from 3Lo)r pinchin" makes my arm h)rt3. (he contemporary version of this ar")ment tends, for these reasons, not to !e in terms of sense e7periences !)t in terms of sensi!le properties. B)t here there is a very simple reply. A *orld *ith all the same sensi!le properties as o)rs *o)ld already !e a *orld *ith nat)res. As 8 remarked a!ove, redness is the property *hose nat)re, amon" other thin"s, is to look 5)st this *ay in normal circ)mstances, and to look systematically different *hen the circ)mstances are systematically varied. Perhaps *e are misled here !y carryin" over the concl)sions of an earlier ; 02 ; metaphysics, concl)sions for *hich the premises have !een discarded. (hese premises involve the doctrine of impressions and ideas. 8n the immediately post+Cartesian philosophy of the British empiricists, sensi!le properties co)ld !e picked o)t !eca)se they looked like their impressions. 9a4e at the first stripe on the American fla": redness is the property that looks like that . Je do not have this copy theoryD so *e do not have properties that are identified like that. Correlatively, *e can no lon"er make the same distinction separatin" po*ers and their properties as did these seventeenth+cent)ry empiricists. In their doctrine, the *ay thin"s looked co)ld "et copied in the perceiver3s impressions of themD !)t the vario)s po*ers of a property co)ld not. -ince their ideas *ere copies of their impressions, necessarily their *orld, as ima"ed, had only inert properties. B)t *e do not have the copy theory of impressions, nor do *e adopt this simple theory of concept formation. Bor )s, there are properties, and all properties have po*ers. .Perhaps, follo*in" -ydney -hoemaker, they are all 5)st con"lomerates of po*ers: cf. Identity, .ause, and Mind MCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19/%N, chap. 1$.2 Jhat they are is "iven not !y ho* they look !)t !y *hat they do. Jhen *e )se a partic)lar po*er *ord to descri!e a property, *e foc)s on one specific aspect of *hat it can accomplish. Jhen *e )se an 6occ)rrent6 or 6sensi!le6 predicate, *e refer to the property *itho)t hi"hli"htin" any one thin" it does, or any one partic)lar *ay of identifyin" it. (hat is only a very ro)"h characteri4ation of the r)les of )se. B)t it points to the fact 8 *ant to stress: the distinction is one in lan")a"e and in *hat *e *ant to accomplish on specific occasions !y )sin" that lan")a"e. Predicates can !e ro)"hly divided into typesD !)t properties and po*ers are not separa!le in that *ay. (he <)estion of 6?o* does the ?)me *orld differ from o)rs=6 may have made sense for ,ocke, Berkeley, and ?)meD !)t *itho)t the copy theory of impressions and the related associationist theory of concept formation, no*adays it has an entirely trivial ans*er.

7. # /istorical Illustration
-o far, 8 have co)ched the disc)ssion in terms of makin" ind)ctions from paltry samples, and that is !eca)se ind)ction is the method that ?)means sho)ld favor for confirmin" la*s. 8 think, tho)"h, that the process is far !etter )nderstood as one of ded)ctionD *e accept la*s on apparently slim e7perimental !ases e7actly *hen *e can take for "ranted s)ch stron" !ack"ro)nd ass)mptions that ."iven these ass)mptions2 the data pl)s the description of the e7perimental set)p ded)ctively imply the la* to !e esta!lished. Pro!a!ly the most prominent advocate of a ded)ctive method in reasonin" from e7periment to la* is 8saac @e*ton. 8 think it *ill !e helpf)l to look !riefly at @e*ton3s )se of the 6cr)cial e7periment6 in his theory of li"ht and colors, and more partic)larly at 9oethe3s criticisms of it. @e*ton3s experi#entu# crucis is descri!ed in his first letter in 10'1 to the

; 0# ; Hoyal -ociety in *hich he introd)ces his theory that *hite li"ht consists of diverse rays of different refran"i!ility .that is, they are !ent !y different amo)nts *hen the li"ht passes thro)"h a prism2 and that color is a property of the ray *hich depends on its refran"i!ility. (he *ork reported in the letter is "enerally taken as a model of scientific reasonin". (homas >)hn, for instance, claims that 6@e*ton3s e7perimental doc)mentation of his theory is a classic in its simplicity.6 Accordin" to >)hn, the opposition vie* mi"ht event)ally have acco)nted for some of the data that appeared to ref)te it, 6!)t ho* co)ld they have evaded the implications of the experi#entu# crucis = An innovator in the sciences has never stood on s)rer "ro)nd6 .6@e*ton3s Iptical Papers,6 in Isaac 'e%ton-s Papers and Letters , ed. 8. B. Cohen MCam!rid"e, :ass.: ?arvard University Press, 19&/N, #02. 8t is important to keep in mind that @e*ton !elieved that his claims *ere pro&ed !y his e7periments. ?e claims 6the (heory, *hich 8 propo)nded, *as evinced !y me, not inferrin" tis th)s !eca)se not other*ise, that is, not !y ded)cin" it only from a conf)tation of contrary s)ppositions !)t !y derivin" it from e7periments concl)din" positively and directly.6 Ir, 68f the E7periments, *hich 8 )r"e, !e defective, it cannot !e diffic)lt to sho* the defectsD !)t if valid, then !y provin" the theory they m)st render all o!5ections invalid.6 Ine last remark to ill)strate the steadfastness of @e*ton3s vie*s on the role of the experi#entu# crucis in provin" this claim appears in @e*ton3s letter of 10'0, fo)r years after his initial report to the Hoyal -ociety. (his letter concerned the diffic)lties Anthony ,)cas had reported in tryin" to d)plicate @e*ton3s e7periments and also some of ,)cas3s o*n res)lts that contradicted @e*ton3s claims. @e*ton replies, 6Let it *ill cond)ce to his more speedy and f)ll satisfaction if he a little chan"e the method he has propo)nded, and instead of a m)ltit)de of thin"s try only the Experi#entu# .rucis . Bor it is not n)m!er of e7periments, !)t *ei"ht to !e re"ardedD and *here one *ill do, *hat need many=6 9oethe3s point of vie* is entirely opposite to @e*ton3s: 6As *orth*hile as each individ)al e7periment may !e, it receives its real val)e only *hen )nited or com!ined *ith other e7periments . . . 8 *o)ld vent)re to say that *e cannot prove anythin" !y one e7periment or even several e7periments to"ether6 .6(he E7periment as :ediator !et*een I!5ect and -)!5ect,6 in Johann Jolf"an" von 9oethe, Scientific Studies , ed. and tr. Co)"las :iller M@e* Lork: -)hrkamp, 19//N2. Bor 9oethe, all phenomena are connected to"ether, and it is essential to follo* thro)"h from each e7periment to another that 6lies ne7t to it or derives directly from it.6 Accordin" to 9oethe, 6(o follo* every sin"le e7periment thro)"h its variations is the real task of the scientific researcher.6 (his is ill)strated in his o*n *ork in optics *here he prod)ces lon" series of 6conti")o)s6 e7periments, each of *hich is s)""ested !y the one !efore it. (he point is not to find some sin"le set of circ)mstances that are special !)t rather to lay o)t all the variations in the phenomena as the circ)mstances chan"e in a ; 0% ; systematic *ay. (hen one m)st come to see all the interrelated e7periments to"ether and )nderstand them as a *hole, 6a sin"le piece of e7perimental evidence e7plored in its manifold variations.6 9oethe is sharp in his criticisms of @e*ton. (*o different kinds of criticism are most relevant here. (he first is that @e*ton3s theory fails to acco)nt for all the phenomena it sho)ld, and that that is no s)rprise since @e*ton failed to look at the phenomena )nder a s)fficient ran"e of variation of circ)mstance. -econd, @e*ton3s inferences from the e7periments he did make *ere not validD the experi#entu# crucis is a case in point. (he chief fa)lt *hich 9oethe finds *ith @e*ton3s inferences is one that co)ld not arise in 9oethe3s method. @e*ton selects a sin"le revealin" e7periment to theori4e

fromD since he does not see ho* the phenomena chan"e thro)"h 9oethe3s lon" se<)ence of e7periments, he does not reco"ni4e ho* variation in circ)mstance affects the o)tcome: 6M@e*ton3sN chief error consisted in too <)ickly and hastily settin" aside and denyin" those <)estions that chiefly relate to *hether e7ternal conditions cooperate in the appearance of color, *itho)t lookin" more e7actly into the pro7imate circ)mstances6 .Cennis ,. -epper, 0oethe contra 'e%ton MCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19//N, 1%%2. (he cr)cial e7periment involves refractin" a !eam of li"ht thro)"h a prism, *hich elon"ates the initial narro* !eam and 6!reaks6 it into a colored !andFviolet at the top, red at the !ottom. (hen differently colored portions of the elon"ated !eam are refracted thro)"h a second prism. Consider dia"ram 2, *hich is taken from Cennis ,. -epper3s st)dy, 0oethe contra 'e%ton . 8n all cases, the color is preserved, !)t at one end of the elon"ated !eam the second refracted !eam is elon"ated more than it is at the other. 8n each case, there is no difference in the *ay in *hich the li"ht falls on the prism for the second refraction. @e*ton immediately concl)des, 6And so the tr)e ca)se of the len"th of the ima"e *as detected to !e no other than that light consists of rays differently refrangi!le 6 .@e*ton3s first letter to the Hoyal -ociety, 10'12. Je sho)ld think a!o)t this inference in the conte7t of my earlier c)rsory description of the modern version of the ded)ctive method, called !ootstrappin" !y Clark 9lymo)r, *ho has !een its champion in recent de!ates. 8n the !ootstrappin" acco)nt, *e infer from an e7perimental o)tcome to a scientific la*, as @e*ton does, !)t only a"ainst a !ackdrop of rather stron" ass)mptions. -ome of these ass)mptions *ill !e fact)al ones a!o)t the specific arran"ements madeFfor e7ample, that the an"le of the prism *as 0#ZD some *ill !e more "eneral claims a!o)t ho* the e7perimental apparat)s *orksFthe theory of condensation in a clo)d cham!er, for instanceD some *ill !e more "eneral claims stillFfor e7ample, all motions are prod)ced !y forcesD and some *ill !e metaphysical, s)ch as the 6same ca)se, same effect6 principle mentioned in section #. (he same is tr)e of @e*ton3s inference. 8t may !e a perfectly valid inference, !)t there are repressed premises. 8t is the repressed premises that 9oethe does not like. In 9oethe3s vie* of nat)re, they are not ; 0& ;

Cia"ram #.2 .Brom Cennis ,. -epper 0oethe contra 'e%ton M.Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19//N.2 ; 00 ; only !adly s)pported !y the evidenceD they are false. Colors, like all else in 9oethe3s *orld,M1$N are a conse<)ence of the action of opposites, in this case li"ht and darkness: Je see on the one side li"ht, the !ri"htD on the other darkness, the darkD *e !rin" *hat is t)r!id !et*een the t*o Ms)ch as a prism or a semitransparent sheet of paperN, and o)t of these opposites, *ith the help of this mediation, there develop, like*ise in an opposition, colors. ./heory of .olors , didactic part, para"raph 1'&2 @e*ton3s ar")ment re<)ires, !y contrast, the ass)mption that the tendency to prod)ce colors is entirely in the nat)re of the li"ht, and that is *hy this disp)te is of relevance to my point here. As -epper says, for @e*ton 6the ca)se is to !e so)"ht only in the li"ht itself.6

,et )s t)rn to @e*ton3s reasonin". (he ar")ment is pla)si!le, so lon" as one is not lookin" for ded)ctive certainty. Brom @e*ton3s point of vie* .tho)"h not from that of 9oethe, *ho ima"ines a far richer set of possi!ilities2, the t*o hypotheses to !e decided !et*een are: .a2 somethin" that happens involvin" *hite li"ht in the prism prod)ces colored li"htD or .!2 colored li"ht is already enterin" the prism in the first place. Je can see the force of the ar")ment !y thinkin" in terms of inp)ts and o)tp)ts. ,ook at *hat happens to, say, the violet li"ht in the second prism .dia"ram #2:

Cia"ram #.#. Compare this *ith the prod)ction of violet li"ht in the first prism .dia"ram %2:

Cia"ram #.%. ; 0' ; 8n !oth cases, the o)tp)ts are the same. (he simplest acco)nt seems to !e that the prism f)nctions in the same *ay in !oth cases: it 5)st transports the colored li"ht thro)"h, !endin" it in accord *ith its fi7ed de"ree of refran"i!ility. Consider an analo"o)s case. Lo) o!serve a lar"e, lo* !)ildin". Colored cars drive thro)"h. Cars of different colors have different fi7ed t)rnin" radii. Lo) o!serve for each color that there is a fi7ed and color+dependent an"le !et*een the tra5ectory on *hich the car enters the !)ildin", and the tra5ectory on *hich it e7itsD moreover, this is 5)st the an"le to !e e7pected if the cars *ere driven thro)"h the !)ildin" *ith steerin" *heels locked to the far left. Besides cars, other vehicles enter the !)ildin", coveredD and each time a covered vehicle enters, a colored car e7its shortly after*ard. 8t e7its at 5)st that an"le that *o)ld !e appropriate had the ori"inal incomin" vehicle !een a car of the same color driven thro)"h *ith its steerin" *heel locked. (*o hypotheses are offered a!o)t *hat "oes on inside the !)ildin". Both hypotheses treat the incomin" colored cars in the same *ay: on enterin" the !)ildin", their steerin" *heels "et locked and then they are driven thro)"h. (he t*o hypotheses differ, ho*ever, a!o)t the covered vehicles. (he first hypothesis ass)mes that these, too, are colored cars. 8nside the !)ildin" they "et )n*rapped, and then they are treated 5)st like all the other colored cars. (he second hypothesis is more am!itio)s. 8t envisa"es that the lo* !)ildin" contains an entire car factory. (he covered vehicles contain ra* material, and inside the !)ildin" there are not only people *ho lock steerin" *heels, !)t a *hole cre* of Biat *orkers and machinery t)rnin" ra* materials into cars. I!vio)sly, the first hypothesis is simpler, !)t it has more in its favor than that. Bor so far, the second hypothesis has not e7plained *hy the man)fact)red cars e7it at the an"le they do, relative to their incomin" ra* materialsD and there seems to !e no immediate nat)ral acco)nt to "ive on the second story. (r)e, the cars are man)fact)red *ith fi7ed t)rnin" radii, !)t *hy sho)ld they leave the factory at 5)st the same an"le relative to the cart that carries in their ra* materials as a drive+thro)"h does relative to its line of entry= After all, the man)fact)red car has come to e7ist only some*here *ithin the factory, and even if its steerin" *heel is locked, it seems a pec)liar coincidence sho)ld that res)lt in 5)st the ri"ht e7it point to yield the re<)ired an"le vis+W+vis the ra* materials. 8n this case, !arrin" other information, the first, @e*tonian, hypothesis seems the s)perior. (he caveat, 6!arrin" other information,6 is central, of co)rse, to 9oethe3s attack. Bor, as 8 have already remarked, 9oethe *as

appalled at the small amo)nt of information that @e*ton collected, and he ar")ed that @e*ton3s claim *as in no *ay ade<)ate to cover the totality of the phenomena. Jhat looks to !e the !est hypothesis in a sin"le case can certainly look very different *hen a *hole array of different cases have to !e considered. (he principal point to notice, for my p)rpose, is that the ar")ment is not at all ded)ctive. 8t can only !ecome so if *e already pres)ppose that *e are lookin" for some fi7ed feat)re in li"ht itself that *ill acco)nt for *hat comes ; 0/ ; o)t of the prismFsomethin", as 8 *o)ld say, in the nat)re of li"ht. Any ass)mption like this is deeply contrary to 9oethe3s point of vie*. (he first fe* para"raphs of @e*ton3s letter, !efore the introd)ction of the cr)cial e7periment, "ive some "ro)nds for s)ch an ass)mption on his partD 9oethe makes f)n of them: 8t is a fact that )nder those circu#stances that @e*ton e7actly specifies, the ima"e of the s)n is five times as lon" as it is *ide, and that this elon"ated ima"e appears entirely in colors. Every o!server can repeatedly *itness this phenomenon *itho)t any "reat effort. @e*ton himself tells )s ho* he *ent to *ork in order to convince himself that no external cause can !rin" this elon"ation and coloration of the ima"e. (his treatment of his *ill, as already *as mentioned a!ove, !e s)!5ected to criticism for *e can raise many <)estions and investi"ate *ith e7actness, *hether he *ent to *ork properly and to *hat e7tent his proof is in every sense complete. 8f one analy4es his reasons, they have the follo*in" form: Jhen the ray is refracted the ima"e is lon"er than it sho)ld !e accordin" to the la*s of refraction. @o* 8 have tried everythin" and there!y convinced myself that no e7ternal ca)se is responsi!le for this elon"ation. (herefore it is an inner ca)se, and this *e find in the divisi!ility of li"ht. Bor since it takes )p a lar"er space than !efore, it m)st divided, thro*n as)nderD and since *e see the s)ndered li"ht in colors, the different parts of it m)st !e colored. ?o* m)ch there is to o!5ect to immediately in this rationaleX M9oethe, 1'9#D <)oted from -epper, p. 1$1N (he contrast that 8 *ant to hi"hli"ht is !et*een @e*ton3s post)lation of an inner ca)se in li"ht vers)s 9oethe3s lon" and many+faceted ro* of e7periments. 9oethe often remarks that he and @e*ton !oth claim to !e concerned *ith colors D @e*ton after all la!els his acco)nt in the 10'1 letter his 6ne* theory of li"ht and colors.6 B)t, in act)ality, 9oethe points o)t, @e*ton3s *ork is almost entirely a!o)t the !ehavior of raysFthat is, a!o)t the inner nat)re of li"ht. 9oethe3s e7periments often involve li"ht, !)t it is not li"ht that he st)dies. (he e7periments descri!e entire interactin" comple7es, s)ch as evenin" li"ht enterin" a room thro)"h a hole in a *hite !lind on *hich a candle thro*s li"ht .6sno* seen thro)"h the openin" *ill then appear perfectly !l)e, !eca)se the paper is tin"ed *ith *arm yello* !y the candleli"ht6 M/heory of .olors , didactic part, para"raph '9N2, or s)nli"ht shinin" into a divin" !ell .in this case 6everythin" is seen in a red li"ht . . . *hile the shado*s appear "reen6 M/heory of .olors , didactic part, para"raph '/N2, or a partic)larly e7emplary case for the e7istence of colored shado*s, a pencil placed on a sheet of *hite paper !et*een a short, li"hted candle and a *indo* so

that the t*ili"ht from the *indo* ill)minates the pencil3s shado* from the candle .6the shado* *ill appear of the most !ea)tif)l !l)e6 M/heory of .olors , didactic part, para"raph 0&N2. Even *hen descri!ed from the point of vie* of 9oethe3s final acco)nt of color forma+ ; 09 ; tion, in the prism e7periments 9oethe is not lookin" at li"ht !)t rather at li"ht .or darkness2 +in+ interaction+*ith+a+t)r!id+medi)m. @e*ton foc)ses on his one special e7periment and maintains that the acco)nt of the phenomena in that e7periment *ill pinpoint an e7planation that is "enerali4a!le. (he feat)re that e7plains the phenomena in that sit)ation *ill e7plain phenomena in other sit)ationsD hence he looks to a feat)re that is part of the inner constit)tion of li"ht itself. (o place it in the inner constit)tion is to cast it not as an o!serva!le property characteristic of li"ht !)t rather as a po*er that reveals itself, if at all, in appropriately str)ct)red circ)mstances. (o descri!e it as part of li"ht3s constitution is to ascri!e a kind of permanence to the association: li"ht retains this po*er across a *ide variation in circ)mstanceFindeed, pro!a!ly so lon" as it remains li"ht. (hat is, 8 maintain, to treat it as an Aristotelian+style nat)re. (his is *hy @e*ton, )nlike 9oethe, can do*nplay the e7perimental conte7t. (he conte7t is there to elicit the nat)re of li"htD it is not an essential in"redient in the )ltimate str)ct)re of the phenomenon.

8. "onclusion
:y ar")ment in this paper hin"es on a not s)rprisin" connection !et*een methodolo"y and ontolo"y. 8f yo) *ant to find o)t ho* a scientific discipline pict)res the *orld, yo) can st)dy its la*s, its theories, its models, and its claimsFyo) can listen to *hat it says a!o)t the *orld. B)t yo) can also consider not 5)st *hat is said !)t *hat is done. ?o* *e choose to look at the *orld is 5)st as s)re a cl)e to *hat *e think the *orld is like as *hat *e say a!o)t it. :odern e7perimental physics looks at the *orld )nder precisely controlled or hi"hly contrived circ)mstancesD and in the !est of cases, one look is eno)"h. (hat, 8 claim, is 5)st ho* one looks for nat)res, and not ho* one looks for information a!o)t *hat thin"s do. 9oethe critici4es @e*ton for this same kind of proced)re that *e )se no*adays, and the disp)te !et*een them ill)strates my point. @e*ton3s concl)sions in his letter of 10'1, as *ell as thro)"ho)t his later *ork in optics, are a!o)t the inner constit)tion of li"ht. 8 claim that this st)dy of the inner constit)tion is a st)dy of an Aristotelian+style nat)re and that @e*ton3s )se of e7periment is s)ited to 5)st that kind of enterprise, *here the experi#entu# crucis is an especially strikin" case. (he colored rays, *ith their different de"rees of refran"i!ility, cannot !e immediately seen in *hite li"ht. B)t thro)"h the e7periment *ith the t*o prisms, the )nderlyin" nat)re e7presses itself in a clearly visi!le !ehavior: the colors are there to !e seen, and the p)rely dispositional property, degree3of3refrangi!ility , is manifested in the act)al an"le thro)"h *hich the li"ht is !ent. (he e7periment is !rilliantly constr)cted: the connection !et*een the nat)res and the !ehavior that is s)pposed to reveal them is so ti"ht that @e*ton takes it to !e ded)ctive. ; '$ ; 9oethe derides @e*ton for s)rveyin" so little evidence, and his *orries are not merely <)estions of e7perimental desi"n: perhaps @e*ton miscalc)lated, or mistakenly ass)med that the second prism *as identical in str)ct)re *ith the first, or @e*ton takes as simple *hat is not . . . 9oethe3s disa"reement

*ith @e*ton is not a matter of mere epistemolo"ical )ncertainty. 8t is rather a reflection of deep ontolo"ical differences. Bor 9oethe, all phenomena are the conse<)ence of interaction !et*een polar opposites. (here is nothin" in li"ht to !e isolated, no inner nat)re to !e revealed. @o e7periment can sho* in a sin"le !ehavior *hat li"ht does <)a li"ht, for !y itself there is nothin", no special sin"le thin" that it is in the nat)re of li"ht to do. (he empiricists of the scientific revol)tion *anted to o)st Aristotle entirely from the ne* learnin". 8 have ar")ed that they did no s)ch thin". 9oethe, !y contrast, did dispense *ith nat)resD there are none in his *orld pict)re. B)t there are, 8 maintain, in o)rs.

Four. 1enetic InferenceD # Reconsideration of ,a+id /umeEs Empiricism

Aarbara ,: -assey and 1erald J: -assey

'. /umeEs For0

Jhat co)ld !e more !anal than ?)me3s fork, the !if)rcation of o!5ects of in<)iry .tr)e propositions2 into relations of ideas and #atters of fact = -)rely historians have so thoro)"hly scr)tini4ed this cele!rated dichotomy that *e can !e confident of their deliverances on this topic. ,et )s revie*, then, the received vie* of ?)me3s fork. (r)e propositions like 3# times & e<)als one+half of #$3 and the Pytha"orean theorem e7press relations of ideas, *hile ones like 3Bire !)rns3 and 3(he s)n *ill rise tomorro*3 record matters of fact or real e7istence. Jhat is distinctive a!o)t a relation of ideas is that its ne"ation entails a contradiction. (he ne"ation of every matter+of+fact)al tr)th, in contrast, is conceiva!le and so does not entail a contradiction !eca)se *hatever is conceiva!le is possi!le. ?)me3s ta7onomy of tr)e propositions .o!5ects of in<)iry2 is clearly dis5oint and e7ha)stive: each tr)e proposition falls into one and only one of his t*o compartments. And that the classification is dichotomo)s, that is, necessarily dis5oint and e7ha)stive, can !e "rasped a priori !eca)se it is !ased on the presence or a!sence of a sin"le property, namely, conceiva!ility of the proposition3s ne"ation.M1N A"ainst the received vie* *e note that ?)me re")larly )ses his fork as if it speared all propositions, the false ones no less than the tr)e. Bor e7ample, he often makes the prior assessment that a "iven proposition is matter+of+fact)al or a relation of ideas an important part of his determination of its tr)th val)e, as in this passa"e from the first En(uiry : 8t is a <)estion of fact, *hether the perceptions of the senses !e prod)ced !y e7ternal o!5ects resem!lin" them. ?o* shall this <)estion !e determined= By e7perience s)rely, as all other <)estions of a like nat)re. B)t here e7perience is, ; '# ; and m)st !e entirely silent. (he mind has never any thin" present to it !)t the perceptions, and cannot possi!ly reach any e7perience of their conne7ion *ith o!5ects. (he s)pposition of s)ch a connection is, therefore, *itho)t any fo)ndation in reasonin".M2N B)t this is to ar")e in a circle and !ears *itness to a f)ndamental incoherence in ?)me3s system of

philosophy. @or is it clear that the classification is dichotomo)s even *hen limited to tr)e propositions. Perhaps ?)me did intend initially to make a tr)e proposition3s classification depend solely on the conceiva!ility of its ne"ation. 8f so, he soon for"ot his resolve. Bor *hether a proposition is matter+of+fact)al or a relation of ideas !ecomes for ?)me as m)ch a matter of ho* it can !e kno*n .via int)ition and demonstration or via o!servation and ca)sal inference2 as a matter of ho* its ne"ation can !e conceived. Bor the most part this am!ivalence ca)ses ?)me little discomfort, for the t*o *ays of )nderstandin" the classificatory !asis match )p pretty *ell. B)t *hen they fail to line )p, *atch o)tX And, )nl)ckily for ?)me, they do indeed sometimes fail to line )pFfor e7ample, in s)ch important cases as the alle"edly fact)al thesis of the do)!le e7istence of o!5ects and perceptions. G)ine3s doctrine that definitional stat)s is a passin" trait of the tr)ths of science s)rely took its inspiration from ver!al !ehavior like ?)me3sXM#N Je are told that ?)me3s fork ans*ers tolera!ly *ell to o)r necessary contin"ent distinction and even to o)r a priori a posteriori distinction. B)rthermore, the story "oes, >ant pretty m)ch took over ?)me3s dichotomy *hile em!ellishin" it in t*o si"nificant *ays. Birst, he promoted strict )niversality and necessity as the marks of the a priori, that is, of relations of ideas. -econd, he s)!divided the a priori itself into analytic and synthetic, there!y settin" the sta"e for his famo)s interro"ative 6?o* are synthetic 5)d"ments a priori possi!le=6 B)t, as *e shall shortly see, >ant f)ndamentally mis)nderstood ?)me. >ant failed to see that ?)me, the champion of modern empiricism, himself posited fac)lties of synthetic a priori co"nition !eyond anythin" that he, >ant, ever dreamed of. >ant sho)ld perhaps not !e m)ch fa)lted for this latter oversi"ht, ho*ever. Bor, #ira!ile dictu , ?)me himself failed to take m)ch notice of the fac)lties of synthetic a priori co"nition *ith *hich he li!erally sprinkled his system of philosophy. -o, any*ay, *e *ill ar")e.

). /umeEs Vie5 of #nimals

,et3s !e"in o)r rethinkin" of ?)me3s fork !y remarkin" )pon a trait of Cavid ?)me that sets him apart from virt)ally all his contemporaries and predecessors and that has endeared him to animal lovers every*here, namely, his resol)te solidarity *ith 6!easts.6 @ever the species cha)vinist, ?)me sa* h)man !ein"s as animals amon" animals, distin")ished in certain *ays from !easts ; '% ; !)t only extrinsically marked off from them !y the "reater po*er and s)!tlety of shared co"nitive po*ers: @e7t to the ridic)le of denyin" an evident tr)th, is that of takin" m)ch pains to defend itD and no tr)th appears to me more evident, than that !easts are endo*3d *ith tho)"ht and reason as *ell as men. (he ar")ments are in this case so o!vio)s, that they never escape the most st)pid and i"norant. Je are conscio)s, that *e o)rselves, in adaptin" means to ends, are ")ided !y reason and desi"n, and that 3tis not i"norantly or cas)ally *e perform those actions, *hich tend to self+ preservation, to the o!tainin" pleas)re, and avoidin" pain. Jhen therefore *e see other creat)res, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to like ends, all of o)r principles of reason and pro!a!ility carry )s *ith an invinci!le force to !elieve the

e7istence of a like ca)se.M%N B)rther, ?)me notes that the three primitive relations of his associationist psycholo"y operate in animals no differently than in h)mans: . . . there is evidently the same relation of ideas, and deriv3d from the same ca)ses, in the minds of animals as in those of men. A do", that has hid a !one, often for"ets the placeD !)t *hen !ro)"ht to it, his tho)"ht passes easily to *hat he formerly conceal3d, !y means of the conti")ity, *hich prod)ces a relation amon" his ideas. 8n like manner, *hen he has !een heartily !eat in any place, he *ill trem!le on his approach to it, even tho3 he discover no si"ns of any present dan"er. (he effects of resem!lance are not so remarka!leD !)t as that relation makes a considera!le in"redient in ca)sation, of *hich all animals she* so evident a 5)d"ement, *e may concl)de that the three relations of resem!lance, conti")ity and ca)sation operate in the same manner )pon !easts as )pon h)man creat)res.M&N (he fact that h)man and animal !ehavior closely resem!le each other, and hence that the animal mind is like the h)man mind, f)rnishes )s *ith a kind of to)chstone, !y *hich *e may try every system in this species of philosophy. 3(is from the resem!lance of the e7ternal actions of animals to those *e o)rselves perform, that *e 5)d"e their internal like*ise to resem!le o)rs. . . . Jhen any hypothesis, therefore, is advanc3d to e7plain a mental operation, *hich is common to men and !easts, *e m)st apply the same hypothesis to !othD and as every tr)e hypothesis *ill a!ide this trial, so 8 may vent)re to affirm, that no false one *ill ever !e a!le to end)re it. M0N ?ere, then, is a philosopher *ho kno*s animals and takes them serio)sly. ?e prides himself on the alle"ed fact that his o*n philosophical system deals evenhandedly *ith h)mans and animals. ?e 5)stifies this pride !y a theory of evidence that characteri4es as !etter s)pported those systems that are evenhanded in the aforementioned respect. 8t may come as a shock, therefore, *hen *e demonstrate shortly that ?)me3s treatment of the co"nitive po*ers of h)mans and animals is decidedly asymmetrical. Even more s)rprisin"ly, *e *ill ; '& ; sho* that the im!alance favors !easts. :ore s)rprisin" still *ill !e the conse<)ences of this psycholo"ical asymmetry for ?)me3s system, and for >ant3s as *ell.M'N ?)me o!serves in the -ection 6If the reason of animals6 in Book 8 of the /reatise that: men are not astonish3d at the operations of their o*n reason, at the same time, that they admire the instinct of animals, and find a diffic)lty in e7plainin" it, merely !eca)se it cannot !e red)c3d to the very same principles. (o consider the matter ari"ht, reason is nothin" !)t a *onderf)l and )nintelli"i!le instinct in o)r so)ls, *hich carries )s alon" a certain train of ideas. . . . (his instinct, 3tis tr)e, arises from past o!servation and e7perienceD !)t can any one "ive the )ltimate reason, *hy past e7perience and o!servation prod)ces s)ch an effect, any more than *hy nat)re alone sho)3d prod)ce it= @at)re may certainly prod)ce *hatever can arise from ha!it: @ay, ha!it is nothin" !)t one of the principles of nat)re, and derives all its force from that ori"in.M/N ?)me3s *ritin"s are replete *ith talk of co"nitive instincts , co"nitive propensities , co"nitive inclinations , and the like. (hese instincts or propensities seem to come in t*o <)ite different varieties *hich *e *ill call generali+ed and speciali+ed . A "ood ill)stration of a "enerali4ed co"nitive instinct

is the ind)ctive propensity, the co"nitive instinct that ?)me has in mind in the passa"e 5)st cited. (he ind)ctive instinct determines )s to pass to the idea of B *hen presented *ith the idea of A, and to transfer vivacity from the idea of A to that of B, *hen *e have e7perienced a n)m!er of cases *here an A is follo*ed !y a B and no cases *here a B has failed to follo* an A. 8t is a propensity shared !y h)mans and animals alike. Ither "enerali4ed co"nitive instincts *ill !e en)merated presently and *ill !e fo)nd also to !e common to h)mans and animals. By speciali+ed cogniti&e instincts *e mean *hat people commonly refer to as instincts , that is, those co"nitive endo*ments responsi!le for comple7 !ehavior that is adaptive !)t )nlearned. ?)me descri!es the affinity of 6e7perimental reasonin",6 nota!ly the ind)ctive propensity, to the speciali4ed co"nitive instincts *ith an elo<)ence )ns)rpassed any*here in his *ritin"s: B)t tho)"h animals learn many parts of their kno*led"e from o!servation, there are also many parts of it, *hich they derive from the ori"inal hand of nat)reD *hich m)ch e7ceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasionsD and in *hich they improve, little or nothin", !y the lon"est practice and e7perience. (hese *e denominate 8@-(8@C(-, and are so apt to admire, as somethin" very e7traordinary, and ine7plica!le !y all the dis<)isitions of h)man )nderstandin". B)t o)r *onder *ill, perhaps, cease or diminishD *hen *e consider, that the e7perimental reasonin" itself, *hich *e possess in common *ith !easts, and on *hich the *hole cond)ct of life depends, is nothin" !)t a species of instinct or mechanical po*er, that acts in )s )nkno*n to o)rselvesD and in its chief operations, is not directed !y any s)ch relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the ; '0 ; proper o!5ects of o)r intellect)al fac)lties. (ho)"h the instinct !e different, yet still it is an instinct, *hich teaches a man to avoid the fireD as m)ch as that, *hich teaches a !ird, *ith s)ch e7actness, the art of inc)!ation, and the *hole economy and order of its n)rsery.M9N Bor ?)me, m)ch and perhaps even most animal $no%ledge is instinctive. -)ch kno*led"e is not learned or ac<)ired thro)"h e7perience. In the contrary, it is directly implanted in the animal !y a providential @at)re independently of e7perience. :odern etholo"y and contemporary co"nitive science s)pport ?)me3s contention. (he ne*!orn *ilde!eest ."n)2 does not have to learn that the lioness !earin" do*n on it is dan"ero)s, or that this circ)mstance calls for rapid locomotion in an opposite directionD it comes into the *orld ready+e<)ipped *ith s)ch vital information. Even more to o)r point, the neonatal *ilde!eest, )nlike the h)man infant, is not condemned to ac<)ire kno*led"e of its vis)al space e7perimentallyD it derives from the ori"inal hand of @at)re the spatial kno*led"e that the h)man !a!y m)st learn slo*ly and painf)lly. (hat is to say, m)ch that in h)mans is or *o)ld have to !e learned e7perimentally !y means of the ind)ctive instinct is possessed innately !y !easts. A "enero)s :other @at)re lavishes tr)e matter+of+fact)al !eliefs on animals, !)t she only !e"r)d"in"ly "rants h)mans a "enerali4ed co"nitive endo*ment !y means of *hich they can *rest from her those facts of life they m)st kno* to s)rvive. 8n short, ?)me3s @at)re f)nctions not as a solicito)s :other to the h)man species !)t as a cold -tepmother *ho sends her char"es into the *orld impoverished and )ninstr)cted to s)rvive on their *its alone. (hese decidedly ?)mean doctrines e7plode the myth of evenhandedness in ?)me3s psycholo"ical treatment of animals and h)mans. (r)e, !oth h)mans and animals possess "enerali4ed co"nitive endo*ments like the ind)ctive propensity, !)t only animals possess speciali4ed co"nitive endo*ments that afford them a priori kno*led"e of co)ntless matters of fact or real e7istence.

3. # Second $oo0 at /umeEs For0

Accordin" to the received vie*, ?)me championed e#piricis# !y demonstratin" that no matter of fact or real e7istence can !e kno*n a prioriD e7perience alone makes s)ch kno*led"e possi!le. Certainly, ?)me himself claims to have done 5)st this. B)t *e have seen that ?)me attri!)tes to animals a priori kno*led"e of matters of fact *ith a li!erality that *o)ld astonish even the most ra!id rationalist. ?ad >ant ri"htly )nderstood ?)me, he *o)ld have rephrased his famo)s <)ery th)s: 6?o* is a priori kno*led"e of matters of fact possi!le for ani#als *hen it is not possi!le for hu#an !eings =6 (o ask this <)estion is almost to ans*er it. Bor *e cannot then help !)t notice that it is clearly an empirical matter *hether h)man !ein"s or any other or"anisms possess a priori kno*led"e of matters of fact. @o one sho)ld have appreciated this circ)mstance !etter than ?)me. 8n the already cited passa"e ; '' ; from the /reatise a!o)t reason3s stat)s as instinct, ?)me e7pressly remarks that 6@at)re may certainly prod)ce *hatever can arise from ha!it: @ay, ha!it is nothin" !)t one of the principles of nat)re, and derives all its force from that ori"in.6 ?e s)rely intends that any matter+of+fact)al !elief ac<)ired !y an or"anism !y means of its ind)ctive instinct co)ld have !een planted directly in the or"anism !y @at)reD that is, it co)ld have !een part of the or"anism3s native endo*ment. Jhat, then, of ?)me3s cele!rated demonstration that kno*led"e of matters of fact or real e7istence is impossi!le a priori, that all s)ch kno*led"e is and m)st !e predicated on e7perience= ?)me3s ar")ment t)rns cr)cially on the conceiva!ility of alternatives to every matter of fact. Even to Adam3s reason in the f)llness of its paradisiacal po*ers, the proposition that fire !)rns *o)ld have recommended itself no more and no less than the proposition that fire free4esD only repeated e7perience of fire ena!led poor Adam, no do)!t s)fferin" ac)tely from second+de"ree !)rns, to infer that fire does indeed cons)me: And as the po*er, !y *hich one o!5ect prod)ces another, is never discovera!le merely from their idea, 3tis evident cause and effect are relations, of *hich *e receive information from e7perience, and not from any a!stract reasonin" or refle7ion. (here is no sin"le phaenomenon, even the most simple, *hich can !e acco)nted for from the <)alities of the o!5ects, as they appear to )sD or *hich *e co)3d foresee *itho)t the help of o)r memory and e7perience.M1$N 8f yo) )nderstand 6reason6 narro*ly eno)"h, yo) *ill find that ?)me3s ar")ment is sound !ut irrele&ant to the iss)e *hether matters of fact can !e kno*n a priori. B)t if yo) take 6reason6 !roadly eno)"h to make the ar")ment rele&ant , yo) *ill discover it to !e unsound . ?ere3s *hy. ,et narro% reason !e a fac)lty limited to concepts, that is, a fac)lty of formin" concepts and of analy4in" and comparin" them. ?)me3s ar")ment does indeed sho* that narro* reason cannot discriminate amon" matter+of+fact)al propositions in a nonar!itrary *ay. B)t of co)rse there is m)ch more to #ind than narro* reason. 8n partic)lar, mind may encompass other co"nitive fac)lties that e7hi!it partiality to certain matter+of+fact)al propositions, perhaps even to many of the tr)e propositions !elief in *hich is re<)isite to s)rvival and *ell+!ein". (his is no mere spec)lative hypothesis. Je kno* from o)r e7perience of animals that their minds m)st incl)de some s)ch fac)lties of a priori fact)al co"nition. ,et !road reason !e a fac)lty coe7tensive *ith mind. (o sho* that all fact)al propositions fare alike at the tri!)nal of !road reason *o)ld indeed !e to sho* that 6o)r reason, )nassisted !y e7perience, Mcan

neverN dra* any inference concernin" real e7istence and matter of fact.6M11N B)t ?)me3s appeal to the conceiva!ility of the ne"ation of every matter+of+fact)al proposition reveals nothin" a!o)t the capacity of !road reason innately to sei4e )pon certain fact)al propositions *hile re5ectin" others. ; '/ ; Je did not o)rselves con5)re )p the distinction !et*een narro* reason and !road reason, handy tho)"h it is for makin" o)r point. (he honor of a)thorship is d)!io)sly ?)me3s. Lo) *ill find an am!i")ity correspondin" to the distinction traded on in all his ar")ments a"ainst the a priori kno*a!ility of ca)sal connections. 8t is )nfort)nate that this am!i")ity !linded him and a le"ion of later philosophers to the fallacio)sness of his favorite demonstration. ,et )s look a"ain at the t*o !ases for classifyin" propositions as relations of ideas or matters of fact, namely, *hether their ne"ations are conceiva!le and *hether they are kno*a!le thro)"h mental activity independently of e7perience. Jhether or not a proposition like 3Bire !)rns3 or 3(he s)n *ill rise tomorro*3 is matter+of+fact)al *ill itself !e an empirical matter, a matter of fact, if *e adopt the second !asis, that is, if *e make the proposition3s stat)s a matter of the manner in *hich it can !e kno*n. Jhen *e "ive ?)me3s fork this !asis, *e discover that his cele!rated e#piricist thesis Fno fact)al proposition can !e kno*n a prioriF!eco#es itself e#pirical , a "en)inely ?)mean line !)t perhaps not "en)inely ?)me3s. By contrast, to choose the first !asis for ?)me3s fork saves more of the letter of ?)me3s philosophy !)t only !y c)ttin" a"ainst its "rain. ?)me *as a s)premely sharp and metic)lo)s thinker. ?o*, then, co)ld he have !een !lind to the "larin" defects in his empiricist doctrines that *e have pointed o)t= Je hinted at an ans*er earlier. -o lon" as he i"nored the a priori co"nition of animals *hile denyin" to h)mans any speciali4ed co"nitive instincts or endo*ments, the t*o !ases for his fork matched )p pretty *ell, close eno)"h any*ay for philosophical *orkX Can *e defend ?)me a"ainst the char"e of invidio)s anomaly *hich *e have leveled at his philosophical psycholo"y, namely, that it credits animals *ith !oth "enerali4ed and speciali4ed co"nitive instincts !)t credits h)mans only *ith "enerali4ed ones= Ine tack mi"ht !e to ar")e that speciali4ed co"nitive instincts like those fo)nd in animals are incompati!le *ith hi"hly developed "enerali4ed co"nitive instincts of the sort fo)nd in h)mans, that is, that the hi"hly developed "enerali4ed co"nitive instincts *o)ld cancel or so completely dominate the speciali4ed ones that the latter *o)ld have no co"nitive role to play. B)t this is not a tack on *hich ?)me can easily sail. ?e deli"hts in assertin" that nat)re so r)thlessly dominates reason that competition !et*een them is no contest at all. At !est, reason *ill en5oy the )pper hand only !riefly, !eca)se there is a "reat difference !et*i7t s)ch opinions as *e form after a calm and profo)nd reflection, and s)ch as *e em!race !y a kind of instinct or nat)ral imp)lse, on acco)nt of their s)ita!leness and conformity to the mind. 8f these opinions !ecome contrary, 3tis not diffic)lt to foresee *hich of them *ill have the advanta"e. As lon" as o)r attention is !ent )pon the s)!5ect, the philosophical and st)dy3d principle may prevailD !)t the moment *e rela7 o)r tho)"hts, nat)re *ill display herself, and dra* )s !ack to o)r former opinion. @ay she has ; '9 ; sometimes s)ch an infl)ence, that she can stop o)r pro"ress, even in the midst of o)r most

profo)nd reflections, and keep )s from r)nnin" on *ith all the conse<)ences of any philosophical opinion.M12N Bor ?)me, therefore, if either is to annihilate the other, the speciali4ed co"nitive instincts *ill cancel the "enerali4ed ones. ?ere is a more promisin" tack. Perhaps the 6anomaly,6 as *e call it, is no em!arrassment to ?)me at all. Perhaps it re"isters a plain matter of fact reco"ni4ed !y ?)me and taken acco)nt of in his philosophical psycholo"y. After all, contemporary scientists and philosophers a"ree that h)man !ein"s innately possess vario)s "enerali4ed co"nitive endo*ments, !)t they heatedly de!ate *hether h)mans innately possess speciali4ed co"nitive endo*ments. Consider, for e7ample, the -kinner+Chomsky+ G)ine controversy over innate lin")istic endo*ments. Chomsky pleads that speciali4ed co"nitive endo*ments are needed to e7plain certain feat)res of lin")istic !ehaviorD G)ine and -kinner insist that *e can e7plain all aspects of ver!al !ehavior !y means of the e7perience and "enerali4ed co"nitive endo*ments of lan")a"e+)sersD anythin" more is )nneeded and )ndesira!le.M1#N

6. /umeD Empiricist or RationalistB

?)me is li!eral, almost profli"ate, in endo*in" h)man !ein"s *ith co"nitive instincts. Bor e7ample, in addition to the ind)ctive instinct already enco)ntered, there is *hat *e *ill call the externali+ing propensity , the instinct that determines r)stics to attri!)te )n!roken d)ration to certain of their intermittent perceptions and that determines the learned to posit a )niverse of end)rin", mind+ independent o!5ects. 8t is not pec)liar to h)mansD animals too possess the e7ternali4in" propensity. (hen there is the egoi+ing propensity , the instinct that determines h)man !ein"s to take themselves to !e s)!stantial selves, that is, to personify certain !)ndles of perceptions. Animals, too, seem to possess the e"oi4in" propensity. (here may also !e a causal propensity that determines !oth h)mans and animals to e7pect a ca)se of every event they meet *ith, !)t this con5ect)re is more controversial and *e *ill not insist )pon it. Ine st)m!les )pon many other co"nitive propensities or instincts in ?)me3s philosophy, !)t this is not the place to en)merate them.M1%N @otice that all these co"nitive instincts are "enerali4ed endo*ments. (he !eliefs that the e7ternali4in" propensity and the e"oi4in" propensity occasion, ?)me3s so+called natural !eliefs , are themselves <)ite "eneral: !elief in !odies, !elief in e7ternal o!5ects, !elief in personal selves. E7perience is re<)ired to tri""er them, !)t no partic)lar e7periences. Jhatever !e the e7perience of a h)man or animal, it *ill come to have these nat)ral !eliefs, at least so lon" as its e7perience or train of impressions e7hi!its a modic)m of coherency. 8nd)ctive !eliefs, that is, the !eliefs prod)ced !y the ind)ctive propensity, are different. (hey are partic)lar !eliefs s)ch as 3Bire !)rns3 or 3(he s)n *ill rise ; /$ ; tomorro*3. @ot any old e7periences tri""er them. Unless Adam consorts fre<)ently eno)"h *ith fire, he *ill never ac<)ire the !elief that it !)rns. .At least he *ill not ac<)ire this !elief directly thro)"h the ind)ctive propensity. ?e may come to hold this !elief !eca)se of somethin" Eve told him, there!y ac<)irin" it indirectly thro)"h the ind)ctive propensity, or madness or disease contracted after their e7p)lsion from Paradise mi"ht perhaps prod)ce it in him.2 Je have already seen that ?)me took @at)re to implant many partic)lar !eliefs of the 3Bire !)rns3 variety directly into animals, !eliefs determined !y speciali4ed co"nitive endo*ments or instincts.

Jhat e7periences tri""er these !eliefs, if indeed they are tri""ered !y e7perience= 8t *o)ld seem that no special e7periences are re<)ired to tri""er themD if they are tri""ered at all, they are tri""ered !y any e7periences *hatsoever. B)t this cannot !e the *hole story. -)rely the neonatal *ilde!eest contentedly s)ckin" its mother3s teat is not thinkin" a!o)t lions )ntil si"ht of the char"in" lioness tri""ers its !elief that lions are dan"ero)s. -hall *e say that the terrified *ilde!eest had the dispositional !elief that lions are dan"ero)s all alon" !)t that the a*esome spectacle presented !y the char"in" lioness tri""ered its occ)rrent !elief that lions are dan"ero)s= (hat is, shall *e say that the !eliefs prod)ced !y speciali4ed co"nitive instincts are dispositional, that they are present in the animal apart from and prior to any e7perience, and that relevantly appropriate partic)lar e7periences are re<)isite only to tri""er the correspondin" occ)rrent !eliefs= Je mi"ht as *ell say so, for ?)me3s *ritin"s offer no help. Lo) *ill search them in vain for the distinction !et*een dispositional and occ)rrent !elief, partly !eca)se ei"hteenth+cent)ry philosophers did not make m)ch of it and partly !eca)se the distinction ill comports *ith his theory of !elief as a certain feelin" connected to a proposition. ,et )s take stock of *here *e have arrived in o)r attempt to defend ?)me. Je have seen that ?)me posited a n)m!er of "enerali4ed co"nitive instincts common to h)mans and animals, that some of these "enerali4ed instincts en"ender very "eneral !eliefs .the so+called natural !eliefs 2 in !oth h)mans and animals, that these "enerali4ed instincts "enerate these "eneral !eliefs independently of partic)lar e7periences, that the ind)ctive instinct .itself a "enerali4ed instinct2 "ives rise to partic)lar !eliefs in !oth h)mans and animals !)t only *hen tri""ered !y partic)lar e7periences of a relevant kind, and that animals are innately endo*ed *ith speciali4ed co"nitive instincts that en"ender many partic)lar dispositional !eliefs independently of e7perience altho)"h appropriate e7periences are needed to tri""er the correspondin" occ)rrent !eliefs. (o save ?)me, *e need add only one more item to this litany, namely, that o)r e7perience of h)man !ein"s "ives )s no reason to s)ppose that they are innately endo*ed *ith any speciali4ed co"nitive instincts, the ones that "enerate partic)lar !eliefs independently of partic)lar e7periences. (here still remains an anomaly in ?)me3s philosophical psycholo"y, that is, a respect in *hich h)mans and animals do not fare alike, !)t it is an anomaly ; /1 ; that does ?)me3s rep)tation more credit than in5)ry. Accordin" to ?)me, only animals possess speciali4ed co"nitive instincts, not !eca)se some )n!rid"ea!le spirit)al divide separates h)mans from animals, nor !eca)se of any philosophical preconceptions or !iases a!o)t the h)man or the animal mind, !)t !eca)se of the !rute fact that only !rutes ha&e instincts $eyed to !rute facts . 8t mi"ht *ell have !een different. 8f ne*!orn h)mans !ehaved more like neonatal *ilde!eests, then *e *o)ld credit o)rselves, too, *ith speciali4ed co"nitive instincts, *ith a "enero)s portion of instinctive kno*led"e of matters of fact served )p !y a !enevolent :other @at)re. -o, if *e )nderstand !y e#piricis# the doctrine that no organis# can have a priori kno*led"e of partic)lar matters of fact, ?)me t)rns o)t to !e an antiempiricist, indeed an )n!ridled rationalist. B)t if *e take empiricism to !e the thesis that hu#an !eings do not have a priori kno*led"e of partic)lar matters of fact !)t m)st ac<)ire s)ch kno*led"e on the !asis of appropriate partic)lar e7periences, ?)me *as an empiricist for pretty convincin" empirical reasons. And, for an empiricist, co)ld there !e a !etter kind of reason for !ein" an empiricist= Coes ?)me then deserve to !e canoni4ed as the patron saint of modern empiricism= 8t all depends on *hom yo) s)rvey. Jhat one mi"ht call dog#atic e#piricis# ref)ses a priori kno*led"e of any fact,

"eneral as *ell as partic)lar, to every or"anism. Co"matic empiricists *ill find ?)me3s attri!)tion to !oth animals and h)mans of "enerali4ed co"nitive instincts, co"nitive endo*ments prod)ctive of s)ch "eneral kno*led"e as the nat)ral !eliefs in an e7ternal *orld and a s)!stantial self, alto"ether as no7io)s as the speciali4ed co"nitive instincts *hich he attri!)ted to !easts alone. (hese do"matists mi"ht *ell )p!raid ?)me for failin" to reco"ni4e that his fork has no tine for the nat)ral !eliefs. .(he ne"ations of these propositions are conceiva!le and so they are fact)al, yet they can !e kno*n more or less independently of e7perience.2 -o, even if he had not professed to find speciali4ed co"nitive endo*ments in animals, ?)me3s treatment of the nat)ral !eliefs itself and alone constit)tes a !etrayal of empiricism in the eyes of these 4ealots. ?ence, do"matic empiricists *ill not hesitate to deliver their verdict lo)d and clear: Cavid ?)me sold o)t to rationalism. B)t neither in philosophy nor in ordinary life sho)ld *e permit fanatics to decide *hat is virt)o)s. 8n its *idest si"nification, e#piricis# denominates those varieties of philosophy that take o!servation and e7perience serio)sly, especially scientific o!servation and scientific e7perimentation. @othin" *e have said a!o)t ?)me detracts from his rep)tation in this re"ard. (r)e, his system of philosophy reco"ni4es a "reat deal of a priori kno*led"e of matters of fact, !oth "eneral and partic)lar. B)t from an empiricist point of vie*, the savin" "race is that this reco"nition is itself !ased on o!servation and e7perience of a fairly compellin" sort. By "ro)ndin" his innatist vie*s a!o)t co"nitive endo*ments thoro)"hly in o!servation and e7perience, that is, !y makin" a priori ; /2 ; kno*led"e an a posteriori matter, ?)me earned forever the respect and admiration of nondo"matic empiricists. A close e7amination of ?)me3s philosophy sho*s that the choice !et*een empiricism and rationalism, as philosophical doctrines rather than philosophical attit)des or approaches, is not the !inary a priori matter that many philosophers seem to take it to !e. ?ardheaded empiricists may co)ntenance n)mero)s fac)lties of a priori fact)al co"nition *itho)t forfeitin" mem!ership in ?)me3s Cl)!. Ither empiricists may !e more restrained in their post)lation of s)ch fac)lties. -till others may esche* them alto"ether. @evertheless, their respective mem!erships in ?)me3s Cl)! are sec)re so lon" as o!servation and e7perience f)rnish the reasons *hy they hold these vie*s. ?o*ever, some philosophers mi"ht, for essentially a priori reasons, rep)diate all fac)lties of a priori fact)al co"nition and yet s)ffer the h)miliation of havin" their mem!ership applications re5ected !y ?)me3s le"atees. Bor it is not one3s &ie%s a!o)t a priori fact)al co"nition !)t one3s reasons for them that make an empiricist or a rationalist o)t of a philosopherX

Fi+e. %hilosophy and the Exact SciencesD $o*ical %ositi+ism as a "ase Study
-ichael Friedman :)ch of modern philosophy developed in close association *ith the development of the e7act sciences: the sciences of mathematics, optics, astronomy, and physics. :any modern philosophersFCescartes, ,ei!ni4, and >ant, for e7ampleFtook these e7act sciences as paradi"matic of o!5ective and rational kno*led"e and, moreover, took this conception of o!5ectivity and rationality as the startin" point of their philosophi4in". 8n the present cent)ry this kind of conception has !een championed !y the lo"ical

positivists, *ho took mathematics and mathematical physics as paradi"matic not only of o!5ective and rational kno*led"e !)t of o!5ective or 6co"nitive6 meanin"f)lness as *ell. Accordin"ly, they spoke dispara"in"ly of the 6co"nitive meanin"lessness6 of ethical disco)rse, reli"io)s disco)rse, poetic disco)rse, and of co)rse traditional philosophical .6metaphysical62 disco)rse. Jith the demise of lo"ical positivism it has !ecome fashiona!le to attack the ideal of scientific o!5ectivity and rationality *hich they championed as *ell. (akin" the e7act sciences of mathematics, optics, astronomy, and physics as paradi"matic of o!5ective and rational kno*led"e is no* dismissed as v)l"ar 6scientism,6 and *e are no* told that the *orld of modern mathematical physics, for e7ample, is 5)st one *orld pict)re amon" othersF*ith no special claim to o!5ective validity. 8n partic)lar, the systems of representation em!odied in the disciplines of art, literat)re, social science, or reli"ion are e<)ally le"itimate and e<)ally 6o!5ective.6 Jhen s)ch 6relativistic6 sentiments are e7pressed even !y eminent philosophers of science, they !ecome especially compellin" and m)st certainly "ive one pa)se. @evertheless, 8 *ant here to oppose this ne* 6relativism.6 8 a"ree, of co)rse, that lo"ical positivism is a failed philosophical movementD !)t 8 think that the reasons for this fail)re have !een very !adly mis)nderstood. 8ndeed, ; /& ; contemporary critics of lo"ical positivism operate *ith an e7tremely s)perficial and stereotypical characteri4ation of that movement *hich misses entirely !oth its most distinctive aims and its real intellect)al pro!lems. As a res)lt, the tr)e nat)re of o)r c)rrent 6relativistic6 predicament remains hidden from )s. 8 hope here to shed li"ht on this predicament thro)"h closer attention to the act)al history of lo"ical positivism and, in partic)lar, thro)"h closer attention to the intimate relationship !et*een that history and the parallel developments takin" place in the e7act sciences themselves. :y story *ill, 8 hope, lead to a rene*ed appreciation for the philosophical importance and centrality of the e7act sciences.

I
,et me !e"in !y !riefly indicatin" the e7tent to *hich lo"ical positivism has !een serio)sly misrepresented and !adly mis)nderstood. Hecent criticsFs)ch as >)hn, ?anson, (o)lmin, and Beyera!endM1N Fportray the lo"ical positivists as !oth naively empiricist and naively ahistorical. -cience is seen as the contin)o)s acc)m)lation of more and more accepted facts, facts that either record direct o!servations or "enerali4e from s)ch o!servations !y a strai"htfor*ard process of ind)ction. 8t follo*s, then, that the lo"ical positivists m)st have !een inspired only !y *hat >)hn calls 6normal science6 and that they m)st have ne"lected entirely the f)ndamentally discontin)o)s transitions that occ)r d)rin" so+called 6scientific revol)tions6F*here the most important e7ample of the latter, for >)hn, is the replacement of @e*tonian physics !y Einstein3s theory of relativity.M2N Let a !rief e7amination of the act)al history of lo"ical positivism reveals that one of its most f)ndamental inspirations is precisely this Einsteinian revol)tion. (he early *ritin"s of the lo"ical positivistsFof -chlick, Heichen!ach, and Carnap, in partic)larFall foc)s on the theory of relativity, a theory *hose revol)tionary impact is e7plicitly reco"ni4ed in the co)rse of a polemic a"ainst their philosophical predecessors.M#N -pecifically, the development of non+E)clidean "eometry and Einstein3s theory of relativity is taken !y these *riters to )nderc)t decisively the conception of space and time !e<)eathed to them !y the >antian philosophyD and this, in fact, is the starting point of their philosophi4in". -o *hatever else may !e tr)e, these philosophers can certainly not !e acc)sed of an ahistorical ne"lect of

scientific revol)tions. Jhat a!o)t the char"e of naive empiricism= (he lo"ical positivists are s)pposed to have a cr)dely 6atomistic6 conception of scientific o!servation and e7periment: o!servation is nothin" !)t immediate contact *ith 6the "iven6 *hich, as s)ch, can take place o)tside the conte7t of any scientific theory *hatsoever. Let this naively empiricist conception of o!servation is, on the *hole, e7plicitly re5ected !y the positivists. (h)s, Heichen!ach, in the introd)ction to his 192% !ook on relativity theory, *rites: ; /0 ; Every fact)al statement, even the simplest one, contains more than an immediate percept)al e7perienceD it is already an interpretation and therefore itself a theory. . . . Je shall have to make )se of the scientific theory itself in order to interpret the indications of o)r meas)rin" instr)ments. (h)s *e shall not say, 6a pointer is movin",6 !)t 6the electric c)rrent is increasin".6 (he most elementary fact)al statement, therefore, contains some meas)re of theory.M%N (his clear statement of *hat is no* called the 6theory+ladenness6 of o!servation is virt)ally indistin")isha!le from any randomly selected statement of the doctrine from >)hn or ?anson. Carnap, in his 192/ classic of positivist tho)"ht, /he Logical Structure of the 4orld Fa *ork that is often taken as paradi"matic of the lo"ical positivists3 alle"ed naive empiricismFe7plicitly opposes an 6atomistic6 conception of e7perience or 6the "iven6 and instead endorses a 6holistic6 conception derived from 9estalt psycholo"y.M&N Binally, the iss)e is s)!5ect to a spirited de!ate in the pa"es of the positivists3 official 5o)rnal Er$enntnis in the years 19#2119#&.M0N (he participants in this de!ate are Carnap, -chlick, @e)rath, and ?empel: all !)t -chlick a"ree that there are no s)ch thin"s as p)re or theory+ independent o!servation+sentences .6protocol+sentences62D all !)t -chlick e7plicitly reno)nce the pro5ect of lookin" for an empiricist fo)ndation of kno*led"e on the immediately 6"iven6 data of e7perience. Ince a"ain, the 6naive empiricist6 la!el simply does not fit.

II
As indicated a!ove, the lo"ical positivists !e"in their philosophi4in" !y reactin" a"ainst the >antian system. B)t *hat in partic)lar are they reactin" a"ainst= >ant, like the positivists, vie*s the e7act sciences of mathematics and physicsFand, specifically, the application of the former to the latter em!odied in the !rilliantly s)ccessf)l mathematical physics initiated !y @e*tonFas paradi"matic of o!5ective and rational kno*led"e. ?is f)ndamental pro!lem is to e7plain ho* s)ch kno*led"e is possi!le: ?o* is it possi!le that mathematics, in its f)ll precision, applies to the chaotic and apparently imprecise *orld of sense= >ant3s sol)tion to this pro!lem is !ased on his theory of space and time: specifically, on his doctrine that space and time are 6p)re forms of o)r sensi!le int)ition.6 8t is this >antian doctrine, a!ove all, that the positivists are concerned to re5ectD and so, to )nderstand their position, *e have to say a fe* *ords a!o)t the meanin" and si"nificance of the doctrine. Birst, >ant conceives p)re mathematics as itself makin" essential reference to space and time. 9eometry involves the constr)ction or "eneration of fi")res in spaceFon the 6!lack!oard of the ima"ination,6 as it *ereD arithmetic involves the s)ccessive addition of )nit to )nit in time. (his conception, *hich is lia!le to seem either <)aint or ridic)lo)s to a sophisticated modern mathematician, act)ally makes e7tremely "ood sense in the conte7t of the mathematics of >ant3s day. Bor the proof str)ct)re of E)clid3s Ele#ents F)nlike that of

; /' ; modern form)lations of E)clidean "eometry s)ch as ?il!ert3s, for e7ampleM'N Fdoes essentially involve a definite process of spatial constr)ction: the proced)re of constr)ction *ith strai"hted"e and compass. :oreover, the ne* calc)l)s that is 5)st !ein" developed at the time, especially in the form of @e*ton3s so+called theory of fl)7ions, makes an even more essential appeal to spatio+temporal int)ition Fin partic)lar, to the int)itive idea of motion. As @e*ton himself p)ts it in a *ell+kno*n passa"e from 6(he G)adrat)re of C)rves6: :athematical G)antities MareN generated !y a continual #otion . ,ines are descri!ed, and !y descri!in" are "enerated . . . !y a contin)al motion of Points. -)rfaces are "enerated !y the motion of ,ines, -olids !y the motion of -)rfaces, An"les !y a rotation of their ,e"s, (ime !y a contin)al fl)7, and so in the rest.M/N 8n other *ords, for >ant, as for @e*ton, the only *ay even to conceive or represent mathematical <)antities is !y an int)itive process of spatiotemporal constr)ction. ,yin" !ehind this >antian conception of p)re mathematics is a f)ndamental difference !et*een the Aristotelian s)!5ect+predicate lo"ic that dominated Jestern tho)"ht )ntil the latter part of the nineteenth cent)ry and the modern 6sym!olic6 or 6mathematical6 lo"ic developed !y Bre"e and H)ssell. Bor *ithin Aristotelian s)!5ect+predicate lo"ic it is impossi!le ade<)ately to represent the idea of an infinite a""re"ate or str)ct)reFfor e7ample, the idea of the infinity of the points on a line or the idea of the infinite e7tendi!ility of the series of nat)ral n)m!ers. -ince for >ant lo"ic is s)!5ect+ predicate lo"ic, these ideasF*hich are of co)rse essential to all mathematical thinkin"Fcannot !e capt)red or represented in an a7iomatic or ded)ctive system in the manner of modern mathematics. In the contrary, the only *ay even to think s)ch ideas is via the indefinite e7tendi!ility of o)r spatiotemporal int)ition: !y the fact that there is al*ays 6room6Fthat is, space and timeFfor 6one more6 n)m!er in the series of nat)ral n)m!ers, 6one more6 e7tension of a "iven finite line se"ment, and so on. (his is *hy, for e7ample, >ant says in the .riti(ue of Pure Reason that 68 cannot represent to myself a line, ho*ever small, *itho)t dra*in" it in tho)"ht, that is "rad)ally "eneratin" all its parts from a point6 .B2$#2. 8n any case, it is this conception of the necessarily int)itive character of p)re mathematics that ena!les >ant to e7plain ho* mathematics is applica!le to the chaotic *orld of sense, to e7plain ho* mathematical physics is possi!le. Bor >ant ar")es that the space and time of p)re int)itionFthe space and time )nderlyin" the constr)ctive proced)res of p)re mathematicsFis the very same space and time *ithin *hich *e perceive or e7perience nat)re thro)"h the senses. (he idea is that, in the a!sence of a ri"oro)s mathematical frame*ork *ithin *hich to order and interpret o)r sense perceptions, they *o)ld not amo)nt to experience or $no%ledge in the f)ll+!looded sense. 8nstead of o!5ective e7perience and rational kno*led"e, *e *o)ld !e left *ith merely s)!5ective ; // ; association of representations. As >ant p)ts it in a *ell+kno*n passa"e from the Prolego#ena to ny Future Metaphysics , it is only the ri"oro)s frame*ork of mathematical physics that allo*s )s 6to spell o)t sensi!le appearances in order to read them as e7perience6 .[#$2. (his >antian e7planation of the applica!ility of mathematics to sensi!le nat)re has one cr)cially important conse<)ence. Bor >ant, there is only one spatiotemporal frame*ork that can possi!ly play s)ch an e7perience+constit)tin" role: the spatiotemporal frame*ork of our p)re int)ition. 8ndeed, as *e have seen, in a!straction from o)r spatiotemporal int)ition it is <)ite impossi!le even to think or represent spatiotemporal ideas. B)t o)r spatiotemporal int)ition, for >ant, has a fi7ed and determinate

str)ct)re: space is necessarily E)clidean, time is necessarily @e*tonian .more precisely, space3ti#e is necessarily @e*tonian2. As a res)lt, the spatiotemporal frame*ork )nderlyin" .@e*tonian2 mathematical physics is a priori fi7ed or determined independently of all empirical data. (here can !e no <)estion of s)!5ectin" this frame*ork to confirmation, ref)tation, or revision in the face of e7perienceD on the contrary, it alone makes o!5ective e7perience first possi!le. @o* it is precisely here, of co)rse, that the >antian system comes to "rief. Bor the development of nineteenth+ and t*entieth+cent)ry mathematics and mathematical physics is nota!le for the creation of a *ide variety of alternatives to the E)clidean+@e*tonian frame*ork. 8 need here only mention the development of non+E)clidean "eometries !y 9a)ss, Bolyai, and ,o!achevsky in the first third of the nineteenth cent)ry and the very "eneral frame*orks for !oth E)clidean and non+E)clidean "eometries later devised !y Hiemann and >lein. (hese developments c)lminate in Einstein3s *ork on relativity theory in the early years of the present cent)ry, *herein the ne* non+E)clidean and non+@e*tonian frame*orks are act)ally applied to nat)re. 8n partic)lar, Einstein3s special theory of relativity .19$&2 makes )se of >lein3s ideas in artic)latin" a non+@e*tonian theory of time .more precisely, of space+ time2D Einstein3s "eneral theory of relativity .191&2 dra*s heavily on Hiemann3s *ork in developin" a very stron"ly non+E)clidean conception of !oth space and time .more precisely, of space+time2. 8n the face of these ne* developments, the >antian conception of p)re int)ition can no lon"er !e s)stained. 8ndeed, d)rin" this same period, mathematicians are developin" techni<)es that free p)re mathematics from any dependence *hatsoever on spatiotemporal int)ition. ?ere 8 am referrin" to the so+called 6ri"ori4ation6 of the calc)l)s initiated !y Bol4ano and Ca)chy in the early ei"hteenth cent)ry that c)lminates in the 6arithmeti4ation6 of analysis !y Jeierstrass. As a res)lt of this *ork, the calc)l)s is p)r"ed of all reference to int)itive ideas of motion and chan"e and is instead "iven a p)rely 6formal6 fo)ndation on the modern ideas of f)nction, conver"ence, and limit. :oreover, *hat makes this 6formal6 conception of mathematics itself possi!le is the ; /9 ; ne* perspective on lo"ic and mathematical reasonin" first ade<)ately form)lated !y Bre"e. Bor, as s)""ested a!ove, it is only this ne* lo"ic that allo*s )s to represent ideas involvin" infinity .*hich of co)rse are especially !asic to the calc)l)s2 in a 6formal6 or nonint)itive manner. 8n other *ords, it is the development of the ne* mathematical lo"ic, a!ove all, that makes possi!le the modern pict)re of mathematics as !ased on ded)ctive systems involvin" strict lo"ical inference from e7plicitly stated a7iomsFa7ioms *hich therefore stand in no need *hatever of an int)itive interpretation.

III
B)t *hat a!o)t the development of lo"ical positivism= As 8 have said, the lo"ical positivists are in clear a"reement *ith >ant a!o)t the paradi"matic stat)s of mathematics and mathematical physics as e7emplars of o!5ective and rational kno*led"e. B)rther, the positivists also a"ree *ith >ant on the )nderlyin" reason for this privile"ed stat)s. :athematics and mathematical physics are paradi"matic of o!5ectivity and rationaliaty !eca)se it is only !y orderin", interpretin", and str)ct)rin" o)r sensory perceptions *ithin a ri"oro)s mathematical frame*ork that *e can first 6o!5ectify6 themFthat is, transform them from mere appearance into o!5ective experience . 8n other *ords, it is mathematical physics alone that makes possi!le a f)ll+!looded notion of o!5ective kno*led"e in the first place. (h)s, for e7ample, -chlick in his 0eneral /heory of 5no%ledge dra*s a sharp distinction !et*een kno*led"e or co"nition .er$ennen 2 and ac<)aintance *ith .$ennen 2 or e7perience of .erle!en 2 the immediately "iven. (he latter, since it is momentary or 6atomistic,6 cannot possi!ly yield kno*led"e.

In the contrary, kno*led"e is possi!le only *hen *e em!ed s)ch momentary perceptions *ithin a ri"oro)s syste# of interconnected 5)d"ments of *hich the systems developed !y mathematical physics are paradi"matic.M9N -imilar themes are dominant in the early *ritin"s of the other lo"ical positivists. M1$N 8t sho)ld !e clear, on the one hand, ho* far *e are from a naively empiricist conception of kno*led"e and e7perience. 8n partic)lar, the 6theory+ladenness6 of o!servation is ri"oro)sly artic)lated and e7plicitly defendedFand defended for f)ndamentally >antian reasons. Let, on the other hand, it is also clear that the >antian system as a *hole is no lon"er tena!le. 8n partic)lar, >ant3s doctrine of p)re int)ition has collapsed completely. P)re mathematics no lon"er re<)ires a !asis in spatiotemporal constr)ction !)t can instead proceed p)rely 6formally6 via strict lo"ical ded)ction *ithin an a7iomatic system. As a res)lt, p)re mathematics has no intrinsic connection *hatever *ith either spatiotemporal int)ition or sense e7perience, and it is no lon"er possi!le to maintain that any mathematical theory has a necessary relation to o)r e7perience of nat)re. -imilarly, there is no lon"er a sin"le, privile"ed spatiotemporal frame*orkFthe E)clidean+@e*tonian frame*orkFlyin" at the !asis of ; 9$ ; mathematical physics. :any s)ch frame*orks are no* possi!le, and some of them have !een already s)ccessf)lly applied to nat)re in Einstein3s theory of relativity. (his sit)ation constit)tes the philosophical conte7t *ithin *hich lo"ical positivism develops. (he attempt to preserve a !asically >antian conception of kno*led"e and e7perience in the face of the collapse of >ant3s doctrine of p)re int)ition creates f)ndamental, and )ltimately )nresolved, intellect)al tensions. (he )nderlyin" pro!lem can perhaps !e e7pressed as follo*s. Je *ish to follo* >ant in insistin" )pon the need for a "eneral theoretical frame*ork in order to confer o!5ectivity and rationality on o)r sense e7perience. Je also *ish to follo* >ant in maintainin" the privile"ed position of mathematics and mathematical physics. Let there is no lon"er a sin"le spatiotemporal frame*ork that alone can perform this 6o!5ectifyin"6 f)nction. In the contrary, each of the many possi!le frame*orks appears to e7emplify its o*n partic)lar standards of o!5ectivity and rationality. Are *e not forced, therefore, into a position of epistemic and concept)al 6relativism6 *hich )ndermines the very notions of o!5ectivity and rationality that *e are tryin" so hard to preserve= (his pro!lem can !e !est appreciated, 8 think, if *e 5)7tapose the philosophical efforts of the lo"ical positivists *ith the so+called :ar!)r" @eo+>antianism of Cohen, @atorp, and especially Cassirer. (hese thinkers a"ree *ith the lo"ical positivists in their assessment of the si"nificance of >ant3s philosophical achievement: >ant3s achievement consists precisely in clearly reco"ni4in" and artic)latin" the 6o!5ectifyin"6 f)nction of mathematics and mathematical physics. (hese thinkersF especially CassirerFalso a"ree *ith the lo"ical positivists that >ant3s doctrine of p)re spatiotemporal int)ition can no lon"er !e maintained in the conte7t of modern mathematics and mathematical physics. M11N B)t from these t*o ideas Cassirer dra*s e7plicitly 6relativistic6 concl)sions: a doctrine *hich he calls 6lo"ical idealism.6 -ince there is no lon"er a sin"le, privile"ed frame*ork for o!5ective and rational tho)"ht, mathematical+physical thinkin" as s)ch provides only one s)ch frame*ork amon" others. (h)s, art, reli"ion, myth, and metaphysics provide e<)ally "ood rational frame*orksFor *hat Cassirer calls 6sym!olic forms6Ffor each s)pplies its o*n characteristic standards of tr)th and hence o!5ectivity. (he lo"ical positivists refer to this 6relativistic6 doctrine as the Coherence (heory of (r)th, for it vie*s coherence and consistency *ithin a partic)lar sym!olic frame*ork as s)fficient for o!5ective tr)thF tr)th relati&e to that fra#e%or$ , of co)rseFand s)pplies no means *hatever for ad5)dicatin" disp)tes

!et*een s)ch frame*orks. -ince the positivists *ish to follo* >ant in maintainin" the privile"ed stat)s of mathematics and mathematical physics, this doctrine is anathema to themD and they therefore do everythin" they can to distance themselves from it. Let, at the same time, this proves to !e no easy taskD for, as *e have seen, the positivists a"ree completely *ith the :ar!)r" -chool on their )nderlyin" premises. (his is the !asis for the ens)in" dialectic. ; 91 ; (he pro!lem of ad5)dicatin" !et*een competin" theoretical frame*orks arises for the lo"ical positivists in their earliest *ritin"s on relativity theoryFmost clearly, perhaps, in -chlick3s 191& paper on relativity theory. (he tro)!le !e"ins *hen -chlick e7plicitly ackno*led"es that there are alternative theories e<)ally capa!le of acco)ntin" for the data that are e7plained !y Einstein3s ne* theory .e."., and especially, the famo)s :ichelson+:orley e7periment of 1//'2. (here is Einstein3s theory itself, of co)rse, *hich e7plains the anomalo)s data !y radically revisin" the classical conceptions of space and time. B)t there is also the so+called 6aether6 theory of ,orent4, Bit4"erald, and PoincarV, *hich e7plains the very same data !y retainin" the classical conceptions of space and time and invokin" compensatory dist)r!ancesFcontractions and retardationsFin the rods and clocks *e )se to meas)re space and time. (he t*o theories lead to all the same empirical predictionsFthey are 6empirically e<)ivalent6D and so the choice !et*een them is radically )nderdetermined !y all the empirical facts. (his kind of 6theoretical )nderdetermination6 is a dramatically ne* phenomenon in the history of science *hich, for e7ample, is simply not possi!le in the conte7t of the @e*tonian physics of >ant3s day.M12N ?o*, then, can *e ad5)dicate the disp)te !et*een the t*o theories= ?o*, in partic)lar, can *e rationali4e o)r preference for the Einsteinian frame*ork= 8n 191& -chlick frankly admits that he has no satisfactory ans*er. 8t appears, to !e s)re, that Einstein3s theory is 6simpler6 and less 6ad hoc6 than the competin" 6aether6 theory. Let *e have no clear acco)nt of *hat s)ch 6simplicity6 really comes to nor, more importantly, any ass)rance that 6simplicity6F*hatever it may !eFis a relia!le ")ide to tr)th. Jhy in the *orld sho)ld nat)re respect our Fmerely s)!5ectiveFpreference for 6simplicity6= Ince a"ain, therefore, the o!5ectivity of physical theory is s)!5ect to do)!t. (hro)"ho)t the 192$s -chlick and the other lo"ical positivistsFHeichen!ach, in partic)larFattempt to solve this epistemolo"ical pro!lem !y means of the doctrine of 6conventionalism6 *hich they derive from PoincarV.M1#N (he idea here is that t*o theories a"reein" on all empirical dataFt*o theories s)ch as relativity theory and the 6aether6 theory that tr)ly are 6empirically e<)ivalent6Fare not really t*o conflicting theories at all. (heir disa"reement is only apparent, and so there is no need rationally to ad5)dicate the choice !et*een them. (he sit)ation is precisely analo"o)s, in fact, to t*o different coordinate systems or t*o different systems of )nits .the metric system and the En"lish system, say2. Hather than a s)!stantive disa"reement over o!5ective tr)th, *e are faced *ith a merely pra"matic <)estion of convenience. 8n this sense, the choice is a p)rely conventional one. @o* this doctine, *hen consistently tho)"ht thro)"h, does in fact lead to a kind of radical empiricism. -ince *e *ish to hold that t*o 6empirically e<)ivalent6 theories are therefore completely e<)ivalent descriptions of the same o!5ective facts, *e are committed to the vie* that the empirical factsFthat is, ; 92 ; the o!serva!le factsFare all the o!5ective facts there are. Je are committed to the vie* that the entire content or meanin" of a scientific theory is lod"ed in its conse<)ences for act)al and possi!le

o!servations. And, in fact, aro)nd 19#$ this vie* hardens into a kind of do"ma for the lo"ical positivists in the form of the notorio)s Kerifia!ility Principle.M1%N (he 6co"nitive meanin"6 of all disco)rse is declared to consist in its implications for act)al and possi!le o!servationsD and this principle is r)thlessly *ielded !oth to solve the pro!lem of )nderdetermined theory choice and to <)estion the 6co"nitive meanin"f)lness6 of all nonscientific disco)rseFof art, reli"ion, myth, and metaphysics in partic)lar. 8n this *ay, the positivists hope to divorce themselves from the 6relativistic6 and 6idealistic6 doctrines of the :ar!)r" -chool once and for all. Let this kind of radical empiricism co)ld not !e consistently s)stained. 8n the first place, it proves to !e impossi!le to artic)late a conception of 6co"nitive meanin"6 that can s)pport the Kerifia!ility Principle. 8n partic)lar, it proves to !e impossi!le to vie* advanced theories s)ch as Einstein3s theory of relativity as mere s)mmaries of act)al and possi!le o!servationsD and this fact is e7plicitly ackno*led"ed, *ith characteristic honesty and ri"or, !y the positivists themselves.M1&N -econd, and perhaps even more f)ndamentally, the notions of o!servation and empirical fact are s)!5ect to more *ei"ht than they can possi!ly !ear. Bor, "iven the @eo+>antian conte7t of positivist tho)"ht, theory is s)pposed to "ive meanin" to o!servation rather than the other *ay aro)nd, and an empiricist fo)ndation for o!5ective kno*led"e on s)pposedly p)re or 6theory+ne)tral6 o!servation reports is <)ite impossi!le. As 8 indicated a!ove, this fact is also e7plicitly ackno*led"ed in the pa"es of the positivists3 official 5o)rnal Er$enntnis in the years 19#2119#&,M10N *herein all parties e7cept -chlick e7plicitly re5ect an empiricist fo)ndation for kno*led"eFand re5ect s)ch a fo)ndation precisely on the "ro)nds of the 6theory+ ladenness6 of all o!servation. .-chlick, !y contrast, perceptively !)t vainly *arns that s)ch a conception leads inevita!ly to the Coherence (heory of (r)th.2 At this 5)nct)re, Carnap, *ho is clearly the deepest and most ri"oro)s of the lo"ical positivists, *rites perhaps his "reatest *ork: /he Logical Syntax of Language . 8n this !ook the empiricist tendencies of lo"ical positivism shrink to the point of vanishin", and Carnap instead ri"oro)sly artic)lates an e7plicitly 6relativistic6 vie*point that is very close indeed to the :ar!)r" -chool, on the one hand, and to m)ch contemporary 6relativism,6 on the other. Carnap3s 6relativistic6 attit)de is encaps)lated in his famo)s Principle of (olerance: In logic, there are no #orals . Everyone is at li!erty to !)ild )p his o*n lo"ic, i.e., his o*n form of lan")a"e, as he *ishes. All that is re<)ired of him is that, if he *ishes to disc)ss it, he m)st state his methods clearly, and "ive syntactical r)les instead of philosophical ar")ments.M1'N B)t *hat does this principle really say= ; 9# ; Birst, Carnap vie*s r)les of lo"icFand hence criteria for meanin"f)lness and tr)thFas em!odied in one or another lan")a"e system or lin")istic frame*ork. :oreover, many s)ch systemsFmany s)ch lin")istic frame*orksFare possi!le, and all are e<)ally le"itimate. 8ndeed, since criteria for meanin"f)lness and tr)thFand hence criteria for o!5ective kno*led"eFare internal to partic)lar lin")istic frame*orks, there can !e no <)estion *hatever of rationally ad5)dicatin" disp)tes !et*een s)ch frame*orks. (he only s)!stantive <)estions are those that can !e form)lated *ithin a "iven frame*ork, and the choice of one frame*ork rather than anotherFas a choice e7ternal to the frame*orks )nder considerationFcan only !e made on the !asis of pra"matic criteria of convenience. 8n other *ords, disp)tes *ithin a sin"le frame*ork .internal <)estions2 can !e ad5)dicated !y rational and o!5ective criteria relative to that frame*orkD disp)tes !et*een different frame*orks .e7ternal <)estions2 cannot !e so ad5)dicated.M1/N

-econd, ho*ever, Carnap sees the artic)lation and ela!oration of the lo"ical r)les definitive of this or that lin")istic frame*ork as takin" place *ithin a definite and precise metadisciplineFa discipline he calls lo"ical synta7.M19N B)ildin" on earlier lo"ical+mathematical *ork of ?il!ert and 9Edel, Carnap vie*s this discipline as itself a !ranch of p)re mathematics. 8ndeed, in li"ht of 9Edel3s so+called 6arithmeti4ation of synta7,6 this discipline can !e vie*ed as a partic)larly ne)tral and )ncontroversial !ranch of mathematicsFa fra"ment of elementary arithmetic. Let *ithin this ne)tral and )ncontroversial metadiscipline *e can still descri!e the lin")istic r)les or lo"ical synta7 of m)ch stron"er and more controversial frame*orks. 8n partic)lar, "iven any s)ch lin")istic frame*ork, *e can, from the standpoint of o)r syntactic metadiscipline, dra* a clear and precise distinction !et*een those sentences definitive of the r)les of that frame*orkFthe so+called lo"ical or analytic sentencesF and those sentences e7pressin" s)!stantive tr)ths form)lated *ithin that frame*orkFthe so+called fact)al or synthetic sentences. Je there!y "ive clear and precise content to the distinction !et*een e7ternal and internal <)estions. :oreover, altho)"h the notion of tr)th si#pliciter has indeed !een relativi4ed, the res)ltin" notion of tr)e+in+a+"iven+frame*ork is 6a!sol)te.6 Bor this latter notion can itself !e precisely and ri"oro)sly characteri4ed *ithin the fra#e%or$3neutral metadiscipline of lo"ical synta7. 8n this *ay, Carnap hopes to avoid the tendency to*ard vicio)s circ)larity inherent in the Coherence (heory of (r)thD and it is here, rather than in any radical empiricism, that Carnap makes his last stand a"ainst the :ar!)r" -chool. :ore specifically, Carnap sets himself apart from the :ar!)r" -chool in contin)in" to "ive pride of place to the e7act sciencesD and he does this, in fact, in t*o distinct yet interrelated *ays. In the one hand, Carnap is a!le to sho* that, in an appropriately desi"ned lin")istic frame*ork, the sentences of classical mathematicsFand even some of the !asic principles of classical physics s)ch as physical "eometryFt)rn o)t to !e analytic tr)ths in the a!ove sense. ; 9% ; (hese sentences and principles are therefore constit)tive of o!5ectivity and rationality relative to this "iven frame*ork, and Carnap has th)s capt)red an important part of the traditional >antian conception of the sciences. In the other hand, Carnap3s metadiscipline of lo"ical synta7 itself takes place *ithin the most e7act of the e7act sciencesFnamely, elementary arithmetic. (his "ives Carnap a fi7ed and e7act place to stand from *hich he can artic)late his thoro)"h"oin" 6relativism6Fthat is, his distinction !et*een sentences that are analytic relative to a "iven frame*ork and those that are synthetic, and th)s his relativi4ed notion of tr)e+in+a+"iven+frame*ork. Alas, ho*ever, it *as not meant to !e. Bor it t)rns o)t to !e impossi!le, in most cases of interest, to characteri4e even this relativi4ed notion of tr)e+in+a+"iven+frame*ork in s)ch an 6a!sol)te6 or frame*ork+ne)tral *ay. 8n partic)lar, it is a conse<)ence of 9Edel3s cele!rated 8ncompleteness (heorem .19#12 that, for any lin")istic frame*ork em!odyin" a si"nificant portion of classical mathematics, s)ch a characteri4ation can only !e dra*n *ithin a still richer and more controversial frame*ork.M2$N (he metadiscipline of lo"ical synta7 is in no *ay frame*ork+ne)tral, and Carnap3s dream of a tr)ly o!5ective and impartial notion of rationalityFal!eit one that is considera!ly *eakened and e7plicitly relativi4edFis not to !e had. As a res)lt, *e m)st <)estion the o!5ectivity and meanin"f)lness of the very distinction that motivates Carnap3s pro"ram in the first place: the distinction !et*een chan"e of frame*ork .or e7ternal <)estions2, on the one hand, and chan"e of s)!stantive theory *ithin a frame*ork .or internal <)estions2, on the other. 8n other *ords, the "eneral notion of lin")istic or theoretical frame*ork is itself thro*n into do)!t.

