S 1752971910000321 A

International Theory
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Reason, emotion, and the problem of world poverty: moral sentiment theory and international ethics
Renee Jeffery
International Theory / Volume 3 / Issue 01 / February 2011, pp 143 - 178 DOI: 10.1017/S1752971910000321, Published online: 18 February 2011
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1752971910000321 How to cite this article: Renee Jeffery (2011). Reason, emotion, and the problem of world poverty: moral sentiment theory and international ethics. International Theory, 3, pp 143-178 doi:10.1017/S1752971910000321 Request Permissions : Click here
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International Theory (2011), 3:1, 143178 & Cambridge University Press, 2011 doi:10.1017/S1752971910000321
Reason, emotion, and the problem of world poverty: moral sentiment theory and international ethics
R E N E E J E F F E RY
Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Grifth Asia Institute, Grifth University, Nathan, QLD, Australia E-mail: r.jeffery@grifth.edu.au
This article defends a sentimentalist cosmopolitan approach to international ethics against the rationalist cosmopolitan claim that emotions ought to be subjugated by their master, reason, and in processes of ethical deliberation. It argues that emotions play an indispensable role in making moral judgements and help to motivate ethical actions. Drawing on elements of 18th century moral sentiment theory and recent advances in neuroscience and psychology, the article demonstrates that reason and emotion are intimately linked forms of reective thought, that emotion is central to reason and, far from disrupting processes of ethical deliberation, may actually enhance our ability to make moral judgements. Focusing on the problem of global poverty, the article shows that a sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic provides a holistic approach to moral dilemmas in world politics that is capable of identifying injustices, prescribing how we ought to respond to them, and motivating ethical action in response to the injustices we observe.
Keywords: international ethics; global poverty; emotion; moral sentiment theory; moral judgement; injustice
[S]entiment is one thing and argument is another, and nothing fogs the brain as thoroughly as emotion. (Feinburg, 1982: 19)
Global poverty is, without question, the most pervasive moral problem confronting contemporary world politics. Affecting more than 2.6 billion of the worlds poorest inhabitants, grinding poverty, hunger, and deprivation constitute the leading indirect causes of mortality in children under 5 years of age, accounting for a staggering 27,000 deaths every day or 10 million deaths per year (UN Millennium Development Goals, Fact Sheet; Singer, 2009: 4). Since the early 1970s, debate about the contours of this problem has been dominated by rationalist cosmopolitan scholars of international ethics and political philosophy (Singer, 1972, 2002a,
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2009; ONeill, 1986a, b; Beitz, 1979; Shue, 1996; Pogge, 2002, 2008; Caney, 2008). Sharing a common commitment to the principles of individualism, universality, and equality, and a belief that ethical deliberation ought to be based on reason and rationality,1 rationalist cosmopolitans have focused their efforts on dening the nature of the duties those of us living in afuence have to assist the impoverished (Tan, 2010: 257). As the continuing plight of the global poor makes clear, however, the problem of world poverty lies not just with the identication of the injustice it entails or even the articulation of an obligation to address it, but with the transposition of that moral obligation into ethical action (Bittner, 2001: 24). Thus, almost three decades after Peter Singer rst argued that the failure of rich nations and individuals to help to alleviate extreme poverty was morally indefensible his latest work asks, despairingly, why the wealthy do not give more and what can be done to motivate action (Singer, 1972, 2009). In response to Singers questions and in accordance with the view that [m]orality requires action of certain sorts (ONeill, 2001: 131), this article defends a sentimentalist version of cosmopolitanism that does not simply identify injustices and prescribe how we ought to respond to them but, when applied to the practice of international ethics has the potential to motivate action. It argues that emotions are central to processes of ethical deliberation and play an indispensable role in the practical application of ethics to a range of moral dilemmas in contemporary international politics. In doing so, it refutes the rationalist assumption, prevalent in the eld, that emotion is the opposite of reason (Mercer, 2006: 289) and thus ought to be omitted from impartial ethical deliberations (Lutz, 1995: 151; Monin et al., 2007: 220221). Drawing on recent advances in the elds of neuroscience and psychology, it conrms the argument articulated by the sentimentalist cosmopolitans of the 18th century that reason is and ought only to be a slave to the passions (Hume, 2000: 2.3.3.4). As such, it does not seek to replace reason with emotion but to establish the place of emotion alongside reason in international ethics. The rst section of this article thus introduces the concept of emotion and details the alternative feeling-based and hybrid approaches that combine feelings with cognitive reection favoured by rationalist and sentimentalist cosmopolitans, respectively. Defending a hybrid approach akin to that promulgated by the 18th century moral sentiment theorists, it argues that emotions are not synonymous with mere feelings, as many
Highlighting their close relationship, Sen denes rationality as the need to subject ones choices to the demands of reason (2002: 4). Rationality, in this context, is thus distinct from that referred to by Keohane (1988) in the context of international institutions, or that associated with the Grotian tradition of the English School.
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rationalist cosmopolitans assume, but include cognitive components. The second section identies two sets of assumptions, about the nature of ethics and the nature of emotions, which lead rationalist cosmopolitans to conclude that emotions ought to be omitted from processes of ethical deliberation. In the third section, these assumptions are refuted using the cosmopolitan moral sentiment theories of Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith. By positing that emotion is central to processes of reasoned reection and that emotions can contribute to the formulation of impartial judgements, the moral sentiment theorists concluded that emotions have and ought to have a place in ethical deliberations. The fourth section then reveals that these conclusions are borne out in recent advances in the elds of neuroscience and political psychology. In particular, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of brain activity associated with deliberative processes demonstrate that emotions are engaged in making moral judgements, including those directed by consequentialist and deontological forms of rationalist cosmopolitan reasoning. What is more, recent studies in political psychology reveal that the engagement of emotion is not detrimental to political decision-making processes but rather enhances the quality of reasoned judgements and motivates ethical actions.2 The nal section of the article then considers how a reformulated, holistic sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic might address the moral problem posed by the extreme poverty and hunger endured by so many of the worlds people. For, as Singer (2009) and others readily acknowledge (Bittner, 2001: 24), recognizing that extreme poverty is unjust and that the rich have an obligation to alleviate it is only part of the problem; more pressing for the worlds least fortunate inhabitants is the need to inspire ethical action in response to that injustice.
