Mind Association

Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements Author(s): I. Berlin Reviewed work(s): Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 235 (Jul., 1950), pp. 289-312 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251174 . Accessed: 18/04/2012 14:33
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VOL. LIX.

No. 235.]

[JUlY, 1950

M IND
A QUARTERLY
OF

REVIEW

PSYCHOLOGY

AND PHILOSOPHY

I.-EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS AND HYPOTHETICAL STATEMENTS BY I.

IT
BERLIN

is becoming the fashionamong empiricist philosophers to assumethat phenomenalism is reallydead' at last. Provokedinto existence of material by non-naturalistic notions substance, it successfully undermined a sufthem;butit shared ficient number offundamental with metaphysical assumptions its rival to perish defeated ofthought which with itwhen thesystem nourished bothwas destroyed, in the veryact of victory.A better thanthatof Descartes or Locke,but stillan ontology it is therefore nowheldto be obsolete;and doubtless Sontology, is dead,the thisis howit ought to be. But ifphenomenalism ofit stillhaunts of ofmodern discussions memory thewritings nature of the external -the wordto a surprising degree; from Eddington's two desks,to the morerefined and notorious penetrating analysis of better equipped philosophical authors, its presence it makes the form of a clearly felt, usually taking sharp distinction between observation statements andthose ; now concerning material senses objects; nowbetween twoor more of the verb "to see"; at othertimesbetween'basic' or ' protocol' sentences and thoseofordinary speech; orbetween ' ofspeech; orbetween " and " weak" ' modes " strong various verification. Such versions of it are almostalwaysformally " implications; guaranteed to carry no "metaphysical nevertheless their resemblance discredited striking to theolder variety is hardto overlook. Hence,an examination ofits latestmaniis notsucha flogging festations ofa deadhorse as at first it may seemto be; forif it is dead, its ghostwalks,and should, ifpossible, be laid.
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Twofurther assumptions are madein thecourse ofthefollowing remarks: (i) The argumelt against the phenomenalistanalysis of common-sense statements leaves open the questionwhether the information providedby the exact sciencessuch as physics, can be translated lossintophenomenalist without terms. Perhapsit can; and perhapsthis demonstrates something of importance; it has alwaysbeen considered that the languageof sciencecould, with no alterationof its " meaning ", be translatedinto solipsisticterms; which, however, is not held to be an argument in favour of solipsism. But if such a "translation" does not adequately render theempirical descriptions ofordinary language, this willaffect the propositions of scienceonlyin so faras these claim to be an extension of ordinary languageused to describe theworld, and nota specialised method ofreferring to aspectsofit forsomenarrower, predictive orother, purposes-a specialised use of wordswhichmay be susceptible to a phenomenalist analysis. In any case the answerto the questionwhether this is so is, I believe,logically independent ofthe restofmyargument. (ii) Nor do I wishto denythehistorical achievement ofphenomenalism. Whateverits defects-and I shall wish to say that they are fatal-it has made less excusableany return to those ancient delusions which the philosophersof substance from Thales to G. F. Stout have done muchto promote. But beneas its influence ficent has been, it has overstayed its welcome; its continuedpresencedoes more harm than good; and the argument set out belowis intended to provideadditionalreasons forconsigning it finally to an honoured grave. I Many forms of modernempiricism, and in particular modern phenomenalism, rest on the view that expressions describing materialobjectsmustin principle be capable of beingtranslated (without residue)into sets of sentences about the data of actual or possibledirectsensible acquaintance, past,present and future, on the part of real or possibleobservers;(sensibleis hereused in the widestsense-to coverall states,activities or dispositions capable of being studied by empirical methods). Any alternativetheoriesof how material object propositions are to be analysed tend to be rejected out of hand by modernempiricistson the groundthat this must at some stage involve beliefin the existenceof non-sensible or transcendent entities or characteristics, and this is ruledout forthe familiar reasons

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advanced,forexample,by Berkeley, and restson his theory. of words; accordingto this, no expressionspurporting to describematerialobjects can have any meaning, let alone be true, unlessall the entitiesor characteristics to whichtheyrefer are eitherfoundin sensibleexperience-in the sense of " sensible" defined above-or can be analysedintoentities or characteristics so found. Since most empiricists hold that any alternative analysisof materialobject propositions involvesthe possibility of acquaintance with non-sensible entitiesor characteristicsand this they hold to be an unintelligible suggestion-phenomenalismappears to followautomatically. Disagreement can arise onlyabout the adequacy of this or that suggested analysis of how materialobject sentences are to be " reduced" (without residue)to sentences describing bothwhat the observer does, or did, or will observe,as well as what he would,or would have, mightor mighthave, observedunder appropriate conditions; and the provision ofalternative analyseson theselineshas taxed of some of the acutest philosophers the ingenuity of our day. But commonsense and the philosophers wh-o are in sympathy withit, have always feltdissatisfied. The reduction of material call sense datum object sentences into what we may,forshort, seemedtoleave something sentences, out,to substitute something and attenuated forsomething solidand continuous. intermittent To dispel this sense of discomfort, phenomenalists began to explainthat it was due to a confusion:the viewthattheywere a metaphysical nor a scientific advocatingwas neither of theory weremade of,or how theybehaved,but something whatthings less adventurous-nomorethan an alternative languagecapable in the materialobject all that could be described of rendering forits therapeutic language,and recommended as an properties antidote to metaphysicalhankeringafter non-sensiblesubstitutes. If translationinto the sense datum language still seemedto leave something out-what some philosophers have called the 'irreduciblecategoricalelement' of materialobject this missing element was labelled emotive-a propositions, psychological residue-with no descriptive function; or else it was (with somewhatgreaterinsight)connectedwith the legitimatedemandforthe kindand degreeof vagueness, indefiniteof speechneededby the plain man for ness,and richambiguity his normal, everyday purposes. But it was claimedthat at any rate the hard core of descriptive meaningcould be successfully as it were,into the new language. The phenotransplanted, menalist equivalent of a materialobject sentencemight,like a new shoe, seem uncomfortable at first, but continueduse

