You are on page 1of 6

20

Gratmat

Frockcoat
CARLIST IMANTRY

ShellJacket

..4 SAVAGE ANDROMANTIC WAR" SPAIN 1833-1840


(Infantry) Part3A:TheCarltstArmyoftheNorth
Text by Conrad Caims. Illustratiorn byRalphWeaver
provinces werepoorlyequipped, but in the Basque therewere saidto be 60,000 Volunteenin 1833. The figureis very likely The first, andat leastuntillate1838the mostinportant,of rhe exaggerated, but it shows that somesort of organisation was Carlist armies wasthatfounded in 1833 byTomdsZumalacdlre- already in place. who diedofwoundsreceived at the imposed which featured Zumalacdrregui a rigid discipline, eui y de Imaz(1778-1835), fiIst siegeof Bilbao. After his deaththe command changed the deathpenaltyfor offences such as openingfire without several times,asmuchbecause of intrigueat the courtof Don orden or shouting demoralising cries;for the lesser crimes of Carlosas for military reasons. As described in part I of this disobeying orden the punishment wasstill severe: a manthus series, the baseof the army wasin the provinces of Navarra, convicted wasbeatenover a drum by six men with canes for (Biscay), Vizcaya Alava and Guiprizcoa, the first threeknown threeminutes, couldresultin dismissal. and a second offence provinces. colleclively astheBasque But Zumalaciirregui wasalways careful ofhismanpower. ashe Thearmyleft itslair for theroyalexpedition of 1837 andorher had to be. ln the lastcensus beforethe war, that of 1797, the Iaids and expeditions, sometimes in collaboration with the four provinces had only 120,862 men aged16 to 50, although Anny of the Centre,which wasbasedin Aragon. It wasnot theremay havebeenmoreby the 1830s. Of these9,538were broughtlow by anygreatbattle;th endcame,aftera yearoI clergy.The army was,however,soonreinforced, notablyby relativelylittle fighting in the north, ar rhe "Embraceof Castilians, whowouldmarch from theirhomeland, berecruited Vergara"in August 1839.The Carlistleader,Maroto, made by oneofthe rovingexpeditions, desert, or change sides when peace with Espartero, leader of theCdstinoArmyofthe North; caDturcd. Castilians cameto form between one third and one Carlos naturally called Marotoatraitor,but since thebulkofhis half of the Army of the North, and, Iike the Basques and ownforces hadhadenough ofthe war therwaslittle he could Navarrese. a factnot always mentioned madeexcellentsoldiers, do. TheArmy of the Centre wasat the heighr of itspowers, but by foreignwriters(Henningsen,Im 67, 183). The heartland of theLrbefalsr couldnowtum theirundivided attention to it. and Carlism, however, remained the four northernprovinces, not itsdefeat became inevitable. leastbecause the armywasneverstrong enough in cavalry and Zumalacdrregui did not haveto build hisarmyfrom scratch. artilleryto performwellon theplains ofCastile. According to a In the yearsbeforethe war, what wasto become the Carlist Carlist sympathiser writingearlyin thewar,theNavarese were partyhadconsiderable influence in the govemment, ard iiwas th mostdaringandcouldonly fight asguerrilleros (thislast,if therefore very easyto organise the so-called RoyalistVolun- evertrue,soon ceased), whereasthe Basqueswere steadierand teerc,a semi-private army of all threearns. In Navara they could{orm line.columnandsquare (Honan,203-4).

