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The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant This eBook is for the use

of anyone any here at no cost an! ith almost no restrictions hatsoe"er# $ou may co%y it, gi"e it a ay or re&use it un!er the terms of the Project Gutenberg 'icense inclu!e! ith this eBook or online at #gutenberg#org Title( The Critique of Pure Reason )uthor( Immanuel Kant Release *ate( +uly, ,--. /EBook 01,2-3 'ast 4%!ate!( )ugust 5, ,-6, 'anguage( English Character set enco!ing( )7CII 888 7T)RT 9: T;I7 PR9+ECT G4TE<BERG EB99K T;E CRITI=4E 9: P4RE RE)79< 888

Pro!uce! by Charles )l!aron!o an! *a"i! >i!ger

THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON By Immanuel Kant

Translated by J.

. !.

e"#le$%&n

PREFACE TO THE FIRST E!ITION' ()*( ;uman reason, in one s%here of its cognition, is calle! u%on to consi!er questions, hich it cannot !ecline, as they are %resente! by its o n nature, but hich it cannot ans er, as they transcen! e"ery faculty of the min!# It falls into this !ifficulty ithout any fault of its o n# It begins ith %rinci%les, hich cannot be !is%ense! ith in the fiel! of e?%erience, an! the truth an! sufficiency of hich are, at the same time, insure! by e?%erience# >ith these %rinci%les it rises, in obe!ience to the la s of its o n nature, to e"er higher an! more remote con!itions# But it quickly !isco"ers that, in this ay, its labours must remain e"er incom%lete, because ne questions ne"er cease to %resent themsel"es@ an! thus it fin!s itself com%elle! to ha"e recourse to %rinci%les hich transcen! the region of e?%erience, hile they are regar!e! by common sense ithout !istrust# It thus falls into confusion an! contra!ictions, from hich it conjectures the %resence of latent errors, hich, ho e"er, it is unable to !isco"er, because the %rinci%les it em%loys, transcen!ing the limits of e?%erience, cannot be teste! by that criterion# The arena of these en!less contests is calle! Aeta%hysic# Time as, hen she as the queen of all the sciences@ an!, if e take the ill for the !ee!, she certainly !eser"es, so far as regar!s the high im%ortance of her object&matter, this title of honour# <o , it is the fashion of the time to hea% contem%t an! scorn u%on her@ an! the matron mourns, forlorn an! forsaken, like ;ecuba( Ao!o ma?ima rerum, Tot generis, natisque %otens### <unc trahor e?ul, ino%s# B9"i!, Aetamor%hoses# ?iii )t first, her go"ernment, un!er the a!ministration of the !ogmatists, as an absolute !es%otism# But, as the legislati"e continue! to sho traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her em%ire gra!ually broke u%, an! intestine ars intro!uce! the reign of anarchy@ hile the sce%tics, like noma!ic tribes, ho hate a %ermanent habitation an! settle! mo!e of li"ing, attacke! from time to time those ho ha! organiCe! themsel"es into ci"il communities# But their number as, "ery ha%%ily, small@ an! thus they coul! not entirely %ut a sto% to the e?ertions of those ho %ersiste! in raising ne e!ifices, although on no settle! or uniform %lan# In recent times the ho%e !a ne! u%on us of seeing those !is%utes settle!, an! the legitimacy of her claims establishe! by a kin! of %hysiology of the human un!erstan!ingBthat of the celebrate! 'ocke# But it as foun!

thatBalthough it as affirme! that this so&calle! queen coul! not refer her !escent to any higher source than that of common e?%erience, a circumstance hich necessarily brought sus%icion on her claimsBas this genealogy as incorrect, she %ersiste! in the a!"ancement of her claims to so"ereignty# Thus meta%hysics necessarily fell back into the antiquate! an! rotten constitution of !ogmatism, an! again became obno?ious to the contem%t from hich efforts ha! been ma!e to sa"e it# )t %resent, as all metho!s, accor!ing to the general %ersuasion, ha"e been trie! in "ain, there reigns nought but eariness an! com%lete in!ifferentismBthe mother of chaos an! night in the scientific orl!, but at the same time the source of, or at least the %relu!e to, the re&creation an! reinstallation of a science, hen it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, an! !isuse from ill !irecte! effort# :or it is in reality "ain to %rofess in!ifference in regar! to such inquiries, the object of hich cannot be in!ifferent to humanity# Besi!es, these %reten!e! in!ifferentists, ho e"er much they may try to !isguise themsel"es by the assum%tion of a %o%ular style an! by changes on the language of the schools, una"oi!ably fall into meta%hysical !eclarations an! %ro%ositions, hich they %rofess to regar! ith so much contem%t# )t the same time, this in!ifference, hich has arisen in the orl! of science, an! hich relates to that kin! of kno le!ge hich e shoul! ish to see !estroye! the last, is a %henomenon that ell !eser"es our attention an! reflection# It is %lainly not the effect of the le"ity, but of the mature! ju!gement8 of the age, hich refuses to be any longer entertaine! ith illusory kno le!ge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to un!ertake the most laborious of all tasksBthat of self&e?amination, an! to establish a tribunal, hich may secure it in its ell&groun!e! claims, hile it %ronounces against all baseless assum%tions an! %retensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but accor!ing to its o n eternal an! unchangeable la s# This tribunal is nothing less than the critical in"estigation of %ure reason# /8:ootnote( >e "ery often hear com%laints of the shallo ness of the %resent age, an! of the !ecay of %rofoun! science# But I !o not think that those hich rest u%on a secure foun!ation, such as mathematics, %hysical science, etc#, in the least !eser"e this re%roach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, an! in the latter case, in!ee!, far sur%ass it# The same oul! be the case ith the other kin!s of cognition, if their %rinci%les ere but firmly establishe!# In the absence of this security, in!ifference, !oubt, an! finally, se"ere criticism are rather signs of a %rofoun! habit of thought# 9ur age is the age of criticism, to hich e"erything must be subjecte!# The sacre!ness of religion, an! the authority of legislation, are by many regar!e! as groun!s of e?em%tion from the e?amination of this tribunal# But, if they on they are e?em%te!, they become the subjects of just sus%icion, an! cannot lay claim to sincere res%ect, hich reason accor!s only to that hich has stoo! the test of a free an! %ublic e?amination#3 I !o not mean by this a criticism of books an! systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, ith reference to the cognitions to hich it stri"es to attain ithout the ai! of e?%erience@ in other or!s, the solution of the question regar!ing the %ossibility or im%ossibility of meta%hysics, an! the !etermination of the origin, as ell as of the e?tent an! limits of this science# )ll this must be !one on the basis of %rinci%les#

This %athBthe only one no remainingBhas been entere! u%on by me@ an! I flatter myself that I ha"e, in this ay, !isco"ere! the cause ofBan! consequently the mo!e of remo"ingBall the errors hich ha"e hitherto set reason at "ariance ith itself, in the s%here of non&em%irical thought# I ha"e not returne! an e"asi"e ans er to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability an! limitation of the faculties of the min!@ I ha"e, on the contrary, e?amine! them com%letely in the light of %rinci%les, an!, after ha"ing !isco"ere! the cause of the !oubts an! contra!ictions into hich reason fell, ha"e sol"e! them to its %erfect satisfaction# It is true, these questions ha"e not been sol"e! as !ogmatism, in its "ain fancies an! !esires, ha! e?%ecte!@ for it can only be satisfie! by the e?ercise of magical arts, an! of these I ha"e no kno le!ge# But neither !o these come ithin the com%ass of our mental %o ers@ an! it as the !uty of %hiloso%hy to !estroy the illusions hich ha! their origin in misconce%tions, hate"er !arling ho%es an! "alue! e?%ectations may be ruine! by its e?%lanations# Ay chief aim in this ork has been thoroughness@ an! I make bol! to say that there is not a single meta%hysical %roblem that !oes not fin! its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here# Pure reason is a %erfect unity@ an! therefore, if the %rinci%le %resente! by it %ro"e to be insufficient for the solution of e"en a single one of those questions to hich the "ery nature of reason gi"es birth, e must reject it, as e coul! not be %erfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others# >hile I say this, I think I see u%on the countenance of the rea!er signs of !issatisfaction mingle! ith contem%t, hen he hears !eclarations hich soun! so boastful an! e?tra"agant@ an! yet they are beyon! com%arison more mo!erate than those a!"ance! by the commonest author of the commonest %hiloso%hical %rogramme, in hich the !ogmatist %rofesses to !emonstrate the sim%le nature of the soul, or the necessity of a %rimal being# 7uch a !ogmatist %romises to e?ten! human kno le!ge beyon! the limits of %ossible e?%erience@ hile I humbly confess that this is com%letely beyon! my %o er# Instea! of any such attem%t, I confine myself to the e?amination of reason alone an! its %ure thought@ an! I !o not nee! to seek far for the sum&total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my o n min!# Besi!es, common logic %resents me ith a com%lete an! systematic catalogue of all the sim%le o%erations of reason@ an! it is my task to ans er the question ho far reason can go, ithout the material %resente! an! the ai! furnishe! by e?%erience# 7o much for the com%leteness an! thoroughness necessary in the e?ecution of the %resent task# The aims set before us are not arbitrarily %ro%ose!, but are im%ose! u%on us by the nature of cognition itself# The abo"e remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry# )s regar!s the form, there are t o in!is%ensable con!itions, hich any one ho un!ertakes so !ifficult a task as that of a critique of %ure reason, is boun! to fulfil# These con!itions are certitu!e an! clearness# )s regar!s certitu!e, I ha"e fully con"ince! myself that, in this s%here of thought, o%inion is %erfectly ina!missible, an! that e"erything hich bears the least semblance of an hy%othesis must be e?clu!e!, as of no "alue in such !iscussions# :or it is a necessary con!ition of e"ery cognition that is to be establishe! u%on a %riori groun!s that it shall

be hel! to be absolutely necessary@ much more is this the case ith an attem%t to !etermine all %ure a %riori cognition, an! to furnish the stan!ar!Ban! consequently an e?am%leBof all a%o!eictic D%hiloso%hicalE certitu!e# >hether I ha"e succee!e! in hat I %rofesse! to !o, it is for the rea!er to !etermine@ it is the authorFs business merely to a!!uce groun!s an! reasons, ithout !etermining hat influence these ought to ha"e on the min! of his ju!ges# But, lest anything he may ha"e sai! may become the innocent cause of !oubt in their min!s, or ten! to eaken the effect hich his arguments might other ise %ro!uceBhe may be allo e! to %oint out those %assages hich may occasion mistrust or !ifficulty, although these !o not concern the main %ur%ose of the %resent ork# ;e !oes this solely ith the "ie of remo"ing from the min! of the rea!er any !oubts hich might affect his ju!gement of the ork as a hole, an! in regar! to its ultimate aim# I kno no in"estigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of the faculty hich e call un!erstan!ing, an! at the same time for the !etermination of the rules an! limits of its use, than those un!ertaken in the secon! cha%ter of the GTranscen!ental )nalytic,G un!er the title of G*e!uction of the Pure Conce%tions of the 4n!erstan!ingG@ an! they ha"e also cost me by far the greatest labourBlabour hich, I ho%e, ill not remain uncom%ensate!# The "ie there taken, hich goes some hat !ee%ly into the subject, has t o si!es, The one relates to the objects of the %ure un!erstan!ing, an! is inten!e! to !emonstrate an! to ren!er com%rehensible the objecti"e "ali!ity of its a %riori conce%tions@ an! it forms for this reason an essential %art of the Critique# The other consi!ers the %ure un!erstan!ing itself, its %ossibility an! its %o ers of cognitionBthat is, from a subjecti"e %oint of "ie @ an!, although this e?%osition is of great im%ortance, it !oes not belong essentially to the main %ur%ose of the ork, because the gran! question is hat an! ho much can reason an! un!erstan!ing, a%art from e?%erience, cogniCe, an! not, ho is the faculty of thought itself %ossibleH )s the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a gi"en effect, an! has thus in it some semblance of an hy%othesis Dalthough, as I shall sho on another occasion, this is really not the factE, it oul! seem that, in the %resent instance, I ha! allo e! myself to enounce a mere o%inion, an! that the rea!er must therefore be at liberty to hol! a !ifferent o%inion# But I beg to remin! him that, if my subjecti"e !e!uction !oes not %ro!uce in his min! the con"iction of its certitu!e at hich I aime!, the objecti"e !e!uction, ith hich alone the %resent ork is %ro%erly concerne!, is in e"ery res%ect satisfactory# )s regar!s clearness, the rea!er has a right to !eman!, in the first %lace, !iscursi"e or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of conce%tions, an!, secon!ly, intuiti"e or aesthetic clearness, by means of intuitions, that is, by e?am%les or other mo!es of illustration in concreto# I ha"e !one hat I coul! for the first kin! of intelligibility# This as essential to my %ur%ose@ an! it thus became the acci!ental cause of my inability to !o com%lete justice to the secon! requirement# I ha"e been almost al ays at a loss, !uring the %rogress of this ork, ho to settle this question# E?am%les an! illustrations al ays a%%eare! to me necessary, an!, in the first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their %ro%er %laces# But I "ery soon became a are of the magnitu!e of my task, an! the numerous %roblems ith hich I shoul! be engage!@ an!, as I %ercei"e! that this critical in"estigation oul!, e"en if !eli"ere! in the !riest scholastic manner, be far from being

brief, I foun! it una!"isable to enlarge it still more ith e?am%les an! e?%lanations, hich are necessary only from a %o%ular %oint of "ie # I as in!uce! to take this course from the consi!eration also that the %resent ork is not inten!e! for %o%ular use, that those !e"ote! to science !o not require such hel%s, although they are al ays acce%table, an! that they oul! ha"e materially interfere! ith my %resent %ur%ose# )bbe Terrasson remarks ith great justice that, if e estimate the siCe of a ork, not from the number of its %ages, but from the time hich e require to make oursel"es master of it, it may be sai! of many a book that it oul! be much shorter, if it ere not so short# 9n the other han!, as regar!s the com%rehensibility of a system of s%eculati"e cognition, connecte! un!er a single %rinci%le, e may say ith equal justice( many a book oul! ha"e been much clearer, if it ha! not been inten!e! to be so "ery clear# :or e?%lanations an! e?am%les, an! other hel%s to intelligibility, ai! us in the com%rehension of %arts, but they !istract the attention, !issi%ate the mental %o er of the rea!er, an! stan! in the ay of his forming a clear conce%tion of the hole@ as he cannot attain soon enough to a sur"ey of the system, an! the colouring an! embellishments besto e! u%on it %re"ent his obser"ing its articulation or organiCationB hich is the most im%ortant consi!eration ith him, hen he comes to ju!ge of its unity an! stability# The rea!er must naturally ha"e a strong in!ucement to co&o%erate ith the %resent author, if he has forme! the intention of erecting a com%lete an! soli! e!ifice of meta%hysical science, accor!ing to the %lan no lai! before him# Aeta%hysics, as here re%resente!, is the only science hich a!mits of com%letionBan! ith little labour, if it is unite!, in a short time@ so that nothing ill be left to future generations e?ce%t the task of illustrating an! a%%lying it !i!actically# :or this science is nothing more than the in"entory of all that is gi"en us by %ure reason, systematically arrange!# <othing can esca%e our notice@ for hat reason %ro!uces from itself cannot lie conceale!, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon as e ha"e !isco"ere! the common %rinci%le of the i!eas e seek# The %erfect unity of this kin! of cognitions, hich are base! u%on %ure conce%tions, an! uninfluence! by any em%irical element, or any %eculiar intuition lea!ing to !eterminate e?%erience, ren!ers this com%leteness not only %racticable, but also necessary# Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta su%elle?# BPersius# 7atirae i"# I,# 7uch a system of %ure s%eculati"e reason I ho%e to be able to %ublish un!er the title of Aeta%hysic of <ature8# The content of this ork D hich ill not be half so longE ill be "ery much richer than that of the %resent Critique, hich has to !isco"er the sources of this cognition an! e?%ose the con!itions of its %ossibility, an! at the same time to clear an! le"el a fit foun!ation for the scientific e!ifice# In the %resent ork, I look for the %atient hearing an! the im%artiality of a ju!ge@ in the other, for the goo!& ill an! assistance of a co&labourer# :or, ho e"er com%lete the list of %rinci%les for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires that no !e!uce! conce%tions shoul! be absent# These cannot be %resente! a %riori, but must be gra!ually !isco"ere!@ an!, hile the synthesis of conce%tions has been fully e?hauste! in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the %ro%ose! ork, the same shoul! be the case ith their analysis# But this ill be rather an amusement than a labour#

/8:ootnote( In contra!istinction to the Aeta%hysic of Ethics# This ork as ne"er %ublishe!#3

PREFACE TO THE SECON! E!ITION' ()*) >hether the treatment of that %ortion of our kno le!ge hich lies ithin the %ro"ince of %ure reason a!"ances ith that un!e"iating certainty hich characteriCes the %rogress of science, e shall be at no loss to !etermine# If e fin! those ho are engage! in meta%hysical %ursuits, unable to come to an un!erstan!ing as to the metho! hich they ought to follo @ if e fin! them, after the most elaborate %re%arations, in"ariably brought to a stan! before the goal is reache!, an! com%elle! to retrace their ste%s an! strike into fresh %aths, e may then feel quite sure that they are far from ha"ing attaine! to the certainty of scientific %rogress an! may rather be sai! to be merely gro%ing about in the !ark# In these circumstances e shall ren!er an im%ortant ser"ice to reason if e succee! in sim%ly in!icating the %ath along hich it must tra"el, in or!er to arri"e at any resultsBe"en if it shoul! be foun! necessary to aban!on many of those aims hich, ithout reflection, ha"e been %ro%ose! for its attainment# That logic has a!"ance! in this sure course, e"en from the earliest times, is a%%arent from the fact that, since )ristotle, it has been unable to a!"ance a ste% an!, thus, to all a%%earance has reache! its com%letion# :or, if some of the mo!erns ha"e thought to enlarge its !omain by intro!ucing %sychological !iscussions on the mental faculties, such as imagination an! it, meta%hysical, !iscussions on the origin of kno le!ge an! the !ifferent kin!s of certitu!e, accor!ing to the !ifference of the objects Di!ealism, sce%ticism, an! so onE, or anthro%ological !iscussions on %reju!ices, their causes an! reme!ies( this attem%t, on the %art of these authors, only sho s their ignorance of the %eculiar nature of logical science# >e !o not enlarge but !isfigure the sciences hen e lose sight of their res%ecti"e limits an! allo them to run into one another# <o logic is enclose! ithin limits hich a!mit of %erfectly clear !efinition@ it is a science hich has for its object nothing but the e?%osition an! %roof of the formal la s of all thought, hether it be a %riori or em%irical, hate"er be its origin or its object, an! hate"er the !ifficultiesBnatural or acci!entalB hich it encounters in the human min!# The early success of logic must be attribute! e?clusi"ely to the narro ness of its fiel!, in hich abstraction may, or rather must, be ma!e of all the objects of cognition ith their characteristic !istinctions, an! in hich the un!erstan!ing has only to !eal ith itself an! ith its o n forms# It is, ob"iously, a much more !ifficult task for reason to strike into the sure %ath of science, here it has to !eal not sim%ly ith itself, but ith objects e?ternal to itself# ;ence, logic is %ro%erly only a %ro%ae!euticBforms, as it ere, the "estibule of the sciences@ an! hile it is necessary to enable us to form a correct ju!gement ith regar! to the "arious branches of kno le!ge, still the acquisition of real, substanti"e kno le!ge is to be sought only in the sciences %ro%erly so calle!, that is, in the objecti"e sciences#

<o these sciences, if they can be terme! rational at all, must contain elements of a %riori cognition, an! this cognition may stan! in a t ofol! relation to its object# Either it may ha"e to !etermine the conce%tion of the objectB hich must be su%%lie! e?traneously, or it may ha"e to establish its reality# The former is theoretical, the latter %ractical, rational cognition# In both, the %ure or a %riori element must be treate! first, an! must be carefully !istinguishe! from that hich is su%%lie! from other sources# )ny other metho! can only lea! to irreme!iable confusion# Aathematics an! %hysics are the t o theoretical sciences hich ha"e to !etermine their objects a %riori# The former is %urely a %riori, the latter is %artially so, but is also !e%en!ent on other sources of cognition# In the earliest times of hich history affor!s us any recor!, mathematics ha! alrea!y entere! on the sure course of science, among that on!erful nation, the Greeks# 7till it is not to be su%%ose! that it as as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct for itself, that royal roa!, as it as for logic, in hich reason has only to !eal ith itself# 9n the contrary, I belie"e that it must ha"e remaine! longBchiefly among the Egy%tiansBin the stage of blin! gro%ing after its true aims an! !estination, an! that it as re"olutioniCe! by the ha%%y i!ea of one man, ho struck out an! !etermine! for all time the %ath hich this science must follo , an! hich a!mits of an in!efinite a!"ancement# The history of this intellectual re"olutionBmuch more im%ortant in its results than the !isco"ery of the %assage roun! the celebrate! Ca%e of Goo! ;o%eBan! of its author, has not been %reser"e!# But *iogenes 'aertius, in naming the su%%ose! !isco"erer of some of the sim%lest elements of geometrical !emonstrationBelements hich, accor!ing to the or!inary o%inion, !o not e"en require to be %ro"e!Bmakes it a%%arent that the change intro!uce! by the first in!ication of this ne %ath, must ha"e seeme! of the utmost im%ortance to the mathematicians of that age, an! it has thus been secure! against the chance of obli"ion# ) ne light must ha"e flashe! on the min! of the first man DThales, or hate"er may ha"e been his nameE ho !emonstrate! the %ro%erties of the isosceles triangle# :or he foun! that it as not sufficient to me!itate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conce%tion of it, as it e?iste! in his min!, an! thus en!ea"our to get at the kno le!ge of its %ro%erties, but that it as necessary to %ro!uce these %ro%erties, as it ere, by a %ositi"e a %riori construction@ an! that, in or!er to arri"e ith certainty at a %riori cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other %ro%erties than those hich necessarily follo e! from that hich he ha! himself, in accor!ance ith his conce%tion, %lace! in the object# ) much longer %erio! ela%se! before %hysics entere! on the high ay of science# :or it is only about a century an! a half since the ise Bacon ga"e a ne !irection to %hysical stu!ies, or ratherBas others ere alrea!y on the right trackBim%arte! fresh "igour to the %ursuit of this ne !irection# ;ere, too, as in the case of mathematics, e fin! e"i!ence of a ra%i! intellectual re"olution# In the remarks hich follo I shall confine myself to the em%irical si!e of natural science# >hen Galilei e?%erimente! ith balls of a !efinite eight on the incline! %lane, hen Torricelli cause! the air to sustain a eight hich he ha! calculate! beforehan! to be equal to that of a !efinite column of ater, or hen 7tahl, at a later %erio!, con"erte!

metals into lime, an! recon"erte! lime into metal, by the a!!ition an! subtraction of certain elements@ /:ootnote( I !o not here follo ith e?actness the history of the e?%erimental metho!, of hich, in!ee!, the first ste%s are in"ol"e! in some obscurity#3 a light broke u%on all natural %hiloso%hers# They learne! that reason only %ercei"es that hich it %ro!uces after its o n !esign@ that it must not be content to follo , as it ere, in the lea!ing&strings of nature, but must %rocee! in a!"ance ith %rinci%les of ju!gement accor!ing to un"arying la s, an! com%el nature to re%ly its questions# :or acci!ental obser"ations, ma!e accor!ing to no %reconcei"e! %lan, cannot be unite! un!er a necessary la # But it is this that reason seeks for an! requires# It is only the %rinci%les of reason hich can gi"e to concor!ant %henomena the "ali!ity of la s, an! it is only hen e?%eriment is !irecte! by these rational %rinci%les that it can ha"e any real utility# Reason must a%%roach nature ith the "ie , in!ee!, of recei"ing information from it, not, ho e"er, in the character of a %u%il, ho listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a ju!ge, ho com%els the itnesses to re%ly to those questions hich he himself thinks fit to %ro%ose# To this single i!ea must the re"olution be ascribe!, by hich, after gro%ing in the !ark for so many centuries, natural science as at length con!ucte! into the %ath of certain %rogress# >e come no to meta%hysics, a %urely s%eculati"e science, hich occu%ies a com%letely isolate! %osition an! is entirely in!e%en!ent of the teachings of e?%erience# It !eals ith mere conce%tionsBnot, like mathematics, ith conce%tions a%%lie! to intuitionBan! in it, reason is the %u%il of itself alone# It is the ol!est of the sciences, an! oul! still sur"i"e, e"en if all the rest ere s allo e! u% in the abyss of an all&!estroying barbarism# But it has not yet ha! the goo! fortune to attain to the sure scientific metho!# This ill be a%%arent@ if e a%%ly the tests hich e %ro%ose! at the outset# >e fin! that reason %er%etually comes to a stan!, hen it attem%ts to gain a %riori the %erce%tion e"en of those la s hich the most common e?%erience confirms# >e fin! it com%elle! to retrace its ste%s in innumerable instances, an! to aban!on the %ath on hich it ha! entere!, because this !oes not lea! to the !esire! result# >e fin!, too, that those ho are engage! in meta%hysical %ursuits are far from being able to agree among themsel"es, but that, on the contrary, this science a%%ears to furnish an arena s%ecially a!a%te! for the !is%lay of skill or the e?ercise of strength in mock&contestsBa fiel! in hich no combatant e"er yet succee!e! in gaining an inch of groun!, in hich, at least, no "ictory as e"er yet cro ne! ith %ermanent %ossession# This lea!s us to inquire hy it is that, in meta%hysics, the sure %ath of science has not hitherto been foun!# 7hall e su%%ose that it is im%ossible to !isco"er itH >hy then shoul! nature ha"e "isite! our reason ith restless as%irations after it, as if it ere one of our eightiest concernsH <ay, more, ho little cause shoul! e ha"e to %lace confi!ence in our reason, if it aban!ons us in a matter about hich, most of all, e !esire to kno the truthBan! not only so, but e"en allures us to the %ursuit of "ain %hantoms, only to betray us in the en!H 9r, if the %ath has only hitherto been misse!, hat in!ications !o e %ossess to gui!e us in a rene e! in"estigation, an! to enable us to ho%e for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our %re!ecessorsH It a%%ears to me that the e?am%les of mathematics an! natural %hiloso%hy, hich, as e ha"e seen, ere brought into their %resent con!ition by a su!!en re"olution, are

sufficiently remarkable to fi? our attention on the essential circumstances of the change hich has %ro"e! so a!"antageous to them, an! to in!uce us to make the e?%eriment of imitating them, so far as the analogy hich, as rational sciences, they bear to meta%hysics may %ermit# It has hitherto been assume! that our cognition must conform to the objects@ but all attem%ts to ascertain anything about these objects a %riori, by means of conce%tions, an! thus to e?ten! the range of our kno le!ge, ha"e been ren!ere! aborti"e by this assum%tion# 'et us then make the e?%eriment hether e may not be more successful in meta%hysics, if e assume that the objects must conform to our cognition# This a%%ears, at all e"ents, to accor! better ith the %ossibility of our gaining the en! e ha"e in "ie , that is to say, of arri"ing at the cognition of objects a %riori, of !etermining something ith res%ect to these objects, before they are gi"en to us# >e here %ro%ose to !o just hat Co%ernicus !i! in attem%ting to e?%lain the celestial mo"ements# >hen he foun! that he coul! make no %rogress by assuming that all the hea"enly bo!ies re"ol"e! roun! the s%ectator, he re"erse! the %rocess, an! trie! the e?%eriment of assuming that the s%ectator re"ol"e!, hile the stars remaine! at rest# >e may make the same e?%eriment ith regar! to the intuition of objects# If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I !o not see ho e can kno anything of them a %riori# If, on the other han!, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily concei"e the %ossibility of such an a %riori kno le!ge# <o as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, butBif they are to become cognitionsBmust refer them, as re%resentations, to something, as object, an! must !etermine the latter by means of the former, here again there are t o courses o%en to me# Either, first, I may assume that the conce%tions, by hich I effect this !etermination, conform to the object Ban! in this case I am re!uce! to the same %er%le?ity as before@ or secon!ly, I may assume that the objects, or, hich is the same thing, that e?%erience, in hich alone as gi"en objects they are cogniCe!, conform to my conce%tionsBan! then I am at no loss ho to %rocee!# :or e?%erience itself is a mo!e of cognition hich requires un!erstan!ing# Before objects, are gi"en to me, that is, a %riori, I must %resu%%ose in myself la s of the un!erstan!ing hich are e?%resse! in conce%tions a %riori# To these conce%tions, then, all the objects of e?%erience must necessarily conform# <o there are objects hich reason thinks, an! that necessarily, but hich cannot be gi"en in e?%erience, or, at least, cannot be gi"en so as reason thinks them# The attem%t to think these objects ill hereafter furnish an e?cellent test of the ne metho! of thought hich e ha"e a!o%te!, an! hich is base! on the %rinci%le that e only cogniCe in things a %riori that hich e oursel"es %lace in them#8 /8:ootnote( This metho!, accor!ingly, hich e ha"e borro e! from the natural %hiloso%her, consists in seeking for the elements of %ure reason in that hich a!mits of confirmation or refutation by e?%eriment# <o the %ro%ositions of %ure reason, es%ecially hen they transcen! the limits of %ossible e?%erience, !o not a!mit of our making any e?%eriment ith their objects, as in natural science# ;ence, ith regar! to those conce%tions an! %rinci%les hich e assume a %riori, our only course ill be to "ie them from t o !ifferent si!es# >e must regar! one an! the same conce%tion, on the one han!, in relation to e?%erience as an

object of the senses an! of the un!erstan!ing, on the other han!, in relation to reason, isolate! an! transcen!ing the limits of e?%erience, as an object of mere thought# <o if e fin! that, hen e regar! things from this !ouble %oint of "ie , the result is in harmony ith the %rinci%le of %ure reason, but that, hen e regar! them from a single %oint of "ie , reason is in"ol"e! in self&contra!iction, then the e?%eriment ill establish the correctness of this !istinction#3 This attem%t succee!s as ell as e coul! !esire, an! %romises to meta%hysics, in its first %artBthat is, here it is occu%ie! ith conce%tions a %riori, of hich the corres%on!ing objects may be gi"en in e?%erienceBthe certain course of science# :or by this ne metho! e are enable! %erfectly to e?%lain the %ossibility of a %riori cognition, an!, hat is more, to !emonstrate satisfactorily the la s hich lie a %riori at the foun!ation of nature, as the sum of the objects of e?%erienceBneither of hich as %ossible accor!ing to the %roce!ure hitherto follo e!# But from this !e!uction of the faculty of a %riori cognition in the first %art of meta%hysics, e !eri"e a sur%rising result, an! one hich, to all a%%earance, militates against the great en! of meta%hysics, as treate! in the secon! %art# :or e come to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcen! the limits of %ossible e?%erience@ an! yet this is %recisely the most essential object of this science# The estimate of our rational cognition a %riori at hich e arri"e is that it has only to !o ith %henomena, an! that things in themsel"es, hile %ossessing a real e?istence, lie beyon! its s%here# ;ere e are enable! to %ut the justice of this estimate to the test# :or that hich of necessity im%els us to transcen! the limits of e?%erience an! of all %henomena is the uncon!itione!, hich reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themsel"es, in or!er to com%lete the series of con!itions# <o , if it a%%ears that hen, on the one han!, e assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themsel"es, the uncon!itione! cannot be thought ithout contra!iction, an! that hen, on the other han!, e assume that our re%resentation of things as they are gi"en to us, !oes not conform to these things as they are in themsel"es, but that these objects, as %henomena, conform to our mo!e of re%resentation, the contra!iction !isa%%ears( e shall then be con"ince! of the truth of that hich e began by assuming for the sake of e?%eriment@ e may look u%on it as establishe! that the uncon!itione! !oes not lie in things as e kno them, or as they are gi"en to us, but in things as they are in themsel"es, beyon! the range of our cognition#8 /8:ootnote( This e?%eriment of %ure reason has a great similarity to that of the chemists, hich they term the e?%eriment of re!uction, or, more usually, the synthetic %rocess# The analysis of the meta%hysician se%arates %ure cognition a %riori into t o heterogeneous elements, "iC#, the cognition of things as %henomena, an! of things in themsel"es# *ialectic combines these again into harmony ith the necessary rational i!ea of the uncon!itione!, an! fin!s that this harmony ne"er results e?ce%t through the abo"e !istinction, hich is, therefore, conclu!e! to be just#3

But, after e ha"e thus !enie! the %o er of s%eculati"e reason to make any %rogress in the s%here of the su%ersensible, it still remains for our consi!eration hether !ata !o not e?ist in %ractical cognition hich may enable us to !etermine the transcen!ent conce%tion of the uncon!itione!, to rise beyon! the limits of all %ossible e?%erience from a %ractical %oint of "ie , an! thus to satisfy the great en!s of meta%hysics# 7%eculati"e reason has thus, at least, ma!e room for such an e?tension of our kno le!ge( an!, if it must lea"e this s%ace "acant, still it !oes not rob us of the liberty to fill it u%, if e can, by means of %ractical !ataBnay, it e"en challenges us to make the attem%t#8 /8:ootnote( 7o the central la s of the mo"ements of the hea"enly bo!ies establishe! the truth of that hich Co%ernicus, first, assume! only as a hy%othesis, an!, at the same time, brought to light that in"isible force D<e tonian attractionE hich hol!s the uni"erse together# The latter oul! ha"e remaine! fore"er un!isco"ere!, if Co%ernicus ha! not "enture! on the e?%erimentBcontrary to the senses but still justBof looking for the obser"e! mo"ements not in the hea"enly bo!ies, but in the s%ectator# In this Preface I treat the ne meta%hysical metho! as a hy%othesis ith the "ie of ren!ering a%%arent the first attem%ts at such a change of metho!, hich are al ays hy%othetical# But in the Critique itself it ill be !emonstrate!, not hy%othetically, but a%o!eictically, from the nature of our re%resentations of s%ace an! time, an! from the elementary conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing#3 This attem%t to intro!uce a com%lete re"olution in the %roce!ure of meta%hysics, after the e?am%le of the geometricians an! natural %hiloso%hers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure 7%eculati"e Reason# It is a treatise on the metho! to be follo e!, not a system of the science itself# But, at the same time, it marks out an! !efines both the e?ternal boun!aries an! the internal structure of this science# :or %ure s%eculati"e reason has this %eculiarity, that, in choosing the "arious objects of thought, it is able to !efine the limits of its o n faculties, an! e"en to gi"e a com%lete enumeration of the %ossible mo!es of %ro%osing %roblems to itself, an! thus to sketch out the entire system of meta%hysics# :or, on the one han!, in cognition a %riori, nothing must be attribute! to the objects but hat the thinking subject !eri"es from itself@ an!, on the other han!, reason is, in regar! to the %rinci%les of cognition, a %erfectly !istinct, in!e%en!ent unity, in hich, as in an organiCe! bo!y, e"ery member e?ists for the sake of the others, an! all for the sake of each, so that no %rinci%le can be "ie e!, ith safety, in one relationshi%, unless it is, at the same time, "ie e! in relation to the total use of %ure reason# ;ence, too, meta%hysics has this singular a!"antageBan a!"antage hich falls to the lot of no other science hich has to !o ith objectsBthat, if once it is con!ucte! into the sure %ath of science, by means of this criticism, it can then take in the hole s%here of its cognitions, an! can thus com%lete its ork, an! lea"e it for the use of %osterity, as a ca%ital hich can ne"er recei"e fresh accessions# :or meta%hysics has to !eal only ith %rinci%les an! ith the limitations of its o n em%loyment as !etermine! by these

%rinci%les# To this %erfection it is, therefore, boun!, as the fun!amental science, to attain, an! to it the ma?im may justly be a%%lie!( <il actum re%utans, si qui! su%eresset agen!um# But, it ill be aske!, hat kin! of a treasure is this that e %ro%ose to bequeath to %osterityH >hat is the real "alue of this system of meta%hysics, %urifie! by criticism, an! thereby re!uce! to a %ermanent con!itionH ) cursory "ie of the %resent ork ill lea! to the su%%osition that its use is merely negati"e, that it only ser"es to arn us against "enturing, ith s%eculati"e reason, beyon! the limits of e?%erience# This is, in fact, its %rimary use# But this, at once, assumes a %ositi"e "alue, hen e obser"e that the %rinci%les ith hich s%eculati"e reason en!ea"ours to transcen! its limits lea! ine"itably, not to the e?tension, but to the contraction of the use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to e?ten! the limits of sensibility, hich is their %ro%er s%here, o"er the entire realm of thought an!, thus, to su%%lant the %ure D%racticalE use of reason# 7o far, then, as this criticism is occu%ie! in confining s%eculati"e reason ithin its %ro%er boun!s, it is only negati"e@ but, inasmuch as it thereby, at the same time, remo"es an obstacle hich im%e!es an! e"en threatens to !estroy the use of %ractical reason, it %ossesses a %ositi"e an! "ery im%ortant "alue# In or!er to a!mit this, e ha"e only to be con"ince! that there is an absolutely necessary use of %ure reasonBthe moral useBin hich it ine"itably transcen!s the limits of sensibility, ithout the ai! of s%eculation, requiring only to be insure! against the effects of a s%eculation hich oul! in"ol"e it in contra!iction ith itself# To !eny the %ositi"e a!"antage of the ser"ice hich this criticism ren!ers us oul! be as absur! as to maintain that the system of %olice is %ro!ucti"e of no %ositi"e benefit, since its main business is to %re"ent the "iolence hich citiCen has to a%%rehen! from citiCen, that so each may %ursue his "ocation in %eace an! security# That s%ace an! time are only forms of sensible intuition, an! hence are only con!itions of the e?istence of things as %henomena@ that, moreo"er, e ha"e no conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, an!, consequently, no elements for the cognition of things, e?ce%t in so far as a corres%on!ing intuition can be gi"en to these conce%tions@ that, accor!ingly, e can ha"e no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as %henomenonBall this is %ro"e! in the analytical %art of the Critique@ an! from this the limitation of all %ossible s%eculati"e cognition to the mere objects of e?%erience, follo s as a necessary result# )t the same time, it must be carefully borne in min! that, hile e surren!er the %o er of cogniCing, e still reser"e the %o er of thinking objects, as things in themsel"es#8 :or, other ise, e shoul! require to affirm the e?istence of an a%%earance, ithout something that a%%earsB hich oul! be absur!# <o let us su%%ose, for a moment, that e ha! not un!ertaken this criticism an!, accor!ingly, ha! not !ra n the necessary !istinction bet een things as objects of e?%erience an! things as they are in themsel"es# The %rinci%le of causality, an!, by consequence, the mechanism of nature as !etermine! by causality, oul! then ha"e absolute "ali!ity in relation to all things as efficient causes# I shoul! then be unable to assert, ith regar! to one an! the same being, e#g#, the human soul, that its ill is free, an! yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is, not free, ithout falling into a %al%able contra!iction, for in both %ro%ositions I shoul! take the soul in the same signification, as a thing in general, as a thing in itselfBas, ithout %re"ious criticism, I coul! not but take it# 7u%%ose no , on the other han!, that

e ha"e un!ertaken this criticism, an! ha"e learnt that an object may be taken in t o senses, first, as a %henomenon, secon!ly, as a thing in itself@ an! that, accor!ing to the !e!uction of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, the %rinci%le of causality has reference only to things in the first sense# >e then see ho it !oes not in"ol"e any contra!iction to assert, on the one han!, that the ill, in the %henomenal s%hereBin "isible actionBis necessarily obe!ient to the la of nature, an!, in so far, not free@ an!, on the other han!, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that la , an!, accor!ingly, is free# <o , it is true that I cannot, by means of s%eculati"e reason, an! still less by em%irical obser"ation, cogniCe my soul as a thing in itself an! consequently, cannot cogniCe liberty as the %ro%erty of a being to hich I ascribe effects in the orl! of sense# :or, to !o so, I must cogniCe this being as e?isting, an! yet not in time, hichB since I cannot su%%ort my conce%tion by any intuitionBis im%ossible# )t the same time, hile I cannot cogniCe, I can quite ell think free!om, that is to say, my re%resentation of it in"ol"es at least no contra!iction, if e bear in min! the critical !istinction of the t o mo!es of re%resentation Dthe sensible an! the intellectualE an! the consequent limitation of the conce%tions of the %ure un!erstan!ing an! of the %rinci%les hich flo from them# 7u%%ose no that morality necessarily %resu%%ose! liberty, in the strictest sense, as a %ro%erty of our ill@ su%%ose that reason containe! certain %ractical, original %rinci%les a %riori, hich ere absolutely im%ossible ithout this %resu%%osition@ an! su%%ose, at the same time, that s%eculati"e reason ha! %ro"e! that liberty as inca%able of being thought at all# It oul! then follo that the moral %resu%%osition must gi"e ay to the s%eculati"e affirmation, the o%%osite of hich in"ol"es an ob"ious contra!iction, an! that liberty an!, ith it, morality must yiel! to the mechanism of nature@ for the negation of morality in"ol"es no contra!iction, e?ce%t on the %resu%%osition of liberty# <o morality !oes not require the s%eculati"e cognition of liberty@ it is enough that I can think it, that its conce%tion in"ol"es no contra!iction, that it !oes not interfere ith the mechanism of nature# But e"en this requirement e coul! not satisfy, if e ha! not learnt the t ofol! sense in hich things may be taken@ an! it is only in this ay that the !octrine of morality an! the !octrine of nature are confine! ithin their %ro%er limits# :or this result, then, e are in!ebte! to a criticism hich arns us of our una"oi!able ignorance ith regar! to things in themsel"es, an! establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere %henomena# /8:ootnote( In or!er to cogniCe an object, I must be able to %ro"e its %ossibility, either from its reality as atteste! by e?%erience, or a %riori, by means of reason# But I can think hat I %lease, %ro"i!e! only I !o not contra!ict myself@ that is, %ro"i!e! my conce%tion is a %ossible thought, though I may be unable to ans er for the e?istence of a corres%on!ing object in the sum of %ossibilities# But something more is require! before I can attribute to such a conce%tion objecti"e "ali!ity, that is real %ossibilityBthe other %ossibility being merely logical# >e are not, ho e"er, confine! to theoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this a!!itional requirement, but may !eri"e them from %ractical sources#3

The %ositi"e "alue of the critical %rinci%les of %ure reason in relation to the conce%tion of Go! an! of the sim%le nature of the soul, a!mits of a similar e?em%lification@ but on this %oint I shall not ! ell# I cannot e"en make the assum%tionBas the %ractical interests of morality requireBof Go!, free!om, an! immortality, if I !o not !e%ri"e s%eculati"e reason of its %retensions to transcen!ent insight# :or to arri"e at these, it must make use of %rinci%les hich, in fact, e?ten! only to the objects of %ossible e?%erience, an! hich cannot be a%%lie! to objects beyon! this s%here ithout con"erting them into %henomena, an! thus ren!ering the %ractical e?tension of %ure reason im%ossible# I must, therefore, abolish kno le!ge, to make room for belief# The !ogmatism of meta%hysics, that is, the %resum%tion that it is %ossible to a!"ance in meta%hysics ithout %re"ious criticism, is the true source of the unbelief Dal ays !ogmaticE hich militates against morality# Thus, hile it may be no "ery !ifficult task to bequeath a legacy to %osterity, in the sha%e of a system of meta%hysics constructe! in accor!ance ith the Critique of Pure Reason, still the "alue of such a bequest is not to be !e%reciate!# It ill ren!er an im%ortant ser"ice to reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific metho! for that ran!om gro%ing after results ithout the gui!ance of %rinci%les, hich has hitherto characteriCe! the %ursuit of meta%hysical stu!ies# It ill ren!er an im%ortant ser"ice to the inquiring min! of youth, by lea!ing the stu!ent to a%%ly his %o ers to the culti"ation of genuine science, instea! of asting them, as at %resent, on s%eculations hich can ne"er lea! to any result, or on the i!le attem%t to in"ent ne i!eas an! o%inions# But, abo"e all, it ill confer an inestimable benefit on morality an! religion, by sho ing that all the objections urge! against them may be silence! for e"er by the 7ocratic metho!, that is to say, by %ro"ing the ignorance of the objector# :or, as the orl! has ne"er been, an!, no !oubt, ne"er ill be ithout a system of meta%hysics of one kin! or another, it is the highest an! eightiest concern of %hiloso%hy to ren!er it %o erless for harm, by closing u% the sources of error# This im%ortant change in the fiel! of the sciences, this loss of its fancie! %ossessions, to hich s%eculati"e reason must submit, !oes not %ro"e in any ay !etrimental to the general interests of humanity# The a!"antages hich the orl! has !eri"e! from the teachings of %ure reason are not at all im%aire!# The loss falls, in its hole e?tent, on the mono%oly of the schools, but !oes not in the slightest !egree touch the interests of mankin!# I a%%eal to the most obstinate !ogmatist, hether the %roof of the continue! e?istence of the soul after !eath, !eri"e! from the sim%licity of its substance@ of the free!om of the ill in o%%osition to the general mechanism of nature, !ra n from the subtle but im%otent !istinction of subjecti"e an! objecti"e %ractical necessity@ or of the e?istence of Go!, !e!uce! from the conce%tion of an ens realissimumBthe contingency of the changeable, an! the necessity of a %rime mo"er, has e"er been able to %ass beyon! the limits of the schools, to %enetrate the %ublic min!, or to e?ercise the slightest influence on its con"ictions# It must be a!mitte! that this has not been the case an! that, o ing to the unfitness of the common un!erstan!ing for such subtle s%eculations, it can ne"er be e?%ecte! to take %lace# 9n the contrary, it is %lain that the ho%e of a future life arises from the feeling, hich e?ists in the breast of e"ery man, that the tem%oral is ina!equate to meet an! satisfy the !eman!s of his nature# In like manner, it cannot be !oubte! that the clear e?hibition of !uties in o%%osition to all the claims of inclination,

gi"es rise to the consciousness of free!om, an! that the glorious or!er, beauty, an! %ro"i!ential care, e"ery here !is%laye! in nature, gi"e rise to the belief in a ise an! great )uthor of the 4ni"erse# 7uch is the genesis of these general con"ictions of mankin!, so far as they !e%en! on rational groun!s@ an! this %ublic %ro%erty not only remains un!isturbe!, but is e"en raise! to greater im%ortance, by the !octrine that the schools ha"e no right to arrogate to themsel"es a more %rofoun! insight into a matter of general human concernment than that to hich the great mass of men, e"er hel! by us in the highest estimation, can ithout !ifficulty attain, an! that the schools shoul!, therefore, confine themsel"es to the elaboration of these uni"ersally com%rehensible an!, from a moral %oint of "ie , am%ly satisfactory %roofs# The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant %retensions of the schools, hich oul! gla!ly retain, in their o n e?clusi"e %ossession, the key to the truths hich they im%art to the %ublic# =uo! mecum nescit, solus "ult scire "i!eri# )t the same time it !oes not !e%ri"e the s%eculati"e %hiloso%her of his just title to be the sole !e%ositor of a science hich benefits the %ublic ithout its kno le!geBI mean, the Critique of Pure Reason# This can ne"er become %o%ular an!, in!ee!, has no occasion to be so@ for fines%un arguments in fa"our of useful truths make just as little im%ression on the %ublic min! as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths# 9n the other han!, since both ine"itably force themsel"es on e"ery man ho rises to the height of s%eculation, it becomes the manifest !uty of the schools to enter u%on a thorough in"estigation of the rights of s%eculati"e reason an!, thus, to %re"ent the scan!al hich meta%hysical contro"ersies are sure, sooner or later, to cause e"en to the masses# It is only by criticism that meta%hysicians Dan!, as such, theologians tooE can be sa"e! from these contro"ersies an! from the consequent %er"ersion of their !octrines# Criticism alone can strike a blo at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free&thinking, fanaticism, an! su%erstition, hich are uni"ersally injuriousBas ell as of i!ealism an! sce%ticism, hich are !angerous to the schools, but can scarcely %ass o"er to the %ublic# If go"ernments think %ro%er to interfere ith the affairs of the learne!, it oul! be more consistent ith a ise regar! for the interests of science, as ell as for those of society, to fa"our a criticism of this kin!, by hich alone the labours of reason can be establishe! on a firm basis, than to su%%ort the ri!iculous !es%otism of the schools, hich raise a lou! cry of !anger to the %ublic o"er the !estruction of cob ebs, of hich the %ublic has ne"er taken any notice, an! the loss of hich, therefore, it can ne"er feel# This critical science is not o%%ose! to the !ogmatic %roce!ure of reason in %ure cognition@ for %ure cognition must al ays be !ogmatic, that is, must rest on strict !emonstration from sure %rinci%les a %rioriBbut to !ogmatism, that is, to the %resum%tion that it is %ossible to make any %rogress ith a %ure cognition, !eri"e! from D%hiloso%hicalE conce%tions, accor!ing to the %rinci%les hich reason has long been in the habit of em%loyingB ithout first inquiring in hat ay an! by hat right reason has come into the %ossession of these %rinci%les# *ogmatism is thus the !ogmatic %roce!ure of %ure reason ithout %re"ious criticism of its o n %o ers, an! in o%%osing this %roce!ure, e must not be su%%ose! to len! any countenance to that loquacious shallo ness hich arrogates to itself the name of %o%ularity, nor yet to sce%ticism, hich makes short ork ith the hole science of meta%hysics# 9n the contrary, our

criticism is the necessary %re%aration for a thoroughly scientific system of meta%hysics hich must %erform its task entirely a %riori, to the com%lete satisfaction of s%eculati"e reason, an! must, therefore, be treate!, not %o%ularly, but scholastically# In carrying out the %lan hich the Critique %rescribes, that is, in the future system of meta%hysics, e must ha"e recourse to the strict metho! of the celebrate! >olf, the greatest of all !ogmatic %hiloso%hers# ;e as the first to %oint out the necessity of establishing fi?e! %rinci%les, of clearly !efining our conce%tions, an! of subjecting our !emonstrations to the most se"ere scrutiny, instea! of rashly jum%ing at conclusions# The e?am%le hich he set ser"e! to a aken that s%irit of %rofoun! an! thorough in"estigation hich is not yet e?tinct in Germany# ;e oul! ha"e been %eculiarly ell fitte! to gi"e a truly scientific character to meta%hysical stu!ies, ha! it occurre! to him to %re%are the fiel! by a criticism of the organum, that is, of %ure reason itself# That he faile! to %ercei"e the necessity of such a %roce!ure must be ascribe! to the !ogmatic mo!e of thought hich characteriCe! his age, an! on this %oint the %hiloso%hers of his time, as ell as of all %re"ious times, ha"e nothing to re%roach each other ith# Those ho reject at once the metho! of >olf, an! of the Critique of Pure Reason, can ha"e no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into s%ort, certainty into o%inion, an! %hiloso%hy into %hilo!o?y# In this secon! e!ition, I ha"e en!ea"oure!, as far as %ossible, to remo"e the !ifficulties an! obscurity hich, ithout fault of mine %erha%s, ha"e gi"en rise to many misconce%tions e"en among acute thinkers# In the %ro%ositions themsel"es, an! in the !emonstrations by hich they are su%%orte!, as ell as in the form an! the entire %lan of the ork, I ha"e foun! nothing to alter@ hich must be attribute! %artly to the long e?amination to hich I ha! subjecte! the hole before offering it to the %ublic an! %artly to the nature of the case# :or %ure s%eculati"e reason is an organic structure in hich there is nothing isolate! or in!e%en!ent, but e"ery 7ingle %art is essential to all the rest@ an! hence, the slightest im%erfection, hether !efect or %ositi"e error, coul! not fail to betray itself in use# I "enture, further, to ho%e, that this system ill maintain the same unalterable character for the future# I am le! to entertain this confi!ence, not by "anity, but by the e"i!ence hich the equality of the result affor!s, hen e %rocee!, first, from the sim%lest elements u% to the com%lete hole of %ure reason an!, an! then, back ar!s from the hole to each %art# >e fin! that the attem%t to make the slightest alteration, in any %art, lea!s ine"itably to contra!ictions, not merely in this system, but in human reason itself# )t the same time, there is still much room for im%ro"ement in the e?%osition of the !octrines containe! in this ork# In the %resent e!ition, I ha"e en!ea"oure! to remo"e misa%%rehensions of the aesthetical %art, es%ecially ith regar! to the conce%tion of time@ to clear a ay the obscurity hich has been foun! in the !e!uction of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing@ to su%%ly the su%%ose! ant of sufficient e"i!ence in the !emonstration of the %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing@ an!, lastly, to ob"iate the misun!erstan!ing of the %aralogisms hich imme!iately %rece!e the rational %sychology# Beyon! this %ointBthe en! of the secon! main !i"ision of the GTranscen!ental *ialecticGBI ha"e not e?ten!e! my alterations,8 %artly from ant of time, an! %artly because I am not a are that any %ortion of the remain!er has gi"en rise to misconce%tions among intelligent an! im%artial critics, hom I !o not here mention ith that %raise hich is their !ue, but ho ill fin! that their suggestions ha"e been atten!e! to in the ork itself#

/8:ootnote( The only a!!ition, %ro%erly so calle!Ban! that only in the metho! of %roofB hich I ha"e ma!e in the %resent e!ition, consists of a ne refutation of %sychological i!ealism, an! a strict !emonstrationBthe only one %ossible, as I belie"eBof the objecti"e reality of e?ternal intuition# ;o e"er harmless i!ealism may be consi!ere!Balthough in reality it is not soBin regar! to the essential en!s of meta%hysics, it must still remain a scan!al to %hiloso%hy an! to the general human reason to be oblige! to assume, as an article of mere belief, the e?istence of things e?ternal to oursel"es Dfrom hich, yet, e !eri"e the hole material of cognition for the internal senseE, an! not to be able to o%%ose a satisfactory %roof to any one ho may call it in question# )s there is some obscurity of e?%ression in the !emonstration as it stan!s in the te?t, I %ro%ose to alter the %assage in question as follo s( GBut this %ermanent cannot be an intuition in me# :or all the !etermining groun!s of my e?istence hich can be foun! in me are re%resentations an!, as such, !o themsel"es require a %ermanent, !istinct from them, hich may !etermine my e?istence in relation to their changes, that is, my e?istence in time, herein they change#G It may, %robably, be urge! in o%%osition to this %roof that, after all, I am only conscious imme!iately of that hich is in me, that is, of my re%resentation of e?ternal things, an! that, consequently, it must al ays remain uncertain hether anything corres%on!ing to this re%resentation !oes or !oes not e?ist e?ternally to me# But I am conscious, through internal e?%erience, of my e?istence in time Dconsequently, also, of the !eterminability of the former in the latterE, an! that is more than the sim%le consciousness of my re%resentation# It is, in fact, the same as the em%irical consciousness of my e?istence, hich can only be !etermine! in relation to something, hich, hile connecte! ith my e?istence, is e?ternal to me# This consciousness of my e?istence in time is, therefore, i!entical ith the consciousness of a relation to something e?ternal to me, an! it is, therefore, e?%erience, not fiction, sense, not imagination, hich inse%arably connects the e?ternal ith my internal sense# :or the e?ternal sense is, in itself, the relation of intuition to something real, e?ternal to me@ an! the reality of this something, as o%%ose! to the mere imagination of it, rests solely on its inse%arable connection ith internal e?%erience as the con!ition of its %ossibility# If ith the intellectual consciousness of my e?istence, in the re%resentation( I am, hich accom%anies all my ju!gements, an! all the o%erations of my

un!erstan!ing, I coul!, at the same time, connect a !etermination of my e?istence by intellectual intuition, then the consciousness of a relation to something e?ternal to me oul! not be necessary# But the internal intuition in hich alone my e?istence can be !etermine!, though %rece!e! by that %urely intellectual consciousness, is itself sensible an! attache! to the con!ition of time# ;ence this !etermination of my e?istence, an! consequently my internal e?%erience itself, must !e%en! on something %ermanent hich is not in me, hich can be, therefore, only in something e?ternal to me, to hich I must look u%on myself as being relate!# Thus the reality of the e?ternal sense is necessarily connecte! ith that of the internal, in or!er to the %ossibility of e?%erience in general@ that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things e?ternal to me relate! to my sense as I am that I myself e?ist as !etermine! in time# But in or!er to ascertain to hat gi"en intuitions objects, e?ternal me, really corres%on!, in other or!s, hat intuitions belong to the e?ternal sense an! not to imagination, I must ha"e recourse, in e"ery %articular case, to those rules accor!ing to hich e?%erience in general De"en internal e?%erienceE is !istinguishe! from imagination, an! hich are al ays base! on the %ro%osition that there really is an e?ternal e?%erience# >e may a!! the remark that the re%resentation of something %ermanent in e?istence, is not the same thing as the %ermanent re%resentation@ for a re%resentation may be "ery "ariable an! changingBas all our re%resentations, e"en that of matter, areBan! yet refer to something %ermanent, hich must, therefore, be !istinct from all my re%resentations an! e?ternal to me, the e?istence of hich is necessarily inclu!e! in the !etermination of my o n e?istence, an! ith it constitutes one e?%erienceBan e?%erience hich oul! not e"en be %ossible internally, if it ere not also at the same time, in %art, e?ternal# To the question ;o H e are no more able to re%ly, than e are, in general, to think the stationary in time, the coe?istence of hich ith the "ariable, %ro!uces the conce%tion of change#3 In attem%ting to ren!er the e?%osition of my "ie s as intelligible as %ossible, I ha"e been com%elle! to lea"e out or abri!ge "arious %assages hich ere not essential to the com%leteness of the ork, but hich many rea!ers might consi!er useful in other res%ects, an! might be un illing to miss# This trifling loss, hich coul! not be a"oi!e! ithout s elling the book beyon! !ue limits, may be su%%lie!, at the %leasure of the rea!er, by a com%arison ith the first e!ition, an! ill, I ho%e, be more than com%ensate! for by the greater clearness of the e?%osition as it no stan!s#

I ha"e obser"e!, ith %leasure an! thankfulness, in the %ages of "arious re"ie s an! treatises, that the s%irit of %rofoun! an! thorough in"estigation is not e?tinct in Germany, though it may ha"e been o"erborne an! silence! for a time by the fashionable tone of a licence in thinking, hich gi"es itself the airs of genius, an! that the !ifficulties hich beset the %aths of criticism ha"e not %re"ente! energetic an! acute thinkers from making themsel"es masters of the science of %ure reason to hich these %aths con!uctB a science hich is not %o%ular, but scholastic in its character, an! hich alone can ho%e for a lasting e?istence or %ossess an abi!ing "alue# To these !eser"ing men, ho so ha%%ily combine %rofun!ity of "ie ith a talent for luci! e?%ositionBa talent hich I myself am not conscious of %ossessingBI lea"e the task of remo"ing any obscurity hich may still a!here to the statement of my !octrines# :or, in this case, the !anger is not that of being refute!, but of being misun!erstoo!# :or my o n %art, I must hencefor ar! abstain from contro"ersy, although I shall carefully atten! to all suggestions, hether from frien!s or a!"ersaries, hich may be of use in the future elaboration of the system of this %ro%ae!eutic# )s, !uring these labours, I ha"e a!"ance! %retty far in years this month I reach my si?ty&fourth yearBit ill be necessary for me to economiCe time, if I am to carry out my %lan of elaborating the meta%hysics of nature as ell as of morals, in confirmation of the correctness of the %rinci%les establishe! in this Critique of Pure Reason, both s%eculati"e an! %ractical@ an! I must, therefore, lea"e the task of clearing u% the obscurities of the %resent orkBine"itable, %erha%s, at the outsetBas ell as, the !efence of the hole, to those !eser"ing men, ho ha"e ma!e my system their o n# ) %hiloso%hical system cannot come for ar! arme! at all %oints like a mathematical treatise, an! hence it may be quite %ossible to take objection to %articular %assages, hile the organic structure of the system, consi!ere! as a unity, has no !anger to a%%rehen!# But fe %ossess the ability, an! still fe er the inclination, to take a com%rehensi"e "ie of a ne system# By confining the "ie to %articular %assages, taking these out of their connection an! com%aring them ith one another, it is easy to %ick out a%%arent contra!ictions, es%ecially in a ork ritten ith any free!om of style# These contra!ictions %lace the ork in an unfa"ourable light in the eyes of those ho rely on the ju!gement of others, but are easily reconcile! by those ho ha"e mastere! the i!ea of the hole# If a theory %ossesses stability in itself, the action an! reaction hich seeme! at first to threaten its e?istence ser"e only, in the course of time, to smooth !o n any su%erficial roughness or inequality, an!Bif men of insight, im%artiality, an! truly %o%ular gifts, turn their attention to itBto secure to it, in a short time, the requisite elegance also# Konigsberg, )%ril 6J2J#

INTRO!UCTION I# 9f the !ifference bet een Pure an! Em%irical Kno le!ge

That all our kno le!ge begins ith e?%erience there can be no !oubt# :or ho is it %ossible that the faculty of cognition shoul! be a akene! into e?ercise other ise than by means of objects hich affect our senses, an! %artly of themsel"es %ro!uce re%resentations, %artly rouse our %o ers of un!erstan!ing into acti"ity, to com%are to connect, or to se%arate these, an! so to con"ert the ra material of our sensuous im%ressions into a kno le!ge of objects, hich is calle! e?%erienceH In res%ect of time, therefore, no kno le!ge of ours is antece!ent to e?%erience, but begins ith it# But, though all our kno le!ge begins ith e?%erience, it by no means follo s that all arises out of e?%erience# :or, on the contrary, it is quite %ossible that our em%irical kno le!ge is a com%oun! of that hich e recei"e through im%ressions, an! that hich the faculty of cognition su%%lies from itself Dsensuous im%ressions gi"ing merely the occasionE, an a!!ition hich e cannot !istinguish from the original element gi"en by sense, till long %ractice has ma!e us attenti"e to, an! skilful in se%arating it# It is, therefore, a question hich requires close in"estigation, an! not to be ans ere! at first sight, hether there e?ists a kno le!ge altogether in!e%en!ent of e?%erience, an! e"en of all sensuous im%ressionsH Kno le!ge of this kin! is calle! a %riori, in contra!istinction to em%irical kno le!ge, hich has its sources a %osteriori, that is, in e?%erience# But the e?%ression, Ga %riori,G is not as yet !efinite enough a!equately to in!icate the hole meaning of the question abo"e starte!# :or, in s%eaking of kno le!ge hich has its sources in e?%erience, e are ont to say, that this or that may be kno n a %riori, because e !o not !eri"e this kno le!ge imme!iately from e?%erience, but from a general rule, hich, ho e"er, e ha"e itself borro e! from e?%erience# Thus, if a man un!ermine! his house, e say, Ghe might kno a %riori that it oul! ha"e fallen@G that is, he nee!e! not to ha"e aite! for the e?%erience that it !i! actually fall# But still, a %riori, he coul! not kno e"en this much# :or, that bo!ies are hea"y, an!, consequently, that they fall hen their su%%orts are taken a ay, must ha"e been kno n to him %re"iously, by means of e?%erience# By the term Gkno le!ge a %riori,G therefore, e shall in the sequel un!erstan!, not such as is in!e%en!ent of this or that kin! of e?%erience, but such as is absolutely so of all e?%erience# 9%%ose! to this is em%irical kno le!ge, or that hich is %ossible only a %osteriori, that is, through e?%erience# Kno le!ge a %riori is either %ure or im%ure# Pure kno le!ge a %riori is that ith hich no em%irical element is mi?e! u%# :or e?am%le, the %ro%osition, GE"ery change has a cause,G is a %ro%osition a %riori, but im%ure, because change is a conce%tion hich can only be !eri"e! from e?%erience# II# The ;uman Intellect, e"en in an 4n%hiloso%hical 7tate, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions Ga %rioriG# The question no is as to a criterion, by hich e may securely !istinguish a %ure from an em%irical cognition# E?%erience no !oubt teaches us that this or that object is constitute! in such an! such a manner, but not that it coul! not %ossibly e?ist other ise# <o , in the first %lace, if e ha"e a %ro%osition hich contains the i!ea of necessity in its "ery conce%tion, it is a if, moreo"er, it is not !eri"e! from any other %ro%osition,

unless from one equally in"ol"ing the i!ea of necessity, it is absolutely %riori# 7econ!ly, an em%irical ju!gement ne"er e?hibits strict an! absolute, but only assume! an! com%arati"e uni"ersality Dby in!uctionE@ therefore, the most e can say isBso far as e ha"e hitherto obser"e!, there is no e?ce%tion to this or that rule# If, on the other han!, a ju!gement carries ith it strict an! absolute uni"ersality, that is, a!mits of no %ossible e?ce%tion, it is not !eri"e! from e?%erience, but is "ali! absolutely a %riori# Em%irical uni"ersality is, therefore, only an arbitrary e?tension of "ali!ity, from that hich may be %re!icate! of a %ro%osition "ali! in most cases, to that hich is asserte! of a %ro%osition hich hol!s goo! in all@ as, for e?am%le, in the affirmation, G)ll bo!ies are hea"y#G >hen, on the contrary, strict uni"ersality characteriCes a ju!gement, it necessarily in!icates another %eculiar source of kno le!ge, namely, a faculty of cognition a %riori# <ecessity an! strict uni"ersality, therefore, are infallible tests for !istinguishing %ure from em%irical kno le!ge, an! are inse%arably connecte! ith each other# But as in the use of these criteria the em%irical limitation is sometimes more easily !etecte! than the contingency of the ju!gement, or the unlimite! uni"ersality hich e attach to a ju!gement is often a more con"incing %roof than its necessity, it may be a!"isable to use the criteria se%arately, each being by itself infallible# <o , that in the s%here of human cognition e ha"e ju!gements hich are necessary, an! in the strictest sense uni"ersal, consequently %ure a %riori, it ill be an easy matter to sho # If e !esire an e?am%le from the sciences, e nee! only take any %ro%osition in mathematics# If e cast our eyes u%on the commonest o%erations of the un!erstan!ing, the %ro%osition, GE"ery change must ha"e a cause,G ill am%ly ser"e our %ur%ose# In the latter case, in!ee!, the conce%tion of a cause so %lainly in"ol"es the conce%tion of a necessity of connection ith an effect, an! of a strict uni"ersality of the la , that the "ery notion of a cause oul! entirely !isa%%ear, ere e to !eri"e it, like ;ume, from a frequent association of hat ha%%ens ith that hich %rece!es@ an! the habit thence originating of connecting re%resentationsBthe necessity inherent in the ju!gement being therefore merely subjecti"e# Besi!es, ithout seeking for such e?am%les of %rinci%les e?isting a %riori in cognition, e might easily sho that such %rinci%les are the in!is%ensable basis of the %ossibility of e?%erience itself, an! consequently %ro"e their e?istence a %riori# :or hence coul! our e?%erience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on hich it !e%en!s ere themsel"es em%irical, an! consequently fortuitousH <o one, therefore, can a!mit the "ali!ity of the use of such rules as first %rinci%les# But, for the %resent, e may content oursel"es ith ha"ing establishe! the fact, that e !o %ossess an! e?ercise a faculty of %ure a %riori cognition@ an!, secon!ly, ith ha"ing %ointe! out the %ro%er tests of such cognition, namely, uni"ersality an! necessity# <ot only in ju!gements, ho e"er, but e"en in conce%tions, is an a %riori origin manifest# :or e?am%le, if e take a ay by !egrees from our conce%tions of a bo!y all that can be referre! to mere sensuous e?%erienceBcolour, har!ness or softness, eight, e"en im%enetrabilityBthe bo!y ill then "anish@ but the s%ace hich it occu%ie! still remains, an! this it is utterly im%ossible to annihilate in thought# )gain, if e take a ay, in like manner, from our em%irical conce%tion of any object, cor%oreal or incor%oreal, all %ro%erties hich mere e?%erience has taught us to connect ith it, still e cannot think a ay those through hich e cogitate it as substance, or a!hering to substance,

although our conce%tion of substance is more !etermine! than that of an object# Com%elle!, therefore, by that necessity ith hich the conce%tion of substance forces itself u%on us, e must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a %riori# III# Philoso%hy stan!s in nee! of a 7cience hich shall *etermine the Possibility, Princi%les, an! E?tent of ;uman Kno le!ge Ga %rioriG 9f far more im%ortance than all that has been abo"e sai!, is the consi!eration that certain of our cognitions rise com%letely abo"e the s%here of all %ossible e?%erience, an! by means of conce%tions, to hich there e?ists in the hole e?tent of e?%erience no corres%on!ing object, seem to e?ten! the range of our ju!gements beyon! its boun!s# )n! just in this transcen!ental or su%ersensible s%here, here e?%erience affor!s us neither instruction nor gui!ance, lie the in"estigations of reason, hich, on account of their im%ortance, e consi!er far %referable to, an! as ha"ing a far more ele"ate! aim than, all that the un!erstan!ing can achie"e ithin the s%here of sensuous %henomena# 7o high a "alue !o e set u%on these in"estigations, that e"en at the risk of error, e %ersist in follo ing them out, an! %ermit neither !oubt nor !isregar! nor in!ifference to restrain us from the %ursuit# These una"oi!able %roblems of mere %ure reason are Go!, free!om Dof illE, an! immortality# The science hich, ith all its %reliminaries, has for its es%ecial object the solution of these %roblems is name! meta%hysicsBa science hich is at the "ery outset !ogmatical, that is, it confi!ently takes u%on itself the e?ecution of this task ithout any %re"ious in"estigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an un!ertaking# <o the safe groun! of e?%erience being thus aban!one!, it seems ne"ertheless natural that e shoul! hesitate to erect a buil!ing ith the cognitions e %ossess, ithout kno ing hence they come, an! on the strength of %rinci%les, the origin of hich is un!isco"ere!# Instea! of thus trying to buil! ithout a foun!ation, it is rather to be e?%ecte! that e shoul! long ago ha"e %ut the question, ho the un!erstan!ing can arri"e at these a %riori cognitions, an! hat is the e?tent, "ali!ity, an! orth hich they may %ossessH >e say, GThis is natural enough,G meaning by the or! natural, that hich is consistent ith a just an! reasonable ay of thinking@ but if e un!erstan! by the term, that hich usually ha%%ens, nothing in!ee! coul! be more natural an! more com%rehensible than that this in"estigation shoul! be left long unattem%te!# :or one %art of our %ure kno le!ge, the science of mathematics, has been long firmly establishe!, an! thus lea!s us to form flattering e?%ectations ith regar! to others, though these may be of quite a !ifferent nature# Besi!es, hen e get beyon! the boun!s of e?%erience, e are of course safe from o%%osition in that quarter@ an! the charm of i!ening the range of our kno le!ge is so great that, unless e are brought to a stan!still by some e"i!ent contra!iction, e hurry on un!oubtingly in our course# This, ho e"er, may be a"oi!e!, if e are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, hich are not the less fictions on that account# Aathematical science affor!s us a brilliant e?am%le, ho far, in!e%en!ently of all e?%erience, e may carry our a %riori kno le!ge# It is true that the mathematician occu%ies himself ith objects an! cognitions only in so far as they can be re%resente! by means of intuition# But this circumstance is easily o"erlooke!, because the sai! intuition

can itself be gi"en a %riori, an! therefore is har!ly to be !istinguishe! from a mere %ure conce%tion# *ecei"e! by such a %roof of the %o er of reason, e can %ercei"e no limits to the e?tension of our kno le!ge# The light !o"e clea"ing in free flight the thin air, hose resistance it feels, might imagine that her mo"ements oul! be far more free an! ra%i! in airless s%ace# +ust in the same ay !i! Plato, aban!oning the orl! of sense because of the narro limits it sets to the un!erstan!ing, "enture u%on the ings of i!eas beyon! it, into the "oi! s%ace of %ure intellect# ;e !i! not reflect that he ma!e no real %rogress by all his efforts@ for he met ith no resistance hich might ser"e him for a su%%ort, as it ere, hereon to rest, an! on hich he might a%%ly his %o ers, in or!er to let the intellect acquire momentum for its %rogress# It is, in!ee!, the common fate of human reason in s%eculation, to finish the im%osing e!ifice of thought as ra%i!ly as %ossible, an! then for the first time to begin to e?amine hether the foun!ation is a soli! one or no# )rri"e! at this %oint, all sorts of e?cuses are sought after, in or!er to console us for its ant of stability, or rather, in!ee!, to enable 4s to !is%ense altogether ith so late an! !angerous an in"estigation# But hat frees us !uring the %rocess of buil!ing from all a%%rehension or sus%icion, an! flatters us into the belief of its soli!ity, is this# ) great %art, %erha%s the greatest %art, of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the conce%tions hich e alrea!y %ossess of objects# By this means e gain a multitu!e of cognitions, hich although really nothing more than eluci!ations or e?%lanations of that hich Dthough in a confuse! mannerE as alrea!y thought in our conce%tions, are, at least in res%ect of their form, %riCe! as ne intros%ections@ hilst, so far as regar!s their matter or content, e ha"e really ma!e no a!!ition to our conce%tions, but only !isin"ol"e! them# But as this %rocess !oes furnish a real %riori kno le!ge, hich has a sure %rogress an! useful results, reason, !ecei"e! by this, sli%s in, ithout being itself a are of it, assertions of a quite !ifferent kin!@ in hich, to gi"en conce%tions it a!!s others, a %riori in!ee!, but entirely foreign to them, ithout our kno ing ho it arri"es at these, an!, in!ee!, ithout such a question e"er suggesting itself# I shall therefore at once %rocee! to e?amine the !ifference bet een these t o mo!es of kno le!ge# IK# 9f the *ifference Bet een )nalytical an! 7ynthetical +u!gements# In all ju!gements herein the relation of a subject to the %re!icate is cogitate! DI mention affirmati"e ju!gements only here@ the a%%lication to negati"e ill be "ery easyE, this relation is %ossible in t o !ifferent ays# Either the %re!icate B belongs to the subject ), as some hat hich is containe! Dthough co"ertlyE in the conce%tion )@ or the %re!icate B lies com%letely out of the conce%tion ), although it stan!s in connection ith it# In the first instance, I term the ju!gement analytical, in the secon!, synthetical# )nalytical ju!gements Daffirmati"eE are therefore those in hich the connection of the %re!icate ith the subject is cogitate! through i!entity@ those in hich this connection is cogitate! ithout i!entity, are calle! synthetical ju!gements# The former may be calle! e?%licati"e, the latter augmentati"e ju!gements@ because the former a!! in the %re!icate nothing to the conce%tion of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conce%tions, hich ere thought alrea!y in the subject, although in a confuse! manner@ the latter a!! to our conce%tions of the subject a %re!icate hich as not containe! in it, an! hich no analysis coul! e"er ha"e !isco"ere! therein# :or e?am%le, hen I say, G)ll bo!ies are e?ten!e!,G this is an analytical ju!gement# :or I nee! not go beyon! the

conce%tion of bo!y in or!er to fin! e?tension connecte! ith it, but merely analyse the conce%tion, that is, become conscious of the manifol! %ro%erties hich I think in that conce%tion, in or!er to !isco"er this %re!icate in it( it is therefore an analytical ju!gement# 9n the other han!, hen I say, G)ll bo!ies are hea"y,G the %re!icate is something totally !ifferent from that hich I think in the mere conce%tion of a bo!y# By the a!!ition of such a %re!icate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical ju!gement# +u!gements of e?%erience, as such, are al ays synthetical# :or it oul! be absur! to think of groun!ing an analytical ju!gement on e?%erience, because in forming such a ju!gement I nee! not go out of the s%here of my conce%tions, an! therefore recourse to the testimony of e?%erience is quite unnecessary# That Gbo!ies are e?ten!e!G is not an em%irical ju!gement, but a %ro%osition hich stan!s firm a %riori# :or before a!!ressing myself to e?%erience, I alrea!y ha"e in my conce%tion all the requisite con!itions for the ju!gement, an! I ha"e only to e?tract the %re!icate from the conce%tion, accor!ing to the %rinci%le of contra!iction, an! thereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the ju!gement, a necessity hich I coul! ne"er learn from e?%erience# 9n the other han!, though at first I !o not at all inclu!e the %re!icate of eight in my conce%tion of bo!y in general, that conce%tion still in!icates an object of e?%erience, a %art of the totality of e?%erience, to hich I can still a!! other %arts@ an! this I !o hen I recogniCe by obser"ation that bo!ies are hea"y# I can cogniCe beforehan! by analysis the conce%tion of bo!y through the characteristics of e?tension, im%enetrability, sha%e, etc#, all hich are cogitate! in this conce%tion# But no I e?ten! my kno le!ge, an! looking back on e?%erience from hich I ha! !eri"e! this conce%tion of bo!y, I fin! eight at all times connecte! ith the abo"e characteristics, an! therefore I synthetically a!! to my conce%tions this as a %re!icate, an! say, G)ll bo!ies are hea"y#G Thus it is e?%erience u%on hich rests the %ossibility of the synthesis of the %re!icate of eight ith the conce%tion of bo!y, because both conce%tions, although the one is not containe! in the other, still belong to one another Donly contingently, ho e"erE, as %arts of a hole, namely, of e?%erience, hich is itself a synthesis of intuitions# But to synthetical ju!gements a %riori, such ai! is entirely anting# If I go out of an! beyon! the conce%tion ), in or!er to recogniCe another B as connecte! ith it, hat foun!ation ha"e I to rest on, hereby to ren!er the synthesis %ossibleH I ha"e here no longer the a!"antage of looking out in the s%here of e?%erience for hat I ant# 'et us take, for e?am%le, the %ro%osition, GE"erything that ha%%ens has a cause#G In the conce%tion of Gsomething that ha%%ens,G I in!ee! think an e?istence hich a certain time antece!es, an! from this I can !eri"e analytical ju!gements# But the conce%tion of a cause lies quite out of the abo"e conce%tion, an! in!icates something entirely !ifferent from Gthat hich ha%%ens,G an! is consequently not containe! in that conce%tion# ;o then am I able to assert concerning the general conce%tionBGthat hich ha%%ensGB something entirely !ifferent from that conce%tion, an! to recogniCe the conce%tion of cause although not containe! in it, yet as belonging to it, an! e"en necessarilyH hat is here the unkno n L M, u%on hich the un!erstan!ing rests hen it belie"es it has foun!, out of the conce%tion ) a foreign %re!icate B, hich it ne"ertheless consi!ers to be connecte! ith itH It cannot be e?%erience, because the %rinci%le a!!uce! anne?es the t o re%resentations, cause an! effect, to the re%resentation e?istence, not only ith

uni"ersality, hich e?%erience cannot gi"e, but also ith the e?%ression of necessity, therefore com%letely a %riori an! from %ure conce%tions# 4%on such synthetical, that is augmentati"e %ro%ositions, !e%en!s the hole aim of our s%eculati"e kno le!ge a %riori@ for although analytical ju!gements are in!ee! highly im%ortant an! necessary, they are so, only to arri"e at that clearness of conce%tions hich is requisite for a sure an! e?ten!e! synthesis, an! this alone is a real acquisition# K# In all Theoretical 7ciences of Reason, 7ynthetical +u!gements Ga %rioriG are containe! as Princi%les# 6# Aathematical ju!gements are al ays synthetical# ;itherto this fact, though incontestably true an! "ery im%ortant in its consequences, seems to ha"e esca%e! the analysts of the human min!, nay, to be in com%lete o%%osition to all their conjectures# :or as it as foun! that mathematical conclusions all %rocee! accor!ing to the %rinci%le of contra!iction D hich the nature of e"ery a%o!eictic certainty requiresE, %eo%le became %ersua!e! that the fun!amental %rinci%les of the science also ere recogniCe! an! a!mitte! in the same ay# But the notion is fallacious@ for although a synthetical %ro%osition can certainly be !iscerne! by means of the %rinci%le of contra!iction, this is %ossible only hen another synthetical %ro%osition %rece!es, from hich the latter is !e!uce!, but ne"er of itself# Before all, be it obser"e!, that %ro%er mathematical %ro%ositions are al ays ju!gements a %riori, an! not em%irical, because they carry along ith them the conce%tion of necessity, hich cannot be gi"en by e?%erience# If this be !emurre! to, it matters not@ I ill then limit my assertion to %ure mathematics, the "ery conce%tion of hich im%lies that it consists of kno le!ge altogether non&em%irical an! a %riori# >e might, in!ee! at first su%%ose that the %ro%osition J N I L 6, is a merely analytical %ro%osition, follo ing Daccor!ing to the %rinci%le of contra!ictionE from the conce%tion of a sum of se"en an! fi"e# But if e regar! it more narro ly, e fin! that our conce%tion of the sum of se"en an! fi"e contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, hereby it cannot at all be cogitate! hat this single number is hich embraces both# The conce%tion of t el"e is by no means obtaine! by merely cogitating the union of se"en an! fi"e@ an! e may analyse our conce%tion of such a %ossible sum as long as e ill, still e shall ne"er !isco"er in it the notion of t el"e# >e must go beyon! these conce%tions, an! ha"e recourse to an intuition hich corres%on!s to one of the t oBour fi"e fingers, for e?am%le, or like 7egner in his )rithmetic fi"e %oints, an! so by !egrees, a!! the units containe! in the fi"e gi"en in the intuition, to the conce%tion of se"en# :or I first take the number J, an!, for the conce%tion of I calling in the ai! of the fingers of my han! as objects of intuition, I a!! the units, hich I before took together to make u% the number I, gra!ually no by means of the material image my han!, to the number J, an! by this %rocess, I at length see the number 6, arise# That J shoul! be a!!e! to I, I ha"e certainly cogitate! in my conce%tion of a sum L J N I, but not that this sum as equal to 6,# )rithmetical %ro%ositions are therefore al ays synthetical, of hich e may become more clearly con"ince! by trying large numbers# :or it ill thus become quite e"i!ent that, turn an! t ist our conce%tions as e may, it is im%ossible, ithout ha"ing recourse to intuition, to arri"e at the sum total or %ro!uct

by means of the mere analysis of our conce%tions# +ust as little is any %rinci%le of %ure geometry analytical# G) straight line bet een t o %oints is the shortest,G is a synthetical %ro%osition# :or my conce%tion of straight contains no notion of quantity, but is merely qualitati"e# The conce%tion of the shortest is therefore fore holly an a!!ition, an! by no analysis can it be e?tracte! from our conce%tion of a straight line# Intuition must therefore here len! its ai!, by means of hich, an! thus only, our synthesis is %ossible# 7ome fe %rinci%les %re%osite! by geometricians are, in!ee!, really analytical, an! !e%en! on the %rinci%le of contra!iction# They ser"e, ho e"er, like i!entical %ro%ositions, as links in the chain of metho!, not as %rinci%lesBfor e?am%le, a L a, the hole is equal to itself, or DaNbE BO a, the hole is greater than its %art# )n! yet e"en these %rinci%les themsel"es, though they !eri"e their "ali!ity from %ure conce%tions, are only a!mitte! in mathematics because they can be %resente! in intuition# >hat causes us here commonly to belie"e that the %re!icate of such a%o!eictic ju!gements is alrea!y containe! in our conce%tion, an! that the ju!gement is therefore analytical, is merely the equi"ocal nature of the e?%ression# >e must join in thought a certain %re!icate to a gi"en conce%tion, an! this necessity clea"es alrea!y to the conce%tion# But the question is, not hat e must join in thought to the gi"en conce%tion, but hat e really think therein, though only obscurely, an! then it becomes manifest that the %re!icate %ertains to these conce%tions, necessarily in!ee!, yet not as thought in the conce%tion itself, but by "irtue of an intuition, hich must be a!!e! to the conce%tion# ,# The science of natural %hiloso%hy D%hysicsE contains in itself synthetical ju!gements a %riori, as %rinci%les# I shall a!!uce t o %ro%ositions# :or instance, the %ro%osition, GIn all changes of the material orl!, the quantity of matter remains unchange!G@ or, that, GIn all communication of motion, action an! reaction must al ays be equal#G In both of these, not only is the necessity, an! therefore their origin a %riori clear, but also that they are synthetical %ro%ositions# :or in the conce%tion of matter, I !o not cogitate its %ermanency, but merely its %resence in s%ace, hich it fills# I therefore really go out of an! beyon! the conce%tion of matter, in or!er to think on to it something a %riori, hich I !i! not think in it# The %ro%osition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, an! ne"ertheless concei"e! a %riori@ an! so it is ith regar! to the other %ro%ositions of the %ure %art of natural %hiloso%hy# .# )s to meta%hysics, e"en if e look u%on it merely as an attem%te! science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an in!is%ensable one, e fin! that it must contain synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori# It is not merely the !uty of meta%hysics to !issect, an! thereby analytically to illustrate the conce%tions hich e form a %riori of things@ but e seek to i!en the range of our a %riori kno le!ge# :or this %ur%ose, e must a"ail oursel"es of such %rinci%les as a!! something to the original conce%tionBsomething not i!entical ith, nor containe! in it, an! by means of synthetical ju!gements a %riori, lea"e far behin! us the limits of e?%erience@ for e?am%le, in the %ro%osition, Gthe orl! must ha"e a beginning,G an! such like# Thus meta%hysics, accor!ing to the %ro%er aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori# KI# The 4ni"ersal Problem of Pure Reason#

It is e?tremely a!"antageous to be able to bring a number of in"estigations un!er the formula of a single %roblem# :or in this manner, e not only facilitate our o n labour, inasmuch as e !efine it clearly to oursel"es, but also ren!er it more easy for others to !eci!e hether e ha"e !one justice to our un!ertaking# The %ro%er %roblem of %ure reason, then, is containe! in the question( G;o are synthetical ju!gements a %riori %ossibleHG That meta%hysical science has hitherto remaine! in so "acillating a state of uncertainty an! contra!iction, is only to be attribute! to the fact that this great %roblem, an! %erha%s e"en the !ifference bet een analytical an! synthetical ju!gements, !i! not sooner suggest itself to %hiloso%hers# 4%on the solution of this %roblem, or u%on sufficient %roof of the im%ossibility of synthetical kno le!ge a %riori, !e%en!s the e?istence or !o nfall of the science of meta%hysics# )mong %hiloso%hers, *a"i! ;ume came the nearest of all to this %roblem@ yet it ne"er acquire! in his min! sufficient %recision, nor !i! he regar! the question in its uni"ersality# 9n the contrary, he sto%%e! short at the synthetical %ro%osition of the connection of an effect ith its cause D%rinci%ium causalitatisE, insisting that such %ro%osition a %riori as im%ossible# )ccor!ing to his conclusions, then, all that e term meta%hysical science is a mere !elusion, arising from the fancie! insight of reason into that hich is in truth borro e! from e?%erience, an! to hich habit has gi"en the a%%earance of necessity# )gainst this assertion, !estructi"e to all %ure %hiloso%hy, he oul! ha"e been guar!e!, ha! he ha! our %roblem before his eyes in its uni"ersality# :or he oul! then ha"e %ercei"e! that, accor!ing to his o n argument, there like ise coul! not be any %ure mathematical science, hich assure!ly cannot e?ist ithout synthetical %ro%ositions a %rioriBan absur!ity from hich his goo! un!erstan!ing must ha"e sa"e! him# In the solution of the abo"e %roblem is at the same time com%rehen!e! the %ossibility of the use of %ure reason in the foun!ation an! construction of all sciences hich contain theoretical kno le!ge a %riori of objects, that is to say, the ans er to the follo ing questions( ;o is %ure mathematical science %ossibleH ;o is %ure natural science %ossibleH Res%ecting these sciences, as they !o certainly e?ist, it may ith %ro%riety be aske!, ho they are %ossibleHBfor that they must be %ossible is sho n by the fact of their really e?isting#8 But as to meta%hysics, the miserable %rogress it has hitherto ma!e, an! the fact that of no one system yet brought for ar!, far as regar!s its true aim, can it be sai! that this science really e?ists, lea"es any one at liberty to !oubt ith reason the "ery %ossibility of its e?istence# /8:ootnote( )s to the e?istence of %ure natural science, or %hysics, %erha%s many may still e?%ress !oubts# But e ha"e only to look at the !ifferent %ro%ositions hich are commonly treate! of at the commencement of %ro%er Dem%iricalE %hysical scienceBthose, for e?am%le, relating

to the %ermanence of the same quantity of matter, the "is inertiae, the equality of action an! reaction, etc#Bto be soon con"ince! that they form a science of %ure %hysics D%hysica %ura, or rationalisE, hich ell !eser"es to be se%arately e?%ose! as a s%ecial science, in its hole e?tent, hether that be great or confine!#3 $et, in a certain sense, this kin! of kno le!ge must unquestionably be looke! u%on as gi"en@ in other or!s, meta%hysics must be consi!ere! as really e?isting, if not as a science, ne"ertheless as a natural !is%osition of the human min! Dmeta%hysica naturalisE# :or human reason, ithout any instigations im%utable to the mere "anity of great kno le!ge, unceasingly %rogresses, urge! on by its o n feeling of nee!, to ar!s such questions as cannot be ans ere! by any em%irical a%%lication of reason, or %rinci%les !eri"e! therefrom@ an! so there has e"er really e?iste! in e"ery man some system of meta%hysics# It ill al ays e?ist, so soon as reason a akes to the e?ercise of its %o er of s%eculation# )n! no the question arises( G;o is meta%hysics, as a natural !is%osition, %ossibleHG In other or!s, ho , from the nature of uni"ersal human reason, !o those questions arise hich %ure reason %ro%oses to itself, an! hich it is im%elle! by its o n feeling of nee! to ans er as ell as it canH But as in all the attem%ts hitherto ma!e to ans er the questions hich reason is %rom%te! by its "ery nature to %ro%ose to itself, for e?am%le, hether the orl! ha! a beginning, or has e?iste! from eternity, it has al ays met ith una"oi!able contra!ictions, e must not rest satisfie! ith the mere natural !is%osition of the min! to meta%hysics, that is, ith the e?istence of the faculty of %ure reason, hence, in!ee!, some sort of meta%hysical system al ays arises@ but it must be %ossible to arri"e at certainty in regar! to the question hether e kno or !o not kno the things of hich meta%hysics treats# >e must be able to arri"e at a !ecision on the subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any ju!gement res%ecting them@ an! therefore either to e?ten! ith confi!ence the boun!s of our %ure reason, or to set strictly !efine! an! safe limits to its action# This last question, hich arises out of the abo"e uni"ersal %roblem, oul! %ro%erly run thus( G;o is meta%hysics %ossible as a scienceHG Thus, the critique of reason lea!s at last, naturally an! necessarily, to science@ an!, on the other han!, the !ogmatical use of reason ithout criticism lea!s to groun!less assertions, against hich others equally s%ecious can al ays be set, thus en!ing una"oi!ably in sce%ticism# Besi!es, this science cannot be of great an! formi!able %roli?ity, because it has not to !o ith objects of reason, the "ariety of hich is ine?haustible, but merely ith Reason herself an! her %roblems@ %roblems hich arise out of her o n bosom, an! are not %ro%ose! to her by the nature of out ar! things, but by her o n nature# )n! hen once Reason has %re"iously become able com%letely to un!erstan! her o n %o er in regar! to objects hich she meets ith in e?%erience, it ill be easy to !etermine securely the e?tent an! limits of her attem%te! a%%lication to objects beyon! the confines of e?%erience#

>e may an! must, therefore, regar! the attem%ts hitherto ma!e to establish meta%hysical science !ogmatically as non&e?istent# :or hat of analysis, that is, mere !issection of conce%tions, is containe! in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a %re%aration for meta%hysics %ro%er, hich has for its object the e?tension, by means of synthesis, of our a %riori kno le!ge# )n! for this %ur%ose, mere analysis is of course useless, because it only sho s hat is containe! in these conce%tions, but not ho e arri"e, a %riori, at them@ an! this it is her !uty to sho , in or!er to be able after ar!s to !etermine their "ali! use in regar! to all objects of e?%erience, to all kno le!ge in general# But little self&!enial, in!ee!, is nee!e! to gi"e u% these %retensions, seeing the un!eniable, an! in the !ogmatic mo!e of %roce!ure, ine"itable contra!ictions of Reason ith herself, ha"e long since ruine! the re%utation of e"ery system of meta%hysics that has a%%eare! u% to this time# It ill require more firmness to remain un!eterre! by !ifficulty from ithin, an! o%%osition from ithout, from en!ea"ouring, by a metho! quite o%%ose! to all those hitherto follo e!, to further the gro th an! fruitfulness of a science in!is%ensable to human reasonBa science from hich e"ery branch it has borne may be cut a ay, but hose roots remain in!estructible# KII# I!ea an! *i"ision of a Particular 7cience, un!er the <ame of a Critique of Pure Reason# :rom all that has been sai!, there results the i!ea of a %articular science, hich may be calle! the Critique of Pure Reason# :or reason is the faculty hich furnishes us ith the %rinci%les of kno le!ge a %riori# ;ence, %ure reason is the faculty hich contains the %rinci%les of cogniCing anything absolutely a %riori# )n organon of %ure reason oul! be a com%en!ium of those %rinci%les accor!ing to hich alone all %ure cognitions a %riori can be obtaine!# The com%letely e?ten!e! a%%lication of such an organon oul! affor! us a system of %ure reason# )s this, ho e"er, is !eman!ing a great !eal, an! it is yet !oubtful hether any e?tension of our kno le!ge be here %ossible, or, if so, in hat cases@ e can regar! a science of the mere criticism of %ure reason, its sources an! limits, as the %ro%ae!eutic to a system of %ure reason# 7uch a science must not be calle! a !octrine, but only a critique of %ure reason@ an! its use, in regar! to s%eculation, oul! be only negati"e, not to enlarge the boun!s of, but to %urify, our reason, an! to shiel! it against errorB hich alone is no little gain# I a%%ly the term transcen!ental to all kno le!ge hich is not so much occu%ie! ith objects as ith the mo!e of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mo!e of cognition is %ossible a %riori# ) system of such conce%tions oul! be calle! transcen!ental %hiloso%hy# But this, again, is still beyon! the boun!s of our %resent essay# :or as such a science must contain a com%lete e?%osition not only of our synthetical a %riori, but of our analytical a %riori kno le!ge, it is of too i!e a range for our %resent %ur%ose, because e !o not require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to un!erstan!, in their full e?tent, the %rinci%les of synthesis a %riori, ith hich alone e ha"e to !o# This in"estigation, hich e cannot %ro%erly call a !octrine, but only a transcen!ental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction an! gui!ance, of our kno le!ge, an! is to ser"e as a touchstone of the orth or orthlessness of all kno le!ge a %riori, is the sole object of our %resent essay# 7uch a critique is consequently, as far as %ossible, a %re%aration for an organon@ an! if this ne organon shoul! be foun! to fail, at least for a canon of %ure reason, accor!ing to hich the com%lete system of the %hiloso%hy of %ure reason,

hether it e?ten! or limit the boun!s of that reason, might one !ay be set forth both analytically an! synthetically# :or that this is %ossible, nay, that such a system is not of so great e?tent as to %reclu!e the ho%e of its e"er being com%lete!, is e"i!ent# :or e ha"e not here to !o ith the nature of out ar! objects, hich is infinite, but solely ith the min!, hich ju!ges of the nature of objects, an!, again, ith the min! only in res%ect of its cognition a %riori# )n! the object of our in"estigations, as it is not to be sought ithout, but, altogether ithin, oursel"es, cannot remain conceale!, an! in all %robability is limite! enough to be com%letely sur"eye! an! fairly estimate!, accor!ing to its orth or orthlessness# 7till less let the rea!er here e?%ect a critique of books an! systems of %ure reason@ our %resent object is e?clusi"ely a critique of the faculty of %ure reason itself# 9nly hen e make this critique our foun!ation, !o e %ossess a %ure touchstone for estimating the %hiloso%hical "alue of ancient an! mo!ern ritings on this subject@ an! ithout this criterion, the incom%etent historian or ju!ge !eci!es u%on an! corrects the groun!less assertions of others ith his o n, hich ha"e themsel"es just as little foun!ation# Transcen!ental %hiloso%hy is the i!ea of a science, for hich the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the hole %lan architectonically, that is, from %rinci%les, ith a full guarantee for the "ali!ity an! stability of all the %arts hich enter into the buil!ing# It is the system of all the %rinci%les of %ure reason# If this Critique itself !oes not assume the title of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, it is only because, to be a com%lete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of all human kno le!ge a %riori# 9ur critique must, in!ee!, lay before us a com%lete enumeration of all the ra!ical conce%tions hich constitute the sai! %ure kno le!ge# But from the com%lete analysis of these conce%tions themsel"es, as also from a com%lete in"estigation of those !eri"e! from them, it abstains ith reason@ %artly because it oul! be !e"iating from the en! in "ie to occu%y itself ith this analysis, since this %rocess is not atten!e! ith the !ifficulty an! insecurity to be foun! in the synthesis, to hich our critique is entirely !e"ote!, an! %artly because it oul! be inconsistent ith the unity of our %lan to bur!en this essay ith the "in!ication of the com%leteness of such an analysis an! !e!uction, ith hich, after all, e ha"e at %resent nothing to !o# This com%leteness of the analysis of these ra!ical conce%tions, as ell as of the !e!uction from the conce%tions a %riori hich may be gi"en by the analysis, e can, ho e"er, easily attain, %ro"i!e! only that e are in %ossession of all these ra!ical conce%tions, hich are to ser"e as %rinci%les of the synthesis, an! that in res%ect of this main %ur%ose nothing is anting# To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes transcen!ental %hiloso%hy@ an! it is the com%lete i!ea of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, but still not the science itself@ because it only %rocee!s so far ith the analysis as is necessary to the %o er of ju!ging com%letely of our synthetical kno le!ge a %riori# The %rinci%al thing e must atten! to, in the !i"ision of the %arts of a science like this, is that no conce%tions must enter it hich contain aught em%irical@ in other or!s, that the kno le!ge a %riori must be com%letely %ure# ;ence, although the highest %rinci%les an! fun!amental conce%tions of morality are certainly cognitions a %riori, yet they !o not belong to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy@ because, though they certainly !o not lay the conce%tions of %ain, %leasure, !esires, inclinations, etc# D hich are all of em%irical

originE, at the foun!ation of its %rece%ts, yet still into the conce%tion of !utyBas an obstacle to be o"ercome, or as an incitement hich shoul! not be ma!e into a moti"eB these em%irical conce%tions must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of %ure morality# Transcen!ental %hiloso%hy is consequently a %hiloso%hy of the %ure an! merely s%eculati"e reason# :or all that is %ractical, so far as it contains moti"es, relates to feelings, an! these belong to em%irical sources of cognition# If e ish to !i"i!e this science from the uni"ersal %oint of "ie of a science in general, it ought to com%rehen!, first, a *octrine of the Elements, an!, secon!ly, a *octrine of the Aetho! of %ure reason# Each of these main !i"isions ill ha"e its sub!i"isions, the se%arate reasons for hich e cannot here %articulariCe# 9nly so much seems necessary, by ay of intro!uction of %remonition, that there are t o sources of human kno le!ge D hich %robably s%ring from a common, but to us unkno n rootE, namely, sense an! un!erstan!ing# By the former, objects are gi"en to us@ by the latter, thought# 7o far as the faculty of sense may contain re%resentations a %riori, hich form the con!itions un!er hich objects are gi"en, in so far it belongs to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy# The transcen!ental !octrine of sense must form the first %art of our science of elements, because the con!itions un!er hich alone the objects of human kno le!ge are gi"en must %rece!e those un!er hich they are thought# I# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' *9CTRI<E 9: E'EAE<T7# :IR7T P)RT# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' )E7T;ETIC# 77 I# Intro!uctory# In hatsoe"er mo!e, or by hatsoe"er means, our kno le!ge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in hich it imme!iately relates to them is by means of an intuition# To this as the in!is%ensable groun! ork, all thought %oints# But an intuition can take %lace only in so far as the object is gi"en to us# This, again, is only %ossible, to man at least, on con!ition that the object affect the min! in a certain manner# The ca%acity for recei"ing re%resentations Drece%ti"ityE through the mo!e in hich e are affecte! by objects, objects, is calle! sensibility# By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are gi"en to us, an! it alone furnishes us ith intuitions@ by the un!erstan!ing they are thought, an! from it arise conce%tions# But an thought must !irectly, or in!irectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions@ consequently, ith us, to sensibility, because in no other ay can an object be gi"en to us# The effect of an object u%on the faculty of re%resentation, so far as e are affecte! by the sai! object, is sensation# That sort of intuition hich relates to an object by means of sensation is calle! an em%irical intuition# The un!etermine! object of an em%irical intuition is calle! %henomenon# That hich in the %henomenon corres%on!s to the sensation, I term its matter@ but that hich effects that the content of the %henomenon can be arrange! un!er certain relations, I call its form# But that in hich our sensations are merely arrange!, an! by hich they are susce%tible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation# It is, then, the matter of all %henomena that is gi"en to us a

%osteriori@ the form must lie rea!y a %riori for them in the min!, an! consequently can be regar!e! se%arately from all sensation# I call all re%resentations %ure, in the transcen!ental meaning of the or!, herein nothing is met ith that belongs to sensation# )n! accor!ingly e fin! e?isting in the min! a %riori, the %ure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in hich all the manifol! content of the %henomenal orl! is arrange! an! "ie e! un!er certain relations# This %ure form of sensibility I shall call %ure intuition# Thus, if I take a ay from our re%resentation of a bo!y all that the un!erstan!ing thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, !i"isibility, etc#, an! also hate"er belongs to sensation, as im%enetrability, har!ness, colour, etc#@ yet there is still something left us from this em%irical intuition, namely, e?tension an! sha%e# These belong to %ure intuition, hich e?ists a %riori in the min!, as a mere form of sensibility, an! ithout any real object of the senses or any sensation# The science of all the %rinci%les of sensibility a %riori, I call transcen!ental aesthetic#8 There must, then, be such a science forming the first %art of the transcen!ental !octrine of elements, in contra!istinction to that %art hich contains the %rinci%les of %ure thought, an! hich is calle! transcen!ental logic# /:ootnote( The Germans are the only %eo%le ho at %resent use this or! to in!icate hat others call the critique of taste# )t the foun!ation of this term lies the !isa%%ointe! ho%e, hich the eminent analyst, Baumgarten, concei"e!, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to %rinci%les of reason, an! so of ele"ating its rules into a science# But his en!ea"ours ere "ain# :or the sai! rules or criteria are, in res%ect to their chief sources, merely em%irical, consequently ne"er can ser"e as !eterminate la s a %riori, by hich our ju!gement in matters of taste is to be !irecte!# It is rather our ju!gement hich forms the %ro%er test as to the correctness of the %rinci%les# 9n this account it is a!"isable to gi"e u% the use of the term as !esignating the critique of taste, an! to a%%ly it solely to that !octrine, hich is true scienceBthe science of the la s of sensibilityBan! thus come nearer to the language an! the sense of the ancients in their ell&kno n !i"ision of the objects of cognition into aiotheta kai noeta, or to share it ith s%eculati"e %hiloso%hy, an! em%loy it %artly in a transcen!ental, %artly in a %sychological signification#3 In the science of transcen!ental aesthetic accor!ingly, e shall first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by se%arating from it all that is anne?e! to its %erce%tions by the conce%tions of un!erstan!ing, so that nothing be left but em%irical intuition# In the ne?t %lace e shall take a ay from this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain but %ure intuition, an! the mere form of %henomena, hich is all that the

sensibility can affor! a %riori# :rom this in"estigation it ill be foun! that there are t o %ure forms of sensuous intuition, as %rinci%les of kno le!ge a %riori, namely, s%ace an! time# To the consi!eration of these e shall no %rocee!# 7ECTI9< I# 9f 7%ace# 77 ,# Aeta%hysical E?%osition of this Conce%tion# By means of the e?ternal sense Da %ro%erty of the min!E, e re%resent to oursel"es objects as ithout us, an! these all in s%ace# ;erein alone are their sha%e, !imensions, an! relations to each other !etermine! or !eterminable# The internal sense, by means of hich the min! contem%lates itself or its internal state, gi"es, in!ee!, no intuition of the soul as an object@ yet there is ne"ertheless a !eterminate form, un!er hich alone the contem%lation of our internal state is %ossible, so that all hich relates to the in ar! !eterminations of the min! is re%resente! in relations of time# 9f time e cannot ha"e any e?ternal intuition, any more than e can ha"e an internal intuition of s%ace# >hat then are time an! s%aceH )re they real e?istencesH 9r, are they merely relations or !eterminations of things, such, ho e"er, as oul! equally belong to these things in themsel"es, though they shoul! ne"er become objects of intuition@ or, are they such as belong only to the form of intuition, an! consequently to the subjecti"e constitution of the min!, ithout hich these %re!icates of time an! s%ace coul! not be attache! to any objectH In or!er to become informe! on these %oints, e shall first gi"e an e?%osition of the conce%tion of s%ace# By e?%osition, I mean the clear, though not !etaile!, re%resentation of that hich belongs to a conce%tion@ an! an e?%osition is meta%hysical hen it contains that hich re%resents the conce%tion as gi"en a %riori# 6# 7%ace is not a conce%tion hich has been !eri"e! from out ar! e?%eriences# :or, in or!er that certain sensations may relate to something ithout me Dthat is, to something hich occu%ies a !ifferent %art of s%ace from that in hich I amE@ in like manner, in or!er that I may re%resent them not merely as ithout, of, an! near to each other, but also in se%arate %laces, the re%resentation of s%ace must alrea!y e?ist as a foun!ation# Consequently, the re%resentation of s%ace cannot be borro e! from the relations of e?ternal %henomena through e?%erience@ but, on the contrary, this e?ternal e?%erience is itself only %ossible through the sai! antece!ent re%resentation# ,# 7%ace then is a necessary re%resentation a %riori, hich ser"es for the foun!ation of all e?ternal intuitions# >e ne"er can imagine or make a re%resentation to oursel"es of the non&e?istence of s%ace, though e may easily enough think that no objects are foun! in it# It must, therefore, be consi!ere! as the con!ition of the %ossibility of %henomena, an! by no means as a !etermination !e%en!ent on them, an! is a re%resentation a %riori, hich necessarily su%%lies the basis for e?ternal %henomena# .# 7%ace is no !iscursi"e, or as e say, general conce%tion of the relations of things, but a %ure intuition# :or, in the first %lace, e can only re%resent to oursel"es one s%ace, an!, hen e talk of !i"ers s%aces, e mean only %arts of one an! the same s%ace# Aoreo"er, these %arts cannot antece!e this one all&embracing s%ace, as the com%onent %arts from hich the aggregate can be ma!e u%, but can be cogitate! only as e?isting in

it# 7%ace is essentially one, an! multi%licity in it, consequently the general notion of s%aces, of this or that s%ace, !e%en!s solely u%on limitations# ;ence it follo s that an a %riori intuition D hich is not em%iricalE lies at the root of all our conce%tions of s%ace# Thus, moreo"er, the %rinci%les of geometryBfor e?am%le, that Gin a triangle, t o si!es together are greater than the thir!,G are ne"er !e!uce! from general conce%tions of line an! triangle, but from intuition, an! this a %riori, ith a%o!eictic certainty# 1# 7%ace is re%resente! as an infinite gi"en quantity# <o e"ery conce%tion must in!ee! be consi!ere! as a re%resentation hich is containe! in an infinite multitu!e of !ifferent %ossible re%resentations, hich, therefore, com%rises these un!er itself@ but no conce%tion, as such, can be so concei"e!, as if it containe! ithin itself an infinite multitu!e of re%resentations# <e"ertheless, s%ace is so concei"e! of, for all %arts of s%ace are equally ca%able of being %ro!uce! to infinity# Consequently, the original re%resentation of s%ace is an intuition a %riori, an! not a conce%tion# 77 .# Transcen!ental E?%osition of the Conce%tion of 7%ace# By a transcen!ental e?%osition, I mean the e?%lanation of a conce%tion, as a %rinci%le, hence can be !iscerne! the %ossibility of other synthetical a %riori cognitions# :or this %ur%ose, it is requisite, firstly, that such cognitions !o really flo from the gi"en conce%tion@ an!, secon!ly, that the sai! cognitions are only %ossible un!er the %resu%%osition of a gi"en mo!e of e?%laining this conce%tion# Geometry is a science hich !etermines the %ro%erties of s%ace synthetically, an! yet a %riori# >hat, then, must be our re%resentation of s%ace, in or!er that such a cognition of it may be %ossibleH It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conce%tion, no %ro%ositions can be !e!uce! hich go out beyon! the conce%tion, an! yet this ha%%ens in geometry# DIntro!# K#E But this intuition must be foun! in the min! a %riori, that is, before any %erce%tion of objects, consequently must be %ure, not em%irical, intuition# :or geometrical %rinci%les are al ays a%o!eictic, that is, unite! ith the consciousness of their necessity, as( G7%ace has only three !imensions#G But %ro%ositions of this kin! cannot be em%irical ju!gements, nor conclusions from them# DIntro!# II#E <o , ho can an e?ternal intuition anterior to objects themsel"es, an! in hich our conce%tion of objects can be !etermine! a %riori, e?ist in the human min!H 9b"iously not other ise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal ca%acity of the subjectFs being affecte! by objects, an! thereby of obtaining imme!iate re%resentation, that is, intuition@ consequently, only as the form of the e?ternal sense in general# Thus it is only by means of our e?%lanation that the %ossibility of geometry, as a synthetical science a %riori, becomes com%rehensible# E"ery mo!e of e?%lanation hich !oes not sho us this %ossibility, although in a%%earance it may be similar to ours, can ith the utmost certainty be !istinguishe! from it by these marks# 77 1# Conclusions from the foregoing Conce%tions# DaE 7%ace !oes not re%resent any %ro%erty of objects as things in themsel"es, nor !oes it re%resent them in their relations to each other@ in other or!s, s%ace !oes not re%resent

to us any !etermination of objects such as attaches to the objects themsel"es, an! oul! remain, e"en though all subjecti"e con!itions of the intuition ere abstracte!# :or neither absolute nor relati"e !eterminations of objects can be intuite! %rior to the e?istence of the things to hich they belong, an! therefore not a %riori# DbE 7%ace is nothing else than the form of all %henomena of the e?ternal sense, that is, the subjecti"e con!ition of the sensibility, un!er hich alone e?ternal intuition is %ossible# <o , because the rece%ti"ity or ca%acity of the subject to be affecte! by objects necessarily antece!es all intuitions of these objects, it is easily un!erstoo! ho the form of all %henomena can be gi"en in the min! %re"ious to all actual %erce%tions, therefore a %riori, an! ho it, as a %ure intuition, in hich all objects must be !etermine!, can contain %rinci%les of the relations of these objects %rior to all e?%erience# It is therefore from the human %oint of "ie only that e can s%eak of s%ace, e?ten!e! objects, etc# If e !e%art from the subjecti"e con!ition, un!er hich alone e can obtain e?ternal intuition, or, in other or!s, by means of hich e are affecte! by objects, the re%resentation of s%ace has no meaning hatsoe"er# This %re!icate is only a%%licable to things in so far as they a%%ear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility# The constant form of this rece%ti"ity, hich e call sensibility, is a necessary con!ition of all relations in hich objects can be intuite! as e?isting ithout us, an! hen abstraction of these objects is ma!e, is a %ure intuition, to hich e gi"e the name of s%ace# It is clear that e cannot make the s%ecial con!itions of sensibility into con!itions of the %ossibility of things, but only of the %ossibility of their e?istence as far as they are %henomena# )n! so e may correctly say that s%ace contains all hich can a%%ear to us e?ternally, but not all things consi!ere! as things in themsel"es, be they intuite! or not, or by hatsoe"er subject one ill# )s to the intuitions of other thinking beings, e cannot ju!ge hether they are or are not boun! by the same con!itions hich limit our o n intuition, an! hich for us are uni"ersally "ali!# If e join the limitation of a ju!gement to the conce%tion of the subject, then the ju!gement ill %ossess uncon!itione! "ali!ity# :or e?am%le, the %ro%osition, G)ll objects are besi!e each other in s%ace,G is "ali! only un!er the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition# But if I join the con!ition to the conce%tion an! say, G)ll things, as e?ternal %henomena, are besi!e each other in s%ace,G then the rule is "ali! uni"ersally, an! ithout any limitation# 9ur e?%ositions, consequently, teach the reality Di#e#, the objecti"e "ali!ityE of s%ace in regar! of all hich can be %resente! to us e?ternally as object, an! at the same time also the i!eality of s%ace in regar! to objects hen they are consi!ere! by means of reason as things in themsel"es, that is, ithout reference to the constitution of our sensibility# >e maintain, therefore, the em%irical reality of s%ace in regar! to all %ossible e?ternal e?%erience, although e must a!mit its transcen!ental i!eality@ in other or!s, that it is nothing, so soon as e ith!ra the con!ition u%on hich the %ossibility of all e?%erience !e%en!s an! look u%on s%ace as something that belongs to things in themsel"es# But, ith the e?ce%tion of s%ace, there is no re%resentation, subjecti"e an! referring to something e?ternal to us, hich coul! be calle! objecti"e a %riori# :or there are no other subjecti"e re%resentations from hich e can !e!uce synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori, as e can from the intuition of s%ace# D7ee 77 .#E Therefore, to s%eak accurately, no

i!eality hate"er belongs to these, although they agree in this res%ect ith the re%resentation of s%ace, that they belong merely to the subjecti"e nature of the mo!e of sensuous %erce%tion@ such a mo!e, for e?am%le, as that of sight, of hearing, an! of feeling, by means of the sensations of colour, soun!, an! heat, but hich, because they are only sensations an! not intuitions, !o not of themsel"es gi"e us the cognition of any object, least of all, an a %riori cognition# Ay %ur%ose, in the abo"e remark, is merely this( to guar! any one against illustrating the asserte! i!eality of s%ace by e?am%les quite insufficient, for e?am%le, by colour, taste, etc#@ for these must be contem%late! not as %ro%erties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes hich may be !ifferent in !ifferent men# :or, in such a case, that hich is originally a mere %henomenon, a rose, for e?am%le, is taken by the em%irical un!erstan!ing for a thing in itself, though to e"ery !ifferent eye, in res%ect of its colour, it may a%%ear !ifferent# 9n the contrary, the transcen!ental conce%tion of %henomena in s%ace is a critical a!monition, that, in general, nothing hich is intuite! in s%ace is a thing in itself, an! that s%ace is not a form hich belongs as a %ro%erty to things@ but that objects are quite unkno n to us in themsel"es, an! hat e call out ar! objects, are nothing else but mere re%resentations of our sensibility, hose form is s%ace, but hose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not kno n by means of these re%resentations, nor e"er can be, but res%ecting hich, in e?%erience, no inquiry is e"er ma!e# 7ECTI9< II# 9f Time# 77 I# Aeta%hysical E?%osition of this Conce%tion# 6# Time is not an em%irical conce%tion# :or neither coe?istence nor succession oul! be %ercei"e! by us, if the re%resentation of time !i! not e?ist as a foun!ation a %riori# >ithout this %resu%%osition e coul! not re%resent to oursel"es that things e?ist together at one an! the same time, or at !ifferent times, that is, contem%oraneously, or in succession# ,# Time is a necessary re%resentation, lying at the foun!ation of all our intuitions# >ith regar! to %henomena in general, e cannot think a ay time from them, an! re%resent them to oursel"es as out of an! unconnecte! ith time, but e can quite ell re%resent to oursel"es time "oi! of %henomena# Time is therefore gi"en a %riori# In it alone is all reality of %henomena %ossible# These may all be annihilate! in thought, but time itself, as the uni"ersal con!ition of their %ossibility, cannot be so annulle!# .# 9n this necessity a %riori is also foun!e! the %ossibility of a%o!eictic %rinci%les of the relations of time, or a?ioms of time in general, such as( GTime has only one !imension,G G*ifferent times are not coe?istent but successi"eG Das !ifferent s%aces are not successi"e but coe?istentE# These %rinci%les cannot be !eri"e! from e?%erience, for it oul! gi"e neither strict uni"ersality, nor a%o!eictic certainty# >e shoul! only be able to say, Gso common e?%erience teaches us,G but not Git must be so#G They are "ali! as rules, through hich, in general, e?%erience is %ossible@ an! they instruct us res%ecting e?%erience, an! not by means of it#

1# Time is not a !iscursi"e, or as it is calle!, general conce%tion, but a %ure form of the sensuous intuition# *ifferent times are merely %arts of one an! the same time# But the re%resentation hich can only be gi"en by a single object is an intuition# Besi!es, the %ro%osition that !ifferent times cannot be coe?istent coul! not be !eri"e! from a general conce%tion# :or this %ro%osition is synthetical, an! therefore cannot s%ring out of conce%tions alone# It is therefore containe! imme!iately in the intuition an! re%resentation of time# I# The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that e"ery !etermine! quantity of time is %ossible only through limitations of one time lying at the foun!ation# Consequently, the original re%resentation, time, must be gi"en as unlimite!# But as the !eterminate re%resentation of the %arts of time an! of e"ery quantity of an object can only be obtaine! by limitation, the com%lete re%resentation of time must not be furnishe! by means of conce%tions, for these contain only %artial re%resentations# Conce%tions, on the contrary, must ha"e imme!iate intuition for their basis# 77 5 Transcen!ental E?%osition of the Conce%tion of Time# I may here refer to hat is sai! abo"e D77 I, .E, here, for or sake of bre"ity, I ha"e %lace! un!er the hea! of meta%hysical e?%osition, that hich is %ro%erly transcen!ental# ;ere I shall a!! that the conce%tion of change, an! ith it the conce%tion of motion, as change of %lace, is %ossible only through an! in the re%resentation of time@ that if this re%resentation ere not an intuition DinternalE a %riori, no conce%tion, of hate"er kin!, coul! ren!er com%rehensible the %ossibility of change, in other or!s, of a conjunction of contra!ictorily o%%ose! %re!icates in one an! the same object, for e?am%le, the %resence of a thing in a %lace an! the non& %resence of the same thing in the same %lace# It is only in time that it is %ossible to meet ith t o contra!ictorily o%%ose! !eterminations in one thing, that is, after each other# Thus our conce%tion of time e?%lains the %ossibility of so much synthetical kno le!ge a %riori, as is e?hibite! in the general !octrine of motion, hich is not a little fruitful# 77 J# Conclusions from the abo"e Conce%tions# DaE Time is not something hich subsists of itself, or hich inheres in things as an objecti"e !etermination, an! therefore remains, hen abstraction is ma!e of the subjecti"e con!itions of the intuition of things# :or in the former case, it oul! be something real, yet ithout %resenting to any %o er of %erce%tion any real object# In the latter case, as an or!er or !etermination inherent in things themsel"es, it coul! not be antece!ent to things, as their con!ition, nor !iscerne! or intuite! by means of synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori# But all this is quite %ossible hen e regar! time as merely the subjecti"e con!ition un!er hich all our intuitions take %lace# :or in that case, this form of the in ar! intuition can be re%resente! %rior to the objects, an! consequently a %riori# DbE Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of self an! of our internal state# :or time cannot be any !etermination of out ar! %henomena# It has to !o neither ith sha%e nor %osition@ on the contrary, it !etermines

the relation of re%resentations in our internal state# )n! %recisely because this internal intuition %resents to us no sha%e or form, e en!ea"our to su%%ly this ant by analogies, an! re%resent the course of time by a line %rogressing to infinity, the content of hich constitutes a series hich is only of one !imension@ an! e conclu!e from the %ro%erties of this line as to all the %ro%erties of time, ith this single e?ce%tion, that the %arts of the line are coe?istent, hilst those of time are successi"e# :rom this it is clear also that the re%resentation of time is itself an intuition, because all its relations can be e?%resse! in an e?ternal intuition# DcE Time is the formal con!ition a %riori of all %henomena hatsoe"er# 7%ace, as the %ure form of e?ternal intuition, is limite! as a con!ition a %riori to e?ternal %henomena alone# 9n the other han!, because all re%resentations, hether they ha"e or ha"e not e?ternal things for their objects, still in themsel"es, as !eterminations of the min!, belong to our internal state@ an! because this internal state is subject to the formal con!ition of the internal intuition, that is, to timeBtime is a con!ition a %riori of all %henomena hatsoe"erBthe imme!iate con!ition of all internal, an! thereby the me!iate con!ition of all e?ternal %henomena# If I can say a %riori, G)ll out ar! %henomena are in s%ace, an! !etermine! a %riori accor!ing to the relations of s%ace,G I can also, from the %rinci%le of the internal sense, affirm uni"ersally, G)ll %henomena in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time an! stan! necessarily in relations of time#G If e abstract our internal intuition of oursel"es an! all e?ternal intuitions, %ossible only by "irtue of this internal intuition an! %resente! to us by our faculty of re%resentation, an! consequently take objects as they are in themsel"es, then time is nothing# It is only of objecti"e "ali!ity in regar! to %henomena, because these are things hich e regar! as objects of our senses# It no longer objecti"e e, make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other or!s, of that mo!e of re%resentation hich is %eculiar to us, an! s%eak of things in general# Time is therefore merely a subjecti"e con!ition of our DhumanE intuition D hich is al ays sensuous, that is, so far as e are affecte! by objectsE, an! in itself, in!e%en!ently of the min! or subject, is nothing# <e"ertheless, in res%ect of all %henomena, consequently of all things hich come ithin the s%here of our e?%erience, it is necessarily objecti"e# >e cannot say, G)ll things are in time,G because in this conce%tion of things in general, e abstract an! make no mention of any sort of intuition of things# But this is the %ro%er con!ition un!er hich time belongs to our re%resentation of objects# If e a!! the con!ition to the conce%tion, an! say, G)ll things, as %henomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time,G then the %ro%osition has its soun! objecti"e "ali!ity an! uni"ersality a %riori# >hat e ha"e no set forth teaches, therefore, the em%irical reality of time@ that is, its objecti"e "ali!ity in reference to all objects hich can e"er be %resente! to our senses# )n! as our intuition is al ays sensuous, no object e"er can be %resente! to us in e?%erience, hich !oes not come un!er the con!itions of time# 9n the other han!, e !eny to time all claim to absolute reality@ that is, e !eny that it, ithout ha"ing regar! to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a con!ition or %ro%erty# 7uch %ro%erties as belong to objects as things in themsel"es ne"er can be %resente! to us through the me!ium of the senses# ;erein consists, therefore, the

transcen!ental i!eality of time, accor!ing to hich, if e abstract the subjecti"e con!itions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, an! cannot be reckone! as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themsel"es, in!e%en!ently of its relation to our intuition# This i!eality, like that of s%ace, is not to be %ro"e! or illustrate! by fallacious analogies ith sensations, for this reasonBthat in such arguments or illustrations, e make the %resu%%osition that the %henomenon, in hich such an! such %re!icates inhere, has objecti"e reality, hile in this case e can only fin! such an objecti"e reality as is itself em%irical, that is, regar!s the object as a mere %henomenon# In reference to this subject, see the remark in 7ection I D77 1E 77 2# Eluci!ation# )gainst this theory, hich grants em%irical reality to time, but !enies to it absolute an! transcen!ental reality, I ha"e hear! from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urge! that I conclu!e that it must naturally %resent itself to e"ery rea!er to hom these consi!erations are no"el# It runs thus( GChanges are realG Dthis the continual change in our o n re%resentations !emonstrates, e"en though the e?istence of all e?ternal %henomena, together ith their changes, is !enie!E# <o , changes are only %ossible in time, an! therefore time must be something real# But there is no !ifficulty in ans ering this# I grant the hole argument# Time, no !oubt, is something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal intuition# It therefore has subjecti"e reality, in reference to our internal e?%erience, that is, I ha"e really the re%resentation of time an! of my !eterminations therein# Time, therefore, is not to be regar!e! as an object, but as the mo!e of re%resentation of myself as an object# But if I coul! intuite myself, or be intuite! by another being, ithout this con!ition of sensibility, then those "ery !eterminations hich e no re%resent to oursel"es as changes, oul! %resent to us a kno le!ge in hich the re%resentation of time, an! consequently of change, oul! not a%%ear# The em%irical reality of time, therefore, remains, as the con!ition of all our e?%erience# But absolute reality, accor!ing to hat has been sai! abo"e, cannot be grante! it# Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition#8 If e take a ay from it the s%ecial con!ition of our sensibility, the conce%tion of time also "anishes@ an! it inheres not in the objects themsel"es, but solely in the subject Dor min!E hich intuites them# /8:ootnote( I can in!ee! say Gmy re%resentations follo one another, or are successi"eG@ but this means only that e are conscious of them as in a succession, that is, accor!ing to the form of the internal sense# Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objecti"e !etermination %ertaining to, or inherent in things#3 But the reason hy this objection is so unanimously brought against our !octrine of time, an! that too by !is%utants ho cannot start any intelligible arguments against the !octrine of the i!eality of s%ace, is thisBthey ha"e no ho%e of !emonstrating a%o!eictically the absolute reality of s%ace, because the !octrine of i!ealism is against them, accor!ing to hich the reality of e?ternal objects is not ca%able of any strict %roof# 9n the other han!, the reality of the object of our internal sense Dthat is, myself an! my

internal stateE is clear imme!iately through consciousness# The formerBe?ternal objects in s%aceBmight be a mere !elusion, but the latterBthe object of my internal %erce%tion Bis un!eniably real# They !o not, ho e"er, reflect that both, ithout question of their reality as re%resentations, belong only to the genus %henomenon, hich has al ays t o as%ects, the one, the object consi!ere! as a thing in itself, ithout regar! to the mo!e of intuiting it, an! the nature of hich remains for this "ery reason %roblematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object, hich must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to hich it a%%earsB hich form of intuition ne"ertheless belongs really an! necessarily to the %henomenal object# Time an! s%ace are, therefore, t o sources of kno le!ge, from hich, a %riori, "arious synthetical cognitions can be !ra n# 9f this e fin! a striking e?am%le in the cognitions of s%ace an! its relations, hich form the foun!ation of %ure mathematics# They are the t o %ure forms of all intuitions, an! thereby make synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori %ossible# But these sources of kno le!ge being merely con!itions of our sensibility, !o therefore, an! as such, strictly !etermine their o n range an! %ur%ose, in that they !o not an! cannot %resent objects as things in themsel"es, but are a%%licable to them solely in so far as they are consi!ere! as sensuous %henomena# The s%here of %henomena is the only s%here of their "ali!ity, an! if e "enture out of this, no further objecti"e use can be ma!e of them# :or the rest, this formal reality of time an! s%ace lea"es the "ali!ity of our em%irical kno le!ge unshaken@ for our certainty in that res%ect is equally firm, hether these forms necessarily inhere in the things themsel"es, or only in our intuitions of them# 9n the other han!, those ho maintain the absolute reality of time an! s%ace, hether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as mo!ifications, in things, must fin! themsel"es at utter "ariance ith the %rinci%les of e?%erience itself# :or, if they !eci!e for the first "ie , an! make s%ace an! time into substances, this being the si!e taken by mathematical natural %hiloso%hers, they must a!mit t o self& subsisting nonentities, infinite an! eternal, hich e?ist Dyet ithout there being anything realE for the %ur%ose of containing in themsel"es e"erything that is real# If they a!o%t the secon! "ie of inherence, hich is %referre! by some meta%hysical natural %hiloso%hers, an! regar! s%ace an! time as relations Dcontiguity in s%ace or succession in timeE, abstracte! from e?%erience, though re%resente! confuse!ly in this state of se%aration, they fin! themsel"es in that case necessitate! to !eny the "ali!ity of mathematical !octrines a %riori in reference to real things Dfor e?am%le, in s%aceEBat all e"ents their a%o!eictic certainty# :or such certainty cannot be foun! in an a %osteriori %ro%osition@ an! the conce%tions a %riori of s%ace an! time are, accor!ing to this o%inion, mere creations of the imagination, ha"ing their source really in e?%erience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracte! from e?%erience, imagination has ma!e u% something hich contains, in!ee!, general statements of these relations, yet of hich no a%%lication can be ma!e ithout the restrictions attache! thereto by nature# The former of these %arties gains this a!"antage, that they kee% the s%here of %henomena free for mathematical science# 9n the other han!, these "ery con!itions Ds%ace an! timeE embarrass them greatly, hen the un!erstan!ing en!ea"ours to %ass the limits of that s%here# The latter has, in!ee!, this a!"antage, that the re%resentations of s%ace an! time !o not come in their ay hen they ish to ju!ge of objects, not as %henomena, but merely in their relation to the un!erstan!ing# *e"oi!, ho e"er, of a true an! objecti"ely "ali! a %riori intuition, they can neither furnish any basis for the %ossibility of

mathematical cognitions a %riori, nor bring the %ro%ositions of e?%erience into necessary accor!ance ith those of mathematics# In our theory of the true nature of these t o original forms of the sensibility, both !ifficulties are surmounte!# In conclusion, that transcen!ental aesthetic cannot contain any more than these t o elementsBs%ace an! time, is sufficiently ob"ious from the fact that all other conce%tions a%%ertaining to sensibility, e"en that of motion, hich unites in itself both elements, %resu%%ose something em%irical# Aotion, for e?am%le, %resu%%oses the %erce%tion of something mo"able# But s%ace consi!ere! in itself contains nothing mo"able, consequently motion must be something hich is foun! in s%ace only through e?%erienceBin other or!s, an em%irical !atum# In like manner, transcen!ental aesthetic cannot number the conce%tion of change among its !ata a %riori@ for time itself !oes not change, but only something hich is in time# To acquire the conce%tion of change, therefore, the %erce%tion of some e?isting object an! of the succession of its !eterminations, in one or!, e?%erience, is necessary# 77 P# General Remarks on Transcen!ental )esthetic# I# In or!er to %re"ent any misun!erstan!ing, it ill be requisite, in the first %lace, to reca%itulate, as clearly as %ossible, hat our o%inion is ith res%ect to the fun!amental nature of our sensuous cognition in general# >e ha"e inten!e!, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the re%resentation of %henomena@ that the things hich e intuite, are not in themsel"es the same as our re%resentations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themsel"es so constitute! as they a%%ear to us@ an! that if e take a ay the subject, or e"en only the subjecti"e constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature an! relations of objects in s%ace an! time, but e"en s%ace an! time themsel"es !isa%%ear@ an! that these, as %henomena, cannot e?ist in themsel"es, but only in us# >hat may be the nature of objects consi!ere! as things in themsel"es an! ithout reference to the rece%ti"ity of our sensibility is quite unkno n to us# >e kno nothing more than our mo!e of %ercei"ing them, hich is %eculiar to us, an! hich, though not of necessity %ertaining to e"ery animate! being, is so to the hole human race# >ith this alone e ha"e to !o# 7%ace an! time are the %ure forms thereof@ sensation the matter# The former alone can e cogniCe a %riori, that is, antece!ent to all actual %erce%tion@ an! for this reason such cognition is calle! %ure intuition# The latter is that in our cognition hich is calle! cognition a %osteriori, that is, em%irical intuition# The former a%%ertain absolutely an! necessarily to our sensibility, of hatsoe"er kin! our sensations may be@ the latter may be of "ery !i"ersifie! character# 7u%%osing that e shoul! carry our em%irical intuition e"en to the "ery highest !egree of clearness, e shoul! not thereby a!"ance one ste% nearer to a kno le!ge of the constitution of objects as things in themsel"es# :or e coul! only, at best, arri"e at a com%lete cognition of our o n mo!e of intuition, that is of our sensibility, an! this al ays un!er the con!itions originally attaching to the subject, namely, the con!itions of s%ace an! time@ hile the question( G>hat are objects consi!ere! as things in themsel"esHG remains unans erable e"en after the most thorough e?amination of the %henomenal orl!# To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confuse! re%resentation of things containing e?clusi"ely that hich belongs to them as things in themsel"es, an! this

un!er an accumulation of characteristic marks an! %artial re%resentations hich e cannot !istinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conce%tion of sensibility an! %henomeniCation, hich ren!ers our hole !octrine thereof em%ty an! useless# The !ifference bet een a confuse! an! a clear re%resentation is merely logical an! has nothing to !o ith content# <o !oubt the conce%tion of right, as em%loye! by a soun! un!erstan!ing, contains all that the most subtle in"estigation coul! unfol! from it, although, in the or!inary %ractical use of the or!, e are not conscious of the manifol! re%resentations com%rise! in the conce%tion# But e cannot for this reason assert that the or!inary conce%tion is a sensuous one, containing a mere %henomenon, for right cannot a%%ear as a %henomenon@ but the conce%tion of it lies in the un!erstan!ing, an! re%resents a %ro%erty Dthe moral %ro%ertyE of actions, hich belongs to them in themsel"es# 9n the other han!, the re%resentation in intuition of a bo!y contains nothing hich coul! belong to an object consi!ere! as a thing in itself, but merely the %henomenon or a%%earance of something, an! the mo!e in hich e are affecte! by that a%%earance@ an! this rece%ti"ity of our faculty of cognition is calle! sensibility, an! remains toto caelo !ifferent from the cognition of an object in itself, e"en though e shoul! e?amine the content of the %henomenon to the "ery bottom# It must be a!mitte! that the 'eibnitC&>olfian %hiloso%hy has assigne! an entirely erroneous %oint of "ie to all in"estigations into the nature an! origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regar!s the !istinction bet een the sensuous an! the intellectual as merely logical, hereas it is %lainly transcen!ental, an! concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity, but the content an! origin of both# :or the faculty of sensibility not only !oes not %resent us ith an in!istinct an! confuse! cognition of objects as things in themsel"es, but, in fact, gi"es us no kno le!ge of these at all# 9n the contrary, so soon as e abstract in thought our o n subjecti"e nature, the object re%resente!, ith the %ro%erties ascribe! to it by sensuous intuition, entirely !isa%%ears, because it as only this subjecti"e nature that !etermine! the form of the object as a %henomenon# In %henomena, e commonly, in!ee!, !istinguish that hich essentially belongs to the intuition of them, an! is "ali! for the sensuous faculty of e"ery human being, from that hich belongs to the same intuition acci!entally, as "ali! not for the sensuous faculty in general, but for a %articular state or organiCation of this or that sense# )ccor!ingly, e are accustome! to say that the former is a cognition hich re%resents the object itself, hilst the latter %resents only a %articular a%%earance or %henomenon thereof# This !istinction, ho e"er, is only em%irical# If e sto% here Das is usualE, an! !o not regar! the em%irical intuition as itself a mere %henomenon Das e ought to !oE, in hich nothing that can a%%ertain to a thing in itself is to be foun!, our transcen!ental !istinction is lost, an! e belie"e that e cogniCe objects as things in themsel"es, although in the hole range of the sensuous orl!, in"estigate the nature of its objects as %rofoun!ly as e may, e ha"e to !o ith nothing but %henomena# Thus, e call the rainbo a mere a%%earance of %henomenon in a sunny sho er, an! the rain, the reality or thing in itself@ an! this is right enough, if e un!erstan! the latter conce%tion in a merely %hysical sense, that is, as that hich in uni"ersal e?%erience, an! un!er hate"er con!itions of sensuous %erce%tion, is kno n in intuition to be so an! so !etermine!, an! not other ise# But if e consi!er this em%irical !atum generally, an! inquire, ithout reference to its accor!ance ith all our senses, hether there can be !isco"ere!

in it aught hich re%resents an object as a thing in itself Dthe rain!ro%s of course are not such, for they are, as %henomena, em%irical objectsE, the question of the relation of the re%resentation to the object is transcen!ental@ an! not only are the rain!ro%s mere %henomena, but e"en their circular form, nay, the s%ace itself through hich they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere mo!ifications or fun!amental !is%ositions of our sensuous intuition, hilst the transcen!ental object remains for us utterly unkno n# The secon! im%ortant concern of our aesthetic is that it !oes not obtain fa"our merely as a %lausible hy%othesis, but %ossess as un!oubte! a character of certainty as can be !eman!e! of any theory hich is to ser"e for an organon# In or!er fully to con"ince the rea!er of this certainty, e shall select a case hich ill ser"e to make its "ali!ity a%%arent, an! also to illustrate hat has been sai! in 77 .# 7u%%ose, then, that s%ace an! time are in themsel"es objecti"e, an! con!itions of theB %ossibility of objects as things in themsel"es# In the first %lace, it is e"i!ent that both %resent us, ith "ery many a%o!eictic an! synthetic %ro%ositions a %riori, but es%ecially s%aceBan! for this reason e shall %refer it for in"estigation at %resent# )s the %ro%ositions of geometry are cogniCe! synthetically a %riori, an! ith a%o!eictic certainty, I inquire( >hence !o you obtain %ro%ositions of this kin!, an! on hat basis !oes the un!erstan!ing rest, in or!er to arri"e at such absolutely necessary an! uni"ersally "ali! truthsH There is no other ay than through intuitions or conce%tions, as such@ an! these are gi"en either a %riori or a %osteriori# The latter, namely, em%irical conce%tions, together ith the em%irical intuition on hich they are foun!e!, cannot affor! any synthetical %ro%osition, e?ce%t such as is itself also em%irical, that is, a %ro%osition of e?%erience# But an em%irical %ro%osition cannot %ossess the qualities of necessity an! absolute uni"ersality, hich, ne"ertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical %ro%ositions# )s to the first an! only means to arri"e at such cognitions, namely, through mere conce%tions or intuitions a %riori, it is quite clear that from mere conce%tions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can be obtaine!# Take, for e?am%le, the %ro%osition( GT o straight lines cannot enclose a s%ace, an! ith these alone no figure is %ossible,G an! try to !e!uce it from the conce%tion of a straight line an! the number t o@ or take the %ro%osition( GIt is %ossible to construct a figure ith three straight lines,G an! en!ea"our, in like manner, to !e!uce it from the mere conce%tion of a straight line an! the number three# )ll your en!ea"ours are in "ain, an! you fin! yourself force! to ha"e recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry al ays !oes# $ou therefore gi"e yourself an object in intuition# But of hat kin! is this intuitionH Is it a %ure a %riori, or is it an em%irical intuitionH If the latter, then neither an uni"ersally "ali!, much less an a%o!eictic %ro%osition can arise from it, for e?%erience ne"er can gi"e us any such %ro%osition# $ou must, therefore, gi"e yourself an object a %riori in intuition, an! u%on that groun! your synthetical %ro%osition# <o if there !i! not e?ist ithin you a faculty of intuition a %riori@ if this subjecti"e con!ition ere not in res%ect to its form also the uni"ersal con!ition a %riori un!er hich alone the object of this e?ternal intuition is itself %ossible@ if the object Dthat is, the triangleE ere something in itself, ithout relation to you the subject@ ho coul! you affirm that that hich lies necessarily in your subjecti"e con!itions in or!er to construct a triangle, must also

necessarily belong to the triangle in itselfH :or to your conce%tions of three lines, you coul! not a!! anything ne Dthat is, the figureE@ hich, therefore, must necessarily be foun! in the object, because the object is gi"en before your cognition, an! not by means of it# If, therefore, s%ace Dan! time alsoE ere not a mere form of your intuition, hich contains con!itions a %riori, un!er hich alone things can become e?ternal objects for you, an! ithout hich subjecti"e con!itions the objects are in themsel"es nothing, you coul! not construct any synthetical %ro%osition hatsoe"er regar!ing e?ternal objects# It is therefore not merely %ossible or %robable, but in!ubitably certain, that s%ace an! time, as the necessary con!itions of all our e?ternal an! internal e?%erience, are merely subjecti"e con!itions of all our intuitions, in relation to hich all objects are therefore mere %henomena, an! not things in themsel"es, %resente! to us in this %articular manner# )n! for this reason, in res%ect to the form of %henomena, much may be sai! a %riori, hilst of the thing in itself, hich may lie at the foun!ation of these %henomena, it is im%ossible to say anything# II# In confirmation of this theory of the i!eality of the e?ternal as ell as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as mere %henomena, e may es%ecially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations# DThe feelings of %ain an! %leasure, an! the ill, hich are not cognitions, are e?ce%te!#E The relations, to it, of %lace in an intuition De?tensionE, change of %lace DmotionE, an! la s accor!ing to hich this change is !etermine! Dmo"ing forcesE# That, ho e"er, hich is %resent in this or that %lace, or any o%eration going on, or result taking %lace in the things themsel"es, ith the e?ce%tion of change of %lace, is not gi"en to us by intuition# <o by means of mere relations, a thing cannot be kno n in itself@ an! it may therefore be fairly conclu!e!, that, as through the e?ternal sense nothing but mere re%resentations of relations are gi"en us, the sai! e?ternal sense in its re%resentation can contain only the relation of the object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself# The same is the case ith the internal intuition, not only because, in the internal intuition, the re%resentation of the e?ternal senses constitutes the material ith hich the min! is occu%ie!@ but because time, in hich e %lace, an! hich itself antece!es the consciousness of, these re%resentations in e?%erience, an! hich, as the formal con!ition of the mo!e accor!ing to hich objects are %lace! in the min!, lies at the foun!ation of them, contains relations of the successi"e, the coe?istent, an! of that hich al ays must be coe?istent ith succession, the %ermanent# <o that hich, as re%resentation, can antece!e e"ery e?ercise of thought Dof an objectE, is intuition@ an! hen it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of the intuition, hich, as it %resents us ith no re%resentation, e?ce%t in so far as something is %lace! in the min!, can be nothing else than the mo!e in hich the min! is affecte! by its o n acti"ity, to itBits %resenting to itself re%resentations, consequently the mo!e in hich the min! is affecte! by itself@ that is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in res%ect to its form# E"erything that is re%resente! through the me!ium of sense is so far %henomenal@ consequently, e must either refuse altogether to a!mit an internal sense, or the subject, hich is the object of that sense, coul! only be re%resente! by it as %henomenon, an! not as it oul! ju!ge of itself, if its intuition ere %ure s%ontaneous acti"ity, that is, ere intellectual# The !ifficulty here lies holly in the question( ;o

can the subject ha"e an internal intuition of itselfH But this !ifficulty is common to e"ery theory# The consciousness of self Da%%erce%tionE is the sim%le re%resentation of the GegoG@ an! if by means of that re%resentation alone, all the manifol! re%resentations in the subject ere s%ontaneously gi"en, then our internal intuition oul! be intellectual# This consciousness in man requires an internal %erce%tion of the manifol! re%resentations hich are %re"iously gi"en in the subject@ an! the manner in hich these re%resentations are gi"en in the min! ithout s%ontaneity, must, on account of this !ifference Dthe ant of s%ontaneityE, be calle! sensibility# If the faculty of self& consciousness is to a%%rehen! hat lies in the min!, it must all act that an! can in this ay alone %ro!uce an intuition of self# But the form of this intuition, hich lies in the original constitution of the min!, !etermines, in the re%resentation of time, the manner in hich the manifol! re%resentations are to combine themsel"es in the min!@ since the subject intuites itself, not as it oul! re%resent itself imme!iately an! s%ontaneously, but accor!ing to the manner in hich the min! is internally affecte!, consequently, as it a%%ears, an! not as it is# III# >hen e say that the intuition of e?ternal objects, an! also the self&intuition of the subject, re%resent both, objects an! subject, in s%ace an! time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they a%%earBthis is by no means equi"alent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory a%%earances# :or hen e s%eak of things as %henomena, the objects, nay, e"en the %ro%erties hich e ascribe to them, are looke! u%on as really gi"en@ only that, in so far as this or that %ro%erty !e%en!s u%on the mo!e of intuition of the subject, in the relation of the gi"en object to the subject, the object as %henomenon is to be !istinguishe! from the object as a thing in itself# Thus I !o not say that bo!ies seem or a%%ear to be e?ternal to me, or that my soul seems merely to be gi"en in my self& consciousness, although I maintain that the %ro%erties of s%ace an! time, in conformity to hich I set both, as the con!ition of their e?istence, abi!e in my mo!e of intuition, an! not in the objects in themsel"es# It oul! be my o n fault, if out of that hich I shoul! reckon as %henomenon, I ma!e mere illusory a%%earance#8 But this ill not ha%%en, because of our %rinci%le of the i!eality of all sensuous intuitions# 9n the contrary, if e ascribe objecti"e reality to these forms of re%resentation, it becomes im%ossible to a"oi! changing e"erything into mere a%%earance# :or if e regar! s%ace an! time as %ro%erties, hich must be foun! in objects as things in themsel"es, as sine quibus non of the %ossibility of their e?istence, an! reflect on the absur!ities in hich e then fin! oursel"es in"ol"e!, inasmuch as e are com%elle! to a!mit the e?istence of t o infinite things, hich are ne"ertheless not substances, nor anything really inhering in substances, nay, to a!mit that they are the necessary con!itions of the e?istence of all things, an! moreo"er, that they must continue to e?ist, although all e?isting things ere annihilate!B e cannot blame the goo! Berkeley for !egra!ing bo!ies to mere illusory a%%earances# <ay, e"en our o n e?istence, hich oul! in this case !e%en! u%on the self&e?istent reality of such a mere nonentity as time, oul! necessarily be change! ith it into mere a%%earanceBan absur!ity hich no one has as yet been guilty of# /8:ootnote( The %re!icates of the %henomenon can be affi?e! to the object itself in relation to our sensuous faculty@ for e?am%le, the re! colour or the %erfume to the rose# But DillusoryE a%%earance ne"er can be attribute! as a %re!icate

to an object, for this "ery reason, that it attributes to this object in itself that hich belongs to it only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in general, e#g#, the t o han!les hich ere formerly ascribe! to 7aturn# That hich is ne"er to be foun! in the object itself, but al ays in the relation of the object to the subject, an! hich moreo"er is inse%arable from our re%resentation of the object, e !enominate %henomenon# Thus the %re!icates of s%ace an! time are rightly attribute! to objects of the senses as such, an! in this there is no illusion# 9n the contrary, if I ascribe re!ness of the rose as a thing in itself, or to 7aturn his han!les, or e?tension to all e?ternal objects, consi!ere! as things in themsel"es, ithout regar!ing the !eterminate relation of these objects to the subject, an! ithout limiting my ju!gement to that relationBthen, an! then only, arises illusion#3 IK# In natural theology, here e think of an objectBGo!B hich ne"er can be an object of intuition to us, an! e"en to himself can ne"er be an object of sensuous intuition, e carefully a"oi! attributing to his intuition the con!itions of s%ace an! timeBan! intuition all his cognition must be, an! not thought, hich al ays inclu!es limitation# But ith hat right can e !o this if e make them forms of objects as things in themsel"es, an! such, moreo"er, as oul! continue to e?ist as a %riori con!itions of the e?istence of things, e"en though the things themsel"es ere annihilate!H :or as con!itions of all e?istence in general, s%ace an! time must be con!itions of the e?istence of the 7u%reme Being also# But if e !o not thus make them objecti"e forms of all things, there is no other ay left than to make them subjecti"e forms of our mo!e of intuitionBe?ternal an! internal@ hich is calle! sensuous, because it is not %rimiti"e, that is, is not such as gi"es in itself the e?istence of the object of the intuition Da mo!e of intuition hich, so far as e can ju!ge, can belong only to the CreatorE, but is !e%en!ent on the e?istence of the object, is %ossible, therefore, only on con!ition that the re%resentati"e faculty of the subject is affecte! by the object# It is, moreo"er, not necessary that e shoul! limit the mo!e of intuition in s%ace an! time to the sensuous faculty of man# It may ell be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this res%ect agree ith man Dthough as to this e cannot !eci!eE, but sensibility !oes not on account of this uni"ersality cease to be sensibility, for this "ery reason, that it is a !e!uce! Dintuitus !eri"ati"usE, an! not an original Dintuitus originariusE, consequently not an intellectual intuition, an! this intuition, as such, for reasons abo"e mentione!, seems to belong solely to the 7u%reme Being, but ne"er to a being !e%en!ent, quoa! its e?istence, as ell as its intuition D hich its e?istence !etermines an! limits relati"ely to gi"en objectsE# This latter remark, ho e"er, must be taken only as an illustration, an! not as any %roof of the truth of our aesthetical theory# 77 6-# Conclusion of the Transcen!ental )esthetic#