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wouldpresently dissipatethis feeling.The discomfort was only " psychological ", due to linguistic habitsharmless in themselves, but tempting philosophers to falsedoctrines about bothlanguage and the world. Commonsense continued to experience a certaindiscomfort, but foundit difficult to formulate it in words. Professor G. F. Stout1 complained that the opaqueness-" the permanent " of materialobjects had been unof sensation impossibility justifiably eliminated. Mr. W. F. R. Hardie 2 foundit puzzling that 'hypothetical' causes could be said to cause ' actual' effects-butthis was held, e.g. by Professor A. J. Ayer3 to be mainlydue to a misunderstanding of the languagewhichphenomenalists weretrying to use or " recommend ". What I propose to do is to tryand articulatewhat the main sourceof the discomfort feltby common sense seemsto me to be, since I think that in this case the doctor'sdiagnosistoo oftenneglectsthe specific natureof the patient'scomplaint. For it seemsto me to be morethan a meresourceofdiscomfort, namelya valid and fatal objection, to the phenomenalist analysis. However,even if I am mistaken in this,the complaint itselfstill seems worth examining. It maybe worthaddingthat evenif phenomenalism turnsout to be unacceptable,some of the stock objectionsto it are not less so. For the familiaranti-phenomenalist theses are often, even whenvalid, formulated in sucha way as to conveyanxiety to salvagealtogether too muchfrom the ruinsofthe theory they are intendedto destroy. Consider, forexample,the fourmost familiar typesofattackupon it. (1) One of the most familiarobjectionsurged against, for example,Berkeley, or Mill or Russell, is that when converting sentencesabout material objects into sentencesabout sense data, they fail to ' convertthe observer' who ' occurs' in the protasis of the hypotheticalstatement,into ' sense data '4 ' material he remains irreducibly '. It has indeedbeensuggested that to ' dissolvethe observer' a secondproposition could be which presumably, constructed, would describethe activities of a second 'observer' who actually or potentiallyobserves
I
2

P.A.S., 1946-47. This argumentwas first developed to the best of my beliefby Professor H. H. Price. A somewhat more complicated method of the progressive " elimination" of material bodies is propounded by Mr. R. B. Braithwaite (" Propositionsabout Material Objects " P.A.S., 1937-38).
3'Phenomenalism',
4

Society,1945-46.

Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, pp. 136-37. 'The Paradox of Phenomenalism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian

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the bodyofthe original ' observer ' ; this 'observer' in his turn a third' observer ' to observehim; and so we shouldget requires a Chinese box series of possible observers-referred to by a seriesofpropositions, whichwouldprogressively logicallysimilar ' reduce' or ' dissolve' theresidualmaterial ofthe object content originalprotasis. This asymptotic processof gradualwhittling wouldtendto theideal limitof pure phenomenalism.Then by one might the series, somehow integrating represent the material terms ofit. A criticism related to theoriginal objectas definablein objection is that such ideal 'observers' and their behaviour could not be properlydescribedwithoutperpetual reference ' their' position to materialobjects,e.g. those whichdetermine in space,movements, etc. Each ofwhichagain,forits analysis, at everypoint presupposes yet other materialobjects, so that down the attempted breaking analysiscannot get goingwithout try at any and everypointin the process. Some philosophers ofthisobjectionby sayingthat such theoretito soften the force limitsset by the context theorieshave pragmatic cally infinite 1 hold and the practicalneeds of the situationand sometimes that sufficiently painstaking analysis(and mostanalystsare too lazy or boredto do the ploddingrequired)could go a long way towardsachieving purephenomenalism.What boththesekinds of objection,whether they are valid or not, suggestis that if phenomenalism fails, it very nearly achieves its result-the residuecan be got downto almost vanishing unresolved point -which is perhapsas muchas one can reasonably hope for. (2) Anotheroftenheard objection is that the hypothetical of observers propositions about the experiences whichare indispensable to the phenomenalist analysis,seem to involve somethinglike the existenceor reality of 'hypotheticalfacts' or sense data', or ' unsensedsensibilia '. For other'hypothetical wise, what do hypotheticals describe? Surely not nothing? And these postulated entities,unknownand unknowableto scienceand commonsense,are, so it is urged, at least as mythological as the Lockean substratum whichtheywereinvokedto exorcise. Phenomenalismis accused of breedingnew metaphysicalentities-withtheirown pseudo-problems: but if we could onlyget rid of thesesomehow, nonsay by an improved, of meaning, all might correspondence theory stillbe well. been assertedthat the promised (3) It has also frequently 'reduction' ofcommon-sense languageby suchmethods as those of Descriptions, Logical Constructions, etc., cannot in fact be performed successfully.Phenomenalists are challenged to
1

VideMr.D. G. C. Macnabb(" Phenomenalism ", P.A.S. 1940-41).

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providean equivalentin sense datum currency of propositions about materialobjects,and when they declineto producethe precise equivalent, they are accused of utteringcounterfeit of scienticheques: and thisis said to hold evenmoreobviously " many storied" 1 logical ficentities-the promise to construct and gamma with sense data as foundations, constructions, particles two or threefloors above-has not been kept. Phenomenalists are accused of maintaining that,although phenomenalist languagemight be intolerably clumsy and prolix, it could in principlealways be substitutedfor the ellipses of common speech: thatnormal languagehas thecharacter it has in order to servethe use that it serves; that sense, datum languagewould and intolerdoubtlessly be inconveniently preciseand definite ably lengthyand tedious,and would have its own unfamiliar "grammar", but that in principlethe translationcould be effected, althoughby sacrificing so much customary vagueness, ambiguity, indefiniteness, etc., as would renderit useless for maintains that everyday purposes. Against this,theopposition it is onlynecessary to tryand put thisprogramme into practice to seethatit is a labourofSisyphus and willnotwork: vagueness, ambiguity,etc., are inalienable propertiesof common-sense language; but forthis,the programme could perhapsbe carried out; but as it is, the claim to reduce-plausible enoughprima facie-turns out to be hollowonce the bluff is called. Yet the reasonfor thisis still thecomparatively weak one thatwe should lose too muchin the way of nuances, of range, impliedmeanings words; the feelingremainsthat the "hard core" of meaning " or translated. mightstillbe " reduced there arethedifficulties aboutdealingwithproposi(4) Finally, tionsabout other minds, communication, etc.,in the appropriate Humeanmanner, too familiar to be repeated; which theoretically leaves open the possibilityof the programmeadvanced by Berkeleywhereby phenomenalism works for material objects and breaksdownonlyin the case ofpersons. The above is a characteristic selectionfromthe, by now traditional, array of.anti-phenomenalist arguments. I should liketo suggest that,formidable and indeedfatalas someofthem may be, they are usually so formulated as to convey a misleading impression, for despite their anti-phenomenalist air they are all in effectso much concealed pro-phenomenalist propaganda. The suggestion implicitin all these criticisms is goal is and mustbe striven towards that,whilethephenomenalist -for the alternative is a metaphvsical morass-the pDarticular 1VideMr.D. G. C. Macnabb(loc.cit.).