Emotion
For well over a century, debates about the nature of emotion have been dominated by two broad perspectives. The rst conceives emotions as feelings or bodily responses and, as we will see in the following section, is commonly adhered to by proponents of rationalist varieties of cosmopolitan thought. In the most famous historical account of emotion as feeling, William James argued that an emotion is the feeling of [bodily]
2 Despite relying on advances in neuroscience and psychology, this article does not seek to imply a wholly materialist understanding of emotions as mere natural phenomena, devoid of any social aspect. Rather, it simply suggests that examining the natural foundations of emotions provides an important insight into the role that emotions play and ought to play in making ethical judgements.
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changes as they occur (1884: 189190). That is, he conceived emotions as bodily sensations excited by particular environmental stimuli (Damsio, 1994: 30). In his now famous example, James argued that it is not because we are afraid of a bear that we run from it, but that we are afraid because we run (1950: 450). Were emotions to precede perception and interpretation of our bodily state, we might then see the bear, and judge it best to runybut we could not actually feel afraid (James, 1884: 190). Rather, James argued that what we would experience is a purely cognitive appraisal of the situation. James-Lange theory, as it became known after Carl Lange arrived at a similar conclusion, thus argued that individuals experience a bodily change in response to environmental stimuli before feeling an emotion. In contemporary scholarship, James approach has been most prominently adopted and developed by Antonio Damasio who has sought to defend James theory against what Damasio considered the unfair attacks that led to its marginalization in most twentieth century scholarship (1999: 39). According to Damasio, emotions such as happiness, sadness, embarrassment, or sympathy are distinct patterns of neural and chemical responses (2003: 53). Diverging from James, who dened emotions as the feeling of bodily changes, however, Damasio distinguishes emotions from feelings. Emotions are thus conceived as outwardly directed and public responses or as actions or movementsyvisible to others as they occur in the face, in the voice, [or] in specic behaviors (Damasio, 1999: 36; 2003: 28). By contrast, feelings are conceived as variants of the experience of pain or pleasure (Damasio, 2003: 3) that are inwardly directed and private (1999: 36). Building on James work, Damasios somatic theory therefore argues that emotions both precede and engender feelings (2003: 29; 1999: 36).3 That is, feelings are derived from perceptions of pain and pleasure elicited by the bodily responses that constitute emotions. The second broad approach conceives emotions in cognitive terms.4 For pure cognitivists, emotions do not simply require thoughts as one of their central components, but are identical to them (Prinz, 2004: 8). In this vein, Martha Nussbaum denes emotions as intelligent responses to the perception of value (2001: 1). That is, emotions do not simply contribute to judgements but are value judgements. Thus, while less extreme cognitive theories conceive emotion as a joint function of a physiologically arousing situation and the persons evaluation or appraisal of the situation
See Prinz (2004: 56) for a discussion of the main difference between James and Damasios theories of emotion. 4 A possible third approach would include the neurobiological theories. See LeDoux (1995).
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(Izard, 1977: 4), Nussbaum maintains that the cognitive elements are an essential part of an emotions identity (2001: 34). Nussbaum and other cognitivists of both extreme and moderate persuasions therefore also distinguish between emotions and feelings. For them, emotions can be distinguished from feelings by the place that cognition or belief occupies within them (Krause, 2008: 57). For example, Nussbaum argues that an emotion such as being angry is distinctly different from experiencing a bodily appetite. As the experience of hunger or thirst does not depend on particular beliefs or require cognitive reection, anger seems to require and to rest upon a belief that one has been wronged or damaged in some signicant way by the person towards whom the anger is directed (Nussbaum, 1990: 41). Proponents of cognitive theories of emotions argue that it is on this basis that emotions are not just a psychological adjunct to ethical deliberations but are part of ethical thought itself (Nussbaum, 2001: 3). For cognitivist theorists, it is precisely because of their cognitive nature that emotions are capable of contributing to ethical deliberations. As Robert Solomon argues, defending the cognitive approach against feeling theories, if emotions are nothing more than speciable physiological changes (i.e. a ushed face, a pounding heart, a queasiness in the stomachy) it is difcult to see why they should have any more relevance to morality and justice than should a headache or a bout of nausea (1995: 209210). According to the cognitivist view, emotions can only have a place in processes of ethical deliberation if they are conceived as something more, some more elaborate set of ideas, and judgements about the world (Solomon, 1995: 210). Pure cognitivists go too far, however, when they argue that emotions are mere cognitive states. Although it is unproblematic to assert that experiencing the emotion of anger in response to an injustice includes the beliefs that an injustice has been committed and that injustice is wrong, this cognitive process does not adequately explain the emotion as we readily experience it in ourselves and witness it in others (Krause, 2008: 62). Anger, along with all other emotions, is more than a simple cognitive state; it also entails a bodily response. With this in mind, it is clear that a hybrid understanding that includes both feelings and cognitive components is required. Although cognitive theories dominate contemporary scholarship concerned with emotions (Ross, 2006: 200), historically, hybrid theories that incorporate elements of feeling and cognition have been the rule rather than the exception (Prinz, 2004: 10). For example, the theories of emotion espoused by Aristotle, Descartes, and, as we will see shortly, the moral sentiment theorists, David Hume and Adam Smith, can be classied as hybrids. Although different hybrid theories place differing degrees of emphasis on the cognitive and affective components of emotions and can
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thus be divided into theories of affect primacy (Zajonc, 1980) and cognitive primacy theories (Lazarus, 1991a, b), they all, in different ways, understand emotions as conscious cognitive experiences, and argue that emotions are responses to bodily states (Prinz, 2004: 10). In doing so, they allow real, bodily emotions to play a role in making moral judgements and motivating ethical actions. As we will see in the following section, by dening emotions in terms of mere feelings, rationalist cosmopolitans not only fail to adequately distinguish between feelings and emotions but preclude the possibility that emotions may play a role in processes of ethical deliberation. By contrast, sentimentalist cosmopolitanism, as we will also see, by conceiving emotions in hybrid terms, accords them a central role, alongside reason, in making moral judgements.