>e ha"e no com%letely before us one %art of the solution of the gran! general %roblem of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, namely, the question( G;o are synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori %ossibleHG That is to say, e ha"e sho n that e are in %ossession of %ure a %riori intuitions, namely, s%ace an! time, in hich e fin!, hen in a ju!gement a %riori e %ass out beyon! the gi"en conce%tion, something hich is not !isco"erable in that conce%tion, but is certainly foun! a %riori in the intuition hich corres%on!s to the conce%tion, an! can be unite! synthetically ith it# But the ju!gements hich these %ure intuitions enable us to make, ne"er reach farther than to objects of the senses, an! are "ali! only for objects of %ossible e?%erience# 7EC9<* P)RT# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' '9GIC#

INTRO!UCTION. Idea %+ a Trans,endental -%.",. I. O+ -%.", "n /eneral. 9ur kno le!ge s%rings from t o main sources in the min!, first of hich is the faculty or %o er of recei"ing re%resentations Drece%ti"ity for im%ressionsE@ the secon! is the %o er of cogniCing by means of these re%resentations Ds%ontaneity in the %ro!uction of conce%tionsE# Through the first an object is gi"en to us@ through the secon!, it is, in relation to the re%resentation D hich is a mere !etermination of the min!E, thought# Intuition an! conce%tions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our kno le!ge, so that neither conce%tions ithout an intuition in some ay corres%on!ing to them, nor intuition ithout conce%tions, can affor! us a cognition# Both are either %ure or em%irical# They are em%irical, hen sensation D hich %resu%%oses the actual %resence of the objectE is containe! in them@ an! %ure, hen no sensation is mi?e! ith the re%resentation# 7ensations e may call the matter of sensuous cognition# Pure intuition consequently contains merely the form un!er hich something is intuite!, an! %ure conce%tion only the form of the thought of an object# 9nly %ure intuitions an! %ure conce%tions are %ossible a %riori@ the em%irical only a %osteriori# >e a%%ly the term sensibility to the rece%ti"ity of the min! for im%ressions, in so far as it is in some ay affecte!@ an!, on the other han!, e call the faculty of s%ontaneously %ro!ucing re%resentations, or the s%ontaneity of cognition, un!erstan!ing# 9ur nature is so constitute! that intuition ith us ne"er can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mo!e in hich e are affecte! by objects# 9n the other han!, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous intuition is the un!erstan!ing# <either of these faculties has a %reference o"er the other# >ithout the sensuous faculty no object oul! be gi"en to us, an! ithout the un!erstan!ing no object oul! be thought# Thoughts ithout content are "oi!@ intuitions ithout conce%tions, blin!# ;ence it is as necessary for the min! to make its conce%tions sensuous Dthat is, to join to them the object in intuitionE, as to make its intuitions intelligible Dthat is, to bring them un!er conce%tionsE# <either of these faculties can e?change its %ro%er function# 4n!erstan!ing cannot intuite, an! the sensuous faculty cannot think# In no other ay than from the

unite! o%eration of both, can kno le!ge arise# But no one ought, on this account, to o"erlook the !ifference of the elements contribute! by each@ e ha"e rather great reason carefully to se%arate an! !istinguish them# >e therefore !istinguish the science of the la s of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the la s of the un!erstan!ing, that is, logic# <o , logic in its turn may be consi!ere! as t ofol!Bnamely, as logic of the general, or of the %articular use of the un!erstan!ing# The first contains the absolutely necessary la s of thought, ithout hich no use hatsoe"er of the un!erstan!ing is %ossible, an! gi"es la s therefore to the un!erstan!ing, ithout regar! to the !ifference of objects on hich it may be em%loye!# The logic of the %articular use of the un!erstan!ing contains the la s of correct thinking u%on a %articular class of objects# The former may be calle! elemental logicBthe latter, the organon of this or that %articular science# The latter is for the most %art em%loye! in the schools, as a %ro%ae!eutic to the sciences, although, in!ee!, accor!ing to the course of human reason, it is the last thing e arri"e at, hen the science has been alrea!y mature!, an! nee!s only the finishing touches to ar!s its correction an! com%letion@ for our kno le!ge of the objects of our attem%te! science must be tolerably e?tensi"e an! com%lete before e can in!icate the la s by hich a science of these objects can be establishe!# General logic is again either %ure or a%%lie!# In the former, e abstract all the em%irical con!itions un!er hich the un!erstan!ing is e?ercise!@ for e?am%le, the influence of the senses, the %lay of the fantasy or imagination, the la s of the memory, the force of habit, of inclination, etc#, consequently also, the sources of %reju!iceBin a or!, e abstract all causes from hich %articular cognitions arise, because these causes regar! the un!erstan!ing un!er certain circumstances of its a%%lication, an!, to the kno le!ge of them e?%erience is require!# Pure general logic has to !o, therefore, merely ith %ure a %riori %rinci%les, an! is a canon of un!erstan!ing an! reason, but only in res%ect of the formal %art of their use, be the content hat it may, em%irical or transcen!ental# General logic is calle! a%%lie!, hen it is !irecte! to the la s of the use of the un!erstan!ing, un!er the subjecti"e em%irical con!itions hich %sychology teaches us# It has therefore em%irical %rinci%les, although, at the same time, it is in so far general, that it a%%lies to the e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing, ithout regar! to the !ifference of objects# 9n this account, moreo"er, it is neither a canon of the un!erstan!ing in general, nor an organon of a %articular science, but merely a cathartic of the human un!erstan!ing# In general logic, therefore, that %art hich constitutes %ure logic must be carefully !istinguishe! from that hich constitutes a%%lie! Dthough still generalE logic# The former alone is %ro%erly science, although short an! !ry, as the metho!ical e?%osition of an elemental !octrine of the un!erstan!ing ought to be# In this, therefore, logicians must al ays bear in min! t o rules( 6# )s general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of the un!erstan!ing, an! of the !ifference of objects, an! has to !o ith nothing but the mere form of thought#

,# )s %ure logic, it has no em%irical %rinci%les, an! consequently !ra s nothing Dcontrary to the common %ersuasionE from %sychology, hich therefore has no influence on the canon of the un!erstan!ing# It is a !emonstrate! !octrine, an! e"erything in it must be certain com%letely a %riori# >hat I calle! a%%lie! logic Dcontrary to the common acce%tation of this term, accor!ing to hich it shoul! contain certain e?ercises for the scholar, for hich %ure logic gi"es the rulesE, is a re%resentation of the un!erstan!ing, an! of the rules of its necessary em%loyment in concreto, that is to say, un!er the acci!ental con!itions of the subject, hich may either hin!er or %romote this em%loyment, an! hich are all gi"en only em%irically# Thus a%%lie! logic treats of attention, its im%e!iments an! consequences, of the origin of error, of the state of !oubt, hesitation, con"iction, etc#, an! to it is relate! %ure general logic in the same ay that %ure morality, hich contains only the necessary moral la s of a free ill, is relate! to %ractical ethics, hich consi!ers these la s un!er all the im%e!iments of feelings, inclinations, an! %assions to hich men are more or less subjecte!, an! hich ne"er can furnish us ith a true an! !emonstrate! science, because it, as ell as a%%lie! logic, requires em%irical an! %sychological %rinci%les# II# 9f Transcen!ental 'ogic# General logic, as e ha"e seen, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, an! regar!s only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, the form of thought in general# But as e ha"e both %ure an! em%irical intuitions Das transcen!ental aesthetic %ro"esE, in like manner a !istinction might be !ra n bet een %ure an! em%irical thought Dof objectsE# In this case, there oul! e?ist a kin! of logic, in hich e shoul! not make abstraction of all content of cognition@ for or logic hich shoul! com%rise merely the la s of %ure thought Dof an objectE, oul! of course e?clu!e all those cognitions hich ere of em%irical content# This kin! of logic oul! also e?amine the origin of our cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribe! to the objects themsel"es@ hile, on the contrary, general logic has nothing to !o ith the origin of our cognitions, but contem%lates our re%resentations, be they gi"en %rimiti"ely a %riori in oursel"es, or be they only of em%irical origin, solely accor!ing to the la s hich the un!erstan!ing obser"es in em%loying them in the %rocess of thought, in relation to each other# Consequently, general logic treats of the form of the un!erstan!ing only, hich can be a%%lie! to re%resentations, from hate"er source they may ha"e arisen# )n! here I shall make a remark, hich the rea!er must bear ell in min! in the course of the follo ing consi!erations, to it, that not e"ery cognition a %riori, but only those through hich e cogniCe that an! ho certain re%resentations Dintuitions or conce%tionsE are a%%lie! or are %ossible only a %riori@ that is to say, the a %riori %ossibility of cognition an! the a %riori use of it are transcen!ental# Therefore neither is s%ace, nor any a %riori geometrical !etermination of s%ace, a transcen!ental Re%resentation, but only the kno le!ge that such a re%resentation is not of em%irical origin, an! the %ossibility of its relating to objects of e?%erience, although itself a %riori, can be calle! transcen!ental# 7o also, the a%%lication of s%ace to objects in general oul! be transcen!ental@ but if it be limite! to objects of sense it is em%irical# Thus, the

!istinction of the transcen!ental an! em%irical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, an! !oes not concern the relation of these to their object# )ccor!ingly, in the e?%ectation that there may %erha%s be conce%tions hich relate a %riori to objects, not as %ure or sensuous intuitions, but merely as acts of %ure thought D hich are therefore conce%tions, but neither of em%irical nor aesthetical originEBin this e?%ectation, I say, e form to oursel"es, by antici%ation, the i!ea of a science of %ure un!erstan!ing an! rational cognition, by means of hich e may cogitate objects entirely a %riori# ) science of this kin!, hich shoul! !etermine the origin, the e?tent, an! the objecti"e "ali!ity of such cognitions, must be calle! transcen!ental logic, because it has not, like general logic, to !o ith the la s of un!erstan!ing an! reason in relation to em%irical as ell as %ure rational cognitions ithout !istinction, but concerns itself ith these only in an a %riori relation to objects# III# 9f the *i"ision of General 'ogic into )nalytic an! *ialectic# The ol! question ith hich %eo%le sought to %ush logicians into a corner, so that they must either ha"e recourse to %itiful so%hisms or confess their ignorance, an! consequently the "anity of their hole art, is this( G>hat is truthHG The !efinition of the or! truth, to it, Gthe accor!ance of the cognition ith its object,G is %resu%%ose! in the question@ but e !esire to be tol!, in the ans er to it, hat is the uni"ersal an! secure criterion of the truth of e"ery cognition# To kno hat questions e may reasonably %ro%ose is in itself a strong e"i!ence of sagacity an! intelligence# :or if a question be in itself absur! an! unsusce%tible of a rational ans er, it is atten!e! ith the !angerBnot to mention the shame that falls u%on the %erson ho %ro%oses itBof se!ucing the unguar!e! listener into making absur! ans ers, an! e are %resente! ith the ri!iculous s%ectacle of one Das the ancients sai!E Gmilking the he&goat, an! the other hol!ing a sie"e#G If truth consists in the accor!ance of a cognition ith its object, this object must be, i%so facto, !istinguishe! from all others@ for a cognition is false if it !oes not accor! ith the object to hich it relates, although it contains something hich may be affirme! of other objects# <o an uni"ersal criterion of truth oul! be that hich is "ali! for all cognitions, ithout !istinction of their objects# But it is e"i!ent that since, in the case of such a criterion, e make abstraction of all the content of a cognition Dthat is, of all relation to its objectE, an! truth relates %recisely to this content, it must be utterly absur! to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition@ an! that, accor!ingly, a sufficient, an! at the same time uni"ersal, test of truth cannot %ossibly be foun!# )s e ha"e alrea!y terme! the content of a cognition its matter, e shall say( G9f the truth of our cognitions in res%ect of their matter, no uni"ersal test can be !eman!e!, because such a !eman! is self&contra!ictory#G 9n the other han!, ith regar! to our cognition in res%ect of its mere form De?clu!ing all contentE, it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it e?hibits the uni"ersal an! necessary la s of the un!erstan!ing, must in these "ery la s %resent us ith criteria of truth# >hate"er contra!icts these rules is false, because thereby the un!erstan!ing is

ma!e to contra!ict its o n uni"ersal la s of thought@ that is, to contra!ict itself# These criteria, ho e"er, a%%ly solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, an! in so far they are %erfectly accurate, yet not sufficient# :or although a cognition may be %erfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self&contra!ictory, it is not ithstan!ing quite %ossible that it may not stan! in agreement ith its object# Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accor!ance of a cognition ith the uni"ersal an! formal la s of un!erstan!ing an! reason, is nothing more than the con!itio sine qua non, or negati"e con!ition of all truth# :arther than this logic cannot go, an! the error hich !e%en!s not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to !isco"er# General logic, then, resol"es the hole formal business of un!erstan!ing an! reason into its elements, an! e?hibits them as %rinci%les of all logical ju!ging of our cognitions# This %art of logic may, therefore, be calle! analytic, an! is at least the negati"e test of truth, because all cognitions must first of an be estimate! an! trie! accor!ing to these la s before e %rocee! to in"estigate them in res%ect of their content, in or!er to !isco"er hether they contain %ositi"e truth in regar! to their object# Because, ho e"er, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accor! ith logical la s, is insufficient to su%%ly us ith material Dobjecti"eE truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can "enture to %re!icate anything of or !eci!e concerning objects, unless he has obtaine!, in!e%en!ently of logic, ell&groun!e! information about them, in or!er after ar!s to e?amine, accor!ing to logical la s, into the use an! connection, in a cohering hole, of that information, or, hat is still better, merely to test it by them# <ot ithstan!ing, there lies so se!ucti"e a charm in the %ossession of a s%ecious art like thisBan art hich gi"es to all our cognitions the form of the un!erstan!ing, although ith res%ect to the content thereof e may be sa!ly !eficientBthat general logic, hich is merely a canon of ju!gement, has been em%loye! as an organon for the actual %ro!uction, or rather for the semblance of %ro!uction, of objecti"e assertions, an! has thus been grossly misa%%lie!# <o general logic, in its assume! character of organon, is calle! !ialectic# *ifferent as are the significations in hich the ancients use! this term for a science or an art, e may safely infer, from their actual em%loyment of it, that ith them it as nothing else than a logic of illusionBa so%histical art for gi"ing ignorance, nay, e"en intentional so%histries, the colouring of truth, in hich the thoroughness of %roce!ure hich logic requires as imitate!, an! their to%ic em%loye! to cloak the em%ty %retensions# <o it may be taken as a safe an! useful arning, that general logic, consi!ere! as an organon, must al ays be a logic of illusion, that is, be !ialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing hate"er res%ecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal con!itions of their accor!ance ith the un!erstan!ing, hich !o not relate to an! are quite in!ifferent in res%ect of objects, any attem%t to em%loy it as an instrument DorganonE in or!er to e?ten! an! enlarge the range of our kno le!ge must en! in mere %rating@ any one being able to maintain or o%%ose, ith some a%%earance of truth, any single assertion hate"er# 7uch instruction is quite unbecoming the !ignity of %hiloso%hy# :or these reasons e ha"e chosen to !enominate this %art of logic !ialectic, in the sense of a critique of !ialectical illusion, an! e ish the term to be so un!erstoo! in this %lace#

IK# 9f the *i"ision of Transcen!ental 'ogic into Transcen!ental )nalytic an! *ialectic# In transcen!ental logic e isolate the un!erstan!ing Das in transcen!ental aesthetic the sensibilityE an! select from our cognition merely that %art of thought hich has its origin in the un!erstan!ing alone# The e?ercise of this %ure cognition, ho e"er, !e%en!s u%on this as its con!ition, that objects to hich it may be a%%lie! be gi"en to us in intuition, for ithout intuition the hole of our cognition is ithout objects, an! is therefore quite "oi!# That %art of transcen!ental logic, then, hich treats of the elements of %ure cognition of the un!erstan!ing, an! of the %rinci%les ithout hich no object at all can be thought, is transcen!ental analytic, an! at the same time a logic of truth# :or no cognition can contra!ict it, ithout losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all reference to an object, an! therefore all truth# But because e are "ery easily se!uce! into em%loying these %ure cognitions an! %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing by themsel"es, an! that e"en beyon! the boun!aries of e?%erience, hich yet is the only source hence e can obtain matter DobjectsE on hich those %ure conce%tions may be em%loye!Bun!erstan!ing runs the risk of making, by means of em%ty so%hisms, a material an! objecti"e use of the mere formal %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, an! of %assing ju!gements on objects ithout !istinctionBobjects hich are not gi"en to us, nay, %erha%s cannot be gi"en to us in any ay# <o , as it ought %ro%erly to be only a canon for ju!ging of the em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, this kin! of logic is misuse! hen e seek to em%loy it as an organon of the uni"ersal an! unlimite! e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing, an! attem%t ith the %ure un!erstan!ing alone to ju!ge synthetically, affirm, an! !etermine res%ecting objects in general# In this case the e?ercise of the %ure un!erstan!ing becomes !ialectical# The secon! %art of our transcen!ental logic must therefore be a critique of !ialectical illusion, an! this critique e shall term transcen!ental !ialecticBnot meaning it as an art of %ro!ucing !ogmatically such illusion Dan art hich is unfortunately too current among the %ractitioners of meta%hysical jugglingE, but as a critique of un!erstan!ing an! reason in regar! to their hy%er%hysical use# This critique ill e?%ose the groun!less nature of the %retensions of these t o faculties, an! in"ali!ate their claims to the !isco"ery an! enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcen!ental %rinci%les, an! sho that the %ro%er em%loyment of these faculties is to test the ju!gements ma!e by the %ure un!erstan!ing, an! to guar! it from so%histical !elusion# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' '9GIC# :IR7T *IKI7I9<# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' )<)'$TIC# 77 I# Transcen!ental analytic is the !issection of the hole of our a %riori kno le!ge into the elements of the %ure cognition of the un!erstan!ing# In or!er to effect our %ur%ose, it is necessary( D6E That the conce%tions be %ure an! not em%irical@ D,E That they belong not to intuition an! sensibility, but to thought an! un!erstan!ing@ D.E That they be elementary conce%tions, an! as such, quite !ifferent from !e!uce! or com%oun! conce%tions@ D1E That our table of these elementary conce%tions be com%lete, an! fill u% the hole s%here of the %ure un!erstan!ing# <o this com%leteness of a science cannot be acce%te! ith confi!ence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its e?istence in an

aggregate forme! only by means of re%eate! e?%eriments an! attem%ts# The com%leteness hich e require is %ossible only by means of an i!ea of the totality of the a %riori cognition of the un!erstan!ing, an! through the thereby !etermine! !i"ision of the conce%tions hich form the sai! hole@ consequently, only by means of their connection in a system# Pure un!erstan!ing !istinguishes itself not merely from e"erything em%irical, but also com%letely from all sensibility# It is a unity self& subsistent, self&sufficient, an! not to be enlarge! by any a!!itions from ithout# ;ence the sum of its cognition constitutes a system to be !etermine! by an! com%rise! un!er an i!ea@ an! the com%leteness an! articulation of this system can at the same time ser"e as a test of the correctness an! genuineness of all the %arts of cognition that belong to it# The hole of this %art of transcen!ental logic consists of t o books, of hich the one contains the conce%tions, an! the other the %rinci%les of %ure un!erstan!ing# B99K I# 77 ,# )nalytic of Conce%tions# By the term )nalytic of Conce%tions, I !o not un!erstan! the analysis of these, or the usual %rocess in %hiloso%hical in"estigations of !issecting the conce%tions hich %resent themsel"es, accor!ing to their content, an! so making them clear@ but I mean the hitherto little attem%te! !issection of the faculty of un!erstan!ing itself, in or!er to in"estigate the %ossibility of conce%tions a %riori, by looking for them in the un!erstan!ing alone, as their birth%lace, an! analysing the %ure use of this faculty# :or this is the %ro%er !uty of a transcen!ental %hiloso%hy@ hat remains is the logical treatment of the conce%tions in %hiloso%hy in general# >e shall therefore follo u% the %ure conce%tions e"en to their germs an! beginnings in the human un!erstan!ing, in hich they lie, until they are !e"elo%e! on occasions %resente! by e?%erience, an!, free! by the same un!erstan!ing from the em%irical con!itions attaching to them, are set forth in their unalloye! %urity#

CHAPTER I. O+ t&e Trans,endental Clue t% t&e !"s,%0ery %+ all Pure Conce%tions of the 4n!erstan!ing# SS 1. Intr%du,t%ry. >hen e call into %lay a faculty of cognition, !ifferent conce%tions manifest themsel"es accor!ing to the !ifferent circumstances, an! make kno n this faculty, an! assemble themsel"es into a more or less e?tensi"e collection, accor!ing to the time or %enetration that has been a%%lie! to the consi!eration of them# >here this %rocess, con!ucte! as it is mechanically, so to s%eak, ill en!, cannot be !etermine! ith certainty# Besi!es, the conce%tions hich e !isco"er in this ha%haCar! manner %resent themsel"es by no means in or!er an! systematic unity, but are at last cou%le! together only accor!ing to

resemblances to each other, an! arrange! in series, accor!ing to the quantity of their content, from the sim%ler to the more com%le?Bseries hich are anything but systematic, though not altogether ithout a certain kin! of metho! in their construction# Transcen!ental %hiloso%hy has the a!"antage, an! moreo"er the !uty, of searching for its conce%tions accor!ing to a %rinci%le@ because these conce%tions s%ring %ure an! unmi?e! out of the un!erstan!ing as an absolute unity, an! therefore must be connecte! ith each other accor!ing to one conce%tion or i!ea# ) connection of this kin!, ho e"er, furnishes us ith a rea!y %re%are! rule, by hich its %ro%er %lace may be assigne! to e"ery %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, an! the com%leteness of the system of all be !etermine! a %rioriBboth hich oul! other ise ha"e been !e%en!ent on mere choice or chance# 77 1# 7ECTI9< 6# 9f !efine! abo"e 4se of un!erstan!ing in General# The un!erstan!ing as !efine! abo"e only negati"ely, as a non&sensuous faculty of cognition# <o , in!e%en!ently of sensibility, e cannot %ossibly ha"e any intuition@ consequently, the un!erstan!ing is no faculty of intuition# But besi!es intuition there is no other mo!e of cognition, e?ce%t through conce%tions@ consequently, the cognition of e"ery, at least of e"ery human, un!erstan!ing is a cognition through conce%tionsBnot intuiti"e, but !iscursi"e# )ll intuitions, as sensuous, !e%en! on affections@ conce%tions, therefore, u%on functions# By the or! function I un!erstan! the unity of the act of arranging !i"erse re%resentations un!er one common re%resentation# Conce%tions, then, are base! on the s%ontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the rece%ti"ity of im%ressions# <o , the un!erstan!ing cannot make any other use of these conce%tions than to ju!ge by means of them# )s no re%resentation, e?ce%t an intuition, relates imme!iately to its object, a conce%tion ne"er relates imme!iately to an object, but only to some other re%resentation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a conce%tion# ) ju!gement, therefore, is the me!iate cognition of an object, consequently the re%resentation of a re%resentation of it# In e"ery ju!gement there is a conce%tion hich a%%lies to, an! is "ali! for many other conce%tions, an! hich among these com%rehen!s also a gi"en re%resentation, this last being imme!iately connecte! ith an object# :or e?am%le, in the ju!gementBG)ll bo!ies are !i"isible,G our conce%tion of !i"isible a%%lies to "arious other conce%tions@ among these, ho e"er, it is here %articularly a%%lie! to the conce%tion of bo!y, an! this conce%tion of bo!y relates to certain %henomena hich occur to us# These objects, therefore, are me!iately re%resente! by the conce%tion of !i"isibility# )ll ju!gements, accor!ingly, are functions of unity in our re%resentations, inasmuch as, instea! of an imme!iate, a higher re%resentation, hich com%rises this an! "arious others, is use! for our cognition of the object, an! thereby many %ossible cognitions are collecte! into one# But e can re!uce all acts of the un!erstan!ing to ju!gements, so that un!erstan!ing may be re%resente! as the faculty of ju!ging# :or it is, accor!ing to hat has been sai! abo"e, a faculty of thought# <o thought is cognition by means of conce%tions# But conce%tions, as %re!icates of %ossible ju!gements, relate to some re%resentation of a yet un!etermine! object# Thus the conce%tion of bo!y in!icates somethingBfor e?am%le, metalB hich can be cogniCe! by means of that conce%tion# It is therefore a conce%tion, for the reason

alone that other re%resentations are containe! un!er it, by means of hich it can relate to objects# It is therefore the %re!icate to a %ossible ju!gement@ for e?am%le( GE"ery metal is a bo!y#G )ll the functions of the un!erstan!ing therefore can be !isco"ere!, hen e can com%letely e?hibit the functions of unity in ju!gements# )n! that this may be effecte! "ery easily, the follo ing section ill sho # 77 I# 7ECTI9< II# 9f the 'ogical :unction of the 4n!erstan!ing in +u!gements# If e abstract all the content of a ju!gement, an! consi!er only the intellectual form thereof, e fin! that the function of thought in a ju!gement can be brought un!er four hea!s, of hich each contains three momenta# These may be con"eniently re%resente! in the follo ing table( 6 =uantity of ju!gements 4ni"ersal Particular 7ingular , =uality )ffirmati"e <egati"e Infinite . Relation Categorical ;y%othetical *isjuncti"e

1 Ao!ality Problematical )ssertorical )%o!eictical )s this !i"ision a%%ears to !iffer in some, though not essential %oints, from the usual technique of logicians, the follo ing obser"ations, for the %re"ention of other ise %ossible misun!erstan!ing, ill not be ithout their use# 6# 'ogicians say, ith justice, that in the use of ju!gements in syllogisms, singular ju!gements may be treate! like uni"ersal ones# :or, %recisely because a singular ju!gement has no e?tent at all, its %re!icate cannot refer to a %art of that hich is containe! in the conce%tion of the subject an! be e?clu!e! from the rest# The %re!icate is "ali! for the hole conce%tion just as if it ere a general conce%tion, an! ha! e?tent, to the hole of hich the %re!icate a%%lie!# 9n the other han!, let us com%are a singular ith a general ju!gement, merely as a cognition, in regar! to quantity# The singular ju!gement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, an! is therefore in itself essentially !ifferent# Thus, if e estimate a singular ju!gement Dju!icium singulareE not merely accor!ing to its intrinsic "ali!ity as a ju!gement, but also as a cognition generally, accor!ing to its quantity in com%arison ith that of other cognitions, it is then entirely !ifferent from a general ju!gement Dju!icium communeE,

an! in a com%lete table of the momenta of thought !eser"es a se%arate %laceBthough, in!ee!, this oul! not be necessary in a logic limite! merely to the consi!eration of the use of ju!gements in reference to each other# ,# In like manner, in transcen!ental logic, infinite must be !istinguishe! from affirmati"e ju!gements, although in general logic they are rightly enough classe! un!er affirmati"e# General logic abstracts all content of the %re!icate Dthough it be negati"eE, an! only consi!ers hether the sai! %re!icate be affirme! or !enie! of the subject# But transcen!ental logic consi!ers also the orth or content of this logical affirmationBan affirmation by means of a merely negati"e %re!icate, an! inquires ho much the sum total of our cognition gains by this affirmation# :or e?am%le, if I say of the soul, GIt is not mortalGBby this negati"e ju!gement I shoul! at least ar! off error# <o , by the %ro%osition, GThe soul is not mortal,G I ha"e, in res%ect of the logical form, really affirme!, inasmuch as I thereby %lace the soul in the unlimite! s%here of immortal beings# <o , because of the hole s%here of %ossible e?istences, the mortal occu%ies one %art, an! the immortal the other, neither more nor less is affirme! by the %ro%osition than that the soul is one among the infinite multitu!e of things hich remain o"er, hen I take a ay the hole mortal %art# But by this %rocee!ing e accom%lish only this much, that the infinite s%here of all %ossible e?istences is in so far limite! that the mortal is e?clu!e! from it, an! the soul is %lace! in the remaining %art of the e?tent of this s%here# But this %art remains, not ithstan!ing this e?ce%tion, infinite, an! more an! more %arts may be taken a ay from the hole s%here, ithout in the slightest !egree thereby augmenting or affirmati"ely !etermining our conce%tion of the soul# These ju!gements, therefore, infinite in res%ect of their logical e?tent, are, in res%ect of the content of their cognition, merely limitati"e@ an! are consequently entitle! to a %lace in our transcen!ental table of all the momenta of thought in ju!gements, because the function of the un!erstan!ing e?ercise! by them may %erha%s be of im%ortance in the fiel! of its %ure a %riori cognition# .# )ll relations of thought in ju!gements are those DaE of the %re!icate to the subject@ DbE of the %rinci%le to its consequence@ DcE of the !i"i!e! cognition an! all the members of the !i"ision to each other# In the first of these three classes, e consi!er only t o conce%tions@ in the secon!, t o ju!gements@ in the thir!, se"eral ju!gements in relation to each other# The hy%othetical %ro%osition, GIf %erfect justice e?ists, the obstinately icke! are %unishe!,G contains %ro%erly the relation to each other of t o %ro%ositions, namely, GPerfect justice e?ists,G an! GThe obstinately icke! are %unishe!#G >hether these %ro%ositions are in themsel"es true is a question not here !eci!e!# <othing is cogitate! by means of this ju!gement e?ce%t a certain consequence# :inally, the !isjuncti"e ju!gement contains a relation of t o or more %ro%ositions to each otherBa relation not of consequence, but of logical o%%osition, in so far as the s%here of the one %ro%osition e?clu!es that of the other# But it contains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as all the %ro%ositions taken together fill u% the s%here of the cognition# The !isjuncti"e ju!gement contains, therefore, the relation of the %arts of the hole s%here of a cognition, since the s%here of each %art is a com%lemental %art of the s%here of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the !i"i!e! cognition# Take, for e?am%le, the %ro%osition, GThe orl! e?ists either through blin! chance, or through internal necessity, or through an e?ternal cause#G Each of these %ro%ositions

embraces a %art of the s%here of our %ossible cognition as to the e?istence of a orl!@ all of them taken together, the hole s%here# To take the cognition out of one of these s%heres, is equi"alent to %lacing it in one of the others@ an!, on the other han!, to %lace it in one s%here is equi"alent to taking it out of the rest# There is, therefore, in a !isjuncti"e ju!gement a certain community of cognitions, hich consists in this, that they mutually e?clu!e each other, yet thereby !etermine, as a hole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make u% the com%lete content of a %articular gi"en cognition# )n! this is all that I fin! necessary, for the sake of hat follo s, to remark in this %lace# 1# The mo!ality of ju!gements is a quite %eculiar function, ith this !istinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to the content of a ju!gement Dfor besi!es quantity, quality, an! relation, there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a ju!gementE, but concerns itself only ith the "alue of the co%ula in relation to thought in general# Problematical ju!gements are those in hich the affirmation or negation is acce%te! as merely %ossible Da! libitumE# In the assertorical, e regar! the %ro%osition as real DtrueE@ in the a%o!eictical, e look on it as necessary#8 Thus the t o ju!gements Dantece!ens et consequensE, the relation of hich constitutes a hy%othetical ju!gement, like ise those Dthe members of the !i"isionE in hose reci%rocity the !isjuncti"e consists, are only %roblematical# In the e?am%le abo"e gi"en the %ro%osition, GThere e?ists %erfect justice,G is not state! assertorically, but as an a! libitum ju!gement, hich someone may choose to a!o%t, an! the consequence alone is assertorical# ;ence such ju!gements may be ob"iously false, an! yet, taken %roblematically, be con!itions of our cognition of the truth# Thus the %ro%osition, GThe orl! e?ists only by blin! chance,G is in the !isjuncti"e ju!gement of %roblematical im%ort only( that is to say, one may acce%t it for the moment, an! it hel%s us Dlike the in!ication of the rong roa! among all the roa!s that one can takeE to fin! out the true %ro%osition# The %roblematical %ro%osition is, therefore, that hich e?%resses only logical %ossibility D hich is not objecti"eE@ that is, it e?%resses a free choice to a!mit the "ali!ity of such a %ro%ositionBa merely arbitrary rece%tion of it into the un!erstan!ing# The assertorical s%eaks of logical reality or truth@ as, for e?am%le, in a hy%othetical syllogism, the antece!ens %resents itself in a %roblematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, an! it sho s that the %ro%osition is in harmony ith the la s of the un!erstan!ing# The a%o!eictical %ro%osition cogitates the assertorical as !etermine! by these "ery la s of the un!erstan!ing, consequently as affirming a %riori, an! in this manner it e?%resses logical necessity# <o because all is here gra!ually incor%orate! ith the un!erstan!ing Binasmuch as in the first %lace e ju!ge %roblematically@ then acce%t assertorically our ju!gement as true@ lastly, affirm it as inse%arably unite! ith the un!erstan!ing, that is, as necessary an! a%o!eicticalB e may safely reckon these three functions of mo!ality as so many momenta of thought# /8:ootnote( +ust as if thought ere in the first instance a function of the un!erstan!ing@ in the secon!, of ju!gement@ in the thir!, of reason# ) remark hich ill be e?%laine! in the sequel#3 77 5# 7ECTI9< III# 9f the Pure Conce%tions of the 4n!erstan!ing, or Categories#

General logic, as has been re%eate!ly sai!, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, an! e?%ects to recei"e re%resentations from some other quarter, in or!er, by means of analysis, to con"ert them into conce%tions# 9n the contrary, transcen!ental logic has lying before it the manifol! content of a %riori sensibility, hich transcen!ental aesthetic %resents to it in or!er to gi"e matter to the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, ithout hich transcen!ental logic oul! ha"e no content, an! be therefore utterly "oi!# <o s%ace an! time contain an infinite !i"ersity of !eterminations of %ure a %riori intuition, but are ne"ertheless the con!ition of the min!Fs rece%ti"ity, un!er hich alone it can obtain re%resentations of objects, an! hich, consequently, must al ays affect the conce%tion of these objects# But the s%ontaneity of thought requires that this !i"ersity be e?amine! after a certain manner, recei"e! into the min!, an! connecte!, in or!er after ar!s to form a cognition out of it# This Process I call synthesis# By the or! synthesis, in its most general signification, I un!erstan! the %rocess of joining !ifferent re%resentations to each other an! of com%rehen!ing their !i"ersity in one cognition# This synthesis is %ure hen the !i"ersity is not gi"en em%irically but a %riori Das that in s%ace an! timeE# 9ur re%resentations must be gi"en %re"iously to any analysis of them@ an! no conce%tions can arise, quoa! their content, analytically# But the synthesis of a !i"ersity Dbe it gi"en a %riori or em%iricallyE is the first requisite for the %ro!uction of a cognition, hich in its beginning, in!ee!, may be cru!e an! confuse!, an! therefore in nee! of analysisBstill, synthesis is that by hich alone the elements of our cognitions are collecte! an! unite! into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on hich e must fi? our attention, if e ish to in"estigate the origin of our kno le!ge# 7ynthesis, generally s%eaking, is, as e shall after ar!s see, the mere o%eration of the imaginationBa blin! but in!is%ensable function of the soul, ithout hich e shoul! ha"e no cognition hate"er, but of the orking of hich e are sel!om e"en conscious# But to re!uce this synthesis to conce%tions is a function of the un!erstan!ing, by means of hich e attain to cognition, in the %ro%er meaning of the term# Pure synthesis, re%resente! generally, gi"es us the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing# But by this %ure synthesis, I mean that hich rests u%on a basis of a %riori synthetical unity# Thus, our numeration Dan! this is more obser"able in large numbersE is a synthesis accor!ing to conce%tions, because it takes %lace accor!ing to a common basis of unity Dfor e?am%le, the !eca!eE# By means of this conce%tion, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifol! becomes necessary# By means of analysis !ifferent re%resentations are brought un!er one conce%tionBan o%eration of hich general logic treats# 9n the other han!, the !uty of transcen!ental logic is to re!uce to conce%tions, not re%resentations, but the %ure synthesis of re%resentations# The first thing hich must be gi"en to us for the sake of the a %riori cognition of all objects, is the !i"ersity of the %ure intuition@ the synthesis of this !i"ersity by means of the imagination is the secon!@ but this gi"es, as yet, no cognition# The conce%tions hich gi"e unity to this %ure synthesis, an! hich consist solely in the

re%resentation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the thir! requisite for the cognition of an object, an! these conce%tions are gi"en by the un!erstan!ing# The same function hich gi"es unity to the !ifferent re%resentation in a ju!gement, gi"es also unity to the mere synthesis of !ifferent re%resentations in an intuition@ an! this unity e call the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing# Thus, the same un!erstan!ing, an! by the same o%erations, hereby in conce%tions, by means of analytical unity, it %ro!uce! the logical form of a ju!gement, intro!uces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifol! in intuition, a transcen!ental content into its re%resentations, on hich account they are calle! %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, an! they a%%ly a %riori to objects, a result not ithin the %o er of general logic# In this manner, there arise e?actly so many %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, a%%lying a %riori to objects of intuition in general, as there are logical functions in all %ossible ju!gements# :or there is no other function or faculty e?isting in the un!erstan!ing besi!es those enumerate! in that table# These conce%tions e shall, ith )ristotle, call categories, our %ur%ose being originally i!entical ith his, not ithstan!ing the great !ifference in the e?ecution# T)B'E 9: T;E C)TEG9RIE7 6 9f =uantity 4nity Plurality Totality , 9f =uality Reality <egation 'imitation

. 9f Relation 9f Inherence an! 7ubsistence Dsubstantia et acci!ensE 9f Causality an! *e%en!ence Dcause an! effectE 9f Community Dreci%rocity bet een the agent an! %atientE 1 9f Ao!ality PossibilityBIm%ossibility E?istenceB<on&e?istence <ecessityBContingence This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally %ure conce%tions of the synthesis hich the un!erstan!ing contains a %riori, an! these conce%tions alone entitle it to be calle! a %ure un!erstan!ing@ inasmuch as only by them it can ren!er the manifol! of intuition concei"able, in other or!s, think an object of intuition# This !i"ision is ma!e systematically from a common %rinci%le, namely the faculty of ju!gement D hich is just the same as the %o er of thoughtE, an! has not arisen rha%so!ically from a search at

ha%haCar! after %ure conce%tions, res%ecting the full number of hich e ne"er coul! be certain, inasmuch as e em%loy in!uction alone in our search, ithout consi!ering that in this ay e can ne"er un!erstan! herefore %recisely these conce%tions, an! none others, abi!e in the %ure un!erstan!ing# It as a !esign orthy of an acute thinker like )ristotle, to search for these fun!amental conce%tions# *estitute, ho e"er, of any gui!ing %rinci%le, he %icke! them u% just as they occurre! to him, an! at first hunte! out ten, hich he calle! categories D%re!icamentsE# )fter ar!s be belie"e! that he ha! !isco"ere! fi"e others, hich ere a!!e! un!er the name of %ost %re!icaments# But his catalogue still remaine! !efecti"e# Besi!es, there are to be foun! among them some of the mo!es of %ure sensibility Dquan!o, ubi, situs, also %rius, simulE, an! like ise an em%irical conce%tion DmotusEB hich can by no means belong to this genealogical register of the %ure un!erstan!ing# Aoreo"er, there are !e!uce! conce%tions Dactio, %assioE enumerate! among the original conce%tions, an!, of the latter, some are entirely anting# >ith regar! to these, it is to be remarke!, that the categories, as the true %rimiti"e conce%tions of the %ure un!erstan!ing, ha"e also their %ure !e!uce! conce%tions, hich, in a com%lete system of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, must by no means be %asse! o"er@ though in a merely critical essay e must be contente! ith the sim%le mention of the fact# 'et it be allo e! me to call these %ure, but !e!uce! conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, the %re!icables of the %ure un!erstan!ing, in contra!istinction to %re!icaments# If e are in %ossession of the original an! %rimiti"e, the !e!uce! an! subsi!iary conce%tions can easily be a!!e!, an! the genealogical tree of the un!erstan!ing com%letely !elineate!# )s my %resent aim is not to set forth a com%lete system, but merely the %rinci%les of one, I reser"e this task for another time# It may be easily e?ecute! by any one ho ill refer to the ontological manuals, an! subor!inate to the category of causality, for e?am%le, the %re!icables of force, action, %assion@ to that of community, those of %resence an! resistance@ to the categories of mo!ality, those of origination, e?tinction, change@ an! so ith the rest# The categories combine! ith the mo!es of %ure sensibility, or ith one another, affor! a great number of !e!uce! a %riori conce%tions@ a com%lete enumeration of hich oul! be a useful an! not un%leasant, but in this %lace a %erfectly !is%ensable, occu%ation# I %ur%osely omit the !efinitions of the categories in this treatise# I shall analyse these conce%tions only so far as is necessary for the !octrine of metho!, hich is to form a %art of this critique# In a system of %ure reason, !efinitions of them oul! be ith justice !eman!e! of me, but to gi"e them here oul! only bi!e from our "ie the main aim of our in"estigation, at the same time raising !oubts an! objections, the consi!eration of hich, ithout injustice to our main %ur%ose, may be "ery ell %ost%one! till another o%%ortunity# Aean hile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little e ha"e alrea!y sai! on this subject, that the formation of a com%lete "ocabulary of %ure conce%tions, accom%anie! by all the requisite e?%lanations, is not only a %ossible, but an easy un!ertaking# The com%artments alrea!y e?ist@ it is only necessary to fill them u%@ an! a systematic to%ic like the %resent, in!icates ith %erfect %recision the

%ro%er %lace to hich each conce%tion belongs, hile it rea!ily %oints out any that ha"e not yet been fille! u%# 77 J# 9ur table of the categories suggests consi!erations of some im%ortance, hich may %erha%s ha"e significant results in regar! to the scientific form of all rational cognitions# :or, that this table is useful in the theoretical %art of %hiloso%hy, nay, in!is%ensable for the sketching of the com%lete %lan of a science, so far as that science rests u%on conce%tions a %riori, an! for !i"i!ing it mathematically, accor!ing to fi?e! %rinci%les, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all the elementary conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, nay, e"en the form of a system of these in the un!erstan!ing itself, an! consequently in!icates all the momenta, an! also the internal arrangement of a %rojecte! s%eculati"e science, as I ha"e else here sho n# /:ootnote( In the Aeta%hysical Princi%les of <atural 7cience#3 ;ere follo some of these obser"ations# I# This table, hich contains four classes of conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, may, in the first instance, be !i"i!e! into t o classes, the first of hich relates to objects of intuitionB%ure as ell as em%irical@ the secon!, to the e?istence of these objects, either in relation to one another, or to the un!erstan!ing# The former of these classes of categories I oul! entitle the mathematical, an! the latter the !ynamical categories# The former, as e see, has no correlates@ these are only to be foun! in the secon! class# This !ifference must ha"e a groun! in the nature of the human un!erstan!ing# II# The number of the categories in each class is al ays the same, namely, threeBa fact hich also !eman!s some consi!eration, because in all other cases !i"ision a %riori through conce%tions is necessarily !ichotomy# It is to be a!!e!, that the thir! category in each tria! al ays arises from the combination of the secon! ith the first# Thus totality is nothing else but %lurality contem%late! as unity@ limitation is merely reality conjoine! ith negation@ community is the causality of a substance, reci%rocally !etermining, an! !etermine! by other substances@ an! finally, necessity is nothing but e?istence, hich is gi"en through the %ossibility itself# 'et it not be su%%ose!, ho e"er, that the thir! category is merely a !e!uce!, an! not a %rimiti"e conce%tion of the %ure un!erstan!ing# :or the conjunction of the first an! secon!, in or!er to %ro!uce the thir! conce%tion, requires a %articular function of the un!erstan!ing, hich is by no means i!entical ith those hich are e?ercise! in the first an! secon!# Thus, the conce%tion of a number D hich belongs to the category of totalityE is not al ays %ossible, here the conce%tions of multitu!e an! unity e?ist Dfor e?am%le, in the re%resentation of the infiniteE# 9r, if I conjoin the conce%tion of a cause ith that of a substance, it !oes not follo that the conce%tion of influence, that is, ho one substance can be the cause of something in another substance, ill be un!erstoo! from that# Thus it is e"i!ent that a %articular act of the un!erstan!ing is here necessary@ an! so in the other instances#

III# >ith res%ect to one category, namely, that of community, hich is foun! in the thir! class, it is not so easy as ith the others to !etect its accor!ance ith the form of the !isjuncti"e ju!gement hich corres%on!s to it in the table of the logical functions# In or!er to assure oursel"es of this accor!ance, e must obser"e that in e"ery !isjuncti"e ju!gement, the s%here of the ju!gement Dthat is, the com%le? of all that is containe! in itE is re%resente! as a hole !i"i!e! into %arts@ an!, since one %art cannot be containe! in the other, they are cogitate! as co&or!inate! ith, not subor!inate! to each other, so that they !o not !etermine each other unilaterally, as in a linear series, but reci%rocally, as in an aggregateBDif one member of the !i"ision is %osite!, all the rest are e?clu!e!@ an! con"erselyE# <o a like connection is cogitate! in a hole of things@ for one thing is not subor!inate!, as effect, to another as cause of its e?istence, but, on the contrary, is co& or!inate! contem%oraneously an! reci%rocally, as a cause in relation to the !etermination of the others Dfor e?am%le, in a bo!yBthe %arts of hich mutually attract an! re%el each otherE# )n! this is an entirely !ifferent kin! of connection from that hich e fin! in the mere relation of the cause to the effect Dthe %rinci%le to the consequenceE, for in such a connection the consequence !oes not in its turn !etermine the %rinci%le, an! therefore !oes not constitute, ith the latter, a holeBjust as the Creator !oes not ith the orl! make u% a hole# The %rocess of un!erstan!ing by hich it re%resents to itself the s%here of a !i"i!e! conce%tion, is em%loye! also hen e think of a thing as !i"isible@ an! in the same manner as the members of the !i"ision in the former e?clu!e one another, an! yet are connecte! in one s%here, so the un!erstan!ing re%resents to itself the %arts of the latter, as ha"ingBeach of themBan e?istence Das substancesE, in!e%en!ently of the others, an! yet as unite! in one hole# 77 2# In the transcen!ental %hiloso%hy of the ancients there e?ists one more lea!ing !i"ision, hich contains %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, an! hich, although not numbere! among the categories, ought, accor!ing to them, as conce%tions a %riori, to be "ali! of objects# But in this case they oul! augment the number of the categories@ hich cannot be# These are set forth in the %ro%osition, so reno ne! among the schoolmenBG=uo!libet ens est 4<4A, KER4A, B9<4A#G <o , though the inferences from this %rinci%le ere mere tautological %ro%ositions, an! though it is allo e! only by courtesy to retain a %lace in mo!ern meta%hysics, yet a thought hich maintaine! itself for such a length of time, ho e"er em%ty it seems to be, !eser"es an in"estigation of its origin, an! justifies the conjecture that it must be groun!e! in some la of the un!erstan!ing, hich, as is often the case, has only been erroneously inter%rete!# These %reten!e! transcen!ental %re!icates are, in fact, nothing but logical requisites an! criteria of all cognition of objects, an! they em%loy, as the basis for this cognition, the categories of quantity, namely, unity, %lurality, an! totality# But these, hich must be taken as material con!itions, that is, as belonging to the %ossibility of things themsel"es, they em%loye! merely in a formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites of all cognition, an! yet most unguar!e!ly change! these criteria of thought into %ro%erties of objects, as things in themsel"es# <o , in e"ery cognition of an object, there

is unity of conce%tion, hich may be calle! qualitati"e unity, so far as by this term e un!erstan! only the unity in our connection of the manifol!@ for e?am%le, unity of the theme in a %lay, an oration, or a story# 7econ!ly, there is truth in res%ect of the !e!uctions from it# The more true !e!uctions e ha"e from a gi"en conce%tion, the more criteria of its objecti"e reality# This e might call the qualitati"e %lurality of characteristic marks, hich belong to a conce%tion as to a common foun!ation, but are not cogitate! as a quantity in it# Thir!ly, there is %erfectionB hich consists in this, that the %lurality falls back u%on the unity of the conce%tion, an! accor!s com%letely ith that conce%tion an! ith no other# This e may !enominate qualitati"e com%leteness# ;ence it is e"i!ent that these logical criteria of the %ossibility of cognition are merely the three categories of quantity mo!ifie! an! transforme! to suit an unauthoriCe! manner of a%%lying them# That is to say, the three categories, in hich the unity in the %ro!uction of the quantum must be homogeneous throughout, are transforme! solely ith a "ie to the connection of heterogeneous %arts of cognition in one act of consciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition, hich is the %rinci%le of that connection# Thus the criterion of the %ossibility of a conce%tion Dnot of its objectE is the !efinition of it, in hich the unity of the conce%tion, the truth of all that may be imme!iately !e!uce! from it, an! finally, the com%leteness of hat has been thus !e!uce!, constitute the requisites for the re%ro!uction of the hole conce%tion# Thus also, the criterion or test of an hy%othesis is the intelligibility of the recei"e! %rinci%le of e?%lanation, or its unity D ithout hel% from any subsi!iary hy%othesisEBthe truth of our !e!uctions from it Dconsistency ith each other an! ith e?%erienceEBan! lastly, the com%leteness of the %rinci%le of the e?%lanation of these !e!uctions, hich refer to neither more nor less than hat as a!mitte! in the hy%othesis, restoring analytically an! a %osteriori, hat as cogitate! synthetically an! a %riori# By the conce%tions, therefore, of unity, truth, an! %erfection, e ha"e ma!e no a!!ition to the transcen!ental table of the categories, hich is com%lete ithout them# >e ha"e, on the contrary, merely em%loye! the three categories of quantity, setting asi!e their a%%lication to objects of e?%erience, as general logical la s of the consistency of cognition ith itself#

CHAPTER II O+ t&e !edu,t"%n %+ t&e Pure C%n,e2t"%ns %+ t&e 4n!erstan!ing# 77 P# 7ECTI9< I 9f the Princi%les of a Transcen!ental *e!uction in general# Teachers of juris%ru!ence, hen s%eaking of rights an! claims, !istinguish in a cause the question of right Dqui! jurisE from the question of fact Dqui! factiE, an! hile they !eman! %roof of both, they gi"e to the %roof of the former, hich goes to establish right or claim in la , the name of !e!uction# <o e make use of a great number of em%irical conce%tions, ithout o%%osition from any one@ an! consi!er oursel"es, e"en ithout any attem%t at !e!uction, justifie! in attaching to them a sense, an! a su%%osititious

signification, because e ha"e al ays e?%erience at han! to !emonstrate their objecti"e reality# There e?ist also, ho e"er, usur%e! conce%tions, such as fortune, fate, hich circulate ith almost uni"ersal in!ulgence, an! yet are occasionally challenge! by the question, Gqui! jurisHG In such cases, e ha"e great !ifficulty in !isco"ering any !e!uction for these terms, inasmuch as e cannot %ro!uce any manifest groun! of right, either from e?%erience or from reason, on hich the claim to em%loy them can be foun!e!# )mong the many conce%tions, hich make u% the "ery "ariegate! eb of human cognition, some are !estine! for %ure use a %riori, in!e%en!ent of all e?%erience@ an! their title to be so em%loye! al ays requires a !e!uction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, %roofs from e?%erience are not sufficient@ but it is necessary to kno ho these conce%tions can a%%ly to objects ithout being !eri"e! from e?%erience# I term, therefore, an e?amination of the manner in hich conce%tions can a%%ly a %riori to objects, the transcen!ental !e!uction of conce%tions, an! I !istinguish it from the em%irical !e!uction, hich in!icates the mo!e in hich conce%tion is obtaine! through e?%erience an! reflection thereon@ consequently, !oes not concern itself ith the right, but only ith the fact of our obtaining conce%tions in such an! such a manner# >e ha"e alrea!y seen that e are in %ossession of t o %erfectly !ifferent kin!s of conce%tions, hich ne"ertheless agree ith each other in this, that they both a%%ly to objects com%letely a %riori# These are the conce%tions of s%ace an! time as forms of sensibility, an! the categories as %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing# To attem%t an em%irical !e!uction of either of these classes oul! be labour in "ain, because the !istinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they a%%ly to their objects, ithout ha"ing borro e! anything from e?%erience to ar!s the re%resentation of them# Consequently, if a !e!uction of these conce%tions is necessary, it must al ays be transcen!ental# Aean hile, ith res%ect to these conce%tions, as ith res%ect to all our cognition, e certainly may !isco"er in e?%erience, if not the %rinci%le of their %ossibility, yet the occasioning causes of their %ro!uction# It ill be foun! that the im%ressions of sense gi"e the first occasion for bringing into action the hole faculty of cognition, an! for the %ro!uction of e?%erience, hich contains t o "ery !issimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, gi"en by the senses, an! a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising out of the inner fountain of %ure intuition an! thought@ an! these, on occasion gi"en by sensuous im%ressions, are calle! into e?ercise an! %ro!uce conce%tions# 7uch an in"estigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from %articular %erce%tions to general conce%tions is un!oubte!ly of great utility@ an! e ha"e to thank the celebrate! 'ocke for ha"ing first o%ene! the ay for this inquiry# But a !e!uction of the %ure a %riori conce%tions of course ne"er can be ma!e in this ay, seeing that, in regar! to their future em%loyment, hich must be entirely in!e%en!ent of e?%erience, they must ha"e a far !ifferent certificate of birth to sho from that of a !escent from e?%erience# This attem%te! %hysiological !eri"ation, hich cannot %ro%erly be calle! !e!uction, because it relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an e?%lanation of the %ossession of a %ure cognition# It is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcen!ental !e!uction of these conce%tions an! by no means an em%irical one@ also, that all attem%ts at an em%irical !e!uction, in regar! to %ure a %riori conce%tions, are

"ain, an! can only be ma!e by one ho !oes not un!erstan! the altogether %eculiar nature of these cognitions# But although it is a!mitte! that the only %ossible !e!uction of %ure a %riori cognition is a transcen!ental !e!uction, it is not, for that reason, %erfectly manifest that such a !e!uction is absolutely necessary# >e ha"e alrea!y trace! to their sources the conce%tions of s%ace an! time, by means of a transcen!ental !e!uction, an! e ha"e e?%laine! an! !etermine! their objecti"e "ali!ity a %riori# Geometry, ne"ertheless, a!"ances stea!ily an! securely in the %ro"ince of %ure a %riori cognitions, ithout nee!ing to ask from %hiloso%hy any certificate as to the %ure an! legitimate origin of its fun!amental conce%tion of s%ace# But the use of the conce%tion in this science e?ten!s only to the e?ternal orl! of sense, the %ure form of the intuition of hich is s%ace@ an! in this orl!, therefore, all geometrical cognition, because it is foun!e! u%on a %riori intuition, %ossesses imme!iate e"i!ence, an! the objects of this cognition are gi"en a %riori Das regar!s their formE in intuition by an! through the cognition itself# >ith the %ure conce%tions of un!erstan!ing, on the contrary, commences the absolute necessity of seeking a transcen!ental !e!uction, not only of these conce%tions themsel"es, but like ise of s%ace, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations concerning objects not by means of the %re!icates of intuition an! sensibility, but of %ure thought a %riori, they a%%ly to objects ithout any of the con!itions of sensibility# Besi!es, not being foun!e! on e?%erience, they are not %resente! ith any object in a %riori intuition u%on hich, antece!ently to e?%erience, they might base their synthesis# ;ence results, not only !oubt as to the objecti"e "ali!ity an! %ro%er limits of their use, but that e"en our conce%tion of s%ace is ren!ere! equi"ocal@ inasmuch as e are "ery rea!y ith the ai! of the categories, to carry the use of this conce%tion beyon! the con!itions of sensuous intuitionBan!, for this reason, e ha"e alrea!y foun! a transcen!ental !e!uction of it nee!ful# The rea!er, then, must be quite con"ince! of the absolute necessity of a transcen!ental !e!uction, before taking a single ste% in the fiel! of %ure reason@ because other ise he goes to ork blin!ly, an! after he has on!ere! about in all !irections, returns to the state of utter ignorance from hich he starte!# ;e ought, moreo"er, clearly to recogniCe beforehan! the una"oi!able !ifficulties in his un!ertaking, so that he may not after ar!s com%lain of the obscurity in hich the subject itself is !ee%ly in"ol"e!, or become too soon im%atient of the obstacles in his %ath@ because e ha"e a choice of only t o thingsBeither at once to gi"e u% all %retensions to kno le!ge beyon! the limits of %ossible e?%erience, or to bring this critical in"estigation to com%letion# >e ha"e been able, ith "ery little trouble, to make it com%rehensible ho the conce%tions of s%ace an! time, although a %riori cognitions, must necessarily a%%ly to e?ternal objects, an! ren!er a synthetical cognition of these %ossible, in!e%en!ently of all e?%erience# :or inasmuch as only by means of such %ure form of sensibility an object can a%%ear to us, that is, be an object of em%irical intuition, s%ace an! time are %ure intuitions, hich contain a %riori the con!ition of the %ossibility of objects as %henomena, an! an a %riori synthesis in these intuitions %ossesses objecti"e "ali!ity# 9n the other han!, the categories of the un!erstan!ing !o not re%resent the con!itions un!er hich objects are gi"en to us in intuition@ objects can consequently a%%ear to us ithout necessarily connecting themsel"es ith these, an! consequently ithout any

necessity bin!ing on the un!erstan!ing to contain a %riori the con!itions of these objects# Thus e fin! oursel"es in"ol"e! in a !ifficulty hich !i! not %resent itself in the s%here of sensibility, that is to say, e cannot !isco"er ho the subjecti"e con!itions of thought can ha"e objecti"e "ali!ity, in other or!s, can become con!itions of the %ossibility of all cognition of objects@ for %henomena may certainly be gi"en to us in intuition ithout any hel% from the functions of the un!erstan!ing# 'et us take, for e?am%le, the conce%tion of cause, hich in!icates a %eculiar kin! of synthesis, namely, that ith something, ), something entirely !ifferent, B, is connecte! accor!ing to a la # It is not a %riori manifest hy %henomena shoul! contain anything of this kin! D e are of course !ebarre! from a%%ealing for %roof to e?%erience, for the objecti"e "ali!ity of this conce%tion must be !emonstrate! a %rioriE, an! it hence remains !oubtful a %riori, hether such a conce%tion be not quite "oi! an! ithout any corres%on!ing object among %henomena# :or that objects of sensuous intuition must corres%on! to the formal con!itions of sensibility e?isting a %riori in the min! is quite e"i!ent, from the fact that ithout these they coul! not be objects for us@ but that they must also corres%on! to the con!itions hich un!erstan!ing requires for the synthetical unity of thought is an assertion, the groun!s for hich are not so easily to be !isco"ere!# :or %henomena might be so constitute! as not to corres%on! to the con!itions of the unity of thought@ an! all things might lie in such confusion that, for e?am%le, nothing coul! be met ith in the s%here of %henomena to suggest a la of synthesis, an! so corres%on! to the conce%tion of cause an! effect@ so that this conce%tion oul! be quite "oi!, null, an! ithout significance# Phenomena oul! ne"ertheless continue to %resent objects to our intuition@ for mere intuition !oes not in any res%ect stan! in nee! of the functions of thought# If e thought to free oursel"es from the labour of these in"estigations by saying( GE?%erience is constantly offering us e?am%les of the relation of cause an! effect in %henomena, an! %resents us ith abun!ant o%%ortunity of abstracting the conce%tion of cause, an! so at the same time of corroborating the objecti"e "ali!ity of this conce%tionG@ e shoul! in this case be o"erlooking the fact, that the conce%tion of cause cannot arise in this ay at all@ that, on the contrary, it must either ha"e an a %riori basis in the un!erstan!ing, or be rejecte! as a mere chimera# :or this conce%tion !eman!s that something, ), shoul! be of such a nature that something else, B, shoul! follo from it necessarily, an! accor!ing to an absolutely uni"ersal la # >e may certainly collect from %henomena a la , accor!ing to hich this or that usually ha%%ens, but the element of necessity is not to be foun! in it# ;ence it is e"i!ent that to the synthesis of cause an! effect belongs a !ignity, hich is utterly anting in any em%irical synthesis@ for it is no mere mechanical synthesis, by means of a!!ition, but a !ynamical one@ that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitate! as merely anne?e! to the cause, but as %osite! by an! through the cause, an! resulting from it# The strict uni"ersality of this la ne"er can be a characteristic of em%irical la s, hich obtain through in!uction only a com%arati"e uni"ersality, that is, an e?ten!e! range of %ractical a%%lication# But the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing oul! entirely lose all their %eculiar character, if e treate! them merely as the %ro!uctions of e?%erience# 77 6-# Transition to the Transcen!ental *e!uction of the Categories#

There are only t o %ossible ays in hich synthetical re%resentation an! its objects can coinci!e ith an! relate necessarily to each other, an!, as it ere, meet together# Either the object alone makes the re%resentation %ossible, or the re%resentation alone makes the object %ossible# In the former case, the relation bet een them is only em%irical, an! an a %riori re%resentation is im%ossible# )n! this is the case ith %henomena, as regar!s that in them hich is referable to mere sensation# In the latter caseBalthough re%resentation alone Dfor of its causality, by means of the ill, e !o not here s%eakE !oes not %ro!uce the object as to its e?istence, it must ne"ertheless be a %riori !eterminati"e in regar! to the object, if it is only by means of the re%resentation that e can cogniCe anything as an object# <o there are only t o con!itions of the %ossibility of a cognition of objects@ firstly, intuition, by means of hich the object, though only as %henomenon, is gi"en@ secon!ly, conce%tion, by means of hich the object hich corres%on!s to this intuition is thought# But it is e"i!ent from hat has been sai! on aesthetic that the first con!ition, un!er hich alone objects can be intuite!, must in fact e?ist, as a formal basis for them, a %riori in the min!# >ith this formal con!ition of sensibility, therefore, all %henomena necessarily corres%on!, because it is only through it that they can be %henomena at all@ that is, can be em%irically intuite! an! gi"en# <o the question is hether there !o not e?ist, a %riori in the min!, conce%tions of un!erstan!ing also, as con!itions un!er hich alone something, if not intuite!, is yet thought as object# If this question be ans ere! in the affirmati"e, it follo s that all em%irical cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to such conce%tions, since, if they are not %resu%%ose!, it is im%ossible that anything can be an object of e?%erience# <o all e?%erience contains, besi!es the intuition of the senses through hich an object is gi"en, a conce%tion also of an object that is gi"en in intuition# )ccor!ingly, conce%tions of objects in general must lie as a %riori con!itions at the foun!ation of all em%irical cognition@ an! consequently, the objecti"e "ali!ity of the categories, as a %riori conce%tions, ill rest u%on this, that e?%erience Das far as regar!s the form of thoughtE is %ossible only by their means# :or in that case they a%%ly necessarily an! a %riori to objects of e?%erience, because only through them can an object of e?%erience be thought# The hole aim of the transcen!ental !e!uction of all a %riori conce%tions is to sho that these conce%tions are a %riori con!itions of the %ossibility of all e?%erience# Conce%tions hich affor! us the objecti"e foun!ation of the %ossibility of e?%erience are for that "ery reason necessary# But the analysis of the e?%eriences in hich they are met ith is not !e!uction, but only an illustration of them, because from e?%erience they coul! ne"er !eri"e the attribute of necessity# >ithout their original a%%licability an! relation to all %ossible e?%erience, in hich all objects of cognition %resent themsel"es, the relation of the categories to objects, of hate"er nature, oul! be quite incom%rehensible# The celebrate! 'ocke, for ant of !ue reflection on these %oints, an! because he met ith %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing in e?%erience, sought also to !e!uce them from e?%erience, an! yet %rocee!e! so inconsequently as to attem%t, ith their ai!, to arri"e it cognitions hich lie far beyon! the limits of all e?%erience# *a"i! ;ume %ercei"e! that, to ren!er this %ossible, it as necessary that the conce%tions shoul! ha"e an a %riori origin# But as he coul! not e?%lain ho it as %ossible that conce%tions hich are not connecte! ith each other in the un!erstan!ing must ne"ertheless be

thought as necessarily connecte! in the objectBan! it ne"er occurre! to him that the un!erstan!ing itself might, %erha%s, by means of these conce%tions, be the author of the e?%erience in hich its objects ere %resente! to itBhe as force! to !ri"e these conce%tions from e?%erience, that is, from a subjecti"e necessity arising from re%eate! association of e?%eriences erroneously consi!ere! to be objecti"eBin one or!, from habit# But he %rocee!e! ith %erfect consequence an! !eclare! it to be im%ossible, ith such conce%tions an! the %rinci%les arising from them, to o"erste% the limits of e?%erience# The em%irical !eri"ation, ho e"er, hich both of these %hiloso%hers attribute! to these conce%tions, cannot %ossibly be reconcile! ith the fact that e !o %ossess scientific a %riori cognitions, namely, those of %ure mathematics an! general %hysics# The former of these t o celebrate! men o%ene! a i!e !oor to e?tra"aganceBDfor if reason has once un!oubte! right on its si!e, it ill not allo itself to be confine! to set limits, by "ague recommen!ations of mo!erationE@ the latter ga"e himself u% entirely to sce%ticismBa natural consequence, after ha"ing !isco"ere!, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition as not trust orthy# >e no inten! to make a trial hether it be not %ossible safely to con!uct reason bet een these t o rocks, to assign her !eterminate limits, an! yet lea"e o%en for her the entire s%here of her legitimate acti"ity# I shall merely %remise an e?%lanation of hat the categories are# They are conce%tions of an object in general, by means of hich its intuition is contem%late! as !etermine! in relation to one of the logical functions of ju!gement# The follo ing ill make this %lain# The function of the categorical ju!gement is that of the relation of subject to %re!icate@ for e?am%le, in the %ro%osition( G)ll bo!ies are !i"isible#G But in regar! to the merely logical use of the un!erstan!ing, it still remains un!etermine! to hich 9f these t o conce%tions belongs the function 9f subject an! to hich that of %re!icate# :or e coul! also say( G7ome !i"isible is a bo!y#G But the category of substance, hen the conce%tion of a bo!y is brought un!er it, !etermines that@ an! its em%irical intuition in e?%erience must be contem%late! al ays as subject an! ne"er as mere %re!icate# )n! so ith all the other categories# 77 66# 7ECTI9< II Transcen!ental *e!uction of the %ure Conce%tions of the 4n!erstan!ing# 9f the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifol! re%resentations gi"en by 7ense# The manifol! content in our re%resentations can be gi"en in an intuition hich is merely sensuousBin other or!s, is nothing but susce%tibility@ an! the form of this intuition can e?ist a %riori in our faculty of re%resentation, ithout being anything else but the mo!e in hich the subject is affecte!# But the conjunction DconjunctioE of a manifol! in intuition ne"er can be gi"en us by the senses@ it cannot therefore be containe! in the %ure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a s%ontaneous act of the faculty of re%resentation# )n! as e must, to !istinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty un!erstan!ing@ so all conjunction hether conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifol! in intuition, sensuous or non&sensuous, or of se"eral conce%tionsBis an act of the un!erstan!ing# To this act e shall gi"e the general a%%ellation of synthesis, thereby

to in!icate, at the same time, that e cannot re%resent anything as conjoine! in the object ithout ha"ing %re"iously conjoine! it oursel"es# 9f all mental notions, that of conjunction is the only one hich cannot be gi"en through objects, but can be originate! only by the subject itself, because it is an act of its %urely s%ontaneous acti"ity# The rea!er ill easily enough %ercei"e that the %ossibility of conjunction must be groun!e! in the "ery nature of this act, an! that it must be equally "ali! for all conjunction, an! that analysis, hich a%%ears to be its contrary, must, ne"ertheless, al ays %resu%%ose it@ for here the un!erstan!ing has not %re"iously conjoine!, it cannot !issect or analyse, because only as conjoine! by it, must that hich is to be analyse! ha"e been gi"en to our faculty of re%resentation# But the conce%tion of conjunction inclu!es, besi!es the conce%tion of the manifol! an! of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it also# Conjunction is the re%resentation of the synthetical unity of the manifol!#8 This i!ea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that of conjunction@ much rather !oes that i!ea, by combining itself ith the re%resentation of the manifol!, ren!er the conce%tion of conjunction %ossible# This unity, hich a %riori %rece!es all conce%tions of conjunction, is not the category of unity D77 5E@ for all the categories are base! u%on logical functions of ju!gement, an! in these functions e alrea!y ha"e conjunction, an! consequently unity of gi"en conce%tions# It is therefore e"i!ent that the category of unity %resu%%oses conjunction# >e must therefore look still higher for this unity Das qualitati"e, 77 2E, in that, namely, hich contains the groun! of the unity of !i"erse conce%tions in ju!gements, the groun!, consequently, of the %ossibility of the e?istence of the un!erstan!ing, e"en in regar! to its logical use# /8:ootnote( >hether the re%resentations are in themsel"es i!entical, an! consequently hether one can be thought analytically by means of an! through the other, is a question hich e nee! not at %resent consi!er# 9ur Consciousness of the one, hen e s%eak of the manifol!, is al ays !istinguishable from our consciousness of the other@ an! it is only res%ecting the synthesis of this D%ossibleE consciousness that e here treat#3 77 6,# 9f the 9riginally 7ynthetical 4nity of )%%erce%tion# The GI thinkG must accom%any all my re%resentations, for other ise something oul! be re%resente! in me hich coul! not be thought@ in other or!s, the re%resentation oul! either be im%ossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing# That re%resentation hich can be gi"en %re"iously to all thought is calle! intuition# )ll the !i"ersity or manifol! content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the GI think,G in the subject in hich this !i"ersity is foun!# But this re%resentation, GI think,G is an act of s%ontaneity@ that is to say, it cannot be regar!e! as belonging to mere sensibility# I call it %ure a%%erce%tion, in or!er to !istinguish it from em%irical@ or %rimiti"e a%%erce%tion, because it is self&consciousness hich, hilst it gi"es birth to the re%resentation GI think,G must necessarily be ca%able of accom%anying all our re%resentations# It is in all acts of consciousness one an! the same, an! unaccom%anie! by it, no re%resentation can e?ist for me# The unity of this a%%erce%tion I call the transcen!ental unity of self&

consciousness, in or!er to in!icate the %ossibility of a %riori cognition arising from it# :or the manifol! re%resentations hich are gi"en in an intuition oul! not all of them be my re%resentations, if they !i! not all belong to one self&consciousness, that is, as my re%resentations De"en although I am not conscious of them as suchE, they must conform to the con!ition un!er hich alone they can e?ist together in a common self& consciousness, because other ise they oul! not all ithout e?ce%tion belong to me# :rom this %rimiti"e conjunction follo many im%ortant results# :or e?am%le, this uni"ersal i!entity of the a%%erce%tion of the manifol! gi"en in intuition contains a synthesis of re%resentations an! is %ossible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis# :or the em%irical consciousness hich accom%anies !ifferent re%resentations is in itself fragmentary an! !isunite!, an! ithout relation to the i!entity of the subject# This relation, then, !oes not e?ist because I accom%any e"ery re%resentation ith consciousness, but because I join one re%resentation to another, an! am conscious of the synthesis of them# Consequently, only because I can connect a "ariety of gi"en re%resentations in one consciousness, is it %ossible that I can re%resent to myself the i!entity of consciousness in these re%resentations@ in other or!s, the analytical unity of a%%erce%tion is %ossible only un!er the %resu%%osition of a synthetical unity#8 The thought, GThese re%resentations gi"en in intuition belong all of them to me,G is accor!ingly just the same as, GI unite them in one self&consciousness, or can at least so unite themG@ an! although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of re%resentations, it %resu%%oses the %ossibility of it@ that is to say, for the reason alone that I can com%rehen! the "ariety of my re%resentations in one consciousness, !o I call them my re%resentations, for other ise I must ha"e as many& coloure! an! "arious a self as are the re%resentations of hich I am conscious# 7ynthetical unity of the manifol! in intuitions, as gi"en a %riori, is therefore the foun!ation of the i!entity of a%%erce%tion itself, hich antece!es a %riori all !eterminate thought# But the conjunction of re%resentations into a conce%tion is not to be foun! in objects themsel"es, nor can it be, as it ere, borro e! from them an! taken u% into the un!erstan!ing by %erce%tion, but it is on the contrary an o%eration of the un!erstan!ing itself, hich is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining a %riori an! of bringing the "ariety of gi"en re%resentations un!er the unity of a%%erce%tion# This %rinci%le is the highest in all human cognition# /8:ootnote( )ll general conce%tionsBas suchB!e%en!, for their e?istence, on the analytical unity of consciousness# :or e?am%le, hen I think of re! in general, I thereby think to myself a %ro%erty hich Das a characteristic markE can be !isco"ere! some here, or can be unite! ith other re%resentations@ consequently, it is only by means of a forethought %ossible synthetical unity that I can think to myself the analytical# ) re%resentation hich is cogitate! as common to !ifferent re%resentations, is regar!e! as belonging to such as, besi!es this common re%resentation, contain something !ifferent@ consequently it must be %re"iously thought in synthetical unity ith other although only %ossible re%resentations, before I can think in it the

analytical unity of consciousness hich makes it a conce%tas communis# )n! thus the synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion is the highest %oint ith hich e must connect e"ery o%eration of the un!erstan!ing, e"en the hole of logic, an! after it our transcen!ental %hiloso%hy@ in!ee!, this faculty is the un!erstan!ing itself#3 This fun!amental %rinci%le of the necessary unity of a%%erce%tion is in!ee! an i!entical, an! therefore analytical, %ro%osition@ but it ne"ertheless e?%lains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifol! gi"en in an intuition, ithout hich the i!entity of self& consciousness oul! be incogitable# :or the ego, as a sim%le re%resentation, %resents us ith no manifol! content@ only in intuition, hich is quite !ifferent from the re%resentation ego, can it be gi"en us, an! by means of conjunction it is cogitate! in one self&consciousness# )n un!erstan!ing, in hich all the manifol! shoul! be gi"en by means of consciousness itself, oul! be intuiti"e@ our un!erstan!ing can only think an! must look for its intuition to sense# I am, therefore, conscious of my i!entical self, in relation to all the "ariety of re%resentations gi"en to me in an intuition, because I call all of them my re%resentations# In other or!s, I am conscious myself of a necessary a %riori synthesis of my re%resentations, hich is calle! the original synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, un!er hich rank all the re%resentations %resente! to me, but that only by means of a synthesis# 77 6.# The Princi%le of the 7ynthetical 4nity of )%%erce%tion is the highest Princi%le of all e?ercise of the 4n!erstan!ing# The su%reme %rinci%le of the %ossibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility as, accor!ing to our transcen!ental aesthetic, that all the manifol! in intuition be subject to the formal con!itions of s%ace an! time# The su%reme %rinci%le of the %ossibility of it in relation to the un!erstan!ing is that all the manifol! in it be subject to con!itions of the originally synthetical unity or a%%erce%tion#8 To the former of these t o %rinci%les are subject all the "arious re%resentations of intuition, in so far as they are gi"en to us@ to the latter, in so far as they must be ca%able of conjunction in one consciousness@ for ithout this nothing can be thought or cogniCe!, because the gi"en re%resentations oul! not ha"e in common the act 9f the a%%erce%tion GI thinkG an! therefore coul! not be connecte! in one self&consciousness# /8:ootnote( 7%ace an! time, an! all %ortions thereof, are intuitions@ consequently are, ith a manifol! for their content, single re%resentations# D7ee the Transcen!ental )esthetic#E Consequently, they are not %ure conce%tions, by means of hich the same consciousness is foun! in a great number of re%resentations@ but, on the contrary, they are many re%resentations containe! in one, the consciousness of hich is, so to s%eak, com%oun!e!# The unity of consciousness is ne"ertheless synthetical an!, therefore, %rimiti"e# :rom this %eculiar character of consciousness follo many im%ortant consequences# D7ee 77 ,6#E3

4n!erstan!ing is, to s%eak generally, the faculty 9f cognitions# These consist in the !etermine! relation of gi"en re%resentation to an object# But an object is that, in the conce%tion of hich the manifol! in a gi"en intuition is unite!# <o all union of re%resentations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them# Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the %ossibility of re%resentations relating to an object, an! therefore of their objecti"e "ali!ity, an! of their becoming cognitions, an! consequently, the %ossibility of the e?istence of the un!erstan!ing itself# The first %ure cognition of un!erstan!ing, then, u%on hich is foun!e! all its other e?ercise, an! hich is at the same time %erfectly in!e%en!ent of all con!itions of mere sensuous intuition, is the %rinci%le of the original synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion# Thus the mere form of e?ternal sensuous intuition, namely, s%ace, affor!s us, %er se, no cognition@ it merely contributes the manifol! in a %riori intuition to a %ossible cognition# But, in or!er to cogniCe something in s%ace Dfor e?am%le, a lineE, I must !ra it, an! thus %ro!uce synthetically a !etermine! conjunction of the gi"en manifol!, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness Din the conce%tion of a lineE, an! by this means alone is an object Da !eterminate s%aceE cogniCe!# The synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objecti"e con!ition of all cognition, hich I !o not merely require in or!er to cogniCe an object, but to hich e"ery intuition must necessarily be subject, in or!er to become an object for me@ because in any other ay, an! ithout this synthesis, the manifol! in intuition coul! not be unite! in one consciousness# This %ro%osition is, as alrea!y sai!, itself analytical, although it constitutes the synthetical unity, the con!ition of all thought@ for it states nothing more than that all my re%resentations in any gi"en intuition must be subject to the con!ition hich alone enables me to connect them, as my re%resentation ith the i!entical self, an! so to unite them synthetically in one a%%erce%tion, by means of the general e?%ression, GI think#G But this %rinci%le is not to be regar!e! as a %rinci%le for e"ery %ossible un!erstan!ing, but only for the un!erstan!ing by means of hose %ure a%%erce%tion in the thought I am, no manifol! content is gi"en# The un!erstan!ing or min! hich containe! the manifol! in intuition, in an! through the act itself of its o n self&consciousness, in other or!s, an un!erstan!ing by an! in the re%resentation of hich the objects of the re%resentation shoul! at the same time e?ist, oul! not require a s%ecial act of synthesis of the manifol! as the con!ition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of hich the human un!erstan!ing, hich thinks only an! cannot intuite, has absolute nee!# But this %rinci%le is the first %rinci%le of all the o%erations of our un!erstan!ing, so that e cannot form the least conce%tion of any other %ossible un!erstan!ing, either of one such as shoul! be itself intuition, or %ossess a sensuous intuition, but ith forms !ifferent from those of s%ace an! time# 77 61# >hat 9bjecti"e 4nity of 7elf&consciousness is# It is by means of the transcen!ental unity of a%%erce%tion that all the manifol!, gi"en in an intuition is unite! into a conce%tion of the object# 9n this account it is calle! objecti"e, an! must be !istinguishe! from the subjecti"e unity of consciousness, hich

is a !etermination of the internal sense, by means of hich the sai! manifol! in intuition is gi"en em%irically to be so unite!# >hether I can be em%irically conscious of the manifol! as coe?istent or as successi"e, !e%en!s u%on circumstances, or em%irical con!itions# ;ence the em%irical unity of consciousness by means of association of re%resentations, itself relates to a %henomenal orl! an! is holly contingent# 9n the contrary, the %ure form of intuition in time, merely as an intuition, hich contains a gi"en manifol!, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, an! that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifol! in intuition to the GI think,G consequently by means of the %ure synthesis of the un!erstan!ing, hich lies a %riori at the foun!ation of all em%irical synthesis# The transcen!ental unity of a%%erce%tion is alone objecti"ely "ali!@ the em%irical hich e !o not consi!er in this essay, an! hich is merely a unity !e!uce! from the former un!er gi"en con!itions in concreto, %ossesses only subjecti"e "ali!ity# 9ne %erson connects the notion con"eye! in a or! ith one thing, another ith another thing@ an! the unity of consciousness in that hich is em%irical, is, in relation to that hich is gi"en by e?%erience, not necessarily an! uni"ersally "ali!# 77 6I# The 'ogical :orm of all +u!gements consists in the 9bjecti"e 4nity of )%%erce%tion of the Conce%tions containe! therein# I coul! ne"er satisfy myself ith the !efinition hich logicians gi"e of a ju!gement# It is, accor!ing to them, the re%resentation of a relation bet een t o conce%tions# I shall not ! ell here on the faultiness of this !efinition, in that it suits only for categorical an! not for hy%othetical or !isjuncti"e ju!gements, these latter containing a relation not of conce%tions but of ju!gements themsel"esBa blun!er from hich many e"il results ha"e follo e!#8 It is more im%ortant for our %resent %ur%ose to obser"e, that this !efinition !oes not !etermine in hat the sai! relation consists# /8:ootnote( The te!ious !octrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only categorical syllogisms@ an! although it is nothing more than an artifice by surre%titiously intro!ucing imme!iate conclusions Dconsequentiae imme!iataeE among the %remises of a %ure syllogism, to gi"e ismF gi"e rise to an a%%earance of more mo!es of !ra ing a conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice oul! not ha"e ha! much success, ha! not its authors succee!e! in bringing categorical ju!gements into e?clusi"e res%ect, as those to hich all others must be referre!Ba !octrine, ho e"er, hich, accor!ing to 77 I, is utterly false#3 But if I in"estigate more closely the relation of gi"en cognitions in e"ery ju!gement, an! !istinguish it, as belonging to the un!erstan!ing, from the relation hich is %ro!uce! accor!ing to la s of the re%ro!ucti"e imagination D hich has only subjecti"e "ali!ityE, I fin! that ju!gement is nothing but the mo!e of bringing gi"en cognitions un!er the objecti"e unit of a%%erce%tion# This is %lain from our use of the term of relation is in ju!gements, in or!er to !istinguish the objecti"e unity of gi"en re%resentations from the subjecti"e unity# :or this term in!icates the relation of these re%resentations to the

original a%%erce%tion, an! also their necessary unity, e"en although the ju!gement is em%irical, therefore contingent, as in the ju!gement( G)ll bo!ies are hea"y#G I !o not mean by this, that these re%resentations !o necessarily belong to each other in em%irical intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of a%%reciation they belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions, that is to say, they belong to each other accor!ing to %rinci%les of the objecti"e !etermination of all our re%resentations, in so far as cognition can arise from them, these %rinci%les being all !e!uce! from the main %rinci%le of the transcen!ental unity of a%%erce%tion# In this ay alone can there arise from this relation a ju!gement, that is, a relation hich has objecti"e "ali!ity, an! is %erfectly !istinct from that relation of the "ery same re%resentations hich has only subjecti"e "ali!ityBa relation, to it, hich is %ro!uce! accor!ing to la s of association# )ccor!ing to these la s, I coul! only say( G>hen I hol! in my han! or carry a bo!y, I feel an im%ression of eightG@ but I coul! not say( GIt, the bo!y, is hea"yG@ for this is tantamount to saying both these re%resentations are conjoine! in the object, that is, ithout !istinction as to the con!ition of the subject, an! !o not merely stan! together in my %erce%tion, ho e"er frequently the %erce%ti"e act may be re%eate!# 77 65# )ll 7ensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Con!itions un!er hich alone the manifol! Content of them can be unite! in one Consciousness# The manifol! content gi"en in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily un!er the original synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, because thereby alone is the unity of intuition %ossible D77 6.E# But that act of the un!erstan!ing, by hich the manifol! content of gi"en re%resentations D hether intuitions or conce%tionsE is brought un!er one a%%erce%tion, is the logical function of ju!gements D77 6IE# )ll the manifol!, therefore, in so far as it is gi"en in one em%irical intuition, is !etermine! in relation to one of the logical functions of ju!gement, by means of hich it is brought into union in one consciousness# <o the categories are nothing else than these functions of ju!gement so far as the manifol! in a gi"en intuition is !etermine! in relation to them D77 PE# Consequently, the manifol! in a gi"en intuition is necessarily subject to the categories of the un!erstan!ing# 77 6J# 9bser"ation# The manifol! in an intuition, hich I call mine, is re%resente! by means of the synthesis of the un!erstan!ing, as belonging to the necessary unity of self&consciousness, an! this takes %lace by means of the category#8 The category in!icates accor!ingly that the em%irical consciousness of a gi"en manifol! in an intuition is subject to a %ure self& consciousness a %riori, in the same manner as an em%irical intuition is subject to a %ure sensuous intuition, hich is also a %riori# In the abo"e %ro%osition, then, lies the beginning of a !e!uction of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing# <o , as the categories ha"e their origin in the un!erstan!ing alone, in!e%en!ently of sensibility, I must in my !e!uction make abstraction of the mo!e in hich the manifol! of an em%irical intuition is gi"en, in or!er to fi? my attention e?clusi"ely on the unity hich is brought by the un!erstan!ing into the intuition by means of the category# In hat follo s D77 ,,E, it ill be sho n, from the mo!e in hich the em%irical intuition is gi"en in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity hich belongs to it is no other than that hich the category Daccor!ing to 77 65E im%oses on the manifol! in a gi"en intuition, an! thus,

its a %riori "ali!ity in regar! to all objects of sense being establishe!, the %ur%ose of our !e!uction ill be fully attaine!# /8:ootnote( The %roof of this rests on the re%resente! unity of intuition, by means of hich an object is gi"en, an! hich al ays inclu!es in itself a synthesis of the manifol! to be intuite!, an! also the relation of this latter to unity of a%%erce%tion#3 But there is one thing in the abo"e !emonstration of hich I coul! not make abstraction, namely, that the manifol! to be intuite! must be gi"en %re"iously to the synthesis of the un!erstan!ing, an! in!e%en!ently of it# ;o this takes %lace remains here un!etermine!# :or if I cogitate an un!erstan!ing hich as itself intuiti"e Das, for e?am%le, a !i"ine un!erstan!ing hich shoul! not re%resent gi"en objects, but by hose re%resentation the objects themsel"es shoul! be gi"en or %ro!uce!E, the categories oul! %ossess no significance in relation to such a faculty of cognition# They are merely rules for an un!erstan!ing, hose hole %o er consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifol! hich is %resente! to it in intuition from a "ery !ifferent quarter, to the unity of a%%erce%tion@ a faculty, therefore, hich cogniCes nothing %er se, but only connects an! arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, hich must be %resente! to it by means of the object# But to sho reasons for this %eculiar character of our un!erstan!ings, that it %ro!uces unity of a%%erce%tion a %riori only by means of categories, an! a certain kin! an! number thereof, is as im%ossible as to e?%lain hy e are en!o e! ith %recisely so many functions of ju!gement an! no more, or hy time an! s%ace are the only forms of our intuition# 77 62# In Cognition, its )%%lication to 9bjects of E?%erience is the only legitimate use of the Category# To think an object an! to cogniCe an object are by no means the same thing# In cognition there are t o elements( firstly, the conce%tion, hereby an object is cogitate! Dthe categoryE@ an!, secon!ly, the intuition, hereby the object is gi"en# :or su%%osing that to the conce%tion a corres%on!ing intuition coul! not be gi"en, it oul! still be a thought as regar!s its form, but ithout any object, an! no cognition of anything oul! be %ossible by means of it, inasmuch as, so far as I kne , there e?iste! an! coul! e?ist nothing to hich my thought coul! be a%%lie!# <o all intuition %ossible to us is sensuous@ consequently, our thought of an object by means of a %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, can become cognition for us only in so far as this conce%tion is a%%lie! to objects of the senses# 7ensuous intuition is either %ure intuition Ds%ace an! timeE or em%irical intuitionBof that hich is imme!iately re%resente! in s%ace an! time by means of sensation as real# Through the !etermination of %ure intuition e obtain a %riori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as regar!s their form as %henomena@ hether there can e?ist things hich must be intuite! in this form is not thereby establishe!# )ll mathematical conce%tions, therefore, are not %er se cognition, e?ce%t in so far as e %resu%%ose that there e?ist things hich can only be re%resente! conformably to the form of our %ure sensuous intuition# But things in s%ace an! time are gi"en only in so far as they are %erce%tions Dre%resentations accom%anie! ith

sensationE, therefore only by em%irical re%resentation# Consequently the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, e"en hen they are a%%lie! to intuitions a %riori Das in mathematicsE, %ro!uce cognition only in so far as these Dan! therefore the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing by means of themE can be a%%lie! to em%irical intuitions# Consequently the categories !o not, e"en by means of %ure intuition affor! us any cognition of things@ they can only !o so in so far as they can be a%%lie! to em%irical intuition# That is to say, the categories ser"e only to ren!er em%irical cognition %ossible# But this is hat e call e?%erience# Consequently, in cognition, their a%%lication to objects of e?%erience is the only legitimate use of the categories# 77 6P# The foregoing %ro%osition is of the utmost im%ortance, for it !etermines the limits of the e?ercise of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing in regar! to objects, just as transcen!ental aesthetic !etermine! the limits of the e?ercise of the %ure form of our sensuous intuition# 7%ace an! time, as con!itions of the %ossibility of the %resentation of objects to us, are "ali! no further than for objects of sense, consequently, only for e?%erience# Beyon! these limits they re%resent to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, an! ha"e no reality a%art from it# The %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing are free from this limitation, an! e?ten! to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, %ro"i!e! only it be sensuous, an! not intellectual# But this e?tension of conce%tions beyon! the range of our intuition is of no a!"antage@ for they are then mere em%ty conce%tions of objects, as to the %ossibility or im%ossibility of the e?istence of hich they furnish us ith no means of !isco"ery# They are mere forms of thought, ithout objecti"e reality, because e ha"e no intuition to hich the synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, hich alone the categories contain, coul! be a%%lie!, for the %ur%ose of !etermining an object# 9ur sensuous an! em%irical intuition can alone gi"e them significance an! meaning# If, then, e su%%ose an object of a non&sensuous intuition to be gi"en e can in that case re%resent it by all those %re!icates hich are im%lie! in the %resu%%osition that nothing a%%ertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to it@ for e?am%le, that it is not e?ten!e!, or in s%ace@ that its !uration is not time@ that in it no change Dthe effect of the !eterminations in timeE is to be met ith, an! so on# But it is no %ro%er kno le!ge if I merely in!icate hat the intuition of the object is not, ithout being able to say hat is containe! in it, for I ha"e not sho n the %ossibility of an object to hich my %ure conce%tion of un!erstan!ing coul! be a%%licable, because I ha"e not been able to furnish any intuition corres%on!ing to it, but am only able to say that our intuition is not "ali! for it# But the most im%ortant %oint is this, that to a something of this kin! not one category can be foun! a%%licable# Take, for e?am%le, the conce%tion of substance, that is, something that can e?ist as subject, but ne"er as mere %re!icate@ in regar! to this conce%tion I am quite ignorant hether there can really be anything to corres%on! to such a !etermination of thought, if em%irical intuition !i! not affor! me the occasion for its a%%lication# But of this more in the sequel# 77 ,-# 9f the )%%lication of the Categories to 9bjects of the 7enses in general#

The %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing a%%ly to objects of intuition in general, through the un!erstan!ing alone, hether the intuition be our o n or some other, %ro"i!e! only it be sensuous, but are, for this "ery reason, mere forms of thought, by means of hich alone no !etermine! object can be cogniCe!# The synthesis or conjunction of the manifol! in these conce%tions relates, e ha"e sai!, only to the unity of a%%erce%tion, an! is for this reason the groun! of the %ossibility of a %riori cognition, in so far as this cognition is !e%en!ent on the un!erstan!ing# This synthesis is, therefore, not merely transcen!ental, but also %urely intellectual# But because a certain form of sensuous intuition e?ists in the min! a %riori hich rests on the rece%ti"ity of the re%resentati"e faculty DsensibilityE, the un!erstan!ing, as a s%ontaneity, is able to !etermine the internal sense by means of the !i"ersity of gi"en re%resentations, conformably to the synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, an! thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the a%%erce%tion of the manifol! of sensuous intuition a %riori, as the con!ition to hich must necessarily be submitte! all objects of human intuition# )n! in this manner the categories as mere forms of thought recei"e objecti"e reality, that is, a%%lication to objects hich are gi"en to us in intuition, but that only as %henomena, for it is only of %henomena that e are ca%able of a %riori intuition# This synthesis of the manifol! of sensuous intuition, hich is %ossible an! necessary a %riori, may be calle! figurati"e Dsynthesis s%eciosaE, in contra!istinction to that hich is cogitate! in the mere category in regar! to the manifol! of an intuition in general, an! is calle! connection or conjunction of the un!erstan!ing Dsynthesis intellectualisE# Both are transcen!ental, not merely because they themsel"es %rece!e a %riori all e?%erience, but also because they form the basis for the %ossibility of other cognition a %riori# But the figurati"e synthesis, hen it has relation only to the originally synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, that is to the transcen!ental unity cogitate! in the categories, must, to be !istinguishe! from the %urely intellectual conjunction, be entitle! the transcen!ental synthesis of imagination# Imagination is the faculty of re%resenting an object e"en ithout its %resence in intuition# <o , as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjecti"e con!ition un!er hich alone it can gi"e a corres%on!ing intuition to the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, belongs to sensibility# But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of s%ontaneity, hich is !eterminati"e, an! not, like sense, merely !eterminable, an! hich is consequently able to !etermine sense a %riori, accor!ing to its form, conformably to the unity of a%%erce%tion, in so far is the imagination a faculty of !etermining sensibility a %riori, an! its synthesis of intuitions accor!ing to the categories must be the transcen!ental synthesis of the imagination# It is an o%eration of the un!erstan!ing on sensibility, an! the first a%%lication of the un!erstan!ing to objects of %ossible intuition, an! at the same time the basis for the e?ercise of the other functions of that faculty# )s figurati"e, it is !istinguishe! from the merely intellectual synthesis, hich is %ro!uce! by the un!erstan!ing alone, ithout the ai! of imagination# <o , in so far as imagination is s%ontaneity, I sometimes call it also the %ro!ucti"e imagination, an! !istinguish it from the re%ro!ucti"e, the synthesis of hich is subject entirely to em%irical la s, those of association, namely, an! hich, therefore, contributes nothing to the e?%lanation of the %ossibility of a %riori cognition, an! for this reason belongs not to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, but to %sychology#

>e ha"e no arri"e! at the %ro%er %lace for e?%laining the %ara!o? hich must ha"e struck e"ery one in our e?%osition of the internal sense D77 5E, namelyBho this sense re%resents us to our o n consciousness, only as e a%%ear to oursel"es, not as e are in oursel"es, because, to it, e intuite oursel"es only as e are in ar!ly affecte!# <o this a%%ears to be contra!ictory, inasmuch as e thus stan! in a %assi"e relation to oursel"es@ an! therefore in the systems of %sychology, the internal sense is commonly hel! to be one ith the faculty of a%%erce%tion, hile e, on the contrary, carefully !istinguish them# That hich !etermines the internal sense is the un!erstan!ing, an! its original %o er of conjoining the manifol! of intuition, that is, of bringing this un!er an a%%erce%tion Du%on hich rests the %ossibility of the un!erstan!ing itselfE# <o , as the human un!erstan!ing is not in itself a faculty of intuition, an! is unable to e?ercise such a %o er, in or!er to conjoin, as it ere, the manifol! of its o n intuition, the synthesis of un!erstan!ing is, consi!ere! %er se, nothing but the unity of action, of hich, as such, it is self&conscious, e"en a%art from sensibility, by hich, moreo"er, it is able to !etermine our internal sense in res%ect of the manifol! hich may be %resente! to it accor!ing to the form of sensuous intuition# Thus, un!er the name of a transcen!ental synthesis of imagination, the un!erstan!ing e?ercises an acti"ity u%on the %assi"e subject, hose faculty it is@ an! so e are right in saying that the internal sense is affecte! thereby# )%%erce%tion an! its synthetical unity are by no means one an! the same ith the internal sense# The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, a%%lies, un!er the name of the categories, to the manifol! of intuition in general, %rior to all sensuous intuition of objects# The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of intuition, but ithout any synthetical conjunction of the manifol! therein, an! consequently !oes not contain any !etermine! intuition, hich is %ossible only through consciousness of the !etermination of the manifol! by the transcen!ental act of the imagination Dsynthetical influence of the un!erstan!ing on the internal senseE, hich I ha"e name! figurati"e synthesis# This e can in!ee! al ays %ercei"e in oursel"es# >e cannot cogitate a geometrical line ithout !ra ing it in thought, nor a circle ithout !escribing it, nor re%resent the three !imensions of s%ace ithout !ra ing three lines from the same %oint %er%en!icular to one another# >e cannot e"en cogitate time, unless, in !ra ing a straight line D hich is to ser"e as the e?ternal figurati"e re%resentation of timeE, e fi? our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifol!, hereby e !etermine successi"ely the internal sense, an! thus atten! also to the succession of this !etermination# Aotion as an act of the subject Dnot as a !etermination of an objectE,8 consequently the synthesis of the manifol! in s%ace, if e make abstraction of s%ace an! atten! merely to the act by hich e !etermine the internal sense accor!ing to its form, is that hich %ro!uces the conce%tion of succession# The un!erstan!ing, therefore, !oes by no means fin! in the internal sense any such synthesis of the manifol!, but %ro!uces it, in that it affects this sense# )t the same time, ho GI ho thinkG is !istinct from the GIG hich intuites itself Dother mo!es of intuition being cogitable as at least %ossibleE, an! yet one an! the same ith this latter as the same subject@ ho , therefore, I am able to say( GI, as an intelligence an! thinking subject, cogniCe myself as an object thought, so far as I am, moreo"er, gi"en to myself in intuitionBonly, like other %henomena, not as I am in

myself, an! as consi!ere! by the un!erstan!ing, but merely as I a%%earGBis a question that has in it neither more nor less !ifficulty than the questionBG;o can I be an object to myselfHG or thisBG;o I can be an object of my o n intuition an! internal %erce%tionsHG But that such must be the fact, if e a!mit that s%ace is merely a %ure form of the %henomena of e?ternal sense, can be clearly %ro"e! by the consi!eration that e cannot re%resent time, hich is not an object of e?ternal intuition, in any other ay than un!er the image of a line, hich e !ra in thought, a mo!e of re%resentation ithout hich e coul! not cogniCe the unity of its !imension, an! also that e are necessitate! to take our !etermination of %erio!s of time, or of %oints of time, for all our internal %erce%tions from the changes hich e %ercei"e in out ar! things# It follo s that e must arrange the !eterminations of the internal sense, as %henomena in time, e?actly in the same manner as e arrange those of the e?ternal senses in s%ace# )n! consequently, if e grant, res%ecting this latter, that by means of them e kno objects only in so far as e are affecte! e?ternally, e must also confess, ith regar! to the internal sense, that by means of it e intuite oursel"es only as e are internally affecte! by oursel"es@ in other or!s, as regar!s internal intuition, e cogniCe our o n subject only as %henomenon, an! not as it is in itself#88 /8:ootnote( Aotion of an object in s%ace !oes not belong to a %ure science, consequently not to geometry@ because, that a thing is mo"able cannot be kno n a %riori, but only from e?%erience# But motion, consi!ere! as the !escri%tion of a s%ace, is a %ure act of the successi"e synthesis of the manifol! in e?ternal intuition by means of %ro!ucti"e imagination, an! belongs not only to geometry, but e"en to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy#3 /88:ootnote( I !o not see hy so much !ifficulty shoul! be foun! in a!mitting that our internal sense is affecte! by oursel"es# E"ery act of attention e?em%lifies it# In such an act the un!erstan!ing !etermines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction hich it cogitates, conformably to the internal intuition hich corres%on!s to the manifol! in the synthesis of the un!erstan!ing# ;o much the min! is usually affecte! thereby e"ery one ill be able to %ercei"e in himself#3 77 ,6# 9n the other han!, in the transcen!ental synthesis of the manifol! content of re%resentations, consequently in the synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, I am conscious of myself, not as I a%%ear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that GI am#G This re%resentation is a thought, not an intuition# <o , as in or!er to cogniCe oursel"es, in a!!ition to the act of thinking, hich subjects the manifol! of e"ery %ossible intuition to the unity of a%%erce%tion, there is necessary a !eterminate mo!e of intuition, hereby this manifol! is gi"en@ although my o n e?istence is certainly not mere %henomenon Dmuch less mere illusionE, the !etermination of my e?istence8 Can only take %lace conformably to the form of the internal sense, accor!ing to the %articular mo!e in hich the manifol! hich I conjoin is gi"en in internal intuition, an! I ha"e therefore no

kno le!ge of myself as I am, but merely as I a%%ear to myself# The consciousness of self is thus "ery far from a kno le!ge of self, in hich I !o not use the categories, hereby I cogitate an object, by means of the conjunction of the manifol! in one a%%erce%tion# In the same ay as I require, for the sake of the cognition of an object !istinct from myself, not only the thought of an object in general Din the categoryE, but also an intuition by hich to !etermine that general conce%tion, in the same ay !o I require, in or!er to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in a!!ition an intuition of the manifol! in myself, by hich to !etermine this thought# It is true that I e?ist as an intelligence hich is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but subjecte! in relation to the manifol! hich this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitati"e conjunction calle! the internal sense# Ay intelligence Dthat is, IE can ren!er that conjunction or synthesis %erce%tible only accor!ing to the relations of time, hich are quite beyon! the %ro%er s%here of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing an! consequently cogniCe itself in res%ect to an intuition D hich cannot %ossibly be intellectual, nor gi"en by the un!erstan!ingE, only as it a%%ears to itself, an! not as it oul! cogniCe itself, if its intuition ere intellectual# /8:ootnote( The GI thinkG e?%resses the act of !etermining my o n e?istence# Ay e?istence is thus alrea!y gi"en by the act of consciousness@ but the mo!e in hich I must !etermine my e?istence, that is, the mo!e in hich I must %lace the manifol! belonging to my e?istence, is not thereby gi"en# :or this %ur%ose intuition of self is require!, an! this intuition %ossesses a form gi"en a %riori, namely, time, hich is sensuous, an! belongs to our rece%ti"ity of the !eterminable# <o , as I !o not %ossess another intuition of self hich gi"es the !etermining in me Dof the s%ontaneity of hich I am consciousE, %rior to the act of !etermination, in the same manner as time gi"es the !eterminable, it is clear that I am unable to !etermine my o n e?istence as that of a s%ontaneous being, but I am only able to re%resent to myself the s%ontaneity of my thought, that is, of my !etermination, an! my e?istence remains e"er !eterminable in a %urely sensuous manner, that is to say, like the e?istence of a %henomenon# But it is because of this s%ontaneity that I call myself an intelligence#3 77 ,,# Transcen!ental *e!uction of the uni"ersally %ossible em%loyment in e?%erience of the Pure Conce%tions of the 4n!erstan!ing# In the meta%hysical !e!uction, the a %riori origin of categories as %ro"e! by their com%lete accor!ance ith the general logical of thought@ in the transcen!ental !e!uction as e?hibite! the %ossibility of the categories as a %riori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general D77 65 an! 6JE#)t %resent e are about to e?%lain the %ossibility of cogniCing, a %riori, by means of the categories, all objects hich can %ossibly be %resente! to our senses, not, in!ee!, accor!ing to the form of their intuition, but accor!ing to the la s of their conjunction or synthesis, an! thus, as it ere, of

%rescribing la s to nature an! e"en of ren!ering nature %ossible# :or if the categories ere ina!equate to this task, it oul! not be e"i!ent to us hy e"erything that is %resente! to our senses must be subject to those la s hich ha"e an a %riori origin in the un!erstan!ing itself# I %remise that by the term synthesis of a%%rehension I un!erstan! the combination of the manifol! in an em%irical intuition, hereby %erce%tion, that is, em%irical consciousness of the intuition Das %henomenonE, is %ossible# >e ha"e a %riori forms of the e?ternal an! internal sensuous intuition in the re%resentations of s%ace an! time, an! to these must the synthesis of a%%rehension of the manifol! in a %henomenon be al ays comformable, because the synthesis itself can only take %lace accor!ing to these forms# But s%ace an! time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themsel"es D hich contain a manifol!E, an! therefore contain a %riori the !etermination of the unity of this manifol!#8 D7ee the Transcen!ent )esthetic#E Therefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifol! ithout or ithin us, consequently also a conjunction to hich all that is to be re%resente! as !etermine! in s%ace or time must corres%on!, gi"en a %riori along ith Dnot inE these intuitions, as the con!ition of the synthesis of all a%%rehension of them# But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of the manifol! of a gi"en intuition in general, in a %rimiti"e act of consciousness, accor!ing to the categories, but a%%lie! to our sensuous intuition# Consequently all synthesis, hereby alone is e"en %erce%tion %ossible, is subject to the categories# )n!, as e?%erience is cognition by means of conjoine! %erce%tions, the categories are con!itions of the %ossibility of e?%erience an! are therefore "ali! a %riori for all objects of e?%erience# /8:ootnote( 7%ace re%resente! as an object Das geometry really requires it to beE contains more than the mere form of the intuition@ namely, a combination of the manifol! gi"en accor!ing to the form of sensibility into a re%resentation that can be intuite!@ so that the form of the intuition gi"es us merely the manifol!, but the formal intuition gi"es unity of re%resentation# In the aesthetic, I regar!e! this unity as belonging entirely to sensibility, for the %ur%ose of in!icating that it antece!es all conce%tions, although it %resu%%oses a synthesis hich !oes not belong to sense, through hich alone, ho e"er, all our conce%tions of s%ace an! time are %ossible# :or as by means of this unity alone Dthe un!erstan!ing !etermining the sensibilityE s%ace an! time are gi"en as intuitions, it follo s that the unity of this intuition a %riori belongs to s%ace an! time, an! not to the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing D77 ,-E#3 >hen, then, for e?am%le, I make the em%irical intuition of a house by a%%rehension of the manifol! containe! therein into a %erce%tion, the necessary unity of s%ace an! of my e?ternal sensuous intuition lies at the foun!ation of this act, an! I, as it ere, !ra the

form of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifol! in s%ace# But this "ery synthetical unity remains, e"en hen I abstract the form of s%ace, an! has its seat in the un!erstan!ing, an! is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition@ that is to say, the category of quantity, to hich the aforesai! synthesis of a%%rehension, that is, the %erce%tion, must be com%letely conformable#8 /8:ootnote( In this manner it is %ro"e!, that the synthesis of a%%rehension, hich is em%irical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of a%%erce%tion, hich is intellectual, an! containe! a %riori in the category# It is one an! the same s%ontaneity hich at one time, un!er the name of imagination, at another un!er that of un!erstan!ing, %ro!uces conjunction in the manifol! of intuition#3 To take another e?am%le, hen I %ercei"e the freeCing of ater, I a%%rehen! t o states Dflui!ity an! soli!ityE, hich, as such, stan! to ar! each other mutually in a relation of time# But in the time, hich I %lace as an internal intuition, at the foun!ation of this %henomenon, I re%resent to myself synthetical unity of the manifol!, ithout hich the aforesai! relation coul! not be gi"en in an intuition as !etermine! Din regar! to the succession of timeE# <o this synthetical unity, as the a %riori con!ition un!er hich I conjoin the manifol! of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the %ermanent form of my internal intuition Dthat is to say, of timeE, the category of cause, by means of hich, hen a%%lie! to my sensibility, I !etermine e"erything that occurs accor!ing to relations of time# Consequently a%%rehension in such an e"ent, an! the e"ent itself, as far as regar!s the %ossibility of its %erce%tion, stan!s un!er the conce%tion of the relation of cause an! effect( an! so in all other cases# Categories are conce%tions hich %rescribe la s a %riori to %henomena, consequently to nature as the com%le? of all %henomena Dnatura materialiter s%ectataE# )n! no the question arisesBinasmuch as these categories are not !eri"e! from nature, an! !o not regulate themsel"es accor!ing to her as their mo!el Dfor in that case they oul! be em%iricalEBho it is concei"able that nature must regulate herself accor!ing to them, in other or!s, ho the categories can !etermine a %riori the synthesis of the manifol! of nature, an! yet not !eri"e their origin from her# The follo ing is the solution of this enigma# It is not in the least more !ifficult to concei"e ho the la s of the %henomena of nature must harmoniCe ith the un!erstan!ing an! ith its a %riori formBthat is, its faculty of conjoining the manifol!Bthan it is to un!erstan! ho the %henomena themsel"es must corres%on! ith the a %riori form of our sensuous intuition# :or la s !o not e?ist in the %henomena any more than the %henomena e?ist as things in themsel"es# 'a s !o not e?ist e?ce%t by relation to the subject in hich the %henomena inhere, in so far as it %ossesses un!erstan!ing, just as %henomena ha"e no e?istence e?ce%t by relation to the same e?isting subject in so far as it has senses# To things as things in themsel"es, conformability to la must necessarily belong in!e%en!ently of an un!erstan!ing to cogniCe them# But %henomena are only re%resentations of things hich are utterly unkno n in res%ect to hat they are in themsel"es# But as mere re%resentations, they

stan! un!er no la of conjunction e?ce%t that hich the conjoining faculty %rescribes# <o that hich conjoins the manifol! of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to hich un!erstan!ing contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, an! sensibility, manifol!ness of a%%rehension# <o as all %ossible %erce%tion !e%en!s on the synthesis of a%%rehension, an! this em%irical synthesis itself on the transcen!ental, consequently on the categories, it is e"i!ent that all %ossible %erce%tions, an! therefore e"erything that can attain to em%irical consciousness, that is, all %henomena of nature, must, as regar!s their conjunction, be subject to the categories# )n! nature Dconsi!ere! merely as nature in generalE is !e%en!ent on them, as the original groun! of her necessary conformability to la Das natura formaliter s%ectataE# But the %ure faculty Dof the un!erstan!ingE of %rescribing la s a %riori to %henomena by means of mere categories, is not com%etent to enounce other or more la s than those on hich a nature in general, as a conformability to la of %henomena of s%ace an! time, !e%en!s# Particular la s, inasmuch as they concern em%irically !etermine! %henomena, cannot be entirely !e!uce! from %ure la s, although they all stan! un!er them# E?%erience must be su%era!!e! in or!er to kno these %articular la s@ but in regar! to e?%erience in general, an! e"erything that can be cogniCe! as an object thereof, these a %riori la s are our only rule an! gui!e# 77 ,.# Result of this *e!uction of the Conce%tions of the 4n!erstan!ing# >e cannot think any object e?ce%t by means of the categories@ e cannot cogniCe any thought e?ce%t by means of intuitions corres%on!ing to these conce%tions# <o all our intuitions are sensuous, an! our cognition, in so far as the object of it is gi"en, is em%irical# But em%irical cognition is e?%erience@ consequently no a %riori cognition is %ossible for us, e?ce%t of objects of %ossible e?%erience#8 /:ootnote( 'est my rea!ers shoul! stumble at this assertion, an! the conclusions that may be too rashly !ra n from it, I must remin! them that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limite! by the con!itions of our sensuous intuition, but ha"e an unboun!e! s%here of action# It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the !etermining of the object, hich requires intuition# In the absence of intuition, our thought of an object may still ha"e true an! useful consequences in regar! to the e?ercise of reason by the subject# But as this e?ercise of reason is not al ays !irecte! on the !etermination of the object, in other or!s, on cognition thereof, but also on the !etermination of the subject an! its "olition, I !o not inten! to treat of it in this %lace#3 But this cognition, hich is limite! to objects of e?%erience, is not for that reason !eri"e! entirely, from, e?%erience, butBan! this is asserte! of the %ure intuitions an! the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ingBthere are, unquestionably, elements of cognition, hich e?ist in the min! a %riori# <o there are only t o ays in hich a necessary harmony of e?%erience ith the conce%tions of its objects can be cogitate!#

Either e?%erience makes these conce%tions %ossible, or the conce%tions make e?%erience %ossible# The former of these statements ill not bol! goo! ith res%ect to the categories Dnor in regar! to %ure sensuous intuitionE, for they are a %riori conce%tions, an! therefore in!e%en!ent of e?%erience# The assertion of an em%irical origin oul! attribute to them a sort of generatio aequi"oca# Consequently, nothing remains but to a!o%t the secon! alternati"e D hich %resents us ith a system, as it ere, of the e%igenesis of %ure reasonE, namely, that on the %art of the un!erstan!ing the categories !o contain the groun!s of the %ossibility of all e?%erience# But ith res%ect to the questions ho they make e?%erience %ossible, an! hat are the %rinci%les of the %ossibility thereof ith hich they %resent us in their a%%lication to %henomena, the follo ing section on the transcen!ental e?ercise of the faculty of ju!gement ill inform the rea!er# It is quite %ossible that someone may %ro%ose a s%ecies of %reformation&system of %ure reasonBa mi!!le ay bet een the t oBto it, that the categories are neither innate an! first a %riori %rinci%les of cognition, nor !eri"e! from e?%erience, but are merely subjecti"e a%titu!es for thought im%lante! in us contem%oraneously ith our e?istence, hich ere so or!ere! an! !is%ose! by our Creator, that their e?ercise %erfectly harmoniCes ith the la s of nature hich regulate e?%erience# <o , not to mention that ith such an hy%othesis it is im%ossible to say at hat %oint e must sto% in the em%loyment of %re!etermine! a%titu!es, the fact that the categories oul! in this case entirely lose that character of necessity hich is essentially in"ol"e! in the "ery conce%tion of them, is a conclusi"e objection to it# The conce%tion of cause, for e?am%le, hich e?%resses the necessity of an effect un!er a %resu%%ose! con!ition, oul! be false, if it reste! only u%on such an arbitrary subjecti"e necessity of uniting certain em%irical re%resentations accor!ing to such a rule of relation# I coul! not then sayBGThe effect is connecte! ith its cause in the object Dthat is, necessarilyE,G but only, GI am so constitute! that I can think this re%resentation as so connecte!, an! not other ise#G <o this is just hat the sce%tic ants# :or in this case, all our kno le!ge, !e%en!ing on the su%%ose! objecti"e "ali!ity of our ju!gement, is nothing but mere illusion@ nor oul! there be anting %eo%le ho oul! !eny any such subjecti"e necessity in res%ect to themsel"es, though they must feel it# )t all e"ents, e coul! not !is%ute ith any one on that hich merely !e%en!s on the manner in hich his subject is organiCe!# 7hort "ie of the abo"e *e!uction# The foregoing !e!uction is an e?%osition of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing Dan! ith them of all theoretical a %riori cognitionE, as %rinci%les of the %ossibility of e?%erience, but of e?%erience as the !etermination of all %henomena in s%ace an! time in generalBof e?%erience, finally, from the %rinci%le of the original synthetical unity of a%%erce%tion, as the form of the un!erstan!ing in relation to time an! s%ace as original forms of sensibility# I consi!er the !i"ision by %aragra%hs to be necessary only u% to this %oint, because e ha! to treat of the elementary conce%tions# )s e no %rocee! to the e?%osition of the em%loyment of these, I shall not !esignate the cha%ters in this manner any further#

B99K II# )nalytic of Princi%les# General logic is constructe! u%on a %lan hich coinci!es e?actly ith the !i"ision of the higher faculties of cognition# These are, un!erstan!ing, ju!gement, an! reason# This science, accor!ingly, treats in its analytic of conce%tions, ju!gements, an! conclusions in e?act corres%on!ence ith the functions an! or!er of those mental %o ers hich e inclu!e generally un!er the generic !enomination of un!erstan!ing# )s this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of cognition, hether %ure or em%irical, an! occu%ies itself ith the mere form of thought D!iscursi"e cognitionE, it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason# :or the form of reason has its la , hich, ithout taking into consi!eration the %articular nature of the cognition about hich it is em%loye!, can be !isco"ere! a %riori, by the sim%le analysis of the action of reason into its momenta# Transcen!ental logic, limite! as it is to a !eterminate content, that of %ure a %riori cognitions, to it, cannot imitate general logic in this !i"ision# :or it is e"i!ent that the transcen!ental em%loyment of reason is not objecti"ely "ali!, an! therefore !oes not belong to the logic of truth Dthat is, to analyticE, but as a logic of illusion, occu%ies a %articular !e%artment in the scholastic system un!er the name of transcen!ental !ialectic# 4n!erstan!ing an! ju!gement accor!ingly %ossess in transcen!ental logic a canon of objecti"ely "ali!, an! therefore true e?ercise, an! are com%rehen!e! in the analytical !e%artment of that logic# But reason, in her en!ea"ours to arri"e by a %riori means at some true statement concerning objects an! to e?ten! cognition beyon! the boun!s of %ossible e?%erience, is altogether !ialectic, an! her illusory assertions cannot be constructe! into a canon such as an analytic ought to contain# )ccor!ingly, the analytic of %rinci%les ill be merely a canon for the faculty of ju!gement, for the instruction of this faculty in its a%%lication to %henomena of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, hich contain the necessary con!ition for the establishment of a %riori la s# 9n this account, although the subject of the follo ing cha%ters is the es%ecial %rinci%les of un!erstan!ing, I shall make use of the term *octrine of the faculty of ju!gement, in or!er to !efine more %articularly my %resent %ur%ose#

INTRO!UCTION. O+ t&e Trans,endental Fa,ulty %+ $ud.ement "n /eneral. If un!erstan!ing in general be !efine! as the faculty of la s or rules, the faculty of ju!gement may be terme! the faculty of subsum%tion un!er these rules@ that is, of

!istinguishing hether this or that !oes or !oes not stan! un!er a gi"en rule Dcasus !atae legisE# General logic contains no !irections or %rece%ts for the faculty of ju!gement, nor can it contain any such# :or as it makes abstraction of all content of cognition, no !uty is left for it, e?ce%t that of e?%osing analytically the mere form of cognition in conce%tions, ju!gements, an! conclusions, an! of thereby establishing formal rules for all e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing# <o if this logic ishe! to gi"e some general !irection ho e shoul! subsume un!er these rules, that is, ho e shoul! !istinguish hether this or that !i! or !i! not stan! un!er them, this again coul! not be !one other ise than by means of a rule# But this rule, %recisely because it is a rule, requires for itself !irection from the faculty of ju!gement# Thus, it is e"i!ent that the un!erstan!ing is ca%able of being instructe! by rules, but that the ju!gement is a %eculiar talent, hich !oes not, an! cannot require tuition, but only e?ercise# This faculty is therefore the s%ecific quality of the so&calle! mother it, the ant of hich no scholastic !isci%line can com%ensate# :or although e!ucation may furnish, an!, as it ere, engraft u%on a limite! un!erstan!ing rules borro e! from other min!s, yet the %o er of em%loying these rules correctly must belong to the %u%il himself@ an! no rule hich e can %rescribe to him ith this %ur%ose is, in the absence or !eficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse#8 ) %hysician therefore, a ju!ge or a statesman, may ha"e in his hea! many a!mirable %athological, juri!ical, or %olitical rules, in a !egree that may enable him to be a %rofoun! teacher in his %articular science, an! yet in the a%%lication of these rules he may "ery %ossibly blun!erBeither because he is anting in natural ju!gement Dthough not in un!erstan!ingE an!, hilst he can com%rehen! the general in abstracto, cannot !istinguish hether a %articular case in concreto ought to rank un!er the former@ or because his faculty of ju!gement has not been sufficiently e?ercise! by e?am%les an! real %ractice# In!ee!, the gran! an! only use of e?am%les, is to shar%en the ju!gement# :or as regar!s the correctness an! %recision of the insight of the un!erstan!ing, e?am%les are commonly injurious rather than other ise, because, as casus in terminis they sel!om a!equately fulfil the con!itions of the rule# Besi!es, they often eaken the %o er of our un!erstan!ing to a%%rehen! rules or la s in their uni"ersality, in!e%en!ently of %articular circumstances of e?%erience@ an! hence, accustom us to em%loy them more as formulae than as %rinci%les# E?am%les are thus the go&cart of the ju!gement, hich he ho is naturally !eficient in that faculty cannot affor! to !is%ense ith# /8:ootnote( *eficiency in ju!gement is %ro%erly that hich is calle! stu%i!ity@ an! for such a failing e kno no reme!y# ) !ull or narro &min!e! %erson, to hom nothing is anting but a %ro%er !egree of un!erstan!ing, may be im%ro"e! by tuition, e"en so far as to !eser"e the e%ithet of learne!# But as such %ersons frequently labour un!er a !eficiency in the faculty of ju!gement, it is not uncommon to fin! men e?tremely learne! ho in the a%%lication of their science betray a lamentable !egree this irreme!iable ant#3

But although general logic cannot gi"e !irections to the faculty of ju!gement, the case is "ery !ifferent as regar!s transcen!ental logic, insomuch that it a%%ears to be the es%ecial !uty of the latter to secure an! !irect, by means of !eterminate rules, the faculty of ju!gement in the em%loyment of the %ure un!erstan!ing# :or, as a !octrine, that is, as an en!ea"our to enlarge the s%here of the un!erstan!ing in regar! to %ure a %riori cognitions, %hiloso%hy is orse than useless, since from all the attem%ts hitherto ma!e, little or no groun! has been gaine!# But, as a critique, in or!er to guar! against the mistakes of the faculty of ju!gement Dla%sus ju!iciiE in the em%loyment of the fe %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing hich e %ossess, although its use is in this case %urely negati"e, %hiloso%hy is calle! u%on to a%%ly all its acuteness an! %enetration# But transcen!ental %hiloso%hy has this %eculiarity, that besi!es in!icating the rule, or rather the general con!ition for rules, hich is gi"en in the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, it can, at the same time, in!icate a %riori the case to hich the rule must be a%%lie!# The cause of the su%eriority hich, in this res%ect, transcen!ental %hiloso%hy %ossesses abo"e all other sciences e?ce%t mathematics, lies in this( it treats of conce%tions hich must relate a %riori to their objects, hose objecti"e "ali!ity consequently cannot be !emonstrate! a %osteriori, an! is, at the same time, un!er the obligation of %resenting in general but sufficient tests, the con!itions un!er hich objects can be gi"en in harmony ith those conce%tions@ other ise they oul! be mere logical forms, ithout content, an! not %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing# 9ur transcen!ental !octrine of the faculty of ju!gement ill contain t o cha%ters# The first ill treat of the sensuous con!ition un!er hich alone %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing can be em%loye!Bthat is, of the schematism of the %ure un!erstan!ing# The secon! ill treat of those synthetical ju!gements hich are !eri"e! a %riori from %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing un!er those con!itions, an! hich lie a %riori at the foun!ation of all other cognitions, that is to say, it ill treat of the %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' *9CTRI<E 9: T;E :)C4'T$ 9: +4*GEAE<T 9R, )<)'$TIC 9: PRI<CIP'E7#

CHAPTER I. O+ t&e S,&emat"sm at %+ t&e Pure C%n,e2t"%ns %+ t&e 4n!erstan!ing# In all subsum%tions of an object un!er a conce%tion, the re%resentation of the object must be homogeneous ith the conce%tion@ in other or!s, the conce%tion must contain that hich is re%resente! in the object to be subsume! un!er it# :or this is the meaning of the e?%ression( G)n object is containe! un!er a conce%tion#G Thus the em%irical conce%tion of a %late is homogeneous ith the %ure geometrical conce%tion of a circle, inasmuch as the roun!ness hich is cogitate! in the former is intuite! in the latter#

But %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, hen com%are! ith em%irical intuitions, or e"en ith sensuous intuitions in general, are quite heterogeneous, an! ne"er can be !isco"ere! in any intuition# ;o then is the subsum%tion of the latter un!er the former, an! consequently the a%%lication of the categories to %henomena, %ossibleHB:or it is im%ossible to say, for e?am%le( GCausality can be intuite! through the senses an! is containe! in the %henomenon#GBThis natural an! im%ortant question forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcen!ental !octrine of the faculty of ju!gement, ith the %ur%ose, to it, of sho ing ho %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing can be a%%lie! to %henomena# In all other sciences, here the conce%tions by hich the object is thought in the general are not so !ifferent an! heterogeneous from those hich re%resent the object in concretoBas it is gi"en, it is quite unnecessary to institute any s%ecial inquiries concerning the a%%lication of the former to the latter# <o it is quite clear that there must be some thir! thing, hich on the one si!e is homogeneous ith the category, an! ith the %henomenon on the other, an! so makes the a%%lication of the former to the latter %ossible# This me!iating re%resentation must be %ure D ithout any em%irical contentE, an! yet must on the one si!e be intellectual, on the other sensuous# 7uch a re%resentation is the transcen!ental schema# The conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing contains %ure synthetical unity of the manifol! in general# Time, as the formal con!ition of the manifol! of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all re%resentations, contains a %riori a manifol! in the %ure intuition# <o a transcen!ental !etermination of time is so far homogeneous ith the category, hich constitutes the unity thereof, that it is uni"ersal an! rests u%on a rule a %riori# 9n the other han!, it is so far homogeneous ith the %henomenon, inasmuch as time is containe! in e"ery em%irical re%resentation of the manifol!# Thus an a%%lication of the category to %henomena becomes %ossible, by means of the transcen!ental !etermination of time, hich, as the schema of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, me!iates the subsum%tion of the latter un!er the former# )fter hat has been %ro"e! in our !e!uction of the categories, no one, it is to be ho%e!, can hesitate as to the %ro%er !ecision of the question, hether the em%loyment of these %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing ought to be merely em%irical or also transcen!ental@ in other or!s, hether the categories, as con!itions of a %ossible e?%erience, relate a %riori solely to %henomena, or hether, as con!itions of the %ossibility of things in general, their a%%lication can be e?ten!e! to objects as things in themsel"es# :or e ha"e there seen that conce%tions are quite im%ossible, an! utterly ithout signification, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of hich they consist, an object be gi"en@ an! that, consequently, they cannot %ossibly a%%ly to objects as things in themsel"es ithout regar! to the question hether an! ho these may be gi"en to us@ an!, further, that the only manner in hich objects can be gi"en to us is by means of the mo!ification of our sensibility@ an!, finally, that %ure a %riori conce%tions, in a!!ition to the function of the un!erstan!ing in the category, must contain a %riori formal con!itions of sensibility Dof the internal sense, namelyE, hich again contain the general con!ition un!er hich alone the category can be a%%lie! to any object# This formal an! %ure con!ition of sensibility, to hich the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing is restricte! in its em%loyment, e shall name the schema of the conce%tion of the

un!erstan!ing, an! the %roce!ure of the un!erstan!ing ith these schemata e shall call the schematism of the %ure un!erstan!ing# The schema is, in itself, al ays a mere %ro!uct of the imagination# But, as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity in the !etermination of sensibility, the schema is clearly !istinguishable from the image# Thus, if I %lace fi"e %oints one after another#### this is an image of the number fi"e# 9n the other han!, if I only think a number in general, hich may be either fi"e or a hun!re!, this thought is rather the re%resentation of a metho! of re%resenting in an image a sum De#g#, a thousan!E in conformity ith a conce%tion, than the image itself, an image hich I shoul! fin! some little !ifficulty in re"ie ing, an! com%aring ith the conce%tion# <o this re%resentation of a general %roce!ure of the imagination to %resent its image to a conce%tion, I call the schema of this conce%tion# In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, hich lie at the foun!ation of our %ure sensuous conce%tions# <o image coul! e"er be a!equate to our conce%tion of a triangle in general# :or the generalness of the conce%tion it ne"er coul! attain to, as this inclu!es un!er itself all triangles, hether right&angle!, acute&angle!, etc#, hilst the image oul! al ays be limite! to a single %art of this s%here# The schema of the triangle can e?ist no here else than in thought, an! it in!icates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regar! to %ure figures in s%ace# 7till less is an object of e?%erience, or an image of the object, e"er to the em%irical conce%tion# 9n the contrary, the conce%tion al ays relates imme!iately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the !etermination of our intuition, in conformity ith a certain general conce%tion# The conce%tion of a !og in!icates a rule, accor!ing to hich my imagination can !elineate the figure of a four&foote! animal in general, ithout being limite! to any %articular in!i"i!ual form hich e?%erience %resents to me, or in!ee! to any %ossible image that I can re%resent to myself in concreto# This schematism of our un!erstan!ing in regar! to %henomena an! their mere form, is an art, hi!!en in the !e%ths of the human soul, hose true mo!es of action e shall only ith !ifficulty !isco"er an! un"eil# Thus much only can e say( GThe image is a %ro!uct of the em%irical faculty of the %ro!ucti"e imaginationBthe schema of sensuous conce%tions Dof figures in s%ace, for e?am%leE is a %ro!uct, an!, as it ere, a monogram of the %ure imagination a %riori, hereby an! accor!ing to hich images first become %ossible, hich, ho e"er, can be connecte! ith the conce%tion only me!iately by means of the schema hich they in!icate, an! are in themsel"es ne"er fully a!equate to it#G 9n the other han!, the schema of a %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing is something that cannot be re!uce! into any imageBit is nothing else than the %ure synthesis e?%resse! by the category, conformably, to a rule of unity accor!ing to conce%tions# It is a transcen!ental %ro!uct of the imagination, a %ro!uct hich concerns the !etermination of the internal sense, accor!ing to con!itions of its form DtimeE in res%ect to all re%resentations, in so far as these re%resentations must be conjoine! a %riori in one conce%tion, conformably to the unity of a%%erce%tion# >ithout entering u%on a !ry an! te!ious analysis of the essential requisites of transcen!ental schemata of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, e shall rather %rocee! at once to gi"e an e?%lanation of them accor!ing to the or!er of the categories, an! in connection there ith#

:or the e?ternal sense the %ure image of all quantities DquantorumE is s%ace@ the %ure image of all objects of sense in general, is time# But the %ure schema of quantity DquantitatisE as a conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, is number, a re%resentation hich com%rehen!s the successi"e a!!ition of one to one Dhomogeneous quantitiesE# Thus, number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifol! in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time itself in my a%%rehension of the intuition# Reality, in the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, is that hich corres%on!s to a sensation in general@ that, consequently, the conce%tion of hich in!icates a being Din timeE# <egation is that the conce%tion of hich re%resents a not&being Din timeE# The o%%osition of these t o consists therefore in the !ifference of one an! the same time, as a time fille! or a time em%ty# <o as time is only the form of intuition, consequently of objects as %henomena, that hich in objects corres%on!s to sensation is the transcen!ental matter of all objects as things in themsel"es D7achheit, realityE# <o e"ery sensation has a !egree or quantity by hich it can fill time, that is to say, the internal sense in res%ect of the re%resentation of an object, more or less, until it "anishes into nothing DL - L negatioE# Thus there is a relation an! connection bet een reality an! negation, or rather a transition from the former to the latter, hich makes e"ery reality re%resentable to us as a quantum@ an! the schema of a reality as the quantity of something in so far as it fills time, is e?actly this continuous an! uniform generation of the reality in time, as e !escen! in time from the sensation hich has a certain !egree, !o n to the "anishing thereof, or gra!ually ascen! from negation to the quantity thereof# The schema of substance is the %ermanence of the real in time@ that is, the re%resentation of it as a substratum of the em%irical !etermination of time@ a substratum hich therefore remains, hilst all else changes# DTime %asses not, but in it %asses the e?istence of the changeable# To time, therefore, hich is itself unchangeable an! %ermanent, corres%on!s that hich in the %henomenon is unchangeable in e?istence, that is, substance, an! it is only by it that the succession an! coe?istence of %henomena can be !etermine! in regar! to time#E The schema of cause an! of the causality of a thing is the real hich, hen %osite!, is al ays follo e! by something else# It consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifol!, in so far as that succession is subjecte! to a rule# The schema of community Dreci%rocity of action an! reactionE, or the reci%rocal causality of substances in res%ect of their acci!ents, is the coe?istence of the !eterminations of the one ith those of the other, accor!ing to a general rule# The schema of %ossibility is the accor!ance of the synthesis of !ifferent re%resentations ith the con!itions of time in general Das, for e?am%le, o%%osites cannot e?ist together at the same time in the same thing, but only after each otherE, an! is therefore the !etermination of the re%resentation of a thing at any time# The schema of reality is e?istence in a !etermine! time#

The schema of necessity is the e?istence of an object in all time# It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity contains an! re%resents the generation DsynthesisE of time itself, in the successi"e a%%rehension of an object@ the schema of quality the synthesis of sensation ith the re%resentation of time, or the filling u% of time@ the schema of relation the relation of %erce%tions to each other in all time Dthat is, accor!ing to a rule of the !etermination of timeE( an! finally, the schema of mo!ality an! its categories, time itself, as the correlati"e of the !etermination of an objectB hether it !oes belong to time, an! ho # The schemata, therefore, are nothing but a %riori !eterminations of time accor!ing to rules, an! these, in regar! to all %ossible objects, follo ing the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the or!er in time, an! finally, to the com%le? or totality in time# ;ence it is a%%arent that the schematism of the un!erstan!ing, by means of the transcen!ental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the manifol! of intuition in the internal sense, an! thus in!irectly to the unity of a%%erce%tion, as a function corres%on!ing to the internal sense Da rece%ti"ityE# Thus, the schemata of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing are the true an! only con!itions hereby our un!erstan!ing recei"es an a%%lication to objects, an! consequently significance# :inally, therefore, the categories are only ca%able of em%irical use, inasmuch as they ser"e merely to subject %henomena to the uni"ersal rules of synthesis, by means of an a %riori necessary unity Don account of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original a%%erce%tionE@ an! so to ren!er them susce%tible of a com%lete connection in one e?%erience# But ithin this hole of %ossible e?%erience lie all our cognitions, an! in the uni"ersal relation to this e?%erience consists transcen!ental truth, hich antece!es all em%irical truth, an! ren!ers the latter %ossible# It is, ho e"er, e"i!ent at first sight, that although the schemata of sensibility are the sole agents in realiCing the categories, they !o, ne"ertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the categories by con!itions hich lie beyon! the s%here of un!erstan!ingB namely, in sensibility# ;ence the schema is %ro%erly only the %henomenon, or the sensuous conce%tion of an object in harmony ith the category# D<umerus est quantitas %haenomenonBsensatio realitas %haenomenon@ constans et %er!urabile rerum substantia %haenomenonBaeternitas, necessitas, %haenomena, etc#E <o , if e remo"e a restricti"e con!ition, e thereby am%lify, it a%%ears, the formerly limite! conce%tion# In this ay, the categories in their %ure signification, free from all con!itions of sensibility, ought to be "ali! of things as they are, an! not, as the schemata re%resent them, merely as they a%%ear@ an! consequently the categories must ha"e a significance far more e?ten!e!, an! holly in!e%en!ent of all schemata# In truth, there !oes al ays remain to the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, after abstracting e"ery sensuous con!ition, a "alue an! significance, hich is, ho e"er, merely logical# But in this case, no object is gi"en them, an! therefore they ha"e no meaning sufficient to affor! us a conce%tion of an object# The notion of substance, for e?am%le, if e lea"e out the sensuous !etermination of %ermanence, oul! mean nothing more than a something hich can be cogitate! as subject, ithout the %ossibility of becoming a %re!icate to anything else# 9f this re%resentation I can make nothing, inasmuch as it !oes not

in!icate to me hat !eterminations the thing %ossesses hich must thus be "ali! as %remier subject# Consequently, the categories, ithout schemata are merely functions of the un!erstan!ing for the %ro!uction of conce%tions, but !o not re%resent any object# This significance they !eri"e from sensibility, hich at the same time realiCes the un!erstan!ing an! restricts it#

CHAPTER II. System %+ all Pr"n,"2les %+ t&e Pure Understand"n.. In the foregoing cha%ter e ha"e merely consi!ere! the general con!itions un!er hich alone the transcen!ental faculty of ju!gement is justifie! in using the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing for synthetical ju!gements# 9ur !uty at %resent is to e?hibit in systematic connection those ju!gements hich the un!erstan!ing really %ro!uces a %riori# :or this %ur%ose, our table of the categories ill certainly affor! us the natural an! safe gui!ance# :or it is %recisely the categories hose a%%lication to %ossible e?%erience must constitute all %ure a %riori cognition of the un!erstan!ing@ an! the relation of hich to sensibility ill, on that "ery account, %resent us ith a com%lete an! systematic catalogue of all the transcen!ental %rinci%les of the use of the un!erstan!ing# Princi%les a %riori are so calle!, not merely because they contain in themsel"es the groun!s of other ju!gements, but also because they themsel"es are not groun!e! in higher an! more general cognitions# This %eculiarity, ho e"er, !oes not raise them altogether abo"e the nee! of a %roof# :or although there coul! be foun! no higher cognition, an! therefore no objecti"e %roof, an! although such a %rinci%le rather ser"es as the foun!ation for all cognition of the object, this by no means hin!ers us from !ra ing a %roof from the subjecti"e sources of the %ossibility of the cognition of an object# 7uch a %roof is necessary, moreo"er, because ithout it the %rinci%le might be liable to the im%utation of being a mere gratuitous assertion# In the secon! %lace, e shall limit our in"estigations to those %rinci%les hich relate to the categories# :or as to the %rinci%les of transcen!ental aesthetic, accor!ing to hich s%ace an! time are the con!itions of the %ossibility of things as %henomena, as also the restriction of these %rinci%les, namely, that they cannot be a%%lie! to objects as things in themsel"esBthese, of course, !o not fall ithin the sco%e of our %resent inquiry# In like manner, the %rinci%les of mathematical science form no %art of this system, because they are all !ra n from intuition, an! not from the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing# The %ossibility of these %rinci%les, ho e"er, ill necessarily be consi!ere! here, inasmuch as they are synthetical ju!gements a %riori, not in!ee! for the %ur%ose of %ro"ing their accuracy an! a%o!eictic certainty, hich is unnecessary, but merely to ren!er concei"able an! !e!uce the %ossibility of such e"i!ent a %riori cognitions# But e shall ha"e also to s%eak of the %rinci%le of analytical ju!gements, in o%%osition to synthetical ju!gements, hich is the %ro%er subject of our inquiries, because this "ery

o%%osition ill free the theory of the latter from all ambiguity, an! %lace it clearly before our eyes in its true nature# 7$7TEA 9: T;E PRI<CIP'E7 9: T;E P4RE 4<*ER7T)<*I<G# 7ECTI9< I# 9f the 7u%reme Princi%le of all )nalytical +u!gements# >hate"er may be the content of our cognition, an! in hate"er manner our cognition may be relate! to its object, the uni"ersal, although only negati"e con!itions of all our ju!gements is that they !o not contra!ict themsel"es@ other ise these ju!gements are in themsel"es De"en ithout res%ect to the objectE nothing# But although there may e?ist no contra!iction in our ju!gement, it may ne"ertheless connect conce%tions in such a manner that they !o not corres%on! to the object, or ithout any groun!s either a %riori or a %osteriori for arri"ing at such a ju!gement, an! thus, ithout being self& contra!ictory, a ju!gement may ne"ertheless be either false or groun!less# <o , the %ro%osition( G<o subject can ha"e a %re!icate that contra!icts it,G is calle! the %rinci%le of contra!iction, an! is a uni"ersal but %urely negati"e criterion of all truth# But it belongs to logic alone, because it is "ali! of cognitions, merely as cognitions an! ithout res%ect to their content, an! !eclares that the contra!iction entirely nullifies them# >e can also, ho e"er, make a %ositi"e use of this %rinci%le, that is, not merely to banish falsehoo! an! error Din so far as it rests u%on contra!ictionE, but also for the cognition of truth# :or if the ju!gement is analytical, be it affirmati"e or negati"e, its truth must al ays be recogniCable by means of the %rinci%le of contra!iction# :or the contrary of that hich lies an! is cogitate! as conce%tion in the cognition of the object ill be al ays %ro%erly negati"e!, but the conce%tion itself must al ays be affirme! of the object, inasmuch as the contrary thereof oul! be in contra!iction to the object# >e must therefore hol! the %rinci%le of contra!iction to be the uni"ersal an! fully sufficient Princi%le of all analytical cognition# But as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no further utility or authority# :or the fact that no cognition can be at "ariance ith this %rinci%le ithout nullifying itself, constitutes this %rinci%le the sine qua non, but not the !etermining groun! of the truth of our cognition# )s our business at %resent is %ro%erly ith the synthetical %art of our kno le!ge only, e shall al ays be on our guar! not to transgress this in"iolable %rinci%le@ but at the same time not to e?%ect from it any !irect assistance in the establishment of the truth of any synthetical %ro%osition# There e?ists, ho e"er, a formula of this celebrate! %rinci%leBa %rinci%le merely formal an! entirely ithout contentB hich contains a synthesis that has been ina!"ertently an! quite unnecessarily mi?e! u% ith it# It is this( GIt is im%ossible for a thing to be an! not to be at the same time#G <ot to mention the su%erfluousness of the a!!ition of the or! im%ossible to in!icate the a%o!eictic certainty, hich ought to be self&e"i!ent from the %ro%osition itself, the %ro%osition is affecte! by the con!ition of time, an! as it ere says( G) thing L ), hich is something L B, cannot at the same time be non&B#G But both, B as ell as non&B, may quite ell e?ist in succession# :or e?am%le, a man ho is young cannot at the same time be ol!@ but the same man can "ery ell be at one time young, an! at another not young, that is, ol!# <o the %rinci%le of contra!iction as a

merely logical %ro%osition must not by any means limit its a%%lication merely to relations of time, an! consequently a formula like the %rece!ing is quite foreign to its true %ur%ose# The misun!erstan!ing arises in this ay# >e first of all se%arate a %re!icate of a thing from the conce%tion of the thing, an! after ar!s connect ith this %re!icate its o%%osite, an! hence !o not establish any contra!iction ith the subject, but only ith its %re!icate, hich has been conjoine! ith the subject syntheticallyBa contra!iction, moreo"er, hich obtains only hen the first an! secon! %re!icate are affirme! in the same time# If I say( G) man ho is ignorant is not learne!,G the con!ition Gat the same timeG must be a!!e!, for he ho is at one time ignorant, may at another be learne!# But if I say( G<o ignorant man is a learne! man,G the %ro%osition is analytical, because the characteristic ignorance is no a constituent %art of the conce%tion of the subject@ an! in this case the negati"e %ro%osition is e"i!ent imme!iately from the %ro%osition of contra!iction, ithout the necessity of a!!ing the con!ition Gthe same time#G This is the reason hy I ha"e altere! the formula of this %rinci%leBan alteration hich sho s "ery clearly the nature of an analytical %ro%osition# 7ECTI9< II# 9f the 7u%reme Princi%le of all 7ynthetical +u!gements# The e?%lanation of the %ossibility of synthetical ju!gements is a task ith hich general logic has nothing to !o@ in!ee! she nee!s not e"en be acquainte! ith its name# But in transcen!ental logic it is the most im%ortant matter to be !ealt ithBin!ee! the only one, if the question is of the %ossibility of synthetical ju!gements a %riori, the con!itions an! e?tent of their "ali!ity# :or hen this question is fully !eci!e!, it can reach its aim ith %erfect ease, the !etermination, to it, of the e?tent an! limits of the %ure un!erstan!ing# In an analytical ju!gement I !o not go beyon! the gi"en conce%tion, in or!er to arri"e at some !ecision res%ecting it# If the ju!gement is affirmati"e, I %re!icate of the conce%tion only that hich as alrea!y cogitate! in it@ if negati"e, I merely e?clu!e from the conce%tion its contrary# But in synthetical ju!gements, I must go beyon! the gi"en conce%tion, in or!er to cogitate, in relation ith it, something quite !ifferent from that hich as cogitate! in it, a relation hich is consequently ne"er one either of i!entity or contra!iction, an! by means of hich the truth or error of the ju!gement cannot be !iscerne! merely from the ju!gement itself# Grante!, then, that e must go out beyon! a gi"en conce%tion, in or!er to com%are it synthetically ith another, a thir! thing is necessary, in hich alone the synthesis of t o conce%tions can originate# <o hat is this tertium qui! that is to be the me!ium of all synthetical ju!gementsH It is only a com%le? in hich all our re%resentations are containe!, the internal sense to it, an! its form a %riori, time# The synthesis of our re%resentations rests u%on the imagination@ their synthetical unity D hich is requisite to a ju!gementE, u%on the unity of a%%erce%tion# In this, therefore, is to be sought the %ossibility of synthetical ju!gements, an! as all three contain the sources of a %riori re%resentations, the %ossibility of %ure synthetical ju!gements also@ nay, they are necessary u%on these groun!s, if e are to %ossess a kno le!ge of objects, hich rests solely u%on the synthesis of re%resentations#