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avenues thus far offered by phenomenalists are unfortunately blockedby varioustypesof logicalor epistemological obstacles: in otherwordsthat some such operationis desperately needed if we are everto eliminate or indescribable entities, unverifiable but thatthe techniques offered by variousphilosophers have all, so far, broken down. Thisposition is notunlike thesituation with regardto say Fermat's theorem: what the theoremassertsis considered as beingverylikely true,at anyratenotdemonstrably fallacious, and in any case as beingthe kind of assertion which should be capable of demonstration or refutation by normal mathematicaltechniques. Similarlyall phenomenalist operations so farconductedhave indeedended in failure; but they, and onlythey, arethekindofprocesses be whichcan,in principle, applied. Somekind of phenomenalist analysismustbe correct, forthe only alternativeis a returnto Locke, or Descartes,or Kant, and that,in thisenlightened age, is surely not a thinkable course. This is the bogey used to drive philosophers back to make yet another gallant attempt to break out of the impasseinto the sense datum language. to finda 'viable ' translation The impressionconveyed throughout, possibly because of a faultytheoryof meaningand truth,is that phenomenalism is, afterall, the onlypossiblevalid view,besetthoughit may be by grave objections and exaggerations: the problem is one of technicalskill: once it is reformulated withsufficient ingenuity the problemwill be solved, or dissolved. My thesis is that is not even prirma phenomenalism facie plausible-let alone and minorimprovements, cannot indispensable, i.e. tinkering, the all too make it moreso. Instead,therefore, ofre-examining familiarcurrent and the answers objectionsto phenomenalism, to them,I should like to suggestthat it mightbe valuable to tryto findout what it is that makes commonsense so uncomis merely fortable-in order to see whetherthis discomfort " psychological accidental ", and perhapsdue to the relatively of ordinarylanguage, or whetherit is a symptom properties of somefatal defect in the theory. II What commonsense,fromDr. Johnsononwards,findsparadoxical in all phenomenalist analyses,is, I believe,this: I say, "There is a browntable in the next room." This, I am told, shouldmean a set or rangeof propositions of the type, " If ' a ' wereto go next door and look, he would, in normalobserver

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etc., see such and such normallight,othernormalconditions, no one goes data, etc." I say, " But supposing brown-coloured nextdoor,whathavewe then? Is theapodosisfalse? Arethere no browndata and no table ?' I am told, " Of course not. Nothingregardingthe consequentfollowsfrom denyingthe at all. It stillremains follows antecedent. In a sense,nothing looked,etc.,he wouldsee browndata, etc." truetjiat ifsomeone I accept all thisand remaindissatisfied. If I believethat there times a land bridgebetweenAfricaand was in pre-historical thisis analytic-thatifthere America, thenI agree-and possibly placed,he wouldhave at thattimesuitably had beenan observer ofit. But I may wishto assert or a portion seentheland bridge and that the land bridge existed, that,in fact,no such observer whether ornotthisis true. What I think there, was nevertheless G. F. Stout wishto say is that the sense and Professor common questionof the existenceof the land bridge,like the existence of the table next door, is one thing,and the question of the of an observer,is presenceor absence, even hypothetically, that if therehad been (and therewas another. The statement not), any observer,he would have observed (and no one did observe),certaindata, seemsto themnot equivalentto asserting propositions the past existenceof materialobjects. Categorical " counterabout material objects are replaced by unfulfilled and what about observers, propositions factual" hypothetical that if the hypotheticals troublesthe plain man is the thought thenifthe ifno observers werein factobserving, are unfulfilled, therewas-in a sense datum analysisis correct, phenomenalist ' thatthissenseof 'existence sense-nothing at all, and,moreover, is basic: because the alleged materialobject sensein whichthe can be 'translated non-existence ofactual sensedata nevertheless the objects,is not a sensein which ofmaterial into 'the existence understood. If he is thentoldthatto word 'exist' is commonly say therewas a materialobject-the land bridgein pre-historic about data there would have been times-is to say something if . . . he feels cheated. For these data appear to depend objectbecomes on theactivity ofobservers; so thatthematerial i.e. nonanalysed into a series of eitherpurelyhypothetical, and disappearing data occurring or at best,intermittent existent, as the observer observesand ceases to observe. And thisseems pictureof the world from that which a different empirically a description he started by believing; and in no sense merely words. ofthe old picture in different though I shall to try to make this clearer. To analyse material data of observersis, in objects in termsof the hypothetical

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about about theminto statements effect, to turnthe statements the dispositional characteristicsof observers. " The table next door exists", on this view view meansthat you or I or X, who are in this room,are possible or potentialtable-data observers. This assertsthe existenceof a dispositional characteristic; but dispositional characteristics are so called in orderto contrast them with non-dispositionalcharacteristics,the said to be different.If I ask, "grammar" of whichis rightly "Does he look much the same when he is asleep ? " that it a the answerto whichcan be discovered question, plain,empirical by ordinaryempiricalmeans, i.e. by looking. But if I ask, " Is he clever evenwhenhe is asleep ? " thissoundsquitewronghow the do not understand I am rightly told that I evidently I am told,to say that used; surely, word" clever" is commonly sort: of the following someone is clever is to say something are put to him,he willeasilyand thatifcertain sortsofquestions correctly answerthem,or that he grasps certaintypes of data than most and makes inferences fromthem more successfully do not people, and so on. When he is asleep, these conditions to the situation. occurand the questionis therefore inappropriate How does all this apply to the table next door ? The assertion that thereis a table next door is made equivalentto what the ofhypothetiobserver wouldsee ifhe looked,etc.,i.e. a collection about the observer; propositions cal, i.e. dispositional-causal neither, as a rule, do but when the causes do not materialise, theireffects, exists,thereis a gap in the series and whenneither of sense datum events. We accept this quite naturallyin the " case of normaldispositional characteristics: " X is irritable is compatiblewith, indeed it is compatibleonly with, " He whenthere flies or sometimes on slightprovocation, intotempers of is no provocation at all," i.e. at othertimesthereare no bursts does not literally no continuing real substratum-there temper, called poexist, in the ordinarysense of " exist", something the tentialirritation underneath going on like volcanic activity surface; we do speak of unconsciousor suppressedirritation, to conbut to take thisliterally is to confuse wordswiththings, of the fusethe mythology withthe furniture of psycho-analysis real world, to fallinto Locke's errors. But if I say, " The table is next door (or 'the table has a back to it,' or ' the table was here two hours ago') even with no one looking,"do I mean, " Thereare table-datawhenever times, peoplelook; butat other when no one is looking,nothingat all ? " This is precisely what commonsense does not believe to be true about tables. Common senseendowsthemwith'actual', i.e. non-dispositional