Rationalist cosmopolitan ethics

Although some recent scholarship has begun to acknowledge the role that emotions play in both the theory and practice of international relations,5 normative International Relations theory remains dominated by rationalist cosmopolitanism. Rationalist cosmopolitans of both deontological and consequentialist persuasions are united by the central claim that all individuals are part of a single moral universe in which they are equally worthy of respect and consideration (Held, 2003: 470) and possess both rights and duties in relation to all other human beings (Charvet, 1998: 523). This claim is underpinned by the assumption that individuals are capable of using reason to identify universally valid moral laws and, by extension, that the emotions ought to be subjugated and controlled by their master, reason. This normative component of rationalist cosmopolitan theories thus rests on two further sets of assumptions, about the nature of ethics and the nature of emotions.
Ethics in rational cosmopolitanism

For rationalist cosmopolitans, ethics are dened in terms of three principles: individualism, universality, and egalitarianism (Atack, 2005: 42; Marchetti, 2008: 36). Thus, in order to be considered ethical, a rule must conform, at
5 See, in particular, Mercer (2010), Crawford (2000), and Lebow (2005) have, in different ways, highlighted the roles that fear, sympathy, and empathy play in the theories of Thucydides, Hobbes, Morgenthau, and Waltz. Others focus on the role of emotions in deterrence, peacebuildingy[and] adherence to normative prescriptions (Crawford, 2000: 116117), geopolitics (Moisi, 2009), peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention (Pupavac, 2004), decision-making in war (Rosen, 2005), and the formation, establishment, and regulation of norms (Nadelmann, 1990: 524; Elster, 1996: 1390; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893).
the very least, to the ideas that the individual is the fundamental unit of analysis to whom all ethical principles apply, that all moral rules must be universally applicable, and that all individuals in this universal moral realm must be afforded equal respect. Drawing on the enlightenment commitment to individual reective autonomy, Kant, following the Stoics, argued that universal laws nd their origins in the wills of all rational beings (1948: 93; Nussbaum, 1997: 30; Hayden, 2005: 13). In doing so, he identied the individual autonomy that is central to rationalist cosmopolitan ethics with the individual exercise of reason (Frazer, 2007: 758) and argued that the universal supremacy of rational beings in themselves as ends is derived from pure reason alone (Kant, 1948: 93). In rationalist cosmopolitan thought, however, reason does not simply stand in close relationship to the principles of individualism and universality, but provides the means by which egalitarianism is achieved. In particular, the relationship between reason and the principle of impartiality, according to which egalitarianism is operationalized, is central to contemporary rationalist cosmopolitan understandings of the nature of ethics itself. [To] reason ethically, to consider things from the moral point of view, rationalist cosmopolitans argue, is to adopt an impartial standpoint (Cottingham, 1983: 83). The impartiality thesis that Singer, Rawls, and others advocate, argues that when we are making moral decisionsywe ought not to give any special weight to our own desires and interests; instead of giving preferential treatment to ourselves, or to members of our own particular group, we should try to adopt a neutral standpoint, detaching ourselves as far as possible from our own special desires and involvements (Cottingham, 1983: 83). Impartiality is thus the guiding principle that ensures that cosmopolitan ethics are indeed universal and egalitarian. In this vein, Singer argues, from a utilitarian perspective, that an ethical principle cannot be justied in relation to any partial or sectional group because [e]thics takes a universal point of view (1993: 11). In his famous and often repeated analogy, Singer drew on the principle of impartiality to argue that those of us living in relative afuence have an obligation to assist strangers living in poverty in other parts of the world. In particular, he was concerned with the lack of assistance being afforded to the several million Bengali refugees who were, at the time, living on the edge of starvation in refugee camps in India (2002a: 156). By way of analogy, Singer argued that if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out (1972: 231). To do so, he reasoned that the negative consequences associated with rescuing the child, getting my clothes muddy, are insignicant in comparison to the negative consequences associated with leaving the child to drown (1972: 231).
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He then argued that the vast majority of people living in the developed world have the same obligation to, at a relatively small cost to themselves, assist the Bengali refugees. In this case, the principle of impartiality dictates that [i]t makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbors child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, 10,000 miles away (1972: 231232). We will return to this analogy later and consider the role that emotions may play in it, but for now it sufces to say that adherence to the principle of impartiality is what facilitates universalism and egalitarianism in consequentialist variants of rationalist cosmopolitanism. John Rawls deontological theory of justice as fairness is no less reliant on the concept of impartiality (1971: 30). His veil of ignorance, a hypothetical scenario in which individuals are required to determine the principle of justice without reference to their own personal circumstances, enforces impartiality by moderating selsh rational choices with reasonableness (2005: 490). Defending what is often portrayed as the extreme rationalism of Rawls theory of justice, Barry argues that justice as impartiality can be conceived as [a] theory of justice which makes it turn on the terms of reasonable agreement (1996: 7). Reason, in this context, Barry explains, means reasoned argument, from premises that are in principle open to everyone to accept (1996: 7). From this starting point Barry thus attempts to formulate an impartial ethic that can cope with the widely differentiated understandings of the good that mark international politics (1996: 119).6
Emotion in rationalist cosmopolitanism

Within theories that conceive ethics as impartial and understand impartiality as the product of reasoned argument, the relationship between reason and emotion is one of master and slave. Kant thus argued that for an action to have genuine moral worth it must be done not from inclination but from duty,ythe necessity to act out of reverence for the law (1948: 64, 66). Although he reluctantly acknowledged that reverence is a feeling, Kant dened it in terms of reason as being self-produced by a rational concept rather than received through outside inuence (1948: 66). Thus, for Kant, our duty to revere the law which formed the basis of moral goodness can only consist in the thought of a rational being (1948: 66). It is guided not by the emotions, inclinations, or selsh interests, but by the demands of reason. Similarly, for rationalist consequentialist cosmopolitans, the demands of reason over-ride judgements driven by emotions. Thus, classical utilitarians
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See also ONeill, 1997.