If a cognition is to ha"e objecti"e reality, that is, to relate to an object, an! %ossess sense an! meaning in res%ect to it, it is necessary that the object be gi"en in some ay or another# >ithout this, our conce%tions are em%ty, an! e may in!ee! ha"e thought by means of them, but by such thinking e ha"e not, in fact, cogniCe! anything, e ha"e merely %laye! ith re%resentation# To gi"e an object, if this e?%ression be un!erstoo! in the sense of Gto %resentG the object, not me!iately but imme!iately in intuition, means nothing else than to a%%ly the re%resentation of it to e?%erience, be that e?%erience real or only %ossible# 7%ace an! time themsel"es, %ure as these conce%tions are from all that is em%irical, an! certain as it is that they are re%resente! fully a %riori in the min!, oul! be com%letely ithout objecti"e "ali!ity, an! ithout sense an! significance, if their necessary use in the objects of e?%erience ere not sho n# <ay, the re%resentation of them is a mere schema, that al ays relates to the re%ro!ucti"e imagination, hich calls u% the objects of e?%erience, ithout hich they ha"e no meaning# )n! so it is ith all conce%tions ithout !istinction# The %ossibility of e?%erience is, then, that hich gi"es objecti"e reality to all our a %riori cognitions# <o e?%erience !e%en!s u%on the synthetical unity of %henomena, that is, u%on a synthesis accor!ing to conce%tions of the object of %henomena in general, a synthesis ithout hich e?%erience ne"er coul! become kno le!ge, but oul! be merely a rha%so!y of %erce%tions, ne"er fitting together into any connecte! te?t, accor!ing to rules of a thoroughly unite! D%ossibleE consciousness, an! therefore ne"er subjecte! to the transcen!ental an! necessary unity of a%%erce%tion# E?%erience has therefore for a foun!ation, a %riori %rinci%les of its form, that is to say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of %henomena, the objecti"e reality of hich rules, as necessary con!itions e"en of the %ossibility of e?%erience can hich rules, as necessary con!itions Be"en of the %ossibility of e?%erienceBcan al ays be sho n in e?%erience# But a%art from this relation, a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions are absolutely im%ossible, because they ha"e no thir! term, that is, no %ure object, in hich the synthetical unity can e?hibit the objecti"e reality of its conce%tions# )lthough, then, res%ecting s%ace, or the forms hich %ro!ucti"e imagination !escribes therein, e !o cogniCe much a %riori in synthetical ju!gements, an! are really in no nee! of e?%erience for this %ur%ose, such kno le!ge oul! ne"ertheless amount to nothing but a busy trifling ith a mere chimera, ere not s%ace to be consi!ere! as the con!ition of the %henomena hich constitute the material of e?ternal e?%erience# ;ence those %ure synthetical ju!gements !o relate, though but me!iately, to %ossible e?%erience, or rather to the %ossibility of e?%erience, an! u%on that alone is foun!e! the objecti"e "ali!ity of their synthesis# >hile then, on the one han!, e?%erience, as em%irical synthesis, is the only %ossible mo!e of cognition hich gi"es reality to all other synthesis@ on the other han!, this latter synthesis, as cognition a %riori, %ossesses truth, that is, accor!ance ith its object, only in so far as it contains nothing more than hat is necessary to the synthetical unity of e?%erience#

)ccor!ingly, the su%reme %rinci%le of all synthetical ju!gements is( GE"ery object is subject to the necessary con!itions of the synthetical unity of the manifol! of intuition in a %ossible e?%erience#G ) %riori synthetical ju!gements are %ossible hen e a%%ly the formal con!itions of the a %riori intuition, the synthesis of the imagination, an! the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transcen!ental a%%erce%tion, to a %ossible cognition of e?%erience, an! say( GThe con!itions of the %ossibility of e?%erience in general are at the same time con!itions of the %ossibility of the objects of e?%erience, an! ha"e, for that reason, objecti"e "ali!ity in an a %riori synthetical ju!gement#G 7ECTI9< III# 7ystematic Re%resentation of all 7ynthetical Princi%les of the Pure 4n!erstan!ing# That %rinci%les e?ist at all is to be ascribe! solely to the %ure un!erstan!ing, hich is not only the faculty of rules in regar! to that hich ha%%ens, but is e"en the source of %rinci%les accor!ing to hich e"erything that can be %resente! to us as an object is necessarily subject to rules, because ithout such rules e ne"er coul! attain to cognition of an object# E"en the la s of nature, if they are contem%late! as %rinci%les of the em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, %ossess also a characteristic of necessity, an! e may therefore at least e?%ect them to be !etermine! u%on groun!s hich are "ali! a %riori an! antece!ent to all e?%erience# But all la s of nature, ithout !istinction, are subject to higher %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing, inasmuch as the former are merely a%%lications of the latter to %articular cases of e?%erience# These higher %rinci%les alone therefore gi"e the conce%tion, hich contains the necessary con!ition, an!, as it ere, the e?%onent of a rule@ e?%erience, on the other han!, gi"es the case hich comes un!er the rule# There is no !anger of our mistaking merely em%irical %rinci%les for %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, or con"ersely@ for the character of necessity, accor!ing to conce%tions hich !istinguish the latter, an! the absence of this in e"ery em%irical %ro%osition, ho e?tensi"ely "ali! soe"er it may be, is a %erfect safeguar! against confoun!ing them# There are, ho e"er, %ure %rinci%les a %riori, hich ne"ertheless I shoul! not ascribe to the %ure un!erstan!ingBfor this reason, that they are not !eri"e! from %ure conce%tions, but Dalthough by the me!iation of the un!erstan!ingE from %ure intuitions# But un!erstan!ing is the faculty of conce%tions# 7uch %rinci%les mathematical science %ossesses, but their a%%lication to e?%erience, consequently their objecti"e "ali!ity, nay the %ossibility of such a %riori synthetical cognitions Dthe !e!uction thereofE rests entirely u%on the %ure un!erstan!ing# 9n this account, I shall not reckon among my %rinci%les those of mathematics@ though I shall inclu!e those u%on the %ossibility an! objecti"e "ali!ity a %riori, of %rinci%les of the mathematical science, hich, consequently, are to be looke! u%on as the %rinci%le of these, an! hich %rocee! from conce%tions to intuition, an! not from intuition to conce%tions#

In the a%%lication of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing to %ossible e?%erience, the em%loyment of their synthesis is either mathematical or !ynamical, for it is !irecte! %artly on the intuition alone, %artly on the e?istence of a %henomenon# But the a %riori con!itions of intuition are in relation to a %ossible e?%erience absolutely necessary, those of the e?istence of objects of a %ossible em%irical intuition are in themsel"es contingent# ;ence the %rinci%les of the mathematical use of the categories ill %ossess a character of absolute necessity, that is, ill be a%o!eictic@ those, on the other han!, of the !ynamical use, the character of an a %riori necessity in!ee!, but only un!er the con!ition of em%irical thought in an e?%erience, therefore only me!iately an! in!irectly# Consequently they ill not %ossess that imme!iate e"i!ence hich is %eculiar to the former, although their a%%lication to e?%erience !oes not, for that reason, lose its truth an! certitu!e# But of this %oint e shall be better able to ju!ge at the conclusion of this system of %rinci%les# The table of the categories is naturally our gui!e to the table of %rinci%les, because these are nothing else than rules for the objecti"e em%loyment of the former# )ccor!ingly, all %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing are( 6 )?ioms of Intuition , . )ntici%ations )nalogies of Perce%tion of E?%erience 1 Postulates of Em%irical Thought in general These a%%ellations I ha"e chosen a!"ise!ly, in or!er that e might not lose sight of the !istinctions in res%ect of the e"i!ence an! the em%loyment of these %rinci%les# It ill, ho e"er, soon a%%ear thatBa fact hich concerns both the e"i!ence of these %rinci%les, an! the a %riori !etermination of %henomenaBaccor!ing to the categories of quantity an! quality Dif e atten! merely to the form of theseE, the %rinci%les of these categories are !istinguishable from those of the t o others, in as much as the former are %ossesse! of an intuiti"e, but the latter of a merely !iscursi"e, though in both instances a com%lete, certitu!e# I shall therefore call the former mathematical, an! the latter !ynamical %rinci%les#8 It must be obser"e!, ho e"er, that by these terms I mean just as little in the one case the %rinci%les of mathematics as those of general D%hysicalE !ynamics in the other# I ha"e here in "ie merely the %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, in their a%%lication to the internal sense D ithout !istinction of the re%resentations gi"en thereinE, by means of hich the sciences of mathematics an! !ynamics become %ossible# )ccor!ingly, I ha"e name! these %rinci%les rather ith reference to their a%%lication than their content@ an! I shall no %rocee! to consi!er them in the or!er in hich they stan! in the table#

/8:ootnote( )ll combination DconjunctioE is either com%osition Dcom%ositioE or connection Dne?usE# The former is the synthesis of a manifol!, the %arts of hich !o not necessarily belong to each other# :or e?am%le, the t o triangles into hich a square is !i"i!e! by a !iagonal, !o not necessarily belong to each other, an! of this kin! is the synthesis of the homogeneous in e"erything that can be mathematically consi!ere!# This synthesis can be !i"i!e! into those of aggregation an! coalition, the former of hich is a%%lie! to e?tensi"e, the latter to intensi"e quantities# The secon! sort of combination Dne?usE is the synthesis of a manifol!, in so far as its %arts !o belong necessarily to each other@ for e?am%le, the acci!ent to a substance, or the effect to the cause# Consequently it is a synthesis of that hich though heterogeneous, is re%resente! as connecte! a %riori# This combinationBnot an arbitrary oneBI entitle !ynamical because it concerns the connection of the e?istence of the manifol!# This, again, may be !i"i!e! into the %hysical synthesis, of the %henomena !i"i!e! among each other, an! the meta%hysical synthesis, or the connection of %henomena a %riori in the faculty of cognition#3 6# )MI9A7 9: I<T4ITI9<# The %rinci%le of these is( )ll Intuitions are E?tensi"e =uantities# PR99:# )ll %henomena contain, as regar!s their form, an intuition in s%ace an! time, hich lies a %riori at the foun!ation of all ithout e?ce%tion# Phenomena, therefore, cannot be a%%rehen!e!, that is, recei"e! into em%irical consciousness other ise than through the synthesis of a manifol!, through hich the re%resentations of a !eterminate s%ace or time are generate!@ that is to say, through the com%osition of the homogeneous an! the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifol! DhomogeneousE# <o the consciousness of a homogeneous manifol! in intuition, in so far as thereby the re%resentation of an object is ren!ere! %ossible, is the conce%tion of a quantity DquantiE# Consequently, e"en the %erce%tion of an object as %henomenon is %ossible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifol! of the gi"en sensuous intuition, through hich the unity of the com%osition of the homogeneous manifol! in the conce%tion of a quantity is cogitate!@ that is to say, all %henomena are quantities, an! e?tensi"e quantities, because as intuitions in s%ace or time they must be re%resente! by means of the same synthesis through hich s%ace an! time themsel"es are !etermine!# )n e?tensi"e quantity I call that herein the re%resentation of the %arts ren!ers %ossible Dan! therefore necessarily antece!esE the re%resentation of the hole# I cannot re%resent to myself any line, ho e"er small, ithout !ra ing it in thought, that is, ithout generating from a %oint all its %arts one after another, an! in this ay alone %ro!ucing this intuition# Precisely the same is the case ith e"ery, e"en the smallest,

%ortion of time# I cogitate therein only the successi"e %rogress from one moment to another, an! hence, by means of the !ifferent %ortions of time an! the a!!ition of them, a !eterminate quantity of time is %ro!uce!# )s the %ure intuition in all %henomena is either time or s%ace, so is e"ery %henomenon in its character of intuition an e?tensi"e quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cogniCe! in our a%%rehension by successi"e synthesis Dfrom %art to %artE# )ll %henomena are, accor!ingly, to be consi!ere! as aggregates, that is, as a collection of %re"iously gi"en %arts@ hich is not the case ith e"ery sort of quantities, but only ith those hich are re%resente! an! a%%rehen!e! by us as e?tensi"e# 9n this successi"e synthesis of the %ro!ucti"e imagination, in the generation of figures, is foun!e! the mathematics of e?tension, or geometry, ith its a?ioms, hich e?%ress the con!itions of sensuous intuition a %riori, un!er hich alone the schema of a %ure conce%tion of e?ternal intuition can e?ist@ for e?am%le, Gbe t een t o %oints only one straight line is %ossible,G Gt o straight lines cannot enclose a s%ace,G etc# These are the a?ioms hich %ro%erly relate only to quantities DquantaE as such# But, as regar!s the quantity of a thing DquantitasE, that is to say, the ans er to the question( G;o large is this or that objectHG although, in res%ect to this question, e ha"e "arious %ro%ositions synthetical an! imme!iately certain Din!emonstrabiliaE@ e ha"e, in the %ro%er sense of the term, no a?ioms# :or e?am%le, the %ro%ositions( GIf equals be a!!e! to equals, the holes are equalG@ GIf equals be taken from equals, the remain!ers are equalG@ are analytical, because I am imme!iately conscious of the i!entity of the %ro!uction of the one quantity ith the %ro!uction of the other@ hereas a?ioms must be a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions# 9n the other han!, the self&e"i!ent %ro%ositions as to the relation of numbers, are certainly synthetical but not uni"ersal, like those of geometry, an! for this reason cannot be calle! a?ioms, but numerical formulae# That J N I L 6, is not an analytical %ro%osition# :or neither in the re%resentation of se"en, nor of fi"e, nor of the com%osition of the t o numbers, !o I cogitate the number t el"e# D>hether I cogitate the number in the a!!ition of both, is not at %resent the question@ for in the case of an analytical %ro%osition, the only %oint is hether I really cogitate the %re!icate in the re%resentation of the subject#E But although the %ro%osition is synthetical, it is ne"ertheless only a singular %ro%osition# In so far as regar! is here ha! merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous Dthe unitsE, it cannot take %lace e?ce%t in one manner, although our use of these numbers is after ar!s general# If I say( G) triangle can be constructe! ith three lines, any t o of hich taken together are greater than the thir!,G I e?ercise merely the %ure function of the %ro!ucti"e imagination, hich may !ra the lines longer or shorter an! construct the angles at its %leasure# 9n the contrary, the number se"en is %ossible only in one manner, an! so is like ise the number t el"e, hich results from the synthesis of se"en an! fi"e# 7uch %ro%ositions, then, cannot be terme! a?ioms Dfor in that case e shoul! ha"e an infinity of theseE, but numerical formulae# This transcen!ental %rinci%le of the mathematics of %henomena greatly enlarges our a %riori cognition# :or it is by this %rinci%le alone that %ure mathematics is ren!ere! a%%licable in all its %recision to objects of e?%erience, an! ithout it the "ali!ity of this a%%lication oul! not be so self&e"i!ent@ on the contrary, contra!ictions an! confusions

ha"e often arisen on this "ery %oint# Phenomena are not things in themsel"es# Em%irical intuition is %ossible only through %ure intuition Dof s%ace an! timeE@ consequently, hat geometry affirms of the latter, is in!is%utably "ali! of the former# )ll e"asions, such as the statement that objects of sense !o not conform to the rules of construction in s%ace Dfor e?am%le, to the rule of the infinite !i"isibility of lines or anglesE, must fall to the groun!# :or, if these objections hol! goo!, e !eny to s%ace, an! ith it to all mathematics, objecti"e "ali!ity, an! no longer kno herefore, an! ho far, mathematics can be a%%lie! to %henomena# The synthesis of s%aces an! times as the essential form of all intuition, is that hich ren!ers %ossible the a%%rehension of a %henomenon, an! therefore e"ery e?ternal e?%erience, consequently all cognition of the objects of e?%erience@ an! hate"er mathematics in its %ure use %ro"es of the former, must necessarily hol! goo! of the latter# )ll objections are but the chicaneries of an ill& instructe! reason, hich erroneously thinks to liberate the objects of sense from the formal con!itions of our sensibility, an! re%resents these, although mere %henomena, as things in themsel"es, %resente! as such to our un!erstan!ing# But in this case, no a %riori synthetical cognition of them coul! be %ossible, consequently not through %ure conce%tions of s%ace an! the science hich !etermines these conce%tions, that is to say, geometry, oul! itself be im%ossible# ,# )<TICIP)TI9<7 9: PERCEPTI9<# The %rinci%le of these is( In all %henomena the Real, that hich is an object of sensation, has Intensi"e =uantity, that is, has a *egree# PR99:# Perce%tion is em%irical consciousness, that is to say, a consciousness hich contains an element of sensation# Phenomena as objects of %erce%tion are not %ure, that is, merely formal intuitions, like s%ace an! time, for they cannot be %ercei"e! in themsel"es# /:ootnote( They can be %ercei"e! only as %henomena, an! some %art of them must al ays belong to the non&ego@ hereas %ure intuitions are entirely the %ro!ucts of the min! itself, an! as such are coguiCe! I< T;EA7E'KE7#BTr3 They contain, then, o"er an! abo"e the intuition, the materials for an object Dthrough hich is re%resente! something e?isting in s%ace or timeE, that is to say, they contain the real of sensation, as a re%resentation merely subjecti"e, hich gi"es us merely the consciousness that the subject is affecte!, an! hich e refer to some e?ternal object# <o , a gra!ual transition from em%irical consciousness to %ure consciousness is %ossible, inasmuch as the real in this consciousness entirely "anishes, an! there remains a merely formal consciousness Da %rioriE of the manifol! in time an! s%ace@ consequently there is %ossible a synthesis also of the %ro!uction of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement, that is, from the %ure intuition L - on ar!s u% to a certain quantity of the sensation# <o as sensation in itself is not an objecti"e re%resentation, an! in it is to be foun! neither the intuition of s%ace nor of time, it cannot %ossess any e?tensi"e quantity, an! yet there !oes belong to it a quantity Dan!

that by means of its a%%rehension, in hich em%irical consciousness can ithin a certain time rise from nothing L - u% to its gi"en amountE, consequently an intensi"e quantity# )n! thus e must ascribe intensi"e quantity, that is, a !egree of influence on sense to all objects of %erce%tion, in so far as this %erce%tion contains sensation# )ll cognition, by means of hich I am enable! to cogniCe an! !etermine a %riori hat belongs to em%irical cognition, may be calle! an antici%ation@ an! ithout !oubt this is the sense in hich E%icurus em%loye! his e?%ression %rhole%sis# But as there is in %henomena something hich is ne"er cogniCe! a %riori, hich on this account constitutes the %ro%er !ifference bet een %ure an! em%irical cognition, that is to say, sensation Das the matter of %erce%tionE, it follo s, that sensation is just that element in cognition hich cannot be at all antici%ate!# 9n the other han!, e might "ery ell term the %ure !eterminations in s%ace an! time, as ell in regar! to figure as to quantity, antici%ations of %henomena, because they re%resent a %riori that hich may al ays be gi"en a %osteriori in e?%erience# But su%%ose that in e"ery sensation, as sensation in general, ithout any %articular sensation being thought of, there e?iste! something hich coul! be cogniCe! a %riori, this oul! !eser"e to be calle! antici%ation in a s%ecial senseBs%ecial, because it may seem sur%rising to forestall e?%erience, in that hich concerns the matter of e?%erience, an! hich e can only !eri"e from itself# $et such really is the case here# )%%rehension8, by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment, that is, if I !o not take into consi!eration a succession of many sensations# )s that in the %henomenon, the a%%rehension of hich is not a successi"e synthesis a!"ancing from %arts to an entire re%resentation, sensation has therefore no e?tensi"e quantity@ the ant of sensation in a moment of time oul! re%resent it as em%ty, consequently L -# That hich in the em%irical intuition corres%on!s to sensation is reality Drealitas %haenomenonE@ that hich corres%on!s to the absence of it, negation L -# <o e"ery sensation is ca%able of a !iminution, so that it can !ecrease, an! thus gra!ually !isa%%ear# Therefore, bet een reality in a %henomenon an! negation, there e?ists a continuous concatenation of many %ossible interme!iate sensations, the !ifference of hich from each other is al ays smaller than that bet een the gi"en sensation an! Cero, or com%lete negation# That is to say, the real in a %henomenon has al ays a quantity, hich ho e"er is not !isco"erable in a%%rehension, inasmuch as a%%rehension take %lace by means of mere sensation in one instant, an! not by the successi"e synthesis of many sensations, an! therefore !oes not %rogress from %arts to the hole# Consequently, it has a quantity, but not an e?tensi"e quantity# /8:ootnote( )%%rehension is the Kantian or! for %rece%tion, in the largest sense in hich e em%loy that term# It is the genus hich inclu!es un!er i, as s%ecies, %erce%tion %ro%er an! sensation %ro%erBTr3 <o that quantity hich is a%%rehen!e! only as unity, an! in hich %lurality can be re%resente! only by a%%ro?imation to negation L 9, I term intensi"e quantity# Consequently, reality in a %henomenon has intensi"e quantity, that is, a !egree# If e consi!er this reality as cause Dbe it of sensation or of another reality in the %henomenon,

for e?am%le, a changeE, e call the !egree of reality in its character of cause a momentum, for e?am%le, the momentum of eight@ an! for this reason, that the !egree only in!icates that quantity the a%%rehension of hich is not successi"e, but instantaneous# This, ho e"er, I touch u%on only in %assing, for ith causality I ha"e at %resent nothing to !o# )ccor!ingly, e"ery sensation, consequently e"ery reality in %henomena, ho e"er small it may be, has a !egree, that is, an intensi"e quantity, hich may al ays be lessene!, an! bet een reality an! negation there e?ists a continuous connection of %ossible realities, an! %ossible smaller %erce%tions# E"ery colourBfor e?am%le, re!Bhas a !egree, hich, be it e"er so small, is ne"er the smallest, an! so is it al ays ith heat, the momentum of eight, etc# This %ro%erty of quantities, accor!ing to hich no %art of them is the smallest %ossible Dno %art sim%leE, is calle! their continuity# 7%ace an! time are quanta continua, because no %art of them can be gi"en, ithout enclosing it ithin boun!aries D%oints an! momentsE, consequently, this gi"en %art is itself a s%ace or a time# 7%ace, therefore, consists only of s%aces, an! time of times# Points an! moments are only boun!aries, that is, the mere %laces or %ositions of their limitation# But %laces al ays %resu%%ose intuitions hich are to limit or !etermine them@ an! e cannot concei"e either s%ace or time com%ose! of constituent %arts hich are gi"en before s%ace or time# 7uch quantities may also be calle! flo ing, because synthesis Dof the %ro!ucti"e imaginationE in the %ro!uction of these quantities is a %rogression in time, the continuity of hich e are accustome! to in!icate by the e?%ression flo ing# )ll %henomena, then, are continuous quantities, in res%ect both to intuition an! mere %erce%tion Dsensation, an! ith it realityE# In the former case they are e?tensi"e quantities@ in the latter, intensi"e# >hen the synthesis of the manifol! of a %henomenon is interru%te!, there results merely an aggregate of se"eral %henomena, an! not %ro%erly a %henomenon as a quantity, hich is not %ro!uce! by the mere continuation of the %ro!ucti"e synthesis of a certain kin!, but by the re%etition of a synthesis al ays ceasing# :or e?am%le, if I call thirteen !ollars a sum or quantity of money, I em%loy the term quite correctly, inasmuch as I un!erstan! by thirteen !ollars the "alue of a mark in stan!ar! sil"er, hich is, to be sure, a continuous quantity, in hich no %art is the smallest, but e"ery %art might constitute a %iece of money, hich oul! contain material for still smaller %ieces# If, ho e"er, by the or!s thirteen !ollars I un!erstan! so many coins Dbe their "alue in sil"er hat it mayE, it oul! be quite erroneous to use the e?%ression a quantity of !ollars@ on the contrary, I must call them aggregate, that is, a number of coins# )n! as in e"ery number e must ha"e unity as the foun!ation, so a %henomenon taken as unity is a quantity, an! as such al ays a continuous quantity Dquantum continuumE# <o , seeing all %henomena, hether consi!ere! as e?tensi"e or intensi"e, are continuous quantities, the %ro%osition( G)ll change Dtransition of a thing from one state into anotherE is continuous,G might be %ro"e! here easily, an! ith mathematical e"i!ence, ere it not that the causality of a change lies, entirely beyon! the boun!s of a transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, an! %resu%%oses em%irical %rinci%les# :or of the %ossibility

of a cause hich changes the con!ition of things, that is, hich !etermines them to the contrary to a certain gi"en state, the un!erstan!ing gi"es us a %riori no kno le!ge@ not merely because it has no insight into the %ossibility of it Dfor such insight is absent in se"eral a %riori cognitionsE, but because the notion of change concerns only certain !eterminations of %henomena, hich e?%erience alone can acquaint us ith, hile their cause lies in the unchangeable# But seeing that e ha"e nothing hich e coul! here em%loy but the %ure fun!amental conce%tions of all %ossible e?%erience, among hich of course nothing em%irical can be a!mitte!, e !are not, ithout injuring the unity of our system, antici%ate general %hysical science, hich is built u%on certain fun!amental e?%eriences# <e"ertheless, e are in no ant of %roofs of the great influence hich the %rinci%le abo"e !e"elo%e! e?ercises in the antici%ation of %erce%tions, an! e"en in su%%lying the ant of them, so far as to shiel! us against the false conclusions hich other ise e might rashly !ra # If all reality in %erce%tion has a !egree, bet een hich an! negation there is an en!less sequence of e"er smaller !egrees, an! if, ne"ertheless, e"ery sense must ha"e a !eterminate !egree of rece%ti"ity for sensations@ no %erce%tion, an! consequently no e?%erience is %ossible, hich can %ro"e, either imme!iately or me!iately, an entire absence of all reality in a %henomenon@ in other or!s, it is im%ossible e"er to !ra from e?%erience a %roof of the e?istence of em%ty s%ace or of em%ty time# :or in the first %lace, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of %erce%tion@ secon!ly, such absence cannot be !e!uce! from the contem%lation of any single %henomenon, an! the !ifference of the !egrees in its reality@ nor ought it e"er to be a!mitte! in e?%lanation of any %henomenon# :or if e"en the com%lete intuition of a !eterminate s%ace or time is thoroughly real, that is, if no %art thereof is em%ty, yet because e"ery reality has its !egree, hich, ith the e?tensi"e quantity of the %henomenon unchange!, can !iminish through en!less gra!ations !o n to nothing Dthe "oi!E, there must be infinitely gra!uate! !egrees, ith hich s%ace or time is fille!, an! the intensi"e quantity in !ifferent %henomena may be smaller or greater, although the e?tensi"e quantity of the intuition remains equal an! unaltere!# >e shall gi"e an e?am%le of this# )lmost all natural %hiloso%hers, remarking a great !ifference in the quantity of the matter of !ifferent kin!s in bo!ies ith the same "olume D%artly on account of the momentum of gra"ity or eight, %artly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bo!ies in motionE, conclu!e unanimously that this "olume De?tensi"e quantity of the %henomenonE must be "oi! in all bo!ies, although in !ifferent %ro%ortion# But ho oul! sus%ect that these for the most %art mathematical an! mechanical inquirers into nature shoul! groun! this conclusion solely on a meta%hysical hy%othesisBa sort of hy%othesis hich they %rofess to !is%arage an! a"oi!H $et this they !o, in assuming that the real in s%ace DI must not here call it im%enetrability or eight, because these are em%irical conce%tionsE is al ays i!entical, an! can only be !istinguishe! accor!ing to its e?tensi"e quantity, that is, multi%licity# <o to this %resu%%osition, for hich they can ha"e no groun! in e?%erience, an! hich consequently is merely meta%hysical, I o%%ose a transcen!ental !emonstration, hich it is true ill not e?%lain the !ifference in the filling u% of s%aces, but hich ne"ertheless

com%letely !oes a ay ith the su%%ose! necessity of the abo"e&mentione! %resu%%osition that e cannot e?%lain the sai! !ifference other ise than by the hy%othesis of em%ty s%aces# This !emonstration, moreo"er, has the merit of setting the un!erstan!ing at liberty to concei"e this !istinction in a !ifferent manner, if the e?%lanation of the fact requires any such hy%othesis# :or e %ercei"e that although t o equal s%aces may be com%letely fille! by matters altogether !ifferent, so that in neither of them is there left a single %oint herein matter is not %resent, ne"ertheless, e"ery reality has its !egree Dof resistance or of eightE, hich, ithout !iminution of the e?tensi"e quantity, can become less an! less a! infinitum, before it %asses into nothingness an! !isa%%ears# Thus an e?%ansion hich fills a s%aceBfor e?am%le, caloric, or any other reality in the %henomenal orl!Bcan !ecrease in its !egrees to infinity, yet ithout lea"ing the smallest %art of the s%ace em%ty@ on the contrary, filling it ith those lesser !egrees as com%letely as another %henomenon coul! ith greater# Ay intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really the case ith the !ifference of matters, in regar! to their s%ecific gra"ity@ I ish only to %ro"e, from a %rinci%le of the %ure un!erstan!ing, that the nature of our %erce%tions makes such a mo!e of e?%lanation %ossible, an! that it is erroneous to regar! the real in a %henomenon as equal quoa! its !egree, an! !ifferent only quoa! its aggregation an! e?tensi"e quantity, an! this, too, on the %reten!e! authority of an a %riori %rinci%le of the un!erstan!ing# <e"ertheless, this %rinci%le of the antici%ation of %erce%tion must some hat startle an inquirer hom initiation into transcen!ental %hiloso%hy has ren!ere! cautious# >e must naturally entertain some !oubt hether or not the un!erstan!ing can enounce any such synthetical %ro%osition as that res%ecting the !egree of all reality in %henomena, an! consequently the %ossibility of the internal !ifference of sensation itselfB abstraction being ma!e of its em%irical quality# Thus it is a question not un orthy of solution( G;o the un!erstan!ing can %ronounce synthetically an! a %riori res%ecting %henomena, an! thus antici%ate these, e"en in that hich is %eculiarly an! merely em%irical, that, namely, hich concerns sensation itselfHG The quality of sensation is in all cases merely em%irical, an! cannot be re%resente! a %riori Dfor e?am%le, colours, taste, etc#E# But the realBthat hich corres%on!s to sensationBin o%%osition to negation L -, only re%resents something the conce%tion of hich in itself contains a being Dein seynE, an! signifies nothing but the synthesis in an em%irical consciousness# That is to say, the em%irical consciousness in the internal sense can be raise! from - to e"ery higher !egree, so that the "ery same e?tensi"e quantity of intuition, an illuminate! surface, for e?am%le, e?cites as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illuminate!# >e can therefore make com%lete abstraction of the e?tensi"e quantity of a %henomenon, an! re%resent to oursel"es in the mere sensation in a certain momentum, a synthesis of homogeneous ascension from u% to the gi"en em%irical consciousness, )ll sensations therefore as such are gi"en only a %osteriori, but this %ro%erty thereof, namely, that they ha"e a !egree, can be kno n a %riori# It is orthy of remark, that in res%ect to quantities in general, e can cogniCe a %riori only a single quality, namely, continuity@ but in res%ect to all quality Dthe real in %henomenaE, e cannot cogniCe a %riori anything more than the intensi"e quantity thereof, namely, that they ha"e a !egree# )ll else is left to e?%erience#

.# )<)'9GIE7 9: EMPERIE<CE# The %rinci%le of these is( E?%erience is %ossible only through the re%resentation of a necessary connection of Perce%tions# PR99:# E?%erience is an em%irical cognition@ that is to say, a cognition hich !etermines an object by means of %erce%tions# It is therefore a synthesis of %erce%tions, a synthesis hich is not itself containe! in %erce%tion, but hich contains the synthetical unity of the manifol! of %erce%tion in a consciousness@ an! this unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses, that is, of e?%erience Dnot merely of intuition or sensationE# <o in e?%erience our %erce%tions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connection a%%ears, or can a%%ear from the %erce%tions themsel"es, because a%%rehension is only a %lacing together of the manifol! of em%irical intuition, an! no re%resentation of a necessity in the connecte! e?istence of the %henomena hich a%%rehension brings together, is to be !isco"ere! therein# But as e?%erience is a cognition of objects by means of %erce%tions, it follo s that the relation of the e?istence of the e?istence of the manifol! must be re%resente! in e?%erience not as it is %ut together in time, but as it is objecti"ely in time# )n! as time itself cannot be %ercei"e!, the !etermination of the e?istence of objects in time can only take %lace by means of their connection in time in general, consequently only by means of a %riori connecting conce%tions# <o as these conce%tions al ays %ossess the character of necessity, e?%erience is %ossible only by means of a re%resentation of the necessary connection of %erce%tion# The three mo!i of time are %ermanence, succession, an! coe?istence# )ccor!ingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in %henomena, accor!ing to hich the e?istence of e"ery %henomenon is !etermine! in res%ect of the unity of all time, an! these antece!e all e?%erience an! ren!er it %ossible# The general %rinci%le of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of a%%erce%tion in relation to all %ossible em%irical consciousness D%erce%tionE at e"ery time, consequently, as this unity lies a %riori at the foun!ation of all mental o%erations, the %rinci%le rests on the synthetical unity of all %henomena accor!ing to their relation in time# :or the original a%%erce%tion relates to our internal sense Dthe com%le? of all re%resentationsE, an! in!ee! relates a %riori to its form, that is to say, the relation of the manifol! em%irical consciousness in time# <o this manifol! must be combine! in original a%%erce%tion accor!ing to relations of timeBa necessity im%ose! by the a %riori transcen!ental unity of a%%erce%tion, to hich is subjecte! all that can belong to my Di#e#, my o nE cognition, an! therefore all that can become an object for me# This synthetical an! a %riori !etermine! unity in relation of %erce%tions in time is therefore the rule( G)ll em%irical !eterminations of time must be subject to rules of the general !etermination of timeG@ an! the analogies of e?%erience, of hich e are no about to treat, must be rules of this nature#

These %rinci%les ha"e this %eculiarity, that they !o not concern %henomena, an! the synthesis of the em%irical intuition thereof, but merely the e?istence of %henomena an! their relation to each other in regar! to this e?istence# <o the mo!e in hich e a%%rehen! a thing in a %henomenon can be !etermine! a %riori in such a manner that the rule of its synthesis can gi"e, that is to say, can %ro!uce this a %riori intuition in e"ery em%irical e?am%le# But the e?istence of %henomena cannot be kno n a %riori, an! although e coul! arri"e by this %ath at a conclusion of the fact of some e?istence, e coul! not cogniCe that e?istence !eterminately, that is to say, e shoul! be inca%able of antici%ating in hat res%ect the em%irical intuition of it oul! be !istinguishable from that of others# The t o %rinci%les abo"e mentione!, hich I calle! mathematical, in consi!eration of the fact of their authoriCing the a%%lication of mathematic %henomena, relate to these %henomena only in regar! to their %ossibility, an! instruct us ho %henomena, as far as regar!s their intuition or the real in their %erce%tion, can be generate! accor!ing to the rules of a mathematical synthesis# Consequently, numerical quantities, an! ith them the !etermination of a %henomenon as a quantity, can be em%loye! in the one case as ell as in the other# Thus, for e?am%le, out of ,--,--- illuminations by the moon, I might com%ose an! gi"e a %riori, that is construct, the !egree of our sensations of the sun&light#8 >e may therefore entitle these t o %rinci%les constituti"e# /8:ootnote( KantFs meaning is( The t o %rinci%les enunciate! un!er the hea!s of G)?ioms of Intuition,G an! G)ntici%ations of Perce%tion,G authoriCe the a%%lication to %henomena of !eterminations of siCe an! number, that is of mathematic# :or e?am%le, I may com%ute the light of the sun, an! say that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon# In the same ay, heat is measure! by the com%arison of its !ifferent effects on ater, Qc#, an! on mercury in a thermometer#BTr3 The case is "ery !ifferent ith those %rinci%les hose %ro"ince it is to subject the e?istence of %henomena to rules a %riori# :or as e?istence !oes not a!mit of being constructe!, it is clear that they must only concern the relations of e?istence an! be merely regulati"e %rinci%les# In this case, therefore, neither a?ioms nor antici%ations are to be thought of# Thus, if a %erce%tion is gi"en us, in a certain relation of time to other Dalthough un!etermine!E %erce%tions, e cannot then say a %riori, hat an! ho great Din quantityE the other %erce%tion necessarily connecte! ith the former is, but only ho it is connecte!, quoa! its e?istence, in this gi"en mo!us of time# )nalogies in %hiloso%hy mean something "ery !ifferent from that hich they re%resent in mathematics# In the latter they are formulae, hich enounce the equality of t o relations of quantity, an! are al ays constituti"e, so that if t o terms of the %ro%ortion are gi"en, the thir! is also gi"en, that is, can be constructe! by the ai! of these formulae# But in %hiloso%hy, analogy is not the equality of t o quantitati"e but of t o qualitati"e relations# In this case, from three gi"en terms, I can gi"e a %riori an! cogniCe the relation to a fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although I certainly %ossess a rule to gui!e me in the search for this fourth term in e?%erience, an! a mark to assist me in !isco"ering it# )n analogy of e?%erience is therefore only a rule accor!ing to hich

unity of e?%erience must arise out of %erce%tions in res%ect to objects D%henomenaE not as a constituti"e, but merely as a regulati"e %rinci%le# The same hol!s goo! also of the %ostulates of em%irical thought in general, hich relate to the synthesis of mere intuition D hich concerns the form of %henomenaE, the synthesis of %erce%tion D hich concerns the matter of %henomenaE, an! the synthesis of e?%erience D hich concerns the relation of these %erce%tionsE# :or they are only regulati"e %rinci%les, an! clearly !istinguishable from the mathematical, hich are constituti"e, not in!ee! in regar! to the certainty hich both %ossess a %riori, but in the mo!e of e"i!ence thereof, consequently also in the manner of !emonstration# But hat has been obser"e! of all synthetical %ro%ositions, an! must be %articularly remarke! in this %lace, is this, that these analogies %ossess significance an! "ali!ity, not as %rinci%les of the transcen!ental, but only as %rinci%les of the em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, an! their truth can therefore be %ro"e! only as such, an! that consequently the %henomena must not be subjoine! !irectly un!er the categories, but only un!er their schemata# :or if the objects to hich those %rinci%les must be a%%lie! ere things in themsel"es, it oul! be quite im%ossible to cogniCe aught concerning them synthetically a %riori# But they are nothing but %henomena@ a com%lete kno le!ge of hichBa kno le!ge to hich all %rinci%les a %riori must at last relateBis the only %ossible e?%erience# It follo s that these %rinci%les can ha"e nothing else for their aim than the con!itions of the em%irical cognition in the unity of synthesis of %henomena# But this synthesis is cogitate! only in the schema of the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, of hose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function unrestricte! by any sensuous con!ition# These %rinci%les ill therefore authoriCe us to connect %henomena accor!ing to an analogy, ith the logical an! uni"ersal unity of conce%tions, an! consequently to em%loy the categories in the %rinci%les themsel"es@ but in the a%%lication of them to e?%erience, e shall use only their schemata, as the key to their %ro%er a%%lication, instea! of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting con!itions, un!er the title of GformulaeG of the former# )# :IR7T )<)'9G$# Princi%le of the Permanence of 7ubstance# In all changes of %henomena, substance is %ermanent, an! the quantum thereof in nature is neither increase! nor !iminishe!# PR99:# )ll %henomena e?ist in time, herein alone as substratum, that is, as the %ermanent form of the internal intuition, coe?istence an! succession can be re%resente!# Consequently time, in hich all changes of %henomena must be cogitate!, remains an! changes not, because it is that in hich succession an! coe?istence can be re%resente! only as !eterminations thereof# <o , time in itself cannot be an object of %erce%tion# It follo s that in objects of %erce%tion, that is, in %henomena, there must be foun! a substratum hich re%resents time in general, an! in hich all change or coe?istence can be %ercei"e! by means of the relation of %henomena to it# But the substratum of all

reality, that is, of all that %ertains to the e?istence of things, is substance@ all that %ertains to e?istence can be cogitate! only as a !etermination of substance# Consequently, the %ermanent, in relation to hich alone can all relations of time in %henomena be !etermine!, is substance in the orl! of %henomena, that is, the real in %henomena, that hich, as the substratum of all change, remains e"er the same# )ccor!ingly, as this cannot change in e?istence, its quantity in nature can neither be increase! nor !iminishe!# 9ur a%%rehension of the manifol! in a %henomenon is al ays successi"e, is Consequently al ays changing# By it alone e coul!, therefore, ne"er !etermine hether this manifol!, as an object of e?%erience, is coe?istent or successi"e, unless it ha! for a foun!ation something fi?e! an! %ermanent, of the e?istence of hich all succession an! coe?istence are nothing but so many mo!es Dmo!i of timeE# 9nly in the %ermanent, then, are relations of time %ossible Dfor simultaneity an! succession are the only relations in timeE@ that is to say, the %ermanent is the substratum of our em%irical re%resentation of time itself, in hich alone all !etermination of time is %ossible# Permanence is, in fact, just another e?%ression for time, as the abi!ing correlate of all e?istence of %henomena, an! of all change, an! of all coe?istence# :or change !oes not affect time itself, but only the %henomena in time Djust as coe?istence cannot be regar!e! as a mo!us of time itself, seeing that in time no %arts are coe?istent, but all successi"eE# If e ere to attribute succession to time itself, e shoul! be oblige! to cogitate another time, in hich this succession oul! be %ossible# It is only by means of the %ermanent that e?istence in !ifferent %arts of the successi"e series of time recei"es a quantity, hich e entitle !uration# :or in mere succession, e?istence is %er%etually "anishing an! recommencing, an! therefore ne"er has e"en the least quantity# >ithout the %ermanent, then, no relation in time is %ossible# <o , time in itself is not an object of %erce%tion@ consequently the %ermanent in %henomena must be regar!e! as the substratum of all !etermination of time, an! consequently also as the con!ition of the %ossibility of all synthetical unity of %erce%tions, that is, of e?%erience@ an! all e?istence an! all change in time can only be regar!e! as a mo!e in the e?istence of that hich abi!es unchangeably# Therefore, in all %henomena, the %ermanent is the object in itself, that is, the substance D%henomenonE@ but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mo!e of the e?istence of this substance or substances, consequently to its !eterminations# I fin! that in all ages not only the %hiloso%her, but e"en the common un!erstan!ing, has %re%osite! this %ermanence as a substratum of all change in %henomena@ in!ee!, I am com%elle! to belie"e that they ill al ays acce%t this as an in!ubitable fact# 9nly the %hiloso%her e?%resses himself in a more %recise an! !efinite manner, hen he says( GIn all changes in the orl!, the substance remains, an! the acci!ents alone are changeable#G But of this !eci!e!ly synthetical %ro%osition, I no here meet ith e"en an attem%t at %roof@ nay, it "ery rarely has the goo! fortune to stan!, as it !eser"es to !o, at the hea! of the %ure an! entirely a %riori la s of nature# In truth, the statement that substance is %ermanent, is tautological# :or this "ery %ermanence is the groun! on hich e a%%ly the category of substance to the %henomenon@ an! e shoul! ha"e been oblige! to %ro"e that in all %henomena there is something %ermanent, of the e?istence of hich the changeable is nothing but a !etermination# But because a %roof of this nature

cannot be !ogmatical, that is, cannot be !ra n from conce%tions, inasmuch as it concerns a synthetical %ro%osition a %riori, an! as %hiloso%hers ne"er reflecte! that such %ro%ositions are "ali! only in relation to %ossible e?%erience, an! therefore cannot be %ro"e! e?ce%t by means of a !e!uction of the %ossibility of e?%erience, it is no on!er that hile it has ser"e! as the foun!ation of all e?%erience Dfor e feel the nee! of it in em%irical cognitionE, it has ne"er been su%%orte! by %roof# ) %hiloso%her as aske!( G>hat is the eight of smokeHG ;e ans ere!( G7ubtract from the eight of the burnt oo! the eight of the remaining ashes, an! you ill ha"e the eight of the smoke#G Thus he %resume! it to be incontro"ertible that e"en in fire the matter DsubstanceE !oes not %erish, but that only the form of it un!ergoes a change# In like manner as the saying( G:rom nothing comes nothing,G only another inference from the %rinci%le or %ermanence, or rather of the e"er&abi!ing e?istence of the true subject in %henomena# :or if that in the %henomenon hich e call substance is to be the %ro%er substratum of all !etermination of time, it follo s that all e?istence in %ast as ell as in future time, must be !eterminable by means of it alone# ;ence e are entitle! to a%%ly the term substance to a %henomenon, only because e su%%ose its e?istence in all time, a notion hich the or! %ermanence !oes not fully e?%ress, as it seems rather to be referable to future time# ;o e"er, the internal necessity %er%etually to be, is inse%arably connecte! ith the necessity al ays to ha"e been, an! so the e?%ression may stan! as it is# GGigni !e nihilo nihil@ in nihilum nil %osse re"erti,G8 are t o %ro%ositions hich the ancients ne"er %arte!, an! hich %eo%le no a!ays sometimes mistakenly !isjoin, because they imagine that the %ro%ositions a%%ly to objects as things in themsel"es, an! that the former might be inimical to the !e%en!ence De"en in res%ect of its substance alsoE of the orl! u%on a su%reme cause# But this a%%rehension is entirely nee!less, for the question in this case is only of %henomena in the s%here of e?%erience, the unity of hich ne"er coul! be %ossible, if e a!mitte! the %ossibility that ne things Din res%ect of their substanceE shoul! arise# :or in that case, e shoul! lose altogether that hich alone can re%resent the unity of time, to it, the i!entity of the substratum, as that through hich alone all change %ossesses com%lete an! thorough unity# This %ermanence is, ho e"er, nothing but the manner in hich e re%resent to oursel"es the e?istence of things in the %henomenal orl!# /8:ootnote( Persius, 7atirae, iii#2.&21#3 The !eterminations of a substance, hich are only %articular mo!es of its e?istence, are calle! acci!ents# They are al ays real, because they concern the e?istence of substance Dnegations are only !eterminations, hich e?%ress the non&e?istence of something in the substanceE# <o , if to this real in the substance e ascribe a %articular e?istence Dfor e?am%le, to motion as an acci!ent of matterE, this e?istence is calle! inherence, in contra!istinction to the e?istence of substance, hich e call subsistence# But hence arise many misconce%tions, an! it oul! be a more accurate an! just mo!e of e?%ression to !esignate the acci!ent only as the mo!e in hich the e?istence of a substance is %ositi"ely !etermine!# Aean hile, by reason of the con!itions of the logical e?ercise of our un!erstan!ing, it is im%ossible to a"oi! se%arating, as it ere, that hich in the e?istence of a substance is subject to change, hilst the substance remains, an! regar!ing it in relation to that hich is %ro%erly %ermanent an! ra!ical# 9n this account,

this category of substance stan!s un!er the title of relation, rather because it is the con!ition thereof than because it contains in itself any relation# <o , u%on this notion of %ermanence rests the %ro%er notion of the conce%tion change# 9rigin an! e?tinction are not changes of that hich originates or becomes e?tinct# Change is but a mo!e of e?istence, hich follo s on another mo!e of e?istence of the same object@ hence all that changes is %ermanent, an! only the con!ition thereof changes# <o since this mutation affects only !eterminations, hich can ha"e a beginning or an en!, e may say, em%loying an e?%ression hich seems some hat %ara!o?ical( G9nly the %ermanent DsubstanceE is subject to change@ the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that is, hen certain !eterminations cease, others begin#G Change, hen, cannot be %ercei"e! by us e?ce%t in substances, an! origin or e?tinction in an absolute sense, that !oes not concern merely a !etermination of the %ermanent, cannot be a %ossible %erce%tion, for it is this "ery notion of the %ermanent hich ren!ers %ossible the re%resentation of a transition from one state into another, an! from non&being to being, hich, consequently, can be em%irically cogniCe! only as alternating !eterminations of that hich is %ermanent# Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be@ e must then ha"e a %oint of time in hich it as not# But ho an! by hat can e fi? an! !etermine this %oint of time, unless by that hich alrea!y e?istsH :or a "oi! timeB %rece!ingBis not an object of %erce%tion@ but if e connect this beginning ith objects hich e?iste! %re"iously, an! hich continue to e?ist till the object in question in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a !etermination of the former as the %ermanent# The same hol!s goo! of the notion of e?tinction, for this %resu%%oses the em%irical re%resentation of a time, in hich a %henomenon no longer e?ists# 7ubstances Din the orl! of %henomenaE are the substratum of all !eterminations of time# The beginning of some, an! the ceasing to be of other substances, oul! utterly !o a ay ith the only con!ition of the em%irical unity of time@ an! in that case %henomena oul! relate to t o !ifferent times, in hich, si!e by si!e, e?istence oul! %ass@ hich is absur!# :or there is only one time in hich all !ifferent times must be %lace!, not as coe?istent, but as successi"e# )ccor!ingly, %ermanence is a necessary con!ition un!er hich alone %henomena, as things or objects, are !eterminable in a %ossible e?%erience# But as regar!s the em%irical criterion of this necessary %ermanence, an! ith it of the substantiality of %henomena, e shall fin! sufficient o%%ortunity to s%eak in the sequel# B# 7EC9<* )<)'9G$# Princi%le of the 7uccession of Time )ccor!ing to the 'a of Causality# )ll changes take %lace accor!ing to the la of the connection of Cause an! Effect# PR99:#

DThat all %henomena in the succession of time are only changes, that is, a successi"e being an! non&being of the !eterminations of substance, hich is %ermanent@ consequently that a being of substance itself hich follo s on the non&being thereof, or a non&being of substance hich follo s on the being thereof, in other or!s, that the origin or e?tinction of substance itself, is im%ossibleBall this has been fully establishe! in treating of the foregoing %rinci%le# This %rinci%le might ha"e been e?%resse! as follo s( G)ll alteration DsuccessionE of %henomena is merely changeG@ for the changes of substance are not origin or e?tinction, because the conce%tion of change %resu%%oses the same subject as e?isting ith t o o%%osite !eterminations, an! consequently as %ermanent# )fter this %remonition, e shall %rocee! to the %roof#E I %ercei"e that %henomena succee! one another, that is to say, a state of things e?ists at one time, the o%%osite of hich e?iste! in a former state# In this case, then, I really connect together t o %erce%tions in time# <o connection is not an o%eration of mere sense an! intuition, but is the %ro!uct of a synthetical faculty of imagination, hich !etermines the internal sense in res%ect of a relation of time# But imagination can connect these t o states in t o ays, so that either the one or the other may antece!e in time@ for time in itself cannot be an object of %erce%tion, an! hat in an object %rece!es an! hat follo s cannot be em%irically !etermine! in relation to it# I am only conscious, then, that my imagination %laces one state before an! the other after@ not that the one state antece!es the other in the object# In other or!s, the objecti"e relation of the successi"e %henomena remains quite un!etermine! by means of mere %erce%tion# <o in or!er that this relation may be cogniCe! as !etermine!, the relation bet een the t o states must be so cogitate! that it is thereby !etermine! as necessary, hich of them must be %lace! before an! hich after, an! not con"ersely# But the conce%tion hich carries ith it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing hich !oes not lie in mere %erce%tion@ an! in this case it is the conce%tion of Gthe relation of cause an! effect,G the former of hich !etermines the latter in time, as its necessary consequence, an! not as something hich might %ossibly antece!e Dor hich might in some cases not be %ercei"e! to follo E# It follo s that it is only because e subject the sequence of %henomena, an! consequently all change, to the la of causality, that e?%erience itself, that is, em%irical cognition of %henomena, becomes %ossible@ an! consequently, that %henomena themsel"es, as objects of e?%erience, are %ossible only by "irtue of this la # 9ur a%%rehension of the manifol! of %henomena is al ays successi"e# The re%resentations of %arts succee! one another# >hether they succee! one another in the object also, is a secon! %oint for reflection, hich as not containe! in the former# <o e may certainly gi"e the name of object to e"erything, e"en to e"ery re%resentation, so far as e are conscious thereof@ but hat this or! may mean in the case of %henomena, not merely in so far as they Das re%resentationsE are objects, but only in so far as they in!icate an object, is a question requiring !ee%er consi!eration# In so far as they, regar!e! merely as re%resentations, are at the same time objects of consciousness, they are not to be !istinguishe! from a%%rehension, that is, rece%tion into the synthesis of imagination, an! e must therefore say( GThe manifol! of %henomena is al ays %ro!uce! successi"ely in the min!#G If %henomena ere things in themsel"es, no man oul! be able to conjecture from the succession of our re%resentations ho this

manifol! is connecte! in the object@ for e ha"e to !o only ith our re%resentations# ;o things may be in themsel"es, ithout regar! to the re%resentations through hich they affect us, is utterly beyon! the s%here of our cognition# <o although %henomena are not things in themsel"es, an! are ne"ertheless the only thing gi"en to us to be cogniCe!, it is my !uty to sho hat sort of connection in time belongs to the manifol! in %henomena themsel"es, hile the re%resentation of this manifol! in a%%rehension is al ays successi"e# :or e?am%le, the a%%rehension of the manifol! in the %henomenon of a house hich stan!s before me, is successi"e# <o comes the question hether the manifol! of this house is in itself successi"eB hich no one ill be at all illing to grant# But, so soon as I raise my conce%tion of an object to the transcen!ental signification thereof, I fin! that the house is not a thing in itself, but only a %henomenon, that is, a re%resentation, the transcen!ental object of hich remains utterly unkno n# >hat then am I to un!erstan! by the question( G;o can the manifol! be connecte! in the %henomenon itselfBnot consi!ere! as a thing in itself, but merely as a %henomenonHG ;ere that hich lies in my successi"e a%%rehension is regar!e! as re%resentation, hilst the %henomenon hich is gi"en me, not ithstan!ing that it is nothing more than a com%le? of these re%resentations, is regar!e! as the object thereof, ith hich my conce%tion, !ra n from the re%resentations of a%%rehension, must harmoniCe# It is "ery soon seen that, as accor!ance of the cognition ith its object constitutes truth, the question no before us can only relate to the formal con!itions of em%irical truth@ an! that the %henomenon, in o%%osition to the re%resentations of a%%rehension, can only be !istinguishe! therefrom as the object of them, if it is subject to a rule hich !istinguishes it from e"ery other a%%rehension, an! hich ren!ers necessary a mo!e of connection of the manifol!# That in the %henomenon hich contains the con!ition of this necessary rule of a%%rehension, is the object# 'et us no %rocee! to our task# That something ha%%ens, that is to say, that something or some state e?ists hich before as not, cannot be em%irically %ercei"e!, unless a %henomenon %rece!es, hich !oes not contain in itself this state# :or a reality hich shoul! follo u%on a "oi! time, in other or!s, a beginning, hich no state of things %rece!es, can just as little be a%%rehen!e! as the "oi! time itself# E"ery a%%rehension of an e"ent is therefore a %erce%tion hich follo s u%on another %erce%tion# But as this is the case ith all synthesis of a%%rehension, as I ha"e sho n abo"e in the e?am%le of a house, my a%%rehension of an e"ent is not yet sufficiently !istinguishe! from other a%%rehensions# But I remark also that if in a %henomenon hich contains an occurrence, I call the antece!ent state of my %erce%tion, ), an! the follo ing state, B, the %erce%tion B can only follo ) in a%%rehension, an! the %erce%tion ) cannot follo B, but only %rece!e it# :or e?am%le, I see a shi% float !o n the stream of a ri"er# Ay %erce%tion of its %lace lo er !o n follo s u%on my %erce%tion of its %lace higher u% the course of the ri"er, an! it is im%ossible that, in the a%%rehension of this %henomenon, the "essel shoul! be %ercei"e! first belo an! after ar!s higher u% the stream# ;ere, therefore, the or!er in the sequence of %erce%tions in a%%rehension is !etermine!@ an! by this or!er a%%rehension is regulate!# In the former e?am%le, my %erce%tions in the a%%rehension of a house might begin at the roof an! en! at the foun!ation, or "ice "ersa@ or I might a%%rehen! the manifol! in this em%irical intuition, by going from left to right, an! from right to left# )ccor!ingly, in the series of these %erce%tions, there as no !etermine! or!er, hich necessitate! my beginning at a certain %oint, in or!er

em%irically to connect the manifol!# But this rule is al ays to be met ith in the %erce%tion of that hich ha%%ens, an! it makes the or!er of the successi"e %erce%tions in the a%%rehension of such a %henomenon necessary# I must, therefore, in the %resent case, !e!uce the subjecti"e sequence of a%%rehension from the objecti"e sequence of %henomena, for other ise the former is quite un!etermine!, an! one %henomenon is not !istinguishable from another# The former alone %ro"es nothing as to the connection of the manifol! in an object, for it is quite arbitrary# The latter must consist in the or!er of the manifol! in a %henomenon, accor!ing to hich or!er the a%%rehension of one thing Dthat hich ha%%ensE follo s that of another thing D hich %rece!esE, in conformity ith a rule# In this ay alone can I be authoriCe! to say of the %henomenon itself, an! not merely of my o n a%%rehension, that a certain or!er or sequence is to be foun! therein# That is, in other or!s, I cannot arrange my a%%rehension other ise than in this or!er# In conformity ith this rule, then, it is necessary that in that hich antece!es an e"ent there be foun! the con!ition of a rule, accor!ing to hich in this e"ent follo s al ays an! necessarily@ but I cannot re"erse this an! go back from the e"ent, an! !etermine Dby a%%rehensionE that hich antece!es it# :or no %henomenon goes back from the succee!ing %oint of time to the %rece!ing %oint, although it !oes certainly relate to a %rece!ing %oint of time@ from a gi"en time, on the other han!, there is al ays a necessary %rogression to the !etermine! succee!ing time# Therefore, because there certainly is something that follo s, I must of necessity connect it ith something else, hich antece!es, an! u%on hich it follo s, in conformity ith a rule, that is necessarily, so that the e"ent, as con!itione!, affor!s certain in!ication of a con!ition, an! this con!ition !etermines the e"ent# 'et us su%%ose that nothing %rece!es an e"ent, u%on hich this e"ent must follo in conformity ith a rule# )ll sequence of %erce%tion oul! then e?ist only in a%%rehension, that is to say, oul! be merely subjecti"e, an! it coul! not thereby be objecti"ely !etermine! hat thing ought to %rece!e, an! hat ought to follo in %erce%tion# In such a case, e shoul! ha"e nothing but a %lay of re%resentations, hich oul! %ossess no a%%lication to any object# That is to say, it oul! not be %ossible through %erce%tion to !istinguish one %henomenon from another, as regar!s relations of time@ because the succession in the act of a%%rehension oul! al ays be of the same sort, an! therefore there oul! be nothing in the %henomenon to !etermine the succession, an! to ren!er a certain sequence objecti"ely necessary# )n!, in this case, I cannot say that t o states in a %henomenon follo one u%on the other, but only that one a%%rehension follo s u%on another# But this is merely subjecti"e, an! !oes not !etermine an object, an! consequently cannot be hel! to be cognition of an objectBnot e"en in the %henomenal orl!# )ccor!ingly, hen e kno in e?%erience that something ha%%ens, e al ays %resu%%ose that something %rece!es, hereu%on it follo s in conformity ith a rule# :or other ise I coul! not say of the object that it follo s@ because the mere succession in my a%%rehension, if it be not !etermine! by a rule in relation to something %rece!ing, !oes not authoriCe succession in the object# 9nly, therefore, in reference to a rule,

accor!ing to hich %henomena are !etermine! in their sequence, that is, as they ha%%en, by the %rece!ing state, can I make my subjecti"e synthesis Dof a%%rehensionE objecti"e, an! it is only un!er this %resu%%osition that e"en the e?%erience of an e"ent is %ossible# <o !oubt it a%%ears as if this ere in thorough contra!iction to all the notions hich %eo%le ha"e hitherto entertaine! in regar! to the %roce!ure of the human un!erstan!ing# )ccor!ing to these o%inions, it is by means of the %erce%tion an! com%arison of similar consequences follo ing u%on certain antece!ent %henomena that the un!erstan!ing is le! to the !isco"ery of a rule, accor!ing to hich certain e"ents al ays follo certain %henomena, an! it is only by this %rocess that e attain to the conce%tion of cause# 4%on such a basis, it is clear that this conce%tion must be merely em%irical, an! the rule hich it furnishes us ithBGE"erything that ha%%ens must ha"e a causeGB oul! be just as contingent as e?%erience itself# The uni"ersality an! necessity of the rule or la oul! be %erfectly s%urious attributes of it# In!ee!, it coul! not %ossess uni"ersal "ali!ity, inasmuch as it oul! not in this case be a %riori, but foun!e! on !e!uction# But the same is the case ith this la as ith other %ure a %riori re%resentations De#g#, s%ace an! timeE, hich e can !ra in %erfect clearness an! com%leteness from e?%erience, only because e ha! alrea!y %lace! them therein, an! by that means, an! by that alone, ha! ren!ere! e?%erience %ossible# In!ee!, the logical clearness of this re%resentation of a rule, !etermining the series of e"ents, is %ossible only hen e ha"e ma!e use thereof in e?%erience# <e"ertheless, the recognition of this rule, as a con!ition of the synthetical unity of %henomena in time, as the groun! of e?%erience itself an! consequently %rece!e! it a %riori# It is no our !uty to sho by an e?am%le that e ne"er, e"en in e?%erience, attribute to an object the notion of succession or effect Dof an e"entBthat is, the ha%%ening of something that !i! not e?ist beforeE, an! !istinguish it from the subjecti"e succession of a%%rehension, unless hen a rule lies at the foun!ation, hich com%els us to obser"e this or!er of %erce%tion in %reference to any other, an! that, in!ee!, it is this necessity hich first ren!ers %ossible the re%resentation of a succession in the object# >e ha"e re%resentations ithin us, of hich also e can be conscious# But, ho e"er i!ely e?ten!e!, ho e"er accurate an! thoroughgoing this consciousness may be, these re%resentations are still nothing more than re%resentations, that is, internal !eterminations of the min! in this or that relation of time# <o ho ha%%ens it that to these re%resentations e shoul! set an object, or that, in a!!ition to their subjecti"e reality, as mo!ifications, e shoul! still further attribute to them a certain unkno n objecti"e realityH It is clear that objecti"e significancy cannot consist in a relation to another re%resentation Dof that hich e !esire to term objectE, for in that case the question again arises( G;o !oes this other re%resentation go out of itself, an! obtain objecti"e significancy o"er an! abo"e the subjecti"e, hich is %ro%er to it, as a !etermination of a state of min!HG If e try to !isco"er hat sort of ne %ro%erty the relation to an object gi"es to our subjecti"e re%resentations, an! hat ne im%ortance they thereby recei"e, e shall fin! that this relation has no other effect than that of ren!ering necessary the connection of our re%resentations in a certain manner, an! of subjecting them to a rule@ an! that con"ersely, it is only because a certain or!er is

necessary in the relations of time of our re%resentations, that objecti"e significancy is ascribe! to them# In the synthesis of %henomena, the manifol! of our re%resentations is al ays successi"e# <o hereby is not re%resente! an object, for by means of this succession, hich is common to all a%%rehension, no one thing is !istinguishe! from another# But so soon as I %ercei"e or assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state antece!ent, from hich the re%resentation follo s in accor!ance ith a rule, so soon !o I re%resent something as an e"ent, or as a thing that ha%%ens@ in other or!s, I cogniCe an object to hich I must assign a certain !eterminate %osition in time, hich cannot be altere!, because of the %rece!ing state in the object# >hen, therefore, I %ercei"e that something ha%%ens, there is containe! in this re%resentation, in the first %lace, the fact, that something antece!es@ because, it is only in relation to this that the %henomenon obtains its %ro%er relation of time, in other or!s, e?ists after an antece!ent time, in hich it !i! not e?ist# But it can recei"e its !etermine! %lace in time only by the %resu%%osition that something e?iste! in the foregoing state, u%on hich it follo s ine"itably an! al ays, that is, in conformity ith a rule# :rom all this it is e"i!ent that, in the first %lace, I cannot re"erse the or!er of succession, an! make that hich ha%%ens %rece!e that u%on hich it follo s@ an! that, in the secon! %lace, if the antece!ent state be %osite!, a certain !eterminate e"ent ine"itably an! necessarily follo s# ;ence it follo s that there e?ists a certain or!er in our re%resentations, hereby the %resent gi"es a sure in!ication of some %re"iously e?isting state, as a correlate, though still un!etermine!, of the e?isting e"ent hich is gi"enBa correlate hich itself relates to the e"ent as its consequence, con!itions it, an! connects it necessarily ith itself in the series of time# If then it be a!mitte! as a necessary la of sensibility, an! consequently a formal con!ition of all %erce%tion, that the %rece!ing necessarily !etermines the succee!ing time Dinasmuch as I cannot arri"e at the succee!ing e?ce%t through the %rece!ingE, it must like ise be an in!is%ensable la of em%irical re%resentation of the series of time that the %henomena of the %ast !etermine all %henomena in the succee!ing time, an! that the latter, as e"ents, cannot take %lace, e?ce%t in so far as the former !etermine their e?istence in time, that is to say, establish it accor!ing to a rule# :or it is of course only in %henomena that e can em%irically cogniCe this continuity in the connection of times# :or all e?%erience an! for the %ossibility of e?%erience, un!erstan!ing is in!is%ensable, an! the first ste% hich it takes in this s%here is not to ren!er the re%resentation of objects clear, but to ren!er the re%resentation of an object in general, %ossible# It !oes this by a%%lying the or!er of time to %henomena, an! their e?istence# In other or!s, it assigns to each %henomenon, as a consequence, a %lace in relation to %rece!ing %henomena, !etermine! a %riori in time, ithout hich it coul! not harmoniCe ith time itself, hich !etermines a %lace a %riori to all its %arts# This !etermination of %lace cannot be !eri"e! from the relation of %henomena to absolute time Dfor it is not an object of %erce%tionE@ but, on the contrary, %henomena must reci%rocally !etermine the %laces in time of one another, an! ren!er these necessary in the or!er of time# In other or!s, hate"er follo s or ha%%ens, must follo in conformity ith a uni"ersal rule u%on that hich as containe! in the foregoing state# ;ence arises a series of

%henomena, hich, by means of the un!erstan!ing, %ro!uces an! ren!ers necessary e?actly the same or!er an! continuous connection in the series of our %ossible %erce%tions, as is foun! a %riori in the form of internal intuition DtimeE, in hich all our %erce%tions must ha"e %lace# That something ha%%ens, then, is a %erce%tion hich belongs to a %ossible e?%erience, hich becomes real only because I look u%on the %henomenon as !etermine! in regar! to its %lace in time, consequently as an object, hich can al ays be foun! by means of a rule in the connecte! series of my %erce%tions# But this rule of the !etermination of a thing accor!ing to succession in time is as follo s( GIn hat %rece!es may be foun! the con!ition, un!er hich an e"ent al ays Dthat is, necessarilyE follo s#G :rom all this it is ob"ious that the %rinci%le of cause an! effect is the %rinci%le of %ossible e?%erience, that is, of objecti"e cognition of %henomena, in regar! to their relations in the succession of time# The %roof of this fun!amental %ro%osition rests entirely on the follo ing momenta of argument# To all em%irical cognition belongs the synthesis of the manifol! by the imagination, a synthesis hich is al ays successi"e, that is, in hich the re%resentations therein al ays follo one another# But the or!er of succession in imagination is not !etermine!, an! the series of successi"e re%resentations may be taken retrogressi"ely as ell as %rogressi"ely# But if this synthesis is a synthesis of a%%rehension Dof the manifol! of a gi"en %henomenonE, then the or!er is !etermine! in the object, or to s%eak more accurately, there is therein an or!er of successi"e synthesis hich !etermines an object, an! accor!ing to hich something necessarily %rece!es, an! hen this is %osite!, something else necessarily follo s# If, then, my %erce%tion is to contain the cognition of an e"ent, that is, of something hich really ha%%ens, it must be an em%irical ju!gement, herein e think that the succession is !etermine!@ that is, it %resu%%oses another %henomenon, u%on hich this e"ent follo s necessarily, or in conformity ith a rule# If, on the contrary, hen I %osite! the antece!ent, the e"ent !i! not necessarily follo , I shoul! be oblige! to consi!er it merely as a subjecti"e %lay of my imagination, an! if in this I re%resente! to myself anything as objecti"e, I must look u%on it as a mere !ream# Thus, the relation of %henomena Das %ossible %erce%tionsE, accor!ing to hich that hich ha%%ens is, as to its e?istence, necessarily !etermine! in time by something hich antece!es, in conformity ith a ruleBin other or!s, the relation of cause an! effectBis the con!ition of the objecti"e "ali!ity of our em%irical ju!gements in regar! to the sequence of %erce%tions, consequently of their em%irical truth, an! therefore of e?%erience# The %rinci%le of the relation of causality in the succession of %henomena is therefore "ali! for all objects of e?%erience, because it is itself the groun! of the %ossibility of e?%erience# ;ere, ho e"er, a !ifficulty arises, hich must be resol"e!# The %rinci%le of the connection of causality among %henomena is limite! in our formula to the succession thereof, although in %ractice e fin! that the %rinci%le a%%lies also hen the %henomena e?ist together in the same time, an! that cause an! effect may be simultaneous# :or e?am%le, there is heat in a room, hich !oes not e?ist in the o%en air# I look about for the cause, an! fin! it to be the fire, <o the fire as the cause is simultaneous ith its effect, the heat of the room# In this case, then, there is no succession as regar!s time,

bet een cause an! effect, but they are simultaneous@ an! still the la hol!s goo!# The greater %art of o%erating causes in nature are simultaneous ith their effects, an! the succession in time of the latter is %ro!uce! only because the cause cannot achie"e the total of its effect in one moment# But at the moment hen the effect first arises, it is al ays simultaneous ith the causality of its cause, because, if the cause ha! but a moment before cease! to be, the effect coul! not ha"e arisen# ;ere it must be s%ecially remembere! that e must consi!er the or!er of time an! not the la%se thereof# The relation remains, e"en though no time has ela%se!# The time bet een the causality of the cause an! its imme!iate effect may entirely "anish, an! the cause an! effect be thus simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains al ays !eterminable accor!ing to time# If, for e?am%le, I consi!er a lea!en ball, hich lies u%on a cushion an! makes a hollo in it, as a cause, then it is simultaneous ith the effect# But I !istinguish the t o through the relation of time of the !ynamical connection of both# :or if I lay the ball u%on the cushion, then the hollo follo s u%on the before smooth surface@ but su%%osing the cushion has, from some cause or another, a hollo , there !oes not thereu%on follo a lea!en ball# Thus, the la of succession of time is in all instances the only em%irical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antece!ent cause# The glass is the cause of the rising of the ater abo"e its horiContal surface, although the t o %henomena are contem%oraneous# :or, as soon as I !ra some ater ith the glass from a larger "essel, an effect follo s thereu%on, namely, the change of the horiContal state hich the ater ha! in the large "essel into a conca"e, hich it assumes in the glass# This conce%tion of causality lea!s us to the conce%tion of action@ that of action, to the conce%tion of force@ an! through it, to the conce%tion of substance# )s I !o not ish this critical essay, the sole %ur%ose of hich is to treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition a %riori, to be cro !e! ith analyses hich merely e?%lain, but !o not enlarge the s%here of our conce%tions, I reser"e the !etaile! e?%lanation of the abo"e conce%tions for a future system of %ure reason# 7uch an analysis, in!ee!, e?ecute! ith great %articularity, may alrea!y be foun! in ell&kno n orks on this subject# But I cannot at %resent refrain from making a fe remarks on the em%irical criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to be more e"i!ent an! more easily recogniCe! through the conce%tion of action than through that of the %ermanence of a %henomenon# >here action Dconsequently acti"ity an! forceE e?ists, substance also must e?ist, an! in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of %henomena# Kery ell# But if e are calle! u%on to e?%lain hat e mean by substance, an! ish to a"oi! the "ice of reasoning in a circle, the ans er is by no means so easy# ;o shall e conclu!e imme!iately from the action to the %ermanence of that hich acts, this being ne"ertheless an essential an! %eculiar criterion of substance D%henomenonEH But after hat has been sai! abo"e, the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the common mo!e of %roce!ureBmerely analysing our conce%tionsBit oul! be quite im%ossible# The conce%tion of action in!icates the relation of the subject of causality to the effect# <o because all effect consists in that hich ha%%ens, therefore in the changeable, the last subject thereof is the %ermanent, as the substratum of all that changes, that is, substance# :or accor!ing to the %rinci%le of causality, actions are

al ays the first groun! of all change in %henomena an!, consequently, cannot be a %ro%erty of a subject hich itself changes, because if this ere the case, other actions an! another subject oul! be necessary to !etermine this change# :rom all this it results that action alone, as an em%irical criterion, is a sufficient %roof of the %resence of substantiality, ithout any necessity on my %art of en!ea"ouring to !isco"er the %ermanence of substance by a com%arison# Besi!es, by this mo!e of in!uction e coul! not attain to the com%leteness hich the magnitu!e an! strict uni"ersality of the conce%tion requires# :or that the %rimary subject of the causality of all arising an! %assing a ay, all origin an! e?tinction, cannot itself Din the s%here of %henomenaE arise an! %ass a ay, is a soun! an! safe conclusion, a conclusion hich lea!s us to the conce%tion of em%irical necessity an! %ermanence in e?istence, an! consequently to the conce%tion of a substance as %henomenon# >hen something ha%%ens, the mere fact of the occurrence, ithout regar! to that hich occurs, is an object requiring in"estigation# The transition from the non&being of a state into the e?istence of it, su%%osing that this state contains no quality hich %re"iously e?iste! in the %henomenon, is a fact of itself !eman!ing inquiry# 7uch an e"ent, as has been sho n in <o# ), !oes not concern substance Dfor substance !oes not thus originateE, but its con!ition or state# It is therefore only change, an! not origin from nothing# If this origin be regar!e! as the effect of a foreign cause, it is terme! creation, hich cannot be a!mitte! as an e"ent among %henomena, because the "ery %ossibility of it oul! annihilate the unity of e?%erience# If, ho e"er, I regar! all things not as %henomena, but as things in themsel"es an! objects of un!erstan!ing alone, they, although substances, may be consi!ere! as !e%en!ent, in res%ect of their e?istence, on a foreign cause# But this oul! require a "ery !ifferent meaning in the or!s, a meaning hich coul! not a%%ly to %henomena as objects of %ossible e?%erience# ;o a thing can be change!, ho it is %ossible that u%on one state e?isting in one %oint of time, an o%%osite state shoul! follo in another %oint of timeBof this e ha"e not the smallest conce%tion a %riori# There is requisite for this the kno le!ge of real %o ers, hich can only be gi"en em%irically@ for e?am%le, kno le!ge of mo"ing forces, or, in other or!s, of certain successi"e %henomena Das mo"ementsE hich in!icate the %resence of such forces# But the form of e"ery change, the con!ition un!er hich alone it can take %lace as the coming into e?istence of another state Dbe the content of the change, that is, the state hich is change!, hat it mayE, an! consequently the succession of the states themsel"es can "ery ell be consi!ere! a %riori, in relation to the la of causality an! the con!itions of time#8 /8:ootnote( It must be remarke! that I !o not s%eak of the change of certain relations, but of the change of the state# Thus, hen a bo!y mo"es in a uniform manner, it !oes not change its state Dof motionE@ but only hen all motion increases or !ecreases#3 >hen a substance %asses from one state, a, into another state, b, the %oint of time in hich the latter e?ists is !ifferent from, an! subsequent to that in hich the former e?iste!# In like manner, the secon! state, as reality Din the %henomenonE, !iffers from the first, in hich the reality of the secon! !i! not e?ist, as b from Cero# That is to say, if

the state, b, !iffers from the state, a, only in res%ect to quantity, the change is a coming into e?istence of b &a, hich in the former state !i! not e?ist, an! in relation to hich that state is L 9# <o the question arises ho a thing %asses from one state L a, into another state L b# Bet een t o moments there is al ays a certain time, an! bet een t o states e?isting in these moments there is al ays a !ifference ha"ing a certain quantity Dfor all %arts of %henomena are in their turn quantitiesE# Consequently, e"ery transition from one state into another is al ays effecte! in a time containe! bet een t o moments, of hich the first !etermines the state hich lea"es, an! the secon! !etermines the state into the thing %asses# The thing lea"es, an! the secon! !etermines the state into hich the thing Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change, consequently of the interme!iate state bet een both, an! as such they belong to the total of the change# <o e"ery change has a cause, hich e"i!ences its causality in the hole time !uring hich the charge takes %lace# The cause, therefore, !oes not %ro!uce the change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gra!ually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its com%letion at b, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality Db & aE is generate! through the lesser !egrees hich are containe! bet een the first an! last# )ll change is therefore %ossible only through a continuous action of the causality, hich, in so far as it is uniform, e call a momentum# The change !oes not consist of these momenta, but is generate! or %ro!uce! by them as their effect# 7uch is the la of the continuity of all change, the groun! of hich is that neither time itself nor any %henomenon in time consists of %arts hich are the smallest %ossible, but that, not ithstan!ing, the state of a thing %asses in the %rocess of a change through all these %arts, as elements, to its secon! state# There is no smallest !egree of reality in a %henomenon, just as there is no smallest !egree in the quantity of time@ an! so the ne state of reality gro s u% out of the former state, through all the infinite !egrees thereof, the !ifferences of hich one from another, taken all together, are less than the !ifference bet een o an! a# It is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this %rinci%le in the in"estigation of nature# But ho such a %ro%osition, hich a%%ears so greatly to e?ten! our kno le!ge of nature, is %ossible com%letely a %riori, is in!ee! a question hich !eser"es in"estigation, although the first "ie seems to !emonstrate the truth an! reality of the %rinci%le, an! the question, ho it is %ossible, may be consi!ere! su%erfluous# :or there are so many groun!less %retensions to the enlargement of our kno le!ge by %ure reason that e must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such, an! ithout a thoroughgoing an! ra!ical !e!uction, to belie"e nothing of the sort e"en on the clearest !ogmatical e"i!ence# E"ery a!!ition to our em%irical kno le!ge, an! e"ery a!"ance ma!e in the e?ercise of our %erce%tion, is nothing more than an e?tension of the !etermination of the internal sense, that is to say, a %rogression in time, be objects themsel"es hat they may, %henomena, or %ure intuitions# This %rogression in time !etermines e"erything, an! is itself !etermine! by nothing else# That is to say, the %arts of the %rogression e?ist only in time, an! by means of the synthesis thereof, an! are not gi"en antece!ently to it# :or

this reason, e"ery transition in %erce%tion to anything hich follo s u%on another in time, is a !etermination of time by means of the %ro!uction of this %erce%tion# )n! as this !etermination of time is, al ays an! in all its %arts, a quantity, the %erce%tion %ro!uce! is to be consi!ere! as a quantity hich %rocee!s through all its !egreesBno one of hich is the smallest %ossibleBfrom Cero u% to its !etermine! !egree# :rom this e %ercei"e the %ossibility of cogniCing a %riori a la of changesBa la , ho e"er, hich concerns their form merely# >e merely antici%ate our o n a%%rehension, the formal con!ition of hich, inasmuch as it is itself to be foun! in the min! antece!ently to all gi"en %henomena, must certainly be ca%able of being cogniCe! a %riori# Thus, as time contains the sensuous con!ition a %riori of the %ossibility of a continuous %rogression of that hich e?ists to that hich follo s it, the un!erstan!ing, by "irtue of the unity of a%%erce%tion, contains the con!ition a %riori of the %ossibility of a continuous !etermination of the %osition in time of all %henomena, an! this by means of the series of causes an! effects, the former of hich necessitate the sequence of the latter, an! thereby ren!er uni"ersally an! for all time, an! by consequence, objecti"ely, "ali! the em%irical cognition of the relations of time# C# T;IR* )<)'9G$# Princi%le of Coe?istence, )ccor!ing to the 'a of Reci%rocity or Community# )ll substances, in so far as they can be %ercei"e! in s%ace at the same time, e?ist in a state of com%lete reci%rocity of action# PR99:# Things are coe?istent, hen in em%irical intuition the %erce%tion of the one can follo u%on the %erce%tion of the other, an! "ice "ersaB hich cannot occur in the succession of %henomena, as e ha"e sho n in the e?%lanation of the secon! %rinci%le# Thus I can %ercei"e the moon an! then the earth, or con"ersely, first the earth an! then the moon@ an! for the reason that my %erce%tions of these objects can reci%rocally follo each other, I say, they e?ist contem%oraneously# <o coe?istence is the e?istence of the manifol! in the same time# But time itself is not an object of %erce%tion@ an! therefore e cannot conclu!e from the fact that things are %lace! in the same time, the other fact, that the %erce%tion of these things can follo each other reci%rocally# The synthesis of the imagination in a%%rehension oul! only %resent to us each of these %erce%tions as %resent in the subject hen the other is not %resent, an! contrari ise@ but oul! not sho that the objects are coe?istent, that is to say, that, if the one e?ists, the other also e?ists in the same time, an! that this is necessarily so, in or!er that the %erce%tions may be ca%able of follo ing each other reci%rocally# It follo s that a conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing or category of the reci%rocal sequence of the !eterminations of %henomena De?isting, as they !o, a%art from each other, an! yet contem%oraneouslyE, is requisite to justify us in saying that the reci%rocal succession of %erce%tions has its foun!ation in the object, an! to enable us to re%resent coe?istence as objecti"e# But that relation of substances in hich the one contains !eterminations the groun! of hich is in the other substance, is the relation of influence# )n!, hen this influence is

reci%rocal, it is the relation of community or reci%rocity# Consequently the coe?istence of substances in s%ace cannot be cogniCe! in e?%erience other ise than un!er the %recon!ition of their reci%rocal action# This is therefore the con!ition of the %ossibility of things themsel"es as objects of e?%erience# Things are coe?istent, in so far as they e?ist in one an! the same time# But ho can e kno that they e?ist in one an! the same timeH 9nly by obser"ing that the or!er in the synthesis of a%%rehension of the manifol! is arbitrary an! a matter of in!ifference, that is to say, that it can %rocee! from ), through B, C, *, to E, or contrari ise from E to )# :or if they ere successi"e in time Dan! in the or!er, let us su%%ose, hich begins ith )E, it is quite im%ossible for the a%%rehension in %erce%tion to begin ith E an! go back ar!s to ), inasmuch as ) belongs to %ast time an!, therefore, cannot be an object of a%%rehension# 'et us assume that in a number of substances consi!ere! as %henomena each is com%letely isolate!, that is, that no one acts u%on another# Then I say that the coe?istence of these cannot be an object of %ossible %erce%tion an! that the e?istence of one cannot, by any mo!e of em%irical synthesis, lea! us to the e?istence of another# :or e imagine them in this case to be se%arate! by a com%letely "oi! s%ace, an! thus %erce%tion, hich %rocee!s from the one to the other in time, oul! in!ee! !etermine their e?istence by means of a follo ing %erce%tion, but oul! be quite unable to !istinguish hether the one %henomenon follo s objecti"ely u%on the first, or is coe?istent ith it# Besi!es the mere fact of e?istence, then, there must be something by means of hich ) !etermines the %osition of B in time an!, con"ersely, B the %osition of )@ because only un!er this con!ition can substances be em%irically re%resente! as e?isting contem%oraneously# <o that alone !etermines the %osition of another thing in time hich is the cause of it or of its !eterminations# Consequently e"ery substance Dinasmuch as it can ha"e succession %re!icate! of it only in res%ect of its !eterminationsE must contain the causality of certain !eterminations in another substance, an! at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself# That is to say, substances must stan! Dme!iately or imme!iatelyE in !ynamical community ith each other, if coe?istence is to be cogniCe! in any %ossible e?%erience# But, in regar! to objects of e?%erience, that is absolutely necessary ithout hich the e?%erience of these objects oul! itself be im%ossible# Consequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the orl! of %henomena, in so far as they are coe?istent, stan! in a relation of com%lete community of reci%rocal action to each other# The or! community has in our language /:ootnote( German3 t o meanings, an! contains the t o notions con"eye! in the 'atin communio an! commercium# >e em%loy it in this %lace in the latter senseBthat of a !ynamical community, ithout hich e"en the community of %lace Dcommunio s%atiiE coul! not be em%irically cogniCe!# In our e?%eriences it is easy to obser"e that it is only the continuous influences in all %arts of s%ace that can con!uct our senses from one object to another@ that the light hich %lays bet een our eyes an! the hea"enly bo!ies %ro!uces a me!iating community bet een them an! us, an! thereby e"i!ences their coe?istence ith us@ that

e cannot em%irically change our %osition D%ercei"e this changeE, unless the e?istence of matter throughout the hole of s%ace ren!ere! %ossible the %erce%tion of the %ositions e occu%y@ an! that this %erce%tion can %ro"e the contem%oraneous e?istence of these %laces only through their reci%rocal influence, an! thereby also the coe?istence of e"en the most remote objectsBalthough in this case the %roof is only me!iate# >ithout community, e"ery %erce%tion Dof a %henomenon in s%aceE is se%arate! from e"ery other an! isolate!, an! the chain of em%irical re%resentations, that is, of e?%erience, must, ith the a%%earance of a ne object, begin entirely !e no"o, ithout the least connection ith %rece!ing re%resentations, an! ithout stan!ing to ar!s these e"en in the relation of time# Ay intention here is by no means to combat the notion of em%ty s%ace@ for it may e?ist here our %erce%tions cannot e?ist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, an! here, therefore, no em%irical %erce%tion of coe?istence takes %lace# But in this case it is not an object of %ossible e?%erience# The follo ing remarks may be useful in the ay of e?%lanation# In the min!, all %henomena, as contents of a %ossible e?%erience, must e?ist in community DcommunioE of a%%erce%tion or consciousness, an! in so far as it is requisite that objects be re%resente! as coe?istent an! connecte!, in so far must they reci%rocally !etermine the %osition in time of each other an! thereby constitute a hole# If this subjecti"e community is to rest u%on an objecti"e basis, or to be a%%lie! to substances as %henomena, the %erce%tion of one substance must ren!er %ossible the %erce%tion of another, an! con"ersely# :or other ise succession, hich is al ays foun! in %erce%tions as a%%rehensions, oul! be %re!icate! of e?ternal objects, an! their re%resentation of their coe?istence be thus im%ossible# But this is a reci%rocal influence, that is to say, a real community DcommerciumE of substances, ithout hich therefore the em%irical relation of coe?istence oul! be a notion beyon! the reach of our min!s# By "irtue of this commercium, %henomena, in so far as they are a%art from, an! ne"ertheless in connection ith each other, constitute a com%ositum reale# 7uch com%osita are %ossible in many !ifferent ays# The three !ynamical relations then, from hich all others s%ring, are those of inherence, consequence, an! com%osition# These, then, are the three analogies of e?%erience# They are nothing more than %rinci%les of the !etermination of the e?istence of %henomena in time, accor!ing to the three mo!i of this !etermination@ to it, the relation to time itself as a quantity Dthe quantity of e?istence, that is, !urationE, the relation in time as a series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the com%le? of all e?istence DsimultaneityE# This unity of !etermination in regar! to time is thoroughly !ynamical@ that is to say, time is not consi!ere! as that in hich e?%erience !etermines imme!iately to e"ery e?istence its %osition@ for this is im%ossible, inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of %erce%tion, by means of hich %henomena can be connecte! ith each other# 9n the contrary, the rule of the un!erstan!ing, through hich alone the e?istence of %henomena can recei"e synthetical unity as regar!s relations of time, !etermines for e"ery %henomenon its %osition in time, an! consequently a %riori, an! ith "ali!ity for all an! e"ery time# By nature, in the em%irical sense of the or!, e un!erstan! the totality of %henomena connecte!, in res%ect of their e?istence, accor!ing to necessary rules, that is, la s# There are therefore certain la s D hich are moreo"er a %rioriE hich make nature %ossible@

an! all em%irical la s can e?ist only by means of e?%erience, an! by "irtue of those %rimiti"e la s through hich e?%erience itself becomes %ossible# The %ur%ose of the analogies is therefore to re%resent to us the unity of nature in the connection of all %henomena un!er certain e?%onents, the only business of hich is to e?%ress the relation of time Din so far as it contains all e?istence in itselfE to the unity of a%%erce%tion, hich can e?ist in synthesis only accor!ing to rules# The combine! e?%ression of all is this( G)ll %henomena e?ist in one nature, an! must so e?ist, inasmuch as ithout this a %riori unity, no unity of e?%erience, an! consequently no !etermination of objects in e?%erience, is %ossible#G )s regar!s the mo!e of %roof hich e ha"e em%loye! in treating of these transcen!ental la s of nature, an! the %eculiar character of e must make one remark, hich ill at the same time be im%ortant as a gui!e in e"ery other attem%t to !emonstrate the truth of intellectual an! like ise synthetical %ro%ositions a %riori# ;a! e en!ea"oure! to %ro"e these analogies !ogmatically, that is, from conce%tions@ that is to say, ha! e em%loye! this metho! in attem%ting to sho that e"erything hich e?ists, e?ists only in that hich is %ermanentBthat e"ery thing or e"ent %resu%%oses the e?istence of something in a %rece!ing state, u%on hich it follo s in conformity ith a ruleBlastly, that in the manifol!, hich is coe?istent, the states coe?ist in connection ith each other accor!ing to a rule, all our labour oul! ha"e been utterly in "ain# :or more conce%tions of things, analyse them as e may, cannot enable us to conclu!e from the e?istence of one object to the e?istence of another# >hat other course as left for us to %ursueH This only, to !emonstrate the %ossibility of e?%erience as a cognition in hich at last all objects must be ca%able of being %resente! to us, if the re%resentation of them is to %ossess any objecti"e reality# <o in this thir!, this me!iating term, the essential form of hich consists in the synthetical unity of the a%%erce%tion of all %henomena, e foun! a %riori con!itions of the uni"ersal an! necessary !etermination as to time of all e?istences in the orl! of %henomena, ithout hich the em%irical !etermination thereof as to time oul! itself be im%ossible, an! e also !isco"ere! rules of synthetical unity a %riori, by means of hich e coul! antici%ate e?%erience# :or ant of this metho!, an! from the fancy that it as %ossible to !isco"er a !ogmatical %roof of the synthetical %ro%ositions hich are requisite in the em%irical em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing, has it ha%%ene! that a %roof of the %rinci%le of sufficient reason has been so often attem%te!, an! al ays in "ain# The other t o analogies nobo!y has e"er thought of, although they ha"e al ays been silently em%loye! by the min!,8 because the gui!ing threa! furnishe! by the categories as anting, the gui!e hich alone can enable us to !isco"er e"ery hiatus, both in the system of conce%tions an! of %rinci%les# /8:ootnote( The unity of the uni"erse, in hich all %henomena to be connecte!, is e"i!ently a mere consequence of the a!mitte! %rinci%le of the community of all substances hich are coe?istent# :or ere substances isolate!, they coul! not as %arts constitute a hole, an! ere their connection Dreci%rocal action of the manifol!E not necessary from the "ery fact of coe?istence, e coul! not conclu!e from the fact of the latter as a merely i!eal relation to the former as a real one# >e ha"e, ho e"er, sho n in its %lace that community is the %ro%er groun! of the %ossibility of an em%irical cognition of coe?istence, an! that

e may therefore %ro%erly reason from the latter to the former as its con!ition#3 1# T;E P97T4')TE7 9: EAPIRIC)' T;94G;T# 6# That hich agrees ith the formal con!itions Dintuition an! conce%tionE of e?%erience, is %ossible# ,# That hich coheres ith the material con!itions of e?%erience DsensationE, is real# .# That hose coherence ith the real is !etermine! accor!ing to uni"ersal con!itions of e?%erience is De?istsE necessary# E?%lanation# The categories of mo!ality %ossess this %eculiarity, that they !o not in the least !etermine the object, or enlarge the conce%tion to hich they are anne?e! as %re!icates, but only e?%ress its relation to the faculty of cognition# Though my conce%tion of a thing is in itself com%lete, I am still entitle! to ask hether the object of it is merely %ossible, or hether it is also real, or, if the latter, hether it is also necessary# But hereby the object itself is not more !efinitely !etermine! in thought, but the question is only in hat relation it, inclu!ing all its !eterminations, stan!s to the un!erstan!ing an! its em%loyment in e?%erience, to the em%irical faculty of ju!gement, an! to the reason of its a%%lication to e?%erience# :or this "ery reason, too, the categories of mo!ality are nothing more than e?%lanations of the conce%tions of %ossibility, reality, an! necessity, as em%loye! in e?%erience, an! at the same time, restrictions of all the categories to em%irical use alone, not authoriCing the transcen!ental em%loyment of them# :or if they are to ha"e something more than a merely logical significance, an! to be something more than a mere analytical e?%ression of the form of thought, an! to ha"e a relation to things an! their %ossibility, reality, or necessity, they must concern %ossible e?%erience an! its synthetical unity, in hich alone objects of cognition can be gi"en# The %ostulate of the %ossibility of things requires also, that the conce%tion of the things agree ith the formal con!itions of our e?%erience in general# But this, that is to say, the objecti"e form of e?%erience, contains all the kin!s of synthesis hich are requisite for the cognition of objects# ) conce%tion hich contains a synthesis must be regar!e! as em%ty an!, ithout reference to an object, if its synthesis !oes not belong to e?%erience Beither as borro e! from it, an! in this case it is calle! an em%irical conce%tion, or such as is the groun! an! a %riori con!ition of e?%erience Dits formE, an! in this case it is a %ure conce%tion, a conce%tion hich ne"ertheless belongs to e?%erience, inasmuch as its object can be foun! in this alone# :or here shall e fin! the criterion or character of the %ossibility of an object hich is cogitate! by means of an a %riori synthetical conce%tion, if not in the synthesis hich constitutes the form of em%irical cognition of objectsH That in such a conce%tion no contra!iction e?ists is in!ee! a necessary logical con!ition, but "ery far from being sufficient to establish the objecti"e reality of the conce%tion, that is, the %ossibility of such an object as is thought in the conce%tion#

Thus, in the conce%tion of a figure hich is containe! ithin t o straight lines, there is no contra!iction, for the conce%tions of t o straight lines an! of their junction contain no negation of a figure# The im%ossibility in such a case !oes not rest u%on the conce%tion in itself, but u%on the construction of it in s%ace, that is to say, u%on the con!itions of s%ace an! its !eterminations# But these ha"e themsel"es objecti"e reality, that is, they a%%ly to %ossible things, because they contain a %riori the form of e?%erience in general# )n! no e shall %rocee! to %oint out the e?tensi"e utility an! influence of this %ostulate of %ossibility# >hen I re%resent to myself a thing that is %ermanent, so that e"erything in it hich changes belongs merely to its state or con!ition, from such a conce%tion alone I ne"er can cogniCe that such a thing is %ossible# 9r, if I re%resent to myself something hich is so constitute! that, hen it is %osite!, something else follo s al ays an! infallibly, my thought contains no self&contra!iction@ but hether such a %ro%erty as causality is to be foun! in any %ossible thing, my thought alone affor!s no means of ju!ging# :inally, I can re%resent to myself !ifferent things DsubstancesE hich are so constitute! that the state or con!ition of one causes a change in the state of the other, an! reci%rocally@ but hether such a relation is a %ro%erty of things cannot be %ercei"e! from these conce%tions, hich contain a merely arbitrary synthesis# 9nly from the fact, therefore, that these conce%tions e?%ress a %riori the relations of %erce%tions in e"ery e?%erience, !o e kno that they %ossess objecti"e reality, that is, transcen!ental truth@ an! that in!e%en!ent of e?%erience, though not in!e%en!ent of all relation to form of an e?%erience in general an! its synthetical unity, in hich alone objects can be em%irically cogniCe!# But hen e fashion to oursel"es ne conce%tions of substances, forces, action, an! reaction, from the material %resente! to us by %erce%tion, ithout follo ing the e?am%le of e?%erience in their connection, e create mere chimeras, of the %ossibility of hich e cannot !isco"er any criterion, because e ha"e not taken e?%erience for our instructress, though e ha"e borro e! the conce%tions from her# 7uch fictitious conce%tions !eri"e their character of %ossibility not, like the categories, a %riori, as conce%tions on hich all e?%erience !e%en!s, but only, a %osteriori, as conce%tions gi"en by means of e?%erience itself, an! their %ossibility must either be cogniCe! a %osteriori an! em%irically, or it cannot be cogniCe! at all# ) substance hich is %ermanently %resent in s%ace, yet ithout filling it Dlike that tertium qui! bet een matter an! the thinking subject hich some ha"e trie! to intro!uce into meta%hysicsE, or a %eculiar fun!amental %o er of the min! of intuiting the future by antici%ation Dinstea! of merely inferring from %ast an! %resent e"entsE, or, finally, a %o er of the min! to %lace itself in community of thought ith other men, ho e"er !istant they may beBthese are conce%tions the %ossibility of hich has no groun! to rest u%on# :or they are not base! u%on e?%erience an! its kno n la s@ an!, ithout e?%erience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, hich, though containing no internal contra!iction, has no claim to objecti"e reality, neither, consequently, to the %ossibility of such an object as is thought in these conce%tions# )s far as concerns reality, it is self& e"i!ent that e cannot cogitate such a %ossibility in concreto ithout the ai! of e?%erience@ because reality is concerne! only ith sensation, as the matter of

e?%erience, an! not ith the form of thought, ith hich e can no !oubt in!ulge in sha%ing fancies# But I %ass by e"erything hich !eri"es its %ossibility from reality in e?%erience, an! I %ur%ose treating here merely of the %ossibility of things by means of a %riori conce%tions# I maintain, then, that the %ossibility of things is not !eri"e! from such conce%tions %er se, but only hen consi!ere! as formal an! objecti"e con!itions of an e?%erience in general# It seems, in!ee!, as if the %ossibility of a triangle coul! be cogniCe! from the conce%tion of it alone D hich is certainly in!e%en!ent of e?%erienceE@ for e can certainly gi"e to the conce%tion a corres%on!ing object com%letely a %riori, that is to say, e can construct it# But as a triangle is only the form of an object, it must remain a mere %ro!uct of the imagination, an! the %ossibility of the e?istence of an object corres%on!ing to it must remain !oubtful, unless e can !isco"er some other groun!, unless e kno that the figure can be cogitate! un!er the con!itions u%on hich all objects of e?%erience rest# <o , the facts that s%ace is a formal con!ition a %riori of e?ternal e?%erience, that the formati"e synthesis, by hich e construct a triangle in imagination, is the "ery same as that e em%loy in the a%%rehension of a %henomenon for the %ur%ose of making an em%irical conce%tion of it, are hat alone connect the notion of the %ossibility of such a thing, ith the conce%tion of it# In the same manner, the %ossibility of continuous quantities, in!ee! of quantities in general, for the conce%tions of them are ithout e?ce%tion synthetical, is ne"er e"i!ent from the conce%tions in themsel"es, but only hen they are consi!ere! as the formal con!itions of the !etermination of objects in e?%erience# )n! here, in!ee!, shoul! e look for objects to corres%on! to our conce%tions, if not in e?%erience, by hich alone objects are %resente! to usH It is, ho e"er, true that ithout antece!ent e?%erience e can cogniCe an! characteriCe the %ossibility of things, relati"ely to the formal con!itions, un!er hich something is !etermine! in e?%erience as an object, consequently, com%letely a %riori# But still this is %ossible only in relation to e?%erience an! ithin its limits# The %ostulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires %erce%tion, consequently conscious sensation, not in!ee! imme!iately, that is, of the object itself, hose e?istence is to be cogniCe!, but still that the object ha"e some connection ith a real %erce%tion, in accor!ance ith the analogies of e?%erience, hich e?hibit all kin!s of real connection in e?%erience# :rom the mere conce%tion of a thing it is im%ossible to conclu!e its e?istence# :or, let the conce%tion be e"er so com%lete, an! containing a statement of all the !eterminations of the thing, the e?istence of it has nothing to !o ith all this, but only ith the question hether such a thing is gi"en, so that the %erce%tion of it can in e"ery case %rece!e the conce%tion# :or the fact that the conce%tion of it %rece!es the %erce%tion, merely in!icates the %ossibility of its e?istence@ it is %erce%tion hich %resents matter to the conce%tion, that is the sole criterion of reality# Prior to the %erce%tion of the thing, ho e"er, an! therefore com%arati"ely a %riori, e are able to cogniCe its e?istence, %ro"i!e! it stan!s in connection ith some %erce%tions accor!ing to the %rinci%les of the em%irical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity ith the

analogies of %erce%tion# :or, in this case, the e?istence of the su%%ose! thing is connecte! ith our %erce%tion in a %ossible e?%erience, an! e are able, ith the gui!ance of these analogies, to reason in the series of %ossible %erce%tions from a thing hich e !o really %ercei"e to the thing e !o not %ercei"e# Thus, e cogniCe the e?istence of a magnetic matter %enetrating all bo!ies from the %erce%tion of the attraction of the steel&filings by the magnet, although the constitution of our organs ren!ers an imme!iate %erce%tion of this matter im%ossible for us# :or, accor!ing to the la s of sensibility an! the connecte! conte?t of our %erce%tions, e shoul! in an e?%erience come also on an imme!iate em%irical intuition of this matter, if our senses ere more acuteBbut this obtuseness has no influence u%on an! cannot alter the form of %ossible e?%erience in general# 9ur kno le!ge of the e?istence of things reaches as far as our %erce%tions, an! hat may be inferre! from them accor!ing to em%irical la s, e?ten!# If e !o not set out from e?%erience, or !o not %rocee! accor!ing to the la s of the em%irical connection of %henomena, our %retensions to !isco"er the e?istence of a thing hich e !o not imme!iately %ercei"e are "ain# I!ealism, ho e"er, brings for ar! %o erful objections to these rules for %ro"ing e?istence me!iately# This is, therefore, the %ro%er %lace for its refutation# RE:4T)TI9< 9: I*E)'I7A# I!ealismBI mean material i!ealismBis the theory hich !eclares the e?istence of objects in s%ace ithout us to be either DE !oubtful an! in!emonstrable, or D,E false an! im%ossible# The first is the %roblematical i!ealism of *escartes, ho a!mits the un!oubte! certainty of only one em%irical assertion DassertioE, to it, GI am#G The secon! is the !ogmatical i!ealism of Berkeley, ho maintains that s%ace, together ith all the objects of hich it is the inse%arable con!ition, is a thing hich is in itself im%ossible, an! that consequently the objects in s%ace are mere %ro!ucts of the imagination# The !ogmatical theory of i!ealism is una"oi!able, if e regar! s%ace as a %ro%erty of things in themsel"es@ for in that case it is, ith all to hich it ser"es as con!ition, a nonentity# But the foun!ation for this kin! of i!ealism e ha"e alrea!y !estroye! in the transcen!ental aesthetic# Problematical i!ealism, hich makes no such assertion, but only alleges our inca%acity to %ro"e the e?istence of anything besi!es oursel"es by means of imme!iate e?%erience, is a theory rational an! e"i!encing a thorough an! %hiloso%hical mo!e of thinking, for it obser"es the rule not to form a !ecisi"e ju!gement before sufficient %roof be sho n# The !esire! %roof must therefore !emonstrate that e ha"e e?%erience of e?ternal things, an! not mere fancies# :or this %ur%ose, e must %ro"e, that our internal an!, to *escartes, in!ubitable e?%erience is itself %ossible only un!er the %re"ious assum%tion of e?ternal e?%erience# T;E9REA# The sim%le but em%irically !etermine! consciousness of my o n e?istence %ro"es the e?istence of e?ternal objects in s%ace# PR99:

I am conscious of my o n e?istence as !etermine! in time# )ll !etermination in regar! to time %resu%%oses the e?istence of something %ermanent in %erce%tion# But this %ermanent something cannot be something in me, for the "ery reason that my e?istence in time is itself !etermine! by this %ermanent something# It follo s that the %erce%tion of this %ermanent e?istence is %ossible only through a thing ithout me an! not through the mere re%resentation of a thing ithout me# Consequently, the !etermination of my e?istence in time is %ossible only through the e?istence of real things e?ternal to me# <o , consciousness in time is necessarily connecte! ith the consciousness of the %ossibility of this !etermination in time# ;ence it follo s that consciousness in time is necessarily connecte! also ith the e?istence of things ithout me, inasmuch as the e?istence of these things is the con!ition of !etermination in time# That is to say, the consciousness of my o n e?istence is at the same time an imme!iate consciousness of the e?istence of other things ithout me# Remark I# The rea!er ill obser"e, that in the foregoing %roof the game hich i!ealism %lays is retorte! u%on itself, an! ith more justice# It assume! that the only imme!iate e?%erience is internal an! that from this e can only infer the e?istence of e?ternal things# But, as al ays ha%%ens, hen e reason from gi"en effects to !etermine! causes, i!ealism has reasone! ith too much haste an! uncertainty, for it is quite %ossible that the cause of our re%resentations may lie in oursel"es, an! that e ascribe it falsely to e?ternal things# But our %roof sho s that e?ternal e?%erience is %ro%erly imme!iate,8 that only by "irtue of itBnot, in!ee!, the consciousness of our o n e?istence, but certainly the !etermination of our e?istence in time, that is, internal e?%erienceBis %ossible# It is true, that the re%resentation GI am,G hich is the e?%ression of the consciousness hich can accom%any all my thoughts, is that hich imme!iately inclu!es the e?istence of a subject# But in this re%resentation e cannot fin! any kno le!ge of the subject, an! therefore also no em%irical kno le!ge, that is, e?%erience# :or e?%erience contains, in a!!ition to the thought of something e?isting, intuition, an! in this case it must be internal intuition, that is, time, in relation to hich the subject must be !etermine!# But the e?istence of e?ternal things is absolutely requisite for this %ur%ose, so that it follo s that internal e?%erience is itself %ossible only me!iately an! through e?ternal e?%erience# /8:ootnote( The imme!iate consciousness of the e?istence of e?ternal things is, in the %rece!ing theorem, not %resu%%ose!, but %ro"e!, by the %ossibility of this consciousness un!erstoo! by us or not# The question as to the %ossibility of it oul! stan! thus( G;a"e e an internal sense, but no e?ternal sense, an! is our belief in e?ternal %erce%tion a mere !elusionHG But it is e"i!ent that, in or!er merely to fancy to oursel"es anything as e?ternal, that is, to %resent it to the sense in intuition e must alrea!y %ossess an e?ternal sense, an! must thereby !istinguish imme!iately the mere rece%ti"ity of an e?ternal intuition from the s%ontaneity hich characteriCes e"ery act of imagination# :or merely to imagine also an e?ternal sense, oul! annihilate the faculty of intuition itself hich is to be !etermine! by the imagination#3

Remark II# <o ith this "ie all em%irical use of our faculty of cognition in the !etermination of time is in %erfect accor!ance# Its truth is su%%orte! by the fact that it is %ossible to %ercei"e a !etermination of time only by means of a change in e?ternal relations DmotionE to the %ermanent in s%ace Dfor e?am%le, e become a are of the sunFs motion by obser"ing the changes of his relation to the objects of this earthE# But this is not all# >e fin! that e %ossess nothing %ermanent that can corres%on! an! be submitte! to the conce%tion of a substance as intuition, e?ce%t matter# This i!ea of %ermanence is not itself !eri"e! from e?ternal e?%erience, but is an a %riori necessary con!ition of all !etermination of time, consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our o n e?istence, an! that through the e?istence of e?ternal things# In the re%resentation GI,G the consciousness of myself is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual re%resentation %ro!uce! by the s%ontaneous acti"ity of a thinking subject# It follo s, that this GIG has not any %re!icate of intuition, hich, in its character of %ermanence, coul! ser"e as correlate to the !etermination of time in the internal sense Bin the same ay as im%enetrability is the correlate of matter as an em%irical intuition# Remark III# :rom the fact that the e?istence of e?ternal things is a necessary con!ition of the %ossibility of a !etermine! consciousness of oursel"es, it !oes not follo that e"ery intuiti"e re%resentation of e?ternal things in"ol"es the e?istence of these things, for their re%resentations may "ery ell be the mere %ro!ucts of the imagination Din !reams as ell as in ma!nessE@ though, in!ee!, these are themsel"es create! by the re%ro!uction of %re"ious e?ternal %erce%tions, hich, as has been sho n, are %ossible only through the reality of e?ternal objects# The sole aim of our remarks has, ho e"er, been to %ro"e that internal e?%erience in general is %ossible only through e?ternal e?%erience in general# >hether this or that su%%ose! e?%erience be %urely imaginary must be !isco"ere! from its %articular !eterminations an! by com%aring these ith the criteria of all real e?%erience# :inally, as regar!s the thir! %ostulate, it a%%lies to material necessity in e?istence, an! not to merely formal an! logical necessity in the connection of conce%tions# <o as e cannot cogniCe com%letely a %riori the e?istence of any object of sense, though e can !o so com%arati"ely a %riori, that is, relati"ely to some other %re"iously gi"en e?istenceBa cognition, ho e"er, hich can only be of such an e?istence as must be containe! in the com%le? of e?%erience, of hich the %re"iously gi"en %erce%tion is a %artBthe necessity of e?istence can ne"er be cogniCe! from conce%tions, but al ays, on the contrary, from its connection ith that hich is an object of %erce%tion# But the only e?istence cogniCe!, un!er the con!ition of other gi"en %henomena, as necessary, is the e?istence of effects from gi"en causes in conformity ith the la s of causality# It is consequently not the necessity of the e?istence of things Das substancesE, but the necessity of the state of things that e cogniCe, an! that not imme!iately, but by means of the e?istence of other states gi"en in %erce%tion, accor!ing to em%irical la s of causality# ;ence it follo s that the criterion of necessity is to be foun! only in the la of %ossible e?%erienceBthat e"erything hich ha%%ens is !etermine! a %riori in the %henomenon by its cause# Thus e cogniCe only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of hich are gi"en us# Aoreo"er, the criterion of necessity in e?istence %ossesses no a%%lication beyon! the fiel! of %ossible e?%erience, an! e"en in this it is not "ali! of the e?istence of things as substances, because these can ne"er be consi!ere! as em%irical effects, or as

something that ha%%ens an! has a beginning# <ecessity, therefore, regar!s only the relations of %henomena accor!ing to the !ynamical la of causality, an! the %ossibility groun!e! thereon, of reasoning from some gi"en e?istence Dof a causeE a %riori to another e?istence Dof an effectE# GE"erything that ha%%ens is hy%othetically necessary,G is a %rinci%le hich subjects the changes that take %lace in the orl! to a la , that is, to a rule of necessary e?istence, ithout hich nature herself coul! not %ossibly e?ist# ;ence the %ro%osition, G<othing ha%%ens by blin! chance Din mun!o non !atur casusE,G is an a %riori la of nature# The case is the same ith the %ro%osition, G<ecessity in nature is not blin!,G that is, it is con!itione!, consequently intelligible necessity Dnon !atur fatumE# Both la s subject the %lay of change to Ga nature of things Das %henomenaE,G or, hich is the same thing, to the unity of the un!erstan!ing, an! through the un!erstan!ing alone can changes belong to an e?%erience, as the synthetical unity of %henomena# Both belong to the class of !ynamical %rinci%les# The former is %ro%erly a consequence of the %rinci%le of causalityBone of the analogies of e?%erience# The latter belongs to the %rinci%les of mo!ality, hich to the !etermination of causality a!!s the conce%tion of necessity, hich is itself, ho e"er, subject to a rule of the un!erstan!ing# The %rinci%le of continuity forbi!s any lea% in the series of %henomena regar!e! as changes Din mun!o non !atur saltusE@ an! like ise, in the com%le? of all em%irical intuitions in s%ace, any break or hiatus bet een t o %henomena Dnon !atur hiatusEBfor e can so e?%ress the %rinci%le, that e?%erience can a!mit nothing hich %ro"es the e?istence of a "acuum, or hich e"en a!mits it as a %art of an em%irical synthesis# :or, as regar!s a "acuum or "oi!, hich e may cogitate as out an! beyon! the fiel! of %ossible e?%erience Dthe orl!E, such a question cannot come before the tribunal of mere un!erstan!ing, hich !eci!es only u%on questions that concern the em%loyment of gi"en %henomena for the construction of em%irical cognition# It is rather a %roblem for i!eal reason, hich %asses beyon! the s%here of a %ossible e?%erience an! aims at forming a ju!gement of that hich surroun!s an! circumscribes it, an! the %ro%er %lace for the consi!eration of it is the transcen!ental !ialectic# These four %ro%ositions, GIn mun!o non !atur hiatus, non !atur saltus, non !atur casus, non !atur fatum,G as ell as all %rinci%les of transcen!ental origin, e coul! "ery easily e?hibit in their %ro%er or!er, that is, in conformity ith the or!er of the categories, an! assign to each its %ro%er %lace# But the alrea!y %ractise! rea!er ill !o this for himself, or !isco"er the clue to such an arrangement# But the combine! result of all is sim%ly this, to a!mit into the em%irical synthesis nothing hich might cause a break in or be foreign to the un!erstan!ing an! the continuous connection of all %henomena, that is, the unity of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing# :or in the un!erstan!ing alone is the unity of e?%erience, in hich all %erce%tions must ha"e their assigne! %lace, %ossible# >hether the fiel! of %ossibility be greater than that of reality, an! hether the fiel! of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity, are interesting enough questions, an! quite ca%able of synthetic solution, questions, ho e"er, hich come un!er the juris!iction of reason alone# :or they are tantamount to asking hether all things as %henomena !o ithout e?ce%tion belong to the com%le? an! connecte! hole of a single e?%erience, of hich e"ery gi"en %erce%tion is a %art hich therefore cannot be conjoine! ith any other %henomenaBor, hether my %erce%tions can belong to more than one %ossible e?%erienceH The un!erstan!ing gi"es to e?%erience, accor!ing to the subjecti"e an! formal con!itions, of sensibility as ell as of a%%erce%tion, the rules

hich alone make this e?%erience %ossible# 9ther forms of intuition besi!es those of s%ace an! time, other forms of un!erstan!ing besi!es the !iscursi"e forms of thought, or of cognition by means of conce%tions, e can neither imagine nor make intelligible to oursel"es@ an! e"en if e coul!, they oul! still not belong to e?%erience, hich is the only mo!e of cognition by hich objects are %resente! to us# >hether other %erce%tions besi!es those hich belong to the total of our %ossible e?%erience, an! consequently hether some other s%here of matter e?ists, the un!erstan!ing has no %o er to !eci!e, its %ro%er occu%ation being ith the synthesis of that hich is gi"en# Aoreo"er, the %o"erty of the usual arguments hich go to %ro"e the e?istence of a "ast s%here of %ossibility, of hich all that is real De"ery object of e?%erienceE is but a small %art, is "ery remarkable# G)ll real is %ossibleG@ from this follo s naturally, accor!ing to the logical la s of con"ersion, the %articular %ro%osition( G7ome %ossible is real#G <o this seems to be equi"alent to( GAuch is %ossible that is not real#G <o !oubt it !oes seem as if e ought to consi!er the sum of the %ossible to be greater than that of the real, from the fact that something must be a!!e! to the former to constitute the latter# But this notion of a!!ing to the %ossible is absur!# :or that hich is not in the sum of the %ossible, an! consequently requires to be a!!e! to it, is manifestly im%ossible# In a!!ition to accor!ance ith the formal con!itions of e?%erience, the un!erstan!ing requires a connection ith some %erce%tion@ but that hich is connecte! ith this %erce%tion is real, e"en although it is not imme!iately %ercei"e!# But that another series of %henomena, in com%lete coherence ith that hich is gi"en in %erce%tion, consequently more than one all&embracing e?%erience is %ossible, is an inference hich cannot be conclu!e! from the !ata gi"en us by e?%erience, an! still less ithout any !ata at all# That hich is %ossible only un!er con!itions hich are themsel"es merely %ossible, is not %ossible in any res%ect# )n! yet e can fin! no more certain groun! on hich to base the !iscussion of the question hether the s%here of %ossibility is i!er than that of e?%erience# I ha"e merely mentione! these questions, that in treating of the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, there might be no omission of anything that, in the common o%inion, belongs to them# In reality, ho e"er, the notion of absolute %ossibility D%ossibility hich is "ali! in e"ery res%ectE is not a mere conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing, hich can be em%loye! em%irically, but belongs to reason alone, hich %asses the boun!s of all em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing# >e ha"e, therefore, contente! oursel"es ith a merely critical remark, lea"ing the subject to be e?%laine! in the sequel# Before conclu!ing this fourth section, an! at the same time the system of all %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, it seems %ro%er to mention the reasons hich in!uce! me to term the %rinci%les of mo!ality %ostulates# This e?%ression I !o not here use in the sense hich some more recent %hiloso%hers, contrary to its meaning ith mathematicians, to hom the or! %ro%erly belongs, attach to itBthat of a %ro%osition, namely, imme!iately certain, requiring neither !e!uction nor %roof# :or if, in the case of synthetical %ro%ositions, ho e"er e"i!ent they may be, e accor! to them ithout !e!uction, an! merely on the strength of their o n %retensions, unqualifie! belief, all critique of the un!erstan!ing is entirely lost@ an!, as there is no ant of bol! %retensions, hich the common belief Dthough for the %hiloso%her this is no cre!entialE !oes not reject, the un!erstan!ing lies e?%ose! to e"ery !elusion an! conceit, ithout

the %o er of refusing its assent to those assertions, hich, though illegitimate, !eman! acce%tance as "eritable a?ioms# >hen, therefore, to the conce%tion of a thing an a %riori !etermination is synthetically a!!e!, such a %ro%osition must obtain, if not a %roof, at least a !e!uction of the legitimacy of its assertion# The %rinci%les of mo!ality are, ho e"er, not objecti"ely synthetical, for the %re!icates of %ossibility, reality, an! necessity !o not in the least augment the conce%tion of that of hich they are affirme!, inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the re%resentation of the object# But as they are, ne"ertheless, al ays synthetical, they are so merely subjecti"ely# That is to say, they ha"e a reflecti"e %o er, an! a%%ly to the conce%tion of a thing, of hich, in other res%ects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in hich the conce%tion originates an! has its seat# 7o that if the conce%tion merely agree ith the formal con!itions of e?%erience, its object is calle! %ossible@ if it is in connection ith %erce%tion, an! !etermine! thereby, the object is real@ if it is !etermine! accor!ing to conce%tions by means of the connection of %erce%tions, the object is calle! necessary# The %rinci%les of mo!ality therefore %re!icate of a conce%tion nothing more than the %roce!ure of the faculty of cognition hich generate! it# <o a %ostulate in mathematics is a %ractical %ro%osition hich contains nothing but the synthesis by hich e %resent an object to oursel"es, an! %ro!uce the conce%tion of it, for e?am%le BG>ith a gi"en line, to !escribe a circle u%on a %lane, from a gi"en %ointG@ an! such a %ro%osition !oes not a!mit of %roof, because the %roce!ure, hich it requires, is e?actly that by hich alone it is %ossible to generate the conce%tion of such a figure# >ith the same right, accor!ingly, can e %ostulate the %rinci%les of mo!ality, because they !o not augment8 the conce%tion of a thing but merely in!icate the manner in hich it is connecte! ith the faculty of cognition# /8:ootnote( >hen I think the reality of a thing, I !o really think more than the %ossibility, but not in the thing@ for that can ne"er contain more in reality than as containe! in its com%lete %ossibility# But hile the notion of %ossibility is merely the notion of a %osition of thing in relation to the un!erstan!ing Dits em%irical useE, reality is the conjunction of the thing ith %erce%tion#3 GE<ER)' REA)RK 9< T;E 7$7TEA 9: PRI<CIP'E7# It is "ery remarkable that e cannot %ercei"e the %ossibility of a thing from the category alone, but must al ays ha"e an intuition, by hich to make e"i!ent the objecti"e reality of the %ure conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing# Take, for e?am%le, the categories of relation# ;o D6E a thing can e?ist only as a subject, an! not as a mere !etermination of other things, that is, can be substance@ or ho D,E, because something e?ists, some other thing must e?ist, consequently ho a thing can be a cause@ or ho D.E, hen se"eral things e?ist, from the fact that one of these things e?ists, some consequence to the others follo s, an! reci%rocally, an! in this ay a community of substances can be %ossibleBare questions hose solution cannot be obtaine! from mere conce%tions# The "ery same is the case ith the other categories@ for e?am%le, ho a thing can be of the same sort ith many others, that is, can be a quantity, an! so on# 7o long as e ha"e not intuition e cannot kno hether e !o really think an object by the categories, an! here an object can any here be foun! to cohere ith them, an! thus the truth is

establishe!, that the categories are not in themsel"es cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from gi"en intuitions# :or the same reason is it true that from categories alone no synthetical %ro%osition can be ma!e# :or e?am%le( GIn e"ery e?istence there is substance,G that is, something that can e?ist only as a subject an! not as mere %re!icate@ or, GE"erything is a quantityGBto construct %ro%ositions such as these, e require something to enable us to go out beyon! the gi"en conce%tion an! connect another ith it# :or the same reason the attem%t to %ro"e a synthetical %ro%osition by means of mere conce%tions, for e?am%le( GE"erything that e?ists contingently has a cause,G has ne"er succee!e!# >e coul! ne"er get further than %ro"ing that, ithout this relation to conce%tions, e coul! not concei"e the e?istence of the contingent, that is, coul! not a %riori through the un!erstan!ing cogniCe the e?istence of such a thing@ but it !oes not hence follo that this is also the con!ition of the %ossibility of the thing itself that is sai! to be contingent# If, accor!ingly@ e look back to our %roof of the %rinci%le of causality, e shall fin! that e ere able to %ro"e it as "ali! only of objects of %ossible e?%erience, an!, in!ee!, only as itself the %rinci%le of the %ossibility of e?%erience, Consequently of the cognition of an object gi"en in em%irical intuition, an! not from mere conce%tions# That, ho e"er, the %ro%osition( GE"erything that is contingent must ha"e a cause,G is e"i!ent to e"ery one merely from conce%tions, is not to be !enie!# But in this case the conce%tion of the contingent is cogitate! as in"ol"ing not the category of mo!ality Das that the non&e?istence of hich can be concei"e!E but that of relation Das that hich can e?ist only as the consequence of something elseE, an! so it is really an i!entical %ro%osition( GThat hich can e?ist only as a consequence, has a cause#G In fact, hen e ha"e to gi"e e?am%les of contingent e?istence, e al ays refer to changes, an! not merely to the %ossibility of concei"ing the o%%osite#8 But change is an e"ent, hich, as such, is %ossible only through a cause, an! consi!ere! %er se its non& e?istence is therefore %ossible, an! e become cogniCant of its contingency from the fact that it can e?ist only as the effect of a cause# ;ence, if a thing is assume! to be contingent, it is an analytical %ro%osition to say, it has a cause# /8:ootnote( >e can easily concei"e the non&e?istence of matter@ but the ancients !i! not thence infer its contingency# But e"en the alternation of the e?istence an! non&e?istence of a gi"en state in a thing, in hich all change consists, by no means %ro"es the contingency of that stateBthe groun! of %roof being the reality of its o%%osite# :or e?am%le, a bo!y is in a state of rest after motion, but e cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the fact that the former is the o%%osite of the latter# :or this o%%osite is merely a logical an! not a real o%%osite to the other# If e ish to !emonstrate the contingency of the motion, hat e ought to %ro"e is that, instea! of the motion hich took %lace in the %rece!ing %oint of time, it as %ossible for the bo!y to ha"e been then in rest, not, that it is after ar!s in rest@ for in this case, both o%%osites are %erfectly consistent ith each other#3 But it is still more remarkable that, to un!erstan! the %ossibility of things accor!ing to the categories an! thus to !emonstrate the objecti"e reality of the latter, e require not merely intuitions, but e?ternal intuitions# If, for e?am%le, e take the %ure conce%tions of relation, e fin! that D6E for the %ur%ose of %resenting to the conce%tion of substance

something %ermanent in intuition corres%on!ing thereto an! thus of !emonstrating the objecti"e reality of this conce%tion, e require an intuition Dof matterE in s%ace, because s%ace alone is %ermanent an! !etermines things as such, hile time, an! ith it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of continual flo @ D,E in or!er to re%resent change as the intuition corres%on!ing to the conce%tion of causality, e require the re%resentation of motion as change in s%ace@ in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the %ossibility of hich no %ure un!erstan!ing can %ercei"e, are ca%able of being intuite!# Change is the connection of !eterminations contra!ictorily o%%ose! to each other in the e?istence of one an! the same thing# <o , ho it is %ossible that out of a gi"en state one quite o%%osite to it in the same thing shoul! follo , reason ithout an e?am%le can not only not concei"e, but cannot e"en make intelligible ithout intuition@ an! this intuition is the motion of a %oint in s%ace@ the e?istence of hich in !ifferent s%aces Das a consequence of o%%osite !eterminationsE alone makes the intuition of change %ossible# :or, in or!er to make e"en internal change cognitable, e require to re%resent time, as the form of the internal sense, figurati"ely by a line, an! the internal change by the !ra ing of that line DmotionE, an! consequently are oblige! to em%loy e?ternal intuition to be able to re%resent the successi"e e?istence of oursel"es in !ifferent states# The %ro%er groun! of this fact is that all change to be %ercei"e! as change %resu%%oses something %ermanent in intuition, hile in the internal sense no %ermanent intuition is to be foun!# 'astly, the objecti"e %ossibility of the category of community cannot be concei"e! by mere reason, an! consequently its objecti"e reality cannot be !emonstrate! ithout an intuition, an! that e?ternal in s%ace# :or ho can e concei"e the %ossibility of community, that is, hen se"eral substances e?ist, that some effect on the e?istence of the one follo s from the e?istence of the other, an! reci%rocally, an! therefore that, because something e?ists in the latter, something else must e?ist in the former, hich coul! not be un!erstoo! from its o n e?istence aloneH :or this is the "ery essence of communityB hich is inconcei"able as a %ro%erty of things hich are %erfectly isolate!# ;ence, 'eibnitC, in attributing to the substances of the orl!Bas cogitate! by the un!erstan!ing aloneBa community, require! the me!iating ai! of a !i"inity@ for, from their e?istence, such a %ro%erty seeme! to him ith justice inconcei"able# But e can "ery easily concei"e the %ossibility of community Dof substances as %henomenaE if e re%resent them to oursel"es as in s%ace, consequently in e?ternal intuition# :or e?ternal intuition contains in itself a %riori formal e?ternal relations, as the con!itions of the %ossibility of the real relations of action an! reaction, an! therefore of the %ossibility of community# >ith the same ease can it be !emonstrate!, that the %ossibility of things as quantities, an! consequently the objecti"e reality of the category of quantity, can be groun!e! only in e?ternal intuition, an! that by its means alone is the notion of quantity a%%ro%riate! by the internal sense# But I must a"oi! %roli?ity, an! lea"e the task of illustrating this by e?am%les to the rea!erFs o n reflection# The abo"e remarks are of the greatest im%ortance, not only for the confirmation of our %re"ious confutation of i!ealism, but still more hen the subject of self&cognition by mere internal consciousness an! the !etermination of our o n nature ithout the ai! of e?ternal em%irical intuitions is un!er !iscussion, for the in!ication of the groun!s of the %ossibility of such a cognition#

The result of the hole of this %art of the analytic of %rinci%les is, therefore( G)ll %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing are nothing more than a %riori %rinci%les of the %ossibility of e?%erience, an! to e?%erience alone !o all a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions a%%ly an! relateG@ in!ee!, their %ossibility itself rests entirely on this relation#

CHAPTER III O+ t&e /r%und %+ t&e !"0"s"%n %+ all Ob$e,ts "nt% P&en%mena an! <oumena# >e ha"e no not only tra"erse! the region of the %ure un!erstan!ing an! carefully sur"eye! e"ery %art of it, but e ha"e also measure! it, an! assigne! to e"erything therein its %ro%er %lace# But this lan! is an islan!, an! enclose! by nature herself ithin unchangeable limits# It is the lan! of truth Dan attracti"e or!E, surroun!e! by a i!e an! stormy ocean, the region of illusion, here many a fog&bank, many an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his "oyage of !isco"ery, a ne country, an!, hile constantly !elu!ing him ith "ain ho%es, engages him in !angerous a!"entures, from hich he ne"er can !esist, an! hich yet he ne"er can bring to a termination# But before "enturing u%on this sea, in or!er to e?%lore it in its hole e?tent, an! to arri"e at a certainty hether anything is to be !isco"ere! there, it ill not be ithout a!"antage if e cast our eyes u%on the chart of the lan! that e are about to lea"e, an! to ask oursel"es, firstly, hether e cannot rest %erfectly contente! ith hat it contains, or hether e must not of necessity be contente! ith it, if e can fin! no here else a soli! foun!ation to buil! u%on@ an!, secon!ly, by hat title e %ossess this lan! itself, an! ho e hol! it secure against all hostile claimsH )lthough, in the course of our analytic, e ha"e alrea!y gi"en sufficient ans ers to these questions, yet a summary reca%itulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our con"iction, by uniting in one %oint the momenta of the arguments# >e ha"e seen that e"erything hich the un!erstan!ing !ra s from itself, ithout borro ing from e?%erience, it ne"ertheless %ossesses only for the behoof an! use of e?%erience# The %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, hether constituti"e a %riori Das the mathematical %rinci%lesE, or merely regulati"e Das the !ynamicalE, contain nothing but the %ure schema, as it ere, of %ossible e?%erience# :or e?%erience %ossesses its unity from the synthetical unity hich the un!erstan!ing, originally an! from itself, im%arts to the synthesis of the imagination in relation to a%%erce%tion, an! in a %riori relation to an! agreement ith hich %henomena, as !ata for a %ossible cognition, must stan!# But although these rules of the un!erstan!ing are not only a %riori true, but the "ery source of all truth, that is, of the accor!ance of our cognition ith objects, an! on this groun!, that they contain the basis of the %ossibility of e?%erience, as the ensemble of all cognition, it seems to us not enough to %ro%oun! hat is trueB e !esire also to be tol! hat e ant to kno # If, then, e learn nothing more by this critical e?amination than hat e shoul! ha"e %ractise! in the merely em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, ithout any such subtle inquiry, the %resum%tion is that the a!"antage e rea% from it

is not orth the labour besto e! u%on it# It may certainly be ans ere! that no rash curiosity is more %reju!icial to the enlargement of our kno le!ge than that hich must kno beforehan! the utility of this or that %iece of information hich e seek, before e ha"e entere! on the nee!ful in"estigations, an! before one coul! form the least conce%tion of its utility, e"en though it ere %lace! before our eyes# But there is one a!"antage in such transcen!ental inquiries hich can be ma!e com%rehensible to the !ullest an! most reluctant learnerBthis, namely, that the un!erstan!ing hich is occu%ie! merely ith em%irical e?ercise, an! !oes not reflect on the sources of its o n cognition, may e?ercise its functions "ery ell an! "ery successfully, but is quite unable to !o one thing, an! that of "ery great im%ortance, to !etermine, namely, the boun!s that limit its em%loyment, an! to kno hat lies ithin or ithout its o n s%here# This %ur%ose can be obtaine! only by such %rofoun! in"estigations as e ha"e institute!# But if it cannot !istinguish hether certain questions lie ithin its horiCon or not, it can ne"er be sure either as to its claims or %ossessions, but must lay its account ith many humiliating corrections, hen it transgresses, as it una"oi!ably ill, the limits of its o n territory, an! loses itself in fanciful o%inions an! blin!ing illusions# That the un!erstan!ing, therefore, cannot make of its a %riori %rinci%les, or e"en of its conce%tions, other than an em%irical use, is a %ro%osition hich lea!s to the most im%ortant results# ) transcen!ental use is ma!e of a conce%tion in a fun!amental %ro%osition or %rinci%le, hen it is referre! to things in general an! consi!ere! as things in themsel"es@ an em%irical use, hen it is referre! merely to %henomena, that is, to objects of a %ossible e?%erience# That the latter use of a conce%tion is the only a!missible one is e"i!ent from the reasons follo ing# :or e"ery conce%tion are requisite, firstly, the logical form of a conce%tion Dof thoughtE general@ an!, secon!ly, the %ossibility of %resenting to this an object to hich it may a%%ly# :ailing this latter, it has no sense, an! utterly "oi! of content, although it may contain the logical function for constructing a conce%tion from certain !ata# <o , object cannot be gi"en to a conce%tion other ise than by intuition, an!, e"en if a %ure intuition antece!ent to the object is a %riori %ossible, this %ure intuition can itself obtain objecti"e "ali!ity only from em%irical intuition, of hich it is itself but the form# )ll conce%tions, therefore, an! ith them all %rinci%les, ho e"er high the !egree of their a %riori %ossibility, relate to em%irical intuitions, that is, to !ata to ar!s a %ossible e?%erience# >ithout this they %ossess no objecti"e "ali!ity, but are mere %lay of imagination or of un!erstan!ing ith images or notions# 'et us take, for e?am%le, the conce%tions of mathematics, an! first in its %ure intuitions# G7%ace has three !imensionsGBGBet een t o %oints there can be only one straight line,G etc# )lthough all these %rinci%les, an! the re%resentation of the object ith hich this science occu%ies itself, are generate! in the min! entirely a %riori, they oul! ne"ertheless ha"e no significance if e ere not al ays able to e?hibit their significance in an! by means of %henomena Dem%irical objectsE# ;ence it is requisite that an abstract conce%tion be ma!e sensuous, that is, that an object corres%on!ing to it in intuition be forthcoming, other ise the conce%tion remains, as e say, ithout sense, that is, ithout meaning# Aathematics fulfils this requirement by the construction of the figure, hich is a %henomenon e"i!ent to the senses# The same science fin!s su%%ort an! significance in number@ this in its turn fin!s it in the fingers, or in counters, or in lines an! %oints# The conce%tion itself is al ays %ro!uce! a %riori, together ith the synthetical %rinci%les or formulas from such conce%tions@ but the %ro%er em%loyment of

them, an! their a%%lication to objects, can e?ist no here but in e?%erience, the %ossibility of hich, as regar!s its form, they contain a %riori# That this is also the case ith all of the categories an! the %rinci%les base! u%on them is e"i!ent from the fact that e cannot ren!er intelligible the %ossibility of an object corres%on!ing to them ithout ha"ing recourse to the con!itions of sensibility, consequently, to the form of %henomena, to hich, as their only %ro%er objects, their use must therefore be confine!, inasmuch as, if this con!ition is remo"e!, all significance, that is, all relation to an object, !isa%%ears, an! no e?am%le can be foun! to make it com%rehensible hat sort of things e ought to think un!er such conce%tions# The conce%tion of quantity cannot be e?%laine! e?ce%t by saying that it is the !etermination of a thing hereby it can be cogitate! ho many times one is %lace! in it# But this Gho many timesG is base! u%on successi"e re%etition, consequently u%on time an! the synthesis of the homogeneous therein# Reality, in contra!istinction to negation, can be e?%laine! only by cogitating a time hich is either fille! there ith or is "oi!# If I lea"e out the notion of %ermanence D hich is e?istence in all timeE, there remains in the conce%tion of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of hich I en!ea"our to realiCe by re%resenting to myself something that can e?ist only as a subject# But not only am I %erfectly ignorant of any con!itions un!er hich this logical %rerogati"e can belong to a thing, I can make nothing out of the notion, an! !ra no inference from it, because no object to hich to a%%ly the conce%tion is !etermine!, an! e consequently !o not kno hether it has any meaning at all# In like manner, if I lea"e out the notion of time, in hich something follo s u%on some other thing in conformity ith a rule, I can fin! nothing in the %ure category, e?ce%t that there is a something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may be !ra n as to the e?istence of some other thing# But in this case it oul! not only be im%ossible to !istinguish bet een a cause an! an effect, but, as this %o er to !ra conclusions requires con!itions of hich I am quite ignorant, the conce%tion is not !etermine! as to the mo!e in hich it ought to a%%ly to an object# The so&calle! %rinci%le( GE"erything that is contingent has a cause,G comes ith a gra"ity an! self&assume! authority that seems to require no su%%ort from ithout# But, I ask, hat is meant by contingentH The ans er is that the non&e?istence of hich is %ossible# But I shoul! like "ery ell to kno by hat means this %ossibility of non&e?istence is to be cogniCe!, if e !o not re%resent to oursel"es a succession in the series of %henomena, an! in this succession an e?istence hich follo s a non&e?istence, or con"ersely, consequently, change# :or to say, that the non&e?istence of a thing is not self&contra!ictory is a lame a%%eal to a logical con!ition, hich is no !oubt a necessary con!ition of the e?istence of the conce%tion, but is far from being sufficient for the real objecti"e %ossibility of non&e?istence# I can annihilate in thought e"ery e?isting substance ithout self&contra!iction, but I cannot infer from this their objecti"e contingency in e?istence, that is to say, the %ossibility of their non&e?istence in itself# )s regar!s the category of community, it may easily be inferre! that, as the %ure categories of substance an! causality are inca%able of a !efinition an! e?%lanation sufficient to !etermine their object ithout the ai! of intuition, the category of reci%rocal causality in the relation of substances to each other DcommerciumE is just as little susce%tible thereof# Possibility, e?istence, an! necessity nobo!y has e"er yet been able to e?%lain ithout being guilty of manifest tautology, hen the !efinition has been

!ra n entirely from the %ure un!erstan!ing# :or the substitution of the logical %ossibility of the conce%tionBthe con!ition of hich is that it be not self&contra!ictory, for the transcen!ental %ossibility of thingsBthe con!ition of hich is that there be an object corres%on!ing to the conce%tion, is a trick hich can only !ecei"e the ine?%erience!#8 /8:ootnote( In one or!, to none of these conce%tions belongs a corres%on!ing object, an! consequently their real %ossibility cannot be !emonstrate!, if e take a ay sensuous intuitionBthe only intuition hich e %ossessBan! there then remains nothing but the logical %ossibility, that is, the fact that the conce%tion or thought is %ossibleB hich, ho e"er, is not the question@ hat e ant to kno being, hether it relates to an object an! thus %ossesses any meaning#3 It follo s incontestably, that the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing are inca%able of transcen!ental, an! must al ays be of em%irical use alone, an! that the %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing relate only to the general con!itions of a %ossible e?%erience, to objects of the senses, an! ne"er to things in general, a%art from the mo!e in hich e intuite them# Transcen!ental analytic has accor!ingly this im%ortant result, to it, that the un!erstan!ing is com%etentF effect nothing a %riori, e?ce%t the antici%ation of the form of a %ossible e?%erience in general, an! that, as that hich is not %henomenon cannot be an object of e?%erience, it can ne"er o"erste% the limits of sensibility, ithin hich alone objects are %resente! to us# Its %rinci%les are merely %rinci%les of the e?%osition of %henomena, an! the %rou! name of an ontology, hich %rofesses to %resent synthetical cognitions a %riori of things in general in a systematic !octrine, must gi"e %lace to the mo!est title of analytic of the %ure un!erstan!ing# Thought is the act of referring a gi"en intuition to an object# If the mo!e of this intuition is unkno n to us, the object is merely transcen!ental, an! the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing is em%loye! only transcen!entally, that is, to %ro!uce unity in the thought of a manifol! in general# <o a %ure category, in hich all con!itions of sensuous intuitionBas the only intuition e %ossessBare abstracte!, !oes not !etermine an object, but merely e?%resses the thought of an object in general, accor!ing to !ifferent mo!es# <o , to em%loy a conce%tion, the function of ju!gement is require!, by hich an object is subsume! un!er the conce%tion, consequently the at least formal con!ition, un!er hich something can be gi"en in intuition# :ailing this con!ition of ju!gement DschemaE, subsum%tion is im%ossible@ for there is in such a case nothing gi"en, hich may be subsume! un!er the conce%tion# The merely transcen!ental use of the categories is therefore, in fact, no use at all an! has no !etermine!, or e"en, as regar!s its form, !eterminable object# ;ence it follo s that the %ure category is incom%etent to establish a synthetical a %riori %rinci%le, an! that the %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing are only of em%irical an! ne"er of transcen!ental use, an! that beyon! the s%here of %ossible e?%erience no synthetical a %riori %rinci%les are %ossible#

It may be a!"isable, therefore, to e?%ress oursel"es thus# The %ure categories, a%art from the formal con!itions of sensibility, ha"e a merely transcen!ental meaning, but are ne"ertheless not of transcen!ental use, because this is in itself im%ossible, inasmuch as all the con!itions of any em%loyment or use of them Din ju!gementsE are absent, to it, the formal con!itions of the subsum%tion of an object un!er these conce%tions# )s, therefore, in the character of %ure categories, they must be em%loye! em%irically, an! cannot be em%loye! transcen!entally, they are of no use at all, hen se%arate! from sensibility, that is, they cannot be a%%lie! to an object# They are merely the %ure form of the em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing in res%ect of objects in general an! of thought, ithout its being at the same time %ossible to think or to !etermine any object by their means# But there lurks at the foun!ation of this subject an illusion hich it is "ery !ifficult to a"oi!# The categories are not base!, as regar!s their origin, u%on sensibility, like the forms of intuition, s%ace, an! time@ they seem, therefore, to be ca%able of an a%%lication beyon! the s%here of sensuous objects# But this is not the case# They are nothing but mere forms of thought, hich contain only the logical faculty of uniting a %riori in consciousness the manifol! gi"en in intuition# )%art, then, from the only intuition %ossible for us, they ha"e still less meaning than the %ure sensuous forms, s%ace an! time, for through them an object is at least gi"en, hile a mo!e of connection of the manifol!, hen the intuition hich alone gi"es the manifol! is anting, has no meaning at all# )t the same time, hen e !esignate certain objects as %henomena or sensuous e?istences, thus !istinguishing our mo!e of intuiting them from their o n nature as things in themsel"es, it is e"i!ent that by this "ery !istinction e as it ere %lace the latter, consi!ere! in this their o n nature, although e !o not so intuite them, in o%%osition to the former, or, on the other han!, e !o so %lace other %ossible things, hich are not objects of our senses, but are cogitate! by the un!erstan!ing alone, an! call them intelligible e?istences DnoumenaE# <o the question arises hether the %ure conce%tions of our un!erstan!ing !o %ossess significance in res%ect of these latter, an! may %ossibly be a mo!e of cogniCing them# But e are met at the "ery commencement ith an ambiguity, hich may easily occasion great misa%%rehension# The un!erstan!ing, hen it terms an object in a certain relation %henomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a re%resentation or notion of an object in itself, an! hence belie"es that it can form also conce%tions of such objects# <o as the un!erstan!ing %ossesses no other fun!amental conce%tions besi!es the categories, it takes for grante! that an object consi!ere! as a thing in itself must be ca%able of being thought by means of these %ure conce%tions, an! is thereby le! to hol! the %erfectly un!etermine! conce%tion of an intelligible e?istence, a something out of the s%here of our sensibility, for a !eterminate conce%tion of an e?istence hich e can cogniCe in some ay or other by means of the un!erstan!ing# If, by the term noumenon, e un!erstan! a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mo!e of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negati"e sense of the or!# But if e un!erstan! by it an object of a non&sensuous intuition, e in this case assume a %eculiar mo!e of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to it, hich !oes not, ho e"er, belong to us, of the "ery %ossibility of hich e ha"e no notionBan! this is a noumenon in the %ositi"e sense#

The !octrine of sensibility is also the !octrine of noumena in the negati"e sense, that is, of things hich the un!erstan!ing is oblige! to cogitate a%art from any relation to our mo!e of intuition, consequently not as mere %henomena, but as things in themsel"es# But the un!erstan!ing at the same time com%rehen!s that it cannot em%loy its categories for the consi!eration of things in themsel"es, because these %ossess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in s%ace an! time, an! that they are com%etent to !etermine this unity by means of general a %riori connecting conce%tions only on account of the %ure i!eality of s%ace an! time# >here this unity of time is not to be met ith, as is the case ith noumena, the hole use, in!ee! the hole meaning of the categories is entirely lost, for e"en the %ossibility of things to corres%on! to the categories is in this case incom%rehensible# 9n this %oint, I nee! only refer the rea!er to hat I ha"e sai! at the commencement of the General Remark a%%en!e! to the foregoing cha%ter# <o , the %ossibility of a thing can ne"er be %ro"e! from the fact that the conce%tion of it is not self&contra!ictory, but only by means of an intuition corres%on!ing to the conce%tion# If, therefore, e ish to a%%ly the categories to objects hich cannot be regar!e! as %henomena, e must ha"e an intuition !ifferent from the sensuous, an! in this case the objects oul! be a noumena in the %ositi"e sense of the or!# <o , as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no %art of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely im%ossible for the categories to %ossess any a%%lication beyon! the limits of e?%erience# It may be true that there are intelligible e?istences to hich our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, an! cannot be a%%lie!, but our conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, !o not e?ten! to these# >hat, therefore, e call noumenon must be un!erstoo! by us as such in a negati"e sense# If I take a ay from an em%irical intuition all thought Dby means of the categoriesE, there remains no cognition of any object@ for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitate!, an!, from the e?istence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, it !oes not follo that this affection or re%resentation has any relation to an object ithout me# But if I take a ay all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that is, the mo!e of !etermining an object for the manifol! of a %ossible intuition# Thus the categories !o in some measure really e?ten! further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, ithout regar! to the mo!e Dof sensibilityE in hich these objects are gi"en# But they !o not for this reason a%%ly to an! !etermine a i!er s%here of objects, because e cannot assume that such can be gi"en, ithout %resu%%osing the %ossibility of another than the sensuous mo!e of intuition, a su%%osition e are not justifie! in making# I call a conce%tion %roblematical hich contains in itself no contra!iction, an! hich is connecte! ith other cognitions as a limitation of gi"en conce%tions, but hose objecti"e reality cannot be cogniCe! in any manner# The conce%tion of a noumenon, that is, of a thing hich must be cogitate! not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself Dsolely through the %ure un!erstan!ingE, is not self&contra!ictory, for e are not entitle! to maintain that sensibility is the only %ossible mo!e of intuition# <ay, further, this conce%tion is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition ithin the boun!s of %henomena, an! thus to limit the objecti"e "ali!ity of sensuous cognition@ for things in themsel"es, hich lie beyon! its %ro"ince, are calle! noumena for the "ery %ur%ose of in!icating that

this cognition !oes not e?ten! its a%%lication to all that the un!erstan!ing thinks# But, after all, the %ossibility of such noumena is quite incom%rehensible, an! beyon! the s%here of %henomena, all is for us a mere "oi!@ that is to say, e %ossess an un!erstan!ing hose %ro"ince !oes %roblematically e?ten! beyon! this s%here, but e !o not %ossess an intuition, in!ee!, not e"en the conce%tion of a %ossible intuition, by means of hich objects beyon! the region of sensibility coul! be gi"en us, an! in reference to hich the un!erstan!ing might be em%loye! assertorically# The conce%tion of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitati"e conce%tion an! therefore only of negati"e use# But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connecte! ith the limitation of sensibility, ithout, ho e"er, being ca%able of %resenting us ith any %ositi"e !atum beyon! this s%here# The !i"ision of objects into %henomena an! noumena, an! of the orl! into a mun!us sensibilis an! intelligibilis is therefore quite ina!missible in a %ositi"e sense, although conce%tions !o certainly a!mit of such a !i"ision@ for the class of noumena ha"e no !eterminate object corres%on!ing to them, an! cannot therefore %ossess objecti"e "ali!ity# If e aban!on the senses, ho can it be ma!e concei"able that the categories D hich are the only conce%tions that coul! ser"e as conce%tions for noumenaE ha"e any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a %ossible intuition, is requisite for their a%%lication to an objectH The conce%tion of a noumenon, consi!ere! as merely %roblematical, is, ho e"er, not only a!missible, but, as a limitati"e conce%tion of sensibility, absolutely necessary# But, in this case, a noumenon is not a %articular intelligible object for our un!erstan!ing@ on the contrary, the kin! of un!erstan!ing to hich it coul! belong is itself a %roblem, for e cannot form the most !istant conce%tion of the %ossibility of an un!erstan!ing hich shoul! cogniCe an object, not !iscursi"ely by means of categories, but intuiti"ely in a non&sensuous intuition# 9ur un!erstan!ing attains in this ay a sort of negati"e e?tension# That is to say, it is not limite! by, but rather limits, sensibility, by gi"ing the name of noumena to things, not consi!ere! as %henomena, but as things in themsel"es# But it at the same time %rescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cogniCe these by means of the categories, an! hence is com%elle! to cogitate them merely as an unkno n something# I fin!, ho e"er, in the ritings of mo!ern authors, an entirely !ifferent use of the e?%ressions, mun!us sensibilis an! intelligibilis, hich quite !e%arts from the meaning of the ancientsBan acce%tation in hich, in!ee!, there is to be foun! no !ifficulty, but hich at the same time !e%en!s on mere "erbal quibbling# )ccor!ing to this meaning, some ha"e chosen to call the com%le? of %henomena, in so far as it is intuite!, mun!us sensibilis, but in so far as the connection thereof is cogitate! accor!ing to general la s of thought, mun!us intelligibilis# )stronomy, in so far as e mean by the or! the mere obser"ation of the starry hea"en, may re%resent the former@ a system of astronomy, such as the Co%ernican or <e tonian, the latter# But such t isting of or!s is a mere so%histical subterfuge, to a"oi! a !ifficult question, by mo!ifying its meaning to suit our o n con"enience# To be sure, un!erstan!ing an! reason are em%loye! in the cognition of %henomena@ but the question is, hether these can be a%%lie! hen the object is not a %henomenon an! in this sense e regar! it if it is cogitate! as gi"en to the un!erstan!ing alone, an! not to the senses# The question therefore is hether, o"er an!

abo"e the em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, a transcen!ental use is %ossible, hich a%%lies to the noumenon as an object# This question e ha"e ans ere! in the negati"e# >hen therefore e say, the senses re%resent objects as they a%%ear, the un!erstan!ing as they are, the latter statement must not be un!erstoo! in a transcen!ental, but only in an em%irical signification, that is, as they must be re%resente! in the com%lete connection of %henomena, an! not accor!ing to hat they may be, a%art from their relation to %ossible e?%erience, consequently not as objects of the %ure un!erstan!ing# :or this must e"er remain unkno n to us# <ay, it is also quite unkno n to us hether any such transcen!ental or e?traor!inary cognition is %ossible un!er any circumstances, at least, hether it is %ossible by means of our categories# 4n!erstan!ing an! sensibility, ith us, can !etermine objects only in conjunction# If e se%arate them, e ha"e intuitions ithout conce%tions, or conce%tions ithout intuitions@ in both cases, re%resentations, hich e cannot a%%ly to any !eterminate object# If, after all our inquiries an! e?%lanations, any one still hesitates to aban!on the mere transcen!ental use of the categories, let him attem%t to construct ith them a synthetical %ro%osition# It oul!, of course, be unnecessary for this %ur%ose to construct an analytical %ro%osition, for that !oes not e?ten! the s%here of the un!erstan!ing, but, being concerne! only about hat is cogitate! in the conce%tion itself, it lea"es it quite un!eci!e! hether the conce%tion has any relation to objects, or merely in!icates the unity of thoughtBcom%lete abstraction being ma!e of the mo!i in hich an object may be gi"en( in such a %ro%osition, it is sufficient for the un!erstan!ing to kno hat lies in the conce%tionBto hat it a%%lies is to it in!ifferent# The attem%t must therefore be ma!e ith a synthetical an! so&calle! transcen!ental %rinci%le, for e?am%le( GE"erything that e?ists, e?ists as substance,G or, GE"erything that is contingent e?ists as an effect of some other thing, "iC#, of its cause#G <o I ask, hence can the un!erstan!ing !ra these synthetical %ro%ositions, hen the conce%tions containe! therein !o not relate to %ossible e?%erience but to things in themsel"es DnoumenaEH >here is to be foun! the thir! term, hich is al ays requisite P4RE site in a synthetical %ro%osition, hich may connect in the same %ro%osition conce%tions hich ha"e no logical DanalyticalE connection ith each otherH The %ro%osition ne"er ill be !emonstrate!, nay, more, the %ossibility of any such %ure assertion ne"er can be sho n, ithout making reference to the em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, an! thus, i%so facto, com%letely renouncing %ure an! non&sensuous ju!gement# Thus the conce%tion of %ure an! merely intelligible objects is com%letely "oi! of all %rinci%les of its a%%lication, because e cannot imagine any mo!e in hich they might be gi"en, an! the %roblematical thought hich lea"es a %lace o%en for them ser"es only, like a "oi! s%ace, to limit the use of em%irical %rinci%les, ithout containing at the same time any other object of cognition beyon! their s%here#

APPEN!I3.