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characteristics in the absence of observers. The table is seen intermittently or not at all: the intermittent presenceor nonexistence of observers is a part of the intermittent or unrealised series of causes or conditionsof its being seen; but it-the table-is assumed to have some characteristics continuously; it differs fromirritability preciselyin this respect-that unlike irritability it is believed to exist continuouslyin the literal sense when there are no intermittent data, no glances directed at the table. To analysematerial object statements as statements about dispositional characteristics of observers, therefore, is to represent the materialobject as being,at most, an intermittent series of actual data with the gaps filledby hypothetical "non-actualised" entities, i.e. in the sense datum sense,by nothing at all. This,forcommon sense,is tantamount to destroying the continuity before of the table-its history and afterit is observed, its unseenportion, its presencenext door. Of course,phenomenalists stoutly and indignantlydenounce this conclusionas a confusionof two senses of ' existence ', a crudemisunderstanding ofthe verynotionof logicalconstructions. Tables,we might be answered, are logicalconstructions as irritability is : in both cases, the essentialtask is to eliminate Locke's substratum and to substitute forit a set ofintermittent and hypothetical data. The unobserved table,or itsunobserved to be. back, continueto be as someone'sirritability continues Yet common sensedoes notraisedifficulties ofthistypeaboutthe analysisof irritability;it acceptseasilyenoughthat irritability does not existin the same senseas an actual burstof temperis said to do, that to speak of irritability is to use a kindof shorthand fora complexof causal laws and observation propositions. But when I say, " There existsa table such as you describe ", am I reallysayingthat it existsin the same sense of 'exists' as someone'sirritable temper? Some characteristics of tables may, of course, genuinelybe describedas dispositional)i.e. in speakingof them,I am referring to certaincausal laws and hypothetical orintermittent data-e.g. whenI saya table is combustible or useful or expensive. But thisonlymeanssomething by contrast withthoseproperties of thetable whichare not dispositional,and perhaps,a good many intermediate properties which we do notthink ofeither as definitely dispositional or definitely ' actual '. The suggestion that every characteristic of the tableis merely possibleorintermittent or dependson dispositions of observers-that everything is dispositional, nothingactualis exactlywhat commonsense and Dr. Johnson revoltagainst, notas beinguntrue, butas coming closeto beingmeaningless, and

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certainly as suspiciously approaching some kind of solipsismand one not very easy to describein empirical(or any other intelligible) language. What common sense dislikes is preciselythe crucial role played by hypotheticals in the phenomenalist analysis,and it seemsto me to displaya soundinstinct in so doing. For this is the centralpoint of this entireissue: that the translation ofcategorical existential statements intohypotheticals (of whatever' level '). is 'a dangerousoperationand cannot be leftto the mechanicaloperationof 'syntactical' rules because different typesofsentence do have certain normal usesin ordinary language-at any rate in most modernEuropean languageswhichwe ignoreat our peril; Humpty-Dumpty's nominalism goestoo far: wordsare sometimes ifwe are to communimasters cate withoutperpetualrecourse to redefinition i.e. if we are to communicate at all; and as we use words, categorical sentences, on the whole,tend to conveythat the object referred to has occurredor is occurring or will occur in time; existed,is in existence, will exist; they have a non-descriptive, existential, ostensive element; theyseemto inviteus to look forthe entity to be about,and onlywhenthereis nonesuchin any theypurport normalsense,e.g.in the case of a sentence like, " Bad temperis unattractive by turning to the ", do we avoid pseudo-problems hypothetical mode of expression as the more natural,as likely to elucidatewhat is being assertedin wordsbetteradapted to expressing it. Existential propositions expressed categoricallyin indicativesentences-tend,as it were,to "point" towards their "objects'"; and demonstratives which appear in existential propositions, like, " this is ", " there is ", " here we have", etc., often functionas substitutesfor such acts of pointingto thingsor personsor processes. The characteristic force ofthe categorical modeof expression is often exactlythis-that it acts in lieu of a gesture, of an 'act of ostension ', " Here is the book I say to someone looking forit, or I could point to it and say, "The book ", and conveyroughly the same information by both methods. But hypotheticals normallydo the opposite ofthis. Hypotheticals, whatever theydescribe ormean, whatever theyentail or conveyor evince,in whatever way they are verified or failto be verified, do notas a generalruledirectly assertthat something has been,is being,or will be occurring, or existing, or being characterised in some way: this is precisely the forceof the conditional mood, and it is realisationof this whichprobablyled Ramsey,forexample,to assertthat causal propositions werenot descriptive at all, but commandsor rules.

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Ramsey's analysis can easily be shown to be unsatisfactory, since it seems to rest on a fatallyfalse view of the nature of a separation which led himto so strong meaning; butthefeeling of general and hypotheticalformsof expressionfrom,say, lead him singular categorical sentences,did not altogetherand hypotheticals astray. For thisgulfdoes dividecategoricals used to desis normally in our normalusage: whereasthe first of the world what is, was or will be-the cribe the furniture (indicative) a categorical wheneve'r secondis not; consequently, to convey is used, oftenquite idiomatically, formof expression thanwhat is, or was, or will be, it is easilyand other something by a sense,replaceable resistance on thepartofcommon without sentence-as in the case of indicative (conditional) hypothetical orgeneral to dispositions, or indirectly directly referring sentences any " type. But even thisis in of the " all, every, propositions qualification. If the generaltermsare so need of a significant used as to suggestthat they possess extensionof any kind, andis feltto be to that extentinsufficient, form the hypothetical are requiredto completethe analysis. categoricalexpressions Thus, " Anyonewho was thereat threeo'clock saw the meteor with,"And no one in fact was " fall , because it is compatible or had been there, into," If anyonewas there, can be translated etc.,thenhe saw,or wouldhave seen,etc."; whereas," He gave away his booksto anyonewhoaskedforthem", is not equivalent to, " If anyoneasked for,had asked for,etc., his books he was, etc.", butneedsin addition," and some orwouldhave beengiven, did ask ". It seemsquiteclearthatin thislastinstancea persons sentenceby itselftells us nothing conditionalor hypothetical about what in fact happened,and an indicativeor categorical usage to convey" existenrequiredby ordinary one is therefore "-to referto actual events whichare believed to tial import have takenplace. too triteand obvious,but thereis All thismayseemaltogether thatno direct namely, is evidently less obvious, which a corollary is, as a general into hypotheticals fromcategoricals translation used, a correct rule, and as our language is to-day ordinarily forthem. And this seems to me to analysis of, or substitute of phenomenalism. foundations one of the indispensable destroy for of hypotheticals For it is this sense of the illicitsubstitution forthe obscurefeelingon the whichis responsible categoricals entity-is being sensethat something-anersatz partof common palmed off upon it by phenomenalists. Such a categorical as, " The table is nextdoor", objectsentence material existential or " There is a table next door", is used at the veryleast to