argue that where feelings contradict reasoned calculations of utility, they ought to be discarded on the grounds of being irrational (Williams, 2004: 212). In this vein, Singer argues that if we simply accept our feelings without engaging in reasoned reection, we would not be able to decide which of our intuitive inclinations to endorse and support and which to oppose (2002a: 163164). In doing so, he ultimately suggests that our feelings and intuitive inclinations are only valid insofar as they accord with the reasoned reections that constitute ethical judgements. The relationship between reason and emotion in rationalist theories of ethics can be summarized in terms of three prevailing assumptions about the nature of emotion. The rst assumption is that emotions are inescapably selsh and is derived, at least in part, from their conceptualization as mere feelings in much rationalist cosmopolitan thought. According to Kant, [t]he appeal to the principle of moral feeling is not only supercial but is incapable of providing a uniform measure of good and evil (1948: 103). Emotions, or moral feelings, differ from one another by an innity of degrees and are thus a function of individual inclination rather than a source of universal moral judgement (1948: 103). As mere feelings, emotions can be nothing other than subjective inclinations with a tendency to self-interest, although Kant did acknowledge, with Francis Hutcheson, the moral feeling of sympathy for the happiness of others (1948: 103). The second assumption is implicit in the explication of the three fundamental principles of rationalist cosmopolitan thought and conceives emotions as being wholly distinct from reason. In rationalist cosmopolitan thought, emotion is consistently conceived as an inappropriate alternative to reason in processes of ethical deliberation. Thus, Rawls explicit Kantianism leads him to emphasize autonomy and rationality as the dening characteristics of moral subjects, to pursue a rigid separation of reason from feeling, and to, at least outwardly, refuse to allow feeling any place in the formulation of moral principles (Okin, 1989: 231).7 As such, rationalist cosmopolitans maintain that the emotions ought to be controlled by their master, reason, lest they contaminate the formulation of moral judgements.
7 Despite the overt rationalism of Rawls theory of justice, Frazer (2007) argues that Rawls is actually equally reliant on Kantian rationalist and sentimentalist ideas, although he is not willing to acknowledge the latter. Indeed, in his later works, Rawls distinguished between rationality and reasonableness. Liberal peoples, he argued, are rational in so far as they engage in instrumental reasoning in order to pursue their interests, but this pursuit is constrained by their sense of what is reasonable, reasonableness entailing a concern for reciprocity and the interests of others (Brown, 2002: 11). This understanding of reasonableness thus opens the door for sentimentalist ideas about the communication of others interests via the phenomena of emotions.
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On the basis of the rst two assumptions, the third contends that emotions, being inescapably selsh and fundamentally distinct from reason, are incapable of contributing to impartial ethical deliberation. Considered together, rationalist cosmopolitan assumptions about the nature of ethics and the nature of emotions thus lead to the conclusion that ethics ought to be based on reason and not emotion. However, even if we are to accept the, admittedly contested, claims that ethics ought to be individualist, universal, egalitarian and, by extension, impartial, it does not necessarily follow that emotions ought to be omitted from processes of ethical deliberation. In particular, the assumptions about the nature of emotions and their relationship to reason that, as discussed above, mark rationalist cosmopolitan thought, are unfounded. As suggested earlier, emotions may not be synonymous with mere feelings but include cognitive components. This not only renders them capable of contributing to ethical deliberations, but establishes a basic connection between emotions and reason. From this starting point, the following two sections challenge the three basic assumptions that lead rationalist cosmopolitans to reject the place of emotion in processes of ethical deliberation. They demonstrate that emotions are not the dichotomous opponent of reason but are, in fact, central to processes of reasoning and rational thought, that emotions are capable of reection that is not selsh or self-centered, and that emotions are capable of rendering impartial judgements. To do so, they draw on the relationship between reason and emotion posited by the moral sentiment theorists of the 18th century and recent advances in neuroscience and psychology to argue that emotions play and ought to play a role in processes of ethical deliberation.
Moral sentiment theory

Contrary to the rationalist cosmopolitan view that an emotionally derived ethic cannot uphold the principles of individualism, universality, and egalitarianism, the sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethics associated with the Scottish Enlightenment founded each of these principles not on reason but on emotion. At its core, moral sentiment theory, rst articulated by the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper (16711713), maintains that virtue is not derived from self-interest, reason, or even religion but from our moral sense or sense of right and wrong. This sense is implanted in our nature and forms the foundation of moral judgement (Shaftesbury, 1897: II.I.I.27, I.III.I.21). Shaftesbury even went so far as to argue that a hypothetical, human-like creature would be capable of Virtue and have a Sense of Right and Wrong, even if they lacked the
capacity to reason (1897: I.III.25). With this, Shaftesbury provided the basis on which the moral sentiment theories of Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith refuted the three main assumptions about the nature of emotions and their relationship to reason promulgated by the later rationalist cosmopolitans.
Reason and sentiment

Following Shaftesbury and his defender, Francis Hutcheson (16941746), Hume argued that morality is determined by sentiment (1998: App.1.10, emphasis added). According to Hume, the emotional responses we have to the impressions we experience determine whether their constitutive actions are deemed moral or immoral. While enacting moral principles call[s] forthyfavourable and affectionate sentiments, immorality elicits favourable ones (Hume, 1998: 2.5). On that basis, our sentiments determine whether particular actions are judged moral or immoral. The relationship between emotion and reason in Humes moral thought is thus one of master and slave. Reason, he argued, is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other ofce than to serve and obey (2000: 2.3.3.4). However, Hume did not view reason and emotion as dichotomous opponents but explicitly conceived them as being uncompounded and inseparable (2000: 3.2.2.14). Dened as the discovery of truth or falsehood (Hume, 2000: III.I.I), reason functions as a calculator, an instrument of analysis (Wolin, 1954: 1002) that assists us in understanding our passions. Reason and emotions or passions, as he referred to them interchangeably (Hume, 2000: 2.1.1.3), thus work in concert with one another in making moral judgements. However, Hume was not simply concerned with the role that emotions play in making moral judgements but recognized that action constitutes an essential part of ethics. Thus, Humes often repeated phrase about the enslavement of reason reected his observation that reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action (1998: App.1.21). Reason, he argued, can only help us to reect upon our emotions but cannot, by itself, motivate ethical action in response to the moral judgements we make (1998: App.1.21).