IV
:y story has !een a story of fail)re. 8n partic)lar, the positivists have failed to develop an ade<)ate alternative to the Coherence (heory of (r)th: the e7plicitly 6relativistic6 doctrines of the :ar!)r" -chool. Coes it follo* that this :ar!)r" 6relativism6 s)rvives intact and, accordin"ly, that o)r contemporary 6relativist6 tendencies are on the ri"ht track after all= 8 think not. (he )nderlyin" idea of s)ch 6relativism,6 8 take it, is that o)r ordinary notion of tr)th si#pliciter is to !e replaced *ith a relativi4ed notion of tr)e+in+a+"iven+frame*ork or tr)e+in+a+"iven+sym!olic+form. B)t if this move is to have any point, the notion of tr)e+in+a+"iven+frame*ork sho)ld have a different stat)s from o)r old 6naive6 notion of tr)th si#pliciter . -pecifically, this ne* notion sho)ld not re<)ire f)rther relativi4ationD it sho)ld itself !e 6a!sol)te.6 Compare the sit)ation in relativity theoryF*hich, for Cassirer at any rate, *as al*ays the model for his relativi4in" move. Helativity theory, as is *ell kno*n, replaces the @e*tonian notion of a!sol)te sim)ltaneity *ith a relativi4ed notion of sim)ltaneo)s+relative+to+a+"iven+inertial+frame. B)t this latter notion is itself a!sol)teFonce *e specify the relevant frame. ; 9& ; Carnap3s Logical Syntax , as 8 )nderstand it, is an attempt to make clear sense of 5)st this kind of relativi4in" move. 8n partic)lar, it is an attempt to artic)late a ne)tral metaperspectiveFlo"ical synta7 Ffrom *hich *e can s)rvey all possi!le lin")istic frame*orks and *ithin *hich *e can develop a precise notion of tr)e+relative+to+a+frame*ork. (his notion, since it is defined *ithin o)r fra#e%or$3 neutral metaperspective, *ill itself have the desired 6a!sol)te6 stat)s. .(his is *hat 8 had in mind *hen 8 said that Carnap hopes to avoid the tendency to*ard vicio)s circ)larity inherent in the Coherence (heory of (r)th.2 9Edel3s (heorem then )ndermines this Carnapian pro5ect !y sho*in" that there is no s)ch frame*ork+ne)tral metaperspective. Let it certainly does not follo* that 6relativism6 emer"es tri)mphant. In the contrary, the one possi!le standpoint from *hich *e co)ld hope coherently to artic)late s)ch a thoro)"h"oin" 6relativism6 has !een p)lled o)t from !eneath o)r feet. @or does it follo* that the e7act sciences have !een in any *ay diminished in philosophical importance or centrality. ?ere *e sho)ld remem!er that 9Edel3s (heorem is itself a theorem of elementary arithmetic. Under the 9Edel n)m!erin" the theorem says that a certain n)m!erFthe 9Edel n)m!er of 9Edel3s )nprova!le sentenceFis not in a certain set of n)m!ersFthe set of 9Edel n)m!ers of prova!le form)las. :oreover, this latter set of n)m!ers can itself !e defined in the lan")a"e of elementary arithmeticFthat is, in terms, )ltimately, of addition and m)ltiplication. 8n these terms, 9Edel3s (heorem merely e7presses a rather arcane fact of elementary arithmetic: if yo) s)!5ect n)m!ers *ith certain properties to certain arithmetical operations .a se<)ence of additions and m)ltiplications in a definite order2, yo) do not "et a certain other n)m!er. (he point is that 9Edel3s (heorem is itself as e7act as e7act can !e: in principle, it is a proposition of the same kind as 2 T 2 R %. @o* this last res)lt of the e7act sciences has, 8 have ar")ed, the most profo)nd conse<)ences for o)r philosophical )nderstandin" of the e7act sciences. 8n partic)lar, it sho*s that the lo"ical positivists3 attempt to "ive a @eo+>antian e7planation for the special stat)s of the e7act sciences cannot s)cceedD for it sho*s that the ne)tral metaperspective that alone co)ld s)pport their attempted e7planation does not e7ist. As a res)lt, *e cannot, from a pec)liarly philosophical vanta"e pointFfrom a transcendental vanta"e point, as it *ereFe7plain the special stat)s of the e7act sciences at all. Let it does not follo* that the e7act sciences do not have this special stat)s. In the contrary, in precisely this fail)re of the positivist pro"ram the e7act sciences have sho*n their special stat)s in a completely )ne7pected and )nprecedented *ay. JeFas philosophersFcannot ans*er a <)estion *e have lon" desired to ans*er. B)t *e no* kno* e7actly *hy *e cannot ans*er it, and *e kno* this on the !asis of the most e7act

tr)ths of elementary arithmetic. 8n other *ords, the e7act sciences have themselves sho*n, and have sho*n e7actly, the li#its of o)r philosophical kno*led"e.M21N -)ch precise kno*led"e of the limits of o)r kno*led"e m)st inevita!ly strike a philosopher *ith >antian sympathies as 5)st the ; 90 ; kind of defense of o!5ectivity and rationality to*ard *hich the modern philosophical tradition has !een aimin" all alon".

Six. $an*ua*e and InterpretationD %hilosophical Reflections and Empirical In>uiry

Noam "homs0y 8n the philosophical literat)re of the past forty years, there have !een several infl)ential c)rrents that seem to me pro!lematic in important, even essential, respects. 8 have in mind, in the first place, approaches that take as their point of depart)re certain conceptions of ho* lan")a"e is st)died, or sho)ld !e st)died, !y the empirical scientistFor the 6field lin")ist,6 to )se the terms of G)ine3s familiar paradi"m. Ine can incl)de here G)ine,MON Conald Cavidson, and others *ho have moved to*ard a form of pra"matism and 6nat)rali4ed epistemolo"y,6 incorporatin" <)estions tho)"ht to !e of philosophical si"nificance *ithin their conception of empirical science, !)t also others *ho adopt a different startin" point: :ichael C)mmett, and many of those infl)enced !y Jitt"enstein and ordinary lan")a"e philosophy, for e7ample. (o ill)strate the flavor of these ideas, take some comments of Hichard Horty in his article in the Cavidson vol)me.M1N ?e *rites that 6Cavidson is s)rely ri"ht that G)ine 3saved philosophy of lan")a"e as a serio)s s)!5ect3 !y "ettin" rid of the analytic+synthetic distinction. G)ine3s !est ar")ment for doin" so *as that the distinction is of no )se to the field lin")ist.6 As for the 6field lin")ist,6 all that he 6has to "o on is his o!servation of the *ay in *hich lin")istic is ali"ned *ith non+lin")istic !ehavior in the co)rse of the native3s interaction *ith his environment, an interaction *hich Mthe lin")istN takes to !e ")ided !y r)les of action,6 specifically, the 6re")lative principle6 that 6most of the native3s r)les are the same as o)rs, *hich is to say that most of them are tr)e6 .6r)les6 here apparently referrin" to !eliefs2. Je need not !e concerned a!o)t 6a concept)al scheme, a *ay of vie*in" thin"s, a perspective .or . . . a lan")a"e, or a c)lt)ral tradition2,6 !eca)se 6the field lin")ist does not need them,6 so 6therefore philosophy does not need them either.6 G)ine and Cavidson a"ree that 6a theory of meanin" for a lan")a"e is ; 1$$ ; *hat comes o)t of empirical research into lin")istic !ehavior,6 *hen this is properly p)rs)ed, in accord *ith the doctrines of 6holism and !ehaviorism.6 (his line of tho)"ht, Horty contin)es, leads to a form of pra"matism that he espo)ses and attri!)tes to James and Cavidson, incl)din" cr)cially the denial of any relations of 63!ein" made tr)e3 *hich hold !et*een !eliefs and the *orld.6 Hather, 6Je )nderstand all there is to kno* a!o)t the relation of !eliefs to the *orld *hen *e )nderstand their ca)sal relations *ith the *orld.6

P)ttin" aside the concl)sions that Horty reaches,M2N consider his ass)mptions. 8f the !est ar")ment for dispensin" *ith the analytic+synthetic distinction is that it is of no )se to the field lin")ist, then virt)ally everyone *ho act)ally *orks in descriptive semantics, or ever has, m)st !e serio)sly in error, since s)ch *ork is shot thro)"h *ith ass)mptions a!o)t connections of meanin", *hich *ill .in partic)lar2 ind)ce e7amples of the analytic+synthetic distinction. Ine *o)ld !e hard p)t to find st)dies of lan")a"e that do not assi"n str)ct)res and descri!e the meanin" of 3kill3, 3so3, and so on, in s)ch a *ay that there is a <)alitative distinction, determined !y the lan")a"e itself, !et*een the sentences 3John killed Bill, so Bill is dead3 and 3John killed Bill, so John is dead3. Ir to take another case, it *o)ld !e diffic)lt to find a st)dy of referential dependence in nat)ral lan")a"e that does not concl)de that the lan")a"e itself determines that the relation holds !et*een 3:ary3 and 3herself3 in .12 :ary e7pects to feed herself !)t not *hen the same e7pression is em!edded in the conte7t 38 *onder *hoF,3 yieldin" .22 8 *onder *ho :ary e7pects to feed herself -)ch syntactic+semantic properties *ill ind)ce cases of the analytic+synthetic distinctionD th)s they *ill yield a distinction !et*een 3:ary e7pects to feed herself, so :ary e7pects to feed Mary 3 .analytic, *ith the three occ)rrences of 3:ary3 taken to !e coreferential2 and 38 *onder *ho :ary e7pects to feed herself, so 8 *onder *ho :ary e7pects to feed Mary 3 .not analytic, )nder the same interpretation2. B)t *hat G)ine is alle"ed to have demonstrated "oes !eyond the matter of analyticity, reachin" to the concl)sion that there are no semantic connections that can !e attri!)ted to the lan")a"e fac)lty itself as distinct from o)r "eneral systems of !eliefD else*here, Horty takes this to !e one of the t*o f)ndamental discoveries that )ndermine a traditional *orld pict)re. As is *ell kno*n, G)ine and others have offered their o*n acco)nt of these distinctions. 8 *ill ret)rn to these proposals and ho* they mi"ht !e eval)ated in accordance *ith the canons of in<)iry of the nat)ral sciences, !)t *ill merely note here that reference to 6the field lin")ist6 can s)rely not !e )nderstood as reference to those *ho act)ally do lin")istic *ork. Hather, it has a normative character, referrin" to the *ay s)ch *ork o)"ht to !e done, keep+ ; 1$1 ; in" to the conditions of 6holism and !ehaviorism6 le"islated !y the philosopher !)t not follo*ed in practice !y the errant scientist. Jhile it mi"ht t)rn o)t on investi"ation that this stance is 5)stifia!le, those *ith an appreciation of the history of the discipline mi"ht !e pardoned some initial skepticism. (o select another e7ample to ill)strate the flavor of these disc)ssions, consider C)mmett3s ar")ment in the same vol)me that the 6f)ndamental sense6 in *hich *e m)st )nderstand the concept of lan")a"e is the sense in *hich C)tch and 9erman are different lan")a"es .he "ives a different e7ample, !)t the point is the same2, each of them a partic)lar social practice 6in *hich people en"a"e,6 a practice that 6is learned from others and is constit)ted !y r)les *hich it is part of social c)stom to follo*.6 (h)s C)tch and 9erman e7ist in this 6f)ndamental sense,6 6independently of any partic)lar speakers6D every individ)al speaker 6has6 s)ch a lan")a"e, !)t typically has only a 6partial, and partially erroneo)s, "rasp of the lan")a"e.6 (he intended import of C)mmett3s proposal is far+reachin". ?e is tellin" )s *hat notion of 6lan")a"e6 is essential for philosophical p)rposes, for the theory of meanin" in partic)larD and also, as he makes clear, it is this concept of lan")a"e that is in his vie* re<)ired for e7plainin" the )se of lan")a"e, specifically, for )nderstandin" 6*hat lon"+ran"e theory someone !rin"s to a first lin")istic enco)nter *ith another.6 8t is, therefore, a proposal that !ears on the empirical st)dy of lan")a"e, of people, of *hat they kno* and *hat they do. Perhaps he means to allo* that lin")ists may follo* some different co)rse for their special concerns, !)t clearly these proposals !ear on the

proper practice in empirical in<)iry into lan")a"e and its )se. ?ere the parado7ical flavor is of a some*hat different order. 8t lies in the conflict !et*een C)mmett3s proposal and the commonplace ass)mption in empirical practice that there is no )sef)l "eneral sense in *hich *e can characteri4e 6lan")a"e6 so that C)tch and 9erman are t*o distinct 6lan")a"es,6 *hich people kno* only 6partially6 and 6erroneo)sly.6 (his is so *hether *e are st)dyin" lan")a"e str)ct)re, psycholin")istics, lan")a"e chan"e, typolo"y, pro!lems of comm)nication, or *hatever. People *ho live near the C)tch !order can comm)nicate <)ite *ell *ith those livin" on the 9erman side, !)t they speak different lan")a"es in accordance *ith the sense of the term that C)mmett ar")es is 6f)ndamental6D and those on the 9erman side of the !order, *ith their 6partial kno*led"e6 of the lan")a"e 9erman, may )nderstand nothin" spoken !y people livin" in some other re"ion, *ho 6have6 a different 6partial kno*led"e6 of the lan")a"e 9erman in C)mmett3s sense. 8t is for s)ch reasons as these that no s)ch concept plays any role in empirical in<)iry into lan")a"e or psycholo"y. -)ch terms as 3En"lish3 and 3Japanese3 are )sed for "eneral e7pository disco)rse, !)t *ith the )nderstandin" that their commonsense )sa"e, *hich C)mmett rather )ncritically adopts, is to !e a!andoned *hen *e t)rn to act)al st)dy of lan")a"e, !ehavior, and comm)nication.M#N 8f C)mmett3s concept is indeed f)ndamental for empirical in<)iry and for philo+ ; 1$2 ; sophical p)rposes, then either philosophy, or the empirical st)dy of lan")a"e and !ehavior, or !oth, are in deep tro)!le, for reasons that sho)ld !e familiar. (he concept of lan")a"e that C)mmett takes to !e essential involves comple7 and o!sc)re sociopolitical, historical, c)lt)ral, and normative+teleolo"ical elements, *hich may !e of some interest for the sociolo"y of identification *ithin vario)s social and political comm)nities and the st)dy of a)thority str)ct)re, !)t *hich plainly lie far !eyond any )sef)l in<)iry into the nat)re of lan")a"e or the psycholo"y of )sers of lan")a"e. (o take one e7ample, consider the st)dy of lan")a"e ac<)isition. 8n ordinary )sa"e, *e say that a child of five and a forei"n ad)lt are on their *ay to*ard ac<)irin" En"lish, !)t *e have no *ay to desi"nate *hatever it is that they 6have.6 (he child, in the normal co)rse of events, *ill come to 6have6 En"lish .at least partially and erroneo)sly2, tho)"h the forei"ner pro!a!ly *ill not. B)t if all ad)lts *ere s)ddenly to die and children *ere someho* to s)rvive, then *hatever it is they are speakin" *o)ld !e a h)man lan")a"e, tho)"h one that does not no* e7ist. Irdinary )sa"e provides no )sef)l *ay to descri!e any of this, since it involves too many disparate and o!sc)re concerns and interests. (his is one reason *hy the concept of lan")a"e that C)mmett adopts is )seless for act)al in<)iry. (his matter is of some importance *hen *e consider the reliance on notions of 6mis)se of lan")a"e,6 6comm)nity norms,6 6social practice,6 and 6r)le follo*in"6 that are often adopted as if they are s)fficiently clearD they are not.M%N 8n this connection, it is perhaps *orth*hile to recall some f)rther tr)ismsD in rational in<)iry, in the nat)ral sciences or else*here, there is no s)ch s)!5ect as 6the st)dy of everythin".6 (h)s it is no part of physics to determine e7actly ho* a partic)lar !ody moves )nder the infl)ence of every particle or force in the )niverse, *ith possi!le h)man intervention, and so on. (his is not a topic. Hather, in rational in<)iry *e ideali4e to selected domains in s)ch a *ay .*e hope2 as to permit )s to discover cr)cial feat)res of the *orld. Cata and o!servations, in the sciences, have an instr)mental characterD they are of no partic)lar interest in themselves, !)t only insofar as they constit)te evidence that permits one to determine f)ndamental feat)res of the real *orld, *ithin a co)rse of in<)iry that is invaria!ly )ndertaken )nder sharp ideali4ations, often implicit and !ased on common )nderstandin", !)t al*ays present. (he st)dy of 6lan")a"e6 in C)mmett3s sense ver"es on 6the st)dy of everythin"6 and is therefore not a )sef)l topic of in<)iry, tho)"h one mi"ht hope, perhaps, to !)ild )p to a st)dy of aspects

of s)ch <)estions in terms of *hat comes to !e )nderstood a!o)t partic)lar components of this hopeless amal"am. (he conception of lan")a"e as a 6social practice6 that C)mmett and others propose raises f)rther <)estions, as !ecomes clear *hen it is applied to concrete e7amples. Consider a"ain the e7amples .12 and .22: .12 :ary e7pects to feed herself .22 8 *onder *ho :ary e7pects to feed herself ; 1$# ; 8n .12, 3feed herself3 is taken to !e predicated of :ary, !)t in .22 it is predicated of some .female2 person distinct from :aryD th)s from .22 it follo*s that 8 *onder *hich female person :ary e7pects to feed that very person, !)t not that 8 *onder *hich person :ary e7pects to feed :ary herself. (he e7ample raises many pertinent <)estions, amon" them, ho* *e kno* these facts. (he ans*er seems to !e that the initial state of the shared lan")a"e fac)lty incorporates certain principles concernin" referential dependence .Bindin" (heory2, and *hen certain options left )ndetermined in the initial state are fi7ed !y elementary e7perience, then *e have no more choice as to ho* to interpret .12 and .22 than *e have a!o)t *hether to perceive somethin" as a red trian"le or as a person. -ocial c)stom appears to have nothin" to do *ith the matter in s)ch cases, tho)"h early e7perience helps set certain details of the invariant, !iolo"ically determined mechanisms of the mind !rain. (he same seems to !e tr)e rather "enerally. (aken literally at least, the proposals of C)mmett and others concernin" 6social practice6 appear to !e false, as a matter of empirical fact. At the very least, some ar")ment *o)ld !e re<)ired to sho* *hy they sho)ld !e considered serio)sly. 8f lan")a"e is constr)ed as a social practice in the manner of these disc)ssions, then it is temptin" to )nderstand kno*led"e of lan")a"e as the learned a!ility to en"a"e in s)ch practices, as C)mmett s)""ests, or more "enerally, as an a!ility that can !e e7ercised !y speakin", )nderstandin", readin", talkin" to oneself, and so on: 6to kno* a lan")a"e 5)st is to have the a!ility to do these and similar thin"s6 .Anthony >enny2.M&N (he temptation is reinforced !y a common constr)al of kno*led"e more "enerally as a kind of a!ility. (his vie* contrasts *ith the conception of a lan")a"e as a "enerative proced)re that assi"ns str)ct)ral descriptions to lin")istic e7pressions, kno*led"e of lan")a"e !ein" the internal representation of s)ch a proced)re in the !rain .in the mind, as *e may say *hen speakin" a!o)t the !rain at a certain level of a!straction2. Brom this point of vie*, a!ility to )se one3s lan")a"e .to p)t one3s kno*led"e to )se2 is sharply distin")ished from havin" s)ch kno*led"e. (he latter conception has t*o primary virt)es: .12 it seems to !e the ri"ht *ay to approach the st)dy of h)man kno*led"e, kno*led"e of lan")a"e in partic)lar, *ithin the "eneral frame*ork of the nat)ral sciences, and it has proven a hi"hly prod)ctive approachD .22 it is in accord *ith normal preanalytic )sa"e, a secondary !)t not entirely insi"nificant matter. 8n contrast, the approach in terms of practical a!ility has proven entirely )nprod)ctive and can !e s)stained only !y )nderstandin" 6a!ility6 in a *ay that departs radically from ordinary )sa"e. (o see *hy this is so, s)ppose that Jones, a speaker of some variety of *hat *e call 6En"lish6 in informal )sa"e, improves his a!ility to speak his lan")a"e !y takin" a p)!lic+speakin" co)rse, or loses this a!ility !eca)se of an in5)ry or disease, then recoverin" that a!ility, say, *ith a dr)". @ote that a speaker of Japanese, )nder the same circ)mstances, *o)ld recover 6apanese , not En"lish, *ith the same dr)", and plainly recovery in s)ch cases differs

; 1$% ; radically from ac<)isitionD a child co)ld not ac<)ire En"lish or Japanese *itho)t any evidence. 8n all s)ch cases, somethin" remains constant, some property >, *hile a!ility to speak, )nderstand, and so on, varies. 8n ordinary )sa"e, *e say that > is kno*led"e of lan")a"eD th)s Jones3s kno*led"e remained constant *hile his a!ility to p)t his kno*led"e to )se improved, declined, recovered, and so on. (he acco)nt in terms of internal representation of a "enerative proced)re accords *ith informal )sa"e in this case. @ote f)rther that other evidence .say, from a)topsy, *ere eno)"h kno*n a!o)t the !rain sciences2 mi"ht lead )s to concl)de that -mith, *ho never recovered En"lish, not havin" taken the dr)", nevertheless retained his kno*led"e of En"lish intact after havin" completely lost his a!ility to speak and )nderstand.M0N 8f kno*led"e is a!ility, then the property > m)st !e a kind of a!ility, tho)"h plainly not a!ility in the <)ite )sef)l normal sense of the *ord, since a!ility varied *hile > remained constant. Je m)st therefore contrive a ne* technical sense of the term 3a!ility3: call it 53a!ility . (hen >+a!ility remained constant *hile a!ility varied.M'N >+a!ility is completely divorced from a!ility, has the properties of the old concept of kno*led"e, and mi"ht as *ell !e called 3kno*led"e3, doctrinal matters aside. 8t is rather ironic that these moves sho)ld !e presented as in the spirit of the later Jitt"enstein, *ho constantly ar")ed a"ainst the practice of constr)ctin" artificial concepts, divorced from ordinary )sa"e, in defense of certain philosophical doctrines. 8n fact, the Jitt"ensteinian constr)al of kno*led"e as a species of a!ility seems to !e a paradi"matic e7ample of the practice that Jitt"enstein held to !e a f)ndamental so)rce of philosophical error. @otice that similar considerations sho* that $no%ing3ho% Ffor e7ample, kno*in" ho* to ride a !icycleFcannot !e analy4ed in terms of a!ilities, dispositions, and so onD rather, there appears to !e an irred)ci!le co"nitive element. @otice finally that an acco)nt of kno*led"e in terms of a!ility, taken in anythin" like its normal sense, has proved )tterly )nprod)ctive. Ine mi"ht try acco)ntin" for the simple e7amples .12 and .22 in terms of Jones3s a!ilities, for e7ample. @o s)ch endeavor has ever !een )ndertaken, and a close look at the pro!lems makes it reasona!ly clear *hy it *o)ld have no hope of s)ccess. (he parado7ical flavor of ideas in the ran"e 8 have !een samplin" !ecomes clearer *hen *e look more closely at some of the specific in5)nctions. (ake a"ain Horty3s o!servation, taken as o!vio)s *itho)t disc)ssion, that 6all the lin")ist has to "o on is his o!servation of the *ay in *hich lin")istic is ali"ned *ith non+lin")istic !ehavior in the co)rse of the native3s interaction *ith the environment,6 apart from the 6re")lative principle6 that the native informant is "enerally speakin" tr)ly. (his conception, he notes, is dra*n from G)ine and Cavidson. (h)s in G)ine3s familiar paradi"m of 6radical translation,6 6field lin")ists6 o!servin" Jones m)st s)pport their hypotheses entirely in terms of o!servation of Jones3s !ehavior .or that of mem!ers of the 6J)n"le comm)nity,6 taken to !e homo"eneo)sD if it is not homo"eneo)s, none of the ; 1$& ; ar")ments *ill "o thro)"h, and if it is homo"eneo)s, *e may dismiss the comm)nity in favor of Jones *itho)t loss for these p)rposes, as 8 *ill do2. 8 sho)ld note that in referrin" to G)ine, te7t)al <)estions arise, since in response to <)eries and criticism he has "iven many different versions of his paradi"m, and these are not consistentDM/N !)t it is the one 5)st cited, *hich Cavidson and Horty adopt, that is necessary if *e are to !e a!le to dra* from G)ine3s paradi"m any of the concl)sions that are held to !e important. Before proceedin", let )s note a"ain that these prescriptions are radically different from the act)al

practice of the 6field lin")ist.6 (hey are also completely forei"n to the standard methods of the nat)ral sciences. 8n the philosophical literat)re, the iss)es are "enerally disc)ssed *ith re"ard to the theory of meanin", and in partic)lar, *ith re"ard to aspects of the theory of meanin" a!o)t *hich little is kno*n .not, say, in connection *ith s)ch matters as referential dependence, a!o)t *hich a "ood deal is )nderstood2. (his is d)!io)s practice, !eca)se it means that controls on spec)lation !y empirical kno*led"e and theoretical )nderstandin" are very sli"ht. B)t if the doctrine has any validity, it sho)ld hold *ith re"ard to all of o)r attri!)tions of lin")istic competence, and G)ine, at least, has sometimes held that this is so. (h)s he has ar")ed that the same considerations hold *hen his 6field lin")ist6 alle"es that in the sentence 3John contemplated the pro!lem3 there are t*o phrases, the no)n phrase 3John3 and the ver! phrase 3contemplated the pro!lem,3 not, say, the t*o phrases 3John contemplated3 and 3the pro!lem3 or 3John contemp3 and 3lated the pro!lem3. Accordin" to G)ine, at least *hen he is keepin" to the ass)mptions re<)ired for his *ell+kno*n concl)sions to follo*, this attri!)tion of some property .kno*led"e, or *hatever *e choose to call it2 to the informant Jones m)st !e !ased e7cl)sively on evidence a!o)t 6ones-s !eha&ior Fin fact, evidence )sed in accord *ith hi"hly restrictive canons that he o)tlines. And the same *o)ld !e tr)e in the st)dy of so)nd str)ct)re, the relation of a refle7ive to its antecedent, or *hatever.M9N 8t is *orth notin" that no lin")ist, or empirical scientist "enerally, *o)ld ever a"ree to !e !o)nd !y s)ch strict)res. A compara!le ass)mption in !iolo"y *o)ld !e that in testin" hypotheses a!o)t em!ryolo"ical development of h)mans, *e cannot consider evidence o!tained from the st)dy of E. coli, or fr)it flies, or apes, or physics. (o mention one cr)cial case, in act)al practice, every lin")ist approaches the st)dy of a partic)lar lan")a"e on the !asis of ass)mptions dra*n from the st)dy of other lan")a"es. (h)s any lin")ist operatin" !y the norms of the sciences *o)ld readily )se evidence derived from the st)dy of Japanese to help "ro)nd ass)mptions a!o)t Jones3s kno*led"e of En"lish. (he lo"ic is strai"htfor*ard, and <)ite correct. (here is over*helmin" empirical evidence that people are not "enetically 6t)ned6 to ac<)ire one rather than another lan")a"eD rather, the 6initial state6 of their lan")a"e fac)lty may !e ass)med to !e )niform to a very "ood appro7imation. Presented *ith an array of evidence, the child ac<)ires a specific lan")a"e, makin" ; 1$0 ; )se of the reso)rces of the initial state that determine a s)!stantial part of the kno*led"e .competence2 ac<)iredD the initial state can !e re"arded as a fi7ed, !iolo"ically determined f)nction that maps evidence availa!le into ac<)ired kno*led"e, )niformly for all lan")a"es.M1$N -t)dy of Japanese may, of co)rse, provide )s *ith evidence, perhaps compellin" evidence, a!o)t the initial state, namely, !y means of a comparison !et*een *hat comes to !e kno*n and *hat is presented, the t*o !ein" mediated !y the reso)rces of the initial state. 8f speakers of Japanese employ some formal property of lan")a"e str)ct)re .say, c3co##and 2 in interpretin" referential dependence, and the evidence availa!le to the Japanese child does not someho* 6compel6 or is not even cond)cive to this )niform res)lt, *e are entitled to attri!)te to the initial state a version of Bindin" (heory, incorporatin" this property and relevant principles involvin" it, and th)s to e7plain the facts o!served. B)t the initial state is shared !y the En"lish speaker Jones, and hypotheses a!o)t his initial state *ill of co)rse have conse<)ences as to the proper description of the co"nitive state he attains. (he concl)sions derived from Japanese concernin" Jones3s kno*led"e of En"lish mi"ht !e far+reachin". (h)s evidence a!o)t referential dependence in Japanese mi"ht prove relevant for determinin" the position of phrase !o)ndaries in En"lish.M11N All of this is 5)st standard scientific practice, never <)estionedFor even disc)ssed, !eca)se it is so )ncontroversialFin the nat)ral sciences. B)t G)ine and those infl)enced !y his paradi"m are en5oinin"

the 6field lin")ist6 to depart radically from the proced)res of the sciences, limitin" themselves to a small part of the relevant evidence, selected in accordance *ith !ehaviorist do"maD and also to re5ect the standard proced)res )sed in theory constr)ction in the sciences. (he point is not academicD the normal practice of descriptive lin")ists cr)cially e7ploits these ass)mptions, *hich a"ain sho)ld !e the merest tr)isms. Je may p)t the point differently. (he lin")ist and the child face radically different tasks. (he child, endo*ed *ith certain innate capacities, ac<)ires kno*led"e of a lan")a"eFa)tomatically, and *ith little if any choice in the matter. (he lin")ist is tryin" to find o)t *hat kno*led"e the child ac<)ires, and *hat innate properties of the mind !rain are responsi!le for this process of "ro*th of kno*led"e .tryin" to find o)t *hat the child kno*s in advance of e7perience, to )se a loc)tion that seems to !e <)ite appropriate2. (he lin")ist *ill <)ite properly )se concl)sions a!o)t innate properties, ho*ever derived, for the description of the kno*led"e attainedFin partic)lar, for the st)dy of meanin", this domain havin" the same stat)s as any other. 8n fact, G)ine3s in5)nctions, consistently applied, *o)ld !e still more e7treme than this e7ample indicates. (h)s evidence from lan")a"e patholo"y, or "enetic variation, or ne)ral str)ct)re, or !iochemistry, or in fact evidence from any so)rce, *o)ld !e re"arded !y any scientist as potentially relevant in principle to determinin" the nat)re of the initial state or the state of kno*led"e ; 1$' ; attained, since these are simply elements of the nat)ral !iolo"ical *orldD G)ine too insists on this point *ith re"ard to st)dy of the nat)ral *orld, apart from the st)dy of h)mans a!ove the neck *hen )ndertaken !y 6lin")ists,6 in his sense of this term. 8f it co)ld !e sho*n that some facts a!o)t the ne)ral str)ct)re of the !rain provide a nat)ral reali4ation of r)le systems of one kind .say, *ith the !reakdo*n of 3John contemplated the pro!lem3 into the t*o phrases 3John3 and 3contemplated the pro!lem32, !)t not other kinds, then this line of ar")ment *o)ld !e accepta!le in the sciences to help settle the <)estion of *hat is the correct description of Jones3s kno*led"eFthe co"nitive state attained !y John .the <)estion of the choice of constit)ent str)ct)re, in the case in <)estion2. (he same is tr)e *ith re"ard to the theory of meanin", or any empirical in<)iry. B)t all of these paths, familiar in the nat)ral sciences, are e7cl)ded !y fiat )nder the G)inean conditions on the *ork of the 6lin")ist6 in accord *ith the paradi"m that is *idely adopted in the philosophical literat)re. G)ine has <)alified these doctrines in interestin" *ays. A closer look at these <)alifications reveals more clearly the ar!itrary character of the stip)lations imposed and the persistent mis)nderstandin" of the empirical iss)es. As an e7ample of ar!itrary stip)lation, consider G)ine3s disc)ssion of the evidence that mi"ht lead )s to assi"n one or another constit)ent str)ct)re to the sentences of Jones3s En"lish.M12N 8f this evidence derives from psycholin")istic e7periments on perceived displacement of clicks,M1#N then it co)ntsD if the evidence derives from conditions on referential dependence in Japanese or on the formation of ca)sative constr)ctions in n)mero)s lan")a"es, then it does not co)ntFtho)"h this is evidence interpreted in the normal manner of the nat)ral sciences, alon" the lines disc)ssed a moment a"o. Perhaps G)ine mi"ht !e interpreted as holdin" that evidence of the former type .so+called 6psycholo"ical evidence62 is in fact more po*erf)l and pers)asive than the so+called 6lin")istic evidence6D if so, this *o)ld simply !e another error, since the opposite is the case, for the present at least. 8n fact, G)ine appears to hold that the evidence differs in its epistemolo"ical character, a notion that is completely )ntena!le. Evidence does not come la!eled 6for confirmin" theories6 .6psycholo"ical evidence62 or 6for p)rposes of 3simplicity and "eneral translata!ility3 6 .6lin")istic evidence62. 8t is 5)st evidence, "ood or !ad, compellin" or noncompellin", "iven the theoretical frame*orks in *hich it can !e interpreted for the p)rposes of sharpenin" or confirmin" hypotheses.

As an e7ample of mis)nderstandin" of empirical iss)es, consider G)ine3s disc)ssion of the so+called 6coordinate str)ct)re constraint,6 a descriptive "enerali4ation that covers, for e7ample, the radical difference in stat)s !et*een the interro"ative e7pressions derived !y <)estionin" 6:ary6 in the sentences 3John sa* Bill and :ary3 and 3John sa* Bill *ith :ary3: that is, the difference !et*een 3*ho did John see Bill and=3, 3*ho did John see Bill *ith=3. G)ine concl)des that the 6strikin" )niformity6 e7hi!ited in this constraint is not 6a ; 1$/ ; hint of a trait of all lan")a"e6 !)t 6a hint of "enetic kinship of the lan")a"es that seem most readily "rammati4ed in these terms.6M1%N (his concl)sion, ho*ever, is !ased on a serio)s mis)nderstandin" of the empirical iss)es at stake. (he pro!lem is to e7plain ho* each child kno*s the relevant difference !et*een 3*ho did John see Bill and=3 and 3*ho did John see Bill *ith=3 8t cannot !e that the child relies on evidence from the history of lan")a"e, and the child typically has no relevant e7perience to determine .!y 6ind)ction,6 or *hatever2 that the simple r)le 6Bront %h +phrase6 is someho* !locked in the e7pression 3John sa* Bill and *ho3 !)t not in 3John sa* Bill *ith *ho3 .in collo<)ial En"lish2. Children do not, for e7ample, prod)ce 3*ho did John see Bill and=3, then to !e informed !y their parents that this is not the *ay it is doneD and lan")a"es have not 6drifted6 to incorporate this 6simplification6 of the r)le of <)estion formation over many millennia.M1&N (he pro!lem, in short, is one of poverty of stim)l)s, and spec)lations a!o)t "enetic kinship of lan")a"es have nothin" *hatsoever to do *ith it, in this and inn)mera!le other similar cases.M10N A similar ref)sal to permit the st)dy of lan")a"e to !e p)rs)ed in the manner of the nat)ral sciences is ill)strated in other connections. Consider Conald Cavidson3s article 6A @ice Ceran"ement of Epitaphs6 in the vol)me cited earlier.M1'N Cavidson considers the thesis that the "oal of the descriptive st)dy of meanin" is to constr)ct 6an e7plicit theory6 that 6is a model of the interpreter3s lin")istic competence,6 a 6rec)rsive theory of a certain sort,6 and that *e can 6descri!e *hat an interpreter can do6 only !y appeal to s)ch a theory. ?e then proceeds: 68t does not add anythin" to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly descri!e the competence of an interpreter, some mechanisms in the interpreter m)st correspond to the theory.6 -imilar points have !een made !y C)mmett and others.M1/N Bor anyone approachin" these pro!lems from the standpoint of the nat)ral sciences, the final comment <)oted is )tterly *ron"headed. 8f it had any validity, the analo"o)s comment *o)ld apply in the st)dy of vis)al perception, or chemistry. As else*here, it adds a "reat deal to the thesis to say that 6some mechanisms in the interpreter . . . correspond to the theory.6 (hat is, nat)ral scientists *ho constr)ct a theory that 6descri!es *hat an interpreter can do6 *ill proceed to attri!)te to the s)!5ect certain fi7ed and e7plicit mechanisms that *o)ld have the properties ass)med in this descriptive acco)nt, not others. (he attri!)tion mi"ht !e at an a!stract level, in terms of mentally represented r)le+systems, or in terms of other a!stract entities s)ch as ne)ral nets, or in terms of cell)lar str)ct)re, or *hateverD all of this is 5)st standard nat)ral science. ?avin" proceeded to attri!)te specific str)ct)re and mechanisms to the person3s mind !rainFoften at some remove from )nkno*n 6more elementary6 physical mechanismsF the nat)ral scientist is then in a position to test the theory in terms of a *ide array of evidence, for e7ample, evidence dra*n from other lan")a"es in the manner 5)st ill)strated, or evidence from pathol+ ; 1$9 ; o"y or the !rain sciences or !iochemistry. Cavidson3s in5)nction !locks these efforts to employ the methods of rational in<)iry in the sciences to determine *hether the post)lated acco)nt of the interpreter is indeed tr)e, and to modify it if .as is likely2 it is not.

(he same pro!lem arises *hen G)ine, Cavid ,e*is, C)mmett, and many others o!5ect that some philosophical pro!lem arises *hen lin")ists attri!)te to a speaker+hearer a specific internali4ed r)le+ system, and then seek to determine *hether this theory of the person is tr)e !y the standard methods of the sciences. Perhaps this is even p)re 6folly,6 as G)ine has ar")ed, to !e overcome !y proper reflection on methodolo"y. (he perceived pro!lem is that for a fi7ed array of o!served !ehavior, or a fi7ed infinite set of )tterances selected on some o!sc)re !asis and taken !y the philosopher to !e 6the lan")a"e,6 it is of co)rse possi!le to constr)ct infinitely many different theories that are consistent *ith this evidence .6"rammars,6 as they are sometimes called2D it is therefore held to !e an )n*arranted move to post)late that one of them is 6tr)e6 and others 6false6F)nless, G)ine sometimes holds, there is 6psycholo"ical evidence,6 *ith its mysterio)s properties that 6lin")istic evidence6 lacks, to s)pport one or another hypothesis. (he ar")ment is often !)ttressed !y an analo"y to the st)dy of formal lan")a"es, *hich are completely irrelevant and hi"hly misleadin" in this connection. 8f valid, the ar")ment *o)ld hold thro)"ho)t the sciencesD in fact, it is nothin" more than a form of skepticism that no one takes serio)sly in the st)dy of the nat)ral *orld for reasons that *ere clear !y the seventeenth cent)ry, as Hichard Popkin o!serves.M19N (he nat)ral scientist *ill attri!)te to the s)!5ect a specific system, not some other one .a 6"rammar,6 to )se a misleadin" term2, and *ill then proceed to determine *hether this ass)mption is correct !y seekin" evidence of as *ide a variety as possi!le, incl)din" cr)cial evidence from other lan")a"es, alon" the lines 5)st disc)ssed. If co)rse, there *ill al*ays remain empirical indeterminacy, since this is empirical science, not mathematics, !)t that is all there is to say a!o)t the matter. A considera!le literat)re e7ists ar")in" the contrary, !)t it is !ased on f)ndamental fallacies of reasonin".M2$N Amon" these fallacies are the mistaken ass)mptions 5)st disc)ssed: that evidence a!o)t Jones3s competence can only !e dra*n from Jones3s !ehavior .interpreted in terms of the re")lative principle a!o)t tr)th2 and that it adds nothin" to a description of Jones3s !ehavior to attri!)te to Jones a specific internal mechanism, perhaps a partic)lar system of r)les or some form of ne)ral or"ani4ation that reali4es them. (he point can !e ill)strated, a"ain, *ith the matter of phrase+str)ct)re !o)ndaries. -)ppose *e have t*o kinds of evidence for the placement of the ma5or !o)ndary after the s)!5ect in 3JohnF contemplated the pro!lem3, evidence from referential dependence in Japanese .6lin")istic evidence62 and evidence from percept)al displacement of clicks .6psycholo"ical evidence62. (he first kind of evidence is s)!5ect to the familiar sort of indeterminacy. ; 11$ ; -o is the second. -)ppose that )nder e7perimental conditions esta!lished to yield the ri"ht res)lts .typically, after many attempts that "o *ron"2, clicks *ill !e percept)ally displaced to the s)!5ect+ predicate !o)ndary, not the ver!+o!5ect !o)ndary. (hese res)lts can !e interpreted as s)pportin" the concl)sion that the str)ct)re is M@PFK @PN, not M@P KF@PN or M@PFKF@PN. B)t it is easy to apply G)ine3s ar")ment to sho* that there is 6no fact of the matter6 in this case. Plainly, there are many other interpretations of the e7perimental res)lts. Perhaps clicks are percept)ally displaced to the middle of a constit)ent, not its !o)ndaryD or perhaps the s)!5ect is respondin" !y identifyin" the phrase+str)ct)re !o)ndary directly !elo* the ma5or one. All other relevant e7periments co)ld !e reinterpreted alon" similar lines, as can certainly !e done in principleFtho)"h it is not so simple in practice, in the case of either the 6psycholo"ical6 or the 6lin")istic6 evidence. (he iss)es are the same thro)"ho)tD or rather, there are no iss)es relevant here, since they hold of empirical in<)iry "enerally. Jhen concl)sions are dra*n a!o)t phrase !o)ndaries or other aspects of lan")a"e on the !asis of 6lin")istic evidence,6 G)ine is rel)ctant to accept them 6*itho)t f)rther li"ht on the nat)re of the s)pposed e<)ipment,6M21N !)t *hen the same concl)sions are !ased on 6psycholo"ical evidence,6 these

<)alms do not arise. (his epistemolo"ical d)alism makes no sense *hatsoeverD it is a lon" step !ack*ard from traditional metaphysical d)alism, *hich *as a rational reaction, on ass)mptions no* kno*n to !e fa)lty,M22N to perceived empirical pro!lems. (he <)alms, s)ch as they are, are in principle the same, *hatever the evidence on *hich concl)sions are !ased, and are simply feat)res of empirical in<)iry. As for the 6s)pposed e<)ipment,6 it raises no pro!lems of principle that differ from those characteristic of all theory constr)ction in the empirical sciences. Let another parado7 arises *ithin this frame*ork. ,in")ists, it is ar")ed, are not permitted to attri!)te one partic)lar lan")a"e system rather than others to the individ)al or ideali4ed comm)nity that they are st)dyin"DM2#N they are not permitted to e7plore *hat is tr)e of the !rain, descri!ed at the level at *hich *e constr)ct r)le systems and the like. B)t somethin" is tr)e of the !rainD there is somethin" a!o)t my !rain that is more or less like yo)rs and cr)cially different from the !rain of a speaker of -*ahili. (herefore someone sho)ld !e permitted to st)dy these aspects of the real *orld, !)t not lin")ists, *ho are restricted to in<)iry into Jones3s !ehavior and may not proceed to attri!)te specific mechanisms to Jones3s mind !rain and to )se evidence from other lan")a"es .or from any domain, in principle2 to verify the acc)racy of their concl)sions a!o)t these mechanisms. Acceptin" these terminolo"ical strict)res a!o)t *hat the lin")ist m)st do, the rational step is to a!andon lin")istics .incl)din" the st)dy of meanin" in accord *ith the conditions stip)lated in the G)inean paradi"m2. ?avin" a!andoned these pointless p)rs)its, *e may no* t)rn to this other s)!5ect, *here *e are permitted to attri!)te ; 111 ; specific mechanisms to Jones3s mind !rain and to investi"ate these hypotheses !y the methods of the sciences, )sin" *hatever evidence is at handFin fact, the act)al practice of lin")ists that is condemned in this c)rio)s, tho)"h e7tremely infl)ential tradition in modern philosophy, *hich, in a final irony, prides itself on its 6nat)ralism6 and adherence to the methods of the sciences. 8n his most recent effort to 5)stify the strict)res he imposes, in the Jan)ary 19/' iss)e of the 6ournal of Philosophy , G)ine offers the follo*in" ar")ment.M2%N Bor the lin")ist, he ar")es, 6the !ehaviorist approach is mandatory.6 (he reason is that in ac<)irin" lan")a"e, 6*e depend strictly on overt !ehavior in o!serva!le sit)ations . . . (here is nothin" in lin")istic meanin", then, !eyond *hat is to !e "leaned from overt !ehavior in o!serva!le circ)mstances,6 and the same holds tr)e, !y parity of ar")ment, for the st)dy of pron)nciation, phrase str)ct)re, or *hatever aspect of lan")a"e *e choose. B)rthermore, as he makes e7plicit once a"ain, the relevant !ehavior for the lin")ist is that of the natives to *hom he she is imp)tin" kno*led"e of lan")a"e: 68f translators disa"ree on the translation of a J)n"le sentence !)t no !ehavior on the part of the J)n"le people Mtacitly ass)med to !e homo"eneo)sN co)ld !ear on the disa"reement, then there is simply no fact of the matter,6 and the lin")ist *ho holds that there are facts to !e discovered, and that some theories ."rammars2 are correct and others not, is ")ilty of serio)s methodolo"ical error or p)re 6folly6 .recall that the 6translator6 stands for the lan")a"e learner as *ellM2&N and that the same ar")ment holds for pron)nciation, phrase str)ct)re, etc.2. Consider no* the follo*in" analo"o)s ar")ment. 8n reachin" its final physical str)ct)re in the passa"e from em!ryo to mat)re state, the or"anism depends strictly on n)trition provided from o)tside .incl)din" o7y"en, etc.2. (here is nothin" in the physical str)ct)re of the mat)re or"anism, then, !eyond *hat is to !e "leaned from the n)tritional inp)ts. (he st)dent of h)man development and its o)tcome, then, m)st limit attention to these inp)tsD for the !iolo"ist, 6the n)tritionist approach is mandatory.6 (he ar")ment is the same as G)ine3s, and *e see at once *hy it is )ntena!le. (r)e, the em!ryo 6depends6 on the n)tritional environment 5)st as the lan")a"e learner 6depends6 on overt !ehavior. B)t *hat does the term 6depends6 incl)de= ?ere *e t)rn to the str)ct)re of the or"anism, *hich *e may think of a!stractly as a mappin" : of e7ternal inp)ts into mat)re state. 8n the a!sence of

s)ch str)ct)re, o!served !ehavior *ill lead to no kno*led"e of lan")a"e and n)trition *ill lead to no "ro*th. G)ine of co)rse reco"ni4es this. (h)s G)ine3s field lin")ist, p)rs)in" the path of the lan")a"e learner, 6tentatively associates a native3s )tterance *ith the o!served conc)rrent sit)ation6 and is permitted to make )se of other hypotheses that alle"edly correspond to capacities *ith *hich the lan")a"e learner is endo*ed. 8f clarified, these hypotheses *o)ld constit)te a theory of the innate str)ct)re of the or"anism and the mappin" :. As is a"reed on all sides, *itho)t innate str)ct)re there is no effect of the ; 112 ; e7ternal environment in lan")a"e .or other2 "ro*thD in partic)lar, *itho)t innate str)ct)re Jones co)ld not have developed in a specific *ay from em!ryo to person, and his lan")a"e fac)lty co)ld not have ass)med the state of mat)re competence that )nderlies and acco)nts for Jones3s !ehavior. (he child is endo*ed *ith this innate str)ct)re and therefore "ro*s to mat)rity alon" a co)rse that is lar"ely inner+ directedD the task of the scientist is to discover *hat the innate endo*ment is and *hat is the nat)re of the state attained. C)rrently, the !est theory is that the initial state of the lan")a"e fac)lty incorporates certain "eneral principles of lan")a"e str)ct)re, incl)din" phonetic and semantic principles, and that the mat)re state of competence is a "enerative proced)re that assi"ns str)ct)ral descriptions to e7pressions and interacts *ith the motor and percept)al system and other co"nitive systems of the mind !rain to yield semantic and phonetic interpretations of )tterances. A vast ran"e of empirical evidence is relevant in principle to determinin" 5)st ho* this proposal sho)ld !e spelled o)t in detail. A"ain, all of this is normal science, yieldin" theories that are tr)e or falseM20N re"ardin" Jones3s competence and his initial state, part of the h)man !iolo"ical endo*ment. Perhaps this approach sho)ld !e a!andoned in terms of some other conception, no* )navaila!le, !)t to esta!lish this concl)sion it does not s)ffice to demand that the lin")ist a!andon the methods of the sciences. As in his earlier form)lations of these ideas, G)ine3s specific stip)lations a!o)t the innate str)ct)re .hence the mappin" :2 are completely ar!itrary, apart from their historical antecedents, here irrelevant. (here is no reason to accept them in the case of lan")a"e, 5)st as compara!le do"matism a!o)t 6dependence6 *o)ld !e re5ected o)t of hand in the st)dy of other aspects of the "ro*th of or"anisms. B)rthermore, there is compellin" evidence that they are false, insofar as they are e7plicit. As in the st)dy of physical development "enerally, the rational investi"ator *ill dismiss these do"matic ass)mptions a!o)t the nat)re of 6dependence6 .i.e., a!o)t innate str)ct)re2 alon" *ith other doctrines s)ch as those 5)st sketched, and *ill )se *hatever evidence can !e fo)nd concernin" the str)ct)re of the or"anism, the mappin" :, and the nat)re of the states attained in partic)lar cases. (he concl)sions that G)ine, Cavidson, Horty and many others dra* remain )nar")ed. @othin" can !e res)rrected from the G)inean pict)re *ith re"ard to these matters, so far as 8 can see, tho)"h some of his concl)sions, in partic)lar, *ith re"ard to 6meanin" holism,6 may *ell t)rn o)t to !e correct, at least in lar"e part. ,et )s ret)rn no* to the 6analytic+synthetic6 distinction, and the Cavidsonian ar")ment that !y 6"ettin" rid of it,6 G)ine 6saved philosophy of lan")a"e as a serio)s s)!5ect.6 Hecall that *hat is at iss)e here is not simply this distinction !)t the <)estion of lan")a"e+determined semantic connections "enerally. As 8 mentioned, *e cannot appeal to Horty3s ar")ment, attri!)ted to G)ine, that the 6field lin")ist6 finds the distinction 6of no )se.6 8n practice, semantic str)ct)re is re")larly attri!)ted to le7ical items in descriptive *ork ; 11# ;

and theoretical st)dies on the semantics of nat)ral lan")a"e, and from these and other str)ct)ral properties, semantic connections of vario)s kinds are deriva!le, incl)din" analytic connections. (here are "ood reasons for these standard ass)mptions a!o)t le7ical str)ct)re. Ac<)isition of le7ical items poses *hat is sometimes called 6Plato3s pro!lem6 in a very sharp form. As anyone *ho has tried to constr)ct a dictionary or to *ork in descriptive semantics is a*are, it is a very diffic)lt matter to descri!e the meanin" of a *ord, and s)ch meanin"s have "reat intricacy and involve the most remarka!le ass)mptions, even in the case of very simple concepts, s)ch as *hat co)nts as a namea!le thin". At peak periods of lan")a"e ac<)isition, children are ac<)irin" .6learnin"62 many *ords a day, perhaps a do4en or more, meanin" that they are ac<)irin" *ords on very fe* e7pos)res, even 5)st one. (his *o)ld appear to indicate that the concepts are already availa!le, *ith m)ch or all of their intricacy and str)ct)re predetermined, and that the child3s task is to assi"n la!els to concepts, as mi"ht !e done *ith limited evidence "iven s)fficiently rich innate str)ct)re. And these concept)al str)ct)res appear to yield semantic connections of a kind that *ill, in partic)lar, ind)ce an analytic+synthetic distinction, as a matter of empirical fact. (o the e7tent that anythin" is )nderstood a!o)t le7ical items and their nat)re, it seems that they are !ased on concept)al str)ct)res of a specific and closely inte"rated type. 8t has !een ar")ed pla)si!ly that concepts of a locational nat)re, incl)din" "oal and so)rce of action, o!5ect moved, and so on, enter *idely into le7ical str)ct)re, often in <)ite a!stract *ays. 8n addition, notions like actor, recipient of action, instr)ment, event, intention, ca)sation, and others are pervasive elements of le7ical str)ct)re, *ith their specific properties and interrelations. Consider, say, the *ords 3chase3 or 3pers)ade3. (hey clearly involve a reference to h)man intention. (o chase Jones is not only to follo* him !)t to follo* him *ith the intent of stayin" on his path, perhaps to catch him. (o pers)ade -mith to do somethin" is to ca)se him to decide or intend to do itD if he never decides or intends to do it, *e have not s)cceeded in pers)adin" him. B)rthermore, he m)st decide or intend !y his o*n volition, not )nder d)ressD if *e say that the police pers)aded -mith to confess !y tort)re, *e are )sin" the term ironically. -ince these facts are kno*n essentially *itho)t evidence, it m)st !e that the child approaches lan")a"e *ith an int)itive )nderstandin" of concepts involvin" intendin", ca)sation, "oal of action, event, and so on, and places the *ords that are heard in a ne7)s that is permitted !y the principles of )niversal "rammar, *hich provide the frame*ork for tho)"ht and lan")a"e, and are common to h)man lan")a"es as systems that enter into vario)s aspects of h)man life. (hese elements also appear to enter into an inte"rated 6concept)al scheme,6 a component of the initial state of the lan")a"e fac)lty that is fleshed o)t in specific *ays, *ith predetermined scope and limits, in the co)rse of lan")a"e "ro*th, one aspect of co"nitive development. (here may !e revision and restr)ct)rin" of s)ch concept)al ; 11% ; schemes,M2'N !)t care m)st !e taken to separate o)t the vario)s factors that enter into the co)rse of development, incl)din", <)ite possi!ly, "enetically determined mat)ration that yields effects perceived only in late sta"es of co"nitive "ro*th. @otice a"ain that *e appear to have connections of meanin" in s)ch cases as theseD *e have a rather clear distinction !et*een tr)ths of meanin" and tr)ths of fact. (h)s, if John pers)aded Bill to "o to colle"e, then Bill at some point decided or intended to "o to colle"e and did so *itho)t d)ressD other*ise, John did not pers)ade Bill to "o to colle"e. -imilarly if John killed Bill, then Bill is dead .tho)"h John may or may not !e, dependin" on the facts2. (hese are tr)ths of meanin", not of fact. (he a priori frame*ork of h)man tho)"ht, *ithin *hich lan")a"e is ac<)ired, provides necessary connections amon" concepts, reflected in connections of meanin" amon" *ords, and more !roadly, amon" e7pressions involvin" these *ords, as in the e7ample of referential dependence mentioned

earlier. -yntactic relations provide a rich array of f)rther e7amples. Bor e7ample, there seems to !e a clear distinction !et*een the sentence 3everyone *ho lives )pstairs lives )pstairs3 and 3everyone *ho lives )pstairs is happy.3 G)ine appears to !elieve that this distinction is more pro!lematic and o!sc)re than his distinction !et*een 6"rammatical6 and 6)n"rammatical,6 *hich he re"ards as someho* cr)cial for the lin")ist3s investi"ations.M2/N (he opposite is the case. 8n fact, an a!sol)te distinction !et*een 6"rammatical6 and 6)n"rammatical6 appears to have little if any si"nificance. 8t can !e esta!lished one *ay or another, or perhaps !etter, not at all, since it is do)!tf)l that the concept, in G)ine3s sense, plays any role in the theory of lan")a"e. (he reasons *ere disc)ssed in the earliest *ork in "enerative "rammar, act)ally the only *ork in *hich an effort *as made to develop s)ch a concept in some manner that mi"ht !e relevant to lin")istic theory, !)t in terms that *ere lon" a"o )nderstood to !e inappropriate.M29N 8t appears, then, that one of the central concl)sions of modern philosophy is rather d)!io)s: namely, the contention, often held to have !een esta!lished !y *ork of G)ine and others, that one can make no principled distinction !et*een <)estions of fact and <)estions of meanin", that it is a matter of more or less deeply held !elief. (his concl)sion has !een s)pported !y reflection on an artificially narro* class of e7amples, amon" them, concepts that have little or no relational str)ct)re. 8n the case of s)ch sentences as 3cats are animals3, for e7ample, it is not easy to find evidence to decide *hether the sentence is tr)e as a matter of meanin" or fact, or *hether there is an ans*er to the <)estion in this case, and there has !een m)ch inconcl)sive controversy a!o)t the matter. Jhen *e t)rn to concepts *ith an inherent relational str)ct)re s)ch as 3pers)ade3 or 3chase3, or to more comple7 syntactic constr)ctions s)ch as those e7hi!itin" referential dependence or ca)sative and relative constr)ctions, then it seems that semantic connections are readily discerned. Contrary to *hat ; 11& ; Horty and others assert, this is the common ass)mption of empirical *ork in the st)dy of lin")istic meanin", and, f)rthermore, it seems to !e a reasona!le ass)mption. (he stat)s of a statement as a tr)th of meanin" or of empirical fact can only !e esta!lished !y empirical in<)iry, and considerations of many sorts may *ell !e relevantD for e7ample, in<)iry into lan")a"e ac<)isition and variation amon" lan")a"es. (he <)estion of the e7istence of analytic tr)ths and semantic connections more "enerally is an empirical one, to !e settled !y in<)iry that "oes *ell !eyond the ran"e of evidence ordinarily !ro)"ht to !ear in the literat)re on these topics. -)ppose that t*o people differ in their int)itive 5)d"ments as to *hether 8 can pers)ade John to "o to colle"e *itho)t his decidin" or intendin" to do so.M#$N Je are !y no means at an impasse. Hather, *e can constr)ct conflictin" theories and proceed to test them. Ine *ho holds that the connection !et*een 3pers)ade3 and 3decide3 or 3intend3 is concept)al *ill proceed to ela!orate the str)ct)re of the concepts, their primitive elements, the principles !y *hich they are inte"rated and related to other co"nitive systems, and so on, and *ill seek to sho* that other properties of lan")a"e and other aspects of the ac<)isition and )se of lan")a"e can !e e7plained in terms of the very same ass)mptions a!o)t the innate str)ct)re of the lan")a"e fac)lty, in the same lan")a"e and others, and that the same concepts play a role in other aspects of tho)"ht and )nderstandin". Ine *ho holds that the connection is one of deeply held !elief, not connection of meanin", has the task of developin" a "eneral theory of !elief fi7ation that *ill yield the ri"ht concl)sions in these and n)mero)s other cases. -)ppose one holds, *ith Pa)l Ch)rchland for e7ample, that the connection is !ased on the 6semantic importance6 of sentences relatin" 3pers)ade3 and 3decide3 or 3intend3 .i.e., that these sentences play a prominent role in inference, or serve to introd)ce the term 3pers)ade3 to the child3s voca!)lary, and th)s are more important than others for comm)nication2. M#1N Ine then faces the task of sho*in" that these empirical claims are in fact tr)e. (he first tack, in

terms of innate concept)al str)ct)re, seems far more promisin" to me, and is the only approach that has any res)lts or even proposals to its credit, !)t it is a matter of empirical in<)iry, not prono)ncements on the !asis of virt)ally no evidence. -pecifically, ar")ments a"ainst the first .concept)al2 approach in terms of indeterminacy, )nclarity, open iss)es, and so on, esta!lish nothin" )nless it is sho*n that alternative approaches in terms of some .no* )navaila!le2 theories of !elief fi7ation or semantic importance are not s)!5ect to these pro!lems. (he *hole matter re<)ires e7tensive rethinkin", and m)ch of *hat has !een "enerally ass)med for the past several decades a!o)t these <)estions appears to !e d)!io)s at !est. (here is, it seems rather clear, a rich concept)al str)ct)re determined !y the initial state of the lan")a"e fac)lty .perhaps dra*in" from the reso)rces of other "enetically determined fac)lties of mind2, *aitin" ; 110 ; to !e a*akened !y e7perience. All of this is m)ch in accord *ith traditional rationalist conceptions and even, in some respects, the so+called 6empiricist6 tho)"ht of James ?arris, Cavid ?)me, and others. :any have fo)nd s)ch concl)sions completely )naccepta!le, even a!s)rdD the idea that there is somethin" like an array of innate concepts and that these are to a lar"e de"ree merely 6la!eled6 in lan")a"e ac<)isition, as the empirical evidence s)""ests, certainly departs radically from many common ass)mptions. -ome, for e7ample ?ilary P)tnam, have ar")ed that it is entirely impla)si!le to s)ppose that *e have 6an innate stock of notions6 incl)din" car!uretor and !ureaucrat .M#2N 8f he *ere correct a!o)t this, it *o)ld not !e partic)larly to the point, since the pro!lem arises in a most serio)s *ay in connection *ith simple *ords s)ch as 3ta!le3, 3person3, 3chase3, 3pers)ade3, 3kill3, and so on. B)t his ar")ment for the e7amples he cites is not compellin". 8t is that to have "iven )s this innate stock of notions, 6evol)tion *o)ld have had to !e a!le to anticipate all the contin"encies of f)t)re physical and c)lt)ral environments. I!vio)sly it didn3t and co)ldn3t do this.6 @otice that the ar")ment is invalid from the start. (o s)ppose that in the co)rse of evol)tion, h)mans come to have an innate stock of notions incl)din" car!uretor and !ureaucrat does not entail that evol)tion *as a!le to anticipate e&ery f)t)re physical and c)lt)ral contin"encyFonly these contin"encies. B)t that aside, notice that a very similar ar")ment had lon" !een accepted in imm)nolo"y: namely, the n)m!er of anti"ens is so immense, incl)din" even artifically synthesi4ed s)!stances that had never e7isted in the *orld, that it *as considered a!s)rd to s)ppose that evol)tion had provided 6an innate stock of anti!odies6D rather, formation of anti!odies m)st !e a kind of 6learnin" process6 in *hich the anti"ens played an 6instr)ctive role.6 B)t this ass)mption may *ell !e false. @iels >a5 Jerne *on the @o!el Pri4e for his *ork challen"in" this idea, and )pholdin" his o*n conception that an animal 6cannot !e stim)lated to make specific anti!odies, )nless it has already made anti!odies of this specificity !efore the anti"en arrives,6 so that anti!ody formation is a selective process in *hich the anti"en plays a selective and amplifyin" role.M##N Jhether or not Jerne is correct, he certainly co)ld !e, and the same co)ld !e tr)e in the case of *ord meanin"s, the ar")ment !ein" <)ite analo"o)s. B)rthermore, there is "ood reason to s)ppose that the ar")ment is at least in s)!stantial meas)re correct even for s)ch *ords as 3car!)retor3 and 3!)rea)crat3, *hich, in fact, pose the familiar pro!lem of poverty of stim)l)s if *e attend caref)lly to the enormo)s "ap !et*een *hat *e kno* and the evidence on the !asis of *hich *e kno* it. (he same is often tr)e of technical terms of science and mathematics, and it s)rely appears to !e the case for the terms of ordinary disco)rse. ?o*ever s)rprisin" the concl)sion may !e that nat)re has provided )s *ith an innate stock of concepts, and that the child3s task is to discover their la!els, the empirical facts appear to leave open fe* other possi+

; 11' ; !ilities. Ither possi!ilities .say, in terms of 6"enerali4ed learnin" mechanisms62 have yet to !e coherently form)lated, and if some day they are, it may *ell !e that the apparent iss)e *ill dissolve. 8n fact, it is not clear *hat thesis is !ein" proposed !y P)tnam and others *ho re5ect *hat they call 6the innateness hypothesis6D 8 sho)ld add that tho)"h 8 am alle"ed to !e one of the e7ponents of this hypothesis, perhaps even the arch+criminal, 8 have never defended it and have no idea *hat it is s)pposed to !e. Jhatever the tr)th may !e a!o)t anti!ody formation, it is !ased on the innate reso)rces of the !ody and its imm)ne system, and the task of the scientist is to find o)t *hat these reso)rces are. E7actly the same is tr)e of concept formation and lan")a"e ac<)isition. Bor this reason, people *ho are s)pposed to !e defenders of 6the innateness hypothesis6 do not defend the hypothesis or even )se the phrase, !eca)se there is no s)ch "eneral hypothesisD rather, only specific hypotheses a!o)t the innate reso)rces of the mind, in partic)lar, its lan")a"e fac)lty. 9eneral ar")ments a"ainst some )nform)lated 6innateness hypothesis6 have no !earin" on act)al hypotheses a!o)t innateness, in the case of "ro*th of lan")a"e and concept)al systems or other forms of physical "ro*th. P)tnam offers a co)nterar")ment to the one 5)st sketched on analo"y to the imm)ne system. ?e points o)t that concepts 6often arise from theories ,6 and the n)m!er of possi!le theories .or perhaps even 6theory types 62 is so immense, even for 6short6 theories, as to make 6the idea that evol)tion e7ha)sted all the possi!ilities in advance *ildly impla)si!le.6 (he ar")ment is correct, !)t a"ain irrelevant. 8n the first place, *e are considerin" *hat h)mans are capa!le of ac<)irin", and there is no reason to !elieve that 6all theories6 can !e learned or constr)cted !y h)mans, nor is it even clear *hat sense this thesis has.M#%N B)rthermore, P)tnam3s ori"inal ar")ment *as s)pposed to !ear on the specific *ords 3!)rea)crat3 and 3car!)retor3, and no cardinality ar")ment is relevant to these cases, or to any s)!stantive empirical hypothesis a!o)t innate str)ct)re. 8n other *ords, his ar")ment that 6evol)tion co)ldn3t have done that6 simply does not hold in the cases for *hich it is offered. (he ar")ment that evol)tion co)ldn3t have done 6everythin"6Feven *hat is !eyond h)man capacityFmi"ht hold if one co)ld make some sense of it, !)t s)ch an ar")ment *o)ld not !e relevant here, even if it co)ld !e "iven in a coherent form. 8n the same connection, P)tnam ar")es that the thesis of 6meanin" holism,6 *ith the G)inean principle that 6revision can strike any*here,6 contri!)tes to )nderminin" certain concl)sions concernin" the innate str)ct)re of concept)al systems and lan")a"e "enerally. B)t this line of ar")ment is <)estiona!le. -)ppose that the thesis of 6meanin" holism6 is correct in the sense that, as P)tnam p)ts it, there are no 63psycholo"ically real3 entities *hich have eno)"h of the properties *e preanalytically assi"n to 3meanin"s3 to *arrant an identification,6 and reference is f)lly determined only on holistic ; 11/ ; "ro)nds. @evertheless, it does not follo* that semantic connections cannot !e completely fi7ed and sta!le as a matter of !iolo"ical endo*ment. (h)s certain relations may remain sta!le as other considerations lead to vario)s choices a!o)t fi7in" of reference. B)rthermore, empirical considerations of the kind disc)ssed earlier !ear on the <)estion of *hether it is indeed tr)e that 6revision can strike any*here.6 (he point cannot !e esta!lished for nat)ral lan")a"e !y reference to the practice of the nat)ral sciences from *hich P)tnam dra*s many of his e7amplesD these ar")ments, ass)min" them to !e correct, do not s)ffice to sho* the a!sence of intrinsic semantic and concept)al str)ct)re !ased on fi7ed properties of the h)man mind. (he thesis of 6holism6 may !e correct in some meas)re or form, !)t the <)estions of semantic connections in nat)ral lan")a"e remain to !e settled !y empirical st)dy,

and for the present at least, the evidence appears to s)pport their e7istenceFrather stron"ly, it seems to me. ,et )s p)rs)e f)rther Cavidson3s ar")ment in his paper 6A @ice Ceran"ement of Epitaphs,6 in *hich he p)rports to sho* that the st)dy of act)al comm)nication )ndermines a 6commonly accepted acco)nt of lin")istic competence and comm)nication6 and sho*s that 6there is no s)ch thin" as a lan")a"e, not if a lan")a"e is anythin" like *hat many philosophers and lin")ists have s)pposed. (here is therefore no s)ch thin" to !e learned, mastered, or !orn *ith.6 (his conception of lan")a"e, *hich Cavidson !elieves to !e ref)ted, is fo)nded on three !asic ass)mptions concernin" *hat he calls 6first lan")a"e6 or 6prior theory,6 a 6comple7 system or theory6 shared more or less !y speaker and hearer. (he ass)mptions are .12 that the prior theory is 6systematic6 in the sense that the interpreter *ho has this theory is a!le to interpret )tterances on the !asis of properties of their parts and the str)ct)re of the )tteranceD .22 that this method of interpretation is sharedD and .#2 that the component elements of the system are "overned !y learned conventions or re")larities. (he third of these ass)mptions is )ntena!le for other reasons, !)t instead of delayin" on this matter, let )s present it in the form re<)ired for Cavidson3s ar")ment: the component elements of the system are availa!le, as he p)ts it, 6in advance of occasions of interpretation6D it is a fi7ed element in comm)nication sit)ations, for interpreters at a fi7ed state of lan")a"e kno*led"e. (o ref)te this conception, Cavidson o!serves that in ordinary comm)nication sit)ations the interpreter makes )se of all sorts of con5ect)res and ass)mptions a!o)t *hat the speaker may have in mind, relyin" on properties of the sit)ation, the speaker3s pres)med intentions, and so on. (he interpreter th)s 6ad5)sts his theory,6 modifyin" the 6prior theory6 to a 6passin" theory6 that is 6"eared to the occasion.6 B)t this 6passin" theory cannot in "eneral correspond to an interpreter3s lin")istic competence.6 (his 6passin" theory is not a theory of *hat anyone .e7cept perhaps a philosopher2 *o)ld call an act)al nat)ral lan")a"e,6 Cavidson contin)es, and 63:astery3 of s)ch a lan")a"e ; 119 ; *o)ld !e )seless, since kno*in" a passin" theory is only kno*in" ho* to interpret a partic)lar )tterance on a partic)lar occasion.6 B)rthermore, comm)nication can proceed <)ite *ell *hen the prior theory is not shared !y speaker and hearer, and the prior theory too is not *hat 6*e *o)ld normally call a lan")a"e6 since it is a psycholo"ical partic)lar, specific to the speaker+hearer *ith feat)res that are not shared thro)"h the 6comm)nity.6 (he interpreter has some kind of 6strate"y,6 a 6mysterio)s process !y *hich a speaker or hearer )ses *hat he kno*s in advance pl)s present data to prod)ce a passin" theory,6 and for comm)nication, *hat t*o people need 6is the a!ility to conver"e on passin" theories from )tterance to )tterance.6 9iven these facts, there is no lon"er any )se for 6the concept of a lan")a"e,6 for 6shared "rammar or r)les,6 for a 6porta!le interpretin" machine set to "rind o)t the meanin" of an ar!itrary )tterance6D rather, *e need somethin" more evanescent, mysterio)s and 6holistic,6 6the a!ility to conver"e on a passin" theory from time to time.6 Je th)s are led to 6a!andon . . . not only the ordinary notion of a lan")a"e, !)t *e have erased the !o)ndary !et*een kno*in" a lan")a"e and kno*in" o)r *ay aro)nd in the *orld "enerally.6 68n lin")istic comm)nication nothin" corresponds to a lin")istic competence6 !ased on the three principles 5)st mentioned, !eca)se 6there are no r)les for arrivin" at passin" theories.6 At the concl)sion of the disc)ssion, ho*ever, Cavidson asserts that a passin" theory is derived someho* 6from a private voca!)lary and "rammar,6 that is, from a 6prior theory6 meetin" the first and perhaps a version of the third condition, !)t possi!ly not shared in the 6comm)nity6D there is then a 6prior theory6 and there are s)rely certain methods, not others, 6for arrivin" at passin" theories,6 *hether or not one *ants to call these methods 6r)les.6

(he vario)s parts of the ar")ment are lar"ely correct, !)t they do not seem to sho* very m)ch. 8n partic)lar, no reason has !een offered to do)!t that there is a 6prior theory6 in the )s)al sense of the st)dy of lan")a"e and kno*led"e of lan")a"eFthat is, a specific "enerative proced)re incorporated in a specific mat)re state of the lan")a"e fac)lty. If co)rse, this 6prior theory6 *ill !e <)ite different from *hat is called 6a lan")a"e6 in ordinary )sa"e, !)t this is !eca)se no s)ch concept plays a role in empirical in<)iry into lan")a"e and mind, as already noted. 8n the face of Cavidson3s ar")ments, *e may contin)e to s)ppose that there is, to very "ood first appro7imation, a fi7ed and invariant lan")a"e fac)lty that maps presented evidence onto a system of r)les and principles .or *hatever t)rns o)t to !e correct *ith re"ard to the co"nitive state attained2 that assi"n interpretations to )tterances. Call this ac<)ired system a 6"enerative proced)re.6 (o kno* a lan")a"e is to have an internal representation of this "enerative proced)re, *hich *e *ill e7press at vario)s levels of a!straction from 6more elementary6 mechanisms and *ill seek to relate to s)ch mechanisms, in the normal manner of the nat)ral sciences.M#&N Proceedin" in accord *ith normal practice, *e may also seek to constr)ct a 6parser,6 a device, also ; 12$ ; attri!)ted to the mind !rain, *hich incorporates the "enerative proced)re attained alon" *ith other specified str)ct)res and properties,M#0N and maps presented )tterances into str)ct)ral descriptions that are interpreted !y other components of mind. -o far, *e are dealin" *ith feasi!le <)estions of empirical in<)iry. (here is also a f)rther pro!lem, *hich *e can form)late in va")e terms !)t *hich cannot !e st)died in practice: namely, to constr)ct an 6interpreter6 that incl)des the parser as a component alon" *ith all other capacities of the mind, *hatever they may !e, and accepts nonlin")istic as *ell as lin")istic inp)ts. (his interpreter, presented *ith an )tterance and a sit)ation, assi"ns some interpretation to *hat is !ein" said !y a person in this sit)ation. (he st)dy of comm)nication in the act)al *orld of e7perience is the st)dy of the interpreter, !)t this is not a topic for empirical in<)iry, for the )s)al reasons: there is no s)ch topic as the st)dy of everythin". -imilarly, science does not investi"ate other phenomena of the *orld as presented to )s in everyday e7perience. (he interpreter, as Cavidson correctly o!serves, incl)des everythin" that people are capa!le of doin", *hich is *hy it is not an o!5ect of empirical in<)iry, and *hy nothin" sensi!le can !e said a!o)t it. Je mi"ht hope to learn somethin" a!o)t vario)s elements of the interpreter, proceedin" !y the normal methods of the sciences, !e"innin" *ith the 6private voca!)lary and "rammar6 that constit)te the lan")a"e attained, proceedin" to the parser, then perhaps, to the e7tent feasi!le, t)rnin" to other elements of the mind and of sit)ations that enter into normal h)man life. B)t if *e !e"in *ith the demand for a theory of everythin", *e *ill find nothin"D it is )nnecessary to constr)ct ela!orate ar")ments to esta!lish this point.M#'N (he sit)ation is no different in the far more advanced sciences. (he proper concl)sion is not that *e m)st a!andon concepts of lan")a"e that can !e prod)ctively st)died, !)t that the topic of s)ccessf)l comm)nication in the act)al *orld of e7perience is far too comple7 and o!sc)re to merit attention in empirical in<)iry, e7cept as a ")ide to int)itions as *e p)rs)e research desi"ned to lead to some )nderstandin" of the real *orld, comm)nication incl)ded. (hese o!servations have no !earin" on *hether or not there is a 6prior theory,6 an internali4ed "enerative proced)re, in the normal sense of empirical practice. Cavidson3s 6passin" theory6 is not a )sef)l notionD a!o)t this, he is s)rely correct. (he interpreter *ill constr)ct all sorts of 6passin" theories6 .tho)"h, cr)cially, not any sort2, chan"in" moment to moment, !eca)se the interpreter as Cavidson conceives it incl)des everythin" availa!le to h)man intelli"enceD !)t it makes no sense to call its transient states 6theories6 or to consider them a s)!5ect of direct in<)iry. Cr)cially, nothin" in Cavidson3s ar")ment !ears on the ass)mption that the 6prior theory6

.tho)"h not )nderstood <)ite in his terms2 remains a fi7ed and invariant element of the 6interpreter6 .as of the narro*er ideali4ed parser2 and that it enters into the f)nctionin" of the interpreter. ; 121 ; 8n this disc)ssion, Cavidson foc)ses attention on malapropisms and so+called 6mis)se of lan")a"e6 more "enerally. ?ere some care is necessary. ,et3s a"ain take Jones, a speaker of a variety of *hat *e informally call 6En"lish.6 Jones has mastered a "enerative proced)re that associates *ith )tterances str)ct)ral descriptions, incl)din" semantic properties, and has other capacities of mind that allo* him to prod)ce and interpret lin")istic e7pressions makin" )se of these str)ct)ral descriptions. ,et )s call this "enerative proced)re his 68+lan")a"e,6 *here I is to s)""est 6internali4ed6 .in the mind !rain2 and 6intensional6 .in that the proced)re is a f)nction en)meratin" str)ct)ral descriptions, considered in intension *ith a partic)lar description2DM#/N here *e are referrin" to specific post)lated mechanisms of the mind !rain, considered a!stractly. Jones may speak in a *ay that is not in accord *ith his 8+lan")a"e, or may offer 5)d"ments inconsistent *ith his 8+lan")a"eD 5)d"ments a!o)t o)rselves, like others, can !e mistaken, and m)ch more than 8+ lan")a"e is involved in !ehavior. (his is an )ninterestin" case of mis)se of lan")a"eD call it the 6individ)al sense.6 -)ppose that Jones, like most of )s, normally says s)ch thin"s as 3hopef)lly, *e3ll !e a!le to solve that pro!lem3, or )ses the *ord 3disinterested3 to mean )ninterested Kario)s a)thority fi")res tell )s that this is 6*ron",6 a 6mistake,6 not in accord *ith the 6r)les of En"lish.6 Jones is 6mis)sin" his lan")a"e,6 namely, En"lish, a lan")a"e of *hich he has only a partial and perhaps distorted kno*led"e, as in C)mmett3s 6f)ndamental sense6 of lan")a"e. Even if 9& percent of the pop)lation, or for that matter everyone !)t Jilliam -afire and a fe* others, *ere to !ehave in the manner of Jones, these cases *o)ld still constit)te 6mis)se of lan")a"e.6 Ir Jones may try to adapt to the practice of some comm)nity for some reason, or perhaps for no reason at all, and may fail to do so, in *hich case people o!servin" Jones may speak informally of a mis)se of the lan")a"e of this comm)nity. (hese concepts of 6mis)se of lan")a"e,6 *hich *e may call 6the comm)nity sense,6 may !e of interest for the st)dy of the sociolo"y of "ro)p identification, a)thority str)ct)re, and the like, !)t they have little !earin" on the st)dy of lan")a"e, so far as *e kno*. Je )nderstand this perfectly *ell in the case of pron)nciation. (h)s to say that one variety of En"lish is 6ri"ht6 and another 6*ron"6 makes as m)ch sense as sayin" that -panish is ri"ht and En"lish *ron"D and the same is tr)e, tho)"h for some reason the point seems more o!sc)re, *ith re"ard to other aspects of lan")a"e. Another possi!le sense of the concept 6mis)se of lan")a"e6 derives from ?ilary P)tnam3s notion of 6the division of lin")istic la!or.6 (h)s in the le7icon represented in my mind !rain, the entry for 3elm3 and 3!eech3, or 3mass3 and 3kinetic ener"y3, may incl)de an indication that the reference for these terms is to !e determined !y e7perts to *hom 8 defer. (hen 8 mi"ht apply the terms inacc)rately, in the sense that the reference is not in accord *ith the ; 122 ; determinations of these e7perts. 8n this case, 8 mi"ht !e said to !e 6mis)sin" my o*n lan")a"e.6M#9N ,et )s call this the 6e7pert sense6 of mis)se of lan")a"e. A"ain, nothin" of "reat moment appears to follo*, s)rely nothin" relatin" to the approach to lan")a"e *ithin the frame*ork of individ)al psycholo"y sketched earlier, and typically follo*ed in practice.M%$N @otice that no )sef)l concept of 6lan")a"e6 or 6comm)nity6 emer"es from these considerations. (h)s my e7pert for 3elm3 and 3!eech3

may !e an 8talian "ardener *ho speaks not a *ord of En"lish, and *ho corrects my )sa"e thro)"h reference to the technical ,atin names that *e shareD and my e7pert for 3mass3 and 3kinetic ener"y3 may !e a monolin")al 9erman physicist. B)t *e *o)ld not concl)de that 9erman and 8talian are incl)ded in En"lish, or that all of )s form a 6comm)nity6 in any )sef)l sense of the term. 8s there any other concept of 6mis)se of lan")a"e6= 8 am a*are of none. 8f so, the concept plays no important role in the st)dy of lan")a"e, meanin", comm)nication, or *hatever. (o take some e7amples of the kind that (yler B)r"e has disc)ssed, s)ppose that Jones )ses the term 3arthritis3 to refer to a pain in the thi"h. -)ppose this is the )sa"e of his villa"e, !)t not the )sa"e of the o)tside comm)nity. Jones is not mis)sin" his lan")a"e in the individ)al senseD his )sa"e is tr)e to his 8+lan")a"e. 8n his villa"e, he is not mis)sin" his lan")a"e in the comm)nity sense, !)t o)tside its !orders, he is. Cependin" on ho* 3arthritis3 is represented in Jones3s mental le7icon, he may or may not !e mis)sin" his lan")a"e in the 6e7pert sense.6 ?o* sho)ld *e attri!)te !eliefs a!o)t arthritis to Jones= ?ere int)itions differ, and it may !e that evidence is too slim, for the moment, to settle the point satisfactorily. P)ttin" aside the 6e7pert sense,6 s)ppose *e )se the term 38+!elief3 to refer to the concept that is like !elief, e7cept that Jones has the same !elief *ithin his villa"e and in the *ider comm)nity, namely, the !elief that *e *o)ld e7press, in o)r 8+lan")a"e, !y sayin" that he has some kind of !ody pain.M%1N (his may or may not !e the same as the concept of !elief in o)r ordinary lan")a"e, !)t it is the concept that seems to !e re<)ired for the st)dy of *hat is misleadin"ly called 6the ca)sation of !ehavior6Fmisleadin"ly, !eca)se it is )nclear that !ehavior is 6ca)sed6 in any )sef)l sense of the term. Clearly, there is no reason to s)ppose that the concepts of "eneral psycholo"y *ill !e those of ordinary )sa"e, 5)st as the concepts of physics, or of the s)!!ranch of psycholo"y called 6lin")istics,6 typically are not. @or is it at all o!vio)s to me that there is a reasona!le !ranch of science .or to !e more acc)rate, h)man science, meanin" the kind of scientific in<)iry that h)mans, *ith their partic)lar co"nitive capacities, are capa!le of )ndertakin"2 that deals *ith <)estions of this nat)re. 8t has not, 8 think, !een esta!lished that there is anythin" more to say a!o)t the matter. 8n partic)lar, reference to 6mis)se of lan")a"e,6 to 6norms,6 to 6comm)nities,6 and so on, seems to me to re<)ire m)ch more care than is often taken. (hese concepts are o!sc)re, and it is not clear that they are of any )se for in<)iry into lan")a"e and h)man !ehavior. Any ar")ment that ; 12# ; relies on these notions merits caref)l scr)tiny, and 8 do)!t that familiar ar")ments can *ithstand it. Comm)nities are formed in all sorts of overlappin" *ays, and the st)dy of comm)nities and their norms <)ickly de"enerates into the st)dy of everythin". (he fact remains that Jones speaks and )nderstands the *ay he does on the !asis of the 8+lan")a"e he has ac<)ired in the co)rse of lan")a"e "ro*thD and if Jones does or does not follo* *hat *e choose, for some transient p)rpose, to call 6comm)nity norms6 or 6social practice,6 it is on the !asis of this internali4ed 8+lan")a"e .alon" *ith m)ch else2. Boris, a monolin")al speaker of some variety of H)ssian, has a different 8+lan")a"e, and follo*s different 6norms.6 8 can )nderstand Jones, *ithin limits, !eca)se my 8+lan")a"e is not too different from his, and !eca)se he and 8 more or less share other )nkno*n properties that enter into the f)ll interpreterD this is not a topic of empirical in<)iry as it stands, in its )nanaly4ed comple7ity. (hat seems to me the *ay *e sho)ld approach these <)estions. 8n these terms, *e can develop a concept of 6kno*led"e of lan")a"e6 that is appropriate for the in<)iry into lan")a"e and mindD namely, mastery and internal representation of a specific 8+lan")a"e. (he lin")ist3s "rammar is a theory of the 8+lan")a"e, and )niversal "rammar is the theory of the initial state of the lan")a"e fac)lty. Jones3s 8+lan")a"e is one partic)lar mat)re stateFor o)tp)t, re"ardin" the lan")a"e fac)lty as a f)nction that maps evidence into 8+lan")a"e. Jhat a!o)t the concept lan")a"e=

Je mi"ht simply )nderstand lan")a"es as 8+lan")a"es, th)s takin" a lan")a"e to !e somethin" like 6a *ay of speakin",6 the 6finite means6 that provide for 6infinite )se6 in the terms of Jilhelm von ?)m!oldt3s characteri4ation of lan")a"e, also an effort to capt)re his concept of lan")a"e as a 6process of "eneration6 rather than a set of 6"enerated o!5ects.6 Je th)s take lan")a"e to !e, in effect, a 6notion of str)ct)re6 that ")ides the speaker in formin" 6free e7pressions,6 in Itto Jespersen3s terms. Bor empirical in<)iry, 8 think that is an appropriate decision, tho)"h o!vio)sly not for ordinary disco)rse. Ir *e mi"ht *ant to constr)ct a concept of lan")a"e divorced from co"nitive states, perhaps alon" lines s)""ested !y James ?i""in!otham. (akin" kno*led"e of lan")a"e to !e a co"nitive state, *e mi"ht constr)e the 6lan")a"e6 as an a!stract o!5ect, the 6o!5ect of kno*led"e,6 an a!stract system of r)les and principles .or *hatever t)rns o)t to !e correct2 that is an ima"e of the "enerative proced)re, the 8+lan")a"e, represented in the mind and )ltimately in the !rain in no*+)nkno*n 6more elementary6 mechanisms. -ince the lan")a"e in this sense is completely determined !y the 8+lan")a"e, tho)"h a!stracted from it, it is not entirely clear that this f)rther step is motivated, !)t perhaps it is. 8n these terms, it seems to me that the <)estions a!o)t lan")a"e and its )se that can !e s)!5ected to empirical in<)iry can readily !e form)lated and, as far as *e no* kno*, !est addressed. (here may *ell !e many other <)estions that are not s)!5ect to empirical in<)iry in the manner of the sciences, and perhaps never *ill !e, if h)mans are themselves part of the nat)ral *orld ; 12% ; and th)s have specific !iolo"ical capacities *ith their scope and limits, like every other or"anism. Je m)st !e caref)l not to s)cc)m! to ill)sions a!o)t evol)tion and its adaptive miracles. (here is nothin" in the theory of evol)tion that s)""ests that *e sho)ld !e a!le to ans*er <)estions that *e can pose, even in principle, even if they have ans*ers, or that *e sho)ld !e a!le to pose the ri"ht <)estions. (o the e7tent that *e can, *e have empirical science, a kind of chance conver"ence of properties of the mind and properties of the e7tramental *orld. (here is nothin" s)rprisin" a!o)t thisD *e take for "ranted that somethin" similar is tr)e of rats and !ees, and sho)ld not !e s)rprised to learn that h)mans are !iolo"ical or"anisms, not an"els. B)t *ithin the limits of h)man science, it seems to me that the !est ")ess as of the present is that the frame*ork 8 have 5)st !riefly o)tlined is a proper one for in<)iry into the empirical <)estions a!o)t lan")a"e and mindD and *ithin it, there are some nota!le s)ccesses and many intri")in" prospects.

%#R II. /EORIES #N, EF%$#N# ION

; 1#1 ;

Se+en. "onstructi+ism, Realism, and %hilosophical -ethod

Richard Aoyd

'. Introduction ':'. "onstructi+ism and Realism

Post+positivist philosophy of science has "one in three directions: to*ard more sophisticated versions of empiricism .e."., van Braassen 19/$2, to*ard social constr)ctivism .e."., >)hn 19'$2, and to*ard scientific realism .Boyd 19/#, 199$aD P)tnam 19'2, 19'&a, 19'&!2. Cefenders of the latter positions affirm, *hile sophisticated empiricists contin)e the tradition of positivists !y denyin", that the typical prod)ct of s)ccessf)l scientific research em!odies kno*led"e of )no!serva!le phenomenaFthat scientists ro)tinely do 6metaphysics6 in the positivists3 pe5orative sense of the term. Healists and constr)ctivists differ in that the former hold, *hile the latter deny, that the phenomena st)died !y scientists e7ist and have the properties they do independently of o)r adoption of theories, concept)al frame*orks, or paradi"ms. (h)s, *hile realism and constr)ctivism are !oth antiempiricist positions, constr)ctivism shares *ith later positivism a tendency lar"ely a!sent from realism of treatin" lar"e+ scale theoretical claims in science as in some important sense conventional. 8n the present essay 8 *ill !e concerned *ith the disp)te !et*een constr)ctivism and realism. 8 have three aims: to artic)late the !est ar")ments for realism a"ainst sophisticated versions of constr)ctivism, to e7plore the implications of those ar")ments for o)r )nderstandin" of the iss)e of conventionality "enerally, and to e7plore some !roader iss)es of philosophical method *hich are raised !y the disp)te !et*een realists and constr)ctivists.

