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Content, Cause, and Stoic Impressions

GLENN LESSES

According to the Stoics, only physical stuff exists.1 To describe it in their terms, the world consists of different types of an airy substance, pneuma . Some of these pneumatic stu ffs instantiate psychological properties or states. Thus, psychological attributes, which they deny are completely different in kind from bodily properties, can be studied as part of the natural world.2 Within the context of their naturalism, the Stoics also carefully attend to the character of psychological properties. Despite their differences, such states as sense-perceptions, emotions, and beliefs convey information to an agent. The complex physical organization of the underlying pneumatic states determines why such psychological states have content. Thus, the Stoics aim to provide a uni ed theory of varied mental phenomena. 3
Accepted March 1997 1 There are ontological complications since they also hold that there are things that do not exist, such as sayables (lekta). See, e.g., Sextus M 10. 218. 2 Though the Stoics reject ordinary versions of substance dualism, their own views are complicated in ways I shall not explore. In particular, they do not appear to accept either a version of reductive type-physicalism in which psychological states are simply identi ed with physical ones, or eliminativist theories. The Stoics are committed to nothing more than that psychological properties have a physical basis suf cient for their real existence and their explanation. Accordingly, all that can be said here is that the Stoics endorse some weak version of non-reductive physicalism. One apparent dissent from this view is Deborah Modrak, Stoics, Epicureans and Mental Content, Apeiron 26 (1993), p. 98, which is a review-discussion of Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Modrak suggests without argument that Stoic monism about the world provides a motive for a reductive physicalism. David Sedley, Chrysippus on psychophysical causality, Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), edd. Jacques Brunschwig and Martha C. Nussbaum, pp. 313331, argues that it is a mistake to understand Chrysippus to distinguish distinctly physical from mental descriptions of psychological attributes. The basic Stoic texts and their fundamental arguments on behalf of their view are clearly presented in Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 3-6, 20-33, 37-70. 3 These general remarks help to reveal the attraction of Stoic philosophy of mind for many contemporary scholars. The Stoics are thoroughgoing naturalists who conduct a serious inquiry into the ascription of propositional attitudes. Their analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy of mind is often subtle and serves to remind Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, 1998 Phronesis XLIII/1

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It quickly becomes evident that the Stoic view about the nature and extent of the propositional content of mental states is puzzling. They deny that human young or animals can entertain beliefs or have thoughts. The existence of propositional attitudes ordinarily is held to involve the attribution of some thought or belief. So, it would follow that the Stoics deny small children or animals have mental states with propositional contents. Yet, there is also evidence to the contrary. For instance, in his well-known example, Chrysippus attributes what appears to be reasoning by disjunctive syllogism to a dog. One might argue that this kind of example commits the Stoics to the ascription of propositional contents even in the case of animals. Furthermore, if the mental states of non-rational animals are so impoverished as to lack any propositional content, the Stoics must explain how it is possible for such animals to function adequately at all. Doesnt, say, a mouse see that a cat is nearby? Recently, commentators have debated the extent of propositional contents in the Stoic account of psychological states. The discussion has focused, in particular, on perceptional states because for the Stoics perception and impulse are what distinguish animal life from other living things and perception has a special prominence in their inquiry into mental states. Two basic, competing interpretations have emerged. On what has become the orthodox reading, the Stoics sharply separate the psychological states of non-rational animals from those of rational animals. According to advocates of the orthodox position, the mental states of, say, small children are too simple to have the cognitive structure necessary for the attribution of propositional attitudes to them.4 Non-rational animals can perceive only qualities such

scholars of contemporary discussions. Here are just two examples. While Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, does not discover the ancestor of any particular contemporary position in Stoic thought, she does suggest, e.g., pp. 1-2, that the Stoics construct the rst philosophy of mind that is recognizably contemporary. Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, Phronesis 35 (1990), pp. 307-314, goes much further. He argues that the Stoics would endorse the basic views of Daniel Dennett on propositional attitudes rather than those of Donald Davidson. 4 Michael Frede, Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions, The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), ed. Myles Burnyeat, pp. 65-93, is among the clearest and most forceful proponents of this view. Others include Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 73-75, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 239-241, Christopher Gill, Is there a concept of person in Greek philosophy?, Companions to ancient thought 2: Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ed. Stephen Everson, pp. 166-193, and Jean-Louis Labarri re, De la nature phantastique

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as sweetness or whiteness. According the second interpretation, the Stoics deny that the sensory perceptions of animals are completely devoid of propositional contents. On this alternative reading, the Stoics much more liberally ascribe propositional content even in the case of non-rational animals.5 In this essay, I argue that the Stoics draw some distinctions as they often are prone to do that, as a result, enable us to locate a solution to the puzzle. The Stoics deny that there are any raw psychological states completely devoid of cognitive content because they discriminate between a conception of more robust and more narrow content. It follows that the Stoics occupy an intermediate position, less severe than what the orthodox interpretation attributes to them and less generous than what the alternative account nds. Thus, the Stoics hold that there is considerable continuity as well as signi cant differences between the psychological states of rational and non-rational animals.

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Several basic features of Stoic psychological theory are relevant to issues about content. The early Stoics speak of psuch in two senses (Sextus M 7. 234). 6 The term often is used to include many of the ways in which
des animaux chez les Sto ciens, Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), edd. Jacques Brunschwig and Martha C. Nussbaum, 225-249. 5 Richard Sorabji is the principal advocate of this interpretation. See his Perceptual Content in the Stoics, pp. 307-314, Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotles Theory of Sense-Perception, Essays on Aristotles De Anima (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), edd. Martha C. Nussbaum and Am lie Oksenberg Rorty, especially, pp. 195-206, Animal Minds, Spindel Conference 1992: Ancient Minds, ed. John Ellis, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (1993), supplement, especially, pp. 1-12, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 20-28, 40-44. Although Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 75-87, of cially adopts a version of the orthodox interpretation, she also occasionally attributes a kind of content to animal perceptions, pp. 57-64, 71-72. At one point, p. 64, Annas says: Hence there is a division of kind between animal and human inner life. And hence the Stoics denied to animals not only reasoning but emotions and even desires; since animals cannot articulate and interpret in language the content of their experience. . . . Does she hold that non-rational sensory perceptions have propositional contents that animals are unable to verbalize? If so, her position ascribes content to the impressions of non-rational animals and appears very close to what Sorabji formulates more fully. 6 The positions formulated by Zeno, Cleanthes, and, especially, Chrysippus consti-