Selshness
In accordance with the passions the central authoritative role in making moral judgements and motivating ethical action, the moral sentiment theorists challenged both the selsh theories of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, and the claim that emotions, and hence moral judgements derived from them, are inescapably selsh (Shaftesbury, 1897; Garrett, 2002: 8).
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Hutcheson, in particular, argued that human nature is marked not only by self-love but by benevolent affections towards others (Hutcheson, 2002: II.i). Although our moral sense may be counterbalanced by Interest, legitimate moral judgements are not derived from the exclusive consideration of our own advantage (Hutcheson, 2002: II.I; 2004: II.I.V). Thus, the central guiding principle of Hutchesons moral sense theory was the sentiment of benevolence, pursued not with ones own interests in mind, but on a disinterested basis (2004: 92.III). Hume confronted the claim that moral sentiment theory is inherently self-interested by distinguishing between two different species of sentiment, those derived from selsh considerations of utility, and universal sentiments drawn from the principles of humanity (1998: 5.39; 9.7). This second form of sentiment common to all mankind is central to the very notion of morals itself and forms the basis of moral judgement (1998: 9.5). Hume thus recognized that not all emotional responses elicit legitimate moral judgements. Those borne of purely selsh interests stand outside the bounds of morality. In contrast, sentiments common to all mankind produce legitimate universal moral principles.8 Hume also refuted claims that the passions are inherently selsh by reference to the concepts of sympathy and benevolence. For Hume, sympathy could be dened as a passion akin to benevolence that makes me concerned for the present sorrows of a stranger or as a faculty of mind with an informational function (Hume, 2000: 2.2.9.13; Krause, 2008: 79). In this second sense, sympathy is not a passion itself but a function charged with communicating the passions of others and provoking in us similar passions and sentiments (Hume, 2000: 3.3.2.2). It is not the basis on which we judge the actions of others, but provides a conduit for the sentiments of disapproval and approval that constitute moral judgements. In part, it is the very functioning of the faculty of sympathy in Humes theory that renders moral sentiments capable of contributing to unselsh judgements. For Hume, sympathy is not a function of unitary independent human actors but like all affections readily pass[es] from one person to another and beget[s] correspondent movements in every human creature (Hume in Krause, 2008: 81). Thus, sentiments borne of sympathy that provide moral judgements about the extent to which the actions of others are acceptable or unacceptable, are not the subjective view of a single individual but are derived from the reverberation of sympathy within and between persons in complex ways (Krause, 2008: 81).
See Wertz (1970: 203) and Dees (1992: 228) for a discussion of some criticisms leveled at Humes universalism.
Impartiality
By approaching the moral sentiments from a generalized perspective, Hume made impartiality possible within his approach. He argued that Tis only when a character is considerd in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil (Hume, 2000: 3.1.2.4). Thus, where a response is derived purely from self-interest and does not accord with a generalized and hence impartial moral sentiment, it is an illegitimate basis on which to make a moral judgement. However, critics of Humes theory argued that in some circumstances discerning precisely what the generalized perspective is might be difcult as some actions may genuinely invoke conicting sentiments, such as gratitude and resentment, in different people. The question then becomes one of how to choose between these sentiments when making a judgement. At the same time, other critics argued that Humes theory remained inherently selsh on the grounds that it is not possible to judge oneself using benevolence.9 Adam Smith sought to overcome both of these problems through his discussion of sympathy and by introducing the impartial spectator to moral sentiment theory. According to Smith, sympathy between individuals is one of the most conspicuous features of human existence. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, he argued, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means conned to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility (1984: I.I.I.1, p. 60). In particular, Smith observed that witnessing the pain or distress of another excites in the observer some degree of the same emotion (1984: I.I.I.2). Hypothetically changing places in fancy with the sufferer, our fellow-feeling for the misery of others thereby elicits some degree of the sufferers response in ourselves (1984: I.I.I.3). On this basis, Smith argued, we determine the wrongfulness of hurtful actions inicted on others. Like Hume, however, Smith also acknowledged that not all emotional responses are acceptable. For example, rather than provoking a sympathetic response, [t]he furious behaviour of an angry man is more likely to exasperate us against himself than against his enemies (1984: I.i.I.7). Thus, the act of sympathizing with another entails a judgement about the propriety of the original passion being observed. As Smith explained: When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in
In particular, John Clarke argued in response to Hutchesons moral sense theory, that even benevolence could not be truly disinterested. See Garrett (2002: 8).
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perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to be just and proper, and suitable to their objects (I.I.iii.1). Conversely, we are disgusted with that clamorous grief, which, without any delicacy, calls upon our compassion with sighs and tears and importunate lamentations and detest anger when its fury is indulged without check or restraint (1984: I.I.V.3; I.I.V.4). To choose between different responses thus requires a judgement about the propriety of those responses to be made. To explain the basis on which this judgement is made, Smith introduced the concept of the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator is an imagined ideal that Smith deployed to establish the existence of an objective perspective which can be learned and then used (Haakonssen, 2002: xv), not only to make impartial judgements about the actions of others but to temper ones own tendency towards selsh anti-social behaviour (Young, 1986: 366). According to Smith, the impartial spectator is a judge within that allows us to view our own actions from a disinterested perspective and properly compare our interests to those of others (1984: III.3.1). It tells us whether our behavior is something which other men can go along with (Smith, 1984: II.ii.2.1). If it is not, we lose the indulgence of the spectatorsy[who] readilyysympathize with the natural resentment of the injured, and become the object of their hatred and indignation (Smith, 1984: II.ii.2.1). With this, our sentiments are tempered, internally by the impartial spectator, and externally by other human observers, thereby limiting their selshness and making impartiality a possibility. In reality, however, the notion of impartiality presented in Smiths work operates in conjunction with what might be called indiscriminate partiality.10 Sympathy, by its very nature, implies partiality with the sentiments of others, be the expressions of joy or manifestations of suffering. That we sympathize with another suggests that we are partial to their emotional response to an action or event. When we sympathize with another, we make two judgements. The rst expresses that the object of our sympathy was right in their initial judgement and the second deems the emotional expression of that judgement to be appropriate. Thus, to return to Smiths example, we have no sympathy for the anger of one who has not been wronged or where the wrong is so slight as not to warrant a furious response. However, the principle of impartiality dictates that the judgements we make are undertaken on a disinterested basis. Our sympathy must thus be afforded to all others without recourse to our own
I would like to thank the anonymous referee who introduced me to this interesting concept, which I hope to develop further in a forthcoming book on this subject.