':). Versions of "onstructi+ism

(he tar"et of my ar")ments *ill !e constr)ctivist conceptions of science of the sort *hose infl)ence *as ")aranteed !y >)hn3s /he Structure of Scientific ; 1#2 ; Re&olutions .19'$2. (he "eneral slo"an 6-cience is the social constr)ction of reality6 and similar e7pressions of constr)ctivist sentiment have a variety of interpretations, more than one of them s)""ested !y >)hn3s o*n insi"hts into scientific practice, and 8 *ill !e concerned here *ith 5)st one amon" them. -ometimes *hen st)dents of science portray science as the social constr)ction of reality, they mean to emphasi4e the e7tent to *hich the act)al prod)ction of scientific te7ts, instr)ments, instit)tions, and so on is a social enterprise s)!5ect to the same sorts of analysesFpolitical, sociolo"ical, literary, anthropolo"ical, and so onFas any other social enterprise *hose o)tp)t incl)des te7ts or other c)lt)ral artifacts .let )s call this doctrine science+as+social+practice constr)ctivism, --P constr)ctivism2. -ometimes they mean to offer a de!)nkin" criti<)e as *ell: perhaps that the content of scientific theories is determined almost e7cl)sively !y facts a!o)t po*er !oth *ithin the scientific

comm)nity itself and *ithin the !roader society .let )s call this de!)nkin" constr)ctivism2. (he constr)ctivism *ith *hich 8 *ill !e concerned here .let )s call it 6@eo+>antian constr)ctivism,6 6@+> constr)ctivism,6 !y *ay of indicatin" somethin" of its motivation !)t *itho)t pre5)dice re"ardin" <)estions of >ant scholarship2 is different. Accordin" to @eo+>antian constr)ctivism, consideration of, for e7ample, the theory+dependence of scientific o!servation and methods, or the e7istence of m)t)ally irred)ci!le concept)al schemes or of m)t)ally incommens)ra!le paradi"ms in the sciences, indicates that there is somethin" misleadin", !)t not literally false, a!o)t the claim that in scientific *ork scientists disco&er *hat the %orld is like. (he implicat)res of that *ay of descri!in" science reflect a conception accordin" to *hich the str)ct)res *hich scientists discover are, independently of any scientific activity, 6o)t there6 in 6the *orld6 availa!le for 6discovery.6 (his conception the @eo+>antian constr)ctivist denies: in some deep sense the str)ct)res st)died !y scientists are imposed on the *orld, in the sense of !ein" reflections of the concept)al schemes they employ. B)t accordin" to @+> constr)ctivists, it *o)ld !e misleadin" .indeed, a strai"ht+o)t error2 to say, *ith a certain de!)nkin" tradition, that the internal politics of the scientific comm)nity or e7ternal press)res and not the %orld determine the content of scientific theories. Jhile the phenomena of political determination identified !y de!)nkin" constr)ctivists sometimes determine the content of scientific theories, the sort of social constr)ction *hich @+> constr)ctivists emphasi4e is s)pposed to !e a )niversal feat)re of scientific investi"ation, and it is not appropriately descri!ed !y denyin" that 6the *ay the *orld is6 can determine the content of scientific theories. (*o considerations indicate to @+> constr)ctivists that scientific theories are often !ro)"ht into appro7imate conformity *ith 6the *ay the *orld is.6 Birst, the s)ccessf)l esta!lishment of a scientific research tradition .or 6paradi"m62 re<)ires the cooperation of nat)re: research traditions are via!le only if they allo* their participants to s)cceed in act)al e7perimental practice !y, for e7ample, ; 1## ; predictin" )ne7pected res)lts or predictin" e7pected ones *ith increasin" n)merical precision. J)st as important is the @+> constr)ctivists3 more "eneral .and 6>antian62 epistemolo"ical conception accordin" to *hich social constr)ction of reality is a necessary condition for systematic investi"ation. 8t is a conse<)ence of the alle"ed )!i<)ity of social constr)ction that the socially constr)cted reality *hich scientists st)dy is as real as st)dia!le thin"s can "et. (here is no more real set of thin"s in themselves for )s to st)dy, and th)s no de!)nkin" of scientific investi"ation is entailed !y the insistence that the reality scientists st)dy is socially constr)cted. Each of the three .or more2 conceptions of science as a matter of social constr)ction is *orthy of serio)s ela!oration and criticism. 8 foc)s here on @+> constr)ctivism for t*o reasons. 8n the first place, it seems ri"ht to think of lo"ical empiricism, scientific realism, and social constr)ctivism as competin" conceptions of the nat)re and of the limits of scientific kno*led"e, correspondin" to !roader empiricist, realist, and 6>antian6 traditions in epistemolo"y and metaphysics. 8f lo"ical empiricism and scientific realism are tho)"ht of as theses a!o)t "en)ine kno*led"e in science .and not, for e7ample, a!o)t ho* fre<)ently s)ch kno*led"e is prod)ced !y act)al instit)tionali4ed scientific practice2, then each is compati!le *ith --P constr)ctivism and each is compati!le *ith all !)t the most e7treme version of de!)nkin" constr)ctivism. (hat is, each is compati!le *ith any versions of de!)nkin" constr)ctivism *hich do not deny that some "en)ine scientific kno*led"eFin the sense of !eliefs controlled in a s)ita!le *ay !y the *ay thin"s act)ally areFis possi!le , ho*ever rarely .if at all2 it is prod)ced !y instit)tionali4ed scientific practice. By contrast, !oth lo"ical empiricism and scientific realism are

incompati!le *ith @+> constr)ctivism, and it is reasona!le to see @+> constr)ctivism as the manifestation of a 6>antian6 epistemolo"ical and metaphysical conception in contemporary philosophy of science. 8t is the version of social constr)ctivism *e *ant to look at if *e are to see ho* si"nificant "eneral philosophical tendencies are played o)t in the philosophy of science. (here is another reason for foc)sin" on @+> constr)ctivism. Ine feat)re of the literat)re, !oth *ithin professional analytic philosophy of science and in related areas of history, sociolo"y, and literary theory, has !een a tendency to conflate the three conceptions of social constr)ction. Bor e7ample, especially in the literat)re o)tside professional philosophy of science, it is often taken for "ranted that a demonstration of --P constr)ctivism precl)des a realist or empiricist interpretation in favor of de!)nkin" constr)ctivism or @+> constr)ctivism. (here is like*ise a tendency, in the professional philosophical literat)re as *ell as in the literat)re in other intellect)al disciplines concerned *ith science as an o!5ect of st)dy, to fail to distin")ish clearly !et*een de!)nkin" and @+> constr)ctivism. Each of these tendencies, it seems to me, makes it harder for ; 1#% ; researchers to assess the merits of the three different doctrines. Ine of the conse<)ences, 8 !elieve, is that a central pro!lem facin" de!)nkin" constr)ctivists has !een inade<)ately e7amined. 8t is, moreover, a pro!lem *hose sol)tion at least ar")a!ly depends on an assessment of the philosophical merits of @+> constr)ctivism. ?ere is the pro!lem: Bor all !)t the most e7treme de!)nkin" constr)ctivist it *ill seem important to distin")ish !et*een those cases in *hich the act)al str)ct)re of the *orld plays some important role in determinin" the content of scientific doctrines, so that some "en)ine kno*led"e is achieved, and those cases in *hich it does not. 8f a realist .or, for that matter, an empiricist2 conception of scientific kno*led"e is appropriate, the intended contrast can !e strai"htfor*ardly defined. 8f, in contrast, an @+> constr)ctivist conception of "en)ine scientific kno*led"e is correct, the moderate de!)nkin" constr)ctivist *ill need to provide some form)lation of the distinction !et*een those episodes of 6social constr)ction of reality6 in *hich the relevant social processes of consens)s formation in science are to !e tho)"ht of as really constr)ctin" reality and those episodes in *hich the esta!lishment of consens)s is to !e de!)nked. (his pro!lem is an especially ac)te one for the many thinkers *ho seem to have adopted !oth de!)nkin" and @+> constr)ctivism in response to a reco"nition of the ideolo"ical role fre<)ently played !y scientific doctrines and the associated ideolo"ical determination of their content. 8f episodes of consens)s formation in science cannot !e so nicely cate"ori4ed, then s)ch thinkers r)n the serio)s risk of havin", in conse<)ence of their @+> constr)ctivism, to treat as tr)e the findin"s of 5)st those episodes of theory constr)ction *hich they other*ise seek to de!)nk. 8 am inclined to do)!t that a principled sol)tion to this pro!lem is availa!le to the @+> constr)ctivist. 8 am th)s concerned to provide an ade<)ate 5)stification for the adoption of a realist rather than an @+> constr)ctivist conception of "en)ine scientific kno*led"e, not merely to advance o)r )nderstandin" of fo)ndational iss)es in the epistemolo"y of science !)t to provide a !asis for dra*in" the re<)ired distinction !et*een "en)ine scientific kno*led"e and the sort of social constr)ction *orthy of de!)nkin". 8t seems to me that the insi"hts of many de!)nkin" constr)ctivists are too importantF politically and morally as *ell as intellect)allyFto !e m)ddled !y @+> constr)ctivism. 8n 6socially constr)ctin"6 racial differences, nineteenth+cent)ry !iolo"ists did not constr)ct a *orld in *hich those of African descent are !iolo"ically s)ited to a s)!ordinate role, ho*ever m)ch they constr)cted

theories to that effect, nor have their latter+day follo*ers done soFany more than those same !iolo"ists .or *e2 have socially constr)cted a *orld in *hich the place of *omen is determined !y !iolo"ical necessity. ; 1#& ;

':3. he Need for a Ne5 Realist "riti>ue of "onstructi+ism

8t mi"ht seem that mo)ntin" a defense of realism a"ainst @+> constr)ctivism is not timely. After all, the artic)lation of distinctly realistic and nat)ralistic conceptions of reference and of kind definitions .e."., >ripke 19'2, P)tnam 19'&a2 has si"nificantly )ndermined the @+> constr)ctivist ar")ments of >)hn and ?anson, as has the artic)lation of distinctly realistic acco)nts of the appropriateness of theory+dependent methods .e."., P)tnam 19'2, Boyd 19/#2. Ar")a!ly the realist3s concern sho)ld no* !e *ith --P and de!)nkin" constr)ctivism and her task sho)ld !e to sho* that the pla)si!le versions of each of these positions are compati!le *ith .and perhaps even entail2 a realist conception of "en)ine kno*led"e. 8 a"ree a!o)t the importance of the latter task, !)t it seems to me that there are reasons to !elieve that the availa!le realist criti<)es of @+> constr)ctivism are inade<)ate. 8n recent years 6pl)ralist6 or 6relativist6 conceptions closely related to the social constr)ctivism of >)hn and ?anson .e."., 9oodman 19'/2 have "ro*n in infl)ence, and 8 am inclined to think that these conceptions and other sophisticated versions of @+> constr)ctivism are not ade<)ately addressed !y the e7tant realist criti<)es of vie*s like those of ?anson and >)hn. 8n !rief, *hat 8 *ill ar")e is that there are pla)si!le versions of constr)ctivism *hich are not committed to the semantic or methodolo"ical conceptions to *hich anticonstr)ctivist ar")ments "ro)nded in nat)ralistic theories of definition and reference provide an ade<)ate re!)ttal, and *hose epistemolo"ical and metaphysical claims are not f)lly re!)tted !y realist acco)nts of theory+dependent methods. Jhat these versions of constr)ctivism have in common is that they reflect *ays of )nderstandin" conventionality *hich are more comple7Fand more pla)si!leFthan those *hich )nderlie earlier de!ates a!o)t constr)ctivism. 8 *ill p)t for*ard here *hat 8 think to !e the stron"est ar")ments a"ainst the more pla)si!le versions of constr)ctivism. Jhile these ar")ments have not, so far as 8 kno*, !een made so f)lly e7plicit as 8 intend to make them, they do, 8 hope, capt)re the considerations that incline many philosophers of science to re5ect constr)ctivism *itho)t f)lly e7plorin" its more sophisticated variants. (he ar")ments in <)estion are methodolo"ically interestin"Fat least 8 find them interestin"F!eca)se, *hile not in any o!vio)s *ay entailin" a nat)ralistic conception of philosophical method, they involve a certain kind of a posteriori scientific assessment of constr)ctivist claims. 8 *ill e7plicate the relevant sort of scientific assessment and compare its operation *ith that reflected in the traditional lo"ical+ empiricist concern to hold philosophical acco)nts s)!5ect to the re<)irement that they offer a 6rational reconstr)ction6 of act)al science. Ine o)tcome of this investi"ation is the artic)lation of a conception of the dialectics of philosophical ar")mentation *hich indicates ho* distinctly philosophical considerations properly interact *ith considerations arisin" from other disciplines. ; 1#0 ;

). "lassical NeoG2antian "onstructi+ism ):'. 5o and a /alf raditional #r*uments for "onstructi+ism
8n this and s)cceedin" sections of part 2, 8 propose to lay o)t and eval)ate the classical ar")ments for and a"ainst @+> constr)ctivismFthose ar")ments *hich have commanded the interest of philosophers from the first artic)lation of contemporary @+> approaches !y ?anson and >)hn. Altho)"h 8 *ill cite the *ork of many of the key fi")res, 8 do not intend to !e providin" a historical s)rvey of ar")ments for and a"ainst constr)ctivism. 8nstead, 8 *ill try to identify the !est and most pla)si!le feat)res of the ar")ments and considerations, e7plicit or tacit, that have infl)enced philosophers3 vie*s on these matters. 8 t)rn first to the classical ar")ments for constr)ctivism. All of the traditional ar")ments for .@+>2 constr)ctivism rest on the important o!servation that all of the f)ndamental methods of science, from the most !asic o!servational proced)res to the most ela!orate standards for the assessment of evidence, are deeply and irretrieva!ly theory+dependent. (hey differ in the e7tent to *hich they depend as *ell on special alle"ed historical conse<)ences of theory+ dependence. (he follo*in" typolo"y sorts the traditional ar")ments into t*o and a half !asic cate"ories.

he Aasic Epistemolo*ical #r*ument from heoryGdependence

8nto this cate"ory fall the vario)s ar")ments that 5)stify an @+> constr)ctivist conception of scientific kno*led"e !y appealin" to the fact of deep theory+dependence of scientific methods and e7plorin" its epistemolo"ical implications. (hese are the key @eo+5antian epistemolo"ical ar")ments for constr)ctivism. (hey reason that the methods of act)al science are so deeply theory+dependent that the only sort of reality for *hose discovery they *o)ld !e appropriate *o)ld !e a reality partly constit)ted !y the theoretical tradition *ithin *hich scientific research takes place. -ince, in my vie*, it is important not to )nderestimate the force of s)ch ar")ments, 8 *ant to indicate somethin" of the ori"ins of their pers)asive force. 8n the first place, it is important to see that the methods of scientific research are not merely deeply theory+dependent, they appear to !e s)ch that their application *o)ld not !e rationally 5)stifia!le e7cept on the ass)mption of the tr)th or the appro7imate tr)th of the theories )pon *hich they depend. (h)s, insofar as *e take .some2 scientific research to !e a !asically rational activity, *e, like the scientists *ho en"a"e in that research, m)st !e takin" for "ranted the .perhaps appro7imate2 tr)th of the theories that )nder*rite their methods. -econd, the theory+dependence of scientific methods is not someho* restricted to deri&ed rather than funda#ental methodolo"ical principles. 8t is, of co)rse, no s)rprise that in developed sciences some .or most2 of the methods scientists employ are 5)stified !y appeal to feat)res of previo)sly esta!lished ; 1#' ; theories. 8t mi"ht seem, ho*ever, that if the development and confirmation of theories in the relevant scientific traditions are f)lly e7plored, then it *ill t)rn o)t to !e tr)e, either in fact or in an appropriate rational reconstr)ction, that the traditions can !e seen as havin" !een first esta!lished !y the application of theory+independent f)ndamental methods to theory+independent o!servations and as s)!se<)ently developin" !y the application at any "iven time of only those theory+dependent methods ratified !y

earlier theoretical discoveries. Jere s)ch a story tr)e, then 6in principle6 *e co)ld take ind)ctive inferences in sciences as "overned !y the )nderlyin" theory+independent methodolo"ical principles, treatin" theory+dependent methods some*hat on the model of derived inference r)les in ded)ctive lo"ic. Jhat ?anson, .especially2 >)hn, and others have sho*n is that this pict)re cannot !e s)stained. Jhen reco"ni4a!ly scientific methods emer"e *ithin a discipline, they emer"e as part of a packa"e that incl)des theoretical conceptions necessary to ratify them, rather than as initially theory+independent principles that "ro)nd the initial adoption of theoretical conceptions. :oreover, not only are methodolo"ical principles deeply dependent on theories, the theories they depend on are often deep. 8 mean !y that that the theoretical pres)ppositions of scientific methods are not, "enerally, almost )npro!lematical, if still a posteriori, propositions like 6like ca)ses have like effects,6 6every event has a ca)se,6 or 6there is order in nat)re.6 8nstead, the methods *ithin a scientific discipline are typically "ro)nded in fo)ndational theoretical principles pec)liar to that discipline3s special concerns. As >)hn s)""ests, scientists3 5)d"ments a!o)t the nat)re of the pro!lems to !e solved and the forms of accepta!le sol)tions .that is, their 5)d"ments of pro5ecti!ility2 are typically determined !y a metaphysical pict)re of *hat the *orld they st)dy is )ltimately like. 8n conse<)ence, the methodolo"y of science *ill seem, *ith respect to the testin" of f)ndamental ass)mptions at least, dist)r!in"ly circular . Je may make precise !oth the nat)re and depth of the circ)larity, and the serio)sness of the dist)r!ance it creates, !y e7aminin" *ith some care the recent fate of fo)ndationalist conceptions of kno*led"e. :odern epistemolo"y has !een lar"ely dominated !y positions that can !e characteri4ed as 6fo)ndationalist6: all kno*led"e is seen as )ltimately "ro)nded in certain fo)ndational !eliefs that have an epistemically privile"ed positionFthey are a priori, or self+ *arrantin", or incorri"i!le, or somethin" of the sort. Ither tr)e !eliefs are instances of kno*led"e only if they can !e 5)stified !y appeals to fo)ndational kno*led"e. -imilarly, the !asic inferential principles that are le"itimate for 5)stifyin" nonfo)ndational kno*led"e claims can themselves !e sho*n a priori to !e rational. Je may fr)itf)lly think of fo)ndationalism as consistin" of t*o parts, pre#ise foundationalis# , *hich holds that all kno*led"e is 5)stifia!le from a core of ; 1#/ ; epistemically privile"ed fo)ndational !eliefs, and inference3rule foundationalis# , *hich holds that the principles of 5)stifia!le inference are )ltimately red)ci!le to inferential principles that are a priori 5)stifia!le. Hecent *orks in nat)ralistic epistemolo"y .see, e."., Armstron" 19'#D 9oldman 190', 19'0D G)ine 1909a, 1909!2 indicate that fo)ndationalism cannot !e entirely correct. Bor the cr)cial case of percept)al kno*led"e, there seem to !e .in typical cases at least2 neither premises .fo)ndational or other*ise2 nor inferencesD instead percept)al kno*led"e o!tains *hen percept)al !eliefs are prod)ced !y epistemically relia!le mechanisms. Even if this analysis is challen"ed and it is insisted that 5)stification of some sort is cr)cial in cases of percept)al kno*led"e, it is clear that there *ill !e nothin" like the traditional fo)ndationalist3s vision of kno*led"e of the e7ternal *orld "ro)nded in premises as sec)re as, for e7ample, those a!o)t sense data, and 5)stified !y appeal to a priori defensi!le inference principles. Even *here premises and inferences are )npro!lematically relevant, the notion of 5)stification does not appear to !e as epistemically central as traditional fo)ndationalists tho)"ht: it seems to !e the relia!le prod)ction of !elief that distin")ishes cases of kno*led"e from other cases of tr)e !elief. J)stification

appears to !e relevant !eca)se of the ca)sal role *hich the seekin" and "ivin" of 5)stifications play in relia!le !elief prod)ction .or re")lationD see Boyd 19/22. Cespite these set!acks, it mi"ht seem that some appropriate version of fo)ndationalism provides )s *ith an appro7imately correct pict)re of kno*led"e. 8f *e think of ordinary percept)al !eliefs, o!tained )nder appropriate conditions, as s)ita!ly privile"ed, for e7ample, and if *e tolerate inference r)les *hose pres)ppositions only 6the skeptic6 *o)ld challen"e, then a modest fo)ndationalism mi"ht seem to capt)re pretty *ell the int)itive notion that kno*led"e claims m)st !e noncirc)larly or non+ <)estion+!e""in"ly defensi!le, ho*ever poorly it )nder*rites the ref)tation of skepticism. Je are no* in a position to see 5)st ho* and *hy the 6circ)larity6 *ith respect to f)ndamental principles )nearthed !y constr)ctivists is so dist)r!in". Jhat it s)""ests is that even modest fo)ndationalism fails, even as a "ood first appro7imation to a theory of kno*led"e, not !eca)se the most !asic availa!le premises are ins)fficiently privile"ed !)t !eca)se inference+r)le fo)ndationalism appears to !e profo)ndly mistaken. (he !asic inferential principles that are reflected in scientific methodolo"y rest on deep and sometimes controversial theoretical principles *hich someone co)ld re5ectFand *hich some have re5ectedF*itho)t the sli"htest hint of philosophical skepticism. @o* fo)ndationalism is an especially pla)si!le philosophical position, especially if it is )nderstood in the proposed modest *ay and as an analysis of the notion of non+<)estion+!e""in" 5)stification rather than as part of a scheme for ref)tin" the skeptic. (h)s the discovery of the deep theory+dependence of ; 1#9 ; methods appears to threaten an especially pla)si!le and central part of o)r conception of kno*led"e. 8t poses a closely related pro!lem as *ell. Je are )sed to thinkin" of the esta!lishment of the first s)ccessf)l research traditions *ithin the vario)s scientific disciplines as, in the first instance, insofar as internal factors are concerned, the res)lt of the adoption of appropriate scientific methods. 8t is the relia!ility of those methods *hich *e e7pect *ill e7plain the s)ccesses of researchers in o!tainin" an appro7imately correct theoretical pict)re of the relevant phenomena. (his e7planation is apparently precl)ded !y a reco"nition of the deep theory+dependence of scientific methods. 8ndeed, it seems to "et thin"s more or less !ack*ard. -ince methods possessin" the relia!ility characteristic of those of recent s)ccessf)l science rest )pon appro7imate theoretical kno*led"e rather than on a priori or commonsensical principles, the emer"ence of epistemically s)ccessf)l scientific methods m)st have depended )pon the lo"ically, epistemically, and historically contin"ent emer"ence of a relevantly appro7imately tr)e theoretical tradition rather than vice versa. 8t is not possi!le to )nderstand the initial emer"ence of s)ch a tradition as the conse<)ence of some more a!stractly conceived scientific or rational methodolo"y *hich itself is theory+independent. (here is no s)ch methodolo"y. (h)s the theory+dependence of methods poses the start3up pro!le# Fho* are *e to e7plain the first emer"ence of appro7imately tr)e theories *ithin a research tradition, and th)s the emer"ence of the relia!le methods they determine, if not !y reference to the prior esta!lishment of noncontin"ently relia!le methods= Jhat seems to !e indicated is a sort of radical contingency in the epistemolo"y of science: not only does the relia!ility of scientific methods rest on hi"hly contin"ent pres)ppositions !)t it is, in a philosophically important .and nons$eptical 2 sense, an accident that in the early sta"es of a s)ccessf)l scientific tradition relevantly appro7imately tr)e theories and the associated relia!le methods emer"e at all .for f)rther disc)ssion see Boyd 19/2, 199$a2. :odest fo)ndationalism is e7tremely pla)si!le, and solvin" the start+)p pro!lem !y appealin" lar"ely to accident or l)ck seems impla)si!le. @o do)!t these facts e7plain part of the attractiveness of de!)nkin" constr)ctivism: if scientific methods are circ)lar in s)ch a *ay that scientific kno*led"e

claims cannot !e accepted *itho)t re5ectin" modest fo)ndationalism, and *itho)t treatin" the first systematic s)ccesses of scientific research as accidents, then so m)ch the *orse for scientific kno*led"e claims. Jhat is important for o)r p)rposes is that the @+> constr)ctivist interpretation of scientific kno*led"e to a si"nificant e7tent ameliorates these diffic)lties and restores the possi!ility of a modest fo)ndationalism. 8f !asic la*s of nat)re are to !e seen as, in some deep sense, imposed on nat)re !y o)r social conventions and practices, then the most !asic theory+dependent methods may *ell !e 5)stified, if not a priori, then at any rate !y appeal to principles that ; 1%$ ; have a distinctly privile"ed epistemic standin". Ither more specific methods that depend on plainly a posteriori theoretical considerations mi"ht then !e treated as reflectin" derived inference r)les 5)st as the fo)ndationalist pro5ect re<)ires. -imilarly, the start+)p pro!lem *ill seem some*hat more tracta!le: at least part of the e7planation of ho* the first s)ccessf)lly esta!lished paradi"matic theories came to appro7imate the tr)th a!o)t nat)ral phenomena *ill lie in the fact that the acceptance of those theories constitutes the reality of the phenomena in <)estion. 8t is these considerations *hich, 8 s)""est, make it pla)si!le that the theory+dependence of scientific methods is s)ch that if they are to !e )nderstood as discovery proced)res, the reality they are )sed to discover m)st !e tho)"ht of as constit)ted !y the adoption of the relevant theories and methods. Inly s)ch an interpretation preserves a modest fo)ndationalism in the philosophy of science and .there!y2 permits an epistemically satisfyin" sol)tion to the start+)p pro!lem. Ine final point a!o)t the !asic ar")ment from theory+dependence is important here. 8 have s)""ested that the thr)st of the ar")ment sho)ld !e )nderstood as an attempt to preserve an eminently pla)si!le version of fo)ndationalism in the li"ht of potentially em!arrassin" facts a!o)t the act)al history of science. If co)rse this ar")ment for constr)ctivism *o)ld !e )nconvincin" if it *ere possi!le !y other more modest means to avoid the re5ection of modest fo)ndationalism. 8 !elieve that it is not. 8 have ar")ed .Boyd 19/9, 199$a, 19912 that scientific realism entailsF"iven over*helmin"ly pla)si!le scientific and philosophical ass)mptionsF5)st the sort of antifo)ndationalism from *hich @+> constr)ctivism saves )s. 8t mi"ht seem that an empiricist conception of scientific theories *o)ld fare !etter in this re"ard, "iven the centrality of fo)ndationalist ass)mptions in empiricist epistemolo"y. 8 have ar")ed else*here .Boyd 199$a, 19912 that this is not the case. -o deeply theory+dependent are the act)al methods of science that the most pla)si!le e#piricist treatment of them *ill treat their relia!ility as an empirical matter and their 5)stification as conse<)ently a posteriori. 8nstead of portrayin" theory+dependent methods as pres)min" the appro7imate tr)th of the !ack"ro)nd theories )pon *hich they depend, the pla)si!le empiricist position *ill treat them as "ro)nded in a second+order ind)ction a!o)t the relia!ility of ind)ctive methods in science of the sort s)""ested !y G)ine .1909a2. -ince the concl)sions of s)ch ind)ctions a!o)t ind)ction are 5)st a!o)t as )no!vio)s and s)!5ect+matter+specific as the !ack"ro)nd theories *hose methodolo"ical import they reconstr)ct, the pla)si!le empiricist *ill reach as pessimistic a concl)sion a!o)t inference+r)le fo)ndationalism as *ill the realist. Inly the @+> constr)ctivist saves modest fo)ndationalism. 8 concl)de, therefore, a!o)t the !asic ar")ment from theory+dependence that, *hen properly form)lated, it rests on the correct assessment that only @+> constr)ctivism can reconcile the reco"nition of s)ch "en)ine scientific

; 1%1 ; kno*led"e as *e appear to have *ith the acceptance of a modest and independently pla)si!le version of fo)ndationalism.

One and a /alf #r*uments from Incommensurability

8n this cate"ory 8 place the ar")ments, anticipated in ?anson 19&/ and developed in >)hn 19'$ and else*here, *hich seek to esta!lish that the methodolo"ical and concept)al distance !et*een s)ccessive sta"es in certain central scientific traditions is so "reat as to precl)de any interpretation accordin" to *hich they have a common s)!5ect matter. 8f the traditions are historically central eno)"h .and >)hn3s candidates certainly are2, the demonstration of s)ch incommens)ra!ility *o)ld make impossi!le any defense of scientific realism alon" any c)rrently developed lines and *o)ld almost certainly compromise the position of any empiricist *ho adopted the response to theory+dependent methods s)""ested a!ove. 8t is )sef)l to distin")ish !et*een t*o components of the alle"ed incommens)ra!ility !et*een s)ch sta"es, se#antic inco##ensura!ility .the doctrine that the concept)al "ap !et*een the relevant sta"es precl)des a common reference for the terms they employ in common2 and #ethodological inco##ensura!ility .the doctrine that no rational methods accepta!le *ithin each of the t*o relevant sta"es are s)fficient for the resol)tion of the disp)te !et*een them2. Central to the defense of the first of these doctrines has !een the conception that the most f)ndamental la*s containin" a theoretical term, and perhaps the most central methodolo"ical principles "overnin" its )se, sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as providin" its definition so that chan"es in s)ch la*s and s)ch principles represent a chan"e in s)!5ect matter. (he ar")ments for methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility have !een more comple7, !)t they all revolve aro)nd demonstrations that certain chan"es in theoretical conceptions .or 6paradi"ms62 have departed from pla)si!le models of scientific rationality in important *ays: (here are never 6cr)cial e7periments6 *hose relevance is accepted !y proponents of the earlier and later paradi"ms and *hose o)tcome is decisive !y the standards of each "ro)p. 8nstead, the res)lts of individ)al e7periments are al*ays s)!5ect to si"nificantly differin" interpretations. Cecisions of scientists to adopt the ne* paradi"m have the character of chan"es in alle"iance or o)tlook or career commitment more than that of a meas)red response to decisive evidence. E<)ally rational and distin")ished scientists make different 5)d"ments a!o)t *hich alle"iance to adopt. B)ll acceptance of the ne* paradi"m often *aits )ntil the holdo)ts .*ho are often older scientists2 have lar"ely died or retired rather than !ein" occasioned !y some especially convincin" !ody of e7periments. (he 6te7t!ook6 pict)re accordin" to *hich the ne* paradi"m is decisively confirmed !y the availa!le data emer"es only after the victors *rite ne* te7t!ooksD it does not descri!e the process of transition !et*een paradi"ms. All of these .and similar2 feat)res of revol)tionary transformation in sci+ ; 1%2 ; ence, the constr)ctivist ar")es, fail to fit the pict)re of pro"ress leadin" to increased kno*led"e of a theory+independent *orld. Je mi"ht ask, 6Jhat m)st the *orld !e like if the proced)res of normal science are to !e discovery proced)res=6 -ince, accordin" to the constr)ctivist, scientific revol)tions cannot !e constr)ed as episodes of discovery, *e m)st think of the periods of normal science *hich they delimit as involvin" the investi"ation of <)ite different sets of socially constr)cted phenomena. A constr)ctivist interpretation is necessary if *e are to )nderstand each of the episodes of normal science *hich precede and s)cceed a scientific revol)tion as involvin" the esta!lishment of "en)ine

kno*led"e: @+> constr)ctivism emer"es as the only alternative to de!)nkin" constr)ctivism. 8t seems to me that these t*o ar")ments are not !est )nderstood as providin" independent considerations favorin" @+> constr)ctivismD each, !y itself, makes at !est a rather *eak case for constr)ctivism. Consider the case of the ar")ment from semantic incommens)ra!ility. Even *itho)t the development of sophisticated realist .or empiricist2 alternatives to the )nderlyin" theory of the definitions of theoretical terms, a n)m!er of considerations cast do)!t on the concl)sion that chan"es in f)ndamental la*s m)st !e taken as indicatin" a shift in reference or in s)!5ect matter. 8n the first place, the ran"e of e7amples of apparent reference !y .or in the face of2 misdescription o)tside science is considera!le so that one3s confidence that f)ndamental la*s m)st fi7 reference !y e7act and essentially analytic description sho)ld !e limited. (here are, moreover, n)mero)s e7amples *ithin science in *hich chan"es in the most f)ndamental la*s involvin" less 6f)ndamental6 entities or ma"nit)des do not seem to have involved a chan"e in s)!5ect matter. Je are not, for e7ample, inclined to think that an apparent discovery that a disease has a dietary rather than a !acterial ca)se m)st !e dia"nosed as a chan"e in s)!5ect matter, nor are *e at all inclined to think that apparent disp)tes a!o)t the mechanisms of speciation m)st al*ays reflect instead chan"es in the e7tension of the term 6species.6 -)ch e7amples s)""est that even in scientific cases f)ndamental la*s are not al*ays to !e tho)"ht of as providin" analytic or other*ise )nrevisa!le definitions of their constit)ent terms. (hese considerations do not entail that the semantic theory )nderlyin" the ar")ment from semantic incommens)ra!ility is mistaken for the sorts of cases involved in scientific revol)tions, !)t they do cast do)!t on its pla)si!ility. (here are like*ise reasons to do)!t that the ar")ment from methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility is so)nd. (here are a n)m!er of models of the *ays in *hich the rationality of the scientific comm)nity s)pervenes on the rationality of individ)al scientists, and of dialectics of rational assessment of e7perimental evidence, *hich can accommodate the tro)!lin" facts a!o)t the epistemolo"y and politics of scientific revol)tions to a realist or empiricist conception of scientific pro"ress. -)ch models can easily portray !oth the idiosyncratic and pro"rammatic feat)res of scientists3 shifts in alle"iance d)rin" 6revol)tions6 ; 1%# ; and the dialectical comple7ity of the assessment of novel data as "enerally contri!)tory to the epistemic s)ccess of scientists in st)dyin" the .theory+independent2 *orld. (h)s any s)ccessf)l deployment of the ar")ment from methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility *o)ld re<)ire re!)ttals to these alternative models of revol)tionary episodes. Cespite these *eaknesses, the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility have played a very serio)s role in recent philosophy of science. 8n part, that is so !eca)se they indicate f)ndamental *eaknesses or diffic)lties in the deeply infl)ential empiricist conceptions of scientific kno*led"e and of the semantics of scientific terms. B)t it *o)ld !e a mistake to see their impact as e7cl)sively ne"ative. 8nstead, 8 s)""est, *hile neither ar")ment is !y itself especially convincin", taken to"ether they spell o)t in a m)t)ally reinforcin" *ay the details of an important nonde!)nkin" alternative to realist and empiricist conceptions of pro"ress in science .hence: one and a half ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility2.

):). 5o and a /alf "lassical Rebuttals

Healist re!)ttals to the classical ar")ments for @+> constr)ctivism can like*ise !e classified into t*o

!road cate"ories em!odyin" responses to the !asic epistemic ar")ment and to the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility.

Realist reatments of the Epistemolo*y of heoryGdependent -ethods

8n seekin" to identify classical realist re!)ttals to the !asic epistemic ar")ment from the theory+ dependence of methods it is important to remem!er that !oth @+> constr)ctivism and contemporary scientific realism arose lar"ely as commentaries on the ina!ility of traditional empiricist conceptions of science to take ade<)ate acco)nt of the theory+dependence of act)al scientific methods. Bar from defendin" realism a"ainst diffic)lties raised !y theory+dependence, realist philosophers of science are pro!a!ly !etter )nderstood as em!racin" the fact of theory+dependence as the !asis of an ar")ment for realism. A"ainst the epistemolo"ical ar")ment for constr)ctivism, 8 s)""est, the classical realist re!)ttal .8 have in mind here the lines of ar")ment represented in, for e7ample, P)tnam 1902, 19'&a2 is !est tho)"ht of as involvin" a strate"y for seein" theory+dependent methods, realistically interpreted, as guarantors of , rather than o!stacles to , kno*led"e of a theory+independent reality. ?ere the cr)cial idea is that s)ch methods sho)ld !e seen as esta!lishin" the !asis for scientists3 episte#ically rele&ant causal contact *ith their s)!5ect matter. (he clearest ill)stration of this conception is that provided !y a realist treatment of the theory+dependence of meas)rement proced)res .see, e."., Byerly and ,a4ara 19'#2 accordin" to *hich scientists employ availa!le appro7imate kno*led"e of 6theoretical entities6 in order to devise proced)res for meas)rin" or detectin" them and their properties, there!y providin" the !asis for improvements in theoretical kno*led"e and in s)!se<)ent meas)rin" proced)res. ; 1%% ; 8n "eneral an acco)nt of the epistemolo"y of science developed so as to s)stain the realist conception of the positive contri!)tion of theory+dependent methods in this *ay *ill portray theory+dependent methods .*hich is to say, in fact, all the methods of science2 as reflectin" a theory+dependent theory+ modification strate"y in *hich, if thin"s "o *ell .partial and appro7imate2 theoretical kno*led"e is e7ploited to develop methods for the ac<)isition of ne* .partial and appro7imate2 kno*led"e, in t)rn leadin" to !etter methods, and so on. -)ch an acco)nt then envisions a dialectical interaction !et*een theoretical and methodolo"ical developments prod)cin", )nder favora!le circ)mstances, m)t)ally reinforcin" pro"ress in !oth arenas .Boyd 19/2, 199$a2. 8t is important to )nderstand the stren"ths and *eaknesses of this classical re!)ttal. 8t ans*ers the p)44lin" <)estion 6?o* mi"ht methods as theory+dependent as those of science provide kno*led"e of a theory+independent *orld=6 !y offerin" an epistemically favora!le !)t realist acco)nt of the operation of those methods, one accordin" to *hich their operation systematically ")ides researchers to*ard .appro7imate2 tr)th. 8nsofar as the epistemic challen"e to realism is seen as arisin" from the threat of radically contin"ent conception of the epistemolo"y of science, the sit)ation is different. (he classical re!)ttal in no *ay avoids the radical contin"ency that seems to pla")e .or at any rate to accompany2 a realist or empiricist treatment of deeply theory+dependent methods. (he theory+ dependent theory+modification strate"y em!odied in scientific methods is portrayed as a theory+ improvement strate"y only *hen the method+determinin" !ack"ro)nd theories are relevantly appro7imately tr)e, so that inference+r)le fo)ndationalism is a!andoned and a radically contin"ent sol)tion to the start+)p pro!lem is entailed. (he realist *ho, like the constr)ctivist, asks, 6Jhat m)st the *orld !e like if the proced)res of normal science are to !e discovery proced)res=6 m)st ans*er, 6A *orld in *hich, as a hi"hly contin"ent matter of fact, s)ita!ly appro7imately tr)e theories arose *hose

acceptance esta!lished relia!le methods rather than !ein" a conse<)ence of their operation.6 .Bor an alternative dia"nosis of the sit)ation of the realist *ith respect to this iss)e see the challen"in" analysis in :iller 19/'.2 8nsofar as the classical realist re!)ttal responds to the challen"e of radical contin"ency .rather than 5)st to the <)estion of ho* theory+dependent methods can !e seen as contri!)tin" to kno*led"e of a theory+ independent *orld2, it is almost certainly !est )nderstood as 5)stifyin" radical contin"ency in the epistemolo"y of science !y assimilatin" it to a !roader nat)ralistic anti+fo)ndationalism 5)stified independently !y appeal to nat)ralistic conceptions of percept)al kno*led"e, everyday nat)ral kno*led"e, 6folk6 psycholo"ical kno*led"e, moral kno*led"e, and so on. (h)s, to a far "reater e7tent than has !een *idely reco"ni4ed, scientific realism m)st !e tho)"ht of as a component of a "eneral nat)ralistic and antifo)ndationalist epistemolo"y. .8 develop this theme in part &.2 ; 1%& ;

he "lassical Rebuttals to Incommensurability #r*uments

A"ainst the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility, the classical realist re!)ttals to constr)ctivism can !e seen, *ith certain important <)alifications, as restin" on t*o conceptions: .a2 ca)sal or nat)ralistic theories of reference and of kind definitions .P)tnam 19'&a, >ripke 19'2, Boyd 19'92 *hich provide the reso)rces necessary to defend, in a fashion appropriate to the act)al history of science, the denial that concept)al chan"es d)rin" 6scientific revol)tions6 entail chan"es in s)!5ect matter, and .!2 ar")ments to the effect that, for the act)al episodes in the history of science identified as revol)tionary !y defenders of incommens)ra!ility, there o!tained, to a relevantly "ood appro7imation, pair%ise theory3neutrality of #ethods . Accordin" to ar")ments in this second class, altho)"h there are no "eneral and theory+independent methods ade<)ate to resolve the differences !et*een pre+ and postrevol)tionary theoretical conceptions .or to do anythin" else interestin" for that matter2, there have al*ays !een methods *hose 5)stification is ne)tral !et*een the conflictin" claims of the pre+ and postrevol)tionary conceptions *hich rationally dictate the choice of the latter conception in most or all of its relevant details. .8 have it in mind that an appeal to appro7imate pair*ise theory ne)trality of methods capt)res central ar")mentative strate"ies of, e."., P)tnam 1902, -hapere 190%, and -cheffler 190'.2 @o* for the <)alifications. 8n the first place, the theories of reference and of kind definitions *hich have classically !een advanced a"ainst ar")ments from semantic incommens)ra!ility have displayed a mi7 of nat)ralistic or ca)sal elements on the one hand and descriptivist or conventional elements on the other. Jhat almost all s)ch conceptions share *ith the positions of, for e7ample, >ripke .19'22 and P)tnam .19'&a2 is that they ackno*led"e the important role, in fi7in" the reference of scientific terms and in definin" scientific kinds .properties, ma"nit)des, etc.2, of nonconventional .non+6nominalist62 feat)res of lin")istic and scientific practiceFfeat)res that reflect a strate"y of deferrin" to the act)al ca)sal str)ct)re of the *orld in classificatory, ind)ctive, and e7planatory practice .for a "eneral acco)nt of the relation !et*een s)ch deference and scientific practice see, e."., P)tnam 19'&a, 19'&!D Boyd 19'9, 199$a, 199$!2. Even amon" philosophers *ho are critical of 6p)re6 ca)sal theories of reference, there is near consens)s in favor of 6mi7ed6 theories reco"ni4in" s)ch deference and near consens)s a!o)t the appropriateness of s)ch theories for re!)ttin" .many2 claims of semantic incommens)ra!ility. G)alifications are also re<)ired *ith respect to the claim that classical realist re!)ttals to ar")ments from methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility posit pair*ise theory ne)trality of methods. As 8 s)""ested earlier, the *ays in *hich rationality of the scientific comm)nity s)pervenes on the rationality of

individ)al scientists is comple7, and one of the comple7ities is that, *itho)t compromisin" either individ)al or collective rationality, scientists *ithin a tradition may differ si"nificantly in their methodolo"ical standards and con+ ; 1%0 ; ceptions. 8ndeed it is ar")a!le .from almost any philosophical perspective2 that s)ch diver"ence of methodolo"ical perspectives and the similar diver"ence on theoretical matters *hich s)stains and follo*s from it are essential to collective scientific rationality. 8n conse<)ence, it *o)ld !e mistaken to think of a pla)si!le realist re!)ttal as restin", for e7ample, on the claim that all of the principal methods that )nder*rite the acceptance of a ne* theoretical perspective or paradi"m are accepta!le to all of the serio)s or rational defenders of its predecessors. Jhat realists are !est )nderstood as claimin" is that all or most of the evidential considerations *hich pers)ade those *ho adopt the ne* conception are certified as evidentially relevant !y theoretical and methodolo"ical considerations rationally accepted !y a s)!stantial fraction of the opposition and that, over time, the evidence *hich has acc)m)lated !ecomes pers)asive !y all or almost all of the evidential standards *hich the earlier conception )nder*rites. (his pattern of overlappin" methodolo"ies stretchin" over 6revol)tionary6 episodes, the realist ar")es, makes a realist historical e7planation of s)ch episodes as reflections of the "ro*th of kno*led"e a!o)t a common *orld prefera!le to any e7planation that invokes *holesale semantic and methodolo"ical discontin)ity. 8t is almost certainly also essential to this classical realist re!)ttal to claim that the pattern of overlappin" methodolo"ies reflects a convincin" pattern of #utual ratification !et*een consec)tive sta"es in the development of the relevant scientific disciplines. 8t is ro)tine in the case of theoretical innovations that .a2 the ne* and innovative theoretical proposal is s)ch that the only 5)stification scientists have for acceptin" it, "iven the relevant evidence, is that it resolves some scientific pro!lem or <)estion %hile preser&ing certain $ey features of the earlier theoretical conceptions and .!2 the ne* proposal ratifies the earlier conceptions as appro7imately tr)e in 5)st those respects *hich 5)stify their role in its o*n acceptance. :oreover the patterns of m)t)al ratification are characteristically seen to !e retrospecti&ely sustained : altho)"h later theoretical innovations typically re<)ire a revision in scientists3 estimates of the de"rees and respects of appro7imation of !oth the earlier innovative proposals and their predecessors, the initially discerni!le relation of m)t)al ratification is typically s)stained as a very "ood first appro7imation to the evidentially and methodolo"ically important relations !et*een the innovation and its predecessor theories. 8t is the )!i<)ity of this sort of retrospecti&ely sustained #utual ratification , even in cases of 6scientific revol)tions,6 *hich, the realist *ill ar")e, 5)stifies o)r acceptin" the realist conception of 5)stification reflected in .a2 and .!2 .see Boyd 19//, 199$a2D it *ill also !e important for the realist3s case to insist that the <)alified methodolo"ical commens)ra!ility *hich the historical record e7hi!its is all the commens)ra!ility that a realist sho)ld e7pect .see Boyd 19//, part &2. 8mportantly, the classical re!)ttals to semantic and to methodolo"ical in+ ; 1%' ; commens)ra!ility are closely related. In the one hand, the sorts of referential contin)ity endorsed !y the former are 5)st those re<)ired to s)stain the latter. In the other hand, the reference+s)stainin" mechanismsFca)sal or descriptiveFand the conceptions of kind definitions for partic)lar cases posited !y nat)ralistic semantic conceptions are 5)st those *hich are apparently indicated !y the pict)re of the "ro*th of kno*led"e offered in re!)ttal to the ar")ment from methodolo"ical

incommens)ra!ility. (hey, like antirealist ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility, sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as m)t)ally s)pportin" components of sin"le philosophical conception offered as an alternative to the constr)ctivists3 conception of scientific revol)tions, rather than as independent criticisms of it .hence, one and a half re!)ttals to constr)ctivism on the iss)e of incommens)ra!ility2. Ine more point a!o)t the classical re!)ttals to constr)ctivism *ill prove to !e important to o)r consideration of the second+"eneration options open to sophisticated constr)ctivists and their realist critics. (he details of the classical realist re!)ttal to incommens)ra!ility, 8 s)""est, are important for a f)ll artic)lation and development of scientific realism !ut not for esta!lishing a pri#a facie case against the inco##ensura!ility argu#ents . 8nstead the lar"ely e7ample+rather+than+theory+driven considerations that so m)ch red)ced philosophers3 confidence in the analytic+synthetic distinction, especially *ith respect to scientific propositions, operated in the case of semantic and methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility as *ell, so that, even in the a!sence of definitive and f)lly artic)lated realist semantic and methodolo"ical conceptions )nder*ritin" an appropriately <)alified findin" of pair*ise theory ne)trality of methods, there still e7isted "ood, if not entirely compellin", reasons to s)ppose that s)ch conceptions *o)ld !e forthcomin". 8ndeed, the n)m!er of pla)si!le semantic and epistemolo"ical conceptions that )nder*rite an appropriate findin" of commens)ra!ility is so lar"e, and the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility are so dependent on ri"id positivist caricat)res of the semantics and epistemolo"y of theoretical in<)iry, that it has !een for a lon" time reasona!le to do)!t the co"ency of those ar")ments. By contrast, 8 s)""est, the case for realism a"ainst the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment for constr)ctivism does really re<)ire somethin" like the artic)lation of an alternative realist theory of confirmation and of the fo)ndations of the epistemolo"y of science. (his is so !eca)se acceptin" a realist conception of scientific kno*led"e over either an empiricist or a constr)ctivist conception re<)ires the re5ection of e7tremely pla)si!le epistemolo"ical principles. 8n order to re5ect key empiricist ar")ments a"ainst the possi!ility of kno*led"e of 6)no!serva!les,6 the realist m)st a!andon even the most pla)si!le versions of the e7tremely pla)si!le position that empirically e<)ivalent theories are al*ays e<)ally *ell s)pported or ref)ted !y any "iven !ody of e7perimental evidence .see Boyd 19/#, 19/92. He!)ttin" the constr)ctivist conception of ; 1%/ ; scientific kno*led"e re<)ires the realist to a!andon not only the evidential indistin")isha!ility thesis 5)st mentioned !)t an e7tremely pla)si!le version of modest fo)ndationalism as *ell. 8n conse<)ence, an ade<)ate defense of scientific realism a"ainst the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment really re<)ires the artic)lation of a distinctly realist .and nat)ralistic2 epistemolo"ical theory ade<)ate to 5)stify the a!andonment of these t*o pla)si!le epistemolo"ical theses. 8 have ar")ed else*here .Boyd 19/2, 19/9, 199$a2 that an appropriate epistemolo"ical theory is availa!le. @evertheless, neither the theory 8 propose nor any other version of epistemolo"ical nat)ralism is )ncontroversial, andFas 8 have indicated earlierFa nat)ralistic epistemolo"y ade<)ate to )nder*rite scientific realism *ill need to re5ect modest fo)ndationalism in a *ay in *hich, for e7ample, a nat)ralistic conception of everyday kno*led"e mi"ht *ell not. 8 concl)de therefore that the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment for @+> constr)ctivism is considera!ly more po*erf)l than the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility and hence that versions of @+> constr)ctivism *hich do not posit the sorts of incommens)ra!ility anticipated !y those latter ar")ments *o)ld pose a serio)s and interestin" challen"e to scientific realism.

3. Sophisticated NeoG2antian "onstructi+ism 3:'. hree and a /alf #r*uments for Sophisticated "onstructi+ism
A sophisticated @+> constr)ctivism that avoids positin" semantic and methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility across scientific revol)tions is, 8 shall presently ar")e, certainly possi!le and is th)s certainly a potential rival to empiricist and realist conceptions of scientific kno*led"e. (he defender of s)ch a constr)ctivism *ill have availa!le the ar")mentative reso)rces of the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment *itho)t the !)rden of defendin" apparently ref)ted claims of incommens)ra!ility. 8n assessin" sophisticated constr)ctivism it *ill, of co)rse, !e important to e7amine realist re!)ttals to the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")mentFthat is, to assess the relative merits of realist nat)ralism and constr)ctivism as epistemolo"ical theories. 8t *ill also !e important, ho*ever, to take acco)nt of the less technical considerations *hich philosophers and others have tho)"ht of as favorin" constr)ctivism and to see to *hat e7tent these considerations may favor or compromise sophisticated constr)ctivism or its realist alternatives. 8 have claimed that the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility for @+> constr)ctivism are *eak and that the variety of pla)si!le re!)ttals to them is "reat. -till it remains tr)e that the primary ar")ments for constr)ctivism disc)ssed in the literat)re are the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility and that constr)ctivist conceptions of science, and closely related relativist conceptions, contin)e to e7ercise considera!le .and perhaps "ro*in"2 infl)ence. 8t is rea+ ; 1%9 ; sona!le to ask *hat e7plains this contin)ed infl)ence. -everal e7planations s)""est themselves. 8n the first place, the distinction !et*een @+> constr)ctivism and other doctrines affirmin" the 6social constr)ction of reality6 has not al*ays !een sharply dra*n, and @+> constr)ctivism has no do)!t "ained some s)pport that properly !elon"s to the more pla)si!le versions of those other doctrines. 8 am inclined, ho*ever, to think that there is another important reason for the contin)ed infl)ence of constr)ctivism. :any people, 8 !elieve, are convinced that, ho*ever *ell or !adly the technical ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility may fare, !roader philosophical considerations favor constr)ctivism. (he more "eneral considerations favorin" constr)ctivism, 8 !elieve, are those *hich s)""est that constr)ctivism is re<)ired in order to acco)nt ade<)ately for a variety of important feat)res of science and of the relations !et*een scientific in<)iry and other h)man activities, even *hen reco"nition of those feat)res may !e lo"ically compati!le *ith the affirmation of an alternative conception of scientific kno*led"e. Ine especially clear case of the latter sort of consideration is almost certainly the tacit reco"nition of the force of the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment disc)ssed earlier. (he revol)tionary episodes in the history of science *hich )nder*rite claims of incommens)ra!ility do indicate <)ite clearly the profo)nd theory+dependence of scientific methods, so it is reasona!le to s)ppose that those *ho advance, or are pers)aded !y, ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility are also tacitly infl)enced !y the more pers)asive !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment from theory+dependence. 8n addition to the considerations capt)red !y the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment there are, 8 !elieve, considerations of t*o other sorts *hich are *idely tho)"ht to s)pport constr)ctivism.

"onsideration of Unob+ious "on+entionality or /istoricity in Representation

?ere 8 have in mind the s)spicion .linked to concerns a!o)t ontolo"ical pl)ralism disc)ssed !elo*2 that there may *ell !e, and pro!a!ly are, feat)res of o)r scientific pict)re of the *orld *hich appear to reflect f)ndamental feat)res of nat)re !)t *hich are, in fact, artifacts of conventional or other*ise merely historically determined feat)res of o)r concept)al schemes. 8 have in mind the sort of thin" that is tr)e of most of o)r conception of ta7a a!ove the species level if cladists are ri"ht. -)ch possi!ilities raise <)estions in "eneral a!o)t the co"ency of the distinction !et*een feat)res of o)r representational apparat)s and "en)ine feat)res of a representation+independent reality.

"onsideration of 5o Sorts of %luralism

Ontological Pluralis#. ?ere 8 have in mind the .5)stly2 infl)ential idea that the concept)al scheme necessary for ade<)ately descri!in" the *orld is )nderdetermined !y the task of matchin" theory to ca)sal str)ct)re so that there *ill !e several different *ays of 6carv+ ; 1&$ ; in" )p6 the *orld *hich are e<)ally scientifically le"itimate. (his point can !e amplified !y indicatin" t*o dimensions to the pl)ralism th)s identified. 8n the first place it is tr)e that !et%een different scientific disciplines there *ill !e different *ays of carvin" )p the *orld ans*erin" to the different interests and concerns of the vario)s disciplines. 8t is also tr)e that even %ithin a sin"le discipline there *ill !e a pl)rality of ade<)ate concept)al schemes. Especially in a dialectical sit)ation in *hich it is *idely held that realism entails !oth the interest+ independence of nat)ral kinds and cate"ories, and the e7istence of a sin"le tr)e theory .*ith a sin"le appropriate concept)al scheme2, these considerations of ontolo"ical pl)ralism make constr)ctivism seem an attractive option. -ince, *here the phenomenon of ontolo"ical pl)ralism o!tains *ithin disciplines, it *ill !e in some sense a conventional or merely historical matter *hich concept)al scheme scientists employ, s)ch pl)ralism is perhaps !est seen as a partic)larly strikin" and philosophically provocative case of )no!vio)s conventionality in scientific representation. -imilarly, the interest+and+discipline+ dependence of kind definitions makes kind definitions determined in part !y historical factors, so that this phenomenon too may !e vie*ed as an important special case of )no!vio)s historicality. .ultural Pluralis#. ?ere 8 have in mind the analo"o)s, !)t in a *ay deeper, point that the theories and practices of c)lt)res different from one3s o*n are likely to em!ody strikin"ly different concept)al schemes and apparent ontolo"ical commitments *itho)t there!y !ein" sho*n to !e irrational. 8n takin" considerations of this sort to tell in favor of constr)ctivism, philosophers and others are participants in *hat is !y no* a lon" and deeply infl)ential tradition of relativism in the name of tolerance. (he most important fact a!o)t these latter considerations favorin" constr)ctivism is that, like the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment from theory+dependence and )nlike the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility, none of them has !een decisively re!)tted !y ar")ments *hich all or almost all realists *o)ld no* accept. At least ar")a!ly an ade<)ate realist response to the concerns a!o)t )ne7pected conventionality and ontolo"ical pl)ralism *o)ld re<)ire the adoption of a distinctly realist and non+?)mean conception of ca)sation, of red)ction, and of s)pervenience *hich *o)ld not !e f)lly accepta!le to many scientific realists .see Boyd 19/&!, 19/92. -imilarly, a co"ent realist response to the concerns a!o)t c)lt)ral pl)ralism may *ell )ltimately depend on the nat)ralistic and anti+.modest2 fo)ndationalist realist re!)ttal to the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment .Boyd 19/9, 199$a, 19912. 8 concl)de that in assessin"

the relative merits of realism and sophisticated @+> constr)ctivism *e need to take serio)sly three and a half ar")ments for constr)ctivism: the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment from theory+dependence and t*o and a half less+technical ar")mentsFthe ar")ment from c)lt)ral pl)ralism and the .one and ; 1&1 ; a half2 closely related ar")ments from considerations of )ne7pected conventionality and historicality and of ontolo"ical pl)ralism.

3:). "onstructi+ism 5ithout #nalyticityD /o5 to Ae a Sophisticated "onstructi+ist

8nsofar as the availa!le re!)ttals to the ar")ments from incommens)ra!ility rest on recent developments in philosophical theory, they rest primarily on the artic)lation of alternatives to the traditional empiricist conception that the definitions of "eneral terms sho)ld !e provided !y analytic sentences or 6,+tr)ths.6 8t is the ease *ith *hich one can artic)late and defend alternatives to this conception that e7plains the ease *ith *hich s)ch re!)ttals can !e developed. 8t mi"ht seem that any version of @+> constr)ctivism, ho*ever little committed to incommens)ra!ility, *o)ld !e v)lnera!le to the ref)tation in the li"ht of recent criti<)es of analyticity. After all, *e are !y no* )sed to thinkin" of social conventions re"ardin" co"nitive matters as !ein" reflected in the analyticity or tr)th !y convention of some !ody of sentences. (he constr)ctivist, in treatin" certain feat)res of reality as matters of social convention, m)st, it *o)ld seem, treat certain theoretical claims or other scientific principles as analytic or other*ise tr)e !y convention. (he !)rden of proof *o)ld then lie *ith her to sho* that the relevant claims of conventionality are not as v)lnera!le as others have so often !een. 8t is important to reco"ni4e that *hat really matters to the thesis of conventionality or social constr)ction in science is not analyticity or lin")istic conventionality !)t rather a sort of historicality . Jhat matters is *hether f)ndamental fact)al descriptions in science represent str)ct)res *hose e7istence and properties are in the relevant sense independent of the historical development of the research or practical traditions in *hich they are st)died, or *hether instead *hat is tr)e a!o)t the *orld scientists st)dy is determined in relevant *ays !y feat)res of the concept)al str)ct)re *hich, as a matter of historical fact, has developed *ithin those traditions. 8s tr)th a matter of !ein" faithf)l to the *orld 6o)t there6 or is it instead a matter of !ein" faithf)l to certain traditions and thus to the only studia!le %orld there is7 8f constr)ctivism is )nderstood as the affirmation of the latter ans*er, then the commitment to anythin" like analyticity of some set of theoretical statements or other principles is, 8 s)""est, entirely dispensa!le. Consider *hat sort of conventionality the constr)ctivist m)st posit as operatin" *ithin a tradition of in<)iry if she is to retain the ontolo"ical thr)st of @+> constr)ctivism *ith respect to that tradition *hile avoidin" impla)si!le commitment to the )nrevisa!ility of any partic)lar theoretical principles or other doctrines. Jhat she re<)ires is that the metaphysical pict)re represented in the relevant theories or other doctrines *ithin the tradition !e in !road outline a matter of convention !)t that the conventionality involved !e s)ch that the r)les of ; 1&2 ;

rational inference internal to the tradition itself permit <)ite radical revisions in la*s or other principles as a res)lt of ne* data, theoretical innovations, or other developments ackno*led"ed as epistemically relevant *ithin the tradition itself. ,et )s call the re<)ired sort of conventionality or historicality dialectically co#plex con&entionality . 8t is all !)t certain that dialectically comple7 conventionality is not only possi!le !)t act)al. Consider for e7ample the *ide ran"e of traditions of theolo"ical in<)iry *hich *e *o)ld no* descri!e as mytholo"ical .8 think that all theolo"ical traditions sho)ld !e so classified, !)t nothin" in my )se of this e7ample depends on s)ch an ass)mption2. 8t is profo)ndly )nlikely that all s)ch traditions possess a tradition+independent s)!5ect matter. Almost e<)ally )nlikely is the historical thesis that each s)ch tradition is fo)nded on a set of analytic or other*ise )nrevisa!le principles. 8ndeed, "iven the e7tent to *hich s)ch traditions are kno*n to !e infl)enced !y chan"in" c)lt)ral, philosophical, scientific, political, and diplomatic factors, it *o)ld !e an )nlikely historical thesis that any s)ch tradition is so fo)nded. (h)s it is reasona!le to s)ppose that o)r )nderstandin" of the semantics of any s)ch tradition involves the reco"nition of 5)st the sort of conventionality *hich the @+> constr)ctivist re<)ires. If co)rse, the <)estion *ill remain *hether or not the constr)ctivist can defend the thesis that relevant instances of this sort of conventionality are *orld+constit)tin" in the relevant metaphysical sense, !)tF "iven the act)al history of intellect)al and practical in<)iryFit seems that dialectically comple7 conventionality is a !etter candidate for this role than conventionality "ro)nded in anythin" like analyticity. 8t mi"ht !e o!5ected that the 5)d"ment that the re<)ired sort of dialectically comple7 conventionality is possi!le is philosophically premat)re since *e do not have a sec)re theory of )nivocity for terms "overned !y s)ch conventionality. Perhaps no acco)nt of )nivocity for comple7 traditions of the sort in <)estion *ill )nder*rite the re<)ired 5)d"ments of contin)ity of s)!5ect matter, and *e *ill !e forced to reco"ni4e that only dialectically simple conceptions of conventionality "ro)nded in notions like that of analyticity *ill s)pport diachronic 5)d"ments of )nivocity. 8t is tr)e, of co)rse, that there is no sin"le theory of )nivocity for .as a realist *o)ld p)t it2 nonreferrin" terms. B)t here, as in the case of the search for semantic theories to "ro)nd a re!)ttal to ar")ments from semantic incommens)ra!ility, *e s)ffer from an em!arrassment of riches. Almost any theory one can think of, from a 6property cl)ster6 acco)nt to an acco)nt that mimics ca)sal theories of reference !y emphasi4in" contin)ities in referential intent, *ill "ro)nd a <)ite pla)si!le first appro7imation to the re<)ired theory of )nivocity. Je have every reason then to e7pect that an appropriate theory is possi!le. Cialectically comple7 conventionality is almost certainly a real phenomenon, and it is not theoretically intracta!le. 8t follo*s that a sophisticated ; 1&# ; constr)ctivist conception of science may !e )nderstood as assertin" that s)ch conventionality characteri4es the ontolo"ical commitments of even the most mat)re sciences and that s)ch conventionality has metaphysical import. -)ch a constr)ctivism need not !e !)rdened *ith the ass)mptions re"ardin" analyticity and semantic and methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility *hich make classical constr)ctivism v)lnera!le to decisive ref)tation.

3:3. Sophisticated "onstructi+ism and "ommensurability

8f sophisticated @+> constr)ctivism can avoid 5)st the concl)sions a!o)t incommens)ra!ility *hich

em!arrass the classical version, it is reasona!le to ask 5)st *hat concl)sions a!o)t commens)ra!ility and incommens)ra!ility sophisticated constr)ctivism can accommodate. (*o concl)sions seem clear from the considerations rehearsed a!ove. Jith respect to the <)estion of semantic commens)ra!ility the sophisticated constr)ctivist can certainly accept any philosophically and historically pla)si!le dia"nosis to *hich a realist mi"ht !e attracted. Indeed , and this is the i#portant point, the constructi&ist can appropriate the causal theory of reference as an account of the ground of "udg#ents of coreferentiality #ade %ithin any gi&en research tradition, so that she can say and defend anything a!out the referential se#antics of actual scientific theories %hich a realist can say and defend . If co)rse she *ill hold that the reference+determinin" ca)sal relations are themselves social constr)cts, !)t since that is somethin" she says a!o)t all ca)sal relations, no special pro!lems need infect her conception of semantic commens)ra!ility. :oreover, precisely !eca)se the sophisticated constr)ctivist need not !e !)rdened *ith impla)si!le 5)d"ments of semantic incommens)ra!ility, she may similarly make and defend any 5)d"ment a!o)t methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility *hich a realist co)ld make and defend. Ine <)alification to theses concl)sions may !e necessary if *e foc)s o)r attention on a special notion of long3range co##ensura!ility . Consider the sit)ation of t*o different theoretical or practical traditions *hich, rather than en5oyin" the relation of predecessor to s)ccessor, have developed in relative independence !)t *hich have to some e7tent overlappin" s)!5ect matters. @either realism nor constr)ctivism, nor sophisticated empiricism for that matter, predicts methodolo"ical commens)ra!ility !et*een t*o s)ch traditions. (he mi7es of insi"ht and error *hich they em!ody may !e so mismatched that there are no common methodolo"ical principles ade<)ate to resolve the differences !et*een them. @evertheless there may !e the prospect of lon"+ran"e methodolo"ical commens)ra!ility: s)!se<)ent theoretical developments *ithin the t*o traditions, perhaps in response to their interaction, may lead to a sit)ation in *hich methodolo"ical commens)ra!ility o!tains. (here are reasons to !elieve that realism makes a certain e7tremely <)alified prediction of lon"+term commens)ra!ility in circ)mstances in *hich sophisticated constr)ctivism need not. After all, if !oth traditions st)dy the same .socially ; 1&% ; )nconstr)cted2 *orld, then the *orld itself can !e seen as a ca)sal factor enhancin" the likelihood of s)fficient theoretical conver"ence to )nder*rite methodolo"ical commens)ra!ility. (he difference here is, 8 !elieve, important !oth to the constr)ctivists3 treatment of iss)es of ontolo"ical and c)lt)ral pl)ralism .see section #.%2 and to correspondin" realist re!)ttals .see sections &.%, &.02, !)t it does not diminish the sophisticated constr)ctivist3s capacity to mimic pla)si!le realist treatments of more standard <)estions of commens)ra!ility !et*een s)ccessive sta"es in a sin"le research tradition or !et*een components of closely interactin" traditions.

3:6. he Virtues of Sophisticated "onstructi+ism

8 no* propose to indicate those virt)es of sophisticated constr)ctivism *hich, in my vie*, make it the version of constr)ctivism to have if yo) are "oin" to !e a constr)ctivist and .th)s2 the version of constr)ctivism to ref)te if yo) are "oin" to defend realism. If co)rse the o!vio)s virt)e of sophisticated constr)ctivism is that it does not entail semantic or methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility for those key historical cases )pon *hich the most s)ccessf)l feat)res of the classical re!)ttal to traditional constr)ctivism rest.

J)st as important is the fact that sophisticated constr)ctivism is 5)st as *ell s)pported !y .an appropriate version of2 the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment as traditional constr)ctivism is. Hecall that the ar")ment in <)estion portrays constr)ctivism as s)perior to realism .or sophisticated empiricism2 !eca)se constr)ctivism alone amon" these positions allo*s for the preservation of a modest fo)ndationalism in the li"ht of the act)al historical facts a!o)t scientific kno*led"e. (he standard constr)ctivist3s response to the irremedia!le theory+dependence of scientific methods sho)ld !e )nderstood, 8 have already s)""ested, as a proposal that the theory+dependent methods of science !e seen as fallin" into t*o cate"ories. (he most !asic r)les are to !e seen as "ro)nded in theoretical principles that are tr)e !y social constr)ction and th)s a priori or other*ise epistemically privile"ed. Ither theory+dependent inference r)les are to !e seen as 6derived6 r)les 5)stifia!le )ltimately !y appeal to o!servational data interpreted accordin" to the epistemically privile"ed !asic r)les. :odest inference+r)le fo)ndationalism is th)s s)stained. Plainly this pict)re cannot !e taken over )nchan"ed !y the sophisticated constr)ctivist since *here dialectically comple7 conventionality operates, any one theoretical principle co)ld !e re5ected in the li"ht of empirical evidence and any potentially !asic inference r)le th)s )ndermined. @evertheless, sophisticated constr)ctivism does seem to restore a modest version of inference+r)le fo)ndationalism. Jhile no sin"le theoretical principle and th)s no sin"le principle of ind)ctive inference is portrayed as a priori 5)stifia!le, *e are provided *ith an a priori or other*ise epistemically elevated 5)stification for the !road theoretical and metaphysical pict)re that )nder*rites scientific methods, and th)s for the !road methodolo"ical strate"y of ; 1&& ; employin" theory+dependent methods in the e7pectation of their "eneral relia!ility and *ith the e7pectation that their s)!se<)ent refinement *ith the development of ne* kno*led"e *ill enhance their relia!ility. (*o considerations s)""est that inference+r)le fo)ndationalism this modest is appropriate as a component in a "eneral modest fo)ndationalism. 8n the first place, for most if not all scientific findin"s there are availa!le conver"in" confirmation strate"ies that reach the same concl)sion on the !asis of a variety of different methodolo"y+determinin" theoretical pres)ppositions, and for most if not all findin"s the relevant methods pres)ppose only the appro7imate tr)th of the theoretical principles that )nder*rite them. (h)s the epistemic *arrant *hich sophisticated constr)ctivism envisions for partic)lar scientific findin"s *ill !e even stron"er than the epistemic *arrant for the theoretical principles that )nder*rite the methods employed in any partic)lar e7perimental or o!servational confirmation of it. :oreover, that *arrant is, at least ar")a!ly, as stron" as any modest fo)ndationalist sho)ld *ant. 8t seems reasona!leFespecially in a post+?)mean *orldFto !e s)spicio)s of any philosophical theory of the "ro)nd of ind)ctive inferences *hich makes the methods employed in makin" s)ch inferences o)t to !e more sec)re than they are seen to !e !y philosophically )ncritical scientists and other ind)ctive+inference makers. B)t even scientists *ho have for"otten their ?)me in their enth)siasm for scientific methodolo"y reco"ni4e that partic)lar 6f)ndamental6 methods, and the theories they are !ased on, are revisa!le. -ophisticated constr)ctivism positin" a dialectically comple7 conventionality in the ontolo"ical commitments of scientific theori4in" has e7cellent prospects as *ell for availin" itself of the other t*o and a half promisin" ar")ments for constr)ctivism. Consider first the ar")ment from the possi!ility of )no!vio)s conventionality. (he ar")ment "ets its force from the 5)d"ment a!o)t certain act)al cases in the history of science that they involve.d2 )ndia"nosed conventionality and from the conception that

the diffic)lty in dia"nosin" s)ch conventionality is in fact e7plained !y its )ne7pected )!i<)ity. Jhatever the merits of this ar")mentative strate"y, it clearly *ill not *ork )nless the initial dia"noses of )ne7pected conventionality can !e s)stained. 8f *e )nderstand conventionality as "ro)nded in analyticity, then familiar ar")ments of a G)inean sort *ill profo)ndly )ndermine any s)ch dia"noses. Inly a conception positin" dialectically comple7 conventionality co)ld provide the !asis for the re<)ired historical 5)d"ments. Consider for e7ample the very important claims of cladists that many of the feat)res of traditional ta7onomy a!ove the species level are ar!itrary or conventional. Jhat is important to cladists3 claims is that the sortin" of species into hi"her ta7a displays a lar"e meas)re of historicalityFthat it is lar"ely the history of classificatory practices and not the fittin" of ta7onomic cate"ories to act)al ca)sal str)ct)re *hich determines the !o)ndaries of hi"her ta7a. ; 1&0 ; Analyticity of the definitions of hi"her ta7a is not entailed, and it *o)ld !e entirely inappropriate to offer in re!)ttal to cladism a demonstration that no proposed definition of a hi"her ta7on is in principle imm)ne from empirical ref)tationD even cladists ackno*led"e that s)ch ref)tation is possi!le since they hold proposed ta7a to a posteriori standards like strict monophyly. (he *hole scientific and methodolo"ical point of cladism is lost if conventionality is )nderstood as entailin" analyticity and so is the pro+constr)ctivist philosophical force of cladists3 claims. -imilar concl)sions follo* *ith respect to the very similar ar")ment from ontolo"ical pl)ralism. (he philosopher *ho offers G)inean ar")ments to the effect that more than one scheme of ontolo"ical commitments can e<)ally *ell fit the data and all of o)r 5)stifia!le methodolo"ical norms *ill !e most ill+advised to hold that *hatever choices a partic)lar scientific comm)nity adopts are irref)ta!le in principle or other*ise rest on analytic fo)ndations. 8n the case of the ar")ment from c)lt)ral pl)ralism the s)periority of sophisticated constr)ctivism has an additional dimension. If co)rse the philosopher concerned to advance an @+> constr)ctivist conception of kno*led"e in order to com!at c)lt)ral cha)vinism *ill not *ant to have to hold a!o)t her o*n c)lt)re or others that their f)ndamental conceptions are so ri"id as to render !asic principles )nrevisa!le in principle. -he *ill, ho*ever, *ant to !e a!le to dia"nose semantic and .conse<)ent2 methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility in those cases in *hich cha)vinism is a serio)s possi!ility. Je need to see *hether the sophisticated constr)ctivist strate"y contemplated here *ill afford her that opport)nity. 8 have ar")ed that the sophisticated constr)ctivist, employin" a dialectically comple7 notion of conventionality, can mimic the realist *ith respect to iss)es of commens)ra!ility in the history of science and can th)s avoid the prima facie ref)tation of her position !y the act)al history of science *hich threatens the traditional constr)ctivist. Jith respect to iss)es of commens)ra!ility !et*een diver"ent c)lt)ral traditions, ho*ever, she is free to reach dia"noses of semantic incommens)ra!ility *hich a realist, especially a realist *ho is also a materialist, mi"ht re5ect. Hecall that the sophisticated constr)ctivist *ill posit conventionality *ithin a tradition *ith respect to 5)st those !road feat)res of its conception of the *orld *hich seem so central as to define its epistemolo"y: its !asic methods and standards of evidence. 8n conse<)ence she *ill treat t*o traditions as reflectin" distinct episodes of the constr)ction of realityFand as manifestin" semantic incommens)ra!ilityF5)st in those cases in *hich the case for methodolo"ical incommens)ra!ility is stron"est: in those cases in *hich there seems to !e no prospect for resolvin" the apparent disa"reements !et*een the traditions !y appeal to 6fair6 .that is, traditionne)tral2 methods. B)t, of co)rse, these are 5)st the circ)mstances in *hich a concern to

precl)de the possi!ility of c)lt)ral cha)vinism *ill seem most press+ ; 1&' ; in", and in *hich a dia"nosis of )no!vio)s conventionality and the social constr)ction of reality *ill !e most pla)si!le. 8 concl)de therefore that sophisticated constr)ctivism avoids decisive ref)tation !y e7tant realist ar")ments *hile optimally satisfyin" the motives that often )nder*rite constr)ctivist analyses.

6. ,ia*nosin* the "hallen*e to Realism 6:'. /idden "on+entionality and a 2ind of Super+enience
8t is an o!vio)s tr)ism that social constr)ctivists and lo"ical empiricists posit )no!vio)s conventionality or historicality in their analyses of scientific theories and research traditions more often than do scientific realists. 8t is 5)st as o!vio)s *hy this is: ,et )s call a methodolo"ical practice stron"ly theory+dependent 5)st in case that practice is dictated !y previo)sly accepted claims a!o)t )no!serva!le phenomena in s)ch a *ay that its 5)stification *o)ld re<)ire treatin" s)ch claims as em!odyin" appro7imate kno*led"e of 6)no!serva!les.6 (here are lots of cases of so)nd methodolo"ical practices in the sciences *hich appear to !e stron"ly theory+dependent. Jhile empiricists and constr)ctivists differ systematically in their response to apparently stron"ly theory+ dependent methods, a common thread of appealin" to the conventional characteri4es each approach. Empiricists have traditionally denied that apparent theory+dependence of scientific methods s)rvives 6rational reconstr)ction.6 (hey have typically s)!scri!ed to some version of inference+r)le fo)ndationalism and th)s they have often denied .or failed to consider2 even the *eaker form of theory+ dependence *hich *o)ld o!tain if some rational methods in science depended irred)ci!ly on a posteriori premises a!o)t o!serva!les. If co)rse empiricists have necessarily re5ected stron" theory+ dependence, and one especially attractive strate"y for providin" the re<)ired empiricist reconstr)ction of cases in *hich rational methods seem irred)ci!ly to depend on theoretical premises is to "rant the dependence !)t to portray as conventional .as ,+tr)ths in Carnap3s sense2 some of the theoretical principles )pon *hich the rationali4ation of methodolo"ical practices depends, so that no )nred)ced appearance of stron"ly theory+dependent methods s)rvives reconstr)ction. 8n no case *ill the posited conventionality !e in any sense o!vio)s. -imilarly, !)t for different reasons, social constr)ctivists respond to apparent stron" theory+dependence of methods !y treatin" f)ndamental theoretical ass)mptions as reflections of conventionality .or 6social constr)ction62. (hey treat many cases of apparent stron" theory+dependence as "en)ineFas involvin" methods *ith deep and irred)ci!le metaphysical pres)ppositionsF!)t, for the sorts of reasons indicated in the precedin" sections, they see the ; 1&/ ; metaphysical reality that is the real s)!5ect of those pres)ppositions as socially constr)cted. ,ike empiricists *hose response to apparent stron" theory+dependence theirs resem!les, they typically portray the most !asic theoretical principles as conventional or socially constr)cted, treatin" less

f)ndamental principles as empirically 5)stified, "iven the methods 5)stified !y the deeper social constr)ction. (h)s for constr)ctivists too, in no case *ill the posited conventionality !e in any sense o!vio)s. Healists, !y contrast, typically em!race apparent stron" theory+dependence at appro7imate face val)e *itho)t conventionalist reconstr)ction. (hey are th)s m)ch less inclined to posit )no!vio)s conventionality than either empiricists or @+> constr)ctivists. Jhat is important for o)r p)rposes is that, altho)"h conventionalists dia"nose hidden conventionality more often than realists, it is denied neither !y realists nor !y those empiricists *ho re5ect the strate"y of rational reconstr)ction 5)st disc)ssed that there are possi!le .indeed act)al2 episodes in the history of science in *hich feat)res of *ell+confirmed theories *hich *ere rationally taken to reflect real feat)res of the *orld t)rned o)t instead to reflect historically contin"ent .and in that sense conventional2 feat)res of the concept)al scheme of the relevant comm)nity. 8ndeed, cases a!o)nd in *hich s)ch a dia"nosis *o)ld !e pla)si!le for any realist or empiricist. 8f the theoretical 5)stification *hich 9)yot .19/'2 provides for cladism is convincin", then the cladist dia"nosis of a hi"h level of conventionality in the definitions of hi"her ta7a provides a spectac)lar e7ample. -o do some other less inspirin" e7amples from the history of !iolo"y. Certainly many nineteenth+and early+t*entieth+cent)ry disc)ssions of the !iolo"y of race and nationality rest on schemes of classification of h)man pop)lations *hich t)rn o)t to !e, from the point of vie* of !iolo"y, conventional, historically contin"ent, or 6socially constr)cted6 in *ays that *ere )ne7pected !y those *ho employed them, and it *o)ld !e *ildly optimistic to hold that there are no similar cases of )ndia"nosed conventionality in c)rrent !iolo"ical *ork on, for e7ample, h)man social str)ct)res. (h)s the difference !et*een realists, empiricists, and constr)ctivists is not over *hether hidden conventionality is possi!le or act)al !)t over, amon" other thin"s, *hen .and hence ho* often2 it sho)ld !e dia"nosed. B)t there is another important <)estion a!o)t hidden conventionality, one *ith respect to *hich realists and .as 8 shall presently ar")e2 empiricists find themselves in a"reement a"ainst @+> constr)ctivists. 8 have in mind the <)estion of *hether or not )ne7pectedly conventional feat)res of *ell+confirmed theories sho)ld !e tho)"ht of asFin the relevant senseFreflections of the reality *hich scientists st)dy. (he agree#ent !et*een the three ma5or conceptions of scientific kno*led"e that hidden conventionality is a real phenomenon is a reflection of "eneral a"reement on t*o points: first, the )npro!lematical claim that in every case in *hich a statement in a lan")a"e is tr)e .or false2 its tr)th .or falsity2 s)per+ ; 1&9 ; venes to some e7tent on the social practices and conventions of the relevant lin")istic comm)nity, and, second, the almost e<)ally )npro!lematical claim that the semantics of act)al lan")a"es is comple7 eno)"h that the e7tent and nat)re of that partial s)pervenience *ill not typically !e entirely o!vio)s. (he disagree#ents !et*een the three conceptions are m)ch s)!tler. 8n partic)lar if *e foc)s, as *e sho)ld in the present case, on the disa"reement !et*een realists and empiricists, on the one hand, and constr)ctivists on the other, over *hether )ne7pectedly conventional feat)res of "ood scientific theories sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as, in the relevant sense, corresponding to reality , then *hat emer"es is an a!str)se metaphysical iss)e a!o)t the nat)re of the partial s)pervenience relation !et*een the tr)th of the statements those theories em!ody and the social practices *ithin the comm)nities that accept and employ them. 8t is *ith this iss)e that *e m)st deal if *e are to assess the relative merits of realism and sophisticated constr)ctivism.

6:). %hilosophical %ac0a*es

8f sophisticated constr)ctivism can mimic realism in its treatment of episodes in the history of science even to the e7tent of availin" itself of ca)sal theories of reference, and if the disa"reements !et*een these positions revolve aro)nd relatively spec)lative iss)es re"ardin" lon"+term commens)ra!ility and relatively esoteric iss)es a!o)t s)pervenience relations, it is reasona!le to *onder *hat philosophical methods are appropriate for eval)atin" the relative merits of the t*o approaches. 8n this section 8 address this <)estion, developin" the notion of a philosophical pac$age , *hich 8 have introd)ced in several earlier papers .Boyd 19//, 199$a, 199$!2. Je are all familiar *ith detailed and specific ar")ments advanced in defense of or a"ainst philosophical conceptions: realism is epistemolo"ically )nso)nd !eca)se theoretical conceptions are )nderdetermined even !y all possi!le o!servations, phenomenalism fails !eca)se the proposed definitions of physical o!5ects in the sense+dat)m lan")a"e m)st in fact incorporate a posteriori claims a!o)t the ca)sal operation of the senses, *e m)st accept a nonco"nitivist acco)nt of moral statements !eca)se there is a lo"ical "ap !et*een statements of fact and concl)sions a!o)t d)ty or o!li"ation . . . .*here each of these ar")ments is to !e tho)"ht of as spelled o)t and ela!orated2. :)ch of *hat *e doFand o)"ht to doFin philosophy takes the form of the artic)lation and criticism of s)ch ar")ments. 8t is nevertheless no s)rprise that sin"le ar")ments of this sort are rarely .or never2 tho)"ht to !e decisive. Philosophical theses "et modified in the li"ht of criticisms, and their defenders may offer revisions in o)r )nderstandin" of related philosophical .or other2 matters in order to re!)t a criticism or artic)late a positive ar")ment. (h)s, for e7ample, phenomenalism can !e "iven a respite from the ar")ment 5)st sketched !y a defender *ho adopts an entirely different conception of the semantics of the ima"ined sense+dat)m lan")a"e ; 10$ ; accordin" to *hich its terms mi"ht !e tho)"ht of as referrin" causally to nat)rally occ)rrin" re")larities in patterns of sensation. -ince there is no real sense+dat)m lan")a"e, this approach *o)ld have to !e spelled o)t in terms of a s)ita!le thesis a!o)t the semantics of tho)"ht, to"ether *ith a s)ita!le conception of the connection !et*een tho)"ht and act)al lan")a"es. (he phenomenalist *ho makes the re<)ired modification in her acco)nt and accepts the associated semantic theses *ill have a version of phenomenalism *hich re<)ires no analytic definitions at all. ?ere *e have a C)hem+G)ine phenomenon in philosophical methodolo"y. -cientific theories face the res)lts of o!servation in !)nchesD philosophical theories face *hatever+it+is+that+philosophical+ theories+face in !)nches, too. 8 have ar")ed else*here .Boyd 19//, 199$a, 199$!2 that, in response to this complication, there is a methodolo"ical conception tacitly at *ork in all of the philosophy of science .and in the rest of philosophy for that matter2 accordin" to *hich the case for any "iven philosophical position, like scientific realism, lo"ical empiricism, or constr)ctivism, consists not 5)st in the ar")ments e7plicitly advanced on its !ehalf !)t also in the !roader ran"e of conceptions a!o)t epistemolo"ical, metaphysical, semantic, and other matters that are either necessary to its defense or pla)si!le developments of it. Hational choices !et*een competin" philosophical conceptions are in t)rn !ased on assessments of the relative merits of the 6philosophical packa"es6 th)s associated *ith them. (h)s, for e7ample, the case for an empiricist conception of scientific kno*led"e rests not only on the primary verificationist ar")ments in its favor !)t also on the s)ccess of related empiricist treatments of iss)es of the semantics of theoretical terms, the nat)re of e7planations, the analysis of materialism, and

so forth. -imilarly the case for realism rests not only on ar")ments desi"ned to esta!lish realism as the appropriate acco)nt of theory+dependent scientific methods !)t also on the development of distinctly realist conceptions in semantic theory and metaphysics. A rational assessment of the relative merits of these conceptions re<)ires an eval)ation of the relative merits of the associated philosophical packa"es. Jhat 8 propose is to employ this e7plicit form)lation of commonsense philosophical methodolo"y in analy4in" the relative merits of realist and constr)ctivist conceptions of scientific kno*led"e.

6:3. 5o and a /alf "onstraints on "on+entionalismHsI

8n a certain sense all philosophical analyses of science, even realist ones, aim at *hat positivists called 6rational reconstr)ction6: they aim at identifyin" and hi"hli"htin" as central those feat)res of science *hich are most f)lly rationally 5)stified and at distin")ishin" these from less rational feat)res that are dia"nosed as inessential. 8n this section 8 form)late some rational constraints on theories of conventionality in science, thinkin" of s)ch theories as components in rational reconstr)ctions of scientific kno*led"e, and thinkin" of those recon+ ; 101 ; str)ctions in t)rn as components in !roader philosophical packa"es. 8 s)""est that *e can "lean from so)nd practice in the philosophy of science t*o and a half constraints on rational reconstr)ctions *hich have a special !earin" on acco)nts of conventionality in science. 8n each case *hat is cr)cial is that accepta!le rational reconstr)ctions m)st, in a sense to !e e7plained, reconstr)ct actual science. 8 propose that any ade<)ate rational reconstr)ction m)st meet t*o conditions, one of *hich has, as a special case, an important constraint on the s)pervenience relation !et*een tr)th and .amon" other thin"s2 social practices disc)ssed in section %.1. ?ere they are:

"oherence 5ith #ctual Science

8 have in mind here t*o closely related constraints on proposed reconstr)ctions. (he first re<)ires that, prima facie, the reconstr)cted versions of scientific theories m)st !e consistent *ith the apparently !est+s)pported findin"s arisin" from act)al scientific practice, *here the standards of evidence are those prevailin" in the apparently !est e7amples of s)ch practice. (his re<)irement is not a!sol)te !oth !eca)se it is permissi!le for philosophers to make philosophical or scientific criticisms of prevailin" methodolo"y and prevailin" theories and !eca)se philosophical or other co"ent reasons may dictate re5ectin" an apparently *ell+s)pported part of c)rrent science. @evertheless, it has !een an important and rational feat)re of practice in the philosophy of science and else*here to impose a !)rden of proof on philosophers *hose reconstr)ctions re<)ire a!andonin" apparently so)nd scientific findin"s. Ine e7ample of the operation of this constraint has !een the )niversal ackno*led"ment amon" empiricist philosophers that their denial of the possi!ility of kno*led"e of )no!serva!les is in "reater need of philosophical defense "iven the apparent s)ccess of chemists, )sin" the !est availa!le chemical methods, in discoverin" feat)res of the .)no!serva!le2 microstr)ct)re of matter. (he closely related constraint is that the specifically philosophical claims that are components of a proposed reconstr)ction .or are central to its defense2 m)st prima facie also !e coherent *ith .s)ita!ly reconstr)cted2 findin"s of act)al science. (he most o!vio)s e7ample of the application of this constraint is pro!a!ly the challen"e to early lo"ical empiricists3 phenomenalism *hich arose from the diffic)lty in assimilatin" ca)sal theories of percept)al e7perience, )nderstood as empirical theories, to

the phenomenalist conception that physical o!5ects themselves are to !e tho)"ht of as constr)cts o)t of sense data. (his e7ample also ill)strates a special case of the t*o constraints 5)st disc)ssed *hich is especially important for o)r present p)rposes: the constraint of super&enience relation -reduction- . Jhenever a theory, philosophical or other*ise, has the conse<)ence that phenomena of one sort s)pervene on phenomena in some other class, rational methodolo"y re<)ires that, prima facie, the theory sho)ld !e accepta!le only if it is possi!le, "iven the !est availa!le theories of the relevant sorts of phenomena, to )nderstand ho* phenomena of the first ; 102 ; sort and their ca)sal po*ers co)ld !e appropriately related to phenomena in the proposed s)pervenience !ase. Jhat is re<)ired is that, in some *eak sense of the term 6red)ction,6 it !e possi!le to esta!lish an appropriate red)ction of the alle"edly s)pervenient phenomena and their properties to the properties and interactions of the phenomena in the alle"ed s)pervenience !ase. (his re<)irement has t*o aspects. (he first, ill)strated in the case of criti<)es of phenomenalism, is that *hen it is maintained that phenomena in one class s)pervene only on phenomena in some second class, it sho)ld !e possi!le to e7plain ho* the ca)sal po*ers and properties of phenomena in the first class can !e f)lly acco)nted for !y the po*ers and properties of phenomena in the second class. (he second aspect is more important for o)r present investi"ation. -)ppose that it is proposed that phenomena in one class are essential components of any s)pervenience !ase for phenomena in some second class. (hen it m)st !e possi!le to make scientific sense of the posited necessity. 8t m)st !e possi!le to )nderstand *hy, *ere phenomena of the first sort relevantly a!sent or different, phenomena of the second sort *o)ld !e a!sent or different. 8t is this aspect of the s)pervenience red)ction re<)irement *hich is tacitly invoked *hen it is o!5ected to a partic)lar version of !ehaviorism that some psycholo"ical state or other co)ld e7ist even if the !ehaviors said to !e from a necessary component of any s)pervenience !ase are a!sent. @ote that *e can reco"ni4e a pla)si!le appeal to the s)pervenience red)ction constraintFor any other similar constraintFeven if *e hold that the res)ltin" challen"e to a s)pervenience claim is )ltimately )ns)ccessf)l. If co)rse this 3red)ctionistic3 re<)irement applies in the special case in *hich the s)pervenience in <)estion is an alle"ed eliminative or constr)ctivist s)pervenience of the tr)th of vario)s fact)al claims on feat)res of lin")istic or concept)al conventions or other aspects of social practice or mental life. Jhen it is claimed that tr)ths a!o)t some sort of phenomena s)pervene lar"ely or e7cl)sively on s)ch matters of lin")istic or other convention, and *hen, accordin" to the !est availa!le science, the s)pervenin" phenomena have certain ca)sal po*ers or effects, it m)st prima facie !e possi!le to offer a scientifically accepta!le acco)nt of ho* those po*ers and effects are reali4ed !y the ca)sal capacities of the phenomena in the alle"ed s)pervenience !ase in s)ch a *ay as to s)stain the intended metaphysical .or antimetaphysical2 concl)sions. 8t is precisely this re<)irement *hich the phenomenalist eliminativist analysis of tr)ths in the 6physical o!5ect lan")a"e6 *as apparently )na!le to meet. Closely related to these constraints is another, the re<)irement of ratification of reconstructed #ethods *hich has !een central in disp)tes in the philosophy of science. -cientific methods are .often if not al*ays2 theory+dependent and *e prima facie re<)ire of a proposed reconstr)ction of *ell+esta!lished scientific theories that the reconstr)cted theories ratify .s)ita!ly reconstr)cted versions of2 the act)al methods of science. If co)rse this re<)irement si"nificantly constrains the acceptance of conceptions of conventionality in science. (h)s,

; 10# ; for e7ample, the operationalist doctrine that theoretical terms sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as conventionally defined in terms of fi7ed la!oratory proced)res failed as a reconstr)ction precisely !eca)se there proved to !e no pla)si!le *ay of accommodatin" *ithin an operationalist reconstr)ction the *ays in *hich rational methods in science permit the relevant sorts of la!oratory proced)res to !e revised and improved in the li"ht of ne* theoretical developments. 8t is important to see that these re<)irements are !oth stron"er and *eaker than a re<)irement that philosophical theories and the methods they *o)ld rationali4e !e consistent *ith the apparent findin"s and methods of the !est science. In the one hand the re<)irements set *eaker standards than consistency since s)fficiently stron" philosophical considerations mi"ht *ell 5)stify a!andonin" apparently *ell+esta!lished findin"s or methods. (h)s lo"ical empiricism is not immediately ref)ted !y the o!servation that it re<)ires )s to a!andon the apparently scientifically appropriate methodolo"ical 5)d"ments that co)ntenance the confirmation of propositions a!o)t the )no!serva!le. In the other hand, more than consistency *ith the ordinary findin"s of science is sometimes re<)ired. Jhere, for e7ample, philosophical theses involve s)pervenience claims of a sort not contemplated in any of the .other=Fsee !elo*2 sciences, the 6red)ctionist6 re<)irement re<)ires that *e assess the coherence *ith the !est science of claims *hich no scientist *o)ld ordinarily consider. 8f *e reach an adverse verdict re"ardin" a proposed s)pervenience claim, the reason *ill !e that it does not make "ood scientific sense, all thin"s considered, rather than that it is inconsistent *ith a findin" of some scientific discipline or other.