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which is occurring or being characterised describe something at the time of speaking,together(perhaps)with some sort of about what prediction (and what has been called retrodiction) or being characterised during has been or will be occurring oftimebefore and after theperiodofspeaking; unspecified periods or occurring, unless the contraryis and being characterised butcontinuously, notintermittently statedorimplied, specifically and in anycase not ' hypothetically'. For to say thatsomething and misleading is a very artificial is occurring hypothetically at sense,occurring way of sayingthat it is not,in the ordinary wererealisedwhich all, but mightor would occurif conditions in their turn may or may not be realised. Consequently, commonsense may mean by the sentence," There is whatever in meaning equivalent a tablenextdoor", itcannotacceptas fully is now,or has been,or that something not asserting any sentence or being characterised. It may well be that will be, occurring entail corresponding hypotheticals categoricalssystematically " The table (or disjunctivesets of such)-that the proposition, A observer is next door now " in somesenseentailsthatifeither ofthem B or C, etc.wereto go nextdoor,one or other or observer or intangible could see or touchsuchand suchdata,: forinvisible mean by 'table '. Likewise, tables are not what we normally in somecases may be said either to it may be that hypotheticals forthe truthof,or else ' sufficentail,or else to state conditions ' the assertionof categoricals; in other words, iently justify halluthat if it is truethata normalobserver (i.e. one freefrom cinations,etc.), sees, or has seen, or will see, or would see, or conditions; wouldhave seen,certaindata, underthe appropriate and not inductively that thereis a table it followsdeductively likethismaybe correct, and perhapsthis nextdoor. Something is all that the phenomenalist requiresas against Locke's insensiblesubstance,or attenuatedversionsof it, such as ' physical occupants'.' For it is clear that if I am to explainunder I should normallyassert material object what circumstances I can do so only by invoking hypothetical observers sentences, states: if I am called upon to describe and theircognitive the in whichsuchand suchsentences are appropriate, conditions then I cannot fail to make use of hypotheticals. But to describe
1 And this is, without doubt, the gieat historical service of phenomenalism-that formore than two centuriesit has been pressing home the paradoxical consequences of simultaneously holding both that material objects, if they exist, " must " possess certain characteristics(although no one has been able to identifythem at all clearly)whichcannot, in principle, be empirically observed,and that these are among the characteristicswith which the natural sciences necessarily deal.

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conditions in whichalone I should be inclinedto enunciatea sentence is certainlynot equivalent to giving its meaning. For my point is that the hypothetical sense datum sentence cannot be equivalentto, or an analysis of, a materialobject sentence if the hypothetical (sense datum) sentenceassertsonly what would be, while the materialobject sentencesometimes assertswhat occurs,occurred, or will occurin the world. Existentialpropositions about materialobjectsassertwhat is, was or will be, and notwhatmight be. Stouthad every reasonto be suspicious of the descriptionof the material world in such " dubious terms as, " The permanent possibility of sensation because however modified andrefined, it bothsuggests a kindof permanent grid-like world frameworkand denies it. Dr. Johnson's well knownattitudedoes not, afterall, rest on such a very grossmisunderstanding. That is the heart of the case against phenomenalism. it may be asked,is it that suchcategorical But whatprecisely, existentialsentences do that hypotheticalones fail to do ? I wish to avoid sayingthat the former describethe Certainly facts whilethe latterdo not, since the unhappyterm " fact" senses to be illuminating has been used in too many different in this connextion. Nor do I wishto assertthat hypotheticals and are mutually and categoricalsare never interchangeable of propositions could be distinguished exclusive-as ifthe forms to 'ontological' or Kantian into natural kinds corresponding or 'ultimate groovesin reality'. But I do suggest categories, to differences in verbal formare oftenpointers that systematic in meaningwhich it is important not to obscure. differences Hence, as a tentativeway of puttingit, I submitthat those whichwe seemto be unableto 'reduce' categorical propositions without to otherlogicalforms doingapparentviolenceto normal to-invite us to look for-things usage,tend to directattention do not. and eventsin a way in whichotherkindsof expressions demonThis is felt most clearlyabout expressions containing strativeslike 'this ', or ' that I, or ' here', but applies no less to existential propositions without demonstrativeswhich in the time series. In the case of objects identify something with some or all of whichwe claim to be acquainted by some this relation-which for want of a kind of direct inspection, betterword I proposeto call 'pointing'-can literallyoccur: table is herebefore that a particular in declaring me,a particular sound is now growinglouder, a particulardoubt is now tormentingme, I am pointingat, directingyour attentionto, with which I am directlyacquainted, an event or something

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a thing. But if I say, " The table is next door ", "The cupboardhas a woodenback whichyou cannotsee ", " Napoleon wore a three corneredhat ", "Napoleon felt a twinge of remorsebeforethe battle", I cannot, of course,in the literal sense be said to be acquainted with, or point at, a thing or event, for it is, in the ordinary sense of the words, not present, not here,not before me, not withinmy ken. And as it seemsto have this is perhapswhat lends such plausibility me hypotheticals to the phenomenalist procedureof offering and to intended both to describe unobservedcharacteristics of observing, i.e. in some senseverifying indicatemethods them. But this will not do, for whereasthe difference betweencategoricals and hypotheticalsis one of logical form, whether the difference syntacticalor semantic, betweenbeing able and or causal. not being able to observea given object is empirical I cannotpointto the table next door,or at a pointbeneathits because it is invisible: thereis the intervening surface, wall or surface whichmakesthis act unhelpful. In saying" Thereis a to refer to the table table next door", I am, as it were,trying " through the wall " or to the back or insideofthe table as ifit werenot concealedbut before me,in mysensefield. If thewall the relevantdifference becomestransparent betweenthe table of me, and the further table nextdoordisappears, here,in front forthe only relevantdifference betweenthe two types of case is that I was originally in a betterpositionin space (or time) of me. Theremay be important to describethe table in front semantic differences, e.g. in learningthe use of symbolsfor present, as opposed to absent,entities,'but thereis no logical difference betweendividingsentenceswhichdescribethingsin my fieldof vision from those whichdescribethingsbeyondthe horizon. The kind of communication which a demonstrative, catewhichpurports goricalsentence, to be true,seeksto perform in respectofunobserved objectsand events, may failto achieveits object in at least one of two ways: the entitymay not exist or in termsof whichit is denoted; or possess the characteristics the failuremay be due to some defectin my technique-if the relevantentityis not, for whateverreason,recognised by my audience; my effort to communicate is thwarted, but only by such empirical circumstances as physicalwalls, or the shape of the earth,or the limitations of my sensesor imagination, or the date of my birth; thwarted by that and not by something incurablyhypothetical, non-existential about the sentenceitself. 1I owethispointto Dr. F. Waismann.