10
interests; that is, it must be expressed on an indiscriminate basis. Smiths impartial spectator ensures that our expressions of partiality are made on an impartial basis. It allows us to take on the suffering of another, as if it was our own and thereby to be motivated to alleviate that suffering, but without our judgements and their associated actions being fundamentally self-interested. In sum, the moral sentiment theorists of the 18th century presented two main arguments defending the role that emotions play and ought to play in processes of ethical deliberation. First, Hume argued that emotions play an important role in making moral judgements and motivating ethical actions and, further to this, that emotion is central to reason. Underpinning this argument is the explicit contention that reason and emotion are inseparable and uncompounded. This is in direct contrast to the rationalist view that emotions ought to be omitted from processes of ethical deliberation, which assumes that reason and emotion are separable forms of reective thought. Second, Hume and, in particular Smith, demonstrated that the basis on which emotions are ordinarily rejected in theories of ethics is false by establishing that emotions are capable of rendering impartial judgements.
The legacy of moral sentiment theory

Although it attracted considerable criticism from Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, and Lord Kames, Smiths theory of sympathy remained popular into the early 19th century. Later in the 19th and 20th centuries, however, three factors contributed to its demise. The rst was the imaginary and exaggerated Adam Smith Problem which xated on the apparent incompatibility of Smiths moral sentiment theory with the selfinterested, prot-maximizing ethic which supposedly underlies The Wealth of Nations (Young, 1986: 365; Reeder, 1997: viii). Second, the moral sentiment theories of Smith and, in particular, Hume, became subsumed by utilitarianism (Sprague, 1954: 794). With its emphasis on rational calculation, utilitarianism, ironically a central element of both Hume and Smiths moral theories, pushed sentiment-based theories to the outer margins of scholarship where they have largely remained. Finally, with the rise to popularity of Kantian cosmopolitanism, the subjugation of moral sentiment theory and, with it, emotion-based theories of ethical deliberation, was complete. Despite its general marginalization, moral sentiment theory has enjoyed three minor revivals in subsequent scholarship. In the late 19th century, the German philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentanos work, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889), sought to nd an ethic on
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emotions and, following the moral sentiment theorists, drew a strong analogy between emotion and judgement. In the late 20th century, feminist writers such as Carol Gilligan and Fiona Robinson drew on elements of moral sentiment theory in developing their ethics of care approaches. Thus, Gilligan noted that [t]he age-old split between thinking and feeling underlies many of the cliche s and stereotypes concerning the differences between the sexes (1982: 69). Rather than disputing this split in its entirety however, Gilligan argued that they reect the existence of two modes of judging, two different constructions of the moral domain, masculine rational ethics and feminine ethics founded on sympathy and care (1982: 69). As an advocate of the ethics of care she, unsurprisingly, endorsed the latter mode of judgement over the former. Making the connection between the emotionally derived ethics of care and moral sentiment theory explicit, Annette Baier argued, ironically, given his reputation for misogyny, that Hume should be given the status of [an] honorary woman on account of his feminine account of the role that emotions play in ethical deliberation (1992: 2). However, there are two major objections to be leveled at feminist accounts of emotional ethics exemplied by proponents of the ethics of care. The rst is that an essentialist connection between masculinity and rationality, and femininity and emotion, is highly disputed. At the height of debate on this issue in the late 1980s and 1990s, Joan Tronto argued that there is little empirical evidence to support Gilligans account of gender differentiation as a denitive description (1993: 84). In doing so, she echoed Susan Moller Okins earlier claim that the evidence for differences in womens and mens ways of thinking is not (at least yet) very clear; neither is the evidence about the source of whatever differences there might be (1989: 15). More recently, however, psychological studies by Nancy Clopton and Gwendolyn Sorrell (2006) and Michael Pratt et al. have found that gender differences in moral reasoning were not as pervasive as Gilligan argues (2006: 373). Second, feminist accounts of the ethics of care place too much emphasis on the emotions to the detriment of reason and rationality. As mentioned earlier, it is not the intention of this article to argue for the replacement of reason with emotion or even to establish the superiority of the emotions over reason, but to demonstrate that both play essential roles in making moral judgements and motivating ethical actions. This second objection is borne out in recent developments in the elds of neuropsychology and political psychology that demonstrate that the relationship between reason and emotion is as close as Hume proposed. As such, they provide substantial evidence against the rationalist conception of reason and emotion as separable forms of reective thought and establish the essential role of emotions in processes of ethical deliberation.