# Naturalistic Note on -ethod

(he methodolo"ical role played !y these constraints ill)strates an important methodolo"ical point a!o)t the 6philosophical packa"es6 that represent contendin" positions in the philosophy of science. Ine *ay to form)late this point is to say that s)ch packa"es are not to !e tho)"ht of as s)!5ect only to p)rely philosophical criticism: they are s)!5ect to additional re<)irements of appropriate coherence *ith the findin"s and methods of the vario)s sciences. An alternative form)lation is that philosophical packa"es sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as incl)din", in addition to distinctly philosophical doctrines, s)ita!le versions of the findin"s of the vario)s other disciplines *ith *hich philosophical in<)iry overlaps. (he latter form)lation is almost certainly !etter: it is, after all, appropriate relations to s)ita!ly reconstr)cted scientific findin"s and methods *hich philosophical doctrines are re<)ired to achieve, and the s)ita!ility of a reconstr)ction of scientific findin"s is partly determined !y the philosophical pro5ect in *hose aid the reconstr)ction is proposedFthat is, !y the rest of the philosophical packa"e *ith respect to *hich it is form)lated. 8t *ill th)s !e more fr)itf)l to think of philosophical packa"es as incorporatin" proposed reconstr)ctions of the relevant findin"s from other disciplines. In this form)lation, the t*o and a half constraints 5)st ; 10% ; disc)ssed are to !e tho)"ht of as reflections of !roader re<)irements of coherence applica!le to philosophical packa"es "enerally. ?o*ever the iss)e is form)lated, *hat is important is that, <)ite independently of any "eneral commitment to philosophical nat)ralism, *e m)st reco"ni4e that "ood philosophical methodolo"y re<)ires of proposals in the philosophy of science an appropriate coherence *ith the empirical

investi"ation of the nat)ral and social *orld. :ethods in the philosophy of science m)st !e at least to that e7tent nat)ralistic. 8t remains to see ho* these nat)ralistic considerations and other standards for assessin" philosophical packa"es apply to the choice !et*een realist and @+> constr)ctivist packa"es *hen the latter packa"es reflect a dialectically comple7 conception of conventionality. 8t is to that <)estion that *e no* t)rn o)r attention.

6:6. ,ia*nosin* the ,ifferencesD /o5 to ell "arnap from 2uhn and Other Interestin* ;uestions
@+> constr)ctivists a"ree *ith realists that scientists ro)tinely o!tain and employ kno*led"e of )no!serva!les, 6metaphysical6 kno*led"e of the sort lo"ical empiricists tho)"ht impossi!le. (hey a"ree as *ell that the tr)th of the statements that artic)late this kno*led"e s)pervenes to some e7tent on lin")istic conventions and other social practices, !)t they disa"ree *ith realists in s)!tle !)t nonetheless cr)cial *ays a!o)t the nat)re of that s)pervenience relation: they differ a!o)t the philosophical import of .at least some2 conventions. 8f *e are to e7amine the relative merits of constr)ctivist and realist philosophical packa"es, *e need to have a deeper )nderstandin" of the difference in their conceptions of conventionality. Ine possi!le approach is s)""ested !y the disp)te !et*een realists and traditional constr)ctivists like >)hn. (raditional constr)ctivists hold that f)ndamental scientific la*s are sometimes .e7actly2 tr)e !y convention *hereas it is )nlikely that any scientific realist *o)ld treat any f)ndamental la* as )nrevisa!ly conventional, and this seems to !e a deep fact a!o)t realism: the realist3s nat)ralistic and G)inean commitments *ill make her do)!t that terms )sed in any dialectically comple7 in<)iry *ill possess analytic definitions. Je mi"ht hope, therefore, to distin")ish realists3 from constr)ctivists3 conceptions of conventionality in terms of the sorts of feat)res of concept)al systems *hich they think can in principle !e conventional: the kinds of thin"s *hich rationally accepta!le conventions can dictate that *e accept or do. -adly this approach is )nlikely to !e helpf)l in the present case. (he reason is that the defender of sophisticated constr)ctivism is e<)ipped *ith a dialectically comple7 notion of conventionality. -)ch a conception has t*o feat)res. 8n the first place, of co)rse, it avoids the commitment to analyticity and can in fact !e incorporated into a semantic theory *hich &ery closely mirrors that of ; 10& ; the realist *ith respect to act)al cases in the history of science. :ore importantly, the sorts of feat)res of concept)al systems *hich sophisticated constr)ctivism treats as conventional in science .ro)"hly: !road feat)res of a metaphysical pict)re2 are the sorts of feat)res *hich the realist m)st hold can !e .indeed are2 matters of convention in some cases of dialectically comple7 in<)iry. (h)s, *hile the almost complete re5ection !y realists of analyticity may provide a cl)e to the difference !et*een realist and constr)ctivist conceptions of conventionality, a simple e7trapolation of that re5ection *ill not help )s to distin")ish realists from sophisticated constr)ctivists. Jhat *o)ld !e nice to e7amine *o)ld !e a case in *hich realists and sophisticated constr)ctivists a"reed e7actly a!o)t *hat the conventional feat)res of a tradition of in<)iry *ere !)t re"ardin" *hich they differed a!o)t the philosophical import of the conventionality they !oth accepted. -)ch a case *o)ld !e provided, for e7ample, if realists and sophisticated constr)ctivists a"reedFas they *ell mi"ht Fa!o)t the conventional elements in, say, ancient 9reek theolo"y !)t differed in that constr)ctivists took the relevant conventionality to !e %orld3constructing , in the philosophically relevant sense of that

notion. If co)rse *e have no s)ch e7ample to e7amine: sophisticated constr)ctivism is a position that has yet to !e f)lly artic)lated, and th)s *e are not yet in a position to see 5)st *hat instances of conventionality the sophisticated constr)ctivist *o)ld have to take as *orld+constr)ctin". 8nstead of )sin" e7amples of the sort in <)estion to clarify the differences !et*een realists and sophisticated constr)ctivists re"ardin" conventionality, *e need to do somethin" like the opposite: to )se an )nderstandin" of the different conceptions of conventionality to clarify differences in the conceptions of the philosophical applications of that notion. 8n conse<)ence 8 propose to approach the pro!lem of characteri4in" constr)ctivist+realist differences over conventionality indirectly, !y e7aminin" a case in *hich a traditional constr)ctivist and a traditional empiricist do a"ree almost e7actly a!o)t *hat the conventional elements are in a scientific research tradition *hile differin" a!o)t the philosophical import of the conventionality they !oth ackno*led"e. 8 propose to ask ho* to tell Carnap from >)hn. (he <)estion arises !eca)se, on the one hand, the later Carnap .of, say, 6Empiricism, -emantics, and Intolo"y,6 19&$2 accepts, in a certain sense, the constr)ctivists3 and realists3 claim that scientific kno*led"e e7tends to kno*led"e of, for e7ample, electrons, and, on the other hand, >)hn in /he Structure of Scientific Re&olutions .19'$2 avoids the apparent realist implications of this concl)sion !y adoptin" a conventionalist conception of the semantics of scientific lan")a"e *hich is almost e7actly that advanced !y Carnap in order to avoid the same realist concl)sions. Each takes the f)ndamental la*s involvin" a theoretical term to constit)te that term3s conventional definition. ?o*, then, is Carnap different from >)hn= 8f *e )nderstand the !asis of the deep ; 100 ; differences in philosophical import of t*o conceptions of conventionality as similar as Carnap3s and >)hn3s, 8 s)""est, it *ill help in dia"nosin" other deep !)t s)!tle differences re"ardin" conventionality. 8nsofar as they are taken to !e descri!in" .rather than philosophically analy4in"2 scientific practice, >)hn may !e seen as in lar"e meas)re pers)asively *orkin" o)t the historical, social, and psycholo"ical details of the adoption, in a nat)ral+lan")a"e conte7t, of the sorts of theoretical conventions mirrored !y the 6,+tr)ths6 of the formali4ed lan")a"es appealed to !y Carnap. Pretty plainly this conception of the descriptive content of >)hn3s *ork leaves )naddressed the philosophical feat)res of >)hn3s analysis *hich res)lt in its distinctive challen"e to empiricist .and realist2 conceptions of scientific kno*led"e. Jhat *e need to kno* is *hat feat)res of Carnap3s and >)hn3s positions make the first distinctly empiricist and the latter distinctly .antiempiricist and2 social constr)ctivist. An o!vio)s candidate .and perhaps a point of difference in their descriptions of scientific practice2 lies in >)hn3s emphasis on the theory+dependence of o!servations. (here m)st !e somethin" ri"ht in foc)sin" on this iss)e, !)t reco"ni4in" their differences over the theory+dependence of o!servations !y itself is not likely to allo* )s to f)lly )nderstand the difference !et*een Carnap and >)hn orFsince this is o)r )ltimate aimFthe difference !et*een the treatments of conventionality appropriate to realist, empiricist, and constr)ctivist philosophical packa"es. (he reason is this: (here is a variety of *ays in *hich the empiricist can ackno*led"e the theory+dependence of o!servations in scientific practice *itho)t a!andonin" hope of a s)ita!ly empiricist rational reconstr)ction of o!servational practice in science. Je have already seen that an appeal to the pair*ise theory+ne)trality of methods "enerally .and of o!servation in partic)lar2 may play a role in s)ch a reconstr)ction. 8n fact, all that *o)ld !e needed for an empiricist or a realist reconstr)ction *o)ld !e an acco)nt accordin" to *hich the theory+ dependence of the methods and voca!)lary of o!servation in science does not precl)de o)r )nderstandin" o!servations and o!servation reports as providin" for science epistemic access to its

theory+independent s)!5ect matter. Jhat is important is that someho* the @+> conception of scientific conventionality is s)pposed to o!viate the need for s)ch a reconstr)ction: epistemic access to theory+ dependent reality is *hat scientists are to !e seen as achievin". 8f *e move to the consideration of the str)ct)re of philosophical packa"es, *hat *e see then is that the constr)ctivist philosophical packa"e W la >)hn is to !e e<)ipped so that it treats socially constr)cted o!servation of, for e7ample, a socially constr)cted planet as playin" ro)"hly the same role *hich an empiricist .or realist2 packa"e assi"ns to the .)nconstr)cted2 epistemic access to an .)nconstr)cted2 planet *hich it attri!)tes to astronomical o!servation. Plainly more is "oin" on than 5)st the reco"nition of the theory+dependence of o!servation. Jhatever else is "oin" on m)st provide the ans*er to the <)estion ; 10' ; of ho*, "iven that !oth >)hn and Carnap hold that f)ndamental la*s are tr)e !y convention, their conceptions of conventionality differ in s)ch a *ay that Carnap3s position is empiricist *hile >)hn3s is antiempiricist and @+> constr)ctivist. Pretty o!vio)sly the difference lies in *hatever is e7pressed !y >)hn3s claim that scientists *ho *ork *ithin different and competin" paradi"ms st)dy 6different *orlds6: the constr)ctivist conception of .certain2 conventions in science treats them as *orld+constit)tin" or somethin" of the sort *hereas the empiricist conception does not. If co)rse @+> constr)ctivists3 talk a!o)t 6different *orlds6 or the 6social constr)ction of reality6 is plainly metaphorical. 8f s)ch talk is *itho)t "en)ine metaphysical and epistemolo"ical importFif it is 5)st a vivid *ay of indicatin" some of the sociolo"ical and psycholo"ical conse<)ences of the theory+dependent and socially or"ani4ed character of scientific practiceFthen constr)ctivists t)rn o)t to !e empiricists, or to !e realists, al!eit realists *ith an inade<)ate semantic theory for theoretical terms. -o *e need an interpretation of 6different *orlds6 and related metaphors *hich "ives them metaphysical and epistemolo"ical import and *hich distin")ishes >)hn3s conception of conventionality, for e7ample, from that of the later Carnap. Ine idea mi"ht !e to say that >)hn3s and Carnap3s conceptions of conventionality differ in that >)hn affirms *hereas Carnap denies that conventional tr)ths can have ontolo"ical import. Bor >)hn and for Carnap the <)estion of, for e7ample, the e7istence of free electrons is to !e )nderstood *ithin a conte7t determined !y certain f)ndamental la*s a!o)t electrons *hich are themselves to !e )nderstood as constit)tin" the conventional definition of 6electron.6 B)t, it mi"ht !e ar")ed, for >)hn the content of those conventional la*s has ontolo"ical import, *hich the <)estion of the e7istence of free electrons inherits, *hereas for Carnap ontolo"ical import is a!sent. -omethin" like this m)st !e ri"ht, !)t the notion of ontolo"ical import does not do the ri"ht 5o!: after all, the point of 6Empiricism, -emantics, and Intolo"y6 is precisely that it is the 6internal6 e7istential <)estions a!o)t theoretical entities like electrons *hich capt)re all the ontolo"ical import there really is. -till, *e can certainly say that, accordin" to >)hn, !)t not accordin" to Carnap, the theoretical conventions that fi7 the meanin"s of theoretical terms have metaphysical import. Carnap3s position is empiricist rather then realist .or constr)ctivist2 in lar"e part !eca)se his dra*in" the distinction !et*een internal and e7ternal <)estions is desi"ned to permit him to treat the former as nonmetaphysical components of scientific in<)iry and the latter as nonmetaphysical pra"matic <)estions. As the differences !et*een empiricist and constr)ctivist treatments of the theory+dependence of o!servations indicates, 6different *orlds6 and related metaphors are s)pposed to have epistemolo"ical as *ell as metaphysical implications. Ine thin" that seems clear a!o)t >)hn3s position is that the f)n+

; 10/ ; damental tenants of a paradi"m are s)pposed to !e research+")idin" in an epistemically central *ay. Paradi"m artic)lation consists in developin" and testin" pro!lem sol)tions s)""ested !y the previo)s achievements of the paradi"m, and this pattern of reasonin" defines scientific rationality. 8t is important to seein" the relation !et*een paradi"m artic)lation and rationality that *e reco"ni4e that, in e7plorin" those pro!lem sol)tions s)""ested !y the paradi"m, the scientist is to !e )nderstood as e7ploitin" previo)sly ac<)ired $no%ledge of the *orld. -ol)tions to ne* pro!lems are e7plored 5)st in case they fit the metaphysical pict)re represented !y the paradi"m in its c)rrent sta"e of development, and this research strate"y is rational .indeed defines rationality2 precisely !eca)se that metaphysical pict)re represents kno*led"e of the *orld the scientist st)dies. A proposed pro!lem sol)tion that 6fits6 e7istin" paradi"matic achievements is appropriate for scientific investi"ation precisely !eca)se it is s)pported !y a kind of ind)ctive inference at the theoretical level: from previo)sly ac<)ired theoretical kno*led"e the scientist infers a nontrivial likelihood that the proposed sol)tion is correct, and that is *hat 5)stifies her e7perimental investi"ation of it. 8t is precisely this that is the import of >)hn3s .and the realist3s2 claim that rational scientific investi"ation is ")ided !y a metaphysical conception of the phenomena st)died. ?ere, 8 think, is the cl)e to the epistemolo"ical difference !et*een the constr)ctivist3s and the empiricist3s conception of conventionality in science. Altho)"h Carnap, for e7ample, m)st a"ree that scientists kno* the theoretical claims that constit)te the definitions of their theoretical terms, the nonmetaphysical empiricist interpretation of the relevant conventions precl)des a rational research+ ")idin" role for that kno*led"e. 8nd)ctive reasonin" from conventionally adopted theoretical principles to .nonconventional2 theoretical concl)sions .6All hitherto posited char"ed particles have )nit char"e M*here this is a matter of conventional definitionN, therefore *e are ind)ctively 5)stified in !elievin" that all f)ndamental char"ed particles have )nit char"e M*here this is nonconventionalN62 is not accepta!le on the empiricist conception. 8 do not mean that the empiricist need deny that s)ch reasonin" plays a pra"matic role in theory+invention, !)t merely that ackno*led"in" the epistemic le"itimacy of this sort of theoretical+level ind)ction is precisely the mark of a metaphysical )nderstandin" of the relevant theoretical premises. 8t amo)nts to ackno*led"in" them as reflections of the *ay in *hich .)no!serva!le aspects of2 the *orld, rather than mere convention, constrains rational scientific description at the theoretical level. (here is, after all, no lo"ical contradiction or semantic anomaly in positin" a ne* particle *ith char"e 1 2 even tho)"h all those previo)sly posited have had )nit char"eD there is only an ind)ctive risk, and that only if one sees the earlier posits as correspondin" to a reality *hich scientists attempt to discover. Je have !een e7aminin" t*o special cases of empiricism and constr)ctivism *hich share a common .and nondialectical2 conception of the conventions ; 109 ; that "overn scientific investi"ation, !)t nothin" in the considerations *e have employed to dia"nose the differences !et*een them depends on the details of that conception. 8 concl)de that if *e are to )nderstand the distinction !et*een empiricist and constr)ctivist conceptions of conventionality in science, then *e sho)ld sho)ld look for conceptions of the metaphysics and epistemolo"y of conventionality *hichFeven *hen they a"ree a!o)t *hat the concept)al tr)ths areFdiffer a!o)t the import of conventionality in the *ay s)""ested !y the follo*in" chart:

Coctrine Empiricism Constr)ctivism

:etaphysical import= @o Les .sometimes2

8nd)ctive 8mport= @o Les .sometimes2

.8 <)alify 6yes6 *ith 6sometimes6 for the constr)ctivist since pres)ma!ly she *ill hold that not all conventions are *orld+constit)tin".2 Jhat then of realism, *hose position on the philosophical map *e are tryin" to locate= Ince *e have sorted o)t empiricism and constr)ctivism, there are very "ood reasons for holdin" that the realist3s conception of conventionality, if it differs from the empiricist3s at all, m)st a"ree *ith the empiricist3s on these matters. Hecall that the realist holds that neither the empiricist3s nor the constr)ctivist3s conventionalistic treatments of theory+dependent methods in science is ade<)ate !eca)se, accordin" to the realist, neither approach ade<)ately reconstr)cts the metaphysical import of the *ay in *hich ind)ctive appeals to past theoretical achievements rationally re")late scientific practice .Boyd 19/&a, 19/9, 199$a2. -o the map *e are lookin" for sit)ates empiricism, constr)ctivism, and realism as follo*s *ith respect to the import of conventionality: Coctrine Empiricism Constr)ctivism Healism :etaphysical import= @o Les .sometimes2 @o 8nd)ctive 8mport= @o Les .sometimes2 @o

Healism and empiricism th)s a"ree a"ainst constr)ctivism in affirmin" the #etaphysical innocence of con&entionality , *hich they treat as entailin" a correspondin" episte#ic infertility . 8t is to the implications for philosophical packa"es of these competin" conceptions of conventionality that *e no* t)rn o)r attention.

6:7. -etaphysical Innocence and %hilosophical %ac0a*es # ;uasiGnaturalistic "onstraint

An @+> constr)ctivist philosophical packa"e m)st re5ect, *hile a realist packa"e m)st honor, the metaphysical+innocence and epistemic+infertility principles. I)r )nderstandin" of the relative merits of the t*o sorts of packa"es *o)ld !e enhanced !y a clearer )nderstandin" of the implications of those constraints for the packa"es that m)st meet them. Bort)+ ; 1'$ ;

nately developments in the history and philosophy of science *hich *e have already e7plored in )nderstandin" the case for constr)ctivism permit )s to identify an additional <)asi+nat)ralistic constraint *hich any pla)si!le philosophical packa"e m)st meet. 8f *e restrict o)r attention to philosophical packa"es that meet the <)asi+nat)ralistic constraint, 8 *ill ar")e, there emer"es a simple, ele"ant even, characteri4ation of the difference !et*een packa"es that honor innocence and infertility and those that do not. Je have already seen that realist, constr)ctivist, and sophisticated empiricist acco)nts of scientific kno*led"e represent three <)ite different responses to an initially s)rprisin" discoveryFthat the theory+dependence of scientific methods cannot !e made to "o a*ay. All of the rational ind)ctive methods of the sciences are theory+dependent in the sense that their scientific 5)stification rests on an appeal to esta!lished !ack"ro)nd theories. (heory+dependent methods resist rational reconstr)ctionD they cannot !e portrayed as 6derived r)les6 o!tained in the first instance thro)"h the application of theory+independent methods. @or do they honor the traditional empiricist3s distinction !et*een the scientific and the 6metaphysical6: the methodolo"ical dictates of the prevailin" !ack"ro)nd theories depend on the theoretical str)ct)re of those theories and not 5)st on their o!servational conse<)ences. 8f *e )se positivist terminolo"y and descri!e as 6s)rpl)s meanin"6 those feat)res of theories *hich "o !eyond their empirical content, then *hat has !een discovered is that the methodolo"ical dictates of !ack"ro)nd theories depend on their s)rpl)s meanin". Jhat is important for o)r present p)rposes is that each of the <)ite different responses to inelimina!le theory+dependence is appropriately seen as a response to the re<)irement disc)ssed earlier that, prima facie, a philosophical packa"e in the philosophy of science m)st accommodate the *ell+confirmed findin"s of the vario)s special sciences. Je can see this !y )nderstandin" more clearly the nat)re of the theory+dependent rationales *hich !ack"ro)nd theories provide for methodolo"ical practices. Hecall that the standard ar")ments for scientific realism .P)tnam 1902, 19'2D Boyd 19/#, 199$a2 are a!d)ctive: they portray realism as a component of the !est e7planation for the s)ccess of scientific methods. Jhether or not s)ch ar")ments are s)ccessf)l in defendin" realism as a philosophical thesis .for critical disc)ssions see Bine 19/%, van Braassen 19/$2, they rest on important facts a!o)t the nat)re of the theoretical rationale for scientific methods: Bor any scientifically 5)stifia!le theory+dependent method :, the theoretical rationale for : *ill take the form of a %ell3confir#ed e7planation of its relia!ility in terms of the .typically )no!serva!le2 ca)sal mechanisms and processes posited in the relevant !ack"ro)nd theories. (he e7planation for the relia!ility of : *ill characteristically invoke the prevailin" theories of those mechanisms and processes to e7plicate the *ays in *hich the employment of : esta!lishes relia!le epistemic contact !et*een scientists3 practices and the ca)sal mecha+ ; 1'1 ; nisms or processes that determine the relevant properties of their s)!5ect matter. (h)s an apparently naturalistic e7planation for the relia!ility of :Fone that pres)pposes the .appro7imate2 tr)th of the relevant !ack"ro)nd theoriesFprovides the scientific rationale for :. (he science3s 6o*n story6 of the relia!ility of its methods seems to pres)ppose kno*led"e of 6)no!serva!les.6 8t is this fact, to"ether *ith the impossi!ility of reconstr)ctin" all s)ch methods as derived r)les, *hich creates the challen"e to empiricism and provides a case for realism or constr)ctivism: it appears that empiricist3s anti+ metaphysical commitments *ill prove incompati!le *ith her artic)lation of a philosophical packa"e that accommodates hi"hly *ell+conformed nat)ralistic acco)nts of the relia!ility of rational scientific methods themselves. If co)rse realists and constr)ctivists m)st also prima facie accommodate the same apparently

nat)ralistic theories and, of co)rse, they do, realists !y acceptin" the nat)ralistic e7planations 6at face val)e,6 constr)ctivists !y acceptin" the e7planations *hile reconstr)ctin" their metaphysical content alon" @eo+>antian lines .there!y atten)atin" their philosophical nat)ralism and preservin" modest fo)ndationalism2. 8t *ill !e important for o)r p)rposes to have a more a!stract and metaphysical form)lation of the conception of the epistemolo"y of scientific methods *hich realists and constr)ctivists th)s come to have in common. Each of the partic)lar nat)ralistic e7planations for the relia!ility of a theory+dependent feat)re of scientific practice portrays that feat)re as relia!le .and there!y 5)stifies it2 !y indicatin" that the method in <)estion is appropriate to the )nderlyin" ca)sal str)ct)res of the relevant phenomena. Bor each s)ch 5)stified methodolo"ical feat)re, the role of the relevant !ack"ro)nd theories in providin" its 5)stification is to provide an .appro7imately2 acc)rate acco)nt of those ca)sal str)ct)res. -ince !oth realists and constr)ctivists accept this conception of the relia!ility and the 5)stification of ind)ctive methods in science "enerally, they sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as acceptin" a (uasi3naturalistic t*o+part acco##odation thesis : .i2 ind)ctive methods are relia!le to the e7tent that they are accommodated to the ca)sal str)ct)res of the phenomena )nder st)dy and of the systems .incl)din" h)mans2 )sed to st)dy them, and .ii2 !ack"ro)nd theories relia!ly "overn methodolo"y to the e7tent that they provide a relevantly appro7imately acc)rate acco)nt of those str)ct)res. 9ood scientific method is a matter of theory+determined accommodation of practice to the act)al ca)sal str)ct)res of the relevant phenomena. 8 have ar")ed .Boyd 199$a, 19912 that the appropriate empiricist response to the challen"e of theory+ dependence, 6sophisticated empiricism,6 sho)ld !e tho)"ht of as acceptin" the concl)sion that theory+ dependent methods are 5)stified !y, and their relia!ility e7plained !y, kno*led"e reflected in the 6s)rpl)s meanin"6 in the relevant !ack"ro)nd theories *hile re5ectin" a metaphysical )nderstandin" of that kno*led"e. 8nstead of metaphysical kno*led"e, the relevant s)rpl)s kno*led"e is kno*led"e of ind)ctive methods of the ; 1'2 ; sort s)""ested in G)ine3s 6@at)ral >inds6 .1909a2. (he theoretical str)ct)re of o)r !ack"ro)nd theories represents the acc)m)lated res)lts of second+order ind)ction a!o)t ind)ction. .8 ar")e in Boyd 199$a that the consistent empiricist m)st portray s)ch str)ct)res as reflectin" the res)lts of n+th order ind)ction a!o)t ind)ction, for all n, !)t that point need not concern )s here.2 Jhat *e have 5)st learned a!o)t the *ay in *hich theory+dependent methods are theoretically 5)stified permits )s to descri!e this sophisticated empiricist position more precisely. Jhen !ack"ro)nd theories ( 5)stify a method :, they do so !y entailin" that : is relia!le. (h)s, in acceptin" *ell+confirmed !ack"ro)nd theories as repositories of kno*led"e a!o)t the relia!ility of ind)ctive methods, the empiricist is simply acceptin" a some*hat !roader conception of their empirical content: one that co)nts as part of the empirical content of a !ody of scientific theories their .con5oint2 predictions a!o)t the instr)mental relia!ility of methodolo"ical proced)res. (h)s, for e7ample, theories in !iochemistry *o)ld !e seen as havin"Fto"ether *ith other *ell+confirmed scientific theoriesFimplications not only a!o)t the o!serva!le !ehavior of chemical, cell)lar, and ecolo"ical systems !)t also a!o)t the relia!ility of methods in chemistry, cell !iolo"y, and ecolo"y. -ince the implications a!o)t the instr)mental relia!ility of s)ch methods represent predictions a!o)t o!ser&a!le phenomena, the traditional empiricist strict)re a"ainst ackno*led"in" metaphysical kno*led"e is maintained: all scientific kno*led"e is instr)mental kno*led"e. (he sophisticated empiricist accepts the apparently nat)ralistic scientific e7planations for the relia!ility of partic)lar methods and interprets them in 5)st the same instr)mentalist *ay she interprets any other scientific findin"s. Jhat is )ntraditional a!o)t the sophisticated empiricist position is 5)st its nat)ralistic and antifo)ndationalist treatment of scientific

kno*led"e. Jhat, *e may no* ask, is the sophisticated empiricist assessment of the accommodation thesis= (he sophisticated empiricist a"rees *ith realists and constr)ctivists in takin" the apparently .on the empiricist3s interpretation actually 2 nat)ralistic e7planations for the relia!ility of scientific methods to constit)te the f)ll story of their relia!ility and their 5)stification. (h)s she accepts it that .i2 ind)ctive methods are relia!le to the e7tent that they are accommodated appropriately to la*like patterns in the relations !et*een o!serva!le feat)res of scientists, the o!5ects of their st)dy, and the e<)ipment they employ, and that .ii2 !ack"ro)nd theories relia!ly "overn methodolo"y to the e7tent that they provide a relevantly appro7imately acc)rate acco)nt of those patterns. B)t, of co)rse, on the empiricist analysis ca)sal str)ct)res "ust are la*like str)ct)res in the relations !et*een o!serva!les, so the sophisticated empiricist accepts precisely the .appropriate empiricist rationally reconstr)cted version of2 the accommodation thesis. (h)s, *e have seen that an appropriate response to the depth of theory+ dependence of scientific methods re<)ires of empiricist as *ell as of realist and constr)ctivist philosophical packa"es that ; 1'# ; they incorporate an appropriate version of the accommodation thesis. -ince realism, empiricism, and constr)ctivism represent the serio)s contenders in the philosophy of science, *e may concl)de that, in the c)rrent dialectical settin", any pla)si!le philosophical packa"e m)st incl)de a version of the accommodation thesis. (his is the <)asi+nat)ralistic constraint on philosophical packa"es *hich permits )s to form)late the metaphysical+innocence thesis *ith "reater precision. Hecall that *e are lookin" for an )nderstandin" of the metaphysical+innocence thesis *hich, *hen *e attri!)te it to empiricists and to realists !)t not to constr)ctivists, *ill ratify the convictions of realists and empiricists that conventional tr)ths lack metaphysical import and that for that reason they lack ind)ctive import. 8f *e restrict o)r attention to philosophical packa"es incorporatin" the accommodation thesis, then in the packa"es *e consider, it *ill !e held that a feat)re of scientists3 theoretical conception of their s)!5ect matter properly has ind)ctive import if and only if it represents kno*led"e of the ca)sal str)ct)res of the relevant phenomena. Healist and empiricist philosophical packa"es satisfyin" the <)asi+nat)ralistic constraint m)st, therefore, incorporate the claim that *hen .or to the e7tent that2 s)ch feat)res of scientific theories are tr)e !y convention, they fail to descri!e ca)sal str)ct)res, *hereas constr)ctivists m)st hold that so#e conventional feat)res .those implicated in the social constr)ction of reality2 do represent kno*led"e of ca)sal str)ct)res. ?ere then is the insi"ht necessary to an )nderstandin" of the metaphysical+innocence thesis: the sense in *hich realists and empiricists hold, *hile constr)ctivists deny, the metaphysical import of conventionality in science is that constr)ctivists affirm *hereas realists and empiricists deny that in the relevant sense social conventions in science determine the ca)sal str)ct)re of the phenomena scientists st)dy. 8 add 6in the relevant sense6 !eca)se, of co)rse, scientific .and other2 conventions are a matter of h)man social practice and h)man social practices themselves have causal effects incl)din" causal effects on the causal structures scientists study . -ince this claim is philosophically )ncontroversial, *e sho)ld )nderstand realists and empiricists as affirmin" and constr)ctivists as denyin" the 'o 'oncausal .ontri!ution thesis .2@2C2: the thesis that h)man social practices make no nonca)sal contri!)tion to the ca)sal str)ct)res of the phenomena scientists st)dy. 8f the accommodation thesis is accepted, then 2@2C e7actly e7presses the metaphysical+innocence doctrine *hose acceptance differentiates realists and empiricists from constr)ctivists. A point a!o)t this interpretation of @+> social constr)ctivism is in order here. 8 am of co)rse a!o)t to

"o on to ar")e against constr)ctivism in part !y ar")in" for 2@2C, so it *ill !e important to my ar")ment that that thesis is *hat distin")ishes pla)si!le realist and empiricist philosophical packa"es from pla)si!le constr)ctivist ones. :y e7perience has !een that philosophers3 reactions to 2@2C and the analysis of constr)ctivism in terms of it are <)ite varied. ; 1'% ; -ome have tho)"ht that a demonstration that constr)ctivists m)st deny 2@2C *o)ld amo)nt to a reductio ad a!surdu# of constr)ctivism *hile others have tho)"ht the interpretation of constr)ctivism offered here entirely fair to the philosophical intentions of constr)ctivists. 8 *ant to emphasi4e that 8 am not offerin" the denial of 2@2C as an analysis of the a)thorial intentions of defenders of @+> constr)ctivism nor as an analysis of the meanin" of any of the vario)s claims that e7press @+> constr)ctivist theses. 8nstead 8 am ar")in" that philosophical insi"hts re"ardin" theory+dependence of scientific methods, insi"hts *hich constr)ctivists helped to esta!lish, dictate acceptance of the accommodation thesis and that it is this thesis in t)rn *hich dictates that metaphysical innocence !e dia"nosed in terms of 2@2C. (h)s those *ho find 2@2C o!vio)s sho)ld take *hat has !een said here so far as a reductio rather than as an )ncharita!le interpretation of a)thorial intent or of meanin". (hat said, it is *orth remarkin" that the denial of 2@2C has considera!le independent merit as an interpretation of the meanin" or the intent of @+> constr)ctivism. @eo+>antian constr)ctivism is, after all, s)pposed to !e @eo+5antian , and it is hard to think of an interpretation more in keepin" *ith that )nderstandin". :oreover it is !y no means impossi!le to offer ar")ments in favor of the denial of 2@2C !esides the "eneral ar")ments for @+> constr)ctivism. Bor e7ample, P)tnam .19/#2 ar")es a"ainst a realist conception of the 6total ca)se6 of an event that no s)ch notion of ca)se is availa!le !ecause the notion of explanation is prior to that of cause .and pres)ma!ly !eca)se there is no e7planatory conte7t in *hich an appeal to an event3s total ca)se is appropriate2. 8 do not mean to spec)late here a!o)t ho* P)tnam )nderstands the relation !et*een the concepts of ca)sation and e7planation nor a!o)t the relation !et*een his pra"matism and @+> constr)ctivism. Jhat is important is that his claim of the concept)al priority of the notion of e7planation is philosophically pla)si!le and that it co)ld !e easily artic)lated alon" lines that *o)ld entail the denial of 2@2C.

7. ,efendin* Realism 7:'. ,efendin* Innocence, %art '. Innocence as a Scientific /ypothesis
,et C !e any statement *hose tr)th or falsity is determined !y certain ca)sal str)ct)res and let - !e any set of h)man social practices. 8f the mem!ers of - contri!)te to the tr)th or falsity of C, then *e may think of their contri!)tion as factora!le into t*o components: the contri!)tion *hich elements of make to determinin" the relevant ca)sal str)ct)res and the contri!)tion the mem!ers of - make to esta!lishin" the semantics of the lan")a"e in *hich C is e7pressed. Je have seen that the disp)te !et*een realists .and empiricists2 and constr)ctivists is over the possi!le e7tent of the first component. Prima facie philosophical packa"es m)st accommodate *ell+confirmed scientific

; 1'& ; theories, so one approach to assessin" the relative merits of realism and constr)ctivism is to assess 2@2C as a scientific hypothesis. A n)m!er of considerations s)""est that *e sho)ld take it to !e e7tremely *ell confirmed and to concl)de, in conse<)ence, that the pla)si!ility of constr)ctivism is serio)sly compromised. 8n e7aminin" the stat)s of 2@2C as a scientific hypothesis, *e face an interestin" pro!lem. 8f either scientific realism or a nat)ralistic version of empiricism is accepted, then one sho)ld pro!a!ly think of philosophy itself .or at least the philosophy of science2 as a scientific discipline, *hereas no similar concl)sion follo*s from constr)ctivism. :oreover, in any science philosophical considerations operate in determinin" ans*ers to <)estions a!o)t confirmation. ?o* then are *e to )nderstand the <)estion of ho* *ell confirmed 2@2C is as a scientific hypothesis= (o *hat e7tent sho)ld philosophical considerations enter into that 5)d"ment= 8 have no "eneral sol)tion to the pro!lem of philosophical method raised here, !)t 8 propose for present p)rposes to ask ho* *ell confirmed 2@2C is !y scientific standards not directly affected !y philosophical considerations re"ardin" @+> constr)ctivism and closely related iss)es. 8f 2@2C fares *ell !y those standards, 8 *ill take that to !e a prima facie pro!lem for constr)ctivist philosophical packa"es !)t one that co)ld !e overcome .from the points of vie* of !oth science and philosophy2 if the distinctly philosophical ar")ments for constr)ctivism prove s)fficiently po*erf)l. 8f *e approach the iss)e in that *ay, then the scientific case for 2@2C seems <)ite stron", if a !it hard to state. -)ppose that *e first ask *hether anythin" in o)r c)rrent )nderstandin" of h)man !ein"s or their social practices s)""ests that 2@2C co)ld !e false. 8s s)ch a possi!ility s)""ested !y *hat *e kno* of the !iolo"y, psycholo"y, sociolo"y, anthropolo"y, or history of h)man social practices, or !y *hat *e kno* from lin")istic theory= Cifferent @+> constr)ctivist packa"es *ill portray different feat)res of the scientific pict)re of the *orld as social constr)ctions, !)t, for e7ample, do the findin"s of any of these disciplines provide )s *ith any reason to s)ppose that there are feat)res of h)man social practice *hich necessarily lie in any s)pervenience !ase of the ca)sal str)ct)res that reflect the atomic composition of matter= 8 take it that if *e e7cl)de from consideration findin"s of sociolo"ists and anthropolo"ists *hose *ork is <)ite directly infl)enced !yFor part ofFthe philosophical case for @+> constr)ctivism, the ans*er is plainly 6no.6 8n partic)lar, if *e e7amine the !est availa!le empirical theories of ho* social practices determine the tr)th or falsity of statements in nat)ral lan")a"es, they provide every reason to accept the pict)re of the factori4ation of that determination s)""ested !y 2@2C. -imilarly *e may ask *hether findin"s in any of the other sciences provide any reason to s)ppose that 2@2C is false. Co the findin"s of chemistry and physics, for e7ample, "ive )s reason to s)ppose that social practices of, for ; 1'0 ; e7ample, chemists and physicists are necessary components of any s)pervenience !ase of the ca)sal str)ct)res they st)dy= ?ere a"ain of co)rse the ans*er is 6no.6 B)t, someone mi"ht o!5ect, the fact that none of o)r scientific theories "ive )s any reason to !elieve that a hypothesis is false provides )s *ith no reason to s)ppose that it is *ell confirmed, th)s the fail)re of o)r !ack"ro)nd theories to endorse the denial of 2@2C is irrelevant to the iss)e at hand. Comple7 "eneral iss)es are raised here a!o)t the relation !et*een theoretical considerations and confirmation, !)t three thin"s are important in the present case. 8n the first place, there is positive evidence for 2@2C, since it )nder*rites o)r !est c)rrent conceptions of ho* h)man social practices determine the tr)th val)es of statements. :oreover, the fact that violations of 2@2C are not

contemplated in o)r !est theories of h)man social practices itself has evidential si"nificance, if the scientific practice that "ives rise to those theories is taken to !e even appro7imately so)nd. (he reason is this: if people live in *orlds *hose ca)sal str)ct)re is determined nonca)sally !y their !eliefs and practices in the *ays contemplated !y @+> constr)ctivism, then the la*s "overnin" the relations !et*een social practices and other conditions of h)man life are <)ite different from *hat they *o)ld !e *ere 2@2C tr)e. A research methodolo"y that does not even co)ntenance the possi!ility of fail)res of 2@2C *o)ld !e as inade<)ate )nder s)ch conditions as one that failed to ackno*led"e the important *ays in *hich theoretical practices and concepts causally determine ca)sal str)ct)resFself+f)lfillin" prophecies for e7ample, or the social effects of ideolo"ically determined theories. (h)s, 2@2C may !e appropriately vie*ed as a pres)pposition of methodolo"y in social in<)iry .cases directly infl)enced !y social constr)ctivism aside2, so the philosopher *ho accepts the methods of social scientific in<)iry as in this re"ard so)nd has reason to accept 2@2C *ith respect to the nonca)sal infl)ences contemplated in social constr)ctivism. -till one mi"ht not !e s)fficiently confident a!o)t methods in the relevant social sciences to find the case 5)st o)tlined convincin", so it is important to reali4e that the claim that certain practices necessarily lie in any s)pervenience !ase of certain ca)sal str)ct)res entails that *ere the practices relevantly different, the ca)sal str)ct)res *o)ld !e too. Jhatever the final *ord on the analysis of co)nterfact)als, they are the sorts of propositions *hich *e can often eval)ate !y scientific standards. Je may reasona!ly ask, in the li"ht of the !est availa!le scientific theories, *hether or not, for e7ample, the "eneral ca)sal str)ct)res of matter *o)ld !e different if chemists and physicists en"a"ed in different social practices. (he ans*er is 6no,6 and the ans*er *o)ld !e 6no6 for any of the alle"ed cases of social constr)ction appropriate to @+> constr)ctivist philosophical packa"es. /hat is evidence for 2@2C, or at least .*hat is eno)"h2 a"ainst those denials of 2@2C essential to the constr)ctivist3s pro5ect. Binally it m)st !e noted that it is in "eneral diffic)lt to say precisely *hy ; 1'' ; loopy proposals are scientifically )naccepta!le. Consider for e7ample the hypothesis that social practices in "em+c)ttin" nonca)sally contri!)te to the determination of crop yields in :isso)ri. (hat is scientifically silly, !)t it is hard to say e7actly *hy. 8 s)""est that constr)ctivist denials of 2@2C are, scientifically speakin", e<)ally silly, so that the distinctly philosophical ar")ments for constr)ctivism m)st !e <)ite stron" indeed if the constr)ctivist3s philosophical packa"e is not to prove less pla)si!le than the realist3s. A some*hat different sort of o!5ection mi"ht at this point !e offered a"ainst the strate"y of scientifically assessin" the constr)ctivist3s denial of 2@2C. 8t mi"ht !e ar")ed that !oth 2@2C and its denial are philosophical rather than scientific hypotheses and that treatin" them as scientific hypotheses !e"s the <)estion a"ainst the philosophical ar")ments in their favor. 8n s)pport of this contention it mi"ht !e ar")ed that the dependence of ca)sal str)ct)res on social practices posited !y constr)ctivists is s)pposed to !e nonca)sal and that, therefore, scientific considerations of s)pervenience relations are irrelevant to its assessment. A"ainst the second and more specific of these o!5ections it m)st !e replied that *hatever the nat)re of the pres)med determination, to say of some processes that they are necessarily part of any s)pervenience !ase for some str)ct)res entails that those str)ct)res *o)ld not o!tain, or *o)ld !e relevantly different, if the processes did not themselves "o on. (he co)nterfact)als of this sort *hich *o)ld follo* from pla)si!le @+> constr)ctivist acco)nts of science do certainly seem to !e the sorts of

co)nterfact)als that are assessa!le scientifically, and they seem deeply disconfirmed. 8 concl)de that there is a stron" !)rden of proof on the constr)ctivist to deny that her position entails s)ch co)nterfact)als or to provide for them an interpretation that makes them imm)ne from scientific criticism. A"ainst the more "eneral o!5ection it m)st !e insisted that the special cases of the accommodation thesis relevant to any partic)lar @+> constr)ctivist acco)nt of act)al episodes in the history of science are scientific hypotheses, as are the scientifically d)!io)s co)nterfact)als entailed !y that acco)nt in the li"ht of those special cases. (h)s it appears that the details of any partic)lar constr)ctivist packa"e *ill !e v)lnera!le to the char"e of inconsistency *ith *ell+esta!lished science *hatever the stat)s of the most "eneral form)lations of constr)ctivism. 8t mi"ht !e tho)"ht that even partic)lar cases of 2@2C are too philosophical to !e *ell confirmed as scientific theses and that the em!arrassin" co)nterfact)als are like*ise too philosophical to !e eval)ated !y scientific standards. Even so, the prima facie re<)irement that philosophical packa"es !e artic)lated so as to cohere *ith *ell+confirmed science is a central methodolo"ical standard in the philosophy of science, and the s)pervenience red)ction constraint is an )npro!lematical special case of that re<)irement. Jhat o)r investi"ation of the relation !et*een 2@2C and *ell+esta!lished science indicates is ; 1'/ ; thatFaltho)"h it is easy to see ho* the tr)th of ca)sal claims depends in part on social practicesF*e have, scientifically speakin", not the fo""iest idea of ho* ca)sal str)ct)res themselves co)ld depend on social practices e7cept in m)ndane ca)sal *ays. Precisely !eca)se of the scientific ine7plica!ility of the violations of 2@2C *hich it entails, the constr)ctivist3s acco)nt of the role of scientific conventionality in determinin" the tr)th or falsity of scientific statements fails to meet this constraint, *hich is clearly met !y competin" realist .and empiricist2 acco)nts. (h)s principles of the )nity of philosophical and scientific kno*led"e *hich seem central to methodolo"y in the philosophy of science are violated !y the details of any @+> constr)ctivist acco)nt of act)al scientific episodes. 8ndeed, there are a n)m!er of other considerations *hich s)""est that @+> constr)ctivism may cohere poorly *ith scientific findin"s. Bor e7ample, *e have scientific reasons "ro)nded in evol)tionary theory to s)ppose that o)r capacities are contin)o)s *ith those of nonh)man animals. Co they socially .or other*ise2 constr)ct the ca)sal str)ct)res of the thin"s they kno* a!o)t= 8f not, then do *e constr)ct those str)ct)res, and ho* are o)r constr)cts related to their percept)al a!ilities= 8f their ca)sal *orld is )nconstr)cted, ho* is it that o)rs re<)ires constr)ction= . . . .Lo) "et the idea.2 -imilar concerns arise a!o)t the coherence of @+> constr)ctivism *ith the !est+esta!lished findin"s of historians of science. (here is a lon" tradition of holdin" that >)hn3s ackno*led"ment of the historical phenomenon of inelimina!le ano#alies *ithin paradi"ms compromises any metaphysical )nderstandin" of his metaphorical claim that scientists *ho accept different paradi"ms st)dy different *orlds. Je are no* in a position to make that criticism precise and to sho* that it is applica!le to dialectically comple7 versions of @+> constr)ctivism as *ell as to less comple7 versions. Jhat seems evident historically is that not every effort at *orld constr)ction can s)cceed. Certain concept)al frame*orks, metaphysical conceptions, and methodolo"ical approaches *ill not res)lt in the s)ccessf)l esta!lishment of a tradition of in<)iry !eca)se, in some sense or other, the *orld fails to cooperate: pro!lem sol)tions of the anticipated sort are not fo)nd *hich are e7perimentally s)ccessf)l, anticipated s)ccess in developin" predictive la*s is not forthcomin", the res)lts of efforts to artic)late e7planations for relevant phenomena do not res)lt in a coherent pict)re of ho* they *ork, . . .

-imilarly, as anomalies sho*, apparently s)ccessf)l *orld constr)ction can hit sna"s: ne* discoveries can pose challen"es insol)!le *ithin an esta!lished paradi"m. @o*, different de"rees of dialectical fle7i!ility in one3s acco)nt of *orld+constit)tin" conventionality *ill affect 5)st *hich cases of *orld constr)ction one *o)ld have to dia"nose as failin" in one or the other of these t*o *ays, !)t no one thinks that scientists or others can impose 5)st any metaphysical pict)re .ho*ever dialectically fle7i!le2 on the *orld. Beyera!end .19/92 has termed the constraints *hich the *orld imposes on paradi"ms 6resistance.6 ; 1'9 ; @o* resistances have interestin" properties. (hey seem to !e independent of h)man social practices at least in this sense: that s)ch practices seem to make no nonca)sal contri!)tion to them. (hey appear to )nder*rite co)nterfact)als: it is not 5)st tr)e that some episodes of attempted *orld constr)ction have met *ith resistance, others *o)ld meet resistance if they *ere attempted. Binally, s)ccessf)l theory constr)ction and s)ccessf)l methodolo"y re<)ire accommodation to the str)ct)re of resistances. Hesistances, that is, are a lot like the theory+independent ca)sal str)ct)res posited !y realists and empiricists: the only o!vio)s difference seems to !e that @+> constr)ctivists !elieve in them. Hesistances are an apparently *ell+confirmed feat)re of the history of science, and they pose a challen"e to any @+> constr)ctivist packa"e that ackno*led"es them. Jhy, "iven that h)man social practices can constr)ct, in !road o)tline, the ca)sal relations scientists st)dy, do they leave )naffected resistances, *hich look so m)ch like ca)sal str)ct)res= 8ndeed, *hat is the 5)stification for denyin" that resistances are theory+independent ca)sal str)ct)res, and for denyin" that, in acceptin" it that scientific theories and methods m)st !e accommodated to resistances, a philosopher has already accepted a realist .or empiricist2 interpretation of the accommodation thesis= 8 am inclined to hold that ca)sal str)ct)resFor at any rate the ca)sal str)ct)res accessi!le in scientific investi"ationF"ust are the resistances *hich history teaches )s to ackno*led"eD or perhaps that the ca)sal str)ct)res scientists st)dy are the s)!strate of s)ch theory+independent resistances. Jhether or not this partic)lar analysis can !e s)stained, the fact remains that anomalies and other resistances represent apparent feat)res of scientific practice *hich are eno)"h like )nconstr)cted ca)sal str)ct)res and *hich play a role eno)"h like that assi"ned !y realists and empiricists to s)ch str)ct)res as to pose the <)estion of *hether or not @+> constr)ctivism coheres *ith the res)lts of empirical in<)iry in the history of science. 8t is *orth remarkin" that one reservation *hich someone mi"ht have *ith the identification of ca)sal str)ct)res *ith resistances .or their s)!strate2 is that there *o)ld remain the <)estion of ho* to distin")ish !et*een those feat)res of esta!lished scientific theories *hich reflect the str)ct)re of resistances and those *hich are reflections of conventionality in the !road dialectical sense. @+> constr)ctivism mi"ht !e seen as "ainin" some s)pport from a reco"nition of the diffic)lty of detectin" s)ch conventionality. 8 disc)ss the connection !et*een constr)ctivism and the pro!lem of hidden conventionality !elo* .see section &.%2. 8 concl)de that there are "ood reasons to hold that @+> constr)ctivism fails to meet ade<)ately the criterion of coherence .or perhaps even consistency2 *ith the findin"s of the vario)s special sciences and of the history of science and that the philosophical ar")ments in its favor *o)ld have to !e very stron" indeed in order to overcome the res)ltin" philosophical impla)si!ility. 8 s)""ested at the !e"innin" of this paper that @+> social constr)ctivism is often ; 1/$ ;

conflated *ith de!)nkin" constr)ctivism. ?ere is an additional reason to s)spect s)ch a conflation: it seems possi!le to maintain, even from a realist .al!eit not a scientific realist2 perspective, the de!)nkin" concl)sion that scientific 6tr)th6 is merely a social constr)ctionD it is m)ch harder indeed to maintain, *ith the @+> constr)ctivist, that scientific truth is a social constr)ction. 8 s)spect that one reason *hy the depth of the diffic)lties facin" the latter position have not al*ays !een reco"ni4ed has !een a fail)re to distin")ish clearly eno)"h !et*een the claims of de!)nkin" and @+> constr)ctivism.

7:). ,efendin* Innocence, %art ). "on+entionality and the E>uifertility of -ethods

8 have ar")ed that constr)ctivism fails to meet the constraint of coherence *ith *ell+esta!lished science. ()rnin" no* to the other f)ndamental constraint identified in section %.#, 8 propose to ar")e that the re5ection of 2@2C )ndermines the possi!ility of rationali4in" a central and )!i<)ito)sly applica!le methodolo"ical principle havin" to do *ith the methodolo"ical import of conventional or ar!itrary feat)res of scientific description. Hecall that it is )ncontroversial that there can !e instances of )no!vio)s conventionality in scientific practice and that the accommodation thesis dictates that theoretical considerations properly "overn ind)ctive practice only to the e7tent that they reflect kno*led"e of relevant ca)sal str)ct)res. 8t *ill !e )sef)l therefore to ask *hat "ood scientific method dictates *hen feat)res of *ell+esta!lished scientific theories are sho*n to !e )ne7pectedly conventional or other*ise ar!itrary. ,et )s say that the choice !et*een t*o theoretical conceptions is ar!itrary, or con&entional in the !road sense , 5)st in case *hat *o)ld co)nt for the appropriateness of choosin" one over the other *o)ld !e facts a!o)t the history and c)rrent practice of the relevant scientific comm)nity rather than anythin" that o!tains independently of that history or practice. -imple or dialectically comple7 conventionality in science, *hether o!vio)s or not and *hether 6*orld+constit)tin"6 or not, *ill !e reflected in there !ein" a possi!le alternative to the act)ally accepted conception s)ch that the choice !et*een them is conventional in this sense. Jhat is the methodolo"y appropriate to the discovery of )ne7pected conventionality in a !ody of scientific research= 8 s)""est that the principle that is act)ally central to scientific practice is the follo*in":

he -ethodolo*ical E>uifertility %rinciple

-)ppose that the choice !et*een t*o conceptions is conventional in the !road sense. (hen the only methodolo"ical practices *hich *ill !e properly 5)stified !y the acceptance of one of these conceptions *ill !e those practices *hich *o)ld also !e 5)stified !y the acceptance of the other.

"orollary
-)ppose that t*o conceptions are s)fficiently different that they appear to provide competin" acco)nts of some phenomena and to have, in ; 1/1 ; conse<)ence, different methodolo"ical import. -)ppose f)rther that the choice !et*een them is in fact conventional in the !road sense and that this fact comes to !e kno*n. (hen, the methodolo"ical import of those conceptions m)st !e reeval)ated accordin" to the principle that the only methodolo"ical

practices that *ill !e properly 5)stified !y the acceptance of either *ill !e those practices *hich they dictate in common. Practices *hich, prior to the discovery of the )ne7pected conventionality, *ere taken to !e 5)stified !y one of the conceptions and not the other m)st !e )nderstood to !e 5)stified !y neither. (*o e7amples *ill ill)strate the application of the e<)ifertility principle. Accordin" to ,e*ontin .19'02, Jensen .190/2 presents as evidence for the "enetic determination of individ)al differences in intelli"ence the fact that the distri!)tion of 8G scores in typical h)man pop)lations is a normal distri!)tion. -ince a normal distri!tion is characteristic of certain poly"enically determined traits, the normality of score distri!)tions for 8G is taken as evidence that intelli"ence is s)ch a trait. A n)m!er of criticisms can !e made of this line of reasonin"D one is that the normality of 8G score distri!)tions is an artifact of practice of test desi"ners: they desi"n !atteries of test <)estions in order to o!tain normal score distri!)tions. Ince this fact is reco"ni4ed, the normality of s)ch score distri!)tions ceases to have evidential !earin" no matter *hat relations normal distri!)tions may ordinarily have to )nderlyin" "enetic facts. Iperative here is the e<)ifertility principle: the standard conception of ho* to meas)re intelli"ence is sho*n to !e one of several conceptions !et*een *hich the choice is conventional in the !road sense, !)t the proposed strate"y for esta!lishin" evidence a!o)t "enetic determination of intelli"ence differences is ratified !y only some of these conceptions. Consider no* the case of alle"ed )no!vio)s conventionality mentioned earlier in this paper. Accordin" to cladists, there is a deep level of conventionality in the definitions of hi"her ta7a of *hich traditional systematists *ere )na*are. -ome cladists p)t this claim in an especially stron" *ay !y maintainin" that the only nonar!itrary constraint on the erection of hi"her ta7a is that the ta7a themselves !e monophyletic. Consider no* research strate"ies in the st)dy of macroevol)tion. Hesearchers interested in ho* the pace of evol)tionary chan"e has varied !et*een different intervals in "eolo"ical time have often proposed to assess s)ch variation !y estimatin", for s)ch intervals, the n)m!er of hi"her ta7a at vario)s levels *hich have either emer"ed or have !ecome e7tinct d)rin" them. -)ppose no* for the sake of ar")ment that the stron" cladist claim a!o)t the ar!itrariness of hi"her ta7a is tr)e. 8n that case, of co)rse, calc)lations of the rates of emer"ence and e7tinction *o)ld prod)ce entirely ar!itrary res)lts and *o)ld th)s !e irrelevant to the st)dy of evol)tionary forces. A"ain the operative methodolo"ical principle is e<)ifertility: different classificatory conceptions !et*een *hich the choice is conventional in the !road sense *o)ld ; 1/2 ; dictate entirely different n)merical meas)res of the rates of evol)tionary chan"e. E<)ifertility seems to !e a f)ndamental methodolo"ical principle re"ardin" conventionality or ar!itrariness in scientific descriptions. 8ndeed, *e can )se it to provide a kind of methodolo"ically relevant 6meas)re6 of the e7tent to *hich feat)res of s)ch descriptions are ar!itrary. By the #ethodological spectru# of a theory let )s mean the class of methodolo"ical 5)d"ments *hich ."iven prevailin" !ack"ro)nd theories2 it properly )nder*rites. (he e<)ifertility doctrine entails that t*o theories !et*een *hich the choice is conventional in the !road sense *ill have the same methodolo"ical spectr)m. 8n conse<)ence, the claim that a theory is )ne7pectedly ar!itrary in partic)lar respects entails that its methodolo"ical spectr)m is narro*er than prevailin" methods *o)ld s)""estD competin" claims re"ardin" respects of ar!itrariness *ill th)s entail different conceptions of a theory3s methodolo"ical spectr)m, and these differences provide a meas)re of sorts of the methodolo"ical import of the differin" estimates of ar!itrariness .see Boyd 199$!2. :oreover, there do not seem to !e any limitations to the applica!ility of the e<)ifertility principle: "ood

scientific method seems to dictate that *e re5ect methods that are artifacts of social convention or other idiosyncratic feat)res of o)r comm)nity3s history. @evertheless, if the accommodation thesis is accepted, then it follo*s that the accepta!ility of any instance of e<)ifertility is e<)ivalent to the accepta!ility of the correspondin" special case of 2@2C. (h)s the constr)ctivist appears to !e in the position of !ein" )na!le to provide an acco)nt of scientific kno*led"e *hich ratifies a central principle of scientific methodolo"y. -he m)st ackno*led"e e7ceptions to 2@2C and th)s correspondin" e7ceptions to e<)ifertility. In no pla)si!le acco)nt can all social conventions in science !e *orld+constit)tin", and th)s the constr)ctivist *ill have to distin")ish !et*een cases in *hich 2@2C holds and cases in *hich it fails. 9iven the scientific ine7plica!ility of any s)ch fail)res, the prospects are dim that she *ill !e a!le to offer a satisfactory acco)nt of the difference !et*een the t*o sorts of cases. (he fact that the constr)ctivist m)st also rationali4e a correspondin" distinction !et*een applications of e<)ifertility makes the prospects for her s)ccess even fainter. 8 concl)de, therefore, that @+> constr)ctivism fails pretty spectac)larly to satisfy the re<)irement of coherence *ith the findin"s and methods of the !est science. Ine additional concern a!o)t a)thorial intent is raised !y the ar")ments 8 have offered for this concl)sion. -ome philosophers have o!5ected to those ar")ments on the "ro)nds that the a)thors of @eo+>antian conceptions of social constr)ction clearly intended to appeal to a kind of social constr)ction that is prior to scientific theori4in" a!o)t ca)sation or a!o)t method in a *ay that *o)ld make scientific criti<)es inappropriate. 8 a"ree that a)thorial intent has !een correctly assessed here, !)t the <)es+ ; 1/# ; tion *e have !een addressin" is *hether or not there is a sort of social constr)ction *ith the feat)res @+ > constr)ctivists re<)ire. After all, phenomenalists intended to appeal to a conception of the red)ci!ility of physical o!5ects to sense data *hich *o)ld not compromise o)r ordinary conception of the ca)sal relations involved in perception nor compromise methodolo"ical commitments that rest on a notion of independent o!servation of the same o!5ect !y several researchers. Heco"nition of that intent does not, !y itself, "ive )s any reason to re5ect the ar")ments that s)""est that no s)ch red)ction e7ists. A similar sit)ation e7ists *ith respect to @+> constr)ctivism. Constr)ctivists make claims a!o)t the metaphysical import of h)man practices thatF*hen taken to"ether *ith other claims a!o)t science *ith *hich they a"reeFappear to contradict 2@2C. (hat "ives )s a "ood reason to do)!t that the sort of social constr)ction they posit happens. (he !)rden of proof lies *ith the constr)ctivist either to indicate a fla* in the ar")ments a!o)t 2@2C or to provide other philosophical .or scientific2 reasons *hy *e sho)ld find its re5ection accepta!le.

7:3. #ssessin* NG2 "onstructi+ism as Epistemolo*yD %hilosophical Inte*ration and Species "hau+inism
Pretty plainly the denials of 2@2C entailed !y @+> constr)ctivism deeply compromise its capacity to meet *ell+esta!lished re<)irements of )nification *ith the findin"s of the sciencesD so serio)s is the shortfall, in fact, that the @+> constr)ctivist3s position has m)ch in common *ith de!)nkin" constr)ctivism. -till, coherence *ith esta!lished science and its methods is not the only standard !y *hich philosophical packa"es are properly assessed, and there is a nontrivial epistemolo"ical ar")ment for constr)ctivism: that it permits the preservation of a pla)si!le version of inference+r)le fo)ndationalism. Je need to kno* *hether or not this advanta"e o)t*ei"hs the apparent

epistemolo"ical failin"s of constr)ctivism, so that it *o)ld !e appropriate to rethink o)r )nderstandin" of the epistemolo"y of science so as someho* to accommodate .nonde!)nkin"ly2 the oddities of constr)ctivism. (hat the ans*er is 6no6 is s)""ested !y three considerations. 8n the first place, of co)rse, the depth of the fail)re of @+> constr)ctivism to reconstr)ct act)al science is profo)nd, and this stron"ly s)""ests that it is on the *ron" track epistemolo"ically. :oreover, the fail)res of fo)ndationalism implied !y the re5ection of inference+r)le fo)ndationalism are independently s)""ested !y other nat)ralistic developments in epistemolo"y. (he *hole thr)st of relia!ilist acco)nts of more commonplace cases of kno*led"e is that *hat is decisive in distin")ishin" cases of kno*led"e from other cases of tr)e !elief is not the operation of some privile"ed principles of 5)stification !)t the relia!ility of the operative mechanisms of !elief re")lation. Jhile s)ch an acco)nt of, for e7ample, percept)al kno*led"e does not entail the falsity of modest inference+r)le fo)ndationalism, ; 1/% ; it does enhance the pla)si!ility of its re5ection, especially since the nat)ralistic acco)nt of ind)ctive reasonin" in the sciences *hich is apparently provided !y the sciences themselves assi"ns to theory+ dependent 5)stificatory methods and proced)res a cr)cial ca)sal role in ens)rin" that relia!ility, th)s corro!oratin" the traditional int)ition that 5)stification is someho* essential in most cases of ind)ctive kno*led"e. 8 concl)de that a philosophical packa"e that incl)des a realist and nat)ralistic acco)nt of scientific kno*led"e has the virt)e that its re5ection of inference+r)le fo)ndationalism coheres *ell *ith the res)lts of independently developed nat)ralistic research in epistemolo"y and the f)rther advanta"e that it affords )s a nat)ralistic acco)nt of the important role of 5)stificatory ar")ments in ind)ction. (hese advanta"es are s)pplemented !y another that is s)""ested !y o)r earlier consideration of the pec)liar relation of constr)ctivism to evol)tionary theory. 8t has proved very fr)itf)l in contemporary epistemolo"y and philosophy of mind to consider the *ays in *hich psycholo"ical and epistemic descriptions can !e appropriately applied, either literally or metaphorically, to nonh)man animals or to nonlivin" information+processin" systems. (*o thin"s seem clear. Birst, there is almost no do)!t that *e sho)ld literally attri!)te kno*led"e to a variety of different nonh)man animals, not all of them intelli"ent primates. -econd, *hen *e attri!)te kno*led"e metaphorically to m)ch simpler animals and simple nonanimal information+processin" systems, o)r e7tension of epistemic concepts is *ell motivated: there is m)ch in common !et*een the 6kno*led"e6 of s)ch systems and kno*led"e in h)mans and more comple7 animals. @o* for none of these nonh)man systems is it pla)si!le to s)ppose that their kno*led"e .or 6kno*led"e62 rests on their !ein" a!le to deploy the reso)rces of a priori 5)stifia!le ind)ctive methods or anythin" of the sort. Je th)s have philosophical as *ell as evol)tionary reasons to !e concerned a!o)t a kind of species cha)vinism in o)r epistemolo"ical thinkin": *hat reason have *e to think that for )s alone kno*led"e is to !e )nderstood in terms of epistemically privile"ed principles of ind)ction= 8 s)""est that the ans*er is 6none.6 8 do not mean to s)""est that if apparently ade<)ate ind)ctive r)les of this sort *ere discoveredFor if their e7istence *ere stron"ly s)""ested !y e7aminations of scientific practiceFthen *e sho)ld re5ect the proposal that they sho)ld set epistemic standards for creat)res like )s capa!le of )nderstandin" them. @or do 8 s)""est that *e sho)ld leave )ne7plored the hypothesis that appro7imate adherence to those r)les e7plains the special ind)ctive s)ccesses of the sciences. Jhat 8 do s)""est is that, in the a!sence of any evidence that s)ch r)les e7ist, *e sho)ld favor philosophical packa"es that incorporate

a scientifically "ro)nded nat)ralistic and anti+.inference+r)le2+fo)ndationalist treatment of scientific kno*led"e over packa"es that salva"e fo)ndationalism at the e7pense of scientific pla)si!ility. 8 concl)de that *hen *e *ei"h the case for @+> constr)ctivism provided !y the !asic epistemolo"ical ar")ment ; 1/& ; a"ainst the contrary case arisin" from considerations of the <)asi+nat)ralistic constraint and the pla)si!ility of 2@2C, the case a"ainst constr)ctivism is <)ite stron". 8 s)""ested in section #.1 that there *ere three and a half ar")ments for constr)ctivism of *hich the f)ndamental epistemolo"ical ar")ment *as the first. 8t is time to t)rn o)r attention to the other t*o.

7:6. /idden "on+entionality and the "ase for "onstructi+ism

8t is )npro!lematic that there co)ld !eFand all !)t )npro!lematic that there areFfeat)res of o)r c)rrent scientific conception of the *orld that are conventional in the !road sense !)t that appear to )s to represent discoveries a!o)t ca)sal str)ct)res. Je lack alto"ether certain methods for ferretin" o)t s)ch hidden conventionalities, and this fact seems to )nder*rite @+> constr)ctivist convictions for at least some st)dents of the philosophy and social st)dies of science. 8n a *ay this mi"ht seem stran"e since falli!ilism re"ardin" <)estions of social constr)ction hardly 5)stifies social constr)ctivism, especially of the @eo+>antian variety. -till, there is a point to the concern: scientific realism is, characteristically, a position of those *ho are inclined to accept the findin"s of the vario)s sciences 6at face val)e,6 and the ar")ments for it t)rn on acceptin" for the most part the nat)ralistic acco)nts of the relia!ility of scientific methods *hich are confirmed !y the application of those very methods. A serio)s eno)"h skepticism a!o)t o)r a!ility to )ncover hidden conventionality *o)ld cast do)!t on the realist3s case. Je need more than mere falli!ilism, ho*everFall the more so !eca)se realist approaches provide some reso)rces for distin")ishin" mere conventions from real 6maps6 of ca)sal str)ct)res .for e7ample, co)nt as pro!a!ly nonconventional those feat)res of received !ack"ro)nd theories *hich clearly seem implicated in relia!le methodolo"y: see Boyd 199$!2. Je need some special reason to s)ppose that philosophers "enerally, or at any rate realist philosophers, *ill tend to make si"nificant mistakes a!o)t *hat is conventional or merely historical and *hat is not. 8 !elieve that those *ho *orry a!o)t hidden conventionality typically have one or !oth of t*o different special concerns of this sort in mind. Ine is a matter of assessin" the prospects for experi#ental #etaphysics , the other a matter of concern over hidden politics . E7perimental metaphysics first. Positivists called 6metaphysics6 any theori4in" a!o)t the )no!serva!le, and they held that e7perimental kno*led"e of 6metaphysics6 is impossi!le. 8f realism is tr)e, then scientists ro)tinely do e7perimental 6metaphysics,6 and they often do it s)ccessf)lly. Jhat a!o)t e7perimental metaphysics .*itho)t the <)otation marks2= Plainly it has !een an infl)ential vie* amon" realists that scientists do s)ccessf)l e7perimental metaphysics as *ell: *itness the *idespread vie* amon" realist philosophers of science that materialism has !een confirmed as a scientific hypothesis. Ine pla)si!le concern *ith this enth)siasm for e7perimental .no <)otes2 metaphysics mi"ht pla)si!ly !e that *e r)n the risk of treatin" as metaphysically ; 1/0 ; informative feat)res of scientific theories *hich are in fact merely artifacts of the concept)al history of

the relevant scientific comm)nities. 8f *e hold, *ith the realist, that physical scientistsF!iochemists, molec)lar "eneticists, and pharmacolo"ists, let )s sayFhave discovered somethin".s2 )no!serva!le and important a!o)t the !iolo"ical and even the mental *orld, and if *e a"ree that they have done so !y employin" a materialist research strate"y, one that co)ld !e and is defended !y claimin" that all phenomenaFmental as *ell as !iolo"icalFare physical, still need *e concl)de that it is the materialist theoretical form)lation of their perspective *hich capt)res their insi"hts a!o)t the relevant ca)sal str)ct)res= Co)ld not the materialistic thesis that these scientists, or o)r rational reconstr)ctions of them, affirm !e conventional= Co)ld there not !e a rationali4ation of the same methods for st)dyin" .admittedly partly )no!serva!le2 ca)sal str)ct)res *hich had no materialist philosophical implications= :i"ht a sort of scientis# not !lind scientific realists re"ardin" this <)estion= 8 think that <)estions s)ch as these pose interestin" pro!lems for the defender of e7perimental metaphysics !)t that @+> constr)ctivism is the inappropriate position for the philosopher *ho has the concerns in <)estion. (he *orry, after all, is that *e may not !e a!le to determine relia!ly 5)st *hich elements of o)r !est+confirmed scientific theories are really conventional in the !road sense. B)t the proposed sol)tion is to adopt a "eneral sol)tion to that diffic)lty: to hold that it is al%ays the feat)res of o)r theories *hich define the !asic metaphysical pict)re *hich are conventional .that is, after all, *hat @+> constr)ctivists hold2. :oreover, this sol)tion seems to have the opposite of the desired methodolo"ical import *ith respect to e7perimental metaphysics. 8f *e are al*ays 5)stified in takin" the !asic metaphysical pict)re presented !y the sciences as reflectin" socially constr)cted reality .*hich is s)pposed to !e, of co)rse, as real as thin"s "et2, then *e are 5)stified in, for e7ample, takin" materialism to !e a *ell+esta!lished scientific findin". Jhat the critic of e7perimental metaphysics raises is the possi!ility that the metaphysical+lookin" doctrines reflected in scientific theori4in" are #erely conventional, *here that stat)s deprives them of real metaphysical import. -ince the definin" feat)re of @+> constr)ctivism is that it attri!)tes metaphysical import to 5)st the sorts of conventions at iss)e, *e have a"ain a case in *hich @+> constr)ctivist doctrine is invoked *here a limited sort of de!)nkin"Fof 5)st the sort precl)ded !y @+> constr)ctivismFis needed instead. As *e shall see, this pattern contin)es. In to politics. A central concern of many scholars .not 5)st professional philosophers2 *ho are attracted to @+> constr)ctivism is to el)cidate the often hidden role of ideolo"y in science. Jhen scientific ideolo"y is effective, it is invisi!le: a hidden political element determinin" the content of scientific theori4in". 8t is effective, that is to say, !eca)se there are feat)res of social practice *hose infl)ence on the content of scientific theories is )no!vio)s. -tr)ck !y the over*helmin" evidence that s)ch hidden politics is a standard ; 1/' ; feat)re of m)ch of scientific life, many scholars have !een led to adopt an @+> constr)ctivist conception of scientific kno*led"e. Ince a"ain, the oddity of the position is evident *hen it is reco"ni4ed that their aim is a critical one. Consider a case of ideolo"ical factors in science, say the 6social constr)ction of "ender.6 8t *as an all !)t )niform feat)re of nineteenth+cent)ry !iolo"ical thinkin" to affirm the intellect)al inferiority of *omenD that is ideolo"y in science. ?o* *ill adoptin" an @+> constr)ctivist vie* of nineteenth+ cent)ry !iolo"y help )s critici4e this ideolo"y= Jell, first, it is clear that the principal e7planation for the )niformity *ith *hich this doctrine *as accepted involves the operation in science of historically determined social practices to*ard *hich the critic has an )nfavora!le attit)de. (he infl)ence of these practices is hard to detectF5)st like the infl)ence of *orld+constit)tin" conventions in science. Are the social practices that determined the doctrine of the inferiority of *omen themselves to !e tho)"ht of as

*orld+constit)tin"= 8f not, then it is hard to see *hy an @+> constr)ctivist conception sho)ld !e especially important to their criticism, since the standards for the epistemic and political criticism of non+*orld+constit)tin" social practices are pres)ma!ly the same for the realist and the @+> constr)ctivist. -)ppose, then, instead that the social practices are to !e )nderstood as *orld+constit)tin". 8n that case, the critic *ill !e o!li"ed to hold that it *as tr)e .!y social constr)ctionF!)t that is as tr)e as thin"s can !e2 that nineteenth+cent)ry *omen *ere intellect)ally inferior in the *ay indicated !y the relevant !iolo"ical theories. @o*, this is a concl)sion *hich someone independently committed to @+> constr)ctivism mi"ht !e o!li"ed to accept, !)t it co)ld hardly !e taken to indicate that @+> constr)ctivism facilitates the criticism of ideolo"y. ?ere a"ain, thinkers *ho have adopted an @+> constr)ctivist conception seem to have !een lookin" instead for a conception of the relevant conventions *hich denies them metaphysical import. 8t is a de!)nkin" constr)ctivist treatment, if not of nineteenth+cent)ry !iolo"y in "eneral, then of nineteenth+cent)ry !iolo"y of se7 differences, *hich is recommended here, not @+> constr)ctivism. Ine remainin" political application of @+> constr)ctivism needs to !e disc)ssed here. 8n some cases of the ideolo"ical role of scienceFthe social constr)ction of "ender is an e7ampleFthe s)!5ect matter of the relevant sciences is us , and it is important to )nderstand the e7tent to *hich scientific practices in s)ch areas may determine *hat *e are like. (heories of se7 differences frame social and ed)cational e7pectations, self+ima"es, le"al and economic possi!ilities, and so on, so that the nat)re of men and *omen is in a deep sense socially constructed . -ome thinkers, str)ck !y this fact, and concerned to emphasi4e its importance, )nderstand the social constr)ction of "ender, for e7ample, on the @+> model of the social constr)ction of reality. (*o considerations s)""est that this is a mistake. 8n the first place, of co)rse, the social constr)ction of "ender roles facilitated ; 1// ; !y, amon" other thin"s, se7ist ideolo"y in science, is causal : social practices in science are amon" the factors that ca)se other social patterns that ca)se men and *omen to e7hi!it certain psycholo"ical dispositions more often than others *hich they *o)ld e7hi!it )nder different circ)mstances. 8n the a!sence of an entirely independent ar")ment, there is no reason to assimilate these ca)sal relations to the model of nonca)sal determination of ca)sal str)ct)re !y theoretical practices. :oreover, nonca)sal social constr)ctionFeven of the dialectically comple7 sortFcannot fail : the *hole idea is that certain social practices i#pose , in somethin" like a lo"ical or concept)al *ay, a certain "eneral ca)sal str)ct)re on the *orld. B)t social constr)ctions of the ca)sal sort often fail spectac)larly at partic)lar historical 5)nct)res. (he social constr)ction of the inferiority of colonial s)!5ects .*hich *as, of co)rse, accomplished more *ith troops, ")ns, *hips, and co)rts than *ith scientific theories2 event)ally prod)ced re!els, not persons "enetically s)ited to !e r)led. Altho)"h no one do)!ts this, thinkin" of causal social constr)ction on the model of @eo+>antian noncausal constr)ction foc)ses attention on its s)ccesses rather than on the conditions of resistance. 8t is hard to see ho* that *o)ld enhance the prospects for a criti<)e of ideolo"y. 8 concl)de that "eneral considerations of the )no!vio)sness of the infl)ence of .some2 social practices in science, altho)"h important, do not tend to s)pport @+> constr)ctivism.

7:7. Scientific %luralism and Nonreductionist -aterialism

(*o <)ite specific forms of the social determination of the str)ct)re of scientific theories are often cited as providin" reasons for @+> constr)ctivism. 8n the first place, it seems certainly tr)e that for any "iven scientific discipline, there *ill !e more than one concept)al scheme that co)ld !e employed to capt)re ade<)ately the kno*led"e reflected in its theories. (here is th)s a si"nificant meas)re of conventionality in the !road sense involved in the acceptance of *hatever concept)al frame*ork scientists in a "iven discipline employ. :oreover, !et*een scientific disciplines there are variations in the schemes of classification and description *hich are appropriate even *henFin some senseFthe same phenomena are )nder st)dy: economists and sociolo"ists m)st employ different e7planatory cate"ories even if they are !oth st)dyin" cons)mers. (he nat)ralness of concepts and the appropriateness of methods seem to !e interest+dependentFto depend on the interests of the investi"ators. Each of these instances of pl)ralism in science has !een taken to provide evidence for @+> constr)ctivism or related positions. 8n the first case, the conventionality involved in choices of concept)al schemes is assimilated to *orld+constit)tin" conventionality on the @+> constr)ctivist modelD in the second, the interest+dependence of kinds and methods is taken to indicate the ; 1/9 ; sort of mind+dependence of reality con"enial to constr)ctivists !)t not to realists. 8 have disc)ssed these cases at some len"th else*here .Boyd 19/$, 19/&a, 19/92. Jhat is important here is that the pl)rality of concept)al schemes e7emplified in the t*o sorts of cases, far from representin" a challen"e to realism, is predicted and f)lly e7plained !y a realist conception of scientific kno*led"e. Consider first the pl)rality of concept)al schemes *ithin a sin"le discipline. 8t is a tr)ism that *hen *e employ a relatively small finite voca!)lary to form)late descriptions of comple7 systems, the respects of similarity and difference *hich "ro)nd the definitions of the primitive terms *e )se *ill not e7ha)st the e7planatorily or predictively important respects of similarity and difference. (he remainin" e7planatorily important distinctions m)st !e capt)red !y more comple7 descriptions "enerated from the !asic voca!)lary. (h)s there *ill al*ays !e some ar!itrarinessFsome conventionality in the !road senseFin the choice of concept)al frame*orks in any comple7 in<)iry. (his tr)ism is )ncontroversial and it certainly poses no pro!lem for the realist *ho holds that the respects of similarity and difference involved are reflections of socially )nconstr)cted ca)sal str)ct)res. .Perhaps it poses a pro!lem for the constr)ctivistFJhy don3t *e 5)st socially constr)ct a simpler *orld=F!)t that3s not the iss)e here.2 (h)s the conventionality of choice of concept)al schemes is apparently somethin" *hich the realist can cheerf)lly ackno*led"e. 8t is tr)e, of co)rse, that s)ch conventionality raises methodolo"ical pro!lems for realist friends of e7perimental metaphysics: one m)st someho* !e s)re that one3s metaphysical lessons are not dra*n from feat)res of scientific theories *hich are conventional in this *ay. B)t that is a pro!lem for realists in their e7perimental+ metaphysician moods, not a pro!lem for defenders of 2@2C. Consider no* the interest+dependence of concept)al schemes. 8n a ca)sally comple7 *orld the respects of similarity and difference in ca)sal po*ers *hich are predictive or e7planatory of one sort of phenomenon .or of certain aspects of a "iven sort of phenomenon2 *ill not typically !e those *hich are important for phenomena of different sorts or for different aspects of the same phenomena. (h)s it is )ns)rprisin" that the voca!)lary and concept)al schemes s)ited to one sort of in<)iry *ill )s)ally !e

)ns)ited to in<)iry *ith different e7planatory or predictive aims. ?ere a"ain there is nothin" to tro)!le the realist. (he appropriateness of a scheme of classification depends on the p)rposes or interests in the service of *hich it is to !e )sed, !)t there is nothin" here to indicate that the ca)sal str)ct)res *hich the vario)s concept)al schemes map o)t depend nonca)sally on h)man interests and desires or on social practices. (hat concept)al schemes are 6mind+dependent6 in the *ay indicated s)""ests nothin" >antian or @eo+>antian. (here is no threat to 2@2C. (here remains one additional ro)te to @+> constr)ctivism alon" similar ; 19$ ; lines. -cientific realism does open )p the possi!ility of scientific metaphysics, and most scientific realists are materialistsFeither materialists "enerally, or at least materialists a!o)t the s)!5ect matters of the vario)s special sciences incl)din" psycholo"y. 8t may !e reasona!ly ar")ed that in the present dialectical sit)ation pla)si!le realist philosophical packa"es *ill em!ody a commitment to materialism. 8f this is conceded, then it follo*s that the realist *ill !e o!li"ed to offer a materialist interpretation of each of the pl)rality of concept)al schemes appropriate to scientific in<)iry. (his re<)irement, it mi"ht !e ar")ed, fatally compromises the realist3s endorsement of concept)al pl)ralismFa materialist interpretation of a theory or concept)al scheme m)st !e red)ctive, so the realist m)st hold that the concept)al reso)rces of any scientific disco)rse are )ltimately red)ci!le to those of some standard version of physical theory. (he o!5ection is co"ent 5)st in case it is impossi!le for the realist to defend a nonred)ctionist )nderstandin" of materialism. (here is a certain irony here. A nonred)ctionist )nderstandin" of materialism is availa!le to the realist !ut not to the e#piricist or to the constructi&ist . ?ere is *hy: :aterialism asserts that all phenomena .or all phenomena in the relevant domain2 are composed of physical phenomena. 8n partic)lar it asserts that all ca)sal po*ers and mechanisms are composite from physical ca)sal po*ers and mechanisms. Bor the empiricist s)ch ca)sal talk m)st red)ce to talk a!o)t the ded)ctive s)!s)mption of the relevant la*s and la*like "enerali4ations )nder the la*s of physics, and that in t)rn re<)ires .in conse<)ence of Crai"3s theorem2 that the voca!)lary of those la*s and "enerali4ations !e red)ci!le to that of the la*s of physics. -imilarly, for the constr)ctivist, physical .!iolo"ical, psycholo"ical, historical . . . 2 ca)sation is socially constr)cted in the practices of physicists .!iolo"ists, psycholo"ists, historians . . . 2, so to say that the ca)sal po*ers or mechanisms operatin" in some other discipline are composite from physical po*ers or mechanism is to say that there is a red)ctive relation of some sort !et*een the concepts and practices of the other discipline and those of physics. In a realist )nderstandin", !y contrast, ca)sal po*ers, mechanisms, and the like are phenomena concept)ally and metaphysically independent of o)r concept)al schemes, and the *ays in *hich po*ers, mechanisms, particles, and so on a""re"ate to form composite phenomena is not a concept)al matter !)t a matter of the theory+independent ca)sal str)ct)res of the relevant phenomena. (h)s on a realist analysis materialism is not in need of, and does not possess, a red)ctionist analysis of the sort at iss)e .8 develop this and related themes in Boyd 19/&!, 19/92. (h)s if realists sho)ld !e materialists .despite the methodolo"ical diffic)lties *ith e7perimental metaphysics disc)ssed earlier, 8 think they sho)ld2, they are entitled to form)late and defend philosophical packa"es that provide a nonred)ctionist )nderstandin" of materialism, one compati!le *ith a pl)rality of m)t)ally irred)ci!le scientific concept)al schemes. 8ncidentally, since !oth

; 191 ; materialism and the m)t)al irred)ci!ility of theoretical conceptions in science are independently attractive positions, the capacity of realism to accommodate them !oth *hen empiricism and constr)ctivism cannot is an additional point in its favor.

7:8. "ultural %luralismD #lternati+e "onceptions of olerance

-ophisticated constr)ctivism reflectin" a dialectically comple7 conception of conventionality *ill mirror realism in its treatment of semantic and methodolo"ical commens)ra!ility for standard cases in the history of science, !)t the sophisticated constr)ctivist has an option not open to the realist. Jhenever t*o traditions of in<)iry are s)fficiently different that there are no compellin" ar")ments for methodolo"ical or semantic commens)ra!ility, the constr)ctivist is free to dia"nose a partic)larly deep form of methodolo"ical and semantic incommens)ra!ility: that *hich o!tains !et*een traditions involved in different episodes of *orld makin". (he availa!ility of this option has often !een taken as providin" a 5)stification for constr)ctivism on the "ro)nds that its e7ercise, in some or all cases of the sort in <)estion, provides the appropriate remedy to c)lt)ral cha)vinism. Jhere the 6Jestern scientific o)tlook,6 say, conflicts *ith that reflected in the tradition of some preind)strial tri!al c)lt)re, an analysis accordin" to *hich the t*o traditions represent different episodes of *orld makin" precl)des on o)r part any sort of condescension !ased on the conviction that participants in the other tradition are irrational or f)ndamentally *ron". Both rationality and tr)th are differently constr)cted in o)r t*o traditions. 8t is important to see *hat is not at iss)e here. 8n the first place, it is not at iss)e that sometimes, *hen there is a translation scheme that appears to esta!lish semantic commens)ra!ility !et*een t*o traditions of in<)iry, there *ill !e a !etter semantic conception that diminishes the apparent disa"reement !et*een the traditions perhaps at the e7pense of semantic commens)ra!ility. 8t is f)lly compati!le *ith realism to hold for e7ample, a!o)t an apparent disa"reement !et*een a Jestern physician and a tri!al medical practitioner, that the tri!al terms initially translated as 6disease6 and 6c)re6 really have different meanin"s and different extensions than the En"lish terms offered as their translation, that their meanin"s and e7tensions are not e7pressi!le in En"lish, and that *hen properly )nderstood the tri!al practitioner3s vie*s are more acc)rate than they appear to !e on the initial translation. Jhere the realist3s and the constr)ctivist3s options differ here is that their acco)nts of the semantics of the relevant lan")a"es and of the acc)racy of the different theories are s)!5ect to different constraints. (he constr)ctivist may cheerf)lly hold that some tri!al term 6d6 means 6conditions ca)sed !y demons,6 has as its e7tension the set of conditions that are so ca)sed, and has a non+n)ll e7tensionFall of this in the *orld socially constr)cted !y the relevant tri!al practice. (he realist co)ld say the same thin"s only if she co)ld ; 192 ; defend a philosophical packa"e in *hich the e7istence of demons is someho* reconciled *ith the apparent scientific evidence a"ainst their e7istenceFall this, of co)rse, in the sin"le *orld *hich she and !oth practitioners st)dy. (h)s *hile the strate"y of atten)atin" apparent disa"reements !et*een traditions of in<)iry !y dia"nosin" appropriate fail)res of semantic commens)ra!ility is availa!le to !oth realists and constr)ctivists, its applications are considera!ly more constrained for the realist.