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both rational and non-rational animals function.7 The pneumatic substance constituting the soul, understood this way, is intimately blended with the somewhat di fferent pneuma of a body to form a living animal. Yet, in another sense, the Stoics often refer to just one part of the soul, namely, its ruling part (to hgemonikon). This part is restricted to those activities we typically regard as mental thinking, believing, perceiving, and so forth rather than the entire range of living functions. Both rational and non-rational animals have a ruling part of the soul, though non-rational animals cannot entertain thoughts or desires. When another part of the soul is affected, such as in the case of sense-perception, it also produces alterations in the ruling part.8 Since the ruling part of the soul is the location of desire and reason in rational animals and activities such as senseperception also affect it,9 it is particularly easy for the Stoics to speak loosely as they often do and identify the soul with the ruling part. I shall restrict my use of soul to the notion of the souls ruling aspect and usually apply mind or mental to describe it. Central to whether the Stoics hold that mental events have content is their view of perception (aisthsis). Ordinary perceptual events have two conceptually distinct stages: phantasia and assent (sunkatathesis ). Although phantasia is often translated as appearance, the term refers to a basic, representational mental state, which includes much more than visual appearances. 10 The Stoic notion of phantasia applies to other mental functions besides sense-perception. For instance, the hgemonikon can generate non-perceptual phantasiai through its own internal operations (D.L. 7. 51). Something more neutral such as impression captures the terms wider range.11
tute orthodox Stoicism. As is well-known, later Stoics such as Panaetius appear to modify or reject several central tenets of early Stoicism about the soul. 7 Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, p. 54, points out that in Stoic theory some capacities of living things such as basic metabolism are not part of the souls functions. 8 See Calcidius in Tim. 220, Aetius 4. 21. 1-3, Plotinus 4. 7. 7. 9 See Stobaeus 1. 368. 12-15, Aetius 4. 23. 1. 10 It is helpful to survey the considerable scholarship about Aristotles conception of phantasia . Two useful sources are: Martha Nussbaum, Aristotles De Motu Animalium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 221-269, for a general discussion of Aristotle on phantasia , and Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, for a succinct account of the general Aristotelian background for the Stoics, pp. 9-17. 11 Although phantasia is, of course, legitimately translated as appearance because it derives from the verb to appear and is just the way things appear to one, this ren-

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The Stoics often describe a phantasia as a kind of imprint (tupsis).12 Although this imprint is something physical, the Stoics debated exactly how one should construe it:
(1) We shall know this if we rst learn what impression is, according to them, and what its speci c differentiae are. So, according to them, an impression is an imprint (tupsis) in the soul. And they differed immediately about this. For Cleanthes took imprint in terms of depression and elevation just like the imprint on wax made by seal-rings. But Chrysippus thought that such a view was absurd. For rst, he says, this will require that when our intellect has impressions at one time of a triangle and a tetragon, the same body will have to have in itself at the same time di fferent shapes triangular and tetragonal together, or even round; which is absurd. Next, since many imprints exist in us at the same time the soul will also have many con gurations. This is worse than the rst problem. [Chrysippus] himself speculated, therefore, that imprint was used by Zeno to mean alteration; so that the de nition becomes like this: impression is an alteration of the soul; for it is no longer absurd that the same body at one and the same time (when many impressions exist in us) should receive many alterations. For just as air, when many people speak at once, receiving at one time an inde nite number of different blows, also has many alterations, so too the ruling part of the soul will experience something similar when it receives varied impressions.13 [Sextus, M 7. 227-231]

Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus share the view that an impression is something physical, namely, a modi cation of some pneuma. They disagree about how to explain this physical change, but both rule out treating
dering might misleadingly suggest that it primarily involves visual images and the sense-modality of sight. Michael Frede, Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions, and A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, employ impression. Various other attempts to render the term include: Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind , and Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, use appearance, Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988), presentation, (which also has the virtue of neutrality with respect to sense-modalities, but doesnt re ect the de nition of phantasia in terms of tupsis quite as well) and A.A. Long, Representation and the self in Stoicism, Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ed. Stephen Everson, pp. 102-120, uses representation. A.A. Long, p. 107, n. 6, changes his usage from his earlier impression to representation because he worries that the Humean associations of impression might mislead. 12 See D.L. 7. 50, Sextus M 7. 227-231, 7. 372-373, Plut. Ad Col . 1122C, Comm. not . 1084F. 13 See also D.L. 7. 45-46, 50. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are based on Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, with occasional modi cations.

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impression solely as a kind of image.14 Furthermore, both Cleanthes and Chrysippus attempt to explain phantasia in terms of the complexity of its physical structure. Chrysippus rejects what he takes to be Cleanthes view that an adequate explanation of an agents impressions must attribute the same qualitative features to the impression as to that which they represent.15 The second stage involved in perception proper is assent (sunkatathesis). For perception to occur, an agent must not only be presented with an impression, he or she also must assent to it.16 In rational animals, assent to an impression is a voluntary act.17 The Stoics often speak of sunkataFor discussions of this passage in Sextus, see Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 72-75, Deborah Modrak, Stoics, Epicureans, and Mental Content, p. 99, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 239, and David Sedley, Chrysippus on psychophysical causality, pp. 329-330. According to Modrak, the passage suggests that Chrysippus does not accept that an impression is an imprint. But the text indicates that the dispute between Chrysippus and Cleanthes over what Zeno meant is instead a matter of interpreting the nature of a tupsis. Both appear to accept that an impression is an imprint of some kind. 15 Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 74-75, points out Sextus might not do justice to the dispute. It is possible that Chrysippus simply attempted to develop further what he held to be the same fundamental view as Cleanthes position. However, Chrysippus appears to criticize Cleanthes for accepting a naive view of mental representation that implies that perceptual impressions are copies of the qualities that the objects represented have. For instance, on Cleanthes account of impression, when we perceive a triangular object the impression that we ordinarily have is triangular. Some commentators have taken the remarks of Chrysippus to entail that impressions are propositional in form or articulable in linguistic form. E.g., Annas, pp. 74-75, concludes that Chrysippus analyzed perception in terms of the reception of content and its articulation in linguistic form. This conclusion is too strong. All that seems to follow is that the impression conveys information. Whether what is conveyed requires propositional content is less clear. Why is it necessary that our perceptual impressions of, say, squareness or redness, involve the proposition that something is red or square? As it stands, all Chrysippus has to accept is that the qualities that impressions have are not necessarily similar to the characteristics of their causes. 16 See D.L. 7. 49, Cicero Acad. 1. 40, 2. 145, Plut. Ad Col. 1122B-C, Stobaeus 1. 349. 23-27. 17 The nature of assent for non-rational animals is a vexed and complicated question. Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, p. 72, denies that nonrational animals can assent. Jean-Louis Labarri re, De la nature phantastique des animaux chez les Sto ciens, especially, pp. 243-249, argues that the Stoic position is that animals can exhibit a type of assent to impressions. See also Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind , pp. 72-75, 89-102, Christopher Gill, Is there a concept of person in Greek philosophy?, pp. 185-186, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 322, A.A. Long, Representation and the self
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thesis resulting in some sort of belief. Much depends on the nature of the impression to which agents are assenting since assent is a sort of genus. To outline the basic Stoic position, what agents assent to, at least in many cases, is a proposition (lekton) characterized by the impression. Genuinely conceptual thinking arises subsequently to the occurrence of impressions.18 The Stoics hold that concepts are a type of impression, which results from an agent, in effect, internalizing repeated, similar impressions.19 The act of thinking involves articulating or re ecting about the proposition to which one has assented. Although the Stoics distinguish theoretically between the occasion of having an impression and assenting to it, it is unclear whether the two stages are actually distinct in cases of sense-perception. II The basic issues about mental content will become clearer if we compare the two principal, competing interpretations. The accounts of Michael Frede and Richard Sorabji are prominent representatives of each. Let me rst brie y discuss Fredes perspicuous formulation of the orthodox reading. According to Frede,20 both non-rational and rational animals have sensory capacities that causally connect them with the world around them. Yet, they also differ signi cantly in the nature of their sense-experience. In particular, the impressions that occur in animals and human young are different in kind from those of adult humans. Mature human beings have rational impressions which are propositional in nature. When Dion sees his house, his impression is that it is brown, has two oors, needs to be painted, and so forth. But a young child, Theon, cannot have these sorts of impressions and perceives only, say, brownness and the characteristic of having two oors. Infant and animal impressions cannot support that something is the case and thus fail to have any propositional contents at all.21
in Stoicism, pp. 110-111, Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 40-42. 18 D.L. 7. 49, Sextus M 8. 56, Galen, Def. med. 19. 381. 19 Plut. Comm. not. 1084F-1085A, Aetius 4. 11. 1-5. 20 The summary of Fredes interpretation is derived from Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions, especially pp. 66-73. 21 Frede also suggests that not all propositional impressions have the same degree of propositional content. There can be grades of propositional involvement. Further, Frede, Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions, p. 69, indicates that we ought to distinguish the manner in which di fferent impressions are held. Although