Most recently, James Brassett (2010) has sought to develop a critical cosmopolitan response to trauma that relies on the sentiments, particularly those shared through the function of empathy. In doing so, he draws on Richard Rortys pragmatic argument in favour of sentimentalist education. According to Rorty, a pragmatic approach to questions of morality and, in particular, human rights, must start from the fact that the emergence of the human rights culture seems to own nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories (1998: 172). For him, the sorts of foundationalist arguments about morality most commonly associated with Kantian notions of truth and rationality ought to be put aside to allow us to concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, or sentimental education (Rorty, 1998: 176). According to Rorty, this exible sentimentality is not only capable of being cultivated but, unlike rigorous rationality, is what unites human beings and, when educated effectively, can drive them to be nicer to each other (1998: 183, 177). Drawing on Rorty, Brassett argues that cultivating understandings of our mutual vulnerability, derived not simply from the identication of subjects of trauma or even sympathy with them, but from a politics of empathy might transform processes of global governance to better address traumatic events (2010: 1415). In doing so, he goes beyond Rortys emphasis on sympathy to suggest that the existential nature of vulnerability might allow for the identication and nurturing of empathy as a more appropriate/powerful ethical sentiment (Brassett, 2010: 24). Although the type of sentimental cosmopolitanism advocated in this article is broadly sympathetic to the agendas pursued by Rorty and Brassett, it is not merely pragmatic in motivation. That is, it does not simply argue that the emotions ought to be afforded a central role in making moral judgements and motivating ethical action because doing so produces the most effective outcomes. Rather, by drawing on advances in psychology and neuroscience in the following section, it suggests that the role played by the emotions in making moral judgements and motivating ethical action has a natural basis. The sentiments are not merely manipulable or limitlessly exible phenomena, but, as the products of particular neurological and psychological processes, have a material foundation. This is not to suggest that emotions are wholly natural phenomena and thus lack a social dimension. On the contrary, the fact that emotions can be manipulated, cultivated, or controlled without directly altering their physiological aspects suggests that, at the very least, their expression is, in part, socially constructed (Grifths, 1997: 139140). However, the natural foundations of emotions delimit the ways in which they may be effectively manipulated, demarcate the bounds within which emotions
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may be cultivated, educated, and restrained and, as we will see in the following section, reveal how emotions interact with reason in making moral judgements.
Reason and emotion in decision neuroscience and psychology

The relationship between reason and emotion posited by Hume and his contemporaries, as well as the alternative presented by their rationalist critics, can now be examined using the methods and techniques of experimental psychology and neuroscience (Neblo, 2007; Neuman et al., 2007: 22). In particular, it is now possible to test whether emotions are central to reason or whether effective moral reasoning can take place in the absence of emotions. As we will see, fMRI studies of decision-making processes in patients with specic types of brain injuries, as well as in subjects with intact brains, have demonstrated that emotions are central to reason, therefore conrming Humes proposition. Similarly, advances in neuropsychology and political psychology demonstrate that the contribution made by emotions is not necessarily detrimental to ethical deliberations and, taking the process one step further, even drives ethical actions.11
Reason and emotion in decision neuroscience

Like the standard separation of reason and emotion in International Relations, for much of its history, the study of decision neuroscience has been dominated by the assumption that cognition and affect constitute independent mechanisms for reective thought (Simon, 1979).12 Although some contemporary scholars maintain this distinction (Marcus, 2000), others dispute their separation (Bechara et al., 1997). In particular, Damasios (1994) study of the relationship between reason and emotion in patients with lesions of the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex of the brain demonstrated that emotion is central to reason. To establish a relationship between reason and emotion, Damasio drew on several cases of patients who suffered damage to the ventro-medial
11 Both neuroscience and psychology have cast their investigations of the relationship between reason and emotion in terms of an assumed dichotomy between cognition and affect, or the narrower category of emotion. Cognition is generally dened as thought-knowledge and thusy[refers] to conscious, internal processes akin to rationality (Spezio and Adolphs, 2007: 76). 12 As Damasio explains, [r]easoning and deciding are so interwoven that they are often used interchangeably. In doing so, he cites Phillip Johnson-Lairds slogan: In order to decide, judge; in order to judge, reason; in order to reason, decide (what to reason about) (1994: 165166).
prefrontal cortexes of their brains, including the famous case of Phineas Gage13 and the more recent case of Elliot (1994: 3451). Elliot was a patient with brain tumour who, in the course of having his tumour removed sustained damage to his prefrontal cortex. After the operation, the once successful businessman found that he was unable to make effective, reasoned judgements, or choose appropriate actions. As a result, he lost his job, started several ill-considered businesses, and ended up bankrupt and divorced. Standardized psychological and neurological tests performed after the operation revealed not only that Elliot possessed a superior intellect but that his perceptual ability, past memory, short-term memory, new learning, language, andyability to do arithmetic were intact (Damasio, 1994: 41). What Elliot had lost was his ability to respond emotionally to stimuli that had once evoked strong emotional reactions (Damasio, 1994: 45). What is more, while Elliot remained able to make choices when presented with hypothetical test scenarios, in real life he was unable to make effective decisions (Damasio, 1994: 4849).14 Damasio thus concluded that [c]ertain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality (1994: 53). Emotion, he argued, was in the loop of reason, andycould assist the reasoning process rather than necessarily disturb it, as was commonly assumed (2005: xxi). Contrary to some interpretations of his work, in doing so Damasio did not suggest that emotion was a substitute for reasoning or set emotion against reason but rather conrmed Humes argument that emotion ought to be seen as at least assisting reason and at best holding a dialogue with it (2005: xi, xiii). Descartes error, as the title of Damasios work hints, was therefore to accept a Cartesian dualist division of mind and body, reason, and emotion.15 The relationship between reason and emotion suggested by the cases of Phineas Gage, Elliot, and others have been further investigated using neuroimaging techniques including functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neuroimaging techniques offer unique advantages in the study of emotion by complementing neurological and psychological studies of patients who have suffered brain injuries and enabling researchers to examine brain function in the intact human (Wager et al., 2008: 250). Identifying those regions of the brain responsible for particular functions no longer relies on correlating instances of brain damage with particular
See Macmillan (2000). See also Bechara et al. (2000), Bechara (2002) and Bechara (2004: 30) for further conrmation of this nding. 15 For a discussion of what he views as Damasios error see Gluck (2007).