:ore importantly, there is no iss)e a!o)t the cultural relati&ity of rational "ustification nor any issue a!out the extent of its applica!ility . ?ere is *hy: Both realists and constr)ctivists accept the accommodation thesis and the associated criti<)e of the hope for theory+independent methods of empirical investi"ation. (hey m)st a"ree that, insofar as rationality is a matter of epistemic responsi!ility, rationality is e7hi!ited !y the conscientio)s application of c)lt)rally transmitted standards of reasonin" and of epistemic practice. At least for a person *ith si"nificant e7pos)re to only one c)lt)ral tradition, there are no other possi!le standards for the assessment of her epistemic responsi!ility. :oreover, and this too is dictated !y any re5ection of the e7istence of theory+ independent methods, even cosmopolitan a"ents *ith e7perience of more than one c)lt)re are o!li"ed to assess conflict in c)lt)ral standards from a perspective someho* derived from their primary theoretical and practical commitments. (here 5)st are no other rational standards to apply. (h)s neither the realist nor the constr)ctivist lacks the reso)rces for e7plainin", in any case of conflictin" c)lt)ral standards of rationality, *hy it *o)ld !e inappropriate to take s)ch a conflict as indicative of a fail)re of rationalityFor of intelli"ence, or of any other co"nitive or moral virt)eFon the part of participants in the other c)lt)re. Inly the empiricist *ho !elieves in a priori 5)stifia!le theory+ne)tral standards of rationality lacks s)ch reso)rcesFand perhaps only a caricat)re of an empiricist, since any philosopher *ho !elieves that s)ch standards e7ist *ill s)rely hold that their discovery *o)ld re<)ire developments in statistical theory of s)fficient comple7ity that it is to no one3s discredit as a rational a"ent not to have lived in a c)lt)re in *hich they have !een achieved. Almost certainly the main antidotes to cha)vinist dia"noses of the irrationality of other c)lt)res are political rather than philosophical, !)t insofar as philosophical remedies are so)"ht, they are as readily availa!le to the realist as to the constr)ctivist. Jhat the realist cannot doFas the constr)ctivist canFis to offer an acco)nt of the relation !et*een traditions of in<)iry *hich ")arantees that neither could !e !etter than the other at mappin" ca)sal str)ct)res or metaphysical reality !eca)se they represent independent instances of *orld constr)ction. (h)s a certain sort of ")arantee of tolerance is availa!le only to the constr)ctivist. -ho)ld this co)nt in favor of the constr)ctivist perspective= If co)rse, if the availa!ility of this sort of ontolo"ical tolerance is seen as advanta"eo)s, its advanta"es *ill have to !e *ei"hed a"ainst the n)mero)s ; 19# ; philosophical disadvanta"es of @+> constr)ctivism already dia"nosed. B)t it is not in any event o!vio)s that there is an advanta"e at all. 8f !ein" a constr)ctivist is never havin" to say they3re *ron", it is never havin" to say *e3re *ron" either. 8f the !asic metaphysical pres)ppositions of any frame*ork of in<)iry are taken to !e !asically correct !y convention, then this is tr)e of one3s o*n frame*ork, and a certain conception of open+mindednessF!ein" *illin" to consider the possi!ility that others3 conceptions are in some *ays s)perior to one3s o*nFis compromised. (he latter claim may !e made precise. (he follo*in" principleFcall it the insight thesis Fis a conse<)ence of the accommodation thesis: -)ppose that a !ody of research practice *ithin a research tradition has proved systematically s)ccessf)l in achievin" some sort of kno*led"e. (hen its s)ccess provides "ood evidence that the theoretical principles and methodolo"ical practices that have "overned that research reflect an insi"ht into the causal structures of the pheno#ena under study . (his thesis is common to constr)ctivists, realists, and sophisticated empiricists, !)t its interpretation depends cr)cially on the philosophical perspective from *hich it is advanced. Bor either a realist or a

sophisticated empiricist, the ca)sal str)ct)res referred to are feat)res of the )ni<)e act)al *orld, *hereas for the constr)ctivist the reference to ca)sal str)ct)res in the form)lation of the insi"ht thesis is reference to ca)sal str)ct)res in the *orld socially constr)cted !y the research tradition *ithin *hich the s)ccesses in <)estion occ)rred. 8n the li"ht of these differences consider the follo*in":

#n #ntichau+inist %rinciple for %roCectibility Jud*ments 5ithin a Research radition

-)ppose that it is discovered a!o)t a tradition (3 other than ( that .a2 ( and (3 share to some e7tent a common s)!5ect matter and .!2 in<)irers .or practitioners2 in (3 possess skill or sophistication a!o)t some theoretical or practical iss)es concernin" that common s)!5ect matter ro)"hly compara!le to that of in<)irers and practitioners in (. (hen, prima facie, the doctrine that the theories employed !y *orkers in (3 in their s)ccessf)l endeavors em!ody an appro7imation to the tr)th a!o)t the ca)sal str)ct)res of the phenomena that make )p that common s)!5ect matter m)st !e co)nted as pro5ecti!le in (.

"orollary
(he discovery of the relevant sort of commonality of s)!5ect matter *ith a sophisticated tradition makes relevant feat)res of that tradition internal to the tradition *ithin *hich the discovery of commonality takes place. (he reco"nition of relevantly sophisticated traditions alternative to ( sharin" a common s)!5ect matter dictates a correspondin" 6open+mindedness6 *ithin ( e&en %hen the t%o traditions are such that #ethodological co##ensura!ility !et%een the# fails to hold . ; 19% ; Each of these principles is entailed !y the insi"ht principle, !)t for constr)ctivistsFand not for realists or sophisticated empiricistsFtheir application is restricted to those cases in *hich the traditions ( and (3 are part of a common episode of the social constr)ction of reality. 8n precisely those cases in *hich constr)ctivism is s)pposed to provide an antidote to cha)vinismFthose in *hich the constr)ctivist portrays the apparently competin" traditions as em!odyin" different episodes of *orld constr)ctionF the force of the open+mindedness principle is lost. (he cost of metaphysical ins)rance a"ainst treatin" other traditions as mistaken is imm)nity from the re<)irement that one take them serio)sly. Even if it *ere not for the deep technical diffic)lties *ith @+> constr)ctivism, it is not clear that this *o)ld !e the version of c)lt)ral tolerance to endorse.

7:9. Realism and Unity of 2no5led*eD "oncludin* Scientific %ostscript

Ine line of ar")ment in metaphilosophy has it that a "enerally nat)ralistic conception of the s)!5ect matter and methods of philosophy is appropriate. @at)ralistic conceptions are correct in epistemolo"y, semantic theory, metaphysics, and ethics, and the reason they are correct is that philosophy is one of, or at any rate is contin)o)s *ith, the empirical sciences. .8t )s)ally "oes *ith this position to remind the reader that the empirical sciences are not *hat empiricists tho)"ht they *ere.2 8 am inclined to think that so#ething like this is ri"ht, !)t the interestin" task is to say 5)st *hat it is. (he res)lts of o)r in<)iry into the relative merits of realism and @+> constr)ctivism provide some indications of an ans*er.

8n the first place, if inference+r)le fo)ndationalism is serio)sly mistaken, as it appears to !e, then the accommodation thesis or its analo")e *ill hold a!o)t all or almost all !ranches of kno*led"e. Jhether this entails nat)ralism in epistemolo"y or not, it certainly entails that the epistemolo"y of in<)iry in any field m)st !e "ro)nded to a si"nificant e7tent either in the findin"s of that field or in a s)!stantive criti<)e of its findin"s and methods. .(he epistemolo"y of morals m)st !e "ro)nded to a si"nificant e7tent in moral theory, or in a criti<)e of moral theory and its methods, and similarly for social sciences, theolo"y, aesthetics, etc.2 8nsofar as the vario)s areas of h)man in<)iry are interconnected, epistemolo"ical theories m)st satisfy a re<)irement of inte"ration *ith the !est+s)!stantiated res)lts of all of the vario)s areas of in<)iry. -imilarly, once the possi!ility of e7perimental metaphysics is ackno*led"ed, any sort of h)man in<)iry m)st !e seen as potentially relevant to metaphysics, and th)s metaphysical theories too m)st face the re<)irement of inte"ration *ith the rest of o)r kno*led"e. Jhat seems dictated is that philosophyF alon" *ith all other disciplinesFis properly "overned !y a principle of )nity of in<)iry analo"o)s to the principle of )nity of science proposed !y empiricist philosophers of science: the res)lts of in<)iry in any area are potentially relevant to the assessment of the res)lts in any other. ; 19& ; (his principle of )nity of in<)iry seems philosophically attractiveD indeed, it seems to capt)re m)ch of the motivation for philosophical activity. 8t has, ho*ever, the conse<)ence thatFeven *hen the relations !et*een disciplines are )nderstood nonred)ctivelyFthere is some limit to disciplinary a)tonomy. (his fact has provided for some a motivation for a partic)lar kind of @+> constr)ctivism *hich portrays vario)s contemporary disciplines as reflectin" independent episodes of *orld constr)ction. Iften the aim is to save, for e7ample, the social sciences, the arts, literat)re, history, morals, or reli"ion from the threat of scientific criticism .6the imperialism of physics62. Heflection on the nonred)ctionist character of .realist2 materialism *ill indicate, 8 !elieve, that neither the social sciences, nor the arts, nor literat)re, nor history, nor morals are in any *ay challen"ed !y the sciences. .Bor the cr)cial case of morals see -t)r"eon 19/%a, 19/%!D :iller 19/%D Boyd 19//D Hailton 19/0.2 8n the case of most orthodo7 reli"ion, !y contrast, there does appear to !e a conflict *ith apparently *ell+ confirmed materialism. -ho)ld @+> constr)ctivism !e accepted in order to save reli"ion from scientific criti<)e= (he myriad metaphysical and epistemolo"ical diffic)lties facin" the artic)lation of constr)ctivist philosophical packa"es s)""est that the ans*er m)st !e 6no.6 -o too does the fact that constr)ctivism seems in "eneral ill+s)ited for the defense of open+mindedness. Binally, the denial of the f)ll applica!ility of the principle of )nity of in<)iry seems especially inappropriate for the defense of traditions of in<)iry *ith aims as synoptic as those of traditional theolo"y. 8 concl)de that a respect for the inte"rity of the aims of theolo"y as *ell as other deep philosophical considerations precl)des s)ch a move. (he scientific challen"e to reli"ion cannot !e made to "o a*ay.

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19/$ /he Scientific I#age . I7ford: I7ford University Press. ; 199 ;

Ei*ht. ,o 4e Need a /ierarchical -odel of ScienceB

,ideri0 Aatens Accordin" to hierarchical models of science, o)r scientific kno*led"e in the !roadest sense, incl)din" descriptive as *ell as methodolo"ical and eval)ative statements, forms a kno*led"e system or is em!edded in a lar"er kno*led"e system that has t*o properties: .i2 it is stratified, and .ii2 the items of some layer are or sho)ld !e 5)stified in terms of items of a hi"her layer. ?ierarchical models are deeply rooted in Jestern c)lt)re in "eneral. (hey are !oth vie*ed as descri!in" the nat)ral order in a variety of domains and as o)tstandin" pro!lem+solvin" environments.M1N :ost past philosophers e7plicitly or implicitly favored hierarchical models. (he vast ma5ority of those *ho vie* science as a rational enterprise *ill, if pressed, opt for a hierarchical model. Even those *ho re5ect hierarchical models often retain many of their aspects. 8 hope to sho*, first, that hierarchical models are affected !y a n)m!er of diffic)ltiesF8 shall !e !rief on this *ell+kno*n pointFand, ne7t, that *e need not try to repair them !eca)se there is a m)ch more attractive alternative *hich 8 shall try to spell o)t and ar")e for. (he alternative is the 6conte7t)al6 approach to meanin" and kno*led"e, em!edded in a relative+rationality vie*. 8 deal *ith only a fe* aspects of this approach here and refer to other p)!lications *here necessary, !)t 8 have tried to make the present te7t as self+contained as possi!le.M2N 8 !e"in *ith a historical remark. 8n section 2, 8 indicate some ma5or diffic)lties of the hierarchical .and the holistic2 model *ith respect to 5)stification. (he third and fo)rth sections are devoted to t*o central feat)res of the conte7t)al model. Bor the sake of e7pository clarity, 8 postpone the disc)ssion of some more f)ndamental pro!lems to the final section. ; 2$$ ;

'. /istorical Note

Jith respect to the kinds of certainty that scientists and philosophers of science are considered to have availa!le, one may distin")ish three periods since the seventeenth cent)ry. 8n the first period, the "eneral conviction *as that certainty may !e attained in at least three different domains: scientific method, o!servations, and scientific theories. 8n the second period, startin" aro)nd 1/2$11/#$, a falli!ilistic vie* on theories is "ainin" "ro)nd, !)t people stay convinced that certainty is availa!le in the t*o other domains. (hey have chan"ed their vie* on the scientific methodM#N !)t are convinced that the ne* vie* is the correct one. (hey !ecame more critical a!o)t o!servation, as may !e seen from the attention paid to the relation !et*een o!servation and so+called sensations, !)t sensations !ecame fashiona!le precisely !eca)se they *ere seen as a!sol)tely relia!le. At present *e are in a third period: a!sol)te certainty is "iven )p in all three domains. (heory+ladenness has !een decisive for the re5ection

of o!servational certainty, and many philosophers of science !ecame convinced that methodolo"ical r)les and methodolo"ical val)es may chan"e and indeed have !een chan"in" in the past. :ore importantly, they are convinced that it is, and al*ays *ill !e, impossi!le to artic)late the correct methodolo"y of science. -ome think this is so !eca)se this methodolo"y is too comple7 to !e kno*n and to !e spelled o)t. :arcello Pera .19//2 is one of them. B)t most philosophers of science simply "ave )p the idea of a timelessly correct scientific methodolo"y.M%N 8n the first period, and even in the second, to adopt a hierarchical model of science *as a most pla)si!le move. (he standard hierarchical model locates descriptive statements a!o)t the *orld, statements a!o)t facts and la*s, at the lo*est level, and methodolo"ical r)les at the second level. (he force of hierarchical models lies essentially in the fact that decisions at the lo*er level derive directly from the items at the hi"her level. 8f *e are certain a!o)t methods, *e are a!le to )nderstand the *ay in *hich *e attain certainty a!o)t facts and theories, the reasons for o)r mistakes at these levels, and the *ays in *hich *e may correct them. Ince direct certainty at the methodolo"ical level is "iven )p, the hierarchical model re<)ires )s to find a hi"her level at *hich certainty is availa!le and from *hich certainty a!o)t methods may !e derived. Jhen this failed, some moved to a mean*hile availa!le alternative: the holistic model. At least since the end of the nineteenth cent)ry a holistic vie* a!o)t science has !een takin" shape. Je find it to some e7tent *ith Pierre C)hem, for *hom it mainly concerns o!servations and theories. 8n the early *ritin"s of G)ine it takes a <)asi+)niversal form, applyin" also to lo"ic and methodolo"y. Jith >)hn, a form of the holistic model is claimed to !e historically acc)rate, and the model "ains respect from there. Accordin" to that model there are t*o loci for 5)stification: *ithin the kno*led"e system .res)ltin" in e7tensions of it2 and ; 2$1 ; a!o)t the choice !et*een overall systems. 8n 5)stificatory activities of the first type, the system as it stands is taken for "ranted, and e7tensions, perhaps even small modifications, are 5)d"ed in terms of their consistency .in a *eak sense2 or coherence. 8n choices !et*een overall systems, the only possi!le criterion seems a"ain to !e consistency or coherenceD 8 ret)rn to this in the ne7t section. Both models may !e com!ined, and in >)hn 1902 they are in a specific senseD ro)"hly, normal science follo*s a hierarchical model, paradi"m shifts are holistic in nat)re.

). %roblems 5ith the raditional -odels

Both the hierarchical and holistic model lead to a n)m!er of *ell+kno*n diffic)lties. ,arry ,a)dan ar")es that !oth models are act)ally pro!lematic from a descriptive as *ell as from an e7planatory point of vie*. ?e mentions that infl)ential proponents of hierarchical models arrived at the concl)sion that disa"reements on the level of co"nitive val)es or aimsFthe apparently hi"hest levelFcannot !e settled in a rational *ay. @otice that the holistic vie* leads to the same concl)sion. Com!inin" this *ith the "lo!al character of paradi"m chan"es, 6*e are forced to say that the vario)s shifts in the predominant "oals in science are 5)st part of the history of taste and fashion6 .,a)dan 19/%, &$2. ,a)dan offers s)!stantial ar")ments to sho*, first, that co"nitive aims are not in principle !eyond the reach of co"nitive decision and have indeed !een chan"in" in rational *ays, and, ne7t, that scientific chan"e need not and did not proceed accordin" to >)hn3s holistic model. Apart from these diffic)lties, !oth models are deeply pro!lematic as 5)stificatory mechanisms. (he

hierarchical model is !o)nd to lead either .i2 to an infinite re"ress, or .ii2 to a sta!le hi"hest level at *hich a!sol)te certainties are availa!le, or finally .iii2 to a merely instr)mental 5)stification that stops at the hi"hest level. 8f the hierarchical model is to lead to 5)stifications, then .i2 is )naccepta!le even in principle, apart from epistemolo"ical diffic)lties, .ii2 is )naccepta!le if the historical remark of the previo)s section is even ro)"hly correct, and .iii2 is )naccepta!le in vie* of the fact that, for any statement, one does act)ally find h)man !ein"s that disa"ree a!o)t it. :ore importantly, *e act)ally find disa"reements a!o)t very 6hi"h+level6 items, s)ch as aims and val)es, amon" sensi!le people *ho are !ein" serio)s and not in e7treme sit)ations .not enra"ed, dr)nk, etc.2. 8f a!sol)te certainty fails at some level, the certainty availa!le at lo*er levels is diffic)lt to ascertain, ho*ever strin"ent the 5)stification of the lo*er+level items in terms of the hi"her+level items. 8 think this is one of the main reasons for the recent discontent *ith hierarchical models. As soon as one accepts the falli!ility of methodolo"ical r)les, the 5)stificatory chain is !roken and the force of hierarchical models red)ces to nil. As a res)lt, some rec)rred to holistic models that had !een developed !y a minority. (hey have the advan+ ; 2$2 ; ta"e of not re<)irin" that hi"her levels !e al*ays more sta!le than lo*er ones, and of admittin" that the 5)stification of the f)ll systems is different in nat)re from 5)stification *ithin the system. @evertheless, the force of a 5)stification derivin" from a holistic model depends directly on the 5)stification of the choice !et*een overall systems. 8f this is not to !e a matter of taste, *e need a criterion or val)e s)persedin" all possi!le overall systems and independent of each of them, and *e a"ain st)m!le )pon the diffic)lty of resolvin" disa"reements a!o)t this criterion or val)e. :any seem convinced that consistency or coherence is a sensi!le candidate, !)t this derives from a mistaken vie* on lo"ic. (here are different notions of consistency and coherenceD they have to f)nction as elements of overall systems and *ill take a different form and especially different *ei"hts in s)ch systems. Ither people rec)rred to pra"matic ar")ments, !)t these clearly cannot resolve all disa"reements in a final *ay. (his is not the place to disc)ss the proposals !y *hich adherents of hierarchical and holistic models have tried to overcome these diffic)lties.M&N 8 merely *anted to point o)t that the diffic)lties are there, !oth *ith respect to e7planation and *ith respect to 5)stification, and that they cannot !e overcome )nless !y reachin" a!sol)te 5)stification and rock+!ottom certainty. 8n my vie*, *e do not have to contin)e this )nendin" <)est, !oth !eca)se of the historical reasons sketched !efore and !eca)se of epistemolo"ical reasons .see Batens 19'%, 19'/2. Before leavin" the matter, let me point o)t t*o thin"s that are perhaps indications rather than ar")ments !)t nevertheless seem relevant. ?ierarchical as *ell as holistic models pres)ppose that kno*in" s)!5ects are a!le to deal *ith overall systems of kno*led"e, hierarchically ordered or not, that they are a!le to relate specific choices to s)ch systems, and, at least for the holistic model, that they are a!le to arrive at a 5)stified choice !et*een them. 8t seems to me that h)mans do not have these capa!ilities. @o h)man f)lly overvie*s even one s)!stantiated overall system. @o h)man disposes of a complete and detailed system of norms and val)es. Je co)nt o)rselves happy to dispose of a fe* realistic alternatives no* and then, and to have some ar")ments to choose one rather than the other. And even then *e reali4e that other alternatives may !e discovered in the f)t)re, and that ne* ar")ments may come )p. :oreover, neither of the t*o models takes into acco)nt .i2 that h)man !ein"s necessarily perform a n)m!er of activities that are !eyond their conscio)s control, and .ii2 that h)man !ein"s are s)!5ect to mechanisms !elon"in" to the domain of the social sciences.M0N 8n other *ords,

!oth types of models pres)ppose a model of man accordin" to *hich kno*led"e ac<)isition, if not all h)man activity, is a matter of conscio)s deli!erationFa model $no%n to !e false. :y concl)sion is that *e need a model of science *hich is !oth less pretentio)s and more realistic. (he model *e need sho)ld .i2 !e closer to act)al ; 2$# ; 5)stificatory processes, .ii2 not re<)ire a!sol)te certainties in any domain, .iii2 allo* in principle for chan"es in any part of o)r kno*led"e system, and .iv2 not re<)ire that *e ever move 6a!ove6 o)r kno*led"e system and its kno*n alternatives in order to choose !et*een them.

3. "ontextual %roblemGsol+in*
8n order to clarify the alternative approach, 8 shall consider t*o of its feat)res. (he present section concerns pro!lem solvin", the ne7t deals *ith the str)ct)re of the kno*led"e system. (he !asic idea is that pro!lems are not solved *ith respect to the f)ll kno*led"e system !)t %ithin specific pro!le#3sol&ing situations , *hich 8 shall call contexts for short. A conte7t consists of a n)m!er of elements *hich 8 !riefly en)merate: .i2 (he pro!lem one tries to solve. .ii2 (he participants. (here may !e one, !)t also more, for e7ample if people cooperate to solve a pro!lem or have an intellect)al fi"ht a!o)t somethin". 8n "eneral the conte7t *ill !e different for each participant. (o stip)late other*ise *o)ld lead to an )nrealistic and simplistic approach and *o)ld res)lt in s*eepin" a lot of important diffic)lties )nder the carpet. .iii2 (he conte7t)al certainties. (hese are statements that are relevant to the pro!lem and are considered as conte7t)ally !eyond disc)ssion. (hey define the possi!le ans*ers to the pro!lem as *ell as the conte7t)al meanin"s of the terms. E7amples of conte7t)al certainties are easily provided: a set of physical la*s for an en"ineer desi"nin" a !rid"eD properties of the employed instr)ments for la!oratory e7perimentsD some properties of paper and pencils for me *ritin" this te7t. 8 *ill ar")e later that no conte7t)al certainty is common to all conte7ts. .iv2 (he statements that are considered relevant to the pro!lem and tr)e or "iven *ithin the conte7t. By 6relevant6 8 mean t*o different thin"s. Birst, it matters *ith respect to the sol)tion of the pro!lem *hether *e incl)de s)ch a statement or notD for e7ample, the position of the moon is irrelevant to a chemical e7periment. :oreover, the tr)th of these statements sho)ld not !e determined !y the conte7t)al certainties. 8n other *ords, they sho)ld !e lo"ically contin"entD keep in mind that lo"ical tr)th is a conte7t)al notion, determined !y the conte7t)al certainties. .v2 (he methodolo"ical r)les or, in "eneral, normative r)les and eval)ative statements that are 5)d"ed appropriate for the sol)tion of the pro!lem. 6:ethodolo"ical r)les6 sho)ld !e taken in the !road sense, incl)din" r)les to handle meas)rin" instr)ments as *ell as, for e7ample, a specific ind)ctive method in the sense of Carnap. -ome or all of these r)les may !e he)ristic. ; 2$% ; (he pro!lem is defined !y .ii2, .iii2, and .v2. 8f a sol)tion is possi!le *ithin the conte7t as it stands .and is a matter of reasonin", not, e."., of o!servation or action2, the sol)tion is 6derived6 from .iv2. 8t

follo*s that the elements of a conte7t are not independent of one another. Je only kno* *hat the pro!lem is if *e have specified the constraints on its sol)tion, and these are determined !y the other elements of the conte7t. Also, 8 already mentioned the dependence !et*een .iii2 and .iv2. Ine of the main advanta"es of the conte7t)al approach is that pro!lems are not solved 6in the open6 and not even *ith respect to some kno*led"e system, !)t *ith respect to somethin" m)ch more specific, *hich 8 called a conte7t. 8t is important to point o)t at once that the certainties, tr)ths, and methodolo"ical r)les are all conte7t)al. (he fact that the properties of some instr)ment are considered !eyond disc)ssion *ithin a "iven conte7t does not prevent one from <)estionin" and investi"atin" these properties in another conte7t. (he fact that an en"ineer considers some physical la* as certain in a "iven conte7t does not even entail that it is a la* of contemporary physics .it may act)ally !e re5ected2. Another point *hich 8 sho)ld stress is that conte7ts are very small and specific.M'N 8t may t)rn o)t that some piece of information necessary to solve the pro!lem is missin"D or that the set)p of the conte7t is incomplete and hence that the pro!lem is not *ell+definedD or that the constraints contained in the conte7t, *hether certainties or methods, are inconsistent or incoherent. 8n all s)ch cases ne*, deri&ed pro!lems are "enerated, the sol)tion of *hich !elon"s to other conte7ts. (hese pro!lems may incl)de s)ch <)estions as 6Jhat *as *ron" *ith the ori"inal conte7t=6 or 6?o* likely is it that the derived pro!lem may !e solved=6 or 6?o* important *as the ori"inal pro!lem=6 After the derived pro!lems are solvedFsometimes *e decide to "ive )pFone may ret)rn to the ori"inal pro!lem. (his does not mean, ho*ever, that one ret)rns to the ori"inal conte7t. (he very fact that the derived pro!lem has !een solved *ill entail that the ne* conte7t is different from the old. A f)rther proliferation of conte7ts *ill occ)r if more than one participant is involved. Cisa"reements of all kinds may lead to ne* pro!lems that have to !e solved !efore the ori"inal pro!lem may !e tackled. (his o!tains for disa"reements a!o)t relevant tr)ths, conte7t)al certainties, and so on. Hemem!er in this connection that conte7t)al certainties are directly related to the meanin"s people attach to *ords. 8 hope all this makes it clear that pro!lem sol)tions may re<)ire considerin" a "reat n)m!er of related pro!lems and movin" thro)"h a "reat n)m!er of conte7ts. 8 skip the disc)ssion on the *ay in *hich pro!lems may !e "enerated. ,et me 5)st mention that the proliferation of pro!lems is c)t do*n !y at least t*o mechanisms. Birst, one may choose !et*een pro!lems on the !asis of their importance and the prospects for their sol)tion. @e7t, one sho)ld not "enerate ; 2$& ; pro!lems )nless there is a "ood reason to do so. 8t is perfectly all ri"ht to reflect )pon one3s kno*led"e system, !eca)se this )s)ally leads to <)ite "ood reasons to consider ne* pro!lems, !)t it is not sensi!le in "eneral to "enerate pro!lems for their o*n sake. By all means, *e are not short of )r"ent and important pro!lems. ,et me s)mmari4e some f)rther materials on conte7t)al pro!lem+solvin" !y listin" some theses. (hey are all specified and defended at len"th in Batens 19/&, *ith the e7ception of thesis /, *hich is dealt *ith in Batens 19/#, and of thesis 9, to *hich 8 ret)rn in section &. 1. (here is no hi"hest conte7t. 8n "eneral, one conte7t cannot !e said to !e hi"her .in a transitive sense of the term2 than anotherD see also section &. 2. A conte7t)al certainty, a relevant tr)th, or a methodolo"ical r)le of a conte7t C1 may !e the pro!lem of a conte7t C2.

#.

may !e certain or relevantly tr)e in C1 *hereas not+ is certain or relevantly tr)e in C2.

%. @o statement is conte7t)ally certain *ith respect to all pro!lems. (he idea of a corpus of accepted statements, as defended !y 8saac ,evi .19/$2, sho)ld !e re5ected. &. All conte7t)al certainties are logical certainties, and all lo"ical certainties are conte7t)al. (his is related to thesis 1 and entails thesis 0. 0. :eanin"s vary from one conte7t to another, and not only from one lan")a"e to another or from one person to another. '. Comm)nication does not re<)ire that people assi"n the same meanin"s to *ords. @ot*ithstandin" 0, comm)nication may !e defined in an ade<)ate *ay: people that have completely different 6*orldvie*s6 may nevertheless comm)nicate perfectly on a n)m!er of pro!lems. /. (his notion of comm)nication ena!les )s to solve a n)m!er of pro!lems connected *ith incommens)ra!ility. 9. -ome pro!lems are solved in an )nconscio)s *ay. (his fact is not a diffic)lty for the present approach. 8ncidentally, if one *ere to deny it, one *o)ld have to define !asic pro!lems. (he tro)!le *ith these is <)ite analo"o)s to the one pointed o)t in connection *ith !asic actions !y Annette Baier .19'92. ?ere are some materials from the literat)re !y *hich the present approach may !e s)!stantiated in a direct *ay: .12 Philosophy of science: in the first place a lar"e part of ,arry ,a)dan3s *orkD on more specific topics, *ork !y (om @ickles and others on scientific discovery and pro!lem solvin" in "eneralD remarks on <)estion dynamics and <)estion dialectics !y @icholas Hescher. .22 ,o"ic: a treas)re of res)lts may !e fo)nd in Jaakko ?intikka3s *ork on dialo")es and <)estionsD also relevant are res)lts on the same topics !y ,ennart ; 2$0 ; ]<vist, H)th :anor, and !y Histo ?ilpinen and other people from the 6?intikka school.6 .#2 Artificial intelli"ence: a lot of fascinatin" res)lts on pro!lem solvin" and he)ristics are fo)nd in the *ork of ?er!ert -imon, the :8( "ro)p, and the -tanford "ro)p. (he idea of he)ristic pro"rams that transform themselves is central for the conte7t)al alternative. Also, this approach fits in <)ite *ell *ith res)lts evolvin" from co"nitive science,M/N action theory, and other recent developments in the social sciences in "eneral. Altho)"h it is o!vio)s that the vie* propo)nded in this section r)ns co)nter to hierarchical models of science, the reader may *onder ho* the information needed to set )p conte7ts and res)ltin" from pro!lem solvin" is or"ani4ed and stored. Co hierarchical models crop )p in this connection= 8n the ne7t section 8 *ill ar")e that the ans*er to this <)estion is ne"ative.

6. he 2no5led*e System
(he kno*led"e system contains elements of many kinds: fact)al, nomolo"ical, normative, eval)ative, and so on. Brom this system *e take the items *e need to set )p conte7ts, and to the system *e add res)lts of pro!lem solvin" and attempted pro!lem solvin". (he elements of the kno*led"e system are

accompanied !y indices that point to the function of these elements *ith respect to the sol)tion of pro!lems or types of pro!lems. Unlike *hat one mi"ht e7pect, the elements of the kno*led"e system may not in "eneral !e classified as certainties, tr)ths, or methodolo"ical r)les. Hather, an element may occ)r in the kno*led"e system *ith different indices that point to different f)nctions *ith respect to different pro!lems. ?o* do *e set )p a conte7t for a partic)lar pro!lem= Birst of all, it is important to reali4e that a pro!lem never comes 6completely open6 !)t is al*ays specified to some e7tent. 8f the specification is ins)fficient, *e first have to consider a derived pro!lem. Jhen *e start solvin" a pro!lem, *e f)rther s)pplement the incomplete conte7t *ith elements of the kno*led"e system that are related !y their indices to this pro!lem or to pro!lems of this type. 8f someone performs an e7periment to o!tain an ans*er to a specific <)estion, he or she *ill take from his or her kno*led"e system the relevant data concernin" the e7perimental set)p, the actions to !e performed, the meas)rin" instr)ments, the r)les "overnin" these instr)ments, the n)m!er of meas)rements that *arrant a relia!le avera"e res)lt, and so on. :ost of these data *ill pertain to a connected set of conte7ts rather than to a sin"le conte7t. 8f one is in do)!t a!o)t the set)p of the conte7t, or if the conte7t t)rns o)t to !e incoherent or incomplete in some other *ay, one first moves to a derived pro!lem. Ince a .derived or 6primitive62 pro!lem is solved, *e may add its sol)tion ; 2$' ; to o)r kno*led"e system. 8ncidentally, if *e decide to stop attemptin" to solve a pro!lemFfor e7ample, !eca)se its sol)tion seems !eyond reach or not *orth the tro)!leFthis decision is itself a sol)tion to a derived pro!lem and may in that capacity !e added to o)r kno*led"e system. Jhether or not some sol)tion *ill !e added, and *hether it *ill later !e removed or replaced .or *ill !e for"otten2, depends to some e7tent on )nconscio)s mechanisms. Philosophers mi"ht *orry a!o)t the ori"in of o)r very first kno*led"e system. G)ite o!vio)sly, it is the res)lt of a comple7 process that takes place d)rin" o)r yo)th. (he process is to a lar"e e7tent determined !y mechanisms that remain !eyond .o)r and others32 conscio)s control. Je can only hope o)r ori"inal system is s)fficiently open to allo* for 5)stified improvements.M9N Apart from this, 8 think, there is nothin" partic)lar here that a philosopher sho)ld *orry a!o)t. B)t remark that the ans*er s)its the conte7t)al model, *hereas hierarchical models have a m)ch harder pro!lem here. ?opin" that the "eneral pict)re is clear, 8 t)rn to the *ay in *hich the items of o)r kno*led"e system are ordered *ith respect to conte7ts. 8 maintain that *e need .and act)ally introd)ce2 only t*o kinds of order here. (he first consists in the fact that some elements are linked to types of pro!lems rather than to specific pro!lems. Bor e7ample, statements and r)les a!o)t meas)rin" instr)ments concern *hole sets of pro!lems. (he same o!tains for ind)ctive methods and for ded)ctive systems. (he second kind of order derives from the fact that elements of o)r kno*led"e system may !e 5oined into connected and coherent *holes. (he t*o forms of order are related in that the latter appears to !e a more ela!orated and s)!stantiated version of the former. Je appear to have a need for coherent s)!systems, the reasons !ein" no* intellect)al, then practical. 8 mention some e7amples that pres)ma!ly occ)r in most people3s kno*led"e systems. :ost of )s have a "eneral vie* of the *orld, *hich *e try to make compati!le *ith present+day scientific theories, and *hich sho)ld ena!le )s to )nderstand o)r environment. (his "eneral vie* sho)ld !e more coherent than o)r kno*led"e system in "eneral. (o its statements *e apply criteria for truth , at least if *e are intentional realists, and to the connected methodolo"ical r)les *e apply criteria for correctness that are stron"er than the correctness criteria applied to most other r)les. (his "eneral

vie* contains the sol)tion to a n)m!er of pro!lems and sho)ld form a s)ita!le !asis for the sol)tion of a lar"e set of potential pro!lems. 8f *e have to e7tend or modify o)r kno*led"e system in order to solve some e7planatory pro!lem, *e shall try to e7tend or modify specifically this s)!system. Philosophers of science have concentrated too e7cl)sively on this "eneral e7planatory theory and have erroneo)sly identified it *ith the set of contemporary accepted scientific theories.M1$N -ometimes they even identify it *ith the f)ll kno*led"e system. Bor this reason, 8 stress that scientific theories form, separately and !y sets, s)!systems of the kno*led"e system *hich are m)t)ally different as *ell as different from the "eneral e7+ ; 2$/ ; planatory theory, and 8 at once "ive some other e7amples of connected and coherent s)!systems. Je all handle a s)!system pertainin" to the o!5ects of everyday life: doors, type*riters, !)ses, hammers, and so on. Je *ant it to contain more than 5)st data a!o)t the )s)al f)nctions of these o!5ects. Bor e7ample, *e *ant not only data a!o)t hammers that ")ide )s in hammerin" nails in a plank !)t also data that ena!le )s to )se a hammer for, say, liftin" some o!5ect or keepin" somethin" from !ein" !lo*n a*ay. Altho)"h these data clearly pres)ppose a lot of nomolo"ical order in the *orld, *e do not need detailed scientific e7planations for them. 8f yo) *ant other e7amples, consider the so+called conte7t of p)rs)it: a relatively ne* theory may !e doin" a lot *orse than one of its esta!lished competitors !)t may nevertheless !e promisin" eno)"h to !e *orked o)t f)rther. Ir think a!o)t the set of norms and val)es that are applied !y a person *ho composes a piece of m)sic. Connected and coherent s)!systems are, fort)nately, not f)lly independent of one another. -ome are contained in .form s)!systems of2 others. 8t is temptin" to e7tend the incl)sion to conte7ts. ?o*ever, it rarely occ)rs that all certainties or all relevant statements of one conte7t also !elon" to some other conte7t, and hence incl)sion seems not very helpf)l to systemati4e conte7ts. 8f 8 am ri"ht, the )nification of the kno*led"e system *ill improve o)r capacity to set )p conte7ts s)ccessf)lly, !)t conte7ts themselves are only indirectly related. -ometimes, one s)!system is not incl)ded in another !)t is *ithin certain limits s)pplemented *ith items from the other. Bor e7ample, all statements deriva!le from the "eneral e7planatory theory *ill, insofar as they are relevant there, and )nless there are e7plicit reasons not to do so, !e added to the s)!system related to everyday o!5ects. Another nice e7ample is the s)!system formed *hile readin" a novel. -pecific statements from the novel are s)pplemented *ith items from other s)!systems insofar as consistency allo*s. Amon" the other s)!systems may !e the one concernin" everyday o!5ects, !)t also the "eneral e7planatory system, some scientific theories .especially for science fiction novels2, or s)!systems of val)es. 8n one typical and interestin" case, the s)!system )nder constr)ction has to !e restr)ct)red several timesFa 6trick6 fre<)ently )sed !y :ar<)e4D in another, the constr)ction of the s)!system for the novel leads to chan"es in the s)!systems from *hich s)pplementary information is takenFfor e7ample, if the reader3s val)e 5)d"ments appear )ntena!le *ith respect to the constr)cted system. Ither relations !et*een s)!systems play a role in increasin" the order of o)r kno*led"e system. A connected methodolo"ical system M may !e associated *ith a s)!system S . (he elements of M *ill play a role in settin" )p conte7ts for pro!lems the sol)tion of *hich sho)ld !e deriva!le from S , !)t )s)ally M *ill !e too poor to set )p the fifth element of the conte7ts. (he elements of M *ill rather pertain to the overall eval)ation or e7tension of S .

; 2$9 ; @e7t, instr)ctions a!o)t settin" )p derived conte7ts may !e associated *ith a s)!systemD for e7ample, specific instr)ctions for meas)rements are associated *ith most scientific theories. :oreover, the kno*led"e system may contain statements a!o)t the m)t)al relevance of the kno*led"e items of a s)!systemD *e have a lar"e n)m!er of va")e theories a!o)t the kinds of mechanisms that mi"ht o!tain in reality, and s)ch theories f)nction, practically speakin", as theories a!o)t relevance.M11N An analo"o)s !)t *eaker mechanism may apply if kno*led"e items of one s)!system do not occ)r in another, or if their ne"ation occ)rs in the other. 8f there is a discrepancy !et*een the s)!system related to everyday o!5ects and the scientific theories, a *ell+for"ed kno*led"e system sho)ld contain information a!o)t the reasons for it, and for the relia!ility of the scientific theory *ith respect to everyday o!5ects. (he order in o)r kno*led"e systems is arrived at !y rather simple means. 8f *e are )na!le to set )p an ade<)ate conte7t for a "iven pro!lem, *e *ill check *hether the pro!lem is of a specific type and *ill in<)ire *hether elements of o)r kno*led"e system that are linked to other pro!lems of the sa#e type may !e linked to all pro!lems of this type. Ir else *e *ill check *hether the pro!lem !elon"s to the type for *hich some s)!system is relevant. 8f a sol)tion *as not deriva!le from the relevant statements of its .s)ita!ly constr)cted2 conte7t, the s)!system from *hich these derive is clearly incomplete. Je *ill move on to derived pro!lems, introd)cin" the conte7t)al re<)irement that the sol)tion of the ori"inal pro!lem sho)ld !e compati!le, and even in some stricter sense coherent, *ith the relevant s)!system. 8f this restriction has to !e "iven )p in order to arrive at a sol)tion, *e shall have to restr)ct)re the s)!system. 8n the aforementioned cases, the order of o)r kno*led"e system is increased as a side effect of specific pro!lem sol)tions. Je may also p)rposef)lly introd)ce pro!lems directed at increasin" the order in o)r kno*led"e system. 8f *e discover that o)r pro!lem+solvin" capa!ilities are lo* for a "iven type of pro!lem, *e may start lookin" for kno*led"e elements that may !e linked to all pro!lems of this type, or *e may try to s)!s)me the pro!lems )nder a s)!system or !)ild a ne* s)!system for them. Conversely, if *e discover a ne* kno*led"e element or s)!system that proves effective for the sol)tion of some pro!lem, *e may look for types of pro!lems to *hich this element may !e linked. Binally, *e may rely on relations !et*een s)!systems in order to e7tend or modify some of them. ,et me end this section *ith some remarks on )nification. Jitho)t any do)!t, the ideal state of o)r kno*led"e system *o)ld !e that it form a sin"le consistent and complete, perfectly connected system to *hich all s)!systems are ded)ctively linked. ?o*ever, this ideal is clearly !eyond the reach of ordinary mortalsD *hence *e need a more realistic model for the 5)stified chan"e of o)r kno*led"e system, for solvin" specific pro!lems, and for eval)atin" specific methods. @e7t, one sho)ld not e7a""erate the importance of )nification. ; 21$ ; :any times it is !etter to dispose of relatively disconnected kno*led"e in many domains, rather than of )nified kno*led"e a!o)t fe*er domains. Binally, it is cr)cial that one is e7tremely caref)l a!o)t the point at *hich )nification is desira!le. (he attempts to copy .pres)med2 methods from the so+called e7act sciences in the social sciences is a *ell+kno*n e7ample *here it *ent *ron". 9iven the differences !et*een domains, )nification sho)ld proceed in vie* of the "eneral aims and take the differences into acco)nt. (he conte7t)al model <)ite nat)rally leads to s)ch an approach. @eedless to say, *e sho)ld strive to )nify o)r kno*led"e system. Even if *e are far a*ay from the ideal state, *e may have an idea a!o)t the e7tent to *hich certain theories and other s)!systems *ill !e

)nifia!le after !ein" e7tended or corrected. (his *ill ")ide )s in phrasin" pro!lems and eval)atin" sol)tions concernin" the chan"e of those s)!systems.

7. "oncludin* Remar0s
(here are fo)r points left that 8 need to to)ch )pon: .i2 relative 5)stification, .ii2 the fact that the present model avoids the diffic)lties that affect the hierarchical model, .iii2 )nconscio)s mechanisms, and .iv2 the openness of the present model. Unlike the hierarchical model, the present model does not re<)ire any a!sol)te certainties or a!sol)te 5)stifications to *hich all decisions may in the end !e 6red)ced.6 J)stification is relative to the state of the kno*led"e system at a "iven moment, !)t one may improve this state and in this *ay arrive at more relia!le 5)stifications .!oth the improvement and the increase in relia!ility are themselves relative to the kno*led"e system and its history2. 8 cannot defend the notion of relative 5)stification *ithin the confines of the present paper. -ome of my older papers .Batens 19'%, 19'/2 deal *ith this topic, incl)din" the relative improvement of o)r kno*led"e system. (he relative 5)stification defended there a"rees *ith @icholas Hescher3s statement: 6(he iss)e of le"itimation is th)s settled in terms of a cyclic interdependence and self+s)pportiveness6 .19/%, 1#11%2. (raditionally this feat)re is re"arded as )nderminin" the claim on 5)stification. (he )ltimate reply to the o!5ection is that .i2 indeed, relative rationality does not lead to any a!sol)te *arrant and clearly is not the optimal lo"ically possi!le form of rationality, !)t .ii2 it appears the !est thin" act)ally availa!le, and .iii2 it offers a tr)e form of 5)stification in that one relies )pon the kno*led"e system to *hich one is committed and *hich one considers the most relia!le, if not the only availa!le, alternative.M12N (he conte7t)al model avoids the diffic)lties that affect the hierarchical model. (he main diffic)lty for the latter derives from the fact that, in order to escape infinite re"ress, there sho)ld !e some hi"hest level, and the items at this level sho)ld !e a!sol)te certainties. -o let me sho* that *e cannot sensi!ly ; 211 ; introd)ce levels, let alone a hi"hest level, and that *e do not have s)ch levels in the conte7t)al approach. If co)rse the certainties of a conte7t are, in a sense and *ith respect to the conte7t, at a hi"her level than the pro!lem or the relevant tr)ths. 9iven this, the follo*in" reasonin" mi"ht !e temptin": let the pro!lem of C1 !e at the lo*est levelD the certainties of C1 are at the second levelD consider a conte7t C2 in *hich a certainty of C1 is the pro!lemD the certainties of C2 are then at the third levelD and so on. (his reasonin", ho*ever, is defective !eca)se it is <)ite possi!le that an item *hich, accordin" to this reasonin", is at the first level f)nctions as a relevant tr)th or even as a certainty in a conte7t of *hich the pro!lem !elon"s, al*ays accordin" to that reasonin", to a hi"her level. Bor the sake of e7ample, consider a statement that f)nctions as a methodolo"ical r)le *ith respect to a set of descriptive pro!lems. (he 5)stification of this statement may very *ell rely essentially on all kinds of descriptive statements, amon" others: .i2 historical data a!o)t the methods act)ally )sed, .ii2 considerations a!o)t the process that *o)ld have occ)rred if some other method had !een )sed, .iii2 descriptive statements a!o)t h)man !ein"sFfor e7ample, a!o)t o)r senses, the comple7ity of the decision proced)res *e are a!le to apply,M1#N or the kinds of kno*led"e at o)r disposal.M1%N (o see that this list is far from complete, remem!er that o)r o!servational methods sho)ld in part depend on the nat)re of the o!served o!5ects,M1&N that the )se of instr)ments involves all kinds of fact)al pres)ppositions, and that o)r a!ility to constr)ct meas)rin" instr)ments for some property, as *ell as the correctness, relia!ility,

and precision of these instr)ments, depends amon" other thin"s )pon o)r kno*led"e a!o)t the *orld. M10N (he reader may easily apply the same reasonin" to conte7t)al certainties. :y concl)sions are that there are no levels in "eneral, and no hi"hest level in partic)lar, and that there is no sense in *hich the methodolo"ical r)les of all conte7ts form a set that is hi"her than, say, the set of descriptive statements.M1'N 8ncidentally, part of my o!5ections also hold a"ainst ,a)dan3s .19/%2 retic)lated model. (his model re5ects the idea of a 6privile"ed or primary or more f)ndamental6 level and vie*s the levels as m)t)ally dependent. B)t 8 do)!t that there are levels or even coherent sets of, respectively, theories, methods, and aims. In the one hand, these sets seem rather incoherentFcompare the theories of physics *ith those of medicine, and do not !e too optimistic a!o)t a clear+c)t distinction !et*een theoretical and applied sciences. In the other hand, the distinction !et*een a methodolo"ical instr)ction and a descriptive statement red)ces many times to a matter of "rammatical form. Unconscio)s mechanisms may play a role in the selection of pro!lems, in their sol)tion, in settin" )p conte7ts, in orderin" o)r kno*led"e system, and so on. -ome are psycholo"ical in nat)re, others sociolo"ical, ne)rolo"ical, and so on. 8f *e compare h)mans to comp)ters, *e may say that )nconscio)s mechanisms play a role in at least the three follo*in" respects. Birst, the hard%are is ; 212 ; !eyond the reach of conscio)s mechanisms. Je may st)dy it and take the res)lts into acco)nt, and *e may try to e7ternali4e kno*led"e and decisionsFfor e7ample, !y p)ttin" thin"s on paper and !y comp)ter sim)lationF!)t the hard*are *ill never !e modeled in f)ll, and to chan"e it is !y definition impossi!le. @e7t, )nconscio)s mechanisms play a role as defaults . (here are activities that *e may .learn to2 perform in a conscio)s *ay, !)t that *ill !e re")lated !y )nconscio)s mechanisms *henever *e do not make a special effort. Binally, )nconscio)s mechanisms may defor# or even direct conscio)s processes, and in e7treme cases the latter may !e mere rationali4ations. (o sho* the import of )nconscio)s mechanisms actin" as defa)lts, let me e7pand on an e7ample. Je may set )p the conte7t for some pro!lem p in a conscio)s and controlled *ay !y first considerin" the deri&ed pro!lem 6Jhich elements form an appropriate conte7t for p =6 Je may even !rin" the set)p of the conte7t for this derived pro!lem )nder s)ch control !y movin" on to a f)rther derived pro!lem, !ut %e cannot do so indefinitely . At least some conte7ts *ill !e set )p !y an )nconscio)s mechanism. 8 take it to !e an essential advanta"e of the present model that )nconscio)s mechanisms need not !e in the *ay of so)nd 5)stifications. 8ndeed, *e may rely on the "eneral ar")ment derivin" from evol)tionary epistemolo"y to consider at least o)r hard*are as minimally adapted to o)r need for kno*led"e. Je r)n into tro)!le if *e try to apply evol)tionary models to all kno*led"e ac<)isition, and *e sho)ld even !e caref)l not to e7a""erate the import of the "eneral ar")ment. @evertheless, the "eneral ar")ment does sho* that o)r hard*are cannot !e all that !ad. Ither )nconscio)s mechanisms are easier to handle *ithin the present model. :any of them are the res)lt of learnin", and a lot more may !e st)died, reflected )pon, and chan"ed, if this appears desira!le. (o see the impact of this remark, consider an e7ample. A person *ho learned to o!serve thro)"h a microscope *ill most pro!a!ly leave o)t conscio)s control from some point on. (his does not precl)de that the person is performin" the act in a .locally2 5)stified *ay and that he or she may chan"e his or her ha!its if they prove erroneo)s. 8n more e7treme cases the 5)stification of some res)lt *ill !e considered d)!io)s !eca)se of the lack of conscio)s control. @o do)!t this constit)tes a diffic)ltyD it )ndermines the 5)stification of the sol)tions to a set of pro!lems. B)t the diffic)lty is only a local one, not, as for other models, an ins)rmo)nta!le disaster.

8 no* come to the final point: the <)estion *hether the present model is not too open, *hether it r)les o)t at least some kno*led"e systems as )nscientific and irrational. 8n one sense the model is very open: no element of the kno*led"e system is in principle e7cl)ded from critical e7amination and chan"e. 8 s)ppose all *ill a"ree that this is a positive property. A second form of openness is e<)ally desira!le: a 5)stificatory model .and its )nderlyin" rationality vie*2 sho)ld not specify the kno*led"e elements themselves nor any methods, lo"ics, or val)es. 8 may ill)strate the point as follo*s. -ome people try to demonstrate !y "eneral philosophical ar")ments that science is !etter off than, say, as+ ; 21# ; trolo"y or fort)ne+tellin". 8 think this is a mistake. (here is nothin" *ron" in principle *ith those 6disciplines6D they are 5)st no "ood for a h)ndred reasons that derive from the contents of o)r kno*led"e system. -o, many thin"s *e *ant to re5ect are not and sho)ld not !e e7cl)ded !y the present model itself. Precisely !eca)se of the a!sence of a!sol)te 5)stifications, the present model forces )s to s)!stantiate and confront o)r kno*led"e system *ith relevant information, to st)dy sensi!le alternatives to parts of o)r kno*led"e system, and to enter into de!ate *ith adherents of s)ch alternatives.M1/N 8n vie* of the fact that the hierarchical str)ct)re of kno*led"e systems is re5ected, methodolo"ical and epistemolo"ical <)estions, and philosophical <)estions in "eneral, are rephrased as <)estions to *hich scientific res)lts are relevant. 8n this *ay, the model ena!les )s to vie* o)rselves !oth as kno*in" and actin" !ein"s and as inte"ral parts of the *orld.

References
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19/2 6Pra"matics and the ,o"ic of G)estions and Assertions.6 Philosophica 29:%&19&. @ickles, (homas 19// 6Heconstr)ctin" -cience: Ciscovery and E7periment.6 8n /heory and Experi#ent , ed. C. Batens and J. P. van Bende"em, ##1&%. Cordrecht: Heidel. @ickles, (homas, ed. 19/$a Scientific ,isco&ery, Logic, and Rationality . Cordrecht: Heidel. 19/$! Scientific ,isco&ery: .ase Studies . Cordrecht: Heidel. Pera, :arcello 19// 6Breakin" the ,ink !et*een :ethodolo"y and Hationality: A Plea for Hhetoric in -cientific 8n<)iry.6 8n /heory and Experi#ent , ed. C. Batens and J. P. van Bende"em, 2&912'0. Cordrecht: Heidel. Hescher, @icholas 19/% /he Li#its of Science . Berkeley, ,os An"eles, ,ondon: University of California Press. ; 210 ;

Nine. heories of heoriesD # Vie5 from "o*niti+e Science

Richard E: 1randy ,o"ical positivism is interred. And *ith it a conception of scientific theories that once dominated the philosophy of science scene .at least the En"lish+, 9erman+, and Polish+speakin" portions2. 8n its place *e have a "ro*in" family of vie*s of scientific theories. Jhether the positivist vie* died of its o*n internal pro!lems, of historicist criticisms, or of selective disadvanta"e *ith respect to the ne*, 8 leave to the historians of the philosophy of science. 8t *as certainly not *itho)t pro!lems, !)t any on"oin" research pro"ram has pro!lemsD the <)estion 8 *ant to address, *ith the advanta"e of some .pro!a!ly not eno)"h2 hindsi"ht, is: Jhat *as serio)sly *ron" *ith the vie*= Altho)"h this 6-tandard Kie*6 is no* .almost2 totally re5ected, 8 *ant to delineate it e7plicitly, !eca)se in comparin" ne* vie*s *ith the old, it is important to !e precise a!o)t *hat the differences are. -ome of the essential characteristics of the -tandard Kie* of theories are said to !e: 12 (heories are to !e represented in first+order lo"ic. (he e7positors vary in the de"ree of their care on this. Bor e7ample, ?empel says, 6Bormally, a scientific theory may !e considered as a set of sentences e7pressed in terms of a specific voca!)lary . . . ?enceforth, *e *ill ass)me that theories are "iven in the form of a7iomati4ed systems6 .19&/, %02.

@otice the phrase 6may !e considered6Fhe does not say 6is.6 If co)rse one often loses si"ht of the difference !et*een the representation and the thin". 22 (here is a f)ndamental distinction !et*een o!servational and theoretical voca!)lary. Carnap for e7ample !e"ins his paper on the methodolo"ical character of theoretical concepts !y sayin", 68n disc)ssions on the methodolo"y of science it is c)stomary to divide the lan")a"e of science into t*o parts, o!servational and theoretical6 .19&0, #/2. ?e "oes on to say, 6(he terms of Ko are predi+ ; 21' ; cates desi"natin" o!serva!le properties of events or thin"s .e."., 3!l)e,3 3hot,3 3lar"e,3 etc.2 or o!serva!le relations !et*een them .e."., 37 is *armer than y,3 37 is conti")o)s to y,3 etc.26 .p.%$2. #2 Brid"e principles or correspondence r)les. %2 (heoretical post)lates. (he theoretical post)lates define the internal relations amon" the p)rely theoretical terms, and the !rid"e principles or correspondence r)les relate the theoretical voca!)lary to the o!servational. :)ch of this str)ct)re, especially the emphasis on and distinction !et*een the last t*o components, is often traced !ack to @. H. Camp!ell .192$2. (his vie* of theories "re* )p in the 19#$s, *ent thro)"h vario)s refinements as pro!lems !ecame o!vio)s to its adherents, and came )nder e7ternal attack <)estion in the 19&$s. By the late 19&$s and early 190$s it *as critici4ed !y a ne* "ro)p of more historically and holistically minded philosophers and historians of science, nota!ly @. H. ?anson .19&/2, *ho *as the first to have m)ch infl)ence, (homas >)hn .19022, *ho *as the most infl)ential in terms of the impact of his !ook, Pa)l Beyera!end .190&2, and others. 8 *ill not disc)ss this cl)ster of vie*s at len"th. Ine of the main points of this approach, tho)"h, *as to oppose or <)estion the o!servational theoretical distinction, and that is a point to *hich 8 *ill t)rn later. (he vie* of theories, if there *as one em!edded here, is m)ch less artic)lated than the -tandard Kie*. Ine analysis of the ne*ly emer"in" Co"nitive Kie* of science .9iere 19//2 is that it com!ines the si"nificant insi"hts of the historically oriented approach *ith the more ela!orated vie* of theories of a third approach. (he proponents of this third approach differ, and, of co)rse, their terminolo"y varies. 8n some cases it is called the 6-emantic Kie*6 of theories. 8n other cases it is called the 6:odel+theoretic Kie*6 of theories, the 6-tr)ct)ralist Kie*6 of theories, or the 6-et+theoretic Kie*6 of theories. (here are important differences, !)t they are irrelevant here, !eca)se 8 *ish to contrast the @on+statement Kie* *ith the -tandard Kie* and to artic)late *hy in "eneral terms the @on+statement Kie* seems to !e prefera!le. (h)s 8 have chosen for no* the rather o!sc)re term, *hich is less specific than 6-tr)ct)ralist6 and certainly m)ch less specific than 6-et+theoretic6 or 6:odel+theoretic.6 Under this "eneral headin" 8 incl)de one of the fo)nders, Evert Beth .19012D one of its proponents, Bas van Braassen .19/$2D and, in a some*hat different !)t related form, Bred -)ppe .19''2 and C)dley -hapere .19/%2. Another "enesis is Patrick -)ppes .190', 19092, and this leads to its most prolific form, Joseph -need .19'12, *hose *ork *as taken )p !y -te"m)ller .19'02 and more recently !y a host of *orkers, Bal4er .19/02, :o)lines .19'02, and Bal4er, :o)lines, and -need .19/'2. (o a considera!le e7tent, 8 am l)mpin" ; 21/ ;

to"ether people *ho *o)ld not !e happy a!o)t !ein" l)mped, !)t 8 !elieve a more "lo!al perspective has its val)e. Kery ro)"hly, then, the @on+statement Kie* says that a theory sho)ld !e tho)"ht of not as a set of statements descri!in" the *orld !)t as a class of str)ct)res that are appro7imately isomorphic, )nder s)ita!le interpretations, to parts of the *orld.

4hat Is 4ron* 5ith the Standard Vie5

8t is often )sef)l to kno* not only that a vie* is *ron" !)t also *hy. 8f *e are )nclear a!o)t *hy a vie* is *ron", there is a considera!le dan"er that later *e *ill either incorporate some of the !ad feat)res or overlook some of the "ood ones. (h)s 8 !e"in !y disc)ssin" *hat is *ron" *ith the -tandard Kie* and, for a start, takin" a look at some of the more )nconvincin" criticisms. Ine "ro)p of criticisms, some of them s)""ested !y -te"m)ller3s o*n terminolo"y, is that the -tandard Kie*3s first+order presentation of theories makes a theory a set of sentences, and therefore makes the theory lin")istic, rather than a more a!stract lan")a"e+independent o!5ect. (hat is not a very deep pro!lem, !eca)se associated *ith each set of first+order sentences is a class of models. And those models are a!stract and lan")a"e+independent. (here is a potential pro!lem if one conf)ses the representations of the theories *ith the theories, !)t as lon" as one makes that distinction, there seems to !e no pro!lem *ith "ivin" lin")istic form)lations of theories. And in fact in many of these approaches, for e7ample -need3s .19'12, one of the concepts that play an important role is a theory for#ulation . And a theory form)lation is a set of sentences *hich picks o)t a class of str)ct)res. Bor historical p)rposes, theory form)lations are especially important. (*o different form)lations of a theory e7 hypothesi have the same models, !)t they may have very different he)ristic properties and may appear very different to scientists. Bor e7ample, it *o)ld seem pec)liar to say that @e*ton sho*ed that in all models of planetary systems *ith inverse+s<)are forces, all planetary or!its are ellipses. Hather he deri&ed the elliptic or!it la* from the inverse+s<)are la*. Another o!5ection that some people have raised a"ainst the -tandard Kie* is that it is merely first+order lo"ic, that the lo"ic is not rich eno)"h. Brent :)ndy .19/', 19//2 has ar")ed for revivin" the -tandard Kie* )sin" a second+ or hi"her+order lo"ic. 8f that *ere all that is *ron" *ith -tandard Kie*, then only a stron"er formal lan")a"e *o)ld !e re<)ired, *hereas the terminolo"y of the ne* approach contrasts it *ith the lin")istic character of the -tandard Kie*. (he o!5ection seems not to !e that the -tandard Kie* )sed the *ron" lan")a"e !)t that it *as too lan")a"e+oriented. Another o!5ection that is sometimes made is that the -tandard Kie* is !ased on the o!servational theoretical distinction. Jhile that may !e *hy the historically orientated philosophers of science re5ect it, it cannot !e *hy the ; 219 ; -need "ro)p re5ects it !eca)se one of the developments comin" o)t of that version of the @on+ statement Kie* is a more precise theoretical nontheoretical distinction. -o if s)ch a distinction e7ists, the pro!lem *ith the -tandard Kie* cannot !e that it ass)mes one, altho)"h it can !e that it ass)mes the *ron" one or misdescri!es its importance. ,et me make a first pass at artic)latin" a deeper pro!lem. 8 *ill then o)tline in more detail a partic)lar version of the @on+statement Kie* and then say a little more e7actly *hat the differences are. Jhat the apparat)s of !rid"e principles correspondence r)les dictionary is s)pposed to do is to provide a partial interpretation of the theory. (he pro!lem is set !y the ass)mption that the theoretical post)lates

are taken as )ninterpretedD *ith them is associated a class of models *hich *o)ld model that part of the lan")a"e, !)t that class is hi"hly )nconstrained. (h)s the dictionary principles are to provide more specification of the theory than *as ori"inally "iven !y the theoretical post)lates. (hey 6hook it to the *orld,6 a phrase that is often )sed. Inly partially, of co)rse, !eca)se they !y no means )ni<)ely determine the interpretation of the theoretical post)latesD if they did, the theoretical terms *o)ld !e defina!le and *o)ld !e elimina!le. B)t the idea is that they are s)pposed to narro* it do*n. (he <)estion remains as to *hat is the empirical content of the theory= Ine response, *hich *as s)""ested in the 192$s !y Brank Hamsey .190$2, amo)nts to sayin" that the content of a theory ( is the statement that there is some *ay of interpretin" the theoretical post)lates to prod)ce a model of the theory. (hat t)rns o)t to !e e7tremely *eak: any consistent theory is "oin" to have s)ch a modelFif no*here else, at least in the nat)ral n)m!ers and in set+theoretic str)ct)res. 8f that is *hat it meant to say that a theory *as tr)e or descri!ed the *orld, then any consistent theory *o)ld !e tr)e and that is far too *eak. Jhat *e *ant to say is that amon" the class of models of that theory is the Heal Jorld. B)t of co)rse the Heal Jorld is not carved )p into a nice str)ct)ral set of relations, and there seems not to !e any "ood *ay of pickin" o)t the Heal Jorld. A lot of the disc)ssions that ?ilary P)tnam .19''2 prod)ced on metaphysical realism and its inartic)lateness are really disc)ssions a!o)t *ays of pickin" o)t the real *orld in this spirit. (hat is a rather va")e statement of *hat is *ron" *ith the -tandard Kie*, that in the notion of partial interpretation the theory is tryin" to latch onto the *orld, and the pro!lem is to "et the latches to hold ti"hter. Jhat is the alternative in the @on+statement Kie*= 8 *ill start *ith a little more !ack"ro)nd, and a little more technical terminolo"y. Ine of the !asic ideas comes from Patrick -)ppes, *ho *as very interested in a7iomati4ationFsemiformal a7iomati4ation, not in first+order lo"ic, !)t in a set+theoretic notationFof vario)s physical theories. (o !e concrete, let me "ive an e7ample: :c>insey, -)"ar, and -)ppes .19&#2. Jhat they define is a set+theoretic predicate of <)int)ples of !ein" a system of particle mechanics. A system of particle mechanics is a <)int)ple: Pp,m,(,s,fQ. (he first com+ ; 22$ ; ponent is a nonempty finite setFthe particles. (he second component is a f)nction, *hich for any o!5ect in the set of particles assi"ns a positive real n)m!erFthat is the mass of the particle. 3(3 is an interval of real n)m!ers. (hat serves as the !ack"ro)nd time for the interpretation. (he f)nction 3s3, applied to any of the particles and any time o)t of the relevant set, specifies a triple of real n)m!ers. And that "ives the spatial location, !y specifyin" the coordinates. And finally, the 3f3 is the force f)nction, and f applied to a particle, a time, and an inde7 .1, 2, #, . . . 2 "ives the first force, the second force, the third force. . . . Each force is specified as a triple of reals "ivin" the components of the force vector in each dimension. 8nt)itively f.l,7,t2 specifies the effect of the first force actin" )pon 7 at time t. (he one f)rther stip)lation is that the second derivatives of the space location in time .the second derivatives *ith respect to time2 al*ays e7ist. (hat is to say that *e can al*ays speak sensi!ly a!o)t the acceleration of the particle. -)ch a <)int)ple is a Particle :echanics. 8t is a set of thin"s that have ro)"hly the role of particles, of assi"nin" them masses, of "ivin" them !ack"ro)nd time, of assi"nin" them location, and of specifyin" the forces actin" )pon them. Je have characteri4ed an entirely set+theoretic predicate. -ome of the thin"s that have this str)ct)re *ill incl)de physical o!5ects. -ome of them *ill incl)de nat)ral n)m!ers. (his is a totally a!stract description of a str)ct)re. (here are many different interpretations of it, many *ays of reali4in" this

str)ct)re. Je can "o a !it f)rther if *e *ish and add a restriction if *e *ant this not to !e any old particle mechanics !)t one that is essentially @e*tonian. 8f *e *rite the second derivative of the spatial location as A7t for the acceleration of 7 at t, then the f)rther condition *e re<)ire is that for each particle its mass times its acceleration at a "iven time is e<)al to the s)m of the forces actin" on it. (his *ill determine that the chan"e in motion is the res)lt of the forces. -)ppes *as interested in this conception of the str)ct)res related to theories. 8t separates the roles of different ass)mptions to tease o)t the mathematics )nderlyin" the theory in different *ays. ?e *as not partic)larly interested in <)estions of o!servational theoretical voca!)lary, theoretical content, or red)ction. Ine iss)e that %as of interest to him *as the relation !et*een theory and applications. 8f one looks at classical applications of particle mechanics, o!5ects on an inclined plane, pend)l)ms, o!5ects in the sit)ation of any traditional physics pro!lems, these can !e seen as specific instances of the "eneral class of set+theoretic str)ct)res. (he difference !et*een -)ppes3s vie* of *hat a theory does and the -tandard Kie* is that -)ppes sa* a theory as providin" a class of mathematical models *hich has many applications, not as a sin"le description of the *orld *hich is specified !y ded)cin" ne* conse<)ences from e7tra conditions. ; 221 ; -need, a st)dent of -)ppes, asked a <)estion to *hich the -tandard Kie* had not !een a!le to "ive a very "ood ans*er: *hat is the empirical content of a theory= Part of the empirical content of a theory, for e7ample, a theory of particle mechanics, can !e "iven !y sayin" that pend)l)ms are a type of instance of classical particle mechanics. (hat is, if one considers the set consistin" of the particle, the restraints on it, its mass, its motion thro)"h time, the forces actin" on it, one finds that it is an instance of this kind of str)ct)re. (hat is part of the content, !)t of co)rse classical particle mechanics says more than thatD it does not apply 5)st to a fe* partic)lar cases !)t sho)ld apply to many instances. Jhat -need added to the !asic -)ppes frame*ork is the notion of intended applications. -o the ne* conception of a theoryFand no* *e are "ettin" some*hat closer to a version of the @on+statement Kie*Fis that a theory consists of a -)ppes+like str)ct)re, to"ether *ith a specification of intended applications. 8n the intended applications, one has a m)ch less formal o!5ect, in the sense that *hat yo) *ant to "ive for any live scientific theory is not simply a finite list .!eca)se yo) e7pect to e7tend that2 !)t a more intentional characteri4ation of *here the applications are "oin" to come from. (his part of the @on+statement Kie* consists in *eddin" the -)ppes+like str)ct)res to the some*hat amorpho)s notion of intended applications. (o make t*o other connections *ith other approaches, 8 think that m)ch of -hapere3s *ork on scientific domains can !e )sef)lly seen, may!e appropriated, as a *ay of specifyin" the intended applications. 8n fact -hapere3s notion of domain may !e !etter for this p)rpose than -need3s o*n characteri4ation of intended application. 8t also has affinities *ith >)hn3s notion of an e7emplar. (here is an interestin" relation !et*een -need and >)hn *hich 8 do not have time to e7plore .see -need 19'', >)hn 19''2. (his approach "ives yo) a different vie* of the relation !et*een the theory and the *orld from *hat *e have on the -tandard Kie*. In the ne* vie*, instead of a lin")istically "iven theory statement *e have a class of str)ct)res and a class of applicationsD the pro!lems are to )se the str)ct)res to make predictions, to "ive e7planations a!o)t str)ct)res in the *orld, and to e7tend the class of applications. Another element m)st !e added !efore this *ill !e at all satisfactory: so far, there is no constraint that relates the applicationsFone of the applications mi"ht !e to e7plain the motion of the earth aro)nd the

s)n. (o do that *e need to assi"n a mass to the earth in the pro!lem. -)ppose *e do that. (hen later *e *ant to make a different application, for e7ample, to e7plain the motion of the moon and the earth, or perhaps the tides, and one assi"ns a mass to the earth for that pro!lem. 8n a third case *e *ant to calc)late the escape velocity of a rocket, and yo) assi"n a mass to the earth for that pro!lem. Brom *hat 8 have said so far, there is no reason *hy these assi"nments of a val)e to the mass of the earth have to !ear any relation to one another, *hich clearly seems *ron". -o ; 222 ; -need also added *hat he called 6constraints,6 *hich re<)ire in this instance that *henever a particle appears in different applications, it has to !e assi"ned the same mass. (hat may seem too strict an ass)mption. Je of co)rse can )se appro7imations, so that if *e are doin" a pro!lem that involves me han"in" from one side of a p)lley, and a *ei"ht on an inclined plane on the other side of the p)lley, and yo) *ant to kno* *hat is "oin" to happen to me in the ne7t t*o seconds, yo) can re"ard me as a particle !eca)se my mass does not chan"e in the relevant amo)nt of time even if 8 am on a very strict diet. (h)s part of *hat -need has capt)red is that for partic)lar applications appro7imations may !e close eno)"h. (his is not all that -need added to -)ppes: he also made a distinction !et*een theories and theory cores that ena!led him to talk a!o)t the same theory "oin" thro)"h chan"es over time as a part of the relation !y *hich he *as tryin" to model some of the aspects of theory dynamics and the relation !et*een theories that >)hn *as concerned a!o)t. (he e7tent to *hich he s)cceeded is an interestin" and controversial s)!5ect !)t is *ell !eyond the scope of this paper. 8 *ant to t)rn no* to @orman Camp!ell3s vie* of theories, *hich is )s)ally said to !e lar"ely responsi!le for inspirin" the -tandard Kie*. 8 do not *ant to <)estion that as a causal historical claim, !)t 8 do *ish to ar")e !riefly that he sho)ld instead !e tho)"ht of as one of the fo)nders of the @on+ statement Kie*. 8 *ill say more a!o)t this shortly. 8n presentin" the molec)lar theory of "ases he says: (he hypothesis of the theory may !e stated as follo*s: .12 (here is a sin"le independent varia!le t. .22 (here are three constants, m, v, and l, independent of t. .#2 (here are #n independent varia!les .7s ,ys ,4s 2 .s R 1 to n2 *hich are contin)o)s f)nctions of t. (hey form a contin)o)s three+dimensional series and are s)ch that

is invariant for all linear transformations of the type 73 R a7 T !y T c4. .(his last sentence is merely a *ay of sayin" that .7,y,42 are related like rectan")lar coordinatesD !)t since any definitely spatial notions mi"ht "ive the idea that the properties of the .7,y,42 *ere someho* determined !y e7periment, they have !een avoided.2 .%2

is constant, e7cept *hen .7y42 is $ or 1D *hen it attains either of these val)es it chan"es si"n.

.&2

, and similar propositions for y and 4 MCamp!ell 192$, 120112'N (his presentation of the theory is not in first+order lo"ic, and to p)t it into s)ch a formalism *o)ld re<)ire considera!le !ack"ro)nd development to define 3contin)o)s f)nction3, 3invariance3, and the differential and s)mmation notations. ?o*ever, a -)ppes type of reform)lation *o)ld !e strai"htfor*ard ; 22# ; Fa molec)lar "as model *o)ld !e a <)int)ple Pt,m,v,l,nQ *here t is a real val)ed varia!le, and m, v, and l are positive real constants and n a positive inte"er, and *here the <)int)ple meets the conditions .12 thro)"h .&2. Consider no* his description of the dictionary: (he dictionary contains the follo*in" propositions: .12 l is the len"th of the side of a c)!ical vessel in *hich a 6perfect6 "as is contained. .22 n# is the mass of the "as, M . .#2

is / , the a!sol)te temperat)re of the "as, *here a is some n)m!er *hich *ill vary *ith the ar!itrary choice of the de"ree of temperat)re1 . .%2 ,et ,#

!e the chan"e in # *hich occ)rs *hen xa attains the val)e l D let S , ,# !e the s)m of all val)es of ,# for *hich t lies !et*een t and t T g D let

then pa , p! , pc are the press)res Pa , P ! , Pc on three m)t)ally perpendic)lar *alls of the c)!ical containin" vessel.

A"ain first+order lo"ic is not at all in evidence, and f)rthermore the concepts to *hich the theoretical varia!les are related are hardly o!servational in the Carnap ?empel sense. (he mass of the "as is hardly a simple percept)al <)alitative property. (he dictionary also relates the theory to temperat)re as one of the antecedently )nderstood itemsFclearly a very theoretical concept compared to 3*arm3. (h)s if one "oes !ack and rereads Camp!ell *ith fresh eyes, he appears to !e *orkin" to*ard a semantic vie*. (here is still an element missin", of co)rseD he does not emphasi4e the class of str)ct)res satisfyin" the theory, so his presentation is still a step short of -)ppes3s. (h)s a more appropriate historical name for the vie* mi"ht !e the Camp!ell+-)ppes Kie* of theories. And the -tandard Kie* *as a distraction from Camp!ell3s in that it emphasi4ed formali4a!ility and introd)ced a stron" o!servational theoretical distinction, in place of Camp!ell3s distinction !et*een concepts proper to the theory and those already e7tant. 6Jhatever the nat)re of the dictionary, all theories have this in common that no proposition !ased on e7perimental evidence can !e asserted concernin" the hypothetical ideas e7cept on the ass)mption that the propositions of the theory are tr)e6 .Camp!ell 192$, 12&2. 8n makin" these historical points, it is also important to add that another aspect of theories that Camp!ell re"arded as indispensa!le is the analo"ical. (his aspect has !een almost totally i"nored !y !oth the -tandard Kie* and ; 22% ; the Camp!ell+-)ppes, altho)"h it has !een developed at len"th !y ?esse .19002 and others. ,et me ret)rn to my title. A difference !et*een the -tandard Kie* and the Camp!ell+-)ppes Kie* as 8 have !een descri!in" it is that the Camp!ell+-)ppes Kie* provides models, and the pro!lem is to find *ays of applyin" those models in the *orld, to find appro7imate isomorphisms !et*een physical systems and the a!stract systems descri!ed !y the theory .:o)lines 19'02. (hat may make it so)nd as tho)"h scientists are not really makin" statements a!o)t the *orld, that they are doin" somethin" rather different from *hat *e do in o)r ordinary talk *hen *e say thin"s that are strai"htfor*ardly tr)e or false. And this impression pro!a!ly has some relevance as to *hy some str)ct)ralists have dra*n antirealist concl)sions from their vie*s of theories, altho)"h one of the least realist str)ct)ralists, van Braassen .19/'2, has o!served that the vie* is compati!le *ith all shades of realism and antirealism. 8 *ant no* to disc)ss some concepts that have !een important to co"nitive science. (his is mostly in *ork in artificial intelli"ence and co"nitive psycholo"y *hen people are disc)ssin" memory, te7t processin", <)estion ans*erin", and other nat)ral co"nitive processes. (he f)ndamental notion is that of a schema. (he "eneral acco)nts of schemas are )nsatisfyin". (hey )s)ally say somethin" like 6a schema is a mental data str)ct)re for the "eneric properties of concepts.6 (h)s H)melhart e7plains: A schema, then, is a data str)ct)re representin" the "eneric concepts stored in memory. . . . A schema contains, as part of its specification, the net*ork of interrelationships that is !elieved to normally hold amon" the constit)ents of the concept in <)estion. . . . (hat is, inasm)ch as a schema )nderlyin" a concept stored in memory corresponds to the meanin" of that concept, meanin"s are encoded in terms of the typical or normal sit)ations or events that instantiate that concept. M19/$, #%N Jhat does that mean more specifically= Bor e7ample, the schema associated *ith a concept like ta!le *ill specify *hat are the parts of a ta!le. (he o!ligatory parts of a ta!le are le"s and a top. Iptional parts of a ta!le may !e dra*ers, leaves to insert, and so on. (hat is one aspect of the schema. Another is the specification of some defa)lt val)es

and ran"es for some of the parts. Part of the information in the schema for a ta!le is that the typical n)m!er of le"s for a ta!le is fo)r. 8f yo) are readin" a story that mentions a ta!le and yo) kno* nothin" else a!o)t the ta!le, it is a reasona!le ass)mption that it has fo)r le"s. Lo) *ill also kno* that the act)al n)m!er can !e any*here from one to some lar"ish n)m!er. Another part of the schema *ill !e the typical f)nctions of a ta!le. -chemas can also characteri4e kinds of events. Lo)n" children in certain socioeconomic strata <)ickly ac<)ire the schema for a !irthday party. 8t is a series of events involvin" ")ests, an honoree, cake, candles, presents from the ; 22& ; ")ests, party favors for the ")ests, and "ames. (he schema prescri!es relations amon" the vario)s elements, as *ell as indicatin" additional optional items .ice creamX2. -chemas are related to act)al episodes of reasonin", thinkin", and "ettin" aro)nd in the *orld, !y providin" a str)ct)re on *hich to !ase predictions, e7planations, reasonin", and actions a!o)t the *orld more or less s)ccessf)lly. (his s)""ests there are similaritiesFnot identities, !)t similaritiesF!et*een this notion of schema, *hich many co"nitive scientists re"ard as )!i<)ito)s and f)ndamental in o)r co"nitive processin", and scientific theories. If co)rse, typically scientific theories are form)lated m)ch more e7plicitly, they are adopted more conscio)sly, their applica!ility is tested more systematically. 8 do not *ant to overstate the relations !et*een theories and schemas, 8 simply *ant to point o)t the si"nificant similarities. A second point is that in "ivin" an acco)nt of readin", recall, or other phenomena involvin" schemas, co"nitive scientists have come to distin")ish 6declarative6 from 6proced)ral6 kno*led"e. (hat is more or less a rela!elin" of the old philosophical distinction !et*een 6kno*in" that6 and 6kno*in" ho*,6 so that kno*led"e *hich is in the schema amo)nts to kno*in" that, and kno*in" *hich schema to apply in a partic)lar sit)ation, kno*in" *hen to call in another schema, kno*in" *hen a schema is inappropriate, is proced)ral kno*led"e, or kno*in" ho*. -imilarly, in the Camp!ell+-)ppes Kie* the theory form)lates a certain kind of kno*led"e, !)t the application of it to partic)lar cases is not somethin" that is f)lly formali4ed and artic)lated as a part of the theory. 8 see t*o important similarites !et*een this vie* of theories and schemas as disc)ssed !y co"nitive scientists. Birst, they are "eneral descriptions of kinds of relational str)ct)res that are not imm)ta!ly anchored to the *orldD applications m)st !e fo)nd and eval)ated. -econd, the choice of an appropriate theory schema is at least as m)ch a matter of kno*in" ho* as kno*in" that. (his s)""ests the not s)rprisin" thesis that scientific theories develop historically and psycholo"ically o)t of familiar patterns of reasonin" and are distin")ished !y the de"ree of the mathemati4ation, e7plicitness, precision, and testin", !)t that they are not totally forei"n co"nitive creat)res. (heories are to schemas as microscopes and telescopes are to the eye. ,et me t)rn no* to a more specific ran"e of topics !e"innin" *ith a ne* version of the o!servational theoretical distinction. -need, in his o*n acco)nt of theories, distin")ished, not !et*een a!sol)tely o!servational and theoretical, !)t for a "iven theory, *hich of the terms appearin" in it are (+theoretical, that is, are dependent )pon the theory for meanin", as opposed to *hich are not. Bor e7ample, -need *o)ld say that a f)nction or a ma"nit)de is CP: .classical particle mechanics2 theoretical if and only if every assi"nment of a val)e to that f)nction ass)mes the correctness of the theory. Jhat -need had in mind is that one of these f)nctions is CP: theoretical if and only if every

; 220 ; determination of a val)e pres)pposes the theory. 8f there is any *ay of determinin" a val)e independently of this theory, then it is not CP: determined. -o it t)rns o)t, at least on his acco)nt, that force is CP: theoretical. Another *ay of form)latin" the distinction is that it depends on *hether one m)st pres)ppose that theory in every determination of the ma"nit)de. :ore recent *ork !y others very conscio)sly in the -need tradition, for e7ample !y Jolf"an" Bal4er .19/02, differs. Bal4er likes the "eneral -need approach, !)t he dislikes -need3s theoretical nontheoretical distinction !eca)se, he says, it is a prag#atic one. 8t can vary from time to time dependin" on *hether *e have other means of determinin" the val)e, so he *ants one that is more p)rely formal. ?e "ives oneD *hat it amo)nts to ro)"hly is that a ma"nit)de is theoretical *ith respect to a "iven theory if fi7in" the other val)es of the theory parameters determines the remainin" ones. 8f yo) fi7 all the other <)antitative ma"nit)des, and if that determines the remainin" f)nction, then that determined f)nction is "oin" to !e theoretical *ithin that frame*ork. (here are some details a!o)t chan"e of scale *hich complicate the definition !)t need not concern )s. Bal4er3s is an a!sol)te, nonpra"matic distinction, entirely a formal matter of theory, so it meets his "oal for havin" a nonpra"matic criterion. (he tro)!le is that if there is anythin" like an int)itive notion, then this is the *ron" one. Bor e7ample, one can form)late *hat 8 *ill call a system of planetary mechanics. PP, ( , C, (Q is a system of planetary mechanics if and only if P is a nonempty finite set, ( a real interval, ( a f)nction .contin)o)s in (2 from pairs of mem!ers of ( and P to an"les, C a contin)o)s f)nction from P and ( to nonne"ative reals. ?e)ristically, P is the set of planets, ( .i, t2 "ives the an"le of the i+th planet at time t, and C.i, t2 is the distance of the i+th planet from the s)n at time t. (he re<)irement of contin)ity on the f)nctions ( and C represents the ass)mption that the planetlike o!5ects move smoothly thro)"h space. Je can form)late a -)ppes+like characteri4ation of a >eplerian planetary theory. (he constraints *o)ld !e that the com!ination of an"les and distances *o)ld prod)ce elliptical planetary or!its that s*eep o)t e<)al areas in e<)al times, and

*here Hi is the avera"e of C.i, t2 and (i is the period of planet i, that is, the smallest n)m!er 7 s)ch that ( .i, t T n72 R ( .i, t2 for all inte"ers n. (his seems to me a , if not the , nat)ral form)lation of >eplerian theory. B)t in that form)+ ; 22' ; lation, )nless 8 mis)nderstand Bal4er3s criteria, since the rates of chan"e of the an"les determine the periods, and the avera"e distances are determined !y the periods, the distances d of the planets are theoretical in Bal4er3s sense. (hey are determined !y fi7in" the other parameter ( , so on Bal4er3s criterion the distance from the s)n to the planets is theoretical. B)t from the historical point of vie*, that is !ack*ard. >epler arrived at his la*s !y havin" painstakin"ly acc)m)lated evidence on the periods and distances and fi")red o)t, as far as anyone kno*s p)rely !y trial and error, that the re")larity fits. 6(he (hird ,a* did not, in itself, chan"e the

theory of the planets, and it did not permit astronomers to comp)te any <)antities that *ere previo)sly )nkno*n. (he si4es and the periods associated *ith each planetary or!it *ere availa!le in advance6 .>)hn 19&', 21'2. Altho)"h Bal4er3s may !e an interestin" for#al distinction, it does not at all capt)re *hat interests )s. Jhat has "one *ron" here= 8 think that *hat *ent *ron" *ith Bal4er and also *ith -need and also lon" a"o *ith the -tandard Kie*, *as the attempt to dra* a theoretical nontheoretical distinction *ith respect to terms. 8 am not <)ite s)re *hat the ri"ht )nit isD it seems to me that it is somethin" more like statements or assertions. Jhy= Consider the <)estion *hether distance is theoretical or nontheoretical. After all, *e can meas)re distances *itho)t m)ch diffic)lty, at least some distances. Ither distances have proved very el)sive. (o p)sh the e7ample to an e7treme, one of the standard o!5ections to the Copernican theory *as that there is no o!served ann)al paralla7 *ith respect to the fi7ed stars.

(hat is, *here a and ! are the positions of the earth si7 months apart and c is -iri)s, the an"les a!c and !ac are indistin")isha!le from 9$Z. Every Copernican kne* the ans*er *as that the fi7ed stars are too far to detect paralla7. (hat ans*er *as repeated even as the telescope *as invented and ever finer meas)rements of paralla7 *ere made, *ith no o!servation of the paralla7 of the fi7ed stars. 8t !ecame a matter of concern to at least some Copernicans to provide a more artic)late ans*er than 6Jell, they3re f)rther o)t than *e tho)"ht6 and act)ally to "ive an estimate of the appro7imate distance of the fi7ed stars, to provide some de"ree of empirical commitment. ?)y"ens attempted to provide an estimate via optics. Utili4in" a device that co)ld restrict his vie* of the s)n to a very small near+point, he 5)d"ed the ; 22/ ; li"ht seen thro)"h a small apert)re to !e appro7imately that of -iri)s, *hich he took to !e one of the nearest fi7ed stars. :akin" the lar"e ass)mption that -iri)s is a!o)t as !ri"ht as the s)n, he calc)lated the distance to the nearest star. ?e did not come very close, !)t the process involves a diffic)lt percept)al 5)d"ment. Lo) have to o!serve the s)n and remem!er *hat -iri)s looked like the ni"ht !efore or vice versa, so a considera!le memory component enters the comparison. 8t is s)rprisin", and perhaps accidental, that he came as close as he did .van ?elden 19/&, 1&/2. @e*ton noted the diffic)lty for ?)y"ens3s method and sa* that there *as, in theory, a sol)tion. 8f yo) co)ld p)t an ad5)sta!le mirror in space, so that at ni"ht yo) co)ld sim)ltaneo)sly o!serve -iri)s directly and the s)n in the mirror, and ad5)st the mirror so that the reflected !ri"htness of the s)n e<)aled that of -iri)s, then, if yo) kne* the si4e of the mirror and its distance from the s)n, yo) co)ld calc)late an estimate of the distance to -iri)s. If co)rse yo) co)ld notFat least not thenFp)t a mirror in space. -o he )sed the ne7t !est thin" to a mirror, a planet. . . . the disk of -at)rn, *hich is only 1'6 or 1/6 in diameter, receives only a!o)t 1 21$$$$$$$$ of the s)n3s li"htD for so m)ch less is that disk than the *hole spherical s)rface of the or! of -at)rn. @o* if *e s)ppose -at)rn to reflect a!o)t 1 % of this li"ht, the *hole li"ht reflected from its ill)minated hemisphere *ill !e a!o)t 1 %2$$$$$$$$ M=F H.E.9.N of the *hole li"ht emitted from the s)n3s hemisphere, and, therefore since li"ht is rarefied inversely as the s<)are of the distance from the l)mino)s !ody, if the s)n *as 1$$$$ %2 times more distant than -at)rn, it *o)ld yet appear as l)cid as -at)rn no* does.