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What is Fredes main evidence? Text (2) leads Frede to hold that any impression of a rational being is rational.
(2) Of impressions, some are rational (logikai ) and some are non-rational (alogoi ). The rational are those of rational animals, the non-rational of non-rational. The rational, then, are thoughts and the non-rational have been given no special name. [D.L. 7. 51]

Because the passage identi es rational impressions with thoughts, he also concludes that only rational impressions have propositional content.22 Other texts also sharply distinguish between rational impressions and impressions that are merely perceptual:
(3) Through the senses alone one is not able to grasp the truth, as we indicated before23 and now shall explain brie y, for they [the senses] are by nature nonrational, and of more than being impressed by impressors [i.e., the things that impress] they are not capable, as they are completely unsuitable for discovering the truth. For not only must one be moved to have a sensation of white or sweet for one to grasp the truth in the underlying things, but one must be brought to have an impression of that thing that this is white and this is sweet. And so the other like things [i.e., the other senses]. But to grasp a thing of this kind is no longer the work of perception. For color only and taste and sound is its nature to grasp, while that this is white or this is sweet, which are neither color nor taste, is unsuspected by sense.24 [Sextus M 7. 344-345]

Frede identi es the results of sense-perception in this passage with what are, according to (2), non-rational impressions. It follows that by the exercise of sense-perception alone one would not be able to entertain impressions with propositional content. A statement that something is the case
this point is generally less important for our purposes, it is worth noting that for Frede rational impressions can give rise to distinct thoughts because otherwise identical impressions can be held in different manners. Sameness of content does not completely determine identity of thoughts. See also, his The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul, The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), edd. Malcolm Scho eld and Gisela Striker, especially pp. 103-107. 22 Michael Frede, Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions, p. 67: Rational impressions have a propositional content, they are impressions to the effect that something is the case very much in the sense in which we might say ordinarily, the impression, which one gets, if one looks at the evidence, is that. . . . Frede also appeals to Galen Def. med. 126 for additional support. 23 See Sextus M 7. 293. 24 The translation is mine.

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is required for us to determine truth or falsity. But Frede takes (3) to deny that sense-perception itself can supply the requisite propositional form. At most, the senses can tell us about the qualities of things their whiteness, say, or sweetness when we are causally affected by external things. This is all that a tupsis, the imprint, can convey in such cases. In another important passage, Cicero appears to con rm Fredes reading and also adds something:
(4) Those characteristics which belong to the things we describe as being grasped by the senses are equally characteristic of that further set of things said to be grasped not by the senses directly but by them in a certain respect, e.g., that is white, this is sweet, that is melodious, this is fragrant, this is bitter. Our grasp of these is secured by the mind, not the senses. Next, that is a horse, that is a dog. The rest of the series then follows, connecting bigger items which virtually include complete grasp of things, like if it is a human being, it is a mortal, rational animal. From this class conceptions of things are imprinted on us, without which there can be no understanding or discussion of anything.25 [Acad. 2. 21]

For Frede, (3) indicates that the senses by themselves are unable to produce impressions containing any propositional content. This task, according to (4), requires certain operations of the mind. Thus, rational and non-rational animals di ffer in the sorts of impressions of which they are capable. Frede explains the capacity of rational animals to entertain rational impressions in terms of their ability to form concepts. Lacking any conceptual apparatus, non-rational animals cannot entertain impressions having propositional form. In the Stoic account of psychologica l development, concepts (ennoiai ) arise later than perceptual impressions (Aetius 4. 11. 1-5). The Stoics separate conceptual thinking from the mere occurrence of perceptual states. Although Fredes formulation of the Stoic account has considerable plausibility, Richard Sorabji rejects the orthodox reading. He challenges both the philosophical underpinnings of Fredes interpretation as well as its textual support. Let us rst consider Sorabjis objection to a philosophical argument employed by Frede and next describe his own fresh interpretive proposal. Sorabji is unimpressed by the theoretical argument that concepts are necessary for propositional thought. It is a controversial matter for many contemporary philosophers of mind whether in every case the employment of concepts is required for propositional attribution.26
25 This translation basically follows A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers . 26 See Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, pp. 308-309, Animal