INTRODUCTION

zl
wasanxious to avoidrecruiting disreputable Zumalacdrregui of the notorious characters. and he tumed down the servics became a Cristinoguedlcurateof Allio, who subsequently of leading an lero. He madesurethat he couldnot be accused !E4_!E4S$4!EI!84!-9EE did take place, hr cd rh ft drar l..d $i r ffi 6.ii b o!'? Bc@ rlft rm,. fedi4 army of brigands.None the less,atrocities d ryr ofthosein otherprovinces. Regulars i!!.dr..0t tribrFffi ^6 x4ue EtoMkh*id.Adtotrud although noton the scale fairlyhumane treatment, espeially takenprisoner mightexpect eitu'ard5d(c.ea.it.croi\6!drd*,6rc 6i,0:4stud1r*dkd sincethe Carlists hopedto recruitthem, but nationalmilitia andevenCarlists admittedthat hn 0*d sd (,- edt: r0{ri0 :lfu E r8rE,i,dd'dh,nd'd6t4 weresenttoworkin the mines. The Carlists took d h46 rd l id d !d'n,'d n.dr r?s massacres occured (Henningsen, I, 251-52). particular offence at {oreigners, andthe "DecreeofDurango" hrsbdt trsiod3.4.cb 6agdEE,ed.drddlrdd&d.( of the BritishAuxiliary rhisb.drdlrr{GrdG.nl.cb allowed theirexecution. Althoughmen 6ltd.nidis,titnrrns 6Mdtrri1rc rather Legion were shot, the Carlistsvery wisely accorded d M t! 'hitureG'etur ch\ rc !p!d rrt. 12iE s' ddnM bettertreatment to the rcgular {orces of william IV, suchasthe $hich dssisted barlalion of Ro)al Marines the I egron. kr sre'i sd lDd sridi cdh 5 .sod h[ sFhc drddr!rk.6iHd whodeserted to the matterwere theforeigners Quiteanother wasalmost wipedout Carlists. A battalion of450 ex-Argelinos r$h du. si 0rd s.4: cldr r0.sqbd ie, 12r*i 16 r Gs n d d itu, 6i t.didl0Mjl*dsdft by the real FrenchForeignLgion at the terrible battle of 3rc,d'ddrtu,6fr*d1 on the royalexpedition campaign. The Legionitself ,5ansbd.rds.lc.EGrd)!cb,6addhb Barbastro wassobadlydamaged by the Carlistbayonets that it played no bn odu. s.lo,e oul.cr.s, r0 Md B e6 dddFbcdtu!i!tu further important part in the war. There were also deserers dhdo.d6sd'dliso{&it,rndn,$n05 poorqualitythat fromtheBritishLegion,but theywereof such hi srd'dsd0ldsdr chh 6.d!d lre,6 r.ri rc 6ndditud75dpreferred theCarlists to depo( themratherthenemploy them. Foreignvolunteer officers,mainlyFrcnch,alsoserved, but r 0*!, 0it0drn jdfu d 9 r'iG e tsh 6 23ih D.ru. S.rlr!..n sd). cb. r0 :dd whose Prince Lichnowsky andCaptain Henningsen, booksare d{. or34in: !tb: tdd: u .d rr!. sE ld 2 x Fc) b .r ton|nlil. of od* of suhgreatvalue, were Prussian and Bdtish respectively. n ffi:Miq6adFdkh$i9',6 They wereboth lancerofficersin the Army of the Nofih and appeartohavebelieved in the cause ofCarlos.Apart from the niimb PrP: uKErPo t25r lhn! s addde dufis r:ic, s-ra c hn !d goodorveryforthcoming, pay,whichwasprobablynotvery the rGonaBsl cuiorE:5r (nnf!00) (m. rdm) Pb rro' t drr rd ddrry. onER coumEr: 50( was no doubt their belief foreignen'chief reason for serving that by upholdingthe foresof reactionin Spainthey were Europe. holding backtheliberals throughout wasrequired to provide a ce(ain numberofrations each The Arny of the North was (until the introductionof village week; these numbers rose when troops were billeted in the area, conscription in 1837), in theory,raised by voluntary enlistment, but it cameto includea very high proportionof the available but after they movedon the areawas exemptfot a time. A particularly manpowerof thefourprovinces, because themajor different systemprevailedin NavaJreifamers $,erecomplled towns of Sar Sebastidn,Bilbao, PamDlonaand Vitoda to hand in their crops,which were then ground,storedand distributed. suppo(ed the Cristinos. A volunteer armyhadadvantages over eventuallv The daily rationwassupposed to be a poundof whitebread,a one madeup of conscript!. whenaflairsweregorng especially poundoI meatanda pint ofwine. Ifthe practice of the Cristino well.butin theendrt was vulnerable more to thewarweariness whicheventually caused Maroto's'lreason".The Ca istsalso army wasfollowed, ofliceN would dine individually rather than andthe menwould divide into groupsof about 12with sufferedfrom homesickness, pressure was in a mess, and considerable pot. a large Every manwould havea woodenspoonand a lump broughtto bearon the royalexpedition to returnto its base in of bread. As he cameto the pot he dippedin his spoonand October1837. In addition,Ca ist arcaswerenaturallyplaced continuing untilthe pot wasempty. understrainby havinga largeproportionof their men away retired,the process Like the Cristinos, the Carlists seem to havedwelt in billets or from home.Because the armymainlyfoughtin its own region, in the open. A British officer thought that Spainwasan ideal men lended lo ddft away in large numbers after a reverseor country for the transport of tents because there were so many duringa periodof inactivityand normallydrifted back later. firstrate mules, but apparently Spaoiards tended to do without Sone, however, did not retum, and it was alleged that they (Henderson, such cover I,255-57). lt is also likely that the wouldbe nade to do soby having theirrelatives beaten badly. Carlists used runners and not horsemen to deliver messases. At the beginning ofthe war, at least,wivesfollowed their men Thispractice wasob\erved by a BritishofficernearSalarnairca on campargn. Beingbased amongits supporters, and dpendent uponthe in 1832,who statedthat relaysof men equippedwith only help or at leastacquiescence of the civilianpopulation,the musketsand cross-beltswould run adoss country, travelling postsa leagueanda half or two leagues apart, andthey Carlist military naturallytried to devisea systemof supply btween would convey quicker (Badcock, despatches than horsemen whichwould cause offenceonly when offencewas intended. 54). The fleetness of foot of Carlis. inJantry, their light was place generals Such a system in by 1835. Underit, began by equipment and the rocky terrain of much of the northem payingfor what they needed by bonor (papermoney),which provinceswould haveaddedto the advantages of runners.lt is weremadeworthwhile by theirbeingredeemable onlyif Carlos known that (zdaotes), who Cabrem had a body of light infantry won. Much more satisfactory, however,wasthe purchase of evenwhen cloth for uniforms from France or (through agents) ftom could keepup with a dder over ter to twelvleagues, part the lalter trotted for of the way. Bilbao,or to have parties raiding bringit backfromCastile. Th army sent the cloth to towns and villages, which were each to make a certainnumberof berets,trouselsand coats;those INFANTRY townsandvillages suspected ofliberal sentiments received the largest amountofwork.The Carlists $ere ahvays eager to have The infantry was not formed into regimentsbut into indepenwhichweresaidto be600,800or, in the case theirarmywellfed,andtheydivided provinces the Basque into dentbattalions, of districts, appointing a commissary in eachone.Everytownand units from Guiprizcoa, 850 strong. The battalions, which of