M@e*ton 1'2/, &90N (his ar")ment ass)mes that the nearest stars are the !ri"htest, that the al!edo of -at)rn is 1 %, that the inverse+s<)are la* for !ri"htness holds at astronomical distances, and that no si"nificant amo)nt of li"ht is a!sor!ed as it passes thro)"h space .an ass)mption he "oes on to defend e7plicitly2. ?is res)lt is fairly acc)rate, and it *o)ld pro!a!ly have !ro)"ht some minor fame to many other astronomers. (he point of !ela!orin" this e7ample is that here *e have a meas)rement of distance, and 8 think that meas)rement is hi"hly theoretical. (he point 8 *ant to emphasi4e is that *e sho)ld not ask *hether the statement that a distance is 2.1% Y 1$n meters is theoretical or not *itho)t <)alification, for it seems clearly theoretical if n is T 1$ or 1 1$. And the theories involved are, of co)rse, <)ite different at the t*o ends of the scale. Jhat a!o)t middlin" distances= (hese 5)d"ments may seem nontheoretical, !)t only !eca)se the theory is transparent or familiar. Bor e7ample, Cescartes *as apparently the first to note that o)r vis)al 5)d"ments of len"th depend not only on relative si4e and occl)sion, *hich are availa!le to monoc)lar vision, !)t also on !inoc)lar c)es. 8f in the dia"ram a!ove on pa"e 22' one takes a and ! to !e the t*o retinas, then information a!o)t the an"les !ac and ; 229 ; a!c provided !y m)scles controllin" eye movements is comp)ted !y the vis)al system and provides a 5)d"ment a!o)t the distance to c. (his is not a theory that is held !y the vie*er *ho is totally )na*are of the process, !)t can !e considered to !e a theory ass)med !y the nat)ral *irin" of the vis)al system. 8f, for e7ample, space *ere not locally E)clidean, then a different theory *o)ld pres)ma!ly !e *ired into )s. .(he ass)mption that vis)al space is E)clidean is not !eyond disp)teD see ?eelan 19/#.2 Another *ay of re"ardin" len"th is thro)"h the lens of fo)ndational st)dies in meas)rement, accordin" to *hich a ma"nit)de is "iven an a!stract characteri4ation in terms of com!inatory operations on a domain and mappin"s from that domain to some appropriate n)m!er system. Act)al physical domains and operations can !e investi"ated as appro7imate instances of the a!stract characteri4ation. (he theory of len"th as meas)red !y collinear concatenation of ri"id !odies depends on applied "eometry .to 5)d"e collinearity2 as *ell as a theory ri"idity. :oreover the choice of collinear concatenation, rather than perpendic)lar concatenation .or any of an infinite family of others2, is a choice that re<)ires 5)stification. Ellis .19002, *ho ori"inally raised this point, !elieved the choice to !e ar!itrary since perpendic)lar concatenation satisfies all of the a7ioms of e7tensive meas)rement .as do infinitely many other choices2. Practical convenience *o)ld pro!a!ly dictate the )se of collinear concatenation !y itself, !)t there are stron"er, more "eneral theoretical "ro)nds. Use of perpendic)lar concatenation as the !asis of len"th meas)rement *o)ld lead to a system of physics in *hich the la*s are not invariant )nder 9alilean transformations of coordinate systems and in *hich @e*ton3s first la* does not hold )nless *e post)late Heichen!achian )niversal forces .Bo4in 19/92.

"onclusion
Jhat *as *ron" *ith the -tandard Kie*= 8 have ar")ed that the root pro!lems *ith the -tandard Kie* of theories stem more from the epistemolo"y that its adherents !ro)"ht to the st)dy of theories than from their vie* of theories itself. (hey re"arded science as startin" from a set of tr)e <)alitative o!servation statements and movin"

thro)"h theory development and some version of confirmation to findin" more theoretical tr)e descriptions of the *orld. An alternative description is that they *ere concerned *ith "ivin" a lin")istic form)lation that *o)ld anchor the meanin" of theoretical terms in the o!servational .?empel 19'#2. (he pres)mption of first+order lo"ic contri!)ted to the distortion !y makin" it m)ch more diffic)lt to form)late theories that related to <)antitative data, th)s reinforcin" the conception of a <)alitative fo)ndation. In the alternative Camp!ell+-)ppes Kie*, theories provide schematic descriptions of kinds of str)ct)res. (hese str)ct)res can !e applied to provide ; 2#$ ; appro7imate descriptions of processes, events, and <)antities in the *orld via appro7imate isomorphisms. (his approach emphasi4es the proced)ral component of the application process, and the theoretical aspects of the descriptions of the processes, events, and <)antities. (he )nderlyin" conception of the -tandard Kie* *as a Cartesian one of scientists follo*in" a "odlike process from o!served certainty to*ard hi"her tr)ths. (he alternative is a vie* of scientists movin" from appro7imate descriptions )sin" simple or implicit theories to more e7plicit schematic characteri4ations of )nderlyin" processes and varia!les *hich often lead to refinement or replacement of the ori"inal theories a!o)t the 6data6 themselves. (he ima"e is one of proceedin" from pretty "ood schemas to some*hat !etter ones, a more modest and perhaps more realistic "oal. (he epistemolo"y of the ne* vie* is not yet a matter of consens)s. 8ndeed there is a <)estion ho* m)ch epistemolo"y is *anted, !)t it *ill !e at most a nat)rali4ed epistemolo"y of m)ddlin" thro)"h to !etter appro7imations of data that are themselves revisa!le .9iere 19//, ?)ll 19//2. Jhat is not .yet=2 ri"ht *ith the Camp!ell+-)ppes Kie*= 8 have ar")ed that more attention needs to !e paid to the <)estions of *hich statements are theoretical and *ith re"ard to *hich theory. ?ere, as *ith some of the claims a!o)t theory red)ction and s)ccession, at least some versions of the ne* vie* seem to s)ffer from an inclination to prefer formal pro!lems and definitions to historically realistic ones .>)hn 19''2. (r)esdell .19/12 has ar")ed vehemently that the ne* vie* is more concerned *ith mathematics than *ith mathematical physics, let alone *ith physics. ?e also has critici4ed the almost e7cl)sive attention to particle mechanics as opposed to the lar"e area of contin))m mechanics, and has also critici4ed the :c>insey, -)"ar, and -)ppes formali4ation. (hese last complaints co)ld pres)ma!ly !e remedied, *hile the first demands that more attention !e paid to o!servation and meas)rement, as 8 too have ar")ed. A more serio)s open iss)e is *hether 5)stification can !e "iven for the si"nificant shift from -need3s title /he Logical Structure of Mathe#atical Physics to -te"m)ller3s s*eepin" /he Structure and ,yna#ics of /heories . 8n the most mathematical of physical theoriesFrelativity theoryFphysicists themselves form)late their theories in set+theoretic terms, for e7ample, ?a*kin" and Ellis3s .19'#2 definition of a manifold. And many other physical theories can readily !e cast in those terms. B)t *hether s)ch an acco)nt fits "eolo"y, !iolo"y, or psycholo"y *itho)t serio)s distortion remains to !e determined.

Note
@ader Chokr, (imothy Cei!ler, Hichard C)schl, John Earman, and Patrick -)ppes provided helpf)l

comments on earlier versions. ; 2#1 ;

References
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:c>insey, J. C. C., A. C. -)"ar, and P. C. -)ppes 19&# 6A7iomatic Bo)ndations of Classical Particle :echanics.6 6ournal of Rational Mechanics and nalysis 2:2&#12'2. :o)lines, C. U. 19'0 6Appro7imate Application of Empirical (heories: A 9eneral E7plication.6 Er$enntnis 1$:2$1122'. :)ndy, Brent 19/' 6-cientific (heory as Partially 8nterpreted Calc)l)s.6 Er$enntnis 2': 1'#1190. 19// 6-cientific (heory as Partially 8nterpreted Calc)l)s 88.6 Er$enntnis 2/: 10&11/#. @e*ton, -ir 8saac 1'2/ Syste# of the 4orld . 8n Sir Isaac 'e%ton-s Mathe#atical Principles of 'atural Philosophy and <is Syste# of the 4orld , ed. B. Ca5ori. Berkeley: University of California Press, 19#%. P)tnam, ?ilary 19'' 6:odels and Heality.6 Heprinted in Realis# and Reason , !y ?ilary P)tnam, 112&. Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19/#. Hamsey, Brank 190$ 6(heories.6 8n /he Foundations of Mathe#atics , !y Brank Hamsey. Paterson, @.J.: ,ittlefield, Adams and Co. H)melhart, Cavid 19/$ 6-chemata: (he B)ildin" Blocks of Co"nition.6 8n /heoretical Issues in Reading .o#prehension , ed. H. -piro, B. Br)ce, and B. Bre*er. ?illsdale, @.J.: Erl!a)m. -hapere, C)dley 19/% Reason and the Search for 5no%ledge . Cordrecht: Heidel. -need, Joseph 19'1 /he Logical Structure of Mathe#atical Physics . Cordrecht: Heidel. 19'' 6Cescri!in" Hevol)tionary -cientific Chan"e: A Bormal Approach.6 8n <istorical and Philosophical ,i#ensions of Logic, Methodology, and Philoso + ; 2## ;

phy of Science , ed. H. E. B)tts and J. ?intikka, 2%&120/. Cordrecht: Heidel. -te"m)ller, Jolf"an" 19'0 /he Structure and ,yna#ics of /heories . @e* Lork: -prin"er+Kerla". 19'9 /he Structuralist ?ie% of /heories . @e* Lork: -prin"er+Kerla". -)ppe, Brederick 19'' /he Structure of Scientific /heories . Ur!ana: University of 8llinois Press. -)ppes, Patrick 190' 6Jhat 8s a -cientific (heory=6 8n Philosophy of Science /oday , ed. -. :or"en!esser, &&10'. @e* Lork: Basic Books. 1909 6:odels of Cata.6 8n Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science , !y Patrick -)ppes, 2%1 #&. Cordrecht: Heidel. (r)esdell, C. 19/$ /1 6-)ppesian -te*s.6 8n n Idiot-s Fugiti&e Essays on Science , !y C. (r)esdell, &$%1&'2. @e* Lork: -prin"er+Kerla", 19/%. van Braassen, Bas 19/$ /he Scientific I#age . I7ford: I7ford University Press. 19/' 6(he -emantic Approach to -cientific (heories. 8n /he Process of Science , ed. @ancy @ersessian. Cordrecht: @i5hoff. van ?elden, Al!ert 19/& Measuring the =ni&erse: .os#ic ,i#ensions fro# ristarchus to <alley . Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press. ; 2#% ;

en. %rocedural Syntax for heory Elements

Joseph ,: Sneed

I. Introduction
8.1. (he >eystone of the traditional lo"ical empiricist acco)nt of empirical science is that scientific theories may pla)si!ly !e represented !y sets of sentences in a formal lan")a"eF)s)ally some variant of first+order predicate lo"ic. Iver the last t*enty years an alternative to this vie*Fcommonly called 6the semantic vie*6 M2%N or 6str)ct)ralism6 M1N, M1'NFhas developed. (here are si"nificant differences amon" common variants of this vie*. B)t *hat these variants all have in common is the vie* that identifyin" scientific theories *ith their semantic 6models,6 rather than *ith the syntactic entities that characteri4e these models, provides a more fr)itf)l startin" point to address a n)m!er of traditional philosophical iss)es a!o)t the nat)re of scientific activity. 8.2. Bor one convinced of the fr)itf)lness of the semantic approach, it is temptin" to concl)de that 6synta76 has !ecome irrelevant to philosophy of science. B)t this *o)ld !e rash, for several reasons. Birst, it is o!vio)s that 6model theory6 cannot !e totally separated from 6synta76 for the simple reason that *e m)st )se so#e lan")a"e .tho)"h perhaps not a formal one2 to talk a!o)t models. -econd, it has !een reco"ni4ed for some time that some traditional <)estions like elimina!ility and defina!ility of theoretical concepts el)de a p)rely semantic approach .M1'N, 190119'2. Binally, the recent reappearance of 6the conte7t of discovery6 .M0N, M1$N, M1#N, M1%N, M19N2 in the mainstream of philosophical disc)ssion, to"ether *ith the appearance of comp)ter models of scientific discovery and pro!lem solvin", forces )s to foc)s o)r attention on the 6syntactic representation6 of scientific theories. 8.#. Ine may !e convinced that the syntactic aspects of scientific theories remain essential to the disc)ssion of important pro!lems *itho)t !elievin" that first+order lo"ic .or some of its common emendationsFhi"her+order ; 2#& ; lo"ics, many+sorted lo"ics, modal lo"ics2 provides the most )sef)l syntactic apparat)s. Be"innin" *ith the vie* that model classes are the 6essential6 feat)res of scientific theories, one may then look aro)nd for a 6s)ita!le6 syntactic apparat)s to characteri4e these model classes. 3-)ita!le3 means here simply 3ade<)ate to dealin" *ith the philosophical <)estions of interest3. Ine mi"ht even co)ntenance the possi!ility that there are a variety of approaches to synta7Feach 6s)ita!le6 for addressin" different <)estions. Ho)"hly, if model classes are the essence of scientific theories, then *e may !e pra"matic and even eclectic a!o)t the synta7 )sed to descri!e these model classes. 8.%. (he p)rpose of this paper is to sketch an approach to providin" a synta7 for str)ct)ralist reconstr)ctions of scientific theories. (his synta7 is offered as an alternative to synta7 !ased on first+ order lo"ic and its relatives. (he motivation for this alternative approach to synta7 is diverse. Birst, it is intended to provide an 6int)itively nat)ral6 pict)re of ho* people .and machines2 mi"ht represent model classes. -econd, it is intended to provide a synta7 ade<)ate to e7pressin" the str)ct)ralist conception of the 6empirical claim6 of a scientific theory. Binally, it is s)""ested as a means to deal *ith some specific philosophical iss)es. Amon" these are:

@ the epistemolo"ical stat)s of 6theoretical concepts6 and <)estions of their elimina!ility and defina!ilityD @ the concepts of 6pro!lem,6 6pro!lem sol)tion,6 and 6pro!lem solver6 relative to a specific empirical theoryD @ the role of the str)ct)ralist concept of 6constraints6 in pro!lem solvin"D @ the concept of 6concept)al innovation6 as the discovery of theoretical concepts and the empirical la*s containin" themD @ criteria of s)ccess for a)tomatic pro!lem solvin" and theory discovery. (his paper is a report of 6*ork in pro"ress,6 not a s)stained defense of a *ell+form)lated vie*. 8t sketches an alternative approach to synta7 and indicates ho* it mi"ht !e e7pected to serve the p)rposes 5)st mentioned. 8n no *ay are these claims s)pported !y s)stained ar")ment or detailed e7amples. :ore e7plicitly, the apparat)s sketched is ill)strated !y application to a very restricted class of theories Fsimple relational theoriesFand even here, important theoretical <)estions a!o)t the e7pressive po*er of the synta7 are i"nored. 8.&. (he f)ndamental idea developed here is this. Classes of models appearin" in str)ct)ralist reconstr)ctions of empirical theories may !e characteri4ed syntactically !y pairs of proced)res PP, P3Q. Proced)res are e7pressions in a formally specified lan")a"e that descri!e f)nctions on set+theoretic entities. (he class of models characteri4ed !y PP, P3Q is simply those models in *hich the val)e of P is a s)!set of the val)e of P3. 8t *ill !e s)""ested that )sin" proced)ral synta7 allo*s )s to denote and manip)late model+theoretic entities in a more e7plicit and transparent *ay than first+order lo"ic. (his makes it ; 2#0 ; easier to provide syntactic descriptions of int)itively si"nificant feat)res of model+theoretic reconstr)ctions. 8.0. 8n section 88, 8 characteri4e a restricted class of set+theoretic str)ct)resFsimple relational theories Fthat is the initial foc)s of the investi"ation. (he semantic concept of 6<)ery6Fa formal analo")e of a kind of e7perimentFfor these str)ct)res is introd)ced in section 888. (hat the concept of 6<)ery6F dra*n from the realm of data+!ase theoryFhas many feat)res int)itively analo"o)s to 6e7periments6 is the !asis for the claim that the syntactic apparat)s sketched here is 6int)itively nat)ral.6 Ho)"hly, it provides )s *ith a *ay of vie*in" empirical la*s as descri!in" relations amon" the res)lts of e7periments. Ar")a!ly, this is m)ch closer to the representation of la*s act)ally )sed in the practice of empirical science than that provided !y sentences in first+order lo"ic. Proced)re lan")a"es and their interpretation as <)eries are descri!ed in section 8K. (he lan")a"es are characteri4ed rather a!stractly in only eno)"h detail to make pla)si!le the int)itive idea that proced)res interpreted as <)eries may !e vie*ed as e7periments on 6empirical systems.6 8.'. 8n section K, 8 sketch ho* the syntactic apparat)s of section 8K can capt)re the essential ideas of str)ct)ralist reconstr)ctions. (he main res)lt of this disc)ssion is to ar")e that proced)ral synta7 can represent the str)ct)ralist conception of the 6empirical claim6 of a scientific theory. (o arrive at this res)lt, !oth empirical la*s and constraints are represented as relations amon" the res)lts of proced)res Finterpreted as <)eries, or more int)itively 6e7periments.6 (he claim of theories involvin" theoretical concepts re<)ires for its representation the )se of a 6"enerator proced)re6 that plays the role of <)ery for theoretical concepts. 8n this *ay the <)antification over predicates in a Hamsey sentence form)lation of the empirical claim is replaced *ith a 6"enerate and test6 proced)re that searches for

instantiations of theoretical concepts that 6*ork.6 8n connection *ith this disc)ssion, section K.#.# indicates ho* the syntactic apparat)s may !e applied to traditional <)estions of elimina!ility and defina!ility of theoretical concepts. 8./. 8n sections K8 and K88, 8 sketch ho* proced)ral synta7 mi"ht !e )sed to e7tend str)ct)ralist acco)nts of empirical science to areas of pro!lem solvin" and theory discovery. -ection K88 sketches a "eneral acco)nt of 6search6 for empirical la*s, e7tendin" the *ork of ,an"ley et al. .M1$N2 to discovery of la*s containin" theoretical concepts in models *here these concepts are not e7plicitly defina!le.

II. %otential -odels as -JsubHpIKJU,rKGRelational StructuresII. %otential -odels as -p JU,rKGRelational Structures

88.1. 8 !e"in !y considerin" proced)ral synta7 in a special case. (he str)ct)ralist notion of theory element *ill !e restricted in three *ays. Birst, 8 consider only finite str)ct)res. -econd, 8 consider str)ct)res in *hich only sets of t)ples ; 2#' ; .relations2 over a sin"le domain appear, rather than more "eneral set+theoretic constr)ctions o!tained from Bo)r!aki3s echelon constr)ctions .M1N, sec. 8.22. Binally, 8 do not consider str)ct)res containin" a)7iliary mathematical apparat)s like the real n)m!ers. 88.2. (he !asic semantic entities 8 *ill )se are set+theoretic str)ct)res like the )s)al 6models6 for first+ order lo"ic. Consider a co)nta!ly infinite set of 6)relemente6 U. Bor all

C A U let

:em!ers of the set :p MU, rNFMp M=, r N+relational structures Fare all the finite relational str)ct)res of the same set+theoretic type r R Pr1 , . . . , ri , . . . , rn Q *hose individ)als are dra*n from U. (hey are e7amples of *hat *e have called potential #odels of an empirical theory .M1N, M1'N2. Bor mp R PC, H1 , . . . , Hn Q B :p MU, rN, the notation C.mp 2 R C and Hi .mp 2 R Hi *ill !e )sed.

III. -JsubHpIKJU, rKG;ueriesIII. -p JU, rKG;ueries

888.1. Ine may re"ard each mem!er of :p MU, rN as a 6data !ase6 containin" information a!o)t sit)ations or systems treated !y empirical science. 8nt)itively, 6e7periments6 are vie*ed as <)eries and 6empirical data6 as the res)lts of <)eries. (o make this metaphor more precise, *e introd)ce the concept of an :p MU, rN+<)ery. 888.2. An Mp M=, r N+(uery is simply a f)nction:

G: :p MU, rN C HMUND

G.mp 2 B HMU, C.mp 2N

for all mp B :p MU, rN. 8nt)itively, a <)ery G is a $ind of e7periment that may !e done on mem!ers of :p MU, rN, *hile G.mp 2 is the result of doin" an e7periment of kind G on the specific 6system6 mp . 888.#. Bor :p MU, rN3s representin" empirical theories only G3s invariant )nder set+theoretic isomorphism are of interest. Also, *e *ant to represent <)eries syntactically so that the syntactic representation is a description of an al"orithm for comp)tin" their val)es. (h)s, *e may restrict o)r attention to partial rec)rsive G3s. -)ch G3s *e call co#puta!le . (he set of all comp)ta!le :p MU, rN+<)eries 8 denote !y 3GMU, rN3 .M#N, M&N2. G)eries *hose val)es are the domain and relations in mp B :p MU, rN are of special interest. 8 )se the notation GC and GHi for <)eries so that, for all mpB :p MU, rN, GC.mp 2 R C.mp 2 and GHi .mp 2 R Hi .mp 2. Bor e7ample, see Appendi7 A.1.

IV. %rocedure $an*ua*es and heir Interpretations

8K.1. Procedure Languages . (he f)ndamental int)itive idea here is that :p MU, rN+<)eries provide interpretations for .some2 e7pressions in a formal ; 2#/ ; lan")a"e ^,.92. (he pro"rammin" lan")a"es ,8-P .M11N, M12N2 and PHI,I9 .M10N, M2$N2 may !e vie*ed as e7amples of the kind of formal lan")a"es 8 have in mind. Ither e7amples have !een devised more specifically for e7pressin" <)eries and addressin" theoretical <)estions .M#N2. 8 *ill sketch, very "enerally, ho* 8 propose to e7ploit this idea *itho)t !ein" committed to any specific formal lan")a"e. 8K.1.2. A procedure language is a formal lan")a"e ^,.92 "enerated !y a conte7t+free "rammar 9 over some alpha!et. ^,.92 consists .in part2 of a set of e7pressions ^E to *hich interpretations *ill !e assi"ned. ^E *ill consist of t*o types of e7pressionsF^E R ^P D ^CF*hich, for present p)rposes, *e may take to !e dis5oint. Je think of the ^P+e7pressions in ^,.92 as 6processes6 or 6pro"rams6 *hose inp)ts and o)tp)ts are ^C+e7pressions in ^,.92 .partial rec)rsive f)nctions on ^C2. (hat is, for all P B ^P, *e ass)me: P: ^C C ^C D _E `, *here E is the val)e assi"ned to P for mem!ers of ^C for *hich it is )ndefined. 8nt)itively, mem!ers of ^ P are 6<)ery6 or 6proced)re6 e7pressions, *hile mem!ers of ^C are 6data6 e7pressions. 8K.1.#. 8 ass)me the "rammar 9 *orks in s)ch a *ay that the proced)re e7pressions may !e analy4ed into component parts that are also proced)re e7pressions. (he notation _P1 , . . . , Pn ` ^9^ 1 P is )sed to indicate that proced)re P is genera!le from proced)res _P1 , . . . , Pn `, to"ether *ith 6lo"ical primitives6 of ^,, via the formation r)les of 9. (he mem!ers of _P1 , . . . , Pn ` need not !e 6primitive.6 (h)s, P may !e "enera!le from more than one set of s)!proced)res.

8K.2. Interpretations for Procedure Languages . :em!ers of ^E *ill !e assi"ned interpretations rec)rsively )sin" the prod)ction r)les of ^9. Bor the moment, *e may a!stract from the details of ho* mem!ers of ^E are constr)cted and interpreted and simply think of an interpretation for a procedure language ^L .0 2 as an ordered pair: 8 R P8C, 8PQ so that 8C assi"ns m+t)ples of relations in HMUN to .some2 data e7pressions in ^C and 8P assi"ns f)nctions from these m+t)ples to HMUN to .some2 proced)re e7pressions in ^P. (his *orks in s)ch a *ay that P is al*ays assi"ned a proced)re that is 6restricted to6 a specific mem!er of :p MU, rN and P .as a f)nction on ^C2 6comm)tes6 *ith 8 and the val)es of 8. :ore precisely, 8C and 8P are f)nctions s)ch that

; 2#9 ; so that, for all mpB :p MU, rND C, C3 B ^CD P B ^P, 8Pm .P, mp 2 B -E( .HMU, C.mp 2Nm , HMU, C.mp 2N2 and, *henever 8Cm .C2 B HMU, C.mp 2Nm P.C2 R C3 iff and 8C1 .C32 B HMU, C.mp 2N,

8Pm .P, mp 2 .8Cm .C22 R 8C1 .C32.

(he notation 3-E( .A, B23 means the set of all f)nctions from A to B. 8K.2.2. -ome proced)res ^P may !e interpreted as <)eriesFmem!ers of GMU, rN. Hecall that mem!ers of :p MU, rN are simply certain kinds of n T 1 t)ples of relations from HMUN. (h)s, 8PnT1 .P, mp 2 *ill !e a .perhaps improper2 s)perset of a mem!er of GMU, rN, provided only that it has a non+E val)es .is defined2 in :p MU, rN and isomorphism invariant. ?ere, *e restrict o)r attention interpretations and P3s so that, for all mpB :p MU, rN, 8PnT1 .P, mp 2 B GMU, rN. Jhere no conf)sion res)lts, 8 *ill occasionally a!!reviate 38PnT1 .P, mp 2 .mp 23 !y 3P.mp 23. @ote that there may remain P B ^P that are not interpreted as <)eries. 8K.2.#. 8 ass)me that the interpretation 8 *orks in s)ch a *ay that *hen _P1 , . . . , Pn ` ^9^ 1 P the val)e of P is determined !y the val)es of _P1 , . . . , Pn `. Ho)"hly, this means that P may !e analy4ed .perhaps in several *ays2 into s)!proced)res *hose val)es s)ffice to determine the val)e of P. Jhen P is interpreted as a <)ery, it is possi!le that all mem!ers of _P1, . . . , Pn` are also interpreted as <)eries, !)t *e do not re<)ire this.

8K.2.%. 8nt)itively, 8PnT1 .P, mp 2 is the <)ery that proced)re e7pression P comp)tes in the potential #odel #p . (he same proced)re e7pression P *ill "enerally comp)te different <)eries in different mp 3s. (hat is, *hen mpF mp 3, 8PnT1 .P, mp 2 F 8PnT1 .P, mp 32. Bor e7ample, see Appendi7 A.1. 8K.2.&. 8n the conte7 of empirical science, *e may think of a proced)re e7pression P as somethin" like an experi#ental proced)re that has a limited ran"e of applica!ility. (he semantic entities in GMU, rN characteri4e kinds of thin"s e7periments mi"ht meas)re or determine. (he syntactic entities in ^P characteri4e concrete e7perimental methods. (he interpretation f)nction tells )s *hat specific e7perimental proced)res do in fact determine in a "iven sit)ation .potential model2. 8K.2.0. (hese considerations motivate the follo*in". Call pairs P^,.92, 8Q of proced)re lan")a"es and their interpretations interpreted procedure languages for :p MU, rN. Bor interpreted proced)re lan")a"e P^,.92, 8Q for :p MU, rN, ; 2%$ ; P B ^P, mpB :p MU, rN, : A :p MU, rN and :p MU, rN+<)ery G B GMU, rN, *e say that: 12 P expresses G in mp iff 8PnT1 .P, mp 2 .mp 2 R G.mp 2D 22 P expresses G in : iff, for all mpB :, P e7presses G in mp D #2 P uni&ersally expresses G iff P e7presses G in :p MU, rN. Bor P B ^P and G B GMU, rN, *e may define : .P, G2 R _mpB :p MU, rN ^P e7presses G in mp `. 8nt)itively, : .P, G2 is all the mem!ers of :p MU, rN in *hich proced)re P 6*orks6 for comp)tin" <)ery G. 8K.2.'. Kie*in" proced)res e7pressin" <)eries as e7perimental methods motivates )s to to restrict o)r attention to proced)res that are "enera!le from proced)res )niversally e7pressin" <)eries for the relations appearin" in mem!ers of :p MU, rN .relative to P^,.92, 8Q2. (hat is, *e are interested in P so that B^9^ 1 P and K A _PC, PH1 , . . . , PHn `

*here PC and PHi )niversally e7press GC and GHi respectively. 8 call P an e#pirical procedure expression and the set B an e#pirical !ase for P. (his corresponds to the c)stomary distinction !et*een 6intensional6 and 6e7tensional6 data+!ase relations .M2#N, 1$$2.

V. heory Elements
K.1. Introduction . 8n this section 8 *ill sketch ho* proced)re lan")a"es may !e )sed to provide

syntactical e7pression for the essential model+theoretic entities appearin" in str)ct)ralist reconstr)ctions of empirical theories .M1N, M1'N2. (hese incl)de potential models and models .sec. K.22, partial potential models .sec. K.#2, and constraints .sec. K.%2. 8 *ill indicate ho* <)estions of elimina!ility and defina!ility that el)de precise semantic form)lation mi"ht !e handled *ith this synta7. 8 do not consider the str)ct)ralist concept of intertheoretical link here, !)t 8 !elieve one mi"ht e7tend proced)ral synta7 to this as *ell. K.2. E#pirical La%s . Clearly, : .P, G2 co)ld !e )sed to characteri4e empirically interestin" classes of models. ?o*ever, G is a semantic entity. :ore appropriate, for o)r p)rposes, is a p)rely syntactic characteri4ation. Consider pairs of empirical proced)re e7pressions PP, P3Q B ^P Y ^P so that, relative to P^,.92, 8Q, !oth P and P3 )niversally e7press <)eries G and G3. (he pair PP, P3Q characteri4es a class of #odels : .P, P32Fa s)!set of :p MU, rNFin the follo*in" *ay: : .P, P32 R _mpB :p MU, rN ^8PnT1 .P, mp 2 .mp 2 A 8PnT1 .P3, mp 2 .mp 2`. Bor empirical theories, : .P, P32 is 5)st the class of potential models in *hich ; 2%1 ; res)lts of the e7perimental proced)re P are a s)!set of the res)lts of P3. 8nt)itively, *e may say that, in :.P, P32, P 6partially determines6 the same o!serva!le of systems of kind :p MU, rN that P3 determines. Bor e7ample, see Appendi7 A.2. K.2.2. 9enerally, the 6la*s6 for a theory ( for :p MU, rN may !e vie*ed as a finite set of proced)re e7pression pairs , R _P,1 , ,1 3Q, . . . , P,n , ,n 3Q`. *here all ,i , ,i 3 B ^P. (he #odels for the theory are

9enerally, :.,2 A :p MU, rN and ( R P:.,2, :p MU, rNQ

determined !y the set of e7pression+<)ery pairs , is an atten)ated e7ample of *hat *e have called a theory ele#ent .M1N2. K.#. /heoretical .oncepts K.#.1. /heoretical Structures . Consider :p MU, r1 , . . . , rk , rkT1 , . . . , r1 N R :p MU, n, tND :pp MU, r1 , . . . , rk N R :pp MU, nN *here

n R Pr1 , . . . , rk QD

t R PrkT1 , . . . , r1 Q.

:em!ers of :pp MU, nN are k T 1, . . . , k1 6red)cts6 of mem!ers of :p MU, n, tN. Je call mem!ers of :pp MU, nN partial potential #odels . 8nt)itively, the relations in the places k T 1, . . . , 1 are theoretical relations and those in places 1, . . . , k are nontheoretical relations . :p MU, n, tN is the class of theoretical structures *hile :pp MU, nN is the class of nontheoretical structures . K.#.1.2. Cenote the 6Hamsey f)nctor6 .M1N, sec. 88.%2 from :p onto :pp !y Ham: :p MU, n, tN C :pp MU, nN so that, for all mp R PC, H1 , . . . , Hk , HkT1 , . . . H1 Q in :p , Ham .mp 2 R PC, H1 , . . . , Hk Q. G)eries for :p MU, n, tN and :pp MU, nN *e *ill denote respectively !y Gp : :p MU, n, tN C HMUN and Gpp : :pp MU, nN C HMUN.

K.#.1.#. E7pression pairs P,p , ,p 3Q for :p determine sets of :p +models in the manner descri!ed a!ove. Kia the Hamsey f)nctor, they also determine sets ; 2%2 ; of :pp +models:

-imilarly, a theory , for :p determines a set of :pp +models *hich *e have called the nontheoretical content of the theory element P:pp , :p , :.,2Q .M1N2. (hat is,

K.#.1.%. (he motivation for callin" :pp 3s nontheoretical str)ct)res is this. 8n the sit)ations *here the theories represented !y these str)ct)res are act)ally )sed, all data to *hich *e have 6direct6 empirical access is defina!le in terms of the :pp +relations. By 6direct6 *e mean ro)"hly access that does not depend on ass)min" that *e are dealin" *ith a mem!er of Cn.:pp , :p , :.,22. (h)s, s)pposin" *e are 6"iven6 some mpp B :pp , all the data *e can o!tain for mpp is of the form PGpp , HQ *here GppB Gpp MU, nN and H R Gpp .mpp 2 B HMUN. K.#.2. /heoretical La%s . (his int)itive )nderstandin" of the data availa!le to the process ,p s)""ests that it m)st operate in a some*hat )n)s)al *ay. -)ppose ,p has an empirical !ase consistin" of e7pressions for all relations in :p MU, n, tN3s. 8n operatin" on a data e7pression C *hose interpretation

is mp , ,p re<)ires as intermediary steps the res)lts of the <)eries e7pressed !y PC, PH1 , . . . , PHn , . . . , PHt . ?o*ever, ,p may have only the res)lts of the nontheoretical <)eries PH1 , . . . , PHn availa!le. (he res)lts of the theoretical <)eries PHnT1 , . . . , PHt may !e totally )navaila!le. 8n effect, *e are invited to consider a proced)re e7pressin" an :p MU, tN+<)ery operatin" on a data e7pression for a mem!er of :pp MU, nN. ?o* co)ld this *ork= K.#.2.2. Je may ima"ine ,p *orkin" *ith 6"enerators6 in place of e7pressions of theoretical <)eries. ,p marches alon" callin" and eval)atin" nontheoretical s)!processes PH1 , . . . , PHn )ntil it reaches a call for PH5 , J B _n T 1, . . . , t`. At this point, instead of calc)latin" PH5 from the "iven data e7pression .*hich cannot !e done2, ,p systematically "enerates .o)t of nothin"2 a 6candidate6 for the o)tp)t of PH5 of the appropriate set+theoretic type and )ses this o)tp)t to complete its calc)lation. (o make this precise, *e need some concept of a generator proced)re. A "enerator sho)ld take as inp)t e7pressions for the domain of an mpp and deliver as o)tp)t a se(uence of mem!ers of HMU, C.mpp 2N of a specific set+theoretic type. An ,p involvin" theoretical concepts is simply one that has "enerators, rather than <)ery e7pressions at certain places. K.#.2.#. (his means that determinin" *hether a "iven mpp is in

!ecomes a 6"enerate and test6 processFrepeatedly "eneratin" pairs P,p .mpp 2, ,p 3.mpp 2Q and testin" *hether ,p .mpp 2 A ,p 3.mpp 2. (he first s)ccessf)l test is s)fficient to le"itimate mpp as a mem!er of the nontheoretical content of the theory *hose sin"le theoretical la* is P,p , ,p 3Q. ; 2%# ; K.#.#. Eli#ina!ility and ,efina!ility . Proced)ral synta7 permits )s to raise <)estions of elimina!ility and defina!ility of theoretical concepts in a precise *ay. :ore important, it may prove possi!le, )sin" this apparat)s, to address these <)estions for theories that are not readily formali4a!le in first+order lo"ic. K.#.#.2. 9iven interpreted proced)re lan")a"e P^,.92, 8Q and the theory element P:pp MU, nN, :p MU, n, tN, :.,p 2Q *ith the mem!ers of ,p in ^P, *e say that the theory ,pp R PP,pp1 , ,pp1 3Q, . . . , P,ppk , ,ppk 3QQ for :pp *ith all ,ppi B ^P is Ra#sey e(ui&alent to , iff

Je then ask, 8s the follo*in" tr)e= HA:-EL E,8:8@AB8,8(L (?E-8-: Bor all theory elements P:pp , :p , :.,p 2Q, there is a theory ,pp for :pp so that ,pp is Hamsey e<)ivalent to ,. K.#.#.#. (he <)estion of defina!ility of theoretical terms and its relation to model+theoretic elimina!ility may !e raised in this *ay. -)ppose

_P1 , . . . , Pn `^9^ 1 P and relative to the interpreted proced)re lan")a"e P^,.92, 8Q,

then *e say, relative to P^,.92, 8Q, > is defina!le in ter#s of G>1 , . . . , Gn ` in :.P, G2. @ote that 3defina!ility3 applies to <)eries rather than to e7pressions for them. 8n the special case of <)eries GHi *e say that Rk is defina!le in terms of _Hi1 , . . . , R inH in M A :p MU, rN *hen there e7ist Pk and _Pi5 ` _Pi5 `^9^ 1 Pk and

(h)s, for theory element P:pp MU, nN, :p MU, n, tN, :.,p 2Q *e may ask *hether Hk , k B t, is defina!le in terms of _Hi5 `, i, 5 B n, in :.,p 2. Clearly, the ans*er to !oth elimina!ility and defina!ility <)estions depends on ^,. K.%. .onstraints K.%.1. .onstraints and n3ary >ueries . :odel+theoretically, a constraint is 5)st a s)!set of Po.:p 2Fthe set of all s)!sets of :p that satisfy the 6constraint.6 A simple e7ample of a constraint is the re<)irement that identical particles in different models of classical particle mechanics have the same mass val)es. (his e7ample is trivial in that it is e<)ivalent to a re<)irement on the )nion of the constrained mp 3s. ?o*ever, e7amples of nontrivial constraints s)ch as the 6e7tensivity constraint6 on mass in particle mechanics a!o)nd in empirical ; 2%% ; science. (hat representin" nontrivial constraints is essential to representin" empirical theories has !een ar")ed in detail in M1N, section 88.2. K.%.1.2. Can proced)ral synta7 !e )sed to represent constraints= Birst, let )s restrict o)r attention to constraints that are sets of t*o+mem!er s)!sets of :p MU, rN. Je mi"ht think of a !inary (ueries as f)nctions: G: :p MU, rN Y :p MU, rN C HMUN so that, for all Pmp , mp 3Q B :p Y :p , G.mp , mp 32 B HMU, .C.mp 2 D C.mp 322N. (hat is, G maps pairs of potential models into relations on the )nion of their domains. A comp)ta!le <)ery of this type is .partial2 rec)rsive and consistent in a nat)ral e7tension of the sense of section 888 a!ove. K.%.1.#. Je may consider a !inary interpretation for proced)res in lan")a"e ^, as a f)nction: 8Pm : ^P Y :p MU, rN Y :p MU, rN C -E( .HMUNm , HMUN2 D _E `. Helative to a !inary interpretation, P expresses the !inary (uery > in I#p , mp 3J iff 8PnT1 .P, mp , mp 32 .mp , mp 32 R G.mp , mp 32. Bor P in ^P and !inary <)ery G *e may define

>.P,G2 R _Pmp , mp 3Q ^P e7presses G in Pmp , mp 3Q`. (h)s, an e7pression+!inary <)ery pair may !e )sed to characteri4e a s)!set of :p MU, rN Y :p MU, rN, and this characteri4ation may !e rendered f)lly syntactic !y replacin" G *ith P3 in the manner of section K.1. Clearly, *e can "enerali4e these ideas to n+ary <)eries *itho)t losin" the capa!ility of representin" comp)ta!le n+ary <)eries in a formal lan")a"e. K.%.1.%. -ome additional conditions are needed to make the sets of n+t)ples determined !y proced)re+n+ ary+<)ery pairs have the properties that constraints for real empirical theories )s)ally have. (his has !een *orked o)t in an )np)!lished man)script .M1/N2. Jhether all 6interestin"6 constraints can !e represented !y sets of n+t)ples is less clear. B)t the ans*er seems to !e 6yes,6 provided *e restrict o)r attention to finite sets of potential models. K.%.2. /heories %ith .onstraints . As *ith the la*s of a theory, *e may re"ard the constraints C associated *ith a theory for :p as a set of proced)re pairs *here the proced)res *ill e7press m)lti+ ar")ment <)eries of the sort e7emplified a!ove. ,et > R _P>1 , >1 3Q, . . . , P>k , >k 3Q` *here >i , >i 3 B ^P and, for some

>i )niversally e7presses Gi : :p MU, rNnC HMUN. ci .>i , Gi 32 R _s B :p MU, rNn ^8PnT1 .>i , s2 A 8PnT1 .>i 3, s2` Ci .>i , Gi 2 R _- B Po.:p MU, rN^-nA ci .>i , Gi 2` ; 2%& ; (he int)itive idea is that s)!sets of :p satisfy Ci .>i , Gi 2 iff all n+t)ples from them satisfy ci .>i , Gi 2. 8t is ar")ed .ind)ctively2 in M1/N that this is eno)"h to represent all 6interestin"6 constraints. (he set of sets of models determined !y > is:

K.%.2.2. Je may no* consider *hat *e have called a theory ele#ent .M1N2: ( R P:pp , :p , :.,2, C.>2Q *here the , and > provide syntactic representations for the model and constraints :.,2 and C.>2. (he nontheoretical content of ( is

(he iss)e of elimina!ility of the theoretical components of the models can !e raised for this more "eneral concept of theory element in the same *ay as o)tlined a!ove for the theory element *itho)t constraints.

VI. -JsubHpIKJU, rKG%roblem Sol+in*VI. -p JU, rKG%roblem Sol+in*

K8.1. Mp M=, r N3Pro!le#s and /heir Solutions . Pro!lem solvin" in empirical science may !e descri!ed in the voca!)lary of <)eries to a data !ase. A 6pro!lem6 is then: "iven the res)lts of a series of <)eries to the same data !ase, predict the res)lt of a f)rther <)ery. Kie*ed syntactically, a pro!lem sol)tion is a proced)re constr)cted from proced)res e7pressin" the 6data6 <)eries *hich e7presses the 6)nkno*n6 <)ery. Pro!lem solvin" is then vie*ed as search in the "raph of ^P for a pro!lem+sol)tion process. 8t appears that conception of 6pro!lem solvin"6 may provide a formally precise model of act)al practice. -)ch a formal model mi"ht serve as the theoretical !asis for comp)ter+assisted instr)ction in empirical sciences analo"o)s to that for theorem provin" in first+order lo"ic and set theory .M22N2. K8.1.2. 9enerally, an Mp M=, r N3pro!le# type is a pair

*here is a vector of <)eries providin" the 6"iven data6 for this pro!lem type and G is the <)ery *hose possi!le res)lts are desired. 8nt)itively, a sol)tion to the pro!lem type is some "eneral method of providin" the possi!le res)lts of <)ery G correspondin" to any possi!le "iven res)lts of <)eries G. -ince there may !e more than one possi!le res)lt for G, this method sho)ld !e vie*ed "enerally as prod)cin" a set of possi!le res)lts or a set of minim)m .*rt A 2 res)lts. K8.1.#. Ass)min" that *e are dealin" only *ith : A :p MU, rN in *hich the <)eries in the pro!lem type are e7pressed !y empirical proced)res

a sol)tion may !e conceived as a proced)re - B ^P s)ch that

; 2%0 ; that is, - is "enera!le from

, and so that, for all mpB :, -.mp 2 R P.mp 2. Jhat makes - a 6)sef)l6 sol)tion is that -.mp 2 may !e o!tained only from the "iven res)lts of

*itho)t 6lookin" at6 a f)ll description of mp . -ince - is "enera!le from , -.mp 2 can !e comp)ted from the val)es of the mem!ers of in mp .see sec. 8K.1.#2. K8.1.%. Jith this concept of sol)tion, the process of 6pro!lem solvin"6 may !e vie*ed syntactically as attemptin" to constr)ct - from

, )sin" the formation r)les 9. (h)s, 6constr)ctin" a sol)tion6 !ecomes some*hat analo"o)s to 6constr)ctin" a proof6 in first+order lo"ic *ith the formation r)les 9 playin" the role of inference r)les .see M/N, esp. sec. 02. (here is, of co)rse, no ")arantee that this *ill yield a s)ita!le -. K8.2. Pro!le# Sol&ing %ith E#pirical La%s . Empirical la*s conceived as pairs of proced)res P,, ,3Q may !e )sed in pro!lem solvin" essentially as e7tensions to the formation r)les 9. (hey provide additional 6s)!stantive6 principles for constr)ctin" ne* proced)res from "iven proced)res. K8.2.2. (he !asic idea of )sin" P,, ,3Q to constr)ct ne* proced)res is to e7ploit the fact that, for mpB :.,, ,32, ,.mp 2 A ,.mp 32. Clearly, if *e may ass)me that the data for o)r pro!lem comes from a model for a theory containin" P,, ,3Q, *e may e7ploit this fact as a kind of 6s)!stit)tion principle6 to constr)ct ne* proced)res from those providin" the data for the pro!lem. :ore precisely, -UB-(8(U(8I@ PH8@C8P,E: Brom P,1 and , ,2 Q constr)ct _P1, . . . , ,1, . . . ` ^9^ 1 P3. (his constr)ction has the desira!le property that, for mpB :.,1 , ,2 2, P3 .mp 2 A P.mp 2. K8.2.#. -)!stit)tion alone is not a very po*erf)l inference principle. ?o*ever, to"ether *ith some principles for "eneratin" ne* la*s from old it appears more interestin". Birst, note an o!vio)s transitivity property of la*+pairs: Brom P,1 , ,2 Q, P,2 , ,# Q constr)ct P,1 , ,# Q in appropriate model classes. Ither principles depend heavily on the specific nat)re of ^,.92. Je can "et some idea of ho* this mi"ht *ork !y s)pposin" that ^,.92 contains as lo"ical primitives the )s)al Boolean operations on sets. Bor e7ample, s)ppose 3,3 and 3D3 are amon" the primitive sym!ols of ^,.92 and _P1 , . . . , ,2 , . . . ` ^9^ 1P

; 2%' ; *ork in the follo*in" *ay: .P1 , P1 2 .mp 2 R P1 .mp 2 K P2 .mp 2 .P1 D P2 2 .mp 2 R P1 .mp 2 D P2 .mp 2 Jith this apparat)s availa!le, *e have s)ch principles as: Brom P,1 , ,Q, P,2 , ,Q constr)ct P.,1 , ,2 2, ,Q. Brom P,, ,1 Q, P,, ,2 Q constr)ct P.,, .,1 D ,2 2Q. K8.2.%. (his s)""ests that, in appropriately chosen ^,.92, somethin" like the sym!olic manip)lations associated *ith pro!lem solvin" in physics and other empirical sciences may !e modeled in a formally ri"oro)s *ay. B)rther, it appears that semantically e<)ivalent la*s may perhaps !e distin")ished !y relative 6ease6 *ith *hich they admit of these syntactic manip)lations .M/N, #/$2. Jere this so, it *o)ld provide a ne* approach to some aspects of the traditional pro!lem of 6la*likeness.6 K8.#. Pro!le# Sol&ing %ith /heoretical La%s and .onstraints . Je may e7tend these ideas to theories *ith theoretical concepts and theoretical la*s in the follo*in" *ay. :ost "enerally, *e may think of pro!lems as any com!ination of theoretical and nontheoretical <)eries. Birst, consider completely nontheoretical pro!lemsF<)eries on the nontheoretical str)ct)res

*ith correspondin" e7pressions A"ain, a sol)tion is some - s)ch that:

(heoretical la*s are pairs of proced)re e7pressions P,p , ,p 3Q that operate on the f)ll theoretical str)ct)res. Je vie* these proced)res as constr)cted, in part, from 6"enerators6 rather than <)ery proced)res for theoretical concepts .sec. K.#.22. 9enerally, pro!lem solvin" here is more comple7 5)st !eca)se there may !e m)ltiple val)es "enerated for theoretical concepts that make ,p .mp 2 A ,p 3 .mp 2. (he process of pro!lem solvin" )sin" the formation r)les and la*s in the manner sketched a!ove *ill !e essentially the same. ?o*ever, *e sho)ld e7pect the - arrived at to yield arrays of sol)tions correspondin" to the m)ltiple possi!le val)es of the theoretical concepts. K8.#.2. Consider ne7t the case in *hich the 6data6 <)eries are 5)st those for the nontheoretical concepts

and the 6)nkno*n6 <)ery is theoretical GHt . (his is a pro!lem in determinin" the val)e of the theoretical concept Ht from complete data a!o)t nontheoretical concepts. (he - that solves this pro!lem *ill "enerally not yield )ni<)e sol)tions for specific val)es of

. B)t there may !e some mp 3s in *hich the sol)tion is )ni<)e. (hese correspond to systems that provide 6meas)rement6 methods for Ht . K8.#.2. Up to this point *e have vie*ed pro!lems and pro!lem solvin" as havin" to do *ith a sin"le mem!er of :p MU, rN. 8t has !een ar")ed at len"th in ; 2%/ ; M1'N, chapters % and &, and in M1N, section 88.2, that this is an incomplete and serio)sly inade<)ate pict)re of the *ay empirical science is practiced. Pro!lem solvin" essentially involves the 6import and e7port6 of information across different models of the same theory. A proced)ral version of this vie* is ro)"hly this. (he "enerators for val)es of theoretical concepts are replaced .s)pplemented2 !y proced)res for 6importin"6 these val)es from other mem!ers of :p MU, rNFthose in *hich the la*s of the theory s)ffice to determine them )ni<)ely. (his s)""ests that, in practice, in 6real+life6 sit)ations, the role of "enerators may !e relatively insi"nificant. (he proced)res that effect the 6importin"6 are essentially constraints on n+t)ples of mp 3s .sec. K.%2. (his s)""ests that a f)lly ade<)ate acco)nt of pro!lem solvin" *ill re<)ire n+ary <)eries and constraints.

VII. heory ,isco+ery

K88.1. Introduction . (he conception of theory discovery as search is *ell kno*n .M1$N2. Proced)ral synta7 provides a precise, "eneral method for !rin"in" this conception to !ear on empirical theories represented as model+theoretic str)ct)res. 8n addition it provides a characteri4ation of concept)al innovationFthe discovery of theories employin" theoretical conceptsFand s)""ests a *ay that 6search6 mi"ht !e e7pected to yield concept)al innovation. (his reform)lates and e7tends the *ork of ,an"ley et al. in M1$N. (he form)lation sketched here opens the *ay to precisely addressin" the <)estion of *hether there are comp)tational limits on a)tomatic .al"orithmic2 concept)al innovation. 8n *hat follo*s, 8 restrict the disc)ssion to discovery of sin"le la*s in theories. K88.2. Mpp M=, n N3,ata Presentations . (he conception of la* discovery )nder consideration is 6data+ driven6 in the sense that the discovery process is vie*ed ro)"hly as a f)nction from 6data presentations 6 to 6la*s.6 (he simplest .tho)"h not the only interestin"2 conception of 6data6 for :pp MU, nN+str)ct)res .relative to an interpreted proced)re lan")a"e P,.92, 8Q2 is a se<)ence of data e7pressions interpreted as :pp MU, nN+str)ct)res:

so that 8C .-.i22 B :pp MU, nN. I)r p)rposes re<)ire that *e are a!le to speak partitions of a presentation - into n nonoverlappin" parts. 8 do this *ith the formal device of a data partition p :

; 2%9 ; so that, for i,

and the inverse of p , Pp , Pp .i2 K Pp .52 R L . K88.2.2. Je may think of a la* P,pp , ,pp 3Q as 6capt)rin"6 a part of a data presentation - *hen all mpp 3s in the part of the initial se"ment are in the model class determined !y the la*. (h)s, relative to partition p , *e say ILpp , ,pp 3J I#, nJ3captures S iff, for all

8C .-.i2 B :.,pp , ,pp 3Q. K88.#. 'ontheoretical La% ,isco&ery . 8nt)itively, the o!5ective in la* discovery is to find the 6stron"est6 la* that capt)res all the data kno*n at any point in time and contin)es to do this as more data are o!tained. 8n o)r formalism, for data presentation -, *e seek a proced)re pair P,pp , ,pp 3Q so that, relative to partition p , !oth: A2 for all m,

P,pp , ,pp 3Q Pm, nQ+capt)res -D B2 for all PPpp , Ppp 3Q so that A2, :.,pp , ,pp 3Q A :.Ppp , Ppp 32. A2 re<)ires that all parts of all initial se"ments of - !e capt)red !y P,pp , ,pp 3Q, *hile B2 says P,pp , ,pp 3Q is the stron"est proced)re pair that does A2, in the sense that it determines the smallest model class. K88.#.2. -earch for proced)re pairs satisfyin" A2 and B2 mi"ht simply !e conceived as search thro)"h a "raph ^^P2 *hich is the cross prod)ct of the "raph of ^^P R P^P, P Q of proced)re e7pressions in ^,.92 *ith itself. (he partial orderin" of pairs PP, P3Q in this "raph *ill !e determined !y the formation r)les 9 and may not have m)ch int)itive relation to o)r o!5ective. :ore )sef)l to o)r enterprise *o)ld !e a partial orderin" Pm havin" the property that PP1 , P1 3Q Pm PP2 , P2 3Q iff :.P1 , P1 32 A :.P2 , P2 32.

K88.#.#. 8nt)itively, search in P^P2 , Pm Q may !e vie*ed in this *ay. At some point i, as *e march thro)"h o)r data presentation -, *e are sittin" at proced)re pair ,i B in ^P2 kno*in" that ,i Pi, mQ+ capt)res -, for all m. Before e7aminin" -.i T 12, *e move do*n Pm to see if *e find a stron"er pair that still capt)res all o)r data. .?o* *e choose the order of e7plorin" do*n*ard paths remains )nspecified.2 Je stop *hen *e hit a pair that fails to capt)re the data and !ack )p to the last s)ccessf)l

pairF,i O. (hen *e e7amine -.i T 12. 8f ,i O Pi T 1, mQ capt)res -, *e e7amine -.i T 22. 8f not, *e !ack f)rther )p Pm )ntil *e reach a pair that capt)res all the data. (hen *e repeat the *hole process. ?ere the Pm +orderin" provides an 6incremental6 search in the sense of M1&N, M10N. 8t does not, of co)rse, f)lly specify a search proced)re. Hather, it appears to !e a necessary condition on any reasona!le search thro)"h proce+ ; 2&$ ; d)re pairs. ?o* one defines an Pm orderin" is clearly dependent on specific properties of ^,.92. At this point, 8 do not kno* ho* to constr)ct it for a specific e7ample. ?o*ever, there is *ork for cla)ses in first+order lo"ic that s)""ests ho* one mi"ht start .M1#N, M1%N2. K88.%. /heoretical La% ,isco&ery . (he precedin" disc)ssion ties model+theoretic representations of empirical theories to previo)s *ork in a)tomated la* discovery via proced)ral synta7. 8t does not s)""est any essentially ne* ideas a!o)t discovery. ?o*ever, ?empel .M0N2 and others have maintained that a cr)cial <)estion a!o)t the ade<)acy of this *ork as a model for scientific practice is *hether it can !e e7tended to a)tomated discovery of 6ne* voca!)lary6 or 6ne* concepts6 and la*s containin" them. :odel+theoretic representations of theories *ith theoretical concepts do s)""est *hat appears to !e ne* insi"hts into this <)estion. :odel+theoretic reconstr)ctions of 6real+life6 e7amples .M1'N, chap. #2 reveal that theoretical conceptsF*hile not defina!le in terms of nontheoretical concepts in all models of the theoryFare so defina!le in so#e models. A)tomated methods have !een developed for identifyin" theoretical concepts and la*s containin" them in those models *here they are defina!le. B)rther, the 6same6 theoretical concept appearin" in different la*s may !e identified .M1$N, 1&0D M19N2. Proced)ral synta7 for model+theoretic representation appears to afford the apparat)s to reform)late and e7tend this *ork to sit)ations *here defina!ility is not present in all models. Jithin this some*hat more a!stract form)lation it sho)ld !ecome possi!le to form)late precisely .and settle2 the <)estion of *hether discovery as search can yield "en)ine concept)al innovation. K88.%.2. ?o* can *e reco"ni4e in a data presentation - that *e are dealin" *ith a phenomenon re<)irin" a ne* theoretical concept= 8 s)""est ro)"hly the follo*in". Je 6discover,6 !y methods sketched a!ove, a data partition p and k different nontheoretical la*s P,pp1 , ,pp1 3Q, . . . , P,pp k , ,ppk 3Q so that, relative to p : 12 P,ppk , ,ppk 3Q Pm, kQ+capt)res -D 22 at some level, ,ppk, s .,pp k3, s2 have isomorphic parse treesD #2 ,pp k, s .,ppk3, s2 differ only in Pk O at isomorphic positions in their parse trees. Property 12 is simply that different nontheoretical la*s capt)re different parts of the initial se"ment m of the data. ?o*ever, these different la*s have the same form a!ove a certain levelD that is, they use data processed at a lo*er level in the same *ayF22. (hey differ only in the *ay presentation data is processed Pk O at lo*er levelsF#2. K88.%.#. 8nt)itively, the different Pk O3s correspond to different *ays of meas)rin" the val)e of the val)e of the sa#e theoretical concept in different

; 2&1 ; models of the theory. Je reco"ni4e this as the sa#e concept 5)st in that the o)tp)t of all Pk O3s is used in the same *ay !y the la*s. 8n fact, there is really 5)st one la*Fonce *e have 6identified6 the different Pk O3s as o)tp)ttin" val)es of the sa#e concept. Kery ro)"hly, *hat 8 am s)""estin" here is a *ay of t)rnin" old+fashioned 6operationalism6 aro)nd. 8nstead of identifyin" concepts !y their methods of determination, 8 s)""est *e identify them !y the f)rther )se *e make of the res)lts of .different2 determination methods. @ote that it is the proced)ral synta7 that makes it possi!le to identify precisely the 6)ses6 of res)lts. K88.%.%. 8 sketch here a process that mi"ht !e t)rned into an al"orithm for discoverin" the simplest kind of theoretical la*Fthat containin" only one theoretical concept. Ass)min" one thinks that s)ch discoveries co)nt as 6interestin"6 concept)al innovation in empirical science, t*o kinds of thin"s mi"ht !e done *ith s)ch a sketch. Birst, one mi"ht try to implement the sketch in some *orkin" proced)ral lan")a"e and see ho* it fared on some nontrivial e7amples .e."., moment)m mechanics2. -econd, one mi"ht try to characteri4e the process in some more a!stract *ay and investi"ate its comp)tational properties. -)ccess *ith the first *o)ld sho* that interestin" concept)al innovation can !e a)tomated. Bailin" this, one mi"ht p)rs)e the second line in the hope of sho*in" that the kind of al"orithm needed for concept)al innovation is comp)tationally 6hard6 .M9N, chap. 1#2, th)s providin" a kind of 6impossi!ility6 res)lt. 8t is the need to represent and search .intelli"ently2 thro)"h data partitions that s)""ests this mi"ht !e the case.

VIII. #ppendix
A.1. 8n the case of !inary relational str)ct)res :p MU, P2QN, the 6converse6 f)nction:

so that, for all mp in :p MU, P2QN,

is in GMU, P2QN. A proced)re P that simply comp)tes GH1 , that is, 8PnT1 .P, mp 2 .PC .mp 2, H1 .mp 2Q2 R H1 .mp 2 *ill also comp)te

in some mem!ers of :p MU, P2QNFnamely, those in *hich H1 is symmetricF!)t not in other mem!ers. A.2. Je may represent each mpB :p MU, P2QN as PHI,I9 data !ase *here 6facts6 of the form: dom .a2. rel .a, !2.

; 2&2 ; respectively descri!e C .mp 2 and H1 .mp 2. (akin" PHI,I9 as o)r proced)re lan")a"e ^,.92, the <)eries 6dom.S26 and 6rel.S, L26 form the empirical !asis for theories a!o)t !inary relational str)ct)res. Consider the PHI,I9 r)les: 1a1.S2:+ rel.S, S2. 1a2.S, L2:+ dom.S2, dom.L2. 1a#.S, L2:+ rel.S,a2, rel.a, L2. Kia the PHI,I9 analo" of set+theoretic a!straction .the 6findall6 f)nction2 each of these may !e vie*ed as proced)re that comp)tes a f)nction defined on :p MU, P2QN *hose val)e is a set. Proced)re pairs formed from these and the !asic <)eries correspond to properties of !inary relation str)ct)res in the follo*in" *ay: Prel.S, L2, 1a2.S, L2Q H1A C Y C P1a1.S2, dom.S2Q refle7ivity Prel.S, L2, rel.L, S2Q symmetry P1a#.S, L2, rel.S, L2Q transitivity @ote that since PHI,I9 e7pressions have !oth a denotational and a proced)ral interpretation, the class of models determined !y the pair P,, ,3Q is the same as the class of models in *hich, in addition to the cla)ses definin" , and ,3, the cla)se ,:+ ,3 is tr)e.

References
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; 2&# ; M0N ?empel, C. 9. 19/& 6(ho)"hts on the ,imitations of Ciscovery !y Comp)ter.6 8n Logic of ,isco&ery and ,iagnosis in Medicine , ed. >. B. -chaffner, 11&1122. Berkeley, ,os An"eles, ,ondon: University of California Press. M'N ?indley, J. H., and J. P. -eldin 19/0 Introduction to .o#!inatorics and La#!da .alculus . Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press. M/N ?o""er, C. J. 19/1 6Cerivation of ,o"ic Pro"rams.6 6ournal of the ssociation for .o#puting Machinery 2/.22:#'21#92. M9N ?opcroft, J. E., and J. C. Ullman 19'9 Introduction to uto#ata /heory, Languages, and .o#putation . Headin", :ass.: Addison+Jesley. M1$N ,an"ley, P., ?. A. -imon, 9. ,. Bradsha*, and J. :. \ytko*. 19/' Scientific ,isco&ery: .o#putational Explorations of the .reati&e Process . Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press. M11N :cCarthy, J. 190$ 6Hec)rsive B)nctions of -ym!olic E7pressions and (heir Comp)tation !y :achine, Part 8.6 .o##unications of the .M #:1/%119&. M12N 190# 6A Basis for a :athematical (heory of Comp)tation.6 8n .o#puter Progra##ing and For#al Syste#s , ed. P. Braffort and C. ?irsh!er". Amsterdam: @orth+?olland. M1#N Plotkin, 9. C. 19'$ 6A @ote on 8nd)ctive 9enerali4ation.6 8n Machine Intelligence M , ed. B. :elt4er and C. :ichie, 1&#1 101. Edin!)r"h: University of Edin!)r"h Press. M1%N 19'1 6A B)rther @ote on 8nd)ctive 9enerali4ation.6 8n Machine Intelligence N , ed. B. :elt4er and C. :ichie, 1$1112%. Edin!)r"h: University of Edin!)r"h Press. M1&N -hapiro, E. L. 19/1 Inducti&e Inference of /heories fro# Facts . Hesearch Heport 192, Be!r)ary. @e* ?aven: Lale

University, Cepartment of Comp)ter -cience. M10N 19/2 lgorith#ic Progra# ,e!ugging . Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press. M1'N -need, J. C. 19'9 /he Logical Structure of Mathe#atical Physics . 2d ed. Cordrecht: Heidel. M1/N 19/# 6Constraints as 8ntertheoretic Helations.6 Unp)!lished man)script. M19N 19/' Hevie* of Scientific ,isco&ery , !y ,an"ley et al. Science 2#0: 1#&'11#&/. M2$N -terlin", ,., and E. L. -hapiro 19/' /he rt of Prolog: d&anced Progra##ing /echni(ues . Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press. M21N -toy, J. 19'' ,enotational Se#antics: /he Scott3Strachey pproach to Progra##ing Language /heory . Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press. M22N -)ppes, P. 19/1 6B)t)re Ed)cational Uses of A)tomatic (heorem Provin".6 8n =ni&ersity3Le&el .o#puter3 ssisted Instruction at Stanford, 9:N;O9:;2 , ed. ; 2&% ; P. -)ppes, 10&11/2. -tanford, Calif.: 8nstit)te for :athematical -t)dies in the -ocial -ciences, -tanford University. M2#N Ullman, J. C. 19// Principles of ,ata!ase and 5no%ledge38ase Syste#s . Kol. 1. Hockville, :d.: Comp)ter -cience Press. M2%N van Braassen, B. C. 19'0 6(o -ave the Phenomena.6 6ournal of Philosophy '#:02#10#2. ; 2&& ;

Ele+en. 4hy Functionalism ,idnEt 4or0

/ilary %utnam -tartin" aro)nd 190$, 8 developed a vie* in the philosophy of mind !ased on the analo"y !et*een a mind and a di"ital comp)ter. 8 "ave my vie* the name 6f)nctionalism,6 and )nder this name it has !ecome the dominant vie*Fsome say the orthodo7yFin contemporary philosophy of mind. 8n my !ook entitled Representation and RealityM1N 8 ar")e that the comp)ter analo"y, call it the 6comp)tational vie* of the mind,6 or 6f)nctionalism,6 or *hat yo) *ill, does not after all ans*er the <)estion *e philosophers .alon" *ith many co"nitive scientists2 *ant to ans*er, the <)estion 6Jhat is the nat)re of mental states=6 (hat !ook *as conceived as a sin"le ar")ment, and 8 o!vio)sly cannot "ive the entire ar")ment in a !rief disc)ssion. B)t *hat 8 hope to do is to e7plain some of the leadin" ideas of the ar")ment that led me to a!andon my former position.M2N (he comp)tational analo"y *as itself a reaction a"ainst the idea that o)r matter is more important than o)r f)nction, that o)r %hat is more important than o)r ho% . :y 6f)nctionalism6 insisted that, in principle, a machine .say, one of 8saac Asimov3s *onderf)l ro!ots2, a h)man !ein", a creat)re *ith a silicon chemistry, and, if there !e disem!odied spirits, a disem!odied spirit, co)ld all *ork m)ch the same *ay *hen descri!ed at the relevant level of a!straction, and that it is 5)st *ron" to think that the essence of o)r minds is o)r 6hard*are.6 (his m)chFand it *as central to my former vie*F8 do not "ive )p in my ne* !ook, and indeed it still seems to me to !e as tr)e and as important as it ever did. Jhat 8 try to do in the !ook is the trick attri!)ted to adepts in 5)5its) of t)rnin" an opponent3s stren"th a"ainst himself: 8 try to sho* that the ar")ments for the comp)tational vie*, in fact, the very ar")ments 8 formerly )sed to sho* that a simple+minded identification of mental states *ith physical+chemical states cannot !e ri"ht, can !e "enerali4ed ; 2&0 ; and e7tended to sho* that a strai"htfor*ard identification of mental states *ith functional states, that is, *ith comp)tationally characteri4ed states, also cannot !e ri"ht. B)nctionalism ar")ed that mental states cannot simply !e physical+chemical states, altho)"h they are emer"ent from and s)pervenient on physical+chemical statesD 8 no* ar")e that mental states also cannot !e comp)tational states, or comp)tational+c)m+physical states .states defined )sin" a mi7ed voca!)lary referrin" !oth to physical and to comp)tational parameters2, altho)"h they are emer"ent from and may !e s)pervenient )pon o)r comp)tational states. Altho)"h this is not a historical essay, 8 *o)ld like to !e"in *ith a historical remark. 8 think that *hat *e *o)ld really li$e to !elieve, if *e co)ld only s<)are s)ch a !elief *ith o)r scientific consciences, is 5)st *hat the ancients !elieved. Ancient philosophers held that thin"s in the *orld have For#s Fthese are a kind of Heason+in+the+JorldFand that *e have a mental fac)lty, the active intellect, *hich is precisely s)ited to fi")rin" o)t the Borms of thin"s. (he !ea)ty of 9reek metaphysics *as that nous .the Heason in )s2 and the Borms *ere made for each other. -ince the appearance of modern science and philosophy in the seventeenth cent)ry, the notion of a Borm and the notion of a special fac)lty for kno*in" Borms have ceased to meet o)r standards of clarity and e7planatory val)e. Je are no lon"er a!le to !elieve that Heason+in+the+Jorld and Heason+in+Us fit to"ether like the pieces of a 5i"sa* p)44le. 8nstead, *hat many philosophers !elieve is that *e have minds .*ith a small 6m6Fthe 6mind6 no

lon"er has a distin")ished part, the 6active intellect6 or nous , *hich can !e identified *ith Heason2 and that *hat looks like Heason+in+the+Jorld is prod)ced !y o)r minds !y an act of 6pro5ection.6 (his *as ?)me3s line .and he has many contemporary s)ccessors2. ?)me, ho*ever, ass)med that one mental po*erFthe po*er of referring F*as relatively )npro!lematical. 8n the simplest case, an idea refers to another idea or to an impression !y rese#!ling it. (his 6resem!lance theory6 of the semantic po*ers of the mind is lon" dead, and th)s ?)me3s present+day s)ccessors have a more diffic)lt task than ?)meD if o)r ascription of Borms .i.e., of 6nat)res,6 or 6ca)sal po*ers,6 or even of dispositions2 to thin"s is 6pro5ection,6 then they o*e )s an acco)nt of the fac)lty of Pro5ection. Ither philosophers say, in effect, that there is Heason 6o)t there6 .an o!5ective relation of 6!rin"in" a!o)t6 in the *orld, or o!5ective 6dispositions6 or o!5ective co)nterfact)als2, and o)r minds simply have evolved *ith a propensity to 6track6 these sorts of facts. (he pro!lem is that neither intentional po*ers in )s nor Heason o)t in the *orld fit into the *orld pict)re of red)ctive physicalism. E7plainin" ho* *e can have the a!ility to refer and to think if there is a primitive and o!5ective notion of E7planation !)ilt into e7ternal reality is of no real interest. E7plainin" ho* *e can 6pro5ect6 a relation of E7planation into e7ternal reality if *e ; 2&' ; ass)me a primitive and o!5ective relation of reference is of no real interest. (he circle connectin" E7planation and Heference is too short. (he task of the red)ctive physicalist is to sho* that it is possi!le to acco)nt for !oth E7planation and Heference startin" from *hat he takes to !e the )ltimate 6!)ildin" !locks6 of realityFthe distri!)tion of f)ndamental ma"nit)des over space+time points, or somethin" of that kind. And this is *hat 8 contend he cannot do. B)t eno)"h for historical !ack"ro)ndD no* for an acco)nt of the diffic)lties *ith f)nctionalism. (he first diffic)lty 8 enco)ntered *ith my f)nctionalist vie*s *as that they *ere incompati!le *ith the acco)nt of meanin" that 8 myself p)t for*ard in 6(he :eanin" of 3:eanin".36 Accordin" to the ar")ments of that essay, the content of o)r !eliefs and desires is not determined !y individ)alistic properties of the speaker !)t depends on social facts a!o)t the lin")istic comm)nity of *hich the speaker is a mem!er and on facts a!o)t the physical environment of the speaker and of the lin")istic comm)nity. Bor e7ample, 8 pointed o)t that the fact that e7perts .or other speakers on *hom *e rely2 are prepared to co)nt certain thin"s as 6real "old,6 certain thin"s as 6elm trees,6 certain thin"s as 6al)min)m,6 and so on, helps to fi7 the e7tension of these terms. (he fi7in" of e7tension depends on cooperation and lin")istic deference. Heference is not fi7ed !y *hat is 6in the heads6 of speakers. Even e7perts need not have criteria .in the sense of necessary and s)fficient conditions2 that determine the e7tensions of o)r terms. 9iven a tradition of investi"ation into nat)re, a tradition of theory constr)ction and e7perimentation that "ives sense to s)ch <)estions as 68s this the same metal as that=,6 68s this the same li<)id as that=,6 one can fi7 the referent of a term .perhaps *ith some va")eness, !)t va")eness need not !e fatal2 !y decidin" that it *ill apply to *hatever is of the sa#e nature as certain paradi"ms. .8n the 6(*in Earth6 e7ample that 8 )sed in 6(he :eanin" of 3:eanin",36 the *ord 3*ater3 on t*o different planets t)rned o)t to refer to t*o different li<)ids even tho)"h there *as nothin" 6in the heads6 of the individ)al speakers *hich *as different.2 Jhat the nat)re of somethin" is .not in the metaphysician3s sense of 6the nat)re,6 !)t in the scientist3s or the artisan3s2 can determine the reference of a term even !efore that nat)re is discovered. Jhat chrysos ."old2 *as in ancient 9reece *as not simply determined !y the properties ancient 9reeks !elie&ed "old to have .altho)"h many philosophers still make the mistake of thinkin" that a comm)nity3s notion of a s)!stance is the definition of the s)!stance for that comm)nity2. 8f the !eliefs ancient 9reeks had a!o)t chrysos defined *hat it is to !e "old .or 6chrysos62 at that time, then it *o)ld have made no sense for an ancient 9reek to ask himself, 68s there perhaps a *ay of tellin" that somethin" isn3t really "old, even *hen it appears !y all the

standard tests to !e "old=6 Hemem!er that this is precisely the <)estion Archimedes did p)t to ; 2&/ ; himselfX *ith a cele!rated res)lt. Archimedes3 in<)iry *o)ld have made no sense if Archimedes did not have the idea that somethin" mi"ht appear to !e "old .mi"ht pass the c)rrent tests for 6chrysos62 *hile not really havin" the same nat)re as paradi"m e7amples of "old. Heference .and 6meanin"62 depend )pon the nonh)man en&iron#ent as *ell as )pon society. (he )pshot of this ne* theory of reference for the philosophy of mind is that 6propositional attit)des,6 as philosophers call them, that is, s)ch thin"s as !elie&ing that sno% is %hite, feeling certain that the cat is on the #at , and so on, are not 6states6 of the h)man !rain and nervo)s system considered in isolation from the social and nonh)man environment. fortiori , they are not 6f)nctional states6Fthat is, states defina!le in terms of parameters that *o)ld enter into a soft*are description of the or"anism. Functionalis#, construed as the thesis that propositional attitudes are "ust co#putational states of the !rain, cannot !e correct . Ine *ay of meetin" this o!5ection has !een defended !y Jerry Bodor and more recently !y @ed Block. M#N (his is to divide meanin" into an individ)alistic component .often called 6narro* content62 and an e7ternal component .reference, or reference in possi!le *orlds2. (he individ)alistic component is a comp)tational state of the !rain in the case of each 6meanin"6 and each 6propositional attit)de,6 Block *o)ld ar")e. A"ainst this 8 *o)ld ar")e .in company *ith (yler B)r"e2M%N that there is no one physical state or one comp)tational state that one m)st !e in to !elieve that there is a cat on the mat. -peakin" at the level of spontaneo)s phenomenolo"y, it is )ndenia!le that *e preceive one another as 6thinkin" that the cat is on the mat,6 or *hatever. 8f *e )nderstand a forei"n lan")a"eFsay, (haiF*e may have s)ch 6perceptions6 even *hen the person in <)estion speaks a lan")a"e very different from o)rs and comes from a very different c)lt)re. Bor e7ample, 8 may kno* that a certain (hai peasant thinks that his cat is on a mat. B)t it does not follo* that the (hai peasant *ho !elieves that his 6mee*6M&N is on a mat is in the same 6psycholo"ical state6 as an En"lish speaker *ho !elieves a 6cat6 is on a mat in any sense of 6psycholo"ical state6 that can !e e7plained *itho)t reference to *hat the (hai peasant and the En"lish speaker #ean . After all, the (hai peasant does not have the same percept)al prototype of a cat as the En"lish speaker .the paradi"matic (hai cat is *hat *e *o)ld call a 6-iamese6 cat, and the En"lish speaker is )nlikely to re"ard a -iamese cat as a stereotypical cat, even if she happens to have seen -iamese cats2D the (hai speaker mi"ht have to rely on others to !e s)re that the En"lish speaker3s cat *as really a 6mee*6D (hai !eliefs a!o)t mee*s .especially in a villa"e2 co)ld !e <)ite different from En"lish speakers3 !eliefs a!o)t 6cats6D and so on. Block specifies that 6narro* content6 is to !e a matter of speakers3 !eliefs and or inferences that speakers makeD yet, as this e7ample ill)strates, it seems impossi!le to specify %hich !eliefs and inferences m)st !e the same in order for the 6narro* content6 of a *ord to !e that of the *ord 3cat3. Block and Bodor reco"ni4e that the enterprise of tryin" to prod)ce necessary tr)ths a!o)t *hat a speaker m)st think in order to ; 2&9 ; mean a "iven thin" !y a "iven *ord is hopelessD yet they provide no alternative *ay of fi7in" the 6narro* content6 of a *ord.

1lobal Functionalism
A different *ay of tryin" to reconcile f)nctionalism *ith the non+individ)alistic theory of reference

defended in 6(he :eanin" of 3:eanin"36 mi"ht !e to e7tend the comp)ter analo"y to a lar"er system. Jhy not think of the entire language co##unity together %ith an appropriate part of its en&iron#ent as analogous to a co#puter rather than 5)st the individ)al mind= .(his *as s)""ested to me !y Hichard Boyd.2 8f the content of a *ord depends on relations to other speakers, *hy not try to descri!e those relations comp)tationally= 8f the content also depends on the nat)re of the o!5ects the *ord refers to, *hy not try to characteri4e the relation of reference , *hich links the *ord to those o!5ects, comp)tationally= Perhaps one *o)ld have to )se !oth comp)tational notions and physical chemical notions in the definition of referenceD !)t the point is that one mi"ht, in some *ay, accept the chain of ar")ments that link meanin" to reference and reference to entities .e7perts and paradi"ms2 6o)tside the head6 of the individ)al speaker *itho)t concedin" that the intentional cannot !e red)ced to the nonintentional. One can !e a reductionist %ithout !eing a #ethodological solipsist, after all . B)nctionalism may have to !ecome more complicated. Je may have to speak of f)nctional .and partly f)nctional2 properties of or"anisms+c)m+environments and not 5)st of f)nctional properties of individ)al !rains. B)t f)nctionalism is not yet ref)ted. If co)rse, the <)estion is *hether this can !e done in principle, not *hether it can really !e done in practice. 8t is *idely reco"ni4ed that the interpretation of someone3s lan")a"e m)st al*ays proceed sim)ltaneo)sly *ith the ascription of !eliefs and desires to the person !ein" interpreted. As the e7ample of the (hai peasant ill)strated, s)ch an ascription *ill rarely, in practice, make the other3s !eliefs and desires come o)t e7actly the same as o)rs. Je constr)e one *ord as meanin" plant , another *ord as meanin" %ater , still another *ord as meanin" gold , in spite of the fact that the !eliefs of the speakers *e are interpretin", as discovered !y this very interpretation .!y the 6translation man)al,6 as G)ine calls it2, disa"ree *ith o)rsFperhaps disa"ree over the nat)re of plants, the nat)re of *ater, the nat)re of "old. Jhen *e o)"ht to co)nt t*o *ords as havin" the same meanin" in spite of the difference !et*een their !eliefs and our !eliefs *hich the very interpretation *e are constr)ctin" re<)ires )s to posit, and *hen the !eliefs *e are attri!)tin" as the res)lt of o)r translation are so !i4arre as to re<)ire revision of the translation, is a <)estion of 6reasona!leness.6 functionalist definition of synony#y and coreferentiality %ould )rationally reconstruct) these intuiti&e "udg#ents of reasona!leness . And there is no reason to think that it *o)ld !e easier to do this than rationally to reconstr)ct ind)ctive lo"ic, or, indeed, h)man informal rationality itself. ; 20$ ; Be* philosophers are afraid of !ein" Utopian, ho*ever. A philosopher mi"ht *ell insist that all this co)ld !e done in principle . (he philosophical pro!lem, s)ch a philosopher *ill insist, is to eval)ate the claim that a certain type of red)ction is 6possi!le in principle.6

#ppraisin* Reduction "laims

Appraisin" red)ction claims is somethin" that analytic philosophers have a "reat deal of e7perience at doin". (h)s, after Carnap3s ,er Logische uf!au der 4elt *as p)!lished, a "reat deal of philosophical *ork *ent into e7aminin" .and, in the end, re5ectin"2 the philosophical claim that 6thin" lan")a"e is red)ci!le to phenomenalistic lan")a"e.6 ,ike*ise, attempted red)ctions of mathematical to 6nominalistic6 lan")a"e have !een and contin)e to !e st)died .e."., ?artry Bield3s Science %ithout 'u#!ers 2. Appraisin" the claim that the notion of reference can !e red)ced to comp)tational or comp)tational+pl)s+physical notions is a very similar enterprise to appraisin" these other red)ci!ility claims.M0N 8f this is not <)ite self+evident, it is !eca)se these other claims *ere claims a!o)t the conceptual or

necessary relations !et*een concepts, and my o*n f)nctionalism *as e7plicitly p)t for*ard as an empirical hypothesis .altho)"h Armstron" and Cavid ,e*is appear to re"ard some version of f)nctionalism as concept)ally necessary2. B)t if one e7amines the famo)s ar")ments a"ainst the claim that thin" lan")a"e is red)ci!le to sense+dat)m lan")a"e "iven !y ?ans Heichen!ach or !y Jilfrid -ellars, one o!serves that *hat those ar")ments really sho*ed *as that there is no no#ological relationship !et*een s)ch typical statements in thin" lan")a"e as 3(here is a chair in the room3 and any statement in phenomenalistic lan")a"e. (hat is to say, the ref)tation of phenomenalism *o)ld have !een e7actly the same if phenomenalism had !een p)t for*ard as an 6empirical hypothesis6 and not as a piece of 6concept)al analysis6X (h)s, *hat *e need to e7amine is the <)estion that is perfectly analo"o)s to the <)estion Heichen!ach considered in Experience and Prediction : 8s there any strict nomolo"ical relation !et*een ar!itrary statements in the class to !e red)ced .in the present case, statements of the form S refers to L2 and statements in the red)cin" class .in the present case, statements in the comp)tational+c)m+physical voca!)lary2= Brom familiar considerations applica!le to all red)ction claims, *e kno* that *e m)st not say that reference has !een red)ced to some physical+c)m+comp)tational relation H .defined over or"anisms+ c)m+environments2 )nless: .82 reference is coe7tensive *ith H in all physically possi!le systemsF coe7tensive for all physically possi!le or"anisms and environments s)ch that those or"anisms are capa!le of )sin" lan")a"e, referrin", and so on, in those environments: .882 H o!eys .appro7imately2 the 6la*s6 that reference is s)p+ ; 201 ; posed to o!ey in int)itive .or anthropolo"ical2 !elief a!o)t referenceD and .8882 the presence of H e7plains the effects .to the e7tent that they really e7ist2 that the int)itive or anthropolo"ical notion of reference *as s)pposed to e7plain. :erely findin" a f)nctional relation H that is coe7tensive *ith referrin" for those or"anisms *hich happen to refer .perhaps, !y chance, there aren3t any other than h)man !ein"s2 *o)ld not !e eno)"h. (he re<)irements .882 and .8882 ass)me that the 6definiens6 in a red)ction m)st !e a property or relation *hich *e can define in the voca!)lary of the red)cin" discipline .allo*in" as parts of that voca!)lary constants for appropriate mathematical o!5ects, e."., tensor or scalar constants, mathematical f)nctions, etc.2 *here 3define3 has the normal sense of define in finitely #any %ords . .8f s)ch a re<)irement is not imposed, then the <)estion of red)ci!ility !ecomes trivial, sinceFif *e happened to !e !lessed *ith omniscienceF*e co)ld 6define6 any term that refers to any property or relation that is s)pervenient on physical facts !y 5)st listin" all the infinitely many physically possi!le cases in *hich the property term applies or the relation o!tains.2M'N Analo")es of these considerations *ere involved in the de!ate a!o)t the red)ci!ility of thin" lan")a"e to sense+dat)m lan")a"e. At first the phenomenalists *ere content to claim that material+thin" sentences co)ld !e 6translated6 into infinitely long sense+dat)m sentencesD ho*ever, it *as very <)ickly pointed o)t that )nless the translation *ere finite .or the infinitely lon" translation co)ld !e constr)cted accordin" to a r)le that *as itself stata!le in finitely many *ords2, then the iss)es over *hether the translation e7ists, *hether it is correct, *hether it is philosophically ill)minatin", and so on, *o)ld !e essentially )ndisc)ssi!le. (he antiphenomenalists said, in effect, 6P)t )p or sh)t )p.6 8n the same *ay, 8 am sayin" to the f)nctionalists .incl)din" my former self2, 6P)t )p or sh)t )p.6 ?o*ever, the antiphenomenalists did not p)t all the !)rden of proof on the phenomenalists. Heichen!ach, Carnap, ?empel, and -ellars "ave reasons *hy a finite translation of material+thin"

lan")a"e into sense+dat)m lan")a"e *as impossi!le. Even if these reasons fall short of a strict mathematical+impossi!ility proof, they are hi"hly convincin", and this is the reason *hy there is hardly a sin"le phenomenalist left in the *orld today.M/N 8n the same spirit, 8 am "oin" to "ive principled reasons *hy a finite red)ction of intentional relations and properties in terms of physical comp)tational relations and properties is impossi!leFreasons *hich fall short of a strict proof, !)t *hich are, 8 !elieve, convincin".

he Sin*leGcomputationalGstate Version of Functionalism

8 am "oin" to !e"in !y considerin" an oversimplified version of f)nctionalism. (his is the theory that each state of !elievin" somethin", desirin" somethin", ; 202 ; perceivin" somethin", havin" a partic)lar emotion, and so on, corresponds to one definite comp)tational state. (he identification is to !e species+independent: !elie&ing that sno% is %hite is to !e the same comp)tational state for all physically possi!le or"anisms capa!le of havin" that !elief. Jhile it is tr)e that so simple a f)nctionalism has never !een defended !y anyone, as far as 8 kno*, the theory that each propositional attit)de, emotion, and so on, corresponds to one partic)lar comp)tational .or comp)tational physical2 state in the case of each particular organis# is a feat)re of all the familiar varieties of f)nctionalism. Bor all of the familiar versions of f)nctionalismFmy o*n and Cavid ,e*is3sM9N in partic)larFass)me that a propositional+attit)de term applies to an or"anism 5)st in case that system is a model for an appropriate psycholo"ical theory, *here somethin" is defined to !e a 6model6 of a psycholo"ical theory only if it has nonpsychological Fphysical or comp)tationalFstates that are related as the psycholo"ical theory says the mental states are related. (his clearly ass)mes that one can find one physical or comp)tational state per propositional attit)de in the case of a sin"le or"anism. Jhere more sophisticated versions of f)nctionalism differ from o)r oversimplified version is in allo*in" that the physical or comp)tational states that serve as the 6reali4ers6 of a "iven mental state may !e different .altho)"h 6f)nctionally isomorphic62 in the case of different or"anisms and or different species. Consider the follo*in" model for a speaker+hearer of a nat)ral lan")a"e: the 6or"anism6 is an information+processin" system .it co)ld !e a ro!ot2 that possesses a *ay of assi"nin" 6de"rees of confirmation6 to the sentences in its 6lan")a"e of tho)"ht,6 and a 6rational preference f)nction6 that .to"ether *ith the de"rees of confirmation2 determines ho* it *ill act in any "iven sit)ation. Certain semantic distinctions m)st !e marked in any s)ch model: for e7ample, *e can tell *hen a *ord is ac(uired !y the fact that the 6c +f)nction6 of the or"anism .the f)nction that calc)lates the de"rees of confirmation2 and the rational+preference f)nction are extended to a ne* ran"e of sentences. Je can tell *hen a *ord is a#!iguous !y the fact that .in the )nderlyin" 6lan")a"e of tho)"ht62 the *ord is marked !y s)!scripts, or f)nctionally e<)ivalent devices, as, for e7ample, 3nap1 3 .short sleep2 and 3nap2 3 .nap of a r)"2. B)t if all *e are "iven to "o on is the c)rrent s)!5ective pro!a!ility metric .the c)rrent de"rees of confirmation2, the c)rrent desires .the c)rrent 6)tilities62, and the )nderlyin" prior+ pro!a!ility f)nction !y *hich the c)rrent s)!5ective pro!a!ility metric *as formed !y conditionali4in" on the o!servations of the or"anism, then at least the first t*o of these *ill !e different even in the case of speakers *hose meanin"s *e are prepared to co)nt as the same. 8n short .this *as the point of a paper 8 p)!lished a n)m!er of years a"o2,M1$N there *ill !e no discerni!le synonymy relation e7tracta!le from the model itself, nothin" to mark the fact that *hen 8 say 3!)rea)crat3 and yo) say 3!)rea)crat3 *e are )tterin" *ords *ith the same meanin".