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Some argue that despite the necessity of concepts for belief-attribution there is no such requirement for other sorts of mental states. Consider a typical example: agents can perceive a structure as ten-sided without having a concept of ten or any other relevant concepts. Perceptual content for Sorabji only demands a sort of predication i.e., one thing being another. 27 Although his conception of propositional content as predication is never fully explained, let us defer our discussion of it until later. At this point, all we need to see is Sorabjis strategy for undermining Fredes argument about concepts and propositional contents.28 Sorabji also addresses Fredes textual arguments. First, Sorabji argues that it is consistent with text (2) that non-rational impressions have propositional form. Rational impressions can be a subset of impressions that have propositional content.29 The passage does not rule out that other impressions also have propositional content. Sorabji then suggests that our sources give us reason to distinguish between two types of verbalizable linguistic form corresponding to impressions. Some phantasiai rational impressions are articulable by their owners, while others non-rational impressions are articulable only by non-owners. Although rational agents can, in principle, articulate the content of their rational impressions, in contrast, an infant, say, cannot verbalize the content of its perceptual impressions. 30
Minds, p. 6, Intentionality and Physiological Processes, pp. 200-210, and Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 30-31. He refers particularly to the work of Peacocke and Evans who deny that concepts are required for propositional thought on every occasion. See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Christopher Peacocke, Analogue Content, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1986), supp. vol. 60, pp. 1-17. 27 Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 307, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 12, 21. 28 If the doctrine that content requires conceptual apparatus fails to be settled for contemporary philosophy, then Sorabji points out it is a mistake to regard it as incontrovertible for ancient authors. In any case, how far can Fredes objection take us? Although any interpretation will be driven by a principle of charity to attribute as plausible an account as the evidence allows, it is always worth being reminded that the Stoics and other historical gures are not immune from adopting patently unjusti ed positions. Hence, even if the thesis that concepts are required for propositional content turns out to be warranted, it still doesnt follow without considerable additional argument that the Stoics realized that it must be so. 29 Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 311, Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 25. 30 For the moment, let it suf ce to point out a more natural reading of (2), which is somewhat weaker than Fredes yet does not require that we endorse Sorabjis strategy.

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According to Sorabji, many of Fredes other important sources should also be read differently. Sorabji tentatively suggests that text (3), Sextus M 7. 344-345, does not re ect genuine Stoic doctrine.31 But even supposing the passage is orthodox Stoicism, Sorabji argues that it together with (4), Cicero Acad. 2. 21, entail that perceptual impressions have content. For, he argues, if it is true that the senses can only perceive in a way , say, that something is white, then such impressions in a way have some propositional content. Accordingly, a perceptual impression must be as of somethings being white rather than an impression simply of whiteness. 32 On Sorabjis account, the impressions of, say, a newborn or a cat do have propositional content in the sense that their impressions present one thing to be predicated of another. Our sources also only speak of impressions as verbalizable, not actually verbalized.33 To be sure, non-rational animals cannot articulate or conceptualize what they perceive. But, Sorabji argues, it doesnt follow that non-rational animals cannot have impressions with content solely because their impressions are not verbalizable by them. It suf ces for the attribution of propositional content that the verbalizable impressions of non-rational animals can be articulated by other animals that are rational namely, us.34 He concludes that animals cannot articulate the content of the impressions that arise in perception and in other mental functioning, but their impressions have articulable content. 35
The passage only establishes that not all impressions are to be identi ed with thoughts or beliefs. Rational animals alone can have impressions of the latter sort, but the passage simply leaves open whether the attribution of content requires that impressions are thoughts. 31 Though most commentators accept that Sextus is describing a Stoic position here, it is dif cult to determine whether in this text Sextus refers to Stoic doctrine because there is no explicit attribution of the view to a particular dogmatic school. Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, pp. 311-312, presents no argument that it cannot be a reference to Stoicism. But it is also not obvious that Fredes inference about the passage follows. The fact that the senses can only grasp color, avor, and sound doesnt tell us exactly what is entailed by such grasping. 32 Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 311. 33 See D.L. 7. 49, Aetius 4. 12. 1, Sextus M 7. 244, M 8. 70. 34 Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 311, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 22-23. 35 In support of his interpretation, Sorabji also appeals to additional sources, which our sketch of his position can only survey in passing. For instance, he refers to Chrysippus well-known example of the dog engaging in something analogous to the application of disjunctive syllogism (Sextus, PH 1. 69). Chrysippus explicitly states

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Despite the considerable force and elegance of Sorabjis interpretation, we should have reservations about it as well. First of all, obviously much depends on an assumption that underlies his reading of the Stoics. He accepts the principle that we ought to ascribe intentionality to the impressions of non-rational animals if rational animals can articulate their content. In this respect, Sorabji acknowledges that he is following Dennett.36 Of course, one could have reasonable doubts about the success of Dennetts instrumentalism for the attribution of propositional attitudes.37 Yet, regardless of whether we nd Dennetts position plausible, it has a certain lack of t with Stoic theory. Dennett is an anti-realist about propositional attitudes. 38 On his view, we ought to accept explanations of human behavior that employ beliefs and desires solely because of their usefulness. But, although this metaphysical issue will not be discussed fully here, it is clear that the Stoics really admit desires and beliefs into their ontology. They are robust realists about propositional attitudes. Impulses and perception
that the mental activity of the dog is only in effect or passes for (dunamei ) reasoning. The Stoics deny that a dog can have beliefs, so it must grasp through perception that one or more of the paths ahead of it does not have any scent. Sorabji also refers to passages from Hierocles, Seneca, and Chrysippus in which these authors discuss the early stages of an animals life. Self-awareness is necessary for self-preservation, an impulse which the Stoics claim all animal life possesses from the very start. The Stoic analysis of self-awareness requires that animals are aware that they have particular body parts, that their prey have weaknesses, and so forth. In Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 312, he holds that such instances of self-awareness can only be understood by attributing propositional attitudes. In addition, he cites passages in Plutarch and Sextus (Plut. On the E at Delphi 386F-387A, Sextus M 8. 276) in which rational and non-rational animals are distinguished in terms of whether they are capable of inferential reasoning. Sorabji says that only rational animals can draw inferences. Although the Stoics are silent in these sources about the nature of animal perceptual impressions, the texts suggest to Sorabji that the di fference between rational and non-rational animals has little to do with whether or not their impressions have propositional form. Consequently, these other sources also lead Sorabji to deny that nonrational animals are only capable of impressions completely devoid of propositional contents. 36 See Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 314, Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotles Theory of Sense-Perception, p. 206, and Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 28. He cites, in particular, D. Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in A. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 175-196. 37 E.g., see Jerry A. Fodor, Fodors Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Aunties Vade-Mecum, A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 6-8. 38 See Jerry Fodor, Fodors Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Aunties Vade-Mecum, p. 7.