S&A

SCENICS

much as British regularsand Auxiliary l-egion and at a les coursewere frequentlyunder strength,were organised sPeed in that theycouldmoveat amazing in the Cristino army, with six companiesof irrilelos, one of the rcgularCdstinos never lost this and they rocky and mountainouslandscape, over ol cazadorcs or tiradorcs, or canbinercs and orc sranaderos ;ith drumsand buglesto relay orders.(In 1835a captured advantage. adcle, in the earlydaysthe main As statedin the previous regimental band was recnrited, but after Zumalacirregui rcalisedthat the band required a cart and two mulesto carry its aimof Zumahcareguiwasto buildup the spidtofhis soldiels, and favourable fought his battlesin chosen whereit and he therefore he packedit off to royal headquarters, instruments forces to more than a minimum not to expose his terrain in order plaing 1838.) Three been as late as July seemsto have battalionsformed a brigade and six to eight, dependingon the of risk. If threatened by an outflanldng manoeuwe he alsohada trick of stadng a fight late largerthana withdrew. Zumalacdrregoi province, a division. At leastin battle,formations prevent movements and to to outflanking in the day in order hom brigade appearto havebeenof varyingsize.Battalions if need be. Normally he away more easily allow his men to slip manyoccasion.. dilferenrprovincesfoughliogetberon of his force, holding the only a nino;ty would at first commit as line, even were considered The rnajorityof the troops was usethe term,andtherewasalsoa group rest in resefle in open order. The lack of ammunition thoughCarlistsdidnot his problem Zumahceregui ordered for the Ca ists. always a del Ejlr.ito. of 6fiteor specialunits. Apartftom the Gronadercs were in battle, and since until they actually troops not to load \alll's in Femando ftom voluntee^previously fomed in 1836 a manfor a fight, four, rounds Royal Guard, there were battalions of Navarreseand Alavese theymighthaveonlyten,or even companies of invalidson the they were rigorouslytrained in self control. The infantry independent Guides (Gl.&?r), frequently opened fire at very shortrange,anditwas taughtto border with France,and customsguards(,4ducn?ros). rely on the bayonet. The Guiasde Nava a, at fint saidto be Navaresebut later werereluctant to stand the theearlyCarlists Not surprisingly, deserters from the andLeonese consisting of Castilians largely trained them until line, but Zumalacdnegui fire of a formed were reported ty one Navarese and the 3rd Royal Guard, mentioned that they were assteadyasany other infantry. They often launched to have been thebestin the army;healso Carlist failed to althoughthey probablyfrequently wasnot a particularly bayonetcharges, Zumalacerregui\ favoured6th Navarrese wars who earlier in this As anyone has studied make contact. renowned (Henningsen, Another I, 128-29). unit distinguished place look in the open, will when a bayoiet attack area know, alre heit Los Chapelzuis was the sth Guipfzcoa$,called unit theclash ofsteel. Be almost always brokebefore oneofthesides whiteberetsdistinctive plains very heavily on the of the Cristinos lost that as it may, the raising of the A popularCarlistsongof the time records (also near Vitoria on 27 and 28 known as Alegria) Salvatierra it are mentioned El In of Navara in 1833. fint four battalions pimero Ia ensalada (hodgepodge), El segundo la morena October1834when their lines were broken by a Navarese (brown, swarthy), El relcerc el reque6 and El cuatto Ia hiefia bayonet assault,and as a result they took to moving in large delined io charge. whichthe Carlists (goodgrass). is saidto columns, The nameof the third battalion bt]nd panisans X, of Charles havebeena Frenchhunting call usedby Evenit did not hit ihe enemy,a mass assault by the Carlhts who fled to Spain to support the Absolutists after the 1830 wasstill a fearsome event.It was especially fiighteningif its thewordwas participants