(he pro!lem does not disappear even if *e s)ppose .as Carnap did2 that *e ; 20# ; sho)ld incl)de information to the effect that certain sentences are marked analytic in the very description of a formal lan")a"e. Even if certain sentences are marked analytic !y the model, say 3!)rea)crats are officials in lar"e instit)tions3, )nless 8 have a criterion of synonymy to tell me that *hen 8 say 3official3 and yo) say 3official3 *e mean the same thin", and that *hen 8 say 3instit)tion3 and yo) say 3instit)tion3 *e mean the same thin", 8 cannot concl)de that 3!)rea)crat3 has the same meanin" for !oth of )s from the fact that this sentence is analytic for !oth of )s. .:oreover, the *ord may have the same meanin" even if *e have a different stock of 6analytic6 sentences. Bor e7ample, someone *ho lives in a monarchy may have the sentence 3People appointed to hi"h positions !y the kin" are officials3 in his stock of 6analytic6 sentences, *hile someone *ho doesn3t kno* *hat a kin" is !)t *ho is ac<)ainted *ith presidents *ill have different 6analytic6 sentences a!o)t officials in his lan")a"e, !)t this is not *hat *e co)nt as a difference in the meanin" of 3official3.2 Binally, G)ine3s cele!rated 6"ava"ai6 e7ample sho*s that pro!lems of synonymy can arise even at the level of o!servation terms. ?ere is a little !it of evidence in s)pport of G)ine3s claim. 8 recall that *hen 8 visited China in 19/% 8 lect)red on G)ine3s vie*s at B)dan University in -han"hai, and sophisticated Chinese told me that they did not think that the Chinese *ord 3mao3 .cat2 co)ld !e determinately translated into En"lish as 3cat3 3cathood3. Jhat they claimed *as that 6Are yo) sayin" there is a cat or that there is cathood e7emplifyin" itself=6 is the *ron" <)estion to p)t to a Chinese speaker. (here is no special s)ffi7 in Chinese to distin")ish 6mao6 from 6maohood6 .3mao3 is )sed !oth in conte7ts in *hich *e *o)ld translate it as 3cat3 and in conte7ts in *hich *e *o)ld translate it as 3cathood32, nor are there articles in Chinese. 3Cat there3 and 3Cathood there3 *o)ld "o into the same sentence in Chinese. 8f my informants *ere ri"ht, then there may !e no 6fact of the matter6 as to *hether a certain Chinese character means 3ra!!it3 or 3ra!!ithood3 or neither+of+the+fore"oin". 8n fact, sameness of 6stim)l)s meanin"6 is not even a necessary condition for synonymy, even in the case of o!servational terms. A (hai speaker may not associate the same stim)l)s meanin" *ith 3mee*3 that 8 do *ith 3cat3, !)t it is still reasona!le to translate 3mee*3 as 3cat3. .3Elm3 in En"lish and 3Ulme3 in 9erman *o)ld still !e synonyms even if 3Ulme3 *ere an o!servation term for 9ermansFthey all learned to distin")ish elmsFand not an o!servation term for En"lish speakers.2 -o far 8 have ar")ed that, in the sort of model of lin")istic capacity that seems reasona!le "iven the insi"hts of G)ine3s meanin" holism, there is no *ay to identify a comp)tational state that is the same *henever any t*o people !elieve that there are a lot of cats in the *orld .or *hatever2. Even if the t*o people happen to speak the same lan")a"e, they may have different stereotypes of a 3cat3, different !eliefs a!o)t the nat)re of cats, and so on .ima"ine t*o ancient E"yptians, one of *hom !elieves cats are divine *hile the other ; 20% ; does not2. (he pro!lems that arise 6in principle6 !ecome m)ch *orse if the t*o 6people6 may !e mem!ers of different 6physically possi!le species.6 Even in the case of a sin"le species, the 6f)nctional or"ani4ation6 may not !e e7actly the same for all mem!ers. (he n)m!er of ne)rons in yo)r !rain is not e7actly the same as the n)m!er of ne)rons in anyone else3s !rain, and ne)rolo"ists tell )s that no t*o !rains are literally 6*ired6 the same *ay. (he 6*irin"6 depends on the mat)rational history and environmental stim)lation of the individ)al !rain.

-till, many thinkers *o)ld s)ppose, *ith @oam Chomsky, that there is some 6competence model6 of the h)man !rain to *hich all act)al h)man !rains can !e re"arded as appro7imatin". (his model *o)ld determine the 6space6 of possi!le comp)tational states that can !e ascri!ed to h)mans. (he pro!lem in the case of t*o different species is that in this case there is no reason to ass)me that the space of possi!le comp)tational states is the same or that either space can !e 6em!edded6 in the other. Consider, for e7ample, the cr)cial 6!elief fi7ation6 component of the model. Even if *e ass)me the species are ideally rational, this leaves an enormo)s amo)nt of lee*ay for different ind)ctive lo"ics .as Carnap pointed o)t2.M11N Carnap introd)ced the concept of a 6ca)tion parameter6Fa parameter that determines ho* rapidly or slo*ly the lo"ic 6learns from e7perience,6 as meas)red !y ho* lar"e a sample si4e the lo"ic typically re<)ires !efore it !e"ins to "ive si"nificant *ei"ht to an o!served sample mean. Cifferent ind)ctive lo"ics can assi"n different ca)tion parameters. Cifferent ind)ctive lo"ics can also assi"n different *ei"hts to analo"y and co)nt different respects as respects of 6similarity.6 8n short, different ind)ctive lo"ics can impose different 6prior pro!a!ilities.6 9rantin" that the need for s)rvival potential *ill red)ce the varia!ility, *e m)st remem!er that *e are talkin" a!o)t all physically possi!le species in all physically possi!le environmentsFthat is to say, a!o)t all the *ays evol)tion .or *hateverFsome of these 6species6 *ill !e artifacts, e."., ro!ots2 mi"ht *ork to prod)ce intelli"ent life, compati!ly *ith physical la*, not 5)st a!o)t the *ay evol)tion act)ally happened to *ork in the one physically possi!le environment that act)ally e7ists. Bor e7ample, if the species is one *hose mem!ers are very hard to dama"e, then they can afford to *ait a lon" time !efore makin" an ind)ctive "enerali4ation. -)ch a species mi"ht )se an ind)ctive lo"ic *ith a very lar"e 6ca)tion parameter.6 Jhat properties it *ill !e )sef)l to co)nt as 6similarities6 or respects of analo"y *ill o!vio)sly depend )pon the contin"encies of the partic)lar physical environment. Perhaps in a s)fficiently pec)liar physical environment a species that pro5ected 6f)nny6 predicates .e."., @elson 9oodman3s famo)s predicate 3"r)e32 *o)ld do !etter than a species *ith o)r ind)ctive pre5)dices. Comp)ters that have to comp)te very different 6analo"ies6 or employ very different ca)tion parameters .ca)tion parameters that can themselves !e different mathematical f)nctions of the partic)lar evidence e , not 5)st ; 20& ; different scalars2 may have totally different descriptions either in the ()rin"+machine formalism or in any other formalism. (he n)m!er of states may !e different, the state r)les may !e different, and there is no reason *hy either machine sho)ld have a ta!le that can !e mapped homomorphically into the machine ta!le of the other machine. Bor all of these reasons, mem!ers of different possi!le species .physically possi!le or"anisms *ith minds and lan")a"e2 *ho are s)fficiently similar in their lin")istic !ehavior in a ran"e of environments to permit )s to translate some of their )tterances may nevertheless have comp)tational states that lie in <)ite different machine ta!lesFlie in, so to speak, different 6spaces6 of comp)tational states. (he fact that their *ay of reasonin" is similar to o)rs in some sit)ations .*hen *e interpret that *ay of reasonin" )sin" a 6translation man)al6 that *e have s)cceeded in constr)ctin"2 does not imply that their states or the al"orithms in their !rains are literally the same. (he idea that there is one comp)tational state that every physically possi!le !ein" *ho !elieves a "iven proposition p m)st !e in is false. Jhat a!o)t physical states= (he reason for introd)cin" f)nctionalism in the first place *as precisely the reali4ation that *e are not "oin" to find any physical state .other than one defined !y the sort of 6infinite list6 that *e r)led o)t as 6cheatin"62 that all physically possi!le !elievers have to !e in to have

a "iven !elief, or *hatever. B)t no* it emer"es that the same thin" is tr)e of comp)tational states. And .finite2 con5)nctions, dis5)nctions, and so on, of physical and comp)tational states *ill not help either. Physically possi!le sentient !ein"s 5)st come in too many 6desi"ns,6 physically and comp)tationally speakin", for anythin" like 6one comp)tational state per propositional attit)de6 f)nctionalism to !e tr)e.

E>ui+alence
8 already said that the one+comp)tational+state version of f)nctionalism is oversimplified and that it is a version that no one has ever act)ally held. ,et me no* descri!e a version *hich 8 have serio)sly entertained. (his version still makes the ass)mption .*hich is made !y all forms of f)nctionalism2 that each mental state corresponds to one comp)tational .or comp)tational physical2 state in the case of each sin"le or"anism .or, in the case of 6"lo!al f)nctionalism,6 in the case of each lan")a"e comm)nity of or"anisms2, !)t it does not ass)me that different or"anisms .or different lan")a"e comm)nities2 m)st !e in the identical comp)tational state *hen they have a "iven !elief, desire, and so on. Hather, it ass)mes that they m)st !e in comp)tational states that are e(ui&alent )nder some comp)tationally defina!le e<)ivalence relation. ,et me e7plain *hat 8 mean !y this. 8ma"ine some definite formalism for comp)tational theory to !e fi7edFsay, for definiteness, the ()rin"+machine formalism. Altho)"h each ()rin" ; 200 ; machine has its o*n 6space6 of machine states, still one can mathematically descri!e the totality of these machinesFindeed, this is 5)st *hat ()rin" and his s)ccessors did. Ine can define predicates that relate the states of different machines in different *ays, and the notion of co#puta!ility has !een defined for s)ch predicates. Jhat is tr)e in this respect of ()rin" machines is e<)ally tr)e of any other kind of machine that mi"ht !e taken as a model in comp)tational theory. (h)s, "iven an e<)ivalence relation .or, indeed, any relation2 that is defined on comp)tational states of different machines, the <)estion *hether that relation is itself 6comp)ta!le6 is *ell defined. .Ine can also define classes of predicates *hich, tho)"h not comp)ta!le, are defina!le startin" from the comp)ta!le predicatesFthese form the so+called 6arithmetic,6 6hyper+arithmetic,6 etc. hierarchies.2 B)t *hy sho)ld one !elieve that there is a comp)ta!le e<)ivalence relation that connects the propositional attit)des of a person in one lan")a"e comm)nity and the propositional attit)des of an ar!itrary person in a different lan")a"e comm)nity= ?ere is an ar")ment of a kind that convinces many people .s)ch ar")ments are <)ite common in present+day lin")istic theori4in"2: -)ppose :ary Jones is an En"lish speaker, and s)ppose *e *ish to ascertain that her *ord 3cat3 is synonymo)s *ith the (hai *ord 3mee*3 .or *ith the *ord 3mee*3 as )sed on a partic)lar occasion !y a partic)lar (hai speaker2. Je have to kno* that the e7tension of the t*o terms is .at least va")ely2 the same to even consider acceptin" the synony#y of the t*o terms, and this re<)ires some kno*led"e of the act)al nat)re of the animals in :ary3s environment that she .or e7perts )pon *hom she relies in do)!tf)l cases2 calls 3cats3 and some kno*led"e of the act)al nat)re of the animals that the (hai speaker .or e7perts )pon *hom she relies2 call 3mee*3. 9ranted that this decision can involve enormo)sly many factors, not only :ary3s speech dispositions and those of her (hai co)nterpart !)t also the speech dispositions of other mem!ers of the lin")istic comm)nities to *hich they !elon", and information a!o)t the microstr)ct)re and evol)tionary history of paradi"m 6cats6 and paradi"m 6mee*6D still, if *e can make this decision and %e are ()rin" machines, then the predicate 3*ord J1 as )sed in sit)ation S1 is synonymo)s *ith *ord J2 as )sed in sit)ation S2 3 m)st !e a

predicate that a ()rin" machine can employFa rec)rsive predicate or at *orst a 6trial and error predicate.6M12N (his ar")ment makes the !asic empirical ass)mption on *hich f)nctionalism depends, namely that there is some class of comp)ters .e."., ()rin" machines or finite a)tomata2 in terms of *hich h)man !ein"s can !e 6modeled.6 8f *e are *illin" to make this ass)mption, then the attractive feat)re of the ar")ment is that it does not pres)ppose that the t*o sit)ations !ein" compared involve identical 6machines.6 All that is necessary is that the entire sit)ationFthe speaker+c)m+environmentF!e descri!a!le in some standardi4ed lan")a"e. 8n short, the pro!lem *e faced in the precedin" section, that it makes no sense to speak of the 6same comp)tational state6 *hen the speakers ; 20' ; .or the speakers+c)m+environments2 are not machines of the same type, does not arise if *hat *e are askin" is, 6Coes a certain defina!le e(ui&alence relation H .the relation of coreferentiality2 hold !et*een an element of the one sit)ation and an element of the other=6 -tates of different 6machines6 can lie in the same e(ui&alence class )nder an arithmetical relation, and so can sit)ations defined in terms of s)ch states. 8n short, movin" from the re<)irement that the 6states6 of speakers *ith the same reference .or !elievers *ith the same !elief2 !e identical to the re<)irement that they !e e(ui&alent under sa#e e(ui&alence relation that is itself co#puta!le, or at least defina!le in the language of co#putational theory plus physical science , "ives )s enormo)s additional lee*ay. Jhat *e have to see is *hether this lee*ay *ill help. -)ppose .ret)rnin" to the e7ample of :ary Jones and her (hai co)nterpart2 that o)r !iolo"y ass)res )s that the animals that :ary takes to !e paradi"m 6cats6 are indeed vario)s sorts of domestic felines .Felis catus 2 and that the same thin" is tr)e of the animals her (hai co)nterpart takes to !e paradi"m 6mee*.6 (his does not sho* that the e7tension of 3cat3 is the same as the e7tension of 3mee*3, for several reasons. BirstFto !e some*hat fancif)lFit mi"ht !e that (hai has an ontolo"y of temporal slices rather than thin"s. 3:ee*3 mi"ht mean 3cat slice3. -econd, even if *e ass)me that En"lish and (hai !oth c)t the *orld )p into 3thin"s3, 3animals3, and so on, the classification )sed !y scientific !iolo"ists mi"ht not !e one either :ary or her (hai co)nter+part employs. 3:ee*3 mi"ht mean 3-iamese cat3, for e7ample. Je have to kno* a "ood deal a!o)t the (hai speaker3s speech dispositions .or those of others to *hom she defers lin")istically2 to kno* that she *o)ld co)nt non+-iamese cats as 6mee*.6 Jhat is at stake, as G)ine and Cavidson have emphasi4ed .not to mention E)ropean hermene)ticists s)ch as 9adamer2 is the interpretation of the t*o disco)rses as *holes. (o interpret a lan")a"e one m)st, in "eneral, have some idea of the theories and inference patterns common in the comm)nity that speaks that lan")a"e. @o one co)ld determine *hat 3spin3 refers to in <)ant)m mechanics, for e7ample, *itho)t learnin" <)ant)m mechanics, or *hat 3ne"ative char"e3 refers to *itho)t learnin" a certain amo)nt of electrical theory or *hat 3inner prod)ct3 refers to *itho)t learnin" a certain amo)nt of mathematics. (his creates a serio)s pro!lem for the idea that coreferentiality and 6synonymy6 are theoretically identical *ith comp)ta!le .or at least comp)tationally defina!le2 relations over properly parametri4ed sit)ations. (he pro!lem is that any theory that 6defines6 coreferentiality and synonymy m)st, in some *ay, s)rvey all possi!le theories. A theory that fi")res o)t *hat people .or physically possi!le e7traterrestials, ro!ots, or *hatever2 are referrin" to *hen they speak of 6spin6 and that decides *hether the notion of 6spin6 in (errestial <)ant)m mechanics is or is not the same notion as the notion of 6"rophth6 in -irian :ootr)7 mechanics, or an al"orithm that *o)ld ena!le a ()rin" machine to make s)ch a decision .or to reach it 6in the limit62

; 20/ ; "iven a description of the 6sit)ations6 on Earth and on -iri)s, m)st, in some *ay, anticipate the processes of !elief fi7ation on *hich the )nderstandin" of <)ant)m mechanics .incl)din" the mathematics pres)pposed !y <)ant)m mechanics2 and 6:ootr)7 mechanics6 .incl)din" the 6mathematics6 pres)pposed !y :ootr)7 mechanics2 depends. Certainly s)ch an al"orithm *o)ld have to do more than 6sim)late6 an a!ility that h)man !ein"s act)ally have. Bor no h)man !ein" can follo* all possi!le mathematics, all possi!le empirical science, and so on. (his point deserves f)rther disc)ssion, ho*ever.

Sur+eyin* Rationality
(he fact that one cannot interpret a disco)rse )nless one can follo* it s)""ests that an al"orithm that co)ld interpret an ar!itrary disco)rse *o)ld have to !e 6smart6 eno)"h to s)rvey all the possi!le rational and semirational and not+too+far+from+rational+to+still+!e+someho*+intelli"i!le disco)rses that physically possi!le creat)res co)ld physically possi!ly constr)ct. ?o* likely is it that there is s)ch an al"orithm= Birst of all, the restriction to physical possi!ility is not really helpf)l. As far as *e kno*, physics does not r)le o)t the possi!ility of an intelli"ent !ein" that s)rvives for @ years for any finite @ *hatsoever. Bor e7ample, some astronomers have s)""ested that a physically possi!le intelli"ent !ein" mi"ht have a !ody that *as a "as clo)d of "alactic si4eFthe !ein" *o)ld move *ith an incredi!le slo*ness, so that its time scale *o)ld !e almost inconceiva!ly slo*ed do*n !y o)r standards, !)t s)ch systems mi"ht have ar!itrary comple7ity. (he fact that s)ch a !ein" s)rvives @ years, for some lar"e @, does not mean that it is 6lon"+lived6 !y its .slo*ed+do*n2 standards, of co)rse, !)t it co)ld also !e incredi!ly lon"+lived !y its standards. (he point 8 mean this e7ample to ill)strate is that *e do not $no% of any la*s of physics that e7cl)de any finite a)tomation *hatsoever from !ein" physically reali4ed and from s)rvivin" for any finite n)m!er @ of machine sta"es. ,et )s !e"in !y considerin" a some*hat less mind+!o""lin" <)estion. Can *e hope to s)rvey .and *rite do*n r)les for interpretin", perhaps !y 6s)ccessive appro7imation62 the reasonin" and !elief of all possi!le hu#an !ein"s and societies= ,et )s recall that there is no one form in *hich all h)man !eliefs are cast. (he predicate calc)l)s is often treated !y philosophers as if it *ere the )niversal lan")a"e, !)t to p)t !eliefs e7pressed in a nat)ral lan")a"e into the predicate+calc)l)s format, one m)st first interpret themFthat is, one m)st deal *ith the very pro!lem *e *ish to solve. A theory of interpretation *hich *orks only after the !eliefs to !e interpreted have !een translated into some 6re"imented notation6 !e"s the <)estion. :oreover, the predicate+calc)l)s format itself has pro!lems. Jhat sho)ld the varia!les ran"e over= Analytic philosophers have a preference for material ; 209 ; o!5ects and sense dataD !)t there is no ")arantee that every h)man lan")a"e and s)!lan")a"e, incl)din" the speciali4ed s)!lan")a"es of vario)s professions .psychoanalysis, theolo"y, sociolo"y, co"nitive science, mathematics . . . 2 *ill employ one of these standard ontolo"iesD in fact, *e kno* that the s)!lan")a"es 5)st mentioned, at least, do not. -pace+time points are another choice pop)lar *ith philosophersD !)t to tell *hether someone is <)antifyin" over points in @e*tonian space, or in space+ time, or in ?il!ert space, or in the space of s)per"ravitation theory . . . , one a"ain has to interpret his or

her disco)rse. And it is not at all clear ho* to represent <)ant)m+mechanical disco)rse in the format of standard predicate calc)l)s. 8 am not thinkin" of the possi!ility that <)ant)m mechanics may !est !e )nderstood in terms of a nonstandard lo"ic .altho)"h that ill)strates the point in a different *ay2 !)t of the pro!lem of interpretin" <)ant)m mechanics in its standard .6Copenha"en62 presentation. Copenha"en theorists claim that <)ant)m mechanics does not treat the *orld as consistin" of o!5ects and o!server+independent properties !)t rather as consistin" of t*o realms: a realm of 6meas)rin" apparat)s,6 descri!ed !y one ontolo"y and one theory .classical physics2, and a realm of 6statistical states,6 descri!ed !y vectors in ?il!ert space and pro5ection operators on ?il!ert space. (he 6c)t6 !et*een these t*o realms is not fi7ed !)t is itself o!server+dependentFsomethin" the predicate+ calc)l)s format has no *ay of representin". Even if it t)rns o)t that <)ant)m mechanics is !ein" presented in the *ron" *ay !y its o*n practitioners, as many philosophers have tho)"ht .tho)"h *itho)t comin" )p *ith an a"reed+)pon !etter *ay2, to interpret a disco)rse in e7istin" <)ant)m mechanics one m)st first reali4e that the lan")a"e of those practitioners is of this 6nonclassical6 kind. Jhat other lan")a"es that science .or history, or literary criticism, or . . . 2 mi"ht )se of a 6nonclassical kind6 are *aitin" to !e invented= E7perience tells )s that no h)man society is )ns)rpassa!le. Bor any h)man society, there is a possi!le other society that is more sophisticated, that has modes of concept)ali4in" and descri!in" thin"s *hich mem!ers of the first society cannot )nderstand *itho)t years of speciali4ed st)dy. Jhat is often said is tr)e, that all h)man lan")a"es are intertranslata!le: !)t that does not mean that one can translate a c)rrent !ook in philosophy or a paper in clinical psycholo"y or a lect)re on <)ant)m mechanics into the lan")a"e of a primitive tri!e *itho)t first coinin" a host of ne* technical terms in that lan")a"e. 8t does not mean that *e co)ld tell any 6smart6 native *hat the !ook in philosophy, or the paper in clinical psycholo"y, or the lect)re on <)ant)m mechanics 6says6 and have him )nderstand .*itho)t years of st)dy2. Iften eno)"h *e cannot even tell mem!ers of our lin")istic comm)nity *hat these disco)rses 6say6 so that they *ill )nderstand them *ell eno)"h to e7plain them to others. 8t *o)ld seem, then, that if there is a theory of all h)man disco)rse .and *hat else co)ld a definition of synonymy !e !ased )pon=2, only a "odFor, at any rate, a !ein" so m)ch smarter than all h)man !ein"s in all possi!le h)man ; 2'$ ; societies that he co)ld s)rvey the totality of possi!le h)man modes of reasonin" and concept)ali4ation as *e can s)rvey the 6modes of !ehavioral aro)sal and sensiti4ation6 in a lo*er or"anismFco)ld possi!ly *rite it do*n. (o ask a h)man !ein" in a time+!o)nd h)man c)lt)re to s)rvey all modes of h)man lin")istic e7istenceFincl)din" those that *ill transcend his o*nFis to ask for an impossi!le 6Archimedean point.6 (he concl)sion that 8 take from these reflections is that *e do not kno* *hat *e #ean *hen *e speak of s)ch a theory. A theory *hich *e co)ld not possi!ly reco"ni4e as doin" *hat the :aster (heory of Cisco)rse .or :aster Cefinition of Heference and -ynonymy in Comp)tational (erms2 is s)pposed to do is a 6*e kno* not *hat.6 (he notion of 6correctness6 for s)ch a theory is less clear than the notion of reference itself, and certainly m)ch less clear than the propositional attit)des in their everyday )se.

5el+e. %hysicalism
/artry Field 8 take it as !eyond serio)s do)!t that there is an important sense in *hich all facts depend on physical facts and all "ood ca)sal e7planations depend on "ood physical e7planations. -ome s)ch doctrine has played an important methodolo"ical role in ")idin" the development of science. 8t *o)ld !e nice, ho*ever, if *e co)ld form)late the doctrine more precisely, and in this paper 8 *ill provide a ro)"h sketch of *hat 8 think the more precise form)lation sho)ld !e like, and also indicate the lines alon" *hich 8 *o)ld defend the proposed characteri4ation of physicalism a"ainst other characteri4ations. 8 take it to !e a condition of ade<)acy on any proposal for a more precise version of the doctrine of physicalism that the proposal !e s)ch as to make physicalism *eak eno)"h to !e !elieva!le !)t stron" eno)"h to e7plain ho* it can ")ide the development of science. (he methodolo"ical role of the doctrine of physicalism is do)!le+ed"ed. In the positive side, the doctrine tells )s that *hen *e have a p)tative !ody of facts and ca)sal e7planations that *e are <)ite convinced are !asically correct, *e need to find a physical fo)ndation for them. .8f the facts and e7planations are s)fficiently 6hi"h+level,6 *e *ill not look directly for a physical fo)ndation: *e *ill simply look for a fo)ndation in terms of 6lo*er+level6 facts and e7planations that *e think are clearly )npro!lematic in that their havin" a physical fo)ndation is relatively )ncontroversial.2 Bor instance, the implicit acceptance of the doctrine of physicalism on the part of most scientists has led to the s)ccessf)l search for the molec)lar fo)ndations of "enetics and the <)ant)m+mechanical fo)ndations of chemical !ondin". (he other, ne"ative, aspect of the doctrine of physicalism is that *hen faced *ith a !ody of doctrine .or a !ody of p)rported ca)sal e7planations2 that *e are convinced can have no physical fo)ndation, *e tend to re5ect that !ody of doctrine .or of p)rported ca)sal e7planations2. 8 think this is the attit)de that most of )s take ; 2'2 ; to*ard astrolo"y or telepathy: even if there *ere positive evidence for telepathy that *e did not kno* ho* to ref)te, most of )s *o)ld tend to dis!elieve the telepathic claims .and pres)ma!ly s)spect the evidence2 simply !eca)se it seems so diffic)lt to conceive ho* s)ch claims co)ld fit in *ith a physicalistic *orldvie*. If co)rse, "ive sufficient evidence for telepathy, *e *o)ld look harder for its physical fo)ndationsD or *e *o)ld contemplate "ivin" )p the doctrine of physicalism and replacin" it !y a !roader 6)nity of science6 type doctrine .m)ch as *e "ave )p the doctrine of mechanism late in the nineteenth cent)ry2. B)t this last move is not one *e take at all li"htly, and that is *hat "ives the doctrine of physicalism its methodolo"ical !ite. 8 think that most attempts to form)late the doctrine of physicalism either make the doctrine seem totally )n!elieva!le or make it so *eak that it is hard to see ho* it co)ld ever have the sort of do)!le+ed"ed methodolo"ical importance 5)st descri!ed. Ine of the "oals of the pro5ect on *hich this paper is !ased is to do !etter. Ince *e have form)lated the doctrine more clearly, the other main "oal of the pro5ect is to say somethin" a!o)t *hy the methodolo"y of adherin" to physicalism .so form)lated2 as a *orkin" hypothesis is a reasona!le methodolo"y. If co)rse, there are limits on *hat can !e said in 5)stification of any methodolo"y: one cannot take a person that is )n*illin" to en)meratively ind)ce or to reason !y any form of inference to the !est e7planation and ar")e that person into acceptance of those forms of ind)ctive inference. -till, 8 think that so#ething can !e said in favor of physicalist methodolo"y !eyond the fact that it has *orked *ell in ")idin" science, even if not eno)"h can !e said to <)ell all possi!le

skepticism. (he version of physicalism 8 *ant to defend is not so very different from classical red)ctionismD !)t it involves several differences desi"ned to make it more !elieva!le. Before mentionin" the main differences, 8 *ant to say a fe* thin"s a!o)t *hat 8 )nderstand classical red)ctionism to !e. Classical red)ctionism as 8 )nderstand it consists of t*o interrelated parts. (he first part is desi"ned to capt)re the idea that all facts )ltimately depend entirely on physical facts. (he classical red)ctionist proposes that this idea !e p)t !y sayin" that for each sentence in the lan")a"e of a s)ccessf)l special science like chemistry or "enetics or psycholo"y, there is a sentence in the lan")a"e of a lo*er+level scienceFand )ltimately, in the lan")a"e of physicsM1N Fthat in some int)itive sense 6e7presses the same facts.6 .8t is this aspect of classical red)ctionism *hich seems to me too strin"ent, and *hich 8 shall disc)ss *eakenin" shortly.2 (he second part of classical red)ctionism is desi"ned to capt)re the idea that all "ood e7planations )ltimately depend entirely on physical e7planations. A minimal version of this idea already can !e ar")ed to follo* from the first part of the red)ctionist thesis. Bor take any e7planation in the lan")a"e of a special science. By the first part of red)ctionism, there *ill !e associated *ith ; 2'# ; each sentence Si of that e7planation a physical transcription f .Si 2. @o*, it is pla)si!le to s)ppose that if the mappin" f is to associate *ith each special+science sentence a sentence in the lan")a"e of physics that 6e7presses the same facts,6 then f m)st preserve ded)ctive relationshipsD also, that it m)st preserve tr)th and falsity. -o if the special+science e7planans lo"ically implies the special+science e7planand)m, then the physical transcription of the e7planans *ill imply the physical transcription of the e7planand)mD and if the special+science e7planation is tr)e, so m)st !e its physical transcription. -o if an e7planation of somethin" is 5)st any old !ody of tr)ths from *hich the thin" to !e e7plained follo*s, then the physical transcription of the special+science e7planation is !o)nd to !e a physical e7planation. .Bor simplicity 8 have e7pressed the ar")ment so as to apply only to deducti&e special+ science e7planations, !)t it "enerali4es *itho)t m)ch loss of pla)si!ility to pro!a!ilistic e7planations.2 M2N (he main tro)!le *ith this is that *hat co)nts as a special+science la* may have as its physical transcription a physical+lan")a"e sentence *ith no motivation independent of its role in special+science e7planations. 8t *o)ld not seem like m)ch of a physical e7planation of the !ondin" of sodi)m and chlorine to say that the initial conditions in physics happen to !e s)ch that the physical transcription of the chemical+!ondin" la*s come o)t tr)e. -ome sort of e7planation of those la*s is needed. -o the second part of the red)ctionist position is simply that the hi"her+level la*s and "enerali4ations sho)ld themselves, *hen physically transcri!ed, admit physical e7planation. (his re<)irement is intended to !e some*hat va")e. 8 *o)ld not *ant to make it precise !y demandin" that the transcri!ed special+ science la* .even if s)ita!ly <)alified and or pro!a!ilified2 !e deriva!le from la*s of physics alone, *itho)t !ack"ro)nd conditions: s)ch a demand *o)ld rarely if ever !e met in practice. .Ine does occasionally hear this demand, !)t 8 s)spect that that is !eca)se of an )nthinkin" e7trapolation from the red)ction of mathematics to set theory.2 B)t it *o)ld !e e<)ally !ad .tho)"h in the opposite direction2 to p)t the demand as a demand that the physically transcri!ed special+science la* !e ded)ced from physical la*s to"ether *ith !ack"ro)nd conditions: that *o)ld !e vac)o)s, since *e co)ld simply )se as the !ack"ro)nd conditions the physically transcri!ed la* *e *anted to ded)ce, and avoid any appeal to physical la* alto"ether. 8 do)!t very m)ch that an attempt at more precision here *o)ld !e )sef)l. (he e7planatory component of red)ctionism is va")e, !)t despite the va")eness 8 think *e often kno*

*hen it has !een satisfied and *hen it has not. As 8 have said, 8 think that the red)ctionist thesisFespecially the first part of itFneeds *eakenin". B)t it is important to !e"in !y makin" s)re that *e )nderstand it sympathetically and that *e appreciate some of its virt)es. In the matter of )nderstandin" it sympathetically, 8 have t*o points to make. (he first is that the re<)irement that a physicalist transcription of a sentence ; 2'% ; 6in some int)itive sense e7press the same facts as6 the ori"inal sentence sho)ld !e taken to allo* that the physical transcription has a precision that the hi"her+level sentence lacks: *e do not *ant the red)ctionist committed to s)pposin" that the va")eness or other semantic indeterminacy in the hi"her+ level sentences can !e e7actly matched at the physical level. A red)ctionist *ill likely hold, in fact, that the va")eness or indeterminacy of terms and sentences from secondary sciences is less a matter of their havin" va")e or indeterminate red)ctions than a matter of their !ein" red)ci!le to .more or less determinate2 physical terms in different and incompati!le *ays. (he second point is that a classical red)ctionist can distin")ish !et*een pro&iding a classical red)ction in f)ll detail and s$etching one, and can hold that altho)"h f)ll red)ctions are possi!le in principle, they *o)ld "enerally !e so comple7 .even in thermodynamics and chemistry, and certainly in !iolo"y and psycholo"y2 that sketches are all *e can reasona!ly e7pect to find. Physicalism "ets its main methodolo"ical !ite in cases *here it is initially )no!vio)s even in !road sketch ho* a red)ction *o)ld "o, and indeed *here there seem to !e o!stacles to providin" s)ch a red)ction. A classical red)ctionist is likely to hold that the reasons for !elievin" in red)ctionism, and the reasons for !elievin" in the e7planatory importance of certain terms, are stron" eno)"h that if *e can provide sketches that overcome the o!stacles apparently standin" in the *ay of red)ctions for those terms, then it is reasona!le to !elieve that the red)ctions co)ld in principle !e filled in. 8n my vie* this is over+ san")ineD !)t 8 also think that if the ideal of red)ction is *eakened in the *ays soon to !e disc)ssed, then it !ecomes reasona!le. Before t)rnin" to the *ays in *hich classical red)ctionism m)st !e revised, 8 *o)ld like to t)rn to one apparent defect in it that is not "en)ine. Coin" so *ill in fact reveal one of the virt)es of red)ctionism: a virt)e that is conspic)o)sly lackin" in certain alternatives to red)ctionism, most nota!ly s)pervenience theses. (he apparent defect in red)ctionism emer"es *hen *e try to fill o)t the re<)irement 8 have va")ely e7pressed !y sayin" that the physical transcription of a hi"her+level claim m)st 6in some int)itive sense e7press the same facts.6 8n the case *here the hi"her+level sentences are !)ilt )p )sin" only predicates and first+order lo"ical operators,M#N part of *hat this pres)ma!ly involves is that the physical transcriptions are determined in the o!vio)s *ay !y a mappin" g that takes predicates in the hi"her+ level lan")a"e into form)las of the physical lan")a"e. (his mappin" g sho)ld correlate *ith each predicate of the hi"her+level lan")a"e a form)la in the lan")a"e of physics *ith the same e7tension .or more acc)rately, a form)la that does not definitely disa"ree in e7tension *ith the hi"her+level predicate Fits e7tension may !e more definite, as previo)sly noted2. B)t, one is inclined to say, e7tensional ade<)acy is not eno)"h: the physical form)la m)st !e la%fully coe7tensive *ith the hi"her+level predicate. ; 2'& ; 8t is here that the apparent defect in red)ctionism emer"es. 8t *o)ld 8 think !e most )nfort)nate if *e

had to appeal to an )ne7plicated notion of 6la*f)lness6 in this conte7t. (he idea of a la* of physics is .for many p)rposes any*ay2 tolera!ly clearD similarly for the idea of a la* of one of the special sciences like chemistry or "enetics or psycholo"y. B)t it is not one of those relatively clear applications of the notion of la*f)lness that *e are concerned *ith here: rather, *e are contemplatin" as a re<)irement for red)ction that a statement of the form 6) 7MP7 P A7N6 !e la*f)l, *here 3P3 is a predicate of a special science like chemistry or "enetics and 3 3 is some candidate for a red)ction into physicalist lan")a"e. 8n this conte7t, appeal to a notion of la*f)lness seems to me of no help at all: it simply la!els the pro!lem to !e solved, namely the pro!lem of sayin" *hich tr)e statements of the form a!ove co)nt as real red)ctions and *hich do not. Bort)nately, the classical red)ctionist does not act)ally need to rely on an )ne7plicated concept of la*f)lness. Hather, the f)ll version of the classical red)ctionist thesis explicates the sense in *hich classical red)ctions m)st !e 6la*f)l.6 (he e7plication of the sense in *hich they m)st !e la*f)l t)rns on the fact 8 emphasi4ed !efore, that classical red)ctionism consists in a doctrine a!o)t e7planations !ein" )ltimately physical as *ell as a doctrine a!o)t facts !ein" )ltimately physical. 8ndeed, the doctrine a!o)t e7planations and the doctrine a!o)t facts are not really separa!le doctrines: the red)ctionist vie* is that a lar"e part of *hat #a$es an assi"nment of physical form)las to hi"her+level form)las !e one that preserves facthood is that it preserves e7planations. 8n the case of the red)ction of predicates, this means that in a sense no la*f)lness re<)irement is needed: a f)nction " that assi"ns e7tensionally correct form)las of physics to hi"her+level predicates *ill !e ade<)ate if it leads to physical transcriptions of hi"her+level la*s that admit of physical e7planation. (alk of la*f)lness is needed only *hen *e try to form)late the re<)irement that the facts !e red)ced independently of the re<)irement that the e7planations !e red)ced.M%N -o classical red)ctionism does not, despite initial appearances, need to rely on an )ne7plicated notion of cross+discipline claims holdin" la*f)lly: and that is "ood since, as remarked !efore, s)ch a )se of the notion of la*f)lness *o)ld simply la!el a pro!lem, not solve it. (his virt)e of classical red)ctionism *ill !e preserved on the *eakenin" of it that 8 *ill ne7t s)""est. ?o*ever, it is not preserved on s)pervenience theses: there, there is an essential )se made of notions of necessity or la*f)lness, applied to cross3discipline sentences .e."., it is necessary or la*f)l that there !e no mental difference *itho)t a physical difference2. And it is essential to the )se of s)pervenience !y antired)ctionists that there is no attempt to e7plain this cross+discipline la*f)lnessFsince the only o!&ious %ay to explain it %ould !e in ter#s of a reduction . Advocates of s)pervenience do not rely on that e7planation !)t do not *ant to p)t anythin" else ; 2'0 ; in its place. .8 do not think that this is the only pro!lem *ith s)pervenience thesesF8 also think that they are far too *eak to !e interestin", even if one for"ets the )nill)minatin"ness of their appeal to necessity or la*f)lness.2 @o* for a rather <)ick disc)ssion of some *ays in *hich *e need to *eaken the classical+red)ctionist claim that for each sentence in the lan")a"e of a s)ccessf)l special science there m)st !e a claim in the lan")a"e of physics that in some int)itive sense 6e7presses the same facts.6 8t is rather easy to ar")e that this is impla)si!le: indeed, one can ar")e that even some claims a!o)t shape that clearly o)"ht to co)nt as physicalistically kosher *ill !e r)led o)t !y this re<)irement. Basically, the ar")ment is that since physical lan")a"e is co)nta!le, only co)nta!ly many facts a!o)t shape *ill !e representa!le in it, !)t there are )nco)nta!ly many facts a!o)t shape that o)"ht to !e represented. 8t t)rns o)t, tho)"h, that a very simple modification of classical red)ctionism *ill handle this cardinality pro!lem: instead of insistin" on strai"ht+o)t e7pressi!ility in the lan")a"e of physics, *e insist on defina!ility in the

lan")a"e of physics fro# physical para#eters . (he physical parameters can incl)de ar!itrary re"ions of spaceD this m)ltiplies the n)m!er of physical facts *e have to *ork *ith enormo)sly and avoids the sort of *orry 5)st raised. A second *orry a!o)t classical red)ctionism is that it seems to !e incompati!le *ith f)nctionalism, that is, *ith the fact that the same special+science predicate can !e physically reali4ed in a *ide variety of very different *ays. 8t has seemed to many .i2 that if the aims of red)ctionism are to !e achieved, then *e need a sin"le form)la in physical lan")a"e applica!le to all occ)rrences of the special+science predicateD !)t .ii2 that the possi!ility of e7tremely different physical reali4ations precl)des this. ,et )s ass)me .i2 for the moment, and foc)s on .ii2. 8 think it can !e made hi"hly pla)si!le that if one takes 6the physical lan")a"e6 to !e a p)rely first+order lan")a"eFno predicate <)antifiers, even s)!stit)tionalFthen it is indeed impossi!le to find form)las in that lan")a"e that can capt)re the fairly a!stract similarities !et*een different possi!le reali4ations of the same special+science predicates .3pain3, 3monetary transaction3, or *hatever2. And there is some reason to constr)e classical red)ctionism as implicitly makin" this restriction to first+order lan")a"e. B)t if so, then the main moral of f)nctionalism is 5)st that *e sho)ld rela7 this: *e sho)ld allo* the physical lan")a"e to contain the lo"ical reso)rces re<)ired for f)nctional definition. A typical f)nctional definition proceeds !y definin" somethin" to !e y 5)st in case it has some property or other P that meets s)ch and s)ch a condition. .6Bein" y 6 is called the 6hi"her+level6 or 6f)nctional6 property, *hereas P is the 6lo*er+level6 property that reali4es y .2 -o to allo* for f)nctional definition, *e need to allo* <)antification over properties of individ)als .or at any rate, predicate <)antification, perhaps constr)ed s)!stit)tionally2. ?o*ever, the second+order lan")a"e in <)estion is to !e a predicative .or ramified2 one: the only properties *e <)antify over are those that are predicatively constr)a!le .perhaps in m)ltiple steps2 from !asic physical pred+ ; 2'' ; icates.M&N (he point of this restriction is to ")arantee that the properties <)antified over are independently certified to !e physically kosher. .A sli"htly less severe restriction *o)ld also ")arantee this,M0N !)t there is no need to "o into this here.2 8f *e li!erali4e classical red)ctionism so as to allo* f)nctional or second+order 6red)ctions,6 as 8 think *e sho)ld, then *e m)st also demand an acco)nt, in each instance *here the f)nctional property holds, of *hat lo*er+level physical properties reali4e it and *hy they reali4e it. 8ndeed, it is in the demand for s)ch an acco)nt of the reali4ations that m)ch of the spirit of red)ctionism is foc)sed. (here is a possi!le alternative to admittin" hi"her+order physical lan")a"e in one3s 6red)ctions6: one can restrict the application of the red)ctions one "ives, there!y denyin" .i2D indeed, one can ar")e that s)ch a restriction is not a li!erali4ation of classical red)ctionism, it is *hat classical red)ctionists intended. :y o*n vie* is that it is indeed fairly pla)si!le that a classical red)ctionist co)ld !e satisfied *ith a physical acco)nt of pain in h)mans and a separate physical acco)nt of pain in octop)ses and a third for pain in :artians: here the need for a common physical acco)nt is not all that compellin". ?o*ever, the !est ar")ments for f)nctionalism sho* the possi!ility that the physical reali4ation of a property like pain can vary not only from species to species !)t !et*een different mem!ers of a species and even *ithin the same mem!er at different times.M'N (his means that if one is to avoid the reco)rse to hi"her+order physical lan")a"e, one m)st restrict the application of one3s red)ctions not 5)st to a "iven species !)t to a "iven interval of time in the life of a "iven individ)al or"anism. 8 do)!t that s)ch a *ay of avoidin" the appeal to hi"her+order physical lan")a"e *o)ld !e satisfactory.M/N B)t there is no need to ar")e this here: the differences !et*een this nonf)nctionalist physicalism and the f)nctionalist physicalism 8 prefer are not really terri!ly important. 8 see f)nctionalist physicalism as only a sli"ht

"enerali4ation of nonf)nctionalist physicalismD the differences !et*een these t*o doctrines have !een "reatly overemphasi4ed. .Ine occasionally hears the vie* that psycholo"y is f)ndamentally different from other sciences !eca)se its terms can only !e f)nctionally e7plicated. B)t 8 think in fact that to the e7tent that f)nctional e7plication is re<)ired for psycholo"ical terms it is also re<)ired for terms m)ch closer to f)ndamental physics: consider 3acidic3 or 3harmonic oscillator3 or 3is hotter than3.M9N A connected vie* that like*ise seems incorrect is that the fact that psycholo"ical theory is appropriately constr)ed in a f)nctionalist vein sho*s that a 6top+do*n6 methodolo"y that i"nores ne)rophysiolo"ical )nderpinnin"s is appropriate in psycholo"y and that a 6!ottom+)p6 methodolo"y is inappropriate. (his is do)!ly *ron": first, a f)nctionalist needs to !e concerned *ith "ettin" a theory of h)man psycholo"y that can !e physically reali4ed, so that attention to ne)rophysiolo"ical )nderpinnin"s is <)ite appropriateD second, even *hen one has nonf)nctional red)ctions, the comple7ity of the system ; 2'/ ; often makes it practically indispensa!le to i"nore the physical )nderpinnin"s in certain conte7ts and proceed in a relatively a)tonomo)s or top+do*n fashion. (he fact is that in any special science, a comple7 interaction of 6top+do*n6 and 6!ottom+)p6 research is essential to pro"ress: this is tr)e *hether or not the science in <)estion is constr)ed in a f)nctionalist fashion.2 A third *orry a!o)t classical red)ctionismFpro!a!ly the most important *orryFis that it does not seem to accommodate the fact that theories in the special sciences are not e7ceptionless.M1$N ?ere 8 do not have in mind simply the fact that in red)cin" a special science *e typically discover vario)s *ays in *hich the la*s hitherto accepted in that science need to !e corrected: that fact has !een emphasi4ed in the red)ctionist literat)re and is no threat to classical red)ctionism. Hather, *hat 8 have in mind is that there need not !e any *ay to provide corrected la*s *hile remainin" in the special science in <)estion: one can only correct the la*s !y shiftin" to a more f)ndamental discipline s)ch as physics. M11N ,a*s in the special sciences typically *ork only in hi"hly ideali4ed circ)mstances, and even there, they *ork only appro7imatelyD and there may simply !e no *ay to remove the ideali4ation and or the appro7imation *hile remainin" in the voca!)lary of the special science. (hese 6defects6 in 6hi"her+ level6 la*s and 6hi"her+level6 types of e7planation are simply the price one has to pay for the mana"ea!ility and added "enerality that one "ets !y shiftin" from the level of physics to the level of the special science. @o*, "iven that la*s in the special science *ork only in ideali4ed circ)mstances and only appro7imately, there is little point in lookin" for a red)ction that *orks o)tside the ideali4ed circ)mstances of applica!ility and that is re<)ired to !e more than appro7imately correct. 8 think it is clear that even the classic cases of 6red)ction6 .e."., of "enes in terms of C@A, or valence in terms of atomic str)ct)re2 provide red)ctions only s)!5ect to this limitation.M12N And 8 think that it *o)ld !e silly to e7pect or demand any more than this in other special sciences s)ch as psycholo"y. 8n "eneral, then, one m)st ad5)st the precision and ran"e of applica!ility re<)ired of a red)ction of a "iven term to the precision and ran"e of applica!ility of the la*s and e7planations in *hich that term f)nctions. (hat3s all 8 can say here on ho* classical red)ctionism m)st !e *eakenedD 8 hope it is clear, tho)"h, that the *eakenin"s 8 have s)""ested do not )nderc)t anythin" very central to the spirit of classical red)ctionist demands. In particular, they do not undercut %hat I thin$ is the central feature of classical reductionis# : loosely form)lated, it is that if *e are to accept a special+science e7planation of somethin", *e are committed to the possi!ility in principle of findin" a physical e7planation of that thin" in %hich the structure of the special3science explanation of it is preser&ed .

(here are several c)rrently pop)lar s)rro"ates for physicalism that do not preserve this central feat)re of classical red)ctionism. Amon" these *eak ; 2'9 ; s)rro"ates for physicalism are: 1. 6Jeak sentential physicalism6 or 6token physicalism6: the vie* that each tr)e singular statement in the lan")a"e of the special sciences is in some sense e<)ivalent to .6reports the same event as62 some tr)e sin")lar statement in the lan")a"e of physics. 2. P)rely ontolo"ical physicalism .the thesis that all entities are physical, *ith no re<)irement that all e7planatorily )sef)l ideolo"y !e red)ci!le to physical ideolo"yFindeed, *ith no re<)irements *hatever a!o)t e7planatorily )sef)l ideolo"y2.M1#N #. Kario)s s)pervenience theses. 8t seems <)ite clear, tho)"h, that none of these *eaker 6physicalist6 doctrines, either sin"ly or in com!ination, is of any help in acco)ntin" for the important methodolo"ical role that physicalism has played in the development of science. 8ndeed, 8 think that each of .121.#2 is very nearly vac)o)s. (he near+vac)ity of 6token physicalism6 can !e seen !y contrastin" it *ith f)nctionalist physicalism. (he latter re<)ires that for the events 6ones is no% in pain and 6ones-s .3fi!ers are no% firing to !e identical, then Jones3s C+fi!ers firin" m)st no* !e part of a reali4ation of pain theory in Jones. (his places a stron" constraint on *hat physical events can co)nt as identical *ith the pain event. Ine of the pro!lems *ith replacin" f)nctionalism !y token physicalism is that it *o)ld then !e )nclear *hat if any constraints there are on *hat physical events are taken as identical *ith mental events .or other events reported in special+science lan")a"e2. Bor instance, it appears to !e possi!le to maintain token physicalism !y simply findin", on any "iven occasion *hen Jones is in pain, some ar!itrary event takin" place in Jones .say, an electron shiftin" ener"y levels in her toenail2 and claimin" that that is identical *ith Jones3s c)rrent pain. Jhat seems int)itively *ron" *ith s)ch an identification is that the event picked does not have the ca)sal role in prod)cin" !ehavior, !eliefs, desires, and so on that pain theory re<)ires. (he moral seems to !e that )nless an event reali4es a certain pain theory, it cannot !e a pain event. B)nctionalism has 5)st this desired conse<)ence. (he near+vac)ity of p)rely ontolo"ical physicalism can !e ar")ed !y ar")in" that e7planations in terms of entities that are not o!vio)sly physical can )s)ally !e reform)lated in a *ay that dispenses *ith the as+yet+)nred)ced ontolo"y and replaces it *ith as+yet+)nred)ced ideolo"y. 8nt)itively, the reform)lated e7planations are 5)st ver!al variants of the ori"inal, !)t the thesis of ontolo"ical red)ctionism has no application to the reform)lations. 8 *ill "ive t*o e7amples of this. (he first e7ample is the search for the physical !asis of "enetics. An ontolo"ical physicalist mi"ht say that here is an e7ample *here ontolo"ical red)ctionism had !ite: *e had an entity, the "ene, *hose physicalistic stat)s *as )no!vio)sD !)t !eca)se the scientific comm)nity accepted ; 2/$ ; ontolo"ical physicalism, they *ere led to esta!lish that "enes *ere physical thin"s after all. (he pro!lem is that it is possi!le to reform)late "enetics trivially so that it does not <)antify over "enes !)t simply )ses special predicates: for instance, 3has a haemophilic "ene3 .predicated of people, or ova2D or failin" that, 3serves as a haemophilic "ene3, predicated of h)nks of matter. Jith "enetics so reform)lated, it is trivial in advance of scientific research that the only post)lated entities are physical:

ontolo"ical physicalism co)ld play no role in motivatin" the search for the chemical fo)ndations of "enetics. (he second e7ample concerns the mind+!ody pro!lem. Consider a modified Cartesianism, *hich insists that even disem!odied minds have spatial locationFnot that they occupy space, perhaps, !)t that their perceptions and tho)"hts are al*ays from the perspective of some point or small re"ion of space. .-)ppose also that the modified Cartesianism has it that no t*o minds can in this sense !e located at the same place at the same time.2 (his s)rely sho)ld co)nt as an antiphysicalist doctrine. 8t !ecomes no less antiphysicalist if *e redescri!e it so that instead of claimin" the e7istence of special nonphysical entities, minds, it says that the only entities are re"ions of space+time, !)t that s)ch re"ions, in addition to satisfyin" predicates like 3is f)lly occ)pied !y a !ody3, also satisfy predicates like 3is the point of vie* of a mind3. 8f this co)nts as physicalism, physicalism is trivial to attain: "iven the nat)ral one+to+ one correspondence !et*een re"ions and minds on the entity version of modified Cartesianism, the elimination of entities in favor of re"ions is a lo"ical triviality. -o m)ch for p)rely ontolo"ical physicalism. ()rnin" finally to s)pervenience, 8 *ill ar")e first that nonmodal s)pervenience theses are incredi!ly *eak. (hen 8 *ill ar")e that there is a nat)ral *ay to stren"then them, one that may conceiva!ly lead to an interestin" f)rther *eakenin" of classical red)ctionism than the one 8 have proposed, !)t that the )s)al attempts to stren"then nonmodal s)pervenience, in terms of modality, have little or no more real content than the nonmodal theses that )nderlie them. ,et3s look at nonmodal s)pervenience theses first. 8f s)ch a s)pervenience thesis is p)t as Any t*o o!5ects that differ in any respect differ in a physical respect it is co#pletely vac)o)s: on even the most radically )nphysicalistic vie*s, any t*o entities in the same possi!le *orld differ in so#e physical respect or other. Je can do a !it !etter !y restrictin" to 6<)alitative6 differencesFvery ro)"htly, differences stata!le *itho)t )se of names or demonstratives or inde7icals: Any t*o o!5ects that differ in any <)alitative respect differ in a <)alitative physical respect. .-12 (his is not (uite vac)o)s: it says that if there is a perfect physical symmetry in the )niverse, as in one of :a7 Black3s d)plicatin" )niverses,M1%N then the physi+ ; 2/1 ; cal doppel"bn"ers are doppel"bn"ers in all nonphysical respects too. B)t in application to any nond)plicatin" )niverse it is contentless: a"ain, there *ill al*ays !e <)alitative respects in *hich t*o entities differ .e."., !arrin" s)ch perfect symmetry, any t*o entities *ill differ in their spatial relations to other entities, <)alitatively descri!ed2. Je co)ld eliminate this pro!lem !y restrictin" to physical differences that are 6intrinsic6 in addition to <)alitative, *here intrinsic physical properties of an o!5ect are those the o!5ect has 6independent of anythin" e7ternal to it.6 B)t if the proposal is Any t*o o!5ects that differ in any <)alitative respect differ in an intrinsic <)alitative physical respect, then it is o!vio)sly false: o!5ects that *ere identical in all intrinsic physical properties co)ld differ in nonintrinsic properties like !ein" a planet, !ein" le"ally married, !ein" near a li"ht so)rce, and so forth. Pres)ma!ly then the proposal has to !e Any t*o o!5ects that differ in any intrinsic <)alitative respect differ in an intrinsic

<)alitative physical respect. .-22 (his is )ndenia!ly !etter. ?o*ever, it is still &ery *eak: <)ite independent of physicalism, it is o!vio)s that virt)ally any t*o o!5ects differ in so#e intrinsic <)alitative physical respect. :oreover, even "iven a science+fiction sit)ation in *hich there *ere t*o *omen *ho *ere atom for atom d)plicates, !)t *here one had the !iolo"ical property of havin"+a+"ene+for+haemophilia *hereas the other had the property of havin"+no+"ene+for+haemophilia, one co)ld still save the s)pervenience of the !iolo"ical on the physical simply !y declarin" the property of havin" a haemophilic "ene to !e nonintrinsic.M1&N (here is a nat)ral idea for ho* to improve these s)pervenience theses *itho)t introd)ctin" modality: Bor any t*o o!5ects that differ in any not+o!vio)sly+physical respect y , there is a physical difference !et*een them that explains their difference *ith respect to y . .JEP2 .6JEP6 stands for 6*eak e7planational physicalism.62 (he relevant sense of e7planation re<)ires some specification: o!vio)sly causal e7planation is not *hat is in <)estion hereD rather, the idea is that the o!5ects differ in respect y 6!y virt)e of6 a certain physical difference. .8t is not eno)"h to e7plain the e&idence that leads us to assert that one o!5ect satisfies y and the other does not.2 (he stren"th of .JEP2 depends on one3s vie* of the sort of e7planation involved. (he most o!vio)s *ays to el)cidate .JEP2 re<)ire that one provide for each not+o!vio)sly+physical condition y a collection of conditions, each s)fficient for y or its ne"ation, *ith each act)al o!5ect satisfyin" at least one of the conditions. (he "ap !et*een this and the locali4ed necessary and s)fficient condition re<)ired !y f)nctionalist versions of red)ctive physicalism is not all ; 2/2 ; that "reat, especially *hen it is remem!ered that red)ctive physicalism allo*s .p. 2'# a!ove2 that there !e indeterminacy as to *hich necessary and s)fficient condition is the ri"ht one. Jhere there appears to !e a !i""er "ap !et*een .JEP2 and red)ctive physicalism is in *hat m)st !e e7plained: the "oal of e7plainin" the individ)al differences looks *eaker than the "oal of e7plainin" the physical transcription of the la*s. 8 s)spect that the added stren"th of a red)ctive physicalism of the sort 8 have advocated over the 6*eak e7planational physicalism6 .JEP2 is a virt)eF8 s)spect that .JEP2 is too *eak to capt)re the methodolo"ical doctrine that act)ally ")ides the development of scienceF!)t 8 *ill not directly p)rs)e that here. Bor .JEP2 is not *hat people mean *hen they speak of a s)pervenience thesis .tho)"h it may *ell !e that the fail)re to distin")ish it from s)pervenience is *hat has led to the pop)larity of the idea that s)pervenience is the key component of a reasona!le physicalism2. -)pervenience theses are s)pposed to stren"then -1 and -2 not !y appealin" to e7planation !)t instead !y appealin" to modality. And the point 8 *ant to make is that s)pervenience theses are far too *eak !eca)se they fall *ay short even of .JEP2. (here are t*o o!vio)s *ays to add modality to -1 and -2. (he *eak *ay is to simply add a modal operator to the o)tside, as in @ecessarily any t*o o!5ects that differ in an intrinsic <)alitative respect differ in an intrinsic <)alitative physical respectD .-2O2 the stron" *ay is to <)antify over possi!ilia, as in Any t*o possi!le o!5ects that differ in an intrinsic <)alitative respect differ in an intrinsic <)alitative physical respect.

.-2OO2 .-1O and -1OO *o)ld !e analo"o)s.2 B)t the e7cessive *eakness of even the do)!le+starred versions sho)ld !e clear: one co)ld in f)ll accordance *ith -2OO apply a predicate like 3has cast spells3 <)ite freely, as lon" as one never applied it differently to t*o act)al or possi!le entities that *ere alike in all intrinsic physical <)alitites. .8ndeed, even this restriction *o)ld not !e needed if one declares 3has cast spells3 to !e itself nonintrinsic. 8n that case the only restriction *o)ld !e the one imposed !y -1OO, *hich precl)des only the differential application of the term to act)al or possi!le people alike in all <)alitative respects incl)din" spatial relations to other <)alitatively descri!ed thin"s.2 Ine co)ld apply the term freely s)!5ect only to this very *eak restriction, even if one had stron" reason to !elieve that there is no physical difference that co)ld explain the difference !et*een people that have cast spells and people *ho have not or cannot. Ince this is appreciated, it is hard to see ho* s)pervenience theses can !e "iven m)ch respect: the advanta"e of modal s)pervenience over nonmodal is minimal. .If co)rse, one co)ld also add modality to .JEP2, there!y sli"htly stren"thenin" it: for instance, one co)ld alter the !e"innin" of .JEP2 to 6for any t*o ; 2/# ; possi!le o!5ects.6 8 do not mean to ar")e that this *o)ld !e no improvement: my point is not to oppose the invocation of modality !)t to insist that physicalism have an e7planatory component that the invocation of modality itself does not provide.2 (his completes my disc)ssion of .121.#2. 8n "eneral, the ina!ility of .121.#2 to acco)nt for the important methodolo"ical role that physicalism has played in the development of science seems d)e to the fact that .121.#2 say nothin" *hatever a!o)t the physical explanation of the facts stated in special+ science voca!)lary. 8 do not *ant to assert do"matically that no physicalism *eaker than the more or less red)ctive physicalism 8 have advocated here co)ld possi!ly capt)re the doctrine that has ")ided the development of science: s)ch a concl)sion seems to me premat)re, for the foc)s on s)ch nonstarters as token physicalism and s)pervenience has tended to prevent the investi"ation of *hether there are serio)s candidates for *eakenin"s of the red)ctivist position. Pres)ma!ly a reasona!le physicalism *o)ld have to entail token physicalism and pro!a!ly ontolo"ical physicalism. 8t *o)ld also have to entail the 6*eak e7planational physicalism6 .JEP2 disc)ssed a!ove .*hich in t)rn entails s)pervenience2. Binally, it *o)ld have to entail the self+containedness of physics: ro)"hly, if A is any sin")lar statement .6event statement62 of f)ndamental physics, and B consists of all tr)e la*s of f)ndamental physics pl)s all tr)e sin")lar statements involvin" only times earlier than those mentioned in A, and - is any collection of tr)e la*s, and tr)e sin")lar statements a!o)t earlier times, that are not part of B, then the pro!a!ility of A "iven B U is identical *ith the pro!a!ility of A "iven B alone. .-C2 8 think that these thin"s are all entailed !y the sli"htly *eakened form of classical red)ctionism 8 have advocatedFor more acc)rately, that a ri"oro)s form)lation of them *o)ld !e a conse<)ence of a ri"oro)s form)lation of the *eakened red)ctionism.M10N B)t perhaps somethin" *eakerFmay!e even s)!stantially *eakerF*o)ld !e eno)"h to entail all of these thin"s and !e other*ise satisfactory. ?o*ever, there is a serio)s challen"e that m)st !e overcome !y anyone *ho thinks that the kind of <)asi+red)ctionism 8 have advocated is s)!stantially too stron". (he pro!lem is that it is not clear that anythin" short of s)ch <)asi+red)ctionism *ill !e capa!le of e7plainin" *hy the special sciences *ork

as *ell as they do. Act)ally this form)lation does not clearly distin")ish !et*een at least t*o closely related e7planatory tasks. Consider any special+science theory that is appro7imately tr)e. .8f it is not appro7imately tr)e, then not even the most sta)nch red)ctionist *o)ld e7pect anythin" like a red)ction of it to physics: it *o)ld !e a candidate for elimination, not red)ction.2 (hen the first e7planatory task is simply to e7plain in terms of an )nderlyin" science like physics *hy ; 2/% ; the "enerali4ations of this theory sho)ld hold. 8t is hard to see ho* any s)ch e7planation is possi!le short of a <)asi+red)ctionistic oneFthat is, short of specifyin" in the voca!)lary of a lo*er+level science certain properties, and sho*in" that if the concepts in the "enerali4ations are vie*ed either as standin" for those lo*er+level properties directly, or as standin" for f)nctional properties that are physically reali4ed !y those lo*er+level properties, then the "enerali4ations appro7imately hold. B)t pres)ma!ly anyone *antin" a s)!stantial *eakenin" of the kind of <)asi+red)ctionism 8 have advocated is "oin" to say that the "oal of e7plainin" hi"her+level la*s in lo*er+level terms is an )nreasona!le "oal: the ina!ility to achieve it sho)ld not !e co)nted a"ainst the nonred)ctionist. -o let )s shift to the second e7planatory task. ?ere the "oal is not to e7plain the la*s of the special sciences themselves !)t simply to e7plain *hy the application of the special+science la*s never comes into conflict *ith the application of the )nderlyin" la*s. -)ppose that *e have a psycholo"ical theory of some sort desi"ned to e7plain a variety of phenomena, s)ch as the rel)ctance of !a!ies to cra*l across a vis)al cliff. ,et )s say that it follo*s from this theory .to"ether *ith s)ita!le a)7iliary hypotheses2 that the pro!a!ility of an infant crossin" the vis)al cliff in the appropriate e7perimental conditions is e7tremely small. @o*, if this conse<)ence of the theory is in fact tr)e, then *ere *e "iven a complete ne)rophysiolo"ical description of a randomly chosen class of infants and *ere *e a!le to apply the correct la*s of ne)rophysiolo"y to predict their movements, *e *o)ld in nearly every case "et a very lo* pro!a!ility that they *o)ld cross the cliff. .(his ass)mes that ne)rophysiolo"y is s)fficiently 6complete6 that no s)pplementation at the lo*er level of physics is re<)ired. 8f yo) like, yo) can s)!stit)te physics for ne)rophysiolo"yD in this case the completeness ass)mption is "iven .-C2.2M1'N Pres)ma!ly there has to !e somethin" a!o)t the "eneral ne)rophysiolo"ical .or physical2 str)ct)re of infants that e7plains *hy a ne)rophysiolo"ical .or physical2 prediction, *ere it feasi!le, *o)ld nearly al*ays yield a lo* pro!a!ility of crossin" the cliff. 8 do not say that this is logically re<)iredD one could say that the statistical fact a!o)t the !ehavior of infants has no "eneral ne)rophysiolo"ical or physical !asis: any ne)rophysiolo"ical or physical e7planation of *hy one infant failed to cross the cliff *o)ld have nothin" in common, at any level of a!straction, *ith a ne)rophysiolo"ical or physical description of *hy another infant failed to cross the cliff. B)t s)ch a position *o)ld !e very hard to take serio)slyD and "iven the ass)mption .-C2, it *o)ld !e tantamo)nt to sayin" that the psycholo"ical la*s "overnin" the infants3 !ehavior are completely fort)ito)s accidents. -o the demand is that *e ne)rophysiolo"ically e7plain, if not the psycholo"ical la*s themselves .the la*s in the theory that *e are ima"inin" e7plains the infants3 !ehavior2, then at least the statistical re")larities that are descri!a!le nonpsycholo"ically and *hich the psycholo"ical theory implies .of *hich the ; 2/& ;

re")larity in the infants3 cliff+avoidin" !ehavior is 5)st one2. (his is in effect a demand that *e e7plain *hy o)r ne)rophysiolo"ical la*s and o)r psycholo"ical la*s never come into conflict. Ir, to introd)ce a convenient phrase, it is a demand that *e sho* that o)r ne)rophysiolo"y and o)r psycholo"y 6mesh.6 8t seems to me that *henever *e employ la*s at different levels, there is a prima facie possi!ility of their comin" into conflict, and it is eminently reasona!le to *ant an e7planation of *hy s)ch conflict does not arise. If co)rse, *e need not $no% the e7planation to employ !oth levels of la*sD !)t *e o)"ht to e7pect that a philosophical acco)nt of the relations !et*een the different sciences *o)ld "ive )s some idea as to the "eneral o)tlines that s)ch an e7planation mi"ht !e e7pected to take. (his demand is *eaker than the demand that *e e7plain the la*s of one science from the la*s of another, and sho)ld !e accepta!le even to someone *ho re5ects the latter demand. 8 take it that a main advanta"e of red)cin" psycholo"y to lo*er+level science, or of "ivin" the kind of <)asi+red)ction 8 have !een advocatin", is that in doin" so one *o)ld !e a!le to e7plain the mesh !et*een psycholo"y and the lo*er+level sciences. Bor instance, "iven a red)ction to ne)rophysiolo"y of a psycholo"ical theory that e7plains the avoidance of vis)al cliffs, one *o)ld !e a!le to e7plain ne)rophysiolo"ically *hat it is a!o)t infants that "enerally leads them to avoid vis)al cliffs: the ne)rophysiolo"y and the psycholo"y *o)ld yield the same res)lts. (he reason one co)ld ne)rophysiolo"ically e7plain this is that accordin" to red)ctionist and <)asi+red)ctionist vie*s, the str)ct)re of special+science e7planations is preserved. -o to "et a ne)rophysiolo"ical e7planation of *hy infants avoid the cliff, yo) !asically 5)st take the psycholo"ical e7planation and 6transcri!e it6 to the ne)rophysiolo"ical level, in the manner specified in the <)asi+red)ction. .Accordin" to the <)asi+ red)ctionist, the physical transcription may involve hi"her+order physical properties that can !e m)ltiply reali4edD it may re<)ire correctin" the ideali4ations that are made in the special scienceD and so forth. B)t the special+science la* "ives at least ro)"h directions for findin" the detailed lo*er+level e7planation.2 8 pointed o)t early in the paper that a physical transcription of a special+science e7planation does not a)tomatically co)nt as a physical e7planationD !)t *hen the la*s and "enerali4ations of the special science themselves admit physical e7planation, it does, and it is part of the s)pposition of there !ein" a <)asi+red)ction that this re<)irement is met. 8 sho)ld remark that a <)asi+red)ctionist e7planation of the mesh !et*een a psycholo"ical theory and ne)rophysiolo"y does not act)ally re<)ire a <)asi+red)ction of psycholo"y to ne)rophysiolo"y: it *o)ld s)ffice to <)asi+red)ce !oth to physics. Bor doin" this *o)ld "ive )s an e7planation of *hy psycholo"y meshes *ith physics and of *hy ne)rophysiolo"y meshes *ith physicsD and t*o theories that mesh *ith physics mesh *ith each other.M1/N -o m)ch for the <)asi+red)ctionist e7planation of the mesh. (he ne7t <)estion is, *hat sho)ld someone hostile to anythin" like red)ctionism say a!o)t ; 2/0 ; ho* to e7plain the mesh !et*een psycholo"y and ne)rophysiolo"y= 8 think it is very hard to come )p *ith an ans*er to this <)estion. And this, 8 think, is a lar"e part of *hat )nderlies the hold that <)asi+ red)ctionism has on many of )s. :y point then is that )nless o)r theories at different levels mesh in the statistical re")larities they imply, they conflict and sho)ld not !e sim)ltaneo)sly accepted. Jhen theories at different levels do mesh in the re")larities they imply, *e need an e7planation of their interrelations that e7plains ho* they do thisD and a <)asi+red)ctive e7planation is the only o!vio)s form for s)ch an e7planation to take. Jitho)t a <)asi+red)ctive e7planation of the mesh in e7planations !et*een sciences, it looks as if this mesh is a total mystery. (o a lar"e e7tent, it is !eca)se *e o)"ht to avoid !elievin" in total mysteries

that *e o)"ht to ass)me that if a special scientific theory is to !e accepted, then a <)asi+red)ction to lo*er+level sciences is possi!le. 8t mi"ht perhaps !e ar")ed that *e kno* on the !asis of e7amples that a f)ndamentally nonred)ctive acco)nt of the mesh !et*een t*o theories of different levels can !e "iven. Consider, for instance, phlo"iston theory. Jithin a limited domain any*ay, the statistical la*s a!o)t com!)stion !ased on phlo"iston theory proved correct and conse<)ently meshed *ith those statistical la*s a!o)t com!)stion events that *o)ld have !een forthcomin" from the correct physics, even tho)"h phlo"iston theory *as not red)ci!le to physics .nor *ere !oth red)ci!le to some tr)e theory at a deeper level2. -o no directly red)ctive acco)nt of the .partial2 mesh !et*een phlo"iston theory and physics is possi!le. (he e7ample *orks, tho)"h, only !eca)se the statistical la*s a!o)t com!)stion "iven !y phlo"iston theory are some*hat similar to those "iven !y a competin" theory at the same levelFo7y"en theoryF%hich %e $no% to !e a !etter theory . 8 "rant that it is not <)ite tr)e that the only kno*n kind of e7planation of the mesh !et*een a nonf)ndamental theory - and physics is a red)ction .or <)asi+red)ction2 of that theory to physicsD sometimes the red)ction of an i#pro&ed theory to physics *ill e7plain the mesh. B)t this fact is of little help to the antired)ctionist: if *e e7plain the mesh !et*een some controversial theory in psycholo"y and physics !y means of the red)ction of an improved psycholo"y to physics, then *e are "rantin" the red)ctionist a!o)t psycholo"y everythin" he or she ever *anted. Act)ally 8 do not *ant to r)le o)t do"matically the possi!ility that there mi"ht !e an e7planation of a close mesh !et*een a special science and physics *hich is not f)ndamentally red)ctive. Jhat 8 do *ant to say is that the antired)ctionist, if he or she is to !e taken serio)sly, o*es an acco)nt of ho* s)ch an alternative style of e7planation of the mesh is to proceed. Je need an e7planation of the close mesh !et*een special sciences and physicsD *itho)t even a sketch of *hat a nonred)ctionist e7planation is like, it is hard to take vie*s that are sim)ltaneo)sly antired)ctionist and antieliminativist serio)sly. Certainly alternatives to !roadly red)ctionist e7planations of the mesh !e+ ; 2/' ; t*een on the one hand hi"her+level sciences like psycholo"y and on the other hand physics are not at all easy to come !y: if they *ere, s)ch alternative e7planations of mesh *o)ld do)!tless have !een proposed for special sciences like chemistry and "enetics, so that !roadly red)ctionist strate"ies *o)ld not have seemed so inevita!le there. 8n any case, no s)ch alternative e7planation of the mesh is forthcomin" simply from a s)pervenience thesis, or a token+token identity thesis, or the like: any physicalist *ho opposes a !roadly red)ctionist thesis o)"ht to "o !eyond espo)sin" s)pervenience and or token+token identity or *hatever, and do the hard *ork of e7plainin" ho* the mesh !et*een psycholo"y and physics is to !e e7plained in a *ay that is not !roadly red)ctionist.M19N

Notes
One. horou*hly -odern -eno
1. Plato, Fi&e ,ialogues , trans. 9. 9r)!e .8ndianapolis: ?ackett, 19/12. All <)otations are taken from this translation. 2. A vie* of in<)iry related to o)rs has !een championed !y A. 9oldman in his Episte#ology and .ognition .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: ?arvard University Press, 19/%2. Hecent commentaries on the :eno !y historians of philosophy have varied in the importance they "ive to :eno3s parado7, !)t none of them "ive it the reconstr)ction considered here. Compare (. 8r*in, Plato-s Moral /heory .I7ford, 19''2D J.

:aravcsik, 6,earnin" as Hecollection,6 in Plato: .ollection of .ritical Essays , ed. 9. Klastos, vol. 1, Metaphysics and Episte#ology .9arden City, @.L.: Anchor Books, 19'12D @. Jhite, Plato on 5no%ledge and Reality .8ndianapolis: ?ackett, 19'02. 8n *hat follo*s a variety of technical claims are asserted *itho)t proof. 8n all cases the claims are simple applications of res)lts sho*n in C. Isherson, :. -to!, and -. Jeinstein, Syste#s /hat Learn .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19/&2D C. 9lymo)r, 68nd)ctive 8nference in the ,imit,6 Er$enntnis 21 .19/%2D C. Isherson and -. Jeinstein, 6Paradi"ms of (r)th Cetection,6 6ournal of Philosophical Logic , 19/9D >. >elly and C. 9lymo)r, 6Conver"ence to the (r)th and @othin" !)t the (r)th,6 Philosophy of Science , 199$D >. >elly and C. 9lymo)r, 6(heory Ciscovery from G)antified Cata,6 6ournal of Philosophical Logic , 199$. #. Bor e7ample, in ?. Bield, 6:ental Hepresentation,6 in Philosophy of Psychology , ed. @. Block .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: ?arvard University Press, 19/$2, and in H. -talnaker, In(uiry .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19/%2. %. Chomsky "ave a strictly parallel ans*er to <)estions a!o)t ho* children learn their native lan")a"e. 6Cartesian lin")istics6 o)"ht perhaps to have !een called 6Platonic lin")istics.6 &. (he res)lt is a pict)re of in<)iry somethin" like that proposed !y 8saac ,evi. Compare his /he Enterprise of 5no%ledge .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19/$2. 0. Compare C. 9lymo)r, /heory and E&idence .Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19/$2, and H. Boyd, 6Healism, Underdetermination, and a Ca)sal (heory of Evidence,6 'ous ' .19'#2. '. Aspects of the frame*ork *ere developed independently and sli"htly earlier !y ?ilary P)tnam. /. -ee his Scientific Inference .Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19'#2. 9. -ee P. ,an"ley, ?. -imon, 9. Bradsha*, and J. \ytko*, Scientific ,isco&ery .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19/02. 1$. -ee C. An"l)in and C. -mith, Sur&ey of Inducti&e Inference Methods , (echnical Heport 2&$ .@e* ?aven: Lale University Cepartment of Comp)ter -cience, 19/22. 11. -ee C. 9lymo)r, 68ndistin")isha!le -pace+(imes and the B)ndamental 9ro)p,6 and C. :alament, 68ndistin")isha!le -pacetimes,6 !oth in Foundations of Space3/i#e /heories , ed. J. Earman .:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19/12. !reak

5o. he "oncept of Induction in the $i*ht of the Interro*ati+e #pproach to In>uiry

1. -ee the follo*in" papers of mine: 6>no*led"e Hepresentation and the 8nterro"ative Approach to 8n<)iry,6 forthcomin" in a s)rvey vol)me edited !y >eith ,ehrer contin)e and :ar5orie A. ClayD 6Jhat 8s the ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry=6 Synthese '% .19//2: 1##+19$D 6(he 8nterro"ative Approach to 8n<)iry and Pro!a!ilistic 8nference,6 Er$enntnis 20 .19/'2: %29+%%2D 6(he ,o"ic of -cience as :odel+oriented ,o"ic,6 in PS 9:;Q , ed. P. As<)ith and P. >itcher .East ,ansin", :ich.: Philosophy of -cience of Association, 19/%2, 1: 1''+1/&D 6A -pectr)m of ,o"ics of G)estionin",6 Philosophica #& .19/&2: 1#&+1&$D 6G)estionin" as a Philosophical :ethod,6 in Principles of Philosophical Reasoning , ed. James Bet4er .(oto*a @.J.: Ho*man and Allanheld, 19/%2, 2&+%#D 6H)les, -trate"ies and Utilities in 8nterro"ative 9ames,6 in .ogniti&e .onstraints on .o##unication , ed. ,)cia Kaina and Jaakko ?intikka .Cordrecht: C. Heidel, 19/%2, 2''+29%D .*ith :erill B. ?intikka2, 6-herlock ?olmes Confronts :odern ,o"ic,6 in rgu#entation : pproaches to /heory For#ation , ed. E. :. Barth and J. ,. :artens .Amsterdam: Ben5amins, 19/22, &&+'0. 2. Bor a l)cid and informative s)rvey of the pro!lem of ind)ction in its t*entieth+cent)ry sense see 9.

?. von Jri"ht, /he Logical Pro!le# of Induction , 2d ed. .@e* Lork: :acmillan, 19&'2. #. (he point in )sin" "ame+theoretical concepts and concept)ali4ations is of co)rse not to !e a!le to )se the mathematical res)lts of "ame theory, !)t to do 5)stice to the importance of research strate"ies in science, modeled in the interro"ative model !y different <)estionin" strate"ies. %. ,ater .see sec. 9 !elo*2 it *ill !e indicated ho* the Atomistic Post)late can serve to motivate an ind)ctivist approach to the pro"ress of science. By almost the same token, if a philosopher of science re5ects the idea of ind)ctive inference, virt)ally the only remainin" alternative is to consider "eneral scientific theories as hypothetical constr)cts in the sense that they are not derived from e7perience !y any r)le+"overned proced)re. (heories can only !e tested a"ainst evidence via their o!serva!le conse<)ences, !)t not derived from them. (his is, ro)"hly speakin", the hypothetico+ded)ctive conception of science, *hich, like the ind)ctivist one, has to !e radically reconsidered if the Atomistic Post)late in "iven )p. Ither vie*s, incl)din" certain >)hnian ones, are also ar")a!ly inspired in part !y a tacit !elief in the Atomistic Post)late. &. (his is ar")ed in 6Jhat 8s the ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry=6 .n. 1 a!ove2. 0. 8n Carnap3s terms, the characteristic f)nction of an ind)ctive method can !e s)ch that it assi"ns definite prior pro!a!ilities .!et*een 4ero and one2 to "enerali4ations. Conversely, the prior pro!a!ilities of "enerali4ations determine partly the characteristic f)nctions .ri"ht !ettin" ratios of the ne7t randomly o!served individ)al2. Cf. here, e."., Jaakko ?intikka and 8lkka @iinil)oto, 6An A7iomatic Bo)ndation for the ,o"ic of 8nd)ctive 9enerali4ation,6 in Studies in Inducti&e Logic and Pro!a!ility , ed. Hichard Jeffrey .Berkeley, ,os An"eles, ,ondon: University of California Press, 19/$2, 1&'+1/1. '. Cf. here 6(he 8nterro"ative Approach to 8n<)iry and Pro!a!ilistic 8nference6 .n. 1 a!ove2. /. 8!id., especially pp. %#2+%#&. '. Cf. here 6(he 8nterro"ative Approach to 8n<)iry and Pro!a!ilistic 8nference6 .n. 1 a!ove2. /. 8!id., especially pp. %#2+%#&. 9. -ee here Jaakko ?intikka, 6Aristotelian 8nd)ction,6 Re&ue Internationale de Philosophie #% .19/$2: %22+%#9D >. von Brit4, Epagoge !ei ristoteles , -it4)n"s!erichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Jissenschaften, Phil.+hist. >lasse, ?eft # .:)nich: C.?. Beck, 190%2D C. J. ?amlyn, 6Aristotelian Epa"o"e,6 Phronesis 21 .19'02: 10'+1/%D 9erd B)chdahl, Induction and 'ecessity in the Philosophy of ristotle , A<)inas Paper no. %$ .,ondon: A<)in Press, 190#2. !reak 1$. Cf. Jaakko ?intikka, 6Concepts of -cientific :ethod from Aristotle to @e*ton,6 5no%ledge and the Sciences in Medie&al Philosophy .Proceedin"s of the Ei"hth 8nternational Con"ress of :edieval Philosophy, ed. :onika As4talos et al.2, cta Philosophica Fennica %/ .199$2: '2+/%. 11. @otice, ho*ever, that the restrictive conse<)ences of the Atomistic Post)late can !e co)nteracted to some e7tent !y stren"thenin" the initial theoretical premise or premises ( from *hich an interro"ative in<)iry starts. ?ence ind)ction !ecame a pro!lem for philosophers only after they accepted the Atomistic Post)late and re5ected s)ch so)rces of "eneral tr)ths as innate ideas. (his is the )nderlyin" reason *hy the pro!lem of ind)ction !ecame ?)me3s pro!lem and, not, say, C)ns -cot)s3s pro!lem. 12. Cf. here Jaakko ?intikka, 6Aristotle3s 8ncontinent ,o"ician,6 "atus #' .19'/2: %/+0&. 1#. -ee 9. E. ,. I*en, 6(ithenai ta phainomena,6 in ristotle et les pro!lR#es de #Sthode , ed. -. :ansion .,o)vain: P)!lications )niversitaires, 19012, /#+1$#.

1%. -ee here Jaakko ?intikka and James 9arrison, 6@e*ton3s :ethodolo"y and the 8nterro"ative ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry,6 forthcomin" in the proceedin"s of the 19/' *orkshop in 8srael on 6(hree ?)ndred Lears of the Principia +Healism (hen and @o*.6 1&. -ee n. 1 a!ove. 10. (he t*o are e<)ivalent in the sense that their decision pro!lems have the same de"ree of diffic)lty. -ee Jaakko ?intikka, 6G)antifiers vs. G)antification (heory,6 Linguistic In(uiry & .19'%2: 1&#+1''. 1'. Another *ay of handlin" the sit)ation *o)ld !e !y means of the idea of partial ans*er. 1/. 8 <)ote from the Cover Books edition .@e* Lork, 19&22, %$%. 19. Cf. here 6@e*ton3s :ethodolo"y and the 8nterro"ative ,o"ic of E7perimental 8n<)iry6 .n. 1% a!ove2. 2$. .Berkeley and ,os An"eles: University of California Press, 19#%2, 2: &%'. 21. -ee the critical edition !y Ale7andre >oyre and 8. Bernard Cohen .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: ?arvard University Press, 19'22. 22. -ee 8. Bernard Cohen, Introduction to 'e%ton-s )Principia) .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: ?arvard University Press, 19'/2, 2%1. 2#. Cf., e."., 8. Bernard Cohen, /he 'e%tonian Re&olution .Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19/$2. 2%. Cohen, Introduction , 2%1. 2&. G)oted in Cohen, Introduction , 29%. 20. Cohen, Introduction , 29&. 2'. Bor Aristotle, *hatever necessarily accompanies a form in "eneral accompanies it *hen it is reali4ed in the h)man so)l .cf. 6Aristotle3s 8ncontinent ,o"ician6 Mn. 12 a!oveN2. ?ence there is no diffic)lty accordin" to Aristotle in seein" *hat is implied !y a certain concept once this concept is f)lly formed in one3s mind. ?ence the primary premises of a science are for him definitions. .Cf., e."., Posterior nalytics B #, 9$!2%.2 ?ence also o)r pro!lem of ind)ction is replaced in Aristotle3s tho)"ht !y pro!lems of definition seekin" and concept formation. 2/. -ee the s)!title to the /reatise .1'#92: n atte#pt to introduce the experi#ental Method of Reasoning into Moral Su!"ects . 29. ?)me occasionally speaks of 6millions of e7periments6 .see /reatise , -el!y+ hard Bi""e ed., 1$&2 that are s)pposed to have confirmed his vie*s. B)t they cannot conceiva!ly !e controlled e7periments of the kind @e*ton ha!it)ally *as referrin" to !y the term 3e7periment3, and they co)ld scarcely even all involve p)rposive interference *ith the normal co)rse of events. #$. -ee n. 1 a!ove. #1. Another e7ample is the *ay in *hich van der Jaals3s "as la* )nifies Boyle3s la* *ith *hat is kno*n e7perimentally of the !ehavior of "ases at lo* temperat)res .i.e., near their li<)efaction point2 and *ith the kno*n !ehavior of li<)ids. (his e7ample is also instr)ctive in that van der Jaals3s la* is !ased on an analysis of the forces "overnin" the interaction of molec)les. #2. -ee n. 9 a!ove. ##. 8 am )sin", *ith some modifications, Jonathan Barnes3s translation: see ristotle-s Posterior nalytics , ed. Jonathan Barnes, Clarendon Aristotle series .I7ford: Clarendon Press, 19'&2, '%.