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are what distinguish animal life from other kinds of living things.39 When they speak more precisely, the Stoics restrict desire (orexis), which they de ne as a kind of impulse that requires belief, to rational beings, though some animal impulses can be relatively similar in nature to human desires.40 In any case, impulses, desires, and beliefs are identi ed with movements of the soul. Thus, the Stoics take such psychological states to be instances of actually existing physical states. Sorabji tells us very little about his predicational notion of propositional contents. His position appears to come to this: there is a weak sense of propositional which means only that one thing is connected with another. 41 Animals have impressions that a is related to b. On his view, we should attribute propositional contents to the mental states of nonrational animals because their impressions contain the proposition that one thing is predicated of another. Sorabji commits himself to nothing more than the position that propositions are what that-clauses introduce. As we already saw, the orthodox interpretation shares this core analysis of propositions. Sorabji also adds a distinction between perceiving-that and perceiving-as.42 Accordingly, one might hold that animals can perceive, say, something as sweet even if one denies that they can perceive that something is sweet. If we argue that the impression that gives rise to the latter sort of perception corresponds to lekta, then non-rational animals cannot entertain it. However, it is unclear what importance Sorabji places on this distinction since he concedes that neither we nor the Stoics neatly distinguish in this way between as and that.43 A more important problem is that Sorabjis attribution of propositional contents is far from restrictive. To say that non-animals perceive that a is related to b or that a is predicated of b is to attribute a huge class of what the Stoics must hold are impressions expressing lekta. If the Stoics deny that animals can entertain the impression that something is white, it is hard to see why they would attribute predicational mental contents to animals or what real theoretical advantage follows. On what basis is it reaD.L. 7. 86. Stobaeus 2. 86. 17 87. 6. For a discussion of Stoic distinctions among kinds of impulses, see Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, pp. 224242. See also Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 89-102. 41 Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 307, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 12, 17, 21. 42 See Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 309, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 21-22. 43 Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 22.
40 39

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sonable to accept that animals can have, for example, impressions that a white thing is to the left of a blue thing, yet not attribute to them the impression that something is white? Frede and other proponents of orthodoxy are right to deny that the Stoics would accept so generous a view since impressions with predicational contents also correspond to lekta and as such are accessible only to rational animals. Finally, there are also textual reasons to be wary of Sorabjis reading. The sources to which he appeals often might reasonably be read more weakly. In particular, I cannot nd any passage that supports his position that the content of the impressions of non-rational animals can, in principle, be articulated by rational animals. For instance, D.L. 7. 49, one passage on which he places much importance, distinguishes between two mental operations: (i) the occasion of having an impression and (ii) formulating in words how one is affected through having it. The text is silent about rational animals having the capacity to verbalize the impressions of non-rational ones. It is possible to read it simply as asserting that the agent in whom the impression occurs has the ability to express its content. Moreover, some passages weigh against Sorabjis point. Consider part of Aetius 4. 12. 1, which states of an impression: [given through sight] we are able to say (eipein ekhomen) that there exists something white which moves us (hmas); similarly for touch or smell.44 In this passage, an impression is linked to what the agents themselves presented with an impression are capable of verbalizing. Its contents can be expressed by the same subjects in whom it occurs. Although such passages indeed show that the Stoics distinguish between what can potentially be expressed and what actually is verbalized, no mention is made of one persons impression being articulable by another or of an animals perceptual impression being verbalizable by us. A more natural and straightforward reading than Sorabjis is available to us. The Stoics do distinguish between what is articulable and what actually is articulated. However, this point applies only to rational agents presented with an impression. Although rational agents normally can express the content of some of their impressions, they do not always actually articulate what these impressions convey. In other words, the Stoics are sensitive to the difference between occurrent verbalization and
44 Aetius 4. 12. 1 is part of text (5) below. See Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 309, for his additional citations. Sextus M 7. 244 says of certain impressions that it is possible to make a true or false assertion as a result (the true, persuasive ones, a true assertion, the false persuasive ones, a false one). Sextus M 8. 70 similarly says of rational impressions that their content can be expressed in words. See also Sextus M 8. 10, D.L. 7. 65, Sextus M 9. 211.

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an agents ability to verbalize. Thus, it is consistent with the evidence that the Stoics are making a much more obvious point in these passages than Sorabji suggests. III The Stoics investigate the initial stages of animal development in terms of their doctrine of oikeisis. In the process that they describe, animals come to have inclinations to act and become aware of themselves.45 Animal life is distinguished from other kinds of living and non-living things in virtue of having impulses (hormai ) and perception (aisthsis).46 For the Stoics, perception is prior to impulse because animals must perceive themselves in order for impulses to occur.47 Such impulses arise as a result of impressions with which animals are presented.48 Animals perceive themselves (aisthanesthai heautou, Hierocles 1, 34-9, 51-7) continuously from birth (Hierocles 1. 37-50, 3. 52-4. 53, 4. 53-4. 58). Chrysippus states that an animals initial inclination is based on the rst thing for every animal belonging to it its own constitution (sustasis ) and the self-consciousness (suneidsis) of this (D.L. 7. 85).49 If self-perception is a species of perception, then self-perception also requires the occurrence of phantasiai .50

D.L. 7. 85, Cicero Fin. 3. 16. See Hierocles 1. 30-37, especially, and D.L. 7. 86. Hierocles arguments are discussed in Brad Inwood, Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century A.D., Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), pp. 151-183, and in A.A. Long, Hierocles on oikeisis and self-perception, Hellenistic Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. K.J. Boudouris (International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens, 1994), pp. 93-104. Longs essay is a summary of more extended discussion in the edition of Hierocles that he together with Guido Bastianini have completed for the series Corpus dei Papiri Filoso ci Greci e Latini (CPF) I, vol. 1** (Florence, 1992). 47 See Cicero n. 3. 16, Seneca Ep. 121. Cicero actually refers to the desires of infants rather than their impulses. When the Stoics speak precisely, they typically distinguish desire (orexis) from impulse (horm ) and deny that non-rational animals including human young can have desire, which is a species of impulse. Stobaeus 2. 86. 20 87. 6 indicates that orexis is a kind of rational impulse. See Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, pp. 225-230, 235-237, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. II, p. 318, note on Stobaeus 2. 86. 17 87. 6, and Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 91-97. 48 See Stobaeus 2. 86. 20 87. 6, Origen, Prin. 3. 1. 2-3. 49 He refers to self-consciousness in this passage, not self-perception. We have no sources of which I am aware where Chrysippus speaks explicitly of self-perception. 50 One way to understand the continuous self-perception to which the Stoics refer
45 46