9f the Equi"ocal <ature or )m%hiboly of the Conce%tions of Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcen!ental ith the Em%irical use of the 4n!erstan!ing# Reflection Drefle?ioE is not occu%ie! about objects themsel"es, for the %ur%ose of !irectly obtaining conce%tions of them, but is that state of the min! in hich e set oursel"es to !isco"er the subjecti"e con!itions un!er hich e obtain conce%tions# It is the consciousness of the relation of gi"en re%resentations to the !ifferent sources or faculties of cognition, by hich alone their relation to each other can be rightly !etermine!# The first question hich occurs in consi!ering our re%resentations is to hat faculty of cognition !o they belongH To the un!erstan!ing or to the sensesH Aany ju!gements are a!mitte! to be true from mere habit or inclination@ but, because reflection neither %rece!es nor follo s, it is hel! to be a ju!gement that has its origin in the un!erstan!ing# )ll ju!gements !o not require e?amination, that is, in"estigation into the groun!s of their truth# :or, hen they are imme!iately certain Dfor e?am%le( GBet een t o %oints there can be only one straight lineGE, no better or less me!iate test of their truth can be foun! than that hich they themsel"es contain an! e?%ress# But all ju!gement, nay, all com%arisons require reflection, that is, a !istinction of the faculty of cognition to hich the gi"en conce%tions belong# The act hereby I com%are my re%resentations ith the faculty of cognition hich originates them, an! hereby I !istinguish hether they are com%are! ith each other as belonging to the %ure un!erstan!ing or to sensuous intuition, I term transcen!ental reflection# <o , the relations in hich conce%tions can stan! to each other are those of i!entity an! !ifference, agreement an! o%%osition, of the internal an! e?ternal, finally, of the !eterminable an! the !etermining Dmatter an! formE# The %ro%er !etermination of these relations rests on the question, to hat faculty of cognition they subjecti"ely belong, hether to sensibility or un!erstan!ingH :or, on the manner in hich e sol"e this question !e%en!s the manner in hich e must cogitate these relations# Before constructing any objecti"e ju!gement, e com%are the conce%tions that are to be %lace! in the ju!gement, an! obser"e hether there e?ists i!entity Dof many re%resentations in one conce%tionE, if a general ju!gement is to be constructe!, or !ifference, if a %articular@ hether there is agreement hen affirmati"e@ an! o%%osition hen negati"e ju!gements are to be constructe!, an! so on# :or this reason e ought to call these conce%tions, conce%tions of com%arison Dconce%tus com%arationisE# But as, hen the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the content of conce%tions, that is to say, hether the things themsel"es are i!entical or !ifferent, in agreement or o%%osition, an! so on, the things can ha"e a t ofol! relation to our faculty of cognition, to it, a relation either to sensibility or to the un!erstan!ing, an! as on this relation !e%en!s their relation to each other, transcen!ental reflection, that is, the relation of gi"en re%resentations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone !etermine this latter relation# Thus e shall not be able to !isco"er hether the things are i!entical or !ifferent, in agreement or o%%osition, etc#, from the mere conce%tion of the things by means of com%arison Dcom%aratioE, but only by !istinguishing the mo!e of cognition to hich they belong, in other or!s, by means of transcen!ental reflection# >e may, therefore, ith justice say, that logical reflection is mere com%arison, for in it no account is taken of the faculty of cognition to hich the gi"en conce%tions belong, an! they are consequently, as far as regar!s their origin, to be treate! as homogeneous@ hile

transcen!ental reflection D hich a%%lies to the objects themsel"esE contains the groun! of the %ossibility of objecti"e com%arison of re%resentations ith each other, an! is therefore "ery !ifferent from the former, because the faculties of cognition to hich they belong are not e"en the same# Transcen!ental reflection is a !uty hich no one can neglect ho ishes to establish an a %riori ju!gement u%on things# >e shall no %rocee! to fulfil this !uty, an! thereby thro not a little light on the question as to the !etermination of the %ro%er business of the un!erstan!ing# 6# I!entity an! *ifference# >hen an object is %resente! to us se"eral times, but al ays ith the same internal !eterminations Dqualitas et quantitasE, it, if an object of %ure un!erstan!ing, is al ays the same, not se"eral things, but only one thing Dnumerica i!entitasE@ but if a %henomenon, e !o not concern oursel"es ith com%aring the conce%tion of the thing ith the conce%tion of some other, but, although they may be in this res%ect %erfectly the same, the !ifference of %lace at the same time is a sufficient groun! for asserting the numerical !ifference of these objects Dof senseE# Thus, in the case of t o !ro%s of ater, e may make com%lete abstraction of all internal !ifference Dquality an! quantityE, an!, the fact that they are intuite! at the same time in !ifferent %laces, is sufficient to justify us in hol!ing them to be numerically !ifferent# 'eibnitC regar!e! %henomena as things in themsel"es, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of %ure un!erstan!ing Dalthough, on account of the confuse! nature of their re%resentations, he ga"e them the name of %henomenaE, an! in this case his %rinci%le of the in!iscernible D%rinci%ium i!entatis in!iscernibiliumE is not to be im%ugne!# But, as %henomena are objects of sensibility, an!, as the un!erstan!ing, in res%ect of them, must be em%loye! em%irically an! not %urely or transcen!entally, %lurality an! numerical !ifference are gi"en by s%ace itself as the con!ition of e?ternal %henomena# :or one %art of s%ace, although it may be %erfectly similar an! equal to another %art, is still ithout it, an! for this reason alone is !ifferent from the latter, hich is a!!e! to it in or!er to make u% a greater s%ace# It follo s that this must hol! goo! of all things that are in the !ifferent %arts of s%ace at the same time, ho e"er similar an! equal one may be to another# ,# )greement an! 9%%osition# >hen reality is re%resente! by the %ure un!erstan!ing Drealitas noumenonE, o%%osition bet een realities is incogitableBsuch a relation, that is, that hen these realities are connecte! in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other an! may be re%resente! in the formula . &. L -# 9n the other han!, the real in a %henomenon Drealitas %haenomenonE may "ery ell be in mutual o%%osition, an!, hen unite! in the same subject, the one may com%letely or in %art annihilate the effect or consequence of the other@ as in the case of t o mo"ing forces in the same straight line !ra ing or im%elling a %oint in o%%osite !irections, or in the case of a %leasure counterbalancing a certain amount of %ain# .# The Internal an! E?ternal# In an object of the %ure un!erstan!ing, only that is internal hich has no relation Das regar!s its e?istenceE to anything !ifferent from itself# 9n the other han!, the internal !eterminations of a substantia %haenomenon in s%ace are nothing but relations, an! it is itself nothing more than a com%le? of mere relations# 7ubstance in s%ace e are cogniCant of only through forces o%erati"e in it, either !ra ing others to ar!s itself DattractionE, or %re"enting others from forcing into itself

Dre%ulsion an! im%enetrabilityE# >e kno no other %ro%erties that make u% the conce%tion of substance %henomenal in s%ace, an! hich e term matter# 9n the other han!, as an object of the %ure un!erstan!ing, e"ery substance must ha"e internal !etermination an! forces# But hat other internal attributes of such an object can I think than those hich my internal sense %resents to meH That, to it, hich in either itself thought, or something analogous to it# ;ence 'eibnitC, ho looke! u%on things as noumena, after !enying them e"erything like e?ternal relation, an! therefore also com%osition or combination, !eclare! that all substances, e"en the com%onent %arts of matter, ere sim%le substances ith %o ers of re%resentation, in one or!, mona!s# 1# Aatter an! :orm# These t o conce%tions lie at the foun!ation of all other reflection, so inse%arably are they connecte! ith e"ery mo!e of e?ercising the un!erstan!ing# The former !enotes the !eterminable in general, the secon! its !etermination, both in a transcen!ental sense, abstraction being ma!e of e"ery !ifference in that hich is gi"en, an! of the mo!e in hich it is !etermine!# 'ogicians formerly terme! the uni"ersal, matter, the s%ecific !ifference of this or that %art of the uni"ersal, form# In a ju!gement one may call the gi"en conce%tions logical matter Dfor the ju!gementE, the relation of these to each other Dby means of the co%ulaE, the form of the ju!gement# In an object, the com%osite %arts thereof DessentialiaE are the matter@ the mo!e in hich they are connecte! in the object, the form# In res%ect to things in general, unlimite! reality as regar!e! as the matter of all %ossibility, the limitation thereof DnegationE as the form, by hich one thing is !istinguishe! from another accor!ing to transcen!ental conce%tions# The un!erstan!ing !eman!s that something be gi"en Dat least in the conce%tionE, in or!er to be able to !etermine it in a certain manner# ;ence, in a conce%tion of the %ure un!erstan!ing, the matter %rece!es the form, an! for this reason 'eibnitC first assume! the e?istence of things Dmona!sE an! of an internal %o er of re%resentation in them, in or!er to foun! u%on this their e?ternal relation an! the community their state Dthat is, of their re%resentationsE# ;ence, ith him, s%ace an! time ere %ossibleBthe former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their !eterminations ith each other, as causes an! effects# )n! so oul! it really be, if the %ure un!erstan!ing ere ca%able of an imme!iate a%%lication to objects, an! if s%ace an! time ere !eterminations of things in themsel"es# But being merely sensuous intuitions, in hich e !etermine all objects solely as %henomena, the form of intuition Das a subjecti"e %ro%erty of sensibilityE must antece!e all matter DsensationsE, consequently s%ace an! time must antece!e all %henomena an! all !ata of e?%erience, an! rather make e?%erience itself %ossible# But the intellectual %hiloso%her coul! not en!ure that the form shoul! %rece!e the things themsel"es an! !etermine their %ossibility@ an objection %erfectly correct, if e assume that e intuite things as they are, although ith confuse! re%resentation# But as sensuous intuition is a %eculiar subjecti"e con!ition, hich is a %riori at the foun!ation of all %erce%tion, an! the form of hich is %rimiti"e, the form must be gi"en %er se, an! so far from matter Dor the things themsel"es hich a%%earE lying at the foun!ation of e?%erience Das e must conclu!e, if e ju!ge by mere conce%tionsE, the "ery %ossibility of itself %resu%%oses, on the contrary, a gi"en formal intuition Ds%ace an! timeE# REA)RK 9< T;E )AP;IB9'$ 9: T;E C9<CEPTI9<7 9: RE:'ECTI9<#

'et me be allo e! to term the %osition hich e assign to a conce%tion either in the sensibility or in the %ure un!erstan!ing, the transcen!ental %lace# In this manner, the a%%ointment of the %osition hich must be taken by each conce%tion accor!ing to the !ifference in its use, an! the !irections for !etermining this %lace to all conce%tions accor!ing to rules, oul! be a transcen!ental to%ic, a !octrine hich oul! thoroughly shiel! us from the surre%titious !e"ices of the %ure un!erstan!ing an! the !elusions hich thence arise, as it oul! al ays !istinguish to hat faculty of cognition each conce%tion %ro%erly belonge!# E"ery conce%tion, e"ery title, un!er hich many cognitions rank together, may be calle! a logical %lace# 4%on this is base! the logical to%ic of )ristotle, of hich teachers an! rhetoricians coul! a"ail themsel"es, in or!er, un!er certain titles of thought, to obser"e hat oul! best suit the matter they ha! to treat, an! thus enable themsel"es to quibble an! talk ith fluency an! an a%%earance of %rofun!ity# Transcen!ental to%ic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the abo"e&mentione! four titles of all com%arison an! !istinction, hich !iffer from categories in this res%ect, that they !o not re%resent the object accor!ing to that hich constitutes its conce%tion Dquantity, realityE, but set forth merely the com%arison of re%resentations, hich %rece!es our conce%tions of things# But this com%arison requires a %re"ious reflection, that is, a !etermination of the %lace to hich the re%resentations of the things hich are com%are! belong, hether, to it, they are cogitate! by the %ure un!erstan!ing, or gi"en by sensibility# Conce%tions may be logically com%are! ithout the trouble of inquiring to hat faculty their objects belong, hether as noumena, to the un!erstan!ing, or as %henomena, to sensibility# If, ho e"er, e ish to em%loy these conce%tions in res%ect of objects, %re"ious transcen!ental reflection is necessary# >ithout this reflection I shoul! make a "ery unsafe use of these conce%tions, an! construct %reten!e! synthetical %ro%ositions hich critical reason cannot ackno le!ge an! hich are base! solely u%on a transcen!ental am%hiboly, that is, u%on a substitution of an object of %ure un!erstan!ing for a %henomenon# :or ant of this !octrine of transcen!ental to%ic, an! consequently !ecei"e! by the am%hiboly of the conce%tions of reflection, the celebrate! 'eibnitC constructe! an intellectual system of the orl!, or rather, belie"e! himself com%etent to cogniCe the internal nature of things, by com%aring all objects merely ith the un!erstan!ing an! the abstract formal conce%tions of thought# 9ur table of the conce%tions of reflection gi"es us the une?%ecte! a!"antage of being able to e?hibit the !istincti"e %eculiarities of his system in all its %arts, an! at the same time of e?%osing the fun!amental %rinci%le of this %eculiar mo!e of thought, hich reste! u%on naught but a misconce%tion# ;e com%are! all things ith each other merely by means of conce%tions, an! naturally foun! no other !ifferences than those by hich the un!erstan!ing !istinguishes its %ure conce%tions one from another# The con!itions of sensuous intuition, hich contain in themsel"es their o n means of !istinction, he !i! not look u%on as %rimiti"e, because sensibility as to him but a confuse! mo!e of re%resentation an! not any %articular source of re%resentations# ) %henomenon as for him the re%resentation of the thing in itself, although !istinguishe! from cognition by the un!erstan!ing only in res%ect of the

logical formBthe former ith its usual ant of analysis containing, accor!ing to him, a certain mi?ture of collateral re%resentations in its conce%tion of a thing, hich it is the !uty of the un!erstan!ing to se%arate an! !istinguish# In one or!, 'eibnitC intellectualiCe! %henomena, just as 'ocke, in his system of noogony Dif I may be allo e! to make use of such e?%ressionsE, sensualiCe! the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, that is to say, !eclare! them to be nothing more than em%irical or abstract conce%tions of reflection# Instea! of seeking in the un!erstan!ing an! sensibility t o !ifferent sources of re%resentations, hich, ho e"er, can %resent us ith objecti"e ju!gements of things only in conjunction, each of these great men recogniCe! but one of these faculties, hich, in their o%inion, a%%lie! imme!iately to things in themsel"es, the other ha"ing no !uty but that of confusing or arranging the re%resentations of the former# )ccor!ingly, the objects of sense ere com%are! by 'eibnitC as things in general merely in the un!erstan!ing# 6st# ;e com%ares them in regar! to their i!entity or !ifferenceBas ju!ge! by the un!erstan!ing# )s, therefore, he consi!ere! merely the conce%tions of objects, an! not their %osition in intuition, in hich alone objects can be gi"en, an! left quite out of sight the transcen!ental locale of these conce%tionsB hether, that is, their object ought to be classe! among %henomena, or among things in themsel"es, it as to be e?%ecte! that he shoul! e?ten! the a%%lication of the %rinci%le of in!iscernibles, hich is "ali! solely of conce%tions of things in general, to objects of sense Dmun!us %haenomenonE, an! that he shoul! belie"e that he ha! thereby contribute! in no small !egree to e?ten! our kno le!ge of nature# In truth, if I cogniCe in all its inner !eterminations a !ro% of ater as a thing in itself, I cannot look u%on one !ro% as !ifferent from another, if the conce%tion of the one is com%letely i!entical ith that of the other# But if it is a %henomenon in s%ace, it has a %lace not merely in the un!erstan!ing Damong conce%tionsE, but also in sensuous e?ternal intuition Din s%aceE, an! in this case, the %hysical locale is a matter of in!ifference in regar! to the internal !eterminations of things, an! one %lace, B, may contain a thing hich is %erfectly similar an! equal to another in a %lace, ), just as ell as if the t o things ere in e"ery res%ect !ifferent from each other# *ifference of %lace ithout any other con!itions, makes the %lurality an! !istinction of objects as %henomena, not only %ossible in itself, but e"en necessary# Consequently, the abo"e so&calle! la is not a la of nature# It is merely an analytical rule for the com%arison of things by means of mere conce%tions# ,n!# The %rinci%le( GRealities Das sim%le affirmationsE ne"er logically contra!ict each other,G is a %ro%osition %erfectly true res%ecting the relation of conce%tions, but, hether as regar!s nature, or things in themsel"es Dof hich e ha"e not the slightest conce%tionE, is ithout any the least meaning# :or real o%%osition, in hich ) &B is L -, e?ists e"ery here, an o%%osition, that is, in hich one reality unite! ith another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the otherBa fact hich is constantly brought before our eyes by the !ifferent antagonistic actions an! o%erations in nature, hich, ne"ertheless, as !e%en!ing on real forces, must be calle! realitates %haenomena# General mechanics can e"en %resent us ith the em%irical con!ition of this o%%osition in an a %riori rule, as it !irects its attention to the o%%osition in the !irection of forcesBa con!ition of hich the transcen!ental conce%tion of reality can tell us nothing# )lthough

A# 'eibnitC !i! not announce this %ro%osition ith %recisely the %om% of a ne %rinci%le, he yet em%loye! it for the establishment of ne %ro%ositions, an! his follo ers intro!uce! it into their 'eibnitCio&>olfian system of %hiloso%hy# )ccor!ing to this %rinci%le, for e?am%le, all e"ils are but consequences of the limite! nature of create! beings, that is, negations, because these are the only o%%osite of reality# DIn the mere conce%tion of a thing in general this is really the case, but not in things as %henomena#E In like manner, the u%hol!ers of this system !eem it not only %ossible, but natural also, to connect an! unite all reality in one being, because they ackno le!ge no other sort of o%%osition than that of contra!iction Dby hich the conce%tion itself of a thing is annihilate!E, an! fin! themsel"es unable to concei"e an o%%osition of reci%rocal !estruction, so to s%eak, in hich one real cause !estroys the effect of another, an! the con!itions of hose re%resentation e meet ith only in sensibility# .r!# The 'eibnitCian mona!ology has really no better foun!ation than on this %hiloso%herFs mo!e of falsely re%resenting the !ifference of the internal an! e?ternal solely in relation to the un!erstan!ing# 7ubstances, in general, must ha"e something in ar!, hich is therefore free from e?ternal relations, consequently from that of com%osition also# The sim%leBthat hich can be re%resente! by a unitBis therefore the foun!ation of that hich is internal in things in themsel"es# The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in %lace, sha%e, contact, or motion, !eterminations hich are all e?ternal relations, an! e can ascribe to them no other than that hereby e internally !etermine our faculty of sense itself, that is to say, the state of re%resentation# Thus, then, ere constructe! the mona!s, hich ere to form the elements of the uni"erse, the acti"e force of hich consists in re%resentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confine! to themsel"es# :or the same reason, his "ie of the %ossible community of substances coul! not re%resent it but as a %re!etermine! harmony, an! by no means as a %hysical influence# :or inasmuch as e"erything is occu%ie! only internally, that is, ith its o n re%resentations, the state of the re%resentations of one substance coul! not stan! in acti"e an! li"ing connection ith that of another, but some thir! cause o%erating on all ithout e?ce%tion as necessary to make the !ifferent states corres%on! ith one another# )n! this !i! not ha%%en by means of assistance a%%lie! in each %articular case Dsystema assistentiaeE, but through the unity of the i!ea of a cause occu%ie! an! connecte! ith all substances, in hich they necessarily recei"e, accor!ing to the 'eibnitCian school, their e?istence an! %ermanence, consequently also reci%rocal corres%on!ence, accor!ing to uni"ersal la s# 1th# This %hiloso%herFs celebrate! !octrine of s%ace an! time, in hich he intellectualiCe! these forms of sensibility, originate! in the same !elusion of transcen!ental reflection# If I attem%t to re%resent by the mere un!erstan!ing, the e?ternal relations of things, I can !o so only by em%loying the conce%tion of their reci%rocal action, an! if I ish to connect one state of the same thing ith another state, I must a"ail myself of the notion of the or!er of cause an! effect# )n! thus 'eibnitC regar!e! s%ace as a certain or!er in the community of substances, an! time as the !ynamical sequence of their states# That hich s%ace an! time %ossess %ro%er to themsel"es an! in!e%en!ent of things, he ascribe! to a necessary confusion in our

conce%tions of them, hereby that hich is a mere form of !ynamical relations is hel! to be a self&e?istent intuition, antece!ent e"en to things themsel"es# Thus s%ace an! time ere the intelligible form of the connection of things Dsubstances an! their statesE in themsel"es# But things ere intelligible substances Dsubstantiae noumenaE# )t the same time, he ma!e these conce%tions "ali! of %henomena, because he !i! not allo to sensibility a %eculiar mo!e of intuition, but sought all, e"en the em%irical re%resentation of objects, in the un!erstan!ing, an! left to sense naught but the !es%icable task of confusing an! !isarranging the re%resentations of the former# But e"en if e coul! frame any synthetical %ro%osition concerning things in themsel"es by means of the %ure un!erstan!ing D hich is im%ossibleE, it coul! not a%%ly to %henomena, hich !o not re%resent things in themsel"es# In such a case I shoul! be oblige! in transcen!ental reflection to com%are my conce%tions only un!er the con!itions of sensibility, an! so s%ace an! time oul! not be !eterminations of things in themsel"es, but of %henomena# >hat things may be in themsel"es, I kno not an! nee! not kno , because a thing is ne"er %resente! to me other ise than as a %henomenon# I must a!o%t the same mo!e of %roce!ure ith the other conce%tions of reflection# Aatter is substantia %haenomenon# That in it hich is internal I seek to !isco"er in all %arts of s%ace hich it occu%ies, an! in all the functions an! o%erations it %erforms, an! hich are in!ee! ne"er anything but %henomena of the e?ternal sense# I cannot therefore fin! anything that is absolutely, but only hat is com%arati"ely internal, an! hich itself consists of e?ternal relations# The absolutely internal in matter, an! as it shoul! be accor!ing to the %ure un!erstan!ing, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an object for the %ure un!erstan!ing# But the transcen!ental object, hich is the foun!ation of the %henomenon hich e call matter, is a mere nescio qui!, the nature of hich e coul! not un!erstan!, e"en though someone ere foun! able to tell us# :or e can un!erstan! nothing that !oes not bring ith it something in intuition corres%on!ing to the e?%ressions em%loye!# If, by the com%laint of being unable to %ercei"e the internal nature of things, it is meant that e !o not com%rehen! by the %ure un!erstan!ing hat the things hich a%%ear to us may be in themsel"es, it is a silly an! unreasonable com%laint@ for those ho talk thus really !esire that e shoul! be able to cogniCe, consequently to intuite, things ithout senses, an! therefore ish that e %ossesse! a faculty of cognition %erfectly !ifferent from the human faculty, not merely in !egree, but e"en as regar!s intuition an! the mo!e thereof, so that thus e shoul! not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the %ossibility of hose e?istence, much less their nature an! constitution, e ha"e no means of cogniCing# By obser"ation an! analysis of %henomena e %enetrate into the interior of nature, an! no one can say hat %rogress this kno le!ge may make in time# But those transcen!ental questions hich %ass beyon! the limits of nature, e coul! ne"er ans er, e"en although all nature ere lai! o%en to us, because e ha"e not the %o er of obser"ing our o n min! ith any other intuition than that of our internal sense# :or herein lies the mystery of the origin an! source of our faculty of sensibility# Its a%%lication to an object, an! the transcen!ental groun! of this unity of subjecti"e an! objecti"e, lie too !ee%ly conceale! for us, ho cogniCe oursel"es only through the internal sense, consequently as %henomena, to be able to !isco"er in our e?istence anything but %henomena, the non& sensuous cause of hich e at the same time earnestly !esire to %enetrate to#

The great utility of this critique of conclusions arri"e! at by the %rocesses of mere reflection consists in its clear !emonstration of the nullity of all conclusions res%ecting objects hich are com%are! ith each other in the un!erstan!ing alone, hile it at the same time confirms hat e %articularly insiste! on, namely, that, although %henomena are not inclu!e! as things in themsel"es among the objects of the %ure un!erstan!ing, they are ne"ertheless the only things by hich our cognition can %ossess objecti"e reality, that is to say, hich gi"e us intuitions to corres%on! ith our conce%tions# >hen e reflect in a %urely logical manner, e !o nothing more than com%are conce%tions in our un!erstan!ing, to !isco"er hether both ha"e the same content, hether they are self&contra!ictory or not, hether anything is containe! in either conce%tion, hich of the t o is gi"en, an! hich is merely a mo!e of thinking that gi"en# But if I a%%ly these conce%tions to an object in general Din the transcen!ental senseE, ithout first !etermining hether it is an object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations %resent themsel"es, hich forbi! us to %ass beyon! the conce%tions an! ren!er all em%irical use of them im%ossible# )n! thus these limitations %ro"e that the re%resentation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient, but, ithout sensuous !etermination an! in!e%en!ently of em%irical con!itions, self&contra!ictory@ that e must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, a!mitting them, must think them un!er con!itions of sensuous intuition@ that, consequently, the intelligible requires an altogether %eculiar intuition, hich e !o not %ossess, an! in the absence of hich it is for us nothing@ hile, on the other han! %henomena cannot be objects in themsel"es# :or, hen I merely think things in general, the !ifference in their e?ternal relations cannot constitute a !ifference in the things themsel"es@ on the contrary, the former %resu%%oses the latter, an! if the conce%tion of one of t o things is not internally !ifferent from that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in !ifferent relations# :urther, by the a!!ition of one affirmation DrealityE to the other, the %ositi"e therein is really augmente!, an! nothing is abstracte! or ith!ra n from it@ hence the real in things cannot be in contra!iction ith or o%%osition to itselfBan! so on# The true use of the conce%tions of reflection in the em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing has, as e ha"e sho n, been so misconcei"e! by 'eibnitC, one of the most acute %hiloso%hers of either ancient or mo!ern times, that he has been misle! into the construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition, hich %rofesses to !etermine its objects ithout the inter"ention of the senses# :or this reason, the e?%osition of the cause of the am%hiboly of these conce%tions, as the origin of these false %rinci%les, is of great utility in !etermining ith certainty the %ro%er limits of the un!erstan!ing# It is right to say hate"er is affirme! or !enie! of the hole of a conce%tion can be affirme! or !enie! of any %art of it D!ictum !e omni et nulloE@ but it oul! be absur! so to alter this logical %ro%osition as to say hate"er is not containe! in a general conce%tion is like ise not containe! in the %articular conce%tions hich rank un!er it@ for the latter are %articular conce%tions, for the "ery reason that their content is greater than that hich is cogitate! in the general conce%tion# )n! yet the hole intellectual system of 'eibnitC is base! u%on this false %rinci%le, an! ith it must necessarily fall to

the groun!, together ith all the ambiguous %rinci%les in reference to the em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing hich ha"e thence originate!# 'eibnitCFs %rinci%le of the i!entity of in!iscernibles or in!istinguishables is really base! on the %resu%%osition that, if in the conce%tion of a thing a certain !istinction is not to be foun!, it is also not to be met ith in things themsel"es@ that, consequently, all things are com%letely i!entical Dnumero ea!emE hich are not !istinguishable from each other Das to quality or quantityE in our conce%tions of them# But, as in the mere conce%tion of anything abstraction has been ma!e of many necessary con!itions of intuition, that of hich abstraction has been ma!e is rashly hel! to be non&e?istent, an! nothing is attribute! to the thing but hat is containe! in its conce%tion# The conce%tion of a cubic foot of s%ace, ho e"er I may think it, is in itself com%letely i!entical# But t o cubic feet in s%ace are ne"ertheless !istinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in !ifferent %laces Dthey are numero !i"ersaE@ an! these %laces are con!itions of intuition, herein the object of this conce%tion is gi"en, an! hich !o not belong to the conce%tion, but to the faculty of sensibility# In like manner, there is in the conce%tion of a thing no contra!iction hen a negati"e is not connecte! ith an affirmati"e@ an! merely affirmati"e conce%tions cannot, in conjunction, %ro!uce any negation# But in sensuous intuition, herein reality Dtake for e?am%le, motionE is gi"en, e fin! con!itions Do%%osite !irectionsEBof hich abstraction has been ma!e in the conce%tion of motion in generalB hich ren!er %ossible a contra!iction or o%%osition Dnot in!ee! of a logical kin!EBan! hich from %ure %ositi"es %ro!uce Cero L -# >e are therefore not justifie! in saying that all reality is in %erfect agreement an! harmony, because no contra!iction is !isco"erable among its conce%tions#8 )ccor!ing to mere conce%tions, that hich is internal is the substratum of all relations or e?ternal !eterminations# >hen, therefore, I abstract all con!itions of intuition, an! confine myself solely to the conce%tion of a thing in general, I can make abstraction of all e?ternal relations, an! there must ne"ertheless remain a conce%tion of that hich in!icates no relation, but merely internal !eterminations# <o it seems to follo that in e"erything DsubstanceE there is something hich is absolutely internal an! hich antece!es all e?ternal !eterminations, inasmuch as it ren!ers them %ossible@ an! that therefore this substratum is something hich !oes not contain any e?ternal relations an! is consequently sim%le Dfor cor%oreal things are ne"er anything but relations, at least of their %arts e?ternal to each otherE@ an!, inasmuch as e kno of no other absolutely internal !eterminations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not only sim%le, but also, analogously ith our internal sense, !etermine! through re%resentations, that is to say, all things are %ro%erly mona!s, or sim%le beings en!o e! ith the %o er of re%resentation# <o all this oul! be %erfectly correct, if the conce%tion of a thing ere the only necessary con!ition of the %resentation of objects of e?ternal intuition# It is, on the contrary, manifest that a %ermanent %henomenon in s%ace Dim%enetrable e?tensionE can contain mere relations, an! nothing that is absolutely internal, an! yet be the %rimary substratum of all e?ternal %erce%tion# By mere conce%tions I cannot think anything e?ternal, ithout, at the same time, thinking something internal, for the reason that conce%tions of relations %resu%%ose gi"en things, an! ithout these are im%ossible# But, as an intuition there is something Dthat is, s%ace, hich, ith all it contains, consists of %urely formal, or, in!ee!, real relationsE

hich is not foun! in the mere conce%tion of a thing in general, an! this %resents to us the substratum hich coul! not be cogniCe! through conce%tions alone, I cannot say( because a thing cannot be re%resente! by mere conce%tions ithout something absolutely internal, there is also, in the things themsel"es hich are containe! un!er these conce%tions, an! in their intuition nothing e?ternal to hich something absolutely internal !oes not ser"e as the foun!ation# :or, hen e ha"e ma!e abstraction of all the con!itions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere conce%tion nothing but the internal in general, through hich alone the e?ternal is %ossible# But this necessity, hich is groun!e! u%on abstraction alone, !oes not obtain in the case of things themsel"es, in so far as they are gi"en in intuition ith such !eterminations as e?%ress mere relations, ithout ha"ing anything internal as their foun!ation@ for they are not things of a thing of hich e can neither for they are not things in themsel"es, but only %henomena# >hat e cogniCe in matter is nothing but relations D hat e call its internal !eterminations are but com%arati"ely internalE# But there are some self& subsistent an! %ermanent, through hich a !etermine! object is gi"en# That I, hen abstraction is ma!e of these relations, ha"e nothing more to think, !oes not !estroy the conce%tion of a thing as %henomenon, nor the conce%tion of an object in abstracto, but it !oes a ay ith the %ossibility of an object that is !eterminable accor!ing to mere conce%tions, that is, of a noumenon# It is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists solely of relations@ but this thing is sim%ly a %henomenon, an! cannot be cogitate! by means of the mere categories( it !oes itself consist in the mere relation of something in general to the senses# In the same ay, e cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if e commence ith conce%tions alone, in any other manner than that one is the cause of !eterminations in the other@ for that is itself the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing or category of relation# But, as in this case e make abstraction of all intuition, e lose altogether the mo!e in hich the manifol! !etermines to each of its %arts its %lace, that is, the form of sensibility Ds%aceE@ an! yet this mo!e antece!es all em%irical causality# /8:ootnote( If any one ishes here to ha"e recourse to the usual subterfuge, an! to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in o%%osition to each other, it ill be requisite for him to a!!uce an e?am%le of this %ure an! non&sensuous reality, that it may be un!erstoo! hether the notion re%resents something or nothing# But an e?am%le cannot be foun! e?ce%t in e?%erience, hich ne"er %resents to us anything more than %henomena@ an! thus the %ro%osition means nothing more than that the conce%tion hich contains only affirmati"es !oes not contain anything negati"eBa %ro%osition nobo!y e"er !oubte!#3 If by intelligible objects e un!erstan! things hich can be thought by means of the %ure categories, ithout the nee! of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are im%ossible# :or the con!ition of the objecti"e use of all our conce%tions of un!erstan!ing is the mo!e of our sensuous intuition, hereby objects are gi"en@ an!, if e make abstraction of the latter, the former can ha"e no relation to an object# )n! e"en if e shoul! su%%ose a !ifferent kin! of intuition from our o n, still our functions of thought oul! ha"e no use or signification in res%ect thereof# But if e un!erstan! by the term, objects of a non&sensuous intuition, in res%ect of hich our categories are not

"ali!, an! of hich e can accor!ingly ha"e no kno le!ge Dneither intuition nor conce%tionE, in this merely negati"e sense noumena must be a!mitte!# :or this is no more than saying that our mo!e of intuition is not a%%licable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objecti"e "ali!ity is limite!, an! that room is therefore left for another kin! of intuition, an! thus also for things that may be objects of it# But in this sense the conce%tion of a noumenon is %roblematical, that is to say, it is the notion of that it that it is %ossible, nor that it is im%ossible, inasmuch as e !o not kno of any mo!e of intuition besi!es the sensuous, or of any other sort of conce%tions than the categoriesBa mo!e of intuition an! a kin! of conce%tion neither of hich is a%%licable to a non&sensuous object# >e are on this account incom%etent to e?ten! the s%here of our objects of thought beyon! the con!itions of our sensibility, an! to assume the e?istence of objects of %ure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as these ha"e no true %ositi"e signification# :or it must be confesse! of the categories that they are not of themsel"es sufficient for the cognition of things in themsel"es an!, ithout the !ata of sensibility, are mere subjecti"e forms of the unity of the un!erstan!ing# Thought is certainly not a %ro!uct of the senses, an! in so far is not limite! by them, but it !oes not therefore follo that it may be em%loye! %urely an! ithout the inter"ention of sensibility, for it oul! then be ithout reference to an object# )n! e cannot call a noumenon an object of %ure thought@ for the re%resentation thereof is but the %roblematical conce%tion of an object for a %erfectly !ifferent intuition an! a %erfectly !ifferent un!erstan!ing from ours, both of hich are consequently themsel"es %roblematical# The conce%tion of a noumenon is therefore not the conce%tion of an object, but merely a %roblematical conce%tion inse%arably connecte! ith the limitation of our sensibility# That is to say, this conce%tion contains the ans er to the question( G)re there objects quite unconnecte! ith, an! in!e%en!ent of, our intuitionHGBa question to hich only an in!eterminate ans er can be gi"en# That ans er is( GInasmuch as sensuous intuition !oes not a%%ly to all things ithout !istinction, there remains room for other an! !ifferent objects#G The e?istence of these %roblematical objects is therefore not absolutely !enie!, in the absence of a !eterminate conce%tion of them, but, as no category is "ali! in res%ect of them, neither must they be a!mitte! as objects for our un!erstan!ing# 4n!erstan!ing accor!ingly limits sensibility, ithout at the same time enlarging its o n fiel!# >hile, moreo"er, it forbi!s sensibility to a%%ly its forms an! mo!es to things in themsel"es an! restricts it to the s%here of %henomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only, ho e"er, as a transcen!ental object, hich is the cause of a %henomenon Dconsequently not itself a %henomenonE, an! hich cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance Dbecause these conce%tions al ays require sensuous forms in hich to !etermine an objectEBan object, therefore, of hich e are quite unable to say hether it can be met ith in oursel"es or out of us, hether it oul! be annihilate! together ith sensibility, or, if this ere taken a ay, oul! continue to e?ist# If e ish to call this object a noumenon, because the re%resentation of it is non& sensuous, e are at liberty to !o so# But as e can a%%ly to it none of the conce%tions of our un!erstan!ing, the re%resentation is for us quite "oi!, an! is a"ailable only for the in!ication of the limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby lea"ing at the same time an em%ty s%ace, hich e are com%etent to fill by the ai! neither of %ossible e?%erience, nor of the %ure un!erstan!ing#

The critique of the %ure un!erstan!ing, accor!ingly, !oes not %ermit us to create for oursel"es a ne fiel! of objects beyon! those hich are %resente! to us as %henomena, an! to stray into intelligible orl!s@ nay, it !oes not e"en allo us to en!ea"our to form so much as a conce%tion of them# The s%ecious error hich lea!s to thisBan! hich is a %erfectly e?cusable oneBlies in the fact that the em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing, contrary to its %ro%er %ur%ose an! !estination, is ma!e transcen!ental, an! objects, that is, %ossible intuitions, are ma!e to regulate themsel"es accor!ing to conce%tions, instea! of the conce%tions arranging themsel"es accor!ing to the intuitions, on hich alone their o n objecti"e "ali!ity rests# <o the reason of this again is that a%%erce%tion, an! ith it thought, antece!es all %ossible !eterminate arrangement of re%resentations# )ccor!ingly e think something in general an! !etermine it on the one han! sensuously, but, on the other, !istinguish the general an! in abstracto re%resente! object from this %articular mo!e of intuiting it# In this case there remains a mo!e of !etermining the object by mere thought, hich is really but a logical form ithout content, hich, ho e"er, seems to us to be a mo!e of the e?istence of the object in itself DnoumenonE, ithout regar! to intuition hich is limite! to our senses# Before en!ing this transcen!ental analytic, e must make an a!!ition, hich, although in itself of no %articular im%ortance, seems to be necessary to the com%leteness of the system# The highest conce%tion, ith hich a transcen!ental %hiloso%hy commonly begins, is the !i"ision into %ossible an! im%ossible# But as all !i"ision %resu%%oses a !i"i!e! conce%tion, a still higher one must e?ist, an! this is the conce%tion of an object in generalB%roblematically un!erstoo! an! ithout its being !eci!e! hether it is something or nothing# )s the categories are the only conce%tions hich a%%ly to objects in general, the !istinguishing of an object, hether it is something or nothing, must %rocee! accor!ing to the or!er an! !irection of the categories# 6# To the categories of quantity, that is, the conce%tions of all, many, an! one, the conce%tion hich annihilates all, that is, the conce%tion of none, is o%%ose!# )n! thus the object of a conce%tion, to hich no intuition can be foun! to corres%on!, is L nothing# That is, it is a conce%tion ithout an object Dens rationisE, like noumena, hich cannot be consi!ere! %ossible in the s%here of reality, though they must not therefore be hel! to be im%ossibleBor like certain ne fun!amental forces in matter, the e?istence of hich is cogitable ithout contra!iction, though, as e?am%les from e?%erience are not forthcoming, they must not be regar!e! as %ossible# ,# Reality is something@ negation is nothing, that is, a conce%tion of the absence of an object, as col!, a sha!o Dnihil %ri"ati"umE# .# The mere form of intuition, ithout substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal con!ition of an object Das %henomenonE, as %ure s%ace an! %ure time# These are certainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themsel"es objects hich are intuite! Dens imaginariumE# 1# The object of a conce%tion hich is self&contra!ictory, is nothing, because the conce%tion is nothingBis im%ossible, as a figure com%ose! of t o straight lines Dnihil negati"umE#

The table of this !i"ision of the conce%tion of nothing Dthe corres%on!ing !i"ision of the conce%tion of something !oes not require s%ecial !escri%tionE must therefore be arrange! as follo s( <9T;I<G )7 6 )s Em%ty Conce%tion ithout object, ens rationis , . Em%ty object of Em%ty intuition a conce%tion, ithout object, nihil %ri"ati"um ens imaginarium 1 Em%ty object ithout conce%tion, nihil negati"um >e see that the ens rationis is !istinguishe! from the nihil negati"um or %ure nothing by the consi!eration that the former must not be reckone! among %ossibilities, because it is a mere fictionBthough not self&contra!ictory, hile the latter is com%letely o%%ose! to all %ossibility, inasmuch as the conce%tion annihilates itself# Both, ho e"er, are em%ty conce%tions# 9n the other han!, the nihil %ri"ati"um an! ens imaginarium are em%ty !ata for conce%tions# If light be not gi"en to the senses, e cannot re%resent to oursel"es !arkness, an! if e?ten!e! objects are not %ercei"e!, e cannot re%resent s%ace# <either the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, ithout something real, be an object# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' '9GIC# 7EC9<* *IKI7I9<# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' *I)'ECTIC# I<TR9*4CTI9<# I# 9f Transcen!ental Illusory )%%earance# >e terme! !ialectic in general a logic of a%%earance# This !oes not signify a !octrine of %robability@ for %robability is truth, only cogniCe! u%on insufficient groun!s, an! though the information it gi"es us is im%erfect, it is not therefore !eceitful# ;ence it must not be se%arate! from the analytical %art of logic# 7till less must %henomenon an! a%%earance be hel! to be i!entical# :or truth or illusory a%%earance !oes not resi!e in the object, in so far as it is intuite!, but in the ju!gement u%on the object, in so far as it is thought# It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses !o not err, not because they al ays ju!ge correctly, but because they !o not ju!ge at all# ;ence truth an! error, consequently also, illusory a%%earance as the cause of error, are only to be foun! in a ju!gement, that is, in the relation of an object to our un!erstan!ing# In a cognition hich com%letely harmoniCes ith the la s of the un!erstan!ing, no error can e?ist# In a re%resentation of the sensesBas not containing any ju!gementBthere is also no error#

But no %o er of nature can of itself !e"iate from its o n la s# ;ence neither the un!erstan!ing %er se D ithout the influence of another causeE, nor the senses %er se, oul! fall into error@ the former coul! not, because, if it acts only accor!ing to its o n la s, the effect Dthe ju!gementE must necessarily accor! ith these la s# But in accor!ance ith the la s of the un!erstan!ing consists the formal element in all truth# In the senses there is no ju!gementBneither a true nor a false one# But, as e ha"e no source of cognition besi!es these t o, it follo s that error is cause! solely by the unobser"e! influence of the sensibility u%on the un!erstan!ing# )n! thus it ha%%ens that the subjecti"e groun!s of a ju!gement an! are confoun!e! ith the objecti"e, an! cause them to !e"iate from their %ro%er !etermination,8 just as a bo!y in motion oul! al ays of itself %rocee! in a straight line, but if another im%etus gi"es to it a !ifferent !irection, it ill then start off into a cur"ilinear line of motion# To !istinguish the %eculiar action of the un!erstan!ing from the %o er hich mingles ith it, it is necessary to consi!er an erroneous ju!gement as the !iagonal bet een t o forces, that !etermine the ju!gement in t o !ifferent !irections, hich, as it ere, form an angle, an! to resol"e this com%osite o%eration into the sim%le ones of the un!erstan!ing an! the sensibility# In %ure a %riori ju!gements this must be !one by means of transcen!ental reflection, hereby, as has been alrea!y sho n, each re%resentation has its %lace a%%ointe! in the corres%on!ing faculty of cognition, an! consequently the influence of the one faculty u%on the other is ma!e a%%arent# /8:ootnote( 7ensibility, subjecte! to the un!erstan!ing, as the object u%on hich the un!erstan!ing em%loys its functions, is the source of real cognitions# But, in so far as it e?ercises an influence u%on the action of the un!erstan!ing an! !etermines it to ju!gement, sensibility is itself the cause of error#3 It is not at %resent our business to treat of em%irical illusory a%%earance Dfor e?am%le, o%tical illusionE, hich occurs in the em%irical a%%lication of other ise correct rules of the un!erstan!ing, an! in hich the ju!gement is misle! by the influence of imagination# 9ur %ur%ose is to s%eak of transcen!ental illusory a%%earance, hich influences %rinci%lesBthat are not e"en a%%lie! to e?%erience, for in this case e shoul! %ossess a sure test of their correctnessBbut hich lea!s us, in !isregar! of all the arnings of criticism, com%letely beyon! the em%irical em%loyment of the categories an! !elu!es us ith the chimera of an e?tension of the s%here of the %ure un!erstan!ing# >e shall term those %rinci%les the a%%lication of hich is confine! entirely ithin the limits of %ossible e?%erience, immanent@ those, on the other han!, hich transgress these limits, e shall call transcen!ent %rinci%les# But by these latter I !o not un!erstan! %rinci%les of the transcen!ental use or misuse of the categories, hich is in reality a mere fault of the ju!gement hen not un!er !ue restraint from criticism, an! therefore not %aying sufficient attention to the limits of the s%here in hich the %ure un!erstan!ing is allo e! to e?ercise its functions@ but real %rinci%les hich e?hort us to break !o n all those barriers, an! to lay claim to a %erfectly ne fiel! of cognition, hich recogniCes no line of !emarcation# Thus transcen!ental an! transcen!ent are not i!entical terms# The %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, hich e ha"e alrea!y %ro%oun!e!, ought to be of em%irical an! not of transcen!ental use, that is, they are not a%%licable to any object beyon! the s%here of e?%erience# ) %rinci%le

hich remo"es these limits, nay, hich authoriCes us to o"erste% them, is calle! transcen!ent# If our criticism can succee! in e?%osing the illusion in these %reten!e! %rinci%les, those hich are limite! in their em%loyment to the s%here of e?%erience may be calle!, in o%%osition to the others, immanent %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing# 'ogical illusion, hich consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason Dthe illusion in so%histical syllogismsE, arises entirely from a ant of !ue attention to logical rules# 7o soon as the attention is a akene! to the case before us, this illusion totally !isa%%ears# Transcen!ental illusion, on the contrary, !oes not cease to e?ist, e"en after it has been e?%ose!, an! its nothingness clearly %ercei"e! by means of transcen!ental criticism# Take, for e?am%le, the illusion in the %ro%osition( GThe orl! must ha"e a beginning in time#G The cause of this is as follo s# In our reason, subjecti"ely consi!ere! as a faculty of human cognition, there e?ist fun!amental rules an! ma?ims of its e?ercise, hich ha"e com%letely the a%%earance of objecti"e %rinci%les# <o from this cause it ha%%ens that the subjecti"e necessity of a certain connection of our conce%tions, is regar!e! as an objecti"e necessity of the !etermination of things in themsel"es# This illusion it is im%ossible to a"oi!, just as e cannot a"oi! %ercei"ing that the sea a%%ears to be higher at a !istance than it is near the shore, because e see the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, hich is a still stronger case, as e"en the astronomer cannot %re"ent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time after ar!s, although he is not !ecei"e! by this illusion# Transcen!ental !ialectic ill therefore content itself ith e?%osing the illusory a%%earance in transcen!ental ju!gements, an! guar!ing us against it@ but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion, entirely !isa%%ear an! cease to be illusion is utterly beyon! its %o er# :or e ha"e here to !o ith a natural an! una"oi!able illusion, hich rests u%on subjecti"e %rinci%les an! im%oses these u%on us as objecti"e, hile logical !ialectic, in the !etection of so%hisms, has to !o merely ith an error in the logical consequence of the %ro%ositions, or ith an artificially constructe! illusion, in imitation of the natural error# There is, therefore, a natural an! una"oi!able !ialectic of %ure reasonBnot that in hich the bungler, from ant of the requisite kno le!ge, in"ol"es himself, nor that hich the so%hist !e"ises for the %ur%ose of mislea!ing, but that hich is an inse%arable a!junct of human reason, an! hich, e"en after its illusions ha"e been e?%ose!, !oes not cease to !ecei"e, an! continually to lea! reason into momentary errors, hich it becomes necessary continually to remo"e# II# 9f Pure Reason as the 7eat of Transcen!ental Illusory )%%earance# )# 9: RE)79< I< GE<ER)'# )ll our kno le!ge begins ith sense, %rocee!s thence to un!erstan!ing, an! en!s ith reason, beyon! hich nothing higher can be !isco"ere! in the human min! for elaborating the matter of intuition an! subjecting it to the highest unity of thought# )t this stage of our inquiry it is my !uty to gi"e an e?%lanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, an! I confess I fin! myself here in some !ifficulty# 9f reason, as of the un!erstan!ing, there is a merely formal, that is, logical use, in hich it makes abstraction of all content of cognition@ but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it

contains in itself the source of certain conce%tions an! %rinci%les, hich it !oes not borro either from the senses or the un!erstan!ing# The former faculty has been long !efine! by logicians as the faculty of me!iate conclusion in contra!istinction to imme!iate conclusions Dconsequentiae imme!iataeE@ but the nature of the latter, hich itself generates conce%tions, is not to be un!erstoo! from this !efinition# <o as a !i"ision of reason into a logical an! a transcen!ental faculty %resents itself here, it becomes necessary to seek for a higher conce%tion of this source of cognition hich shall com%rehen! both conce%tions# In this e may e?%ect, accor!ing to the analogy of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, that the logical conce%tion ill gi"e us the key to the transcen!ental, an! that the table of the functions of the former ill %resent us ith the clue to the conce%tions of reason# In the former %art of our transcen!ental logic, e !efine! the un!erstan!ing to be the faculty of rules@ reason may be !istinguishe! from un!erstan!ing as the faculty of %rinci%les# The term %rinci%le is ambiguous, an! commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be em%loye! as a %rinci%le, although it is not in itself, an! as regar!s its %ro%er origin, entitle! to the !istinction# E"ery general %ro%osition, e"en if !eri"e! from e?%erience by the %rocess of in!uction, may ser"e as the major in a syllogism@ but it is not for that reason a %rinci%le# Aathematical a?ioms Dfor e?am%le, there can be only one straight line bet een t o %ointsE are general a %riori cognitions, an! are therefore rightly !enominate! %rinci%les, relati"ely to the cases hich can be subsume! un!er them# But I cannot for this reason say that I cogniCe this %ro%erty of a straight line from %rinci%les BI cogniCe it only in %ure intuition# Cognition from %rinci%les, then, is that cognition in hich I cogniCe the %articular in the general by means of conce%tions# Thus e"ery syllogism is a form of the !e!uction of a cognition from a %rinci%le# :or the major al ays gi"es a conce%tion, through hich e"erything that is subsume! un!er the con!ition thereof is cogniCe! accor!ing to a %rinci%le# <o as e"ery general cognition may ser"e as the major in a syllogism, an! the un!erstan!ing %resents us ith such general a %riori %ro%ositions, they may be terme! %rinci%les, in res%ect of their %ossible use# But if e consi!er these %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing in relation to their origin, e shall fin! them to be anything rather than cognitions from conce%tions# :or they oul! not e"en be %ossible a %riori, if e coul! not rely on the assistance of %ure intuition Din mathematicsE, or on that of the con!itions of a %ossible e?%erience# That e"erything that ha%%ens has a cause, cannot be conclu!e! from the general conce%tion of that hich ha%%ens@ on the contrary the %rinci%le of causality instructs us as to the mo!e of obtaining from that hich ha%%ens a !eterminate em%irical conce%tion# 7ynthetical cognitions from conce%tions the un!erstan!ing cannot su%%ly, an! they alone are entitle! to be calle! %rinci%les# )t the same time, all general %ro%ositions may be terme! com%arati"e %rinci%les#

It has been a long&cherishe! ishBthat D ho kno s ho lateE, may one !ay, be ha%%ily accom%lishe!Bthat the %rinci%les of the en!less "ariety of ci"il la s shoul! be in"estigate! an! e?%ose!@ for in this ay alone can e fin! the secret of sim%lifying legislation# But in this case, la s are nothing more than limitations of our free!om u%on con!itions un!er hich it subsists in %erfect harmony ith itself@ they consequently ha"e for their object that hich is com%letely our o n ork, an! of hich e oursel"es may be the cause by means of these conce%tions# But ho objects as things in themsel"esBho the nature of things is subor!inate! to %rinci%les an! is to be !etermine!, accor!ing to conce%tions, is a question hich it seems ell nigh im%ossible to ans er# Be this, ho e"er, as it mayBfor on this %oint our in"estigation is yet to be ma!eBit is at least manifest from hat e ha"e sai! that cognition from %rinci%les is something "ery !ifferent from cognition by means of the un!erstan!ing, hich may in!ee! %rece!e other cognitions in the form of a %rinci%le, but in itselfBin so far as it is syntheticalBis neither base! u%on mere thought, nor contains a general %ro%osition !ra n from conce%tions alone# The un!erstan!ing may be a faculty for the %ro!uction of unity of %henomena by "irtue of rules@ the reason is a faculty for the %ro!uction of unity of rules Dof the un!erstan!ingE un!er %rinci%les# Reason, therefore, ne"er a%%lies !irectly to e?%erience, or to any sensuous object@ its object is, on the contrary, the un!erstan!ing, to the manifol! cognition of hich it gi"es a unity a %riori by means of conce%tionsBa unity hich may be calle! rational unity, an! hich is of a nature "ery !ifferent from that of the unity %ro!uce! by the un!erstan!ing# The abo"e is the general conce%tion of the faculty of reason, in so far as it has been %ossible to make it com%rehensible in the absence of e?am%les# These ill be gi"en in the sequel# B# 9: T;E '9GIC)' 47E 9: RE)79<# ) !istinction is commonly ma!e bet een that hich is imme!iately cogniCe! an! that hich is inferre! or conclu!e!# That in a figure hich is boun!e! by three straight lines there are three angles, is an imme!iate cognition@ but that these angles are together equal to t o right angles, is an inference or conclusion# <o , as e are constantly em%loying this mo!e of thought an! ha"e thus become quite accustome! to it, e no longer remark the abo"e !istinction, an!, as in the case of the so&calle! !ece%tions of sense, consi!er as imme!iately %ercei"e!, hat has really been inferre!# In e"ery reasoning or syllogism, there is a fun!amental %ro%osition, after ar!s a secon! !ra n from it, an! finally the conclusion, hich connects the truth in the first ith the truth in the secon!Ban! that infallibly# If the ju!gement conclu!e! is so containe! in the first %ro%osition that it can be !e!uce! from it ithout the me!itation of a thir! notion, the conclusion is calle! imme!iate Dconsequentia imme!iataE@ I %refer the term conclusion of the un!erstan!ing# But if, in a!!ition to the fun!amental cognition, a secon! ju!gement is necessary for the %ro!uction of the conclusion, it is calle! a conclusion of the reason# In the %ro%osition( )ll men are mortal, are containe! the %ro%ositions( 7ome men are mortal, <othing that is not mortal is a man, an! these are therefore imme!iate conclusions from the first# 9n the other han!, the %ro%osition( all the learne! are

mortal, is not containe! in the main %ro%osition Dfor the conce%tion of a learne! man !oes not occur in itE, an! it can be !e!uce! from the main %ro%osition only by means of a me!iating ju!gement# In e"ery syllogism I first cogitate a rule Dthe majorE by means of the un!erstan!ing# In the ne?t %lace I subsume a cognition un!er the con!ition of the rule Dan! this is the minorE by means of the ju!gement# )n! finally I !etermine my cognition by means of the %re!icate of the rule Dthis is the conclusioE, consequently, I !etermine it a %riori by means of the reason# The relations, therefore, hich the major %ro%osition, as the rule, re%resents bet een a cognition an! its con!ition, constitute the !ifferent kin!s of syllogisms# These are just threefol!Banalogously ith all ju!gements, in so far as they !iffer in the mo!e of e?%ressing the relation of a cognition in the un!erstan!ingB namely, categorical, hy%othetical, an! !isjuncti"e# >hen as often ha%%ens, the conclusion is a ju!gement hich may follo from other gi"en ju!gements, through hich a %erfectly !ifferent object is cogitate!, I en!ea"our to !isco"er in the un!erstan!ing hether the assertion in this conclusion !oes not stan! un!er certain con!itions accor!ing to a general rule# If I fin! such a con!ition, an! if the object mentione! in the conclusion can be subsume! un!er the gi"en con!ition, then this conclusion follo s from a rule hich is also "ali! for other objects of cognition# :rom this e see that reason en!ea"ours to subject the great "ariety of the cognitions of the un!erstan!ing to the smallest %ossible number of %rinci%les Dgeneral con!itionsE, an! thus to %ro!uce in it the highest unity# C# 9: T;E P4RE 47E 9: RE)79<# Can e isolate reason, an!, if so, is it in this case a %eculiar source of conce%tions an! ju!gements hich s%ring from it alone, an! through hich it can be a%%lie! to objects@ or is it merely a subor!inate faculty, hose !uty it is to gi"e a certain form to gi"en cognitionsBa form hich is calle! logical, an! through hich the cognitions of the un!erstan!ing are subor!inate! to each other, an! lo er rules to higher Dthose, to it, hose con!ition com%rises in its s%here the con!ition of the othersE, in so far as this can be !one by com%arisonH This is the question hich e ha"e at %resent to ans er# Aanifol! "ariety of rules an! unity of %rinci%les is a requirement of reason, for the %ur%ose of bringing the un!erstan!ing into com%lete accor!ance ith itself, just as un!erstan!ing subjects the manifol! content of intuition to conce%tions, an! thereby intro!uces connection into it# But this %rinci%le %rescribes no la to objects, an! !oes not contain any groun! of the %ossibility of cogniCing or of !etermining them as such, but is merely a subjecti"e la for the %ro%er arrangement of the content of the un!erstan!ing# The %ur%ose of this la is, by a com%arison of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, to re!uce them to the smallest %ossible number, although, at the same time, it !oes not justify us in !eman!ing from objects themsel"es such a uniformity as might contribute to the con"enience an! the enlargement of the s%here of the un!erstan!ing, or in e?%ecting that it ill itself thus recei"e from them objecti"e "ali!ity# In one or!, the question is( G!oes reason in itself, that is, !oes %ure reason contain a %riori synthetical %rinci%les an! rules, an! hat are those %rinci%lesHG

The formal an! logical %roce!ure of reason in syllogisms gi"es us sufficient information in regar! to the groun! on hich the transcen!ental %rinci%le of reason in its %ure synthetical cognition ill rest# 6# Reason, as obser"e! in the syllogistic %rocess, is not a%%licable to intuitions, for the %ur%ose of subjecting them to rulesBfor this is the %ro"ince of the un!erstan!ing ith its categoriesBbut to conce%tions an! ju!gements# If %ure reason !oes a%%ly to objects an! the intuition of them, it !oes so not imme!iately, but me!iatelyBthrough the un!erstan!ing an! its ju!gements, hich ha"e a !irect relation to the senses an! their intuition, for the %ur%ose of !etermining their objects# The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a %ossible e?%erience, but is essentially !ifferent from this unity, hich is that of the un!erstan!ing# That e"erything hich ha%%ens has a cause, is not a %rinci%le cogniCe! an! %rescribe! by reason# This %rinci%le makes the unity of e?%erience %ossible an! borro s nothing from reason, hich, ithout a reference to %ossible e?%erience, coul! ne"er ha"e %ro!uce! by means of mere conce%tions any such synthetical unity# ,# Reason, in its logical use, en!ea"ours to !isco"er the general con!ition of its ju!gement Dthe conclusionE, an! a syllogism is itself nothing but a ju!gement by means of the subsum%tion of its con!ition un!er a general rule Dthe majorE# <o as this rule may itself be subjecte! to the same %rocess of reason, an! thus the con!ition of the con!ition be sought Dby means of a %rosyllogismE as long as the %rocess can be continue!, it is "ery manifest that the %eculiar %rinci%le of reason in its logical use is to fin! for the con!itione! cognition of the un!erstan!ing the uncon!itione! hereby the unity of the former is com%lete!# But this logical ma?im cannot be a %rinci%le of %ure reason, unless e a!mit that, if the con!itione! is gi"en, the hole series of con!itions subor!inate! to one anotherBa series hich is consequently itself uncon!itione!Bis also gi"en, that is, containe! in the object an! its connection# But this %rinci%le of %ure reason is e"i!ently synthetical@ for, analytically, the con!itione! certainly relates to some con!ition, but not to the uncon!itione!# :rom this %rinci%le also there must originate !ifferent synthetical %ro%ositions, of hich the %ure un!erstan!ing is %erfectly ignorant, for it has to !o only ith objects of a %ossible e?%erience, the cognition an! synthesis of hich is al ays con!itione!# The uncon!itione!, if it !oes really e?ist, must be es%ecially consi!ere! in regar! to the !eterminations hich !istinguish it from hate"er is con!itione!, an! ill thus affor! us material for many a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions# The %rinci%les resulting from this highest %rinci%le of %ure reason ill, ho e"er, be transcen!ent in relation to %henomena, that is to say, it ill be im%ossible to make any a!equate em%irical use of this %rinci%le# It is therefore com%letely !ifferent from all %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing, the use ma!e of hich is entirely immanent, their object an! %ur%ose being merely the %ossibility of e?%erience# <o our !uty in the transcen!ental !ialectic is as follo s# To !isco"er hether the %rinci%le that the series of con!itions Din the synthesis of %henomena, or of thought in generalE e?ten!s to the

uncon!itione! is objecti"ely true, or not@ hat consequences result therefrom affecting the em%irical use of the un!erstan!ing, or rather hether there e?ists any such objecti"ely "ali! %ro%osition of reason, an! hether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical %rece%t hich !irects us to ascen! %er%etually to still higher con!itions, to a%%roach com%leteness in the series of them, an! thus to intro!uce into our cognition the highest %ossible unity of reason# >e must ascertain, I say, hether this requirement of reason has not been regar!e!, by a misun!erstan!ing, as a transcen!ental %rinci%le of %ure reason, hich %ostulates a thorough com%leteness in the series of con!itions in objects themsel"es# >e must sho , moreo"er, the misconce%tions an! illusions that intru!e into syllogisms, the major %ro%osition of hich %ure reason has su%%lie!Ba %ro%osition hich has %erha%s more of the character of a %etitio than of a %ostulatumB an! that %rocee! from e?%erience u% ar!s to its con!itions# The solution of these %roblems is our task in transcen!ental !ialectic, hich e are about to e?%ose e"en at its source, that lies !ee% in human reason# >e shall !i"i!e it into t o %arts, the first of hich ill treat of the transcen!ent conce%tions of %ure reason, the secon! of transcen!ent an! !ialectical syllogisms# B99K I# B 9: T;E C9<CEPTI9<7 9: P4RE RE)79<# The conce%tions of %ure reasonB e !o not here s%eak of the %ossibility of themBare not obtaine! by reflection, but by inference or conclusion# The conce%tions of un!erstan!ing are also cogitate! a %riori antece!ently to e?%erience, an! ren!er it %ossible@ but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection u%on %henomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong to a %ossible em%irical consciousness# Through them alone are cognition an! the !etermination of an object %ossible# It is from them, accor!ingly, that e recei"e material for reasoning, an! antece!ently to them e %ossess no a %riori conce%tions of objects from hich they might be !e!uce!, 9n the other han!, the sole basis of their objecti"e reality consists in the necessity im%ose! on them, as containing the intellectual form of all e?%erience, of restricting their a%%lication an! influence to the s%here of e?%erience# But the term, conce%tion of reason, or rational conce%tion, itself in!icates that it !oes not confine itself ithin the limits of e?%erience, because its object&matter is a cognition, of hich e"ery em%irical cognition is but a %artBnay, the hole of %ossible e?%erience may be itself but a %art of itBa cognition to hich no actual e?%erience e"er fully attains, although it !oes al ays %ertain to it# The aim of rational conce%tions is the com%rehension, as that of the conce%tions of un!erstan!ing is the un!erstan!ing of %erce%tions# If they contain the uncon!itione!, they relate to that to hich all e?%erience is subor!inate, but hich is ne"er itself an object of e?%erienceBthat to ar!s hich reason ten!s in all its conclusions from e?%erience, an! by the stan!ar! of hich it estimates the !egree of their em%irical use, but hich is ne"er itself an element in an em%irical synthesis# If, not ithstan!ing, such conce%tions %ossess objecti"e "ali!ity, they may be calle! conce%tus ratiocinati Dconce%tions legitimately conclu!e!E@ in cases here they !o not, they ha"e been a!mitte! on account of ha"ing the a%%earance of being correctly conclu!e!, an! may be calle! conce%tus ratiocinantes Dso%histical conce%tionsE# But as this can only be sufficiently !emonstrate! in that %art of our treatise hich relates to the !ialectical conclusions of reason, e shall omit any

consi!eration of it in this %lace# )s e calle! the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing categories, e shall also !istinguish those of %ure reason by a ne name an! call them transcen!ental i!eas# These terms, ho e"er, e must in the first %lace e?%lain an! justify# 7ECTI9< IB9f I!eas in General# *es%ite the great ealth of or!s hich Euro%ean languages %ossess, the thinker fin!s himself often at a loss for an e?%ression e?actly suite! to his conce%tion, for ant of hich he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to himself# To coin ne or!s is a %retension to legislation in language hich is sel!om successful@ an!, before recourse is taken to so !es%erate an e?%e!ient, it is a!"isable to e?amine the !ea! an! learne! languages, ith the ho%e an! the %robability that e may there meet ith some a!equate e?%ression of the notion e ha"e in our min!s# In this case, e"en if the original meaning of the or! has become some hat uncertain, from carelessness or ant of caution on the %art of the authors of it, it is al ays better to a!here to an! confirm its %ro%er meaningBe"en although it may be !oubtful hether it as formerly use! in e?actly this senseBthan to make our labour "ain by ant of sufficient care to ren!er oursel"es intelligible# :or this reason, hen it ha%%ens that there e?ists only a single or! to e?%ress a certain conce%tion, an! this or!, in its usual acce%tation, is thoroughly a!equate to the conce%tion, the accurate !istinction of hich from relate! conce%tions is of great im%ortance, e ought not to em%loy the e?%ression im%ro"i!ently, or, for the sake of "ariety an! elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate or!s# It is our !uty, on the contrary, carefully to %reser"e its %eculiar signification, as other ise it easily ha%%ens that hen the attention of the rea!er is no longer %articularly attracte! to the e?%ression, an! it is lost ami! the multitu!e of other or!s of "ery !ifferent im%ort, the thought hich it con"eye!, an! hich it alone con"eye!, is lost ith it# Plato em%loye! the e?%ression i!ea in a ay that %lainly sho e! he meant by it something hich is ne"er !eri"e! from the senses, but hich far transcen!s e"en the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing D ith hich )ristotle occu%ie! himselfE, inasmuch as in e?%erience nothing %erfectly corres%on!ing to them coul! be foun!# I!eas are, accor!ing to him, archety%es of things themsel"es, an! not merely keys to %ossible e?%eriences, like the categories# In his "ie they flo from the highest reason, by hich they ha"e been im%arte! to human reason, hich, ho e"er, e?ists no longer in its original state, but is oblige! ith great labour to recall by reminiscenceB hich is calle! %hiloso%hyBthe ol! but no sa!ly obscure! i!eas# I ill not here enter u%on any literary in"estigation of the sense hich this sublime %hiloso%her attache! to this e?%ression# I shall content myself ith remarking that it is nothing unusual, in common con"ersation as ell as in ritten orks, by com%aring the thoughts hich an author has !eli"ere! u%on a subject, to un!erstan! him better than he un!erstoo! himself inasmuch as he may not ha"e sufficiently !etermine! his conce%tion, an! thus ha"e sometimes s%oken, nay e"en thought, in o%%osition to his o n o%inions#

Plato %ercei"e! "ery clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a much higher "ocation than that of merely s%elling out %henomena accor!ing to synthetical unity, for the %ur%ose of being able to rea! them as e?%erience, an! that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too ele"ate! to a!mit of the %ossibility of an object gi"en by e?%erience corres%on!ing to themBcognitions hich are ne"ertheless real, an! are not mere %hantoms of the brain# This %hiloso%her foun! his i!eas es%ecially in all that is %ractical,8 that is, hich rests u%on free!om, hich in its turn ranks un!er cognitions that are the %eculiar %ro!uct of reason# ;e ho oul! !eri"e from e?%erience the conce%tions of "irtue, ho oul! make Das many ha"e really !oneE that, hich at best can but ser"e as an im%erfectly illustrati"e e?am%le, a mo!el for or the formation of a %erfectly a!equate i!ea on the subject, oul! in fact transform "irtue into a nonentity changeable accor!ing to time an! circumstance an! utterly inca%able of being em%loye! as a rule# 9n the contrary, e"ery one is conscious that, hen any one is hel! u% to him as a mo!el of "irtue, he com%ares this so&calle! mo!el ith the true original hich he %ossesses in his o n min! an! "alues him accor!ing to this stan!ar!# But this stan!ar! is the i!ea of "irtue, in relation to hich all %ossible objects of e?%erience are in!ee! ser"iceable as e?am%lesB %roofs of the %racticability in a certain !egree of that hich the conce%tion of "irtue !eman!sBbut certainly not as archety%es# That the actions of man ill ne"er be in %erfect accor!ance ith all the requirements of the %ure i!eas of reason, !oes not %ro"e the thought to be chimerical# :or only through this i!ea are all ju!gements as to moral merit or !emerit %ossible@ it consequently lies at the foun!ation of e"ery a%%roach to moral %erfection, ho e"er far remo"e! from it the obstacles in human natureB in!eterminable as to !egreeBmay kee% us# /8:ootnote( ;e certainly e?ten!e! the a%%lication of his conce%tion to s%eculati"e cognitions also, %ro"i!e! they ere gi"en %ure an! com%letely a %riori, nay, e"en to mathematics, although this science cannot %ossess an object other here than in Possible e?%erience# I cannot follo him in this, an! as little can I follo him in his mystical !e!uction of these i!eas, or in his hy%ostatiCation of them@ although, in truth, the ele"ate! an! e?aggerate! language hich he em%loye! in !escribing them is quite ca%able of an inter%retation more sub!ue! an! more in accor!ance ith fact an! the nature of things#3 The Platonic Re%ublic has become %ro"erbial as an e?am%leBan! a striking oneBof imaginary %erfection, such as can e?ist only in the brain of the i!le thinker@ an! Brucker ri!icules the %hiloso%her for maintaining that a %rince can ne"er go"ern ell, unless he is %artici%ant in the i!eas# But e shoul! !o better to follo u% this thought an!, here this a!mirable thinker lea"es us ithout assistance, em%loy ne efforts to %lace it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling it asi!e as useless, un!er the "ery miserable an! %ernicious %rete?t of im%racticability# ) constitution of the greatest %ossible human free!om accor!ing to la s, by hich the liberty of e"ery in!i"i!ual can consist ith the liberty of e"ery other Dnot of the greatest %ossible ha%%iness, for this follo s necessarily from the formerE, is, to say the least, a necessary i!ea, hich must be %lace! at the foun!ation not only of the first %lan of the constitution of a state, but of all its la s# )n!,

in this, it not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles hich lie in our ay Bobstacles hich %erha%s !o not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather from the %re"ious neglect of true i!eas in legislation# :or there is nothing more %ernicious an! more un orthy of a %hiloso%her, than the "ulgar a%%eal to a so& calle! a!"erse e?%erience, hich in!ee! oul! not ha"e e?iste!, if those institutions ha! been establishe! at the %ro%er time an! in accor!ance ith i!eas@ hile, instea! of this, conce%tions, cru!e for the "ery reason that they ha"e been !ra n from e?%erience, ha"e marre! an! frustrate! all our better "ie s an! intentions# The more legislation an! go"ernment are in harmony ith this i!ea, the more rare !o %unishments become an! thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato !i!, that in a %erfect state no %unishments at all oul! be necessary# <o although a %erfect state may ne"er e?ist, the i!ea is not on that account the less just, hich hol!s u% this ma?imum as the archety%e or stan!ar! of a constitution, in or!er to bring legislati"e go"ernment al ays nearer an! nearer to the greatest %ossible %erfection# :or at hat %recise !egree human nature must sto% in its %rogress, an! ho i!e must be the chasm hich must necessarily e?ist bet een the i!ea an! its realiCation, are %roblems hich no one can or ought to !etermineBan! for this reason, that it is the !estination of free!om to o"erste% all assigne! limits bet een itself an! the i!ea# But not only in that herein human reason is a real causal agent an! here i!eas are o%erati"e causes Dof actions an! their objectsE, that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regar! to nature herself, Plato sa clear %roofs of an origin from i!eas# ) %lant, an! animal, the regular or!er of natureB%robably also the !is%osition of the hole uni"erseBgi"e manifest e"i!ence that they are %ossible only by means of an! accor!ing to i!eas@ that, in!ee!, no one creature, un!er the in!i"i!ual con!itions of its e?istence, %erfectly harmoniCes ith the i!ea of the most %erfect of its kin!Bjust as little as man ith the i!ea of humanity, hich ne"ertheless he bears in his soul as the archety%al stan!ar! of his actions@ that, not ithstan!ing, these i!eas are in the highest sense in!i"i!ually, unchangeably, an! com%letely !etermine!, an! are the original causes of things@ an! that the totality of connecte! objects in the uni"erse is alone fully a!equate to that i!ea# 7etting asi!e the e?aggerations of e?%ression in the ritings of this %hiloso%her, the mental %o er e?hibite! in this ascent from the ecty%al mo!e of regar!ing the %hysical orl! to the architectonic connection thereof accor!ing to en!s, that is, i!eas, is an effort hich !eser"es imitation an! claims res%ect# But as regar!s the %rinci%les of ethics, of legislation, an! of religion, s%heres in hich i!eas alone ren!er e?%erience %ossible, although they ne"er attain to full e?%ression therein, he has "in!icate! for himself a %osition of %eculiar merit, hich is not a%%reciate! only because it is ju!ge! by the "ery em%irical rules, the "ali!ity of hich as %rinci%les is !estroye! by i!eas# :or as regar!s nature, e?%erience %resents us ith rules an! is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical la s e?%erience is the %arent of illusion, an! it is in the highest !egree re%rehensible to limit or to !e!uce the la s hich !ictate hat I ought to !o, from hat is !one# >e must, ho e"er, omit the consi!eration of these im%ortant subjects, the !e"elo%ment of hich is in reality the %eculiar !uty an! !ignity of %hiloso%hy, an! confine oursel"es for the %resent to the more humble but not less useful task of %re%aring a firm foun!ation for those majestic e!ifices of moral science# :or this foun!ation has been

hitherto insecure from the many subterranean %assages hich reason in its confi!ent but "ain search for treasures has ma!e in all !irections# 9ur %resent !uty is to make oursel"es %erfectly acquainte! ith the transcen!ental use ma!e of %ure reason, its %rinci%les an! i!eas, that e may be able %ro%erly to !etermine an! "alue its influence an! real orth# But before bringing these intro!uctory remarks to a close, I beg those ho really ha"e %hiloso%hy at heartBan! their number is but smallBif they shall fin! themsel"es con"ince! by the consi!erations follo ing as ell as by those abo"e, to e?ert themsel"es to %reser"e to the e?%ression i!ea its original signification, an! to take care that it be not lost among those other e?%ressions by hich all sorts of re%resentations are loosely !esignate!Bthat the interests of science may not thereby suffer# >e are in no ant of or!s to !enominate a!equately e"ery mo!e of re%resentation, ithout the necessity of encroaching u%on terms hich are %ro%er to others# The follo ing is a gra!uate! list of them# The genus is re%resentation in general Dre%resentatioE# 4n!er it stan!s re%resentation ith consciousness D%erce%tioE# ) %erce%tion hich relates solely to the subject as a mo!ification of its state, is a sensation DsensatioE, an objecti"e %erce%tion is a cognition DcognitioE# ) cognition is either an intuition or a conce%tion Dintuitus "el conce%tusE# The former has an imme!iate relation to the object an! is singular an! in!i"i!ual@ the latter has but a me!iate relation, by means of a characteristic mark hich may be common to se"eral things# ) conce%tion is either em%irical or %ure# ) %ure conce%tion, in so far as it has its origin in the un!erstan!ing alone, an! is not the conce%tion of a %ure sensuous image, is calle! notio# ) conce%tion forme! from notions, hich transcen!s the %ossibility of e?%erience, is an i!ea, or a conce%tion of reason# To one ho has accustome! himself to these !istinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the re%resentation of the colour re! calle! an i!ea# It ought not e"en to be calle! a notion or conce%tion of un!erstan!ing# 7ECTI9< II# 9f Transcen!ental I!eas# Transcen!ental analytic sho e! us ho the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of %ure conce%tions a %riori, conce%tions hich re%resent objects antece!ently to all e?%erience, or rather, in!icate the synthetical unity hich alone ren!ers %ossible an em%irical cognition of objects# The form of ju!gementsBcon"erte! into a conce%tion of the synthesis of intuitionsB%ro!uce! the categories hich !irect the em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing in e?%erience# This consi!eration arrants us to e?%ect that the form of syllogisms, hen a%%lie! to synthetical unity of intuitions, follo ing the rule of the categories, ill contain the origin of %articular a %riori conce%tions, hich e may call %ure conce%tions of reason or transcen!ental i!eas, an! hich ill !etermine the use of the un!erstan!ing in the totality of e?%erience accor!ing to %rinci%les# The function of reason in arguments consists in the uni"ersality of a cognition accor!ing to conce%tions, an! the syllogism itself is a ju!gement hich is !etermine! a %riori in the hole e?tent of its con!ition# The %ro%osition( GCaius is mortal,G is one hich may be obtaine! from e?%erience by the ai! of the un!erstan!ing alone@ but my ish is to fin! a conce%tion hich contains the con!ition un!er hich the %re!icate of this ju!gement is gi"enBin this case, the conce%tion of manBan! after subsuming un!er

this con!ition, taken in its hole e?tent Dall men are mortalE, I !etermine accor!ing to it the cognition of the object thought, an! say( GCaius is mortal#G ;ence, in the conclusion of a syllogism e restrict a %re!icate to a certain object, after ha"ing thought it in the major in its hole e?tent un!er a certain con!ition# This com%lete quantity of the e?tent in relation to such a con!ition is calle! uni"ersality Duni"ersalitasE# To this corres%on!s totality Duni"ersitasE of con!itions in the synthesis of intuitions# The transcen!ental conce%tion of reason is therefore nothing else than the conce%tion of the totality of the con!itions of a gi"en con!itione!# <o as the uncon!itione! alone ren!ers %ossible totality of con!itions, an!, con"ersely, the totality of con!itions is itself al ays uncon!itione!@ a %ure rational conce%tion in general can be !efine! an! e?%laine! by means of the conce%tion of the uncon!itione!, in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the con!itione!# To the number of mo!es of relation hich the un!erstan!ing cogitates by means of the categories, the number of %ure rational conce%tions ill corres%on!# >e must therefore seek for, first, an uncon!itione! of the categorical synthesis in a subject@ secon!ly, of the hy%othetical synthesis of the members of a series@ thir!ly, of the !isjuncti"e synthesis of %arts in a system# There are e?actly the same number of mo!es of syllogisms, each of hich %rocee!s through %rosyllogisms to the uncon!itione!Bone to the subject hich cannot be em%loye! as %re!icate, another to the %resu%%osition hich su%%oses nothing higher than itself, an! the thir! to an aggregate of the members of the com%lete !i"ision of a conce%tion# ;ence the %ure rational conce%tions of totality in the synthesis of con!itions ha"e a necessary foun!ation in the nature of human reasonBat least as mo!es of ele"ating the unity of the un!erstan!ing to the uncon!itione!# They may ha"e no "ali! a%%lication, corres%on!ing to their transcen!ental em%loyment, in concreto, an! be thus of no greater utility than to !irect the un!erstan!ing ho , hile e?ten!ing them as i!ely as %ossible, to maintain its e?ercise an! a%%lication in %erfect consistence an! harmony# But, hile s%eaking here of the totality of con!itions an! of the uncon!itione! as the common title of all conce%tions of reason, e again light u%on an e?%ression hich e fin! it im%ossible to !is%ense ith, an! hich ne"ertheless, o ing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, e cannot em%loy ith safety# The or! absolute is one of the fe or!s hich, in its original signification, as %erfectly a!equate to the conce%tion it as inten!e! to con"eyBa conce%tion hich no other or! in the same language e?actly suits, an! the lossBor, hich is the same thing, the incautious an! loose em%loymentBof hich must be follo e! by the loss of the conce%tion itself# )n!, as it is a conce%tion hich occu%ies much of the attention of reason, its loss oul! be greatly to the !etriment of all transcen!ental %hiloso%hy# The or! absolute is at %resent frequently use! to !enote that something can be %re!icate! of a thing consi!ere! in itself an! intrinsically# In this sense absolutely %ossible oul! signify that hich is %ossible in itself DinterneEB hich is, in fact, the least that one can %re!icate of an object# 9n the other han!, it is sometimes em%loye! to in!icate that a thing is "ali! in all res%ectsBfor e?am%le, absolute so"ereignty# )bsolutely %ossible oul! in this sense

signify that hich is %ossible in all relations an! in e"ery res%ect@ an! this is the most that can be %re!icate! of the %ossibility of a thing# <o these significations !o in truth frequently coinci!e# Thus, for e?am%le, that hich is intrinsically im%ossible, is also im%ossible in all relations, that is, absolutely im%ossible# But in most cases they !iffer from each other toto caelo, an! I can by no means conclu!e that, because a thing is in itself %ossible, it is also %ossible in all relations, an! therefore absolutely# <ay, more, I shall in the sequel sho that absolute necessity !oes not by any means !e%en! on internal necessity, an! that, therefore, it must not be consi!ere! as synonymous ith it# 9f an o%%osite hich is intrinsically im%ossible, e may affirm that it is in all res%ects im%ossible, an! that, consequently, the thing itself, of hich this is the o%%osite, is absolutely necessary@ but I cannot reason con"ersely an! say, the o%%osite of that hich is absolutely necessary is intrinsically im%ossible, that is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity# :or this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere em%ty or! ith hich the least conce%tion cannot be connecte!, hile the conce%tion of the necessity of a thing in all relations %ossesses "ery %eculiar !eterminations# <o as the loss of a conce%tion of great utility in s%eculati"e science cannot be a matter of in!ifference to the %hiloso%her, I trust that the %ro%er !etermination an! careful %reser"ation of the e?%ression on hich the conce%tion !e%en!s ill like ise be not in!ifferent to him# In this enlarge! signification, then, shall I em%loy the or! absolute, in o%%osition to that hich is "ali! only in some %articular res%ect@ for the latter is restricte! by con!itions, the former is "ali! ithout any restriction hate"er# <o the transcen!ental conce%tion of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of con!itions an! !oes not rest satisfie! till it has attaine! to the absolutely, that is, in all res%ects an! relations, uncon!itione!# :or %ure reason lea"es to the un!erstan!ing e"erything that imme!iately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination# The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the em%loyment of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing an! aims at carrying out the synthetical unity hich is cogitate! in the category, e"en to the uncon!itione!# This unity may hence be calle! the rational unity of %henomena, as the other, hich the category e?%resses, may be terme! the unity of the un!erstan!ing# Reason, therefore, has an imme!iate relation to the use of the un!erstan!ing, not in!ee! in so far as the latter contains the groun! of %ossible e?%erience Dfor the conce%tion of the absolute totality of con!itions is not a conce%tion that can be em%loye! in e?%erience, because no e?%erience is uncon!itione!E, but solely for the %ur%ose of !irecting it to a certain unity, of hich the un!erstan!ing has no conce%tion, an! the aim of hich is to collect into an absolute hole all acts of the un!erstan!ing# ;ence the objecti"e em%loyment of the %ure conce%tions of reason is al ays transcen!ent, hile that of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing must, accor!ing to their nature, be al ays immanent, inasmuch as they are limite! to %ossible e?%erience# I un!erstan! by i!ea a necessary conce%tion of reason, to hich no corres%on!ing object can be !isco"ere! in the orl! of sense# )ccor!ingly, the %ure conce%tions of reason at %resent un!er consi!eration are transcen!ental i!eas# They are conce%tions of %ure

reason, for they regar! all em%irical cognition as !etermine! by means of an absolute totality of con!itions# They are not mere fictions, but natural an! necessary %ro!ucts of reason, an! ha"e hence a necessary relation to the hole s%here of the e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing# )n!, finally, they are transcen!ent, an! o"erste% the limits of all e?%eriences, in hich, consequently, no object can e"er be %resente! that oul! be %erfectly a!equate to a transcen!ental i!ea# >hen e use the or! i!ea, e say, as regar!s its object Dan object of the %ure un!erstan!ingE, a great !eal, but as regar!s its subject Dthat is, in res%ect of its reality un!er con!itions of e?%erienceE, e?cee!ingly little, because the i!ea, as the conce%tion of a ma?imum, can ne"er be com%letely an! a!equately %resente! in concreto# <o , as in the merely s%eculati"e em%loyment of reason the latter is %ro%erly the sole aim, an! as in this case the a%%ro?imation to a conce%tion, hich is ne"er attaine! in %ractice, is the same thing as if the conce%tion ere non&e?istentBit is commonly sai! of the conce%tion of this kin!, Git is only an i!ea#G 7o e might "ery ell say, Gthe absolute totality of all %henomena is only an i!ea,G for, as e ne"er can %resent an a!equate re%resentation of it, it remains for us a %roblem inca%able of solution# 9n the other han!, as in the %ractical use of the un!erstan!ing e ha"e only to !o ith action an! %ractice accor!ing to rules, an i!ea of %ure reason can al ays be gi"en really in concreto, although only %artially, nay, it is the in!is%ensable con!ition of all %ractical em%loyment of reason# The %ractice or e?ecution of the i!ea is al ays limite! an! !efecti"e, but ne"ertheless ithin in!eterminable boun!aries, consequently al ays un!er the influence of the conce%tion of an absolute %erfection# )n! thus the %ractical i!ea is al ays in the highest !egree fruitful, an! in relation to real actions in!is%ensably necessary# In the i!ea, %ure reason %ossesses e"en causality an! the %o er of %ro!ucing that hich its conce%tion contains# ;ence e cannot say of is!om, in a !is%araging ay, Git is only an i!ea#G :or, for the "ery reason that it is the i!ea of the necessary unity of all %ossible aims, it must be for all %ractical e?ertions an! en!ea"ours the %rimiti"e con!ition an! ruleBa rule hich, if not constituti"e, is at least limitati"e# <o , although e must say of the transcen!ental conce%tions of reason, Gthey are only i!eas,G e must not, on this account, look u%on them as su%erfluous an! nugatory# :or, although no object can be !etermine! by them, they can be of great utility, unobser"e! an! at the basis of the e!ifice of the un!erstan!ing, as the canon for its e?ten!e! an! self&consistent e?erciseBa canon hich, in!ee!, !oes not enable it to cogniCe more in an object than it oul! cogniCe by the hel% of its o n conce%tions, but hich gui!es it more securely in its cognition# <ot to mention that they %erha%s ren!er %ossible a transition from our conce%tions of nature an! the non&ego to the %ractical conce%tions, an! thus %ro!uce for e"en ethical i!eas kee%ing, so to s%eak, an! connection ith the s%eculati"e cognitions of reason# The e?%lication of all this must be looke! for in the sequel# But setting asi!e, in conformity ith our original %ur%ose, the consi!eration of the %ractical i!eas, e %rocee! to contem%late reason in its s%eculati"e use alone, nay, in a still more restricte! s%here, to it, in the transcen!ental use@ an! here must strike into the same %ath hich e follo e! in our !e!uction of the categories# That is to say, e shall consi!er the logical form of the cognition of reason, that e may see hether reason may not be thereby a source of conce%tions hich enables us to regar! objects in

themsel"es as !etermine! synthetically a %riori, in relation to one or other of the functions of reason# Reason, consi!ere! as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of me!iate ju!gementBby means of the subsum%tion of the con!ition of a %ossible ju!gement un!er the con!ition of a gi"en ju!gement# The gi"en ju!gement is the general rule DmajorE# The subsum%tion of the con!ition of another %ossible ju!gement un!er the con!ition of the rule is the minor# The actual ju!gement, hich enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsume! case, is the conclusion DconclusioE# The rule %re!icates something generally un!er a certain con!ition# The con!ition of the rule is satisfie! in some %articular case# It follo s that hat as "ali! in general un!er that con!ition must also be consi!ere! as "ali! in the %articular case hich satisfies this con!ition# It is "ery %lain that reason attains to a cognition, by means of acts of the un!erstan!ing hich constitute a series of con!itions# >hen I arri"e at the %ro%osition, G)ll bo!ies are changeable,G by beginning ith the more remote cognition Din hich the conce%tion of bo!y !oes not a%%ear, but hich ne"ertheless contains the con!ition of that conce%tionE, G)ll com%oun! is changeable,G by %rocee!ing from this to a less remote cognition, hich stan!s un!er the con!ition of the former, GBo!ies are com%oun!,G an! hence to a thir!, hich at length connects for me the remote cognition DchangeableE ith the one before me, GConsequently, bo!ies are changeableGBI ha"e arri"e! at a cognition DconclusionE through a series of con!itions D%remissesE# <o e"ery series, hose e?%onent Dof the categorical or hy%othetical ju!gementE is gi"en, can be continue!@ consequently the same %roce!ure of reason con!ucts us to the ratiocinatio %olysyllogistica, hich is a series of syllogisms, that can be continue! either on the si!e of the con!itions D%er %rosyllogismosE or of the con!itione! D%er e%isyllogismosE to an in!efinite e?tent# But e "ery soon %ercei"e that the chain or series of %rosyllogisms, that is, of !e!uce! cognitions on the si!e of the groun!s or con!itions of a gi"en cognition, in other or!s, the ascen!ing series of syllogisms must ha"e a "ery !ifferent relation to the faculty of reason from that of the !escen!ing series, that is, the %rogressi"e %roce!ure of reason on the si!e of the con!itione! by means of e%isyllogisms# :or, as in the former case the cognition DconclusioE is gi"en only as con!itione!, reason can attain to this cognition only un!er the %resu%%osition that all the members of the series on the si!e of the con!itions are gi"en Dtotality in the series of %remissesE, because only un!er this su%%osition is the ju!gement e may be consi!ering %ossible a %riori@ hile on the si!e of the con!itione! or the inferences, only an incom%lete an! becoming, an! not a %resu%%ose! or gi"en series, consequently only a %otential %rogression, is cogitate!# ;ence, hen a cognition is contem%late! as con!itione!, reason is com%elle! to consi!er the series of con!itions in an ascen!ing line as com%lete! an! gi"en in their totality# But if the "ery same con!ition is consi!ere! at the same time as the con!ition of other cognitions, hich together constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a !escen!ing line, reason may %reser"e a %erfect in!ifference, as to ho far this %rogression may e?ten! a %arte %osteriori, an! hether the totality of this series is %ossible, because it stan!s in no nee! of such a series for the %ur%ose of arri"ing at the conclusion before it, inasmuch as this conclusion is sufficiently guarantee! an! !etermine! on groun!s a %arte %riori# It may be the case, that u%on the si!e of the

con!itions the series of %remisses has a first or highest con!ition, or it may not %ossess this, an! so be a %arte %riori unlimite!@ but it must, ne"ertheless, contain totality of con!itions, e"en a!mitting that e ne"er coul! succee! in com%letely a%%rehen!ing it@ an! the hole series must be uncon!itionally true, if the con!itione!, hich is consi!ere! as an inference resulting from it, is to be hel! as true# This is a requirement of reason, hich announces its cognition as !etermine! a %riori an! as necessary, either in itselfBan! in this case it nee!s no groun!s to rest u%onBor, if it is !e!uce!, as a member of a series of groun!s, hich is itself uncon!itionally true# 7ECTI9< III# 7ystem of Transcen!ental I!eas# >e are not at %resent engage! ith a logical !ialectic, hich makes com%lete abstraction of the content of cognition an! aims only at un"eiling the illusory a%%earance in the form of syllogisms# 9ur subject is transcen!ental !ialectic, hich must contain, com%letely a %riori, the origin of certain cognitions !ra n from %ure reason, an! the origin of certain !e!uce! conce%tions, the object of hich cannot be gi"en em%irically an! hich therefore lie beyon! the s%here of the faculty of un!erstan!ing# >e ha"e obser"e!, from the natural relation hich the transcen!ental use of our cognition, in syllogisms as ell as in ju!gements, must ha"e to the logical, that there are three kin!s of !ialectical arguments, corres%on!ing to the three mo!es of conclusion, by hich reason attains to cognitions on %rinci%les@ an! that in all it is the business of reason to ascen! from the con!itione! synthesis, beyon! hich the un!erstan!ing ne"er %rocee!s, to the uncon!itione! hich the un!erstan!ing ne"er can reach# <o the most general relations hich can e?ist in our re%resentations are( 6st, the relation to the subject@ ,n!, the relation to objects, either as %henomena, or as objects of thought in general# If e connect this sub!i"ision ith the main !i"ision, all the relations of our re%resentations, of hich e can form either a conce%tion or an i!ea, are threefol!( 6# The relation to the subject@ ,# The relation to the manifol! of the object as a %henomenon@ .# The relation to all things in general# <o all %ure conce%tions ha"e to !o in general ith the synthetical unity of re%resentations@ conce%tions of %ure reason Dtranscen!ental i!easE, on the other han!, ith the uncon!itional synthetical unity of all con!itions# It follo s that all transcen!ental i!eas arrange themsel"es in three classes, the first of hich contains the absolute Duncon!itione!E unity of the thinking subject, the secon! the absolute unity of the series of the con!itions of a %henomenon, the thir! the absolute unity of the con!ition of all objects of thought in general# The thinking subject is the object&matter of Psychology@ the sum total of all %henomena Dthe orl!E is the object&matter of Cosmology@ an! the thing hich contains the highest con!ition of the %ossibility of all that is cogitable Dthe being of all beingsE is the object& matter of all Theology# Thus %ure reason %resents us ith the i!ea of a transcen!ental !octrine of the soul D%sychologia rationalisE, of a transcen!ental science of the orl! Dcosmologia rationalisE, an! finally of a transcen!ental !octrine of Go! Dtheologia transcen!entalisE# 4n!erstan!ing cannot originate e"en the outline of any of these

sciences, e"en hen connecte! ith the highest logical use of reason, that is, all cogitable syllogismsBfor the %ur%ose of %rocee!ing from one object D%henomenonE to all others, e"en to the utmost limits of the em%irical synthesis# They are, on the contrary, %ure an! genuine %ro!ucts, or %roblems, of %ure reason# >hat mo!i of the %ure conce%tions of reason these transcen!ental i!eas are ill be fully e?%ose! in the follo ing cha%ter# They follo the gui!ing threa! of the categories# :or %ure reason ne"er relates imme!iately to objects, but to the conce%tions of these containe! in the un!erstan!ing# In like manner, it ill be ma!e manifest in the !etaile! e?%lanation of these i!easBho reason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function hich it em%loys in a categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conce%tion of the absolute unity of the thinking subjectBho the logical %roce!ure in hy%othetical i!eas necessarily %ro!uces the i!ea of the absolutely uncon!itione! in a series of gi"en con!itions, an! finallyBho the mere form of the !isjuncti"e syllogism in"ol"es the highest conce%tion of a being of all beings( a thought hich at first sight seems in the highest !egree %ara!o?ical# )n objecti"e !e!uction, such as e ere able to %resent in the case of the categories, is im%ossible as regar!s these transcen!ental i!eas# :or they ha"e, in truth, no relation to any object, in e?%erience, for the "ery reason that they are only i!eas# But a subjecti"e !e!uction of them from the nature of our reason is %ossible, an! has been gi"en in the %resent cha%ter# It is easy to %ercei"e that the sole aim of %ure reason is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the si!e of the con!itions, an! that it !oes not concern itself ith the absolute com%leteness on the Part of the con!itione!# :or of the former alone !oes she stan! in nee!, in or!er to %re%osit the hole series of con!itions, an! thus %resent them to the un!erstan!ing a %riori# But if e once ha"e a com%letely Dan! uncon!itionallyE gi"en con!ition, there is no further necessity, in %rocee!ing ith the series, for a conce%tion of reason@ for the un!erstan!ing takes of itself e"ery ste% !o n ar!, from the con!ition to the con!itione!# Thus the transcen!ental i!eas are a"ailable only for ascen!ing in the series of con!itions, till e reach the uncon!itione!, that is, %rinci%les# )s regar!s !escen!ing to the con!itione!, on the other han!, e fin! that there is a i!ely e?tensi"e logical use hich reason makes of the la s of the un!erstan!ing, but that a transcen!ental use thereof is im%ossible@ an! that hen e form an i!ea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis, for e?am%le, of the hole series of all future changes in the orl!, this i!ea is a mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, an! not a necessary %resu%%osition of reason# :or the %ossibility of the con!itione! %resu%%oses the totality of its con!itions, but not of its consequences# Consequently, this conce%tion is not a transcen!ental i!eaBan! it is ith these alone that e are at %resent occu%ie!# :inally, it is ob"ious that there e?ists among the transcen!ental i!eas a certain connection an! unity, an! that %ure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one system# :rom the cognition of self to the cognition of the orl!, an! through these to the su%reme being, the %rogression is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the %remisses to the conclusion#8 <o hether there lies

unobser"e! at the foun!ation of these i!eas an analogy of the same kin! as e?ists bet een the logical an! transcen!ental %roce!ure of reason, is another of those questions, the ans er to hich e must not e?%ect till e arri"e at a more a!"ance! stage in our inquiries# In this cursory an! %reliminary "ie , e ha"e, mean hile, reache! our aim# :or e ha"e !is%elle! the ambiguity hich attache! to the transcen!ental conce%tions of reason, from their being commonly mi?e! u% ith other conce%tions in the systems of %hiloso%hers, an! not %ro%erly !istinguishe! from the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing@ e ha"e e?%ose! their origin an!, thereby, at the same time their !eterminate number, an! %resente! them in a systematic connection, an! ha"e thus marke! out an! enclose! a !efinite s%here for %ure reason# /8:ootnote( The science of Aeta%hysics has for the %ro%er object of its inquiries only three gran! i!eas( G9*, :REE*9A, an! IAA9RT)'IT$, an! it aims at sho ing, that the secon! conce%tion, conjoine! ith the first, must lea! to the thir!, as a necessary conclusion# )ll the other subjects ith hich it occu%ies itself, are merely means for the attainment an! realiCation of these i!eas# It !oes not require these i!eas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the %ur%ose of %assing beyon! the s%here of nature# ) com%lete insight into an! com%rehension of them oul! ren!er Theology, Ethics, an!, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely !e%en!ent on the s%eculati"e faculty of reason# In a systematic re%resentation of these i!eas the abo"e&mentione! arrangementBthe synthetical oneB oul! be the most suitable@ but in the in"estigation hich must necessarily %rece!e it, the analytical, hich re"erses this arrangement, oul! be better a!a%te! to our %ur%ose, as in it e shoul! %rocee! from that hich e?%erience imme!iately %resents to usB%sychology, to cosmology, an! thence to theology#3 B99K II#B 9: T;E *I)'ECTIC)' PR9CE*4RE 9: P4RE RE)79<# It may be sai! that the object of a merely transcen!ental i!ea is something of hich e ha"e no conce%tion, although the i!ea may be a necessary %ro!uct of reason accor!ing to its original la s# :or, in fact, a conce%tion of an object that is a!equate to the i!ea gi"en by reason, is im%ossible# :or such an object must be ca%able of being %resente! an! intuite! in a Possible e?%erience# But e shoul! e?%ress our meaning better, an! ith less risk of being misun!erstoo!, if e sai! that e can ha"e no kno le!ge of an object, hich %erfectly corres%on!s to an i!ea, although e may %ossess a %roblematical conce%tion thereof# <o the transcen!ental Dsubjecti"eE reality at least of the %ure conce%tions of reason rests u%on the fact that e are le! to such i!eas by a necessary %roce!ure of reason# There must therefore be syllogisms hich contain no em%irical %remisses, an! by means of hich e conclu!e from something that e !o kno , to something of hich e !o not e"en %ossess a conce%tion, to hich e, ne"ertheless, by an una"oi!able illusion, ascribe objecti"e reality# 7uch arguments are, as regar!s their result, rather to be terme! so%hisms than syllogisms, although in!ee!, as regar!s their origin, they are "ery ell entitle! to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or acci!ental %ro!ucts of

reason, but are necessitate! by its "ery nature# They are so%hisms, not of men, but of %ure reason herself, from hich the >isest cannot free himself# )fter long labour he may be able to guar! against the error, but he can ne"er be thoroughly ri! of the illusion hich continually mocks an! mislea!s him# 9f these !ialectical arguments there are three kin!s, corres%on!ing to the number of the i!eas hich their conclusions %resent# In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclu!e, from the transcen!ental conce%tion of the subject contains no manifol!, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of hich I cannot in this manner attain to a conce%tion# This !ialectical argument I shall call the transcen!ental %aralogism# The secon! class of so%histical arguments is occu%ie! ith the transcen!ental conce%tion of the absolute totality of the series of con!itions for a gi"en %henomenon, an! I conclu!e, from the fact that I ha"e al ays a self&contra!ictory conce%tion of the uncon!itione! synthetical unity of the series u%on one si!e, the truth of the o%%osite unity, of hich I ha"e ne"ertheless no conce%tion# The con!ition of reason in these !ialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of %ure reason# :inally, accor!ing to the thir! kin! of so%histical argument, I conclu!e, from the totality of the con!itions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be gi"en, the absolute synthetical unity of all con!itions of the %ossibility of things in general@ that is, from things hich I !o not kno in their mere transcen!ental conce%tion, I conclu!e a being of all beings hich I kno still less by means of a transcen!ental conce%tion, an! of hose uncon!itione! necessity I can form no conce%tion hate"er# This !ialectical argument I shall call the i!eal of %ure reason#

CHAPTER I. O+ t&e Paral%."sms %+ Pure Reas%n. The logical %aralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in res%ect of its form, be the content hat it may# But a transcen!ental %aralogism has a transcen!ental foun!ation, an! conclu!es falsely, hile the form is correct an! une?ce%tionable# In this manner the %aralogism has its foun!ation in the nature of human reason, an! is the %arent of an una"oi!able, though not insoluble, mental illusion# >e no come to a conce%tion hich as not inserte! in the general list of transcen!ental conce%tions, an! yet must be reckone! ith them, but at the same time ithout in the least altering, or in!icating a !eficiency in that table# This is the conce%tion, or, if the term is %referre!, the ju!gement, GI think#G But it is rea!ily %ercei"e! that this thought is as it ere the "ehicle of all conce%tions in general, an! consequently of transcen!ental conce%tions also, an! that it is therefore regar!e! as a transcen!ental conce%tion, although it can ha"e no %eculiar claim to be so ranke!, inasmuch as its only use is to in!icate that all thought is accom%anie! by consciousness# )t the same time, %ure as this conce%tion is from em%irical content Dim%ressions of the sensesE, it enables us to !istinguish t o !ifferent kin!s of objects# GI,G as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, an! am calle! soul# That hich is an object of the e?ternal

senses is calle! bo!y# Thus the e?%ression, GI,G as a thinking being, !esignates the object&matter of %sychology, hich may be calle! Gthe rational !octrine of the soul,G inasmuch as in this science I !esire to kno nothing of the soul but hat, in!e%en!ently of all e?%erience D hich !etermines me in concretoE, may be conclu!e! from this conce%tion GI,G in so far as it a%%ears in all thought# <o , the rational !octrine of the soul is really an un!ertaking of this kin!# :or if the smallest em%irical element of thought, if any %articular %erce%tion of my internal state, ere to be intro!uce! among the groun!s of cognition of this science, it oul! not be a rational, but an em%irical !octrine of the soul# >e ha"e thus before us a %reten!e! science, raise! u%on the single %ro%osition, GI think,G hose foun!ation or ant of foun!ation e may "ery %ro%erly, an! agreeably ith the nature of a transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, here e?amine# It ought not to be objecte! that in this %ro%osition, hich e?%resses the %erce%tion of oneFs self, an internal e?%erience is asserte!, an! that consequently the rational !octrine of the soul hich is foun!e! u%on it, is not %ure, but %artly foun!e! u%on an em%irical %rinci%le# :or this internal %erce%tion is nothing more than the mere a%%erce%tion, GI think,G hich in fact ren!ers all transcen!ental conce%tions %ossible, in hich e say, GI think substance, cause, etc#G :or internal e?%erience in general an! its %ossibility, or %erce%tion in general, an! its relation to other %erce%tions, unless some %articular !istinction or !etermination thereof is em%irically gi"en, cannot be regar!e! as em%irical cognition, but as cognition of the em%irical, an! belongs to the in"estigation of the %ossibility of e"ery e?%erience, hich is certainly transcen!ental# The smallest object of e?%erience Dfor e?am%le, only %leasure or %ainE, that shoul! be inclu!e! in the general re%resentation of self& consciousness, oul! imme!iately change the rational into an em%irical %sychology# GI thinkG is therefore the only te?t of rational %sychology, from hich it must !e"elo% its hole system# It is manifest that this thought, hen a%%lie! to an object DmyselfE, can contain nothing but transcen!ental %re!icates thereof@ because the least em%irical %re!icate oul! !estroy the %urity of the science an! its in!e%en!ence of all e?%erience# But e shall ha"e to follo here the gui!ance of the categoriesBonly, as in the %resent case a thing, GI,G as thinking being, is at first gi"en, e shallBnot in!ee! change the or!er of the categories as it stan!s in the tableBbut begin at the category of substance, by hich at the a thing in itself is re%resente! an! %rocee!s back ar!s through the series# The to%ic of the rational !octrine of the soul, from hich e"erything else it may contain must be !e!uce!, is accor!ingly as follo s( 6 , The 7oul is 74B7T)<CE )s regar!s its quality it is 7IAP'E . )s regar!s the !ifferent times in hich it e?ists, it is numerically i!entical, that is 4<IT$, not Plurality#

1 It is in relation to %ossible objects in s%ace8 /8:ootnote( The rea!er, ho may not so easily %ercei"e the %sychological sense of these e?%ressions, taken here in their transcen!ental abstraction, an! cannot guess hy the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of e?istence, ill fin! the e?%ressions sufficiently e?%laine! an! justifie! in the sequel# I ha"e, moreo"er, to a%ologiCe for the 'atin terms hich ha"e been em%loye!, instea! of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct riting# But I ju!ge! it better to sacrifice elegance to %ers%icuity#3 :rom these elements originate all the conce%tions of %ure %sychology, by combination alone, ithout the ai! of any other %rinci%le# This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gi"es the conce%tion of Immateriality@ as sim%le substance, that of Incorru%tibility@ its i!entity, as intellectual substance, gi"es the conce%tion of Personality@ all these three together, 7%irituality# Its relation to objects in s%ace gi"es us the conce%tion of connection DcommerciumE ith bo!ies# Thus it re%resents thinking substance as the %rinci%le of life in matter, that is, as a soul DanimaE, an! as the groun! of )nimality@ an! this, limite! an! !etermine! by the conce%tion of s%irituality, gi"es us that of Immortality# <o to these conce%tions relate four %aralogisms of a transcen!ental %sychology, hich is falsely hel! to be a science of %ure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being# >e can, ho e"er, lay at the foun!ation of this science nothing but the sim%le an! in itself %erfectly contentless re%resentation GIG hich cannot e"en be calle! a conce%tion, but merely a consciousness hich accom%anies all conce%tions# By this GI,G or G;e,G or GIt,G ho or hich thinks, nothing more is re%resente! than a transcen!ental subject of thought L ?, hich is cogniCe! only by means of the thoughts that are its %re!icates, an! of hich, a%art from these, e cannot form the least conce%tion# ;ence in a %er%etual circle, inasmuch as e must al ays em%loy it, in or!er to frame any ju!gement res%ecting it# )n! this incon"enience e fin! it im%ossible to ri! oursel"es of, because consciousness in itself is not so much a re%resentation !istinguishing a %articular object, as a form of re%resentation in general, in so far as it may be terme! cognition@ for in an! by cognition alone !o I think anything# It must, ho e"er, a%%ear e?traor!inary at first sight that the con!ition un!er hich I think, an! hich is consequently a %ro%erty of my subject, shoul! be hel! to be like ise "ali! for e"ery e?istence hich thinks, an! that e can %resume to base u%on a seemingly em%irical %ro%osition a ju!gement hich is a%o!eictic an! uni"ersal, to it, that e"erything hich thinks is constitute! as the "oice of my consciousness !eclares it to be, that is, as a self&conscious being# The cause of this belief is to be foun! in the fact that e necessarily attribute to things a %riori all the %ro%erties hich constitute con!itions un!er hich alone e can cogitate them# <o I cannot obtain the least re%resentation of a thinking being by means of e?ternal e?%erience, but solely through self&consciousness# 7uch objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things hich can only thus be re%resente! as

thinking beings# The %ro%osition, GI think,G is, in the %resent case, un!erstoo! in a %roblematical sense, not in so far as it contains a %erce%tion of an e?istence Dlike the Cartesian GCogito, ergo sumGE,/:ootnote( GI think, therefore I am#G3 but in regar! to its mere %ossibilityBfor the %ur%ose of !isco"ering hat %ro%erties may be inferre! from so sim%le a %ro%osition an! %re!icate! of the subject of it# If at the foun!ation of our %ure rational cognition of thinking beings there lay more than the mere CogitoBif e coul! like ise call in ai! obser"ations on the %lay of our thoughts, an! the thence !eri"e! natural la s of the thinking self, there oul! arise an em%irical %sychology hich oul! be a kin! of %hysiology of the internal sense an! might %ossibly be ca%able of e?%laining the %henomena of that sense# But it coul! ne"er be a"ailable for !isco"ering those %ro%erties hich !o not belong to %ossible e?%erience Dsuch as the quality of sim%licityE, nor coul! it make any a%o!eictic enunciation on the nature of thinking beings( it oul! therefore not be a rational %sychology# <o , as the %ro%osition GI thinkG Din the %roblematical senseE contains the form of e"ery ju!gement in general an! is the constant accom%animent of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions are !ra n from it only by a transcen!ental em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing# This use of the un!erstan!ing e?clu!es all em%irical elements@ an! e cannot, as has been sho n abo"e, ha"e any fa"ourable conce%tion beforehan! of its %roce!ure# >e shall therefore follo ith a critical eye this %ro%osition through all the %re!icaments of %ure %sychology@ but e shall, for bre"ityFs sake, allo this e?amination to %rocee! in an uninterru%te! connection# Before entering on this task, ho e"er, the follo ing general remark may hel% to quicken our attention to this mo!e of argument# It is not merely through my thinking that I cogniCe an object, but only through my !etermining a gi"en intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in hich all thinking consists# It follo s that I cogniCe myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only hen I am conscious of the intuition of myself as !etermine! in relation to the function of thought# )ll the mo!i of self&consciousness in thought are hence not conce%tions of objects Dconce%tions of the un!erstan!ingBcategoriesE@ they are mere logical functions, hich !o not %resent to thought an object to be cogniCe!, an! cannot therefore %resent my 7elf as an object# <ot the consciousness of the !etermining, but only that of the !eterminable self, that is, of my internal intuition Din so far as the manifol! containe! in it can be connecte! conformably ith the general con!ition of the unity of a%%erce%tion in thoughtE, is the object# 6# In all ju!gements I am the !etermining subject of that relation hich constitutes a ju!gement# But that the I hich thinks, must be consi!ere! as in thought al ays a subject, an! as a thing hich cannot be a %re!icate to thought, is an a%o!eictic an! i!entical %ro%osition# But this %ro%osition !oes not signify that I, as an object, am, for myself, a self&subsistent being or substance# This latter statementBan ambitious oneB requires to be su%%orte! by !ata hich are not to be !isco"ere! in thought@ an! are %erha%s Din so far as I consi!er the thinking self merely as suchE not to be !isco"ere! in the thinking self at all#

,# That the I or Ego of a%%erce%tion, an! consequently in all thought, is singular or sim%le, an! cannot be resol"e! into a %lurality of subjects, an! therefore in!icates a logically sim%le subjectBthis is self&e"i!ent from the "ery conce%tion of an Ego, an! is consequently an analytical %ro%osition# But this is not tantamount to !eclaring that the thinking Ego is a sim%le substanceBfor this oul! be a synthetical %ro%osition# The conce%tion of substance al ays relates to intuitions, hich ith me cannot be other than sensuous, an! hich consequently lie com%letely out of the s%here of the un!erstan!ing an! its thought( but to this s%here belongs the affirmation that the Ego is sim%le in thought# It oul! in!ee! be sur%rising, if the conce%tion of Gsubstance,G hich in other cases requires so much labour to !istinguish from the other elements %resente! by intuitionBso much trouble, too, to !isco"er hether it can be sim%le Das in the case of the %arts of matterEBshoul! be %resente! imme!iately to me, as if by re"elation, in the %oorest mental re%resentation of all# .# The %ro%osition of the i!entity of my 7elf ami!st all the manifol! re%resentations of hich I am conscious, is like ise a %ro%osition lying in the conce%tions themsel"es, an! is consequently analytical# But this i!entity of the subject, of hich I am conscious in all its re%resentations, !oes not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by hich it is gi"en as an object# This %ro%osition cannot therefore enounce the i!entity of the %erson, by hich is un!erstoo! the consciousness of the i!entity of its o n substance as a thinking being in all change an! "ariation of circumstances# To %ro"e this, e shoul! require not a mere analysis of the %ro%osition, but synthetical ju!gements base! u%on a gi"en intuition# 1# I !istinguish my o n e?istence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things e?ternal to meBamong hich my bo!y also is reckone!# This is also an analytical %ro%osition, for other things are e?actly those hich I think as !ifferent or !istinguishe! from myself# But hether this consciousness of myself is %ossible ithout things e?ternal to me@ an! hether therefore I can e?ist merely as a thinking being D ithout being manEBcannot be kno n or inferre! from this %ro%osition# Thus e ha"e gaine! nothing as regar!s the cognition of myself as object, by the analysis of the consciousness of my 7elf in thought# The logical e?%osition of thought in general is mistaken for a meta%hysical !etermination of the object# 9ur Critique oul! be an in"estigation utterly su%erfluous, if there e?iste! a %ossibility of %ro"ing a %riori, that all thinking beings are in themsel"es sim%le substances, as such, therefore, %ossess the inse%arable attribute of %ersonality, an! are conscious of their e?istence a%art from an! unconnecte! ith matter# :or e shoul! thus ha"e taken a ste% beyon! the orl! of sense, an! ha"e %enetrate! into the s%here of noumena@ an! in this case the right coul! not be !enie! us of e?ten!ing our kno le!ge in this s%here, of establishing oursel"es, an!, un!er a fa"ouring star, a%%ro%riating to oursel"es %ossessions in it# :or the %ro%osition( GE"ery thinking being, as such, is sim%le substance,G is an a %riori synthetical %ro%osition@ because in the first %lace it goes beyon! the conce%tion hich is the subject of it, an! a!!s to the mere notion of a thinking being the mo!e of its e?istence, an! in the secon! %lace anne?es a %re!icate Dthat of sim%licityE to the latter conce%tionBa %re!icate hich it coul! not ha"e

!isco"ere! in the s%here of e?%erience# It oul! follo that a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions are %ossible an! legitimate, not only, as e ha"e maintaine!, in relation to objects of %ossible e?%erience, an! as %rinci%les of the %ossibility of this e?%erience itself, but are a%%licable to things in themsel"esBan inference hich makes an en! of the hole of this Critique, an! obliges us to fall back on the ol! mo!e of meta%hysical %roce!ure# But in!ee! the !anger is not so great, if e look a little closer into the question# There lurks in the %roce!ure of rational Psychology a %aralogism, hich is re%resente! in the follo ing syllogism( That hich cannot be cogitate! other ise than as subject, !oes not e?ist other ise than as subject, an! is therefore substance# ) thinking being, consi!ere! merely as such, cannot be cogitate! other ise than as subject# Therefore it e?ists also as such, that is, as substance# In the major e s%eak of a being that can be cogitate! generally an! in e"ery relation, consequently as it may be gi"en in intuition# But in the minor e s%eak of the same being only in so far as it regar!s itself as subject, relati"ely to thought an! the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intuition, by hich it is %resente! as an object to thought# Thus the conclusion is here arri"e! at by a 7o%hisma figurae !ictionis#8 /8:ootnote( Thought is taken in the t o %remisses in t o totally !ifferent senses# In the major it is consi!ere! as relating an! a%%lying to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also# In the minor, e un!erstan! it as relating merely to self&consciousness# In this sense, e !o not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the self&consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought# In the former %remiss e s%eak of things hich cannot be cogitate! other ise than as subjects# In the secon!, e !o not s%eak of things, but of thought Dall objects being abstracte!E, in hich the Ego is al ays the subject of consciousness# ;ence the conclusion cannot be, GI cannot e?ist other ise than as subjectG@ but only GI can, in cogitating my e?istence, em%loy my Ego only as the subject of the ju!gement#G But this is an i!entical %ro%osition, an! thro s no light on the mo!e of my e?istence#3 That this famous argument is a mere %aralogism, ill be %lain to any one ho ill consi!er the general remark hich %rece!es our e?%osition of the %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, an! the section on noumena# :or it as there %ro"e! that the conce%tion of a thing, hich can e?ist %er seBonly as a subject an! ne"er as a %re!icate, %ossesses no objecti"e reality@ that is to say, e can ne"er kno hether there e?ists any object to corres%on! to the conce%tion@ consequently, the conce%tion is nothing more than a conce%tion, an! from it e !eri"e no %ro%er kno le!ge# If this conce%tion is to in!icate by the term substance, an object that can be gi"en, if it is to become a cognition, e must

ha"e at the foun!ation of the cognition a %ermanent intuition, as the in!is%ensable con!ition of its objecti"e reality# :or through intuition alone can an object be gi"en# But in internal intuition there is nothing %ermanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought# If then, e a%%eal merely to thought, e cannot !isco"er the necessary con!ition of the a%%lication of the conce%tion of substanceBthat is, of a subject e?isting %er seBto the subject as a thinking being# )n! thus the conce%tion of the sim%le nature of substance, hich is connecte! ith the objecti"e reality of this conce%tion, is sho n to be also in"ali!, an! to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitati"e unity of self&consciousness in thought@ hilst e remain %erfectly ignorant hether the subject is com%osite or not# Refutation of the )rgument of Aen!elssohn for the 7ubstantiality or Permanence of the 7oul# This acute %hiloso%her easily %ercei"e! the insufficiency of the common argument hich attem%ts to %ro"e that the soulBit being grante! that it is a sim%le beingBcannot %erish by !issolution or !ecom%osition@ he sa it is not im%ossible for it to cease to be by e?tinction, or !isa%%earance# ;e en!ea"oure! to %ro"e in his Phae!o, that the soul cannot be annihilate!, by sho ing that a sim%le being cannot cease to e?ist# Inasmuch as, he sai!, a sim%le e?istence cannot !iminish, nor gra!ually lose %ortions of its being, an! thus be by !egrees re!uce! to nothing Dfor it %ossesses no %arts, an! therefore no multi%licityE, bet een the moment in hich it is, an! the moment in hich it is not, no time can be !isco"ere!B hich is im%ossible# But this %hiloso%her !i! not consi!er that, granting the soul to %ossess this sim%le nature, hich contains no %arts e?ternal to each other an! consequently no e?tensi"e quantity, e cannot refuse to it any less than to any other being, intensi"e quantity, that is, a !egree of reality in regar! to all its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes its e?istence# But this !egree of reality can become less an! less through an infinite series of smaller !egrees# It follo s, therefore, that this su%%ose! substanceBthis thing, the %ermanence of hich is not assure! in any other ay, may, if not by !ecom%osition, by gra!ual loss DremissioE of its %o ers Dconsequently by elanguescence, if I may em%loy this e?%ressionE, be change! into nothing# :or consciousness itself has al ays a !egree, hich may be lessene!#8 Consequently the faculty of being conscious may be !iminishe!@ an! so ith all other faculties# The %ermanence of the soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense, remains un!emonstrate!, nay, e"en in!emonstrable# Its %ermanence in life is e"i!ent, %er se, inasmuch as the thinking being Das manE is to itself, at the same time, an object of the e?ternal senses# But this !oes not authoriCe the rational %sychologist to affirm, from mere conce%tions, its %ermanence beyon! life#8, /8:ootnote( Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a re%resentation# :or a certain !egree of consciousness, hich may not, ho e"er, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met ith in many !im re%resentations# :or ithout any consciousness at all, e shoul! not be able to recogniCe any !ifference in the obscure re%resentations e connect@ as e really can !o ith many conce%tions, such as those of right an! justice, an! those of the musician, ho strikes at once se"eral notes in im%ro"ising a %iece of music# But a re%resentation is

clear, in hich our consciousness is sufficient for the consciousness of the !ifference of this re%resentation from others# If e are only conscious that there is a !ifference, but are not conscious of the !ifferenceBthat is, hat the !ifference isBthe re%resentation must be terme! obscure# There is, consequently, an infinite series of !egrees of consciousness !o n to its entire !isa%%earance#3 /8/,3:ootnote( There are some ho think they ha"e !one enough to establish a ne %ossibility in the mo!e of the e?istence of souls, hen they ha"e sho n that there is no contra!iction in their hy%otheses on this subject# 7uch are those ho affirm the %ossibility of thoughtBof hich they ha"e no other kno le!ge than hat they !eri"e from its use in connecting em%irical intuitions %resente! in this our human lifeBafter this life has cease!# But it is "ery easy to embarrass them by the intro!uction of counter&%ossibilities, hich rest u%on quite as goo! a foun!ation# 7uch, for e?am%le, is the %ossibility of the !i"ision of a sim%le substance into se"eral substances@ an! con"ersely, of the coalition of se"eral into one sim%le substance# :or, although !i"isibility %resu%%oses com%osition, it !oes not necessarily require a com%osition of substances, but only of the !egrees Dof the se"eral facultiesE of one an! the same substance# <o e can cogitate all the %o ers an! faculties of the soulBe"en that of consciousnessBas !iminishe! by one half, the substance still remaining# In the same ay e can re%resent to oursel"es ithout contra!iction, this obliterate! half as %reser"e!, not in the soul, but ithout it@ an! e can belie"e that, as in this case e"ery thing that is real in the soul, an! has a !egreeBconsequently its entire e?istenceBhas been hal"e!, a %articular substance oul! arise out of the soul# :or the multi%licity, hich has been !i"i!e!, formerly e?iste!, but not as a multi%licity of substances, but of e"ery reality as the quantum of e?istence in it@ an! the unity of substance as merely a mo!e of e?istence, hich by this !i"ision alone has been transforme! into a %lurality of subsistence# In the same manner se"eral sim%le substances might coalesce into one, ithout anything being lost e?ce%t the %lurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance oul! contain the !egree of reality of all the former substances# Perha%s, in!ee!, the sim%le substances, hich a%%ear un!er the form of matter, might Dnot in!ee! by a mechanical or chemical influence u%on each other, but by an unkno n influence, of hich the former oul! be but the %henomenal a%%earanceE, by means of such a !ynamical !i"ision of the %arent&souls, as intensi"e quantities, %ro!uce other souls, hile the former re%aire! the loss thus sustaine! ith ne matter of the same sort# I am far from allo ing any "alue to such chimeras@ an! the %rinci%les of our analytic ha"e clearly %ro"e! that no other than an em%irical use of the categoriesBthat of substance, for e?am%leBis %ossible# But if the rationalist is bol! enough to construct, on the mere authority of the faculty of thoughtB ithout any intuition, hereby an object is gi"enBa self&subsistent being, merely because the unity of a%%erce%tion in thought cannot allo him to belie"e

it a com%osite being, instea! of !eclaring, as he ought to !o, that he is unable to e?%lain the %ossibility of a thinking nature@ hat ought to hin!er the materialist, ith as com%lete an in!e%en!ence of e?%erience, to em%loy the %rinci%le of the rationalist in a !irectly o%%osite mannerBstill %reser"ing the formal unity require! by his o%%onentH3 If, no , e take the abo"e %ro%ositionsBas they must be acce%te! as "ali! for all thinking beings in the system of rational %sychologyBin synthetical connection, an! %rocee!, from the category of relation, ith the %ro%osition( G)ll thinking beings are, as such, substances,G back ar!s through the series, till the circle is com%lete!@ e come at last to their e?istence, of hich, in this system of rational %sychology, substances are hel! to be conscious, in!e%en!ently of e?ternal things@ nay, it is asserte! that, in relation to the %ermanence hich is a necessary characteristic of substance, they can of themsel"es !etermine e?ternal things# It follo s that i!ealismBat least %roblematical i!ealism, is %erfectly una"oi!able in this rationalistic system# )n!, if the e?istence of out ar! things is not hel! to be requisite to the !etermination of the e?istence of a substance in time, the e?istence of these out ar! things at all, is a gratuitous assum%tion hich remains ithout the %ossibility of a %roof# But if e %rocee! analyticallyBthe GI thinkG as a %ro%osition containing in itself an e?istence as gi"en, consequently mo!ality being the %rinci%leBan! !issect this %ro%osition, in or!er to ascertain its content, an! !isco"er hether an! ho this Ego !etermines its e?istence in time an! s%ace ithout the ai! of anything e?ternal@ the %ro%ositions of rationalistic %sychology oul! not begin ith the conce%tion of a thinking being, but ith a reality, an! the %ro%erties of a thinking being in general oul! be !e!uce! from the mo!e in hich this reality is cogitate!, after e"erything em%irical ha! been abstracte!@ as is sho n in the follo ing table( 6 I think, , as 7ubject, . as sim%le 7ubject,

1 as i!entical 7ubject, in e"ery state of my thought# <o , inasmuch as it is not !etermine! in this secon! %ro%osition, hether I can e?ist an! be cogitate! only as subject, an! not also as a %re!icate of another being, the conce%tion of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense@ an! it remains un!etermine!, hether substance is to be cogitate! un!er the conce%tion or not# But in the thir! %ro%osition, the absolute unity of a%%erce%tionBthe sim%le Ego in the re%resentation to hich all connection an! se%aration, hich constitute thought, relate, is of itself im%ortant@ e"en although it %resents us ith no information about the constitution or subsistence of the subject# )%%erce%tion is something real, an! the sim%licity of its nature is gi"en in the "ery fact of its %ossibility# <o in s%ace there is

nothing real that is at the same time sim%le@ for %oints, hich are the only sim%le things in s%ace, are merely limits, but not constituent %arts of s%ace# :rom this follo s the im%ossibility of a !efinition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely thinking subject# But, because my e?istence is consi!ere! in the first %ro%osition as gi"en, for it !oes not mean, GE"ery thinking being e?istsG Dfor this oul! be %re!icating of them absolute necessityE, but only, GI e?ist thinkingG@ the %ro%osition is quite em%irical, an! contains the !eterminability of my e?istence merely in relation to my re%resentations in time# But as I require for this %ur%ose something that is %ermanent, such as is not gi"en in internal intuition@ the mo!e of my e?istence, hether as substance or as acci!ent, cannot be !etermine! by means of this sim%le self& consciousness# Thus, if materialism is ina!equate to e?%lain the mo!e in hich I e?ist, s%iritualism is like ise as insufficient@ an! the conclusion is that e are utterly unable to attain to any kno le!ge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the %ossibility of its e?istence a%art from e?ternal objects# )n!, in!ee!, ho shoul! it be %ossible, merely by the ai! of the unity of consciousnessB hich e cogniCe only for the reason that it is in!is%ensable to the %ossibility of e?%erienceBto %ass the boun!s of e?%erience Dour e?istence in this lifeE@ an! to e?ten! our cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the em%iricalBbut in relation to e"ery sort of intuition, %erfectly un!etermine!B%ro%osition, GI thinkGH There !oes not then e?ist any rational %sychology as a !octrine furnishing any a!!ition to our kno le!ge of oursel"es# It is nothing more than a !isci%line, hich sets im%assable limits to s%eculati"e reason in this region of thought, to %re"ent it, on the one han!, from thro ing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, an!, on the other, from losing itself in the maCes of a baseless s%iritualism# It teaches us to consi!er this refusal of our reason to gi"e any satisfactory ans er to questions hich reach beyon! the limits of this our human life, as a hint to aban!on fruitless s%eculation@ an! to !irect, to a %ractical use, our kno le!ge of oursel"esB hich, although a%%licable only to objects of e?%erience, recei"es its %rinci%les from a higher source, an! regulates its %roce!ure as if our !estiny reache! far beyon! the boun!aries of e?%erience an! life# :rom all this it is e"i!ent that rational %sychology has its origin in a mere misun!erstan!ing# The unity of consciousness, hich lies at the basis of the categories, is consi!ere! to be an intuition of the subject as an object@ an! the category of substance is a%%lie! to the intuition# But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by hich no object is gi"en@ to hich therefore the category of substanceB hich al ays %resu%%oses a gi"en intuitionBcannot be a%%lie!# Consequently, the subject cannot be cogniCe!# The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the "ery reason that it cogitates these, frame any conce%tion of itself as an object of the categories@ for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foun!ation its o n %ure self&consciousnessBthe "ery thing that it ishes to e?%lain an! !escribe# In like manner, the subject, in hich the re%resentation of time has its basis, cannot !etermine, for this "ery reason, its o n e?istence in time# <o , if the latter is im%ossible, the former, as an attem%t to !etermine itself by means of the categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so#8 /8:ootnote( The GI thinkG is, as has been alrea!y state!, an em%irical