#%. -ee n. 9 a!ove. #&. Bor Planck3s reconciliation of the t*o la*s, cf. (homas -. >)hn, 8lac$38ody /heory and the >uantu# ,iscontinuity 9;:Q39:9T .I7ford: Clarendon Press, 19'/2D :a7 Jammer, /he .onceptual ,e&elop#ent of >uantu# Mechanics .@e* Lork: :c9ra*+?ill, 19002D and Armin ?ermann, /he 0enesis of >uantu# /heory U9;::39:9VW .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19'12. #0. Jammer, .onceptual ,e&elop#ent , 1/. #'. @e*ton, Optic$s .see n. 1/ a!ove2. #/. -ee n. 1 a!ove. #9. -ee >arl H. Popper, 6(he Aim of -cience,6 Ratio 1 .19&'2: 2%+#&D reprinted in Popper3s O!"ecti&e 5no%ledge .I7ford: Clarendon Press, 19'22, 191+2$&. !reak

hree. #ristotelian Natures and the -odern Experimental -ethod

1. (ho)"h in each case the independent methods of identification *ill themselves depend on some different aspect of the nat)re of the property in <)estionD other*ise the methods of identification co)ld not !e e7pected to indicate the presence of the property relia!ly and repeata!ly. Bor a !rief disc)ssion of the connection amon" these different nat)res all of the same property, see sec. %.! !elo*. 2. @ot all physics is !ased on the analytic method. -pace+time theories that p)rport to st)dy the *hole manifold all at once are a case in point. Jhat 8 claim to !e characteristic of la*s in classical mechanics, <)ant)m mechanics, thermodynamics, and electroma"netic theory *ill not !e so readily applica!le in these nonanalytic domains. #. -till, the kno*led"e cannot !e too implicit. (rivially, *here the e7periment is to serve as a test, *e m)st kno* eno)"h to !e ass)red that the !ehavior *e see is a manifestation of the nat)re of the phenomenon *e *ant to st)dy and not a manifestation of some other side aspect of the arran"ement. %. 8 do not mean to s)""est that there can !e no other !asis for this "enerali4ation. -heer repetition *ill serve as *ell, and that is an important aspect of claims like those of 8an ?ackin" . Representing and Inter&ening MCam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19/%N2, that the sta!le phenomena that are created in the e7perimental settin" have a life of their o*n and contin)e to persist across "reat shifts in their a!stract interpretation. &. I)r de"ree of confidence in the "enerali4ation *ill !e limited, of co)rse, !y ho* certain *e are that o)r assessment of the sit)ation is correct. 0. (he *orld, of co)rse, is f)ll of relatively relia!le, ro)"h re")larities. @ot only are all men mortalD in "eneral, or"anisms e7hi!it re")lar developmental se<)ences pec)liar contin)e to their species. 8 do not disc)ss these, not only from a lack of e7pertise !)t also to avoid old iss)es of vitalism and mysticism. Part of the reason for lookin" at physics is that physics provides o)r paradi"m for precisely testa!le claims. 8f physics treats of nat)res, or some similar concept s)ita!le for makin" sense of the analytic method, then nat)res need not a)tomatically commit )s to mystical processes that lie f)ndamentally !eyond o)r s)re )nderstandin". '. 8n 'ature-s .apacities and /heir Measure#ent , 8 call them 6capacities6 since my concern there is primarily *ith causal la*s. /. Cf. 'ature-s .apacities D also 6Capacities and A!stractions,6 in Scientific Explanation , ed. Philip >itcher and Jesley -almon .:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19//2. 9. (he inference is ceteris pari!us , of co)rseF6so lon" as nothin" "oes *ron".6 (he 64ero tor<)e6

"enerali4ation apparently has the advanta"e that it needs no s)ch ceteris pari!us cla)se. B)t that is a mi7ed !lessin" since the advanta"e is !o)"ht at the cost of makin" 64ero tor<)e6 a concept that is not identifia!le independently of its effect. As soon as *e !e"in to fill in *hat #a$es for 4ero tor<)e, anythin" *e say *ill inevita!ly have to contain a ceteris pari!us proviso. 1$. -ee, for e7ample, para"raph '#9 of the didactic part of his /heory of .olors .1/1$2: 6(r)e o!servers of nat)re, ho*ever they may differ in opinion in other respects, *ill a"ree that all *hich presents itself as appearance, all that *e meet *ith as phenomenon, m)st either indicate an ori"inal division *hich is capa!le of )nion, or an ori"inal )nity *hich admits of division, and that the phenomenon *ill present itself accordin"ly. (o divide the )nited, to )nite the divided, is the life of nat)reD this is the eternal systole and diastole, the eternal collapsion and e7pansion, the inspiration and e7piration of the *orld in *hich *e live and move.6 !reak

Four. 1enetic InferenceD # Reconsideration of ,a+id /umeEs Empiricism

A some*hat e7panded version of this 5oint paper *as first presented !y 9erald :assey in Cecem!er 19/& in the ,ect)re -eries in the Philosophy of -cience sponsored !y the Center for Philosophy of -cience at the University of Pitts!)r"h, and at the University of -yrac)se in early 19/0. An earlier version *as delivered !y him at :ichi"an -tate University in :ay 19/&. (his version of the paper *as presented !y him at Cleveland -tate University in J)ne 19//, and 5ointly !y !oth a)thors at the >atholieke Universiteit ,e)ven .Bel"i)m2 in :ay 19/9. 1. Bor his o*n acco)nt of the dichotomy of the o!5ects of in<)iry, see Cavid ?)me, En(uiry concerning <u#an =nderstanding .8ndianapolis: ?ackett P)!lishin" Co., 19/12, 8K, 1, pp. 1&+2$. Bor an e7cellent presentation of the received vie* of the dichotomy, see the acco)nt of ?)me3s fork "iven !y C. 9. C. :ac@a!! in his entry 6?)me, Cavid6 in /he Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Pa)l Ed*ards .@e* Lork: :acmillan, 19'22, %: '/+/$. 2. ?)me, En(uiry , S88, 1, p. 1$&. #. -ee J. K. I. G)ine, 6Carnap and ,o"ical (r)th,6 in /he Philosophy of Rudolf .arnap , ed. Pa)l -chilpp .,a-alle, 8ll.: Ipen Co)rt P)!lishin" Co., 190#2, #/&+%$0. %. /reatise of <u#an 'ature .I7ford: Clarendon Press, 19/#2, 8, #, 7vi, p. 1'0. &. 8!id., 88, 1, 7ii, p. #2'. 0. 8!id., 8, #, 7vi, pp. 1'0+1''. %. /reatise of <u#an 'ature .I7ford: Clarendon Press, 19/#2, 8, #, 7vi, p. 1'0. &. 8!id., 88, 1, 7ii, p. #2'. 0. 8!id., 8, #, 7vi, pp. 1'0+1''. %. /reatise of <u#an 'ature .I7ford: Clarendon Press, 19/#2, 8, #, 7vi, p. 1'0. &. 8!id., 88, 1, 7ii, p. #2'. 0. 8!id., 8, #, 7vi, pp. 1'0+1''. '. 8n 6>no*in" I)r Place in the Animal Jorld,6 in her Postures of the Mind .,ondon: :eth)en and Co., 19/&2, 1#9+1&0, Annette Baier ar")es that, of the *ell+kno*n theories of morality, only ?)me3s does 5)stice to o)r )ncontaminated int)itions a!o)t the proper treatment of animals. 8n effect, !y emphasi4in" the similarity of h)mans and !easts in ?)me3s system *ith respect to the properties and a!ilities relevant to ethics, Baier does for ?)me3s moral philosophy *hat *e try here to do for his theory of kno*led"e. !reak

/. /reatise , 8, #, 7vi, pp. 1'/+1'9. 9. En(uiry , 8S, p. '2. 1$. /reatise , 8, #, i, pp. 09+'$. 11. En(uiry , 8K, p. 1'. 12. /reatise , 8, %, ii, p. 21%. 1#. -ee, for e7ample, @oam Chomsky, Hevie* of -kinner3s ?er!al 8eha&ior , in Language #& .19&92: 20+&/. Bor a fairly )p+to+date report on the stat)s of the de!ate, see Chomsky, Rules and Representations .@e* Lork: Col)m!ia University Press, 19/$2, %$ ff., 1$$ ff., 2%% ff. 1%. Concernin" the e7ternali4in" and the e"oi4in" propensities, see ?)me3s /reatise , 8, %, ii, pp. 1/' ff., and 8, %, vi, pp. 2&# ff., respectively. Concernin" co"nitive propensities !eyond those mentioned in the !ody of this paper, see, for e7ample, ?)me3s mention of *hat *e *ill call the pro"ection propensity in i!id., 8, #, 7iv, p. 10'. !reak

Fi+e. %hilosophy and the Exact SciencesD $o*ical %ositi+ism as a "ase Study
Earlier versions of this paper *ere presented at the University of Jisconsin at :il*a)kee, the University of Kir"inia, the University of Pitts!)r"h, Boston University, the University of Jestern Intario, and the Ihio -tate University. 8 *o)ld like to thank Philip Catton, 9raciela Ce Pierris, Cora Ciamond, Arth)r Bine, Bernard 9oldstein, Peter ?eath, Jilliam ?o*ard, Hichard >ra)t, (homas >)hn, Penelope :addy, Hichard Horty, Jesley -almon, Ho!ert -ch*art4, and :atti -intonen. 1. 8 sho)ld point o)t that Beyera!end presents a m)ch more historically n)anced acco)nt of the lo"ical positivists than do the other recent critics. -ee, in partic)lar, his disc)ssion of the positivists3 6pra"matic theory of o!servation6 .arisin" d)rin" the 6protocol+sentence6 de!ate in 19#2+19#&2 in [1 of 6E7planation, Hed)ction, and Empiricism,6 in Scientific Explanation, Space, and /i#e , ed. ?. Bei"l and 9. :a7*ell, :innesota -t)dies in the Philosophy of -cience, vol. # .:inneapolis, 19022. Let even Beyera!end errs, it seems to me, in portrayin" the positivists as naive empiricists in the periods !efore and after the 6protocol+sentence6 de!ate. 2. -ee, for e7ample, (. >)hn, /he Structure of Scientific Re&olutions .Chica"o, 19022, 9'+1$2. #. -ee :. -chlick, 6Cie philosophische Bede)t)n" des Helativitbtsprin4ips,6 Xeit. fYr Phil. und phil. 5riti$ 1&9 .191&2: 129+1'&, translation !y P. ?eath in :orit4 -chlick, Philosophical Papers , ed. ?. :)lder and B. van de Kelde+-chlick, vol. 1 .Cordrecht, 19'/2D :. -chlick, Rau# und Xeit in der gegen%Zrtigen Physi$ .Berlin, 191'2, translation !y ?. Brose in -chlick, Philosophical Papers D ?. Heichen!ach, Relati&itZtstheorie und Er$enntnis priori .Berlin, 192$2, translation !y :. Heichen!ach .Berkeley and ,os An"eles: University of California Press, 190&2D ?. Heichen!ach, xio#ati$ der relati&istischen Rau#3Xeit3Lehre .Kie*e", 192%2, translation !y :. Heichen!ach .Berkeley and ,os An"eles: University of California Press, 19092D :. Heichen!ach, Philosophie der Rau#3Xeit3Lehre .Berlin, 192/2, translation !y :. Heichen!ach and J. Bre)nd .@e* Lork, 19&/2D H. Carnap, ,er Rau# : Ein 8eitrag +ur 4issenschaftslehre >ant+-t)dien Er"bn4)n"sheft, no. &0 .Berlin, 19222. %. P. & of the En"lish translation. &. -ee H. Carnap, ,er logische uf!au der 4elt .Berlin, 192/2, [[0'f., translation !y H. 9eor"e .Berkeley and ,os An"eles: University of California Press, 190'2. 0. -ee I. @e)rath, 6Protokollsbt4e,6 Er$enntnis # .19#22: 2$%+21%, translation !y H. Cohen and :. @e)rath in Itto @e)rath, Philosophical Papers 191#+19%0, ed. H. Cohen and :. @e)rath .Cordrecht, 19/#2D H. Carnap, 6Ue!er Protokollsbt4e,6 Er$enntnis # .19#22: 21&+22/, translation !y H. Creath and

H. @ollan in

21 .19/'2: %&'+%'$D :. -chlick, 6Ue!er das B)ndament der Erkenntnis,6 Er$enntnis % .19#%2: '9+99, translation !y P. ?eath in -chlick, Philosophical Papers , vol. 2D C. ?empel, 6In the ,o"ical Positivists3 (heory of (r)th,6 nalysis 2 .19#&2: %9+&9. '. C. ?il!ert, 0rundlagen der 0eo#etrie .,eip4i", 1/992, translation !y ,. Un"er .,a -alle, 8ll., 19'12. /. 8n Mathe#atical 4or$s of Isaac 'e%ton , ed. C. Jhiteside vol. 1 .@e* Lork, 190%2, 1: 1%1. !reak 9. -ee :. -chlick, llge#eine Er$enntnislehre .Berlin, 191/2, [[#+12, translation !y A. Bl)m!er" .@e* Lork, 19'%2. 1$. -ee especially Heichen!ach3s 192$ !ook on relativity theory and Carnap3s uf!au . 11. -ee E. Cassirer, 6>ant )nd die moderne :athematik,6 5ant3Studien 12 .19$'2: 1+%9D Su!stan+!egriff und Fun$tions!egriff .Berlin, 191$2D Xur Einsteinschen Relati&itZtstheorie .Berlin, 192$2D latter t*o translated to"ether !y J. -*a!ey and :. -*a!ey .@e* Lork, 19&#2. 12. 8t mi"ht appear o!vio)s that s)ch 6theoretical )nderdetermination6 is not at all a ne* phenomenon in the history of science and, in fact, that even pre+@e*tonian theories are s)!5ect to it: consider, for e7ample, the choice !et*een Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy. 8t is precisely here, ho*ever, that the >antian system .to"ether *ith @e*tonian physics2 sho*s its "reatest stren"th. 8n order for there to !e an iss)e !et*een Ptolemy and Copernic)s, *e need first to "ive clear sense to the notion of tr)e or a!sol)te motionD and ho*, independently of @e*tonian physics itself, can this possi!ly !e done= Bor >ant, there is no pree7istin" a!sol)te space nor a!sol)te motion. @e*ton3s ,a*s of :otion, rather than assertin" facts, as it *ere, a!o)t a!sol)te motion, instead serve to make the idea of s)ch motion first possi!le. :ore precisely, @e*ton3s la*s of motion, as employed in the ar")ment for Universal 9ravitation of Principia , Book 888, serve to pick o)t a privile"ed frame of referenceFthe center+of+ mass frame of the solar systemFrelative to *hich the notion of tr)e or a!sol)te motion is first defined. And, since this center+of+mass frame t)rns o)t to !e centered very close to the center of the s)n, the Copernican system is closer to the tr)th. (h)s, in the conte7t of the only proced)re *e possess for "ivin" o!5ective meanin" to the idea of tr)e or a!sol)te motion in the first placeF@e*ton3s proced)re Fthe Ptolemaic system is definitively r)led o)t. :oreover, for >ant, any possi!ility of 6theoretical )nderdetermination6 here is eliminated !y the fact that E)clidean "eometry and @e*ton3s la*s of motion .to"ether *ith certain properties of "ravitation as a 6f)ndamental force62 are themselves co)nted as a priori: there can !e no <)estion of s)!5ectin" the# to ref)tation or revision in the li"ht of e7perience. Jhat is then dramatically ne* a!o)t relativity theory, in this conte7t, is that it s)!5ects 5)st these feat)res of @e*tonian physics to empirical revision. Bor more details on >ant3s readin" of @e*ton see :. Briedman, 6(he :etaphysical Bo)ndations of @e*tonian -cience,6 in 5ant-s Philosophy of Physical Science , ed. H. B)tts .Cordrecht, 19/02. 1#. -ee especially ?. PoincarV, La science et l-hypothRse .Paris, 19$22, translation !y J. 9reenstreet .@e* Lork, 191&2. 1%. -ee especially :. -chlick, 6Positivism)s )nd Healism)s,6 Er$enntnis # .19#22: 1+#1, translation !y P. ?eath in -chlick, Philosophical Papers D H. Carnap, Scheinpro!le#e in der Philosophie .Berlin, 192/2, translation !y H. 9eor"e .Berkeley and ,os An"eles: University of California Press, 190'2. 1&. -ee H. Carnap, 6(esta!ility and :eanin",6 Philosophy of Science # .19#02 and % .19#'2D C. ?empel, 6Pro!lems and Chan"es in the Empiricist Criterion of :eanin",6 Re&ue intern. de phil . 11 .19&12: %1+0#.

10. -ee n. 0 a!ove. 1'. H. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache .Kienna, 19#%2, [1', translation !y A. -meaton .,ondon, 19#'2. 1/. (he internal e7ternal distinction is e7plicitly form)lated in H. Carnap, 6Empiricism, -emantics, and Intolo"y,6 Re&ue intern. de phil. % .19&$2: 2$+%$. !reak 19. As Carnap e7plicitly ackno*led"es, his conception of lo"ical synta7 is inspired !y, and at the same time radically transforms, the ideas of Jitt"enstein3s /ractatus Logico3Philosophicus .*ith translation !y C. I"den M,ondon, 1922N2. 2$. 8n !rief, the pro!lem arises in the follo*in" *ay. Carnap3s lin")istic frame*orks are individ)ated !y their 6formation r)les6 .their "rammar2 and their 6,+r)les6 or analytic sentencesFfor these latter, as *e have seen, are definitive of the lo"ical r)les of the frame*ork. (hese ,+r)les or analytic sentences are in t)rn characteri4ed on the !asis of a distinction !et*een 6lo"ical6 and 6descriptive6 e7pressions. (his, in fact, is ho* lo"ical r)les like the sentences of arithmetic are distin")ished from 6physical6 r)les like :a7*ell3s e<)ations: !oth are prova!le in an appropriate frame*ork for classical physics, !)t the former contain only lo"ical e7pressions essentially . Logical Syntax , [&12. B)t ho* do *e distin")ish lo"ical si"ns like the primitive si"ns of arithmetic from descriptive si"ns like the electroma"netic field f)nctor= (he lo"ical si"ns are those si"ns s)ch that e&ery sentence !)ilt )p from them alone is either prova!le or ref)ta!le in the "iven frame*ork. By contrast, in the case of descriptive si"ns like the electroma"netic field f)nctor, there *ill !e so#e sentencesFsentences ascri!in" partic)lar val)es at partic)lar space+time points to the electroma"netic field, for e7ampleF that are not either prova!le or ref)ta!le in the "iven frame*ork: their tr)th can !e determined only a posteriori, as it *ere . Logical Syntax , [&$2. 8t is clear, ho*ever, that this distinction re<)ires a nonrecursi&e .in fact, nonarithmetical2 conse<)ence relation for the case of classical elementary arithmetic, and it follo*s that it cannot !e dra*n *ithin the ne)tral .primitive rec)rsive2 metaperspective of lo"ical synta7. Bor more details concernin" the relevance of 9Edel3s (heorem to the pro"ram of Logical Syntax see :. Briedman, 6,o"ical (r)th and Analyticity in Carnap3s Logical Syntax of Language ,6 in Essays in the <istory and Philosophy of Mathe#atics , ed. J. Aspray and P. >itcher .:inneapolis, 19/'2. 21. ?ere 8 am partic)larly inde!ted to conversations *ith 9raciela Ce Pierris. !reak

Six. $an*ua*e and InterpretationD %hilosophical Reflections and Empirical In>uiry

O Editor3s note. Headers may !e p)44led !y Chomsky3s reference to G)ine3s most recent effort )nless they reali4e that Chomsky3s paper *as *ritten in :arch 19//. (he delay in p)!lication is to !e re"retted, !)t nothin" *hich has happened in the intervenin" years *o)ld re<)ire any s)!stantial revision in his ar")ment. 1. E. ,ePore, ed., /ruth and Interpretation : Perspecti&es on the Philosophy of ,onald ,a&idson .I7ford and @e* Lork: Black*ell, 19/02. 2. (h)s from the last statement <)oted, it follo*s that if 8 !elieve that it is rainin" !eca)se 8 heard it over the radio, so that the complete acco)nt of the ca)sal relation of my !elief *ith the *orld is this interaction, then there is nothin" more to kno* a!o)t the relation of my !elief that it is rainin" to the fact that it is or is not rainin"D there is no f)rther <)estion as to the relation !et*een my !eliefs and the *orld. #. (ho)"h one may, of co)rse, choose to i"nore one or another distinction for the p)rposes of some

partic)lar in<)iry. (he point is that there is no "eneral interpretation of C)mmett3s 6f)ndamental sense6 .no narro*er interpretation, for e7ample2 that overcomes pro!lems of the kind noted, or any kno*n *ay to constr)ct s)ch a "eneral concept as a )sef)l ideali4ation, or any reason to try to do so. @ote that not every ideali4ation is *orth constr)ctin". (his one, *hatever e7actly is intended, apparently is not. %. 8 kno* of only one attempt to come to "rips *ith these pro!lems: (revor Pateman, Language in Mind and Language in Society .I7ford: I7ford University Press, 19/'2. Pateman develops a notion of lan")a"e as a 6social fact6 in a *ay that seems pla)si!le !)t has no relevance to the iss)es 8 am disc)ssin" here. 8n his sense, a person *ho is a*are of some of the elementary facts a!o)t lan")a"e and society *ill speak a "reat many lan")a"es, chan"in" from moment to moment, dependin" on ho* he or she chooses to identify *ith one or another comm)nityD and a person )na*are of s)ch facts *ill have a considera!le ran"e of !eliefs .and typically, ill)sions2 a!o)t *hat he or she is doin", !eliefs that may play some social role in certain comm)nities. &. /he Legacy of 4ittgenstein .I7ford: Black*ell, 19/%2. In >enny3s mis)nderstand+ soft in" of my re5ection of these vie*s, and the conse<)ent irrelevance of his response to it, see my paper 6,an")a"e and Pro!lems of >no*led"e,6 ms, 19/0D ,in")istic A"ency, University of C)is!)r", :arch 19/', series A, no. 1/1 .C)is!)r": C)is!)r" University, 19/'2D Synthesis Philosophica &, vol. #, no. 1 .19//2. 0. Bor more e7tensive disc)ssion of these matters, and of possi!le alternative acco)nts, see my Rules and Representations .@e* Lork: Col)m!ia University Press, 19/$2D 5no%ledge of Language .@e* Lork: Prae"er, 19/02. '. (his is, in fact, 5)st the tack taken !y >enny, Legacy , in the face of concept)al considerations of this sort, tho)"h he does not reco"ni4e that a s)!stantive chan"e in the )nderstandin" of 3a!ility3 or 3capacity3 has !een introd)ced. -ee my paper cited in n. & for f)rther disc)ssion. /. -ee my Reflections on Language .@e* Lork: Pantheon, 19'&2, 1/' f., 19/ ff. 9. 8 ret)rn directly to some of G)ine3s <)alifications, *ith re"ard to these c)rio)s doctrines. 1$. (o foc)s the disc)ssion, 8 p)t aside f)rther comple7itiesFfor e7ample, the fact that the reso)rces of the initial state also play a role in determinin" *hat co)nts as evidence and ho* it is )sed .or disre"arded2. 8ntrod)ction of s)ch f)rther factors *o)ld simply stren"then the concl)sions. 11. (he e7ample is, in fact, a real one. -ee 5no%ledge of Language , 01. 12. (his and the ne7t para"raph refer to G)ine3s 6Heply to 9il!ert ?. ?arman,6 in /he Philosophy of 4. ?. >uine , ed. Ed*ard ?ahn and Pa)l Arth)r -chilpp .,a -alle, 8ll.: Ipen Co)rt, 19/02. 1#. ?e s)""ests also st)dies of )niformities in lan")a"e ac<)isitionD the same considerations apply in this case. 1%. Je mi"ht note, incidentally, that the latter phrase is appropriate only insofar as one mi"ht ref)se to speak of theories as tr)e in physics, only as !ein" )sef)l for some p)rpose over some domain of phenomenaD G)ine mi"ht re5ect this concl)sion on the "ro)nds of his stip)lations *ith re"ard to the st)dy of the mind !rain !y the 6lin")ist,6 in *hich the normal canons of nat)ral science are .implicitly2 held to !e )naccepta!le, as disc)ssed in the te7t. 1&. 8 place 6simplification6 in <)otes, since the concept is hi"hly misleadin". (he r)le 6Bront %h +phrase,6 not s)!5ect to the coordinate str)ct)re constraint and other locality conditions, *o)ld indeed !e simpler than the act)al r)le, *hich is s)!5ect to these conditions, for an or"anism that lacked the conditions .or more properly, the principles from *hich they derive2 as part of its innate str)ct)reD for h)mans, the opposite is tr)e. Jhatever sense there may !e to the concept 6a!sol)te simplicity,6

independent of the str)ct)re of the system )nder investi"ation, it is not relevant here. Bor disc)ssion of these matters, see my Logical Structure of Linguistic /heory .19&&+&0D @e* Lork: Plen)m, 19'&D Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19/&2. 10. G)ine s)pposes that the coordinate str)ct)re constraint is tied to translata!ility, ass)min" that to determine *hether it holds in some lan")a"e *e m)st determine *hich e7pressions co)nt as semantic co)nterparts of En"lish coordinate constr)ctions. (he constraint, ho*ever, has to do *ith str)ct)res, independent of their semantic relation to coordinate constr)ctions in some other lan")a"e, and may *ell derive, at least in si"nificant part, from m)ch more "eneral conditions on locality of "rammatical operations that are constr)ction+independent alto"etherD s)rely many e7amples of constraints raisin" the same iss)es are of this nat)re, perhaps all. !reak 1'. ,ePore, /ruth and Interpretation . 1/. Bor disc)ssion of C)mmett3s version, see my 5no%ledge of Language . @ote that Cavidson is apparently limitin" attention here to *hat is called 6o!servational ade<)acy,6 not 6descriptive ade<)acy,6 in the lin")istic literat)reD if the theory of lin")istic competence *ere )nderstood in the latter sense, then it *o)ld attri!)te specific mechanisms .at an a!stract level, to !e s)re2. 19. -ee Hichard Popkin, /he <istory of S$epticis# fro# Eras#us to Spino+a .Berkeley, ,os An"eles, ,ondon: University of California Press, 19'92D see my 5no%ledge of Language , 2%$, for disc)ssion. Ho"er 9i!son attri!)tes to me the !elief that 6neither physics nor lin")istics has a fact of the matter6 . Philosophy of >uine , ed. ?ahn and -chilpp2, a concl)sion that 8 do not accept and that is not s)""ested !y the ar")ment, to *hich he refers, that the st)dy of lan")a"e faces no pro!lem of indeterminacy that does not arise thro)"ho)t the nat)ral sciences. ?is f)rther effort to esta!lish a difference on ontolo"ical "ro)nds, endorsed !y G)ine in response, fails for the reasons "iven in the references he cites. Je can certainly insist, lo)dly if *e like, that there 5)st are chemical elements and .)nkno*n2 physical confi")rations that determine the co)rse of se7)al mat)ration, and there 5)st aren-t le7ical meanin"s, connections of referential dependency, and phrases, and perhaps this concl)sion *ill someday !e sho*n to have meritD !)t *hat is re<)ired is an ar")ment. (o say that 6t*o conflictin" man)als of translation can !oth do 5)stice to all dispositions to !ehavior6 and are 6compati!le *ith all the same distri!)tions of states and relations over elementary particles6 .G)ine2 makes as m)ch sense as sayin" essentially the same thin" a!o)t t*o theories of chemistry or physical mat)rationD and in the nineteenth cent)ry, one co)ld have added, *ith e<)al irrelevance, that neither chemical theory co)ld !e accommodated *ithin 6an already accepted nat)ralistic+physicalistic theory6 .9i!son2, if !y the latter *e mean 6f)ndamental physics,6 *hich had to !e si"nificantly modified to incorporate the chemist3s discoveries. Brom s)ch considerations, epistemolo"ical or ontolo"ical, nothin" follo*s *ith re"ard to lan")a"e or anythin" else. 2$. Bor disc)ssion, see my article in Mind and Language , s)mmer 19/', from *hich some of these remarks are dra*n, and so)rces cited there. 21. 6Heply to ?arman.6 22. (he !asic ass)mption *as that the theory of !ody co)ld !e "iven fairly sharp !o)nds, essentially those of Cartesian contact mechanics. (his *as )ndermined !y @e*ton, and since that time it has !een impossi!le to form)late a coherent mind !ody pro!lem in anythin" like Cartesian terms, or any others, as far as 8 can see, there !ein" no fi7ed concept of !ody. 2#. Bor G)ine, "rammars differ 6e7tensionally6 if 6they diver"e in net o)tp)t6 .6Heply to ?arman62. (his familiar )sa"e is serio)sly misleadin", !eca)se it is com!ined *ith stip)lations as to *hat constit)tes 6net o)tp)t6 for a "rammar. Hecall a"ain that G)ine is not considerin" the empirically si"nificant concept of 6stron" "eneration6 of str)ct)ral descriptions, !)t rather 6*eak "eneration6 of

some class > of e7pressions selected on a !asis that seems <)ite ar!itrary. 8t is > that is the 6net o)tp)t,6 !)t ho*ever > may !e selected, its properties appear to !e of no empirical si"nificance. In these matters, see my Logical Structure of Linguistic /heory and spects of the /heory of Syntax .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 190&2. G)ine has al*ays taken the <)estion of 6"rammaticality6 to !e essentially that of 6havin" meanin"6 and !elieves that this concept, 6for all its shortcomin"s, is in far !etter order than6 the concept 6alike in meanin"6 contin)e .6Heply to ?arman62. B)t insofar as *e have any )nderstandin" of 6"rammaticality,6 it has little to do *ith 6havin" meanin",6 and )nlike the vario)s semantic notions that G)ine finds pro!lematic, his concepts of 6"rammaticality6 and 6havin" meanin"6 appear to lack any moderately clear sense, or any stat)s in the st)dy of lan")a"e. 2%. 68ndeterminacy of (ranslation A"ain,6 6ournal of Philosophy , Jan)ary 19/'. 2&. An erroneo)s ass)mption, since as noted earlier, the tasks of the child and lin")ist are radically different. 20. 8nsofar as any scientific theories merit this appellation. Je may p)t aside here any <)estions that apply to scientific in<)iry "enerally. 8t makes little sense to raise s)ch <)estions *ith re"ard to the 6soft sciences.6 8f one is interested in findin" ans*ers to <)estions, rather than 5)st harassin" emer"in" disciplines, one *ill t)rn to domains in *hich ans*ers are likely to !e forthcomin", in this case, domains in *hich there is s)fficient depth of kno*led"e and )nderstandin" to ")ide in<)iry in a serio)s *ay. 2'. -ee -)san Carey, .onceptual .hange in .hildhood .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19/&2. 2/. Bor recent reiteration of this idea, see his 6Heply to ?arman.6 ?ere he descri!es a 6!rilliant idea6 of J. ?aas concernin" a criterion to esta!lish the distinction he appears to have in mindD the criterion, s)ch as it is, provides a distinction of no kno*n si"nificance for in<)iry into the st)dy of lan")a"e. (he *idespread !elief to the contrary is !ased in part on a mistaken analo"y to formal lan")a"es, *here the iss)es are entirely different, and may have !een fostered !y e7pository passa"es in early *ork in "enerative "rammar that evidently *ere misleadin", tho)"h appropriate <)alifications *ere in fact e7pressed. 29. -ee Logical Structure of Linguistic /heory , *here the iss)es *ere disc)ssed in terms that seem to me still acc)rate, and an attempt *as made to define s)ch a concept in terms of the principles for assi"nment of derived constit)ent str)ct)re, !)t alon" lines soon sho*n to !e inappropriate. #$. -ee 9il!ert ?arman, commentary, 8eha&ioral and 8rain Sciences # .19/$2. #1. Scientific Realis# and the Plasticity of Mind .Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19'9, 19/02, &1 f. #2. -ee P)tnam, 6:eanin" and :entalism,6 chap. 1 of P)tnam, Representation and Reality .Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19//2. ##. Bor disc)ssion in a lin")istic+co"nitive conte7t, see Rules and Representations , 1#0 f.D Jerne3s @o!el Pri4e lect)re, 6(he 9enerative 9rammar of the 8mm)ne -ystem,6 Science 229 .1# -eptem!er 19/&2: 1$&'+1$&9D and for more e7tensive disc)ssion, :assimo Piattelli+Palmerini, 6(he Hise of -elective (heories: A Case -t)dy and -ome ,essons from 8mm)nolo"y,6 in Language Learning and .oncept c(uisition: Foundational Issues , ed. Jilliam Cemopo)los and A)sonio :arras .@or*ood, @.J.: A!le7, 19/02. #%. @or are 6short theories6 necessarily theories attaina!le !y h)mans, or reco"ni4a!le as intelli"i!le theories !y h)mans, "iven their specific !iolo"ically determined intellect)al capacities.

#&. A"ain, *e are ass)min" familiar ideali4ations, as disc)ssed else*here. #0. -trate"ies, memory str)ct)re, etc. @ote that a parser, as conceived in c)rrent research, is post)lated, ri"htly or *ron"ly, to !e a real component of the mind !rain, a coherent s)!system of some sort incl)din" certain elements of the f)ll interpreter, not others. As thro)"ho)t, these ass)mptions are s)!5ect to e7actly those "eneral <)estions that arise in all empirical in<)iry. (he st)dy of the parser is often tho)"ht to !e some+ soft ho* imm)ne to "eneral pro!lems that arise in the st)dy of lin")istic competence .that is, st)dy of the "enerative proced)re that is taken to !e one component of the parser2, !)t this is an error. 8t is sometimes ar")ed that since evidence is al*ays from performance, *e have no 5)stification for )sin" it to determine the nat)re of )nderlyin" competence. By the same .fallacio)s2 ar")ment, *e co)ld concl)de that *e are not 5)stified in )sin" s)ch evidence to determine the nat)re of the ideali4ed parser, and *e *o)ld have no !asis for s)pposin" that physics is the st)dy of anythin" !eyond meter readin"s. Cata do not come la!eled as 6evidence for S, not L.6 #'. Helated considerations help e7plain *hy the efforts in A8 a!o)t *hich Caniel Cennett is so enth)siastic are so !arren of conse<)ences .see the article !y ?ilary P)tnam, disc)ssin" this matter, and Cennett3s response in ,aedalus , Jinter 19//2. Cennett !elieves that there are or mi"ht !e s)!stantive res)lts fallin" )nder somethin" he calls 6en"ineerin",6 !)t it is not clear *hat he has in mind, and his report of informal disc)ssion several years a"o, on *hich his acco)nt is in part !ased, seems to me rather misleadin", to say the least. @ote that the notion 6st)dy of everythin"6 dismissed here has nothin" to do *ith the 6theory of everythin"6 so)"ht in contemporary physics. #/. @ote a"ain that there is no reason to s)ppose that the 8+lan")a"e 6*eakly "enerates6 some set of *ell+formed e7pressions, so that it *o)ld make sense to speak of 8+lan")a"es .6"rammars62 as 6e7tensionally e<)ivalent6 or not in G)ine3s termsD even if this concept is fo)nd to have some sense or si"nificance, no* )nkno*n, there is no reason to s)ppose that formal properties of this set *o)ld !e of any interest for the st)dy of lan")a"e str)ct)re, meanin", learnin", comm)nication, parsin", etc. -ee my spects of the /heory of Syntax , chap. 1. (here has !een vast conf)sion a!o)t these matters, *hich 8 *ill not p)rs)e here. #9. 8n an odd sense, ho*ever. 8n this case, 8 am applyin" a *ord lackin" certain evidence that is relevant to its application, as specified !y my internal le7icon. Je *o)ld not say that Jones is mis)sin" his lan")a"e *hen he refers to an o!5ect !efore him as a sphere, not kno*in" that the hidden part has some different shape. %$. Even !y sociolin")ists and others *ho sometimes alle"e that they are not follo*in" this practice. In this matter, see my 5no%ledge of Language , 1'+1/. %1. -)ppose that Jones3s le7icon incl)des deference to some e7pert, say some speaker of 9erman, in the entry for 3arthritis3. (hen attri!)tion of 6!elief6 to Jones may involve f)rther circ)mloc)tion, or *e mi"ht *ant to a!andon the concept as )seless in anythin" like its familiar sense for psycholo"y. B)t no matter of m)ch import appears to !e at stake. Bor more on the <)estions to)ched on here, see Akeel Bil"rami, 6An E7ternalist Acco)nt of Psycholo"ical Content,6 Philosophical /opics , -prin" 19/'D 9a!riel -e"al, 68n Ceference to Heference6 .Ph.C. diss., :8(, 19/'2. !reak

Ei*ht. ,o 4e Need a /ierarchical -odel of ScienceB

Part of the research for the present paper *as done *hile 8 en5oyed a research fello*ship at the Center for Philosophy of -cience of the University of Pitts!)r"h, *here a former version *as delivered as a lect)re. Part of the research *as s)pported !y a "rant from the Bel"ian @ational -cience Bo)ndation .@BJI2. 8 *ish to thank James Child, John Bor"e, Ulrich :ayer, ?elm)t Pape, ,othar -hbfer,

Anastassios (siado)las, and especially Jerry :assey and @icholas Hescher, for critical remarks and s)""estions. Headin" ,arry ,a)dan3s Science and ?alues , 8 reali4ed the import of the hierarchical model. 1. (ypically, all standard sol)tions of the parado7es introd)ce a hierarchy. 2. :any recent res)lts point in the direction of the conte7t)al model and of relative rationality. :any contemporary philosophers of science implicitly adhere to somethin" close to it. 8 hope the present paper contri!)tes to render the model more e7plicit. #. Bor a convincin" analysis of the reasons see ,a)dan 19/$. %. Apart from methods, o!servations, and theories, one mi"ht consider co"nitive val)es. (he pict)re is more or less the same: d)rin" the first and second periods, philosophers and scientists many times disa"ree a!o)t specific val)es !)t are convinced that certainty may !e attained in the domainD at present this certainty has !een "iven )p. &. :)ch relevant information is contained in ,a)dan 19/%. 0. -ee Batens 19/' for a parado7ical discrepancy !et*een the traditional vie* on the social science and the e<)ally traditional vie* on epistemolo"yD !oth vie*s act)ally !elon" to the same tradition. '. Patrick 9oes .19/%2 has analy4ed part of a dialo")e !y 9alileo and fo)nd, on the avera"e, more than one conte7t per pa"e. /. 8 *armly recommend Johnson+,aird 19//, an e7cellent acco)nt of the state of the art, clearly *ritten, consistent *ith its !asic principles, and f)ll of e7cellent s)""estions. 9. (his statement concerns the 5)stification of one3s o*n kno*led"e system. ?o*ever, the rationality vie* )nderlyin" the present paper has implications for the or"ani4ation of societies and for ed)cation. -ome are pointed o)t in section 9 of Batens 19'%. 1$. :oreover, philosophers of science erroneo)sly took it for "ranted that this contin)e theory *as .!o)nd to !e2 accompanied !y a sin"le and coherent set of methodolo"ical r)les. 11. Jitho)t s)ch theories, *e *o)ld practically !e )na!le to set )p conte7ts !eca)se it is essential that the possi!ly relevant data are restricted .e7periments form a "ood e7ample2. 12. 8 really never )nderstood that there sho)ld !e a f)ndamental o!5ection to the follo*in" mechanism: one is committed to a set of !eliefs !)t kno*s they are not a!sol)tely relia!le, and one s)ccessively relies on a s)!set to improve an element o)tside of this s)!set. Altho)"h this clearly cannot lead to a!solute 5)stification, it clearly leads to some form of 5)stificationFthe only possi!le one in my vie*. 1#. (he comple7ity that h)mans are a!le to deal *ith is a stron" ar")ment a"ainst "lo!al ind)ction as defended, e."., !y H)dolf Carnap .190/2 and Lehos)a Bar+?illel .190/2. 1%. Bor e7ample: *e have no direct access to realityD *e have no sta!le o!servational dataD most of o)r theories are 6falsified6 most of the timeD most scientific theories .in the strict sense of a partic)lar form)lation2 remain accepted only for a relatively short period of time. 1&. As a conse<)ence o)r fact)al kno*led"e a!o)t h)mans is not only relevant *ith respect to all methods !)t also relevant in a specific *ay to the methodolo"y of the social sciences. 10. (he history of the thermometer is a "ood ill)stration of the diffic)lties involved in the desi"n and act)al constr)ction of instr)ments. Jith a little reflection the reader *ill easily find the n)mero)s fact)al pres)ppositions !ehind the )se of thermometers. :eas)rin" instr)ments are not conventionally accepted and are re5ected if their fact)al pres)ppositions t)rn o)t false.

1'. A different set of ar")ments, more theoretical in nat)re and also related to meanin", is presented Batens 19/&. 1/. (hese aspects co)ld not !e ela!orated )pon in the present paperD conte7t)al pro!lem+solvin" and the 6str)ct)red6 kno*led"e system are meant to !e em!edded in a relative+rationality vie*.

Ele+en. 4hy Functionalism ,idnEt 4or0

1. Cam!rid"e, :ass.: :8( Press, 19//. 2. (he present paper covers the same "ro)nd as, and incl)des some sentences from, the fifth chapter of Representation and Reality . #. -ee Block3s 6An Advertisement for a -emantics for Psycholo"y,6 Mid%est Studies in Philosophy , 19/0. %. Cf. his 68ndivid)alism and the :ental,6 Mid%est Studies in Philosophy % .19'92, and 68ntellect)ral @orms and Bo)ndations of :ind,6 /he 6ournal of Philosophy '#, no. 12 .Cecem!er 19/02. &. 3:ee*3 is the (hai *ord for 3cat3. 0. (he idea that the pro!lem of red)cin" intentional notions to nonintentional ones is analo"o)s to the pro!lem of red)cin" physicalist notions to phenomenalistic ones *as advanced !y Hoderick Chisholm in a famo)s correspondence *ith Jilfrid -ellars in the 19&$s. -ee 6(he Chisholm+-ellars Correspondence on 8ntentionality,6 in .oncepts, /heories and the Mind38ody Pro!le# , ed. ?er!ert Bei"l, :ichael -criven, and 9rover :a7*ell, :innesota -t)dies in the Philosophy of -cience, 2 .:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19&/2. '. Bor a more detailed disc)ssion of this point, see Representation and Reality , ''+'/. /. (o my kno*led"e, Brank Jackson is the only oneX 9. -ee ,e*is3s Philosophical Papers , vol. 1 .I7ford: I7ford University Press, 19/#2. ,e*is3s vie*s are disc)ssed in detail in chap. 0 of Representation and Reality . 1$. 6Comp)tational Psycholo"y and 8nterpretation (heory,6 in Realis# and Reason , vol. # of my Philosophical Papers .Cam!rid"e: Cam!rid"e University Press, 19/#2. 11. Cf. Carnap3s /he .ontinuu# of Inducti&e Methods .Chica"o: University of Chica"o Press, 19&02. 12. (he notion of a 6trial and error predicate6 *as introd)ced in my 6(rial and Error Predicates and the -ol)tion to a Pro!lem of :osto*ski,6 /he 6ournal of Sy#!olic Logic #$, no. 1 .:arch 190&2. -)ch predicates are limits of rec)rsive predicatesD their )se is possi!le if one does not ask that one !e a!le to kno* for s)re *hen the val)e of the predicate has conver"ed, !)t only that it *ill sooner or later conver"e. !reak

5el+e. %hysicalism
1. (his sentence sho)ld not only !e in the lan")a"e of physics, it sho)ld have all <)antifiers restricted to physical entities, that is, to entities of a sort reco"ni4ed !y physics. (he physics involved need not !e present+day physicsD so red)ctionism .like other versions of physicalism2 inherits *hatever va")eness there is in classifyin" f)t)re sciences into those *hich are 6parts of physics6 and those *hich are not. B)t 8 do)!t that this de"ree of va")eness in the notion is )naccepta!le. 2. ?ere is the "enerali4ation: if the special+science e7planation says that condition C o!tained, and also

lo"ically implies that the pro!a!ility for the e7planand)m is hi"h in conditions C .or hi"her in conditions C than it is "enerallyD or *hatever2, then the physical transcription of the special+science e7planation *ill say that the physical transcription P.C2 of C o!tains, and *ill also imply that the pro!a!ility of the physical transcription of the e7planand)m is hi"h in P.C2 .or hi"her than in a!sence of P.C2, or *hatever2. -o as in the te7t, if an e7planation of somethin" *ere 5)st any old !ody of tr)ths that stands in the ri"ht lo"ical pro!a!ilistic relations to it, then the physical transcription of a special+ science e7planation *o)ld itself co)nt as an e7planation of it. #. (his is a very special case. 8n "eneral, the hi"her+level sentences may contain syntactic constr)ctions not present in the physical lan")a"e. Bor this and other reasons, the 5o! of makin" the int)itive re<)irement of 6e7pressin" the same facts6 more precise is complicated. %. Ine mi"ht indeed ar")e that even the re<)irement of e7tensional ade<)acy is needed only *hen *e try to form)late the 6fact6 part of red)ctionism independently of the 6e7planation6 part, !)t 8 *ill not p)rs)e this. &. 8n other *ords, either they are 6level $ properties,6 i.e., first+order defina!le from !asic physical predicatesD or they are 6level 1 properties,6 i.e., defina!le *ith property <)antifiers ran"in" only over level $ propertiesD or they are 6level 2 properties,6 i.e., defina!le *ith property <)antifiers ran"in" only over level $ and 1 propertiesD or . . . 0. -ee my Realis#, Mathe#atics, and Modality .I7ford: Basil Black*ell, 19/92, 212n and 21%. '. @ote that 8 do not say: *ithin the same mem!er at the same time. 8t is possi!le, to !e s)re, for a theory of pain to !e reali4ed in more than one *ay in an a"ent at a time, !)t contin)e this is !etter vie*ed as a semantic indeterminacy in the *ord 3pain3 .there is no fact of the matter as to *hether it refers to a f)nctional property *ith one of these reali4ations or to a f)nctional property *ith the other2 than as the *ord standin" determinately for a f)nctional property *ith !oth of these reali4ations. (he clearest ar")ment for this comes *hen the f)nctional theory involves t*o f)nctional terms that are !o)nd )p to"ether, as !elief and desire are !o)nd )p to"ether in commonsense psycholo"y. Pro!a!ly any decent theory of pain *ill take 3pain3 to !e !o)nd )p *ith other terms, !)t rather than ar")e this, let me 5)st )se !elief and desire to ill)strate my point. Jhat *o)ld it !e for a theory post)latin" !elief states and desire states to !e reali4ed in t*o different *ays in a "iven or"anism at a "iven time= 8t *o)ld pres)ma!ly involve t*o sorts of !elief states, !eliefs 1 and !eliefs 2 , and t*o sorts of desire states, desires 1 and desires 2 D correspondin" to any "iven proposition there can !e !oth a !elief 1 and a !elief 2 , and similarly for desire. Beliefs 1 and desires 1 *o)ld interact in the characteristic *ay to res)lt in !ehavior, and similarly !eliefs 2 and desires 2 . Je sho)ld not s)ppose, tho)"h, that !eliefs 1 and desires 2 interact in the characteristic *ay so as to prod)ce !ehavior, or that !eliefs 2 and desires 1 do. .-imilarly, *e sho)ld not s)ppose that !eliefs 1 and !eliefs 2 interact *ith each other in the characteristic manner to form f)rther !eliefs.2 Bor if *e s)ppose that !eliefs 1 interact in the standard *ays *ith !eliefs 2 and desires 2 , then *e do not have a case nat)rally descri!ed as a case of m)ltiple reali4ation: rather, it is simply dis5)nctive reali4ation, that is, 3!elief3 is reali4ed !y 3!elief 1 or !elief 2 3, and similarly for desire. @o*, s)ppose a person !elieves 1 somethin" !)t does not !elieve 2 that same thin". Are *e to say that he !elieves it= (he f)nctionalist *ho holds that !elief 1 and !elief 2 are simply t*o reali4ations of the f)nctional property of !elief .i.e., of !ein" a !elief state2 re<)ires that *e ans*er this <)estion *ith an )n<)alified 3yes3D analo"o)sly, s)ch a f)nctionalist *ill "ive an )n<)alified 3yes3 to the <)estion, Coes someone desire somethin" *hen she desires 1 it !)t doesn3t desire 2 it= B)t these ans*ers lead to anomalies: )n<)alifiedly tr)e !elief statements and )n<)alifiedly tr)e desire statements *ill not have the desired conse<)ences, !eca)se of the fail)re of !eliefs 1 and desires 2 .or !eliefs 2 and desires 1 2 to interact in the desired *ays. An )n<)alified 3no3 ans*er *o)ld !e similarly !i4arre: it *o)ld mean

that !elief talk and desire talk *as deemed *holly inappropriate in descri!in" a sit)ation that co)ld !e e7plained !y a lar"e !ody of !eliefs 1 and desires 1 *hen there *ere no correspondin" !eliefs 2 and desires 2 . 8 think *e sho)ld instead adopt the vie* that in s)ch cases the *ords 3!elief3 and 3desire3 are semantically indeterminate .in a correlative *ayFsee my 6G)ine and the Correspondence (heory,6 Philosophical Re&ie% /# M19'%N: 2$$+22/2. (his *ay of lookin" at s)ch cases makes them not special to f)nctionalism: they are 5)st analo")es in a f)nctionalist settin" of the cases of semantic indeterminacy that arise in a nonf)nctional conte7t. /. -till, 8 think that there is somethin" ri"ht a!o)t the denial of .i2. Even if one "rants that *hat 6red)ces6 a property like 3pain3 is a f)nctional property that is itself physically reali4ed, there is "ood reason to allo* the 6red)ctions6 to vary from species to species. Bor there seems little point to lookin" for a f)nctional specification of pain that *orks for all possi!le or"anismsD all *e need, pres)ma!ly, is separate f)nctional specifications of pain+in+h)mans, pain+in+octop)ses, pain+in+:artians, etc. .(he f)nctional properties of pain+in+octop)ses and pain+in+:artians are pres)ma!ly <)ite similar to the f)nctional property of pain+in+h)mans. (his is one reason *hy invokin" the species+relativity is more attractive for f)nctional properties than for lo*er+level properties, *here there need !e no similarity.2 !reak 9. 8n connection *ith the latter t*o e7amples, see :ark Jilson, 6Jhat 8s (his (hin" Called Pain=F (he Philosophy of -cience !ehind the Contemporary Ce!ate,6 Pacific Philosophical >uarterly 00 .19/&2: 22'+20'. B)t *hile Jilson )ses these e7amples in part for the same p)rposes as 8 am )sin" them hereFto sho* that the distinction !et*een "ivin" a f)nctional e7plication of a term and "ivin" a nonf)nctional e7plication is not of "reat importanceFhe also has a more radical p)rpose: he is tryin" to ar")e that no e7plication at all, *hether f)nctional or nonf)nctional, is re<)ired. In this last point 8 disa"reeD 8 *ill ret)rn to this later. 1$. 8 ass)me that the la*s are form)lated *itho)t ceteris pari!us cla)ses. (o say that the correct 6la*s6 al*ays involve ceteris pari!us cla)ses is 5)st another *ay of sayin" that definitely form)lated la*s not involvin" s)ch cla)ses are not strictly tr)e. 11. (he la*s can )s)ally !e s)!stantially improved !y retainin" the special+science terminolo"y !)t addin" conditions stated in the lan")a"e of a more f)ndamental science to r)le o)t some of the e7ceptions. B)t 8 do)!t that even this is eno)"h for f)lly e7ceptionless la*s: for that, one needs to "o o)tside the special science entirely. 12. (he claim that these classical e7amples sho)ld !e taken only as red)ction sketches is reasona!le, !)t 8 am claimin" that they need only !e .and can only !e pla)si!ly taken to !e2 sketches of approxi#ate red)ctions. 1#. 8t is sometimes said that p)rely ontolo"ical physicalism entails red)ctive physicalism, "iven a s)fficiently f)ll+!looded ontolo"y of propertiesD or that it entails token physicalism, "iven a f)ll+ !looded ontolo"y of events. :ore f)lly, the idea .in the property case2 is that one co)ld ar")e for red)ctionist physicalism from ontolo"ical physicalism as follo*s: .i2 (here are no nonphysical entitiesD .ii2 (herefore in partic)lar there are no nonphysical propertiesD .iii2 B)t .a2 e7planatorily )sef)l predicates stand for properties, and .!2 if a predicate cannot !e red)ced to physical terms, then any property it stands for m)st !e nonphysicalD so .iv2 Any e7planatorily )sef)l predicate m)st !e red)ci!le to physical terms. B)t 8 think that any s)ch ar")ment is hi"hly d)!io)s, even p)ttin" aside all do)!ts a!o)t the realism a!o)t properties on *hich it depends. Consider the follo*in" apparently analo"o)s ar")ment:

.i2 (here are no nonphysical entitiesD .iiO2 (herefore in partic)lar there are no nonphysical predicatesD .iiiO2 B)t a predicate *hich cannot !e red)ced to physical terms m)st !e vie*ed as nonphysicalD so .ivO2 Any predicate m)st !e red)ci!le to physical terms. .@ote the stren"th of the concl)sion: it applies not only to e7planatorily )sef)l predicates !)t to predicates from scientifically disrep)ta!le disciplines, for instance, 3is telepathically comm)nicatin" *ith3.2 8t seems clear that this ar")ment t)rns on a p)n on the readin" of the phrase 3nonphysical predicate3. ll predicates are physical entities, even predicates like 3is telepathically comm)nicatin" *ith3. -o if for a predicate to !e physical is for it to !e a physical entity, .iiO2 follo*s from .i2D !)t then .iiiO2 is simply false. (here is tho)"h a nat)ral readin" of 3physical predicate3 on *hich .iiiO2 is pla)si!le: *e take 6red)ci!le to physical terms6 as the criterion for a predicate3s !ein" physical. B)t then the physical nonphysical distinction for predicates is not an ontolo"ical contin)e classification of the predicates !)t an ideological classification, so that the inference from .i2 to .iiO2 fails. 8t seems to me that a similar dia"nosis is pla)si!le for the ori"inal ar")ment .i2+.iv2. 8f to call a property nonphysical is to comment on its ideological stat)s, then part .!2 of .iii2 is nonpro!lematicD !)t on that readin" of *hat it is for a property to !e nonphysical, there is no reason to think that a property3s !ein" nonphysical coincides *ith its !ein" a nonphysical entity, and so no reason to accept the inference from .i2 to .ii2. .8ndeed, there are nat)ral readin"s of 3physical entity3 accordin" to *hich no property co)ld co)nt as a physical entity, no matter ho* 6physical6 that property *as, ideolo"ically speakin": even the property of havin" mass *o)ld not !e a physical entity, simply !eca)se it *as a property. B)t there are more fle7i!le readin"s of 3physical entity3 that *o)ld co)nt properties "enerally as physical entities, no matter ho* 6ideolo"ically nonphysical6 they are, as lon" as they applied only to physical thin"s. -ee for instance 9eoff ?ellman and Brank (hompson, 6Physicalist :aterialism,6 'ous 11 M19''N: #$9+#%&.2 8 concl)de that the a!ove ar")ment for red)ctive physicalism sho)ld not !e taken serio)sly. (he ri"ht *ay of vie*in" thin"s is not that the case for red)ctive physicalism .or for some other form of physicalism that foc)ses on f)rther aspects of the sentences )sed in e7planations than 5)st their ontolo"y2 derives from the case for an 6ontolo"ical6 physicalism, via the acceptance of properties .or events or *hatever2 into one3s ontolo"y. Hather, the most o!vio)s *ay to appreciate the virt)es of physicalism is to foc)s on the important role it has played in ")idin" the development of science. B)t the principle that appears to have ")ided the development of science is not 5)st that *e sho)ld avoid the appeal to 6irred)ci!ly nonphysical6 entities in o)r e7planations. Hather, the principle ")idin" science r)les o)t the )se in e7planations of predicates *hose instantiation or noninstantiation cannot !e physically e7plained, as even a s)perficial e7amination of the sort of e7amples mentioned in the second para"raph of the paper *ill reveal. Ine cannot in any *ay )ndermine the case for red)ctive physicalism !y )nderminin" realism a!o)t properties .as attempted in chap. 0 of -tephen -chiffer, Re#nants of Meaning MCam!rid"e, :ass.: Bradford Books, 19/'N2: the iss)e of the ontolo"ical stat)s of properties is a red herrin". 1%. :a7 Black, 6(he 8dentity of 8ndiscerni!les,6 Mind 01 .19&22: 1&#+10%. 1&. Bor a specific property like pain it mi"ht !e proposed that *e form)late o)r nonmodal s)pervenience thesis more restrictively: say, as the claim that *hen any t*o people differ as to their pains at a "iven time, the intrinsic physical properties of s)ch+and+s)ch re"ions of their !rains also differ at that time. B)t of co)rse this is not eno)"h to solve the pro!lem of e7cessive *eakness: the intrinsic physical properties of correspondin" re"ions of any t*o people3s !rains *ill al*ays differ. .:oreover, in other *ays the 6physicalist6 thesis is no* too stron": it involves the specific ass)mption

that only that re"ion of the !rain is relevant to pain, *hich is certainly no part of the content of physicalism.2 (he only o!vio)s *ay to avoid the e7cessive+*eakness pro!lem in a nonmodal s)pervenience thesis is to !)ild in the effects of a specific red)ction. 10. 8n the case of .-C2 the ideaFslidin" over some comple7itiesFis that red)ctionism makes each fact in - in some sense 6e<)ivalent6 to some collection of facts in B, so that pro!a!ilities conditional on B and - amo)nt to the same thin" as pro!a!ilities conditional on B alone. 1'. If co)rse, 3infant3 and 3cliff3 and 3crosses3 are not terms from either ne)rophysiolo"y or f)ndamental physics, so the application of ne)rophysiolo"y or f)ndamen+ soft tal physics to a partic)lar infant *o)ld not yield any pro!a!ility at all for the sentence 3(he child *ill cross the cliff3. B)t it *o)ld yield a concl)sion that, *ere it not for its comple7ity, *e co)ld interpret in terms of the child crossin" the cliff: for instance, in the case of f)ndamental physics, a concl)sion that the center of mass of a certain system of particles .those that make )p the infant at the start of the e7periment2 shifted to a certain location .a!ove the "lass2 *o)ld !e tantamo)nt to a prediction that the infant crossed the cliff. (he claim that *e co)ld so interpret claims in physics and ne)rophysiolo"y rests on some modest physicalist ass)mptions .*hich are hard to state preciselyD incl)ded amon" them *o)ld !e the ass)mption that infants3 !odies are made )p of particles and that the position of the infant depends in a systematic *ay on the positions of those particles2D !)t 8 do not think many *o)ld <)estion these ass)mptions, and they do not incl)de ass)mptions a!o)t the physical !asis of psycholo"y. 1/. .12 A proper ela!oration of these claims *o)ld re<)ire a !it more delicate statement than 8 have "iven a!ove of *hat it is for t*o hi"her+level theories to 6mesh.6 .22 (he claim that t*o theories that mesh *ith physics mesh *ith each other depends on some nat)ral ass)mptions a!o)t physics, s)ch as .-C2. 19. :y research *as s)pported !y the @ational -cience Bo)ndation ."rant -E-+/'21/&92. 8 am "ratef)l to disc)ssion *ith -tephen -chiffer and comments on earlier drafts !y Janet ,evin and H)ssell (renholme. !reak

"ON RIAU ORS

; 29# ; Diderik BatensF -eminary for ,o"ic and Philosophy of the -ciences, Universiteit 9ent. Richard BoydF Cepartment of Philosophy, Cornell University. Nancy Cart rightF Cepartment of Philosophy, ,ondon -chool of Economics. Noa! Cho!skyF Cepartment of ,in")istics and Philosophy, :8(. "artry #ieldF Philosophy Pro"ram, 9rad)ate -chool, City Colle"e of @e* Lork. $ichael #ried!anF Cepartment of Philosophy, University of 8llinois at Chica"o. Clark %ly!o&rF Cepartment of Philosophy, Carne"ie :ellon University, and Cepartment of ?istory and Philosophy of -cience, University of Pitts!)r"h. Richard E' %randyF Cepartment of Philosophy, Hice University. (aakko "intikkaF Cepartment of Philosophy, Boston University, and Cepartment of Philosophy, University of ?elsinki.

)e*in )ellyF Cepartment of Philosophy, Carne"ie :ellon University. Bar+ara D' $asseyF Cepartment of Philosophy, Chatham Colle"e. %erald (' $asseyF Cepartment of Philosophy, University of Pitts!)r"h. "ilary P&tna!F Cepartment of Philosophy, ?arvard University. (oseph D' SneedF Cepartment of ?)man and -ocial -cience, Colorado -chool of :ines. ; 29& ;

IN,EF
#
Accommodation thesis, 192 119# 6Aether6 theory of space time, 91 Analyticity, 1&1 , 10% 110& Analytic+synthetic distinction, 99 , 1$$ , 112 111#, 1%' Anti!ody formation, 110 , 11' A priori a posteriori distinction, '# A<)inas, (homas, %& ]<vist, ,ennart, 2$& 12$0 Archimedes, 2&' 12&/ Aristotle: on atomistic post)late, 2' D on epagoge , 20 , ## , #% , #0 1#'D on forms, 2' , #% D lo"ic of, /' D on meanin", %% 1%&D on Meno , # D on nat)res essences, viii , %% 1'1D on phenomena as so)rce of tr)th, ## D Posterior nalytics of, #0 , #' D Prior nalytics of, #0 D on search for definition, #0 , #' Armstron", Cavid, 20$ Artificial intelli"ence, 2$0

Atomistic post)late, 2% , 20 12/, #&

A
Ba!!a"e, Charles, 1/ Bacon, Brancis, / 19, %0 Baier, Annette, /2 n. ', 2$& Balmer, Johann J., 1/ 119 Bal4er, Jolf"an", 21' , 220 122' Batens, Ciderik, 7 , 199 121& Behavior, repeata!le, &1 , &# 1&%, && Behaviorism, 111 Beth, Evert, 21' Black, :a7, 2/$ Block, @ed, 2&/ 12&9 Bol4ano, Bernhard, // Bootstrappin", 0% D See also Ced)ction Bo)r!aki, 2#' Boyd, Hichard, i7 17, 1#1 119/, 2&9 Boyle, Ho!ert, 1' Brid"e principles, 21' , 219 B)chdahl, 9erd, %/ B)r"e, (yler, 122 , 2&/

"
Calc)l)s, /' , // Camp!ell, @orman H., 21' D on theories, 222 122#, 22% , 22& , 229 , 2#$ Canni44aro, -tanislao, 19 Carnap, H)dolf, i7 , /& , 20$ , 201 , 202 120#D 6ca)tion parameter6 of, 20% D on conventionality, 10& 1109D 6Empiricism, -emantics, and Intolo"y6 of, 10& , 10' D on e7act sciences, 9# 19%D on lo"ic lo"ical synta7 of, /0 , 92 , 9# , 9% , 9& D ,+r)les of, 9/ n. 2$, 1&1 , 1&' , 100 D

v. :ar!)r" -chool, 9# D principle of tolerance of, 92 19#D relativism of, 92 , 9% , 9& D on theories, 210 121' Cartesianism, 2/$ . See also Cescartes, HenV Cart*ri"ht, @ancy, viii , %% 1'1 Cassirer, Ernst, 9$ , 9% Ca)chy, A)")stin, // Cha)vinism, species, 1/% Chomsky, @oam, i7 , '9 , 99 112/, 20% Ch)rchland, Pa)l, 11& Cladism, 1&& 11&0, 1&/ , 1/1 Cohen, ?ermann, 9$ ; 290 ; Coherence, 101 1102, 10# 110%D and neo+>antian constr)ctivism, 1'' 11'/, 1'9 11/$, 1/2 , 1/# D theory of tr)th, 9$ , 92 , 9# , 9% , 9& Collins, ?arry, &% Commens)ra!ility, 1&# 11&%, 1&0 , 191 1192. See also 8ncommens)ra!ility Comm)nication, interpretation in, 11/ 1119, 12$ Constr)ction, social. See Conventionality Constr)ctivism, 7 D analyticity ref)tes, 1&1 D classical, 1#0 11%/D coherence of, 1'' 11'/, 1'9 11/$, 1/2 , 1/# D on commens)ra!ility incommens)ra!ility, 1&1 11&%, 1&0 D on conventionality, 1#1 , 1#2 11##, 1#& , 1&' 11&9, 10% 1109, 191 D de!)nkin", 1#2 , 1## 11#%, 1#& , 1#9 , 1%2 , 1/$ , 1/# , 1/0 , 1/' D v. empiricism, 1#1 , 1## , 1%# , 1&' 11&9, 10& , 10' 110/, 109 , 19$ D on epistemic infertility, 109 11'%D epistemolo"ical !asis of, 1&% , 1/# 11/&D and evol)tionary theory, 1/% D fo)ndationalism in, 1&% 11&&, 1/# D

on historicality, 1&' D infl)ence of, 1%/ 11%9D on kno*led"e in science, 1## D on metaphysical innocence, 109 11'%D neo+>antian, 1#2 11#%, 1#& , 1#0 11%1, 1%2 , 1%# 11%/, 1&1 11&%, 1&0 , 10% 11'%, 1'' 11'/, 1'9 1 1/$, 1/2 , 1/# 11/&, 1/0 11//D on no nonca)sal contri!)tion thesis, 1'& 11'', 1/2 11/#D on nonred)ctionist materialism, 19$ D on politics in science, 1/0 11//D v. realism, 1#1 , 1#% 11#&, 1%# 11%/, 1&# , 1&% , 1&0 , 1&9 110$, 10% 11'%, 1'& 11'', 19$ , 191 1192D on resistances to paradi"ms, 1'9 D science+as+social+practice, 1#2 , 1## , 1#& D on scientific revol)tions, 1%2 , 1%& , 1%0 11%'D on semantics, 191 1192D social, 1#1 , 1&' 11&9D sophisticated, 1%/ 11&', 1&9 110$, 10% 110&, 191 D on s)pervenience, 10% D and theory+dependent methods, 1#0 11%1, 1&' 11&9, 10& , 10' 110/, 109 , 1'$ D traditional, 1&% D on )no!serva!les, 10% Conte7t)al model. See -cience, conte7t)al model of Conventionality .social constr)ction2, 1%9 D constraints on, 10$ 110%D constr)ctivists on, 1#1 , 1#2 11##, 1#& , 1&' 11&9, 10% 1109, 191 D dialectically comple7, 1&2 11&#, 1&& 11&0, 10% 1109, 191 D empiricists on, 1&' 11&9, 109 D hidden, 1/& 11//D historicality in, 1&1 11&#D metaphysical innocence of, 109 11'#D ontolo"ical import of, 10' D realists on, 1#1 , 1&/ , 10% 1109D )no!vio)s, 1/$ 11/1 Copenha"en theorists, 209 Copernican theory of stars, 22'

Co)lom!3s la*, %/ , %9 , &$ Correspondence r)les, 21' , 219

,
Cavidson, Conald, 99 11$$, 1$% , 1$& , 112 , 20' D on comm)nication, 11/ 1119D on interpreter, 12$ D on lan")a"e, 11/ 1121D on st)dy of meanin", 1$/ , 1$9 Ced)ction, 2# 12%, 2& , 20 , #2 , ## , 02 , 0% Cescartes, HenV, %& , 22/ , 2/$ Ciscovery, 1' 12$D conte7t of, v. conte7t of 5)stification, vii 1viiiD data points in, 1' 11/D distin")isha!ility in, 21 D "eneratin" f)nctions in, 1/ 119D proced)res for, 11 11%D theory, 2%/ 12&1 C)hem, Pierre, 2$$ C)mmett, :ichael, 99 , 1$1 11$2, 1$# , 1$/ , 1$9 , 121

E
Einstein, Al!ert, #& D on relativity, /& , // , 91 Ellis, Brian, 229 Ellis, 9. B. H., 2#$ Empiricism, 2#% 12&%D anti+, /1 1/2, 92 , 1#1 D v. Aristotelianism, %% 1%&D challen"es "enerali4ation from e7periments, &0 102D on conventionality, 1&' 11&9, 109 D v. constr)ctivism, 1#1 , 1## , 1%# , 1&' 11&9, 10& , 10' 110/, 109 , 19$ D co)nter+fact)als )sed !y, %/ 1%9D on fo)ndationalism, 1%$ , 1&' D on historicality, 1&' D

?)me3s, #% 1#&, '2 1/#D ind)ction as !asis of, &1 D on kno*led"e in science, 1#1 D lo"ical, 2#% D of lo"ical positivism, /& 1/0, /9 , 91 192D on meanin", %% 1%&D on nonred)ctionist materialism, 19$ D on o!servation, /& D pairs of proced)res in, 2%0 12%'D phenomenalism of, 101 D on po*ers v. sensi!le <)alities, %' 1%/D pro!lem solvin" in, 2%& 12%/D radical, 91 192D on rationality, 192 D v. realism, 1#1 , 1## , 1%# , 109 , 19$ D v. -cholasticism, %% 1%&D in theory, 221 D on theory+dependent methods, 1%$ , 1&' 11&9, 10& , 10' 110/, 1'1 11'2 Entropy, #/ Epagoge , 20 , ## , #0 , #' Epistemic infertility, 109 11'% Epistemolo"y, & D constr)ctivism !ased on, 1&% , 1/# 11/&D of morals, 19% D nat)ralistic, 1%/ , 19% D of realism, 1%' , 1%/ ; 29' ; E<)ifertility principle, 1/$ 11/2 Er$enntnis , /0 , 92 Essences. See @at)re.s2 E)clidean "eometry, /0 1/', // , /9 19$ Evol)tionary theory, 1/% E7perimentation, &$ , &1 102D

conte7t+dependent factors in, &' D control factors in, &2 1&#D "enerali4ations from, &% 1&&, &0 102D inference from, 0$ D predicta!ility in, 0$ D p)re data !ase in, 0$ 101D repeata!le !ehavior as !asis of, &1 , &# 1&%, && , &0 1&'

F
Balli!ilism, 1/& , 2$$ Beyera!end, Pa)l, /& , 1'/ , 21' Bield, ?artry, 7i , 2'1 1291 Bine, Arth)r, 0$ Bit4"erald, 9eor"e B., 91 Bl)7ions, /' Bodor, Jerry, 2&/ 12&9 Borms, % , 2' , #% , 2&0 Bo)ndationalism: in constr)ctivism, 1&% 11&&, 1/# D empiricism on, 1%$ , 1&' D fail)re of, 1/# 11/%D inference+r)le, 1&% 11&&, 1/# 11/%, 19% D on kno*led"e, 1#' 11%$D realism re!)ts, 1%$ , 1%% , 1%/ , 1/% Bre"e, 9ottlo!, /' , /9 Briedman, :ichael, i7 , /% 19/ B)nctionalism, 7 D v. classical red)ctionism, 2'0 12''D as comp)tational vie* of mind, 2&& 12&0, 2&9 D fail)re of, 2&& 12'$D "lo!al, 2&9 D incompati!le *ith meanin", 2&' 12&/, 2&9 D in physicalism, 2'0 12'', 2'9 D in psycholo"y, 2'' D

sin"le+comp)tational+state, 201 120&

1
9adamer, ?ans 9., 20' 9alileo 9alilei, &$ 9ases, molec)lar theory of, 222 122# 9assendi, Pierre, %% 1%& 9eometry, /0 1/', // , /9 19$ 9lanvill, Joseph, %% , %& 9lymo)r, Clark, viii , # 122, 0% 9Edel, >)rt, i7 , 9# D incompleteness theorem of, 9% , 9& 9oethe, Jollann J. von, on @e*ton3s theory of li"ht, 02 , 0# 1'$ 9old, E. :ark, 10 11', 2$ 9oodman, @elson, viii , 20% 9rammar "rammaticality, 1$9 , 11% , 120 112' n. 2# 9randy, Hichard E., 7 , 210 12## 9ravity, #& , %$ 9)yot, >., 1&/

/
?anson, @. H., /& , 1#& , 1#0 , 1#' , 1%1 , 21' ?arris, James, 110 ?a*kin", -tephen B., 2#$ ?empel, Carl 9., /0 , 210 , 2&$ , 201 ?ierarchical model. See -cience, hierarchical model of ?i""in!otham, James, 12# ?il!ert, Cavid, /' , 9# , 209 ?ilpinen, Histo, 2$0 ?intikka, Jaakko, viii , 2# 1%#, 2$& ?istoricality, 1&1 11&#, 1&& , 1&' , 1&/ ?)m!oldt, Jilhelm von, 12# ?)me, Cavid, 110 , 1&& D on animals, '# 1'0, /$ 1/1D on a priori kno*led"e, '0 1'/, /1 D

associationist psycholo"y of, '% D on atomistic post)late, #& D on empiricism, viii , #% 1#&, '2 1/#D En(uiry .oncerning <u#an =nderstanding of, '2 1'#, '& 1'0D e7perimental method of, #% 1#&D fork of .relation of ideas and matters of fact2, '2 1'#, '0 1'9, /1 D on ind)ction, viii , 2& , 20 , 2' , #% 1#&, 02 D on instinct, '& 1'0, '' , '/ , /$ , /1 D on nat)re, '/ 1'9, /$ D on @e*ton, #% 1#&D on po*ers, %/ , 2&0 D as rationalist, viii , /1 1/2D on reason, '% , '' 1'9D same ca)se, same effect principle of, &1 1&2D /reatise of <u#an 'ature of, '% 1'&, '' , '/ 1'9 ?)y"ens, Christian, 22' 122/

I
8dealism, lo"ical, 9$ 8deali4ation, 9alilean, &$ 8deas facts dichotomy, '2 1'#, '0 1'9, /1 8ncommens)ra!ility, 1%9 D constr)ctivists on, 1&1 11&%D methodolo"ical, 1%1 , 1%2 11%#, 1%& , 1%0 11%', 1&# , 1&0 , 191 , 192 D re!)tted, 1%& 11%/, 1&1 D semantic, 1%1 , 1%2 , 1%& , 1%0 11%', 1&2 , 1&# , 1&0 , 191 , 192 8nd)ction, 2# 1%#D Aristotle3s, 20 , ## , #% , #0 1#'D conventional, 2% 120D empiricism !ased on, &1 D e7tends "enerali4ations, #$ 1##, #& D ?)me3s, v. non+?)mean, viii , 2& , 20 , 2' , #% 1#&, 02 D in inference, 2% 12&, 20 12'D in instinct, '& 1'0, '' , '9 , /$ D

in interro"ative model, 2% 120, 2/ D 5)stified, 2' , #% D la*s confirmed !y, 02 D moves from partic)lar to another partic)lar, 2% 12&D moves from partic)lar to "eneral, 2% 12&, 2' , #/ 1#9D @e*tonian, #1 1##, #% , #& , #0 , ; 29/ ; 8nd)ction #9 1%$D reconciles partial "enerali4ations, #& 1%$ 8nference: ded)ctive, 2& , 20 D from e7perimentation, 0$ , 0# , 0% , 00 , 09 D in fo)ndationalism, 1&% 11&&, 1/# 11/%, 19% D ind)ctive, 2% 12&, 20 12'D @e*tonian, #2 , 0# , 0% , 00 , 09 8n<)iry: interro"ative model of, 2# 1%#D kno*led"e via, 11 112, 1% D proced)res for, 1% 11&D tr)e o!5ect of, '2 1'# 8nstincts, '& 1'0, '' , '/ , '9 , /$ , /1 8nterpretation, 11/ 1119, 12$ 8nterro"ative model, 2# 1%#D ded)ction and, 2# 12%D in "ame+theoretical terms, 2# 12%D ind)ction in, 2% 120, 2/ D pres)ppositions in, 2/ 1#$ 8nt)ition .>antian2, /' , // , /9 , 9$

J
James, Jilliam, 1$$ Jammer, :a7, #'

Jeffreys, ?arold, 1/ Jensen, Arth)r, 1/1 Jerne, @iels >a5, 110 Jespersen, Itto, 12# J)stification, vii 1viii, 1#/ D in conte7t)al model, 21$ D in hierarchical model, 2$1 12$2D in ind)ction, 2' , #%

2
>ant, 8mman)el: .riti(ue of Pure Reason of, /' D on ?)me, '# , '0 D on int)ition, /' , // , /9 , 9$ D lo"ic for, /' D lo"ical positivism infl)enced !y, /& , /0 1/9, 9$ , 9& D on math and physics, /0 1/9, 9$ D Prolego#ena to ny Future Metaphysics of, // D on space time, /& , /0 1//, /9 19$ >elly, >evin, viii , # 122 >enny, Anthony, 1$# >epler, Johannes, 1' , #& , #9 , %$ , 220 , 22' >lein, Beli7, // >no*led"e: ac<)isition of, % 1', 1$ , 11 , 12 , 1# , 1% 11&, 1/ D a priori, '0 1'/, /1 D !ack"ro)nd, 12 11#D constr)ctivism on, 1## D conte7t)al model3s str)ct)re of, 2$0 121$D empiricism on, 1## D v. e7perience, /9 D fo)ndationalism on, 1#' 11%$D via in<)iry, 11 112, 1% D of lan")a"e, 1$# , 1$% , 12# D

lan")a"e assists, 9 , 1$ D Meno on, # 122D possi!ility impossi!ility of, # 122D realism on, 1## D recollection3s role in, 12 , 1# D relia!ility in, & , 11 , 1% 11&, 1/ D re<)irements for, ' 19, 1$ , 11 D science, as rational, /% , /0 D v. tr)e opinion, & , ' D of tr)th, # , 1$ >ripke, -a)l A., 1%& >)hn, (homas, /& , 1#& , 1#0 , 1#' , 1%1 , 2$$ , 2$1 , 21' , 221 , 222 D on conventionality, 10& 1109D on @e*ton, 0# D on paradi"ms, 10' 110/, 1'/ D v. realists, 10% D /he Structure of Scientific Re&olutions of, 1#1 11#2, 10& D on theory dependence, 100

$
,an"ley, P., 1/ , 2$ , 2#0 , 2%/ ,an")a"e: a!ility to )se, 1$# , 1$% D ac<)isition of, 10 11', 1$2 , 1$# 11$%, 1$& 11$0, 1$/ , 111 , 112 , 11# 111%, 11& 111'D fac)lty, 11& 1110, 119 112$D first, 11/ , 119 , 12$ D "rammar theory of, 1$9 D kno*led"e assisted !y, 9 , 1$ D kno*led"e of, 1$# , 1$% , 12# D mis)se of, 121 1122D no s)ch thin" as, 11/ D proced)re, 2#' 12%$, 2%# , 2&2 D red)ci!le, 20$ D semantics determine, 112 111#D

as social practice, 1$2 11$#D str)ct)re, 112 D st)dy, 99 112/D thin", v. phenomenalistic, 20$ , 201 ,a)dan, ,arry, 2$1 , 2$& , 211 ,evi, 8saac, 2$& ,e*is, Cavid, 1$9 , 20$ , 202 ,e*ontin, Hichard, 1/1 ,i"ht, @e*ton3s theory of, 02 1'$ ,in")ist, field, 99 11$$, 1$% , 1$& ,8-P, 2#/ ,o"ic, 2$& 12$0D Aristotelian, /' D Carnap3s, /0 , 92 , 9# , 9% , 9& D >ant3s, /' D mathematical as !ranch of mathematics, /' , /9 , 9# , 9% . See also Positivism, lo"ical ,orent4, ?endrik, 91 ,+tr)ths ,+r)les, 9/ n. 2$, 1&1 , 1&' , 100 ,)cas, Anthony, 0#

:c>insey, J. C. C., 219 122$, 2#$ :alapropisms, 121 :anor, H)th, 2$0 :ar!)r" -chool, 9$ , 92 , 9# , 9% :assey, Bar!ara and 9erald, viii , '2 1/# :aterialism, 1/& 11/0, 19$ :athematics: certainty of, %% D as int)itive, /' D >ant on, /' 1//, 9$ D lo"ic as !ranch of, 9# , 9% D lo"ic in, /' , /9 D

lo"ical positivism on, /% , /9 D in nat)re, /' 1//D @e*tonian, ## 1#%, // D as o!5ective rational, /% , /0 , /9 , 9$ D in physics, #/ , /0 :a7*ell, James Clerk, #& :eanin": Aristotelian, %% 1%&D empiricist, ; 299 ; %% 1%&D e7ternal component of, 2&/ D f)nctionalism and, 2&' 12&/, 2&9 D holism, 11' 111/D individ)alistic component of, 2&/ D <)estions of fact v. <)estions of, 11% 111&D -cholasticism on, %% 1%&D st)dy of, 1$/ , 1$9 D theory of, 1$& , 1$' :echanics, particle, 219 122$, 221 Megalopsychia , #0 , #' Meno , # 122D on findin" virt)e, % D on kno*led"e v. tr)e opinion, & D on lo"ical form, % D on possi!ility of kno*led"e, # 121D on reco"nition of o!5ect, # D on re<)irements for kno*led"e, ' 1/ :etaphysics, 109 11'%, 1/& 11/0 :ethod: analytic, %9 1&$, &0 , 0$ D e7perimental, 2' , #% 1#&D nat)ralistic, 10# 110%D

pair*ise theory ne)trality of, 1%& D scientific, 2$$ D theory+dependent .see (heory dependence, of scientific methods2D theory+independent, 1#' , 1%2 , 1%# :ethodolo"y, 1% 11&D circ)lar, 1#' , 1#/ 11#9 :ichelson+:orley e7periment, 91 :ill, John -t)art, / :ind+!ody pro!lem, 2/$ :otion, @e*tonian, /' :o)lines, Charles Ulises, 21' :)ndy, Brent, 21/

N
@atorp, Pa)l 9., 9$ @at)re.s2: Aristotelian, viii , %% 1'1D Bacon on, %0 D e7periments on, &$ , &1 1&0D la*s of, viii , %& D mathematics in, /' 1//D modern definition of, %0 1%'D reason dominated !y, '/ 1'9D repeata!le !ehaviors in, &1 , &# 1&%, && D resem!le po*ers, %/ D visi!le properties of, %0 @eo+>antianism, :ar!)r", 9$ , 92 , 9# , 9% . See also Constr)ctivism @e)rath, Itto, /0 @e*ton, 8saac, /0 , 22/ , 229 D Aristotle infl)enced, #' , 09 D on atomistic post)late, 2' D on ded)ction, #2 , ## D on e7perimental method, 2' D on fl)7ions, /' D

on "ravity, #& , %$ D ind)ction of, #1 1##, #% , #& , #0 , #9 1%$D inference of, #2 , 0# , 0% , 00 , 09 D on li"ht and colors, 02 1'$D mathematical models of, ## 1#%, // D misinterpreted, #% 1#&D on motion, /' D Optic$s of, #1 , ## D Principia of, #2 , ## 1#%D on space time, /9 19$, 209 D theory form)lation of, 21/ @ickles, (om, 2$& @o nonca)sal contri!)tion thesis .2@2C2, 1'# 11'%, 1'/ , 1'9 , 1/$ , 1/& , 1/9 D constr)ctivists on, 1'& 11'', 1/2 , 1/# D realists on, 1'& 11'' 'ous .reason2, 2&0

O
I!servation, /& 1/0, 2$$ Ihm3s la*, 19 12$ Iperationalism, 10# Isherson, Caniel @., 11 , 1' I*ens, 9. E. ,., 2'

%
Pain, theory of, 2'' Paradi"ms, 10' 110/D anomalies *ithin, 1'/ D resistances to, 1'/ 11'9 Parser, 119 112$ Pateman, (revor, 12% n. % Pera, :arcello, 2$$ Phenomenalism, 1&9 110$, 102 , 1/# D of empiricism, 101 D in lan")a"e, 20$ , 201

Phlo"iston theory, 2/0 Phrase+str)ct)re !o)ndaries, 1$9 111$ Physicalism, 7i , 2'1 1291D v. Cartesianism, 2/$ D compared to classical red)ctionism, 2'2 12'%D f)nctionalist nonf)nctionalist, 2'0 12'', 2'9 D ontolo"ical, 2'9 12/$, 2/# D red)ctive, 2&0 12&', 2/1 12/2, 2/# , 2/9 129$ n. 1#D s)rro"ates for, 2'/ 12/#D *eak, 2'9 , 2/1 12/2, 2/# Planck, :a7, #& D on entropy, #/ D reconciliative ind)ction of, #' 1#/, #9 , %$ Plato: on kno*led"e v. tr)e opinion, & D on recollection, 12 , 1# D on tr)th, 9 , 1$ , 11 . -ee also Meno Pl)ralism: c)lt)ral, 1&$ 11&1, 1&% , 1&0 , 191 119%D ontolo"ical, 1%9 11&$, 1&1 , 1&% , 1&0 D in science, 1// 1191 PoincarV, J)les ?enri, 91 Popkin, Hichard, 1$9 Popper, >arl, %$ Positivism, lo"ical, /% 19/, 1#1 D as ahistorical, /& D on conventionalism, 91 D death of, 210 D empiricism re5ected !y, 92 D as empiricist, /& 1/0, /9 , 91 192D fail)re of, i7 , /% 1/&, 9& D on int)ition, /9 , 9$ D v. >ant, /& , /0 1/9, 9$ , 9& D

on mathematics, /% , /9 , 9$ D misrepresented, /& 1/0D on o!servation, /& 1/0D philosophical conte7t of, /9 19$D on relativism, /& , 9$ , 9% D scientific revol)tion inspires, /& D on space time, /9 19$D verifia!ility principle of, 92 PHI,I9, 2#/ , 2&2 ; #$$ ; Psycholo"y: associationist, '% D as f)nctionalist, 2'' D red)ced to lo*er+level science, 2/& D restricts in<)iry proced)res, 1% 11& P)tnam, ?ilary, 1%& , 219 D on ca)sation, 1'% D on concepts from theories, 11' D on division of lin")istic la!or, 121 D on f)nctionalism, 2&& 12'$D on innate stock of notions, 110 , 11' D on meanin" holism, 11' 111/D on relation !et*een mental and physical states, 7 D Representation and Reality of, 2&&

;
G)ery, concept of, 2#0 , 2#' , 2%$ G)ine, J. K. I., i7 , '# , '9 , 1$9 , 1%$ , 1'2 , 2$$ , 2&9 , 20' D on !ehaviorist approach, 111 D on field lin")ist, 99 11$$, 1$% , 1$& D 6"ava"ai6 e7ample of, 20# D on "rammar "rammaticality, 11% , 120 112' n. 2#D on innate str)ct)re of lan")a"e, 112 D

on phrase !o)ndaries, 11$ D on strict)res on lan")a"e st)dy, 1$0 11$/, 11$ 1111

R
Hamsey, Brank, 219 , 2#0 , 2%1 12%2, 2%# Hationalism, 192 D ?)me3s, viii , /1 1/2 Haylei"h+Jeans la*, #' Healism, i7 17, 1#1 119/D challen"ed, 1&' 11'%D on commens)ra!ility, 1&0 D v. constr)ctivism, 1#1 , 1#% 11#&, 1%# 11%/, 1&# , 1&% , 1&0 , 1&9 110$, 10% 11'%, 1'& 11'', 19$ , 191 1192D on conventionality, 1#1 , 1&/ , 10% 1109D defense of, 1'% 119&D v. empiricism, 1#1 , 1## , 1%# , 109 , 19$ D on epistemic infertility, 109 11'%D fo)ndationalism re!)tted !y, 1%$ , 1%% , 1%/ , 1/% D on kno*led"e in science, 1## D v. >)hn, 10% D as materialist, 19$ D on metaphysical innocence, 109 11'%D nat)ralistic epistemolo"y of, 1%' , 1%/ D on no nonca)sal contri!)tion thesis, 1'& 11''D on scientific revol)tions, 1%& , 1%0 11%'D on semantics, 191 1192D on s)pervenience, 10% D on theory dependence, 1%# 11%%, 1&/ , 1'$ D on )no!serva!les, 10% Hec)rsion theory, 1& , 10 , 1/ Hed)ctionism, 7i , 20$ 1201D anti+, 2/0 D classical, 2'2 12'/, 2/# D defects in, 2'% 12'/D v. f)nctionalism, 2'0 12''D

notion of la*f)lness in, 2'& D ontolo"ical, 2'9 D in physicalism, 2&0 12&', 2/1 12/2, 2/# , 2/9 129$ n. 1#D physicalism compared to, 2'2 12'%D <)asi+, 2/# 12/%, 2/& 12/0D s)pervenience as alternative to, 2'% , 2'& 12'0 Heichen!ach, ?ans, 9 , /& 1/0, 91 , 20$ , 201 Helativism, i7 D Carnap3s, 92 , 9% , 9& D Cassirer3s, 9% D of lo"ical positivism, 9$ , 9% D and tolerance, 1&$ Helativity, theory of, /& , // , 91 , 9% Hescher, @icholas, 2$& , 21$ Hiemann, 9eor", // Horty, Hichard, 99 , 1$$ , 1$% , 1$& , 112 , 11& H)melhart, Cavid, 22% H)ssell, Bertrand, /'

S
-chema, defined, 22% 122& -chlick, :orit4, /& , /0 , /9 , 91 , 92 -cholasticism, %% 1%& -cience: co"nitive, 22% 122&D conte7t)al model of, 199 , 2$# 121$, 211 1212D f)nctional decomposition pro!lems in, 19 12$D hierarchical models of, 7 , 199 121&D holistic model of, 7 , 199 , 2$$ , 2$1 12$2D interro"ative model of, 2# 1%#D mesh !et*een, 2/& 12/'D method in .see :ethod2D as o!5ective, /% D o!servation in, 2$$ D

philosophy linked *ith, /% D philosophy of, 2$& , 2#% D pl)ralism in, 1// 1191D politics in, 1/0 11//D as rational kno*led"e, /% , /0 D rational reconstr)ction of, 10$ 110%D social constr)ction in .see Conventionality2D theoretical )nderdetermination in, 91 D theory in .see (heory2 -cientific revol)tions, 1%9 D on Aristotelian e7planation of nat)res, %% , %& 1%0D constr)ctivists on, 1%2 , 1%& , 1%0 11%'D lo"ical positivists on, /& D realists on, 1%& , 1%0 11%' -cientism, /% -ellars, Jilfrid, 20$ , 201 -emantics, 191 1192D in scientific theories, 7 , 21' , 21/ , 219 , 221 , 222 122#, 2#% 12&% -epper, Cennis ,., 0% , 0& , 00 -hapere, C)dley, 21' , 221 -hoemaker, -ydney, 02 -imon, ?er!ert, 2$0 -kepticism, ' , / -kinner, B. B., '9 -need, Joseph C., 7 , 21' , 21/ , 221 1222, 22& 1220, 22' , 2#% 12&% -ocrates: on conditions for kno*led"e, / D con5ect)res tr)th, 1$ D on findin" virt)e, % D on kno*led"e v. tr)e opinion, & , ' D on reco"ni4in" tr)th, & 10 -pace+time: 6aether6 theory of, 91 D E)clidean+@e*tonian, /9 19$, 209 D

; #$1 ; ?il!ertian, 209 D in int)ition, // D >antian, /& , /0 1//, /9 19$D lo"ical positivist, /9 19$ -tanford3s 9ravity+Pro!e+B e7periment, &1 , &2 1&#, &% , &0 , &' 10$ -te"m)ller, Jolf"an", 21' , 21/ , 2#$ -tr)ct)ralism, 7 , 2#% 12&% -)"ar, A. C., 219 122$, 2#$ -)pervenience, 7i , 1&9 , 101 1102, 10# D as alternative to physicalism, 2'9 , 2/$ 12/2, 2/# D as alternative to red)ctionism, 2'% , 2'& 12'0D constr)ctivism v. realism on, 10% D nonmodal, 2/$ 12/1 -)ppe, Bred, 21' -)ppes, Patrick, 21' , 219 122$, 221 , 222 , 22# , 22% , 22& , 229 , 2#$ -ynonymy, 202 120#, 200 , 209

(heory, i7 , 2$$ D and application, 22$ 1222D Camp!ell on, 222 122#, 22% , 22& , 229 , 2#$ D Carnap on, 210 121'D coherence, 9$ , 92 , 9# , 9% , 9& D concepts from, 11' D defina!ility of, 2#% , 2%# D discovery, 2%/ 12&1D elimina!ility of, 2#% , 2%# D empirical content of, 221 D form)lation of, 21/ D of kind definitions, 1%& D of reference, 1%& D semantic vie* of, 7 , 21' , 21/ , 219 , 221 , 222 122#, 2#% 12&%D

-need on, 22& 1220, 22' D standard vie* of, 210 12##D str)ct)ralist vie* of, 7 , 2#% 12&% (heory dependence, of scientific methods, 1#2 , 1#& , 1%9 , 1&% , 1&& D constr)ctivists on, 1#0 11%1, 1&' 11&9, 10& , 10' 110/, 109 , 1'$ D empiricists on, 1%$ , 1&' 11&9, 10& , 10' 110/, 109 , 1'1 11'2D 5)stified, 1'1 11'2D >)hn on, 100 D and nat)ralistic e7planations, 1'$ 11'1D realists on, 1%# 11%%, 1&/ , 1'$ (ime. See -pace+time (olerance, principle of, 92 19# (o)lmin, -tephen, /& (r)esdell, Clifford, 2#$ (r)th, # , & 10, 9 , 1$ , 11 , ## D coherence theory of, 9$ , 92 , 9# , 9% , 9& ()rin"+machine, 20& 1200

U
Unconscio)s mechanisms, 211 1212 Underdetermination, 2$ 121, 91 Univocity, 1&2

V
van Braassen, Bas, %& 1%0, 0$ , 01 , 21' , 22% von @e)mann, John, #/

4
Jeierstrass, >arl, // Jien3s la*, #' Jeinstein, -cott, 11 , 1' Jitt"enstein, ,)d*i", 99 , 1$% ; #$2 ; Cesi"ner: U.C. Press -taff

Compositor: Asco (rade (ypesettin", ,td. (e7t: 1$ 12 Baskerville Cisplay: Baskerville Printer: :aple+Kail Book :f". 9ro)p Binder: :aple+Kail Book :f". 9ro)p
Preferred Citation: Earman, John, editor. Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1992 1992. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft%f&9n9''