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What is the nature of the initial impressions of self-perception? Answering this question will help determine the extent of the Stoic attribution of propositional contents. Since these impressions occur from the moment of birth, the initial impressions cannot be the result of repeated experience. Stoic examples of self-perception often refer to speci c animal body parts and functions. For instance, snails perceive their esh and shells and birds perceive their wings are for ying. 51 Self-perception sometimes is said to involve perceiving that something is the case but since such descriptions are far from typical we should exercise caution about drawing too much from this evidence.52 The Stoics often seem to be searching for a way of speaking that is less cognitively loaded and appear to be reluctant to attribute too much cognition to animals and human infants.53 In any event, these kinds of examples such as the bull perceiving that its horns are for self-defense appeal to later stages of oikeisis. But self-perception also occurs during the initial stages of oikeisis. What about the original impressions that arise in self-perception in the

is that animals have a steady disposition to perceive themselves. It is also possible that they intend to make the stronger claim that animals are continuously perceiving themselves occurrently. A.A. Long, Hierocles on oikeisis and self-perception, pp. 93-104, proposes an account along these lines of continuous self-perception in terms of proprioception, i.e., the notion of self-monitoring. 51 See Hierocles 1. 51-2. 3, Seneca Ep. 121. 18-20. 52 See Hierocles 3. 2-6 and Seneca Ep. 121. 21. 53 For instance, Seneca, in a remark reminiscent of Chrysippus, says that every animal is aware of its constitution or physical makeup from birth (Ep. 121. 5-6). Their awareness is the developmental basis for the other things that they perceive (Ep. 121. 12). But he also thinks that it is a mistake to take animals or human young to be capable of explaining their makeup or de ning their constitution (Ep. 121. 11-13). Although non-rational animals are aware of their ruling part, they cannot elucidate or express what it is (Ep. 121. 13). Seneca makes an analogy (Ep. 121. 12) between the awareness that adult humans have of their souls and the awareness of non-rational animals of their constitution. Though we perceive our souls, this awareness does not entail that we know the souls nature or even its location. Similarly, when non-rational animals perceive themselves, the impressions that occur do not include enough information to de ne what they perceive or to say anything clearly about it. See also Seneca Ira 1. 3. 7. Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 312, is, of course, correct that these texts and similar ones where the Stoics speak of the vagueness or lack of clarity of the perception of non-rational animals underdetermine whether their impressions are propositional. My point here is simply that Seneca marks non-rational animal perceptual impressions as somewhat weaker than the perceptual impressions of rational animals. Though Seneca does not say exactly what is ruled out, he places restrictions on what the initial impressions of self-perception can contain.

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initial stages of oikeisis? In the following passage, the Stoics refer to basic sense impressions:
(5) Chrysippus says that these four things di ffer from each other. Impression, then, is an experience ( pathos ) which occurs in the soul and which, in [the pathos ] itself, also indicates that which caused it. For example, when we observe something white by means of vision, there is a pathos which has occurred in the soul by means of vision; and <in virtue of> this pathos we are able to say there exists something white which stimulates us. And similarly for touch and smell. Impression ( phantasia ) gets its name from light ( phs); for just as light reveals itself and the other things which are encompassed in it, so too impression reveals itself and that which caused it. The impressed thing is that which causes the impression. For example, the impressed thing is the white and the cold and everything which is able to stimulate the soul. [Aetius 4. 12. 1-3]

In conjunction with (5), consider also another similar text, which further helps us to understand and explain di fferences in mental content:54
(6) And this pathos must be indicative both of itself and of the phenomenon which produced it, which pathos is not other than the impression. Hence, we say that an impression is a pathos of an animal capable of presenting both itself and the other thing [i.e., its cause]. For example, Antiochus says, when we look at something we are put into a certain condition with respect to sight and we do not have our sight in the same condition as before we looked. In this sort of alteration, we take hold of (antilambanometha ) two things, one, the alteration itself, which is the impression, and, the second, that which produced the alteration, which is the visible thing. And similarly in the case of the other senses. So, just as light ( phs) reveals both itself and everything in it, in this way the impression too, which is the beginning of the animals cognitive functions, like light, must make apparent both itself and the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it. [Sextus, M 7. 161-163]

Neither of these passages primarily concerns the kinds of examples of selfperception provided by Hierocles such as the bulls awareness of its own horns for self-defense. The accounts here are general descriptions of any impression of sense. In addition, text (6) speaks of the impressions as the source of any cognition, which strongly suggests that these descriptions pertain to the earliest stages of oikeisis. First, a preliminary question must be addressed. Do these passages apply to both non-rational and rational animals?55 There is no reason to
54 The language of (6) is so similar to (5) that we should suppose that Antiochus is speaking in his Stoicizing mode and that the passage genuinely re ects Stoic doctrine. 55 This question is raised by Jean-Louis Labarri re, De la nature phantastique des

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think that these texts are restricted to a discussion of the beginnings of cognition in rational animals. (5) speaks generally of the notion of impression and gives an account of its etymology. If these sources mean to include the impressions of human newborns, then they are likely also to refer to the impressions of any non-rational animal. Furthermore, text (6) refers very broadly to the impressions of an animal (to zon). Even more signi cant is that in (6) we discover that impressions are related to the beginnings of an animals cognitive functions. Thus, we should conclude that our sources here describe theoretical features shared by impressions generally. An examination of these general features produces a relatively circumscribed notion of propositional contents. First of all, we are told that impressions of this sort reveal their causes. The Stoics do not say that an impression has features which copy the characteristics of its cause. As an example, sight is said to perceive the white, which is identi ed as the cause of the impression. There is no indication that the perception of the white includes the impression that something is white. According to (5), the white, the cause of the impression, is the impressed thing ( phantaston ) and is indicated in the impression itself. Recall that in text (4) Cicero distinguishes between what the senses perceive whiteness and what is actually perceived by the mind, not the senses the proposition that something is white. There are puzzles about this passage to which we will return shortly, but for the moment at least it is reasonable to suggest that the sense-impression has the impressed thing, viz., the white, as part of its contents but does not have the proposition that something is white as part. Passages (5) and (6) also stipulate that a sensory impression is capable of conveying some additional content for we are told that the sense impression reveals itself. Thus, provisionally we can say that sense impression of white includes the following contents: (i) the white, which indicates the cause of the impression, and (ii) the occurrent impression (i.e., of the white) itself. At this point, we do not have to commit ourselves to specifying that these mental contents are propositional in form. But it is clear that the proposition that something is white goes beyond the ascription of these modest contents. According to (5), the impression of white is then the basis of our saying that there exists something white. The Stoics are cautious here about
animaux chez les Sto ciens, pp. 238-243, though in the context of whether animals have any self-consciousness. As a result, he never directly poses the question about the cases of self-perception on which we focus.

