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503–508, 2000
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Discussion
Eve Seguin*
The debate between Bloor and Latour is based on a fundamental misunderstanding
due to too narrow a view of what Bloor calls ‘the field’. The boundaries of this ‘field’
are not defined by the sociological analysis of the content of science: SSK and Latour
do not share the same object of study. Latour’s approach marks a shift from the social
determinants of scientific knowledge to the ontological labour performed by scientific
activity. The research on the science/society interface has generated two approaches.
Some works tackle the social factors which determine science. Their object is society
in science. Other works address the social role of science. Their object of study is
science in society. The difference in the way SSK and Latour look at science is
an incarnation of this division. A re-conceptualization of ‘the field’ based on the
acknowledgement of these two objects is perhaps the only way to allow for a diversity
of approaches in the study of the science/society interface. 2000 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0039-3681(00)00020-0
503
504 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
mapping of the vast domain of research that tackles the links between science
and society.
When Latour states ‘I think David is right in everything he says’ (Latour, 1999a;
p. 113), we should not see any irony in his remark. Indeed, Bloor’s difficulty in
accepting Latour’s work comes from his addressing it from the viewpoint of SSK.
Change the viewpoint and the work under attack changes accordingly. Bloor’s
thesis is that ‘the two approaches are deeply opposed’ (Bloor, 1999a; p. 81). Of
course, Latour agrees. Unfortunately, it seems to me that to read the debate in such
simple terms is to miss something crucial. Bloor’s statement suggests that the two
approaches are intended to explain the same phenomenon in divergent ways. But
what phenomenon exactly? No doubt that for Bloor, Latour seeks to develop an
alternative to SSK for studying science as knowledge: ‘His aim is to produce some
manner of non-sociological, non-reductionist analysis of knowledge...’(Bloor,
1999a; p. 86). ‘Knowledge’ is a collectively held belief system. For exponents of
SSK all belief systems are equal in the sense that their credibility is explainable
by social factors (Barnes and Bloor, 1982; Bloor, 1976). Here, we touch the greatest
achievement of SSK—that is, the secularization of scientific knowledge. But for
Latour the analysis of science in terms of belief has limited value because it ignores
the distinctive character of science as practice. Exponents of SSK do not address
this question for the excellent reason that their goal is to eliminate the gap that
epistemology builds between science and ‘irrational’ beliefs.
For Latour the interesting aspect is that science differs profoundly from other
cosmologies. The difference between science and other forms of ‘knowledge’ lies
in the activity of the laboratory. This is perhaps the most important component of
his work. His description of lactic acid, for instance, beautifully captures the impor-
tance he gives to the scientific laboratory: ‘...the acid is not presented as a substance
durable in time and defined by its attributes but rather by a collection of verbs
referring to laboratory gestures. Acid is ultimately a procedure, a recipe, and is
coextensive with a course of action.’ (Latour, 1996; p. 83). This means that science
is not to be regarded as a collection of beliefs. It is a set of procedures that activate
a reality. Latour concludes his account of Pasteur’s discovery of lactic acid yeast
by stressing the role of science in the production of realities: ‘...he [Pasteur] has
given a phenomenon its chance’ (Latour, 1996; p. 87). This clearly shows that we
are no longer in the study of science as knowledge.
Latour’s approach marks a shift from the social determinants of scientific knowl-
edge to the ontological labour performed by scientific activity. As we will see
below, such activity is political through and through, and Latour has now
accomplished the task of giving science a political philosophy. Here, the point that
must be stressed is that the boundaries of what Bloor calls ‘the field’ are not defined
by the sociological analysis of the content of science: SSK and Latour do not share
the same object of study. Insofar as SSK seeks to shed light on the social interests
that condition the formation of scientific knowledge, its object can be called
Bloor, Latour, and the Field 505
should give way to a conceptualization along the lines suggested in Fig. 1. This
is perhaps the only way to do justice to this rich area of research and to allow for
a diversity of approaches.
References
Barnes, B. and Bloor, D. (1982) ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge’,
in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell), pp.
21–47.
Bloor, D. (1976) Knowledge and Social Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Bloor, D. (1999a) ‘Anti-Latour’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30A(1),
81–112.
Bloor, D. (1999b) ‘Reply to Bruno Latour’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
30A(1), 131–136.
Callon, M. and Latour, B. (1992) ‘Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath School! A
Reply to Collins and Yearley’, in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture
(Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press), pp. 343–368.
Freimiller, J. (1998) ‘Unnatural Discourse’, Social Theory and Practice 24(2), 283–299.
Friedman, M. (1998) ‘On the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Its Philosophical
Agenda’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29A(2), 239–271.
Latour, B. (1996) ‘Do Scientific Objects Have a History? Pasteur and Whitehead in a Bath
of Lactic Acid’, Common Knowledge 5, 76–91.
508 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Latour, B. (1999a) ‘For David Bloor … and Beyond: A Reply to David Bloor’s ‘Anti
Latour’’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30A(1), 113–129.
Latour, B. (1999b) Politiques de la nature. Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie
(Paris: La Découverte).
Seguin, E. (1996) ‘L’analyse politique de la science: technocratie vs discours scientifique’,
Politix 36, 181–193.
Seguin, E. (2001) ‘Narration and Legitimation. The Case of In Vitro Fertilisation’, Dis-
course & Society 12(3), forthcoming.
Woolgar, S. (1992) ‘Some Remarks about Positionism: A Reply to Collins and Yearley’,
in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago/London: University of
Chicago Press), pp. 327–342.