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Let me give an example: when I say that Napoleon wore a three-cornered hat, or that on the eveningbefore the battleof he had a twinge this Borodino of remorse, I do notmean (though is not strictly relevantto the argument) that one man and one man onlywas called Napoleon,and who everwas so called wore a three-cornered hat,or had a twinge of remorse. Propernames are not usuallymeredefinite descriptions. My use of the word " Napoleon" is, amongotherthings, a substitute fora wave of ofthe head, etc. because I cannotpoint the hand,an inclination in a literalsense,if onlybecause I was borntoo late; and this an empirical is ultimately obstaclelike thewall of a roomorthe you natureof lightor the structure of my brain. I am inviting to Napoleon or to physicalor mental to directyour attention and there is a non-descriptive and existential eventsin hishistory forcein my use of the relevantwords-and in particularof propernames-because I suggestor believe or knowthat such events have happened-that they are part of the collection of what was and is and will be. Certain types of categorical in thisway directattention and eventswhich sentences to things are taken to exist whether or not they are observed. therefore The fact that they are in some sense capable of being directly or their existence supportedby sense observed,or verified, datum evidence, may be part of the meaningof such concepts as " thing" or " event", but it is not what is assertedwhen I say thattheyoccurhereor now,or have suchand suchcharacteristics; and the reason for this is that the hypotheticals in exchangefor categoricals do not, whichI am being offered and fatally,invite anyone (except it seems, even misleadingly to look for any "thing " or event in the some philosophers) time series. Whateveris being asserted by, " If it rains, I shall take my umbrella", or "If Hitler had not wanted it, therewould have been no war it will not be foundin theinannalsoftheactualworld, in the historical ofevents, nor ventory that I a,mbeinginvitedto look for am I underany impression have goneto the length of any such entity. (Onlyphilosophers I ofhypothetical ' referends fororinventing searching ontological sentences propositions.) Hypothetical do, of course,like other involvethe use of wordswhich,to have empirical expressions, be capable of occurring must themselves in true any meaning, ostensive sentenceswhich do in some sense 'point '-words like " rain", or " umbrella ", or " Hitler but in themselves do not hypotheticals 'point' ; otherwise theywouldcease to be non-actual-facthypothetical, theywould lose theirconditional, force. asserting

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At this point a criticmightsay (as Professor A. J. Ayerdid sayto mein discussion), something likethis: " You restyourcase on thegenerally feltdistinctiont between whatis dispositional and what is non-dispositional in the material world, and say thatthe lattercannotbe describedby hypotheticals, as the former can, without doingviolenceto normal usage. But thisis not so. In the first place, manyexpressions whichdo not seemdispositional at first, turnout to be so on further analysis: forexample, ifwe say that the table is heavy and six feetlong,that seemsat first categorical enough, but of course'heavy ' means'if weighed according to a recognised technique, theinstrument willrecord etc.' and ' six feetlong' refers to thepossible application ofa ruler and so forth: theseapparently categorical statements turnout,therefore,to need translation into hypotheticals to make themclear: fromwhichit follows that the categorical form of statement by itselfgives no sortofindication of how sentences mean ". But thisargument establishes lessthanit appearsto do. I shouldnot dream of maintaining that verbal or grammatical formis an infallible guide to logicalform, i.e. kindsof ways in whichsentences mean. Indeed, that is the whole point of exposingthe the dispositionalcharacterof expressionswhich prima facie appear non-dispositional.But because some or many categoricals are in this sense concealedhypotheticals (i.e. their meaning is madeclearer, orcertain errors areprevented, bythesubstitution of hypotheticals) because languageis flexible and the frontiers shifting and vague, it cannot followthat the distinction does not exist at all, that the frontiers are invisible-forif that were " and " hypothetical so, such words as " dispositional ", (there being nothing with whichto contrast them) would not signify anythingat all. And this is not what phenomenalists or defenders if their own of the theoryof logical constructions, words are to mean anything, want to say. At this point the criticmay say: " But this is a sheertravestyof my position. Of courseI do not wish to blur the usefuldistinction between is thatall hypotheticals and categoricals. What I am asserting be translated descriptive into sense statements can in principle datum language: all materialobject statements will be transposed into hypothetical statements about sensedata, and these are what they are by contrastwith the only true ultimate, irreducible those describing someone'sactual sense categoricals, experiences: e.g. Russell's basic propositions, Carnap'sprotocol sentences, etc. As for between yourdistinction and dispositional non-dispositional of materialobjects,or between characteristics as applied to material hypothetical and categorical statements 20

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objects,the sense datumlanguageis perfectly wellable to reproduce it in its ownterminology: material categorical objectstatementswill be translatedinto hypotheticals about sense data; hypotheticals aboutmaterial objectswillbe rendered byhypotheticals about hypotheticals: thus to say that a given table looks brownis to say something about the dispositions of certainobservers; to say thatit is fragile is to say something aboutthedisofdispositions positions ofthesesameobservers;thedistinction is one ofdegreeofcomplexity ofhypotheticals;but the wholepyramid ofthemonlyhas descriptive force iftheyare about-if their ultimatesubject is-the actual data of actual observers about which all material object sentences,whethercategorical or hypothetical, are in the end, hypotheses or theories. For what else is therein the worldbut what people see and hear and imagine and do and suffer ?" We are thereat last: this reallyis what phenomenalism boils down to: that the only irreducibly categoricalpropositions, by contrastwith which alone hypotheticals are what they are, are statements about immediate " knock-down " verification. experience, capableofdirect, strong, These are basic. All else is theoryand speculation about their behaviour and incidence. We have returnedto the manytieredlogical constructions, with materialobjects and perhaps theirmore obvious causal properties on the floors immediately above the " basic" groundfloor(or should it be basement?) and the upper levels occupied by positrons, nerve impulses, super-egos, and possiblyvectorsand non-Euclidean spaces and numbers too,as wellas theZeitgeist, and the British Constitution and thenational'character.In a sense, thisposition seemsalmost too academicin character: if phenomenalists finddifficulty, in fact, in producingthe sense datum equivalentsof even plain categoricalmaterialobject statements, their claim to produce two or morestoreys ofsuch-simple hypotheticals and overthese rows of complex ones-hypotheticals about hypotheticalsseems somewhatunreal; but even if we do not pressforcash in the formof basic sentencesagainst phenomenalist cheques (as being unfairand against the spiritof the conventions in use oflanguage)the argument stillremains fallacious. For what this view comesto is that materialobject sentences-including existential ones-are so manygeneral propositions or hypotheses or theoriesabout the behaviour of sense data. And this is precisely what common sensefinds so repugnant. For a general proposition or theory may be interpreted purelyintensionallyi.e. irrespective of whetheror not instances of the concepts, involvedin factoccur; whereassuch a sentence as, " The table