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the source of that propositional information. Is the proposition that something white exists already contained in the impression? If it is, then it is tempting to conclude that non-rational minds are incapable of discerning all the contents already contained in the impression. But an alternative reading is also possible. It must be conceded that the evidence underdetermines either interpretation, however, the second reading is preferable for the sake of consistency with our earlier analysis of (5) and (6). These sources are fairly speci c about what narrow contents are contained generally in impressions. In addition, (4) tells us that rational animals bring other mental operations into play which affect their impressions. On the preferred reading, a rational mind contributes some new information, which expresses the proposition that something is white, to the contents of the original sense-impression.56 A propositional mental state of this sort might well be broadly described as inferential. A rational animal is capable of inferring that, e.g., if a white thing causes my impression, then it is the case that something is white. For the Stoics, any inference about the cause of the impression of whiteness requires an ability of which nonrational minds are incapable. Even in the well-known Chrysippean example, the dog employing disjunctive syllogism is only said to simulate reasoning. 57 One might plausibly hold that inferential reasoning, however minimal and automatic the inference, requires other operations of the mind besides perception. Let us return to text (4), which makes some distinction about content.58 The senses are said to perceive things such as whiteness. Yet, Cicero holds that the senses perceive only in a way propositional claims such as that something is white. It is not altogether obvious how to unpack this passage.59 If we read Cicero rather literally here, he distinguishes between

Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 82-84, discusses a parallel set of interpretations for kataleptic vs. non-kataleptic impressions in rational animals. 57 Sextus, PH 1. 69 states that the dog in effect (dunamei ) is reasoning. Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 313, takes this instance of simulated reasoning to be more or less a legitimate case of reasoning. 58 I am making a weaker point here than Frede, who argues that text (4) rules out the possibility of non-rational impressions having content at all. 59 We saw that the passage, according to Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics, p. 311, commits the Stoics to impressions having propositional form. He proposes that if the senses can perceive in a way that something is the case then in a way such impressions can have propositional form. He states that to be propositional in a way when the senses perceive that, say, this is white can be understood as the senses present a non-verbalized appearance as of somethings being white.
56

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what the senses can perceive only in a way and what the mind here, referring to mental operations in the hgemonikon other than senseperception perceives fully. Perception involves assent so that in each instance the mind assents to what is presented. On the orthodox view, there is simply less to assent to in the case of what is presented only to the senses. There also appears to be a reading consistent with Sorabjis interpretation if what the mind contributes is an articulation of the content that is already present in the original impression of sense. Let me suggest a third possibility. If animal minds are incapable of making inferences from what they do in fact perceive, then Ciceros remarks that the mind alone secures that, say, this is white applies only to rational animals. The senses of rational animals alone can grasp in a way that something is white because they alone can draw inferences based on their sensations. Fredes orthodox interpretation is mistaken in supposing that (4) supports the view that animals perceives only qualities. Sorabjis alternative is also incorrect because non-rational impressions are not the issue here. The context of Acad. 2. 21 shows that the impressions being considered are only those of rational animals. So Ciceros discussion applies only to impressions of rational animals and has little to do with impressions of sense generally.60 In texts (5) and (6), we saw that the impressions of sense are said to reveal their causes. In the case of an impression of whiteness, the cause of the impression is the white, which is the impressed thing ( phantaston ). The passages speak of the white (to leukon ) or the visible (to horaton ), which could refer, of course, either to the quality of an object or to an object itself. But we do not need to commit ourselves to either alternative and so will speak just of qualities in what follows. Additionally, the claim that the impressions cause, the white, is revealed might be taken in two ways. First, one might hold that the impression reveals something, which, as it happens, caused it. In the case of the impression of a white thing, what gets revealed is just whiteness. If all the Stoics mean is that the perceiver sees whiteness, then nothing more is contained in the impression than the rudimentary perception of a quality, whiteness. This reading of the texts is consistent with the orthodox interpretation. But, according to a second possible interpretation, what gets revealed when an impression reveals its cause is considerably more content-laden. The white is revealed as the cause of the impression. So, when these passages say

60

I am grateful to John Ellis for clarifying my point on Acad. 2. 21.

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that a sensory impression reveals its cause, they mean that, generally, a quality is revealed as the impressions cause. On this reading, the subject can have an experience of causal relations. The second interpretation is preferable. Why? The language and context of these passages supports this alternative for two reasons. First, the use of the term reveals must be consistent throughout the passages. Hence, we should apply how reveals is employed when an impression is said to reveal its own occurrence to the case of an impressions cause. In texts (5) and (6), the Stoics describe impressions so that even nonrational animals perceive that an impression belongs to them. The point is that the subject rational or non-rational is aware of its impression. If, as seems likely, this awareness requires some propositional attribution, then it is also likely that an impression reveals more than the rudimentary awareness of a quality when the impression reveals its cause. Second, text (6) speaks explicitly of the subject also having the capacity to be aware of or grasp the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it (heautn te emphanizein opheilei kai tou poisantos autn enargous endeiktik kathestanai).61 This description of what an impression reveals about its cause entails that more is revealed than just some quality, which, as it happens, causes the impression. The content of the impression clearly points to what produced it. In other words, something is revealed as the cause of the impression. The content of such an impression explicitly contains causal relations of which a perceiver can be aware. In an interesting way, this reading of the content of an impression can also be linked to Stoic remarks about self-perception and oikeisis. The contents of an impression make possible, in part, the awareness that the impression is occurring because the impressions occurrence is itself conveyed in its contents. If an impression reveals itself in this way, we can formulate a kind of self-perception that has been unnoticed by commentators.62 A perceiving subject can be aware of its own basic mental state the impression itself. It is possible to analyze the initial instances of self-perception to which oikeisis refers in terms of such awareness.

My rendering closely follows Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy , here. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, translates the passage [the impression] must be capable of revealing the self-evident object that caused it, which even more strongly suggests that more than just a quality is revealed. A self-evident feature is that the quality or object is related to the impression as its cause. 62 Nothing in this discussion is meant to suggest that such impressions are kataleptic.
61

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Very generally, oikeisis describes a process of something coming to belong. If applied to individuals, the process refers to that which comes to belong to me or is of mine.63 The account of mental contents we have described thus ts well with oikeisis. The Stoics hold that in the early stages of oikeisis impressions occur because all animals from birth on come equipped with impulses and the basis of their initial impulses is selfperception. These impressions include as part of their contents that the impression itself belongs to the perceiver. In this minimal sense of selfperception, the Stoics attribute suf cient cognitive functioning to nonrational animals so as to discriminate between their own psychological states and whatever is alien64 to them. The contents of the impressions themselves indicate that they are the perceivers and not of something independent. 65 An example might help to illustrate the basic features of mental content that have emerged in our discussion. Suppose that Dion has a dog, Zeno. What are the contents of Zenos sensory impressions? If Zeno sees his paw, he has an impression which, rst of all, he is aware of as his. In addition, various causal relations constitute part of the contents of his impression. Zenos impression contains at least something like the following: his impression is caused by his paw. Thus, it can be said of Zeno that he perceives his paw. What cannot be attributed to Zeno is that he perceives that it is a paw. The Stoics also deny that Zeno draws inferences from what he perceives or that he can assess the truth of the contents of his impressions. The basic point is that the Stoics are making some sort of distinction between perceiving and perceiving that. They want to explain why Zeno perceives his paw but doesnt perceive that it is a paw. They construct their explanation in terms of a somewhat restricted set of propositional contents.

