The Mathematics of the Great U.S.

Blackout
August 14, 2003

Ralph Fehr, P.E. Engineering Consultant

The Mathematics of the Great U.S. Blackout

August 14, 2003

Note: The photograph on the preceding slide has been circulating on the Internet since shortly after August 14, 2003. It is impressive, dramatic, and FAKE. But it does attempt to indicate the huge impact and expanse of the August 14 event, and most importantly, it makes for a cool title slide!

Ralph Fehr, P.E. Engineering Consultant

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)

NERC is a not-for-profit company formed after the 1965 Northeast Blackout to promote the reliability of the bulk electrical system that serves North America.

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)

NERC is divided into 10 regional reliability councils. Each council monitors utilities within its geographic area.

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)

3 Interconnections / 10 NERC Regions

NERC Control Areas

NERC Reliability Coordinators

Footprints of Reliability Coordinators in Midwest

The August 14, 2003 Blackout was caused by a cascading series of events.

What started the ball rolling?

A wire attached at two points sags under its own weight.

The amount of sag is a function of tension. Tension is a function of wire temperature and weight. Temperature is a function of several variables but a major contributor is electrical loading. Temperature increases with electrical loading SQUARED. As the wire temperature INCREASES, the tension DECREASES. For a level span, the maximum sag D is the y-coordinate at the midpoint of the line, and is given by:

where S = span length TH = horizontal component of tension w = conductor weight per unit length

Effects of Ambient Conditions on Ratings

Mathematical Analysis of Root Cause

Alternate Mathematical Analysis of Root Cause y = cosh(x)

Cost maintenance > 0
x

Outage Sequence of Events Transmission Map Key

ONTARIO

East Lake 5 Trip: 1:31:34 PM

ONTARIO

Stuart Atlanta Trip: 2:02 PM

ONTARIO

MISO State Estimator and Reliability Analysis

MISO state estimator and contingency analysis ineffective from 12:37 to 16:04
State estimator not solving due to missing information on lines out in Cinergy then DPL Human error in not resetting SE automatic trigger

Using Flowgate Monitoring tool to monitor conditions on previously identified critical flowgates

FirstEnergy Computer Failures

14:14 Alarm logger fails and operators are not aware
No further alarms to FE operators

14:20 Several remote consoles fail 14:41 EMS server hosting alarm processor and other functions fails to backup 14:54 Backup server fails
EMS continues to function but with very degraded performance (59 second refresh) FE system data passed normally to others: MISO and AEP AGC function degraded and strip charts flat-lined

15:08 IT warm reboot of EMS appears to work but alarm process not tested and still in failed condition No contingency analysis of events during the day including loss of East Lake 5 and subsequent line trips

Phone Calls to FirstEnergy

FE received calls from MISO, AEP, and PJM indicating problems on the FE system but did not recognize evolving emergency
14:32 AEP calls regarding trip and reclose of Star-S. Canton 15:19 AEP calls again confirming Star-S. Canton trip and reclose 15:35 Calls received about spikes seen on system 15:36 MISO calls FE regarding contingency overload on Star-Juniper for loss of Hanna-Juniper 15:45 FE tree trimming crew calls in regarding HannaJuniper flashover to a tree PJM called MISO at 15:48 and FE at 15:56 regarding overloads on FE system

The Chamberlin - Harding 345 kV line sags into a tree at 3:05:41. Contact with tree causes a ground fault which results in very high current. The protective relays on the Chamberlin Harding line sense the high current and trip (deenergize) the line. A Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) at nearby Juniper Substation recorded the fault current.

Chamberlin-Harding (3:05:41)

Chamberlin-Harding Indication of Ground Fault Due to Tree Contact as Measured by DFR at Juniper

y = ex sin x NOT STABLE should be y = e-x sin x

(3:05:41)

Hanna-Juniper (3:32:03)

Hanna Juniper Confirmed as Tree Contact at Less than Emergency Ratings of Line

(3:05:41)

(3:32:03)

Star- S. Canton (3:41:35)

Situation after Initial Trips 3:05:41 3:41:35

ONTARIO

Canton Central Tidd (3:45:41)