%ro%osition, an! contains the %ro%osition, GI e?ist#G But I cannot say, GE"erything, hich thinks, e?istsG@ for in this case the %ro%erty of thought oul! constitute all beings %ossessing it, necessary beings# ;ence my e?istence cannot be consi!ere! as an inference from the %ro%osition, GI think,G as *escartes maintaine!Bbecause in this case the major %remiss, GE"erything, hich thinks, e?ists,G must %rece!eBbut the t o %ro%ositions are i!entical# The %ro%osition, GI think,G e?%resses an un!etermine! em%irical intuition, that %erce%tion D%ro"ing consequently that sensation, hich must belong to sensibility, lies at the foun!ation of this %ro%ositionE@ but it %rece!es e?%erience, hose %ro"ince it is to !etermine an object of %erce%tion by means of the categories in relation to time@ an! e?istence in this %ro%osition is not a category, as it !oes not a%%ly to an un!etermine! gi"en object, but only to one of hich e ha"e a conce%tion, an! about hich e ish to kno hether it !oes or !oes not e?ist, out of, an! a%art from this conce%tion# )n un!etermine! %erce%tion signifies here merely something real that has been gi"en, only, ho e"er, to thought in generalBbut not as a %henomenon, nor as a thing in itself DnoumenonE, but only as something that really e?ists, an! is !esignate! as such in the %ro%osition, GI think#G :or it must be remarke! that, hen I call the %ro%osition, GI think,G an em%irical %ro%osition, I !o not thereby mean that the Ego in the %ro%osition is an em%irical re%resentation@ on the contrary, it is %urely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general# But ithout some em%irical re%resentation, hich %resents to the min! material for thought, the mental act, GI think,G oul! not take %lace@ an! the em%irical is only the con!ition of the a%%lication or em%loyment of the %ure intellectual faculty#3 Thus, then, a%%ears the "anity of the ho%e of establishing a cognition hich is to e?ten! its rule beyon! the limits of e?%erienceBa cognition hich is one of the highest interests of humanity@ an! thus is %ro"e! the futility of the attem%t of s%eculati"e %hiloso%hy in this region of thought# But, in this interest of thought, the se"erity of criticism has ren!ere! to reason a not unim%ortant ser"ice, by the !emonstration of the im%ossibility of making any !ogmatical affirmation concerning an object of e?%erience beyon! the boun!aries of e?%erience# 7he has thus fortifie! reason against all affirmations of the contrary# <o , this can be accom%lishe! in only t o ays# Either our %ro%osition must be %ro"e! a%o!eictically@ or, if this is unsuccessful, the sources of this inability must be sought for, an!, if these are !isco"ere! to e?ist in the natural an! necessary limitation of our reason, our o%%onents must submit to the same la of renunciation an! refrain from a!"ancing claims to !ogmatic assertion# But the right, say rather the necessity to a!mit a future life, u%on %rinci%les of the %ractical conjoine! ith the s%eculati"e use of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation@ for the merely s%eculati"e %roof has ne"er ha! any influence u%on the common reason of men# It stan!s u%on the %oint of a hair, so that e"en the schools ha"e been able to %reser"e it from falling only by incessantly !iscussing it an! s%inning it like a to%@ an! e"en in their eyes it has ne"er been able to %resent any safe foun!ation for the

erection of a theory# The %roofs hich ha"e been current among men, %reser"e their "alue un!iminishe!@ nay, rather gain in clearness an! unso%histicate! %o er, by the rejection of the !ogmatical assum%tions of s%eculati"e reason# :or reason is thus confine! ithin her o n %eculiar %ro"inceBthe arrangement of en!s or aims, hich is at the same time the arrangement of nature@ an!, as a %ractical faculty, ithout limiting itself to the latter, it is justifie! in e?ten!ing the former, an! ith it our o n e?istence, beyon! the boun!aries of e?%erience an! life# If e turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of li"ing beings in this orl!, in the consi!eration of hich reason is oblige! to acce%t as a %rinci%le that no organ, no faculty, no a%%etite is useless, an! that nothing is su%erfluous, nothing !is%ro%ortionate to its use, nothing unsuite! to its en!@ but that, on the contrary, e"erything is %erfectly conforme! to its !estination in lifeB e shall fin! that man, ho alone is the final en! an! aim of this or!er, is still the only animal that seems to be e?ce%te! from it# :or his natural giftsBnot merely as regar!s the talents an! moti"es that may incite him to em%loy them, but es%ecially the moral la in himB stretch so far beyon! all mere earthly utility an! a!"antage, that he feels himself boun! to %riCe the mere consciousness of %robity, a%art from all a!"antageous consequencesB e"en the sha!o y gift of %osthumous fameBabo"e e"erything@ an! he is conscious of an in ar! call to constitute himself, by his con!uct in this orl!B ithout regar! to mere sublunary interestsBthe citiCen of a better# This mighty, irresistible %roofBaccom%anie! by an e"er&increasing kno le!ge of the conformability to a %ur%ose in e"erything e see aroun! us, by the con"iction of the boun!less immensity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the %ossible e?tension of our kno le!ge, an! by a !esire commensurate there ithBremains to humanity, e"en after the theoretical cognition of oursel"es has faile! to establish the necessity of an e?istence after !eath#

C%n,lus"%n %+ t&e S%lut"%n %+ t&e Psy,&%l%.",al Paral%."sm. The !ialectical illusion in rational %sychology arises from our confoun!ing an i!ea of reason Dof a %ure intelligenceE ith the conce%tionBin e"ery res%ect un!etermine!Bof a thinking being in general# I cogitate myself in behalf of a %ossible e?%erience, at the same time making abstraction of all actual e?%erience@ an! infer therefrom that I can be conscious of myself a%art from e?%erience an! its em%irical con!itions# I consequently confoun! the %ossible abstraction of my em%irically !etermine! e?istence ith the su%%ose! consciousness of a %ossible se%arate e?istence of my thinking self@ an! I belie"e that I cogniCe hat is substantial in myself as a transcen!ental subject, hen I ha"e nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness, hich lies at the basis of all !etermination of cognition# The task of e?%laining the community of the soul ith the bo!y !oes not %ro%erly belong to the %sychology of hich e are here s%eaking@ because it %ro%oses to %ro"e the %ersonality of the soul a%art from this communion Dafter !eathE, an! is therefore transcen!ent in the %ro%er sense of the or!, although occu%ying itself ith an object of

e?%erienceBonly in so far, ho e"er, as it ceases to be an object of e?%erience# But a sufficient ans er may be foun! to the question in our system# The !ifficulty hich lies in the e?ecution of this task consists, as is ell kno n, in the %resu%%ose! heterogeneity of the object of the internal sense Dthe soulE an! the objects of the e?ternal senses@ inasmuch as the formal con!ition of the intuition of the one is time, an! of that of the other s%ace also# But if e consi!er that both kin!s of objects !o not !iffer internally, but only in so far as the one a%%ears e?ternally to the otherBconsequently, that hat lies at the basis of %henomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous@ this !ifficulty !isa%%ears# There then remains no other !ifficulty than is to be foun! in the questionB ho a community of substances is %ossible@ a question hich lies out of the region of %sychology, an! hich the rea!er, after hat in our analytic has been sai! of %rimiti"e forces an! faculties, ill easily ju!ge to be also beyon! the region of human cognition# GE<ER)' REA)RK 9n the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology# The %ro%osition, GI think,G or, GI e?ist thinking,G is an em%irical %ro%osition# But such a %ro%osition must be base! on em%irical intuition, an! the object cogitate! as a %henomenon@ an! thus our theory a%%ears to maintain that the soul, e"en in thought, is merely a %henomenon@ an! in this ay our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts u%on nothing# Thought, %er se, is merely the %urely s%ontaneous logical function hich o%erates to connect the manifol! of a %ossible intuition@ an! it !oes not re%resent the subject of consciousness as a %henomenonBfor this reason alone, that it %ays no attention to the question hether the mo!e of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual# I therefore !o not re%resent myself in thought either as I am, or as I a%%ear to myself@ I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mo!e of intuiting hich I make abstraction# >hen I re%resent myself as the subject of thought, or as the groun! of thought, these mo!es of re%resentation are not relate! to the categories of substance or of cause@ for these are functions of thought a%%licable only to our sensuous intuition# The a%%lication of these categories to the Ego oul!, ho e"er, be necessary, if I ishe! to make myself an object of kno le!ge# But I ish to be conscious of myself only as thinking@ in hat mo!e my 7elf is gi"en in intuition, I !o not consi!er, an! it may be that I, ho think, am a %henomenonBalthough not in so far as I am a thinking being@ but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am a being, though this consciousness !oes not %resent to me any %ro%erty of this being as material for thought# But the %ro%osition, GI think,G in so far as it !eclares, GI e?ist thinking,G is not the mere re%resentation of a logical function# It !etermines the subject D hich is in this case an object alsoE in relation to e?istence@ an! it cannot be gi"en ithout the ai! of the internal sense, hose intuition %resents to us an object, not as a thing in itself, but al ays as a %henomenon# In this %ro%osition there is therefore something more to be foun! than the mere s%ontaneity of thought@ there is also the rece%ti"ity of intuition, that is, my thought of myself a%%lie! to the em%irical intuition of myself# <o , in this intuition the thinking self must seek the con!itions of the em%loyment of its logical functions as

categories of substance, cause, an! so forth@ not merely for the %ur%ose of !istinguishing itself as an object in itself by means of the re%resentation GI,G but also for the %ur%ose of !etermining the mo!e of its e?istence, that is, of cogniCing itself as noumenon# But this is im%ossible, for the internal em%irical intuition is sensuous, an! %resents us ith nothing but %henomenal !ata, hich !o not assist the object of %ure consciousness in its attem%t to cogniCe itself as a se%arate e?istence, but are useful only as contributions to e?%erience# But, let it be grante! that e coul! !isco"er, not in e?%erience, but in certain firmly& establishe! a %riori la s of the use of %ure reasonBla s relating to our e?istence, authority to consi!er oursel"es as legislating a %riori in relation to our o n e?istence an! as !etermining this e?istence@ e shoul!, on this su%%osition, fin! oursel"es %ossesse! of a s%ontaneity, by hich our actual e?istence oul! be !eterminable, ithout the ai! of the con!itions of em%irical intuition# >e shoul! also become a are that in the consciousness of our e?istence there as an a %riori content, hich oul! ser"e to !etermine our o n e?istenceBan e?istence only sensuously !eterminableB relati"ely, ho e"er, to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible orl!# But this oul! not gi"e the least hel% to the attem%ts of rational %sychology# :or this on!erful faculty, hich the consciousness of the moral la in me re"eals, oul! %resent me ith a %rinci%le of the !etermination of my o n e?istence hich is %urely intellectualBbut by hat %re!icatesH By none other than those hich are gi"en in sensuous intuition# Thus I shoul! fin! myself in the same %osition in rational %sychology hich I formerly occu%ie!, that is to say, I shoul! fin! myself still in nee! of sensuous intuitions, in or!er to gi"e significance to my conce%tions of substance an! cause, by means of hich alone I can %ossess a kno le!ge of myself( but these intuitions can ne"er raise me abo"e the s%here of e?%erience# I shoul! be justifie!, ho e"er, in a%%lying these conce%tions, in regar! to their %ractical use, hich is al ays !irecte! to objects of e?%erienceBin conformity ith their analogical significance hen em%loye! theoreticallyBto free!om an! its subject# )t the same time, I shoul! un!erstan! by them merely the logical functions of subject an! %re!icate, of %rinci%le an! consequence, in conformity ith hich all actions are so !etermine!, that they are ca%able of being e?%laine! along ith the la s of nature, conformably to the categories of substance an! cause, although they originate from a "ery !ifferent %rinci%le# >e ha"e ma!e these obser"ations for the %ur%ose of guar!ing against misun!erstan!ing, to hich the !octrine of our intuition of self as a %henomenon is e?%ose!# >e shall ha"e occasion to %ercei"e their utility in the sequel#

CHAPTER II. T&e Ant"n%my %+ Pure Reas%n. >e sho e! in the intro!uction to this %art of our ork, that all transcen!ental illusion of %ure reason arose from !ialectical arguments, the schema of hich logic gi"es us in its three formal s%ecies of syllogismsBjust as the categories fin! their logical schema in the

four functions of all ju!gements# The first kin! of these so%histical arguments relate! to the uncon!itione! unity of the subjecti"e con!itions of all re%resentations in general Dof the subject or soulE, in corres%on!ence ith the categorical syllogisms, the major of hich, as the %rinci%le, enounces the relation of a %re!icate to a subject# The secon! kin! of !ialectical argument ill therefore be concerne!, follo ing the analogy ith hy%othetical syllogisms, ith the uncon!itione! unity of the objecti"e con!itions in the %henomenon@ an!, in this ay, the theme of the thir! kin! to be treate! of in the follo ing cha%ter ill be the uncon!itione! unity of the objecti"e con!itions of the %ossibility of objects in general# But it is orthy of remark that the transcen!ental %aralogism %ro!uce! in the min! only a one&thir! illusion, in regar! to the i!ea of the subject of our thought@ an! the conce%tions of reason ga"e no groun! to maintain the contrary %ro%osition# The a!"antage is com%letely on the si!e of Pneumatism@ although this theory itself %asses into naught, in the crucible of %ure reason# Kery !ifferent is the case hen e a%%ly reason to the objecti"e synthesis of %henomena# ;ere, certainly, reason establishes, ith much %lausibility, its %rinci%le of uncon!itione! unity@ but it "ery soon falls into such contra!ictions that it is com%elle!, in relation to cosmology, to renounce its %retensions# :or here a ne %henomenon of human reason meets usBa %erfectly natural antithetic, hich !oes not require to be sought for by subtle so%histry, but into hich reason of itself una"oi!ably falls# It is thereby %reser"e!, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancie! con"ictionB hich a merely one&si!e! illusion %ro!uces@ but it is at the same time com%elle!, either, on the one han!, to aban!on itself to a !es%airing sce%ticism, or, on the other, to assume a !ogmatical confi!ence an! obstinate %ersistence in certain assertions, ithout granting a fair hearing to the other si!e of the question# Either is the !eath of a soun! %hiloso%hy, although the former might %erha%s !eser"e the title of the euthanasia of %ure reason# Before entering this region of !iscor! an! confusion, hich the conflict of the la s of %ure reason DantinomyE %ro!uces, e shall %resent the rea!er ith some consi!erations, in e?%lanation an! justification of the metho! e inten! to follo in our treatment of this subject# I term all transcen!ental i!eas, in so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of %henomena, cosmical conce%tions@ %artly on account of this uncon!itione! totality, on hich the conce%tion of the orl!& hole is base!Ba conce%tion, hich is itself an i!eaB%artly because they relate solely to the synthesis of %henomenaBthe em%irical synthesis@ hile, on the other han!, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the con!itions of all %ossible things gi"es rise to an i!eal of %ure reason, hich is quite !istinct from the cosmical conce%tion, although it stan!s in relation ith it# ;ence, as the %aralogisms of %ure reason lai! the foun!ation for a !ialectical %sychology, the antinomy of %ure reason ill %resent us ith the transcen!ental %rinci%les of a %reten!e! %ure DrationalE cosmologyBnot, ho e"er, to !eclare it "ali! an! to a%%ro%riate it, butBas the "ery term of a conflict of reason sufficiently in!icates, to %resent it as an i!ea hich cannot be reconcile! ith %henomena an! e?%erience#

7ECTI9< I# 7ystem of Cosmological I!eas# That >e may be able to enumerate ith systematic %recision these i!eas accor!ing to a %rinci%le, e must remark, in the first %lace, that it is from the un!erstan!ing alone that %ure an! transcen!ental conce%tions take their origin@ that the reason !oes not %ro%erly gi"e birth to any conce%tion, but only frees the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing from the una"oi!able limitation of a %ossible e?%erience, an! thus en!ea"ours to raise it abo"e the em%irical, though it must still be in connection ith it# This ha%%ens from the fact that, for a gi"en con!itione!, reason !eman!s absolute totality on the si!e of the con!itions Dto hich the un!erstan!ing submits all %henomenaE, an! thus makes of the category a transcen!ental i!ea# This it !oes that it may be able to gi"e absolute com%leteness to the em%irical synthesis, by continuing it to the uncon!itione! D hich is not to be foun! in e?%erience, but only in the i!eaE# Reason requires this accor!ing to the %rinci%le( If the con!itione! is gi"en the hole of the con!itions, an! consequently the absolutely uncon!itione!, is also gi"en, hereby alone the former as %ossible# :irst, then, the transcen!ental i!eas are %ro%erly nothing but categories ele"ate! to the uncon!itione!@ an! they may be arrange! in a table accor!ing to the titles of the latter# But, secon!ly, all the categories are not a"ailable for this %ur%ose, but only those in hich the synthesis constitutes a seriesBof con!itions subor!inate! to, not co&or!inate! ith, each other# )bsolute totality is require! of reason only in so far as concerns the ascen!ing series of the con!itions of a con!itione!@ not, consequently, hen the question relates to the !escen!ing series of consequences, or to the aggregate of the co& or!inate! con!itions of these consequences# :or, in relation to a gi"en con!itione!, con!itions are %resu%%ose! an! consi!ere! to be gi"en along ith it# 9n the other han!, as the consequences !o not ren!er %ossible their con!itions, but rather %resu%%ose themBin the consi!eration of the %rocession of consequences Dor in the !escent from the gi"en con!ition to the con!itione!E, e may be quite unconcerne! hether the series ceases or not@ an! their totality is not a necessary !eman! of reason# Thus e cogitateBan! necessarilyBa gi"en time com%letely ela%se! u% to a gi"en moment, although that time is not !eterminable by us# But as regar!s time future, hich is not the con!ition of arri"ing at the %resent, in or!er to concei"e it@ it is quite in!ifferent hether e consi!er future time as ceasing at some %oint, or as %rolonging itself to infinity# Take, for e?am%le, the series m, n, o, in hich n is gi"en as con!itione! in relation to m, but at the same time as the con!ition of o, an! let the series %rocee! u% ar!s from the con!itione! n to m Dl, k, i, etc#E, an! also !o n ar!s from the con!ition n to the con!itione! o D%, q, r, etc#EBI must %resu%%ose the former series, to be able to consi!er n as gi"en, an! n is accor!ing to reason Dthe totality of con!itionsE %ossible only by means of that series# But its %ossibility !oes not rest on the follo ing series o, %, q, r, hich for this reason cannot be regar!e! as gi"en, but only as ca%able of being gi"en D!abilisE# I shall term the synthesis of the series on the si!e of the con!itionsBfrom that nearest to the gi"en %henomenon u% to the more remoteBregressi"e@ that hich %rocee!s on the si!e of the con!itione!, from the imme!iate consequence to the more remote, I shall call the %rogressi"e synthesis# The former %rocee!s in antece!entia, the latter in consequentia# The cosmological i!eas are therefore occu%ie! ith the totality of the

regressi"e synthesis, an! %rocee! in antece!entia, not in consequentia# >hen the latter takes %lace, it is an arbitrary an! not a necessary %roblem of %ure reason@ for e require, for the com%lete un!erstan!ing of hat is gi"en in a %henomenon, not the consequences hich succee!, but the groun!s or %rinci%les hich %rece!e# In or!er to construct the table of i!eas in corres%on!ence ith the table of categories, e take first the t o %rimiti"e quanta of all our intuitions, time an! s%ace# Time is in itself a series Dan! the formal con!ition of all seriesE, an! hence, in relation to a gi"en %resent, e must !istinguish a %riori in it the antece!entia as con!itions Dtime %astE from the consequentia Dtime futureE# Consequently, the transcen!ental i!ea of the absolute totality of the series of the con!itions of a gi"en con!itione!, relates merely to all %ast time# )ccor!ing to the i!ea of reason, the hole %ast time, as the con!ition of the gi"en moment, is necessarily cogitate! as gi"en# But, as regar!s s%ace, there e?ists in it no !istinction bet een %rogressus an! regressus@ for it is an aggregate an! not a series Bits %arts e?isting together at the same time# I can consi!er a gi"en %oint of time in relation to %ast time only as con!itione!, because this gi"en moment comes into e?istence only through the %ast time rather through the %assing of the %rece!ing time# But as the %arts of s%ace are not subor!inate!, but co&or!inate! to each other, one %art cannot be the con!ition of the %ossibility of the other@ an! s%ace is not in itself, like time, a series# But the synthesis of the manifol! %arts of s%aceBDthe syntheses hereby e a%%rehen! s%aceEBis ne"ertheless successi"e@ it takes %lace, therefore, in time, an! contains a series# )n! as in this series of aggregate! s%aces Dfor e?am%le, the feet in a roo!E, beginning ith a gi"en %ortion of s%ace, those hich continue to be anne?e! form the con!ition of the limits of the formerBthe measurement of a s%ace must also be regar!e! as a synthesis of the series of the con!itions of a gi"en con!itione!# It !iffers, ho e"er, in this res%ect from that of time, that the si!e of the con!itione! is not in itself !istinguishable from the si!e of the con!ition@ an!, consequently, regressus an! %rogressus in s%ace seem to be i!entical# But, inasmuch as one %art of s%ace is not gi"en, but only limite!, by an! through another, e must also consi!er e"ery limite! s%ace as con!itione!, in so far as it %resu%%oses some other s%ace as the con!ition of its limitation, an! so on# )s regar!s limitation, therefore, our %roce!ure in s%ace is also a regressus, an! the transcen!ental i!ea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a series of con!itions a%%lies to s%ace also@ an! I am entitle! to !eman! the absolute totality of the %henomenal synthesis in s%ace as ell as in time# >hether my !eman! can be satisfie! is a question to be ans ere! in the sequel# 7econ!ly, the real in s%aceBthat is, matterBis con!itione!# Its internal con!itions are its %arts, an! the %arts of %arts its remote con!itions@ so that in this case e fin! a regressi"e synthesis, the absolute totality of hich is a !eman! of reason# But this cannot be obtaine! other ise than by a com%lete !i"ision of %arts, hereby the real in matter becomes either nothing or that hich is not matter, that is to say, the sim%le# Consequently e fin! here also a series of con!itions an! a %rogress to the uncon!itione!# Thir!ly, as regar!s the categories of a real relation bet een %henomena, the category of substance an! its acci!ents is not suitable for the formation of a transcen!ental i!ea@ that is to say, reason has no groun!, in regar! to it, to %rocee! regressi"ely ith

con!itions# :or acci!ents Din so far as they inhere in a substanceE are co&or!inate! ith each other, an! !o not constitute a series# )n!, in relation to substance, they are not %ro%erly subor!inate! to it, but are the mo!e of e?istence of the substance itself# The conce%tion of the substantial might ne"ertheless seem to be an i!ea of the transcen!ental reason# But, as this signifies nothing more than the conce%tion of an object in general, hich subsists in so far as e cogitate in it merely a transcen!ental subject ithout any %re!icates@ an! as the question here is of an uncon!itione! in the series of %henomenaBit is clear that the substantial can form no member thereof# The same hol!s goo! of substances in community, hich are mere aggregates an! !o not form a series# :or they are not subor!inate! to each other as con!itions of the %ossibility of each other@ hich, ho e"er, may be affirme! of s%aces, the limits of hich are ne"er !etermine! in themsel"es, but al ays by some other s%ace# It is, therefore, only in the category of causality that e can fin! a series of causes to a gi"en effect, an! in hich e ascen! from the latter, as the con!itione!, to the former as the con!itions, an! thus ans er the question of reason# :ourthly, the conce%tions of the %ossible, the actual, an! the necessary !o not con!uct us to any seriesBe?ce%ting only in so far as the contingent in e?istence must al ays be regar!e! as con!itione!, an! as in!icating, accor!ing to a la of the un!erstan!ing, a con!ition, un!er hich it is necessary to rise to a higher, till in the totality of the series, reason arri"es at uncon!itione! necessity# There are, accor!ingly, only four cosmological i!eas, corres%on!ing ith the four titles of the categories# :or e can select only such as necessarily furnish us ith a series in the synthesis of the manifol!# 6 The absolute Com%leteness of the C9AP97ITI9< of the gi"en totality of all %henomena# , The absolute Com%leteness of the *IKI7I9< of gi"en totality in a %henomenon# . The absolute Com%leteness of the 9RIGI<)TI9< of a %henomenon# 1 The absolute Com%leteness of the *EPE<*E<CE of the EMI7TE<CE

of hat is changeable in a %henomenon# >e must here remark, in the first %lace, that the i!ea of absolute totality relates to nothing but the e?%osition of %henomena, an! therefore not to the %ure conce%tion of a totality of things# Phenomena are here, therefore, regar!e! as gi"en, an! reason requires the absolute com%leteness of the con!itions of their %ossibility, in so far as these con!itions constitute a seriesBconsequently an absolutely Dthat is, in e"ery res%ectE com%lete synthesis, hereby a %henomenon can be e?%laine! accor!ing to the la s of the un!erstan!ing# 7econ!ly, it is %ro%erly the uncon!itione! alone that reason seeks in this serially an! regressi"ely con!ucte! synthesis of con!itions# It ishes, to s%eak in another ay, to attain to com%leteness in the series of %remisses, so as to ren!er it unnecessary to %resu%%ose others# This uncon!itione! is al ays containe! in the absolute totality of the series, hen e en!ea"our to form a re%resentation of it in thought# But this absolutely com%lete synthesis is itself but an i!ea@ for it is im%ossible, at least before han!, to kno hether any such synthesis is %ossible in the case of %henomena# >hen e re%resent all e?istence in thought by means of %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, ithout any con!itions of sensuous intuition, e may say ith justice that for a gi"en con!itione! the hole series of con!itions subor!inate! to each other is also gi"en@ for the former is only gi"en through the latter# But e fin! in the case of %henomena a %articular limitation of the mo!e in hich con!itions are gi"en, that is, through the successi"e synthesis of the manifol! of intuition, hich must be com%lete in the regress# <o hether this com%leteness is sensuously %ossible, is a %roblem# But the i!ea of it lies in the reasonBbe it %ossible or im%ossible to connect ith the i!ea a!equate em%irical conce%tions# Therefore, as in the absolute totality of the regressi"e synthesis of the manifol! in a %henomenon Dfollo ing the gui!ance of the categories, hich re%resent it as a series of con!itions to a gi"en con!itione!E the uncon!itione! is necessarily containe!Bit being still left unascertaine! hether an! ho this totality e?ists@ reason sets out from the i!ea of totality, although its %ro%er an! final aim is the uncon!itione! Bof the hole series, or of a %art thereof# This uncon!itione! may be cogitate!Beither as e?isting only in the entire series, all the members of hich therefore oul! be ithout e?ce%tion con!itione! an! only the totality absolutely uncon!itione!Ban! in this case the regressus is calle! infinite@ or the absolutely uncon!itione! is only a %art of the series, to hich the other members are subor!inate!, but hich Is not itself submitte! to any other con!ition#8 In the former case the series is a %arte %riori unlimite! D ithout beginningE, that is, infinite, an! ne"ertheless com%letely gi"en# But the regress in it is ne"er com%lete!, an! can only be calle! %otentially infinite# In the secon! case there e?ists a first in the series# This first is calle!, in relation to %ast time, the beginning of the orl!@ in relation to s%ace, the limit of the orl!@ in relation to the %arts of a gi"en limite! hole, the sim%le@ in relation to causes, absolute s%ontaneity DlibertyE@ an! in relation to the e?istence of changeable things, absolute %hysical necessity# /8:ootnote( The absolute totality of the series of con!itions to a gi"en con!itione! is al ays uncon!itione!@ because beyon! it there e?ist no

other con!itions, on hich it might !e%en!# But the absolute totality of such a series is only an i!ea, or rather a %roblematical conce%tion, the %ossibility of hich must be in"estigate!B%articularly in relation to the mo!e in hich the uncon!itione!, as the transcen!ental i!ea hich is the real subject of inquiry, may be containe! therein#3 >e %ossess t o e?%ressions, orl! an! nature, hich are generally interchange!# The first !enotes the mathematical total of all %henomena an! the totality of their synthesis Bin its %rogress by means of com%osition, as ell as by !i"ision# )n! the orl! is terme! nature,8 hen it is regar!e! as a !ynamical holeB hen our attention is not !irecte! to the aggregation in s%ace an! time, for the %ur%ose of cogitating it as a quantity, but to the unity in the e?istence of %henomena# In this case the con!ition of that hich ha%%ens is calle! a cause@ the uncon!itione! causality of the cause in a %henomenon is terme! liberty@ the con!itione! cause is calle! in a more limite! sense a natural cause# The con!itione! in e?istence is terme! contingent, an! the uncon!itione! necessary# The uncon!itione! necessity of %henomena may be calle! natural necessity# /8:ootnote( <ature, un!erstoo! a!jecti"e DformaliterE, signifies the com%le? of the !eterminations of a thing, connecte! accor!ing to an internal %rinci%le of causality# 9n the other han!, e un!erstan! by nature, substanti"e DmaterialiterE, the sum total of %henomena, in so far as they, by "irtue of an internal %rinci%le of causality, are connecte! ith each other throughout# In the former sense e s%eak of the nature of liqui! matter, of fire, etc#, an! em%loy the or! only a!jecti"e@ hile, if s%eaking of the objects of nature, e ha"e in our min!s the i!ea of a subsisting hole#3 The i!eas hich e are at %resent engage! in !iscussing I ha"e calle! cosmological i!eas@ %artly because by the term orl! is un!erstoo! the entire content of all %henomena, an! our i!eas are !irecte! solely to the uncon!itione! among %henomena@ %artly also, because orl!, in the transcen!ental sense, signifies the absolute totality of the content of e?isting things, an! e are !irecting our attention only to the com%leteness of the synthesisBalthough, %ro%erly, only in regression# In regar! to the fact that these i!eas are all transcen!ent, an!, although they !o not transcen! %henomena as regar!s their mo!e, but are concerne! solely ith the orl! of sense Dan! not ith noumenaE, ne"ertheless carry their synthesis to a !egree far abo"e all %ossible e?%erienceBit still seems to me that e can, ith %erfect %ro%riety, !esignate them cosmical conce%tions# )s regar!s the !istinction bet een the mathematically an! the !ynamically uncon!itione! hich is the aim of the regression of the synthesis, I shoul! call the t o former, in a more limite! signification, cosmical conce%tions, the remaining t o transcen!ent %hysical conce%tions# This !istinction !oes not at %resent seem to be of %articular im%ortance, but e shall after ar!s fin! it to be of some "alue# 7ECTI9< II# )ntithetic of Pure Reason# Thetic is the term a%%lie! to e"ery collection of !ogmatical %ro%ositions# By antithetic I !o not un!erstan! !ogmatical assertions of the o%%osite, but the self&contra!iction of

seemingly !ogmatical cognitions Dthesis cum antithesisE, in none of hich e can !isco"er any !eci!e! su%eriority# )ntithetic is not, therefore, occu%ie! ith one&si!e! statements, but is engage! in consi!ering the contra!ictory nature of the general cognitions of reason an! its causes# Transcen!ental antithetic is an in"estigation into the antinomy of %ure reason, its causes an! result# If e em%loy our reason not merely in the a%%lication of the %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing to objects of e?%erience, but "enture ith it beyon! these boun!aries, there arise certain so%histical %ro%ositions or theorems# These assertions ha"e the follo ing %eculiarities( They can fin! neither confirmation nor confutation in e?%erience@ an! each is in itself not only self&consistent, but %ossesses con!itions of its necessity in the "ery nature of reasonBonly that, unluckily, there e?ist just as "ali! an! necessary groun!s for maintaining the contrary %ro%osition# The questions hich naturally arise in the consi!eration of this !ialectic of %ure reason, are therefore( 6st# In hat %ro%ositions is %ure reason una"oi!ably subject to an antinomyH ,n!# >hat are the causes of this antinomyH .r!# >hether an! in hat ay can reason free itself from this self&contra!ictionH ) !ialectical %ro%osition or theorem of %ure reason must, accor!ing to hat has been sai!, be !istinguishable from all so%histical %ro%ositions, by the fact that it is not an ans er to an arbitrary question, hich may be raise! at the mere %leasure of any %erson, but to one hich human reason must necessarily encounter in its %rogress# In the secon! %lace, a !ialectical %ro%osition, ith its o%%osite, !oes not carry the a%%earance of a merely artificial illusion, hich !isa%%ears as soon as it is in"estigate!, but a natural an! una"oi!able illusion, hich, e"en hen e are no longer !ecei"e! by it, continues to mock us an!, although ren!ere! harmless, can ne"er be com%letely remo"e!# This !ialectical !octrine ill not relate to the unity of un!erstan!ing in em%irical conce%tions, but to the unity of reason in %ure i!eas# The con!itions of this !octrine are Binasmuch as it must, as a synthesis accor!ing to rules, be conformable to the un!erstan!ing, an! at the same time as the absolute unity of the synthesis, to the reason Bthat, if it is a!equate to the unity of reason, it is too great for the un!erstan!ing, if accor!ing ith the un!erstan!ing, it is too small for the reason# ;ence arises a mutual o%%osition, hich cannot be a"oi!e!, !o hat e ill# These so%histical assertions of !ialectic o%en, as it ere, a battle&fiel!, here that si!e obtains the "ictory hich has been %ermitte! to make the attack, an! he is com%elle! to yiel! ho has been unfortunately oblige! to stan! on the !efensi"e# )n! hence, cham%ions of ability, hether on the right or on the rong si!e, are certain to carry a ay the cro n of "ictory, if they only take care to ha"e the right to make the last attack, an! are not oblige! to sustain another onset from their o%%onent# >e can easily belie"e that this arena has been often tram%le! by the feet of combatants, that many "ictories ha"e been obtaine! on both si!es, but that the last "ictory, !ecisi"e of the affair bet een the conten!ing %arties, as on by him ho fought for the right, only if his a!"ersary as forbi!!en to continue the tourney# )s im%artial um%ires, e must lay asi!e entirely the consi!eration hether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the rong

si!e, for the true or for the false, an! allo the combat to be first !eci!e!# Perha%s, after they ha"e earie! more than injure! each other, they ill !isco"er the nothingness of their cause of quarrel an! %art goo! frien!s# This metho! of atching, or rather of originating, a conflict of assertions, not for the %ur%ose of finally !eci!ing in fa"our of either si!e, but to !isco"er hether the object of the struggle is not a mere illusion, hich each stri"es in "ain to reach, but hich oul! be no gain e"en hen reache!Bthis %roce!ure, I say, may be terme! the sce%tical metho!# It is thoroughly !istinct from sce%ticismBthe %rinci%le of a technical an! scientific ignorance, hich un!ermines the foun!ations of all kno le!ge, in or!er, if %ossible, to !estroy our belief an! confi!ence therein# :or the sce%tical metho! aims at certainty, by en!ea"ouring to !isco"er in a conflict of this kin!, con!ucte! honestly an! intelligently on both si!es, the %oint of misun!erstan!ing@ just as ise legislators !eri"e, from the embarrassment of ju!ges in la suits, information in regar! to the !efecti"e an! ill&!efine! %arts of their statutes# The antinomy hich re"eals itself in the a%%lication of la s, is for our limite! is!om the best criterion of legislation# :or the attention of reason, hich in abstract s%eculation !oes not easily become conscious of its errors, is thus rouse! to the momenta in the !etermination of its %rinci%les# But this sce%tical metho! is essentially %eculiar to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, an! can %erha%s be !is%ense! ith in e"ery other fiel! of in"estigation# In mathematics its use oul! be absur!@ because in it no false assertions can long remain hi!!en, inasmuch as its !emonstrations must al ays %rocee! un!er the gui!ance of %ure intuition, an! by means of an al ays e"i!ent synthesis# In e?%erimental %hiloso%hy, !oubt an! !elay may be "ery useful@ but no misun!erstan!ing is %ossible, hich cannot be easily remo"e!@ an! in e?%erience means of sol"ing the !ifficulty an! %utting an en! to the !issension must at last be foun!, hether sooner or later# Aoral %hiloso%hy can al ays e?hibit its %rinci%les, ith their %ractical consequences, in concretoBat least in %ossible e?%eriences, an! thus esca%e the mistakes an! ambiguities of abstraction# But transcen!ental %ro%ositions, hich lay claim to insight beyon! the region of %ossible e?%erience, cannot, on the one han!, e?hibit their abstract synthesis in any a %riori intuition, nor, on the other, e?%ose a lurking error by the hel% of e?%erience# Transcen!ental reason, therefore, %resents us ith no other criterion than that of an attem%t to reconcile such assertions, an! for this %ur%ose to %ermit a free an! unrestraine! conflict bet een them# )n! this e no %rocee! to arrange#8 /8:ootnote( The antinomies stan! in the or!er of the four transcen!ental i!eas abo"e !etaile!#3 :IR7T C9<:'ICT 9: T;E TR)<7CE<*E<T)' I*E)7# T;E7I7# The orl! has a beginning in time, an! is also limite! in regar! to s%ace# PR99:# Grante! that the orl! has no beginning in time@ u% to e"ery gi"en moment of time, an eternity must ha"e ela%se!, an! there ith %asse! a ay an infinite series of successi"e

con!itions or states of things in the orl!# <o the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it ne"er can be com%lete! by means of a successi"e synthesis# It follo s that an infinite series alrea!y ela%se! is im%ossible an! that, consequently, a beginning of the orl! is a necessary con!ition of its e?istence# )n! this as the first thing to be %ro"e!# )s regar!s the secon!, let us take the o%%osite for grante!# In this case, the orl! must be an infinite gi"en total of coe?istent things# <o e cannot cogitate the !imensions of a quantity, hich is not gi"en ithin certain limits of an intuition,8 in any other ay than by means of the synthesis of its %arts, an! the total of such a quantity only by means of a com%lete! synthesis, or the re%eate! a!!ition of unity to itself# )ccor!ingly, to cogitate the orl!, hich fills all s%aces, as a hole, the successi"e synthesis of the %arts of an infinite orl! must be looke! u%on as com%lete!, that is to say, an infinite time must be regar!e! as ha"ing ela%se! in the enumeration of all co&e?isting things@ hich is im%ossible# :or this reason an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be consi!ere! as a gi"en hole, consequently, not as a contem%oraneously gi"en hole# The orl! is consequently, as regar!s e?tension in s%ace, not infinite, but enclose! in limits# )n! this as the secon! thing to be %ro"e!# /8:ootnote( >e may consi!er an un!etermine! quantity as a hole, hen it is enclose! ithin limits, although e cannot construct or ascertain its totality by measurement, that is, by the successi"e synthesis of its %arts# :or its limits of themsel"es !etermine its com%leteness as a hole#3 )<TIT;E7I7# The orl! has no beginning, an! no limits in s%ace, but is, in relation both to time an! s%ace, infinite# PR99:# :or let it be grante! that it has a beginning# ) beginning is an e?istence hich is %rece!e! by a time in hich the thing !oes not e?ist# 9n the abo"e su%%osition, it follo s that there must ha"e been a time in hich the orl! !i! not e?ist, that is, a "oi! time# But in a "oi! time the origination of a thing is im%ossible@ because no %art of any such time contains a !istincti"e con!ition of being, in %reference to that of non&being D hether the su%%ose! thing originate of itself, or by means of some other causeE# Consequently, many series of things may ha"e a beginning in the orl!, but the orl! itself cannot ha"e a beginning, an! is, therefore, in relation to %ast time, infinite# )s regar!s the secon! statement, let us first take the o%%osite for grante!Bthat the orl! is finite an! limite! in s%ace@ it follo s that it must e?ist in a "oi! s%ace, hich is not limite!# >e shoul! therefore meet not only ith a relation of things in s%ace, but also a relation of things to s%ace# <o , as the orl! is an absolute hole, out of an! beyon! hich no object of intuition, an! consequently no correlate to hich can be !isco"ere!, this relation of the orl! to a "oi! s%ace is merely a relation to no object# But such a relation, an! consequently the limitation of the orl! by "oi! s%ace, is

nothing# Consequently, the orl!, as regar!s s%ace, is not limite!, that is, it is infinite in regar! to e?tension#8 /8:ootnote( 7%ace is merely the form of e?ternal intuition Dformal intuitionE, an! not a real object hich can be e?ternally %ercei"e!# 7%ace, %rior to all things hich !etermine it Dfill or limit itE, or, rather, hich %resent an em%irical intuition conformable to it, is, un!er the title of absolute s%ace, nothing but the mere %ossibility of e?ternal %henomena, in so far as they either e?ist in themsel"es, or can anne? themsel"es to gi"en intuitions# Em%irical intuition is therefore not a com%osition of %henomena an! s%ace Dof %erce%tion an! em%ty intuitionE# The one is not the correlate of the other in a synthesis, but they are "itally connecte! in the same em%irical intuition, as matter an! form# If e ish to set one of these t o a%art from the otherBs%ace from %henomenaBthere arise all sorts of em%ty !eterminations of e?ternal intuition, hich are "ery far from being %ossible %erce%tions# :or e?am%le, motion or rest of the orl! in an infinite em%ty s%ace, or a !etermination of the mutual relation of both, cannot %ossibly be %ercei"e!, an! is therefore merely the %re!icate of a notional entity#3 9B7ERK)TI9<7 9< T;E :IR7T )<TI<9A$# 9< T;E T;E7I7# In bringing for ar! these conflicting arguments, I ha"e not been on the search for so%hisms, for the %ur%ose of a"ailing myself of s%ecial %lea!ing, hich takes a!"antage of the carelessness of the o%%osite %arty, a%%eals to a misun!erstoo! statute, an! erects its unrighteous claims u%on an unfair inter%retation# Both %roofs originate fairly from the nature of the case, an! the a!"antage %resente! by the mistakes of the !ogmatists of both %arties has been com%letely set asi!e# The thesis might also ha"e been unfairly !emonstrate!, by the intro!uction of an erroneous conce%tion of the infinity of a gi"en quantity# ) quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot %ossibly e?ist# The quantity is measure! by the number of gi"en unitsB hich are taken as a stan!ar!Bcontaine! in it# <o no number can be the greatest, because one or more units can al ays be a!!e!# It follo s that an infinite gi"en quantity, consequently an infinite orl! Dboth as regar!s time an! e?tensionE is im%ossible# It is, therefore, limite! in both res%ects# In this manner I might ha"e con!ucte! my %roof@ but the conce%tion gi"en in it !oes not agree ith the true conce%tion of an infinite hole# In this there is no re%resentation of its quantity, it is not sai! ho large it is@ consequently its conce%tion is not the conce%tion of a ma?imum# >e cogitate in it merely its relation to an arbitrarily assume! unit, in relation to hich it is greater than any number# <o , just as the unit hich is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite ill be greater or smaller@ but the infinity, hich consists merely in the relation to this gi"en unit, must remain al ays the same, although the absolute quantity of the hole is not thereby cogniCe!#

The true Dtranscen!entalE conce%tion of infinity is( that the successi"e synthesis of unity in the measurement of a gi"en quantum can ne"er be com%lete!#8 ;ence it follo s, ithout %ossibility of mistake, that an eternity of actual successi"e states u% to a gi"en Dthe %resentE moment cannot ha"e ela%se!, an! that the orl! must therefore ha"e a beginning# /8:ootnote( The quantum in this sense contains a congeries of gi"en units, hich is greater than any numberBan! this is the mathematical conce%tion of the infinite#3 In regar! to the secon! %art of the thesis, the !ifficulty as to an infinite an! yet ela%se! series !isa%%ears@ for the manifol! of a orl! infinite in e?tension is contem%oraneously gi"en# But, in or!er to cogitate the total of this manifol!, as e cannot ha"e the ai! of limits constituting by themsel"es this total in intuition, e are oblige! to gi"e some account of our conce%tion, hich in this case cannot %rocee! from the hole to the !etermine! quantity of the %arts, but must !emonstrate the %ossibility of a hole by means of a successi"e synthesis of the %arts# But as this synthesis must constitute a series that cannot be com%lete!, it is im%ossible for us to cogitate %rior to it, an! consequently not by means of it, a totality# :or the conce%tion of totality itself is in the %resent case the re%resentation of a com%lete! synthesis of the %arts@ an! this com%letion, an! consequently its conce%tion, is im%ossible# 9< T;E )<TIT;E7I7# The %roof in fa"our of the infinity of the cosmical succession an! the cosmical content is base! u%on the consi!eration that, in the o%%osite case, a "oi! time an! a "oi! s%ace must constitute the limits of the orl!# <o I am not una are, that there are some ays of esca%ing this conclusion# It may, for e?am%le, be allege!, that a limit to the orl!, as regar!s both s%ace an! time, is quite %ossible, ithout at the same time hol!ing the e?istence of an absolute time before the beginning of the orl!, or an absolute s%ace e?ten!ing beyon! the actual orl!B hich is im%ossible# I am quite ell satisfie! ith the latter %art of this o%inion of the %hiloso%hers of the 'eibnitCian school# 7%ace is merely the form of e?ternal intuition, but not a real object hich can itself be e?ternally intuite!@ it is not a correlate of %henomena, it is the form of %henomena itself# 7%ace, therefore, cannot be regar!e! as absolutely an! in itself something !eterminati"e of the e?istence of things, because it is not itself an object, but only the form of %ossible objects# Consequently, things, as %henomena, !etermine s%ace@ that is to say, they ren!er it %ossible that, of all the %ossible %re!icates of s%ace DsiCe an! relationE, certain may belong to reality# But e cannot affirm the con"erse, that s%ace, as something self& subsistent, can !etermine real things in regar! to siCe or sha%e, for it is in itself not a real thing# 7%ace Dfille! or "oi!E8 may therefore be limite! by %henomena, but %henomena cannot be limite! by an em%ty s%ace ithout them# This is true of time also# )ll this being grante!, it is ne"ertheless in!is%utable, that e must assume these t o nonentities, "oi! s%ace ithout an! "oi! time before the orl!, if e assume the e?istence of cosmical limits, relati"ely to s%ace or time# /8:ootnote( It is e"i!ent that hat is meant here is, that em%ty s%ace,

in so far as it is limite! by %henomenaBs%ace, that is, ithin the orl!B!oes not at least contra!ict transcen!ental %rinci%les, an! may therefore, as regar!s them, be a!mitte!, although its %ossibility cannot on that account be affirme!#3 :or, as regar!s the subterfuge a!o%te! by those ho en!ea"our to e"a!e the consequenceBthat, if the orl! is limite! as to s%ace an! time, the infinite "oi! must !etermine the e?istence of actual things in regar! to their !imensionsBit arises solely from the fact that instea! of a sensuous orl!, an intelligible orl!Bof hich nothing is kno nBis cogitate!@ instea! of a real beginning Dan e?istence, hich is %rece!e! by a %erio! in hich nothing e?istsE, an e?istence hich %resu%%oses no other con!ition than that of time@ an!, instea! of limits of e?tension, boun!aries of the uni"erse# But the question relates to the mun!us %haenomenon, an! its quantity@ an! in this case e cannot make abstraction of the con!itions of sensibility, ithout !oing a ay ith the essential reality of this orl! itself# The orl! of sense, if it is limite!, must necessarily lie in the infinite "oi!# If this, an! ith it s%ace as the a %riori con!ition of the %ossibility of %henomena, is left out of "ie , the hole orl! of sense !isa%%ears# In our %roblem is this alone consi!ere! as gi"en# The mun!us intelligibilis is nothing but the general conce%tion of a orl!, in hich abstraction has been ma!e of all con!itions of intuition, an! in relation to hich no synthetical %ro%ositionBeither affirmati"e or negati"eBis %ossible# 7EC9<* C9<:'ICT 9: TR)<7CE<*E<T)' I*E)7# T;E7I7# E"ery com%osite substance in the orl! consists of sim%le %arts@ an! there e?ists nothing that is not either itself sim%le, or com%ose! of sim%le %arts# PR99:# :or, grant that com%osite substances !o not consist of sim%le %arts@ in this case, if all combination or com%osition ere annihilate! in thought, no com%osite %art, an! Das, by the su%%osition, there !o not e?ist sim%le %artsE no sim%le %art oul! e?ist# Consequently, no substance@ consequently, nothing oul! e?ist# Either, then, it is im%ossible to annihilate com%osition in thought@ or, after such annihilation, there must remain something that subsists ithout com%osition, that is, something that is sim%le# But in the former case the com%osite coul! not itself consist of substances, because ith substances com%osition is merely a contingent relation, a%art from hich they must still e?ist as self&subsistent beings# <o , as this case contra!icts the su%%osition, the secon! must contain the truthBthat the substantial com%osite in the orl! consists of sim%le %arts# It follo s, as an imme!iate inference, that the things in the orl! are all, ithout e?ce%tion, sim%le beingsBthat com%osition is merely an e?ternal con!ition %ertaining to themBan! that, although e ne"er can se%arate an! isolate the elementary substances from the state of com%osition, reason must cogitate these as the %rimary

subjects of all com%osition, an! consequently, as %rior theretoBan! as sim%le substances# )<TIT;E7I7# <o com%osite thing in the orl! consists of sim%le %arts@ an! there !oes not e?ist in the orl! any sim%le substance# PR99:# 'et it be su%%ose! that a com%osite thing Das substanceE consists of sim%le %arts# Inasmuch as all e?ternal relation, consequently all com%osition of substances, is %ossible only in s%ace@ the s%ace, occu%ie! by that hich is com%osite, must consist of the same number of %arts as is containe! in the com%osite# But s%ace !oes not consist of sim%le %arts, but of s%aces# Therefore, e"ery %art of the com%osite must occu%y a s%ace# But the absolutely %rimary %arts of hat is com%osite are sim%le# It follo s that hat is sim%le occu%ies a s%ace# <o , as e"erything real that occu%ies a s%ace, contains a manifol! the %arts of hich are e?ternal to each other, an! is consequently com%ositeB an! a real com%osite, not of acci!ents Dfor these cannot e?ist e?ternal to each other a%art from substanceE, but of substancesBit follo s that the sim%le must be a substantial com%osite, hich is self&contra!ictory# The secon! %ro%osition of the antithesisBthat there e?ists in the orl! nothing that is sim%leBis here equi"alent to the follo ing( The e?istence of the absolutely sim%le cannot be !emonstrate! from any e?%erience or %erce%tion either e?ternal or internal@ an! the absolutely sim%le is a mere i!ea, the objecti"e reality of hich cannot be !emonstrate! in any %ossible e?%erience@ it is consequently, in the e?%osition of %henomena, ithout a%%lication an! object# :or, let us take for grante! that an object may be foun! in e?%erience for this transcen!ental i!ea@ the em%irical intuition of such an object must then be recogniCe! to contain absolutely no manifol! ith its %arts e?ternal to each other, an! connecte! into unity# <o , as e cannot reason from the non&consciousness of such a manifol! to the im%ossibility of its e?istence in the intuition of an object, an! as the %roof of this im%ossibility is necessary for the establishment an! %roof of absolute sim%licity@ it follo s that this sim%licity cannot be inferre! from any %erce%tion hate"er# )s, therefore, an absolutely sim%le object cannot be gi"en in any e?%erience, an! the orl! of sense must be consi!ere! as the sum total of all %ossible e?%eriences( nothing sim%le e?ists in the orl!# This secon! %ro%osition in the antithesis has a more e?ten!e! aim than the first# The first merely banishes the sim%le from the intuition of the com%osite@ hile the secon! !ri"es it entirely out of nature# ;ence e ere unable to !emonstrate it from the conce%tion of a gi"en object of e?ternal intuition Dof the com%ositeE, but e ere oblige! to %ro"e it from the relation of a gi"en object to a %ossible e?%erience in general# 9B7ERK)TI9<7 9< T;E 7EC9<* )<TI<9A$# T;E7I7#

>hen I s%eak of a hole, hich necessarily consists of sim%le %arts, I un!erstan! thereby only a substantial hole, as the true com%osite@ that is to say, I un!erstan! that contingent unity of the manifol! hich is gi"en as %erfectly isolate! Dat least in thoughtE, %lace! in reci%rocal connection, an! thus constitute! a unity# 7%ace ought not to be calle! a com%ositum but a totum, for its %arts are %ossible in the hole, an! not the hole by means of the %arts# It might %erha%s be calle! a com%ositum i!eale, but not a com%ositum reale# But this is of no im%ortance# )s s%ace is not a com%osite of substances Dan! not e"en of real acci!entsE, if I abstract all com%osition thereinB nothing, not e"en a %oint, remains@ for a %oint is %ossible only as the limit of a s%aceB consequently of a com%osite# 7%ace an! time, therefore, !o not consist of sim%le %arts# That hich belongs only to the con!ition or state of a substance, e"en although it %ossesses a quantity Dmotion or change, for e?am%leE, like ise !oes not consist of sim%le %arts# That is to say, a certain !egree of change !oes not originate from the a!!ition of many sim%le changes# 9ur inference of the sim%le from the com%osite is "ali! only of self&subsisting things# But the acci!ents of a state are not self&subsistent# The %roof, then, for the necessity of the sim%le, as the com%onent %art of all that is substantial an! com%osite, may %ro"e a failure, an! the hole case of this thesis be lost, if e carry the %ro%osition too far, an! ish to make it "ali! of e"erything that is com%osite ithout !istinctionBas in!ee! has really no an! then ha%%ene!# Besi!es, I am here s%eaking only of the sim%le, in so far as it is necessarily gi"en in the com%osite Bthe latter being ca%able of solution into the former as its com%onent %arts# The %ro%er signification of the or! monas Das em%loye! by 'eibnitCE ought to relate to the sim%le, gi"en imme!iately as sim%le substance Dfor e?am%le, in consciousnessE, an! not as an element of the com%osite# )s an clement, the term atomus oul! be more a%%ro%riate# )n! as I ish to %ro"e the e?istence of sim%le substances, only in relation to, an! as the elements of, the com%osite, I might term the antithesis of the secon! )ntinomy, transcen!ental )tomistic# But as this or! has long been em%loye! to !esignate a %articular theory of cor%oreal %henomena DmoleculaeE, an! thus %resu%%oses a basis of em%irical conce%tions, I %refer calling it the !ialectical %rinci%le of Aona!ology# )<TIT;E7I7# )gainst the assertion of the infinite sub!i"isibility of matter hose groun! of %roof is %urely mathematical, objections ha"e been allege! by the Aona!ists# These objections lay themsel"es o%en, at first sight, to sus%icion, from the fact that they !o not recogniCe the clearest mathematical %roofs as %ro%ositions relating to the constitution of s%ace, in so far as it is really the formal con!ition of the %ossibility of all matter, but regar! them merely as inferences from abstract but arbitrary conce%tions, hich cannot ha"e any a%%lication to real things# +ust as if it ere %ossible to imagine another mo!e of intuition than that gi"en in the %rimiti"e intuition of s%ace@ an! just as if its a %riori !eterminations !i! not a%%ly to e"erything, the e?istence of hich is %ossible, from the fact alone of its filling s%ace# If e listen to them, e shall fin! oursel"es require! to cogitate, in a!!ition to the mathematical %oint, hich is sim%leBnot, ho e"er, a %art, but a mere limit of s%aceB%hysical %oints, hich are in!ee! like ise sim%le, but %ossess the %eculiar %ro%erty, as %arts of s%ace, of filling it merely by their aggregation# I shall not re%eat here the common an! clear refutations of this absur!ity, hich are to be foun! e"ery here in numbers( e"ery one kno s that it is im%ossible to un!ermine the

e"i!ence of mathematics by mere !iscursi"e conce%tions@ I shall only remark that, if in this case %hiloso%hy en!ea"ours to gain an a!"antage o"er mathematics by so%histical artifices, it is because it forgets that the !iscussion relates solely to Phenomena an! their con!itions# It is not sufficient to fin! the conce%tion of the sim%le for the %ure conce%tion of the com%osite, but e must !isco"er for the intuition of the com%osite DmatterE, the intuition of the sim%le# <o this, accor!ing to the la s of sensibility, an! consequently in the case of objects of sense, is utterly im%ossible# In the case of a hole com%ose! of substances, hich is cogitate! solely by the %ure un!erstan!ing, it may be necessary to be in %ossession of the sim%le before com%osition is %ossible# But this !oes not hol! goo! of the Totum substantiale %haenomenon, hich, as an em%irical intuition in s%ace, %ossesses the necessary %ro%erty of containing no sim%le %art, for the "ery reason that no %art of s%ace is sim%le# Aean hile, the Aona!ists ha"e been subtle enough to esca%e from this !ifficulty, by %resu%%osing intuition an! the !ynamical relation of substances as the con!ition of the %ossibility of s%ace, instea! of regar!ing s%ace as the con!ition of the %ossibility of the objects of e?ternal intuition, that is, of bo!ies# <o e ha"e a conce%tion of bo!ies only as %henomena, an!, as such, they necessarily %resu%%ose s%ace as the con!ition of all e?ternal %henomena# The e"asion is therefore in "ain@ as, in!ee!, e ha"e sufficiently sho n in our )esthetic# If bo!ies ere things in themsel"es, the %roof of the Aona!ists oul! be une?ce%tionable# The secon! !ialectical assertion %ossesses the %eculiarity of ha"ing o%%ose! to it a !ogmatical %ro%osition, hich, among all such so%histical statements, is the only one that un!ertakes to %ro"e in the case of an object of e?%erience, that hich is %ro%erly a transcen!ental i!eaBthe absolute sim%licity of substance# The %ro%osition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking Ego, is an absolute sim%le substance# >ithout at %resent entering u%on this subjectBas it has been consi!ere! at length in a former cha%terBI shall merely remark that, if something is cogitate! merely as an object, ithout the a!!ition of any synthetical !etermination of its intuitionBas ha%%ens in the case of the bare re%resentation, IBit is certain that no manifol! an! no com%osition can be %ercei"e! in such a re%resentation# )s, moreo"er, the %re!icates hereby I cogitate this object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be !isco"ere! in them anything to %ro"e the e?istence of a manifol! hose %arts are e?ternal to each other, an!, consequently, nothing to %ro"e the e?istence of real com%osition# Consciousness, therefore, is so constitute! that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the same time its o n object, it cannot !i"i!e itselfBalthough it can !i"i!e its inhering !eterminations# :or e"ery object in relation to itself is absolute unity# <e"ertheless, if the subject is regar!e! e?ternally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of %henomenon, %ossess the %ro%erty of com%osition# )n! it must al ays be regar!e! in this manner, if e ish to kno hether there is or is not containe! in it a manifol! hose %arts are e?ternal to each other# T;IR* C9<:'ICT 9: T;E TR)<7CE<*E<T)' I*E)7# T;E7I7# Causality accor!ing to the la s of nature, is not the only causality o%erating to originate the %henomena of the orl!# ) causality of free!om is also necessary to account fully for these %henomena#

PR99:# 'et it be su%%ose!, that there is no other kin! of causality than that accor!ing to the la s of nature# Consequently, e"erything that ha%%ens %resu%%oses a %re"ious con!ition, hich it follo s ith absolute certainty, in conformity ith a rule# But this %re"ious con!ition must itself be something that has ha%%ene! Dthat has arisen in time, as it !i! not e?ist beforeE, for, if it has al ays been in e?istence, its consequence or effect oul! not thus originate for the first time, but oul! like ise ha"e al ays e?iste!# The causality, therefore, of a cause, hereby something ha%%ens, is itself a thing that has ha%%ene!# <o this again %resu%%oses, in conformity ith the la of nature, a %re"ious con!ition an! its causality, an! this another anterior to the former, an! so on# If, then, e"erything ha%%ens solely in accor!ance ith the la s of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of things, but only a subaltern or com%arati"e beginning# There cannot, therefore, be a com%leteness of series on the si!e of the causes hich originate the one from the other# But the la of nature is that nothing can ha%%en ithout a sufficient a %riori !etermine! cause# The %ro%osition thereforeBif all causality is %ossible only in accor!ance ith the la s of natureBis, hen state! in this unlimite! an! general manner, self&contra!ictory# It follo s that this cannot be the only kin! of causality# :rom hat has been sai!, it follo s that a causality must be a!mitte!, by means of hich something ha%%ens, ithout its cause being !etermine! accor!ing to necessary la s by some other cause %rece!ing# That is to say, there must e?ist an absolute s%ontaneity of cause, hich of itself originates a series of %henomena hich %rocee!s accor!ing to natural la sBconsequently transcen!ental free!om, ithout hich e"en in the course of nature the succession of %henomena on the si!e of causes is ne"er com%lete# )<TIT;E7I7# There is no such thing as free!om, but e"erything in the orl! ha%%ens solely accor!ing to the la s of nature# PR99:# Grante!, that there !oes e?ist free!om in the transcen!ental sense, as a %eculiar kin! of causality, o%erating to %ro!uce e"ents in the orl!Ba faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, an! consequently a series of consequences from that state# In this case, not only the series originate! by this s%ontaneity, but the !etermination of this s%ontaneity itself to the %ro!uction of the series, that is to say, the causality itself must ha"e an absolute commencement, such that nothing can %rece!e to !etermine this action accor!ing to un"arying la s# But e"ery beginning of action %resu%%oses in the acting cause a state of inaction@ an! a !ynamically %rimal beginning of action %resu%%oses a state, hich has no connectionBas regar!s causalityB ith the %rece!ing state of the causeB hich !oes not, that is, in any ise result from it# Transcen!ental free!om is therefore o%%ose! to the natural la of cause an! effect, an! such a conjunction of successi"e states in effecti"e causes is !estructi"e of the %ossibility of

unity in e?%erience an! for that reason not to be foun! in e?%erienceBis consequently a mere fiction of thought# >e ha"e, therefore, nothing but nature to hich e must look for connection an! or!er in cosmical e"ents# :ree!omBin!e%en!ence of the la s of natureBis certainly a !eli"erance from restraint, but it is also a relinquishing of the gui!ance of la an! rule# :or it cannot be allege! that, instea! of the la s of nature, la s of free!om may be intro!uce! into the causality of the course of nature# :or, if free!om ere !etermine! accor!ing to la s, it oul! be no longer free!om, but merely nature# <ature, therefore, an! transcen!ental free!om are !istinguishable as conformity to la an! la lessness# The former im%oses u%on un!erstan!ing the !ifficulty of seeking the origin of e"ents e"er higher an! higher in the series of causes, inasmuch as causality is al ays con!itione! thereby@ hile it com%ensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity com%lete an! in conformity ith la # The latter, on the contrary, hol!s out to the un!erstan!ing the %romise of a %oint of rest in the chain of causes, by con!ucting it to an uncon!itione! causality, hich %rofesses to ha"e the %o er of s%ontaneous origination, but hich, in its o n utter blin!ness, !e%ri"es it of the gui!ance of rules, by hich alone a com%letely connecte! e?%erience is %ossible# 9B7ERK)TI9<7 9< T;E T;IR* )<TI<9A$# 9< T;E T;E7I7# The transcen!ental i!ea of free!om is far from constituting the entire content of the %sychological conce%tion so terme!, hich is for the most %art em%irical# It merely %resents us ith the conce%tion of s%ontaneity of action, as the %ro%er groun! for im%uting free!om to the cause of a certain class of objects# It is, ho e"er, the true stumbling&stone to %hiloso%hy, hich meets ith unconquerable !ifficulties in the ay of its a!mitting this kin! of uncon!itione! causality# That element in the question of the free!om of the ill, hich has for so long a time %lace! s%eculati"e reason in such %er%le?ity, is %ro%erly only transcen!ental, an! concerns the question, hether there must be hel! to e?ist a faculty of s%ontaneous origination of a series of successi"e things or states# ;o such a faculty is %ossible is not a necessary inquiry@ for in the case of natural causality itself, e are oblige! to content oursel"es ith the a %riori kno le!ge that such a causality must be %resu%%ose!, although e are quite inca%able of com%rehen!ing ho the being of one thing is %ossible through the being of another, but must for this information look entirely to e?%erience# <o e ha"e !emonstrate! this necessity of a free first beginning of a series of %henomena, only in so far as it is require! for the com%rehension of an origin of the orl!, all follo ing states being regar!e! as a succession accor!ing to la s of nature alone# But, as there has thus been %ro"e! the e?istence of a faculty hich can of itself originate a series in timeBalthough e are unable to e?%lain ho it can e?istB e feel oursel"es authoriCe! to a!mit, e"en in the mi!st of the natural course of e"ents, a beginning, as regar!s causality, of !ifferent successions of %henomena, an! at the same time to attribute to all substances a faculty of free action# But e ought in this case not to allo oursel"es to fall into a common misun!erstan!ing, an! to su%%ose that, because a successi"e series in the orl! can only ha"e a com%arati"ely first beginningBanother state or con!ition of things al ays %rece!ingBan absolutely first beginning of a series in the course of nature is im%ossible#

:or e are not s%eaking here of an absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but as regar!s causality alone# >hen, for e?am%le, I, com%letely of my o n free ill, an! in!e%en!ently of the necessarily !eterminati"e influence of natural causes, rise from my chair, there commences ith this e"ent, inclu!ing its material consequences in infinitum, an absolutely ne series@ although, in relation to time, this e"ent is merely the continuation of a %rece!ing series# :or this resolution an! act of mine !o not form %art of the succession of effects in nature, an! are not mere continuations of it@ on the contrary, the !etermining causes of nature cease to o%erate in reference to this e"ent, hich certainly succee!s the acts of nature, but !oes not %rocee! from them# :or these reasons, the action of a free agent must be terme!, in regar! to causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely %rimal beginning of a series of %henomena# The justification of this nee! of reason to rest u%on a free act as the first beginning of the series of natural causes is e"i!ent from the fact, that all %hiloso%hers of antiquity D ith the e?ce%tion of the E%icurean schoolE felt themsel"es oblige!, hen constructing a theory of the motions of the uni"erse, to acce%t a %rime mo"er, that is, a freely acting cause, hich s%ontaneously an! %rior to all other causes e"ol"e! this series of states# They al ays felt the nee! of going beyon! mere nature, for the %ur%ose of making a first beginning com%rehensible# 9< T;E )<TIT;E7I7# The assertor of the all&sufficiency of nature in regar! to causality Dtranscen!ental PhysiocracyE, in o%%osition to the !octrine of free!om, oul! !efen! his "ie of the question some hat in the follo ing manner# ;e oul! say, in ans er to the so%histical arguments of the o%%osite %arty( If you !o not acce%t a mathematical first, in relation to time, you ha"e no nee! to seek a !ynamical first, in regar! to causality# >ho com%elle! you to imagine an absolutely %rimal con!ition of the orl!, an! there ith an absolute beginning of the gra!ually %rogressing successions of %henomenaBan!, as some foun!ation for this fancy of yours, to set boun!s to unlimite! natureH Inasmuch as the substances in the orl! ha"e al ays e?iste!Bat least the unity of e?%erience ren!ers such a su%%osition quite necessaryBthere is no !ifficulty in belie"ing also, that the changes in the con!itions of these substances ha"e al ays e?iste!@ an!, consequently, that a first beginning, mathematical or !ynamical, is by no means require!# The %ossibility of such an infinite !eri"ation, ithout any initial member from hich all the others result, is certainly quite incom%rehensible# But, if you are rash enough to !eny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason, you ill fin! yoursel"es oblige! to !eny also the e?istence of many fun!amental %ro%erties of natural objects Dsuch as fun!amental forcesE, hich you can just as little com%rehen!@ an! e"en the %ossibility of so sim%le a conce%tion as that of change must %resent to you insu%erable !ifficulties# :or if e?%erience !i! not teach you that it as real, you ne"er coul! concei"e a %riori the %ossibility of this ceaseless sequence of being an! non&being# But if the e?istence of a transcen!ental faculty of free!om is grante!Ba faculty of originating changes in the orl!Bthis faculty must at least e?ist out of an! a%art from the orl!@ although it is certainly a bol! assum%tion, that, o"er an! abo"e the com%lete content of all %ossible intuitions, there still e?ists an object hich cannot be %resente!

in any %ossible %erce%tion# But, to attribute to substances in the orl! itself such a faculty, is quite ina!missible@ for, in this case@ the connection of %henomena reci%rocally !etermining an! !etermine! accor!ing to general la s, hich is terme! nature, an! along ith it the criteria of em%irical truth, hich enable us to !istinguish e?%erience from mere "isionary !reaming, oul! almost entirely !isa%%ear# In %ro?imity ith such a la less faculty of free!om, a system of nature is har!ly cogitable@ for the la s of the latter oul! be continually subject to the intrusi"e influences of the former, an! the course of %henomena, hich oul! other ise %rocee! regularly an! uniformly, oul! become thereby confuse! an! !isconnecte!# :94RT; C9<:'ICT 9: T;E TR)<7CE<*E<T)' I*E)7# T;E7I7# There e?ists either in, or in connection ith the orl!Beither as a %art of it, or as the cause of itBan absolutely necessary being# PR99:# The orl! of sense, as the sum total of all %henomena, contains a series of changes# :or, ithout such a series, the mental re%resentation of the series of time itself, as the con!ition of the %ossibility of the sensuous orl!, coul! not be %resente! to us#8 But e"ery change stan!s un!er its con!ition, hich %rece!es it in time an! ren!ers it necessary# <o the e?istence of a gi"en con!ition %resu%%oses a com%lete series of con!itions u% to the absolutely uncon!itione!, hich alone is absolutely necessary# It follo s that something that is absolutely necessary must e?ist, if change e?ists as its consequence# But this necessary thing itself belongs to the sensuous orl!# :or su%%ose it to e?ist out of an! a%art from it, the series of cosmical changes oul! recei"e from it a beginning, an! yet this necessary cause oul! not itself belong to the orl! of sense# But this is im%ossible# :or, as the beginning of a series in time is !etermine! only by that hich %rece!es it in time, the su%reme con!ition of the beginning of a series of changes must e?ist in the time in hich this series itself !i! not e?ist@ for a beginning su%%oses a time %rece!ing, in hich the thing that begins to be as not in e?istence# The causality of the necessary cause of changes, an! consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to timeBan! to %henomena, time being %ossible only as the form of %henomena# Consequently, it cannot be cogitate! as se%arate! from the orl! of senseB the sum total of all %henomena# There is, therefore, containe! in the orl!, something that is absolutely necessaryB hether it be the hole cosmical series itself, or only a %art of it# /8:ootnote( 9bjecti"ely, time, as the formal con!ition of the %ossibility of change, %rece!es all changes@ but subjecti"ely, an! in consciousness, the re%resentation of time, like e"ery other, is gi"en solely by occasion of %erce%tion#3 )<TIT;E7I7# )n absolutely necessary being !oes not e?ist, either in the orl!, or out of itBas its cause#

PR99:# Grant that either the orl! itself is necessary, or that there is containe! in it a necessary e?istence# T o cases are %ossible# :irst, there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a beginning, hich is uncon!itionally necessary, an! therefore uncause!B hich is at "ariance ith the !ynamical la of the !etermination of all %henomena in time@ or, secon!ly, the series itself is ithout beginning, an!, although contingent an! con!itione! in all its %arts, is ne"ertheless absolutely necessary an! uncon!itione! as a holeB hich is self&contra!ictory# :or the e?istence of an aggregate cannot be necessary, if no single %art of it %ossesses necessary e?istence# Grant, on the other ban!, that an absolutely necessary cause e?ists out of an! a%art from the orl!# This cause, as the highest member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate or begin8 the e?istence of the latter an! their series# In this case it must also begin to act, an! its causality oul! therefore belong to time, an! consequently to the sum total of %henomena, that is, to the orl!# It follo s that the cause cannot be out of the orl!@ hich is contra!ictory to the hy%othesis# Therefore, neither in the orl!, nor out of it Dbut in causal connection ith itE, !oes there e?ist any absolutely necessary being# /8:ootnote( The or! begin is taken in t o senses# The first is acti"eBthe cause being regar!e! as beginning a series of con!itions as its effect DinfitE# The secon! is %assi"eBthe causality in the cause itself beginning to o%erate DfitE# I reason here from the first to the secon!#3 9B7ERK)TI9<7 9< T;E :94RT; )<TI<9A$# 9< T;E T;E7I7# To !emonstrate the e?istence of a necessary being, I cannot be %ermitte! in this %lace to em%loy any other than the cosmological argument, hich ascen!s from the con!itione! in %henomena to the uncon!itione! in conce%tionBthe uncon!itione! being consi!ere! the necessary con!ition of the absolute totality of the series# The %roof, from the mere i!ea of a su%reme being, belongs to another %rinci%le of reason an! requires se%arate !iscussion# The %ure cosmological %roof !emonstrates the e?istence of a necessary being, but at the same time lea"es it quite unsettle!, hether this being is the orl! itself, or quite !istinct from it# To establish the truth of the latter "ie , %rinci%les are requisite, hich are not cosmological an! !o not %rocee! in the series of %henomena# >e shoul! require to intro!uce into our %roof conce%tions of contingent beingsBregar!e! merely as objects of the un!erstan!ing, an! also a %rinci%le hich enables us to connect these, by means of mere conce%tions, ith a necessary being# But the %ro%er %lace for all such arguments is a transcen!ent %hiloso%hy, hich has unha%%ily not yet been establishe!# But, if e begin our %roof cosmologically, by laying at the foun!ation of it the series of %henomena, an! the regress in it accor!ing to em%irical la s of causality, e are not at liberty to break off from this mo!e of !emonstration an! to %ass o"er to something

hich is not itself a member of the series# The con!ition must be taken in e?actly the same signification as the relation of the con!itione! to its con!ition in the series has been taken, for the series must con!uct us in an unbroken regress to this su%reme con!ition# But if this relation is sensuous, an! belongs to the %ossible em%irical em%loyment of un!erstan!ing, the su%reme con!ition or cause must close the regressi"e series accor!ing to the la s of sensibility an! consequently, must belong to the series of time# It follo s that this necessary e?istence must be regar!e! as the highest member of the cosmical series# Certain %hiloso%hers ha"e, ne"ertheless, allo e! themsel"es the liberty of making such a saltus Dmetabasis eis allo gonosE# :rom the changes in the orl! they ha"e conclu!e! their em%irical contingency, that is, their !e%en!ence on em%irically&!etermine! causes, an! they thus a!mitte! an ascen!ing series of em%irical con!itions( an! in this they are quite right# But as they coul! not fin! in this series any %rimal beginning or any highest member, they %asse! su!!enly from the em%irical conce%tion of contingency to the %ure category, hich %resents us ith a seriesBnot sensuous, but intellectualB hose com%leteness !oes certainly rest u%on the e?istence of an absolutely necessary cause# <ay, more, this intellectual series is not tie! to any sensuous con!itions@ an! is therefore free from the con!ition of time, hich requires it s%ontaneously to begin its causality in time# But such a %roce!ure is %erfectly ina!missible, as ill be ma!e %lain from hat follo s# In the %ure sense of the categories, that is contingent the contra!ictory o%%osite of hich is %ossible# <o e cannot reason from em%irical contingency to intellectual# The o%%osite of that hich is change!Bthe o%%osite of its stateBis actual at another time, an! is therefore %ossible# Consequently, it is not the contra!ictory o%%osite of the former state# To be that, it is necessary that, in the same time in hich the %rece!ing state e?iste!, its o%%osite coul! ha"e e?iste! in its %lace@ but such a cognition is not gi"en us in the mere %henomenon of change# ) bo!y that as in motion L ), comes into a state of rest L non&)# <o it cannot be conclu!e! from the fact that a state o%%osite to the state ) follo s it, that the contra!ictory o%%osite of ) is %ossible@ an! that ) is therefore contingent# To %ro"e this, e shoul! require to kno that the state of rest coul! ha"e e?iste! in the "ery same time in hich the motion took %lace# <o e kno nothing more than that the state of rest as actual in the time that follo e! the state of motion@ consequently, that it as also %ossible# But motion at one time, an! rest at another time, are not contra!ictorily o%%ose! to each other# It follo s from hat has been sai! that the succession of o%%osite !eterminations, that is, change, !oes not !emonstrate the fact of contingency as re%resente! in the conce%tions of the %ure un!erstan!ing@ an! that it cannot, therefore, con!uct us to the fact of the e?istence of a necessary being# Change %ro"es merely em%irical contingency, that is to say, that the ne state coul! not ha"e e?iste! ithout a cause, hich belongs to the %rece!ing time# This causeBe"en although it is regar!e! as absolutely necessaryBmust be %resente! to us in time, an! must belong to the series of %henomena# 9< T;E )<TIT;E7I7#

The !ifficulties hich meet us, in our attem%t to rise through the series of %henomena to the e?istence of an absolutely necessary su%reme cause, must not originate from our inability to establish the truth of our mere conce%tions of the necessary e?istence of a thing# That is to say, our objections not be ontological, but must be !irecte! against the causal connection ith a series of %henomena of a con!ition hich is itself uncon!itione!# In one or!, they must be cosmological an! relate to em%irical la s# >e must sho that the regress in the series of causes Din the orl! of senseE cannot conclu!e ith an em%irically uncon!itione! con!ition, an! that the cosmological argument from the contingency of the cosmical stateBa contingency allege! to arise from changeB!oes not justify us in acce%ting a first cause, that is, a %rime originator of the cosmical series# The rea!er ill obser"e in this antinomy a "ery remarkable contrast# The "ery same groun!s of %roof hich establishe! in the thesis the e?istence of a su%reme being, !emonstrate! in the antithesisBan! ith equal strictnessBthe non&e?istence of such a being# >e foun!, first, that a necessary being e?ists, because the hole time %ast contains the series of all con!itions, an! ith it, therefore, the uncon!itione! Dthe necessaryE@ secon!ly, that there !oes not e?ist any necessary being, for the same reason, that the hole time %ast contains the series of all con!itionsB hich are themsel"es, therefore, in the aggregate, con!itione!# The cause of this seeming incongruity is as follo s# >e atten!, in the first argument, solely to the absolute totality of the series of con!itions, the one of hich !etermines the other in time, an! thus arri"e at a necessary uncon!itione!# In the secon!, e consi!er, on the contrary, the contingency of e"erything that is !etermine! in the series of timeBfor e"ery e"ent is %rece!e! by a time, in hich the con!ition itself must be !etermine! as con!itione!Ban! thus e"erything that is uncon!itione! or absolutely necessary !isa%%ears# In both, the mo!e of %roof is quite in accor!ance ith the common %roce!ure of human reason, hich often falls into !iscor! ith itself, from consi!ering an object from t o !ifferent %oints of "ie # ;err "on Aairan regar!e! the contro"ersy bet een t o celebrate! astronomers, hich arose from a similar !ifficulty as to the choice of a %ro%er stan!%oint, as a %henomenon of sufficient im%ortance to arrant a se%arate treatise on the subject# The one conclu!e!( the moon re"ol"es on its o n a?is, because it constantly %resents the same si!e to the earth@ the other !eclare! that the moon !oes not re"ol"e on its o n a?is, for the same reason# Both conclusions ere %erfectly correct, accor!ing to the %oint of "ie from hich the motions of the moon ere consi!ere!# 7ECTI9< III# 9f the Interest of Reason in these 7elf&contra!ictions# >e ha"e thus com%letely before us the !ialectical %roce!ure of the cosmological i!eas# <o %ossible e?%erience can %resent us ith an object a!equate to them in e?tent# <ay, more, reason itself cannot cogitate them as accor!ing ith the general la s of e?%erience# )n! yet they are not arbitrary fictions of thought# 9n the contrary, reason, in its uninterru%te! %rogress in the em%irical synthesis, is necessarily con!ucte! to them, hen it en!ea"ours to free from all con!itions an! to com%rehen! in its uncon!itione! totality that hich can only be !etermine! con!itionally in accor!ance ith the la s of e?%erience# These !ialectical %ro%ositions are so many attem%ts to sol"e four natural an! una"oi!able %roblems of reason# There are neither more, nor can there

be less, than this number, because there are no other series of synthetical hy%otheses, limiting a %riori the em%irical synthesis# The brilliant claims of reason stri"ing to e?ten! its !ominion beyon! the limits of e?%erience, ha"e been re%resente! abo"e only in !ry formulae, hich contain merely the groun!s of its %retensions# They ha"e, besi!es, in conformity ith the character of a transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, been free! from e"ery em%irical element@ although the full s%len!our of the %romises they hol! out, an! the antici%ations they e?cite, manifests itself only hen in connection ith em%irical cognitions# In the a%%lication of them, ho e"er, an! in the a!"ancing enlargement of the em%loyment of reason, hile struggling to rise from the region of e?%erience an! to soar to those sublime i!eas, %hiloso%hy !isco"ers a "alue an! a !ignity, hich, if it coul! but make goo! its assertions, oul! raise it far abo"e all other !e%artments of human kno le!geB %rofessing, as it !oes, to %resent a sure foun!ation for our highest ho%es an! the ultimate aims of all the e?ertions of reason# The questions( hether the orl! has a beginning an! a limit to its e?tension in s%ace@ hether there e?ists any here, or %erha%s, in my o n thinking 7elf, an in!i"isible an! in!estructible unityBor hether nothing but hat is !i"isible an! transitory e?ists@ hether I am a free agent, or, like other beings, am boun! in the chains of nature an! fate@ hether, finally, there is a su%reme cause of the orl!, or all our thought an! s%eculation must en! ith nature an! the or!er of e?ternal thingsBare questions for the solution of hich the mathematician oul! illingly e?change his hole science@ for in it there is no satisfaction for the highest as%irations an! most ar!ent !esires of humanity# <ay, it may e"en be sai! that the true "alue of mathematicsBthat %ri!e of human reasonBconsists in this( that she gui!es reason to the kno le!ge of natureBin her greater as ell as in her less manifestationsBin her beautiful or!er an! regularityBgui!es her, moreo"er, to an insight into the on!erful unity of the mo"ing forces in the o%erations of nature, far beyon! the e?%ectations of a %hiloso%hy buil!ing only on e?%erience@ an! that she thus encourages %hiloso%hy to e?ten! the %ro"ince of reason beyon! all e?%erience, an! at the same time %ro"i!es it ith the most e?cellent materials for su%%orting its in"estigations, in so far as their nature a!mits, by a!equate an! accor!ant intuitions# 4nfortunately for s%eculationBbut %erha%s fortunately for the %ractical interests of humanityBreason, in the mi!st of her highest antici%ations, fin!s herself hemme! in by a %ress of o%%osite an! contra!ictory conclusions, from hich neither her honour nor her safety ill %ermit her to !ra back# <or can she regar! these conflicting trains of reasoning ith in!ifference as mere %assages at arms, still less can she comman! %eace@ for in the subject of the conflict she has a !ee% interest# There is no other course left o%en to her than to reflect ith herself u%on the origin of this !isunion in reasonB hether it may not arise from a mere misun!erstan!ing# )fter such an inquiry, arrogant claims oul! ha"e to be gi"en u% on both si!es@ but the so"ereignty of reason o"er un!erstan!ing an! sense oul! be base! u%on a sure foun!ation# >e shall at %resent !efer this ra!ical inquiry an!, in the meantime, consi!er for a little hat si!e in the contro"ersy e shoul! most illingly take, if e ere oblige! to become %artisans at all# )s, in this case, e lea"e out of sight altogether the logical criterion of truth, an! merely consult our o n interest in reference to the question, these

consi!erations, although ina!equate to settle the question of right in either %arty, ill enable us to com%rehen! ho those ho ha"e taken %art in the struggle, a!o%t the one "ie rather than the otherBno s%ecial insight into the subject, ho e"er, ha"ing influence! their choice# They ill, at the same time, e?%lain to us many other things by the ayBfor e?am%le, the fiery Ceal on the one si!e an! the col! maintenance of their cause on the other@ hy the one %arty has met ith the armest a%%robations, an! the other has al ays been re%ulse! by irreconcilable %reju!ices# There is one thing, ho e"er, that !etermines the %ro%er %oint of "ie , from hich alone this %reliminary inquiry can be institute! an! carrie! on ith the %ro%er com%letenessB an! that is the com%arison of the %rinci%les from hich both si!es, thesis an! antithesis, %rocee!# Ay rea!ers oul! remark in the %ro%ositions of the antithesis a com%lete uniformity in the mo!e of thought an! a %erfect unity of %rinci%le# Its %rinci%le as that of %ure em%iricism, not only in the e?%lication of the %henomena in the orl!, but also in the solution of the transcen!ental i!eas, e"en of that of the uni"erse itself# The affirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, ere base!, in a!!ition to the em%irical mo!e of e?%lanation em%loye! in the series of %henomena, on intellectual %ro%ositions@ an! its %rinci%les ere in so far not sim%le# I shall term the thesis, in "ie of its essential characteristic, the !ogmatism of %ure reason# 9n the si!e of *ogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the !etermination of the cosmological i!eas, e fin!( 6# ) %ractical interest, hich must be "ery !ear to e"ery right&thinking man# That the or! has a beginningBthat the nature of my thinking self is sim%le, an! therefore in!estructibleBthat I am a free agent, an! raise! abo"e the com%ulsion of nature an! her la sBan!, finally, that the entire or!er of things, hich form the orl!, is !e%en!ent u%on a 7u%reme Being, from hom the hole recei"es unity an! connection Bthese are so many foun!ation&stones of morality an! religion# The antithesis !e%ri"es us of all these su%%ortsBor, at least, seems so to !e%ri"e us# ,# ) s%eculati"e interest of reason manifests itself on this si!e# :or, if e take the transcen!ental i!eas an! em%loy them in the manner hich the thesis !irects, e can e?hibit com%letely a %riori the entire chain of con!itions, an! un!erstan! the !eri"ation of the con!itione!Bbeginning from the uncon!itione!# This the antithesis !oes not !o@ an! for this reason !oes not meet ith so elcome a rece%tion# :or it can gi"e no ans er to our question res%ecting the con!itions of its synthesisBe?ce%t such as must be su%%lemente! by another question, an! so on to infinity# )ccor!ing to it, e must rise from a gi"en beginning to one still higher@ e"ery %art con!ucts us to a still smaller one@ e"ery e"ent is %rece!e! by another e"ent hich is its cause@ an! the con!itions of e?istence rest al ays u%on other an! still higher con!itions, an! fin! neither en! nor basis in some self&subsistent thing as the %rimal being# .# This si!e has also the a!"antage of %o%ularity@ an! this constitutes no small %art of its claim to fa"our# The common un!erstan!ing !oes not fin! the least !ifficulty in the i!ea of the uncon!itione! beginning of all synthesisBaccustome!, as it is, rather to follo our consequences than to seek for a %ro%er basis for cognition# In the conce%tion of an

absolute first, moreo"erBthe %ossibility of hich it !oes not inquire intoBit is highly gratifie! to fin! a firmly&establishe! %oint of !e%arture for its attem%ts at theory@ hile in the restless an! continuous ascent from the con!itione! to the con!ition, al ays ith one foot in the air, it can fin! no satisfaction# 9n the si!e of the antithesis, or Em%iricism, in the !etermination of the cosmological i!eas( 6# >e cannot !isco"er any such %ractical interest arising from %ure %rinci%les of reason as morality an! religion %resent# 9n the contrary, %ure em%iricism seems to em%ty them of all their %o er an! influence# If there !oes not e?ist a 7u%reme Being !istinct from the orl!Bif the orl! is ithout beginning, consequently ithout a CreatorBif our ills are not free, an! the soul is !i"isible an! subject to corru%tion just like matterBthe i!eas an! %rinci%les of morality lose all "ali!ity an! fall ith the transcen!ental i!eas hich constitute! their theoretical su%%ort# ,# But em%iricism, in com%ensation, hol!s out to reason, in its s%eculati"e interests, certain im%ortant a!"antages, far e?cee!ing any that the !ogmatist can %romise us# :or, hen em%loye! by the em%iricist, un!erstan!ing is al ays u%on its %ro%er groun! of in"estigationBthe fiel! of %ossible e?%erience, the la s of hich it can e?%lore, an! thus e?ten! its cognition securely an! ith clear intelligence ithout being sto%%e! by limits in any !irection# ;ere can it an! ought it to fin! an! %resent to intuition its %ro%er objectBnot only in itself, but in all its relations@ or, if it em%loy conce%tions, u%on this groun! it can al ays %resent the corres%on!ing images in clear an! unmistakable intuitions# It is quite unnecessary for it to renounce the gui!ance of nature, to attach itself to i!eas, the objects of hich it cannot kno @ because, as mere intellectual entities, they cannot be %resente! in any intuition# 9n the contrary, it is not e"en %ermitte! to aban!on its %ro%er occu%ation, un!er the %retence that it has been brought to a conclusion Dfor it ne"er can beE, an! to %ass into the region of i!ealiCing reason an! transcen!ent conce%tions, hich it is not require! to obser"e an! e?%lore the la s of nature, but merely to think an! to imagineBsecure from being contra!icte! by facts, because they ha"e not been calle! as itnesses, but %asse! by, or %erha%s subor!inate! to the so&calle! higher interests an! consi!erations of %ure reason# ;ence the em%iricist ill ne"er allo himself to acce%t any e%och of nature for the first Bthe absolutely %rimal state@ he ill not belie"e that there can be limits to his outlook into her i!e !omains, nor %ass from the objects of nature, hich he can satisfactorily e?%lain by means of obser"ation an! mathematical thoughtB hich he can !etermine synthetically in intuition, to those hich neither sense nor imagination can e"er %resent in concreto@ he ill not conce!e the e?istence of a faculty in nature, o%erating in!e%en!ently of the la s of natureBa concession hich oul! intro!uce uncertainty into the %roce!ure of the un!erstan!ing, hich is gui!e! by necessary la s to the obser"ation of %henomena@ nor, finally, ill he %ermit himself to seek a cause beyon! nature, inasmuch as e kno nothing but it, an! from it alone recei"e an objecti"e basis for all our conce%tions an! instruction in the un"arying la s of things#

In truth, if the em%irical %hiloso%her ha! no other %ur%ose in the establishment of his antithesis than to check the %resum%tion of a reason hich mistakes its true !estination, hich boasts of its insight an! its kno le!ge, just here all insight an! kno le!ge cease to e?ist, an! regar!s that hich is "ali! only in relation to a %ractical interest, as an a!"ancement of the s%eculati"e interests of the min! Din or!er, hen it is con"enient for itself, to break the threa! of our %hysical in"estigations, an!, un!er %retence of e?ten!ing our cognition, connect them ith transcen!ental i!eas, by means of hich e really kno only that e kno nothingEBif, I say, the em%iricist reste! satisfie! ith this benefit, the %rinci%le a!"ance! by him oul! be a ma?im recommen!ing mo!eration in the %retensions of reason an! mo!esty in its affirmations, an! at the same time oul! !irect us to the right mo!e of e?ten!ing the %ro"ince of the un!erstan!ing, by the hel% of the only true teacher, e?%erience# In obe!ience to this a!"ice, intellectual hy%otheses an! faith oul! not be calle! in ai! of our %ractical interests@ nor shoul! e intro!uce them un!er the %om%ous titles of science an! insight# :or s%eculati"e cognition cannot fin! an objecti"e basis any other here than in e?%erience@ an!, hen e o"erste% its limits our synthesis, hich requires e"er ne cognitions in!e%en!ent of e?%erience, has no substratum of intuition u%on hich to buil!# But ifBas often ha%%ensBem%iricism, in relation to i!eas, becomes itself !ogmatic an! bol!ly !enies that hich is abo"e the s%here of its %henomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intem%eranceBan error hich is here all the more re%rehensible, as thereby the %ractical interest of reason recei"es an irre%arable injury# )n! this constitutes the o%%osition bet een E%icureanism8 an! Platonism# /8:ootnote( It is, ho e"er, still a matter of !oubt hether E%icurus e"er %ro%oun!e! these %rinci%les as !irections for the objecti"e em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing# If, in!ee!, they ere nothing more than ma?ims for the s%eculati"e e?ercise of reason, he gi"es e"i!ence therein a more genuine %hiloso%hic s%irit than any of the %hiloso%hers of antiquity# That, in the e?%lanation of %henomena, e must %rocee! as if the fiel! of inquiry ha! neither limits in s%ace nor commencement in time@ that e must be satisfie! ith the teaching of e?%erience in reference to the material of hich the orl! is %ose!@ that e must not look for any other mo!e of the origination of e"ents than that hich is !etermine! by the unalterable la s of nature@ an! finally, that e not em%loy the hy%othesis of a cause !istinct from the orl! to account for a %henomenon or for the orl! itselfBare %rinci%les for the e?tension of s%eculati"e %hiloso%hy, an! the !isco"ery of the true sources of the %rinci%les of morals, hich, ho e"er little conforme! to in the %resent !ay, are un!oubte!ly correct# )t the same time, any one !esirous of ignoring, in mere s%eculation, these !ogmatical %ro%ositions, nee! not for that reason be accuse! of !enying them#3 Both E%icurus an! Plato assert more in their systems than they kno # The former encourages an! a!"ances scienceBalthough to the %reju!ice of the %ractical@ the latter

%resents us ith e?cellent %rinci%les for the in"estigation of the %ractical, but, in relation to e"erything regar!ing hich e can attain to s%eculati"e cognition, %ermits reason to a%%en! i!ealistic e?%lanations of natural %henomena, to the great injury of %hysical in"estigation# .# In regar! to the thir! moti"e for the %reliminary choice of a %arty in this ar of assertions, it seems "ery e?traor!inary that em%iricism shoul! be utterly un%o%ular# >e shoul! be incline! to belie"e that the common un!erstan!ing oul! recei"e it ith %leasureB%romising as it !oes to satisfy it ithout %assing the boun!s of e?%erience an! its connecte! or!er@ hile transcen!ental !ogmatism obliges it to rise to conce%tions hich far sur%ass the intelligence an! ability of the most %ractise! thinkers# But in this, in truth, is to be foun! its real moti"e# :or the common un!erstan!ing thus fin!s itself in a situation here not e"en the most learne! can ha"e the a!"antage of it# If it un!erstan!s little or nothing about these transcen!ental conce%tions, no one can boast of un!erstan!ing any more@ an! although it may not e?%ress itself in so scholastically correct a manner as others, it can busy itself ith reasoning an! arguments ithout en!, an!ering among mere i!eas, about hich one can al ays be "ery eloquent, because e kno nothing about them@ hile, in the obser"ation an! in"estigation of nature, it oul! be force! to remain !umb an! to confess its utter ignorance# Thus in!olence an! "anity form of themsel"es strong recommen!ations of these %rinci%les# Besi!es, although it is a har! thing for a %hiloso%her to assume a %rinci%le, of hich he can gi"e to himself no reasonable account, an! still more to em%loy conce%tions, the objecti"e reality of hich cannot be establishe!, nothing is more usual ith the common un!erstan!ing# It ants something hich ill allo it to go to ork ith confi!ence# The !ifficulty of e"en com%rehen!ing a su%%osition !oes not !isquiet it, becauseBnot kno ing hat com%rehen!ing meansBit ne"er e"en thinks of the su%%osition it may be a!o%ting as a %rinci%le@ an! regar!s as kno n that ith hich it has become familiar from constant use# )n!, at last, all s%eculati"e interests !isa%%ear before the %ractical interests hich it hol!s !ear@ an! it fancies that it un!erstan!s an! kno s hat its necessities an! ho%es incite it to assume or to belie"e# Thus the em%iricism of transcen!entally i!ealiCing reason is robbe! of all %o%ularity@ an!, ho e"er %reju!icial it may be to the highest %ractical %rinci%les, there is no fear that it ill e"er %ass the limits of the schools, or acquire any fa"our or influence in society or ith the multitu!e# ;uman reason is by nature architectonic# That is to say, it regar!s all cognitions as %arts of a %ossible system, an! hence acce%ts only such %rinci%les as at least !o not inca%acitate a cognition to hich e may ha"e attaine! from being %lace! along ith others in a general system# But the %ro%ositions of the antithesis are of a character hich ren!ers the com%letion of an e!ifice of cognitions im%ossible# )ccor!ing to these, beyon! one state or e%och of the orl! there is al ays to be foun! one more ancient@ in e"ery %art al ays other %arts themsel"es !i"isible@ %rece!ing e"ery e"ent another, the origin of hich must itself be sought still higher@ an! e"erything in e?istence is con!itione!, an! still not !e%en!ent on an uncon!itione! an! %rimal e?istence# )s, therefore, the antithesis ill not conce!e the e?istence of a first beginning hich might be a"ailable as a foun!ation, a com%lete e!ifice of cognition, in the %resence of such hy%othesis, is utterly im%ossible# Thus the architectonic interest of reason, hich

requires a unityBnot em%irical, but a %riori an! rationalBforms a natural recommen!ation for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy# But if any one coul! free himself entirely from all consi!erations of interest, an! eigh ithout %artiality the assertions of reason, atten!ing only to their content, irres%ecti"e of the consequences hich follo from them@ such a %erson, on the su%%osition that he kne no other ay out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or other of the conflicting !octrines, oul! li"e in a state of continual hesitation# To!ay, he oul! feel con"ince! that the human ill is free@ to&morro , consi!ering the in!issoluble chain of nature, he oul! look on free!om as a mere illusion an! !eclare nature to be all&in&all# But, if he ere calle! to action, the %lay of the merely s%eculati"e reason oul! !isa%%ear like the sha%es of a !ream, an! %ractical interest oul! !ictate his choice of %rinci%les# But, as it ell befits a reflecti"e an! inquiring being to !e"ote certain %erio!s of time to the e?amination of its o n reasonBto !i"est itself of all %artiality, an! frankly to communicate its obser"ations for the ju!gement an! o%inion of others@ so no one can be blame! for, much less %re"ente! from, %lacing both %arties on their trial, ith %ermission to en! themsel"es, free from intimi!ation, before intimi!ation, before a s orn jury of equal con!ition ith themsel"esBthe con!ition of eak an! fallible men# 7ECTI9< IK# 9f the necessity im%ose! u%on Pure Reason of %resenting a 7olution of its Transcen!ental Problems# To a"o an ability to sol"e all %roblems an! to ans er all questions oul! be a %rofession certain to con"ict any %hiloso%her of e?tra"agant boasting an! self&conceit, an! at once to !estroy the confi!ence that might other ise ha"e been re%ose! in him# There are, ho e"er, sciences so constitute! that e"ery question arising ithin their s%here must necessarily be ca%able of recei"ing an ans er from the kno le!ge alrea!y %ossesse!, for the ans er must be recei"e! from the same sources hence the question arose# In such sciences it is not allo able to e?cuse oursel"es on the %lea of necessary an! una"oi!able ignorance@ a solution is absolutely requisite# The rule of right an! rong must hel% us to the kno le!ge of hat is right or rong in all %ossible cases@ other ise, the i!ea of obligation or !uty oul! be utterly null, for e cannot ha"e any obligation to that hich e cannot kno # 9n the other han!, in our in"estigations of the %henomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, an! many questions continue insoluble@ because hat e kno of nature is far from being sufficient to e?%lain all the %henomena that are %resente! to our obser"ation# <o the question is( >hether there is in transcen!ental %hiloso%hy any question, relating to an object %resente! to %ure reason, hich is unans erable by this reason@ an! hether e must regar! the subject of the question as quite uncertain, so far as our kno le!ge e?ten!s, an! must gi"e it a %lace among those subjects, of hich e ha"e just so much conce%tion as is sufficient to enable us to raise a questionBfaculty or materials failing us, ho e"er, hen e attem%t an ans er# <o I maintain that, among all s%eculati"e cognition, the %eculiarity of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy is that there is no question, relating to an object %resente! to %ure reason, hich is insoluble by this reason@ an! that the %rofession of una"oi!able ignoranceBthe %roblem being allege! to be beyon! the reach of our facultiesBcannot free us from the

obligation to %resent a com%lete an! satisfactory ans er# :or the "ery conce%tion hich enables us to raise the question must gi"e us the %o er of ans ering it@ inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right an! rong, is not to be !isco"ere! out of the conce%tion# But, in transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, it is only the cosmological questions to hich e can !eman! a satisfactory ans er in relation to the constitution of their object@ an! the %hiloso%her is not %ermitte! to a"ail himself of the %rete?t of necessary ignorance an! im%enetrable obscurity# These questions relate solely to the cosmological i!eas# :or the object must be gi"en in e?%erience, an! the question relates to the a!equateness of the object to an i!ea# If the object is transcen!ental an! therefore itself unkno n@ if the question, for e?am%le, is hether the objectBthe something, the %henomenon of hich DinternalBin oursel"esE is thoughtBthat is to say, the soul, is in itself a sim%le being@ or hether there is a cause of all things, hich is absolutely necessaryBin such cases e are seeking for our i!ea an object, of hich e may confess that it is unkno n to us, though e must not on that account assert that it is im%ossible#8 The cosmological i!eas alone %osses the %eculiarity that e can %resu%%ose the object of them an! the em%irical synthesis requisite for the conce%tion of that object to be gi"en@ an! the question, hich arises from these i!eas, relates merely to the %rogress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute totalityB hich, ho e"er, is not em%irical, as it cannot be gi"en in any e?%erience# <o , as the question here is solely in regar! to a thing as the object of a %ossible e?%erience an! not as a thing in itself, the ans er to the transcen!ental cosmological question nee! not be sought out of the i!ea, for the question !oes not regar! an object in itself# The question in relation to a %ossible e?%erience is not, G>hat can be gi"en in an e?%erience in concretoG but G hat is containe! in the i!ea, to hich the em%irical synthesis must a%%ro?imate#G The question must therefore be ca%able of solution from the i!ea alone# :or the i!ea is a creation of reason itself, hich therefore cannot !isclaim the obligation to ans er or refer us to the unkno n object# /8:ootnote( The question, G>hat is the constitution of a transcen!ental objectHG is unans erableB e are unable to say hat it is@ but e can %ercei"e that the question itself is nothing@ because it !oes not relate to any object that can be %resente! to us# :or this reason, e must consi!er all the questions raise! in transcen!ental %sychology as ans erable an! as really ans ere!@ for they relate to the transcen!ental subject of all internal %henomena, hich is not itself %henomenon an! consequently not gi"en as an object, in hich, moreo"er, none of the categoriesBan! it is to them that the question is %ro%erly !irecte!Bfin! any con!itions of its a%%lication# ;ere, therefore, is a case here no ans er is the only %ro%er ans er# :or a question regar!ing the constitution of a something hich cannot be cogitate! by any !etermine! %re!icate, being com%letely beyon! the s%here of objects an! e?%erience, is %erfectly null an! "oi!#3 It is not so e?traor!inary, as it at first sight a%%ears, that a science shoul! !eman! an! e?%ect satisfactory ans ers to all the questions that may arise ithin its o n s%here Dquestiones !omesticaeE, although, u% to a certain time, these ans ers may not ha"e been !isco"ere!# There are, in a!!ition to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, only t o %ure

sciences of reason@ the one ith a s%eculati"e, the other ith a %ractical contentB%ure mathematics an! %ure ethics# ;as any one e"er hear! it allege! that, from our com%lete an! necessary ignorance of the con!itions, it is uncertain hat e?act relation the !iameter of a circle bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbersH By the former the sum cannot be gi"en e?actly, by the latter only a%%ro?imately@ an! therefore e !eci!e that the im%ossibility of a solution of the question is e"i!ent# 'ambert %resente! us ith a !emonstration of this# In the general %rinci%les of morals there can be nothing uncertain, for the %ro%ositions are either utterly ithout meaning, or must originate solely in our rational conce%tions# 9n the other han!, there must be in %hysical science an infinite number of conjectures, hich can ne"er become certainties@ because the %henomena of nature are not gi"en as objects !e%en!ent on our conce%tions# The key to the solution of such questions cannot, therefore, be foun! in our conce%tions, or in %ure thought, but must lie ithout us an! for that reason is in many cases not to be !isco"ere!@ an! consequently a satisfactory e?%lanation cannot be e?%ecte!# The questions of transcen!ental analytic, hich relate to the !e!uction of our %ure cognition, are not to be regar!e! as of the same kin! as those mentione! abo"e@ for e are not at %resent treating of the certainty of ju!gements in relation to the origin of our conce%tions, but only of that certainty in relation to objects# >e cannot, therefore, esca%e the res%onsibility of at least a critical solution of the questions of reason, by com%laints of the limite! nature of our faculties, an! the seemingly humble confession that it is beyon! the %o er of our reason to !eci!e, hether the orl! has e?iste! from all eternity or ha! a beginningB hether it is infinitely e?ten!e!, or enclose! ithin certain limitsB hether anything in the orl! is sim%le, or hether e"erything must be ca%able of infinite !i"isibilityB hether free!om can originate %henomena, or hether e"erything is absolutely !e%en!ent on the la s an! or!er of natureBan!, finally, hether there e?ists a being that is com%letely uncon!itione! an! necessary, or hether the e?istence of e"erything is con!itione! an! consequently !e%en!ent on something e?ternal to itself, an! therefore in its o n nature contingent# :or all these questions relate to an object, hich can be gi"en no here else than in thought# This object is the absolutely uncon!itione! totality of the synthesis of %henomena# If the conce%tions in our min!s !o not assist us to some certain result in regar! to these %roblems, e must not !efen! oursel"es on the %lea that the object itself remains hi!!en from an! unkno n to us# :or no such thing or object can be gi"enBit is not to be foun! out of the i!ea in our min!s# >e must seek the cause of our failure in our i!ea itself, hich is an insoluble %roblem an! in regar! to hich e obstinately assume that there e?ists a real object corres%on!ing an! a!equate to it# ) clear e?%lanation of the !ialectic hich lies in our conce%tion, ill "ery soon enable us to come to a satisfactory !ecision in regar! to such a question# The %rete?t that e are unable to arri"e at certainty in regar! to these %roblems may be met ith this question, hich requires at least a %lain ans er( G:rom hat source !o the i!eas originate, the solution of hich in"ol"es you in such !ifficultiesH )re you seeking for an e?%lanation of certain %henomena@ an! !o you e?%ect these i!eas to gi"e you the %rinci%les or the rules of this e?%lanationHG 'et it be grante!, that all nature as lai! o%en before you@ that nothing as hi! from your senses an! your consciousness# 7till, you coul! not cogniCe in concreto the object of your i!eas in any e?%erience# :or hat is

!eman!e! is not only this full an! com%lete intuition, but also a com%lete synthesis an! the consciousness of its absolute totality@ an! this is not %ossible by means of any em%irical cognition# It follo s that your questionByour i!eaBis by no means necessary for the e?%lanation of any %henomenon@ an! the i!ea cannot ha"e been in any sense gi"en by the object itself# :or such an object can ne"er be %resente! to us, because it cannot be gi"en by any %ossible e?%erience# >hate"er %erce%tions you may attain to, you are still surroun!e! by con!itionsBin s%ace, or in timeBan! you cannot !isco"er anything uncon!itione!@ nor can you !eci!e hether this uncon!itione! is to be %lace! in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, or in an absolute totality of the series ithout beginning# ) hole, in the em%irical signification of the term, is al ays merely com%arati"e# The absolute hole of quantity Dthe uni"erseE, of !i"ision, of !eri"ation, of the con!ition of e?istence, ith the questionB hether it is to be %ro!uce! by finite or infinite synthesis, no %ossible e?%erience can instruct us concerning# $ou ill not, for e?am%le, be able to e?%lain the %henomena of a bo!y in the least !egree better, hether you belie"e it to consist of sim%le, or of com%osite %arts@ for a sim%le %henomenonBan! just as little an infinite series of com%ositionBcan ne"er be %resente! to your %erce%tion# Phenomena require an! a!mit of e?%lanation, only in so far as the con!itions of that e?%lanation are gi"en in %erce%tion@ but the sum total of that hich is gi"en in %henomena, consi!ere! as an absolute hole, is itself a %erce%tionBan! e cannot therefore seek for e?%lanations of this hole beyon! itself, in other %erce%tions# The e?%lanation of this hole is the %ro%er object of the transcen!ental %roblems of %ure reason# )lthough, therefore, the solution of these %roblems is unattainable through e?%erience, e must not %ermit oursel"es to say that it is uncertain ho the object of our inquiries is constitute!# :or the object is in our o n min! an! cannot be !isco"ere! in e?%erience@ an! e ha"e only to take care that our thoughts are consistent ith each other, an! to a"oi! falling into the am%hiboly of regar!ing our i!ea as a re%resentation of an object em%irically gi"en, an! therefore to be cogniCe! accor!ing to the la s of e?%erience# ) !ogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory but im%ossible# The critical solution, hich may be a %erfectly certain one, !oes not consi!er the question objecti"ely, but %rocee!s by inquiring into the basis of the cognition u%on hich the question rests# 7ECTI9< K# 7ce%tical E?%osition of the Cosmological Problems %resente! in the four Transcen!ental I!eas# >e shoul! be quite illing to !esist from the !eman! of a !ogmatical ans er to our questions, if e un!erstoo! beforehan! that, be the ans er hat it may, it oul! only ser"e to increase our ignorance, to thro us from one incom%rehensibility into another, from one obscurity into another still greater, an! %erha%s lea! us into irreconcilable contra!ictions# If a !ogmatical affirmati"e or negati"e ans er is !eman!e!, is it at all %ru!ent to set asi!e the %robable groun!s of a solution hich lie before us an! to take into consi!eration hat a!"antage e shall gain, if the ans er is to fa"our the one si!e or the otherH If it ha%%ens that in both cases the ans er is mere nonsense, e ha"e in this an irresistible summons to institute a critical in"estigation of the question, for the %ur%ose of !isco"ering hether it is base! on a groun!less %resu%%osition an! relates to

an i!ea, the falsity of hich oul! be more easily e?%ose! in its a%%lication an! consequences than in the mere re%resentation of its content# This is the great utility of the sce%tical mo!e of treating the questions a!!resse! by %ure reason to itself# By this metho! e easily ri! oursel"es of the confusions of !ogmatism, an! establish in its %lace a tem%erate criticism, hich, as a genuine cathartic, ill successfully remo"e the %resum%tuous notions of %hiloso%hy an! their consequenceBthe "ain %retension to uni"ersal science# If, then, I coul! un!erstan! the nature of a cosmological i!ea an! %ercei"e, before I entere! on the !iscussion of the subject at all, that, hate"er si!e of the question regar!ing the uncon!itione! of the regressi"e synthesis of %henomena it fa"oure!Bit must either be too great or too small for e"ery conce%tion of the un!erstan!ingBI oul! be able to com%rehen! ho the i!ea, hich relates to an object of e?%erienceBan e?%erience hich must be a!equate to an! in accor!ance ith a %ossible conce%tion of the un!erstan!ingBmust be com%letely "oi! an! ithout significance, inasmuch as its object is ina!equate, consi!er it as e may# )n! this is actually the case ith all cosmological conce%tions, hich, for the reason abo"e mentione!, in"ol"e reason, so long as it remains attache! to them, in an una"oi!able antinomy# :or su%%ose( :irst, that the orl! has no beginningBin this case it is too large for our conce%tion@ for this conce%tion, hich consists in a successi"e regress, cannot o"ertake the hole eternity that has ela%se!# Grant that it has a beginning, it is then too small for the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing# :or, as a beginning %resu%%oses a time %rece!ing, it cannot be uncon!itione!@ an! the la of the em%irical em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing im%oses the necessity of looking for a higher con!ition of time@ an! the orl! is, therefore, e"i!ently too small for this la # The same is the case ith the !ouble ans er to the question regar!ing the e?tent, in s%ace, of the orl!# :or, if it is infinite an! unlimite!, it must be too large for e"ery %ossible em%irical conce%tion# If it is finite an! limite!, e ha"e a right to ask( G>hat !etermines these limitsHG Koi! s%ace is not a self&subsistent correlate of things, an! cannot be a final con!itionBan! still less an em%irical con!ition, forming a %art of a %ossible e?%erience# :or ho can e ha"e any e?%erience or %erce%tion of an absolute "oi!H But the absolute totality of the em%irical synthesis requires that the uncon!itione! be an em%irical conce%tion# Consequently, a finite orl! is too small for our conce%tion# 7econ!ly, if e"ery %henomenon DmatterE in s%ace consists of an infinite number of %arts, the regress of the !i"ision is al ays too great for our conce%tion@ an! if the !i"ision of s%ace must cease ith some member of the !i"ision Dthe sim%leE, it is too small for the i!ea of the uncon!itione!# :or the member at hich e ha"e !iscontinue! our !i"ision still a!mits a regress to many more %arts containe! in the object# Thir!ly, su%%ose that e"ery e"ent in the orl! ha%%ens in accor!ance ith the la s of nature@ the causality of a cause must itself be an e"ent an! necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, an! consequently the unceasing %rolongation of the series of con!itions a %arte %riori# 9%erati"e nature is therefore too large for e"ery conce%tion e can form in the synthesis of cosmical e"ents#

If e a!mit the e?istence of s%ontaneously %ro!uce! e"ents, that is, of free agency, e are !ri"en, in our search for sufficient reasons, on an una"oi!able la of nature an! are com%elle! to a%%eal to the em%irical la of causality, an! e fin! that any such totality of connection in our synthesis is too small for our necessary em%irical conce%tion# :ourthly, if e assume the e?istence of an absolutely necessary beingB hether it be the orl! or something in the orl!, or the cause of the orl!B e must %lace it in a time at an infinite !istance from any gi"en moment@ for, other ise, it must be !e%en!ent on some other an! higher e?istence# 7uch an e?istence is, in this case, too large for our em%irical conce%tion, an! unattainable by the continue! regress of any synthesis# But if e belie"e that e"erything in the orl!Bbe it con!ition or con!itione!Bis contingent@ e"ery gi"en e?istence is too small for our conce%tion# :or in this case e are com%elle! to seek for some other e?istence u%on hich the former !e%en!s# >e ha"e sai! that in all these cases the cosmological i!ea is either too great or too small for the em%irical regress in a synthesis, an! consequently for e"ery %ossible conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing# >hy !i! e not e?%ress oursel"es in a manner e?actly the re"erse of this an!, instea! of accusing the cosmological i!ea of o"er ste%%ing or of falling short of its true aim, %ossible e?%erience, say that, in the first case, the em%irical conce%tion is al ays too small for the i!ea, an! in the secon! too great, an! thus attach the blame of these contra!ictions to the em%irical regressH The reason is this# Possible e?%erience can alone gi"e reality to our conce%tions@ ithout it a conce%tion is merely an i!ea, ithout truth or relation to an object# ;ence a %ossible em%irical conce%tion must be the stan!ar! by hich e are to ju!ge hether an i!ea is anything more than an i!ea an! fiction of thought, or hether it relates to an object in the orl!# If e say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is too large or too small, the former is consi!ere! as e?isting for the sake of the latter, an! requiring to be a!a%te! to it# )mong the tri"ial subjects of !iscussion in the ol! schools of !ialectics as this question( GIf a ball cannot %ass through a hole, shall e say that the ball is too large or the hole too smallHG In this case it is in!ifferent hat e?%ression e em%loy@ for e !o not kno hich e?ists for the sake of the other# 9n the other han!, e cannot say( GThe man is too long for his coatG@ but( GThe coat is too short for the man#G >e are thus le! to the ell&foun!e! sus%icion that the cosmological i!eas, an! all the conflicting so%histical assertions connecte! ith them, are base! u%on a false an! fictitious conce%tion of the mo!e in hich the object of these i!eas is %resente! to us@ an! this sus%icion ill %robably !irect us ho to e?%ose the illusion that has so long le! us astray from the truth# 7ECTI9< KI# Transcen!ental I!ealism as the Key to the7olution of Pure Cosmological *ialectic# In the transcen!ental aesthetic e %ro"e! that e"erything intuite! in s%ace an! time, all objects of a %ossible e?%erience, are nothing but %henomena, that is, mere re%resentations@ an! that these, as %resente! to usBas e?ten!e! bo!ies, or as series of changesBha"e no self&subsistent e?istence a%art from human thought# This !octrine I

call Transcen!ental I!ealism#8 The realist in the transcen!ental sense regar!s these mo!ifications of our sensibility, these mere re%resentations, as things subsisting in themsel"es# /8:ootnote( I ha"e else here terme! this theory formal i!ealism, to !istinguish it from material i!ealism, hich !oubts or !enies the e?istence of e?ternal things# To a"oi! ambiguity, it seems a!"isable in many cases to em%loy this term instea! of that mentione! in the te?t#3 It oul! be unjust to accuse us of hol!ing the long&!ecrie! theory of em%irical i!ealism, hich, hile a!mitting the reality of s%ace, !enies, or at least !oubts, the e?istence of bo!ies e?ten!e! in it, an! thus lea"es us ithout a sufficient criterion of reality an! illusion# The su%%orters of this theory fin! no !ifficulty in a!mitting the reality of the %henomena of the internal sense in time@ nay, they go the length of maintaining that this internal e?%erience is of itself a sufficient %roof of the real e?istence of its object as a thing in itself# Transcen!ental i!ealism allo s that the objects of e?ternal intuitionBas intuite! in s%ace, an! all changes in timeBas re%resente! by the internal sense, are real# :or, as s%ace is the form of that intuition hich e call e?ternal, an!, ithout objects in s%ace, no em%irical re%resentation coul! be gi"en us, e can an! ought to regar! e?ten!e! bo!ies in it as real# The case is the same ith re%resentations in time# But time an! s%ace, ith all %henomena therein, are not in themsel"es things# They are nothing but re%resentations an! cannot e?ist out of an! a%art from the min!# <ay, the sensuous internal intuition of the min! Das the object of consciousnessE, the !etermination of hich is re%resente! by the succession of !ifferent states in time, is not the real, %ro%er self, as it e?ists in itselfBnot the transcen!ental subjectBbut only a %henomenon, hich is %resente! to the sensibility of this, to us, unkno n being# This internal %henomenon cannot be a!mitte! to be a self&subsisting thing@ for its con!ition is time, an! time cannot be the con!ition of a thing in itself# But the em%irical truth of %henomena in s%ace an! time is guarantee! beyon! the %ossibility of !oubt, an! sufficiently !istinguishe! from the illusion of !reams or fancyBalthough both ha"e a %ro%er an! thorough connection in an e?%erience accor!ing to em%irical la s# The objects of e?%erience then are not things in themsel"es, but are gi"en only in e?%erience, an! ha"e no e?istence a%art from an! in!e%en!ently of e?%erience# That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has e"er obser"e! them, must certainly be a!mitte!@ but this assertion means only, that e may in the %ossible %rogress of e?%erience !isco"er them at some future time# :or that hich stan!s in connection ith a %erce%tion accor!ing to the la s of the %rogress of e?%erience is real# They are therefore really e?istent, if they stan! in em%irical connection ith my actual or real consciousness, although they are not in themsel"es real, that is, a%art from the %rogress of e?%erience# There is nothing actually gi"enB e can be conscious of nothing as real, e?ce%t a %erce%tion an! the em%irical %rogression from it to other %ossible %erce%tions# :or %henomena, as mere re%resentations, are real only in %erce%tion@ an! %erce%tion is, in fact, nothing but the reality of an em%irical re%resentation, that is, a %henomenon# To call a %henomenon a real thing %rior to %erce%tion means either that e must meet ith

this %henomenon in the %rogress of e?%erience, or it means nothing at all# :or I can say only of a thing in itself that it e?ists ithout relation to the senses an! e?%erience# But e are s%eaking here merely of %henomena in s%ace an! time, both of hich are !eterminations of sensibility, an! not of things in themsel"es# It follo s that %henomena are not things in themsel"es, but are mere re%resentations, hich if not gi"en in usBin %erce%tionBare non&e?istent# The faculty of sensuous intuition is %ro%erly a rece%ti"ityBa ca%acity of being affecte! in a certain manner by re%resentations, the relation of hich to each other is a %ure intuition of s%ace an! timeBthe %ure forms of sensibility# These re%resentations, in so far as they are connecte! an! !eterminable in this relation Din s%ace an! timeE accor!ing to la s of the unity of e?%erience, are calle! objects# The non&sensuous cause of these re%resentations is com%letely unkno n to us an! hence cannot be intuite! as an object# :or such an object coul! not be re%resente! either in s%ace or in time@ an! ithout these con!itions intuition or re%resentation is im%ossible# >e may, at the same time, term the non&sensuous cause of %henomena the transcen!ental objectBbut merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, consi!ere! as a rece%ti"ity# To this transcen!ental object e may attribute the hole connection an! e?tent of our %ossible %erce%tions, an! say that it is gi"en an! e?ists in itself %rior to all e?%erience# But the %henomena, corres%on!ing to it, are not gi"en as things in themsel"es, but in e?%erience alone# :or they are mere re%resentations, recei"ing from %erce%tions alone significance an! relation to a real object, un!er the con!ition that this or that %erce%tionBin!icating an objectBis in com%lete connection ith all others in accor!ance ith the rules of the unity of e?%erience# Thus e can say( GThe things that really e?iste! in %ast time are gi"en in the transcen!ental object of e?%erience#G But these are to me real objects, only in so far as I can re%resent to my o n min!, that a regressi"e series of %ossible %erce%tionsB follo ing the in!ications of history, or the footste%s of cause an! effectBin accor!ance ith em%irical la sBthat, in one or!, the course of the orl! con!ucts us to an ela%se! series of time as the con!ition of the %resent time# This series in %ast time is re%resente! as real, not in itself, but only in connection ith a %ossible e?%erience# Thus, hen I say that certain e"ents occurre! in %ast time, I merely assert the %ossibility of %rolonging the chain of e?%erience, from the %resent %erce%tion, u% ar!s to the con!itions that !etermine it accor!ing to time# If I re%resent to myself all objects e?isting in all s%ace an! time, I !o not thereby %lace these in s%ace an! time %rior to all e?%erience@ on the contrary, such a re%resentation is nothing more than the notion of a %ossible e?%erience, in its absolute com%leteness# In e?%erience alone are those objects, hich are nothing but re%resentations, gi"en# But, hen I say they e?iste! %rior to my e?%erience, this means only that I must begin ith the %erce%tion %resent to me an! follo the track in!icate! until I !isco"er them in some %art or region of e?%erience# The cause of the em%irical con!ition of this %rogressionBan! consequently at hat member therein I must sto%, an! at hat %oint in the regress I am to fin! this memberBis transcen!ental, an! hence necessarily incogniCable# But ith this e ha"e not to !o@ our concern is only ith the la of %rogression in e?%erience, in hich objects, that is, %henomena, are gi"en# It is a matter of in!ifference, hether I say, GI may in the %rogress of e?%erience !isco"er stars, at a hun!re! times greater !istance than the most !istant of those no "isible,G or, G7tars at

this !istance may be met in s%ace, although no one has, or e"er ill !isco"er them#G :or, if they are gi"en as things in themsel"es, ithout any relation to %ossible e?%erience, they are for me non&e?istent, consequently, are not objects, for they are not containe! in the regressi"e series of e?%erience# But, if these %henomena must be em%loye! in the construction or su%%ort of the cosmological i!ea of an absolute hole, an! hen e are !iscussing a question that o"erste%s the limits of %ossible e?%erience, the %ro%er !istinction of the !ifferent theories of the reality of sensuous objects is of great im%ortance, in or!er to a"oi! the illusion hich must necessarily arise from the misinter%retation of our em%irical conce%tions# 7ECTI9< KII# Critical 7olution of the Cosmological Problem# The antinomy of %ure reason is base! u%on the follo ing !ialectical argument( GIf that hich is con!itione! is gi"en, the hole series of its con!itions is also gi"en@ but sensuous objects are gi"en as con!itione!@ consequently###G This syllogism, the major of hich seems so natural an! e"i!ent, intro!uces as many cosmological i!eas as there are !ifferent kin!s of con!itions in the synthesis of %henomena, in so far as these con!itions constitute a series# These i!eas require absolute totality in the series, an! thus %lace reason in ine?tricable embarrassment# Before %rocee!ing to e?%ose the fallacy in this !ialectical argument, it ill be necessary to ha"e a correct un!erstan!ing of certain conce%tions that a%%ear in it# In the first %lace, the follo ing %ro%osition is e"i!ent, an! in!ubitably certain( GIf the con!itione! is gi"en, a regress in the series of all its con!itions is thereby im%erati"ely require!#G :or the "ery conce%tion of a con!itione! is a conce%tion of something relate! to a con!ition, an!, if this con!ition is itself con!itione!, to another con!itionBan! so on through all the members of the series# This %ro%osition is, therefore, analytical an! has nothing to fear from transcen!ental criticism# It is a logical %ostulate of reason( to %ursue, as far as %ossible, the connection of a conce%tion ith its con!itions# If, in the secon! %lace, both the con!itione! an! the con!ition are things in themsel"es, an! if the former is gi"en, not only is the regress to the latter requisite, but the latter is really gi"en ith the former# <o , as this is true of all the members of the series, the entire series of con!itions, an! ith them the uncon!itione!, is at the same time gi"en in the "ery fact of the con!itione!, the e?istence of hich is %ossible only in an! through that series, being gi"en# In this case, the synthesis of the con!itione! ith its con!ition, is a synthesis of the un!erstan!ing merely, hich re%resents things as they are, ithout regar!ing hether an! ho e can cogniCe them# But if I ha"e to !o ith %henomena, hich, in their character of mere re%resentations, are not gi"en, if I !o not attain to a cognition of them Din other or!s, to themsel"es, for they are nothing more than em%irical cognitionsE, I am not entitle! to say( GIf the con!itione! is gi"en, all its con!itions Das %henomenaE are also gi"en#G I cannot, therefore, from the fact of a con!itione! being gi"en, infer the absolute totality of the series of its con!itions# :or %henomena are nothing but an em%irical synthesis in a%%rehension or %erce%tion, an! are therefore gi"en only in it# <o , in s%eaking of %henomena it !oes not follo that, if the con!itione! is gi"en, the synthesis hich constitutes its em%irical con!ition is also thereby gi"en an! %resu%%ose!@ such a synthesis can be establishe! only by an actual

regress in the series of con!itions# But e are entitle! to say in this case that a regress to the con!itions of a con!itione!, in other or!s, that a continuous em%irical synthesis is enjoine!@ that, if the con!itions are not gi"en, they are at least require!@ an! that e are certain to !isco"er the con!itions in this regress# >e can no see that the major, in the abo"e cosmological syllogism, takes the con!itione! in the transcen!ental signification hich it has in the %ure category, hile the minor s%eaks of it in the em%irical signification hich it has in the category as a%%lie! to %henomena# There is, therefore, a !ialectical fallacy in the syllogismBa so%hisma figurae !ictionis# But this fallacy is not a consciously !e"ise! one, but a %erfectly natural illusion of the common reason of man# :or, hen a thing is gi"en as con!itione!, e %resu%%ose in the major its con!itions an! their series, un%ercei"e!, as it ere, an! unseen@ because this is nothing more than the logical requirement of com%lete an! satisfactory %remisses for a gi"en conclusion# In this case, time is altogether left out in the connection of the con!itione! ith the con!ition@ they are su%%ose! to be gi"en in themsel"es, an! contem%oraneously# It is, moreo"er, just as natural to regar! %henomena Din the minorE as things in themsel"es an! as objects %resente! to the %ure un!erstan!ing, as in the major, in hich com%lete abstraction as ma!e of all con!itions of intuition# But it is un!er these con!itions alone that objects are gi"en# <o e o"erlooke! a remarkable !istinction bet een the conce%tions# The synthesis of the con!itione! ith its con!ition, an! the com%lete series of the latter Din the majorE are not limite! by time, an! !o not contain the conce%tion of succession# 9n the contrary, the em%irical synthesis an! the series of con!itions in the %henomenal orl!Bsubsume! in the minorBare necessarily successi"e an! gi"en in time alone# It follo s that I cannot %resu%%ose in the minor, as I !i! in the major, the absolute totality of the synthesis an! of the series therein re%resente!@ for in the major all the members of the series are gi"en as things in themsel"esB ithout any limitations or con!itions of time, hile in the minor they are %ossible only in an! through a successi"e regress, hich cannot e?ist, e?ce%t it be actually carrie! into e?ecution in the orl! of %henomena# )fter this %roof of the "iciousness of the argument commonly em%loye! in maintaining cosmological assertions, both %arties may no be justly !ismisse!, as a!"ancing claims ithout groun!s or title# But the %rocess has not been en!e! by con"incing them that one or both ere in the rong an! ha! maintaine! an assertion hich as ithout "ali! groun!s of %roof# <othing seems to be clearer than that, if one maintains( GThe orl! has a beginning,G an! another( GThe orl! has no beginning,G one of the t o must be right# But it is like ise clear that, if the e"i!ence on both si!es is equal, it is im%ossible to !isco"er on hat si!e the truth lies@ an! the contro"ersy continues, although the %arties ha"e been recommen!e! to %eace before the tribunal of reason# There remains, then, no other means of settling the question than to con"ince the %arties, ho refute each other ith such conclusi"eness an! ability, that they are !is%uting about nothing, an! that a transcen!ental illusion has been mocking them ith "isions of reality here there is none# The mo!e of a!justing a !is%ute hich cannot be !eci!e! u%on its o n merits, e shall no %rocee! to lay before our rea!ers#

Reno of Elea, a subtle !ialectician, as se"erely re%riman!e! by Plato as a so%hist, ho, merely from the base moti"e of e?hibiting his skill in !iscussion, maintaine! an! sub"erte! the same %ro%osition by arguments as %o erful an! con"incing on the one si!e as on the other# ;e maintaine!, for e?am%le, that Go! D ho as %robably nothing more, in his "ie , than the orl!E is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor in rest, neither similar nor !issimilar to any other thing# It seeme! to those %hiloso%hers ho criticiCe! his mo!e of !iscussion that his %ur%ose as to !eny com%letely both of t o self&contra!ictory %ro%ositionsB hich is absur!# But I cannot belie"e that there is any justice in this accusation# The first of these %ro%ositions I shall %resently consi!er in a more !etaile! manner# >ith regar! to the others, if by the or! of Go! he un!erstoo! merely the 4ni"erse, his meaning must ha"e beenBthat it cannot be %ermanently %resent in one %laceBthat is, at restBnor be ca%able of changing its %laceBthat is, of mo"ingBbecause all %laces are in the uni"erse, an! the uni"erse itself is, therefore, in no %lace# )gain, if the uni"erse contains in itself e"erything that e?ists, it cannot be similar or !issimilar to any other thing, because there is, in fact, no other thing ith hich it can be com%are!# If t o o%%osite ju!gements %resu%%ose a contingent im%ossible, or arbitrary con!ition, bothBin s%ite of their o%%osition D hich is, ho e"er, not %ro%erly or really a contra!ictionEBfall a ay@ because the con!ition, hich ensure! the "ali!ity of both, has itself !isa%%eare!# If e say( GE"erybo!y has either a goo! or a ba! smell,G e ha"e omitte! a thir! %ossible ju!gementBit has no smell at all@ an! thus both conflicting statements may be false# If e say( GIt is either goo!&smelling or not goo!&smelling D"el sua"eolens "el non& sua"eolensE,G both ju!gements are contra!ictorily o%%ose!@ an! the contra!ictory o%%osite of the former ju!gementBsome bo!ies are not goo!&smellingBembraces also those bo!ies hich ha"e no smell at all# In the %rece!ing %air of o%%ose! ju!gements D%er !is%arataE, the contingent con!ition of the conce%tion of bo!y DsmellE attache! to both conflicting statements, instea! of ha"ing been omitte! in the latter, hich is consequently not the contra!ictory o%%osite of the former# If, accor!ingly, e say( GThe orl! is either infinite in e?tension, or it is not infinite Dnon est infinitusEG@ an! if the former %ro%osition is false, its contra!ictory o%%ositeBthe orl! is not infiniteBmust be true# )n! thus I shoul! !eny the e?istence of an infinite, ithout, ho e"er affirming the e?istence of a finite orl!# But if e construct our %ro%osition thus( GThe orl! is either infinite or finite Dnon&infiniteE,G both statements may be false# :or, in this case, e consi!er the orl! as %er se !etermine! in regar! to quantity, an! hile, in the one ju!gement, e !eny its infinite an! consequently, %erha%s, its in!e%en!ent e?istence@ in the other, e a%%en! to the orl!, regar!e! as a thing in itself, a certain !eterminationBthat of finitu!e@ an! the latter may be false as ell as the former, if the orl! is not gi"en as a thing in itself, an! thus neither as finite nor as infinite in quantity# This kin! of o%%osition I may be allo e! to term !ialectical@ that of contra!ictories may be calle! analytical o%%osition# Thus then, of t o !ialectically o%%ose! ju!gements both may be false, from the fact, that the one is not a mere contra!ictory of the other, but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full an! com%lete contra!iction#

>hen e regar! the t o %ro%ositionsBGThe orl! is infinite in quantity,G an!, GThe orl! is finite in quantity,G as contra!ictory o%%osites, e are assuming that the orl!B the com%lete series of %henomenaBis a thing in itself# :or it remains as a %ermanent quantity, hether I !eny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of its %henomena# But if e !ismiss this assum%tionBthis transcen!ental illusionBan! !eny that it is a thing in itself, the contra!ictory o%%osition is metamor%hose! into a merely !ialectical one@ an! the orl!, as not e?isting in itselfBin!e%en!ently of the regressi"e series of my re%resentationsBe?ists in like manner neither as a hole hich is infinite nor as a hole hich is finite in itself# The uni"erse e?ists for me only in the em%irical regress of the series of %henomena an! not %er se# If, then, it is al ays con!itione!, it is ne"er com%letely or as a hole@ an! it is, therefore, not an uncon!itione! hole an! !oes not e?ist as such, either ith an infinite, or ith a finite quantity# >hat e ha"e here sai! of the first cosmological i!eaBthat of the absolute totality of quantity in %henomenaBa%%lies also to the others# The series of con!itions is !isco"erable only in the regressi"e synthesis itself, an! not in the %henomenon consi!ere! as a thing in itselfBgi"en %rior to all regress# ;ence I am com%elle! to say( GThe aggregate of %arts in a gi"en %henomenon is in itself neither finite nor infinite@ an! these %arts are gi"en only in the regressi"e synthesis of !ecom%ositionBa synthesis hich is ne"er gi"en in absolute com%leteness, either as finite, or as infinite#G The same is the case ith the series of subor!inate! causes, or of the con!itione! u% to the uncon!itione! an! necessary e?istence, hich can ne"er be regar!e! as in itself, in! in its totality, either as finite or as infinite@ because, as a series of subor!inate re%resentations, it subsists only in the !ynamical regress an! cannot be regar!e! as e?isting %re"iously to this regress, or as a self&subsistent series of things# Thus the antinomy of %ure reason in its cosmological i!eas !isa%%ears# :or the abo"e !emonstration has establishe! the fact that it is merely the %ro!uct of a !ialectical an! illusory o%%osition, hich arises from the a%%lication of the i!ea of absolute totalityB a!missible only as a con!ition of things in themsel"esBto %henomena, hich e?ist only in our re%resentations, an!B hen constituting a seriesBin a successi"e regress# This antinomy of reason may, ho e"er, be really %rofitable to our s%eculati"e interests, not in the ay of contributing any !ogmatical a!!ition, but as %resenting to us another material su%%ort in our critical in"estigations# :or it furnishes us ith an in!irect %roof of the transcen!ental i!eality of %henomena, if our min!s ere not com%letely satisfie! ith the !irect %roof set forth in the Trancen!ental )esthetic# The %roof oul! %rocee! in the follo ing !ilemma# If the orl! is a hole e?isting in itself, it must be either finite or infinite# But it is neither finite nor infiniteBas has been sho n, on the one si!e, by the thesis, on the other, by the antithesis# Therefore the orl!Bthe content of all %henomenaBis not a hole e?isting in itself# It follo s that %henomena are nothing, a%art from our re%resentations# )n! this is hat e mean by transcen!ental i!eality# This remark is of some im%ortance# It enables us to see that the %roofs of the fourfol! antinomy are not mere so%histriesBare not fallacious, but groun!e! on the nature of reason, an! "ali!Bun!er the su%%osition that %henomena are things in themsel"es# The o%%osition of the ju!gements hich follo makes it e"i!ent that a fallacy lay in the initial su%%osition, an! thus hel%s us to !isco"er the true constitution of objects of

sense# This transcen!ental !ialectic !oes not fa"our sce%ticism, although it %resents us ith a trium%hant !emonstration of the a!"antages of the sce%tical metho!, the great utility of hich is a%%arent in the antinomy, here the arguments of reason ere allo e! to confront each other in un!iminishe! force# )n! although the result of these conflicts of reason is not hat e e?%ecte!Balthough e ha"e obtaine! no %ositi"e !ogmatical a!!ition to meta%hysical scienceB e ha"e still rea%e! a great a!"antage in the correction of our ju!gements on these subjects of thought# 7ECTI9< KIII# Regulati"e Princi%le of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological I!eas# The cosmological %rinci%le of totality coul! not gi"e us any certain kno le!ge in regar! to the ma?imum in the series of con!itions in the orl! of sense, consi!ere! as a thing in itself# The actual regress in the series is the only means of a%%roaching this ma?imum# This %rinci%le of %ure reason, therefore, may still be consi!ere! as "ali!Bnot as an a?iom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual, but as a %roblem for the un!erstan!ing, hich requires it to institute an! to continue, in conformity ith the i!ea of totality in the min!, the regress in the series of the con!itions of a gi"en con!itione!# :or in the orl! of sense, that is, in s%ace an! time, e"ery con!ition hich e !isco"er in our in"estigation of %henomena is itself con!itione!@ because sensuous objects are not things in themsel"es Din hich case an absolutely uncon!itione! might be reache! in the %rogress of cognitionE, but are merely em%irical re%resentations the con!itions of hich must al ays be foun! in intuition# The %rinci%le of reason is therefore %ro%erly a mere ruleB%rescribing a regress in the series of con!itions for gi"en %henomena, an! %rohibiting any %ause or rest on an absolutely uncon!itione!# It is, therefore, not a %rinci%le of the %ossibility of e?%erience or of the em%irical cognition of sensuous objectsBconsequently not a %rinci%le of the un!erstan!ing@ for e"ery e?%erience is confine! ithin certain %ro%er limits !etermine! by the gi"en intuition# 7till less is it a constituti"e %rinci%le of reason authoriCing us to e?ten! our conce%tion of the sensuous orl! beyon! all %ossible e?%erience# It is merely a %rinci%le for the enlargement an! e?tension of e?%erience as far as is %ossible for human faculties# It forbi!s us to consi!er any em%irical limits as absolute# It is, hence, a %rinci%le of reason, hich, as a rule, !ictates ho e ought to %rocee! in our em%irical regress, but is unable to antici%ate or in!icate %rior to the em%irical regress hat is gi"en in the object itself# I ha"e terme! it for this reason a regulati"e %rinci%le of reason@ hile the %rinci%le of the absolute totality of the series of con!itions, as e?isting in itself an! gi"en in the object, is a constituti"e cosmological %rinci%le# This !istinction ill at once !emonstrate the falsehoo! of the constituti"e %rinci%le, an! %re"ent us from attributing Dby a transcen!ental subre%tioE objecti"e reality to an i!ea, hich is "ali! only as a rule# In or!er to un!erstan! the %ro%er meaning of this rule of %ure reason, e must notice first that it cannot tell us hat the object is, but only ho the em%irical regress is to be %rocee!e! ith in or!er to attain to the com%lete conce%tion of the object# If it ga"e us any information in res%ect to the former statement, it oul! be a constituti"e %rinci%le Ba %rinci%le im%ossible from the nature of %ure reason# It ill not therefore enable us to establish any such conclusions as( GThe series of con!itions for a gi"en con!itione! is in itself finite,G or, GIt is infinite#G :or, in this case, e shoul! be cogitating in the mere i!ea

of absolute totality, an object hich is not an! cannot be gi"en in e?%erience@ inasmuch as e shoul! be attributing a reality objecti"e an! in!e%en!ent of the em%irical synthesis, to a series of %henomena# This i!ea of reason cannot then be regar!e! as "ali! Be?ce%t as a rule for the regressi"e synthesis in the series of con!itions, accor!ing to hich e must %rocee! from the con!itione!, through all interme!iate an! subor!inate con!itions, u% to the uncon!itione!@ although this goal is unattaine! an! unattainable# :or the absolutely uncon!itione! cannot be !isco"ere! in the s%here of e?%erience# >e no %rocee! to !etermine clearly our notion of a synthesis hich can ne"er be com%lete# There are t o terms commonly em%loye! for this %ur%ose# These terms are regar!e! as e?%ressions of !ifferent an! !istinguishable notions, although the groun! of the !istinction has ne"er been clearly e?%ose!# The term em%loye! by the mathematicians is %rogressus in infinitum# The %hiloso%hers %refer the e?%ression %rogressus in in!efinitum# >ithout !etaining the rea!er ith an e?amination of the reasons for such a !istinction, or ith remarks on the right or rong use of the terms, I shall en!ea"our clearly to !etermine these conce%tions, so far as is necessary for the %ur%ose in this Critique# >e may, ith %ro%riety, say of a straight line, that it may be %ro!uce! to infinity# In this case the !istinction bet een a %rogressus in infinitum an! a %rogressus in in!efinitum is a mere %iece of subtlety# :or, although hen e say, GPro!uce a straight line,G it is more correct to say in in!efinitum than in infinitum@ because the former means, GPro!uce it as far as you %lease,G the secon!, G$ou must not cease to %ro!uce itG@ the e?%ression in infinitum is, hen e are s%eaking of the %o er to !o it, %erfectly correct, for e can al ays make it longer if e %leaseBon to infinity# )n! this remark hol!s goo! in all cases, hen e s%eak of a %rogressus, that is, an a!"ancement from the con!ition to the con!itione!@ this %ossible a!"ancement al ays %rocee!s to infinity# >e may %rocee! from a gi"en %air in the !escen!ing line of generation from father to son, an! cogitate a ne"er&en!ing line of !escen!ants from it# :or in such a case reason !oes not !eman! absolute totality in the series, because it !oes not %resu%%ose it as a con!ition an! as gi"en D!atumE, but merely as con!itione!, an! as ca%able of being gi"en D!abileE# Kery !ifferent is the case ith the %roblem( G;o far the regress, hich ascen!s from the gi"en con!itione! to the con!itions, must e?ten!G@ hether I can say( GIt is a regress in infinitum,G or only Gin in!efinitumG@ an! hether, for e?am%le, setting out from the human beings at %resent ali"e in the orl!, I may ascen! in the series of their ancestors, in infinitumBmr hether all that can be sai! is, that so far as I ha"e %rocee!e!, I ha"e !isco"ere! no em%irical groun! for consi!ering the series limite!, so that I am justifie!, an! in!ee!, com%elle! to search for ancestors still further back, although I am not oblige! by the i!ea of reason to %resu%%ose them# Ay ans er to this question is( GIf the series is gi"en in em%irical intuition as a hole, the regress in the series of its internal con!itions %rocee!s in infinitum@ but, if only one member of the series is gi"en, from hich the regress is to %rocee! to absolute totality, the regress is %ossible only in in!efinitum#G :or e?am%le, the !i"ision of a %ortion of matter gi"en ithin certain limitsBof a bo!y, that isB%rocee!s in infinitum# :or, as the con!ition of this hole is its %art, an! the con!ition of the %art a %art of the %art, an! so

on, an! as in this regress of !ecom%osition an uncon!itione! in!i"isible member of the series of con!itions is not to be foun!@ there are no reasons or groun!s in e?%erience for sto%%ing in the !i"ision, but, on the contrary, the more remote members of the !i"ision are actually an! em%irically gi"en %rior to this !i"ision# That is to say, the !i"ision %rocee!s to infinity# 9n the other han!, the series of ancestors of any gi"en human being is not gi"en, in its absolute totality, in any e?%erience, an! yet the regress %rocee!s from e"ery genealogical member of this series to one still higher, an! !oes not meet ith any em%irical limit %resenting an absolutely uncon!itione! member of the series# But as the members of such a series are not containe! in the em%irical intuition of the hole, %rior to the regress, this regress !oes not %rocee! to infinity, but only in in!efinitum, that is, e are calle! u%on to !isco"er other an! higher members, hich are themsel"es al ays con!itione!# In neither caseBthe regressus in infinitum, nor the regressus in in!efinitum, is the series of con!itions to be consi!ere! as actually infinite in the object itself# This might be true of things in themsel"es, but it cannot be asserte! of %henomena, hich, as con!itions of each other, are only gi"en in the em%irical regress itself# ;ence, the question no longer is, G>hat is the quantity of this series of con!itions in itselfBis it finite or infiniteHG for it is nothing in itself@ but, G;o is the em%irical regress to be commence!, an! ho far ought e to %rocee! ith itHG )n! here a signal !istinction in the a%%lication of this rule becomes a%%arent# If the hole is gi"en em%irically, it is %ossible to rece!e in the series of its internal con!itions to infinity# But if the hole is not gi"en, an! can only be gi"en by an! through the em%irical regress, I can only say( GIt is %ossible to infinity, to %rocee! to still higher con!itions in the series#G In the first case, I am justifie! in asserting that more members are em%irically gi"en in the object than I attain to in the regress Dof !ecom%ositionE# In the secon! case, I am justifie! only in saying, that I can al ays %rocee! further in the regress, because no member of the series is gi"en as absolutely con!itione!, an! thus a higher member is %ossible, an! an inquiry ith regar! to it is necessary# In the one case it is necessary to fin! other members of the series, in the other it is necessary to inquire for others, inasmuch as e?%erience %resents no absolute limitation of the regress# :or, either you !o not %ossess a %erce%tion hich absolutely limits your em%irical regress, an! in this case the regress cannot be regar!e! as com%lete@ or, you !o %ossess such a limitati"e %erce%tion, in hich case it is not a %art of your series Dfor that hich limits must be !istinct from that hich is limite! by itE, an! it is incumbent you to continue your regress u% to this con!ition, an! so on# These remarks ill be %lace! in their %ro%er light by their a%%lication in the follo ing section# 7ECTI9< IM# 9f the Em%irical 4se of the Regulati"e Princi%le of Reason ith regar! to the Cosmological I!eas# >e ha"e sho n that no transcen!ental use can be ma!e either of the conce%tions of reason or of un!erstan!ing# >e ha"e sho n, like ise, that the !eman! of absolute totality in the series of con!itions in the orl! of sense arises from a transcen!ental em%loyment of reason, resting on the o%inion that %henomena are to be regar!e! as things in themsel"es# It follo s that e are not require! to ans er the question

res%ecting the absolute quantity of a seriesB hether it is in itself limite! or unlimite!# >e are only calle! u%on to !etermine ho far e must %rocee! in the em%irical regress from con!ition to con!ition, in or!er to !isco"er, in conformity ith the rule of reason, a full an! correct ans er to the questions %ro%ose! by reason itself# This %rinci%le of reason is hence "ali! only as a rule for the e?tension of a %ossible e?%erienceBits in"ali!ity as a %rinci%le constituti"e of %henomena in themsel"es ha"ing been sufficiently !emonstrate!# )n! thus, too, the antinomial conflict of reason ith itself is com%letely %ut an en! to@ inasmuch as e ha"e not only %resente! a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the o%%osite statements of reason, but ha"e sho n the true meaning of the i!eas hich ga"e rise to these statements# The !ialectical %rinci%le of reason has, therefore, been change! into a !octrinal %rinci%le# But in fact, if this %rinci%le, in the subjecti"e signification hich e ha"e sho n to be its only true sense, may be guarantee! as a %rinci%le of the unceasing e?tension of the em%loyment of our un!erstan!ing, its influence an! "alue are just as great as if it ere an a?iom for the a %riori !etermination of objects# :or such an a?iom coul! not e?ert a stronger influence on the e?tension an! rectification of our kno le!ge, other ise than by %rocuring for the %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing the most i!ely e?%an!e! em%loyment in the fiel! of e?%erience# I# 7olution of the Cosmological I!ea of the Totality of the Com%osition of Phenomena in the 4ni"erse# ;ere, as ell as in the case of the other cosmological %roblems, the groun! of the regulati"e %rinci%le of reason is the %ro%osition that in our em%irical regress no e?%erience of an absolute limit, an! consequently no e?%erience of a con!ition, hich is itself absolutely uncon!itione!, is !isco"erable# )n! the truth of this %ro%osition itself rests u%on the consi!eration that such an e?%erience must re%resent to us %henomena as limite! by nothing or the mere "oi!, on hich our continue! regress by means of %erce%tion must abutB hich is im%ossible# <o this %ro%osition, hich !eclares that e"ery con!ition attaine! in the em%irical regress must itself be consi!ere! em%irically con!itione!, contains the rule in terminis, hich requires me, to hate"er e?tent I may ha"e %rocee!e! in the ascen!ing series, al ays to look for some higher member in the seriesB hether this member is to become kno n to me through e?%erience, or not# <othing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the first cosmological %roblem, than to !eci!e, hether, in the regress to the uncon!itione! quantity of the uni"erse Das regar!s s%ace an! timeE, this ne"er limite! ascent ought to be calle! a regressus in infinitum or in!efinitum# The general re%resentation hich e form in our min!s of the series of all %ast states or con!itions of the orl!, or of all the things hich at %resent e?ist in it, is itself nothing more than a %ossible em%irical regress, hich is cogitate!Balthough in an un!etermine! mannerBin the min!, an! hich gi"es rise to the conce%tion of a series of con!itions for a gi"en object#8 <o I ha"e a conce%tion of the uni"erse, but not an

intuitionBthat is, not an intuition of it as a hole# Thus I cannot infer the magnitu!e of the regress from the quantity or magnitu!e of the orl!, an! !etermine the former by means of the latter@ on the contrary, I must first of all form a conce%tion of the quantity or magnitu!e of the orl! from the magnitu!e of the em%irical regress# But of this regress I kno nothing more than that I ought to %rocee! from e"ery gi"en member of the series of con!itions to one still higher# But the quantity of the uni"erse is not thereby !etermine!, an! e cannot affirm that this regress %rocee!s in infinitum# 7uch an affirmation oul! antici%ate the members of the series hich ha"e not yet been reache!, an! re%resent the number of them as beyon! the gras% of any em%irical synthesis@ it oul! consequently !etermine the cosmical quantity %rior to the regress Dalthough only in a negati"e mannerEB hich is im%ossible# :or the orl! is not gi"en in its totality in any intuition( consequently, its quantity cannot be gi"en %rior to the regress# It follo s that e are unable to make any !eclaration res%ecting the cosmical quantity in itselfB not e"en that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum@ e must only en!ea"our to attain to a conce%tion of the quantity of the uni"erse, in conformity ith the rule hich !etermines the em%irical regress in it# But this rule merely requires us ne"er to a!mit an absolute limit to our seriesBho far soe"er e may ha"e %rocee!e! in it, but al ays, on the contrary, to subor!inate e"ery %henomenon to some other as its con!ition, an! consequently to %rocee! to this higher %henomenon# 7uch a regress is, therefore, the regressus in in!efinitum, hich, as not !etermining a quantity in the object, is clearly !istinguishable from the regressus in infinitum# /8:ootnote( The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the %ossible em%irical regress, u%on hich its conce%tion is base!# )n! as this regress cannot be a !eterminate infinite regress, still less a !eterminate finite Dabsolutely limite!E, it is e"i!ent that e cannot regar! the orl! as either finite or infinite, because the regress, hich gi"es us the re%resentation of the orl!, is neither finite nor infinite#3 It follo s from hat e ha"e sai! that e are not justifie! in !eclaring the orl! to be infinite in s%ace, or as regar!s %ast time# :or this conce%tion of an infinite gi"en quantity is em%irical@ but e cannot a%%ly the conce%tion of an infinite quantity to the orl! as an object of the senses# I cannot say, GThe regress from a gi"en %erce%tion to e"erything limite! either in s%ace or time, %rocee!s in infinitum,G for this %resu%%oses an infinite cosmical quantity@ neither can I say, GIt is finite,G for an absolute limit is like ise im%ossible in e?%erience# It follo s that I am not entitle! to make any assertion at all res%ecting the hole object of e?%erienceBthe orl! of sense@ I must limit my !eclarations to the rule accor!ing to hich e?%erience or em%irical kno le!ge is to be attaine!# To the question, therefore, res%ecting the cosmical quantity, the first an! negati"e ans er is( GThe orl! has no beginning in time, an! no absolute limit in s%ace#G :or, in the contrary case, it oul! be limite! by a "oi! time on the one han!, an! by a "oi! s%ace on the other# <o , since the orl!, as a %henomenon, cannot be thus limite! in itself for a %henomenon is not a thing in itself@ it must be %ossible for us to ha"e a