63 See S.G. Pembroke, Oikeisis, Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone Press, 1971), ed. A.A. Long, pp. 115-116, Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 262-263. Oikeisis, the verbal noun which becomes Stoic technical usage, is related to the adjective oikeios. This latter term originally meant of the household and picks out members of a household, their relations, and others connected to it less immediately. The term applies also to property and, derivatively, comes to have the sense of anything belonging to a person. 64 I.e., allotrion, the opposite of oikeion. 65 In addition, we can conjecture that awareness of this feature of mental content can constitute a kind of assent to the impression. If we could establish this case, the two-stage model of perception having an impression and assent to it still can t the account of impressions with modest contents.

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Of course, even if this interpretation is correct, the Stoic position might turn out to be muddled. For one thing, it might plausibly be held that an awareness of causal relations requires concepts. Yet, the Stoics deny that non-rational animals are capable of conceptual thought. In addition, there is the fundamental problem that non-rational impressions cannot express lekta. But in the interpretation that we have developed, non-rational animals perceive causal relations: that one thing causes something else. It is unlikely that the Stoics can make these kinds of propositional content consistent with their of cial position about lekta. Perhaps the content of such impressions is restrictive enough that they did not notice the problem.66 In any case, the Stoic account of the initial stages of animal development also supports a conception of mental contents that is narrow and restrictive. In this sense, the content of an impression has only to be adequately rich (i) to represent certain causal relations and (ii) to signal that the impression itself is occurring in the perceiver. The Stoics can try to explain the ability of non-rational animals to function cognitively in terms of their power to entertain such impressions. The Stoics are also adamant that non-rational animals are incapable of belief.67 Thus, the nature of impressions in rational and non-rational animals is readily distinguished. By formulating an account of a more restricted mental content, the Stoics can explain the observed, cognitive behavior of non-rational animals and also differentiate between non-rational and rational animals. In this essay, I have tried to show that there is interpretive space between the austerity of Fredes orthodox view and the too charitable alternative presented by Sorabji. Frede is mistaken that all non-rational impressions are devoid of propositional content. Not only do animals perceive whiteness, sweetness, and other qualities, they also can be aware of causal relations. On the other hand, Sorabji is wrong to attribute relatively

These problems could have led the Stoics to offer a more familiar theory of causal contents in which the meaning of the impression is simply whatever causes the impression. This kind of content does not require attributing any propositional content at all to non-rational animals. Such a position would then be consistent with the orthodox view. But there is little evidence that they do, in fact, propose a version of this sort of causal theory of content. 67 On the Stoic view, it is clear that rational animals have impressions that are robustly propositional in form. Roughly, beliefs involves assent to an impression which contains what are termed sayables (lekta). Sayables are rather similar to statements. Earlier, we saw that impressions containing sayables are equivalent to thoughts and occur only in rational beings.
66

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unrestricted propositional content to non-rational animals.68 Both accounts fail to notice another sort of propositional contents, which the Stoics can effectively employ in their systematic and careful inquiry into philosophy of mind.69 Thus, the Stoics hold a position that is intermediate between the two interpretations. The more narrow propositional contents of impressions include a type of self-perception of mental states and an awareness of causal relations. The application of this more restrictive notion enables the Stoics within the context of their overall naturalism to develop a

Sorabji evidently tries to formulate something weaker than full- edged propositional content when he employs his conception of predicational content. Though he never completely explains his notion, it enables him to distinguish between predicational content and the stronger type of content involved in assenting to a belief. However, he at least must clarify why saying of an animals impression that, for instance, the scent is in a certain direction commits him to so much less in terms of propositional contents than the position that there is an impression that something is white. There obviously are complex issues of reference and opacity to be dealt with in both cases, which we will put aside. See A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 240, for one attempt to explain a position that at rst appears similar to Sorabjis. They discuss this sort of impression in terms of an example. Imagine seeing a John Wayne movie in which we get the impression of John Waynes being on the screen in front of us, but not of course the impression that John Wayne is on the screen in front of us (p. 240). Their point is really to distinguish a person having beliefs from merely having impressions. For Long and Sedley, only the second is a case of belief. However, they do not explicitly deny the rst case also has propositional content. Their example shows we must exercise caution about specifying the propositions contained in an impression, not that there is none. One might argue that the rst case also involves beliefs, though there are issues about what is believed. Long and Sedley deny that non-rational animals can have concepts and agree with the orthodox view that non-rational impressions are empty of mental content. But this illustration concerns questions about a persons impression of Waynes being on the screen. Hence, issues about whether their account commits us to denying the ascription of impressions with propositional form to non-rational animals never really arise. 69 The project undertaken in this essay is limited to constructing an interpretation that is intermediate between the two standard ones. There are a number of open questions. Perhaps the most important is how the two-stage model of perception applies to impressions having only modest mental contents. The nature of assent in the case of narrow content must be distinguished from that of robustly propositional impressions. How exactly does the mind assent in the former case? There are related questions about the nature of impulses since perception is the basis of impulse. Any impulses to which non-rational impressions give rise must be different in kind from the impulses generated by rational impressions. Ultimately, these issues can affect Stoic moral theory because the Stoics tie their account of moral development to the nature of impulse.

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remarkably uni ed and subtle theory of mental content. The distinctions that they make about types of content yield an account of the continuity and contrast between non-rational and rational minds.70 College of Charleston Charleston, South Carolina

70 My initial work on these issues began while I was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, where I was generously allowed the use of its resources. I have delivered di fferent parts of early versions of this essay to a number of audiences to whom I am grateful, especially, to those present at the American Philosophical Association meeting in Chicago in April 1995. I have bene ted from suggestions and criticisms on all these occasions, and, in particular, from the subsequent written comments of Shaun Nichols and Joyce Carpenter. I owe a special debt to John Ellis, the respondent at the APA meeting, whose stimulating discussion and written remarks greatly improved this essay.

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