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1This is, of course,not literally true,since theoriespresuppose the of theorists existence withall that theyneed by the way of a universe in order to fixthe 'grammar'oftheir words, but thisis not partofwhat noris it logically the theories themselves assert, entailed by them. 2 It may be worth addingthat such demonstratives as " thereis " or "this is " are seldomemployed to refer to " sense data "-for that is a termwhichis rarely of use in ordinary and is moreproperly experience, whichconcern applicable to thataspectofthings physiologists or oculists or impressionist painters, and is useful becauseit contrasts precisely that which sensuous interests thesespecialists-purely qualities-withmaterial ofordinary life. objects-things-thefurniture

next door is brown" is existential and as such has extensional is occurring and assertsthat something in a sense in import, whichgeneralor hypothetical propositions properdo not normallyassertanything of this sort; if such generalpropositions are taken extensionally as well as intensionally, i.e. if general propositions about sense data are to be understoodto assert morethan a merelogical or causal nexus betweenthe possible experiencesof possible observers,namely, the existence or or other which the nexus connects, occurrenceof something this task, unsensedsensa or sensibilia mustbe then,to perform introduced: and these are rightlyas much taboo to phenomenalistsas Lockean substancesor physicaloccupants,and a good deal odder in character. The point is that existential material object propositionsdirectly assert that something or hypotheses do not directly existsin a sensein whichtheories assertthis. One can bringout this point mostsharply(at the cost of some exaggeration) by asserting baldlythat all theories, hypotheses, generaland hypothetical propositions, etc., may be iftheprotases areunfulfilled, existat all; for trueand yetnothing the proposition the apodoseshave no application; whereas that are true is not some existentialmaterial object propositions that nothingexists at all.' compatiblewith the proposition What this over-simple paradox servesto bringout is that the essence of hypothetical or conditionalsentencesis to be in a peculiarway non-commital-inthe sense in which,let us say, singular (empirical) existentialcategoricalsnormallycommit which in principlecan be directly the speaker to something verified. Now it is notoriously impossibledirectlyto verify mustentailat least unfulfilled conditionals: but all conditionals in thisrespect one suchunfulfilled and consequently conditional, cannotbe equivalent to statements asserting onlywhatis directly verifiable on by an act of observation. Existentialcategoricals us becausethere is normally an ostensive the otherhand,commit about existential (pointing) property materialobject categorical propositions.2

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The-same point may be broughtout in yet another way. analysis, sentencesdescribing to the phenomenalist According in logical type accordingto the material objects will differ (to my senses)or the absenceof the objectin question. presence I am said to be acquaintedwithactual seendata, If it is present, is at least partiallyanalysableinto irreducibly and my sentence categorical(" basic ") propositions: if it is absent,it is wholly analysableinto hypotheticals. But this is surelynot the case: woodentable in thisroom,I can, if I say that thereis a brown, whichI can if I like,go on to say that amongthe propositions some plainlyhypoassertof it, some are obviouslycategorical, thetical: some perhaps of neitherkind, and then it cannot whether of principle, i.e. a difference make a logical difference, a wall: whatorhidden mein theroom, behind the tableis before about the present true, i.e. dispositional, ever is hypothetically (disequallyhypothetical is doubtless table (or its visibleportion) about the one next door (or its visibleportion): but positional) about the is categorical whateveris categoricalabout the first other-absent one-too. The actual steps whichI am obliged about a giventable will,of propositions to take in orderto verify course, varywithcircumstances:ifthetable is movedout ofmy me, I cannotdo what I could have ken, or someoneblindfolds of the sentence done had this not happened; but the meaning does not alterwiththe movements ofthe table or whichI utter, " There of my eyes: the meaning ofthe sentence, the condition and is a browntable in my study", does not swingforwards backwards from partially categoricalto wholly hypothetical as I move aroundit, or saw it in half,or walk in and out of my from opaque to transparent orthewallsofmystudychange study, does it whollyconsistof a clusterof hypotheticals and neither with the noncompatible(if theirantecedentsare unfulfilled) existenceof any experienceswhatever. Perhaps we now see fromwhichthese odd consequences more clearlythe confusion of the meaning of whatwe are spring: namelythe confounding conditions underwhichwe feelinclined sayingwiththe varying to say it.

III
At thispoint,someuneasinessmay be feltabout the attribution to our language of a capacity to 'point to ' objects in frompointingto objects directly absence-as if the transition sense of pointing, may not perceivedto this semi-metaphorical may wish be quitelegitimate. It is herethatthe phenomenalist

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to play one of his strongest cards,forone of the mosttempting advantages which his theoryappears to offer is that by substituting logicalconstructions forinferred entities, he promises to describe the worldsolelyin terms ofthe so called data ofimmediate acquaintance. He undertakes, in effect, to describeeverythingby means of logical or linguistic rulesfor rules,including the use ofconditional participles like " if" and " provided that ", and otherwise confine himself solelyto whatwe can directly and literally point to in our everyday experience. And to speak of the ostensivefunction of a sentencewhich purportsto point towards, directattention to something-the table-real enough, indeed, but not here and not now, something i.e. unobserved, outsidethe fieldof directacquaintance-is thisnotto go beyond and againsttheprinciple ofnotimporting unfamiliar and dubious entities, to contravene the rule of the definability of ostensively all empirical terms ? Arewe notintroducing notmet something withface to face,not directly verifiable, and consequently not directly descriptive, perhapsaltogether non-empirical?Andthis mayat first unnerve the strictempiricist;but his anxietieswill ", be groundless. For the notionof " nothere", " not observed mustin any case be introduced intolanguageseekingto describe theworldsooner orlater, and howthisis accomplished is a psychologicalrather thanan epistemological question. It is onething to admitthatwhatever in one's descriptive languageis notgoverned by syntactical rulesmustbe capableofostensive elucidation:and a very one to saythatI maynotrefer different unlessI to anything can establish themeaning ofthevariables in terms ofmylanguage ofwhatI am actuallyexperiencing hereand now; ifI adopt the latterprinciple, I becomeunableto refer to thepast or the future or to theexperiences ofothers to explain" here" and " now" and " observed by me ", and so on-that way liesthekindofverification theory of meaningwhichhas morethanoncebeen shown to lead to an extravagantly solipsistanalysis of the meaningsof words, ending literallyin nonsense. The meaning of such " basic " wordsas " here", now "', " observed ", dependon the existence ofan equally" basic " use for" nothere", c notnow ", " not observed " in contrastwith which alone the meanings of " here" "now", etc., can be established. Thereis no need to go on withthisline of argument-suchcomparatively primitive notionsas " not now ", or " beyondthe horizon ", cannot " without be " constructed circularity out ofsensefields occurring in " speciouspresents"; but without suchnotions classification, and therefore language,in the ordinary sense,is demonstrably impossible. Hence, this kind of objection to the possibility
CC

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in principleof pointingto objects in absence cannot be considered seriously, for it rests on the assumption(ultimately perhapstraceableto Aristotle'sdoctrineof actual v. potential being)that what is not here does not existin the same sense of ' exist' as that which is here, which rules out all possibility of descriptive symbolism. For what exists but is not here, exists and is not here,in exactly the same sense of 'exists' as what is-does exist-here. Withoutthis,all wordswould lose theirfunction of discrimirating and classifying.

