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Introduction
The tax avoidance has been increasing for decades. This phenomenon is no exception in the Chinese tax regime. In January 2008, when launching the new corporate income tax reform, in addition to introducing specic anti-tax avoidance provisions such as controlled foreign corporation rules, cost sharing arrangement, and thin-capitalization rules, China also took the opportunity to introduce a whole new set of General Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules (GAAR) to its corporate income tax regime. Among the other things, the GAAR are aimed to attack those tax-driven scheme and blatant tax devices. Over the past three years, China has experienced a lot of challenge on how to administer the GAAR in terms of application and interpretation with an establishment of case decisions and practice guidelines. All these are extremely relevant to MNCs to better understanding their tax exposures when exercising their investment and exit strategies in the framework of mergers and acquisitions which involve the equity interests of Chinese entities. This article provides an update on the GAAR in China. It will rstly introduce the evolution of the GAAR in the corporate income tax regime in terms of laws and rules. Then, the article will analyze the signicance and application of the related circulars with an illustration to highlight the issue of indirect share transfer of equity interest in China. Detailed case analyses are included for a better understanding of the decision bases and implications. The article is concluded with practical advice.
Daniel K.C. Cheung is Associate Professor and Work-Integrated Education Coordinator at the School of Accounting and Finance at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
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legal basis to form the decision to tax the gains. Although there was little information about the case, tax practitioners were speculating about whether the Chinese tax authority would formally adopt this position in similar transactions because in 2008 the application of GAAR in the CIT Law was not yet known. But the issuance of Guoshuihan [2009] No. 698 (Circular 698)5 in December 2009 laid such speculation to rest. In the Chongqing case, the taxpayer argued that gain on transfer of shares in a nonresident company should not be subject to corporate income tax in China if it was a genuine and legal transaction. On the other hand, the tax authority was of the view that the related gains should be regarded as sourced from China as there was no documentary evidence to prove that the Singapore intermediary holding company (a special purpose vehicle)s management was located outside Chinathus, the transaction in substance was to transfer interest in a Chinese company. In making such decision, one has to look at the functions of an offshore special purpose vehicle (SPV) in the international tax planning regime. In general, a SPV can be used as intermediate holding company of MNCs and investment funds for income tax, operational or other reasons. From income tax perspective, the offshore SPV could enjoy the applicable tax treaty benets such as reduced rate on dividend, interest and royalty payment or capital gain tax exemption on transfer of shares. Another reason is to facilitate the future exit strategy through transfer of shares in the offshore SPV without triggering any taxes in the country where the investment is located. This is the key point the seller in the Chongqing case wants to rely on. In most cases, the transfer of shares in the offshore SPV will not trigger any taxes in such offshore country. In the Chongqing case (see above), the Chinese local tax bureau disregarded the SPV on the ground that the SPV had no substance and the purpose of interposing and disposing such SPV was solely for China tax avoidance. Though the case concluded with WHT being collected over the equity transfer gains, no strong legal precedence may be taken from the ruling.
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this time he does not know whether the gain arising from transaction may trigger any exposure to China corporate income tax because the subject shares are related to the nonresident BVI holding company thus, the gains should be sourced outside China. 2. If the indirect disposal of the shares in the BVI holding company is potentially liable to China corporate income tax in (1) above, are there any possible defensive strategies to combat these attacks from the China tax authorities. What are the valid arguments? Under Circular 698, the overseas investors are required to report the transaction to the local tax bureau in-charge if the transaction meets either of the following requirements: If the tax jurisdiction of the holding company (i.e., Offshore SPV) has an effective tax rate of less than 12.5 percent; or If such tax jurisdiction exempts the holding company (i.e., Offshore SPV) from income tax on its income derived from overseas. The above overseas investors are required to report the transactions and submit the following documents within 30 days from the signed date of share transfer agreement: Share transfer agreement or contract Description of relationship between overseas investors and holding company (i.e., Offshore SPV) with regard to capital funding, operations, sales and purchases, etc. Information related to holding company including its operations, employees, bookkeeping and assets, etc. Written explanation of the reasonable business purposes of setting up Offshore SPV as holding company of PRC company Other information requested by the local tax bureau in-charge Based on the information provided, the local tax bureau in-charge will review the transaction based on the principle of substance over form to assess whether the indirect offshore disposal is executed through an abusive arrangement set up by the overseas investors to avoid paying taxes in China. The local tax bureau in-charge is required to report its views to the SAT for verication. If the SAT and the local tax bureau in-charge conclude that the arrangement is set up without reasonable business purposes, they may seek to apply GAAR to challenge the indirect offshore disposal by disregarding the existence of the Offshore SPV, which means that the overseas investors had disposed the shares of the PRC company. If this is the case, the local tax bureau in-charge will treat the realized capital gain arising from the indirect offshore disposal as PRC-sourced income and thus the overseas investors would be subject to 10-percent WHT in China. (Note: Whether the Diagram 1. Transfer of the BVI Holding Companys Shares rate is 10 percent is uncertain from Co. A to Co. B because it is uncertain whether Tr Transfer of SAT accepts reduced rate if the Sh Shares Co. A treaty between China and the Co. B (UK) (France) country where the overseas investor is located provides such benet.) In this Illustration, sal Indirect offshore disposal the tax authorities, pursuant to Circular 698, might challenge BVI holding this structural arrangement company with the BVI interposing SPV. If successful, the gain from the Overseas disposal of the BVI company is subject to tax in China.6 As PRC 75% Chinese partner regards the second question in the Illustration on any possible defensive strategies to combat 25% these attacks from the China EJV tax authorities, it is necessary to look at the issue of business purposes (see below).