war. thatof 1936-39, In the lastCarlist revolurion. shouted, asdid the Basques at night. Onewitness "to a wolfs genenllyto Carlistmilitia. applied described thelatterasstarting like a hone, changing the army had ho$,I, At the time of the deathof Zumalacrrregui andfinally(ending) with the shake like the expiring notes glown to about 30,000men. The infantry was organisedin 35 of a jackass's bray" (Bacon,380;Bolleart,II, 290).Another - 12lineandoneof guides fivelineand personoDthe receivingendof a Carlist attack, at Oriamendi (16 fromNavarra, battalions seven from March1837) from Alava,fivelinefrom Guipfzcoa, oneof guides described vividlyhow, afteralong, wailingsound (Barado, 226;Albi andStampa, of bugles,"a mighty cloud of ski.mishers,fo owed by a dense Vizcaya andfoul ftom Castile By 1837 column of Navarreseinfantry" rusheddown from a mountain different figures). ix, gives slightly 222.Henningsen,l, 2|4 to 1l line, and in 20 minuteswere overrunningenemylines and swarming were down were battalions. The Navarese there Therewere over hils in their thousands hadeighteach. andVizcayans but the Guipfzcoans in skinnishing order.The author (formed from recentlyvisitedthe siteof this chargeandcanstatethat he would and Valencians aho two each of Aragonese battalion, not have collected by G6mezon hismid), the foreign recruits beenableto coverthe ground in thattime today,even the Gnnaderos del Ei'rcilo, and last the Madrid Volunteers, a without being shot at (HenningseD,ll, 19-20). The Carlist I, 68;Pirala,IV, 29-31 probablytwo Alavese,three unit of poorquality(Lichnowsky, , gives forcesinvolvedwere, however, had14 Guiprizcoan, At a laterdateNavarra in February 1837). 46battalions andtwo Aragonese battalions). the most apparently Vizcaya nineandAlava seven, battalions, In order to guard againstsuchattacks,both sidesmadegreat thearmyhad useof fieldfortifications, By mid 1838 whichwereraised in theseprovinces. entrenchments andfortifiedhouses. It (Bacon,108;Albi and StamPa, 277).One is not diffiuft 1o convert a Basque farmhouse into a small to 26,000 declined work (Apalategui,90) claims that there were 24 Castilian stronghold by diggingditchesaround it and loopholingthe This figureseensunlikelyto walls. place in the summerof1837. battalions Muchbitterfightingtook arcund such strongpoints, units whichrhe Carlisls no doubtsomeshort-lived havebeendttained,although provedablero caprure on manyoccasions. ollhe royalexPedilion were raired in thewake Wheretheyfailedwasin attacks on majortowns. Notonly was thatZumalac6rregui'sgreatplanwas It mustnot be forgotten their artillery often insufficient, but it also appearc that the not to makebis army a replicaof the regularforces(although infantry may not have been ove y keen to form the close than columns at light warfare muchmorecompetent these soonbecame who lived needed to assault a breach, An Englishman mosiothe$ in Europe)nor to leaveit as a guerrillaband.He thrcugh or French bothsieges ofBilbaobelievedthat anEnglish andbuilda regularly general would have attacked and acceptedthe 1,000 or so the bestof bothworlds wanted to combine armywhichwouldretainits casualties andsupplied disciplined, organised which would haveoccuned, but that the Carlistswere powerto movefreely andrapidly over a typesof terain. lf the unable to do so (Bacon.338). veryfrequently, this ontothe openplains armydid not venture Like the Cristinos,the Carlistswere exceptionallyfrugal and in had greatpowersof patience not the resultofits inabilityto meetthe Cristinos failurewas They were also and endurance. in often most carefulnot to loseanyweaponin battle, for musketswre of difficulties of supply but mther because openbaitle, and the lack of a strongcavalry. hard to comeby. One of their advantages hostilelands,homesickness, in this respect was overthe their superiormobility,which allowedthem to keep hold of were,nevertheless, at a $eat advantage The Carlists