%erce%tion of this limitation by a "oi! time an! a "oi! s%ace# But such a %erce%tionB such an e?%erience is im%ossible@ because it has no content# Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is em%irically, an! therefore absolutely, im%ossible#8 /8:ootnote( The rea!er ill remark that the %roof %resente! abo"e is "ery !ifferent from the !ogmatical !emonstration gi"en in the antithesis of the first antinomy# In that !emonstration, it as taken for grante! that the orl! is a thing in itselfBgi"en in its totality %rior to all regress, an! a !etermine! %osition in s%ace an! time as !enie! to itBif it as not consi!ere! as occu%ying all time an! all s%ace# ;ence our conclusion !iffere! from that gi"en abo"e@ for e inferre! in the antithesis the actual infinity of the orl!#3 :rom this follo s the affirmati"e ans er( GThe regress in the series of %henomenaBas a !etermination of the cosmical quantity, %rocee!s in in!efinitum#G This is equi"alent to saying( GThe orl! of sense has no absolute quantity, but the em%irical regress Dthrough hich alone the orl! of sense is %resente! to us on the si!e of its con!itionsE rests u%on a rule, hich requires it to %rocee! from e"ery member of the series, as con!itione!, to one still more remote D hether through %ersonal e?%erience, or by means of history, or the chain of cause an! effectE, an! not to cease at any %oint in this e?tension of the %ossible em%irical em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing#G )n! this is the %ro%er an! only use hich reason can make of its %rinci%les# The abo"e rule !oes not %rescribe an unceasing regress in one kin! of %henomena# It !oes not, for e?am%le, forbi! us, in our ascent from an in!i"i!ual human being through the line of his ancestors, to e?%ect that e shall !isco"er at some %oint of the regress a %rime"al %air, or to a!mit, in the series of hea"enly bo!ies, a sun at the farthest %ossible !istance from some centre# )ll that it !eman!s is a %er%etual %rogress from %henomena to %henomena, e"en although an actual %erce%tion is not %resente! by them Das in the case of our %erce%tions being so eak as that e are unable to become conscious of themE, since they, ne"ertheless, belong to %ossible e?%erience# E"ery beginning is in time, an! all limits to e?tension are in s%ace# But s%ace an! time are in the orl! of sense# Consequently %henomena in the orl! are con!itionally limite!, but the orl! itself is not limite!, either con!itionally or uncon!itionally# :or this reason, an! because neither the orl! nor the cosmical series of con!itions to a gi"en con!itione! can be com%letely gi"en, our conce%tion of the cosmical quantity is gi"en only in an! through the regress an! not %rior to itBin a collecti"e intuition# But the regress itself is really nothing more than the !etermining of the cosmical quantity, an! cannot therefore gi"e us any !etermine! conce%tion of itBstill less a conce%tion of a quantity hich is, in relation to a certain stan!ar!, infinite# The regress !oes not, therefore, %rocee! to infinity Dan infinity gi"enE, but only to an in!efinite e?tent, for or the of %resenting to us a quantityBrealiCe! only in an! through the regress itself# II# 7olution of the Cosmological I!ea of the Totality of the *i"ision of a >hole gi"en in Intuition#

>hen I !i"i!e a hole hich is gi"en in intuition, I %rocee! from a con!itione! to its con!itions# The !i"ision of the %arts of the hole Dsub!i"isio or !ecom%ositioE is a regress in the series of these con!itions# The absolute totality of this series oul! be actually attaine! an! gi"en to the min!, if the regress coul! arri"e at sim%le %arts# But if all the %arts in a continuous !ecom%osition are themsel"es !i"isible, the !i"ision, that is to say, the regress, %rocee!s from the con!itione! to its con!itions in infinitum@ because the con!itions Dthe %artsE are themsel"es containe! in the con!itione!, an!, as the latter is gi"en in a limite! intuition, the former are all gi"en along ith it# This regress cannot, therefore, be calle! a regressus in in!efinitum, as ha%%ene! in the case of the %rece!ing cosmological i!ea, the regress in hich %rocee!e! from the con!itione! to the con!itions not gi"en contem%oraneously an! along ith it, but !isco"erable only through the em%irical regress# >e are not, ho e"er, entitle! to affirm of a hole of this kin!, hich is !i"isible in infinitum, that it consists of an infinite number of %arts# :or, although all the %arts are containe! in the intuition of the hole, the hole !i"ision is not containe! therein# The !i"ision is containe! only in the %rogressing !ecom%osition Bin the regress itself, hich is the con!ition of the %ossibility an! actuality of the series# <o , as this regress is infinite, all the members D%artsE to hich it attains must be containe! in the gi"en hole as an aggregate# But the com%lete series of !i"ision is not containe! therein# :or this series, being infinite in succession an! al ays incom%lete, cannot re%resent an infinite number of members, an! still less a com%osition of these members into a hole# To a%%ly this remark to s%ace# E"ery limite! %art of s%ace %resente! to intuition is a hole, the %arts of hich are al ays s%acesBto hate"er e?tent sub!i"i!e!# E"ery limite! s%ace is hence !i"isible to infinity# 'et us again a%%ly the remark to an e?ternal %henomenon enclose! in limits, that is, a bo!y# The !i"isibility of a bo!y rests u%on the !i"isibility of s%ace, hich is the con!ition of the %ossibility of the bo!y as an e?ten!e! hole# ) bo!y is consequently !i"isible to infinity, though it !oes not, for that reason, consist of an infinite number of %arts# It certainly seems that, as a bo!y must be cogitate! as substance in s%ace, the la of !i"isibility oul! not be a%%licable to it as substance# :or e may an! ought to grant, in the case of s%ace, that !i"ision or !ecom%osition, to any e?tent, ne"er can utterly annihilate com%osition Dthat is to say, the smallest %art of s%ace must still consist of s%acesE@ other ise s%ace oul! entirely cease to e?istB hich is im%ossible# But, the assertion on the other ban! that hen all com%osition in matter is annihilate! in thought, nothing remains, !oes not seem to harmoniCe ith the conce%tion of substance, hich must be %ro%erly the subject of all com%osition an! must remain, e"en after the conjunction of its attributes in s%aceB hich constitute! a bo!yBis annihilate! in thought# But this is not the case ith substance in the %henomenal orl!, hich is not a thing in itself cogitate! by the %ure category# Phenomenal substance is not an absolute subject@ it is merely a %ermanent sensuous image, an! nothing more than an intuition, in hich the uncon!itione! is not to be foun!# But, although this rule of %rogress to infinity is legitimate an! a%%licable to the sub!i"ision of a %henomenon, as a mere occu%ation or filling of s%ace, it is not

a%%licable to a hole consisting of a number of !istinct %arts an! constituting a quantum !iscretumBthat is to say, an organiCe! bo!y# It cannot be a!mitte! that e"ery %art in an organiCe! hole is itself organiCe!, an! that, in analysing it to infinity, e must al ays meet ith organiCe! %arts@ although e may allo that the %arts of the matter hich e !ecom%ose in infinitum, may be organiCe!# :or the infinity of the !i"ision of a %henomenon in s%ace rests altogether on the fact that the !i"isibility of a %henomenon is gi"en only in an! through this infinity, that is, an un!etermine! number of %arts is gi"en, hile the %arts themsel"es are gi"en an! !etermine! only in an! through the sub!i"ision@ in a or!, the infinity of the !i"ision necessarily %resu%%oses that the hole is not alrea!y !i"i!e! in se# ;ence our !i"ision !etermines a number of %arts in the holeBa number hich e?ten!s just as far as the actual regress in the !i"ision@ hile, on the other han!, the "ery notion of a bo!y organiCe! to infinity re%resents the hole as alrea!y an! in itself !i"i!e!# >e e?%ect, therefore, to fin! in it a !eterminate, but at the same time, infinite, number of %artsB hich is self& contra!ictory# :or e shoul! thus ha"e a hole containing a series of members hich coul! not be com%lete! in any regressB hich is infinite, an! at the same time com%lete in an organiCe! com%osite# Infinite !i"isibility is a%%licable only to a quantum continuum, an! is base! entirely on the infinite !i"isibility of s%ace, But in a quantum !iscretum the multitu!e of %arts or units is al ays !etermine!, an! hence al ays equal to some number# To hat e?tent a bo!y may be organiCe!, e?%erience alone can inform us@ an! although, so far as our e?%erience of this or that bo!y has e?ten!e!, e may not ha"e !isco"ere! any inorganic %art, such %arts must e?ist in %ossible e?%erience# But ho far the transcen!ental !i"ision of a %henomenon must e?ten!, e cannot kno from e?%erienceBit is a question hich e?%erience cannot ans er@ it is ans ere! only by the %rinci%le of reason hich forbi!s us to consi!er the em%irical regress, in the analysis of e?ten!e! bo!y, as e"er absolutely com%lete# Conclu!ing Remark on the 7olution of the Transcen!ental Aathematical I!easBan! Intro!uctory to the 7olution of the *ynamical I!eas# >e %resente! the antinomy of %ure reason in a tabular form, an! e en!ea"oure! to sho the groun! of this self&contra!iction on the %art of reason, an! the only means of bringing it to a conclusionBnamely, by !eclaring both contra!ictory statements to be false# >e re%resente! in these antinomies the con!itions of %henomena as belonging to the con!itione! accor!ing to relations of s%ace an! timeB hich is the usual su%%osition of the common un!erstan!ing# In this res%ect, all !ialectical re%resentations of totality, in the series of con!itions to a gi"en con!itione!, ere %erfectly homogeneous# The con!ition as al ays a member of the series along ith the con!itione!, an! thus the homogeneity of the hole series as assure!# In this case the regress coul! ne"er be cogitate! as com%lete@ or, if this as the case, a member really con!itione! as falsely regar!e! as a %rimal member, consequently as uncon!itione!# In such an antinomy, therefore, e !i! not consi!er the object, that is, the con!itione!, but the series of con!itions belonging to the object, an! the magnitu!e of that series# )n! thus arose the !ifficultyBa !ifficulty not to be settle! by any !ecision regar!ing the claims of the t o %arties, but sim%ly by cutting the knotBby !eclaring the series %ro%ose! by reason to be either too long or too short for the un!erstan!ing, hich coul! in neither case make its conce%tions a!equate ith the i!eas#

But e ha"e o"erlooke!, u% to this %oint, an essential !ifference e?isting bet een the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing hich reason en!ea"ours to raise to the rank of i!eas Bt o of these in!icating a mathematical, an! t o a !ynamical synthesis of %henomena# ;itherto, it as necessary to signaliCe this !istinction@ for, just as in our general re%resentation of all transcen!ental i!eas, e consi!ere! them un!er %henomenal con!itions, so, in the t o mathematical i!eas, our !iscussion is concerne! solely ith an object in the orl! of %henomena# But as e are no about to %rocee! to the consi!eration of the !ynamical conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, an! their a!equateness ith i!eas, e must not lose sight of this !istinction# >e shall fin! that it o%ens u% to us an entirely ne "ie of the conflict in hich reason is in"ol"e!# :or, hile in the first t o antinomies, both %arties ere !ismisse!, on the groun! of ha"ing a!"ance! statements base! u%on false hy%othesis@ in the %resent case the ho%e a%%ears of !isco"ering a hy%othesis hich may be consistent ith the !eman!s of reason, an!, the ju!ge com%leting the statement of the groun!s of claim, hich both %arties ha! left in an unsatisfactory state, the question may be settle! on its o n merits, not by !ismissing the claimants, but by a com%arison of the arguments on both si!es# If e consi!er merely their e?tension, an! hether they are a!equate ith i!eas, the series of con!itions may be regar!e! as all homogeneous# But the conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing hich lies at the basis of these i!eas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous D%resu%%ose! in e"ery quantityBin its com%osition as ell as in its !i"isionE or of the heterogeneous, hich is the case in the !ynamical synthesis of cause an! effect, as ell as of the necessary an! the contingent# Thus it ha%%ens that in the mathematical series of %henomena no other than a sensuous con!ition is a!missibleBa con!ition hich is itself a member of the series@ hile the !ynamical series of sensuous con!itions a!mits a heterogeneous con!ition, hich is not a member of the series, but, as %urely intelligible, lies out of an! beyon! it# )n! thus reason is satisfie!, an! an uncon!itione! %lace! at the hea! of the series of %henomena, ithout intro!ucing confusion into or !iscontinuing it, contrary to the %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing# <o , from the fact that the !ynamical i!eas a!mit a con!ition of %henomena hich !oes not form a %art of the series of %henomena, arises a result hich e shoul! not ha"e e?%ecte! from an antinomy# In former cases, the result as that both contra!ictory !ialectical statements ere !eclare! to be false# In the %resent case, e fin! the con!itione! in the !ynamical series connecte! ith an em%irically uncon!itione!, but non&sensuous con!ition@ an! thus satisfaction is !one to the un!erstan!ing on the one han! an! to the reason on the other#8 >hile, moreo"er, the !ialectical arguments for uncon!itione! totality in mere %henomena fall to the groun!, both %ro%ositions of reason may be sho n to be true in their %ro%er signification# This coul! not ha%%en in the case of the cosmological i!eas hich !eman!e! a mathematically uncon!itione! unity@ for no con!ition coul! be %lace! at the hea! of the series of %henomena, e?ce%t one hich as itself a %henomenon an! consequently a member of the series# /8:ootnote( :or the un!erstan!ing cannot a!mit among %henomena a con!ition hich is itself em%irically uncon!itione!# But if it is %ossible to cogitate an intelligible con!itionBone hich is not a

member of the series of %henomenaBfor a con!itione! %henomenon, ithout breaking the series of em%irical con!itions, such a con!ition may be a!missible as em%irically uncon!itione!, an! the em%irical regress continue regular, unceasing, an! intact#3 III# 7olution of the Cosmological I!ea of the Totality of the *e!uction of Cosmical E"ents from their Causes# There are only t o mo!es of causality cogitableBthe causality of nature or of free!om# The first is the conjunction of a %articular state ith another %rece!ing it in the orl! of sense, the former follo ing the latter by "irtue of a la # <o , as the causality of %henomena is subject to con!itions of time, an! the %rece!ing state, if it ha! al ays e?iste!, coul! not ha"e %ro!uce! an effect hich oul! make its first a%%earance at a %articular time, the causality of a cause must itself be an effectBmust itself ha"e begun to be, an! therefore, accor!ing to the %rinci%le of the un!erstan!ing, itself requires a cause# >e must un!erstan!, on the contrary, by the term free!om, in the cosmological sense, a faculty of the s%ontaneous origination of a state@ the causality of hich, therefore, is not subor!inate! to another cause !etermining it in time# :ree!om is in this sense a %ure transcen!ental i!ea, hich, in the first %lace, contains no em%irical element@ the object of hich, in the secon! %lace, cannot be gi"en or !etermine! in any e?%erience, because it is a uni"ersal la of the "ery %ossibility of e?%erience, that e"erything hich ha%%ens must ha"e a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself something that has ha%%ene!, must also ha"e a cause# In this "ie of the case, the hole fiel! of e?%erience, ho far soe"er it may e?ten!, contains nothing that is not subject to the la s of nature# But, as e cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of con!itions in reference to the series of causes an! effects, reason creates the i!ea of a s%ontaneity, hich can begin to act of itself, an! ithout any e?ternal cause !etermining it to action, accor!ing to the natural la of causality# It is es%ecially remarkable that the %ractical conce%tion of free!om is base! u%on the transcen!ental i!ea, an! that the question of the %ossibility of the former is !ifficult only as it in"ol"es the consi!eration of the truth of the latter# :ree!om, in the %ractical sense, is the in!e%en!ence of the ill of coercion by sensuous im%ulses# ) ill is sensuous, in so far as it is %athologically affecte! Dby sensuous im%ulsesE@ it is terme! animal Darbitrium brutumE, hen it is %athologically necessitate!# The human ill is certainly an arbitrium sensiti"um, not brutum, but liberum@ because sensuousness !oes not necessitate its action, a faculty e?isting in man of self&!etermination, in!e%en!ently of all sensuous coercion# It is %lain that, if all causality in the orl! of sense ere naturalBan! natural onlyB e"ery e"ent oul! be !etermine! by another accor!ing to necessary la s, an! that, consequently, %henomena, in so far as they !etermine the ill, must necessitate e"ery action as a natural effect from themsel"es@ an! thus all %ractical free!om oul! fall to the groun! ith the transcen!ental i!ea# :or the latter %resu%%oses that although a certain thing has not ha%%ene!, it ought to ha"e ha%%ene!, an! that, consequently, its

%henomenal cause as not so %o erful an! !eterminati"e as to e?clu!e the causality of our illBa causality ca%able of %ro!ucing effects in!e%en!ently of an! e"en in o%%osition to the %o er of natural causes, an! ca%able, consequently, of s%ontaneously originating a series of e"ents# ;ere, too, e fin! it to be the case, as e generally foun! in the self&contra!ictions an! %er%le?ities of a reason hich stri"es to %ass the boun!s of %ossible e?%erience, that the %roblem is %ro%erly not %hysiological, but transcen!ental# The question of the %ossibility of free!om !oes in!ee! concern %sychology@ but, as it rests u%on !ialectical arguments of %ure reason, its solution must engage the attention of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy# Before attem%ting this solution, a task hich transcen!ental %hiloso%hy cannot !ecline, it ill be a!"isable to make a remark ith regar! to its %roce!ure in the settlement of the question# If %henomena ere things in themsel"es, an! time an! s%ace forms of the e?istence of things, con!ition an! con!itione! oul! al ays be members of the same series@ an! thus oul! arise in the %resent case the antinomy common to all transcen!ental i!easB that their series is either too great or too small for the un!erstan!ing# The !ynamical i!eas, hich e are about to !iscuss in this an! the follo ing section, %ossess the %eculiarity of relating to an object, not consi!ere! as a quantity, but as an e?istence@ an! thus, in the !iscussion of the %resent question, e may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of con!itions, an! consi!er merely the !ynamical relation of the con!ition to the con!itione!# The question, then, suggests itself, hether free!om is %ossible@ an!, if it is, hether it can consist ith the uni"ersality of the natural la of causality@ an!, consequently, hether e enounce a %ro%er !isjuncti"e %ro%osition hen e say( GE"ery effect must ha"e its origin either in nature or in free!om,G or hether both cannot e?ist together in the same e"ent in !ifferent relations# The %rinci%le of an unbroken connection bet een all e"ents in the %henomenal orl!, in accor!ance ith the unchangeable la s of nature, is a ell&establishe! %rinci%le of transcen!ental analytic hich a!mits of no e?ce%tion# The question, therefore, is( G>hether an effect, !etermine! accor!ing to the la s of nature, can at the same time be %ro!uce! by a free agent, or hether free!om an! nature mutually e?clu!e each otherHG )n! here, the common but fallacious hy%othesis of the absolute reality of %henomena manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the %roce!ure of reason# :or if %henomena are things in themsel"es, free!om is im%ossible# In this case, nature is the com%lete an! all& sufficient cause of e"ery e"ent@ an! con!ition an! con!itione!, cause an! effect are containe! in the same series, an! necessitate! by the same la # If, on the contrary, %henomena are hel! to be, as they are in fact, nothing more than mere re%resentations, connecte! ith each other in accor!ance ith em%irical la s, they must ha"e a groun! hich is not %henomenal# But the causality of such an intelligible cause is not !etermine! or !eterminable by %henomena@ although its effects, as %henomena, must be !etermine! by other %henomenal e?istences# This cause an! its causality e?ist therefore out of an! a%art from the series of %henomena@ hile its effects !o e?ist an! are !isco"erable in the series of em%irical con!itions# 7uch an effect may therefore be consi!ere! to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, an! necessary in relation to the %henomena from hich it is a necessary consequenceBa !istinction hich, state! in this %erfectly general an! abstract manner, must a%%ear in the highest !egree subtle an!

obscure# The sequel ill e?%lain# It is sufficient, at %resent, to remark that, as the com%lete an! unbroken connection of %henomena is an unalterable la of nature, free!om is im%ossibleBon the su%%osition that %henomena are absolutely real# ;ence those %hiloso%hers ho a!here to the common o%inion on this subject can ne"er succee! in reconciling the i!eas of nature an! free!om# Possibility of :ree!om in ;armony ith the 4ni"ersal 'a of <atural <ecessity# That element in a sensuous object hich is not itself sensuous, I may be allo e! to term intelligible# If, accor!ingly, an object hich must be regar!e! as a sensuous %henomenon %ossesses a faculty hich is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of hich it is ca%able of being the cause of %henomena, the causality of an object or e?istence of this kin! may be regar!e! from t o !ifferent %oints of "ie # It may be consi!ere! to be intelligible, as regar!s its actionBthe action of a thing hich is a thing in itself, an! sensuous, as regar!s its effectsBthe effects of a %henomenon belonging to the sensuous orl!# >e shoul! accor!ingly, ha"e to form both an em%irical an! an intellectual conce%tion of the causality of such a faculty or %o erBboth, ho e"er, ha"ing reference to the same effect# This t ofol! manner of cogitating a %o er resi!ing in a sensuous object !oes not run counter to any of the conce%tions hich e ought to form of the orl! of %henomena or of a %ossible e?%erience# PhenomenaBnot being things in themsel"esBmust ha"e a transcen!ental object as a foun!ation, hich !etermines them as mere re%resentations@ an! there seems to be no reason hy e shoul! not ascribe to this transcen!ental object, in a!!ition to the %ro%erty of self& %henomeniCation, a causality hose effects are to be met ith in the orl! of %henomena, although it is not itself a %henomenon# But e"ery effecti"e cause must %ossess a character, that is to say, a la of its causality, ithout hich it oul! cease to be a cause# In the abo"e case, then, e"ery sensuous object oul! %ossess an em%irical character, hich guarantee! that its actions, as %henomena, stan! in com%lete an! harmonious connection, conformably to un"arying natural la s, ith all other %henomena, an! can be !e!uce! from these, as con!itions, an! that they !o thus, in connection ith these, constitute a series in the or!er of nature# This sensuous object must, in the secon! %lace, %ossess an intelligible character, hich guarantees it to be the cause of those actions, as %henomena, although it is not itself a %henomenon nor subor!inate to the con!itions of the orl! of sense# The former may be terme! the character of the thing as a %henomenon, the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself# <o this acti"e subject oul!, in its character of intelligible subject, be subor!inate to no con!itions of time, for time is only a con!ition of %henomena, an! not of things in themsel"es# <o action oul! begin or cease to be in this subject@ it oul! consequently be free from the la of all !etermination of timeBthe la of change, namely, that e"erything hich ha%%ens must ha"e a cause in the %henomena of a %rece!ing state# In one or!, the causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, oul! not form %art of the series of em%irical con!itions hich !etermine an! necessitate an e"ent in the orl! of sense# )gain, this intelligible character of a thing cannot be imme!iately cogniCe!, because e can %ercei"e nothing but %henomena, but it must be ca%able of being cogitate! in harmony ith the em%irical character@ for e al ays fin! oursel"es

com%elle! to %lace, in thought, a transcen!ental object at the basis of %henomena although e can ne"er kno hat this object is in itself# In "irtue of its em%irical character, this subject oul! at the same time be subor!inate to all the em%irical la s of causality, an!, as a %henomenon an! member of the sensuous orl!, its effects oul! ha"e to be accounte! for by a reference to %rece!ing %henomena# Eternal %henomena must be ca%able of influencing it@ an! its actions, in accor!ance ith natural la s, must e?%lain to us ho its em%irical character, that is, the la of its causality, is to be cogniCe! in an! by means of e?%erience# In a or!, all requisites for a com%lete an! necessary !etermination of these actions must be %resente! to us by e?%erience# In "irtue of its intelligible character, on the other han! Dalthough e %ossess only a general conce%tion of this characterE, the subject must be regar!e! as free from all sensuous influences, an! from all %henomenal !etermination# Aoreo"er, as nothing ha%%ens in this subjectBfor it is a noumenon, an! there !oes not consequently e?ist in it any change, !eman!ing the !ynamical !etermination of time, an! for the same reason no connection ith %henomena as causesBthis acti"e e?istence must in its actions be free from an! in!e%en!ent of natural necessity, for or necessity e?ists only in the orl! of %henomena# It oul! be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effects in the orl! of sense from itself, although the action %ro!ucti"e of these effects !oes not begin in itself# >e shoul! not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to e?ist of themsel"es, because they are al ays !etermine! by %rior em%irical con!itions Bby "irtue of the em%irical character, hich is the %henomenon of the intelligible characterBan! are %ossible only as constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes# )n! thus nature an! free!om, each in the com%lete an! absolute signification of these terms, can e?ist, ithout contra!iction or !isagreement, in the same action# E?%osition of the Cosmological I!ea of :ree!om in ;armony ith the 4ni"ersal 'a of <atural <ecessity# I ha"e thought it a!"isable to lay before the rea!er at first merely a sketch of the solution of this transcen!ental %roblem, in or!er to enable him to form ith greater ease a clear conce%tion of the course hich reason must a!o%t in the solution# I shall no %rocee! to e?hibit the se"eral momenta of this solution, an! to consi!er them in their or!er# The natural la that e"erything hich ha%%ens must ha"e a cause, that the causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause D hich cannot al ays ha"e e?iste!, but must be itself an e"ent, for it %rece!es in time some effect hich it has originate!E, must ha"e itself a %henomenal cause, by hich it is !etermine! an!, an!, consequently, all e"ents are em%irically !etermine! in an or!er of natureBthis la , I say, hich lies at the foun!ation of the %ossibility of e?%erience, an! of a connecte! system of %henomena or nature is a la of the un!erstan!ing, from hich no !e%arture, an! to hich no e?ce%tion, can be a!mitte!# :or to e?ce%t e"en a single %henomenon from its o%eration is to e?clu!e it from the s%here of %ossible e?%erience an! thus to a!mit it to be a mere fiction of thought or %hantom of the brain#

Thus e are oblige! to ackno le!ge the e?istence of a chain of causes, in hich, ho e"er, absolute totality cannot be foun!# But e nee! not !etain oursel"es ith this question, for it has alrea!y been sufficiently ans ere! in our !iscussion of the antinomies into hich reason falls, hen it attem%ts to reach the uncon!itione! in the series of %henomena# If e %ermit oursel"es to be !ecei"e! by the illusion of transcen!ental i!ealism, e shall fin! that neither nature nor free!om e?ists# <o the question is( G>hether, a!mitting the e?istence of natural necessity in the orl! of %henomena, it is %ossible to consi!er an effect as at the same time an effect of nature an! an effect of free!omBor, hether these t o mo!es of causality are contra!ictory an! incom%atibleHG <o %henomenal cause can absolutely an! of itself begin a series# E"ery action, in so far as it is %ro!ucti"e of an e"ent, is itself an e"ent or occurrence, an! %resu%%oses another %rece!ing state, in hich its cause e?iste!# Thus e"erything that ha%%ens is but a continuation of a series, an! an absolute beginning is im%ossible in the sensuous orl!# The actions of natural causes are, accor!ingly, themsel"es effects, an! %resu%%ose causes %rece!ing them in time# ) %rimal action hich forms an absolute beginning, is beyon! the causal %o er of %henomena# <o , is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are %henomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a %henomenon an! belong to the em%irical orl!H Is it not rather %ossible that, although e"ery effect in the %henomenal orl! must be connecte! ith an em%irical cause, accor!ing to the uni"ersal la of nature, this em%irical causality may be itself the effect of a non&em%irical an! intelligible causalityBits connection ith natural causes remaining ne"ertheless intactH 7uch a causality oul! be consi!ere!, in reference to %henomena, as the %rimal action of a cause, hich is in so far, therefore, not %henomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or %o er, intelligible@ although it must, at the same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regar!e! as belonging to the sensuous orl!# ) belief in the reci%rocal causality of %henomena is necessary, if e are require! to look for an! to %resent the natural con!itions of natural e"ents, that is to say, their causes# This being a!mitte! as une?ce%tionably "ali!, the requirements of the un!erstan!ing, hich recogniCes nothing but nature in the region of %henomena, are satisfie!, an! our %hysical e?%lanations of %hysical %henomena may %rocee! in their regular course, ithout hin!rance an! ithout o%%osition# But it is no stumbling&block in the ay, e"en assuming the i!ea to be a %ure fiction, to a!mit that there are some natural causes in the %ossession of a faculty hich is not em%irical, but intelligible, inasmuch as it is not !etermine! to action by em%irical con!itions, but %urely an! solely u%on groun!s brought for ar! by the un!erstan!ingBthis action being still, hen the cause is %henomeniCe!, in %erfect accor!ance ith the la s of em%irical causality# Thus the acting subject, as a causal %henomenon, oul! continue to %reser"e a com%lete connection ith nature an! natural con!itions@ an! the %henomenon only of the subject D ith all its %henomenal causalityE oul! contain certain con!itions, hich, if e ascen! from the em%irical to the transcen!ental object, must necessarily be regar!e! as intelligible# :or, if e atten!, in our inquiries ith regar! to causes in the orl! of %henomena, to the !irections of nature alone, e nee! not trouble oursel"es about the

relation in hich the transcen!ental subject, hich is com%letely unkno n to us, stan!s to these %henomena an! their connection in nature# The intelligible groun! of %henomena in this subject !oes not concern em%irical questions# It has to !o only ith %ure thought@ an!, although the effects of this thought an! action of the %ure un!erstan!ing are !isco"erable in %henomena, these %henomena must ne"ertheless be ca%able of a full an! com%lete e?%lanation, u%on %urely %hysical groun!s an! in accor!ance ith natural la s# )n! in this case e atten! solely to their em%irical an! omit all consi!eration of their intelligible character D hich is the transcen!ental cause of the formerE as com%letely unkno n, e?ce%t in so far as it is e?hibite! by the latter as its em%irical symbol# <o let us a%%ly this to e?%erience# Aan is a %henomenon of the sensuous orl! an!, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of hich must be regulate! by em%irical la s# )s such, he must %ossess an em%irical character, like all other natural %henomena# >e remark this em%irical character in his actions, hich re"eal the %resence of certain %o ers an! faculties# If e consi!er inanimate or merely animal nature, e can !isco"er no reason for ascribing to oursel"es any other than a faculty hich is !etermine! in a %urely sensuous manner# But man, to hom nature re"eals herself only through sense, cogniCes himself not only by his senses, but also through %ure a%%erce%tion@ an! this in actions an! internal !eterminations, hich he cannot regar! as sensuous im%ressions# ;e is thus to himself, on the one han!, a %henomenon, but on the other han!, in res%ect of certain faculties, a %urely intelligible objectBintelligible, because its action cannot be ascribe! to sensuous rece%ti"ity# These faculties are un!erstan!ing an! reason# The latter, es%ecially, is in a %eculiar manner !istinct from all em%irically&con!itione! faculties, for it em%loys i!eas alone in the consi!eration of its objects, an! by means of these !etermines the un!erstan!ing, hich then %rocee!s to make an em%irical use of its o n conce%tions, hich, like the i!eas of reason, are %ure an! non&em%irical# That reason %ossesses the faculty of causality, or that at least e are com%elle! so to re%resent it, is e"i!ent from the im%erati"es, hich in the s%here of the %ractical e im%ose on many of our e?ecuti"e %o ers# The or!s I ought e?%ress a s%ecies of necessity, an! im%ly a connection ith groun!s hich nature !oes not an! cannot %resent to the min! of man# 4n!erstan!ing kno s nothing in nature but that hich is, or has been, or ill be# It oul! be absur! to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in hich it stan!s@ in!ee!, the ought, hen e consi!er merely the course of nature, has neither a%%lication nor meaning# The question, G>hat ought to ha%%en in the s%here of natureHG is just as absur! as the question, G>hat ought to be the %ro%erties of a circleHG )ll that e are entitle! to ask is, G>hat takes %lace in natureHG or, in the latter case, G>hat are the %ro%erties of a circleHG But the i!ea of an ought or of !uty in!icates a %ossible action, the groun! of hich is a %ure conce%tion@ hile the groun! of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, al ays a %henomenon# This action must certainly be %ossible un!er %hysical con!itions, if it is %rescribe! by the moral im%erati"e ought@ but these %hysical or natural con!itions !o not concern the !etermination of the ill itself, they relate to its effects alone, an! the consequences of the effect in the orl! of %henomena# >hate"er number of moti"es nature may %resent to my ill, hate"er sensuous im%ulsesBthe moral ought it is beyon! their %o er to %ro!uce# They may %ro!uce a "olition, hich, so far from being

necessary, is al ays con!itione!Ba "olition to hich the ought enunciate! by reason, sets an aim an! a stan!ar!, gi"es %ermission or %rohibition# Be the object hat it may, %urely sensuousBas %leasure, or %resente! by %ure reasonBas goo!, reason ill not yiel! to groun!s hich ha"e an em%irical origin# Reason ill not follo the or!er of things %resente! by e?%erience, but, ith %erfect s%ontaneity, rearranges them accor!ing to i!eas, ith hich it com%els em%irical con!itions to agree# It !eclares, in the name of these i!eas, certain actions to be necessary hich ne"ertheless ha"e not taken %lace an! hich %erha%s ne"er ill take %lace@ an! yet %resu%%oses that it %ossesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions# :or, in the absence of this su%%osition, it coul! not e?%ect its i!eas to %ro!uce certain effects in the orl! of e?%erience# <o , let us sto% here an! a!mit it to be at least %ossible that reason !oes stan! in a really causal relation to %henomena# In this case it mustB%ure reason as it isBe?hibit an em%irical character# :or e"ery cause su%%oses a rule, accor!ing to hich certain %henomena follo as effects from the cause, an! e"ery rule requires uniformity in these effects@ an! this is the %ro%er groun! of the conce%tion of a causeBas a faculty or %o er# <o this conce%tion Dof a causeE may be terme! the em%irical character of reason@ an! this character is a %ermanent one, hile the effects %ro!uce! a%%ear, in conformity ith the "arious con!itions hich accom%any an! %artly limit them, in "arious forms# Thus the "olition of e"ery man has an em%irical character, hich is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in so far as its effects in the %henomenal orl! manifest the %resence of a rule, accor!ing to hich e are enable! to e?amine, in their se"eral kin!s an! !egrees, the actions of this causality an! the rational groun!s for these actions, an! in this ay to !eci!e u%on the subjecti"e %rinci%les of the "olition# <o e learn hat this em%irical character is only from %henomenal effects, an! from the rule of these hich is %resente! by e?%erience@ an! for this reason all the actions of man in the orl! of %henomena are !etermine! by his em%irical character, an! the co&o%erati"e causes of nature# If, then, e coul! in"estigate all the %henomena of human "olition to their lo est foun!ation in the min!, there oul! be no action hich e coul! not antici%ate ith certainty, an! recogniCe to be absolutely necessary from its %rece!ing con!itions# 7o far as relates to this em%irical character, therefore, there can be no free!om@ an! it is only in the light of this character that e can consi!er the human ill, hen e confine oursel"es to sim%le obser"ation an!, as is the case in anthro%ology, institute a %hysiological in"estigation of the moti"e causes of human actions# But hen e consi!er the same actions in relation to reasonBnot for the %ur%ose of e?%laining their origin, that is, in relation to s%eculati"e reason, but to %ractical reason, as the %ro!ucing cause of these actionsB e shall !isco"er a rule an! an or!er "ery !ifferent from those of nature an! e?%erience# :or the !eclaration of this mental faculty may be that hat has an! coul! not but take %lace in the course of nature, ought not to ha"e taken %lace# 7ometimes, too, e !isco"er, or belie"e that e !isco"er, that the i!eas of reason !i! actually stan! in a causal relation to certain actions of man@ an! that these actions ha"e taken %lace because they ere !etermine!, not by em%irical causes, but by the act of the ill u%on groun!s of reason#

<o , granting that reason stan!s in a causal relation to %henomena@ can an action of reason be calle! free, hen e kno that, sensuously, in its em%irical character, it is com%letely !etermine! an! absolutely necessaryH But this em%irical character is itself !etermine! by the intelligible character# The latter e cannot cogniCe@ e can only in!icate it by means of %henomena, hich enable us to ha"e an imme!iate cognition only of the em%irical character#8 )n action, then, in so far as it is to be ascribe! to an intelligible cause, !oes not result from it in accor!ance ith em%irical la s# That is to say, not the con!itions of %ure reason, but only their effects in the internal sense, %rece!e the act# Pure reason, as a %urely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the con!itions of time# The causality of reason in its intelligible character !oes not begin to be@ it !oes not make its a%%earance at a certain time, for the %ur%ose of %ro!ucing an effect# If this ere not the case, the causality of reason oul! be subser"ient to the natural la of %henomena, hich !etermines them accor!ing to time, an! as a series of causes an! effects in time@ it oul! consequently cease to be free!om an! become a %art of nature# >e are therefore justifie! in saying( GIf reason stan!s in a causal relation to %henomena, it is a faculty hich originates the sensuous con!ition of an em%irical series of effects#G :or the con!ition, hich resi!es in the reason, is non&sensuous, an! therefore cannot be originate!, or begin to be# )n! thus e fin!B hat e coul! not !isco"er in any em%irical seriesBa con!ition of a successi"e series of e"ents itself em%irically uncon!itione!# :or, in the %resent case, the con!ition stan!s out of an! beyon! the series of %henomenaBit is intelligible, an! it consequently cannot be subjecte! to any sensuous con!ition, or to any time&!etermination by a %rece!ing cause# /8:ootnote( The real morality of actionsBtheir merit or !emerit, an! e"en that of our o n con!uct, is com%letely unkno n to us# 9ur estimates can relate only to their em%irical character# ;o much is the result of the action of free ill, ho much is to be ascribe! to nature an! to blameless error, or to a ha%%y constitution of tem%erament Dmerito fortunaeE, no one can !isco"er, nor, for this reason, !etermine ith %erfect justice#3 But, in another res%ect, the same cause belongs also to the series of %henomena# Aan is himself a %henomenon# ;is ill has an em%irical character, hich is the em%irical cause of all his actions# There is no con!itionB!etermining man an! his "olition in conformity ith this characterB hich !oes not itself form %art of the series of effects in nature, an! is subject to their la Bthe la accor!ing to hich an em%irically un!etermine! cause of an e"ent in time cannot e?ist# :or this reason no gi"en action can ha"e an absolute an! s%ontaneous origination, all actions being %henomena, an! belonging to the orl! of e?%erience# But it cannot be sai! of reason, that the state in hich it !etermines the ill is al ays %rece!e! by some other state !etermining it# :or reason is not a %henomenon, an! therefore not subject to sensuous con!itions@ an!, consequently, e"en in relation to its causality, the sequence or con!itions of time !o not influence reason, nor can the !ynamical la of nature, hich !etermines the sequence of time accor!ing to certain rules, be a%%lie! to it# Reason is consequently the %ermanent con!ition of all actions of the human ill# Each of these is !etermine! in the em%irical character of the man, e"en before it has taken

%lace# The intelligible character, of hich the former is but the sensuous schema, kno s no before or after@ an! e"ery action, irres%ecti"e of the time&relation in hich it stan!s ith other %henomena, is the imme!iate effect of the intelligible character of %ure reason, hich, consequently, enjoys free!om of action, an! is not !ynamically !etermine! either by internal or e?ternal %rece!ing con!itions# This free!om must not be !escribe!, in a merely negati"e manner, as in!e%en!ence of em%irical con!itions, for in this case the faculty of reason oul! cease to be a cause of %henomena@ but it must be regar!e!, %ositi"ely, as a faculty hich can s%ontaneously originate a series of e"ents# )t the same time, it must not be su%%ose! that any beginning can take %lace in reason@ on the contrary, reason, as the uncon!itione! con!ition of all action of the ill, a!mits of no time&con!itions, although its effect !oes really begin in a series of %henomenaBa beginning hich is not, ho e"er, absolutely %rimal# I shall illustrate this regulati"e %rinci%le of reason by an e?am%le, from its em%loyment in the orl! of e?%erience@ %ro"e! it cannot be by any amount of e?%erience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcen!ental %ro%ositions# 'et us take a "oluntary actionBfor e?am%le, a falsehoo!Bby means of hich a man has intro!uce! a certain !egree of confusion into the social life of humanity, hich is ju!ge! accor!ing to the moti"es from hich it originate!, an! the blame of hich an! of the e"il consequences arising from it, is im%ute! to the offen!er# >e at first %rocee! to e?amine the em%irical character of the offence, an! for this %ur%ose e en!ea"our to %enetrate to the sources of that character, such as a !efecti"e e!ucation, ba! com%any, a shameless an! icke! !is%osition, fri"olity, an! ant of reflectionBnot forgetting also the occasioning causes hich %re"aile! at the moment of the transgression# In this the %roce!ure is e?actly the same as that %ursue! in the in"estigation of the series of causes hich !etermine a gi"en %hysical effect# <o , although e belie"e the action to ha"e been !etermine! by all these circumstances, e !o not the less blame the offen!er# >e !o not blame him for his unha%%y !is%osition, nor for the circumstances hich influence! him, nay, not e"en for his former course of life@ for e %resu%%ose that all these consi!erations may be set asi!e, that the series of %rece!ing con!itions may be regar!e! as ha"ing ne"er e?iste!, an! that the action may be consi!ere! as com%letely uncon!itione! in relation to any state %rece!ing, just as if the agent commence! ith it an entirely ne series of effects# 9ur blame of the offen!er is groun!e! u%on a la of reason, hich requires us to regar! this faculty as a cause, hich coul! ha"e an! ought to ha"e other ise !etermine! the beha"iour of the cul%rit, in!e%en!ently of all em%irical con!itions# This causality of reason e !o not regar! as a co&o%erating agency, but as com%lete in itself# It matters not hether the sensuous im%ulses fa"oure! or o%%ose! the action of this causality, the offence is estimate! accor!ing to its intelligible characterBthe offen!er is !eci!e!ly orthy of blame, the moment he utters a falsehoo!# It follo s that e regar! reason, in s%ite of the em%irical con!itions of the act, as com%letely free, an! therefore, therefore, as in the %resent case, cul%able# The abo"e ju!gement is com%lete e"i!ence that e are accustome! to think that reason is not affecte! by sensuous con!itions, that in it no change takes %laceBalthough its %henomena, in other or!s, the mo!e in hich it a%%ears in its effects, are subject to changeBthat in it no %rece!ing state !etermines the follo ing, an!, consequently, that it

!oes not form a member of the series of sensuous con!itions hich necessitate %henomena accor!ing to natural la s# Reason is %resent an! the same in all human actions an! at all times@ but it !oes not itself e?ist in time, an! therefore !oes not enter u%on any state in hich it !i! not formerly e?ist# It is, relati"ely to ne states or con!itions, !etermining, but not !eterminable# ;ence e cannot ask( G>hy !i! not reason !etermine itself in a !ifferent mannerHG The question ought to be thus state!( G>hy !i! not reason em%loy its %o er of causality to !etermine certain %henomena in a !ifferent mannerHG But this is a question hich a!mits of no ans er# :or a !ifferent intelligible character oul! ha"e e?hibite! a !ifferent em%irical character@ an!, hen e say that, in s%ite of the course hich his hole former life has taken, the offen!er coul! ha"e refraine! from uttering the falsehoo!, this means merely that the act as subject to the %o er an! authorityB%ermissi"e or %rohibiti"eBof reason# <o , reason is not subject in its causality to any con!itions of %henomena or of time@ an! a !ifference in time may %ro!uce a !ifference in the relation of %henomena to each otherBfor these are not things an! therefore not causes in themsel"esBbut it cannot %ro!uce any !ifference in the relation in hich the action stan!s to the faculty of reason# Thus, then, in our in"estigation into free actions an! the causal %o er hich %ro!uce! them, e arri"e at an intelligible cause, beyon! hich, ho e"er, e cannot go@ although e can recogniCe that it is free, that is, in!e%en!ent of all sensuous con!itions, an! that, in this ay, it may be the sensuously uncon!itione! con!ition of %henomena# But for hat reason the intelligible character generates such an! such %henomena an! e?hibits such an! such an em%irical character un!er certain circumstances, it is beyon! the %o er of our reason to !eci!e# The question is as much abo"e the %o er an! the s%here of reason as the follo ing oul! be( G>hy !oes the transcen!ental object of our e?ternal sensuous intuition allo of no other form than that of intuition in s%aceHG But the %roblem, hich e ere calle! u%on to sol"e, !oes not require us to entertain any such questions# The %roblem as merely thisB hether free!om an! natural necessity can e?ist ithout o%%osition in the same action# To this question e ha"e gi"en a sufficient ans er@ for e ha"e sho n that, as the former stan!s in a relation to a !ifferent kin! of con!ition from those of the latter, the la of the one !oes not affect the la of the other an! that, consequently, both can e?ist together in in!e%en!ence of an! ithout interference ith each other# The rea!er must be careful to remark that my intention in the abo"e remarks has not been to %ro"e the actual e?istence of free!om, as a faculty in hich resi!es the cause of certain sensuous %henomena# :or, not to mention that such an argument oul! not ha"e a transcen!ental character, nor ha"e been limite! to the !iscussion of %ure conce%tionsBall attem%ts at inferring from e?%erience hat cannot be cogitate! in accor!ance ith its la s, must e"er be unsuccessful# <ay, more, I ha"e not e"en aime! at !emonstrating the %ossibility of free!om@ for this too oul! ha"e been a "ain en!ea"our, inasmuch as it is beyon! the %o er of the min! to cogniCe the %ossibility of a reality or of a causal %o er by the ai! of mere a %riori conce%tions# :ree!om has been consi!ere! in the foregoing remarks only as a transcen!ental i!ea, by means of hich reason aims at originating a series of con!itions in the orl! of %henomena ith the hel% of that hich is sensuously uncon!itione!, in"ol"ing itself, ho e"er, in an antinomy ith the la s hich itself %rescribes for the con!uct of the un!erstan!ing#

That this antinomy is base! u%on a mere illusion, an! that nature an! free!om are at least not o%%ose!Bthis as the only thing in our %o er to %ro"e, an! the question hich it as our task to sol"e# IK# 7olution of the Cosmological I!ea of the Totality of the *e%en!ence of Phenomenal E?istences# In the %rece!ing remarks, e consi!ere! the changes in the orl! of sense as constituting a !ynamical series, in hich each member is subor!inate! to anotherBas its cause# 9ur %resent %ur%ose is to a"ail oursel"es of this series of states or con!itions as a gui!e to an e?istence hich may be the highest con!ition of all changeable %henomena, that is, to a necessary being# 9ur en!ea"our to reach, not the uncon!itione! causality, but the uncon!itione! e?istence, of substance# The series before us is therefore a series of conce%tions, an! not of intuitions Din hich the one intuition is the con!ition of the otherE# But it is e"i!ent that, as all %henomena are subject to change an! con!itione! in their e?istence, the series of !e%en!ent e?istences cannot embrace an uncon!itione! member, the e?istence of hich oul! be absolutely necessary# It follo s that, if %henomena ere things in themsel"es, an!Bas an imme!iate consequence from this su%%ositionBcon!ition an! con!itione! belonge! to the same series of %henomena, the e?istence of a necessary being, as the con!ition of the e?istence of sensuous %henomena, oul! be %erfectly im%ossible# )n im%ortant !istinction, ho e"er, e?ists bet een the !ynamical an! the mathematical regress# The latter is engage! solely ith the combination of %arts into a hole, or ith the !i"ision of a hole into its %arts@ an! therefore are the con!itions of its series %arts of the series, an! to be consequently regar!e! as homogeneous, an! for this reason, as consisting, ithout e?ce%tion, of %henomena# If the former regress, on the contrary, the aim of hich is not to establish the %ossibility of an uncon!itione! hole consisting of gi"en %arts, or of an uncon!itione! %art of a gi"en hole, but to !emonstrate the %ossibility of the !e!uction of a certain state from its cause, or of the contingent e?istence of substance from that hich e?ists necessarily, it is not requisite that the con!ition shoul! form %art of an em%irical series along ith the con!itione!# In the case of the a%%arent antinomy ith hich e are at %resent !ealing, there e?ists a ay of esca%e from the !ifficulty@ for it is not im%ossible that both of the contra!ictory statements may be true in !ifferent relations# )ll sensuous %henomena may be contingent, an! consequently %ossess only an em%irically con!itione! e?istence, an! yet there may also e?ist a non&em%irical con!ition of the hole series, or, in other or!s, a necessary being# :or this necessary being, as an intelligible con!ition, oul! not form a memberBnot e"en the highest memberBof the series@ the hole orl! of sense oul! be left in its em%irically !etermine! e?istence uninterfere! ith an! uninfluence!# This oul! also form a groun! of !istinction bet een the mo!es of solution em%loye! for the thir! an! fourth antinomies# :or, hile in the consi!eration of free!om in the former antinomy, the thing itselfBthe cause Dsubstantia %haenomenonEB as regar!e! as belonging to the series of con!itions, an! only its causality to the intelligible orl!B e

are oblige! in the %resent case to cogitate this necessary being as %urely intelligible an! as e?isting entirely a%art from the orl! of sense Das an ens e?tramun!anumE@ for other ise it oul! be subject to the %henomenal la of contingency an! !e%en!ence# In relation to the %resent %roblem, therefore, the regulati"e %rinci%le of reason is that e"erything in the sensuous orl! %ossesses an em%irically con!itione! e?istenceBthat no %ro%erty of the sensuous orl! %ossesses uncon!itione! necessityBthat e are boun! to e?%ect, an!, so far as is %ossible, to seek for the em%irical con!ition of e"ery member in the series of con!itionsBan! that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in !e!ucing any e?istence from a con!ition hich lies out of an! beyon! the em%irical series, or in regar!ing any e?istence as in!e%en!ent an! self&subsistent@ although this shoul! not %re"ent us from recogniCing the %ossibility of the hole series being base! u%on a being hich is intelligible, an! for this reason free from all em%irical con!itions# But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to %ro"e the e?istence of this uncon!itione! an! necessary being, or e"en to e"i!ence the %ossibility of a %urely intelligible con!ition of the e?istence or all sensuous %henomena# )s boun!s ere set to reason, to %re"ent it from lea"ing the gui!ing threa! of em%irical con!itions an! losing itself in transcen!ent theories hich are inca%able of concrete %resentation@ so it as my %ur%ose, on the other ban!, to set boun!s to the la of the %urely em%irical un!erstan!ing, an! to %rotest against any attem%ts on its %art at !eci!ing on the %ossibility of things, or !eclaring the e?istence of the intelligible to be im%ossible, merely on the groun! that it is not a"ailable for the e?%lanation an! e?%osition of %henomena# It has been sho n, at the same time, that the contingency of all the %henomena of nature an! their em%irical con!itions is quite consistent ith the arbitrary hy%othesis of a necessary, although %urely intelligible con!ition, that no real contra!iction e?ists bet een them an! that, consequently, both may be true# The e?istence of such an absolutely necessary being may be im%ossible@ but this can ne"er be !emonstrate! from the uni"ersal contingency an! !e%en!ence of sensuous %henomena, nor from the %rinci%le hich forbi!s us to !iscontinue the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some s%here of e?istence beyon! the orl! of nature# Reason goes its ay in the em%irical orl!, an! follo s, too, its %eculiar %ath in the s%here of the transcen!ental# The sensuous orl! contains nothing but %henomena, hich are mere re%resentations, an! al ays sensuously con!itione!@ things in themsel"es are not, an! cannot be, objects to us# It is not to be on!ere! at, therefore, that e are not justifie! in lea%ing from some member of an em%irical series beyon! the orl! of sense, as if em%irical re%resentations ere things in themsel"es, e?isting a%art from their transcen!ental groun! in the human min!, an! the cause of hose e?istence may be sought out of the em%irical series# This oul! certainly be the case ith contingent things@ but it cannot be ith mere re%resentations of things, the contingency of hich is itself merely a %henomenon an! can relate to no other regress than that hich !etermines %henomena, that is, the em%irical# But to cogitate an intelligible groun! of %henomena, as free, moreo"er, from the contingency of the latter, conflicts neither ith the unlimite! nature of the em%irical regress, nor ith the com%lete contingency of %henomena# )n! the !emonstration of this as the only thing necessary for the solution of this a%%arent

antinomy# :or if the con!ition of e"ery con!itione!Bas regar!s its e?istenceBis sensuous, an! for this reason a %art of the same series, it must be itself con!itione!, as as sho n in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy# The embarrassments into hich a reason, hich %ostulates the uncon!itione!, necessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to e?ist@ or the uncon!itione! must be %lace! in the s%here of the intelligible# In this ay, its necessity !oes not require, nor !oes it e"en %ermit, the %resence of an em%irical con!ition( an! it is, consequently, uncon!itionally necessary# The em%irical em%loyment of reason is not affecte! by the assum%tion of a %urely intelligible being@ it continues its o%erations on the %rinci%le of the contingency of all %henomena, %rocee!ing from em%irical con!itions to still higher an! higher con!itions, themsel"es em%irical# +ust as little !oes this regulati"e %rinci%le e?clu!e the assum%tion of an intelligible cause, hen the question regar!s merely the %ure em%loyment of reasonBin relation to en!s or aims# :or, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcen!ental an! to us unkno n groun! of the %ossibility of sensuous %henomena, an! its e?istence, necessary an! in!e%en!ent of all sensuous con!itions, is not inconsistent ith the contingency of %henomena, or ith the unlimite! %ossibility of regress hich e?ists in the series of em%irical con!itions# Conclu!ing Remarks on the )ntinomy of Pure Reason# 7o long as the object of our rational conce%tions is the totality of con!itions in the orl! of %henomena, an! the satisfaction, from this source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our i!eas transcen!ental an! cosmological# But hen e set the uncon!itione! B hich is the aim of all our inquiriesBin a s%here hich lies out of the orl! of sense an! %ossible e?%erience, our i!eas become transcen!ent# They are then not merely ser"iceable to ar!s the com%letion of the e?ercise of reason D hich remains an i!ea, ne"er e?ecute!, but al ays to be %ursue!E@ they !etach themsel"es com%letely from e?%erience an! construct for themsel"es objects, the material of hich has not been %resente! by e?%erience, an! the objecti"e reality of hich is not base! u%on the com%letion of the em%irical series, but u%on %ure a %riori conce%tions# The intelligible object of these transcen!ent i!eas may be conce!e!, as a transcen!ental object# But e cannot cogitate it as a thing !eterminable by certain !istinct %re!icates relating to its internal nature, for it has no connection ith em%irical conce%tions@ nor are e justifie! in affirming the e?istence of any such object# It is, consequently, a mere %ro!uct of the min! alone# 9f all the cosmological i!eas, ho e"er, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy hich com%els us to "enture u%on this ste%# :or the e?istence of %henomena, al ays con!itione! an! ne"er self&subsistent, requires us to look for an object !ifferent from %henomenaBan intelligible object, ith hich all contingency must cease# But, as e ha"e allo e! oursel"es to assume the e?istence of a self&subsistent reality out of the fiel! of e?%erience, an! are therefore oblige! to regar! %henomena as merely a contingent mo!e of re%resenting intelligible objects em%loye! by beings hich are themsel"es intelligencesBno other course remains for us than to follo analogy an! em%loy the same mo!e in forming some conce%tion of intelligible things, of hich e ha"e not the least kno le!ge, hich nature taught us to use in the formation of em%irical conce%tions# E?%erience ma!e us acquainte! ith the contingent# But e are at %resent engage! in the !iscussion of things hich are not objects of e?%erience@ an!

must, therefore, !e!uce our kno le!ge of them from that hich is necessary absolutely an! in itself, that is, from %ure conce%tions# ;ence the first ste% hich e take out of the orl! of sense obliges us to begin our system of ne cognition ith the in"estigation of a necessary being, an! to !e!uce from our conce%tions of it all our conce%tions of intelligible things# This e %ro%ose to attem%t in the follo ing cha%ter#

CHAPTER III. T&e Ideal %+ Pure Reas%n. SECTION I. O+ t&e Ideal "n /eneral. >e ha"e seen that %ure conce%tions !o not %resent objects to the min!, e?ce%t un!er sensuous con!itions@ because the con!itions of objecti"e reality !o not e?ist in these conce%tions, hich contain, in fact, nothing but the mere form of thought# They may, ho e"er, hen a%%lie! to %henomena, be %resente! in concreto@ for it is %henomena that %resent to them the materials for the formation of em%irical conce%tions, hich are nothing more than concrete forms of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing# But i!eas are still further remo"e! from objecti"e reality than categories@ for no %henomenon can e"er %resent them to the human min! in concreto# They contain a certain %erfection, attainable by no %ossible em%irical cognition@ an! they gi"e to reason a systematic unity, to hich the unity of e?%erience attem%ts to a%%ro?imate, but can ne"er com%letely attain# But still further remo"e! than the i!ea from objecti"e reality is the I!eal, by hich term I un!erstan! the i!ea, not in concreto, but in in!i"i!uoBas an in!i"i!ual thing, !eterminable or !etermine! by the i!ea alone# The i!ea of humanity in its com%lete %erfection su%%oses not only the a!"ancement of all the %o ers an! faculties, hich constitute our conce%tion of human nature, to a com%lete attainment of their final aims, but also e"erything hich is requisite for the com%lete !etermination of the i!ea@ for of all contra!ictory %re!icates, only one can conform ith the i!ea of the %erfect man# >hat I ha"e terme! an i!eal as in PlatoFs %hiloso%hy an i!ea of the !i"ine min!Ban in!i"i!ual object %resent to its %ure intuition, the most %erfect of e"ery kin! of %ossible beings, an! the archety%e of all %henomenal e?istences# >ithout rising to these s%eculati"e heights, e are boun! to confess that human reason contains not only i!eas, but i!eals, hich %ossess, not, like those of Plato, creati"e, but certainly %ractical %o erBas regulati"e %rinci%les, an! form the basis of the %erfectibility of certain actions# Aoral conce%tions are not %erfectly %ure conce%tions of reason, because an em%irical elementBof %leasure or %ainBlies at the foun!ation of them# In relation, ho e"er, to the %rinci%le, hereby reason sets boun!s to a free!om hich is in itself ithout la , an! consequently hen e atten! merely to their form, they may be consi!ere! as %ure conce%tions of reason# Kirtue an! is!om in their %erfect %urity are i!eas# But the ise man of the 7toics is an i!eal, that is to say, a human being e?isting only in thought an! in com%lete conformity ith the i!ea of

is!om# )s the i!ea %ro"i!es a rule, so the i!eal ser"es as an archety%e for the %erfect an! com%lete !etermination of the co%y# Thus the con!uct of this ise an! !i"ine man ser"es us as a stan!ar! of action, ith hich e may com%are an! ju!ge oursel"es, hich may hel% us to reform oursel"es, although the %erfection it !eman!s can ne"er be attaine! by us# )lthough e cannot conce!e objecti"e reality to these i!eals, they are not to be consi!ere! as chimeras@ on the contrary, they %ro"i!e reason ith a stan!ar!, hich enables it to estimate, by com%arison, the !egree of incom%leteness in the objects %resente! to it# But to aim at realiCing the i!eal in an e?am%le in the orl! of e?%erience Bto !escribe, for instance, the character of the %erfectly ise man in a romanceBis im%racticable# <ay more, there is something absur! in the attem%t@ an! the result must be little e!ifying, as the natural limitations, hich are continually breaking in u%on the %erfection an! com%leteness of the i!ea, !estroy the illusion in the story an! thro an air of sus%icion e"en on hat is goo! in the i!ea, hich hence a%%ears fictitious an! unreal# 7uch is the constitution of the i!eal of reason, hich is al ays base! u%on !eterminate conce%tions, an! ser"es as a rule an! a mo!el for limitation or of criticism# Kery !ifferent is the nature of the i!eals of the imagination# 9f these it is im%ossible to %resent an intelligible conce%tion@ they are a kin! of monogram, !ra n accor!ing to no !eterminate rule, an! forming rather a "ague %ictureBthe %ro!uction of many !i"erse e?%eriencesBthan a !eterminate image# 7uch are the i!eals hich %ainters an! %hysiognomists %rofess to ha"e in their min!s, an! hich can ser"e neither as a mo!el for %ro!uction nor as a stan!ar! for a%%reciation# They may be terme!, though im%ro%erly, sensuous i!eals, as they are !eclare! to be mo!els of certain %ossible em%irical intuitions# They cannot, ho e"er, furnish rules or stan!ar!s for e?%lanation or e?amination# In its i!eals, reason aims at com%lete an! %erfect !etermination accor!ing to a %riori rules@ an! hence it cogitates an object, hich must be com%letely !eterminable in conformity ith %rinci%les, although all em%irical con!itions are absent, an! the conce%tion of the object is on this account transcen!ent# 7ECTI9< II# 9f the Transcen!ental I!eal DPrototy%on Trancen!entaleE# E"ery conce%tion is, in relation to that hich is not containe! in it, un!etermine! an! subject to the %rinci%le of !eterminability# This %rinci%le is that, of e"ery t o contra!ictorily o%%ose! %re!icates, only one can belong to a conce%tion# It is a %urely logical %rinci%le, itself base! u%on the %rinci%le of contra!iction@ inasmuch as it makes com%lete abstraction of the content an! atten!s merely to the logical form of the cognition# But again, e"erything, as regar!s its %ossibility, is also subject to the %rinci%le of com%lete !etermination, accor!ing to hich one of all the %ossible contra!ictory %re!icates of things must belong to it# This %rinci%le is not base! merely u%on that of contra!iction@ for, in a!!ition to the relation bet een t o contra!ictory %re!icates, it regar!s e"erything as stan!ing in a relation to the sum of %ossibilities, as the sum total of all %re!icates of things, an!, hile %resu%%osing this sum as an a %riori con!ition,

%resents to the min! e"erything as recei"ing the %ossibility of its in!i"i!ual e?istence from the relation it bears to, an! the share it %ossesses in, the aforesai! sum of %ossibilities#8 The %rinci%le of com%lete !etermination relates the content an! not to the logical form# It is the %rinci%le of the synthesis of all the %re!icates hich are require! to constitute the com%lete conce%tion of a thing, an! not a mere %rinci%le analytical re%resentation, hich enounces that one of t o contra!ictory %re!icates must belong to a conce%tion# It contains, moreo"er, a transcen!ental %resu%%ositionBthat, namely, of the material for all %ossibility, hich must contain a %riori the !ata for this or that %articular %ossibility# /8:ootnote( Thus this %rinci%le !eclares e"erything to %ossess a relation to a common correlateBthe sum&total of %ossibility, hich, if !isco"ere! to e?ist in the i!ea of one in!i"i!ual thing, oul! establish the affinity of all %ossible things, from the i!entity of the groun! of their com%lete !etermination# The !eterminability of e"ery conce%tion is subor!inate to the uni"ersality D)llgemeinheit, uni"ersalitasE of the %rinci%le of e?clu!e! mi!!le@ the !etermination of a thing to the totality D)llheit, uni"ersitasE of all %ossible %re!icates#3 The %ro%osition, e"erything hich e?ists is com%letely !etermine!, means not only that one of e"ery %air of gi"en contra!ictory attributes, but that one of all %ossible attributes, is al ays %re!icable of the thing@ in it the %re!icates are not merely com%are! logically ith each other, but the thing itself is transcen!entally com%are! ith the sum&total of all %ossible %re!icates# The %ro%osition is equi"alent to saying( GTo attain to a com%lete kno le!ge of a thing, it is necessary to %ossess a kno le!ge of e"erything that is %ossible, an! to !etermine it thereby in a %ositi"e or negati"e manner#G The conce%tion of com%lete !etermination is consequently a conce%tion hich cannot be %resente! in its totality in concreto, an! is therefore base! u%on an i!ea, hich has its seat in the reasonBthe faculty hich %rescribes to the un!erstan!ing the la s of its harmonious an! %erfect e?ercise# <o , although this i!ea of the sum&total of all %ossibility, in so far as it forms the con!ition of the com%lete !etermination of e"erything, is itself un!etermine! in relation to the %re!icates hich may constitute this sum&total, an! e cogitate in it merely the sum&total of all %ossible %re!icatesB e ne"ertheless fin!, u%on closer e?amination, that this i!ea, as a %rimiti"e conce%tion of the min!, e?clu!es a large number of %re!icatesB those !e!uce! an! those irreconcilable ith others, an! that it is e"ol"e! as a conce%tion com%letely !etermine! a %riori# Thus it becomes the conce%tion of an in!i"i!ual object, hich is com%letely !etermine! by an! through the mere i!ea, an! must consequently be terme! an i!eal of %ure reason# >hen e consi!er all %ossible %re!icates, not merely logically, but transcen!entally, that is to say, ith reference to the content hich may be cogitate! as e?isting in them a %riori, e shall fin! that some in!icate a being, others merely a non&being# The logical negation e?%resse! in the or! not !oes not %ro%erly belong to a conce%tion, but only to the relation of one conce%tion to another in a ju!gement, an! is consequently quite insufficient to %resent to the min! the content of a conce%tion# The e?%ression not

mortal !oes not in!icate that a non&being is cogitate! in the object@ it !oes not concern the content at all# ) transcen!ental negation, on the contrary, in!icates non&being in itself, an! is o%%ose! to transcen!ental affirmation, the conce%tion of hich of itself e?%resses a being# ;ence this affirmation in!icates a reality, because in an! through it objects are consi!ere! to be somethingBto be things@ hile the o%%osite negation, on the other ban!, in!icates a mere ant, or %ri"ation, or absence, an!, here such negations alone are attache! to a re%resentation, the non&e?istence of anything corres%on!ing to the re%resentation# <o a negation cannot be cogitate! as !etermine!, ithout cogitating at the same time the o%%osite affirmation# The man born blin! has not the least notion of !arkness, because he has none of light@ the "agabon! kno s nothing of %o"erty, because he has ne"er kno n hat it is to be in comfort@8 the ignorant man has no conce%tion of his ignorance, because he has no conce%tion of kno le!ge# )ll conce%tions of negati"es are accor!ingly !eri"e! or !e!uce! conce%tions@ an! realities contain the !ata, an!, so to s%eak, the material or transcen!ental content of the %ossibility an! com%lete !etermination of all things# /8:ootnote( The in"estigations an! calculations of astronomers ha"e taught us much that is on!erful@ but the most im%ortant lesson e ha"e recei"e! from them is the !isco"ery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation to the uni"erseBan ignorance the magnitu!e of hich reason, ithout the information thus !eri"e!, coul! ne"er ha"e concei"e!# This !isco"ery of our !eficiencies must %ro!uce a great change in the !etermination of the aims of human reason#3 If, therefore, a transcen!ental substratum lies at the foun!ation of the com%lete !etermination of thingsBa substratum hich is to form the fun! from hich all %ossible %re!icates of things are to be su%%lie!, this substratum cannot be anything else than the i!ea of a sum&total of reality Domnitu!o realitatisE# In this "ie , negations are nothing but limitationsBa term hich coul! not, ith %ro%riety, be a%%lie! to them, if the unlimite! Dthe allE !i! not form the true basis of our conce%tion# This conce%tion of a sum&total of reality is the conce%tion of a thing in itself, regar!e! as com%letely !etermine!@ an! the conce%tion of an ens realissimum is the conce%tion of an in!i"i!ual being, inasmuch as it is !etermine! by that %re!icate of all %ossible contra!ictory %re!icates, hich in!icates an! belongs to being# It is, therefore, a transcen!ental i!eal hich forms the basis of the com%lete !etermination of e"erything that e?ists, an! is the highest material con!ition of its %ossibilityBa con!ition on hich must rest the cogitation of all objects ith res%ect to their content# <ay, more, this i!eal is the only %ro%er i!eal of hich the human min! is ca%able@ because in this case alone a general conce%tion of a thing is com%letely !etermine! by an! through itself, an! cogniCe! as the re%resentation of an in!i"i!uum# The logical !etermination of a conce%tion is base! u%on a !isjuncti"e syllogism, the major of hich contains the logical !i"ision of the e?tent of a general conce%tion, the minor limits this e?tent to a certain %art, hile the conclusion !etermines the

conce%tion by this %art# The general conce%tion of a reality cannot be !i"i!e! a %riori, because, ithout the ai! of e?%erience, e cannot kno any !eterminate kin!s of reality, stan!ing un!er the former as the genus# The transcen!ental %rinci%le of the com%lete !etermination of all things is therefore merely the re%resentation of the sum&total of all reality@ it is not a conce%tion hich is the genus of all %re!icates un!er itself, but one hich com%rehen!s them all ithin itself# The com%lete !etermination of a thing is consequently base! u%on the limitation of this total of reality, so much being %re!icate! of the thing, hile all that remains o"er is e?clu!e!Ba %roce!ure hich is in e?act agreement ith that of the !isjuncti"e syllogism an! the !etermination of the objects in the conclusion by one of the members of the !i"ision# It follo s that reason, in laying the transcen!ental i!eal at the foun!ation of its !etermination of all %ossible things, takes a course in e?act analogy ith that hich it %ursues in !isjuncti"e syllogismsBa %ro%osition hich forme! the basis of the systematic !i"ision of all transcen!ental i!eas, accor!ing to hich they are %ro!uce! in com%lete %arallelism ith the three mo!es of syllogistic reasoning em%loye! by the human min!# It is self&e"i!ent that reason, in cogitating the necessary com%lete !etermination of things, !oes not %resu%%ose the e?istence of a being corres%on!ing to its i!eal, but merely the i!ea of the i!ealBfor the %ur%ose of !e!ucing from the uncon!itional totality of com%lete !etermination, The i!eal is therefore the %rototy%e of all things, hich, as !efecti"e co%ies Decty%aE, recei"e from it the material of their %ossibility, an! a%%ro?imate to it more or less, though it is im%ossible that they can e"er attain to its %erfection# The %ossibility of things must therefore be regar!e! as !eri"e!Be?ce%t that of the thing hich contains in itself all reality, hich must be consi!ere! to be %rimiti"e an! original# :or all negationsBan! they are the only %re!icates by means of hich all other things can be !istinguishe! from the ens realissimumBare mere limitations of a greater an! a higherBnay, the highest reality@ an! they consequently %resu%%ose this reality, an! are, as regar!s their content, !eri"e! from it# The manifol! nature of things is only an infinitely "arious mo!e of limiting the conce%tion of the highest reality, hich is their common substratum@ just as all figures are %ossible only as !ifferent mo!es of limiting infinite s%ace# The object of the i!eal of reasonBan object e?isting only in reason itselfB is also terme! the %rimal being Dens originariumE@ as ha"ing no e?istence su%erior to him, the su%reme being Dens summumE@ an! as being the con!ition of all other beings, hich rank un!er it, the being of all beings Dens entiumE# But none of these terms in!icate the objecti"e relation of an actually e?isting object to other things, but merely that of an i!ea to conce%tions@ an! all our in"estigations into this subject still lea"e us in %erfect uncertainty ith regar! to the e?istence of this being# ) %rimal being cannot be sai! to consist of many other beings ith an e?istence hich is !eri"ati"e, for the latter %resu%%ose the former, an! therefore cannot be constituti"e %arts of it# It follo s that the i!eal of the %rimal being must be cogitate! as sim%le# The !e!uction of the %ossibility of all other things from this %rimal being cannot, strictly s%eaking, be consi!ere! as a limitation, or as a kin! of !i"ision of its reality@ for this oul! be regar!ing the %rimal being as a mere aggregateB hich has been sho n to be

im%ossible, although it as so re%resente! in our first rough sketch# The highest reality must be regar!e! rather as the groun! than as the sum&total of the %ossibility of all things, an! the manifol! nature of things be base!, not u%on the limitation of the %rimal being itself, but u%on the com%lete series of effects hich flo from it# )n! thus all our %o ers of sense, as ell as all %henomenal reality, %henomenal reality, may be ith %ro%riety regar!e! as belonging to this series of effects, hile they coul! not ha"e forme! %arts of the i!ea, consi!ere! as an aggregate# Pursuing this track, an! hy%ostatiCing this i!ea, e shall fin! oursel"es authoriCe! to !etermine our notion of the 7u%reme Being by means of the mere conce%tion of a highest reality, as one, sim%le, all& sufficient, eternal, an! so onBin one or!, to !etermine it in its uncon!itione! com%leteness by the ai! of e"ery %ossible %re!icate# The conce%tion of such a being is the conce%tion of Go! in its transcen!ental sense, an! thus the i!eal of %ure reason is the object&matter of a transcen!ental theology# But, by such an em%loyment of the transcen!ental i!ea, e shoul! be o"er ste%%ing the limits of its "ali!ity an! %ur%ose# :or reason %lace! it, as the conce%tion of all reality, at the basis of the com%lete !etermination of things, ithout requiring that this conce%tion be regar!e! as the conce%tion of an objecti"e e?istence# 7uch an e?istence oul! be %urely fictitious, an! the hy%ostatiCing of the content of the i!ea into an i!eal, as an in!i"i!ual being, is a ste% %erfectly unauthoriCe!# <ay, more, e are not e"en calle! u%on to assume the %ossibility of such an hy%othesis, as none of the !e!uctions !ra n from such an i!eal oul! affect the com%lete !etermination of things in generalBfor the sake of hich alone is the i!ea necessary# It is not sufficient to circumscribe the %roce!ure an! the !ialectic of reason@ e must also en!ea"our to !isco"er the sources of this !ialectic, that e may ha"e it in our %o er to gi"e a rational e?%lanation of this illusion, as a %henomenon of the human min!# :or the i!eal, of hich e are at %resent s%eaking, is base!, not u%on an arbitrary, but u%on a natural, i!ea# The question hence arises( ;o ha%%ens it that reason regar!s the %ossibility of all things as !e!uce! from a single %ossibility, that, to it, of the highest reality, an! %resu%%oses this as e?isting in an in!i"i!ual an! %rimal beingH The ans er is rea!y@ it is at once %resente! by the %roce!ure of transcen!ental analytic# The %ossibility of sensuous objects is a relation of these objects to thought, in hich something Dthe em%irical formE may be cogitate! a %riori@ hile that hich constitutes the matterBthe reality of the %henomenon Dthat element hich corres%on!s to sensationEBmust be gi"en from ithout, as other ise it coul! not e"en be cogitate! by, nor coul! its %ossibility be %resentable to the min!# <o , a sensuous object is com%letely !etermine!, hen it has been com%are! ith all %henomenal %re!icates, an! re%resente! by means of these either %ositi"ely or negati"ely# But, as that hich constitutes the thing itselfBthe real in a %henomenon, must be gi"en, an! that, in hich the real of all %henomena is gi"en, is e?%erience, one, sole, an! all&embracingBthe material of the %ossibility of all sensuous objects must be %resu%%ose! as gi"en in a hole, an! it is u%on the limitation of this hole that the %ossibility of all em%irical objects, their !istinction from each other an! their com%lete !etermination, are base!# <o , no other objects are %resente! to us besi!es sensuous objects, an! these can be gi"en only in connection ith a %ossible e?%erience@ it follo s that a thing is not an

object to us, unless it %resu%%oses the hole or sum&total of em%irical reality as the con!ition of its %ossibility# <o , a natural illusion lea!s us to consi!er this %rinci%le, hich is "ali! only of sensuous objects, as "ali! ith regar! to things in general# )n! thus e are in!uce! to hol! the em%irical %rinci%le of our conce%tions of the %ossibility of things, as %henomena, by lea"ing out this limitati"e con!ition, to be a transcen!ental %rinci%le of the %ossibility of things in general# >e %rocee! after ar!s to hy%ostatiCe this i!ea of the sum&total of all reality, by changing the !istributi"e unity of the em%irical e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing into the collecti"e unity of an em%irical holeBa !ialectical illusion, an! by cogitating this hole or sum of e?%erience as an in!i"i!ual thing, containing in itself all em%irical reality# This in!i"i!ual thing or being is then, by means of the abo"e&mentione! transcen!ental subre%tion, substitute! for our notion of a thing hich stan!s at the hea! of the %ossibility of all things, the real con!itions of hose com%lete !etermination it %resents#8 /8:ootnote( This i!eal of the ens realissimumBalthough merely a mental re%resentationBis first objecti"iCe!, that is, has an objecti"e e?istence attribute! to it, then hy%ostatiCe!, an! finally, by the natural %rogress of reason to the com%letion of unity, %ersonifie!, as e shall sho %resently# :or the regulati"e unity of e?%erience is not base! u%on %henomena themsel"es, but u%on the connection of the "ariety of %henomena by the un!erstan!ing in a consciousness, an! thus the unity of the su%reme reality an! the com%lete !eterminability of all things, seem to resi!e in a su%reme un!erstan!ing, an!, consequently, in a conscious intelligence#3 7ECTI9< III# 9f the )rguments em%loye! by 7%eculati"e Reason in Proof of the E?istence of a 7u%reme Being# <ot ithstan!ing the %ressing necessity hich reason feels, to form some %resu%%osition that shall ser"e the un!erstan!ing as a %ro%er basis for the com%lete !etermination of its conce%tions, the i!ealistic an! factitious nature of such a %resu%%osition is too e"i!ent to allo reason for a moment to %ersua!e itself into a belief of the objecti"e e?istence of a mere creation of its o n thought# But there are other consi!erations hich com%el reason to seek out some resting %lace in the regress from the con!itione! to the uncon!itione!, hich is not gi"en as an actual e?istence from the mere conce%tion of it, although it alone can gi"e com%leteness to the series of con!itions# )n! this is the natural course of e"ery human reason, e"en of the most une!ucate!, although the %ath at first entere! it !oes not al ays continue to follo # It !oes not begin from conce%tions, but from common e?%erience, an! requires a basis in actual e?istence# But this basis is insecure, unless it rests u%on the immo"able rock of the absolutely necessary# )n! this foun!ation is itself un orthy of trust, if it lea"e un!er an! abo"e it em%ty s%ace, if it !o not fill all, an! lea"e no room for a hy or a herefore, if it be not, in one or!, infinite in its reality#

If e a!mit the e?istence of some one thing, hate"er it may be, e must also a!mit that there is something hich e?ists necessarily# :or hat is contingent e?ists only un!er the con!ition of some other thing, hich is its cause@ an! from this e must go on to conclu!e the e?istence of a cause hich is not contingent, an! hich consequently e?ists necessarily an! uncon!itionally# 7uch is the argument by hich reason justifies its a!"ances to ar!s a %rimal being# <o reason looks roun! for the conce%tion of a being that may be a!mitte!, ithout inconsistency, to be orthy of the attribute of absolute necessity, not for the %ur%ose of inferring a %riori, from the conce%tion of such a being, its objecti"e e?istence Dfor if reason allo e! itself to take this course, it oul! not require a basis in gi"en an! actual e?istence, but merely the su%%ort of %ure conce%tionsE, but for the %ur%ose of !isco"ering, among all our conce%tions of %ossible things, that conce%tion hich %ossesses no element inconsistent ith the i!ea of absolute necessity# :or that there must be some absolutely necessary e?istence, it regar!s as a truth alrea!y establishe!# <o , if it can remo"e e"ery e?istence inca%able of su%%orting the attribute of absolute necessity, e?ce%ting oneBthis must be the absolutely necessary being, hether its necessity is com%rehensible by us, that is, !e!ucible from the conce%tion of it alone, or not# <o that, the conce%tion of hich contains a therefore to e"ery herefore, hich is not !efecti"e in any res%ect hate"er, hich is all&sufficient as a con!ition, seems to be the being of hich e can justly %re!icate absolute necessityBfor this reason, that, %ossessing the con!itions of all that is %ossible, it !oes not an! cannot itself require any con!ition# )n! thus it satisfies, in one res%ect at least, the requirements of the conce%tion of absolute necessity# In this "ie , it is su%erior to all other conce%tions, hich, as !eficient an! incom%lete, !o not %ossess the characteristic of in!e%en!ence of all higher con!itions# It is true that e cannot infer from this that hat !oes not contain in itself the su%reme an! com%lete con!itionBthe con!ition of all other thingsBmust %ossess only a con!itione! e?istence@ but as little can e assert the contrary, for this su%%ose! being !oes not %ossess the only characteristic hich can enable reason to cogniCe by means of an a %riori conce%tion the uncon!itione! an! necessary nature of its e?istence# The conce%tion of an ens realissimum is that hich best agrees ith the conce%tion of an uncon!itione! an! necessary being# The former conce%tion !oes not satisfy all the requirements of the latter@ but e ha"e no choice, e are oblige! to a!here to it, for e fin! that e cannot !o ithout the e?istence of a necessary being@ an! e"en although e a!mit it, e fin! it out of our %o er to !isco"er in the hole s%here of %ossibility any being that can a!"ance ell&groun!e! claims to such a !istinction# The follo ing is, therefore, the natural course of human reason# It begins by %ersua!ing itself of the e?istence of some necessary being# In this being it recogniCes the characteristics of uncon!itione! e?istence# It then seeks the conce%tion of that hich is in!e%en!ent of all con!itions, an! fin!s it in that hich is itself the sufficient con!ition of all other thingsBin other or!s, in that hich contains all reality# But the unlimite! all is an absolute unity, an! is concei"e! by the min! as a being one an! su%reme@ an!

thus reason conclu!es that the 7u%reme Being, as the %rimal basis of all things, %ossesses an e?istence hich is absolutely necessary# This conce%tion must be regar!e! as in some !egree satisfactory, if e a!mit the e?istence of a necessary being, an! consi!er that there e?ists a necessity for a !efinite an! final ans er to these questions# In such a case, e cannot make a better choice, or rather e ha"e no choice at all, but feel oursel"es oblige! to !eclare in fa"our of the absolute unity of com%lete reality, as the highest source of the %ossibility of things# But if there e?ists no moti"e for coming to a !efinite conclusion, an! e may lea"e the question unans ere! till e ha"e fully eighe! both si!esBin other or!s, hen e are merely calle! u%on to !eci!e ho much e ha%%en to kno about the question, an! ho much e merely flatter oursel"es that e kno Bthe abo"e conclusion !oes not a%%ear to be so great a!"antage, but, on the contrary, seems !efecti"e in the groun!s u%on hich it is su%%orte!# :or, a!mitting the truth of all that has been sai!, that, namely, the inference from a gi"en e?istence Dmy o n, for e?am%leE to the e?istence of an uncon!itione! an! necessary being is "ali! an! unassailable@ that, in the secon! %lace, e must consi!er a being hich contains all reality, an! consequently all the con!itions of other things, to be absolutely uncon!itione!@ an! a!mitting too, that e ha"e thus !isco"ere! the conce%tion of a thing to hich may be attribute!, ithout inconsistency, absolute necessityBit !oes not follo from all this that the conce%tion of a limite! being, in hich the su%reme reality !oes not resi!e, is therefore incom%atible ith the i!ea of absolute necessity# :or, although I !o not !isco"er the element of the uncon!itione! in the conce%tion of such a beingBan element hich is manifestly e?istent in the sum&total of all con!itionsBI am not entitle! to conclu!e that its e?istence is therefore con!itione!@ just as I am not entitle! to affirm, in a hy%othetical syllogism, that here a certain con!ition !oes not e?ist Din the %resent, com%leteness, as far as %ure conce%tions are concerne!E, the con!itione! !oes not e?ist either# 9n the contrary, e are free to consi!er all limite! beings as like ise uncon!itionally necessary, although e are unable to infer this from the general conce%tion hich e ha"e of them# Thus con!ucte!, this argument is inca%able of gi"ing us the least notion of the %ro%erties of a necessary being, an! must be in e"ery res%ect ithout result# This argument continues, ho e"er, to %ossess a eight an! an authority, hich, in s%ite of its objecti"e insufficiency, it has ne"er been !i"este! of# :or, granting that certain res%onsibilities lie u%on us, hich, as base! on the i!eas of reason, !eser"e to be res%ecte! an! submitte! to, although they are inca%able of a real or %ractical a%%lication to our nature, or, in other or!s, oul! be res%onsibilities ithout moti"es, e?ce%t u%on the su%%osition of a 7u%reme Being to gi"e effect an! influence to the %ractical la s( in such a case e shoul! be boun! to obey our conce%tions, hich, although objecti"ely insufficient, !o, accor!ing to the stan!ar! of reason, %re%on!erate o"er an! are su%erior to any claims that may be a!"ance! from any other quarter# The equilibrium of !oubt oul! in this case be !estroye! by a %ractical a!!ition@ in!ee!, Reason oul! be com%elle! to con!emn herself, if she refuse! to com%ly ith the !eman!s of the ju!gement, no su%erior to hich e kno Bho e"er !efecti"e her un!erstan!ing of the groun!s of these !eman!s might be#

This argument, although in fact transcen!ental, inasmuch as it rests u%on the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so sim%le an! natural, that the commonest un!erstan!ing can a%%reciate its "alue# >e see things aroun! us change, arise, an! %ass a ay@ they, or their con!ition, must therefore ha"e a cause# The same !eman! must again be ma!e of the cause itselfBas a !atum of e?%erience# <o it is natural that e shoul! %lace the highest causality just here e %lace su%reme causality, in that being, hich contains the con!itions of all %ossible effects, an! the conce%tion of hich is so sim%le as that of an all&embracing reality# This highest cause, then, e regar! as absolutely necessary, because e fin! it absolutely necessary to rise to it, an! !o not !isco"er any reason for %rocee!ing beyon! it# Thus, among all nations, through the !arkest %olytheism glimmer some faint s%arks of monotheism, to hich these i!olaters ha"e been le!, not from reflection an! %rofoun! thought, but by the stu!y an! natural %rogress of the common un!erstan!ing# There are only three mo!es of %ro"ing the e?istence of a *eity, on the groun!s of s%eculati"e reason# )ll the %aths con!ucting to this en! begin either from !eterminate e?%erience an! the %eculiar constitution of the orl! of sense, an! rise, accor!ing to the la s of causality, from it to the highest cause e?isting a%art from the orl!Bor from a %urely in!eterminate e?%erience, that is, some em%irical e?istenceBor abstraction is ma!e of all e?%erience, an! the e?istence of a su%reme cause is conclu!e! from a %riori conce%tions alone# The first is the %hysico&theological argument, the secon! the cosmological, the thir! the ontological# Aore there are not, an! more there cannot be# I shall sho it is as unsuccessful on the one %athBthe em%iricalBas on the otherBthe transcen!ental, an! that it stretches its ings in "ain, to soar beyon! the orl! of sense by the mere might of s%eculati"e thought# )s regar!s the or!er in hich e must !iscuss those arguments, it ill be e?actly the re"erse of that in hich reason, in the %rogress of its !e"elo%ment, attains to themBthe or!er in hich they are %lace! abo"e# :or it ill be ma!e manifest to the rea!er that, although e?%erience %resents the occasion an! the starting&%oint, it is the transcen!ental i!ea of reason hich gui!es it in its %ilgrimage an! is the goal of all its struggles# I shall therefore begin ith an e?amination of the transcen!ental argument, an! after ar!s inquire hat a!!itional strength has accrue! to this mo!e of %roof from the a!!ition of the em%irical element# 7ECTI9< IK# 9f the Im%ossibility of an 9ntological Proof of the E?istence of Go!# It is e"i!ent from hat has been sai! that the conce%tion of an absolutely necessary being is a mere i!ea, the objecti"e reality of hich is far from being establishe! by the mere fact that it is a nee! of reason# 9n the contrary, this i!ea ser"es merely to in!icate a certain unattainable %erfection, an! rather limits the o%erations than, by the %resentation of ne objects, e?ten!s the s%here of the un!erstan!ing# But a strange anomaly meets us at the "ery threshol!@ for the inference from a gi"en e?istence in general to an absolutely necessary e?istence seems to be correct an! una"oi!able, hile the con!itions of the un!erstan!ing refuse to ai! us in forming any conce%tion of such a being#

Philoso%hers ha"e al ays talke! of an absolutely necessary being, an! ha"e ne"ertheless !ecline! to take the trouble of concei"ing hetherBan! ho Ba being of this nature is e"en cogitable, not to mention that its e?istence is actually !emonstrable# ) "erbal !efinition of the conce%tion is certainly easy enough( it is something the non&e?istence of hich is im%ossible# But !oes this !efinition thro any light u%on the con!itions hich ren!er it im%ossible to cogitate the non&e?istence of a thingBcon!itions hich e ish to ascertain, that e may !isco"er hether e think anything in the conce%tion of such a being or notH :or the mere fact that I thro a ay, by means of the or! uncon!itione!, all the con!itions hich the un!erstan!ing habitually requires in or!er to regar! anything as necessary, is "ery far from making clear hether by means of the conce%tion of the uncon!itionally necessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all# <ay, more, this chance&conce%tion, no become so current, many ha"e en!ea"oure! to e?%lain by e?am%les hich seeme! to ren!er any inquiries regar!ing its intelligibility quite nee!less# E"ery geometrical %ro%ositionBa triangle has three anglesBit as sai!, is absolutely necessary@ an! thus %eo%le talke! of an object hich lay out of the s%here of our un!erstan!ing as if it ere %erfectly %lain hat the conce%tion of such a being meant# )ll the e?am%les a!!uce! ha"e been !ra n, ithout e?ce%tion, from ju!gements, an! not from things# But the uncon!itione! necessity of a ju!gement !oes not form the absolute necessity of a thing# 9n the contrary, the absolute necessity of a ju!gement is only a con!itione! necessity of a thing, or of the %re!icate in a ju!gement# The %ro%osition abo"e&mentione! !oes not enounce that three angles necessarily e?ist, but, u%on con!ition that a triangle e?ists, three angles must necessarily e?istBin it# )n! thus this logical necessity has been the source of the greatest !elusions# ;a"ing forme! an a %riori conce%tion of a thing, the content of hich as ma!e to embrace e?istence, e belie"e! oursel"es safe in conclu!ing that, because e?istence belongs necessarily to the object of the conce%tion Dthat is, un!er the con!ition of my %ositing this thing as gi"enE, the e?istence of the thing is also %osite! necessarily, an! that it is therefore absolutely necessaryBmerely because its e?istence has been cogitate! in the conce%tion# If, in an i!entical ju!gement, I annihilate the %re!icate in thought, an! retain the subject, a contra!iction is the result@ an! hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter# But if I su%%ress both subject an! %re!icate in thought, no contra!iction arises@ for there is nothing at all, an! therefore no means of forming a contra!iction# To su%%ose the e?istence of a triangle an! not that of its three angles, is self&contra!ictory@ but to su%%ose the non&e?istence of both triangle an! angles is %erfectly a!missible# )n! so is it ith the conce%tion of an absolutely necessary being# )nnihilate its e?istence in thought, an! you annihilate the thing itself ith all its %re!icates@ ho then can there be any room for contra!ictionH E?ternally, there is nothing to gi"e rise to a contra!iction, for a thing cannot be necessary e?ternally@ nor internally, for, by the annihilation or su%%ression of the thing itself, its internal %ro%erties are also annihilate!# Go! is omni%otentBthat is a necessary ju!gement# ;is omni%otence cannot be !enie!, if the e?istence of a *eity is %osite!Bthe e?istence, that is, of an infinite being, the t o conce%tions being i!entical# But hen you say, Go! !oes not e?ist, neither omni%otence

nor any other %re!icate is affirme!@ they must all !isa%%ear ith the subject, an! in this ju!gement there cannot e?ist the least self&contra!iction# $ou ha"e thus seen that hen the %re!icate of a ju!gement is annihilate! in thought along ith the subject, no internal contra!iction can arise, be the %re!icate hat it may# There is no %ossibility of e"a!ing the conclusionByou fin! yoursel"es com%elle! to !eclare( There are certain subjects hich cannot be annihilate! in thought# But this is nothing more than saying( There e?ist subjects hich are absolutely necessaryBthe "ery hy%othesis hich you are calle! u%on to establish# :or I fin! myself unable to form the slightest conce%tion of a thing hich hen annihilate! in thought ith all its %re!icates, lea"es behin! a contra!iction@ an! contra!iction is the only criterion of im%ossibility in the s%here of %ure a %riori conce%tions# )gainst these general consi!erations, the justice of hich no one can !is%ute, one argument is a!!uce!, hich is regar!e! as furnishing a satisfactory !emonstration from the fact# It is affirme! that there is one an! only one conce%tion, in hich the non&being or annihilation of the object is self&contra!ictory, an! this is the conce%tion of an ens realissimum# It %ossesses, you say, all reality, an! you feel yoursel"es justifie! in a!mitting the %ossibility of such a being# DThis I am illing to grant for the %resent, although the e?istence of a conce%tion hich is not self&contra!ictory is far from being sufficient to %ro"e the %ossibility of an object#E8 <o the notion of all reality embraces in it that of e?istence@ the notion of e?istence lies, therefore, in the conce%tion of this %ossible thing# If this thing is annihilate! in thought, the internal %ossibility of the thing is also annihilate!, hich is self&contra!ictory# /8:ootnote( ) conce%tion is al ays %ossible, if it is not self&contra!ictory# This is the logical criterion of %ossibility, !istinguishing the object of such a conce%tion from the nihil negati"um# But it may be, not ithstan!ing, an em%ty conce%tion, unless the objecti"e reality of this synthesis, but hich it is generate!, is !emonstrate!@ an! a %roof of this kin! must be base! u%on %rinci%les of %ossible e?%erience, an! not u%on the %rinci%le of analysis or contra!iction# This remark may be ser"iceable as a arning against conclu!ing, from the %ossibility of a conce%tionB hich is logicalBthe %ossibility of a thingB hich is real#3 I ans er( It is absur! to intro!uceBun!er hate"er term !isguise!Binto the conce%tion of a thing, hich is to be cogitate! solely in reference to its %ossibility, the conce%tion of its e?istence# If this is a!mitte!, you ill ha"e a%%arently gaine! the !ay, but in reality ha"e enounce! nothing but a mere tautology# I ask, is the %ro%osition, this or that thing D hich I am a!mitting to be %ossibleE e?ists, an analytical or a synthetical %ro%ositionH If the former, there is no a!!ition ma!e to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its e?istence@ but then the conce%tion in your min!s is i!entical ith the thing itself, or you ha"e su%%ose! the e?istence of a thing to be %ossible, an! then inferre! its e?istence from its internal %ossibilityB hich is but a miserable tautology# The or! reality in the conce%tion of the thing, an! the or! e?istence in the conce%tion of the %re!icate, ill not hel% you out of the !ifficulty# :or, su%%osing you ere to term all

%ositing of a thing reality, you ha"e thereby %osite! the thing ith all its %re!icates in the conce%tion of the subject an! assume! its actual e?istence, an! this you merely re%eat in the %re!icate# But if you confess, as e"ery reasonable %erson must, that e"ery e?istential %ro%osition is synthetical, ho can it be maintaine! that the %re!icate of e?istence cannot be !enie! ithout contra!ictionHBa %ro%erty hich is the characteristic of analytical %ro%ositions, alone# I shoul! ha"e a reasonable ho%e of %utting an en! for e"er to this so%histical mo!e of argumentation, by a strict !efinition of the conce%tion of e?istence, !i! not my o n e?%erience teach me that the illusion arising from our confoun!ing a logical ith a real %re!icate Da %re!icate hich ai!s in the !etermination of a thingE resists almost all the en!ea"ours of e?%lanation an! illustration# ) logical %re!icate may be hat you %lease, e"en the subject may be %re!icate! of itself@ for logic %ays no regar! to the content of a ju!gement# But the !etermination of a conce%tion is a %re!icate, hich a!!s to an! enlarges the conce%tion# It must not, therefore, be containe! in the conce%tion# Being is e"i!ently not a real %re!icate, that is, a conce%tion of something hich is a!!e! to the conce%tion of some other thing# It is merely the %ositing of a thing, or of certain !eterminations in it# 'ogically, it is merely the co%ula of a ju!gement# The %ro%osition, Go! is omni%otent, contains t o conce%tions, hich ha"e a certain object or content@ the or! is, is no a!!itional %re!icateBit merely in!icates the relation of the %re!icate to the subject# <o , if I take the subject DGo!E ith all its %re!icates Domni%otence being oneE, an! say( Go! is, or, There is a Go!, I a!! no ne %re!icate to the conce%tion of Go!, I merely %osit or affirm the e?istence of the subject ith all its %re!icatesBI %osit the object in relation to my conce%tion# The content of both is the same@ an! there is no a!!ition ma!e to the conce%tion, hich e?%resses merely the %ossibility of the object, by my cogitating the objectBin the e?%ression, it isBas absolutely gi"en or e?isting# Thus the real contains no more than the %ossible# ) hun!re! real !ollars contain no more than a hun!re! %ossible !ollars# :or, as the latter in!icate the conce%tion, an! the former the object, on the su%%osition that the content of the former as greater than that of the latter, my conce%tion oul! not be an e?%ression of the hole object, an! oul! consequently be an ina!equate conce%tion of it# But in reckoning my ealth there may be sai! to be more in a hun!re! real !ollars than in a hun!re! %ossible !ollarsB that is, in the mere conce%tion of them# :or the real objectBthe !ollarsBis not analytically containe! in my conce%tion, but forms a synthetical a!!ition to my conce%tion D hich is merely a !etermination of my mental stateE, although this objecti"e realityBthis e?istenceBa%art from my conce%tions, !oes not in the least !egree increase the aforesai! hun!re! !ollars# By hate"er an! by hate"er number of %re!icatesBe"en to the com%lete !etermination of itBI may cogitate a thing, I !o not in the least augment the object of my conce%tion by the a!!ition of the statement( This thing e?ists# 9ther ise, not e?actly the same, but something more than hat as cogitate! in my conce%tion, oul! e?ist, an! I coul! not affirm that the e?act object of my conce%tion ha! real e?istence# If I cogitate a thing as containing all mo!es of reality e?ce%t one, the mo!e of reality hich is absent is not a!!e! to the conce%tion of the thing by the affirmation that the thing e?ists@ on the contrary, the thing e?istsBif it e?ist at allB ith the same !efect as that

cogitate! in its conce%tion@ other ise not that hich as cogitate!, but something !ifferent, e?ists# <o , if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, ithout !efect or im%erfection, the question still remainsB hether this being e?ists or notH :or, although no element is anting in the %ossible real content of my conce%tion, there is a !efect in its relation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant hether the cognition of the object in!icate! by the conce%tion is %ossible a %osteriori# )n! here the cause of the %resent !ifficulty becomes a%%arent# If the question regar!e! an object of sense merely, it oul! be im%ossible for me to confoun! the conce%tion ith the e?istence of a thing# :or the conce%tion merely enables me to cogitate an object as accor!ing ith the general con!itions of e?%erience@ hile the e?istence of the object %ermits me to cogitate it as containe! in the s%here of actual e?%erience# )t the same time, this connection ith the orl! of e?%erience !oes not in the least augment the conce%tion, although a %ossible %erce%tion has been a!!e! to the e?%erience of the min!# But if e cogitate e?istence by the %ure category alone, it is not to be on!ere! at, that e shoul! fin! oursel"es unable to %resent any criterion sufficient to !istinguish it from mere %ossibility# >hate"er be the content of our conce%tion of an object, it is necessary to go beyon! it, if e ish to %re!icate e?istence of the object# In the case of sensuous objects, this is attaine! by their connection accor!ing to em%irical la s ith some one of my %erce%tions@ but there is no means of cogniCing the e?istence of objects of %ure thought, because it must be cogniCe! com%letely a %riori# But all our kno le!ge of e?istence Dbe it imme!iately by %erce%tion, or by inferences connecting some object ith a %erce%tionE belongs entirely to the s%here of e?%erienceB hich is in %erfect unity ith itself@ an! although an e?istence out of this s%here cannot be absolutely !eclare! to be im%ossible, it is a hy%othesis the truth of hich e ha"e no means of ascertaining# The notion of a 7u%reme Being is in many res%ects a highly useful i!ea@ but for the "ery reason that it is an i!ea, it is inca%able of enlarging our cognition ith regar! to the e?istence of things# It is not e"en sufficient to instruct us as to the %ossibility of a being hich e !o not kno to e?ist# The analytical criterion of %ossibility, hich consists in the absence of contra!iction in %ro%ositions, cannot be !enie! it# But the connection of real %ro%erties in a thing is a synthesis of the %ossibility of hich an a %riori ju!gement cannot be forme!, because these realities are not %resente! to us s%ecifically@ an! e"en if this ere to ha%%en, a ju!gement oul! still be im%ossible, because the criterion of the %ossibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the orl! of e?%erience, to hich the object of an i!ea cannot belong# )n! thus the celebrate! 'eibnitC has utterly faile! in his attem%t to establish u%on a %riori groun!s the %ossibility of this sublime i!eal being# The celebrate! ontological or Cartesian argument for the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being is therefore insufficient@ an! e may as ell ho%e to increase our stock of kno le!ge by the ai! of mere i!eas, as the merchant to augment his ealth by the a!!ition of noughts to his cash account# 7ECTI9< K# 9f the Im%ossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the E?istence of Go!#

It as by no means a natural course of %rocee!ing, but, on the contrary, an in"ention entirely !ue to the subtlety of the schools, to attem%t to !ra from a mere i!ea a %roof of the e?istence of an object corres%on!ing to it# 7uch a course oul! ne"er ha"e been %ursue!, ere it not for that nee! of reason hich requires it to su%%ose the e?istence of a necessary being as a basis for the em%irical regress, an! that, as this necessity must be uncon!itione! an! a %riori, reason is boun! to !isco"er a conce%tion hich shall satisfy, if %ossible, this requirement, an! enable us to attain to the a %riori cognition of such a being# This conce%tion as thought to be foun! in the i!ea of an ens realissimum, an! thus this i!ea as em%loye! for the attainment of a better !efine! kno le!ge of a necessary being, of the e?istence of hich e ere con"ince!, or %ersua!e!, on other groun!s# Thus reason as se!uce! from her natural courage@ an!, instea! of conclu!ing ith the conce%tion of an ens realissimum, an attem%t as ma!e to begin ith it, for the %ur%ose of inferring from it that i!ea of a necessary e?istence hich it as in fact calle! in to com%lete# Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, hich neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific e?amination of the %hiloso%her# The cosmological %roof, hich e are about to e?amine, retains the connection bet een absolute necessity an! the highest reality@ but, instea! of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary e?istence, like the %rece!ing argument, it conclu!es from the gi"en uncon!itione! necessity of some being its unlimite! reality# The track it %ursues, hether rational or so%histical, is at least natural, an! not only goes far to %ersua!e the common un!erstan!ing, but sho s itself !eser"ing of res%ect from the s%eculati"e intellect@ hile it contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments em%loye! in natural theologyBarguments hich al ays ha"e been, an! still ill be, in use an! authority# These, ho e"er a!orne!, an! hi! un!er hate"er embellishments of rhetoric an! sentiment, are at bottom i!entical ith the arguments e are at %resent to !iscuss# This %roof, terme! by 'eibnitC the argumentum a contingentia mun!i, I shall no lay before the rea!er, an! subject to a strict e?amination# It is frame! in the follo ing manner( If something e?ists, an absolutely necessary being must like ise e?ist# <o I, at least, e?ist# Consequently, there e?ists an absolutely necessary being# The minor contains an e?%erience, the major reasons from a general e?%erience to the e?istence of a necessary being#8 Thus this argument really begins at e?%erience, an! is not com%letely a %riori, or ontological# The object of all %ossible e?%erience being the orl!, it is calle! the cosmological %roof# It contains no reference to any %eculiar %ro%erty of sensuous objects, by hich this orl! of sense might be !istinguishe! from other %ossible orl!s@ an! in this res%ect it !iffers from the %hysico& theological %roof, hich is base! u%on the consi!eration of the %eculiar constitution of our sensuous orl!# /8:ootnote( This inference is too ell kno n to require more !etaile! !iscussion# It is base! u%on the s%urious transcen!ental la of causality, that e"erything hich is contingent has a cause, hich, if itself contingent, must also ha"e a cause@ an! so on, till the series of subor!inate! causes must en! ith an absolutely necessary cause, ithout hich it oul! not %ossess com%leteness#3

The %roof %rocee!s thus( ) necessary being can be !etermine! only in one ay, that is, it can be !etermine! by only one of all %ossible o%%ose! %re!icates@ consequently, it must be com%letely !etermine! in an! by its conce%tion# But there is only a single conce%tion of a thing %ossible, hich com%letely !etermines the thing a %riori( that is, the conce%tion of the ens realissimum# It follo s that the conce%tion of the ens realissimum is the only conce%tion by an! in hich e can cogitate a necessary being# Consequently, a 7u%reme Being necessarily e?ists# In this cosmological argument are assemble! so many so%histical %ro%ositions that s%eculati"e reason seems to ha"e e?erte! in it all her !ialectical skill to %ro!uce a transcen!ental illusion of the most e?treme character# >e shall %ost%one an in"estigation of this argument for the %resent, an! confine oursel"es to e?%osing the stratagem by hich it im%oses u%on us an ol! argument in a ne !ress, an! a%%eals to the agreement of t o itnesses, the one ith the cre!entials of %ure reason, an! the other ith those of em%iricism@ hile, in fact, it is only the former ho has change! his !ress an! "oice, for the %ur%ose of %assing himself off for an a!!itional itness# That it may %ossess a secure foun!ation, it bases its conclusions u%on e?%erience, an! thus a%%ears to be com%letely !istinct from the ontological argument, hich %laces its confi!ence entirely in %ure a %riori conce%tions# But this e?%erience merely ai!s reason in making one ste%Bto the e?istence of a necessary being# >hat the %ro%erties of this being are cannot be learne! from e?%erience@ an! therefore reason aban!ons it altogether, an! %ursues its inquiries in the s%here of %ure conce%tion, for the %ur%ose of !isco"ering hat the %ro%erties of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that is, hat among all %ossible things contain the con!itions DrequisitaE of absolute necessity# Reason belie"es that it has !isco"ere! these requisites in the conce%tion of an ens realissimumBan! in it alone, an! hence conclu!es( The ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being# But it is e"i!ent that reason has here %resu%%ose! that the conce%tion of an ens realissimum is %erfectly a!equate to the conce%tion of a being of absolute necessity, that is, that e may infer the e?istence of the latter from that of the formerBa %ro%osition hich forme! the basis of the ontological argument, an! hich is no em%loye! in the su%%ort of the cosmological argument, contrary to the ish an! %rofessions of its in"entors# :or the e?istence of an absolutely necessary being is gi"en in conce%tions alone# But if I say( GThe conce%tion of the ens realissimum is a conce%tion of this kin!, an! in fact the only conce%tion hich is a!equate to our i!ea of a necessary being,G I am oblige! to a!mit, that the latter may be inferre! from the former# Thus it is %ro%erly the ontological argument hich figures in the cosmological, an! constitutes the hole strength of the latter@ hile the s%urious basis of e?%erience has been of no further use than to con!uct us to the conce%tion of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to !emonstrate the %resence of this attribute in any !eterminate e?istence or thing# :or hen e %ro%ose to oursel"es an aim of this character, e must aban!on the s%here of e?%erience, an! rise to that of %ure conce%tions, hich e e?amine ith the %ur%ose of !isco"ering hether any one contains the con!itions of the %ossibility of an absolutely necessary being# But if the %ossibility of such a being is thus !emonstrate!, its e?istence is also %ro"e!@ for e may then assert that, of all %ossible beings there is one hich %ossesses the attribute of necessityBin other or!s, this being %ossesses an absolutely necessary e?istence#

)ll illusions in an argument are more easily !etecte! hen they are %resente! in the formal manner em%loye! by the schools, hich e no %rocee! to !o# If the %ro%osition( GE"ery absolutely necessary being is like ise an ens realissimum,G is correct Dan! it is this hich constitutes the ner"us %roban!i of the cosmological argumentE, it must, like all affirmati"e ju!gements, be ca%able of con"ersionBthe con"ersio %er acci!ens, at least# It follo s, then, that some entia realissima are absolutely necessary beings# But no ens realissimum is in any res%ect !ifferent from another, an! hat is "ali! of some is "ali! of all# In this %resent case, therefore, I may em%loy sim%le con"ersion, an! say( GE"ery ens realissimum is a necessary being#G But as this %ro%osition is !etermine! a %riori by the conce%tions containe! in it, the mere conce%tion of an ens realissimum must %ossess the a!!itional attribute of absolute necessity# But this is e?actly hat as maintaine! in the ontological argument, an! not recogniCe! by the cosmological, although it forme! the real groun! of its !isguise! an! illusory reasoning# Thus the secon! mo!e em%loye! by s%eculati"e reason of !emonstrating the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, is not only, like the first, illusory an! ina!equate, but %ossesses the a!!itional blemish of an ignoratio elenchiB%rofessing to con!uct us by a ne roa! to the !esire! goal, but bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the ol! %ath hich e ha! !eserte! at its call# I mentione! abo"e that this cosmological argument contains a %erfect nest of !ialectical assum%tions, hich transcen!ental criticism !oes not fin! it !ifficult to e?%ose an! to !issi%ate# I shall merely enumerate these, lea"ing it to the rea!er, ho must by this time be ell %ractise! in such matters, to in"estigate the fallacies resi!ing therein# The follo ing fallacies, for e?am%le, are !isco"erable in this mo!e of %roof( 6# The transcen!ental %rinci%le( GE"erything that is contingent must ha"e a causeGBa %rinci%le ithout significance, e?ce%t in the sensuous orl!# :or the %urely intellectual conce%tion of the contingent cannot %ro!uce any synthetical %ro%osition, like that of causality, hich is itself ithout significance or !istinguishing characteristic e?ce%t in the %henomenal orl!# But in the %resent case it is em%loye! to hel% us beyon! the limits of its s%here# ,# G:rom the im%ossibility of an infinite ascen!ing series of causes in the orl! of sense a first cause is inferre!G@ a conclusion hich the %rinci%les of the em%loyment of reason !o not justify e"en in the s%here of e?%erience, an! still less hen an attem%t is ma!e to %ass the limits of this s%here# .# Reason allo s itself to be satisfie! u%on insufficient groun!s, ith regar! to the com%letion of this series# It remo"es all con!itions D ithout hich, ho e"er, no conce%tion of <ecessity can take %laceE@ an!, as after this it is beyon! our %o er to form any other conce%tions, it acce%ts this as a com%letion of the conce%tion it ishes to form of the series# 1# The logical %ossibility of a conce%tion of the total of reality Dthe criterion of this %ossibility being the absence of contra!ictionE is confoun!e! ith the transcen!ental, hich requires a %rinci%le of the %racticability of such a synthesisBa %rinci%le hich again refers us to the orl! of e?%erience# )n! so on#

The aim of the cosmological argument is to a"oi! the necessity of %ro"ing the e?istence of a necessary being %riori from mere conce%tionsBa %roof hich must be ontological, an! of hich e feel oursel"es quite inca%able# >ith this %ur%ose, e reason from an actual e?istenceBan e?%erience in general, to an absolutely necessary con!ition of that e?istence# It is in this case unnecessary to !emonstrate its %ossibility# :or after ha"ing %ro"e! that it e?ists, the question regar!ing its %ossibility is su%erfluous# <o , hen e ish to !efine more strictly the nature of this necessary being, e !o not look out for some being the conce%tion of hich oul! enable us to com%rehen! the necessity of its beingBfor if e coul! !o this, an em%irical %resu%%osition oul! be unnecessary@ no, e try to !isco"er merely the negati"e con!ition Dcon!itio sine qua nonE, ithout hich a being oul! not be absolutely necessary# <o this oul! be %erfectly a!missible in e"ery sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its %rinci%le@ but in the %resent case it unfortunately ha%%ens that the con!ition of absolute necessity can be !isco"ere! in but a single being, the conce%tion of hich must consequently contain all that is requisite for !emonstrating the %resence of absolute necessity, an! thus entitle me to infer this absolute necessity a %riori# That is, it must be %ossible to reason con"ersely, an! say( The thing, to hich the conce%tion of the highest reality belongs, is absolutely necessary# But if I cannot reason thusBan! I cannot, unless I belie"e in the sufficiency of the ontological argumentBI fin! insurmountable obstacles in my ne %ath, an! am really no farther than the %oint from hich I set out# The conce%tion of a 7u%reme Being satisfies all questions a %riori regar!ing the internal !eterminations of a thing, an! is for this reason an i!eal ithout equal or %arallel, the general conce%tion of it in!icating it as at the same time an ens in!i"i!uum among all %ossible things# But the conce%tion !oes not satisfy the question regar!ing its e?istenceB hich as the %ur%ose of all our inquiries@ an!, although the e?istence of a necessary being ere a!mitte!, e shoul! fin! it im%ossible to ans er the question( >hat of all things in the orl! must be regar!e! as suchH It is certainly allo able to a!mit the e?istence of an all&sufficient beingBa cause of all %ossible effectsBfor the %ur%ose of enabling reason to intro!uce unity into its mo!e an! groun!s of e?%lanation ith regar! to %henomena# But to assert that such a being necessarily e?ists, is no longer the mo!est enunciation of an a!missible hy%othesis, but the bol!est !eclaration of an a%o!eictic certainty@ for the cognition of that hich is absolutely necessary must itself %ossess that character# The aim of the transcen!ental i!eal forme! by the min! is either to !isco"er a conce%tion hich shall harmoniCe ith the i!ea of absolute necessity, or a conce%tion hich shall contain that i!ea# If the one is %ossible, so is the other@ for reason recogniCes that alone as absolutely necessary hich is necessary from its conce%tion# But both attem%ts are equally beyon! our %o erB e fin! it im%ossible to satisfy the un!erstan!ing u%on this %oint, an! as im%ossible to in!uce it to remain at rest in relation to this inca%acity# 4ncon!itione! necessity, hich, as the ultimate su%%ort an! stay of all e?isting things, is an in!is%ensable requirement of the min!, is an abyss on the "erge of hich human reason trembles in !ismay# E"en the i!ea of eternity, terrible an! sublime as it is, as !e%icte! by ;aller, !oes not %ro!uce u%on the mental "ision such a feeling of a e an!

terror@ for, although it measures the !uration of things, it !oes not su%%ort them# >e cannot bear, nor can e ri! oursel"es of the thought that a being, hich e regar! as the greatest of all %ossible e?istences, shoul! say to himself( I am from eternity to eternity@ besi!e me there is nothing, e?ce%t that hich e?ists by my ill@ hence then am IH ;ere all sinks a ay from un!er us@ an! the greatest, as the smallest, %erfection, ho"ers ithout stay or footing in %resence of the s%eculati"e reason, hich fin!s it as easy to %art ith the one as ith the other# Aany %hysical %o ers, hich e"i!ence their e?istence by their effects, are %erfectly inscrutable in their nature@ they elu!e all our %o ers of obser"ation# The transcen!ental object hich forms the basis of %henomena, an!, in connection ith it, the reason hy our sensibility %ossesses this rather than that %articular kin! of con!itions, are an! must e"er remain hi!!en from our mental "ision@ the fact is there, the reason of the fact e cannot see# But an i!eal of %ure reason cannot be terme! mysterious or inscrutable, because the only cre!ential of its reality is the nee! of it felt by reason, for the %ur%ose of gi"ing com%leteness to the orl! of synthetical unity# )n i!eal is not e"en gi"en as a cogitable object, an! therefore cannot be inscrutable@ on the contrary, it must, as a mere i!ea, be base! on the constitution of reason itself, an! on this account must be ca%able of e?%lanation an! solution# :or the "ery essence of reason consists in its ability to gi"e an account, of all our conce%tions, o%inions, an! assertionsBu%on objecti"e, or, hen they ha%%en to be illusory an! fallacious, u%on subjecti"e groun!s# *etection an! E?%lanation of the *ialectical Illusion in all Transcen!ental )rguments for the E?istence of a <ecessary Being# Both of the abo"e arguments are transcen!ental@ in other or!s, they !o not %rocee! u%on em%irical %rinci%les# :or, although the cosmological argument %rofesse! to lay a basis of e?%erience for its e!ifice of reasoning, it !i! not groun! its %roce!ure u%on the %eculiar constitution of e?%erience, but u%on %ure %rinci%les of reasonBin relation to an e?istence gi"en by em%irical consciousness@ utterly aban!oning its gui!ance, ho e"er, for the %ur%ose of su%%orting its assertions entirely u%on %ure conce%tions# <o hat is the cause, in these transcen!ental arguments, of the !ialectical, but natural, illusion, hich connects the conce%tions of necessity an! su%reme reality, an! hy%ostatiCes that hich cannot be anything but an i!eaH >hat is the cause of this una"oi!able ste% on the %art of reason, of a!mitting that some one among all e?isting things must be necessary, hile it falls back from the assertion of the e?istence of such a being as from an abyssH )n! ho !oes reason %rocee! to e?%lain this anomaly to itself, an! from the a"ering con!ition of a timi! an! reluctant a%%robationBal ays again ith!ra nBarri"e at a calm an! settle! insight into its causeH It is something "ery remarkable that, on the su%%osition that something e?ists, I cannot a"oi! the inference that something e?ists necessarily# 4%on this %erfectly naturalBbut not on that account reliableBinference !oes the cosmological argument rest# But, let me form any conce%tion hate"er of a thing, I fin! that I cannot cogitate the e?istence of the thing as absolutely necessary, an! that nothing %re"ents meBbe the thing or being hat it mayBfrom cogitating its non&e?istence# I may thus be oblige! to a!mit that all e?isting things ha"e a necessary basis, hile I cannot cogitate any single or in!i"i!ual

thing as necessary# In other or!s, I can ne"er com%lete the regress through the con!itions of e?istence, ithout a!mitting the e?istence of a necessary being@ but, on the other han!, I cannot make a commencement from this being# If I must cogitate something as e?isting necessarily as the basis of e?isting things, an! yet am not %ermitte! to cogitate any in!i"i!ual thing as in itself necessary, the ine"itable inference is that necessity an! contingency are not %ro%erties of things themsel"esB other ise an internal contra!iction oul! result@ that consequently neither of these %rinci%les are objecti"e, but merely subjecti"e %rinci%les of reasonBthe one requiring us to seek for a necessary groun! for e"erything that e?ists, that is, to be satisfie! ith no other e?%lanation than that hich is com%lete a %riori, the other forbi!!ing us e"er to ho%e for the attainment of this com%leteness, that is, to regar! no member of the em%irical orl! as uncon!itione!# In this mo!e of "ie ing them, both %rinci%les, in their %urely heuristic an! regulati"e character, an! as concerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite consistent ith each other# The one says( G$ou must %hiloso%hiCe u%on nature,G as if there e?iste! a necessary %rimal basis of all e?isting things, solely for the %ur%ose of intro!ucing systematic unity into your kno le!ge, by %ursuing an i!ea of this characterBa foun!ation hich is arbitrarily a!mitte! to be ultimate@ hile the other arns you to consi!er no in!i"i!ual !etermination, concerning the e?istence of things, as such an ultimate foun!ation, that is, as absolutely necessary, but to kee% the ay al ays o%en for further %rogress in the !e!uction, an! to treat e"ery !etermination as !etermine! by some other# But if all that e %ercei"e must be regar!e! as con!itionally necessary, it is im%ossible that anything hich is em%irically gi"en shoul! be absolutely necessary# It follo s from this that you must acce%t the absolutely necessary as out of an! beyon! the orl!, inasmuch as it is useful only as a %rinci%le of the highest %ossible unity in e?%erience, an! you cannot !isco"er any such necessary e?istence in the oul!, the secon! rule requiring you to regar! all em%irical causes of unity as themsel"es !e!uce!# The %hiloso%hers of antiquity regar!e! all the forms of nature as contingent@ hile matter as consi!ere! by them, in accor!ance ith the ju!gement of the common reason of mankin!, as %rimal an! necessary# But if they ha! regar!e! matter, not relati"elyBas the substratum of %henomena, but absolutely an! in itselfBas an in!e%en!ent e?istence, this i!ea of absolute necessity oul! ha"e imme!iately !isa%%eare!# :or there is nothing absolutely connecting reason ith such an e?istence@ on the contrary, it can annihilate it in thought, al ays an! ithout self&contra!iction# But in thought alone lay the i!ea of absolute necessity# ) regulati"e %rinci%le must, therefore, ha"e been at the foun!ation of this o%inion# In fact, e?tension an! im%enetrabilityB hich together constitute our conce%tion of matterBform the su%reme em%irical %rinci%le of the unity of %henomena, an! this %rinci%le, in so far as it is em%irically uncon!itione!, %ossesses the %ro%erty of a regulati"e %rinci%le# But, as e"ery !etermination of matter hich constitutes hat is real in itBan! consequently im%enetrabilityBis an effect, hich must ha"e a cause, an! is for this reason al ays !eri"e!, the notion of matter cannot harmoniCe ith the i!ea of a necessary being, in its character of the %rinci%le of all !eri"e! unity# :or e"ery one of its real %ro%erties, being !eri"e!, must be only con!itionally necessary, an! can therefore be annihilate! in

thought@ an! thus the hole e?istence of matter can be so annihilate! or su%%resse!# If this ere not the case, e shoul! ha"e foun! in the orl! of %henomena the highest groun! or con!ition of unityB hich is im%ossible, accor!ing to the secon! regulati"e %rinci%le# It follo s that matter, an!, in general, all that forms %art of the orl! of sense, cannot be a necessary %rimal being, nor e"en a %rinci%le of em%irical unity, but that this being or %rinci%le must ha"e its %lace assigne! ithout the orl!# )n!, in this ay, e can %rocee! in %erfect confi!ence to !e!uce the %henomena of the orl! an! their e?istence from other %henomena, just as if there e?iste! no necessary being@ an! e can at the same time, stri"e ithout ceasing to ar!s the attainment of com%leteness for our !e!uction, just as if such a beingBthe su%reme con!ition of all e?istencesB ere %resu%%ose! by the min!# These remarks ill ha"e ma!e it e"i!ent to the rea!er that the i!eal of the 7u%reme Being, far from being an enouncement of the e?istence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulati"e %rinci%le of reason, requiring us to regar! all connection e?isting bet een %henomena as if it ha! its origin from an all&sufficient necessary cause, an! basing u%on this the rule of a systematic an! necessary unity in the e?%lanation of %henomena# >e cannot, at the same time, a"oi! regar!ing, by a transcen!ental subre%tio, this formal %rinci%le as constituti"e, an! hy%ostatiCing this unity# Precisely similar is the case ith our notion of s%ace# 7%ace is the %rimal con!ition of all forms, hich are %ro%erly just so many !ifferent limitations of it@ an! thus, although it is merely a %rinci%le of sensibility, e cannot hel% regar!ing it as an absolutely necessary an! self&subsistent thingBas an object gi"en a %riori in itself# In the same ay, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be establishe! as a %rinci%le for the em%irical em%loyment of reason, unless it is base! u%on the i!ea of an ens realissimum, as the su%reme cause, e shoul! regar! this i!ea as a real object, an! this object, in its character of su%reme con!ition, as absolutely necessary, an! that in this ay a regulati"e shoul! be transforme! into a constituti"e %rinci%le# This interchange becomes e"i!ent hen I regar! this su%reme being, hich, relati"ely to the orl!, as absolutely Duncon!itionallyE necessary, as a thing %er se# In this case, I fin! it im%ossible to re%resent this necessity in or by any conce%tion, an! it e?ists merely in my o n min!, as the formal con!ition of thought, but not as a material an! hy%ostatic con!ition of e?istence# 7ECTI9< KI# 9f the Im%ossibility of a Physico&Theological Proof# If, then, neither a %ure conce%tion nor the general e?%erience of an e?isting being can %ro"i!e a sufficient basis for the %roof of the e?istence of the *eity, e can make the attem%t by the only other mo!eBthat of groun!ing our argument u%on a !eterminate e?%erience of the %henomena of the %resent orl!, their constitution an! !is%osition, an! !isco"er hether e can thus attain to a soun! con"iction of the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being# This argument e shall term the %hysico&theological argument# If it is sho n to be insufficient, s%eculati"e reason cannot %resent us ith any satisfactory %roof of the e?istence of a being corres%on!ing to our transcen!ental i!ea# It is e"i!ent from the remarks that ha"e been ma!e in the %rece!ing sections, that an ans er to this question ill be far from being !ifficult or uncon"incing# :or ho can any

e?%erience be a!equate ith an i!eaH The "ery essence of an i!ea consists in the fact that no e?%erience can e"er be !isco"ere! congruent or a!equate ith it# The transcen!ental i!ea of a necessary an! all&sufficient being is so immeasurably great, so high abo"e all that is em%irical, hich is al ays con!itione!, that e ho%e in "ain to fin! materials in the s%here of e?%erience sufficiently am%le for our conce%tion, an! in "ain seek the uncon!itione! among things that are con!itione!, hile e?am%les, nay, e"en gui!ance is !enie! us by the la s of em%irical synthesis# If the 7u%reme Being forms a link in the chain of em%irical con!itions, it must be a member of the em%irical series, an!, like the lo er members hich it %rece!es, ha"e its origin in some higher member of the series# If, on the other han!, e !isengage it from the chain, an! cogitate it as an intelligible being, a%art from the series of natural causes Bho shall reason bri!ge the abyss that se%arates the latter from the formerH )ll la s res%ecting the regress from effects to causes, all synthetical a!!itions to our kno le!ge relate solely to %ossible e?%erience an! the objects of the sensuous orl!, an!, a%art from them, are ithout significance# The orl! aroun! us o%ens before our "ie so magnificent a s%ectacle of or!er, "ariety, beauty, an! conformity to en!s, that hether e %ursue our obser"ations into the infinity of s%ace in the one !irection, or into its illimitable !i"isions in the other, hether e regar! the orl! in its greatest or its least manifestationsBe"en after e ha"e attaine! to the highest summit of kno le!ge hich our eak min!s can reach, e fin! that language in the %resence of on!ers so inconcei"able has lost its force, an! number its %o er to reckon, nay, e"en thought fails to concei"e a!equately, an! our conce%tion of the hole !issol"es into an astonishment ithout %o er of e?%ressionBall the more eloquent that it is !umb# E"ery here aroun! us e obser"e a chain of causes an! effects, of means an! en!s, of !eath an! birth@ an!, as nothing has entere! of itself into the con!ition in hich e fin! it, e are constantly referre! to some other thing, hich itself suggests the same inquiry regar!ing its cause, an! thus the uni"erse must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless e a!mit that, besi!es this infinite chain of contingencies, there e?ists something that is %rimal an! self&subsistentBsomething hich, as the cause of this %henomenal orl!, secures its continuance an! %reser"ation# This highest causeB hat magnitu!e shall e attribute to itH 9f the content of the orl! e are ignorant@ still less can e estimate its magnitu!e by com%arison ith the s%here of the %ossible# But this su%reme cause being a necessity of the human min!, hat is there to %re"ent us from attributing to it such a !egree of %erfection as to %lace it abo"e the s%here of all that is %ossibleH This e can easily !o, although only by the ai! of the faint outline of an abstract conce%tion, by re%resenting this being to oursel"es as containing in itself, as an in!i"i!ual substance, all %ossible %erfectionBa conce%tion hich satisfies that requirement of reason hich !eman!s %arsimony in %rinci%les, hich is free from self&contra!iction, hich e"en contributes to the e?tension of the em%loyment of reason in e?%erience, by means of the gui!ance affor!e! by this i!ea to or!er an! system, an! hich in no res%ect conflicts ith any la of e?%erience# This argument al ays !eser"es to be mentione! ith res%ect# It is the ol!est, the clearest, an! that most in conformity ith the common reason of humanity# It animates

the stu!y of nature, as it itself !eri"es its e?istence an! !ra s e"er ne strength from that source# It intro!uces aims an! en!s into a s%here in hich our obser"ation coul! not of itself ha"e !isco"ere! them, an! e?ten!s our kno le!ge of nature, by !irecting our attention to a unity, the %rinci%le of hich lies beyon! nature# This kno le!ge of nature again reacts u%on this i!eaBits cause@ an! thus our belief in a !i"ine author of the uni"erse rises to the %o er of an irresistible con"iction# :or these reasons it oul! be utterly ho%eless to attem%t to rob this argument of the authority it has al ays enjoye!# The min!, unceasingly ele"ate! by these consi!erations, hich, although em%irical, are so remarkably %o erful, an! continually a!!ing to their force, ill not suffer itself to be !e%resse! by the !oubts suggeste! by subtle s%eculation@ it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look u%on the on!rous forms of nature an! the majesty of the uni"erse, an! rises from height to height, from con!ition to con!ition, till it has ele"ate! itself to the su%reme an! uncon!itione! author of all# But although e ha"e nothing to object to the reasonableness an! utility of this %roce!ure, but ha"e rather to commen! an! encourage it, e cannot a%%ro"e of the claims hich this argument a!"ances to !emonstrati"e certainty an! to a rece%tion u%on its o n merits, a%art from fa"our or su%%ort by other arguments# <or can it injure the cause of morality to en!ea"our to lo er the tone of the arrogant so%hist, an! to teach him that mo!esty an! mo!eration hich are the %ro%erties of a belief that brings calm an! content into the min!, ithout %rescribing to it an un orthy subjection# I maintain, then, that the %hysico&theological argument is insufficient of itself to %ro"e the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, that it must entrust this to the ontological argumentB to hich it ser"es merely as an intro!uction, an! that, consequently, this argument contains the only %ossible groun! of %roof D%ossesse! by s%eculati"e reasonE for the e?istence of this being# The chief momenta in the %hysico&theological argument are as follo ( 6# >e obser"e in the orl! manifest signs of an arrangement full of %ur%ose, e?ecute! ith great is!om, an! argument in hole of a content in!escribably "arious, an! of an e?tent ithout limits# ,# This arrangement of means an! en!s is entirely foreign to the things e?isting in the orl!Bit belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute@ in other or!s, the nature of !ifferent things coul! not of itself, hate"er means ere em%loye!, harmoniously ten! to ar!s certain %ur%oses, ere they not chosen an! !irecte! for these %ur%oses by a rational an! !is%osing %rinci%le, in accor!ance ith certain fun!amental i!eas# .# There e?ists, therefore, a sublime an! ise cause Dor se"eralE, hich is not merely a blin!, all&%o erful nature, %ro!ucing the beings an! e"ents hich fill the orl! in unconscious fecun!ity, but a free an! intelligent cause of the orl!# 1# The unity of this cause may be inferre! from the unity of the reci%rocal relation e?isting bet een the %arts of the orl!, as %ortions of an artistic e!ificeBan inference hich all our obser"ation fa"ours, an! all %rinci%les of analogy su%%ort# In the abo"e argument, it is inferre! from the analogy of certain %ro!ucts of nature ith those of human art, hen it com%els <ature to ben! herself to its %ur%oses, as in the case of a house, a shi%, or a atch, that the same kin! of causalityBnamely,

un!erstan!ing an! illBresi!es in nature# It is also !eclare! that the internal %ossibility of this freely&acting nature D hich is the source of all art, an! %erha%s also of human reasonE is !eri"able from another an! su%erhuman artBa conclusion hich oul! %erha%s be foun! inca%able of stan!ing the test of subtle transcen!ental criticism# But to neither of these o%inions shall e at %resent object# >e shall only remark that it must be confesse! that, if e are to !iscuss the subject of cause at all, e cannot %rocee! more securely than ith the gui!ance of the analogy subsisting bet een nature an! such %ro!ucts of !esignBthese being the only %ro!ucts hose causes an! mo!es of organiCation are com%letely kno n to us# Reason oul! be unable to satisfy her o n requirements, if she %asse! from a causality hich she !oes kno , to obscure an! in!emonstrable %rinci%les of e?%lanation hich she !oes not kno # )ccor!ing to the %hysico&theological argument, the connection an! harmony e?isting in the orl! e"i!ence the contingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the orl!# To establish the truth of the latter o%inion, it oul! be necessary to %ro"e that all things oul! be in themsel"es inca%able of this harmony an! or!er, unless they ere, e"en as regar!s their substance, the %ro!uct of a su%reme is!om# But this oul! require "ery !ifferent groun!s of %roof from those %resente! by the analogy ith human art# This %roof can at most, therefore, !emonstrate the e?istence of an architect of the orl!, hose efforts are limite! by the ca%abilities of the material ith hich he orks, but not of a creator of the orl!, to hom all things are subject# Thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task before usBa !emonstration of the e?istence of an all&sufficient being# If e ish to %ro"e the contingency of matter, e must ha"e recourse to a transcen!ental argument, hich the %hysico&theological as constructe! e?%ressly to a"oi!# >e infer, from the or!er an! !esign "isible in the uni"erse, as a !is%osition of a thoroughly contingent character, the e?istence of a cause %ro%ortionate thereto# The conce%tion of this cause must contain certain !eterminate qualities, an! it must therefore be regar!e! as the conce%tion of a being hich %ossesses all %o er, is!om, an! so on, in one or!, all %erfectionBthe conce%tion, that is, of an all&sufficient being# :or the %re!icates of "ery great, astonishing, or immeasurable %o er an! e?cellence, gi"e us no !eterminate conce%tion of the thing, nor !o they inform us hat the thing may be in itself# They merely in!icate the relation e?isting bet een the magnitu!e of the object an! the obser"er, ho com%ares it ith himself an! ith his o n %o er of com%rehension, an! are mere e?%ressions of %raise an! re"erence, by hich the object is either magnifie!, or the obser"ing subject !e%reciate! in relation to the object# >here e ha"e to !o ith the magnitu!e Dof the %erfectionE of a thing, e can !isco"er no !eterminate conce%tion, e?ce%t that hich com%rehen!s all %ossible %erfection or com%leteness, an! it is only the total Domnitu!oE of reality hich is com%letely !etermine! in an! through its conce%tion alone# <o it cannot be e?%ecte! that any one ill be bol! enough to !eclare that he has a %erfect insight into the relation hich the magnitu!e of the orl! he contem%lates bears Din its e?tent as ell as in its contentE to omni%otence, into that of the or!er an! !esign in the orl! to the highest is!om, an! that of the unity of the orl! to the absolute unity of a 7u%reme Being# Physico&theology is therefore inca%able of %resenting a

!eterminate conce%tion of a su%reme cause of the orl!, an! is therefore insufficient as a %rinci%le of theologyBa theology hich is itself to be the basis of religion# The attainment of absolute totality is com%letely im%ossible on the %ath of em%iricism# )n! yet this is the %ath %ursue! in the %hysico&theological argument# >hat means shall e em%loy to bri!ge the abyssH )fter ele"ating oursel"es to a!miration of the magnitu!e of the %o er, is!om, an! other attributes of the author of the orl!, an! fin!ing e can a!"ance no further, e lea"e the argument on em%irical groun!s, an! %rocee! to infer the contingency of the orl! from the or!er an! conformity to aims that are obser"able in it# :rom this contingency e infer, by the hel% of transcen!ental conce%tions alone, the e?istence of something absolutely necessary@ an!, still a!"ancing, %rocee! from the conce%tion of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the com%letely !etermine! or !etermining conce%tion thereofBthe conce%tion of an all&embracing reality# Thus the %hysico& theological, failing in its un!ertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument@ an!, as this is merely the ontological argument in !isguise, it e?ecutes its !esign solely by the ai! of %ure reason, although it at first %rofesse! to ha"e no connection ith this faculty an! to base its entire %roce!ure u%on e?%erience alone# The %hysico&theologians ha"e therefore no reason to regar! ith such contem%t the transcen!ental mo!e of argument, an! to look !o n u%on it, ith the conceit of clear& sighte! obser"ers of nature, as the brain&cob eb of obscure s%eculatists# :or, if they reflect u%on an! e?amine their o n arguments, they ill fin! that, after follo ing for some time the %ath of nature an! e?%erience, an! !isco"ering themsel"es no nearer their object, they su!!enly lea"e this %ath an! %ass into the region of %ure %ossibility, here they ho%e to reach u%on the ings of i!eas hat ha! elu!e! all their em%irical in"estigations# Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense lea%, they e?ten! their !eterminate conce%tionBinto the %ossession of hich they ha"e come, they kno not ho Bo"er the hole s%here of creation, an! e?%lain their i!eal, hich is entirely a %ro!uct of %ure reason, by illustrations !ra n from e?%erienceBthough in a !egree miserably un orthy of the gran!eur of the object, hile they refuse to ackno le!ge that they ha"e arri"e! at this cognition or hy%othesis by a "ery !ifferent roa! from that of e?%erience# Thus the %hysico&theological is base! u%on the cosmological, an! this u%on the ontological %roof of the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being@ an! as besi!es these three there is no other %ath o%en to s%eculati"e reason, the ontological %roof, on the groun! of %ure conce%tions of reason, is the only %ossible one, if any %roof of a %ro%osition so far transcen!ing the em%irical e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing is %ossible at all# 7ECTI9< KII# Critique of all Theology base! u%on 7%eculati"e Princi%les of Reason# If by the term theology I un!erstan! the cognition of a %rimal being, that cognition is base! either u%on reason alone Dtheologia rationalisE or u%on re"elation Dtheologia re"elataE# The former cogitates its object either by means of %ure transcen!ental conce%tions, as an ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium, an! is terme!

transcen!ental theology@ or, by means of a conce%tion !eri"e! from the nature of our o n min!, as a su%reme intelligence, an! must then be entitle! natural theology# The %erson ho belie"es in a transcen!ental theology alone, is terme! a !eist@ he ho ackno le!ges the %ossibility of a natural theology also, a theist# The former a!mits that e can cogniCe by %ure reason alone the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, but at the same time maintains that our conce%tion of this being is %urely transcen!ental, an! that all e can say of it is that it %ossesses all reality, ithout being able to !efine it more closely# The secon! asserts that reason is ca%able of %resenting us, from the analogy ith nature, ith a more !efinite conce%tion of this being, an! that its o%erations, as the cause of all things, are the results of intelligence an! free ill# The former regar!s the 7u%reme Being as the cause of the orl!B hether by the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left un!etermine!@ the latter consi!ers this being as the author of the orl!# Transcen!ental theology aims either at inferring the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being from a general e?%erience, ithout any closer reference to the orl! to hich this e?%erience belongs, an! in this case it is calle! cosmotheology@ or it en!ea"ours to cogniCe the e?istence of such a being, through mere conce%tions, ithout the ai! of e?%erience, an! is then terme! ontotheology# <atural theology infers the attributes an! the e?istence of an author of the orl!, from the constitution of, the or!er an! unity obser"able in, the orl!, in hich t o mo!es of causality must be a!mitte! to e?istBthose of nature an! free!om# Thus it rises from this orl! to a su%reme intelligence, either as the %rinci%le of all natural, or of all moral or!er an! %erfection# In the former case it is terme! %hysico&theology, in the latter, ethical or moral&theology#8 /8:ootnote( <ot theological ethics@ for this science contains ethical la s, hich %resu%%ose the e?istence of a 7u%reme Go"ernor of the orl!@ hile moral&theology, on the contrary, is the e?%ression of a con"iction of the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, foun!e! u%on ethical la s#3 )s e are ont to un!erstan! by the term Go! not merely an eternal nature, the o%erations of hich are insensate an! blin!, but a 7u%reme Being, ho is the free an! intelligent author of all things, an! as it is this latter "ie alone that can be of interest to humanity, e might, in strict rigour, !eny to the !eist any belief in Go! at all, an! regar! him merely as a maintainer of the e?istence of a %rimal being or thingBthe su%reme cause of all other things# But, as no one ought to be blame!, merely because he !oes not feel himself justifie! in maintaining a certain o%inion, as if he altogether !enie! its truth an! asserte! the o%%osite, it is more correctBas it is less harshBto say, the !eist belie"es in a Go!, the theist in a li"ing Go! Dsumma intelligentiaE# >e shall no %rocee! to in"estigate the sources of all these attem%ts of reason to establish the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being# It may be sufficient in this %lace to !efine theoretical kno le!ge or cognition as kno le!ge of that hich is, an! %ractical kno le!ge as kno le!ge of that hich ought to be# In this "ie , the theoretical em%loyment of reason is that by hich I cogniCe a