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doing business in China. For example, the following questions are worth asking. How to determine capital gain where PRC tax authorities apply a look through approach? What is the cost base for capital gains tax purposes? Are there nes / penalties for failing to report to the tax authorities? Will tax authorities apply the Tax Collection and Administration Law of the PRC? Are PRC subsidiaries subject to penalties and tax liabilities of the foreign investor seller? So from foreign investors perspective, what do these new requirements mean for them? Practically speaking, they should consider: increased monitoring on cross-border transactions by PRC tax authorities; greater compliance burden on reporting or disclosures; need to focus on and document business substance and reasonable business purposes when setting up and implementing investment holding structures and on investment exit; need to assess potential exposures and consider how the investment structure can be strengthened to mitigate potential challenges; and signicant uncertainties on how the rules (in particular Circular 698) would be interpreted and enforced in the context of GAAR (see the Chongqing case was before January 1, 2008).
Recent Developments for the Circular 698 and Interpretations and Clarications
On March 28, 2011, the SAT released the Bulletin 248 to clarify Circular 698 and certain other tax issues related to NTREs. Although Bulletin 24 only became effective on April 1, 2011, it is set to have retroactive effect to determine the tax treatment of any transaction that occurred after January 1, 2008, and before April 1, 2011, unless the tax authorities have already ruled on the transaction. If an NTRE directly transfers the shares of a Chinese enterprise and receives payment in installments, the NTRE must recognize the entire amount of the capital gain when the relevant contract becomes effective and the share transfer registration procedures have been completed. Bulletin 24 denes foreign investors (actual controlling party) for indirect transfers of Chinese subsidiaries under the Articles 5, 6, and 8 of Circular 698 to include all the investors that indirectly transfer the shares of the Chinese enterprise Under
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Circular 698, reporting obligations will arise if either of the following conditions is met: (1) The actual tax burden in the jurisdiction of the target company (i.e., the intermediate holding entity to be transferred) is lower than 12.5 percent; or (2) The jurisdiction of the target company does not tax its residents on foreignsourced income. Bulletin 24 has put a new spin on these conditions by further dening the terms actual tax burden and does not tax. Now, after Bulletin 24, the conditions triggering a reporting obligation under Circular 698 should be interpreted to be: the actual tax burden on capital gains in the jurisdiction of the target company (i.e., the intermediate holding entity to be transferred) is lower than 12.5 percent; or the jurisdiction of the target company does not tax its residents on foreign-sourced capital gains. In addition, Bulletin 24 states that when two or more foreign investors indirectly transfer shares of a Chinese enterprise at the same time, they can entrust one of the foreign investors to report the transfer to the competent tax authorities where the transferred Chinese enterprise is located.9 state tax bureau of Jiangdu city (Jiangdu STB) became aware of the intended disposal of the Hong Kong subsidiary by the overseas investor and thus a team of experts was set up to monitor the proposed transaction. On January 14, 2010, the Jiangdu STB, from the buyers website, learnt an announcement that the overseas investor, i.e., the U.S. Group disposed of the PRC equity through an indirect transfer by the offshore intermediate company of 100 percent of the shares of the Hong Kong subsidiary to a U.S. listed group (U.S. investor) at a capital gain of USD254 million (approximately RMB1,730 million). Although the disposal was between two nonresident companies and involved a nonresident company, the Chinese tax authorities imposed tax of RMB173 million on the gain realized by the sellers on the disposal (tax return led on April 29, 