23 possible thirweapons iJtheyhadto flee,something not always for the regularforces. plundered fromt}le TheCarlistscommonly everything usable evenlootingunder heavy enemydead except stocks andshakos, fire. It alsowastheir habit to try to preventthe enemyfrom a takingthe bodies of their own dead.If they weredefending positiontheydug a trench,andjust beforethe Cristinos were uponthemstripped the bodies of anything of valueandburied them, Peasants with wooden stretchers sometimes carried Carlistwounded ftom thefield. The Carlists may have formed battalions rathet than regiments because theypreferred the flexibilityof the smaller units, althoughin fact the companyand battalionwere the also normaltactical formations on both sides. Zumalac6rregui ensured that his units had an unusuallyhigh propotion of NCOS in order to allowthem to be dividedinto smallgroups the withoutloss of control. Apart fromthese changes, however, soldien were apparently drilled in the commontacticsof the period, no doubt at times with the aid of the 1791French regulations whichwerestill standard for thegovernment army. Carlistbattalions could and did form squareagainst cavalry, reserving theirfire until thelastmoment. Accordingto the rport of an observerwith the Crislino forces written at the end of 1834. the Carlists movedforward andretreated in Derfect order.whetherinclose columnor line. The observer addedthat the Carlists were better skimhhers than the Cristinolight infantry and that their officeN were (Duncan,14). covered in scars from the war of lndependence and Itis clearthatthe Carlists, like theFrenchrevolutionaries A the Cistinos, would use entire battalions as skirmishers. wasto havea battalion supported by common tactic engrefr,Tla, thistactic twoor morcin close order.Zumalacdneguiemployed at Salvatiera./Alegria, where a skirmishingbattalion was backedby two otherser,bdral/dand a fourth in reserve;cavalry guardedthe flanks. At the Carlist victory o{ Villar de los Navarros(24 August 1837)the right wing had a Navarese battalionin skirmishing order, and behindit otherNavarese lunits,the Granaderosdel Eillciro and two Aragonesebatta' lions.Thecentre wascomposed of the artillery(four guns)and the left consisted of four Alavese battalions in the first line and Castilians in the second. The cavalryappears to have been lurkinginambush, anditdebouched to greateffect. Notwithstanding the Carlists' lack of ammunition and fondnessfor the bayonet, they would sometimes deliver propery (2-3January volleyfire. At Segura 1835), Zumalacerregui,in orderto halta Cristino offensive, decidedthat hisarmy wouldfor oncehaveto sufferhaly losses. Whenattackingthe enemycolumns on the march,the Carlists delivered a rolling fire and then a fire by platoons,and Henningsen found its regularityand order surprisingfor what he still (probably unfairly)rhought.obe half-disciplined troops(Il,45-6,60).At a tatr peiod in the battle th 1st Navarese and Gulasde Ndrdlrd"opened left andright" to allowthegeneral's squadron of escorting cavalryto chargethroughat the gallop, a very doesnot. however. considerabls featof drill. This manoeuvre the Ptncrpe seem to havedonethehorsemen muchgood,since regiment, drawnup threedeep,haltedthemwithitsfire. IEIDALEIBOTEBAIGE
MACIC TIIE GATI'ERING

F&Ellig

Hercss Miniarurss
teoe eb sPtuE tr $Pl

s30 2sY

ad---------__l lus. M.dt, mdrhE


lFrtbbs NorrhY stur 1908

r"-r 5or2s lr"dr,,*|1


ttudiNqRlk' leio I:@ c$s Nde lror s'a .r.t l:ei6 haHdn. 4,c I I I I I .r@etu@!to6@!.d! a*|l&(Bd6lLleoq
P@fuiB}d<.dldjdq! uK.qhtfu@odc.bd