%riori Das necessaryE that something is, hile the %ractical is that by hich I cogniCe a %riori hat ought to ha%%en# <o , if it is an in!ubitably certain, though at the same time an entirely con!itione! truth, that something is, or ought to ha%%en, either a certain !eterminate con!ition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a con!ition may be arbitrarily %resu%%ose!# In the former case the con!ition is %ostulate! D%er thesinE, in the latter su%%ose! D%er hy%othesinE# There are certain %ractical la sBthose of moralityB hich are absolutely necessary# <o , if these la s necessarily %resu%%ose the e?istence of some being, as the con!ition of the %ossibility of their obligatory %o er, this being must be %ostulate!, because the con!itione!, from hich e reason to this !eterminate con!ition, is itself cogniCe! a %riori as absolutely necessary# >e shall at some future time sho that the moral la s not merely %resu%%ose the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, but also, as themsel"es absolutely necessary in a !ifferent relation, !eman! or %ostulate itBalthough only from a %ractical %oint of "ie # The !iscussion of this argument e %ost%one for the %resent# >hen the question relates merely to that hich is, not to that hich ought to be, the con!itione! hich is %resente! in e?%erience is al ays cogitate! as contingent# :or this reason its con!ition cannot be regar!e! as absolutely necessary, but merely as relati"ely necessary, or rather as nee!ful@ the con!ition is in itself an! a %riori a mere arbitrary %resu%%osition in ai! of the cognition, by reason, of the con!itione!# If, then, e are to %ossess a theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing, e cannot attain to this cognition other ise than a %riori by means of conce%tions@ hile it is im%ossible in this ay to cogniCe the e?istence of a cause hich bears any relation to an e?istence gi"en in e?%erience# Theoretical cognition is s%eculati"e hen it relates to an object or certain conce%tions of an object hich is not gi"en an! cannot be !isco"ere! by means of e?%erience# It is o%%ose! to the cognition of nature, hich concerns only those objects or %re!icates hich can be %resente! in a %ossible e?%erience# The %rinci%le that e"erything hich ha%%ens Dthe em%irically contingentE must ha"e a cause, is a %rinci%le of the cognition of nature, but not of s%eculati"e cognition# :or, if e change it into an abstract %rinci%le, an! !e%ri"e it of its reference to e?%erience an! the em%irical, e shall fin! that it cannot ith justice be regar!e! any longer as a synthetical %ro%osition, an! that it is im%ossible to !isco"er any mo!e of transition from that hich e?ists to something entirely !ifferentBterme! cause# <ay, more, the conce%tion of a cause like ise that of the contingentBloses, in this s%eculati"e mo!e of em%loying it, all significance, for its objecti"e reality an! meaning are com%rehensible from e?%erience alone# >hen from the e?istence of the uni"erse an! the things in it the e?istence of a cause of the uni"erse is inferre!, reason is %rocee!ing not in the natural, but in the s%eculati"e metho!# :or the %rinci%le of the former enounces, not that things themsel"es or substances, but only that hich ha%%ens or their statesBas em%irically contingent, ha"e a cause( the assertion that the e?istence of substance itself is contingent is not justifie! by e?%erience, it is the assertion of a reason em%loying its %rinci%les in a s%eculati"e manner# If, again, I infer from the form of the uni"erse, from the ay in hich all things

are connecte! an! act an! react u%on each other, the e?istence of a cause entirely !istinct from the uni"erseBthis oul! again be a ju!gement of %urely s%eculati"e reason@ because the object in this caseBthe causeBcan ne"er be an object of %ossible e?%erience# In both these cases the %rinci%le of causality, hich is "ali! only in the fiel! of e?%erienceBuseless an! e"en meaningless beyon! this region, oul! be !i"erte! from its %ro%er !estination# <o I maintain that all attem%ts of reason to establish a theology by the ai! of s%eculation alone are fruitless, that the %rinci%les of reason as a%%lie! to nature !o not con!uct us to any theological truths, an!, consequently, that a rational theology can ha"e no e?istence, unless it is foun!e! u%on the la s of morality# :or all synthetical %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing are "ali! only as immanent in e?%erience@ hile the cognition of a 7u%reme Being necessitates their being em%loye! transcen!entally, an! of this the un!erstan!ing is quite inca%able# If the em%irical la of causality is to con!uct us to a 7u%reme Being, this being must belong to the chain of em%irical objectsBin hich case it oul! be, like all %henomena, itself con!itione!# If the %ossibility of %assing the limits of e?%erience be a!mitte!, by means of the !ynamical la of the relation of an effect to its cause, hat kin! of conce%tion shall e obtain by this %roce!ureH Certainly not the conce%tion of a 7u%reme Being, because e?%erience ne"er %resents us ith the greatest of all %ossible effects, an! it is only an effect of this character that coul! itness to the e?istence of a corres%on!ing cause# If, for the %ur%ose of fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, e recogniCe her right to assert the e?istence of a %erfect an! absolutely necessary being, this can be a!mitte! only from fa"our, an! cannot be regar!e! as the result or irresistible !emonstration# The %hysico& theological %roof may a!! eight to othersBif other %roofs there areBby connecting s%eculation ith e?%erience@ but in itself it rather %re%ares the min! for theological cognition, an! gi"es it a right an! natural !irection, than establishes a sure foun!ation for theology# It is no %erfectly e"i!ent that transcen!ental questions a!mit only of transcen!ental ans ersBthose %resente! a %riori by %ure conce%tions ithout the least em%irical a!mi?ture# But the question in the %resent case is e"i!ently syntheticalBit aims at the e?tension of our cognition beyon! the boun!s of e?%erienceBit requires an assurance res%ecting the e?istence of a being corres%on!ing ith the i!ea in our min!s, to hich no e?%erience can e"er be a!equate# <o it has been abun!antly %ro"e! that all a %riori synthetical cognition is %ossible only as the e?%ression of the formal con!itions of a %ossible e?%erience@ an! that the "ali!ity of all %rinci%les !e%en!s u%on their immanence in the fiel! of e?%erience, that is, their relation to objects of em%irical cognition or %henomena# Thus all transcen!ental %roce!ure in reference to s%eculati"e theology is ithout result# If any one %refers !oubting the conclusi"eness of the %roofs of our analytic to losing the %ersuasion of the "ali!ity of these ol! an! time honoure! arguments, he at least cannot !ecline ans ering the questionBho he can %ass the limits of all %ossible e?%erience by the hel% of mere i!eas# If he talks of ne arguments, or of im%ro"ements u%on ol! arguments, I request him to s%are me# There is certainly no great choice in this s%here of !iscussion, as all s%eculati"e arguments must at last look for su%%ort to the ontological,

an! I ha"e, therefore, "ery little to fear from the argumentati"e fecun!ity of the !ogmatical !efen!ers of a non&sensuous reason# >ithout looking u%on myself as a remarkably combati"e %erson, I shall not !ecline the challenge to !etect the fallacy an! !estroy the %retensions of e"ery attem%t of s%eculati"e theology# )n! yet the ho%e of better fortune ne"er !eserts those ho are accustome! to the !ogmatical mo!e of %roce!ure# I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the sim%le an! equitable !eman! that such reasoners ill !emonstrate, from the nature of the human min! as ell as from that of the other sources of kno le!ge, ho e are to %rocee! to e?ten! our cognition com%letely a %riori, an! to carry it to that %oint here e?%erience aban!ons us, an! no means e?ist of guaranteeing the objecti"e reality of our conce%tions# In hate"er ay the un!erstan!ing may ha"e attaine! to a conce%tion, the e?istence of the object of the conce%tion cannot be !isco"ere! in it by analysis, because the cognition of the e?istence of the object !e%en!s u%on the objectFs being %osite! an! gi"en in itself a%art from the conce%tion# But it is utterly im%ossible to go beyon! our conce%tion, ithout the ai! of e?%erienceB hich %resents to the min! nothing but %henomena, or to attain by the hel% of mere conce%tions to a con"iction of the e?istence of ne kin!s of objects or su%ernatural beings# But although %ure s%eculati"e reason is far from sufficient to !emonstrate the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, it is of the highest utility in correcting our conce%tion of this being Bon the su%%osition that e can attain to the cognition of it by some other meansBin making it consistent ith itself an! ith all other conce%tions of intelligible objects, clearing it from all that is incom%atible ith the conce%tion of an ens summun, an! eliminating from it all limitations or a!mi?tures of em%irical elements# Transcen!ental theology is still therefore, not ithstan!ing its objecti"e insufficiency, of im%ortance in a negati"e res%ect@ it is useful as a test of the %roce!ure of reason hen engage! ith %ure i!eas, no other than a transcen!ental stan!ar! being in this case a!missible# :or if, from a %ractical %oint of "ie , the hy%othesis of a 7u%reme an! )ll& sufficient Being is to maintain its "ali!ity ithout o%%osition, it must be of the highest im%ortance to !efine this conce%tion in a correct an! rigorous mannerBas the transcen!ental conce%tion of a necessary being, to eliminate all %henomenal elements Danthro%omor%hism in its most e?ten!e! significationE, an! at the same time to o"erflo all contra!ictory assertionsBbe they atheistic, !eistic, or anthro%omor%hic# This is of course "ery easy@ as the same arguments hich !emonstrate! the inability of human reason to affirm the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being must be alike sufficient to %ro"e the in"ali!ity of its !enial# :or it is im%ossible to gain from the %ure s%eculation of reason !emonstration that there e?ists no 7u%reme Being, as the groun! of all that e?ists, or that this being %ossesses none of those %ro%erties hich e regar! as analogical ith the !ynamical qualities of a thinking being, or that, as the anthro%omor%hists oul! ha"e us belie"e, it is subject to all the limitations hich sensibility im%oses u%on those intelligences hich e?ist in the orl! of e?%erience# ) 7u%reme Being is, therefore, for the s%eculati"e reason, a mere i!eal, though a faultless oneBa conce%tion hich %erfects an! cro ns the system of human cognition, but the objecti"e reality of hich can neither be %ro"e! nor !is%ro"e! by %ure reason# If this !efect is e"er su%%lie! by a moral theology, the %roblematic transcen!ental theology

hich has %rece!e!, ill ha"e been at least ser"iceable as !emonstrating the mental necessity e?isting for the conce%tion, by the com%lete !etermination of it hich it has furnishe!, an! the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason often !ecei"e! by sense, an! not al ays in harmony ith its o n i!eas# The attributes of necessity, infinitu!e, unity, e?istence a%art from the orl! Dan! not as a orl! soulE, eternity Dfree from con!itions of timeE, omni%resence Dfree from con!itions of s%aceE, omni%otence, an! others, are %ure transcen!ental %re!icates@ an! thus the accurate conce%tion of a 7u%reme Being, hich e"ery theology requires, is furnishe! by transcen!ental theology alone#

APPEN!I3. O+ t&e Re.ulat"0e Em2l%yment %+ t&e Ideas %+ Pure Reas%n. The result of all the !ialectical attem%ts of %ure reason not only confirms the truth of hat e ha"e alrea!y %ro"e! in our Transcen!ental )nalytic, namely, that all inferences hich oul! lea! us beyon! the limits of e?%erience are fallacious an! groun!less, but it at the same time teaches us this im%ortant lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to o"erste% these limits, an! that transcen!ental i!eas are as much the natural %ro%erty of the reason as categories are of the un!erstan!ing# There e?ists this !ifference, ho e"er, that hile the categories ne"er mislea! us, out ar! objects being al ays in %erfect harmony there ith, i!eas are the %arents of irresistible illusions, the se"erest an! most subtle criticism being require! to sa"e us from the fallacies hich they in!uce# >hate"er is groun!e! in the nature of our %o ers ill be foun! to be in harmony ith the final %ur%ose an! %ro%er em%loyment of these %o ers, hen once e ha"e !isco"ere! their true !irection an! aim# >e are entitle! to su%%ose, therefore, that there e?ists a mo!e of em%loying transcen!ental i!eas hich is %ro%er an! immanent@ although, hen e mistake their meaning, an! regar! them as conce%tions of actual things, their mo!e of a%%lication is transcen!ent an! !elusi"e# :or it is not the i!ea itself, but only the em%loyment of the i!ea in relation to %ossible e?%erience, that is transcen!ent or immanent# )n i!ea is em%loye! transcen!ently, hen it is a%%lie! to an object falsely belie"e! to be a!equate ith an! to corres%on! to it@ imminently, hen it is a%%lie! solely to the em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing in the s%here of e?%erience# Thus all errors of subre%tioBof misa%%lication, are to be ascribe! to !efects of ju!gement, an! not to un!erstan!ing or reason# Reason ne"er has an imme!iate relation to an object@ it relates imme!iately to the un!erstan!ing alone# It is only through the un!erstan!ing that it can be em%loye! in the fiel! of e?%erience# It !oes not form conce%tions of objects, it merely arranges them an! gi"es to them that unity hich they are ca%able of %ossessing hen the s%here of their a%%lication has been e?ten!e! as i!ely as %ossible# Reason a"ails itself of the

conce%tion of the un!erstan!ing for the sole %ur%ose of %ro!ucing totality in the !ifferent series# This totality the un!erstan!ing !oes not concern itself ith@ its only occu%ation is the connection of e?%eriences, by hich series of con!itions in accor!ance ith conce%tions are establishe!# The object of reason is, therefore, the un!erstan!ing an! its %ro%er !estination# )s the latter brings unity into the !i"ersity of objects by means of its conce%tions, so the former brings unity into the !i"ersity of conce%tions by means of i!eas@ as it sets the final aim of a collecti"e unity to the o%erations of the un!erstan!ing, hich ithout this occu%ies itself ith a !istributi"e unity alone# I accor!ingly maintain that transcen!ental i!eas can ne"er be em%loye! as constituti"e i!eas, that they cannot be conce%tions of objects, an! that, hen thus consi!ere!, they assume a fallacious an! !ialectical character# But, on the other han!, they are ca%able of an a!mirable an! in!is%ensably necessary a%%lication to objectsBas regulati"e i!eas, !irecting the un!erstan!ing to a certain aim, the gui!ing lines to ar!s hich all its la s follo , an! in hich they all meet in one %oint# This %ointBthough a mere i!ea Dfocus imaginariusE, that is, not a %oint from hich the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing !o really %rocee!, for it lies beyon! the s%here of %ossible e?%erienceBser"es, not ithstan!ing, to gi"e to these conce%tions the greatest %ossible unity combine! ith the greatest %ossible e?tension# ;ence arises the natural illusion hich in!uces us to belie"e that these lines %rocee! from an object hich lies out of the s%here of em%irical cognition, just as objects reflecte! in a mirror a%%ear to be behin! it# But this illusionB hich e may hin!er from im%osing u%on usBis necessary an! una"oi!able, if e !esire to see, not only those objects hich lie before us, but those hich are at a great !istance behin! us@ that is to say, hen, in the %resent case, e !irect the aims of the un!erstan!ing, beyon! e"ery gi"en e?%erience, to ar!s an e?tension as great as can %ossibly be attaine!# If e re"ie our cognitions in their entire e?tent, e shall fin! that the %eculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system, that is to say, to gi"e them connection accor!ing to a %rinci%le# This unity %resu%%oses an i!eaBthe i!ea of the form of a hole Dof cognitionE, %rece!ing the !eterminate cognition of the %arts, an! containing the con!itions hich !etermine a %riori to e"ery %art its %lace an! relation to the other %arts of the hole system# This i!ea, accor!ingly, !eman!s com%lete unity in the cognition of the un!erstan!ingBnot the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a system connecte! accor!ing to necessary la s# It cannot be affirme! ith %ro%riety that this i!ea is a conce%tion of an object@ it is merely a conce%tion of the com%lete unity of the conce%tions of objects, in so far as this unity is a"ailable to the un!erstan!ing as a rule# 7uch conce%tions of reason are not !eri"e! from nature@ on the contrary, e em%loy them for the interrogation an! in"estigation of nature, an! regar! our cognition as !efecti"e so long as it is not a!equate to them# >e a!mit that such a thing as %ure earth, %ure ater, or %ure air, is not to be !isco"ere!# )n! yet e require these conce%tions D hich ha"e their origin in the reason, so far as regar!s their absolute %urity an! com%letenessE for the %ur%ose of !etermining the share hich each of these natural causes has in e"ery %henomenon# Thus the !ifferent kin!s of matter are all referre! to earths, as mere eight@ to salts an! inflammable bo!ies, as %ure force@ an! finally, to ater an! air, as the "ehicula of the former, or the machines em%loye! by them in their o%erationsBfor the %ur%ose of e?%laining the chemical action an! reaction of bo!ies in

accor!ance ith the i!ea of a mechanism# :or, although not actually so e?%resse!, the influence of such i!eas of reason is "ery obser"able in the %roce!ure of natural %hiloso%hers# If reason is the faculty of !e!ucing the %articular from the general, an! if the general be certain in se an! gi"en, it is only necessary that the ju!gement shoul! subsume the %articular un!er the general, the %articular being thus necessarily !etermine!# I shall term this the !emonstrati"e or a%o!eictic em%loyment of reason# If, ho e"er, the general is a!mitte! as %roblematical only, an! is a mere i!ea, the %articular case is certain, but the uni"ersality of the rule hich a%%lies to this %articular case remains a %roblem# 7e"eral %articular cases, the certainty of hich is beyon! !oubt, are then taken an! e?amine!, for the %ur%ose of !isco"ering hether the rule is a%%licable to them@ an! if it a%%ears that all the %articular cases hich can be collecte! follo from the rule, its uni"ersality is inferre!, an! at the same time, all the causes hich ha"e not, or cannot be %resente! to our obser"ation, are conclu!e! to be of the same character ith those hich e ha"e obser"e!# This I shall term the hy%othetical em%loyment of the reason# The hy%othetical e?ercise of reason by the ai! of i!eas em%loye! as %roblematical conce%tions is %ro%erly not constituti"e# That is to say, if e consi!er the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, hich has been em%loye! as an hy%othesis, !oes not follo from the use that is ma!e of it by reason# :or ho can e kno all the %ossible cases that may ariseH some of hich may, ho e"er, %ro"e e?ce%tions to the uni"ersality of the rule# This em%loyment of reason is merely regulati"e, an! its sole aim is the intro!uction of unity into the aggregate of our %articular cognitions, an! thereby the a%%ro?imating of the rule to uni"ersality# The object of the hy%othetical em%loyment of reason is therefore the systematic unity of cognitions@ an! this unity is the criterion of the truth of a rule# 9n the other han!, this systematic unityBas a mere i!eaBis in fact merely a unity %rojecte!, not to be regar!e! as gi"en, but only in the light of a %roblemBa %roblem hich ser"es, ho e"er, as a %rinci%le for the "arious an! %articular e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing in e?%erience, !irects it ith regar! to those cases hich are not %resente! to our obser"ation, an! intro!uces harmony an! consistency into all its o%erations# )ll that e can be certain of from the abo"e consi!erations is that this systematic unity is a logical %rinci%le, hose aim is to assist the un!erstan!ing, here it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means of i!eas, to bring all these "arious rules un!er one %rinci%le, an! thus to ensure the most com%lete consistency an! connection that can be attaine!# But the assertion that objects an! the un!erstan!ing by hich they are cogniCe! are so constitute! as to be !etermine! to systematic unity, that this may be %ostulate! a %riori, ithout any reference to the interest of reason, an! that e are justifie! in !eclaring all %ossible cognitionsBem%irical an! othersBto %ossess systematic unity, an! to be subject to general %rinci%les from hich, not ithstan!ing their "arious character, they are all !eri"able such an assertion can be foun!e! only u%on a transcen!ental %rinci%le of reason, hich oul! ren!er this systematic unity not subjecti"ely an! logicallyBin its character of a metho!, but objecti"ely necessary#

>e shall illustrate this by an e?am%le# The conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing make us acquainte!, among many other kin!s of unity, ith that of the causality of a substance, hich is terme! %o er# The !ifferent %henomenal manifestations of the same substance a%%ear at first "ie to be so "ery !issimilar that e are incline! to assume the e?istence of just as many !ifferent %o ers as there are !ifferent effectsBas, in the case of the human min!, e ha"e feeling, consciousness, imagination, memory, it, analysis, %leasure, !esire an! so on# <o e are require! by a logical ma?im to re!uce these !ifferences to as small a number as %ossible, by com%aring them an! !isco"ering the hi!!en i!entity hich e?ists# >e must inquire, for e?am%le, hether or not imagination Dconnecte! ith consciousnessE, memory, it, an! analysis are not merely !ifferent forms of un!erstan!ing an! reason# The i!ea of a fun!amental %o er, the e?istence of hich no effort of logic can assure us of, is the %roblem to be sol"e!, for the systematic re%resentation of the e?isting "ariety of %o ers# The logical %rinci%le of reason requires us to %ro!uce as great a unity as is %ossible in the system of our cognitions@ an! the more the %henomena of this an! the other %o er are foun! to be i!entical, the more %robable !oes it become, that they are nothing but !ifferent manifestations of one an! the same %o er, hich may be calle!, relati"ely s%eaking, a fun!amental %o er# )n! so ith other cases# These relati"ely fun!amental %o ers must again be com%are! ith each other, to !isco"er, if %ossible, the one ra!ical an! absolutely fun!amental %o er of hich they are but the manifestations# But this unity is %urely hy%othetical# It is not maintaine!, that this unity !oes really e?ist, but that e must, in the interest of reason, that is, for the establishment of %rinci%les for the "arious rules %resente! by e?%erience, try to !isco"er an! intro!uce it, so far as is %racticable, into the s%here of our cognitions# But the transcen!ental em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing oul! lea! us to belie"e that this i!ea of a fun!amental %o er is not %roblematical, but that it %ossesses objecti"e reality, an! thus the systematic unity of the "arious %o ers or forces in a substance is !eman!e! by the un!erstan!ing an! erecte! into an a%o!eictic or necessary %rinci%le# :or, ithout ha"ing attem%te! to !isco"er the unity of the "arious %o ers e?isting in nature, nay, e"en after all our attem%ts ha"e faile!, e not ithstan!ing %resu%%ose that it !oes e?ist, an! may be, sooner or later, !isco"ere!# )n! this reason !oes, not only, as in the case abo"e a!!uce!, ith regar! to the unity of substance, but here many substances, although all to a certain e?tent homogeneous, are !isco"erable, as in the case of matter in general# ;ere also !oes reason %resu%%ose the e?istence of the systematic unity of "arious %o ersBinasmuch as %articular la s of nature are subor!inate to general la s@ an! %arsimony in %rinci%les is not merely an economical %rinci%le of reason, but an essential la of nature# >e cannot un!erstan!, in fact, ho a logical %rinci%le of unity can of right e?ist, unless e %resu%%ose a transcen!ental %rinci%le, by hich such a systematic unitBas a %ro%erty of objects themsel"esBis regar!e! as necessary a %riori# :or ith hat right can reason, in its logical e?ercise, require us to regar! the "ariety of forces hich nature !is%lays, as in effect a !isguise! unity, an! to !e!uce them from one fun!amental force or %o er, hen she is free to a!mit that it is just as %ossible that all forces shoul! be !ifferent in kin!, an! that a systematic unity is not conformable to the !esign of natureH

In this "ie of the case, reason oul! be %rocee!ing in !irect o%%osition to her o n !estination, by setting as an aim an i!ea hich entirely conflicts ith the %roce!ure an! arrangement of nature# <either can e assert that reason has %re"iously inferre! this unity from the contingent nature of %henomena# :or the la of reason hich requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary la , inasmuch as ithout it e shoul! not %ossess a faculty of reason, nor ithout reason a consistent an! self&accor!ant mo!e of em%loying the un!erstan!ing, nor, in the absence of this, any %ro%er an! sufficient criterion of em%irical truth# In relation to this criterion, therefore, e must su%%ose the i!ea of the systematic unity of nature to %ossess objecti"e "ali!ity an! necessity# >e fin! this transcen!ental %resu%%osition lurking in !ifferent forms in the %rinci%les of %hiloso%hers, although they ha"e neither recogniCe! it nor confesse! to themsel"es its %resence# That the !i"ersities of in!i"i!ual things !o not e?clu!e i!entity of s%ecies, that the "arious s%ecies must be consi!ere! as merely !ifferent !eterminations of a fe genera, an! these again as !i"isions of still higher races, an! so onBthat, accor!ingly, a certain systematic unity of all %ossible em%irical conce%tions, in so far as they can be !e!uce! from higher an! more general conce%tions, must be sought for, is a scholastic ma?im or logical %rinci%le, ithout hich reason coul! not be em%loye! by us# :or e can infer the %articular from the general, only in so far as general %ro%erties of things constitute the foun!ation u%on hich the %articular rest# That the same unity e?ists in nature is %resu%%ose! by %hiloso%hers in the ell&kno n scholastic ma?im, hich forbi!s us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or %rinci%les Dentia %raeter necessitatem non esse multi%lican!aE# This ma?im asserts that nature herself assists in the establishment of this unity of reason, an! that the seemingly infinite !i"ersity of %henomena shoul! not !eter us from the e?%ectation of !isco"ering beneath this !i"ersity a unity of fun!amental %ro%erties, of hich the aforesai! "ariety is but a more or less !etermine! form# This unity, although a mere i!ea, thinkers ha"e foun! it necessary rather to mo!erate the !esire than to encourage it# It as consi!ere! a great ste% hen chemists ere able to re!uce all salts to t o main generaBaci!s an! alkalis@ an! they regar! this !ifference as itself a mere "ariety, or !ifferent manifestation of one an! the same fun!amental material# The !ifferent kin!s of earths Dstones an! e"en metalsE chemists ha"e en!ea"oure! to re!uce to three, an! after ar!s to t o@ but still, not content ith this a!"ance, they cannot but think that behin! these !i"ersities there lurks but one genusBnay, that e"en salts an! earths ha"e a common %rinci%le# It might be conjecture! that this is merely an economical %lan of reason, for the %ur%ose of s%aring itself trouble, an! an attem%t of a %urely hy%othetical character, hich, hen successful, gi"es an a%%earance of %robability to the %rinci%le of e?%lanation em%loye! by the reason# But a selfish %ur%ose of this kin! is easily to be !istinguishe! from the i!ea, accor!ing to hich e"ery one %resu%%oses that this unity is in accor!ance ith the la s of nature, an! that reason !oes not in this case request, but requires, although e are quite unable to !etermine the %ro%er limits of this unity# If the !i"ersity e?isting in %henomenaBa !i"ersity not of form Dfor in this they may be similarE but of contentB ere so great that the subtlest human reason coul! ne"er by com%arison !isco"er in them the least similarity D hich is not im%ossibleE, in this case the logical la of genera oul! be ithout foun!ation, the conce%tion of a genus, nay,

all general conce%tions oul! be im%ossible, an! the faculty of the un!erstan!ing, the e?ercise of hich is restricte! to the orl! of conce%tions, coul! not e?ist# The logical %rinci%le of genera, accor!ingly, if it is to be a%%lie! to nature Dby hich I mean objects %resente! to our sensesE, %resu%%oses a transcen!ental %rinci%le# In accor!ance ith this %rinci%le, homogeneity is necessarily %resu%%ose! in the "ariety of %henomena Dalthough e are unable to !etermine a %riori the !egree of this homogeneityE, because ithout it no em%irical conce%tions, an! consequently no e?%erience, oul! be %ossible# The logical %rinci%le of genera, hich !eman!s i!entity in %henomena, is balance! by another %rinci%leBthat of s%ecies, hich requires "ariety an! !i"ersity in things, not ithstan!ing their accor!ance in the same genus, an! !irects the un!erstan!ing to atten! to the one no less than to the other# This %rinci%le Dof the faculty of !istinctionE acts as a check u%on the reason an! reason e?hibits in this res%ect a !ouble an! conflicting interestBon the one han!, the interest in the e?tent Dthe interest of generalityE in relation to genera@ on the other, that of the content Dthe interest of in!i"i!ualityE in relation to the "ariety of s%ecies# In the former case, the un!erstan!ing cogitates more un!er its conce%tions, in the latter it cogitates more in them# This !istinction manifests itself like ise in the habits of thought %eculiar to natural %hiloso%hers, some of homBthe remarkably s%eculati"e hea!sBmay be sai! to be hostile to heterogeneity in %henomena, an! ha"e their eyes al ays fi?e! on the unity of genera, hile othersB ith a strong em%irical ten!encyBaim unceasingly at the analysis of %henomena, an! almost !estroy in us the ho%e of e"er being able to estimate the character of these accor!ing to general %rinci%les# The latter mo!e of thought is e"i!ently base! u%on a logical %rinci%le, the aim of hich is the systematic com%leteness of all cognitions# This %rinci%le authoriCes me, beginning at the genus, to !escen! to the "arious an! !i"erse containe! un!er it@ an! in this ay e?tension, as in the former case unity, is assure! to the system# :or if e merely e?amine the s%here of the conce%tion hich in!icates a genus, e cannot !isco"er ho far it is %ossible to %rocee! in the !i"ision of that s%here@ just as it is im%ossible, from the consi!eration of the s%ace occu%ie! by matter, to !etermine ho far e can %rocee! in the !i"ision of it# ;ence e"ery genus must contain !ifferent s%ecies, an! these again !ifferent subs%ecies@ an! as each of the latter must itself contain a s%here Dmust be of a certain e?tent, as a conce%tus communisE, reason !eman!s that no s%ecies or sub& s%ecies is to be consi!ere! as the lo est %ossible# :or a s%ecies or sub&s%ecies, being al ays a conce%tion, hich contains only hat is common to a number of !ifferent things, !oes not com%letely !etermine any in!i"i!ual thing, or relate imme!iately to it, an! must consequently contain other conce%tions, that is, other sub&s%ecies un!er it# This la of s%ecification may be thus e?%resse!( entium "arietates non temere sunt minuen!ae# But it is easy to see that this logical la oul! like ise be ithout sense or a%%lication, ere it not base! u%on a transcen!ental la of s%ecification, hich certainly !oes not require that the !ifferences e?isting %henomena shoul! be infinite in number, for the logical %rinci%le, hich merely maintains the in!eterminateness of the logical s%here of a conce%tion, in relation to its %ossible !i"ision, !oes not authoriCe this statement@ hile it !oes im%ose u%on the un!erstan!ing the !uty of searching for subs%ecies to e"ery

s%ecies, an! minor !ifferences in e"ery !ifference# :or, ere there no lo er conce%tions, neither coul! there be any higher# <o the un!erstan!ing cogniCes only by means of conce%tions@ consequently, ho far soe"er it may %rocee! in !i"ision, ne"er by mere intuition, but al ays by lo er an! lo er conce%tions# The cognition of %henomena in their com%lete !etermination D hich is %ossible only by means of the un!erstan!ingE requires an unceasingly continue! s%ecification of conce%tions, an! a %rogression to e"er smaller !ifferences, of hich abstraction ba! been ma!e in the conce%tion of the s%ecies, an! still more in that of the genus# This la of s%ecification cannot be !e!uce! from e?%erience@ it can ne"er %resent us ith a %rinci%le of so uni"ersal an a%%lication# Em%irical s%ecification "ery soon sto%s in its !istinction of !i"ersities, an! requires the gui!ance of the transcen!ental la , as a %rinci%le of the reasonBa la hich im%oses on us the necessity of ne"er ceasing in our search for !ifferences, e"en although these may not %resent themsel"es to the senses# That absorbent earths are of !ifferent kin!s coul! only be !isco"ere! by obeying the antici%atory la of reason, hich im%oses u%on the un!erstan!ing the task of !isco"ering the !ifferences e?isting bet een these earths, an! su%%oses that nature is richer in substances than our senses oul! in!icate# The faculty of the un!erstan!ing belongs to us just as much un!er the %resu%%osition of !ifferences in the objects of nature, as un!er the con!ition that these objects are homogeneous, because e coul! not %ossess conce%tions, nor make any use of our un!erstan!ing, ere not the %henomena inclu!e! un!er these conce%tions in some res%ects !issimilar, as ell as similar, in their character# Reason thus %re%ares the s%here of the un!erstan!ing for the o%erations of this faculty( 6# By the %rinci%le of the homogeneity of the !i"erse in higher genera@ ,# By the %rinci%le of the "ariety of the homogeneous in lo er s%ecies@ an!, to com%lete the systematic unity, it a!!s, .# ) la of the affinity of all conce%tions hich %rescribes a continuous transition from one s%ecies to e"ery other by the gra!ual increase of !i"ersity# >e may term these the %rinci%les of the homogeneity, the s%ecification, an! the continuity of forms# The latter results from the union of the t o former, inasmuch as e regar! the systematic connection as com%lete in thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as ell as in the !escent to lo er s%ecies# :or all !i"ersities must be relate! to each other, as they all s%ring from one highest genus, !escen!ing through the !ifferent gra!ations of a more an! more e?ten!e! !etermination# >e may illustrate the systematic unity %ro!uce! by the three logical %rinci%les in the follo ing manner# E"ery conce%tion may be regar!e! as a %oint, hich, as the stan!%oint of a s%ectator, has a certain horiCon, hich may be sai! to enclose a number of things that may be "ie e!, so to s%eak, from that centre# >ithin this horiCon there must be an infinite number of other %oints, each of hich has its o n horiCon, smaller an! more circumscribe!@ in other or!s, e"ery s%ecies contains sub&s%ecies, accor!ing to the %rinci%le of s%ecification, an! the logical horiCon consists of smaller horiCons Dsubs%eciesE, but not of %oints Din!i"i!ualsE, hich %ossess no e?tent# But !ifferent horiCons or genera, hich inclu!e un!er them so many conce%tions, may ha"e one common horiCon, from hich, as from a mi!&%oint, they may be sur"eye!@ an! e may %rocee! thus, till e arri"e at the highest genus, or uni"ersal an! true horiCon, hich is

!etermine! by the highest conce%tion, an! hich contains un!er itself all !ifferences an! "arieties, as genera, s%ecies, an! subs%ecies# To this highest stan!%oint I am con!ucte! by the la of homogeneity, as to all lo er an! more "ariously&!etermine! conce%tions by the la of s%ecification# <o as in this ay there e?ists no "oi! in the hole e?tent of all %ossible conce%tions, an! as out of the s%here of these the min! can !isco"er nothing, there arises from the %resu%%osition of the uni"ersal horiCon abo"e mentione!, an! its com%lete !i"ision, the %rinci%le( <on !atur "acuum formarum# This %rinci%le asserts that there are not !ifferent %rimiti"e an! highest genera, hich stan! isolate!, so to s%eak, from each other, but all the "arious genera are mere !i"isions an! limitations of one highest an! uni"ersal genus@ an! hence follo s imme!iately the %rinci%le( *atur continuum formarum# This %rinci%le in!icates that all !ifferences of s%ecies limit each other, an! !o not a!mit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller !egrees of the !ifference bet een the one s%ecies an! the other# In one or!, there are no s%ecies or sub&s%ecies hich Din the "ie of reasonE are the nearest %ossible to each other@ interme!iate s%ecies or sub&s%ecies being al ays %ossible, the !ifference of hich from each of the former is al ays smaller than the !ifference e?isting bet een these# The first la , therefore, !irects us to a"oi! the notion that there e?ist !ifferent %rimal genera, an! enounces the fact of %erfect homogeneity@ the secon! im%oses a check u%on this ten!ency to unity an! %rescribes the !istinction of sub&s%ecies, before %rocee!ing to a%%ly our general conce%tions to in!i"i!uals# The thir! unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as e?isting e"en in the most "arious !i"ersity, by means of the gra!ual transition from one s%ecies to another# Thus it in!icates a relationshi% bet een the !ifferent branches or s%ecies, in so far as they all s%ring from the same stem# But this logical la of the continuum s%ecierum Dformarum logicarumE %resu%%oses a transcen!ental %rinci%le Dle? continui in naturaE, ithout hich the un!erstan!ing might be le! into error, by follo ing the gui!ance of the former, an! thus %erha%s %ursuing a %ath contrary to that %rescribe! by nature# This la must, consequently, be base! u%on %ure transcen!ental, an! not u%on em%irical, consi!erations# :or, in the latter case, it oul! come later than the system@ hereas it is really itself the %arent of all that is systematic in our cognition of nature# These %rinci%les are not mere hy%otheses em%loye! for the %ur%ose of e?%erimenting u%on nature@ although hen any such connection is !isco"ere!, it forms a soli! groun! for regar!ing the hy%othetical unity as "ali! in the s%here of natureBan! thus they are in this res%ect not ithout their use# But e go farther, an! maintain that it is manifest that these %rinci%les of %arsimony in fun!amental causes, "ariety in effects, an! affinity in %henomena, are in accor!ance both ith reason an! nature, an! that they are not mere metho!s or %lans !e"ise! for the %ur%ose of assisting us in our obser"ation of the e?ternal orl!# But it is %lain that this continuity of forms is a mere i!ea, to hich no a!equate object can be !isco"ere! in e?%erience# )n! this for t o reasons# :irst, because the s%ecies in nature are really !i"i!e!, an! hence form quanta !iscreta@ an!, if the gra!ual %rogression through their affinity ere continuous, the interme!iate members lying

bet een t o gi"en s%ecies must be infinite in number, hich is im%ossible# 7econ!ly, because e cannot make any !eterminate em%irical use of this la , inasmuch as it !oes not %resent us ith any criterion of affinity hich coul! ai! us in !etermining ho far e ought to %ursue the gra!uation of !ifferences( it merely contains a general in!ication that it is our !uty to seek for an!, if %ossible, to !isco"er them# >hen e arrange these %rinci%les of systematic unity in the or!er conformable to their em%loyment in e?%erience, they ill stan! thus( Kariety, )ffinity, 4nity, each of them, as i!eas, being taken in the highest !egree of their com%leteness# Reason %resu%%oses the e?istence of cognitions of the un!erstan!ing, hich ha"e a !irect relation to e?%erience, an! aims at the i!eal unity of these cognitionsBa unity hich far transcen!s all e?%erience or em%irical notions# The affinity of the !i"erse, not ithstan!ing the !ifferences e?isting bet een its %arts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere %ro%erties an! %o ers of things# :or e?am%le, im%erfect e?%erience may re%resent the orbits of the %lanets as circular# But e !isco"er "ariations from this course, an! e %rocee! to su%%ose that the %lanets re"ol"e in a %ath hich, if not a circle, is of a character "ery similar to it# That is to say, the mo"ements of those %lanets hich !o not form a circle ill a%%ro?imate more or less to the %ro%erties of a circle, an! %robably form an elli%se# The %aths of comets e?hibit still greater "ariations, for, so far as our obser"ation e?ten!s, they !o not return u%on their o n course in a circle or elli%se# But e %rocee! to the conjecture that comets !escribe a %arabola, a figure hich is closely allie! to the elli%se# In fact, a %arabola is merely an elli%se, ith its longer a?is %ro!uce! to an in!efinite e?tent# Thus these %rinci%les con!uct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, an!, %rocee!ing farther, to a unity as regar!s the cause of the motions of the hea"enly bo!iesBthat is, gra"itation# But e go on e?ten!ing our conquests o"er nature, an! en!ea"our to e?%lain all seeming !e"iations from these rules, an! e"en make a!!itions to our system hich no e?%erience can e"er substantiate Bfor e?am%le, the theory, in affinity ith that of elli%ses, of hy%erbolic %aths of comets, %ursuing hich, these bo!ies lea"e our solar system an!, %assing from sun to sun, unite the most !istant %arts of the infinite uni"erse, hich is hel! together by the same mo"ing %o er# The most remarkable circumstance connecte! ith these %rinci%les is that they seem to be transcen!ental, an!, although only containing i!eas for the gui!ance of the em%irical e?ercise of reason, an! although this em%irical em%loyment stan!s to these i!eas in an asym%totic relation alone Dto use a mathematical termE, that is, continually a%%ro?imate, ithout e"er being able to attain to them, they %ossess, not ithstan!ing, as a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions, objecti"e though un!etermine! "ali!ity, an! are a"ailable as rules for %ossible e?%erience# In the elaboration of our e?%erience, they may also be em%loye! ith great a!"antage, as heuristic /:ootnote( :rom the Greek, eurhioko#3 %rinci%les# ) transcen!ental !e!uction of them cannot be ma!e@ such a !e!uction being al ays im%ossible in the case of i!eas, as has been alrea!y sho n# >e !istinguishe!, in the Transcen!ental )nalytic, the !ynamical %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing, hich are regulati"e %rinci%les of intuition, from the mathematical, hich are constituti"e %rinci%les of intuition# These !ynamical la s are, ho e"er, constituti"e in relation to e?%erience, inasmuch as they ren!er the conce%tions ithout

hich e?%erience coul! not e?ist %ossible a %riori# But the %rinci%les of %ure reason cannot be constituti"e e"en in regar! to em%irical conce%tions, because no sensuous schema corres%on!ing to them can be !isco"ere!, an! they cannot therefore ha"e an object in concreto# <o , if I grant that they cannot be em%loye! in the s%here of e?%erience, as constituti"e %rinci%les, ho shall I secure for them em%loyment an! objecti"e "ali!ity as regulati"e %rinci%les, an! in hat ay can they be so em%loye!H The un!erstan!ing is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object of the un!erstan!ing# The %ro!uction of systematic unity in all the em%irical o%erations of the un!erstan!ing is the %ro%er occu%ation of reason@ just as it is the business of the un!erstan!ing to connect the "arious content of %henomena by means of conce%tions, an! subject them to em%irical la s# But the o%erations of the un!erstan!ing are, ithout the schemata of sensibility, un!etermine!@ an!, in the same manner, the unity of reason is %erfectly un!etermine! as regar!s the con!itions un!er hich, an! the e?tent to hich, the un!erstan!ing ought to carry the systematic connection of its conce%tions# But, although it is im%ossible to !isco"er in intuition a schema for the com%lete systematic unity of all the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, there must be some analogon of this schema# This analogon is the i!ea of the ma?imum of the !i"ision an! the connection of our cognition in one %rinci%le# :or e may ha"e a !eterminate notion of a ma?imum an! an absolutely %erfect, all the restricti"e con!itions hich are connecte! ith an in!eterminate an! "arious content ha"ing been abstracte!# Thus the i!ea of reason is analogous ith a sensuous schema, ith this !ifference, that the a%%lication of the categories to the schema of reason !oes not %resent a cognition of any object Das is the case ith the a%%lication of the categories to sensuous schemataE, but merely %ro"i!es us ith a rule or %rinci%le for the systematic unity of the e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing# <o , as e"ery %rinci%le hich im%oses u%on the e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing a %riori com%liance ith the rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an in!irect manner, to an object of e?%erience, the %rinci%les of %ure reason ill also %ossess objecti"e reality an! "ali!ity in relation to e?%erience# But they ill not aim at !etermining our kno le!ge in regar! to any em%irical object@ they ill merely in!icate the %roce!ure, follo ing hich the em%irical an! !eterminate e?ercise of the un!erstan!ing may be in com%lete harmony an! connection ith itselfBa result hich is %ro!uce! by its being brought into harmony ith the %rinci%le of systematic unity, so far as that is %ossible, an! !e!uce! from it# I term all subjecti"e %rinci%les, hich are not !eri"e! from obser"ation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest hich Reason has in %ro!ucing a certain com%leteness in her cognition of that object, ma?ims of reason# Thus there are ma?ims of s%eculati"e reason, hich are base! solely u%on its s%eculati"e interest, although they a%%ear to be objecti"e %rinci%les# >hen %rinci%les hich are really regulati"e are regar!e! as constituti"e, an! em%loye! as objecti"e %rinci%les, contra!ictions must arise@ but if they are consi!ere! as mere ma?ims, there is no room for contra!ictions of any kin!, as they then merely in!icate the !ifferent interests of reason, hich occasion !ifferences in the mo!e of thought# In effect, Reason has only one single interest, an! the seeming contra!iction e?isting

bet een her ma?ims merely in!icates a !ifference in, an! a reci%rocal limitation of, the metho!s by hich this interest is satisfie!# This reasoner has at heart the interest of !i"ersityBin accor!ance ith the %rinci%le of s%ecification@ another, the interest of unityBin accor!ance ith the %rinci%le of aggregation# Each belie"es that his ju!gement rests u%on a thorough insight into the subject he is e?amining, an! yet it has been influence! solely by a greater or less !egree of a!herence to some one of the t o %rinci%les, neither of hich are objecti"e, but originate solely from the interest of reason, an! on this account to be terme! ma?ims rather than %rinci%les# >hen I obser"e intelligent men !is%uting about the !istincti"e characteristics of men, animals, or %lants, an! e"en of minerals, those on the one si!e assuming the e?istence of certain national characteristics, certain ell&!efine! an! here!itary !istinctions of family, race, an! so on, hile the other si!e maintain that nature has en!o e! all races of men ith the same faculties an! !is%ositions, an! that all !ifferences are but the result of e?ternal an! acci!ental circumstancesBI ha"e only to consi!er for a moment the real nature of the subject of !iscussion, to arri"e at the conclusion that it is a subject far too !ee% for us to ju!ge of, an! that there is little %robability of either %arty being able to s%eak from a %erfect insight into an! un!erstan!ing of the nature of the subject itself# Both ha"e, in reality, been struggling for the t ofol! interest of reason@ the one maintaining the one interest, the other the other# But this !ifference bet een the ma?ims of !i"ersity an! unity may easily be reconcile! an! a!juste!@ although, so long as they are regar!e! as objecti"e %rinci%les, they must occasion not only contra!ictions an! %olemic, but %lace hin!erances in the ay of the a!"ancement of truth, until some means is !isco"ere! of reconciling these conflicting interests, an! bringing reason into union an! harmony ith itself# The same is the case ith the so&calle! la !isco"ere! by 'eibnitC, an! su%%orte! ith remarkable ability by BonnetBthe la of the continuous gra!ation of create! beings, hich is nothing more than an inference from the %rinci%le of affinity@ for obser"ation an! stu!y of the or!er of nature coul! ne"er %resent it to the min! as an objecti"e truth# The ste%s of this la!!er, as they a%%ear in e?%erience, are too far a%art from each other, an! the so&calle! %etty !ifferences bet een !ifferent kin!s of animals are in nature commonly so i!e se%arations that no confi!ence can be %lace! in such "ie s D%articularly hen e reflect on the great "ariety of things, an! the ease ith hich e can !isco"er resemblancesE, an! no faith in the la s hich are sai! to e?%ress the aims an! %ur%oses of nature# 9n the other han!, the metho! of in"estigating the or!er of nature in the light of this %rinci%le, an! the ma?im hich requires us to regar! this or!erBit being still un!etermine! ho far it e?ten!sBas really e?isting in nature, is beyon! !oubt a legitimate an! e?cellent %rinci%le of reasonBa %rinci%le hich e?ten!s farther than any e?%erience or obser"ation of ours an! hich, ithout gi"ing us any %ositi"e kno le!ge of anything in the region of e?%erience, gui!es us to the goal of systematic unity# 9f the 4ltimate En! of the <atural *ialectic of ;uman Reason# The i!eas of %ure reason cannot be, of themsel"es an! in their o n nature, !ialectical@ it is from their misem%loyment alone that fallacies an! illusions arise# :or they originate

in the nature of reason itself, an! it is im%ossible that this su%reme tribunal for all the rights an! claims of s%eculation shoul! be itself un!eser"ing of confi!ence an! %romoti"e of error# It is to be e?%ecte!, therefore, that these i!eas ha"e a genuine an! legitimate aim# It is true, the mob of so%hists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency an! contra!iction, an! affect to !es%ise the go"ernment of that faculty, because they cannot un!erstan! its constitution, hile it is to its beneficial influences alone that they o e the %osition an! the intelligence hich enable them to criticiCe an! to blame its %roce!ure# >e cannot em%loy an a %riori conce%tion ith certainty, until e ha"e ma!e a transcen!ental !e!uction therefore# The i!eas of %ure reason !o not a!mit of the same kin! of !e!uction as the categories# But if they are to %ossess the least objecti"e "ali!ity, an! to re%resent anything but mere creations of thought Dentia rationis ratiocinantisE, a !e!uction of them must be %ossible# This !e!uction ill com%lete the critical task im%ose! u%on %ure reason@ an! it is to this %art 9f our labours that e no %rocee!# There is a great !ifference bet een a thingFs being %resente! to the min! as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an i!eal object# In the former case I em%loy my conce%tions to !etermine the object@ in the latter case nothing is %resent to the min! but a mere schema, hich !oes not relate !irectly to an object, not e"en in a hy%othetical sense, but hich is useful only for the %ur%ose of re%resenting other objects to the min!, in a me!iate an! in!irect manner, by means of their relation to the i!ea in the intellect# Thus I say the conce%tion of a su%reme intelligence is a mere i!ea@ that is to say, its objecti"e reality !oes not consist in the fact that it has an imme!iate relation to an object Dfor in this sense e ha"e no means of establishing its objecti"e "ali!ityE, it is merely a schema constructe! accor!ing to the necessary con!itions of the unity of reasonBthe schema of a thing in general, hich is useful to ar!s the %ro!uction of the highest !egree of systematic unity in the em%irical e?ercise of reason, in hich e !e!uce this or that object of e?%erience from the imaginary object of this i!ea, as the groun! or cause of the sai! object of e?%erience# In this ay, the i!ea is %ro%erly a heuristic, an! not an ostensi"e, conce%tion@ it !oes not gi"e us any information res%ecting the constitution of an object, it merely in!icates ho , un!er the gui!ance of the i!ea, e ought to in"estigate the constitution an! the relations of objects in the orl! of e?%erience# <o , if it can be sho n that the three kin!s of transcen!ental i!eas D%sychological, cosmological, an! theologicalE, although not relating !irectly to any object nor !etermining it, !o ne"ertheless, on the su%%osition of the e?istence of an i!eal object, %ro!uce systematic unity in the la s of the em%irical em%loyment of the reason, an! e?ten! our em%irical cognition, ithout e"er being inconsistent or in o%%osition ith it Bit must be a necessary ma?im of reason to regulate its %roce!ure accor!ing to these i!eas# )n! this forms the transcen!ental !e!uction of all s%eculati"e i!eas, not as constituti"e %rinci%les of the e?tension of our cognition beyon! the limits of our e?%erience, but as regulati"e %rinci%les of the systematic unity of em%irical cognition, hich is by the ai! of these i!eas arrange! an! emen!e! ithin its o n %ro%er limits, to an e?tent unattainable by the o%eration of the %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing alone# I shall make this %lainer# Gui!e! by the %rinci%les in"ol"e! in these i!eas, e must, in the first %lace, so connect all the %henomena, actions, an! feelings of the min!, as if it

ere a sim%le substance, hich, en!o e! ith %ersonal i!entity, %ossesses a %ermanent e?istence Din this life at leastE, hile its states, among hich those of the bo!y are to be inclu!e! as e?ternal con!itions, are in continual change# 7econ!ly, in cosmology, e must in"estigate the con!itions of all natural %henomena, internal as ell as e?ternal, as if they belonge! to a chain infinite an! ithout any %rime or su%reme member, hile e !o not, on this account, !eny the e?istence of intelligible groun!s of these %henomena, although e ne"er em%loy them to e?%lain %henomena, for the sim%le reason that they are not objects of our cognition# Thir!ly, in the s%here of theology, e must regar! the hole system of %ossible e?%erience as forming an absolute, but !e%en!ent an! sensuously&con!itione! unity, an! at the same time as base! u%on a sole, su%reme, an! all&sufficient groun! e?isting a%art from the orl! itselfBa groun! hich is a self& subsistent, %rime"al an! creati"e reason, in relation to hich e so em%loy our reason in the fiel! of e?%erience, as if all objects !re their origin from that archety%e of all reason# In other or!s, e ought not to !e!uce the internal %henomena of the min! from a sim%le thinking substance, but !e!uce them from each other un!er the gui!ance of the regulati"e i!ea of a sim%le being@ e ought not to !e!uce the %henomena, or!er, an! unity of the uni"erse from a su%reme intelligence, but merely !ra from this i!ea of a su%remely ise cause the rules hich must gui!e reason in its connection of causes an! effects# <o there is nothing to hin!er us from a!mitting these i!eas to %ossess an objecti"e an! hy%erbolic e?istence, e?ce%t the cosmological i!eas, hich lea! reason into an antinomy( the %sychological an! theological i!eas are not antinomial# They contain no contra!iction@ an! ho , then, can any one !is%ute their objecti"e reality, since he ho !enies it kno s as little about their %ossibility as e ho affirmH )n! yet, hen e ish to a!mit the e?istence of a thing, it is not sufficient to con"ince oursel"es that there is no %ositi"e obstacle in the ay@ for it cannot be allo able to regar! mere creations of thought, hich transcen!, though they !o not contra!ict, all our conce%tions, as real an! !eterminate objects, solely u%on the authority of a s%eculati"e reason stri"ing to com%ass its o n aims# They cannot, therefore, be a!mitte! to be real in themsel"es@ they can only %ossess a com%arati"e realityBthat of a schema of the regulati"e %rinci%le of the systematic unity of all cognition# They are to be regar!e! not as actual things, but as in some measure analogous to them# >e abstract from the object of the i!ea all the con!itions hich limit the e?ercise of our un!erstan!ing, but hich, on the other han!, are the sole con!itions of our %ossessing a !eterminate conce%tion of any gi"en thing# )n! thus e cogitate a something, of the real nature of hich e ha"e not the least conce%tion, but hich e re%resent to oursel"es as stan!ing in a relation to the hole system of %henomena, analogous to that in hich %henomena stan! to each other# By a!mitting these i!eal beings, e !o not really e?ten! our cognitions beyon! the objects of %ossible e?%erience@ e e?ten! merely the em%irical unity of our e?%erience, by the ai! of systematic unity, the schema of hich is furnishe! by the i!ea, hich is therefore "ali!Bnot as a constituti"e, but as a regulati"e %rinci%le# :or although e %osit a thing corres%on!ing to the i!eaBa something, an actual e?istenceB e !o not on that account aim at the e?tension of our cognition by means of transcen!ent conce%tions# This e?istence is %urely i!eal, an! not objecti"e@ it is the mere e?%ression of the systematic unity hich is to be the gui!e of reason in the fiel! of e?%erience# There are

no attem%ts ma!e at !eci!ing hat the groun! of this unity may be, or hat the real nature of this imaginary being# Thus the transcen!ental an! only !eterminate conce%tion of Go!, hich is %resente! to us by s%eculati"e reason, is in the strictest sense !eistic# In other or!s, reason !oes not assure us of the objecti"e "ali!ity of the conce%tion@ it merely gi"es us the i!ea of something, on hich the su%reme an! necessary unity of all e?%erience is base!# This something e cannot, follo ing the analogy of a real substance, cogitate other ise than as the cause of all things o%erating in accor!ance ith rational la s, if e regar! it as an in!i"i!ual object@ although e shoul! rest contente! ith the i!ea alone as a regulati"e %rinci%le of reason, an! make no attem%t at com%leting the sum of the con!itions im%ose! by thought# This attem%t is, in!ee!, inconsistent ith the gran! aim of com%lete systematic unity in the s%here of cognitionBa unity to hich no boun!s are set by reason# ;ence it ha%%ens that, a!mitting a !i"ine being, I can ha"e no conce%tion of the internal %ossibility of its %erfection, or of the necessity of its e?istence# The only a!"antage of this a!mission is that it enables me to ans er all other questions relating to the contingent, an! to gi"e reason the most com%lete satisfaction as regar!s the unity hich it aims at attaining in the orl! of e?%erience# But I cannot satisfy reason ith regar! to this hy%othesis itself@ an! this %ro"es that it is not its intelligence an! insight into the subject, but its s%eculati"e interest alone hich in!uces it to %rocee! from a %oint lying far beyon! the s%here of our cognition, for the %ur%ose of being able to consi!er all objects as %arts of a systematic hole# ;ere a !istinction %resents itself, in regar! to the ay in hich e may cogitate a %resu%%ositionBa !istinction hich is some hat subtle, but of great im%ortance in transcen!ental %hiloso%hy# I may ha"e sufficient groun!s to a!mit something, or the e?istence of something, in a relati"e %oint of "ie Dsu%%ositio relati"aE, ithout being justifie! in a!mitting it in an absolute sense Dsu%%ositio absolutaE# This !istinction is un!oubte!ly requisite, in the case of a regulati"e %rinci%le, the necessity of hich e recogniCe, though e are ignorant of the source an! cause of that necessity, an! hich e assume to be base! u%on some ultimate groun!, for the %ur%ose of being able to cogitate the uni"ersality of the %rinci%le in a more !eterminate ay# :or e?am%le, I cogitate the e?istence of a being corres%on!ing to a %ure transcen!ental i!ea# But I cannot a!mit that this being e?ists absolutely an! in itself, because all of the conce%tions by hich I can cogitate an object in a !eterminate manner fall short of assuring me of its e?istence@ nay, the con!itions of the objecti"e "ali!ity of my conce%tions are e?clu!e! by the i!eaBby the "ery fact of its being an i!ea# The conce%tions of reality, substance, causality, nay, e"en that of necessity in e?istence, ha"e no significance out of the s%here of em%irical cognition, an! cannot, beyon! that s%here, !etermine any object# They may, accor!ingly, be em%loye! to e?%lain the %ossibility of things in the orl! of sense, but they are utterly ina!equate to e?%lain the %ossibility of the uni"erse itself consi!ere! as a hole@ because in this case the groun! of e?%lanation must lie out of an! beyon! the orl!, an! cannot, therefore, be an object of %ossible e?%erience# <o , I may a!mit the e?istence of an incom%rehensible being of this natureBthe object of a mere i!ea, relati"ely to the orl! of sense@ although I ha"e no groun! to a!mit its e?istence

absolutely an! in itself# :or if an i!ea Dthat of a systematic an! com%lete unity, of hich I shall %resently s%eak more %articularlyE lies at the foun!ation of the most e?ten!e! em%irical em%loyment of reason, an! if this i!ea cannot be a!equately re%resente! in concreto, although it is in!is%ensably necessary for the a%%ro?imation of em%irical unity to the highest %ossible !egreeBI am not only authoriCe!, but com%elle!, to realiCe this i!ea, that is, to %osit a real object corres%on!ing thereto# But I cannot %rofess to kno this object@ it is to me merely a something, to hich, as the groun! of systematic unity in cognition, I attribute such %ro%erties as are analogous to the conce%tions em%loye! by the un!erstan!ing in the s%here of e?%erience# :ollo ing the analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, an! necessity, I cogitate a being, hich %ossesses all these attributes in the highest !egree@ an!, as this i!ea is the offs%ring of my reason alone, I cogitate this being as self&subsistent reason, an! as the cause of the uni"erse o%erating by means of i!eas of the greatest %ossible harmony an! unity# Thus I abstract all con!itions that oul! limit my i!ea, solely for the %ur%ose of ren!ering systematic unity %ossible in the orl! of em%irical !i"ersity, an! thus securing the i!est %ossible e?tension for the e?ercise of reason in that s%here# This I am enable! to !o, by regar!ing all connections an! relations in the orl! of sense, as if they ere the !is%ositions of a su%reme reason, of hich our reason is but a faint image# I then %rocee! to cogitate this 7u%reme Being by conce%tions hich ha"e, %ro%erly, no meaning or a%%lication, e?ce%t in the orl! of sense# But as I am authoriCe! to em%loy the transcen!ental hy%othesis of such a being in a relati"e res%ect alone, that is, as the substratum of the greatest %ossible unity in e?%erienceBI may attribute to a being hich I regar! as !istinct from the orl!, such %ro%erties as belong solely to the s%here of sense an! e?%erience# :or I !o not !esire, an! am not justifie! in !esiring, to cogniCe this object of my i!ea, as it e?ists in itself@ for I %ossess no conce%tions sufficient for or task, those of reality, substance, causality, nay, e"en that of necessity in e?istence, losing all significance, an! becoming merely the signs of conce%tions, ithout content an! ithout a%%licability, hen I attem%t to carry them beyon! the limits of the orl! of sense# I cogitate merely the relation of a %erfectly unkno n being to the greatest %ossible systematic unity of e?%erience, solely for the %ur%ose of em%loying it as the schema of the regulati"e %rinci%le hich !irects reason in its em%irical e?ercise# It is e"i!ent, at the first "ie , that e cannot %resu%%ose the reality of this transcen!ental object, by means of the conce%tions of reality, substance, causality, an! so on, because these conce%tions cannot be a%%lie! to anything that is !istinct from the orl! of sense# Thus the su%%osition of a 7u%reme Being or cause is %urely relati"e@ it is cogitate! only in behalf of the systematic unity of e?%erience@ such a being is but a something, of hose e?istence in itself e ha"e not the least conce%tion# Thus, too, it becomes sufficiently manifest hy e require! the i!ea of a necessary being in relation to objects gi"en by sense, although e can ne"er ha"e the least conce%tion of this being, or of its absolute necessity# )n! no e can clearly %ercei"e the result of our transcen!ental !ialectic, an! the %ro%er aim of the i!eas of %ure reasonB hich become !ialectical solely from misun!erstan!ing an! inconsi!erateness# Pure reason is, in fact, occu%ie! ith itself, an! not ith any object# 9bjects are not %resente! to it to be embrace! in the unity of an em%irical conce%tion@ it is only the cognitions of the un!erstan!ing that are %resente! to

it, for the %ur%ose of recei"ing the unity of a rational conce%tion, that is, of being connecte! accor!ing to a %rinci%le# The unity of reason is the unity of system@ an! this systematic unity is not an objecti"e %rinci%le, e?ten!ing its !ominion o"er objects, but a subjecti"e ma?im, e?ten!ing its authority o"er the em%irical cognition of objects# The systematic connection hich reason gi"es to the em%irical em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing not only a!"ances the e?tension of that em%loyment, but ensures its correctness, an! thus the %rinci%le of a systematic unity of this nature is also objecti"e, although only in an in!efinite res%ect D%rinci%ium "agumE# It is not, ho e"er, a constituti"e %rinci%le, !etermining an object to hich it !irectly relates@ it is merely a regulati"e %rinci%le or ma?im, a!"ancing an! strengthening the em%irical e?ercise of reason, by the o%ening u% of ne %aths of hich the un!erstan!ing is ignorant, hile it ne"er conflicts ith the la s of its e?ercise in the s%here of e?%erience# But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, ithout at the same time cogitating an object of the i!eaBan object that cannot be %resente! in any e?%erience, hich contains no concrete e?am%le of a com%lete systematic unity# This being Dens rationis ratiocinataeE is therefore a mere i!ea an! is not assume! to be a thing hich is real absolutely an! in itself# 9n the contrary, it forms merely the %roblematical foun!ation of the connection hich the min! intro!uces among the %henomena of the sensuous orl!# >e look u%on this connection, in the light of the abo"e&mentione! i!ea, as if it !re its origin from the su%%ose! being hich corres%on!s to the i!ea# )n! yet all e aim at is the %ossession of this i!ea as a secure foun!ation for the systematic unity of e?%erienceBa unity in!is%ensable to reason, a!"antageous to the un!erstan!ing, an! %romoti"e of the interests of em%irical cognition# >e mistake the true meaning of this i!ea hen e regar! it as an enouncement, or e"en as a hy%othetical !eclaration of the e?istence of a real thing, hich e are to regar! as the origin or groun! of a systematic constitution of the uni"erse# 9n the contrary, it is left com%letely un!etermine! hat the nature or %ro%erties of this so&calle! groun! may be# The i!ea is merely to be a!o%te! as a %oint of "ie , from hich this unity, so essential to reason an! so beneficial to the un!erstan!ing, may be regar!e! as ra!iating# In one or!, this transcen!ental thing is merely the schema of a regulati"e %rinci%le, by means of hich Reason, so far as in her lies, e?ten!s the !ominion of systematic unity o"er the hole s%here of e?%erience# The first object of an i!ea of this kin! is the ego, consi!ere! merely as a thinking nature or soul# If I ish to in"estigate the %ro%erties of a thinking being, I must interrogate e?%erience# But I fin! that I can a%%ly none of the categories to this object, the schema of these categories, hich is the con!ition of their a%%lication, being gi"en only in sensuous intuition# But I cannot thus attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the %henomena of the internal sense# Instea!, therefore, of an em%irical conce%tion of hat the soul really is, reason takes the conce%tion of the em%irical unity of all thought, an!, by cogitating this unity as uncon!itione! an! %rimiti"e, constructs the rational conce%tion or i!ea of a sim%le substance hich is in itself unchangeable, %ossessing %ersonal i!entity, an! in connection ith other real things e?ternal to it@ in one or!, it constructs the i!ea of a sim%le self&subsistent intelligence# But the real aim of reason in this %roce!ure is the attainment of %rinci%les of systematic unity for the e?%lanation of

the %henomena of the soul# That is, reason !esires to be able to re%resent all the !eterminations of the internal sense as e?isting in one subject, all %o ers as !e!uce! from one fun!amental %o er, all changes as mere "arieties in the con!ition of a being hich is %ermanent an! al ays the same, an! all %henomena in s%ace as entirely !ifferent in their nature from the %roce!ure of thought# Essential sim%licity D ith the other attributes %re!icate! of the egoE is regar!e! as the mere schema of this regulati"e %rinci%le@ it is not assume! that it is the actual groun! of the %ro%erties of the soul# :or these %ro%erties may rest u%on quite !ifferent groun!s, of hich e are com%letely ignorant@ just as the abo"e %re!icates coul! not gi"e us any kno le!ge of the soul as it is in itself, e"en if e regar!e! them as "ali! in res%ect of it, inasmuch as they constitute a mere i!ea, hich cannot be re%resente! in concreto# <othing but goo! can result from a %sychological i!ea of this kin!, if e only take %ro%er care not to consi!er it as more than an i!ea@ that is, if e regar! it as "ali! merely in relation to the em%loyment of reason, in the s%here of the %henomena of the soul# 4n!er the gui!ance of this i!ea, or %rinci%le, no em%irical la s of cor%oreal %henomena are calle! in to e?%lain that hich is a %henomenon of the internal sense alone@ no in!y hy%otheses of the generation, annihilation, an! %alingenesis of souls are a!mitte!# Thus the consi!eration of this object of the internal sense is ke%t %ure, an! unmi?e! ith heterogeneous elements@ hile the in"estigation of reason aims at re!ucing all the groun!s of e?%lanation em%loye! in this s%here of kno le!ge to a single %rinci%le# )ll this is best effecte!, nay, cannot be effecte! other ise than by means of such a schema, hich requires us to regar! this i!eal thing as an actual e?istence# The %sychological i!ea is, therefore, meaningless an! ina%%licable, e?ce%t as the schema of a regulati"e conce%tion# :or, if I ask hether the soul is not really of a s%iritual natureBit is a question hich has no meaning# :rom such a conce%tion has been abstracte!, not merely all cor%oreal nature, but all nature, that is, all the %re!icates of a %ossible e?%erience@ an! consequently, all the con!itions hich enable us to cogitate an object to this conce%tion ha"e !isa%%eare!# But, if these con!itions are absent, it is e"i!ent that the conce%tion is meaningless# The secon! regulati"e i!ea of s%eculati"e reason is the conce%tion of the uni"erse# :or nature is %ro%erly the only object %resente! to us, in regar! to hich reason requires regulati"e %rinci%les# <ature is t ofol!Bthinking an! cor%oreal nature# To cogitate the latter in regar! to its internal %ossibility, that is, to !etermine the a%%lication of the categories to it, no i!ea is require!Bno re%resentation hich transcen!s e?%erience# In this s%here, therefore, an i!ea is im%ossible, sensuous intuition being our only gui!e@ hile, in the s%here of %sychology, e require the fun!amental i!ea DIE, hich contains a %riori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of the ego# Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in general, an! the com%leteness of con!itions in nature in accor!ance ith some %rinci%le# The absolute totality of the series of these con!itions is an i!ea, hich can ne"er be fully realiCe! in the em%irical e?ercise of reason, hile it is ser"iceable as a rule for the %roce!ure of reason in relation to that totality# It requires us, in the e?%lanation of gi"en %henomena Din the regress or ascent in the seriesE, to %rocee! as if the series ere infinite in itself, that is, ere %rolonge! in in!efinitum@ hile on the other han!, here reason is regar!e! as itself the !etermining cause Din the region of free!omE, e are require! to %rocee! as if e ha! not before us an object of sense, but of the %ure un!erstan!ing# In this latter case, the con!itions !o not e?ist in

the series of %henomena, but may be %lace! quite out of an! beyon! it, an! the series of con!itions may be regar!e! as if it ha! an absolute beginning from an intelligible cause# )ll this %ro"es that the cosmological i!eas are nothing but regulati"e %rinci%les, an! not constituti"e@ an! that their aim is not to realiCe an actual totality in such series# The full !iscussion of this subject ill be foun! in its %ro%er %lace in the cha%ter on the antinomy of %ure reason# The thir! i!ea of %ure reason, containing the hy%othesis of a being hich is "ali! merely as a relati"e hy%othesis, is that of the one an! all&sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other or!s, the i!ea of Go!# >e ha"e not the slightest groun! absolutely to a!mit the e?istence of an object corres%on!ing to this i!ea@ for hat can em%o er or authoriCe us to affirm the e?istence of a being of the highest %erfectionBa being hose e?istence is absolutely necessaryBmerely because e %ossess the conce%tion of such a beingH The ans er is( It is the e?istence of the orl! hich ren!ers this hy%othesis necessary# But this ans er makes it %erfectly e"i!ent that the i!ea of this being, like all other s%eculati"e i!eas, is essentially nothing more than a !eman! u%on reason that it shall regulate the connection hich it an! its subor!inate faculties intro!uce into the %henomena of the orl! by %rinci%les of systematic unity an!, consequently, that it shall regar! all %henomena as originating from one all&embracing being, as the su%reme an! all&sufficient cause# :rom this it is %lain that the only aim of reason in this %roce!ure is the establishment of its o n formal rule for the e?tension of its !ominion in the orl! of e?%erience@ that it !oes not aim at an e?tension of its cognition beyon! the limits of e?%erience@ an! that, consequently, this i!ea !oes not contain any constituti"e %rinci%le# The highest formal unity, hich is base! u%on i!eas alone, is the unity of all thingsBa unity in accor!ance ith an aim or %ur%ose@ an! the s%eculati"e interest of reason ren!ers it necessary to regar! all or!er in the orl! as if it originate! from the intention an! !esign of a su%reme reason# This %rinci%le unfol!s to the "ie of reason in the s%here of e?%erience ne an! enlarge! %ros%ects, an! in"ites it to connect the %henomena of the orl! accor!ing to teleological la s, an! in this ay to attain to the highest %ossible !egree of systematic unity# The hy%othesis of a su%reme intelligence, as the sole cause of the uni"erseBan intelligence hich has for us no more than an i!eal e?istenceBis accor!ingly al ays of the greatest ser"ice to reason# Thus, if e %resu%%ose, in relation to the figure of the earth D hich is roun!, but some hat flattene! at the %olesE,8 or that of mountains or seas, ise !esigns on the %art of an author of the uni"erse, e cannot fail to make, by the light of this su%%osition, a great number of interesting !isco"eries# If e kee% to this hy%othesis, as a %rinci%le hich is %urely regulati"e, e"en error cannot be "ery !etrimental# :or, in this case, error can ha"e no more serious consequences than that, here e e?%ecte! to !isco"er a teleological connection Dne?us finalisE, only a mechanical or %hysical connection a%%ears# In such a case, e merely fail to fin! the a!!itional form of unity e e?%ecte!, but e !o not lose the rational unity hich the min! requires in its %roce!ure in e?%erience# But e"en a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the la in its general an! teleological relations# :or although e may con"ict an anatomist of an error, hen he connects the limb of some animal ith a certain %ur%ose, it is quite im%ossible to %ro"e in a single case that any arrangement of nature, be it hat it may, is entirely ithout aim or !esign# )n! thus me!ical %hysiology, by the ai! of a %rinci%le %resente! to it by %ure reason, e?ten!s its

"ery limite! em%irical kno le!ge of the %ur%oses of the !ifferent %arts of an organiCe! bo!y so far that it may be asserte! ith the utmost confi!ence, an! ith the a%%robation of all reflecting men, that e"ery organ or bo!ily %art of an animal has its use an! ans ers a certain !esign# <o , this is a su%%osition hich, if regar!e! as of a constituti"e character, goes much farther than any e?%erience or obser"ation of ours can justify# ;ence it is e"i!ent that it is nothing more than a regulati"e %rinci%le of reason, hich aims at the highest !egree of systematic unity, by the ai! of the i!ea of a causality accor!ing to !esign in a su%reme causeBa cause hich it regar!s as the highest intelligence# /8:ootnote( The a!"antages hich a circular form, in the case of the earth, has o"er e"ery other, are ell kno n# But fe are a are that the slight flattening at the %oles, hich gi"es it the figure of a s%heroi!, is the only cause hich %re"ents the ele"ations of continents or e"en of mountains, %erha%s thro n u% by some internal con"ulsion, from continually altering the %osition of the a?is of the earthBan! that to some consi!erable !egree in a short time# The great %rotuberance of the earth un!er the Equator ser"es to o"erbalance the im%etus of all other masses of earth, an! thus to %reser"e the a?is of the earth, so far as e can obser"e, in its %resent %osition# )n! yet this ise arrangement has been unthinkingly e?%laine! from the equilibrium of the formerly flui! mass#3 If, ho e"er, e neglect this restriction of the i!ea to a %urely regulati"e influence, reason is betraye! into numerous errors# :or it has then left the groun! of e?%erience, in hich alone are to be foun! the criteria of truth, an! has "enture! into the region of the incom%rehensible an! unsearchable, on the heights of hich it loses its %o er an! collecte!ness, because it has com%letely se"ere! its connection ith e?%erience# The first error hich arises from our em%loying the i!ea of a 7u%reme Being as a constituti"e Din re%ugnance to the "ery nature of an i!eaE, an! not as a regulati"e %rinci%le, is the error of inacti"e reason Digna"a ratioE#8 >e may so term e"ery %rinci%le hich requires us to regar! our in"estigations of nature as absolutely com%lete, an! allo s reason to cease its inquiries, as if it ha! fully e?ecute! its task# Thus the %sychological i!ea of the ego, hen em%loye! as a constituti"e %rinci%le for the e?%lanation of the %henomena of the soul, an! for the e?tension of our kno le!ge regar!ing this subject beyon! the limits of e?%erienceBe"en to the con!ition of the soul after !eathBis con"enient enough for the %ur%oses of %ure reason, but !etrimental an! e"en ruinous to its interests in the s%here of nature an! e?%erience# The !ogmatiCing s%iritualist e?%lains the unchanging unity of our %ersonality through all changes of con!ition from the unity of a thinking substance, the interest hich e take in things an! e"ents that can ha%%en only after our !eath, from a consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, an! so on# Thus he !is%enses ith all em%irical in"estigations into the cause of these internal %henomena, an! ith all %ossible e?%lanations of them u%on %urely natural groun!s@ hile, at the !ictation of a transcen!ent reason, he %asses by the immanent sources of cognition in e?%erience, greatly to his o n ease an! con"enience, but to the sacrifice of all, genuine insight an!

intelligence# These %reju!icial consequences become still more e"i!ent, in the case of the !ogmatical treatment of our i!ea of a 7u%reme Intelligence, an! the theological system of nature D%hysico&theologyE hich is falsely base! u%on it# :or, in this case, the aims hich e obser"e in nature, an! often those hich e merely fancy to e?ist, make the in"estigation of causes a "ery easy task, by !irecting us to refer such an! such %henomena imme!iately to the unsearchable ill an! counsel of the 7u%reme >is!om, hile e ought to in"estigate their causes in the general la s of the mechanism of matter# >e are thus recommen!e! to consi!er the labour of reason as en!e!, hen e ha"e merely !is%ense! ith its em%loyment, hich is gui!e! surely an! safely only by the or!er of nature an! the series of changes in the orl!B hich are arrange! accor!ing to immanent an! general la s# This error may be a"oi!e!, if e !o not merely consi!er from the "ie &%oint of final aims certain %arts of nature, such as the !i"ision an! structure of a continent, the constitution an! !irection of certain mountain&chains, or e"en the organiCation e?isting in the "egetable an! animal king!oms, but look u%on this systematic unity of nature in a %erfectly general ay, in relation to the i!ea of a 7u%reme Intelligence# If e %ursue this a!"ice, e lay as a foun!ation for all in"estigation the conformity to aims of all %henomena of nature in accor!ance ith uni"ersal la s, for hich no %articular arrangement of nature is e?em%t, but only cogniCe! by us ith more or less !ifficulty@ an! e %ossess a regulati"e %rinci%le of the systematic unity of a teleological connection, hich e !o not attem%t to antici%ate or %re!etermine# )ll that e !o, an! ought to !o, is to follo out the %hysico&mechanical connection in nature accor!ing to general la s, ith the ho%e of !isco"ering, sooner or later, the teleological connection also# Thus, an! thus only, can the %rinci%le of final unity ai! in the e?tension of the em%loyment of reason in the s%here of e?%erience, ithout being in any case !etrimental to its interests# /8:ootnote( This as the term a%%lie! by the ol! !ialecticians to a so%histical argument, hich ran thus( If it is your fate to !ie of this !isease, you ill !ie, hether you em%loy a %hysician or not# Cicero says that this mo!e of reasoning has recei"e! this a%%ellation, because, if follo e!, it %uts an en! to the em%loyment of reason in the affairs of life# :or a similar reason, I ha"e a%%lie! this !esignation to the so%histical argument of %ure reason#3 The secon! error hich arises from the misconce%tion of the %rinci%le of systematic unity is that of %er"erte! reason D%er"ersa ratio, usteron roteron rationisE# The i!ea of systematic unity is a"ailable as a regulati"e %rinci%le in the connection of %henomena accor!ing to general natural la s@ an!, ho far soe"er e ha"e to tra"el u%on the %ath of e?%erience to !isco"er some fact or e"ent, this i!ea requires us to belie"e that e ha"e a%%roache! all the more nearly to the com%letion of its use in the s%here of nature, although that com%letion can ne"er be attaine!# But this error re"erses the %roce!ure of reason# >e begin by hy%ostatiCing the %rinci%le of systematic unity, an! by gi"ing an anthro%omor%hic !etermination to the conce%tion of a 7u%reme Intelligence, an! then %rocee! forcibly to im%ose aims u%on nature# Thus not only !oes teleology, hich ought to ai! in the com%letion of unity in accor!ance ith general la s, o%erate to the !estruction of its influence, but it hin!ers reason from attaining its %ro%er aim, that is, the %roof, u%on natural groun!s, of the e?istence of a su%reme intelligent cause# :or, if

e cannot %resu%%ose su%reme finality in nature a %riori, that is, as essentially belonging to nature, ho can e be !irecte! to en!ea"our to !isco"er this unity an!, rising gra!ually through its !ifferent !egrees, to a%%roach the su%reme %erfection of an author of allBa %erfection hich is absolutely necessary, an! therefore cogniCable a %rioriH The regulati"e %rinci%le !irects us to %resu%%ose systematic unity absolutely an!, consequently, as follo ing from the essential nature of thingsBbut only as a unity of nature, not merely cogniCe! em%irically, but %resu%%ose! a %riori, although only in an in!eterminate manner# But if I insist on basing nature u%on the foun!ation of a su%reme or!aining Being, the unity of nature is in effect lost# :or, in this case, it is quite foreign an! unessential to the nature of things, an! cannot be cogniCe! from the general la s of nature# )n! thus arises a "icious circular argument, hat ought to ha"e been %ro"e! ha"ing been %resu%%ose!# To take the regulati"e %rinci%le of systematic unity in nature for a constituti"e %rinci%le, an! to hy%ostatiCe an! make a cause out of that hich is %ro%erly the i!eal groun! of the consistent an! harmonious e?ercise of reason, in"ol"es reason in ine?tricable embarrassments# The in"estigation of nature %ursues its o n %ath un!er the gui!ance of the chain of natural causes, in accor!ance ith the general la s of nature, an! e"er follo s the light of the i!ea of an author of the uni"erseBnot for the %ur%ose of !e!ucing the finality, hich it constantly %ursues, from this 7u%reme Being, but to attain to the cognition of his e?istence from the finality hich it seeks in the e?istence of the %henomena of nature, an!, if %ossible, in that of all things to cogniCe this being, consequently, as absolutely necessary# >hether this latter %ur%ose succee! or not, the i!ea is an! must al ays be a true one, an! its em%loyment, hen merely regulati"e, must al ays be accom%anie! by truthful an! beneficial results# Com%lete unity, in conformity ith aims, constitutes absolute %erfection# But if e !o not fin! this unity in the nature of the things hich go to constitute the orl! of e?%erience, that is, of objecti"e cognition, consequently in the uni"ersal an! necessary la s of nature, ho can e infer from this unity the i!ea of the su%reme an! absolutely necessary %erfection of a %rimal being, hich is the origin of all causalityH The greatest systematic unity, an! consequently teleological unity, constitutes the "ery foun!ation of the %ossibility of the most e?ten!e! em%loyment of human reason# The i!ea of unity is therefore essentially an! in!issolubly connecte! ith the nature of our reason# This i!ea is a legislati"e one@ an! hence it is "ery natural that e shoul! assume the e?istence of a legislati"e reason corres%on!ing to it, from hich the systematic unity of natureBthe object of the o%erations of reasonBmust be !eri"e!# In the course of our !iscussion of the antinomies, e state! that it is al ays %ossible to ans er all the questions hich %ure reason may raise@ an! that the %lea of the limite! nature of our cognition, hich is una"oi!able an! %ro%er in many questions regar!ing natural %henomena, cannot in this case be a!mitte!, because the questions raise! !o not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily originate! by the nature of reason itself, an! relate to its o n internal constitution# >e can no establish this assertion, hich at first sight a%%eare! so rash, in relation to the t o questions in hich reason takes the greatest interest, an! thus com%lete our !iscussion of the !ialectic of %ure reason#

If, then, the question is aske!, in relation to transcen!ental theology,8 first, hether there is anything !istinct from the orl!, hich contains the groun! of cosmical or!er an! connection accor!ing to general la sH The ans er is( Certainly# :or the orl! is a sum of %henomena@ there must, therefore, be some transcen!ental basis of these %henomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the %ure un!erstan!ing alone# If, secon!ly, the question is aske! hether this being is substance, hether it is of the greatest reality, hether it is necessary, an! so forthH I ans er that this question is utterly ithout meaning# :or all the categories hich ai! me in forming a conce%tion of an object cannot be em%loye! e?ce%t in the orl! of sense, an! are ithout meaning hen not a%%lie! to objects of actual or %ossible e?%erience# 9ut of this s%here, they are not %ro%erly conce%tions, but the mere marks or in!ices of conce%tions, hich e may a!mit, although they cannot, ithout the hel% of e?%erience, hel% us to un!erstan! any subject or thing# If, thir!ly, the question is hether e may not cogitate this being, hich is !istinct from the orl!, in analogy ith the objects of e?%erienceH The ans er is( 4n!oubte!ly, but only as an i!eal, an! not as a real object# That is, e must cogitate it only as an unkno n substratum of the systematic unity, or!er, an! finality of the orl!Ba unity hich reason must em%loy as the regulati"e %rinci%le of its in"estigation of nature# <ay, more, e may a!mit into the i!ea certain anthro%omor%hic elements, hich are %romoti"e of the interests of this regulati"e %rinci%le# :or it is no more than an i!ea, hich !oes not relate !irectly to a being !istinct from the orl!, but to the regulati"e %rinci%le of the systematic unity of the orl!, by means, ho e"er, of a schema of this unityBthe schema of a 7u%reme Intelligence, ho is the isely&!esigning author of the uni"erse# >hat this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, e kno notB e cannot !isco"er from the i!ea@ e merely kno ho e ought to em%loy the i!ea of this unity, in relation to the systematic o%eration of reason in the s%here of e?%erience# /8:ootnote( )fter hat has been sai! of the %sychological i!ea of the ego an! its %ro%er em%loyment as a regulati"e %rinci%le of the o%erations of reason, I nee! not enter into !etails regar!ing the transcen!ental illusion by hich the systematic unity of all the "arious %henomena of the internal sense is hy%ostatiCe!# The %roce!ure is in this case "ery similar to that hich has been !iscusse! in our remarks on the theological i!eal#3 But, it ill be aske! again, can e on these groun!s, a!mit the e?istence of a ise an! omni%otent author of the orl!H >ithout !oubt@ an! not only so, but e must assume the e?istence of such a being# But !o e thus e?ten! the limits of our kno le!ge beyon! the fiel! of %ossible e?%erienceH By no means# :or e ha"e merely %resu%%ose! a something, of hich e ha"e no conce%tion, hich e !o not kno as it is in itself@ but, in relation to the systematic !is%osition of the uni"erse, hich e must %resu%%ose in all our obser"ation of nature, e ha"e cogitate! this unkno n being in analogy ith an intelligent e?istence Dan em%irical conce%tionE, that is to say, e ha"e en!o e! it ith those attributes, hich, ju!ging from the nature of our o n reason, may contain the groun! of such a systematic unity# This i!ea is therefore "ali! only relati"ely to the em%loyment in e?%erience of our reason# But if e attribute to it absolute an! objecti"e "ali!ity, e o"erlook the fact that it is merely an i!eal being that e cogitate@ an!, by setting out from a basis hich is not !eterminable by consi!erations !ra n from

e?%erience, e %lace oursel"es in a %osition hich inca%acitates us from a%%lying this %rinci%le to the em%irical em%loyment of reason# But, it ill be aske! further, can I make any use of this conce%tion an! hy%othesis in my in"estigations into the orl! an! natureH $es, for this "ery %ur%ose as the i!ea establishe! by reason as a fun!amental basis# But may I regar! certain arrangements, hich seeme! to ha"e been ma!e in conformity ith some fi?e! aim, as the arrangements of !esign, an! look u%on them as %rocee!ing from the !i"ine ill, ith the inter"ention, ho e"er, of certain other %articular arrangements !is%ose! to that en!H $es, you may !o so@ but at the same time you must regar! it as in!ifferent, hether it is asserte! that !i"ine is!om has !is%ose! all things in conformity ith his highest aims, or that the i!ea of su%reme is!om is a regulati"e %rinci%le in the in"estigation of nature, an! at the same time a %rinci%le of the systematic unity of nature accor!ing to general la s, e"en in those cases here e are unable to !isco"er that unity# In other or!s, it must be %erfectly in!ifferent to you hether you say, hen you ha"e !isco"ere! this unity( Go! has isely ille! it so@ or( <ature has isely arrange! this# :or it as nothing but the systematic unity, hich reason requires as a basis for the in"estigation of nature, that justifie! you in acce%ting the i!ea of a su%reme intelligence as a schema for a regulati"e %rinci%le@ an!, the farther you a!"ance in the !isco"ery of !esign an! finality, the more certain the "ali!ity of your i!ea# But, as the hole aim of this regulati"e %rinci%le as the !isco"ery of a necessary an! systematic unity in nature, e ha"e, in so far as e attain this, to attribute our success to the i!ea of a 7u%reme Being@ hile, at the same time, e cannot, ithout in"ol"ing oursel"es in contra!ictions, o"erlook the general la s of nature, as it as in reference to them alone that this i!ea as em%loye!# >e cannot, I say, o"erlook the general la s of nature, an! regar! this conformity to aims obser"able in nature as contingent or hy%er%hysical in its origin@ inasmuch as there is no groun! hich can justify us in the a!mission of a being ith such %ro%erties !istinct from an! abo"e nature# )ll that e are authoriCe! to assert is that this i!ea may be em%loye! as a %rinci%le, an! that the %ro%erties of the being hich is assume! to corres%on! to it may be regar!e! as systematically connecte! in analogy ith the causal !etermination of %henomena# :or the same reasons e are justifie! in intro!ucing into the i!ea of the su%reme cause other anthro%omor%hic elements Dfor ithout these e coul! not %re!icate anything of itE@ e may regar! it as allo able to cogitate this cause as a being ith un!erstan!ing, the feelings of %leasure an! !is%leasure, an! faculties of !esire an! ill corres%on!ing to these# )t the same time, e may attribute to this being infinite %erfectionBa %erfection hich necessarily transcen!s that hich our kno le!ge of the or!er an! !esign in the orl! authoriCe us to %re!icate of it# :or the regulati"e la of systematic unity requires us to stu!y nature on the su%%osition that systematic an! final unity in infinitum is e"ery here !isco"erable, e"en in the highest !i"ersity# :or, although e may !isco"er little of this cosmical %erfection, it belongs to the legislati"e %rerogati"e of reason to require us al ays to seek for an! to e?%ect it@ hile it must al ays be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in accor!ance ith this %rinci%le# But it is e"i!ent that, by this i!ea of a su%reme author of all, hich I %lace as the foun!ation of all inquiries into nature, I !o not mean to assert the e?istence of such a being, or that I ha"e any kno le!ge of its e?istence@ an!, consequently, I !o not really !e!uce anything from the

e?istence of this being, but merely from its i!ea, that is to say, from the nature of things in this orl!, in accor!ance ith this i!ea# ) certain !im consciousness of the true use of this i!ea seems to ha"e !ictate! to the %hiloso%hers of all times the mo!erate language use! by them regar!ing the cause of the orl!# >e fin! them em%loying the e?%ressions is!om an! care of nature, an! !i"ine is!om, as synonymousBnay, in %urely s%eculati"e !iscussions, %referring the former, because it !oes not carry the a%%earance of greater %retensions than such as e are entitle! to make, an! at the same time !irects reason to its %ro%er fiel! of actionBnature an! her %henomena# Thus, %ure reason, hich at first seeme! to %romise us nothing less than the e?tension of our cognition beyon! the limits of e?%erience, is foun!, hen thoroughly e?amine!, to contain nothing but regulati"e %rinci%les, the "irtue an! function of hich is to intro!uce into our cognition a higher !egree of unity than the un!erstan!ing coul! of itself# These %rinci%les, by %lacing the goal of all our struggles at so great a !istance, realiCe for us the most thorough connection bet een the !ifferent %arts of our cognition, an! the highest !egree of systematic unity# But, on the other han!, if misun!erstoo! an! em%loye! as constituti"e %rinci%les of transcen!ent cognition, they become the %arents of illusions an! contra!ictions, hile %reten!ing to intro!uce us to ne regions of kno le!ge# Thus all human cognition begins ith intuitions, %rocee!s from thence to conce%tions, an! en!s ith i!eas# )lthough it %ossesses, in relation to all three elements, a %riori sources of cognition, hich seeme! to transcen! the limits of all e?%erience, a thoroughgoing criticism !emonstrates that s%eculati"e reason can ne"er, by the ai! of these elements, %ass the boun!s of %ossible e?%erience, an! that the %ro%er !estination of this highest faculty of cognition is to em%loy all metho!s, an! all the %rinci%les of these metho!s, for the %ur%ose of %enetrating into the innermost secrets of nature, by the ai! of the %rinci%les of unity Damong all kin!s of hich teleological unity is the highestE, hile it ought not to attem%t to soar abo"e the s%here of e?%erience, beyon! hich there lies nought for us but the "oi! inane# The critical e?amination, in our Transcen!ental )nalytic, of all the %ro%ositions hich %rofesse! to e?ten! cognition beyon! the s%here of e?%erience, com%letely !emonstrate! that they can only con!uct us to a %ossible e?%erience# If e ere not !istrustful e"en of the clearest abstract theorems, if e ere not allure! by s%ecious an! in"iting %ros%ects to esca%e from the constraining %o er of their e"i!ence, e might s%are oursel"es the laborious e?amination of all the !ialectical arguments hich a transcen!ent reason a!!uces in su%%ort of its %retensions@ for e shoul! kno ith the most com%lete certainty that, ho e"er honest such %rofessions might be, they are null an! "alueless, because they relate to a kin! of kno le!ge to hich no man can by any %ossibility attain# But, as there is no en! to !iscussion, if e cannot !isco"er the true cause of the illusions by hich e"en the isest are !ecei"e!, an! as the analysis of all our transcen!ent cognition into its elements is of itself of no slight "alue as a %sychological stu!y, hile it is a !uty incumbent on e"ery %hiloso%herBit as foun! necessary to in"estigate the !ialectical %roce!ure of reason in its %rimary sources# )n! as the inferences of hich this !ialectic is the %arent are not only !eceitful, but naturally %ossess a %rofoun! interest for humanity, it as a!"isable at the same time, to gi"e a full account of the momenta of

this !ialectical %roce!ure, an! to !e%osit it in the archi"es of human reason, as a arning to all future meta%hysicians to a"oi! these causes of s%eculati"e error# II# TR)<7CE<*E<T)' *9CTRI<E 9: AET;9*# If e regar! the sum of the cognition of %ure s%eculati"e reason as an e!ifice, the i!ea of hich, at least, e?ists in the human min!, it may be sai! that e ha"e in the Transcen!ental *octrine of Elements e?amine! the materials an! !etermine! to hat e!ifice these belong, an! hat its height an! stability# >e ha"e foun!, in!ee!, that, although e ha! %ur%ose! to buil! for oursel"es a to er hich shoul! reach to ;ea"en, the su%%ly of materials suffice! merely for a habitation, hich as s%acious enough for all terrestrial %ur%oses, an! high enough to enable us to sur"ey the le"el %lain of e?%erience, but that the bol! un!ertaking !esigne! necessarily faile! for ant of materialsBnot to mention the confusion of tongues, hich ga"e rise to en!less !is%utes among the labourers on the %lan of the e!ifice, an! at last scattere! them o"er all the orl!, each to erect a se%arate buil!ing for himself, accor!ing to his o n %lans an! his o n inclinations# 9ur %resent task relates not to the materials, but to the %lan of an e!ifice@ an!, as e ha"e ha! sufficient arning not to "enture blin!ly u%on a !esign hich may be foun! to transcen! our natural %o ers, hile, at the same time, e cannot gi"e u% the intention of erecting a secure abo!e for the min!, e must %ro%ortion our !esign to the material hich is %resente! to us, an! hich is, at the same time, sufficient for all our ants# I un!erstan!, then, by the transcen!ental !octrine of metho!, the !etermination of the formal con!itions of a com%lete system of %ure reason# >e shall accor!ingly ha"e to treat of the !isci%line, the canon, the architectonic, an!, finally, the history of %ure reason# This %art of our Critique ill accom%lish, from the transcen!ental %oint of "ie , hat has been usually attem%te!, but miserably e?ecute!, un!er the name of %ractical logic# It has been ba!ly e?ecute!, I say, because general logic, not being limite! to any %articular kin! of cognition Dnot e"en to the %ure cognition of the un!erstan!ingE nor to any %articular objects, it cannot, ithout borro ing from other sciences, !o more than %resent merely the titles or signs of %ossible metho!s an! the technical e?%ressions, hich are em%loye! in the systematic %arts of all sciences@ an! thus the %u%il is ma!e acquainte! ith names, the meaning an! a%%lication of hich he is to learn only at some future time#

CHAPTER I. T&e !"s,"2l"ne %+ Pure Reas%n. <egati"e ju!gementsBthose hich are so not merely as regar!s their logical form, but in res%ect of their contentBare not commonly hel! in es%ecial res%ect# They are, on the contrary, regar!e! as jealous enemies of our insatiable !esire for kno le!ge@ an! it

almost requires an a%ology to in!uce us to tolerate, much less to %riCe an! to res%ect them# )ll %ro%ositions, in!ee!, may be logically e?%resse! in a negati"e form@ but, in relation to the content of our cognition, the %eculiar %ro"ince of negati"e ju!gements is solely to %re"ent error# :or this reason, too, negati"e %ro%ositions, hich are frame! for the %ur%ose of correcting false cognitions here error is absolutely im%ossible, are un!oubte!ly true, but inane an! senseless@ that is, they are in reality %ur%oseless an!, for this reason, often "ery ri!iculous# 7uch is the %ro%osition of the schoolman that )le?an!er coul! not ha"e sub!ue! any countries ithout an army# But here the limits of our %ossible cognition are "ery much contracte!, the attraction to ne fiel!s of kno le!ge great, the illusions to hich the min! is subject of the most !ece%ti"e character, an! the e"il consequences of error of no inconsi!erable magnitu!e Bthe negati"e element in kno le!ge, hich is useful only to guar! us against error, is of far more im%ortance than much of that %ositi"e instruction hich makes a!!itions to the sum of our kno le!ge# The restraint hich is em%loye! to re%ress, an! finally to e?tir%ate the constant inclination to !e%art from certain rules, is terme! !isci%line# It is !istinguishe! from culture, hich aims at the formation of a certain !egree of skill, ithout attem%ting to re%ress or to !estroy any other mental %o er, alrea!y e?isting# In the culti"ation of a talent, hich has gi"en e"i!ence of an im%ulse to ar!s self& !e"elo%ment, !isci%line takes a negati"e,8 culture an! !octrine a %ositi"e, %art# /8:ootnote( I am ell a are that, in the language of the schools, the term !isci%line is usually em%loye! as synonymous ith instruction# But there are so many cases in hich it is necessary to !istinguish the notion of the former, as a course of correcti"e training, from that of the latter, as the communication of kno le!ge, an! the nature of things itself !eman!s the a%%ro%riation of the most suitable e?%ressions for this !istinction, that it is my !esire that the former terms shoul! ne"er be em%loye! in any other than a negati"e signification#3 That natural !is%ositions an! talents Dsuch as imagination an! itE, hich ask a free an! unlimite! !e"elo%ment, require in many res%ects the correcti"e influence of !isci%line, e"ery one ill rea!ily grant# But it may ell a%%ear strange that reason, hose %ro%er !uty it is to %rescribe rules of !isci%line to all the other %o ers of the min!, shoul! itself require this correcti"e# It has, in fact, hitherto esca%e! this humiliation, only because, in %resence of its magnificent %retensions an! high %osition, no one coul! rea!ily sus%ect it to be ca%able of substituting fancies for conce%tions, an! or!s for things# Reason, hen em%loye! in the fiel! of e?%erience, !oes not stan! in nee! of criticism, because its %rinci%les are subjecte! to the continual test of em%irical obser"ations# <or is criticism requisite in the s%here of mathematics, here the conce%tions of reason must al ays be %resente! in concreto in %ure intuition, an! baseless or arbitrary assertions are !isco"ere! ithout !ifficulty# But here reason is not hel! in a %lain track by the influence of em%irical or of %ure intuition, that is, hen it is em%loye! in the

transcen!ental s%here of %ure conce%tions, it stan!s in great nee! of !isci%line, to restrain its %ro%ensity to o"erste% the limits of %ossible e?%erience an! to kee% it from an!ering into error# In fact, the utility of the %hiloso%hy of %ure reason is entirely of this negati"e character# Particular errors may be correcte! by %articular anima!"ersions, an! the causes of these errors may be era!icate! by criticism# But here e fin!, as in the case of %ure reason, a com%lete system of illusions an! fallacies, closely connecte! ith each other an! !e%en!ing u%on gran! general %rinci%les, there seems to be require! a %eculiar an! negati"e co!e of mental legislation, hich, un!er the !enomination of a !isci%line, an! foun!e! u%on the nature of reason an! the objects of its e?ercise, shall constitute a system of thorough e?amination an! testing, hich no fallacy ill be able to ithstan! or esca%e from, un!er hate"er !isguise or concealment it may lurk# But the rea!er must remark that, in this the secon! !i"ision of our transcen!ental Critique the !isci%line of %ure reason is not !irecte! to the content, but to the metho! of the cognition of %ure reason# The former task has been com%lete! in the !octrine of elements# But there is so much similarity in the mo!e of em%loying the faculty of reason, hate"er be the object to hich it is a%%lie!, hile, at the same time, its em%loyment in the transcen!ental s%here is so essentially !ifferent in kin! from e"ery other, that, ithout the arning negati"e influence of a !isci%line s%ecially !irecte! to that en!, the errors are una"oi!able hich s%ring from the unskillful em%loyment of the metho!s hich are originate! by reason but hich are out of %lace in this s%here# 7ECTI9< I# The *isci%line of Pure Reason in the 7%here of *ogmatism# The science of mathematics %resents the most brilliant e?am%le of the e?tension of the s%here of %ure reason ithout the ai! of e?%erience# E?am%les are al ays contagious@ an! they e?ert an es%ecial influence on the same faculty, hich naturally flatters itself that it ill ha"e the same goo! fortune in other case as fell to its lot in one fortunate instance# ;ence %ure reason ho%es to be able to e?ten! its em%ire in the transcen!ental s%here ith equal success an! security, es%ecially hen it a%%lies the same metho! hich as atten!e! ith such brilliant results in the science of mathematics# It is, therefore, of the highest im%ortance for us to kno hether the metho! of arri"ing at !emonstrati"e certainty, hich is terme! mathematical, be i!entical ith that by hich e en!ea"our to attain the same !egree of certainty in %hiloso%hy, an! hich is terme! in that science !ogmatical# Philoso%hical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of conce%tions@ mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conce%tions# The construction of a conce%tion is the %resentation a %riori of the intuition hich corres%on!s to the conce%tion# :or this %ur%ose a non&em%irical intuition is requisite, hich, as an intuition, is an in!i"i!ual object@ hile, as the construction of a conce%tion Da general re%resentationE, it must be seen to be uni"ersally "ali! for all the %ossible intuitions hich rank un!er that conce%tion# Thus I construct a triangle, by the %resentation of the object hich corres%on!s to this conce%tion, either by mere imagination, in %ure intuition, or u%on %a%er, in em%irical intuition, in both cases com%letely a %riori, ithout borro ing the ty%e of that figure from any e?%erience# The

in!i"i!ual figure !ra n u%on %a%er is em%irical@ but it ser"es, not ithstan!ing, to in!icate the conce%tion, e"en in its uni"ersality, because in this em%irical intuition e kee% our eye merely on the act of the construction of the conce%tion, an! %ay no attention to the "arious mo!es of !etermining it, for e?am%le, its siCe, the length of its si!es, the siCe of its angles, these not in the least affecting the essential character of the conce%tion# Philoso%hical cognition, accor!ingly, regar!s the %articular only in the general@ mathematical the general in the %articular, nay, in the in!i"i!ual# This is !one, ho e"er, entirely a %riori an! by means of %ure reason, so that, as this in!i"i!ual figure is !etermine! un!er certain uni"ersal con!itions of construction, the object of the conce%tion, to hich this in!i"i!ual figure corres%on!s as its schema, must be cogitate! as uni"ersally !etermine!# The essential !ifference of these t o mo!es of cognition consists, therefore, in this formal quality@ it !oes not regar! the !ifference of the matter or objects of both# Those thinkers ho aim at !istinguishing %hiloso%hy from mathematics by asserting that the former has to !o ith quality merely, an! the latter ith quantity, ha"e mistaken the effect for the cause# The reason hy mathematical cognition can relate only to quantity is to be foun! in its form alone# :or it is the conce%tion of quantities only that is ca%able of being constructe!, that is, %resente! a %riori in intuition@ hile qualities cannot be gi"en in any other than an em%irical intuition# ;ence the cognition of qualities by reason is %ossible only through conce%tions# <o one can fin! an intuition hich shall corres%on! to the conce%tion of reality, e?ce%t in e?%erience@ it cannot be %resente! to the min! a %riori an! antece!ently to the em%irical consciousness of a reality# >e can form an intuition, by means of the mere conce%tion of it, of a cone, ithout the ai! of e?%erience@ but the colour of the cone e cannot kno e?ce%t from e?%erience# I cannot %resent an intuition of a cause, e?ce%t in an e?am%le hich e?%erience offers to me# Besi!es, %hiloso%hy, as ell as mathematics, treats of quantities@ as, for e?am%le, of totality, infinity, an! so on# Aathematics, too, treats of the !ifference of lines an! surfacesBas s%aces of !ifferent quality, of the continuity of e?tensionBas a quality thereof# But, although in such cases they ha"e a common object, the mo!e in hich reason consi!ers that object is "ery !ifferent in %hiloso%hy from hat it is in mathematics# The former confines itself to the general conce%tions@ the latter can !o nothing ith a mere conce%tion, it hastens to intuition# In this intuition it regar!s the conce%tion in concreto, not em%irically, but in an a %riori intuition, hich it has constructe!@ an! in hich, all the results hich follo from the general con!itions of the construction of the conce%tion are in all cases "ali! for the object of the constructe! conce%tion# 7u%%ose that the conce%tion of a triangle is gi"en to a %hiloso%her an! that he is require! to !isco"er, by the %hiloso%hical metho!, hat relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle# ;e has nothing before him but the conce%tion of a figure enclose! ithin three right lines, an!, consequently, ith the same number of angles# ;e may analyse the conce%tion of a right line, of an angle, or of the number three as long as he %leases, but he ill not !isco"er any %ro%erties not containe! in these conce%tions# But, if this question is %ro%ose! to a geometrician, he at once begins by constructing a

triangle# ;e kno s that t o right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles hich %rocee! from one %oint in a straight line@ an! he goes on to %ro!uce one si!e of his triangle, thus forming t o a!jacent angles hich are together equal to t o right angles# ;e then !i"i!es the e?terior of these angles, by !ra ing a line %arallel ith the o%%osite si!e of the triangle, an! imme!iately %ercei"es that he has thus got an e?terior a!jacent angle hich is equal to the interior# Procee!ing in this ay, through a chain of inferences, an! al ays on the groun! of intuition, he arri"es at a clear an! uni"ersally "ali! solution of the question# But mathematics !oes not confine itself to the construction of quantities DquantaE, as in the case of geometry@ it occu%ies itself ith %ure quantity also DquantitasE, as in the case of algebra, here com%lete abstraction is ma!e of the %ro%erties of the object in!icate! by the conce%tion of quantity# In algebra, a certain metho! of notation by signs is a!o%te!, an! these in!icate the !ifferent %ossible constructions of quantities, the e?traction of roots, an! so on# )fter ha"ing thus !enote! the general conce%tion of quantities, accor!ing to their !ifferent relations, the !ifferent o%erations by hich quantity or number is increase! or !iminishe! are %resente! in intuition in accor!ance ith general rules# Thus, hen one quantity is to be !i"i!e! by another, the signs hich !enote both are %lace! in the form %eculiar to the o%eration of !i"ision@ an! thus algebra, by means of a symbolical construction of quantity, just as geometry, ith its ostensi"e or geometrical construction Da construction of the objects themsel"esE, arri"es at results hich !iscursi"e cognition cannot ho%e to reach by the ai! of mere conce%tions# <o , hat is the cause of this !ifference in the fortune of the %hiloso%her an! the mathematician, the former of hom follo s the %ath of conce%tions, hile the latter %ursues that of intuitions, hich he re%resents, a %riori, in corres%on!ence ith his conce%tionsH The cause is e"i!ent from hat has been alrea!y !emonstrate! in the intro!uction to this Critique# >e !o not, in the %resent case, ant to !isco"er analytical %ro%ositions, hich may be %ro!uce! merely by analysing our conce%tionsBfor in this the %hiloso%her oul! ha"e the a!"antage o"er his ri"al@ e aim at the !isco"ery of synthetical %ro%ositionsBsuch synthetical %ro%ositions, moreo"er, as can be cogniCe! a %riori# I must not confine myself to that hich I actually cogitate in my conce%tion of a triangle, for this is nothing more than the mere !efinition@ I must try to go beyon! that, an! to arri"e at %ro%erties hich are not containe! in, although they belong to, the conce%tion# <o , this is im%ossible, unless I !etermine the object %resent to my min! accor!ing to the con!itions, either of em%irical, or of %ure, intuition# In the former case, I shoul! ha"e an em%irical %ro%osition Darri"e! at by actual measurement of the angles of the triangleE, hich oul! %ossess neither uni"ersality nor necessity@ but that oul! be of no "alue# In the latter, I %rocee! by geometrical construction, by means of hich I collect, in a %ure intuition, just as I oul! in an em%irical intuition, all the "arious %ro%erties hich belong to the schema of a triangle in general, an! consequently to its conce%tion, an! thus construct synthetical %ro%ositions hich %ossess the attribute of uni"ersality# It oul! be "ain to %hiloso%hiCe u%on the triangle, that is, to reflect on it !iscursi"ely@ I shoul! get no further than the !efinition ith hich I ha! been oblige! to set out# There

are certainly transcen!ental synthetical %ro%ositions hich are frame! by means of %ure conce%tions, an! hich form the %eculiar !istinction of %hiloso%hy@ but these !o not relate to any %articular thing, but to a thing in general, an! enounce the con!itions un!er hich the %erce%tion of it may become a %art of %ossible e?%erience# But the science of mathematics has nothing to !o ith such questions, nor ith the question of e?istence in any fashion@ it is concerne! merely ith the %ro%erties of objects in themsel"es, only in so far as these are connecte! ith the conce%tion of the objects# In the abo"e e?am%le, e merely attem%te! to sho the great !ifference hich e?ists bet een the !iscursi"e em%loyment of reason in the s%here of conce%tions, an! its intuiti"e e?ercise by means of the construction of conce%tions# The question naturally arises( >hat is the cause hich necessitates this t ofol! e?ercise of reason, an! ho are e to !isco"er hether it is the %hiloso%hical or the mathematical metho! hich reason is %ursuing in an argumentH )ll our kno le!ge relates, finally, to %ossible intuitions, for it is these alone that %resent objects to the min!# )n a %riori or non&em%irical conce%tion contains either a %ure intuitionBan! in this case it can be constructe!@ or it contains nothing but the synthesis of %ossible intuitions, hich are not gi"en a %riori# In this latter case, it may hel% us to form synthetical a %riori ju!gements, but only in the !iscursi"e metho!, by conce%tions, not in the intuiti"e, by means of the construction of conce%tions# The only a %riori intuition is that of the %ure form of %henomenaBs%ace an! time# ) conce%tion of s%ace an! time as quanta may be %resente! a %riori in intuition, that is, constructe!, either alone ith their quality DfigureE, or as %ure quantity Dthe mere synthesis of the homogeneousE, by means of number# But the matter of %henomena, by hich things are gi"en in s%ace an! time, can be %resente! only in %erce%tion, a %osteriori# The only conce%tion hich re%resents a %riori this em%irical content of %henomena is the conce%tion of a thing in general@ an! the a %riori synthetical cognition of this conce%tion can gi"e us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that hich may be containe! in the corres%on!ing a %osteriori %erce%tion@ it is utterly ina!equate to %resent an a %riori intuition of the real object, hich must necessarily be em%irical# 7ynthetical %ro%ositions, hich relate to things in general, an a %riori intuition of hich is im%ossible, are transcen!ental# :or this reason transcen!ental %ro%ositions cannot be frame! by means of the construction of conce%tions@ they are a %riori, an! base! entirely on conce%tions themsel"es# They contain merely the rule, by hich e are to seek in the orl! of %erce%tion or e?%erience the synthetical unity of that hich cannot be intuite! a %riori# But they are incom%etent to %resent any of the conce%tions hich a%%ear in them in an a %riori intuition@ these can be gi"en only a %osteriori, in e?%erience, hich, ho e"er, is itself %ossible only through these synthetical %rinci%les# If e are to form a synthetical ju!gement regar!ing a conce%tion, e must go beyon! it, to the intuition in hich it is gi"en# If e kee% to hat is containe! in the conce%tion, the ju!gement is merely analyticalBit is merely an e?%lanation of hat e ha"e cogitate! in the conce%tion# But I can %ass from the conce%tion to the %ure or em%irical intuition hich corres%on!s to it# I can %rocee! to e?amine my conce%tion in concreto,

an! to cogniCe, either a %riori or a %osterio, hat I fin! in the object of the conce%tion# The formerBa %riori cognitionBis rational&mathematical cognition by means of the construction of the conce%tion@ the latterBa %osteriori cognitionBis %urely em%irical cognition, hich !oes not %ossess the attributes of necessity an! uni"ersality# Thus I may analyse the conce%tion I ha"e of gol!@ but I gain no ne information from this analysis, I merely enumerate the !ifferent %ro%erties hich I ha! connecte! ith the notion in!icate! by the or!# Ay kno le!ge has gaine! in logical clearness an! arrangement, but no a!!ition has been ma!e to it# But if I take the matter hich is in!icate! by this name, an! submit it to the e?amination of my senses, I am enable! to form se"eral syntheticalBalthough still em%iricalB%ro%ositions# The mathematical conce%tion of a triangle I shoul! construct, that is, %resent a %riori in intuition, an! in this ay attain to rational&synthetical cognition# But hen the transcen!ental conce%tion of reality, or substance, or %o er is %resente! to my min!, I fin! that it !oes not relate to or in!icate either an em%irical or %ure intuition, but that it in!icates merely the synthesis of em%irical intuitions, hich cannot of course be gi"en a %riori# The synthesis in such a conce%tion cannot %rocee! a %rioriB ithout the ai! of e?%erienceB to the intuition hich corres%on!s to the conce%tion@ an!, for this reason, none of these conce%tions can %ro!uce a !eterminati"e synthetical %ro%osition, they can ne"er %resent more than a %rinci%le of the synthesis8 of %ossible em%irical intuitions# ) transcen!ental %ro%osition is, therefore, a synthetical cognition of reason by means of %ure conce%tions an! the !iscursi"e metho!, an! it ren!ers %ossible all synthetical unity in em%irical cognition, though it cannot %resent us ith any intuition a %riori# /8:ootnote( In the case of the conce%tion of cause, I !o really go beyon! the em%irical conce%tion of an e"entBbut not to the intuition hich %resents this conce%tion in concreto, but only to the time&con!itions, hich may be foun! in e?%erience to corres%on! to the conce%tion# Ay %roce!ure is, therefore, strictly accor!ing to conce%tions@ I cannot in a case of this kin! em%loy the construction of conce%tions, because the conce%tion is merely a rule for the synthesis of %erce%tions, hich are not %ure intuitions, an! hich, therefore, cannot be gi"en a %riori#3 There is thus a t ofol! e?ercise of reason# Both mo!es ha"e the %ro%erties of uni"ersality an! an a %riori origin in common, but are, in their %roce!ure, of i!ely !ifferent character# The reason of this is that in the orl! of %henomena, in hich alone objects are %resente! to our min!s, there are t o main elementsBthe form of intuition Ds%ace an! timeE, hich can be cogniCe! an! !etermine! com%letely a %riori, an! the matter or contentBthat hich is %resente! in s%ace an! time, an! hich, consequently, contains a somethingBan e?istence corres%on!ing to our %o ers of sensation# )s regar!s the latter, hich can ne"er be gi"en in a !eterminate mo!e e?ce%t by e?%erience, there are no a %riori notions hich relate to it, e?ce%t the un!etermine! conce%tions of the synthesis of %ossible sensations, in so far as these belong Din a %ossible e?%erienceE to the unity of consciousness# )s regar!s the former, e can !etermine our conce%tions a %riori in intuition, inasmuch as e are oursel"es the creators of the objects of the conce%tions in s%ace an! timeBthese objects being regar!e! sim%ly as quanta# In the one case, reason %rocee!s accor!ing to conce%tions

an! can !o nothing more than subject %henomena to theseB hich can only be !etermine! em%irically, that is, a %osterioriBin conformity, ho e"er, ith those conce%tions as the rules of all em%irical synthesis# In the other case, reason %rocee!s by the construction of conce%tions@ an!, as these conce%tions relate to an a %riori intuition, they may be gi"en an! !etermine! in %ure intuition a %riori, an! ithout the ai! of em%irical !ata# The e?amination an! consi!eration of e"erything that e?ists in s%ace or timeB hether it is a quantum or not, in ho far the %articular something D hich fills s%ace or timeE is a %rimary substratum, or a mere !etermination of some other e?istence, hether it relates to anything elseBeither as cause or effect, hether its e?istence is isolate! or in reci%rocal connection ith an! !e%en!ence u%on others, the %ossibility of this e?istence, its reality an! necessity or o%%ositesBall these form %art of the cognition of reason on the groun! of conce%tions, an! this cognition is terme! %hiloso%hical# But to !etermine a %riori an intuition in s%ace Dits figureE, to !i"i!e time into %erio!s, or merely to cogniCe the quantity of an intuition in s%ace an! time, an! to !etermine it by numberBall this is an o%eration of reason by means of the construction of conce%tions, an! is calle! mathematical# The success hich atten!s the efforts of reason in the s%here of mathematics naturally fosters the e?%ectation that the same goo! fortune ill be its lot, if it a%%lies the mathematical metho! in other regions of mental en!ea"our besi!es that of quantities# Its success is thus great, because it can su%%ort all its conce%tions by a %riori intuitions an!, in this ay, make itself a master, as it ere, o"er nature@ hile %ure %hiloso%hy, ith its a %riori !iscursi"e conce%tions, bungles about in the orl! of nature, an! cannot accre!it or sho any a %riori e"i!ence of the reality of these conce%tions# Aasters in the science of mathematics are confi!ent of the success of this metho!@ in!ee!, it is a common %ersuasion that it is ca%able of being a%%lie! to any subject of human thought# They ha"e har!ly e"er reflecte! or %hiloso%hiCe! on their fa"ourite scienceBa task of great !ifficulty@ an! the s%ecific !ifference bet een the t o mo!es of em%loying the faculty of reason has ne"er entere! their thoughts# Rules current in the fiel! of common e?%erience, an! hich common sense stam%s e"ery here ith its a%%ro"al, are regar!e! by them as a?iomatic# :rom hat source the conce%tions of s%ace an! time, ith hich Das the only %rimiti"e quantaE they ha"e to !eal, enter their min!s, is a question hich they !o not trouble themsel"es to ans er@ an! they think it just as unnecessary to e?amine into the origin of the %ure conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing an! the e?tent of their "ali!ity# )ll they ha"e to !o ith them is to em%loy them# In all this they are %erfectly right, if they !o not o"erste% the limits of the s%here of nature# But they %ass, unconsciously, from the orl! of sense to the insecure groun! of %ure transcen!ental conce%tions Dinstabilis tellus, innabilis un!aE, here they can neither stan! nor s im, an! here the tracks of their footste%s are obliterate! by time@ hile the march of mathematics is %ursue! on a broa! an! magnificent high ay, hich the latest %osterity shall frequent ithout fear of !anger or im%e!iment# )s e ha"e taken u%on us the task of !etermining, clearly an! certainly, the limits of %ure reason in the s%here of transcen!entalism, an! as the efforts of reason in this !irection are %ersiste! in, e"en after the %lainest an! most e?%ressi"e arnings, ho%e still beckoning us %ast the limits of e?%erience into the s%len!ours of the intellectual orl!Bit becomes necessary to cut a ay the last anchor of this fallacious an! fantastic

ho%e# >e shall, accor!ingly, sho that the mathematical metho! is unatten!e! in the s%here of %hiloso%hy by the least a!"antageBe?ce%t, %erha%s, that it more %lainly e?hibits its o n ina!equacyBthat geometry an! %hiloso%hy are t o quite !ifferent things, although they go ban! in han! in han! in the fiel! of natural science, an!, consequently, that the %roce!ure of the one can ne"er be imitate! by the other# The e"i!ence of mathematics rests u%on !efinitions, a?ioms, an! !emonstrations# I shall be satisfie! ith sho ing that none of these forms can be em%loye! or imitate! in %hiloso%hy in the sense in hich they are un!erstoo! by mathematicians@ an! that the geometrician, if he em%loys his metho! in %hiloso%hy, ill succee! only in buil!ing car!&castles, hile the em%loyment of the %hiloso%hical metho! in mathematics can result in nothing but mere "erbiage# The essential business of %hiloso%hy, in!ee!, is to mark out the limits of the science@ an! e"en the mathematician, unless his talent is naturally circumscribe! an! limite! to this %articular !e%artment of kno le!ge, cannot turn a !eaf ear to the arnings of %hiloso%hy, or set himself abo"e its !irection# I# 9f *efinitions# ) !efinition is, as the term itself in!icates, the re%resentation, u%on %rimary groun!s, of the com%lete conce%tion of a thing ithin its o n limits#8 )ccor!ingly, an em%irical conce%tion cannot be !efine!, it can only be e?%laine!# :or, as there are in such a conce%tion only a certain number of marks or signs, hich !enote a certain class of sensuous objects, e can ne"er be sure that e !o not cogitate un!er the or! hich in!icates the same object, at one time a greater, at another a smaller number of signs# Thus, one %erson may cogitate in his conce%tion of gol!, in a!!ition to its %ro%erties of eight, colour, malleability, that of resisting rust, hile another %erson may be ignorant of this quality# >e em%loy certain signs only so long as e require them for the sake of !istinction@ ne obser"ations abstract some an! a!! ne ones, so that an em%irical conce%tion ne"er remains ithin %ermanent limits# It is, in fact, useless to !efine a conce%tion of this kin!# If, for e?am%le, e are s%eaking of ater an! its %ro%erties, e !o not sto% at hat e actually think by the or! ater, but %rocee! to obser"ation an! e?%eriment@ an! the or!, ith the fe signs attache! to it, is more %ro%erly a !esignation than a conce%tion of the thing# ) !efinition in this case oul! e"i!ently be nothing more than a !etermination of the or!# In the secon! %lace, no a %riori conce%tion, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness, an! so on, can be !efine!# :or I can ne"er be sure, that the clear re%resentation of a gi"en conce%tion D hich is gi"en in a confuse! stateE has been fully !e"elo%e!, until I kno that the re%resentation is a!equate ith its object# But, inasmuch as the conce%tion, as it is %resente! to the min!, may contain a number of obscure re%resentations, hich e !o not obser"e in our analysis, although e em%loy them in our a%%lication of the conce%tion, I can ne"er be sure that my analysis is com%lete, hile e?am%les may make this %robable, although they can ne"er !emonstrate the fact# Instea! of the or! !efinition, I shoul! rather em%loy the term e?%ositionBa more mo!est e?%ression, hich the critic may acce%t ithout surren!ering his !oubts as to the com%leteness of the analysis of any such conce%tion# )s, therefore, neither em%irical nor a %riori conce%tions are ca%able of !efinition, e ha"e to see hether the only other kin! of conce%tionsBarbitrary conce%tionsBcan be subjecte! to this mental o%eration# 7uch a conce%tion can al ays be !efine!@ for I must kno thoroughly hat I ishe! to cogitate in it, as it as I ho create! it, an! it as not gi"en to my min! either by the nature of

my un!erstan!ing or by e?%erience# )t the same time, I cannot say that, by such a !efinition, I ha"e !efine! a real object# If the conce%tion is base! u%on em%irical con!itions, if, for e?am%le, I ha"e a conce%tion of a clock for a shi%, this arbitrary conce%tion !oes not assure me of the e?istence or e"en of the %ossibility of the object# Ay !efinition of such a conce%tion oul! ith more %ro%riety be terme! a !eclaration of a %roject than a !efinition of an object# There are no other conce%tions hich can bear !efinition, e?ce%t those hich contain an arbitrary synthesis, hich can be constructe! a %riori# Consequently, the science of mathematics alone %ossesses !efinitions# :or the object here thought is %resente! a %riori in intuition@ an! thus it can ne"er contain more or less than the conce%tion, because the conce%tion of the object has been gi"en by the !efinitionBan! %rimarily, that is, ithout !eri"ing the !efinition from any other source# Philoso%hical !efinitions are, therefore, merely e?%ositions of gi"en conce%tions, hile mathematical !efinitions are constructions of conce%tions originally forme! by the min! itself@ the former are %ro!uce! by analysis, the com%leteness of hich is ne"er !emonstrati"ely certain, the latter by a synthesis# In a mathematical !efinition the conce%tion is forme!, in a %hiloso%hical !efinition it is only e?%laine!# :rom this it follo s( /8:ootnote( The !efinition must !escribe the conce%tion com%letely that is, omit none of the marks or signs of hich it com%ose!@ ithin its o n limits, that is, it must be %recise, an! enumerate no more signs than belong to the conce%tion@ an! on %rimary groun!s, that is to say, the limitations of the boun!s of the conce%tion must not be !e!uce! from other conce%tions, as in this case a %roof oul! be necessary, an! the so&calle! !efinition oul! be inca%able of taking its %lace at the bea! of all the ju!gements e ha"e to form regar!ing an object#3 DaE That e must not imitate, in %hiloso%hy, the mathematical usage of commencing ith !efinitionsBe?ce%t by ay of hy%othesis or e?%eriment# :or, as all so&calle! %hiloso%hical !efinitions are merely analyses of gi"en conce%tions, these conce%tions, although only in a confuse! form, must %rece!e the analysis@ an! the incom%lete e?%osition must %rece!e the com%lete, so that e may be able to !ra certain inferences from the characteristics hich an incom%lete analysis has enable! us to !isco"er, before e attain to the com%lete e?%osition or !efinition of the conce%tion# In one or!, a full an! clear !efinition ought, in %hiloso%hy, rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our labours#8 In mathematics, on the contrary, e cannot ha"e a conce%tion %rior to the !efinition@ it is the !efinition hich gi"es us the conce%tion, an! it must for this reason form the commencement of e"ery chain of mathematical reasoning# /8:ootnote( Philoso%hy aboun!s in faulty !efinitions, es%ecially such as contain some of the elements requisite to form a com%lete !efinition# If a conce%tion coul! not be em%loye! in reasoning before it ha! been !efine!, it oul! fare ill ith all %hiloso%hical thought# But, as incom%letely !efine! conce%tions may al ays be em%loye! ithout !etriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the elements containe! in them %rocee!s, im%erfect !efinitions, that is, %ro%ositions hich are

%ro%erly not !efinitions, but merely a%%ro?imations thereto, may be use! ith great a!"antage# In mathematics, !efinition belongs a! esse, in %hiloso%hy a! melius esse# It is a !ifficult task to construct a %ro%er !efinition# +urists are still ithout a com%lete !efinition of the i!ea of right#3 DbE Aathematical !efinitions cannot be erroneous# :or the conce%tion is gi"en only in an! through the !efinition, an! thus it contains only hat has been cogitate! in the !efinition# But although a !efinition cannot be incorrect, as regar!s its content, an error may sometimes, although sel!om, cree% into the form# This error consists in a ant of %recision# Thus the common !efinition of a circleBthat it is a cur"e! line, e"ery %oint in hich is equally !istant from another %oint calle! the centreBis faulty, from the fact that the !etermination in!icate! by the or! cur"e! is su%erfluous# :or there ought to be a %articular theorem, hich may be easily %ro"e! from the !efinition, to the effect that e"ery line, hich has all its %oints at equal !istances from another %oint, must be a cur"e! lineBthat is, that not e"en the smallest %art of it can be straight# )nalytical !efinitions, on the other han!, may be erroneous in many res%ects, either by the intro!uction of signs hich !o not actually e?ist in the conce%tion, or by anting in that com%leteness hich forms the essential of a !efinition# In the latter case, the !efinition is necessarily !efecti"e, because e can ne"er be fully certain of the com%leteness of our analysis# :or these reasons, the metho! of !efinition em%loye! in mathematics cannot be imitate! in %hiloso%hy# ,# 9f )?ioms# These, in so far as they are imme!iately certain, are a %riori synthetical %rinci%les# <o , one conce%tion cannot be connecte! synthetically an! yet imme!iately ith another@ because, if e ish to %rocee! out of an! beyon! a conce%tion, a thir! me!iating cognition is necessary# )n!, as %hiloso%hy is a cognition of reason by the ai! of conce%tions alone, there is to be foun! in it no %rinci%le hich !eser"es to be calle! an a?iom# Aathematics, on the other han!, may %ossess a?ioms, because it can al ays connect the %re!icates of an object a %riori, an! ithout any me!iating term, by means of the construction of conce%tions in intuition# 7uch is the case ith the %ro%osition( Three %oints can al ays lie in a %lane# 9n the other han!, no synthetical %rinci%le hich is base! u%on conce%tions, can e"er be imme!iately certain Dfor e?am%le, the %ro%osition( E"erything that ha%%ens has a causeE, because I require a me!iating term to connect the t o conce%tions of e"ent an! causeBnamely, the con!ition of time& !etermination in an e?%erience, an! I cannot cogniCe any such %rinci%le imme!iately an! from conce%tions alone# *iscursi"e %rinci%les are, accor!ingly, "ery !ifferent from intuiti"e %rinci%les or a?ioms# The former al ays require !e!uction, hich in the case of the latter may be altogether !is%ense! ith# )?ioms are, for this reason, al ays self& e"i!ent, hile %hiloso%hical %rinci%les, hate"er may be the !egree of certainty they %ossess, cannot lay any claim to such a !istinction# <o synthetical %ro%osition of %ure transcen!ental reason can be so e"i!ent, as is often rashly enough !eclare!, as the statement, t ice t o are four# It is true that in the )nalytic I intro!uce! into the list of %rinci%les of the %ure un!erstan!ing, certain a?ioms of intuition@ but the %rinci%le there !iscusse! as not itself an a?iom, but ser"e! merely to %resent the %rinci%le of the %ossibility of a?ioms in general, hile it as really nothing more than a %rinci%le base! u%on conce%tions# :or it is one %art of the !uty of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy to establish

the %ossibility of mathematics itself# Philoso%hy %ossesses, then, no a?ioms, an! has no right to im%ose its a %riori %rinci%les u%on thought, until it has establishe! their authority an! "ali!ity by a thoroughgoing !e!uction# .# 9f *emonstrations# 9nly an a%o!eictic %roof, base! u%on intuition, can be terme! a !emonstration# E?%erience teaches us hat is, but it cannot con"ince us that it might not ha"e been other ise# ;ence a %roof u%on em%irical groun!s cannot be a%o!eictic# ) %riori conce%tions, in !iscursi"e cognition, can ne"er %ro!uce intuiti"e certainty or e"i!ence, ho e"er certain the ju!gement they %resent may be# Aathematics alone, therefore, contains !emonstrations, because it !oes not !e!uce its cognition from conce%tions, but from the construction of conce%tions, that is, from intuition, hich can be gi"en a %riori in accor!ance ith conce%tions# The metho! of algebra, in equations, from hich the correct ans er is !e!uce! by re!uction, is a kin! of constructionBnot geometrical, but by symbolsBin hich all conce%tions, es%ecially those of the relations of quantities, are re%resente! in intuition by signs@ an! thus the conclusions in that science are secure! from errors by the fact that e"ery %roof is submitte! to ocular e"i!ence# Philoso%hical cognition !oes not %ossess this a!"antage, it being require! to consi!er the general al ays in abstracto Dby means of conce%tionsE, hile mathematics can al ays consi!er it in concreto Din an in!i"i!ual intuitionE, an! at the same time by means of a %riori re%resentation, hereby all errors are ren!ere! manifest to the senses# The formerB!iscursi"e %roofsBought to be terme! acroamatic %roofs, rather than !emonstrations, as only or!s are em%loye! in them, hile !emonstrations %ro%er, as the term itself in!icates, al ays require a reference to the intuition of the object# It follo s from all these consi!erations that it is not consonant ith the nature of %hiloso%hy, es%ecially in the s%here of %ure reason, to em%loy the !ogmatical metho!, an! to a!orn itself ith the titles an! insignia of mathematical science# It !oes not belong to that or!er, an! can only ho%e for a fraternal union ith that science# Its attem%ts at mathematical e"i!ence are "ain %retensions, hich can only kee% it back from its true aim, hich is to !etect the illusory %roce!ure of reason hen transgressing its %ro%er limits, an! by fully e?%laining an! analysing our conce%tions, to con!uct us from the !im regions of s%eculation to the clear region of mo!est self&kno le!ge# Reason must not, therefore, in its transcen!ental en!ea"ours, look for ar! ith such confi!ence, as if the %ath it is %ursuing le! straight to its aim, nor reckon ith such security u%on its %remisses, as to consi!er it unnecessary to take a ste% back, or to kee% a strict atch for errors, hich, o"erlooke! in the %rinci%les, may be !etecte! in the arguments themsel"esBin hich case it may be requisite either to !etermine these %rinci%les ith greater strictness, or to change them entirely# I !i"i!e all a%o!eictic %ro%ositions, hether !emonstrable or imme!iately certain, into !ogmata an! mathemata# ) !irect synthetical %ro%osition, base! on conce%tions, is a !ogma@ a %ro%osition of the same kin!, base! on the construction of conce%tions, is a mathema# )nalytical ju!gements !o not teach us any more about an object than hat as containe! in the conce%tion e ha! of it@ because they !o not e?ten! our cognition beyon! our conce%tion of an object, they merely eluci!ate the conce%tion# They cannot therefore be ith %ro%riety terme! !ogmas# 9f the t o kin!s of a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions abo"e mentione!, only those hich are em%loye! in %hiloso%hy can,

accor!ing to the general mo!e of s%eech, bear this name@ those of arithmetic or geometry oul! not be rightly so !enominate!# Thus the customary mo!e of s%eaking confirms the e?%lanation gi"en abo"e, an! the conclusion arri"e! at, that only those ju!gements hich are base! u%on conce%tions, not on the construction of conce%tions, can be terme! !ogmatical# Thus, %ure reason, in the s%here of s%eculation, !oes not contain a single !irect synthetical ju!gement base! u%on conce%tions# By means of i!eas, it is, as e ha"e sho n, inca%able of %ro!ucing synthetical ju!gements, hich are objecti"ely "ali!@ by means of the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, it establishes certain in!ubitable %rinci%les, not, ho e"er, !irectly on the basis of conce%tions, but only in!irectly by means of the relation of these conce%tions to something of a %urely contingent nature, namely, %ossible e?%erience# >hen e?%erience is %resu%%ose!, these %rinci%les are a%o!eictically certain, but in themsel"es, an! !irectly, they cannot e"en be cogniCe! a %riori# Thus the gi"en conce%tions of cause an! e"ent ill not be sufficient for the !emonstration of the %ro%osition( E"ery e"ent has a cause# :or this reason, it is not a !ogma@ although from another %oint of "ie , that of e?%erience, it is ca%able of being %ro"e! to !emonstration# The %ro%er term for such a %ro%osition is %rinci%le, an! not theorem Dalthough it !oes require to be %ro"e!E, because it %ossesses the remarkable %eculiarity of being the con!ition of the %ossibility of its o n groun! of %roof, that is, e?%erience, an! of forming a necessary %resu%%osition in all em%irical obser"ation# If then, in the s%eculati"e s%here of %ure reason, no !ogmata are to be foun!@ all !ogmatical metho!s, hether borro e! from mathematics, or in"ente! by %hiloso%hical thinkers, are alike ina%%ro%riate an! inefficient# They only ser"e to conceal errors an! fallacies, an! to !ecei"e %hiloso%hy, hose !uty it is to see that reason %ursues a safe an! straight %ath# ) %hiloso%hical metho! may, ho e"er, be systematical# :or our reason is, subjecti"ely consi!ere!, itself a system, an!, in the s%here of mere conce%tions, a system of in"estigation accor!ing to %rinci%les of unity, the material being su%%lie! by e?%erience alone# But this is not the %ro%er %lace for !iscussing the %eculiar metho! of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, as our %resent task is sim%ly to e?amine hether our faculties are ca%able of erecting an e!ifice on the basis of %ure reason, an! ho far they may %rocee! ith the materials at their comman!# 7ECTI9< II# The *isci%line of Pure Reason in Polemics# Reason must be subject, in all its o%erations, to criticism, hich must al ays be %ermitte! to e?ercise its functions ithout restraint@ other ise its interests are im%erille! an! its influence obno?ious to sus%icion# There is nothing, ho e"er useful, ho e"er sacre! it may be, that can claim e?em%tion from the searching e?amination of this su%reme tribunal, hich has no res%ect of %ersons# The "ery e?istence of reason !e%en!s u%on this free!om@ for the "oice of reason is not that of a !ictatorial an! !es%otic %o er, it is rather like the "ote of the citiCens of a free state, e"ery member of hich must ha"e the %ri"ilege of gi"ing free e?%ression to his !oubts, an! %ossess e"en the right of "eto#

But hile reason can ne"er !ecline to submit itself to the tribunal of criticism, it has not al ays cause to !rea! the ju!gement of this court# Pure reason, ho e"er, hen engage! in the s%here of !ogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict obser"ance of its highest la s, as to a%%ear before a higher ju!icial reason ith %erfect confi!ence# 9n the contrary, it must renounce its magnificent !ogmatical %retensions in %hiloso%hy# Kery !ifferent is the case hen it has to !efen! itself, not before a ju!ge, but against an equal# If !ogmatical assertions are a!"ance! on the negati"e si!e, in o%%osition to those ma!e by reason on the %ositi"e si!e, its justification kat authrho%on is com%lete, although the %roof of its %ro%ositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory# By the %olemic of %ure reason I mean the !efence of its %ro%ositions ma!e by reason, in o%%osition to the !ogmatical counter&%ro%ositions a!"ance! by other %arties# The question here is not hether its o n statements may not also be false@ it merely regar!s the fact that reason %ro"es that the o%%osite cannot be establishe! ith !emonstrati"e certainty, nor e"en asserte! ith a higher !egree of %robability# Reason !oes not hol! her %ossessions u%on sufferance@ for, although she cannot sho a %erfectly satisfactory title to them, no one can %ro"e that she is not the rightful %ossessor# It is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest e?ercise, falls into an antithetic@ an! that the su%reme tribunal for the settlement of !ifferences shoul! not be at union ith itself# It is true that e ha! to !iscuss the question of an a%%arent antithetic, but e foun! that it as base! u%on a misconce%tion# In conformity ith the common %reju!ice, %henomena ere regar!e! as things in themsel"es, an! thus an absolute com%leteness in their synthesis as require! in the one mo!e or in the other Dit as sho n to be im%ossible in bothE@ a !eman! entirely out of %lace in regar! to %henomena# There as, then, no real self&contra!iction of reason in the %ro%ositions( The series of %henomena gi"en in themsel"es has an absolutely first beginning@ an!( This series is absolutely an! in itself ithout beginning# The t o %ro%ositions are %erfectly consistent ith each other, because %henomena as %henomena are in themsel"es nothing, an! consequently the hy%othesis that they are things in themsel"es must lea! to self&contra!ictory inferences# But there are cases in hich a similar misun!erstan!ing cannot be %ro"i!e! against, an! the !is%ute must remain unsettle!# Take, for e?am%le, the theistic %ro%osition( There is a 7u%reme Being@ an! on the other han!, the atheistic counter&statement( There e?ists no 7u%reme Being@ or, in %sychology( E"erything that thinks %ossesses the attribute of absolute an! %ermanent unity, hich is utterly !ifferent from the transitory unity of material %henomena@ an! the counter&%ro%osition( The soul is not an immaterial unity, an! its nature is transitory, like that of %henomena# The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or contra!ictory elements, for they relate to things in themsel"es, an! not to %henomena# There oul! arise, in!ee!, a real contra!iction, if reason came for ar! ith a statement on the negati"e si!e of these questions alone# )s regar!s the criticism to hich the groun!s of %roof on the affirmati"e si!e must be subjecte!, it may be freely a!mitte!, ithout necessitating the surren!er of the affirmati"e %ro%ositions, hich ha"e, at least, the interest of reason in their fa"ourBan a!"antage hich the o%%osite %arty cannot lay claim to#

I cannot agree ith the o%inion of se"eral a!mirable thinkersB7ulCer among the restB that, in s%ite of the eakness of the arguments hitherto in use, e may ho%e, one !ay, to see sufficient !emonstrations of the t o car!inal %ro%ositions of %ure reasonBthe e?istence of a 7u%reme Being, an! the immortality of the soul# I am certain, on the contrary, that this ill ne"er be the case# :or on hat groun! can reason base such synthetical %ro%ositions, hich !o not relate to the objects of e?%erience an! their internal %ossibilityH But it is also !emonstrati"ely certain that no one ill e"er be able to maintain the contrary ith the least sho of %robability# :or, as he can attem%t such a %roof solely u%on the basis of %ure reason, he is boun! to %ro"e that a 7u%reme Being, an! a thinking subject in the character of a %ure intelligence, are im%ossible# But here ill he fin! the kno le!ge hich can enable him to enounce synthetical ju!gements in regar! to things hich transcen! the region of e?%erienceH >e may, therefore, rest assure! that the o%%osite ne"er ill be !emonstrate!# >e nee! not, then, ha"e recourse to scholastic arguments@ e may al ays a!mit the truth of those %ro%ositions hich are consistent ith the s%eculati"e interests of reason in the s%here of e?%erience, an! form, moreo"er, the only means of uniting the s%eculati"e ith the %ractical interest# 9ur o%%onent, ho must not be consi!ere! here as a critic solely, e can be rea!y to meet ith a non liquet hich cannot fail to !isconcert him@ hile e cannot !eny his right to a similar retort, as e ha"e on our si!e the a!"antage of the su%%ort of the subjecti"e ma?im of reason, an! can therefore look u%on all his so%histical arguments ith calm in!ifference# :rom this %oint of "ie , there is %ro%erly no antithetic of %ure reason# :or the only arena for such a struggle oul! be u%on the fiel! of %ure theology an! %sychology@ but on this groun! there can a%%ear no combatant hom e nee! to fear# Ri!icule an! boasting can be his only ea%ons@ an! these may be laughe! at, as mere chil!Fs %lay# This consi!eration restores to Reason her courage@ for hat source of confi!ence coul! be foun!, if she, hose "ocation it is to !estroy error, ere at "ariance ith herself an! ithout any reasonable ho%e of e"er reaching a state of %ermanent re%oseH E"erything in nature is goo! for some %ur%ose# E"en %oisons are ser"iceable@ they !estroy the e"il effects of other %oisons generate! in our system, an! must al ays fin! a %lace in e"ery com%lete %harmaco%oeia# The objections raise! against the fallacies an! so%histries of s%eculati"e reason, are objections gi"en by the nature of this reason itself, an! must therefore ha"e a !estination an! %ur%ose hich can only be for the goo! of humanity# :or hat %ur%ose has Pro"i!ence raise! many objects, in hich e ha"e the !ee%est interest, so far abo"e us, that e "ainly try to cogniCe them ith certainty, an! our %o ers of mental "ision are rather e?cite! than satisfie! by the glim%ses e may chance to seiCeH It is "ery !oubtful hether it is for our benefit to a!"ance bol! affirmations regar!ing subjects in"ol"e! in such obscurity@ %erha%s it oul! e"en be !etrimental to our best interests# But it is un!oubte!ly al ays beneficial to lea"e the in"estigating, as ell as the critical reason, in %erfect free!om, an! %ermit it to take charge of its o n interests, hich are a!"ance! as much by its limitation, as by its e?tension of its "ie s, an! hich al ays suffer by the interference of foreign %o ers forcing it, against its natural ten!encies, to ben! to certain %reconcei"e! !esigns#

)llo your o%%onent to say hat he thinks reasonable, an! combat him only ith the ea%ons of reason# ;a"e no an?iety for the %ractical interests of humanityBthese are ne"er im%erille! in a %urely s%eculati"e !is%ute# 7uch a !is%ute ser"es merely to !isclose the antinomy of reason, hich, as it has its source in the nature of reason, ought to be thoroughly in"estigate!# Reason is benefite! by the e?amination of a subject on both si!es, an! its ju!gements are correcte! by being limite!# It is not the matter that may gi"e occasion to !is%ute, but the manner# :or it is %erfectly %ermissible to em%loy, in the %resence of reason, the language of a firmly roote! faith, e"en after e ha"e been oblige! to renounce all %retensions to kno le!ge# If e ere to ask the !is%assionate *a"i! ;umeBa %hiloso%her en!o e!, in a !egree that fe are, ith a ell&balance! ju!gement( >hat moti"e in!uce! you to s%en! so much labour an! thought in un!ermining the consoling an! beneficial %ersuasion that reason is ca%able of assuring us of the e?istence, an! %resenting us ith a !eterminate conce%tion of a 7u%reme BeingHBhis ans er oul! be( <othing but the !esire of teaching reason to kno its o n %o ers better, an!, at the same time, a !islike of the %roce!ure by hich that faculty as com%elle! to su%%ort foregone conclusions, an! %re"ente! from confessing the internal eaknesses hich it cannot but feel hen it enters u%on a rigi! self&e?amination# If, on the other han!, e ere to ask PriestleyBa %hiloso%her ho ha! no taste for transcen!ental s%eculation, but as entirely !e"ote! to the %rinci%les of em%iricismB hat his moti"es ere for o"erturning those t o main %illars of religionBthe !octrines of the free!om of the ill an! the immortality of the soul Din his "ie the ho%e of a future life is but the e?%ectation of the miracle of resurrectionEBthis %hiloso%her, himself a Cealous an! %ious teacher of religion, coul! gi"e no other ans er than this( I acte! in the interest of reason, hich al ays suffers, hen certain objects are e?%laine! an! ju!ge! by a reference to other su%%ose! la s than those of material natureBthe only la s hich e kno in a !eterminate manner# It oul! be unfair to !ecry the latter %hiloso%her, ho en!ea"oure! to harmoniCe his %ara!o?ical o%inions ith the interests of religion, an! to un!er"alue an honest an! reflecting man, because he fin!s himself at a loss the moment he has left the fiel! of natural science# The same grace must be accor!e! to ;ume, a man not less ell& !is%ose!, an! quite as blameless in his moral character, an! ho %ushe! his abstract s%eculations to an e?treme length, because, as he rightly belie"e!, the object of them lies entirely beyon! the boun!s of natural science, an! ithin the s%here of %ure i!eas# >hat is to be !one to %ro"i!e against the !anger hich seems in the %resent case to menace the best interests of humanityH The course to be %ursue! in reference to this subject is a %erfectly %lain an! natural one# 'et each thinker %ursue his o n %ath@ if he sho s talent, if he gi"es e"i!ence of %rofoun! thought, in one or!, if he sho s that he %ossesses the %o er of reasoningBreason is al ays the gainer# If you ha"e recourse to other means, if you attem%t to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you e?cite the feelings of the cro !, hich can neither un!erstan! nor sym%athiCe ith such subtle s%eculationsByou ill only make yoursel"es ri!iculous# :or the question !oes not concern the a!"antage or !isa!"antage hich e are e?%ecte! to rea% from such inquiries@ the question is merely ho far reason can a!"ance in the fiel! of s%eculation, a%art from all kin!s of interest, an! hether e may !e%en! u%on the e?ertions of s%eculati"e reason, or must renounce all reliance on it# Instea! of joining

the combatants, it is your %art to be a tranquil s%ectator of the struggleBa laborious struggle for the %arties engage!, but atten!e!, in its %rogress as ell as in its result, ith the most a!"antageous consequences for the interests of thought an! kno le!ge# It is absur! to e?%ect to be enlightene! by Reason, an! at the same time to %rescribe to her hat si!e of the question she must a!o%t# Aoreo"er, reason is sufficiently hel! in check by its o n %o er, the limits im%ose! on it by its o n nature are sufficient@ it is unnecessary for you to %lace o"er it a!!itional guar!s, as if its %o er ere !angerous to the constitution of the intellectual state# In the !ialectic of reason there is no "ictory gaine! hich nee! in the least !isturb your tranquility# The strife of !ialectic is a necessity of reason, an! e cannot but ish that it ha! been con!ucte! long ere this ith that %erfect free!om hich ought to be its essential con!ition# In this case, e shoul! ha"e ha! at an earlier %erio! a mature! an! %rofoun! criticism, hich must ha"e %ut an en! to all !ialectical !is%utes, by e?%osing the illusions an! %reju!ices in hich they originate!# There is in human nature an un orthy %ro%ensityBa %ro%ensity hich, like e"erything that s%rings from nature, must in its final %ur%ose be con!uci"e to the goo! of humanity Bto conceal our real sentiments, an! to gi"e e?%ression only to certain recei"e! o%inions, hich are regar!e! as at once safe an! %romoti"e of the common goo!# It is true, this ten!ency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to %rofess those hich may gain us fa"our in the eyes of society, has not only ci"iliCe!, but, in a certain measure, moraliCe! us@ as no one can break through the out ar! co"ering of res%ectability, honour, an! morality, an! thus the seemingly&goo! e?am%les hich e hich e see aroun! us form an e?cellent school for moral im%ro"ement, so long as our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken# But this !is%osition to re%resent oursel"es as better than e are, an! to utter o%inions hich are not our o n, can be nothing more than a kin! of %ro"isionary arrangement of nature to lea! us from the ru!eness of an unci"iliCe! state, an! to teach us ho to assume at least the a%%earance an! manner of the goo! e see# But hen true %rinci%les ha"e been !e"elo%e!, an! ha"e obtaine! a sure foun!ation in our habit of thought, this con"entionalism must be attacke! ith earnest "igour, other ise it corru%ts the heart, an! checks the gro th of goo! !is%ositions ith the mischie"ous ee! of air a%%earances# I am sorry to remark the same ten!ency to misre%resentation an! hy%ocrisy in the s%here of s%eculati"e !iscussion, here there is less tem%tation to restrain the free e?%ression of thought# :or hat can be more %reju!icial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our real sentiments, to conceal the !oubts hich e feel in regar! to our statements, or to maintain the "ali!ity of groun!s of %roof hich e ell kno to be insufficientH 7o long as mere %ersonal "anity is the source of these un orthy artificesB an! this is generally the case in s%eculati"e !iscussions, hich are mostly !estitute of %ractical interest, an! are inca%able of com%lete !emonstrationBthe "anity of the o%%osite %arty e?aggerates as much on the other si!e@ an! thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the !is%ute ha! been con!ucte! in a sincere an! u%right s%irit# But here the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle s%eculators is nothing less than to shake the "ery foun!ations of %ublic elfare an! moralityBit seems not only %ru!ent, but e"en %raise orthy, to maintain

the goo! cause by illusory arguments, rather than to gi"e to our su%%ose! o%%onents the a!"antage of lo ering our !eclarations to the mo!erate tone of a merely %ractical con"iction, an! of com%elling us to confess our inability to attain to a%o!eictic certainty in s%eculati"e subjects# But e ought to reflect that there is nothing, in the orl! more fatal to the maintenance of a goo! cause than !eceit, misre%resentation, an! falsehoo!# That the strictest la s of honesty shoul! be obser"e! in the !iscussion of a %urely s%eculati"e subject is the least requirement that can be ma!e# If e coul! reckon ith security e"en u%on so little, the conflict of s%eculati"e reason regar!ing the im%ortant questions of Go!, immortality, an! free!om, oul! ha"e been either !eci!e! long ago, or oul! "ery soon be brought to a conclusion# But, in general, the u%rightness of the !efence stan!s in an in"erse ratio to the goo!ness of the cause@ an! %erha%s more honesty an! fairness are sho n by those ho !eny than by those ho u%hol! these !octrines# I shall %ersua!e myself, then, that I ha"e rea!ers ho !o not ish to see a righteous cause !efen!e! by unfair arguments# 7uch ill no recogniCe the fact that, accor!ing to the %rinci%les of this Critique, if e consi!er not hat is, but hat ought to be the case, there can be really no %olemic of %ure reason# :or ho can t o %ersons !is%ute about a thing, the reality of hich neither can %resent in actual or e"en in %ossible e?%erienceH Each a!o%ts the %lan of me!itating on his i!ea for the %ur%ose of !ra ing from the i!ea, if he can, hat is more than the i!ea, that is, the reality of the object hich it in!icates# ;o shall they settle the !is%ute, since neither is able to make his assertions !irectly com%rehensible an! certain, but must restrict himself to attacking an! confuting those of his o%%onentH )ll statements enounce! by %ure reason transcen! the con!itions of %ossible e?%erience, beyon! the s%here of hich e can !isco"er no criterion of truth, hile they are at the same time frame! in accor!ance ith the la s of the un!erstan!ing, hich are a%%licable only to e?%erience@ an! thus it is the fate of all such s%eculati"e !iscussions that hile the one %arty attacks the eaker si!e of his o%%onent, he infallibly lays o%en his o n eaknesses# The critique of %ure reason may be regar!e! as the highest tribunal for all s%eculati"e !is%utes@ for it is not in"ol"e! in these !is%utes, hich ha"e an imme!iate relation to certain objects an! not to the la s of the min!, but is institute! for the %ur%ose of !etermining the rights an! limits of reason# >ithout the control of criticism, reason is, as it ere, in a state of nature, an! can only establish its claims an! assertions by ar# Criticism, on the contrary, !eci!ing all questions accor!ing to the fun!amental la s of its o n institution, secures to us the %eace of la an! or!er, an! enables us to !iscuss all !ifferences in the more tranquil manner of a legal %rocess# In the former case, !is%utes are en!e! by "ictory, hich both si!es may claim an! hich is follo e! by a hollo armistice@ in the latter, by a sentence, hich, as it strikes at the root of all s%eculati"e !ifferences, ensures to all concerne! a lasting %eace# The en!less !is%utes of a !ogmatiCing reason com%el us to look for some mo!e of arri"ing at a settle! !ecision by a critical in"estigation of reason itself@ just as ;obbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice an! "iolence, an! that e must lea"e it an! submit oursel"es to the constraint of la , hich in!ee! limits

in!i"i!ual free!om, but only that it may consist ith the free!om of others an! ith the common goo! of all# This free!om ill, among other things, %ermit of our o%enly stating the !ifficulties an! !oubts hich e are oursel"es unable to sol"e, ithout being !ecrie! on that account as turbulent an! !angerous citiCens# This %ri"ilege forms %art of the nati"e rights of human reason, hich recogniCes no other ju!ge than the uni"ersal reason of humanity@ an! as this reason is the source of all %rogress an! im%ro"ement, such a %ri"ilege is to be hel! sacre! an! in"iolable# It is un ise, moreo"er, to !enounce as !angerous any bol! assertions against, or rash attacks u%on, an o%inion hich is hel! by the largest an! most moral class of the community@ for that oul! be gi"ing them an im%ortance hich they !o not !eser"e# >hen I hear that the free!om of the ill, the ho%e of a future life, an! the e?istence of Go! ha"e been o"erthro n by the arguments of some able riter, I feel a strong !esire to rea! his book@ for I e?%ect that he ill a!! to my kno le!ge an! im%art greater clearness an! !istinctness to my "ie s by the argumentati"e %o er sho n in his ritings# But I am %erfectly certain, e"en before I ha"e o%ene! the book, that he has not succee!e! in a single %oint, not because I belie"e I am in %ossession of irrefutable !emonstrations of these im%ortant %ro%ositions, but because this transcen!ental critique, hich has !isclose! to me the %o er an! the limits of %ure reason, has fully con"ince! me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmati"e, it is as %o erless, an! e"en more so, to assure us of the truth of the negati"e ans er to these questions# :rom hat source !oes this free&thinker !eri"e his kno le!ge that there is, for e?am%le, no 7u%reme BeingH This %ro%osition lies out of the fiel! of %ossible e?%erience, an!, therefore, beyon! the limits of human cognition# But I oul! not rea! at, all the ans er hich the !ogmatical maintainer of the goo! cause makes to his o%%onent, because I kno ell beforehan!, that he ill merely attack the fallacious groun!s of his a!"ersary, ithout being able to establish his o n assertions# Besi!es, a ne illusory argument, in the construction of hich talent an! acuteness are sho n, is suggesti"e of ne i!eas an! ne trains of reasoning, an! in this res%ect the ol! an! e"ery!ay so%histries are quite useless# )gain, the !ogmatical o%%onent of religion gi"es em%loyment to criticism, an! enables us to test an! correct its %rinci%les, hile there is no occasion for an?iety in regar! to the influence an! results of his reasoning# But, it ill be sai!, must e not arn the youth entruste! to aca!emical care against such ritings, must e not %reser"e them from the kno le!ge of these !angerous assertions, until their ju!gement is ri%ene!, or rather until the !octrines hich e ish to inculcate are so firmly roote! in their min!s as to ithstan! all attem%ts at instilling the contrary !ogmas, from hate"er quarter they may comeH If e are to confine oursel"es to the !ogmatical %roce!ure in the s%here of %ure reason, an! fin! oursel"es unable to settle such !is%utes other ise than by becoming a %arty in them, an! setting counter&assertions against the statements a!"ance! by our o%%onents, there is certainly no %lan more a!"isable for the moment, but, at the same time, none more absur! an! inefficient for the future, than this retaining of the youthful min! un!er guar!ianshi% for a time, an! thus %reser"ing itBfor so long at leastBfrom se!uction into error# But hen, at a later %erio!, either curiosity, or the %re"alent fashion of thought %laces such ritings in their han!s, ill the so&calle! con"ictions of

their youth stan! firmH The young thinker, ho has in his armoury none but !ogmatical ea%ons ith hich to resist the attacks of his o%%onent, an! ho cannot !etect the latent !ialectic hich lies in his o n o%inions as ell as in those of the o%%osite %arty, sees the a!"ance of illusory arguments an! groun!s of %roof hich ha"e the a!"antage of no"elty, against as illusory groun!s of %roof !estitute of this a!"antage, an! hich, %erha%s, e?cite the sus%icion that the natural cre!ulity of his youth has been abuse! by his instructors# ;e thinks he can fin! no better means of sho ing that he has out gro n the !isci%line of his minority than by !es%ising those ell&meant arnings, an!, kno ing no system of thought but that of !ogmatism, he !rinks !ee% !raughts of the %oison that is to sa% the %rinci%les in hich his early years ere traine!# E?actly the o%%osite of the system here recommen!e! ought to be %ursue! in aca!emical instruction# This can only be effecte!, ho e"er, by a thorough training in the critical in"estigation of %ure reason# :or, in or!er to bring the %rinci%les of this critique into e?ercise as soon as %ossible, an! to !emonstrate their %erfect e"en in the %resence of the highest !egree of !ialectical illusion, the stu!ent ought to e?amine the assertions ma!e on both si!es of s%eculati"e questions ste% by ste%, an! to test them by these %rinci%les# It cannot be a !ifficult task for him to sho the fallacies inherent in these %ro%ositions, an! thus he begins early to feel his o n %o er of securing himself against the influence of such so%histical arguments, hich must finally lose, for him, all their illusory %o er# )n!, although the same blo s hich o"erturn the e!ifice of his o%%onent are as fatal to his o n s%eculati"e structures, if such he has ishe! to rear@ he nee! not feel any sorro in regar! to this seeming misfortune, as he has no before him a fair %ros%ect into the %ractical region in hich he may reasonably ho%e to fin! a more secure foun!ation for a rational system# There is, accor!ingly, no %ro%er %olemic in the s%here of %ure reason# Both %arties beat the air an! fight ith their o n sha!o s, as they %ass beyon! the limits of nature, an! can fin! no tangible %oint of attackBno firm footing for their !ogmatical conflict# :ight as "igorously as they may, the sha!o s hich they he !o n, imme!iately start u% again, like the heroes in >alhalla, an! rene the bloo!less an! unceasing contest# But neither can e a!mit that there is any %ro%er sce%tical em%loyment of %ure reason, such as might be base! u%on the %rinci%le of neutrality in all s%eculati"e !is%utes# To e?cite reason against itself, to %lace ea%ons in the han!s of the %arty on the one si!e as ell as in those of the other, an! to remain an un!isturbe! an! sarcastic s%ectator of the fierce struggle that ensues, seems, from the !ogmatical %oint of "ie , to be a %art fitting only a male"olent !is%osition# But, hen the so%hist e"i!ences an in"incible obstinacy an! blin!ness, an! a %ri!e hich no criticism can mo!erate, there is no other %racticable course than to o%%ose to this %ri!e an! obstinacy similar feelings an! %retensions on the other si!e, equally ell or ill foun!e!, so that reason, staggere! by the reflections thus force! u%on it, fin!s it necessary to mo!erate its confi!ence in such %retensions an! to listen to the a!"ice of criticism# But e cannot sto% at these !oubts, much less regar! the con"iction of our ignorance, not only as a cure for the conceit natural to !ogmatism, but as the settlement of the !is%utes in hich reason is in"ol"e! ith itself# 9n the contrary, sce%ticism is merely a means of a akening reason from its !ogmatic !reams an! e?citing it to a more careful in"estigation into its o n %o ers an!