2010, and tax duly paid on May 18, 2010). In assessing the transfer to tax under the Circular 698, the tax authority determined that the Hong Kong subsidiary did not have any economic substance, as it had no employees, assets (other than the JV interest), liabilities or operations other than the investment in the JV. After reviewing the transaction, the tax authorities re-characterized the transaction under the GAAR in order to assess the gain on disposal of this indirect share transfer to tax in China. The tax authorities disregarded the existence of the Hong Kong subsidiary and treated the prots on sale as being sourced in China and imposed WHT on the gain. The sellers argument that the transaction took place outside China was apparently not accepted. The Jiangdu case appears to be an inuential precedent case for attacking indirect transfer of shares in China in the tax planning regime. However, it is expected that much of the controversy surrounding the Circular 698 will come from the fact that the broad language of the Circular 698 may give rise lot of room for interpretation. For example, whether the PRC tax authorities will allow access to a relevant treaty once an offshore transaction is recharacterized into an onshore transaction. Another grey area is that the Circular 698 does not dene the meaning of and operation how to re-characterize the transfer of its shares as a direct transfer of the shares of the underlying Chinese company where the foreign investor has avoided taxation in China through the abuse of organizational form and without a reasonable business purpose. Although there are many grey areas under Circular 698 as discussed above, the issue that gives rise to most concerns might be the interpretation of reasonable business purposes.10
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Henan Case
In August 2010, the local tax authorities in Henan Province initiated an investigation against a U.S.based investment bank. The investigation also involves capital gains tax relating to transfers of shares in nonresident companies that in turn held, directly or indirectly, shares of a Chinese publicly listed company. Compared with the Jiangdu case, the factual background and holding structure of the Henan case is far more complicated. Moreover, a greater number of parties are involved at different layers of the holding structure, and the potential tax exposure may be even higher than in the Jiangdu case. The indirect transfer of equity of the Chinese company was achieved by a series of offshore restructuring and transfers, some of which occurred before January 1, 2008, i.e., before the new CIT Law and its anti-avoidance rules took effect [Circular 698 also took effect retrospectively on January 1, 2008]. Therefore, the timing of the transfers also adds to the uncertainty about the outcome of this investigation. The Henan case is still under investigation and the tax authorities have not issued any decision. Tax practitioners are paying attention to the outcome of the nal ruling.
Circular 698, the offshore transfer of BVI Subsidiary (second tier) should be deemed as a direct transfer of Shantou Company. Therefore, the offshore transfer should be subject to PRC capital gains tax. The result was that BVI Seller paid a capital gain tax of RMB7.2 million (approximately USD1.1 million) to the SMSTB at the end of March 2011. Substantively, however, the Shantou case adds little to the understanding of Circular 698 because the facts of the case were indisputable that all the intermediate holding companies were SPVs with presumably little reasonable business purpose outside of avoiding tax on the capital gains.11 It is generally agreed that this case provides little insight into the more difcult questions raised by Circular 698, such as what constitutes a reasonable business purpose and what is the relationship between reasonable business purpose and economic substance. It is also observed that as the Shantou case was decided before Bulletin 24, it is of no help in interpreting its effect on the reporting obligations under Circular 698 that have been repeatedly addressed. Finally, this case is particularly interesting because the foreign seller was four tiers above the Chinese subsidiary and yet, was still caught by the Chinese tax authorities.