I I

$rtuq!ttu,+od.oc
rGci4!@!!(&Gsoot

UMFORMS,WEAPONS ANDEQUIPMENT
Althoughno dressregulations survive,the Carlists did try to uniformtheir forces,and a vaguely consistent appearance is paintings shown in mostontemporary andprints.The system of manufacturing uniforms has alreadybeen described; in addition fromFrance. Evenso,there , unifoms werepurchased wasseldomenoughclothingto go around,and Carlists wore whattheystripped from friendandfoe,eventheredcoats of the British Auxil'ary Legion, which they wore underneath their

greatoats, wastheBasque of Carlistuniforms TheoneuniveNal feature and Navarese beret, called the boina in Castilianand the The beretwaslarge,157a'ord)cm across ,.rapela in Basque. impossible to (largerin sorne cases), and it madethe Carlists mistake(excptthat the Cristino crap?lSorrir alsowore it see part 2). Moreover,because of its sizeand the fact that it was asanumbrella waterproof loth,itcouldserve madeftomthick, hada central demanded. Mostberets or sunshade asconditions rnainbody, colour to that ofthe roundel, in a contrasting cloth wereommon in ordettomaintain Internalhoops anda tassel. "secrets",which the shaDe.and some berets had metal protected Exceptfor the green the headfrom swordstrokes. werered,blueor wom volunteers, berets boindr by Portuguese white. The original systemof colour wasapparentlyfor inJantry to wear blue berets and regimental oficers red, but Cristino appearto have been the only ones to have sha+shooters andgenenllyall ranksin a unit wore approved of thisscheme, seniorones, bretsof the samecolour. Officers,especially hasbeensuggested that tended to havegoldor silvertassels.It were red for 8rdndderos,yellow for cazadoferandwhite tassels definitely fori6/e/or, but the only unitswheresucha system prevailed of Cabrera's army, and were the Tortosabattalions of at least here the coloun were different. The flank companies in the better than their comrades one battalionwere drcssed centre companies, and were composed of older soldiers. Infantry pioneen appearto have worn red bercts at least until andcouldhave thea\esand andtheyalsoltore full beards 1837, equipment of their equivalents in th Cristino forces. The in sported beards andmoustaches someCristinos, Carlists,like plenty,andtheywerealsonotedfor theirlonghair. frock which fell to The coat wasnormally a double-breasted just abovethe knees,but single-breasted shell jacketsand greatcoats (the hookedback lattersometimes double-breasted werealsowom.All threehadopen, like those of the Cristinos) standingcollars. The offiial dressof the line was a grey lrock