Anatomy of a Cascading Outage

20% 20% 20%

Source

20% 20%

Load

Anatomy of a Cascading Outage

0% 25% 25%

Source

25% 25%

Load

Anatomy of a Cascading Outage

0% 0% 33%

Source

33% 33%

Load

Anatomy of a Cascading Outage

0% 0% 0%

Source

50% 50%

Load

Anatomy of a Cascading Outage

0% 0% 0%

Source

0% 100%

Load

138 kV Lines Overload and Cascade Near Akron

Simulated 138 kV Line Loadings
200 180 Dale-W.Can 138 kV W.Ak-PV Q22 138 kV Cham-W.Ak 138 kV E.LimaN.Fin 138 kV CantC Xfmr 100 80 60 40 20 0 W.Ak-PV Q21 138 kV Babb-W.Ak 138 kV E.LimaN.Lib 138 kV Clov-Torrey 138 kV

% of Normal Ratings (Amps)

160 140 120

W.Ak-PV Q21 138 kV

W.Ak 138 kV Bkr Failure

E.Lima-N.Lib 138 kV

Hard-Chamb 345 kV

E.Lima-N.Fin 138 kV

Cham-W.Ak 138 kV

Dale-W.Can 138 kV

Clov-Torrey 138 kV

CantC Xfmr

Star-S.Cant 345 kV

Babb-W.Ak 138 kV

Hanna-Jun 345 kV

Outages

Dale-W.Canton 138 kV
16:05:55 EDT

138 kV Cascade Contributes Further to Overload of Sammis-Star

W.Akron 138 kV Breaker Chamberlin-W.Akron 138 kV

Sammis-Star

E.Lima-N.Finlay 138 kV Canton Central Transformer

15:51:41 EDT

W.Akron-Pleasant Valley 138 kV

Babb-W.Akron 138 kV E.Lima-New Liberty 138 kV

Cloverdale-Torrey 138 kV

Star-S.Canton 15:41:35 EDT HannaJuniper

15:32:03 EDT

HardingChamberlin 15:05:41 EDT

80

60

40

140

120

% of Normal Ratings

100

20

Sammis-Star (4:05:57.5)

Sammis-Star Zone 3 Relay Operates on Steady State Overload

Operating point must lie below blue curve, or line will trip. As loading on line increases, operating point moves up and to the left.

Actual Loading on Critical Lines

Harding - Chamberlin Hanna - Juniper Star - South Canton Sammis - Star Line Trip Sammis - Star Star - South Canton Line Trip
Hanna - Juniper Line Trip East Lake 5 Trip

1600

1200

Flows (MW)

800

400
Harding - Chamberlin Line Trip

0 12:00 13:00 14:00 Time - EDT 15:00 16:00

Actual Voltages Leading to Sammis-Star

370 Harding - Chamberlin 345 kV Line Trip 350 Hanna - Juniper 345 kV Line Trip
Gaps in Data Records

100% Voltage

95% Voltage 330

Voltage (kV)

90% Voltage 310

Star
290

Star - South Canton 345 kV Line Trip Sammis - Star 345 kV Line Trip

Hanna Beaver Perry

270

250 15:00

Time - EDT

16:00

Major Path to Cleveland Blocked after Loss of Sammis-Star 4:05:57.5 PM

Remaining Paths

345 kV Lines Trip Across Ohio to West

ONTARIO

Generation Trips 4:09:08 4:10:27 PM

ONTARIO

345 kV Transmission Cascade Moves North into Michigan 4:10:36 4:10:37 PM

Northern Ohio and Eastern Michigan Served Only from

Ontario after 4:10:37.5 4:10:38.6 PM

Power Transfers Shift at 4:10:38.6 PM

Eastern Eastern Michigan (Detroit) Unstable Voltage and Frequency Collapse and Pole Slipping
Ontario Michigan Interface Flow and Voltages Beginning 16:10:38

Generator Trips to 16:10:38

Generator Trips Next 7 Seconds

Overloads on PJM NY Ties 4:10:39 PM

PJM NY Separating 4:10:44 PM

Cleveland Toledo Island 4:10:39 - 4:10:46 PM Cleveland Blacks Out

Northeast Completes Separation from Eastern Interconnection 4:10:43 4:10:45 PM

Conditions at Niagara Indicate Progressively Worsening Stability Conditions with Prior Events

Island Breaks Up: 4:10:46 4:13 PM

Frequency in Ontario and New York during Breakup Niagara Generation Stays with Western NY

Generator Trips After 16:10:44

End of the Cascade

Some Local Load Interrupted

Areas Affected by the Blackout

Service maintained in some area

Lessons Learned
Better maintenance practices

Better training for system operators

Better communications between utilities

Can it happen again?

What do you think?

Thank you!

Manhattan skyline with only emergency lighting August 14, 2003