IV
Thereare twofinal pointsto be made. (1) Supposing someone were to ask, " But how can we say anythingabout the table sentencesdescribingwhat an obapart fromthe hypothetical server wouldsee ifhe walkedroundit, etc. ? Is the table round or oval, dark or lightbrown, lightor heavy ? Surelythe sense if it has establishednothingelse, datum school of philosophy, in has made it clear beyond any doubt that these properties some sense depend on the observer,his physical position,his physiologicaland psychologicalcondition, etc. Surely the argumentfromillusion,for example, cannot be dismissedas showingnothingat all because of logical considerations of how are used ? Does thegramophone different typesofsentences play tunesin a desert,or to an audiencewhichis stonedeaf ? How does the view advanced here differ fromthe most untenably of naive realism? " This rejoinder naive of all forms restson a serious and important confusion which mayin part be responsible forthe desperate that onlyphenomenalism feeling can somehow, in the end, be true. The theoriesadvanced by physiologists, say about the indispensability of the mechanism of the ear to the hearingof sounds are empiricaltheories,corroborated by observational and notlinguistic tests: and to say,therefore, that of a particular the occurrence kindofheareris to asserta causal, i.e. empirical,and not semanticor logical proposition. I am sayingthatthe eventdescribed as thehearing ofa soundemitted by a gramophone dependson certainnecessary conditions, and amongstthesethe structure ofthehearer's brainor ear occursin the same sortofway as, let us say,the physical properties ofthe needleattachedto the soundbox ofthe gramophone. But when I analyse propositions about the meaningof sentences, I am not asserting, and need notInecessarilybe implying, certainly propositions stating causesor conditions ofthe eventswhich they describe. Theremay verywell in particular cases exista causal

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nexus betweenthe personof the observer and a given material object-what this nexus is, it is the task of the naturalsciences to investigate. But thiscausal nexusis precisely whatthephenomenalist,1 claimsnotto be discussing whenhe offers a reduction of categoricalmaterial object sentencesto hypothetical sense datumsentences-ifhe were, his theory wouldamountto a queer kindofoccasionalism, metaphysical or empirical, according to his viewof connections in nature, whereby the observer who figures in the protasisof the phenomenalist hypothetical could destroy a table by avertinghis gaze as surelyas by settingit on fire.2 WhenI say that a material objectexistsor has certain characteristics,I am not, it seemsto me, committing myself necessarily to any specific theory about thenecessary or sufficient conditions of the existenceor character ofthe object. Hence,the question of when,or forhow long,the table next dooris colouredbrown need not in principleever affect the answer to the question, " What do I mean when I say, 'There is a browntable next door' ? " This, of course,needs qualification: the meanings of words are affected, and oftenvery deeply affected, by our explicitor implicitcausal beliefs,and the analysis of what is meantby an expression mayverywellrevealall kindsofphysical or social or psychological beliefsor assumptions in a prevalent givensociety, a change in which couldaffect themeaning ofwords. The degreeto which the dispositional characteristics ofobservers, treatedas personsin timeand space,enter intothewayin which we employ material objectwordswillvarywidely: thus,it seems to me reasonably clearthatwhenwe saythatthereis a tablenext door,we are not implying anyparticular beliefs about thepresence or dispositional characteristics of the normalhuman observer, beyondthe factthat if it is a table at all, it mustbe not wholly invisible, intangible to him,etc.-since otherwise it wouldnot be whatwe meanby a material object. It seemsa littleless obvious that I can to-daysaythatit is coloured whennotobserved, brown forperhapsby nowrudimentary is suffiphysiological knowledge cientlywidespreadto have imported into the notion of being coloured certaincausal beliefsabout the effects in the visual fieldofchanges in ournervoussystem, etc. It seemsverymuch less clearthatI can say thatrosessmellsweetwhenno one smells them,or that windshowlwhenno one hearsthem,and it seems clearly eccentric to say that heard melodies are sweet, while
This is one ofthe notorious absurdities of whichBerkeley is at times and on which beginners in philosophy are often taughtto practise guilty, theircritical powers.
2

1 For example, Professor A. J. Ayerin Arist. Soc. Proc.,1947.

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those unheardare literallysweeter. And all this is doubtless useful in throwing lighton our normal usage withregardto such wordsas, " smellsweet", or " howl", or " sweetmelodies ", some of whichdo, whileothersdo not, implythe presenceof persons with certain psychological,physiological,etc., attributesas concerned to showthata quite sufficient observers. I am merely numberof material object sentencesdo not presupposesuch of this dependenceon the existenceor behaviourof observers to materialobjects is more kind,that the relationof observers and not a semanticquestion, to be called an empirical properly however deeplyverbalusage and empirical beliefs may be interthe view that nothingcan connected; and that consequently said to occur withoutexplicitand in principlebe significantly is a major fallacywhichrestson reference to observers implicit betweenthe causal propositions failureto distinguish of natural scienceor commonsense and propositions about meaning. I return to my originalpointthat phenomenalism, or at any rate the most prevalentmodernformof it, seems to rest on a mistakenanalysis of what normal existentialmaterial object statements state; they state that thingsor events existed,or exist,or will exist,or were,are, or will be, characterised by this or that characteristic; and not that something might exist or would exist, or would have existed,the truth (if not the assertion) ofwhichis logically compatible withthe non-existence of anything whatever. Even if hypothetical propositions alone describethe conditions withoutwhichwe should not assert or be justified in asserting therelevant categoricals, yetthemeaning of the former is notthe same as the meaning ofthelatter. And this is so, even if we go further and hold,as some do, that the two typesof proposition entailone another; sincewhatstrictly ever be the sense in which mutual entailmentis regardedas tantamount to, or identicalwith,logicalequivalence(as it is by somelogicians), it is clearlynotthe same as the sense of identity of meaningin whichtwo or moredescriptive sentencescan be said by commonsense to mean the same; yet it is this last senseof " meaningthe same ' as betweenthe analysansand the analysandum,and it alone, that the best known variants of modern phenomenalism seek to establish and, if the above thesisis correct, seekin vain. OxfordUniversity