Shantou Case
In November 2010, the Shantou Municipal State Tax Bureau (SMSTB) started an investigation of a suspected Circular 698 case. Based on publicly available information from the Internet describing an offshore transaction involving a Shantou operating company, the tax authorities were committed to attack this avoidance scheme. According to unofcial information, it disclosed that the investigation revealed that a BVI company being a seller, sold a wholly owned BVI subsidiary which in turn also held another lower tier BVI subsidiary and a Hong Kong company which then owned a Shantou company, to another BVI company being a buyer. The ownership structure showed the following chain: namely Seller in BVI BVI Subsidiary (second tier) BVI Subsidiary (rst tier) HK Co. Shantou Company. In the case, the BVI Seller made the transfer of shares in BVI Subsidiary (second tier) to the BVI Buyer. It was also known that the BVI Buyer is owned by a Hong Kong listing company. Indeed all companies are within the same group. In its ruling, the SMSTB concluded that the existence and use of all of BVI subsidiaries and the Hong Kong company absolutely lacked a reasonable business purpose and by virtue of the GAAR and the
Guizhou Case
Following Circular 698, in August 2011, the Guizhou Provincial State Tax Bureau (GPSTB) collected RMB31.5 million of CIT on the transfer of a BVI company indirectly holding an equity interest in a company established in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province. The BVI company had a business registration in Hong Kong and had claimed that it was a tax resident of Hong Kong in order to obtain the vepercent reduced WHT rate on dividends from the Guiyang company under the double tax arrangement between Hong Kong and the Mainland of China. This was done on the basis that its place of effective management was in Hong Kong. The ownership chain is: Hong Kong parent owns another Hong Kong company which in turn owns the BVI company, the subject shares of which were transferred in this case. Correspondingly the BVI company owns 80 percent of equity capital of the Guiyang company. In the course of a tax assessment against the Guiyang company in late 2010, the tax ofcials discovered that the BVI company was transferred in the early part of 2010 at a price of about RMB800 million with a capital gain of about RMB300 million. After investigation, the GPSTB determined that the BVI company had no
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economic substance in the BVIthe jurisdiction of incorporation (but not in Hong Kong)thus it was a shell company. It levied CIT of RMB31.5 million on the indirect transfer of the equity interest in the Guiyang company pursuant to Circular 698. In this case, it is unclear from the report whether the BVI company had economic substance in Hong Kong. If the BVI company had sufcient economic substance in Hong Kong to be treated as the benecial owner of the dividend income, it is unclear why the tax bureau chose to ignore the companys presence and substance in Hong Kong in the context of the Circular 698 case.12 ferring the timing of paying taxes in China. Therefore, if the taxpayers would like to demonstrate that the structures are established with reasonable business purposes in accordance to the anti-tax avoidance provision under CIT Law and IR, they must at least prove to the SAT that the primary reason for setting up the offshore structures is commercial or business related, instead of tax-driven.13 The key is business substance, and actions are always better words. The business and structural reasons behind the indirect equity transfer must be substantiated and justied to the Chinese tax authorities as reasonable business purposes of the transfer. Despite the case decisions on the application of the Circular 698, there are still many uncertainties from a practical perspective; for example, whether capital gains arising from the indirect share transfer of a Chinese entity by a nonresident individual shall be subject to individual income tax in the domain of GAAR.14 Even at the corporate level, it is questionable if both gains and losses on the indirect share transfers of different equity interests for a whole investment project can be set off. Another uncertainty comes from the application for special reorganization of mergers and acquisitionsthat is whether the Circular 698 can override the agreed special tax treatment as laid down in Caishui [2009] No. 5915 and attack the at cost transactions. Anti-tax avoidance works are like a cat and a mouse game. The extent of greed of a taxpayer must be inversely commensurate with the level of efforts and resources the SAT has put. It is hoped that more objective bases and grounds of applying the Circular 698 can be publicly disclosed so that investors may have a better understanding of their tax position in structuring their transactions involving the interests of Chinese entities.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the above discussion, MNCs when making investments in China, must be alert of the potential attack on taxing the gain on disposal of indirect transfer of equity interests in overall merger and acquisition strategies. Chinese tax authorities are taking an active approach rather than merely relying on NTRE investors to voluntary report the case. Taxpayers must understand that not reporting does not mean no GAAR. Based on the interpretation of Circular 2 and Circular 698, one of the key factors the SAT will apply GAAR is based on whether the taxpayers can demonstrate the reasonable business purposes for setting up the offshore structures. However, the SAT has not issued further guidance or interpretation notes to elaborate the denition of reasonable business purposes and it makes the assessment on each case becomes subjective. On the other hand, transaction without reasonable business purposes has been dened in the CIT Law and IR as transactions which have the primary purpose of reducing, avoiding or de-
ENDNOTES
1
China Corporate Income Tax Law was passed at the 5th Session of the 10th NPC on March 16, 2007, and took effect on January 1, 2008. The Implementation Rules of the China Corporate Income Tax Law was issued through the State Councils Decree No. 512 in 2007, and took effect on January 1, 2008. Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2 Implementation Measures for Special Tax Adjustments (Trial), Jan. 8, 2009, released by SAT on January 9, 2009, with retrospective effect from January 1, 2008. Danny Po, et. al., The Tax Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring in China, ASIA-PACIFIC J. TAXN,
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Spring-Summer 2010, at 43-54. Guoshuihan [2009] No. 698 (Dec. 10, 2009) Strengthening of Administration of Corporate Income Tax Liability on Income of Non-resident Enterprises from Transfer of Equity Interests. Karmen Yeung, et. al., Recent Development in the General Anti-tax Avoidance Rules in China and Future Impacts on and Challenges for Offshore Investment Structuring, ASIA-PACIFIC J. TAXN, Spring-Summer 2010, at 55-61. See note 6. SAT Bulletin [2011] No. 24 Concerning Certain Issues Related to Taxation of Non-resident Enterprises (Mar. 28, 2011). The full text
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of Bulletin 24 is available at www.gzds.gov. cn/xwzx/zxfg/201104/t20110414_808178. htm (in Chinese). Baker & McKenzie, Recent Developments for Notice 698, CHINA TAX MONTHLY, Apr. 2011, at 1-3. Baker & McKenzie, Tax Disputes Gradually Becoming a Reality in China, CLIENT ALERT, Apr. 2011, at 5-6. See note 9. Baker & McKenzie, Recent Developments for Notice 698, CHINA TAX MONTHLY, Apr. 2011, at 3-5. According to the news report in the China Taxation News (Reported on China Taxation News on May 11, 2011 (www.ctaxnews.net.cn/ html/2011-05/11/nbs.D340100zgswb_01.