%retensions# But, as sce%ticism a%%ears to be the shortest roa! to a %ermanent %eace in the !omain of %hiloso%hy, an! as it is the track %ursue! by the many ho aim at gi"ing a %hiloso%hical colouring to their contem%tuous !islike of all inquiries of this kin!, I think it necessary to %resent to my rea!ers this mo!e of thought in its true light# 7ce%ticism not a Permanent 7tate for ;uman Reason# The consciousness of ignoranceBunless this ignorance is recogniCe! to be absolutely necessary ought, instea! of forming the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest moti"e to the %ursuit of them# )ll ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of kno le!ge# If my ignorance is acci!ental an! not necessary, it must incite me, in the first case, to a !ogmatical inquiry regar!ing the objects of hich I am ignorant@ in the secon!, to a critical in"estigation into the boun!s of all %ossible kno le!ge# But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary an! una"oi!able, an! that it consequently absol"es from the !uty of all further in"estigation, is a fact hich cannot be ma!e out u%on em%irical groun!sBfrom obser"ationBbut u%on critical groun!s alone, that is, by a thoroughgoing in"estigation into the %rimary sources of cognition# It follo s that the !etermination of the boun!s of reason can be ma!e only on a %riori groun!s@ hile the em%irical limitation of reason, hich is merely an in!eterminate cognition of an ignorance that can ne"er be com%letely remo"e!, can take %lace only a %osteriori# In other or!s, our em%irical kno le!ge is limite! by that hich yet remains for us to kno # The former cognition of our ignorance, hich is %ossible only on a rational basis, is a science@ the latter is merely a %erce%tion, an! e cannot say ho far the inferences !ra n from it may e?ten!# If I regar! the earth, as it really a%%ears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am ignorant ho far this surface e?ten!s# But e?%erience teaches me that, ho far soe"er I go, I al ays see before me a s%ace in hich I can %rocee! farther@ an! thus I kno the limitsBmerely "isualBof my actual kno le!ge of the earth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself# But if I ha"e got so far as to kno that the earth is a s%here, an! that its surface is s%herical, I can cogniCe a %riori an! !etermine u%on %rinci%les, from my kno le!ge of a small %art of this surfaceBsay to the e?tent of a !egreeBthe !iameter an! circumference of the earth@ an! although I am ignorant of the objects hich this surface contains, I ha"e a %erfect kno le!ge of its limits an! e?tent# The sum of all the %ossible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a le"el surface, ith an a%%arent horiConBthat hich forms the limit of its e?tent, an! hich has been terme! by us the i!ea of uncon!itione! totality# To reach this limit by em%irical means is im%ossible, an! all attem%ts to !etermine it a %riori accor!ing to a %rinci%le, are alike in "ain# But all the questions raise! by %ure reason relate to that hich lies beyon! this horiCon, or, at least, in its boun!ary line# The celebrate! *a"i! ;ume as one of those geogra%hers of human reason ho belie"e that they ha"e gi"en a sufficient ans er to all such questions by !eclaring them to lie beyon! the horiCon of our kno le!geBa horiCon hich, ho e"er, ;ume as unable to !etermine# ;is attention es%ecially as !irecte! to the %rinci%le of causality@ an! he remarke! ith %erfect justice that the truth of this %rinci%le, an! e"en the objecti"e "ali!ity of the conce%tion of a cause, as not commonly base! u%on clear insight, that is,

u%on a %riori cognition# ;ence he conclu!e! that this la !oes not !eri"e its authority from its uni"ersality an! necessity, but merely from its general a%%licability in the course of e?%erience, an! a kin! of subjecti"e necessity thence arising, hich he terme! habit# :rom the inability of reason to establish this %rinci%le as a necessary la for the acquisition of all e?%erience, he inferre! the nullity of all the attem%ts of reason to %ass the region of the em%irical# This %roce!ure of subjecting the facta of reason to e?amination, an!, if necessary, to !isa%%ro"al, may be terme! the censura of reason# This censura must ine"itably lea! us to !oubts regar!ing all transcen!ent em%loyment of %rinci%les# But this is only the secon! ste% in our inquiry# The first ste% in regar! to the subjects of %ure reason, an! hich marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of !ogmatism# The secon!, hich e ha"e just mentione!, is that of sce%ticism, an! it gi"es e"i!ence that our ju!gement has been im%ro"e! by e?%erience# But a thir! ste% is necessaryBin!icati"e of the maturity an! manhoo! of the ju!gement, hich no lays a firm foun!ation u%on uni"ersal an! necessary %rinci%les# This is the %erio! of criticism, in hich e !o not e?amine the facta of reason, but reason itself, in the hole e?tent of its %o ers, an! in regar! to its ca%ability of a %riori cognition@ an! thus e !etermine not merely the em%irical an! e"er&shifting boun!s of our kno le!ge, but its necessary an! eternal limits# >e !emonstrate from in!ubitable %rinci%les, not merely our ignorance in res%ect to this or that subject, but in regar! to all %ossible questions of a certain class# Thus sce%ticism is a resting %lace for reason, in hich it may reflect on its !ogmatical an!erings an! gain some kno le!ge of the region in hich it ha%%ens to be, that it may %ursue its ay ith greater certainty@ but it cannot be its %ermanent ! elling&%lace# It must take u% its abo!e only in the region of com%lete certitu!e, hether this relates to the cognition of objects themsel"es, or to the limits hich boun! all our cognition# Reason is not to be consi!ere! as an in!efinitely e?ten!e! %lane, of the boun!s of hich e ha"e only a general kno le!ge@ it ought rather to be com%are! to a s%here, the ra!ius of hich may be foun! from the cur"ature of its surfaceBthat is, the nature of a %riori synthetical %ro%ositionsBan!, consequently, its circumference an! e?tent# Beyon! the s%here of e?%erience there are no objects hich it can cogniCe@ nay, e"en questions regar!ing such su%%osititious objects relate only to the subjecti"e %rinci%les of a com%lete !etermination of the relations hich e?ist bet een the un!erstan!ing& conce%tions hich lie ithin this s%here# >e are actually in %ossession of a %riori synthetical cognitions, as is %ro"e! by the e?istence of the %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing, hich antici%ate e?%erience# If any one cannot com%rehen! the %ossibility of these %rinci%les, he may ha"e some reason to !oubt hether they are really a %riori@ but he cannot on this account !eclare them to be im%ossible, an! affirm the nullity of the ste%s hich reason may ha"e taken un!er their gui!ance# ;e can only say( If e %ercei"e! their origin an! their authenticity, e shoul! be able to !etermine the e?tent an! limits of reason@ but, till e can !o this, all %ro%ositions regar!ing the latter are mere ran!om assertions# In this "ie , the !oubt res%ecting all !ogmatical %hiloso%hy, hich %rocee!s ithout the gui!ance of criticism, is ell groun!e!@ but e cannot therefore !eny to reason the ability to construct a soun! %hiloso%hy, hen the ay has been %re%are! by a thorough critical in"estigation# )ll the

conce%tions %ro!uce!, an! all the questions raise!, by %ure reason, !o not lie in the s%here of e?%erience, but in that of reason itself, an! hence they must be sol"e!, an! sho n to be either "ali! or ina!missible, by that faculty# >e ha"e no right to !ecline the solution of such %roblems, on the groun! that the solution can be !isco"ere! only from the nature of things, an! un!er %retence of the limitation of human faculties, for reason is the sole creator of all these i!eas, an! is therefore boun! either to establish their "ali!ity or to e?%ose their illusory nature# The %olemic of sce%ticism is %ro%erly !irecte! against the !ogmatist, ho erects a system of %hiloso%hy ithout ha"ing e?amine! the fun!amental objecti"e %rinci%les on hich it is base!, for the %ur%ose of e"i!encing the futility of his !esigns, an! thus bringing him to a kno le!ge of his o n %o ers# But, in itself, sce%ticism !oes not gi"e us any certain information in regar! to the boun!s of our kno le!ge# )ll unsuccessful !ogmatical attem%ts of reason are facia, hich it is al ays useful to submit to the censure of the sce%tic# But this cannot hel% us to any !ecision regar!ing the e?%ectations hich reason cherishes of better success in future en!ea"ours@ the in"estigations of sce%ticism cannot, therefore, settle the !is%ute regar!ing the rights an! %o ers of human reason# ;ume is %erha%s the ablest an! most ingenious of all sce%tical %hiloso%hers, an! his ritings ha"e, un!oubte!ly, e?erte! the most %o erful influence in a akening reason to a thorough in"estigation into its o n %o ers# It ill, therefore, ell re%ay our labours to consi!er for a little the course of reasoning hich he follo e! an! the errors into hich he straye!, although setting out on the %ath of truth an! certitu!e# ;ume as %robably a are, although he ne"er clearly !e"elo%e! the notion, that e %rocee! in ju!gements of a certain class beyon! our conce%tion if the object# I ha"e terme! this kin! of ju!gement synthetical# )s regar! the manner in hich I %ass beyon! my conce%tion by the ai! of e?%erience, no !oubts can be entertaine!# E?%erience is itself a synthesis of %erce%tions@ an! it em%loys %erce%tions to increment the conce%tion, hich I obtain by means of another %erce%tion# But e feel %ersua!e! that e are able to %rocee! beyon! a conce%tion, an! to e?ten! our cognition a %riori# >e attem%t this in t o aysBeither, through the %ure un!erstan!ing, in relation to that hich may become an object of e?%erience, or, through %ure reason, in relation to such %ro%erties of things, or of the e?istence of things, as can ne"er be %resente! in any e?%erience# This sce%tical %hiloso%her !i! not !istinguish these t o kin!s of ju!gements, as he ought to ha"e !one, but regar!e! this augmentation of conce%tions, an!, if e may so e?%ress oursel"es, the s%ontaneous generation of un!erstan!ing an! reason, in!e%en!ently of the im%regnation of e?%erience, as altogether im%ossible# The so&calle! a %riori %rinci%les of these faculties he consequently hel! to be in"ali! an! imaginary, an! regar!e! them as nothing but subjecti"e habits of thought originating in e?%erience, an! therefore %urely em%irical an! contingent rules, to hich e attribute a s%urious necessity an! uni"ersality# In su%%ort of this strange assertion, he referre! us to the generally ackno le!ge! %rinci%le of the relation bet een cause an! effect# <o faculty of the min! can con!uct us from the conce%tion of a thing to the e?istence of something else@ an! hence he belie"e! he coul! infer that, ithout e?%erience, e %ossess no source from hich e can augment a conce%tion, an! no groun! sufficient to

justify us in framing a ju!gement that is to e?ten! our cognition a %riori# That the light of the sun, hich shines u%on a %iece of a?, at the same time melts it, hile it har!ens clay, no %o er of the un!erstan!ing coul! infer from the conce%tions hich e %re"iously %ossesse! of these substances@ much less is there any a %riori la that coul! con!uct us to such a conclusion, hich e?%erience alone can certify# 9n the other han!, e ha"e seen in our !iscussion of transcen!ental logic, that, although e can ne"er %rocee! imme!iately beyon! the content of the conce%tion hich is gi"en us, e can al ays cogniCe com%letely a %rioriBin relation, ho e"er, to a thir! term, namely, %ossible e?%erienceBthe la of its connection ith other things# :or e?am%le, if I obser"e that a %iece of a? melts, I can cogniCe a %riori that there must ha"e been something Dthe sunFs heatE %rece!ing, hich this la @ although, ithout the ai! of e?%erience, I coul! not cogniCe a %riori an! in a !eterminate manner either the cause from the effect, or the effect from the cause# ;ume as, therefore, rong in inferring, from the contingency of the !etermination accor!ing to la , the contingency of the la itself@ an! the %assing beyon! the conce%tion of a thing to %ossible e?%erience D hich is an a %riori %rocee!ing, constituting the objecti"e reality of the conce%tionE, he confoun!e! ith our synthesis of objects in actual e?%erience, hich is al ays, of course, em%irical# Thus, too, he regar!e! the %rinci%le of affinity, hich has its seat in the un!erstan!ing an! in!icates a necessary connection, as a mere rule of association, lying in the imitati"e faculty of imagination, hich can %resent only contingent, an! not objecti"e connections# The sce%tical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose %rinci%ally from a !efect, hich as common to him ith the !ogmatists, namely, that he ha! ne"er ma!e a systematic re"ie of all the !ifferent kin!s of a %riori synthesis %erforme! by the un!erstan!ing# ;a! he !one so, he oul! ha"e foun!, to take one e?am%le among many, that the %rinci%le of %ermanence as of this character, an! that it, as ell as the %rinci%le of causality, antici%ates e?%erience# In this ay he might ha"e been able to !escribe the !eterminate limits of the a %riori o%erations of un!erstan!ing an! reason# But he merely !eclare! the un!erstan!ing to be limite!, instea! of sho ing hat its limits ere@ he create! a general mistrust in the %o er of our faculties, ithout gi"ing us any !eterminate kno le!ge of the boun!s of our necessary an! una"oi!able ignorance@ he e?amine! an! con!emne! some of the %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing, ithout in"estigating all its %o ers ith the com%leteness necessary to criticism# ;e !enies, ith truth, certain %o ers to the un!erstan!ing, but he goes further, an! !eclares it to be utterly ina!equate to the a %riori e?tension of kno le!ge, although he has not fully e?amine! all the %o ers hich resi!e in the faculty@ an! thus the fate hich al ays o"ertakes sce%ticism meets him too# That is to say, his o n !eclarations are !oubte!, for his objections ere base! u%on facta, hich are contingent, an! not u%on %rinci%les, hich can alone !emonstrate the necessary in"ali!ity of all !ogmatical assertions# )s ;ume makes no !istinction bet een the ell&groun!e! claims of the un!erstan!ing an! the !ialectical %retensions of reason, against hich, ho e"er, his attacks are mainly !irecte!, reason !oes not feel itself shut out from all attem%ts at the e?tension of a %riori cognition, an! hence it refuses, in s%ite of a fe checks in this or that quarter, to relinquish such efforts# :or one naturally arms oneself to resist an attack, an! becomes more obstinate in the resol"e to establish the claims he has a!"ance!# But a com%lete

re"ie of the %o ers of reason, an! the con"iction thence arising that e are in %ossession of a limite! fiel! of action, hile e must a!mit the "anity of higher claims, %uts an en! to all !oubt an! !is%ute, an! in!uces reason to rest satisfie! ith the un!isturbe! %ossession of its limite! !omain# To the uncritical !ogmatist, ho has not sur"eye! the s%here of his un!erstan!ing, nor !etermine!, in accor!ance ith %rinci%les, the limits of %ossible cognition, ho, consequently, is ignorant of his o n %o ers, an! belie"es he ill !isco"er them by the attem%ts he makes in the fiel! of cognition, these attacks of sce%ticism are not only !angerous, but !estructi"e# :or if there is one %ro%osition in his chain of reasoning hich be he cannot %ro"e, or the fallacy in hich he cannot e"ol"e in accor!ance ith a %rinci%le, sus%icion falls on all his statements, ho e"er %lausible they may a%%ear# )n! thus sce%ticism, the bane of !ogmatical %hiloso%hy, con!ucts us to a soun! in"estigation into the un!erstan!ing an! the reason# >hen e are thus far a!"ance!, e nee! fear no further attacks@ for the limits of our !omain are clearly marke! out, an! e can make no claims nor become in"ol"e! in any !is%utes regar!ing the region that lies beyon! these limits# Thus the sce%tical %roce!ure in %hiloso%hy !oes not %resent any solution of the %roblems of reason, but it forms an e?cellent e?ercise for its %o ers, a akening its circums%ection, an! in!icating the means hereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate %ossessions# 7ECTI9< III# The *isci%line of Pure Reason in ;y%othesis# This critique of reason has no taught us that all its efforts to e?ten! the boun!s of kno le!ge, by means of %ure s%eculation, are utterly fruitless# 7o much the i!er fiel!, it may a%%ear, lies o%en to hy%othesis@ as, here e cannot kno ith certainty, e are at liberty to make guesses an! to form su%%ositions# Imagination may be allo e!, un!er the strict sur"eillance of reason, to in"ent su%%ositions@ but, these must be base! on something that is %erfectly certainBan! that is the %ossibility of the object# If e are ell assure! u%on this %oint, it is allo able to ha"e recourse to su%%osition in regar! to the reality of the object@ but this su%%osition must, unless it is utterly groun!less, be connecte!, as its groun! of e?%lanation, ith that hich is really gi"en an! absolutely certain# 7uch a su%%osition is terme! a hy%othesis# It is beyon! our %o er to form the least conce%tion a %riori of the %ossibility of !ynamical connection in %henomena@ an! the category of the %ure un!erstan!ing ill not enable us to e?cogitate any such connection, but merely hel%s us to un!erstan! it, hen e meet ith it in e?%erience# :or this reason e cannot, in accor!ance ith the categories, imagine or in"ent any object or any %ro%erty of an object not gi"en, or that may not be gi"en in e?%erience, an! em%loy it in a hy%othesis@ other ise, e shoul! be basing our chain of reasoning u%on mere chimerical fancies, an! not u%on conce%tions of things# Thus, e ha"e no right to assume the e?istence of ne %o ers, not e?isting in natureBfor e?am%le, an un!erstan!ing ith a non&sensuous intuition, a force of attraction ithout contact, or some ne kin! of substances occu%ying s%ace, an! yet

ithout the %ro%erty of im%enetrabilityBan!, consequently, e cannot assume that there is any other kin! of community among substances than that obser"able in e?%erience, any kin! of %resence than that in s%ace, or any kin! of !uration than that in time# In one or!, the con!itions of %ossible e?%erience are for reason the only con!itions of the %ossibility of things@ reason cannot "enture to form, in!e%en!ently of these con!itions, any conce%tions of things, because such conce%tions, although not self&contra!ictory, are ithout object an! ithout a%%lication# The conce%tions of reason are, as e ha"e alrea!y sho n, mere i!eas, an! !o not relate to any object in any kin! of e?%erience# )t the same time, they !o not in!icate imaginary or %ossible objects# They are %urely %roblematical in their nature an!, as ai!s to the heuristic e?ercise of the faculties, form the basis of the regulati"e %rinci%les for the systematic em%loyment of the un!erstan!ing in the fiel! of e?%erience# If e lea"e this groun! of e?%erience, they become mere fictions of thought, the %ossibility of hich is quite in!emonstrable@ an! they cannot, consequently, be em%loye! as hy%otheses in the e?%lanation of real %henomena# It is quite a!missible to cogitate the soul as sim%le, for the %ur%ose of enabling oursel"es to em%loy the i!ea of a %erfect an! necessary unity of all the faculties of the min! as the %rinci%le of all our inquiries into its internal %henomena, although e cannot cogniCe this unity in concreto# But to assume that the soul is a sim%le substance Da transcen!ental conce%tionE oul! be enouncing a %ro%osition hich is not only in!emonstrableBas many %hysical hy%otheses areBbut a %ro%osition hich is %urely arbitrary, an! in the highest !egree rash# The sim%le is ne"er %resente! in e?%erience@ an!, if by substance is here meant the %ermanent object of sensuous intuition, the %ossibility of a sim%le %henomenon is %erfectly inconcei"able# Reason affor!s no goo! groun!s for a!mitting the e?istence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible %ro%erties of sensuous things, althoughBas e ha"e no conce%tion either of their %ossibility or of their im%ossibilityBit ill al ays be out of our %o er to affirm !ogmatically that they !o not e?ist# In the e?%lanation of gi"en %henomena, no other things an! no other groun!s of e?%lanation can be em%loye! than those hich stan! in connection ith the gi"en %henomena accor!ing to the kno n la s of e?%erience# ) transcen!ental hy%othesis, in hich a mere i!ea of reason is em%loye! to e?%lain the %henomena of nature, oul! not gi"e us any better insight into a %henomenon, as e shoul! be trying to e?%lain hat e !o not sufficiently un!erstan! from kno n em%irical %rinci%les, by hat e !o not un!erstan! at all# The %rinci%les of such a hy%othesis might con!uce to the satisfaction of reason, but it oul! not assist the un!erstan!ing in its a%%lication to objects# 9r!er an! conformity to aims in the s%here of nature must be themsel"es e?%laine! u%on natural groun!s an! accor!ing to natural la s@ an! the il!est hy%otheses, if they are only %hysical, are here more a!missible than a hy%er%hysical hy%othesis, such as that of a !i"ine author# :or such a hy%othesis oul! intro!uce the %rinci%le of igna"a ratio, hich requires us to gi"e u% the search for causes that might be !isco"ere! in the course of e?%erience an! to rest satisfie! ith a mere i!ea# )s regar!s the absolute totality of the groun!s of e?%lanation in the series of these causes, this can be no hin!rance to the un!erstan!ing in the case of %henomena@ because, as they are to us nothing more than %henomena, e ha"e no right to look for anything like com%leteness in the synthesis of the series of their con!itions#

Transcen!ental hy%otheses are therefore ina!missible@ an! e cannot use the liberty of em%loying, in the absence of %hysical, hy%er%hysical groun!s of e?%lanation# )n! this for t o reasons@ first, because such hy%othesis !o not a!"ance reason, but rather sto% it in its %rogress@ secon!ly, because this licence oul! ren!er fruitless all its e?ertions in its o n %ro%er s%here, hich is that of e?%erience# :or, hen the e?%lanation of natural %henomena ha%%ens to be !ifficult, e ha"e constantly at han! a transcen!ental groun! of e?%lanation, hich lifts us abo"e the necessity of in"estigating nature@ an! our inquiries are brought to a close, not because e ha"e obtaine! all the requisite kno le!ge, but because e abut u%on a %rinci%le hich is incom%rehensible an! hich, in!ee!, is so far back in the track of thought as to contain the conce%tion of the absolutely %rimal being# The ne?t requisite for the a!missibility of a hy%othesis is its sufficiency# That is, it must !etermine a %riori the consequences hich are gi"en in e?%erience an! hich are su%%ose! to follo from the hy%othesis itself# If e require to em%loy au?iliary hy%otheses, the sus%icion naturally arises that they are mere fictions@ because the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the case of the original hy%othesis, an! thus their testimony is in"ali!# If e su%%ose the e?istence of an infinitely %erfect cause, e %ossess sufficient groun!s for the e?%lanation of the conformity to aims, the or!er an! the greatness hich e obser"e in the uni"erse@ but e fin! oursel"es oblige!, hen e obser"e the e"il in the orl! an! the e?ce%tions to these la s, to em%loy ne hy%othesis in su%%ort of the original one# >e em%loy the i!ea of the sim%le nature of the human soul as the foun!ation of all the theories e may form of its %henomena@ but hen e meet ith !ifficulties in our ay, hen e obser"e in the soul %henomena similar to the changes hich take %lace in matter, e require to call in ne au?iliary hy%otheses# These may, in!ee!, not be false, but e !o not kno them to be true, because the only itness to their certitu!e is the hy%othesis hich they themsel"es ha"e been calle! in to e?%lain# >e are not !iscussing the abo"e&mentione! assertions regar!ing the immaterial unity of the soul an! the e?istence of a 7u%reme Being as !ogmata, hich certain %hiloso%hers %rofess to !emonstrate a %riori, but %urely as hy%otheses# In the former case, the !ogmatist must take care that his arguments %ossess the a%o!eictic certainty of a !emonstration# :or the assertion that the reality of such i!eas is %robable is as absur! as a %roof of the %robability of a %ro%osition in geometry# Pure abstract reason, a%art from all e?%erience, can either cogniCe nothing at all@ an! hence the ju!gements it enounces are ne"er mere o%inions, they are either a%o!eictic certainties, or !eclarations that nothing can be kno n on the subject# 9%inions an! %robable ju!gements on the nature of things can only be em%loye! to e?%lain gi"en %henomena, or they may relate to the effect, in accor!ance ith em%irical la s, of an actually e?isting cause# In other or!s, e must restrict the s%here of o%inion to the orl! of e?%erience an! nature# Beyon! this region o%inion is mere in"ention@ unless e are gro%ing about for the truth on a %ath not yet fully kno n, an! ha"e some ho%es of stumbling u%on it by chance# But, although hy%otheses are ina!missible in ans ers to the questions of %ure s%eculati"e reason, they may be em%loye! in the !efence of these ans ers# That is to say, hy%otheses are a!missible in %olemic, but not in the s%here of !ogmatism# By the

!efence of statements of this character, I !o not mean an attem%t at !isco"ering ne groun!s for their su%%ort, but merely the refutation of the arguments of o%%onents# )ll a %riori synthetical %ro%ositions %ossess the %eculiarity that, although the %hiloso%her ho maintains the reality of the i!eas containe! in the %ro%osition is not in %ossession of sufficient kno le!ge to establish the certainty of his statements, his o%%onent is as little able to %ro"e the truth of the o%%osite# This equality of fortune !oes not allo the one %arty to be su%erior to the other in the s%here of s%eculati"e cognition@ an! it is this s%here, accor!ingly, that is the %ro%er arena of these en!less s%eculati"e conflicts# But e shall after ar!s sho that, in relation to its %ractical e?ercise, Reason has the right of a!mitting hat, in the fiel! of %ure s%eculation, she oul! not be justifie! in su%%osing, e?ce%t u%on %erfectly sufficient groun!s@ because all such su%%ositions !estroy the necessary com%leteness of s%eculationBa con!ition hich the %ractical reason, ho e"er, !oes not consi!er to be requisite# In this s%here, therefore, Reason is mistress of a %ossession, her title to hich she !oes not require to %ro"eB hich, in fact, she coul! not !o# The bur!en of %roof accor!ingly rests u%on the o%%onent# But as he has just as little kno le!ge regar!ing the subject !iscusse!, an! is as little able to %ro"e the non&e?istence of the object of an i!ea, as the %hiloso%her on the other si!e is to !emonstrate its reality, it is e"i!ent that there is an a!"antage on the si!e of the %hiloso%her ho maintains his %ro%osition as a %ractically necessary su%%osition Dmelior est con!itio %ossi!entisE# :or he is at liberty to em%loy, in self&!efence, the same ea%ons as his o%%onent makes use of in attacking him@ that is, he has a right to use hy%otheses not for the %ur%ose of su%%orting the arguments in fa"our of his o n %ro%ositions, but to sho that his o%%onent kno s no more than himself regar!ing the subject un!er F!iscussion an! cannot boast of any s%eculati"e a!"antage# ;y%otheses are, therefore, a!missible in the s%here of %ure reason only as ea%ons for self&!efence, an! not as su%%orts to !ogmatical assertions# But the o%%osing %arty e must al ays seek for in oursel"es# :or s%eculati"e reason is, in the s%here of transcen!entalism, !ialectical in its o n nature# The !ifficulties an! objections e ha"e to fear lie in oursel"es# They are like ol! but ne"er su%erannuate! claims@ an! e must seek them out, an! settle them once an! for e"er, if e are to e?%ect a %ermanent %eace# E?ternal tranquility is hollo an! unreal# The root of these contra!ictions, hich lies in the nature of human reason, must be !estroye!@ an! this can only be !one by gi"ing it, in the first instance, free!om to gro , nay, by nourishing it, that it may sen! out shoots, an! thus betray its o n e?istence# It is our !uty, therefore, to try to !isco"er ne objections, to %ut ea%ons in the ban!s of our o%%onent, an! to grant him the most fa"ourable %osition in the arena that he can ish# >e ha"e nothing to fear from these concessions@ on the contrary, e may rather ho%e that e shall thus make oursel"es master of a %ossession hich no one ill e"er "enture to !is%ute# The thinker requires, to be fully equi%%e!, the hy%otheses of %ure reason, hich, although but lea!en ea%ons Dfor they ha"e not been steele! in the armoury of e?%erienceE, are as useful as any that can be em%loye! by his o%%onents# If, accor!ingly, e ha"e assume!, from a non&s%eculati"e %oint of "ie , the immaterial nature of the soul, an! are met by the objection that e?%erience seems to %ro"e that the gro th an! !ecay of our mental faculties are mere mo!ifications of the sensuous organismB e can eaken the force of this objection by the assum%tion that the bo!y is nothing but the

fun!amental %henomenon, to hich, as a necessary con!ition, all sensibility, an! consequently all thought, relates in the %resent state of our e?istence@ an! that the se%aration of soul an! bo!y forms the conclusion of the sensuous e?ercise of our %o er of cognition an! the beginning of the intellectual# The bo!y oul!, in this "ie of the question, be regar!e!, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restricti"e con!ition, as %romoti"e of the sensuous an! animal, but as a hin!rance to the %ure an! s%iritual life@ an! the !e%en!ence of the animal life on the constitution of the bo!y, oul! not %ro"e that the hole life of man as also !e%en!ent on the state of the organism# >e might go still farther, an! !isco"er ne objections, or carry out to their e?treme consequences those hich ha"e alrea!y been a!!uce!# Generation, in the human race as ell as among the irrational animals, !e%en!s on so many acci!entsBof occasion, of %ro%er sustenance, of the la s enacte! by the go"ernment of a country of "ice e"en, that it is !ifficult to belie"e in the eternal e?istence of a being hose life has begun un!er circumstances so mean an! tri"ial, an! so entirely !e%en!ent u%on our o n control# )s regar!s the continuance of the e?istence of the hole race, e nee! ha"e no !ifficulties, for acci!ent in single cases is subject to general la s@ but, in the case of each in!i"i!ual, it oul! seem as if e coul! har!ly e?%ect so on!erful an effect from causes so insignificant# But, in ans er to these objections, e may a!!uce the transcen!ental hy%othesis that all life is %ro%erly intelligible, an! not subject to changes of time, an! that it neither began in birth, nor ill en! in !eath# >e may assume that this life is nothing more than a sensuous re%resentation of %ure s%iritual life@ that the hole orl! of sense is but an image, ho"ering before the faculty of cognition hich e e?ercise in this s%here, an! ith no more objecti"e reality than a !ream@ an! that if e coul! intuite oursel"es an! other things as they really are, e shoul! see oursel"es in a orl! of s%iritual natures, our connection ith hich !i! not begin at our birth an! ill not cease ith the !estruction of the bo!y# )n! so on# >e cannot be sai! to kno hat has been abo"e asserte!, nor !o e seriously maintain the truth of these assertions@ an! the notions therein in!icate! are not e"en i!eas of reason, they are %urely fictitious conce%tions# But this hy%othetical %roce!ure is in %erfect conformity ith the la s of reason# 9ur o%%onent mistakes the absence of em%irical con!itions for a %roof of the com%lete im%ossibility of all that e ha"e asserte!@ an! e ha"e to sho him that he has not e?hauste! the hole s%here of %ossibility an! that he can as little com%ass that s%here by the la s of e?%erience an! nature, as e can lay a secure foun!ation for the o%erations of reason beyon! the region of e?%erience# 7uch hy%othetical !efences against the %retensions of an o%%onent must not be regar!e! as !eclarations of o%inion# The %hiloso%her aban!ons them, so soon as the o%%osite %arty renounces its !ogmatical conceit# To maintain a sim%ly negati"e %osition in relation to %ro%ositions hich rest on an insecure foun!ation, ell befits the mo!eration of a true %hiloso%her@ but to u%hol! the objections urge! against an o%%onent as %roofs of the o%%osite statement is a %rocee!ing just as un arrantable an! arrogant as it is to attack the %osition of a %hiloso%her ho a!"ances affirmati"e %ro%ositions regar!ing such a subject# It is e"i!ent, therefore, that hy%otheses, in the s%eculati"e s%here, are "ali!, not as in!e%en!ent %ro%ositions, but only relati"ely to o%%osite transcen!ent assum%tions#

:or, to make the %rinci%les of %ossible e?%erience con!itions of the %ossibility of things in general is just as transcen!ent a %roce!ure as to maintain the objecti"e reality of i!eas hich can be a%%lie! to no objects e?ce%t such as lie ithout the limits of %ossible e?%erience# The ju!gements enounce! by %ure reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounce! at all# Reason cannot trouble herself ith o%inions# But the hy%otheses e ha"e been !iscussing are merely %roblematical ju!gements, hich can neither be confute! nor %ro"e!@ hile, therefore, they are not %ersonal o%inions, they are in!is%ensable as ans ers to objections hich are liable to be raise!# But e must take care to confine them to this function, an! guar! against any assum%tion on their %art of absolute "ali!ity, a %rocee!ing hich oul! in"ol"e reason in ine?tricable !ifficulties an! contra!ictions# 7ECTI9< IK# The *isci%line of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs# It is a %eculiarity, hich !istinguishes the %roofs of transcen!ental synthetical %ro%ositions from those of all other a %riori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, !oes not a%%ly its conce%tions !irectly to an object, but is first oblige! to %ro"e, a %riori, the objecti"e "ali!ity of these conce%tions an! the %ossibility of their syntheses# This is not merely a %ru!ential rule, it is essential to the "ery %ossibility of the %roof of a transcen!ental %ro%osition# If I am require! to %ass, a %riori, beyon! the conce%tion of an object, I fin! that it is utterly im%ossible ithout the gui!ance of something hich is not containe! in the conce%tion# In mathematics, it is a %riori intuition that gui!es my synthesis@ an!, in this case, all our conclusions may be !ra n imme!iately from %ure intuition# In transcen!ental cognition, so long as e are !ealing only ith conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing, e are gui!e! by %ossible e?%erience# That is to say, a %roof in the s%here of transcen!ental cognition !oes not sho that the gi"en conce%tion Dthat of an e"ent, for e?am%leE lea!s !irectly to another conce%tion Dthat of a causeEBfor this oul! be a saltus hich nothing can justify@ but it sho s that e?%erience itself, an! consequently the object of e?%erience, is im%ossible ithout the connection in!icate! by these conce%tions# It follo s that such a %roof must !emonstrate the %ossibility of arri"ing, synthetically an! a %riori, at a certain kno le!ge of things, hich as not containe! in our conce%tions of these things# 4nless e %ay %articular attention to this requirement, our %roofs, instea! of %ursuing the straight %ath in!icate! by reason, follo the tortuous roa! of mere subjecti"e association# The illusory con"iction, hich rests u%on subjecti"e causes of association, an! hich is consi!ere! as resulting from the %erce%tion of a real an! objecti"e natural affinity, is al ays o%en to !oubt an! sus%icion# :or this reason, all the attem%ts hich ha"e been ma!e to %ro"e the %rinci%le of sufficient reason, ha"e, accor!ing to the uni"ersal a!mission of %hiloso%hers, been quite unsuccessful@ an!, before the a%%earance of transcen!ental criticism, it as consi!ere! better, as this %rinci%le coul! not be aban!one!, to a%%eal bol!ly to the common sense of mankin! Da %rocee!ing hich al ays %ro"es that the %roblem, hich reason ought to sol"e, is one in hich %hiloso%hers fin! great !ifficultiesE, rather than attem%t to !isco"er ne !ogmatical %roofs# But, if the %ro%osition to be %ro"e! is a %ro%osition of %ure reason, an! if I aim at %assing beyon! my em%irical conce%tions by the ai! of mere i!eas, it is necessary that

the %roof shoul! first sho that such a ste% in synthesis is %ossible D hich it is notE, before it %rocee!s to %ro"e the truth of the %ro%osition itself# The so&calle! %roof of the sim%le nature of the soul from the unity of a%%erce%tion, is a "ery %lausible one# But it contains no ans er to the objection, that, as the notion of absolute sim%licity is not a conce%tion hich is !irectly a%%licable to a %erce%tion, but is an i!ea hich must be inferre!Bif at allBfrom obser"ation, it is by no means e"i!ent ho the mere fact of consciousness, hich is containe! in all thought, although in so far a sim%le re%resentation, can con!uct me to the consciousness an! cognition of a thing hich is %urely a thinking substance# >hen I re%resent to my min! the %o er of my bo!y as in motion, my bo!y in this thought is so far absolute unity, an! my re%resentation of it is a sim%le one@ an! hence I can in!icate this re%resentation by the motion of a %oint, because I ha"e ma!e abstraction of the siCe or "olume of the bo!y# But I cannot hence infer that, gi"en merely the mo"ing %o er of a bo!y, the bo!y may be cogitate! as sim%le substance, merely because the re%resentation in my min! takes no account of its content in s%ace, an! is consequently sim%le# The sim%le, in abstraction, is "ery !ifferent from the objecti"ely sim%le@ an! hence the Ego, hich is sim%le in the first sense, may, in the secon! sense, as in!icating the soul itself, be a "ery com%le? conce%tion, ith a "ery "arious content# Thus it is e"i!ent that in all such arguments there lurks a %aralogism# >e guess Dfor ithout some such surmise our sus%icion oul! not be e?cite! in reference to a %roof of this characterE at the %resence of the %aralogism, by kee%ing e"er before us a criterion of the %ossibility of those synthetical %ro%ositions hich aim at %ro"ing more than e?%erience can teach us# This criterion is obtaine! from the obser"ation that such %roofs !o not lea! us !irectly from the subject of the %ro%osition to be %ro"e! to the require! %re!icate, but fin! it necessary to %resu%%ose the %ossibility of e?ten!ing our cognition a %riori by means of i!eas# >e must, accor!ingly, al ays use the greatest caution@ e require, before attem%ting any %roof, to consi!er ho it is %ossible to e?ten! the s%here of cognition by the o%erations of %ure reason, an! from hat source e are to !eri"e kno le!ge, hich is not obtaine! from the analysis of conce%tions, nor relates, by antici%ation, to %ossible e?%erience# >e shall thus s%are oursel"es much se"ere an! fruitless labour, by not e?%ecting from reason hat is beyon! its %o er, or rather by subjecting it to !isci%line, an! teaching it to mo!erate its "ehement !esires for the e?tension of the s%here of cognition# The first rule for our gui!ance is, therefore, not to attem%t a transcen!ental %roof, before e ha"e consi!ere! from hat source e are to !eri"e the %rinci%les u%on hich the %roof is to be base!, an! hat right e ha"e to e?%ect that our conclusions from these %rinci%les ill be "eracious# If they are %rinci%les of the un!erstan!ing, it is "ain to e?%ect that e shoul! attain by their means to i!eas of %ure reason@ for these %rinci%les are "ali! only in regar! to objects of %ossible e?%erience# If they are %rinci%les of %ure reason, our labour is alike in "ain# :or the %rinci%les of reason, if em%loye! as objecti"e, are ithout e?ce%tion !ialectical an! %ossess no "ali!ity or truth, e?ce%t as regulati"e %rinci%les of the systematic em%loyment of reason in e?%erience# But hen such !elusi"e %roof are %resente! to us, it is our !uty to meet them ith the non liquet of a mature! ju!gement@ an!, although e are unable to e?%ose the %articular so%hism u%on hich the %roof is base!, e ha"e a right to !eman! a !e!uction of the %rinci%les em%loye! in it@ an!, if these %rinci%les ha"e their origin in %ure reason alone, such a !e!uction is absolutely im%ossible# )n! thus it is unnecessary that e shoul! trouble

oursel"es ith the e?%osure an! confutation of e"ery so%histical illusion@ e may, at once, bring all !ialectic, hich is ine?haustible in the %ro!uction of fallacies, before the bar of critical reason, hich tests the %rinci%les u%on hich all !ialectical %roce!ure is base!# The secon! %eculiarity of transcen!ental %roof is that a transcen!ental %ro%osition cannot rest u%on more than a single %roof# If I am !ra ing conclusions, not from conce%tions, but from intuition corres%on!ing to a conce%tion, be it %ure intuition, as in mathematics, or em%irical, as in natural science, the intuition hich forms the basis of my inferences %resents me ith materials for many synthetical %ro%ositions, hich I can connect in "arious mo!es, hile, as it is allo able to %rocee! from !ifferent %oints in the intention, I can arri"e by !ifferent %aths at the same %ro%osition# But e"ery transcen!ental %ro%osition sets out from a conce%tion, an! %osits the synthetical con!ition of the %ossibility of an object accor!ing to this conce%tion# There must, therefore, be but one groun! of %roof, because it is the conce%tion alone hich !etermines the object@ an! thus the %roof cannot contain anything more than the !etermination of the object accor!ing to the conce%tion# In our Transcen!ental )nalytic, for e?am%le, e inferre! the %rinci%le( E"ery e"ent has a cause, from the only con!ition of the objecti"e %ossibility of our conce%tion of an e"ent# This is that an e"ent cannot be !etermine! in time, an! consequently cannot form a %art of e?%erience, unless it stan!s un!er this !ynamical la # This is the only %ossible groun! of %roof@ for our conce%tion of an e"ent %ossesses objecti"e "ali!ity, that is, is a true conce%tion, only because the la of causality !etermines an object to hich it can refer# 9ther arguments in su%%ort of this %rinci%le ha"e been attem%te!Bsuch as that from the contingent nature of a %henomenon@ but hen this argument is consi!ere!, e can !isco"er no criterion of contingency, e?ce%t the fact of an e"entBof something ha%%ening, that is to say, the e?istence hich is %rece!e! by the non&e?istence of an object, an! thus e fall back on the "ery thing to be %ro"e!# If the %ro%osition( GE"ery thinking being is sim%le,G is to be %ro"e!, e kee% to the conce%tion of the ego, hich is sim%le, an! to hich all thought has a relation# The same is the case ith the transcen!ental %roof of the e?istence of a *eity, hich is base! solely u%on the harmony an! reci%rocal fitness of the conce%tions of an ens realissimum an! a necessary being, an! cannot be attem%te! in any other manner# This caution ser"es to sim%lify "ery much the criticism of all %ro%ositions of reason# >hen reason em%loys conce%tions alone, only one %roof of its thesis is %ossible, if any# >hen, therefore, the !ogmatist a!"ances ith ten arguments in fa"our of a %ro%osition, e may be sure that not one of them is conclusi"e# :or if he %ossesse! one hich %ro"e! the %ro%osition he brings for ar! to !emonstrationBas must al ays be the case ith the %ro%ositions of %ure reasonB hat nee! is there for any moreH ;is intention can only be similar to that of the a!"ocate ho ha! !ifferent arguments for !ifferent ju!ges@ this a"ailing himself of the eakness of those ho e?amine his arguments, ho, ithout going into any %rofoun! in"estigation, a!o%t the "ie of the case hich seems most %robable at first sight an! !eci!e accor!ing to it# The thir! rule for the gui!ance of %ure reason in the con!uct of a %roof is that all transcen!ental %roofs must ne"er be a%agogic or in!irect, but al ays ostensi"e or !irect# The !irect or ostensi"e %roof not only establishes the truth of the %ro%osition to be

%ro"e!, but e?%oses the groun!s of its truth@ the a%agogic, on the other han!, may assure us of the truth of the %ro%osition, but it cannot enable us to com%rehen! the groun!s of its %ossibility# The latter is, accor!ingly, rather an au?iliary to an argument, than a strictly %hiloso%hical an! rational mo!e of %roce!ure# In one res%ect, ho e"er, they ha"e an a!"antage o"er !irect %roofs, from the fact that the mo!e of arguing by contra!iction, hich they em%loy, ren!ers our un!erstan!ing of the question more clear, an! a%%ro?imates the %roof to the certainty of an intuitional !emonstration# The true reason hy in!irect %roofs are em%loye! in !ifferent sciences is this# >hen the groun!s u%on hich e seek to base a cognition are too "arious or too %rofoun!, e try hether or not e may not !isco"er the truth of our cognition from its consequences# The mo!us %onens of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a %ro%osition oul! be a!missible if all the inferences that can be !ra n from it are kno n to be true@ for in this case there can be only one %ossible groun! for these inferences, an! that is the true one# But this is a quite im%racticable %roce!ure, as it sur%asses all our %o ers to !isco"er all the %ossible inferences that can be !ra n from a %ro%osition# But this mo!e of reasoning is em%loye!, un!er fa"our, hen e ish to %ro"e the truth of an hy%othesis@ in hich case e a!mit the truth of the conclusionB hich is su%%orte! by analogyBthat, if all the inferences e ha"e !ra n an! e?amine! agree ith the %ro%osition assume!, all other %ossible inferences ill also agree ith it# But, in this ay, an hy%othesis can ne"er be establishe! as a !emonstrate! truth# The mo!us tollens of reasoning from kno n inferences to the unkno n %ro%osition, is not only a rigorous, but a "ery easy mo!e of %roof# :or, if it can be sho n that but one inference from a %ro%osition is false, then the %ro%osition must itself be false# Instea!, then, of e?amining, in an ostensi"e argument, the hole series of the groun!s on hich the truth of a %ro%osition rests, e nee! only take the o%%osite of this %ro%osition, an! if one inference from it be false, then must the o%%osite be itself false@ an!, consequently, the %ro%osition hich e ishe! to %ro"e must be true# The a%agogic metho! of %roof is a!missible only in those sciences here it is im%ossible to mistake a subjecti"e re%resentation for an objecti"e cognition# >here this is %ossible, it is %lain that the o%%osite of a gi"en %ro%osition may contra!ict merely the subjecti"e con!itions of thought, an! not the objecti"e cognition@ or it may ha%%en that both %ro%ositions contra!ict each other only un!er a subjecti"e con!ition, hich is incorrectly consi!ere! to be objecti"e, an!, as the con!ition is itself false, both %ro%ositions may be false, an! it ill, consequently, be im%ossible to conclu!e the truth of the one from the falseness of the other# In mathematics such subre%tions are im%ossible@ an! it is in this science, accor!ingly, that the in!irect mo!e of %roof has its true %lace# In the science of nature, here all assertion is base! u%on em%irical intuition, such subre%tions may be guar!e! against by the re%eate! com%arison of obser"ations@ but this mo!e of %roof is of little "alue in this s%here of kno le!ge# But the transcen!ental efforts of %ure reason are all ma!e in the s%here of the subjecti"e, hich is the real me!ium of all !ialectical illusion@ an! thus reason en!ea"ours, in its %remisses, to im%ose u%on us subjecti"e re%resentations for objecti"e cognitions# In the transcen!ental s%here of %ure reason, then, an! in the case of synthetical %ro%ositions, it is ina!missible to su%%ort a statement by !is%ro"ing the

counter&statement# :or only t o cases are %ossible@ either, the counter&statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the o%%osite o%inion ith the subjecti"e con!itions of reason, hich !oes not affect the real case Dfor e?am%le, e cannot com%rehen! the uncon!itione! necessity of the e?istence of a being, an! hence e"ery s%eculati"e %roof of the e?istence of such a being must be o%%ose! on subjecti"e groun!s, hile the %ossibility of this being in itself cannot ith justice be !enie!E@ or, both %ro%ositions, being !ialectical in their nature, are base! u%on an im%ossible conce%tion# In this latter case the rule a%%lies( non entis nulla sunt %re!icata@ that is to say, hat e affirm an! hat e !eny, res%ecting such an object, are equally untrue, an! the a%agogic mo!e of arri"ing at the truth is in this case im%ossible# If, for e?am%le, e %resu%%ose that the orl! of sense is gi"en in itself in its totality, it is false, either that it is infinite, or that it is finite an! limite! in s%ace# Both are false, because the hy%othesis is false# :or the notion of %henomena Das mere re%resentationsE hich are gi"en in themsel"es Das objectsE is self&contra!ictory@ an! the infinitu!e of this imaginary hole oul!, in!ee!, be uncon!itione!, but oul! be inconsistent Das e"erything in the %henomenal orl! is con!itione!E ith the uncon!itione! !etermination an! finitu!e of quantities hich is %resu%%ose! in our conce%tion# The a%agogic mo!e of %roof is the true source of those illusions hich ha"e al ays ha! so strong an attraction for the a!mirers of !ogmatical %hiloso%hy# It may be com%are! to a cham%ion ho maintains the honour an! claims of the %arty he has a!o%te! by offering battle to all ho !oubt the "ali!ity of these claims an! the %urity of that honour@ hile nothing can be %ro"e! in this ay, e?ce%t the res%ecti"e strength of the combatants, an! the a!"antage, in this res%ect, is al ays on the si!e of the attacking %arty# 7%ectators, obser"ing that each %arty is alternately conqueror an! conquere!, are le! to regar! the subject of !is%ute as beyon! the %o er of man to !eci!e u%on# But such an o%inion cannot be justifie!@ an! it is sufficient to a%%ly to these reasoners the remark( <on !efensoribus istis Tem%us eget# Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcen!ental !e!uction of the groun!s of %roof em%loye! in his argument, an! thus enable us to see in hat ay the claims of reason may be su%%orte!# If an o%%onent bases his assertions u%on subjecti"e groun!s, he may be refute! ith ease@ not, ho e"er to the a!"antage of the !ogmatist, ho like ise !e%en!s u%on subjecti"e sources of cognition an! is in like manner !ri"en into a corner by his o%%onent# But, if %arties em%loy the !irect metho! of %roce!ure, they ill soon !isco"er the !ifficulty, nay, the im%ossibility of %ro"ing their assertions, an! ill be force! to a%%eal to %rescri%tion an! %rece!ence@ or they ill, by the hel% of criticism, !isco"er ith ease the !ogmatical illusions by hich they ha! been mocke!, an! com%el reason to renounce its e?aggerate! %retensions to s%eculati"e insight an! to confine itself ithin the limits of its %ro%er s%hereBthat of %ractical %rinci%les#

CHAPTER II. T&e Can%n %+ Pure Reas%n. It is a humiliating consi!eration for human reason that it is incom%etent to !isco"er truth by means of %ure s%eculation, but, on the contrary, stan!s in nee! of !isci%line to check its !e"iations from the straight %ath an! to e?%ose the illusions hich it originates# But, on the other han!, this consi!eration ought to ele"ate an! to gi"e it confi!ence, for this !isci%line is e?ercise! by itself alone, an! it is subject to the censure of no other %o er# The boun!s, moreo"er, hich it is force! to set to its s%eculati"e e?ercise, form like ise a check u%on the fallacious %retensions of o%%onents@ an! thus hat remains of its %ossessions, after these e?aggerate! claims ha"e been !isallo e!, is secure from attack or usur%ation# The greatest, an! %erha%s the only, use of all %hiloso%hy of %ure reason is, accor!ingly, of a %urely negati"e character# It is not an organon for the e?tension, but a !isci%line for the !etermination, of the limits of its e?ercise@ an! ithout laying claim to the !isco"ery of ne truth, it has the mo!est merit of guar!ing against error# )t the same time, there must be some source of %ositi"e cognitions hich belong to the !omain of %ure reason an! hich become the causes of error only from our mistaking their true character, hile they form the goal to ar!s hich reason continually stri"es# ;o else can e account for the ine?tinguishable !esire in the human min! to fin! a firm footing in some region beyon! the limits of the orl! of e?%erienceH It ho%es to attain to the %ossession of a kno le!ge in hich it has the !ee%est interest# It enters u%on the %ath of %ure s%eculation@ but in "ain# >e ha"e some reason, ho e"er, to e?%ect that, in the only other ay that lies o%en to itBthe %ath of %ractical reasonBit may meet ith better success# I un!erstan! by a canon a list of the a %riori %rinci%les of the %ro%er em%loyment of certain faculties of cognition# Thus general logic, in its analytical !e%artment, is a formal canon for the faculties of un!erstan!ing an! reason# In the same ay, Transcen!ental )nalytic as seen to be a canon of the %ure un!erstan!ing@ for it alone is com%etent to enounce true a %riori synthetical cognitions# But, hen no %ro%er em%loyment of a faculty of cognition is %ossible, no canon can e?ist# But the synthetical cognition of %ure s%eculati"e reason is, as has been sho n, com%letely im%ossible# There cannot, therefore, e?ist any canon for the s%eculati"e e?ercise of this facultyBfor its s%eculati"e e?ercise is entirely !ialectical@ an!, consequently, transcen!ental logic, in this res%ect, is merely a !isci%line, an! not a canon# If, then, there is any %ro%er mo!e of em%loying the faculty of %ure reasonBin hich case there must be a canon for this facultyBthis canon ill relate, not to the s%eculati"e, but to the %ractical use of reason# This canon e no %rocee! to in"estigate# 7ECTI9< I# 9f the 4ltimate En! of the Pure 4se of Reason# There e?ists in the faculty of reason a natural !esire to "enture beyon! the fiel! of e?%erience, to attem%t to reach the utmost boun!s of all cognition by the hel% of i!eas alone, an! not to rest satisfie! until it has fulfille! its course an! raise! the sum of its cognitions into a self&subsistent systematic hole# Is the moti"e for this en!ea"our to be foun! in its s%eculati"e, or in its %ractical interests aloneH

7etting asi!e, at %resent, the results of the labours of %ure reason in its s%eculati"e e?ercise, I shall merely inquire regar!ing the %roblems the solution of hich forms its ultimate aim, hether reache! or not, an! in relation to hich all other aims are but %artial an! interme!iate# These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, %ossess com%lete unity@ other ise the highest interest of humanity coul! not be successfully %romote!# The transcen!ental s%eculation of reason relates to three things( the free!om of the ill, the immortality of the soul, an! the e?istence of Go!# The s%eculati"e interest hich reason has in those questions is "ery small@ an!, for its sake alone, e shoul! not un!ertake the labour of transcen!ental in"estigationBa labour full of toil an! ceaseless struggle# >e shoul! be loth to un!ertake this labour, because the !isco"eries e might make oul! not be of the smallest use in the s%here of concrete or %hysical in"estigation# >e may fin! out that the ill is free, but this kno le!ge only relates to the intelligible cause of our "olition# )s regar!s the %henomena or e?%ressions of this ill, that is, our actions, e are boun!, in obe!ience to an in"iolable ma?im, ithout hich reason cannot be em%loye! in the s%here of e?%erience, to e?%lain these in the same ay as e e?%lain all the other %henomena of nature, that is to say, accor!ing to its unchangeable la s# >e may ha"e !isco"ere! the s%irituality an! immortality of the soul, but e cannot em%loy this kno le!ge to e?%lain the %henomena of this life, nor the %eculiar nature of the future, because our conce%tion of an incor%oreal nature is %urely negati"e an! !oes not a!! anything to our kno le!ge, an! the only inferences to be !ra n from it are %urely fictitious# If, again, e %ro"e the e?istence of a su%reme intelligence, e shoul! be able from it to make the conformity to aims e?isting in the arrangement of the orl! com%rehensible@ but e shoul! not be justifie! in !e!ucing from it any %articular arrangement or !is%osition, or inferring any here it is not %ercei"e!# :or it is a necessary rule of the s%eculati"e use of reason that e must not o"erlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of e?%erience, for the sake of !e!ucing hat e kno an! %ercei"e from something that transcen!s all our kno le!ge# In one or!, these three %ro%ositions are, for the s%eculati"e reason, al ays transcen!ent, an! cannot be em%loye! as immanent %rinci%les in relation to the objects of e?%erience@ they are, consequently, of no use to us in this s%here, being but the "alueless results of the se"ere but un%rofitable efforts of reason# If, then, the actual cognition of these three car!inal %ro%ositions is %erfectly useless, hile Reason uses her utmost en!ea"ours to in!uce us to a!mit them, it is %lain that their real "alue an! im%ortance relate to our %ractical, an! not to our s%eculati"e interest# I term all that is %ossible through free ill, %ractical# But if the con!itions of the e?ercise of free "olition are em%irical, reason can ha"e only a regulati"e, an! not a constituti"e, influence u%on it, an! is ser"iceable merely for the intro!uction of unity into its em%irical la s# In the moral %hiloso%hy of %ru!ence, for e?am%le, the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the en!s, hich are aime! at by our inclinations, into one ultimate en!Bthat of ha%%inessBan! to sho the agreement hich shoul! e?ist among the means of attaining that en!# In this s%here, accor!ingly, reason cannot %resent to us any other than %ragmatical la s of free action, for our gui!ance to ar!s

the aims set u% by the senses, an! is incom%etent to gi"e us la s hich are %ure an! !etermine! com%letely a %riori# 9n the other han!, %ure %ractical la s, the en!s of hich ha"e been gi"en by reason entirely a %riori, an! hich are not em%irically con!itione!, but are, on the contrary, absolutely im%erati"e in their nature, oul! be %ro!ucts of %ure reason# 7uch are the moral la s@ an! these alone belong to the s%here of the %ractical e?ercise of reason, an! a!mit of a canon# )ll the %o ers of reason, in the s%here of hat may be terme! %ure %hiloso%hy, are, in fact, !irecte! to the three abo"e&mentione! %roblems alone# These again ha"e a still higher en!Bthe ans er to the question, hat e ought to !o, if the ill is free, if there is a Go! an! a future orl!# <o , as this %roblem relates to our in reference to the highest aim of humanity, it is e"i!ent that the ultimate intention of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been !irecte! to the moral alone# >e must take care, ho e"er, in turning our attention to an object hich is foreign8 to the s%here of transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, not to injure the unity of our system by !igressions, nor, on the other han!, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the ne subject of !iscussion# I ho%e to a"oi! both e?tremes, by kee%ing as close as %ossible to the transcen!ental, an! e?clu!ing all %sychological, that is, em%irical, elements# /8:ootnote( )ll %ractical conce%tions relate to objects of %leasure an! %ain, an! consequentlyBin an in!irect manner, at leastBto objects of feeling# But as feeling is not a faculty of re%resentation, but lies out of the s%here of our %o ers of cognition, the elements of our ju!gements, in so far as they relate to %leasure or %ain, that is, the elements of our %ractical ju!gements, !o not belong to transcen!ental %hiloso%hy, hich has to !o ith %ure a %riori cognitions alone#3 I ha"e to remark, in the first %lace, that at %resent I treat of the conce%tion of free!om in the %ractical sense only, an! set asi!e the corres%on!ing transcen!ental conce%tion, hich cannot be em%loye! as a groun! of e?%lanation in the %henomenal orl!, but is itself a %roblem for %ure reason# ) ill is %urely animal Darbitrium brutumE hen it is !etermine! by sensuous im%ulses or instincts only, that is, hen it is !etermine! in a %athological manner# ) ill, hich can be !etermine! in!e%en!ently of sensuous im%ulses, consequently by moti"es %resente! by reason alone, is calle! a free ill Darbitrium liberumE@ an! e"erything hich is connecte! ith this free ill, either as %rinci%le or consequence, is terme! %ractical# The e?istence of %ractical free!om can be %ro"e! from e?%erience alone# :or the human ill is not !etermine! by that alone hich imme!iately affects the senses@ on the contrary, e ha"e the %o er, by calling u% the notion of hat is useful or hurtful in a more !istant relation, of o"ercoming the imme!iate im%ressions on our sensuous faculty of !esire# But these consi!erations of hat is !esirable in relation to our hole state, that is, is in the en! goo! an! useful, are base! entirely u%on reason# This faculty, accor!ingly, enounces la s, hich are im%erati"e or objecti"e la s of free!om an! hich tell us hat ought to take %lace, thus !istinguishing themsel"es from the la s of nature, hich relate to that hich !oes take %lace# The la s of free!om or of free ill are hence terme! %ractical la s#

>hether reason is not itself, in the actual !eli"ery of these la s, !etermine! in its turn by other influences, an! hether the action hich, in relation to sensuous im%ulses, e call free, may not, in relation to higher an! more remote o%erati"e causes, really form a %art of natureBthese are questions hich !o not here concern us# They are %urely s%eculati"e questions@ an! all e ha"e to !o, in the %ractical s%here, is to inquire into the rule of con!uct hich reason has to %resent# E?%erience !emonstrates to us the e?istence of %ractical free!om as one of the causes hich e?ist in nature, that is, it sho s the causal %o er of reason in the !etermination of the ill# The i!ea of transcen!ental free!om, on the contrary, requires that reasonBin relation to its causal %o er of commencing a series of %henomenaBshoul! be in!e%en!ent of all sensuous !etermining causes@ an! thus it seems to be in o%%osition to the la of nature an! to all %ossible e?%erience# It therefore remains a %roblem for the human min!# But this %roblem !oes not concern reason in its %ractical use@ an! e ha"e, therefore, in a canon of %ure reason, to !o ith only t o questions, hich relate to the %ractical interest of %ure reason( Is there a Go!H an!, Is there a future lifeH The question of transcen!ental free!om is %urely s%eculati"e, an! e may therefore set it entirely asi!e hen e come to treat of %ractical reason# Besi!es, e ha"e alrea!y !iscusse! this subject in the antinomy of %ure reason# 7ECTI9< II# 9f the I!eal of the 7ummum Bonum as a *etermining Groun! of the 4ltimate En! of Pure Reason# Reason con!ucte! us, in its s%eculati"e use, through the fiel! of e?%erience an!, as it can ne"er fin! com%lete satisfaction in that s%here, from thence to s%eculati"e i!easB hich, ho e"er, in the en! brought us back again to e?%erience, an! thus fulfille! the %ur%ose of reason, in a manner hich, though useful, as not at all in accor!ance ith our e?%ectations# It no remains for us to consi!er hether %ure reason can be em%loye! in a %ractical s%here, an! hether it ill here con!uct us to those i!eas hich attain the highest en!s of %ure reason, as e ha"e just state! them# >e shall thus ascertain hether, from the %oint of "ie of its %ractical interest, reason may not be able to su%%ly us ith that hich, on the s%eculati"e si!e, it holly !enies us# The hole interest of reason, s%eculati"e as ell as %ractical, is centre! in the three follo ing questions( 6# >;)T C)< I K<9>H ,# >;)T 94G;T I T9 *9H .# >;)T A)$ I ;9PEH The first question is %urely s%eculati"e# >e ha"e, as I flatter myself, e?hauste! all the re%lies of hich it is susce%tible, an! ha"e at last foun! the re%ly ith hich reason must content itself, an! ith hich it ought to be content, so long as it %ays no regar! to the %ractical# But from the t o great en!s to the attainment of hich all these efforts of %ure reason ere in fact !irecte!, e remain just as far remo"e! as if e ha! consulte! our ease an! !ecline! the task at the outset# 7o far, then, as kno le!ge is concerne!, thus much, at least, is establishe!, that, in regar! to those t o %roblems, it lies beyon! our reach#

The secon! question is %urely %ractical# )s such it may in!ee! fall ithin the %ro"ince of %ure reason, but still it is not transcen!ental, but moral, an! consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our criticism# The thir! question( If I act as I ought to !o, hat may I then ho%eHBis at once %ractical an! theoretical# The %ractical forms a clue to the ans er of the theoretical, an!Bin its highest formBs%eculati"e question# :or all ho%ing has ha%%iness for its object an! stan!s in %recisely the same relation to the %ractical an! the la of morality as kno ing to the theoretical cognition of things an! the la of nature# The former arri"es finally at the conclusion that something is D hich !etermines the ultimate en!E, because something ought to take %lace@ the latter, that something is D hich o%erates as the highest causeE, because something !oes take %lace# ;a%%iness is the satisfaction of all our !esires@ e?tensi"e, in regar! to their multi%licity@ intensi"e, in regar! to their !egree@ an! %rotensi"e, in regar! to their !uration# The %ractical la base! on the moti"e of ha%%iness I term a %ragmatical la Dor %ru!ential ruleE@ but that la , assuming such to e?ist, hich has no other moti"e than the orthiness of being ha%%y, I term a moral or ethical la # The first tells us hat e ha"e to !o, if e ish to become %ossesse! of ha%%iness@ the secon! !ictates ho e ought to act, in or!er to !eser"e ha%%iness# The first is base! u%on em%irical %rinci%les@ for it is only by e?%erience that I can learn either hat inclinations e?ist hich !esire satisfaction, or hat are the natural means of satisfying them# The secon! takes no account of our !esires or the means of satisfying them, an! regar!s only the free!om of a rational being, an! the necessary con!itions un!er hich alone this free!om can harmoniCe ith the !istribution of ha%%iness accor!ing to %rinci%les# This secon! la may therefore rest u%on mere i!eas of %ure reason, an! may be cogniCe! a %riori# I assume that there are %ure moral la s hich !etermine, entirely a %riori D ithout regar! to em%irical moti"es, that is, to ha%%inessE, the con!uct of a rational being, or in other or!s, to use hich it makes of its free!om, an! that these la s are absolutely im%erati"e Dnot merely hy%othetically, on the su%%osition of other em%irical en!sE, an! therefore in all res%ects necessary# I am arrante! in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightene! moralists, but by the moral ju!gement of e"ery man ho ill make the attem%t to form a !istinct conce%tion of such a la # Pure reason, then, contains, not in!ee! in its s%eculati"e, but in its %ractical, or, more strictly, its moral use, %rinci%les of the %ossibility of e?%erience, of such actions, namely, as, in accor!ance ith ethical %rece%ts, might be met ith in the history of man# :or since reason comman!s that such actions shoul! take %lace, it must be %ossible for them to take %lace@ an! hence a %articular kin! of systematic unityBthe moralBmust be %ossible# >e ha"e foun!, it is true, that the systematic unity of nature coul! not be establishe! accor!ing to s%eculati"e %rinci%les of reason, because, hile reason %ossesses a causal %o er in relation to free!om, it has none in relation to the hole s%here of nature@ an!, hile moral %rinci%les of reason can %ro!uce free actions, they cannot %ro!uce natural la s# It is, then, in its %ractical, but es%ecially in its moral use, that the %rinci%les of %ure reason %ossess objecti"e reality#

I call the orl! a moral orl!, in so far as it may be in accor!ance ith all the ethical la sB hich, by "irtue of the free!om of reasonable beings, it can be, an! accor!ing to the necessary la s of morality it ought to be# But this orl! must be concei"e! only as an intelligible orl!, inasmuch as abstraction is therein ma!e of all con!itions Den!sE, an! e"en of all im%e!iments to morality Dthe eakness or %ra"ity of human natureE# 7o far, then, it is a mere i!eaBthough still a %ractical i!eaB hich may ha"e, an! ought to ha"e, an influence on the orl! of sense, so as to bring it as far as %ossible into conformity ith itself# The i!ea of a moral orl! has, therefore, objecti"e reality, not as referring to an object of intelligible intuitionBfor of such an object e can form no conce%tion hate"erBbut to the orl! of senseBconcei"e!, ho e"er, as an object of %ure reason in its %ractical useBan! to a cor%us mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the in!i"i!ual is %lace!, un!er an! by "irtue of moral la s, in com%lete systematic unity both ith itself an! ith the free!om of all others# That is the ans er to the first of the t o questions of %ure reason hich relate to its %ractical interest( *o that hich ill ren!er thee orthy of ha%%iness# The secon! question is this( If I con!uct myself so as not to be un orthy of ha%%iness, may I ho%e thereby to obtain ha%%inessH In or!er to arri"e at the solution of this question, e must inquire hether the %rinci%les of %ure reason, hich %rescribe a %riori the la , necessarily also connect this ho%e ith it# I say, then, that just as the moral %rinci%les are necessary accor!ing to reason in its %ractical use, so it is equally necessary accor!ing to reason in its theoretical use to assume that e"ery one has groun! to ho%e for ha%%iness in the measure in hich he has ma!e himself orthy of it in his con!uct, an! that therefore the system of morality is inse%arably Dthough only in the i!ea of %ure reasonE connecte! ith that of ha%%iness# <o in an intelligible, that is, in the moral orl!, in the conce%tion of hich e make abstraction of all the im%e!iments to morality Dsensuous !esiresE, such a system of ha%%iness, connecte! ith an! %ro%ortione! to morality, may be concei"e! as necessary, because free!om of "olitionB%artly incite!, an! %artly restraine! by moral la sB oul! be itself the cause of general ha%%iness@ an! thus rational beings, un!er the gui!ance of such %rinci%les, oul! be themsel"es the authors both of their o n en!uring elfare an! that of others# But such a system of self&re ar!ing morality is only an i!ea, the carrying out of hich !e%en!s u%on the con!ition that e"ery one acts as he ought@ in other or!s, that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they oul! be if they s%rung from a 7u%reme >ill, com%rehen!ing in, or un!er, itself all %articular ills# But since the moral la is bin!ing on each in!i"i!ual in the use of his free!om of "olition, e"en if others shoul! not act in conformity ith this la , neither the nature of things, nor the causality of actions an! their relation to morality, !etermine ho the consequences of these actions ill be relate! to ha%%iness@ an! the necessary connection of the ho%e of ha%%iness ith the unceasing en!ea"our to become orthy of ha%%iness, cannot be cogniCe! by reason, if e take nature alone for our gui!e# This connection can be ho%e! for only on the assum%tion that the cause of nature is a su%reme reason, hich go"erns accor!ing to moral la s#

I term the i!ea of an intelligence in hich the morally most %erfect ill, unite! ith su%reme blesse!ness, is the cause of all ha%%iness in the orl!, so far as ha%%iness stan!s in strict relation to morality Das the orthiness of being ha%%yE, the i!eal of the su%reme Goo!# It is only, then, in the i!eal of the su%reme original goo!, that %ure reason can fin! the groun! of the %ractically necessary connection of both elements of the highest !eri"ati"e goo!, an! accor!ingly of an intelligible, that is, moral orl!# <o since e are necessitate! by reason to concei"e oursel"es as belonging to such a orl!, hile the senses %resent to us nothing but a orl! of %henomena, e must assume the former as a consequence of our con!uct in the orl! of sense Dsince the orl! of sense gi"es us no hint of itE, an! therefore as future in relation to us# Thus Go! an! a future life are t o hy%otheses hich, accor!ing to the %rinci%les of %ure reason, are inse%arable from the obligation hich this reason im%oses u%on us# Aorality %er se constitutes a system# But e can form no system of ha%%iness, e?ce%t in so far as it is !is%ense! in strict %ro%ortion to morality# But this is only %ossible in the intelligible orl!, un!er a ise author an! ruler# 7uch a ruler, together ith life in such a orl!, hich e must look u%on as future, reason fin!s itself com%elle! to assume@ or it must regar! the moral la s as i!le !reams, since the necessary consequence hich this same reason connects ith them must, ithout this hy%othesis, fall to the groun!# ;ence also the moral la s are uni"ersally regar!e! as comman!s, hich they coul! not be !i! they not connect a %riori a!equate consequences ith their !ictates, an! thus carry ith them %romises an! threats# But this, again, they coul! not !o, !i! they not resi!e in a necessary being, as the 7u%reme Goo!, hich alone can ren!er such a teleological unity %ossible# 'eibnitC terme! the orl!, hen "ie e! in relation to the rational beings hich it contains, an! the moral relations in hich they stan! to each other, un!er the go"ernment of the 7u%reme Goo!, the king!om of Grace, an! !istinguishe! it from the king!om of <ature, in hich these rational beings li"e, un!er moral la s, in!ee!, but e?%ect no other consequences from their actions than such as follo accor!ing to the course of nature in the orl! of sense# To "ie oursel"es, therefore, as in the king!om of grace, in hich all ha%%iness a aits us, e?ce%t in so far as e oursel"es limit our %artici%ation in it by actions hich ren!er us un orthy of ha%%iness, is a %ractically necessary i!ea of reason# Practical la s, in so far as they are subjecti"e groun!s of actions, that is, subjecti"e %rinci%les, are terme! ma?ims# The ju!gements of moral accor!ing to in its %urity an! ultimate results are frame! accor!ing i!eas@ the obser"ance of its la s, accor!ing to accor!ing to ma?ims# The hole course of our life must be subject to moral ma?ims@ but this is im%ossible, unless ith the moral la , hich is a mere i!ea, reason connects an efficient cause hich or!ains to all con!uct hich is in conformity ith the moral la an issue either in this or in another life, hich is in e?act conformity ith our highest aims# Thus, ithout a Go! an! ithout a orl!, in"isible to us no , but ho%e! for, the glorious i!eas of morality are, in!ee!, objects of a%%robation an! of a!miration, but cannot be the s%rings of %ur%ose an! action# :or they !o not satisfy all the aims hich are natural to

e"ery rational being, an! hich are !etermine! a %riori by %ure reason itself, an! necessary# ;a%%iness alone is, in the "ie of reason, far from being the com%lete goo!# Reason !oes not a%%ro"e of it Dho e"er much inclination may !esire itE, e?ce%t as unite! ith !esert# 9n the other han!, morality alone, an! ith it, mere !esert, is like ise far from being the com%lete goo!# To make it com%lete, he ho con!ucts himself in a manner not un orthy of ha%%iness, must be able to ho%e for the %ossession of ha%%iness# E"en reason, unbiase! by %ri"ate en!s, or intereste! consi!erations, cannot ju!ge other ise, if it %uts itself in the %lace of a being hose business it is to !is%ense all ha%%iness to others# :or in the %ractical i!ea both %oints are essentially combine!, though in such a ay that %artici%ation in ha%%iness is ren!ere! %ossible by the moral !is%osition, as its con!ition, an! not con"ersely, the moral !is%osition by the %ros%ect of ha%%iness# :or a !is%osition hich shoul! require the %ros%ect of ha%%iness as its necessary con!ition oul! not be moral, an! hence also oul! not be orthy of com%lete ha%%inessBa ha%%iness hich, in the "ie of reason, recogniCes no limitation but such as arises from our o n immoral con!uct# ;a%%iness, therefore, in e?act %ro%ortion ith the morality of rational beings D hereby they are ma!e orthy of ha%%inessE, constitutes alone the su%reme goo! of a orl! into hich e absolutely must trans%ort oursel"es accor!ing to the comman!s of %ure but %ractical reason# This orl! is, it is true, only an intelligible orl!@ for of such a systematic unity of en!s as it requires, the orl! of sense gi"es us no hint# Its reality can be base! on nothing else but the hy%othesis of a su%reme original goo!# In it in!e%en!ent reason, equi%%e! ith all the sufficiency of a su%reme cause, foun!s, maintains, an! fulfils the uni"ersal or!er of things, ith the most %erfect teleological harmony, ho e"er much this or!er may be hi!!en from us in the orl! of sense# This moral theology has the %eculiar a!"antage, in contrast ith s%eculati"e theology, of lea!ing ine"itably to the conce%tion of a sole, %erfect, an! rational :irst Cause, hereof s%eculati"e theology !oes not gi"e us any in!ication on objecti"e groun!s, far less any con"incing e"i!ence# :or e fin! neither in transcen!ental nor in natural theology, ho e"er far reason may lea! us in these, any groun! to arrant us in assuming the e?istence of one only Being, hich stan!s at the hea! of all natural causes, an! on hich these are entirely !e%en!ent# 9n the other ban!, if e take our stan! on moral unity as a necessary la of the uni"erse, an! from this %oint of "ie consi!er hat is necessary to gi"e this la a!equate efficiency an!, for us, obligatory force, e must come to the conclusion that there is one only su%reme ill, hich com%rehen!s all these la s in itself# :or ho , un!er !ifferent ills, shoul! e fin! com%lete unity of en!sH This ill must be omni%otent, that all nature an! its relation to morality in the orl! may be subject to it@ omniscient, that it may ha"e kno le!ge of the most secret feelings an! their moral orth@ omni%resent, that it may be at han! to su%%ly e"ery necessity to hich the highest eal of the orl! may gi"e rise@ eternal, that this harmony of nature an! liberty may ne"er fail@ an! so on# But this systematic unity of en!s in this orl! of intelligencesB hich, as mere nature, is only a orl! of sense, but, as a system of free!om of "olition, may be terme! an

intelligible, that is, moral orl! Dregnum gratiaeEBlea!s ine"itably also to the teleological unity of all things hich constitute this great hole, accor!ing to uni"ersal natural la sBjust as the unity of the former is accor!ing to uni"ersal an! necessary moral la sBan! unites the %ractical ith the s%eculati"e reason# The orl! must be re%resente! as ha"ing originate! from an i!ea, if it is to harmoniCe ith that use of reason ithout hich e cannot e"en consi!er oursel"es as orthy of reasonBnamely, the moral use, hich rests entirely on the i!ea of the su%reme goo!# ;ence the in"estigation of nature recei"es a teleological !irection, an! becomes, in its i!est e?tension, %hysico&theology# But this, taking its rise in moral or!er as a unity foun!e! on the essence of free!om, an! not acci!entally institute! by e?ternal comman!s, establishes the teleological "ie of nature on groun!s hich must be inse%arably connecte! ith the internal %ossibility of things# This gi"es rise to a transcen!ental theology, hich takes the i!eal of the highest ontological %erfection as a %rinci%le of systematic unity@ an! this %rinci%le connects all things accor!ing to uni"ersal an! necessary natural la s, because all things ha"e their origin in the absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being# >hat use can e make of our un!erstan!ing, e"en in res%ect of e?%erience, if e !o not %ro%ose en!s to oursel"esH But the highest en!s are those of morality, an! it is only %ure reason that can gi"e us the kno le!ge of these# Though su%%lie! ith these, an! %utting oursel"es un!er their gui!ance, e can make no teleological use of the kno le!ge of nature, as regar!s cognition, unless nature itself has establishe! teleological unity# :or ithout this unity e shoul! not e"en %ossess reason, because e shoul! ha"e no school for reason, an! no culti"ation through objects hich affor! the materials for its conce%tions# But teleological unity is a necessary unity, an! foun!e! on the essence of the in!i"i!ual ill itself# ;ence this ill, hich is the con!ition of the a%%lication of this unity in concreto, must be so like ise# In this ay the transcen!ental enlargement of our rational cognition oul! be, not the cause, but merely the effect of the %ractical teleology hich %ure reason im%oses u%on us# ;ence, also, e fin! in the history of human reason that, before the moral conce%tions ere sufficiently %urifie! an! !etermine!, an! before men ha! attaine! to a %erce%tion of the systematic unity of en!s accor!ing to these conce%tions an! from necessary %rinci%les, the kno le!ge of nature, an! e"en a consi!erable amount of intellectual culture in many other sciences, coul! %ro!uce only ru!e an! "ague conce%tions of the *eity, sometimes e"en a!mitting of an astonishing in!ifference ith regar! to this question altogether# But the more enlarge! treatment of moral i!eas, hich as ren!ere! necessary by the e?treme %ure moral la of our religion, a akene! the interest, an! thereby quickene! the %erce%tions of reason in relation to this object# In this ay, an! ithout the hel% either of an e?ten!e! acquaintance ith nature, or of a reliable transcen!ental insight Dfor these ha"e been anting in all agesE, a conce%tion of the *i"ine Being as arri"e! at, hich e no bol! to be the correct one, not because s%eculati"e reason con"inces us of its correctness, but because it accor!s ith the moral %rinci%les of reason# Thus it is to %ure reason, but only in its %ractical use, that e must ascribe the merit of ha"ing connecte! ith our highest interest a cognition, of hich mere s%eculation as able only to form a conjecture, but the "ali!ity of hich it as

unable to establishBan! of ha"ing thereby ren!ere! it, not in!ee! a !emonstrate! !ogma, but a hy%othesis absolutely necessary to the essential en!s of reason# But if %ractical reason has reache! this ele"ation, an! has attaine! to the conce%tion of a sole Primal Being as the su%reme goo!, it must not, therefore, imagine that it has transcen!e! the em%irical con!itions of its a%%lication, an! risen to the imme!iate cognition of ne objects@ it must not %resume to start from the conce%tion hich it has gaine!, an! to !e!uce from it the moral la s themsel"es# :or it as these "ery la s, the internal %ractical necessity of hich le! us to the hy%othesis of an in!e%en!ent cause, or of a ise ruler of the uni"erse, ho shoul! gi"e them effect# ;ence e are not entitle! to regar! them as acci!ental an! !eri"e! from the mere ill of the ruler, es%ecially as e ha"e no conce%tion of such a ill, e?ce%t as forme! in accor!ance ith these la s# 7o far, then, as %ractical reason has the right to con!uct us, e shall not look u%on actions as bin!ing on us, because they are the comman!s of Go!, but e shall regar! them as !i"ine comman!s, because e are internally boun! by them# >e shall stu!y free!om un!er the teleological unity hich accor!s ith %rinci%les of reason@ e shall look u%on oursel"es as acting in conformity ith the !i"ine ill only in so far as e hol! sacre! the moral la hich reason teaches us from the nature of actions themsel"es, an! e shall belie"e that e can obey that ill only by %romoting the eal of the uni"erse in oursel"es an! in others# Aoral theology is, therefore, only of immanent use# It teaches us to fulfil our !estiny here in the orl!, by %lacing oursel"es in harmony ith the general system of en!s, an! arns us against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of !e%ri"ing reason of its legislati"e authority in the moral con!uct of life, for the %ur%ose of !irectly connecting this authority ith the i!ea of the 7u%reme Being# :or this oul! be, not an immanent, but a transcen!ent use of moral theology, an!, like the transcen!ent use of mere s%eculation, oul! ine"itably %er"ert an! frustrate the ultimate en!s of reason# 7ECTI9< III# 9f 9%inion, Kno le!ge, an! Belief# The hol!ing of a thing to be true is a %henomenon in our un!erstan!ing hich may rest on objecti"e groun!s, but requires, also, subjecti"e causes in the min! of the %erson ju!ging# If a ju!gement is "ali! for e"ery rational being, then its groun! is objecti"ely sufficient, an! it is terme! a con"iction# If, on the other han!, it has its groun! in the %articular character of the subject, it is terme! a %ersuasion# Persuasion is a mere illusion, the groun! of the ju!gement, hich lies solely in the subject, being regar!e! as objecti"e# ;ence a ju!gement of this kin! has only %ri"ate "ali!ityBis only "ali! for the in!i"i!ual ho ju!ges, an! the hol!ing of a thing to be true in this ay cannot be communicate!# But truth !e%en!s u%on agreement ith the object, an! consequently the ju!gements of all un!erstan!ings, if true, must be in agreement ith each other Dconsentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter seE# Con"iction may, therefore, be !istinguishe!, from an e?ternal %oint of "ie , from %ersuasion, by the %ossibility of communicating it an! by sho ing its "ali!ity for the reason of e"ery man@ for in this case the %resum%tion, at least, arises that the agreement of all ju!gements ith each other, in s%ite of the !ifferent characters of in!i"i!uals, rests u%on the common groun! of the agreement of each ith the object, an! thus the correctness of the ju!gement is establishe!#

Persuasion, accor!ingly, cannot be subjecti"ely !istinguishe! from con"iction, that is, so long as the subject "ie s its ju!gement sim%ly as a %henomenon of its o n min!# But if e inquire hether the groun!s of our ju!gement, hich are "ali! for us, %ro!uce the same effect on the reason of others as on our o n, e ha"e then the means, though only subjecti"e means, not, in!ee!, of %ro!ucing con"iction, but of !etecting the merely %ri"ate "ali!ity of the ju!gement@ in other or!s, of !isco"ering that there is in it the element of mere %ersuasion# If e can, in a!!ition to this, !e"elo% the subjecti"e causes of the ju!gement, hich e ha"e taken for its objecti"e groun!s, an! thus e?%lain the !ece%ti"e ju!gement as a %henomenon in our min!, a%art altogether from the objecti"e character of the object, e can then e?%ose the illusion an! nee! be no longer !ecei"e! by it, although, if its subjecti"e cause lies in our nature, e cannot ho%e altogether to esca%e its influence# I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily "ali! for e"ery one, that hich %ro!uces con"iction# Persuasion I may kee% for myself, if it is agreeable to me@ but I cannot, an! ought not, to attem%t to im%ose it as bin!ing u%on others# ;ol!ing for true, or the subjecti"e "ali!ity of a ju!gement in relation to con"iction D hich is, at the same time, objecti"ely "ali!E, has the three follo ing !egrees( o%inion, belief, an! kno le!ge# 9%inion is a consciously insufficient ju!gement, subjecti"ely as ell as objecti"ely# Belief is subjecti"ely sufficient, but is recogniCe! as being objecti"ely insufficient# Kno le!ge is both subjecti"ely an! objecti"ely sufficient# 7ubjecti"e sufficiency is terme! con"iction Dfor myselfE@ objecti"e sufficiency is terme! certainty Dfor allE# I nee! not ! ell longer on the e?%lanation of such sim%le conce%tions# I must ne"er "enture to be of o%inion, ithout kno ing something, at least, by hich my ju!gement, in itself merely %roblematical, is brought into connection ith the truthB hich connection, although not %erfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction# Aoreo"er, the la of such a connection must be certain# :or if, in relation to this la , I ha"e nothing more than o%inion, my ju!gement is but a %lay of the imagination, ithout the least relation to truth# In the ju!gements of %ure reason, o%inion has no %lace# :or, as they !o not rest on em%irical groun!s an! as the s%here of %ure reason is that of necessary truth an! a %riori cognition, the %rinci%le of connection in it requires uni"ersality an! necessity, an! consequently %erfect certaintyBother ise e shoul! ha"e no gui!e to the truth at all# ;ence it is absur! to ha"e an o%inion in %ure mathematics@ e must kno , or abstain from forming a ju!gement altogether# The case is the same ith the ma?ims of morality# :or e must not haCar! an action on the mere o%inion that it is allo e!, but e must kno it to be so# In the transcen!ental s%here of reason, on the other han!, the term o%inion is too eak, hile the or! kno le!ge is too strong# :rom the merely s%eculati"e %oint of "ie , therefore, e cannot form a ju!gement at all# :or the subjecti"e groun!s of a ju!gement, such as %ro!uce belief, cannot be a!mitte! in s%eculati"e inquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stan! ithout em%irical su%%ort an! are inca%able of being communicate! to others in equal measure# But it is only from the %ractical %oint of "ie that a theoretically insufficient ju!gement can be terme! belief# <o the %ractical reference is either to skill or to morality@ to the

former, hen the en! %ro%ose! is arbitrary an! acci!ental, to the latter, hen it is absolutely necessary# If e %ro%ose to oursel"es any en! hate"er, the con!itions of its attainment are hy%othetically necessary# The necessity is subjecti"ely, but still only com%arati"ely, sufficient, if I am acquainte! ith no other con!itions un!er hich the en! can be attaine!# 9n the other han!, it is sufficient, absolutely an! for e"ery one, if I kno for certain that no one can be acquainte! ith any other con!itions un!er hich the attainment of the %ro%ose! en! oul! be %ossible# In the former case my su%%ositionB my ju!gement ith regar! to certain con!itionsBis a merely acci!ental belief@ in the latter it is a necessary belief# The %hysician must %ursue some course in the case of a %atient ho is in !anger, but is ignorant of the nature of the !isease# ;e obser"es the sym%toms, an! conclu!es, accor!ing to the best of his ju!gement, that it is a case of %hthisis# ;is belief is, e"en in his o n ju!gement, only contingent( another man might, %erha%s come nearer the truth# 7uch a belief, contingent in!ee!, but still forming the groun! of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain en!s, I term Pragmatical belief# The usual test, hether that hich any one maintains is merely his %ersuasion, or his subjecti"e con"iction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet# It frequently ha%%ens that a man !eli"ers his o%inions ith so much bol!ness an! assurance, that he a%%ears to be un!er no a%%rehension as to the %ossibility of his being in error# The offer of a bet startles him, an! makes him %ause# 7ometimes it turns out that his %ersuasion may be "alue! at a !ucat, but not at ten# :or he !oes not hesitate, %erha%s, to "enture a !ucat, but if it is %ro%ose! to stake ten, he imme!iately becomes a are of the %ossibility of his being mistakenBa %ossibility hich has hitherto esca%e! his obser"ation# If e imagine to oursel"es that e ha"e to stake the ha%%iness of our hole life on the truth of any %ro%osition, our ju!gement !ro%s its air of trium%h, e take the alarm, an! !isco"er the actual strength of our belief# Thus %ragmatical belief has !egrees, "arying in %ro%ortion to the interests at stake# <o , in cases here e cannot enter u%on any course of action in reference to some object, an! here, accor!ingly, our ju!gement is %urely theoretical, e can still re%resent to oursel"es, in thought, the %ossibility of a course of action, for hich e su%%ose that e ha"e sufficient groun!s, if any means e?iste! of ascertaining the truth of the matter# Thus e fin! in %urely theoretical ju!gements an analogon of %ractical ju!gements, to hich the or! belief may %ro%erly be a%%lie!, an! hich e may term !octrinal belief# I shoul! not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the %ro%ositionBif there ere any %ossibility of bringing it to the test of e?%erienceBthat, at least, some one of the %lanets, hich e see, is inhabite!# ;ence I say that I ha"e not merely the o%inion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of hich I oul! stake e"en many of the a!"antages of life, that there are inhabitants in other orl!s# <o e must a!mit that the !octrine of the e?istence of Go! belongs to !octrinal belief# :or, although in res%ect to the theoretical cognition of the uni"erse I !o not require to form any theory hich necessarily in"ol"es this i!ea, as the con!ition of my e?%lanation of the %henomena hich the uni"erse %resents, but, on the contrary, am rather boun! so

to use my reason as if e"erything ere mere nature, still teleological unity is so im%ortant a con!ition of the a%%lication of my reason to nature, that it is im%ossible for me to ignore itBes%ecially since, in a!!ition to these consi!erations, abun!ant e?am%les of it are su%%lie! by e?%erience# But the sole con!ition, so far as my kno le!ge e?ten!s, un!er hich this unity can be my gui!e in the in"estigation of nature, is the assum%tion that a su%reme intelligence has or!ere! all things accor!ing to the isest en!s# Consequently, the hy%othesis of a ise author of the uni"erse is necessary for my gui!ance in the in"estigation of natureBis the con!ition un!er hich alone I can fulfil an en! hich is contingent in!ee!, but by no means unim%ortant# Aoreo"er, since the result of my attem%ts so frequently confirms the utility of this assum%tion, an! since nothing !ecisi"e can be a!!uce! against it, it follo s that it oul! be saying far too little to term my ju!gement, in this case, a mere o%inion, an! that, e"en in this theoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly belie"e in Go!# 7till, if e use or!s strictly, this must not be calle! a %ractical, but a !octrinal belief, hich the theology of nature D%hysico&theologyE must also %ro!uce in my min!# In the is!om of a 7u%reme Being, an! in the shortness of life, so ina!equate to the !e"elo%ment of the glorious %o ers of human nature, e may fin! equally sufficient groun!s for a !octrinal belief in the future life of the human soul# The e?%ression of belief is, in such cases, an e?%ression of mo!esty from the objecti"e %oint of "ie , but, at the same time, of firm confi!ence, from the subjecti"e# If I shoul! "enture to term this merely theoretical ju!gement e"en so much as a hy%othesis hich I am entitle! to assume@ a more com%lete conce%tion, ith regar! to another orl! an! to the cause of the orl!, might then be justly require! of me than I am, in reality, able to gi"e# :or, if I assume anything, e"en as a mere hy%othesis, I must, at least, kno so much of the %ro%erties of such a being as ill enable me, not to form the conce%tion, but to imagine the e?istence of it# But the or! belief refers only to the gui!ance hich an i!ea gi"es me, an! to its subjecti"e influence on the con!uct of my reason, hich forces me to hol! it fast, though I may not be in a %osition to gi"e a s%eculati"e account of it# But mere !octrinal belief is, to some e?tent, anting in stability# >e often quit our hol! of it, in consequence of the !ifficulties hich occur in s%eculation, though in the en! e ine"itably return to it again# It is quite other ise ith moral belief# :or in this s%here action is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obe!ience to the moral la in all %oints# The en! is here incontro"ertibly establishe!, an! there is only one con!ition %ossible, accor!ing to the best of my %erce%tion, un!er hich this en! can harmoniCe ith all other en!s, an! so ha"e %ractical "ali!ityBnamely, the e?istence of a Go! an! of a future orl!# I kno also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainte! ith any other con!itions hich con!uct to the same unity of en!s un!er the moral la # But since the moral %rece%t is, at the same time, my ma?im Das reason requires that it shoul! beE, I am irresistibly constraine! to belie"e in the e?istence of Go! an! in a future life@ an! I am sure that nothing can make me a"er in this belief, since I shoul! thereby o"erthro my moral ma?ims, the renunciation of hich oul! ren!er me hateful in my o n eyes#

Thus, hile all the ambitious attem%ts of reason to %enetrate beyon! the limits of e?%erience en! in !isa%%ointment, there is still enough left to satisfy us in a %ractical %oint of "ie # <o one, it is true, ill be able to boast that he kno s that there is a Go! an! a future life@ for, if he kno s this, he is just the man hom I ha"e long ishe! to fin!# )ll kno le!ge, regar!ing an object of mere reason, can be communicate!@ an! I shoul! thus be enable! to ho%e that my o n kno le!ge oul! recei"e this on!erful e?tension, through the instrumentality of his instruction# <o, my con"iction is not logical, but moral certainty@ an! since it rests on subjecti"e groun!s Dof the moral sentimentE, I must not e"en say( It is morally certain that there is a Go!, etc#, but( I am morally certain, that is, my belief in Go! an! in another orl! is so inter o"en ith my moral nature that I am un!er as little a%%rehension of ha"ing the former torn from me as of losing the latter# The only %oint in this argument that may a%%ear o%en to sus%icion is that this rational belief %resu%%oses the e?istence of moral sentiments# If e gi"e u% this assum%tion, an! take a man ho is entirely in!ifferent ith regar! to moral la s, the question hich reason %ro%oses, becomes then merely a %roblem for s%eculation an! may, in!ee!, be su%%orte! by strong groun!s from analogy, but not by such as ill com%el the most obstinate sce%ticism to gi"e ay#8 But in these questions no man is free from all interest# :or though the ant of goo! sentiments may %lace him beyon! the influence of moral interests, still e"en in this case enough may be left to make him fear the e?istence of Go! an! a future life# :or he cannot %reten! to any certainty of the non&e?istence of Go! an! of a future life, unlessBsince it coul! only be %ro"e! by mere reason, an! therefore a%o!eicticallyBhe is %re%are! to establish the im%ossibility of both, hich certainly no reasonable man oul! un!ertake to !o# This oul! be a negati"e belief, hich coul! not, in!ee!, %ro!uce morality an! goo! sentiments, but still coul! %ro!uce an analogon of these, by o%erating as a %o erful restraint on the outbreak of e"il !is%ositions# /8:ootnote( The human min! Das, I belie"e, e"ery rational being must of necessity !oE takes a natural interest in morality, although this interest is not un!i"i!e!, an! may not be %ractically in %re%on!erance# If you strengthen an! increase it, you ill fin! the reason become !ocile, more enlightene!, an! more ca%able of uniting the s%eculati"e interest ith the %ractical# But if you !o not take care at the outset, or at least mi! ay, to make men goo!, you ill ne"er force them into an honest belief#3 But, it ill be sai!, is this all that %ure reason can effect, in o%ening u% %ros%ects beyon! the limits of e?%erienceH <othing more than t o articles of beliefH Common sense coul! ha"e !one as much as this, ithout taking the %hiloso%hers to counsel in the matterS I shall not here eulogiCe %hiloso%hy for the benefits hich the laborious efforts of its criticism ha"e conferre! on human reasonBe"en granting that its merit shoul! turn out in the en! to be only negati"eBfor on this %oint something more ill be sai! in the ne?t section# But, I ask, !o you require that that kno le!ge hich concerns all men, shoul! transcen! the common un!erstan!ing, an! shoul! only be re"eale! to you by %hiloso%hersH The "ery circumstance hich has calle! forth your censure, is the best

confirmation of the correctness of our %re"ious assertions, since it !iscloses, hat coul! not ha"e been foreseen, that <ature is not chargeable ith any %artial !istribution of her gifts in those matters hich concern all men ithout !istinction an! that, in res%ect to the essential en!s of human nature, e cannot a!"ance further ith the hel% of the highest %hiloso%hy, than un!er the gui!ance hich nature has "ouchsafe! to the meanest un!erstan!ing#

CHAPTER III. T&e Ar,&"te,t%n", %+ Pure Reas%n. By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system# >ithout systematic unity, our kno le!ge cannot become science@ it ill be an aggregate, an! not a system# Thus architectonic is the !octrine of the scientific in cognition, an! therefore necessarily forms %art of our metho!ology# Reason cannot %ermit our kno le!ge to remain in an unconnecte! an! rha%so!istic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions shoul! constitute a system# It is thus alone that they can a!"ance the en!s of reason# By a system I mean the unity of "arious cognitions un!er one i!ea# This i!ea is the conce%tionBgi"en by reasonBof the form of a hole, in so far as the conce%tion !etermines a %riori not only the limits of its content, but the %lace hich each of its %arts is to occu%y# The scientific i!ea contains, therefore, the en! an! the form of the hole hich is in accor!ance ith that en!# The unity of the en!, to hich all the %arts of the system relate, an! through hich all ha"e a relation to each other, communicates unity to the hole system, so that the absence of any %art can be imme!iately !etecte! from our kno le!ge of the rest@ an! it !etermines a %riori the limits of the system, thus e?clu!ing all contingent or arbitrary a!!itions# The hole is thus an organism DarticulatioE, an! not an aggregate Dcoacer"atioE@ it may gro from ithin D%er intussusce%tionemE, but it cannot increase by e?ternal a!!itions D%er a%%ositionemE# It is, thus, like an animal bo!y, the gro th of hich !oes not a!! any limb, but, ithout changing their %ro%ortions, makes each in its s%here stronger an! more acti"e# >e require, for the e?ecution of the i!ea of a system, a schema, that is, a content an! an arrangement of %arts !etermine! a %riori by the %rinci%le hich the aim of the system %rescribes# ) schema hich is not %rojecte! in accor!ance ith an i!ea, that is, from the stan!%oint of the highest aim of reason, but merely em%irically, in accor!ance ith acci!ental aims an! %ur%oses Dthe number of hich cannot be %re!etermine!E, can gi"e us nothing more than technical unity# But the schema hich is originate! from an i!ea Din hich case reason %resents us ith aims a %riori, an! !oes not look for them to e?%erienceE, forms the basis of architectonical unity# ) science, in the %ro%er acce%tation of that term, cannot be forme! technically, that is, from obser"ation of the similarity e?isting bet een !ifferent objects, an! the %urely contingent use e make of our kno le!ge in concreto ith reference to all kin!s of arbitrary e?ternal aims@ its constitution must be frame! on architectonical %rinci%les, that is, its %arts must be

sho n to %ossess an essential affinity, an! be ca%able of being !e!uce! from one su%reme an! internal aim or en!, hich forms the con!ition of the %ossibility of the scientific hole# The schema of a science must gi"e a %riori the %lan of it DmonogrammaE, an! the !i"ision of the hole into %arts, in conformity ith the i!ea of the science@ an! it must also !istinguish this hole from all others, accor!ing to certain un!erstoo! %rinci%les# <o one ill attem%t to construct a science, unless he ha"e some i!ea to rest on as a %ro%er basis# But, in the elaboration of the science, he fin!s that the schema, nay, e"en the !efinition hich he at first ga"e of the science, rarely corres%on!s ith his i!ea@ for this i!ea lies, like a germ, in our reason, its %arts un!e"elo%e! an! hi! e"en from microsco%ical obser"ation# :or this reason, e ought to e?%lain an! !efine sciences, not accor!ing to the !escri%tion hich the originator gi"es of them, but accor!ing to the i!ea hich e fin! base! in reason itself, an! hich is suggeste! by the natural unity of the %arts of the science alrea!y accumulate!# :or it ill of ten be foun! that the originator of a science an! e"en his latest successors remain attache! to an erroneous i!ea, hich they cannot ren!er clear to themsel"es, an! that they thus fail in !etermining the true content, the articulation or systematic unity, an! the limits of their science# It is unfortunate that, only after ha"ing occu%ie! oursel"es for a long time in the collection of materials, un!er the gui!ance of an i!ea hich lies un!e"elo%e! in the min!, but not accor!ing to any !efinite %lan of arrangementBnay, only after e ha"e s%ent much time an! labour in the technical !is%osition of our materials, !oes it become %ossible to "ie the i!ea of a science in a clear light, an! to %roject, accor!ing to architectonical %rinci%les, a %lan of the hole, in accor!ance ith the aims of reason# 7ystems seem, like certain orms, to be forme! by a kin! of generatio aequi"ocaBby the mere confluence of conce%tions, an! to gain com%leteness only ith the %rogress of time# But the schema or germ of all lies in reason@ an! thus is not only e"ery system organiCe! accor!ing to its o n i!ea, but all are unite! into one gran! system of human kno le!ge, of hich they form members# :or this reason, it is %ossible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of hich, at the %resent time, consi!ering the immense materials collecte! or to be foun! in the ruins of ol! systems, oul! not in!ee! be "ery !ifficult# 9ur %ur%ose at %resent is merely to sketch the %lan of the architectonic of all cognition gi"en by %ure reason@ an! e begin from the %oint here the main root of human kno le!ge !i"i!es into t o, one of hich is reason# By reason I un!erstan! here the hole higher faculty of cognition, the rational being %lace! in contra!istinction to the em%irical# If I make com%lete abstraction of the content of cognition, objecti"ely consi!ere!, all cognition is, from a subjecti"e %oint of "ie , either historical or rational# ;istorical cognition is cognitio e? !atis, rational, cognitio e? %rinci%iis# >hate"er may be the original source of a cognition, it is, in relation to the %erson ho %ossesses it, merely historical, if he kno s only hat has been gi"en him from another quarter, hether that kno le!ge as communicate! by !irect e?%erience or by instruction# Thus the Person ho has learne! a system of %hiloso%hyBsay the >olfianBalthough he has a %erfect kno le!ge of all the %rinci%les, !efinitions, an! arguments in that %hiloso%hy, as ell as

of the !i"isions that ha"e been ma!e of the system, %ossesses really no more than an historical kno le!ge of the >olfian system@ he kno s only hat has been tol! him, his ju!gements are only those hich he has recei"e! from his teachers# *is%ute the "ali!ity of a !efinition, an! he is com%letely at a loss to fin! another# ;e has forme! his min! on anotherFs@ but the imitati"e faculty is not the %ro!ucti"e# ;is kno le!ge has not been !ra n from reason@ an! although, objecti"ely consi!ere!, it is rational kno le!ge, subjecti"ely, it is merely historical# ;e has learne! this or that %hiloso%hy an! is merely a %laster cast of a li"ing man# Rational cognitions hich are objecti"e, that is, hich ha"e their source in reason, can be so terme! from a subjecti"e %oint of "ie , only hen they ha"e been !ra n by the in!i"i!ual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from %rinci%les@ an! it is in this ay alone that criticism, or e"en the rejection of hat has been alrea!y learne!, can s%ring u% in the min!# )ll rational cognition is, again, base! either on conce%tions, or on the construction of conce%tions# The former is terme! %hiloso%hical, the latter mathematical# I ha"e alrea!y sho n the essential !ifference of these t o metho!s of cognition in the first cha%ter# ) cognition may be objecti"ely %hiloso%hical an! subjecti"ely historicalBas is the case ith the majority of scholars an! those ho cannot look beyon! the limits of their system, an! ho remain in a state of %u%ilage all their li"es# But it is remarkable that mathematical kno le!ge, hen committe! to memory, is "ali!, from the subjecti"e %oint of "ie , as rational kno le!ge also, an! that the same !istinction cannot be !ra n here as in the case of %hiloso%hical cognition# The reason is that the only ay of arri"ing at this kno le!ge is through the essential %rinci%les of reason, an! thus it is al ays certain an! in!is%utable@ because reason is em%loye! in concretoBbut at the same time a %rioriBthat is, in %ure an!, therefore, infallible intuition@ an! thus all causes of illusion an! error are e?clu!e!# 9f all the a %riori sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learne!# Philoso%hyBunless it be in an historical mannerB cannot be learne!@ e can at most learn to %hiloso%hiCe# Philoso%hy is the system of all %hiloso%hical cognition# >e must use this term in an objecti"e sense, if e un!erstan! by it the archety%e of all attem%ts at %hiloso%hiCing, an! the stan!ar! by hich all subjecti"e %hiloso%hies are to be ju!ge!# In this sense, %hiloso%hy is merely the i!ea of a %ossible science, hich !oes not e?ist in concreto, but to hich e en!ea"our in "arious ays to a%%ro?imate, until e ha"e !isco"ere! the right %ath to %ursueBa %ath o"ergro n by the errors an! illusions of senseBan! the image e ha"e hitherto trie! in "ain to sha%e has become a %erfect co%y of the great %rototy%e# 4ntil that time, e cannot learn %hiloso%hyBit !oes not e?ist@ if it !oes, here is it, ho %ossesses it, an! ho shall e kno itH >e can only learn to %hiloso%hiCe@ in other or!s, e can only e?ercise our %o ers of reasoning in accor!ance ith general %rinci%les, retaining at the same time, the right of in"estigating the sources of these %rinci%les, of testing, an! e"en of rejecting them# 4ntil then, our conce%tion of %hiloso%hy is only a scholastic conce%tionBa conce%tion, that is, of a system of cognition hich e are trying to elaborate into a science@ all that e at %resent kno being the systematic unity of this cognition, an! consequently the logical com%leteness of the cognition for the !esire! en!# But there is also a cosmical conce%tion Dconce%tus cosmicusE of %hiloso%hy, hich has al ays forme! the true basis

of this term, es%ecially hen %hiloso%hy as %ersonifie! an! %resente! to us in the i!eal of a %hiloso%her# In this "ie %hiloso%hy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate an! essential aims of human reason Dteleologia rationis humanaeE, an! the %hiloso%her is not merely an artistB ho occu%ies himself ith conce%tionsBbut a la gi"er, legislating for human reason# In this sense of the or!, it oul! be in the highest !egree arrogant to assume the title of %hiloso%her, an! to %reten! that e ha! reache! the %erfection of the %rototy%e hich lies in the i!ea alone# The mathematician, the natural %hiloso%her, an! the logicianBho far soe"er the first may ha"e a!"ance! in rational, an! the t o latter in %hiloso%hical kno le!geBare merely artists, engage! in the arrangement an! formation of conce%tions@ they cannot be terme! %hiloso%hers# )bo"e them all, there is the i!eal teacher, ho em%loys them as instruments for the a!"ancement of the essential aims of human reason# ;im alone can e call %hiloso%her@ but he no here e?ists# But the i!ea of his legislati"e %o er resi!es in the min! of e"ery man, an! it alone teaches us hat kin! of systematic unity %hiloso%hy !eman!s in "ie of the ultimate aims of reason# This i!ea is, therefore, a cosmical conce%tion#8 /8:ootnote( By a cosmical conce%tion, I mean one in hich all men necessarily take an interest@ the aim of a science must accor!ingly be !etermine! accor!ing to scholastic conce%tions, if it is regar!e! merely as a means to certain arbitrarily %ro%ose! en!s#3 In "ie of the com%lete systematic unity of reason, there can only be one ultimate en! of all the o%erations of the min!# To this all other aims are subor!inate, an! nothing more than means for its attainment# This ultimate en! is the !estination of man, an! the %hiloso%hy hich relates to it is terme! moral %hiloso%hy# The su%erior %osition occu%ie! by moral %hiloso%hy, abo"e all other s%heres for the o%erations of reason, sufficiently in!icates the reason hy the ancients al ays inclu!e! the i!eaBan! in an es%ecial mannerBof moralist in that of %hiloso%her# E"en at the %resent !ay, e call a man ho a%%ears to ha"e the %o er of self&go"ernment, e"en although his kno le!ge may be "ery limite!, by the name of %hiloso%her# The legislation of human reason, or %hiloso%hy, has t o objectsBnature an! free!omB an! thus contains not only the la s of nature, but also those of ethics, at first in t o se%arate systems, hich, finally, merge into one gran! %hiloso%hical system of cognition# The %hiloso%hy of nature relates to that hich is, that of ethics to that hich ought to be# But all %hiloso%hy is either cognition on the basis of %ure reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of em%irical %rinci%les# The former is terme! %ure, the latter em%irical %hiloso%hy# The %hiloso%hy of %ure reason is either %ro%ae!eutic, that is, an inquiry into the %o ers of reason in regar! to %ure a %riori cognition, an! is terme! critical %hiloso%hy@ or it is, secon!ly, the system of %ure reasonBa science containing the systematic %resentation of the hole bo!y of %hiloso%hical kno le!ge, true as ell as illusory, gi"en by %ure reason

Ban! is calle! meta%hysic# This name may, ho e"er, be also gi"en to the hole system of %ure %hiloso%hy, critical %hiloso%hy inclu!e!, an! may !esignate the in"estigation into the sources or %ossibility of a %riori cognition, as ell as the %resentation of the a %riori cognitions hich form a system of %ure %hiloso%hyBe?clu!ing, at the same time, all em%irical an! mathematical elements# Aeta%hysic is !i"i!e! into that of the s%eculati"e an! that of the %ractical use of %ure reason, an! is, accor!ingly, either the meta%hysic of nature, or the meta%hysic of ethics# The former contains all the %ure rational %rinci%lesBbase! u%on conce%tions alone Dan! thus e?clu!ing mathematicsEBof all theoretical cognition@ the latter, the %rinci%les hich !etermine an! necessitate a %riori all action# <o moral %hiloso%hy alone contains a co!e of la sBfor the regulation of our actionsB hich are !e!uce! from %rinci%les entirely a %riori# ;ence the meta%hysic of ethics is the only %ure moral %hiloso%hy, as it is not base! u%on anthro%ological or other em%irical consi!erations# The meta%hysic of s%eculati"e reason is hat is commonly calle! meta%hysic in the more limite! sense# But as %ure moral %hiloso%hy %ro%erly forms a %art of this system of cognition, e must allo it to retain the name of meta%hysic, although it is not requisite that e shoul! insist on so terming it in our %resent !iscussion# It is of the highest im%ortance to se%arate those cognitions hich !iffer from others both in kin! an! in origin, an! to take great care that they are not confoun!e! ith those ith hich they are generally foun! connecte!# >hat the chemist !oes in the analysis of substances, hat the mathematician in %ure mathematics, is, in a still higher !egree, the !uty of the %hiloso%her, that the "alue of each !ifferent kin! of cognition, an! the %art it takes in the o%erations of the min!, may be clearly !efine!# ;uman reason has ne"er ante! a meta%hysic of some kin!, since it attaine! the %o er of thought, or rather of reflection@ but it has ne"er been able to kee% this s%here of thought an! cognition %ure from all a!mi?ture of foreign elements# The i!ea of a science of this kin! is as ol! as s%eculation itself@ an! hat min! !oes not s%eculateBeither in the scholastic or in the %o%ular fashionH )t the same time, it must be a!mitte! that e"en thinkers by %rofession ha"e been unable clearly to e?%lain the !istinction bet een the t o elements of our cognitionBthe one com%letely a %riori, the other a %osteriori@ an! hence the %ro%er !efinition of a %eculiar kin! of cognition, an! ith it the just i!ea of a science hich has so long an! so !ee%ly engage! the attention of the human min!, has ne"er been establishe!# >hen it as sai!( GAeta%hysic is the science of the first %rinci%les of human cognition,G this !efinition !i! not signaliCe a %eculiarity in kin!, but only a !ifference in !egree@ these first %rinci%les ere thus !eclare! to be more general than others, but no criterion of !istinction from em%irical %rinci%les as gi"en# 9f these some are more general, an! therefore higher, than others@ an!Bas e cannot !istinguish hat is com%letely a %riori from that hich is kno n to be a %osterioriB here shall e !ra the line hich is to se%arate the higher an! so&calle! first %rinci%les, from the lo er an! subor!inate %rinci%les of cognitionH >hat oul! be sai! if e ere aske! to be satisfie! ith a !i"ision of the e%ochs of the orl! into the earlier centuries an! those follo ing themH G*oes the fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuriesHG it oul! be aske!# In the same ay I ask( *oes the conce%tion of e?tension belong to meta%hysicsH $ou ans er, G$es#G >ell, that of bo!y tooH G$es#G )n! that of a flui! bo!yH $ou sto%, you are un%re%are! to a!mit this@ for if you !o,

e"erything ill belong to meta%hysics# :rom this it is e"i!ent that the mere !egree of subor!inationBof the %articular to the generalBcannot !etermine the limits of a science@ an! that, in the %resent case, e must e?%ect to fin! a !ifference in the conce%tions of meta%hysics both in kin! an! in origin# The fun!amental i!ea of meta%hysics as obscure! on another si!e by the fact that this kin! of a %riori cognition sho e! a certain similarity in character ith the science of mathematics# Both ha"e the %ro%erty in common of %ossessing an a %riori origin@ but, in the one, our kno le!ge is base! u%on conce%tions, in the other, on the construction of conce%tions# Thus a !eci!e! !issimilarity bet een %hiloso%hical an! mathematical cognition comes outBa !issimilarity hich as al ays felt, but hich coul! not be ma!e !istinct for ant of an insight into the criteria of the !ifference# )n! thus it ha%%ene! that, as %hiloso%hers themsel"es faile! in the %ro%er !e"elo%ment of the i!ea of their science, the elaboration of the science coul! not %rocee! ith a !efinite aim, or un!er trust orthy gui!ance# Thus, too, %hiloso%hers, ignorant of the %ath they ought to %ursue an! al ays !is%uting ith each other regar!ing the !isco"eries hich each asserte! he ha! ma!e, brought their science into !isre%ute ith the rest of the orl!, an! finally, e"en among themsel"es# )ll %ure a %riori cognition forms, therefore, in "ie of the %eculiar faculty hich originates it, a %eculiar an! !istinct unity@ an! meta%hysic is the term a%%lie! to the %hiloso%hy hich attem%ts to re%resent that cognition in this systematic unity# The s%eculati"e %art of meta%hysic, hich has es%ecially a%%ro%riate! this a%%ellationBthat hich e ha"e calle! the meta%hysic of natureBan! hich consi!ers e"erything, as it is Dnot as it ought to beE, by means of a %riori conce%tions, is !i"i!e! in the follo ing manner# Aeta%hysic, in the more limite! acce%tation of the term, consists of t o %artsB transcen!ental %hiloso%hy an! the %hysiology of %ure reason# The former %resents the system of all the conce%tions an! %rinci%les belonging to the un!erstan!ing an! the reason, an! hich relate to objects in general, but not to any %articular gi"en objects D9ntologiaE@ the latter has nature for its subject&matter, that is, the sum of gi"en objects B hether gi"en to the senses, or, if e ill, to some other kin! of intuitionBan! is accor!ingly %hysiology, although only rationalis# But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational mo!e of regar!ing nature is either %hysical or hy%er%hysical, or, more %ro%erly s%eaking, immanent or transcen!ent# The former relates to nature, in so far as our kno le!ge regar!ing it may be a%%lie! in e?%erience Din concretoE@ the latter to that connection of the objects of e?%erience, hich transcen!s all e?%erience# Transcen!ent %hysiology has, again, an internal an! an e?ternal connection ith its object, both, ho e"er, transcen!ing %ossible e?%erience@ the former is the %hysiology of nature as a hole, or transcen!ental cognition of the orl!, the latter of the connection of the hole of nature ith a being abo"e nature, or transcen!ental cognition of Go!# Immanent %hysiology, on the contrary, consi!ers nature as the sum of all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is %resente! to usBbut still accor!ing to a %riori con!itions, for it is un!er these alone that nature can be %resente! to our min!s at all# The objects of immanent %hysiology are of t o kin!s( 6# Those of the e?ternal senses, or cor%oreal nature@ ,# The object of the internal sense, the soul, or, in accor!ance ith our

fun!amental conce%tions of it, thinking nature# The meta%hysics of cor%oreal nature is calle! %hysics@ but, as it must contain only the %rinci%les of an a %riori cognition of nature, e must term it rational %hysics# The meta%hysics of thinking nature is calle! %sychology, an! for the same reason is to be regar!e! as merely the rational cognition of the soul# Thus the hole system of meta%hysics consists of four %rinci%al %arts( 6# 9ntology@ ,# Rational Physiology@ .# Rational cosmology@ an! 1# Rational theology# The secon! %artB that of the rational !octrine of natureBmay be sub!i"i!e! into t o, %hysica rationalis8 an! %sychologia rationalis# /8:ootnote( It must not be su%%ose! that I mean by this a%%ellation hat is generally calle! %hysica general is, an! hich is rather mathematics than a %hiloso%hy of nature# :or the meta%hysic of nature is com%letely !ifferent from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results, although it is of great im%ortance as a critical test of the a%%lication of %ure un!erstan!ingBcognition to nature# :or ant of its gui!ance, e"en mathematicians, a!o%ting certain common notionsB hich are, in fact, meta%hysicalBha"e unconsciously cro !e! their theories of nature ith hy%otheses, the fallacy of hich becomes e"i!ent u%on the a%%lication of the %rinci%les of this meta%hysic, ithout !etriment, ho e"er, to the em%loyment of mathematics in this s%here of cognition#3 The fun!amental i!ea of a %hiloso%hy of %ure reason of necessity !ictates this !i"ision@ it is, therefore, architectonicalBin accor!ance ith the highest aims of reason, an! not merely technical, or accor!ing to certain acci!entally&obser"e! similarities e?isting bet een the !ifferent %arts of the hole science# :or this reason, also, is the !i"ision immutable an! of legislati"e authority# But the rea!er may obser"e in it a fe %oints to hich he ought to !emur, an! hich may eaken his con"iction of its truth an! legitimacy# In the first %lace, ho can I !esire an a %riori cognition or meta%hysic of objects, in so far as they are gi"en a %osterioriH an! ho is it %ossible to cogniCe the nature of things accor!ing to a %riori %rinci%les, an! to attain to a rational %hysiologyH The ans er is this# >e take from e?%erience nothing more than is requisite to %resent us ith an object Din generalE of the e?ternal or of the internal sense@ in the former case, by the mere conce%tion of matter Dim%enetrable an! inanimate e?tensionE, in the latter, by the conce%tion of a thinking beingBgi"en in the internal em%irical re%resentation, I think# )s to the rest, e must not em%loy in our meta%hysic of these objects any em%irical %rinci%les D hich a!! to the content of our conce%tions by means of e?%erienceE, for the %ur%ose of forming by their hel% any ju!gements res%ecting these objects# 7econ!ly, hat %lace shall e assign to em%irical %sychology, hich has al ays been consi!ere! a %art of meta%hysics, an! from hich in our time such im%ortant %hiloso%hical results ha"e been e?%ecte!, after the ho%e of constructing an a %riori system of kno le!ge ha! been aban!one!H I ans er( It must be %lace! by the si!e of em%irical %hysics or %hysics %ro%er@ that is, must be regar!e! as forming a %art of

a%%lie! %hiloso%hy, the a %riori %rinci%les of hich are containe! in %ure %hiloso%hy, hich is therefore connecte!, although it must not be confoun!e!, ith %sychology# Em%irical %sychology must therefore be banishe! from the s%here of meta%hysics, an! is in!ee! e?clu!e! by the "ery i!ea of that science# In conformity, ho e"er, ith scholastic usage, e must %ermit it to occu%y a %lace in meta%hysicsBbut only as an a%%en!i? to it# >e a!o%t this course from moti"es of economy@ as %sychology is not as yet full enough to occu%y our attention as an in!e%en!ent stu!y, hile it is, at the same time, of too great im%ortance to be entirely e?clu!e! or %lace! here it has still less affinity than it has ith the subject of meta%hysics# It is a stranger ho has been long a guest@ an! e make it elcome to stay, until it can take u% a more suitable abo!e in a com%lete system of anthro%ologyBthe %en!ant to em%irical %hysics# The abo"e is the general i!ea of meta%hysics, hich, as more as e?%ecte! from it than coul! be looke! for ith justice, an! as these %leasant e?%ectations ere unfortunately ne"er realiCe!, fell into general !isre%ute# 9ur Critique must ha"e fully con"ince! the rea!er that, although meta%hysics cannot form the foun!ation of religion, it must al ays be one of its most im%ortant bul arks, an! that human reason, hich naturally %ursues a !ialectical course, cannot !o ithout this science, hich checks its ten!encies to ar!s !ialectic an!, by ele"ating reason to a scientific an! clear self&kno le!ge, %re"ents the ra"ages hich a la less s%eculati"e reason oul! infallibly commit in the s%here of morals as ell as in that of religion# >e may be sure, therefore, hate"er contem%t may be thro n u%on meta%hysics by those ho ju!ge a science not by its o n nature, but accor!ing to the acci!ental effects it may ha"e %ro!uce!, that it can ne"er be com%letely aban!one!, that e must al ays return to it as to a belo"e! one ho has been for a time estrange!, because the questions ith hich it is engage! relate to the highest aims of humanity, an! reason must al ays labour either to attain to settle! "ie s in regar! to these, or to !estroy those hich others ha"e alrea!y establishe!# Aeta%hysic, thereforeBthat of nature, as ell as that of ethics, but in an es%ecial manner the criticism hich forms the %ro%ae!eutic to all the o%erations of reasonB forms %ro%erly that !e%artment of kno le!ge hich may be terme!, in the truest sense of the or!, %hiloso%hy# The %ath hich it %ursues is that of science, hich, hen it has once been !isco"ere!, is ne"er lost, an! ne"er mislea!s# Aathematics, natural science, the common e?%erience of men, ha"e a high "alue as means, for the most %art, to acci!ental en!sBbut at last also, to those hich are necessary an! essential to the e?istence of humanity# But to gui!e them to this high goal, they require the ai! of rational cognition on the basis of %ure conce%tions, hich, be it terme! as it may, is %ro%erly nothing but meta%hysics# :or the same reason, meta%hysics forms like ise the com%letion of the culture of human reason# In this res%ect, it is in!is%ensable, setting asi!e altogether the influence hich it e?erts as a science# :or its subject&matter is the elements an! highest ma?ims of reason, hich form the basis of the %ossibility of some sciences an! of the use of all# That, as a %urely s%eculati"e science, it is more useful in %re"enting error than in the e?tension of kno le!ge, !oes not !etract from its "alue@ on the contrary, the su%reme office of censor hich it occu%ies assures to it the highest authority an! im%ortance# This office it a!ministers for the %ur%ose of securing or!er, harmony, an! ell&being to

science, an! of !irecting its noble an! fruitful labours to the highest %ossible aimBthe ha%%iness of all mankin!#

CHAPTER I4. T&e H"st%ry %+ Pure Reas%n. This title is %lace! here merely for the %ur%ose of !esignating a !i"ision of the system of %ure reason of hich I !o not inten! to treat at %resent# I shall content myself ith casting a cursory glance, from a %urely transcen!ental %oint of "ie Bthat of the nature of %ure reasonBon the labours of %hiloso%hers u% to the %resent time# They ha"e aime! at erecting an e!ifice of %hiloso%hy@ but to my eye this e!ifice a%%ears to be in a "ery ruinous con!ition# It is "ery remarkable, although naturally it coul! not ha"e been other ise, that, in the infancy of %hiloso%hy, the stu!y of the nature of Go! an! the constitution of a future orl! forme! the commencement, rather than the conclusion, as e shoul! ha"e it, of the s%eculati"e efforts of the human min!# ;o e"er ru!e the religious conce%tions generate! by the remains of the ol! manners an! customs of a less culti"ate! time, the intelligent classes ere not thereby %re"ente! from !e"oting themsel"es to free inquiry into the e?istence an! nature of Go!@ an! they easily sa that there coul! be no surer ay of %leasing the in"isible ruler of the orl!, an! of attaining to ha%%iness in another orl! at least, than a goo! an! honest course of life in this# Thus theology an! morals forme! the t o chief moti"es, or rather the %oints of attraction in all abstract inquiries# But it as the former that es%ecially occu%ie! the attention of s%eculati"e reason, an! hich after ar!s became so celebrate! un!er the name of meta%hysics# I shall not at %resent in!icate the %erio!s of time at hich the greatest changes in meta%hysics took %lace, but shall merely gi"e a hasty sketch of the !ifferent i!eas hich occasione! the most im%ortant re"olutions in this s%here of thought# There are three !ifferent en!s in relation to hich these re"olutions ha"e taken %lace# 6# In relation to the object of the cognition of reason, %hiloso%hers may be !i"i!e! into sensualists an! intellectualists# E%icurus may be regar!e! as the hea! of the former, Plato of the latter# The !istinction here signaliCe!, subtle as it is, !ates from the earliest times, an! as long maintaine!# The former asserte! that reality resi!es in sensuous objects alone, an! that e"erything else is merely imaginary@ the latter, that the senses are the %arents of illusion an! that truth is to be foun! in the un!erstan!ing alone# The former !i! not !eny to the conce%tions of the un!erstan!ing a certain kin! of reality@ but ith them it as merely logical, ith the others it as mystical# The former a!mitte! intellectual conce%tions, but !eclare! that sensuous objects alone %ossesse! real e?istence# The latter maintaine! that all real objects ere intelligible, an! belie"e! that the %ure un!erstan!ing %ossesse! a faculty of intuition a%art from sense, hich, in their o%inion, ser"e! only to confuse the i!eas of the un!erstan!ing#

,# In relation to the origin of the %ure cognitions of reason, e fin! one school maintaining that they are !eri"e! entirely from e?%erience, an! another that they ha"e their origin in reason alone# )ristotle may be regar!e! as the bea! of the em%iricists, an! Plato of the noologists# 'ocke, the follo er of )ristotle in mo!ern times, an! 'eibnitC of Plato Dalthough he cannot be sai! to ha"e imitate! him in his mysticismE, ha"e not been able to bring this question to a settle! conclusion# The %roce!ure of E%icurus in his sensual system, in hich he al ays restricte! his conclusions to the s%here of e?%erience, as much more consequent than that of )ristotle an! 'ocke# The latter es%ecially, after ha"ing !eri"e! all the conce%tions an! %rinci%les of the min! from e?%erience, goes so far, in the em%loyment of these conce%tions an! %rinci%les, as to maintain that e can %ro"e the e?istence of Go! an! the e?istence of Go! an! the immortality of them objects lying beyon! the soulBboth of them of %ossible e?%erience B ith the same force of !emonstration as any mathematical %ro%osition# .# In relation to metho!# Aetho! is %roce!ure accor!ing to %rinci%les# >e may !i"i!e the metho!s at %resent em%loye! in the fiel! of inquiry into the naturalistic an! the scientific# The naturalist of %ure reason lays it !o n as his %rinci%le that common reason, ithout the ai! of scienceB hich he calls soun! reason, or common senseBcan gi"e a more satisfactory ans er to the most im%ortant questions of meta%hysics than s%eculation is able to !o# ;e must maintain, therefore, that e can !etermine the content an! circumference of the moon more certainly by the nake! eye, than by the ai! of mathematical reasoning# But this system is mere misology re!uce! to %rinci%les@ an!, hat is the most absur! thing in this !octrine, the neglect of all scientific means is %ara!e! as a %eculiar metho! of e?ten!ing our cognition# )s regar!s those ho are naturalists because they kno no better, they are certainly not to be blame!# They follo common sense, ithout %ara!ing their ignorance as a metho! hich is to teach us the on!erful secret, ho e are to fin! the truth hich lies at the bottom of the ell of *emocritus# =uo! sa%io satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quo! )rcesilas aerumnosique 7olones# PER7I47 B7atirae, iii# J2&JP# is their motto, un!er hich they may lea! a %leasant an! %raise orthy life, ithout troubling themsel"es ith science or troubling science ith them# )s regar!s those ho ish to %ursue a scientific metho!, they ha"e no the choice of follo ing either the !ogmatical or the sce%tical, hile they are boun! ne"er to !esert the systematic mo!e of %roce!ure# >hen I mention, in relation to the former, the celebrate! >olf, an! as regar!s the latter, *a"i! ;ume, I may lea"e, in accor!ance ith my %resent intention, all others unname!# The critical %ath alone is still o%en# If my rea!er has been kin! an! %atient enough to accom%any me on this hitherto untra"elle! route, he can no ju!ge hether, if he an! others ill contribute their e?ertions to ar!s making this narro foot%ath a high roa! of thought, that hich many centuries ha"e faile! to accom%lish may not be e?ecute! before the close of the %resentBnamely, to bring Reason to %erfect contentment in regar! to that hich has al ays, but ithout %ermanent results, occu%ie! her %o ers an! engage! her ar!ent !esire for kno le!ge#

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