*"ut, tt " "opa", ,"hi.t ,ras cut down frcm a Crisuno grealcoal Sergeants rnayhaveworn gold chevrcnson the lower arm, their It was to have had collar patches of several colours rvhich pointsfacingup, with onefor a second sergeant and two for a denoted theprovinces, but onlytheredofGuipfzcoais known. first sergeant; corporals mayhavehadthe samesystem, but in Browncoats and iackets werealsoworn, andblue ones,made redandon the upperarm. itemwas Oneadditional andpopular ftom captured garments,must also have been common. the zanafta, a plain blacktur (sometineswolf fur) pelissewith Trousenweresupposed to havebeenredin winterandwhitein about three toggles on the chest,a simplifiedversionof the jacket. and weresometimes rolled up for easein marching. wel-knownhussar summer, Buttonsappear to havebeenbrass. The blue of th beretwas worewhat they pleased, but their uniJorm usually Generals a yellowroundelanda whitetassel includeda blue coat and a red or white beret. Trappingsof rank fairlybright,with probably in its centre.The G iar de,4/dvahad a red beretand the 5th suchas embroidered and holsters. orders.and saddle-cloths (white-caps). evenjackboots were known as Los Chapelzuri: Guipdzcoans couldb seenon generals and and aiguillettes witnesses one battalionasrollingits greatcoats and staff officers, althoughit is doubtful they were usedin the field. described wearing them across their bodies, and another in grey At Vergarathe Carlist leaderswere dressed muchmore soberly greatcoats for the officersandNCOS, than Esparteroa;rdhis train. andblue berets,except who wore all coloun. An officer of the British Auxiliary Lgion Ofle of Zumalacdrregui's officers wrote that the general,who v/ith a greatdealof experience, whichendedwith the sightof was knolvn familiarly as l rio ?onds (Uncle Thomas), always the army drawn up at vergara, said that the Carlist foot wore a rode a white horse. He added that Zumalacirregui always short,loose bluetunic.redtrcusers, anda beretofred, whiteor dressedthe sameway (although this statementis conradicted blue if they were from Navarra, Vizcaya or Guipdzcoa by severalpictures):a red beret with a silver tassel,black wasseen respectively. A drummer-boy in a rcdjacketandwhite zarnalralined with white fur andwith red velvet edgingandgilt trousers, and one obsefler commentedthat other drummers clasps, greytrousers l, and largeSpanish spurs(Henningsen, adrum major 90). werebadlycladin various colou$. He described as "the least impressivepersonageof that rank I had hitheno It appearsthat the canrirrff (vivandiaresin French), who I,334,II, 165;Henningsen, acomoanied seen"(Honan,68,98i Henderson, battalions into battle.drcssed muchlike the men. t,14142). This conclusioncanbe drawn by the fact that the ofJicerof the Someof the specialunits wore distinctive uniforms.The Bitish Auxiliary Legionwho rescuedthe woundedc4l.tinraof e\le(Eghtilg Guiasde Nava./a, which at onestageroseto I ,000 the 5th GuiprizcoaBattalion and who later married her at first with yllowtails,collan, and rnistook the young, cigar-smokingFrenchwomanfor a man. men,dressed first in greycoatees souare-ended chestbars:$ouserswere red. As this costume Shewaswearinga whiteberet,white cashmere vest,embroi from the dead;later deredwaistcoat, wore out, the men equipped themselves goldends,similar to overcoat, a red sashwith they wore blue jacketswith red "binding" and greytrousers. that wom by "many Carlistofficers,"and a large amountof jervellery (Henderson, I, 337-44, forher story). 'ft,e Gmnadercsdel Ejarciro wore dark blue capotesor shell wore bootsor shoes, especially in The Carlists sometimes jackets, with whiterard,nerar on thecuffsandbarson thecollar. winter, but their normalfootwearwas the rope-soled sandal red, beretsblue with a yellow (d/pdgara), Buttonswere white, trousers which wasalsornuchusedby the queen's troops who wereto andindeedby Spaniards roundelandwhitetassel. The MadridVolunteers. genemlly for a long time bforeand guard the Cantabriancoast, had blue caporerwith brass after the war. The sandalwasideal for rushing over mountains buttons,greytrousers and red berets. Therewasalsoa small butnotsogoodin thewet, anditwasthen at timesreplaced by bodyguard known as rhe Alaba lercs de k Gua ia de k the abdlca,a leatherbrogue.Somesoldienwere not usedto Personadel ReJ and later ^s the Gua ias de Honor. Yo,rng anddid not take to any "closed" shoesincesandals were natural men sened in the company,which was a sort of military to them. Even though sandalswere more easily made than academy, andleftwiththerankoflieutenant. The firstuniform shoes, the lackof anyfootwear wasfrequently a problen. was a sky blue frok coat with red cuff flaps, rdl.lir?errr, collar No doubt captured crcss-belts,packs and cartridge boxes grey weresometimes bars,andpoinlendedchestbars.The coat laterbecame *as used, butthe standard infantryequipment (darkbluefor officers) with blackcuffsandcollarpatches and much lighter and consisted of only two items.First was the werered, latergrey. Buttonswere sa.r-rro'al, alsotakenup by the Cdstinos,a light, white canvas whiterardrnerdr. Trcusers white,beretsblue with ayellowroundel andwhitetassel. pack held in placeby strapsundr the arms.In it the soldier had The deserters from the Portuguese Legionbegan in their old a shirt, sparcalparyata:, and food for day. Few pictures show no doubt they also kept their water unifom (seepart 2 ofthis series) with greenbercts;theylater Carlistswith canteens; overa Aroundthewaist,sometimesworn took up the grey coat and red trousersof the line infantry. The bottlesintheirpacks. "Napoleonic" wasablack belt which held a canana or belly box. The redsash, Osna Battalion may have worn a type of pockets, had 20 tin tubes, each for a cartridge, and two each box uniform, with a tailed coat cut like the Frenchiart, with by a two packeas of canridges, the wholecovered redcollar containing cut-away red lapehwhichrevealed a *hite waistcoat, flap.Thereweremanyadvantages to thissystem. and cuffs, yellorv epaulettesand bnss buttons. TrousN were blackleather redwith a bluestripe,theberetwhitewth ayellowroundel and It was more comfortableto wear than a traditional box. which greytassel.Not all the customsguardsworc uniform, but those bounced on th right hip (although the Cristino practice of a waistbelt reduced the movement o{ the latter);it left that did had a short brown jacket, of typical Spanishstyle but wearing "braces" not muchwom in the Army of the North. The jackethadfour the upperhaff of the body ftee (althoughif leather rowsof silverbuttonsdown the front and five buttonson the were addedto the box this was lesstrue); it was more difficult cuffs.lt waswom open in order to displaya multi-buttoned for the soldier to lose rounds in his confusion; it allowed for brown waistcoatanda red sash.Trouserswere browni the beret nore rapid fire. Belly boxeshad been wom by British and Americanlight troopsin the AmericanWar oflndependence, wasbluewith a yellowroundel andwhitetassel. thattheBritishandFrench objectedtotheir The unifom of officers wasby and large the sameas that of but it wasclaimed by formed in line because they were more likely to use soldie^ generals, wore epaulettes their men. Someofficen, especially (HenniDgsen, in front I, 10G7; be ignited by the fire of the man and red sashes, and it has been speculated that regimental officers showedtheir rank by one or two rings of meta ic braid Lichnowsky, I, 70). The French Foreign l-egion, however, the beuybox in Spainand usedit for yearsafter the aroundth cuffs,eitherstraight(lieutenant-colonels, captains adopted and second lieutenants) or pointed(majorsand lieutenants).