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See note 6. Baker & McKenzie, Individual Income Tax: Capital Gain from Indirect Share Transfer, CHINA TAX MONTHLY, June 2011, at 4-5. In June 2011, the rst case in which a local tax bureau imposed individual income tax (IIT) on capital gains derived by a Hong Kong individual from the indirect share transfer of a Chinese entity became publicly available. A local tax bureau in Shenzhen successfully attacked an indirect share transfer of a Chinese entity carried out by a Hong Kong individual transferor and collected IIT in an amount of RMB13.68 million. The Hong Kong indi-
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vidual had transferred his shares in a Hong Kong company which in turn was the sole shareholder of a Shenzhen logistics company, a wholly foreign owned enterprise, to a Singapore company in return for more than RMB200 million. On April 30, 2009, the Ministry of Finance and the SAT promulgated Caishui [2009] No. 59 Circular on Several Issues on Corporate Income Tax Treatment for Corporate Restructuring Transactions, retroactive effect from January 1, 2008. See Daniel Cheung, Tax Implications of Recent Merger and Acquisition Rules in China, INTL TAX J., MayJune 2011, at 43-51.
provide an independent, wholesale exemption for the disposition of partnership interests,33 they treat the ownership of an interest in a partnership that qualies for the trading exception as not commercial in nature, suggesting a look-through approach. A consistent (and logical) approach would treat the gain on the sale of a partnership interest as exempt under Code Sec. 892 to the extent that a sale of the exempt partners portion of the assets (if held directly by the foreign government) would be exempt. Additionally, because there is ambiguity under Code Sec. 897(g) as to when a partnership interest is itself considered a USRPI, Treasury shouldat the very leastclarify the common sense conclusion in the example above that the sale of an interest in a partnership that holds only noncontrolled USRPHC stock (determined by looking to the portion indirectly owned by a foreign government) would be exempt under Code Sec. 892.34
tity as a CCE if the entity would be considered a USRPHC if it were a U.S. corporation. 35 The Deemed CCE Rule thus treats a foreign controlled entity that holds USRPIs (including stock in USRPHCs) as a CCE if the USRPIs constitute more than 50 percent of the entitys assets.36 The Deemed CCE Rule, which would prevent any of the controlled entitys income from being exempt under Code Sec. 892, is inconsistent with the general treatment of foreign governments ownership of USRPIs under Code Sec. 892. In particular, under the Deemed CCE Rule, a controlled entity that owns less than 50 percent of the stock of a USRPHC and does not have enough other good assets to offset the USPRHC stock would not be eligible for exemption under Code Sec. 892, regardless of how much actual U.S. real property it actually holds. However, if the foreign government held the USPRHC stock directly, through an integral part, or through a noncontrolled entity, the foreign government would not be subject to gain on the sale of USPRHC stock.37 Additionally, the Proposed Regulations clarify that a controlled entity is not considered engaged in commercial
activities by virtue of disposing of USRPIs, 38 so it makes little sense that a controlled entity may dispose of USRPIs without being engaged in commercial activities, but it cannot also hold USRPIs without fear of triggering the Deemed CCE Rule. Furthermore, this rule is relatively easy to avoid by internal re-structuring, so it only becomes a nuisance or, worse, a trap for the unwary. Not only is the Deemed CCE Rule confusing and inconsistent with the other provisions in the Temporary and Proposed Regulations, it can also lead to inefficient structuring mechanisms to avoid its application.
Conclusions
The Proposed Regulations offer some comfort to foreign governments and their 100-percent controlled entities, and it is hoped that these clarications and modications are ultimately incorporated into the nal regulations. But the job of providing guidance under Code Sec. 892, and further clarifying or removing some of the strict, confusing, and arbitrary rules still lurking in the Temporary Regulations, should continue.
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