25

95 MILITAIRE NORTHEAST
1995 Saturday 4thMarch BOWL at the REDCAR 10.00a.m. to 4.00p.m.

YORKWARCAMES soCrETy

SATURDAY4TN FEBRUAXY 1995 Admhsim f L50Adulr 50plunior

[INIATUNESWARGAUING BOABDGAI'ING FANTASY BOLE PLAYII{GGAUES rFAOE STANOS REfREStII'ENIS .

& PARTICIPATION GAMES


& NATIONAI) {LOCAL

COMPETITION GAMES
{lnvitation,lnterClub knock.our)

BRING & BUY STAND


PARNC|PATION ANDDEI'ONSIRA'ION GAIES

RE.ENACTMENT SOCIETIES TRADE STANDS BRING& BUY STALL

The 1{orlheast's Wargames Gonrenti0n own


Adults t1.50 O.A.P'3 e1.00Chlldren50D

The bayonetwasnormally wom on the right of the canaM in a black leather frog, with the socket angled to the front. When scabbards werenot to hand,soldiers at times made holes in their beltsandstuckthe bayonets through them. Officers' swordbelts wereof the nomal sort, of black, or occasionally white, leather, with two slings.They could be wom undemealhthe frock coat. Officers caried any swords they could obtain; th men likewise used a variety of types of muskets. Zumalacdnegui establishedmusket factories at Eulate and Segrara, and rhe Carlistsalsoheld the old factory at Eybar for the fiIst 18months of the war. The mw materials and cnftsmen were available, although at limes the necessarymachinery was not. French, GermanandBritish modelswerecommon.The Soaniards liked lheir banelsro shine.but rbe Brilishpraclice ofduUjng banels would have beenan advantage in mountainwarfare, wherethe glint of polishedsteel*ould give awaya position. The Cadists seem to have had a few rifles. A sniDerhit a Cdstinomarineofficer at the rao8eof 300or 400yardsafter many attempts,but this feat could havebeenperfomed with a (very) lucky shotwith a nusket (Far, 120).The Alradelos had "English carbines" with long sword-bayonets(Bueno [198,4], 16). Like the weapons of the Cristino light regiment Re,'la Gobenadoru, the!tr,mlust havebeen Baker.ifles. SomeCarlist rnusketswere describedas "about 3 or 4 incheslonger (thatr a Bdtish musket), nuch nanower in the muzzle,and very light; they carry a ball to a geat distance,doing excutionfor beyond a mile." Skimishers sometimes loaded with two bulets ("Voluntee/',21-22).

Where can I Jind 2000Military Books?


ln the

KENTROTMAN Catalogue
of course!

Ken Trotman Ltd


FineandRareBooks on Military Hismry andWeaponry

tor attee catabgue novl

Mailorderis our speciality. KENTROTMAN LTD. UNIT 11,135DITTON WALKCAMBRIDGE, cBs 80D

You might also like