14 13
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types of functional impairment, as occurred in the case of Phineas Gage. fMRI technology has thus allowed researchers to identify the particular brain regions and structures activated when we engage in reasoning and experience emotion (Phan et al., 2002). fMRI technology has contributed, in particular, to several important studies of the neural activity involved in processes of moral deliberation. For example, Jorge Moll et al. used fMRI techniques to identify the brain regions activated by the experience of basic and moral emotions, those readily evoked by the perception of moral violations and found that emotional experience is linked to moral appraisal (2002: 2730, 2736). Similarly, Joshua Greene et al. (2001) also used neuroimaging technology to study the nature and extent of the role that emotions play in making moral judgements. In doing so, they demonstrated not only that there is a correlation between neural activity associated with emotions and making moral judgements, but that emotional responses have an inuence on and are not merely incidental to moral judgements (2001: 2107). In a separate study, again using fMRI technology, Greene (2008) found that both deontological and consequentialist forms of rationalist cosmopolitan decision-making include emotions in their deliberations. Surprisingly, given the close relationship between moral sentiment theory and utilitarianism, he found that deontological patterns of moral judgement are driven by emotional responses while consequentialist judgements are driven by cognitive processes but also include emotions in their calculations (Greene, 2008: 59). By also considering the time subjects took to make a decision in response to each of the dilemmas, Greene concluded that deontological judgements, as immediate responses, are fundamentally driven by our emotions, while consequentialist judgements involve the weighing of emotional and cognitive responses over a longer period of time. Greenes ndings have a number of signicant implications for how we understand processes of cosmopolitan moral reasoning. First, they pose a serious challenge to the historical stereotype that assumes that consequentialism is more emotional due to its close association with moral sentiment theory, and deontology is more cognitive (encompassing Kants rationalist tradition) (Greene, 2008: 41). Second, by demonstrating that deontological reasoning is driven by emotions, they bring into question the assumed rationalist underpinnings and status of deontological cosmopolitanism. They show deontological cosmopolitanism, as presented in purely rationalist terms, to be a kind of moral confabulation (Greene, 2008: 63). Thus, rather than being rationally driven, deontology provides a rational justication for emotionally driven judgements; it is, according to Greene, a natural cognitive expression of our deepest
moral emotions (2008: 63).16 Finally, these ndings not only support the general argument that processes of moral deliberation incorporate both reason and emotion but demonstrate, more specically, that both play key roles in the two dominant forms of rationalist cosmopolitan thought, consequentialism, and deontology.17 In doing so, they accord with Humes view that all forms of moral judgement, by their very nature, include emotions (Hume, 1998: App.1.2; Greene, 2008: 41, 64).
A normative argument?
Advances in decision neuroscience, including the ndings of studies by Damasio (1994), Bechara (2004), Moll et al. (2002), Greene et al. (2001), and Greene (2008) have all lent support to Humes claim that emotion is central to reason and demonstrated that reason and emotion are engaged in both deontological and consequentialist variants of cosmopolitan moral deliberation. As phenomena inseparable and indivisible from processes of rational deliberation, it thus makes little sense to argue, as rationalists conventionally do, that moral deliberation ought to take place on the basis of reason alone. Extending that sort of rationalist logic to its natural end, moral deliberation would simply not be possible as emotions cannot be excised from the deliberative process and, more than that, play an indispensable role in making rational judgements. That is, without emotion, there can be no reason. The question of whether emotions ought to play a role in processes of ethical deliberation is thus null and void. This is not to breach Humes law that an ought cannot be derived from an is, but is to recognize that ought may be constrained by is. That is, in order to be meaningful, oughts must reect actions that can, in fact, be enacted. A moral principle that requires individuals to do something that is functionally impossible for human beings to perform is effectively meaningless.18 The is in this case, that emotions are inseparable from reason in processes of ethical deliberation, thus presents normative arguments about the place of emotion in ethics with a practical constraint.
16 This, of course, raises questions as to the nature of deontological and consequentialist cosmopolitan moral reasoning and, in particular, Greenes suggestion that they are not moral philosophies at all but philosophical manifestations of two dissociable psychological patterns (2008: 37). It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to delve into that issue. 17 For objections to and criticisms of Greene see Mikhail (2008) and Timmons (2008). 18 Again, this is not to imply that emotions and practices of moral judgement are wholly natural phenomena and are, in that state, xed. The social dimensions of emotions, although not discussed in any detail in this article, make the cultivation of moral judgements and ethical actions, and thus movement towards attainment of as-yet unreached goals, possible. However, the social development of moral judgement remains limited by the nature of emotion and its relationship to reason in the human brain.
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However, two legitimate questions about the contribution of emotions to moral judgements and ethical actions remain and will be addressed in the next section. The rst concerns the nature of the contribution made by emotions to processes of ethical deliberation and, in particular, whether emotions hinder our ability to make effective, reasoned judgements. Acknowledging that emotions play a role in making moral judgements is one thing, but it is quite another to argue that contribution is a positive one. The second concerns the extent of that contribution and, in particular, the role that emotions play in motivating ethical actions in response to moral judgements.
Cognition and affect in political psychology

It is commonly assumed that emotions have an essentially negative impact on processes of ethical deliberation. According to the prevailing assumption, emotions exert a disruptive inuence over decision-making processes and, in doing so, render judgements irrational, and hence less reliable than they otherwise might have been (Isen, 2008: 548). Some evidence seems to support this claim. For example, Baron has demonstrated that moral decisions driven by intuitions, dened as blind feelings and reective beliefs, do not lead to the most optimal public policy outcomes (1998: 5, 2). He argues, instead, from a utilitarian perspective, that moral judgements must be based on quantitative analysis of the possible outcomes achieved by pursuing one course of action over another. Although intuitions ought not to be banished from the decisionmaking process entirely, he argues, they ought to play a secondary role to reason (1998: 19). However, several psychological studies of emotions in politics contradict this nding. In particular, Marcus et al.s examination of how emotions affect moral judgements about war and political leadership demonstrated that emotion is not a secondary, derivative phenomenon but drives rational decision-making (2000: 105). Their study hypothesized that people who experienced anxiety during the war about the troops or about the possible expansion of the war would think more deeply about policies and about the presidents leadership and [t]hose who were unmoved would not do so (Marcus et al., 2000: 106). Their ndings not only conrmed this hypothesis, but demonstrated that anxiety encourages people to make rational judgements (2000: 108). Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuens affective intelligence theory thus argues that anxiety leads individuals to play closer attention to the environment and bring more information to task in processing information (Cassino and Lodge, 2007: 105). In doing so, it also demonstrates
that when stimulated by their emotional systems, voters who ordinarily vote a particular way out of habit, think through their decisions and act as relatively well-informed rational voters (Marcus et al., 2000: 129). That is, emotions do not hamper the ability to make rational decisions but rather drive rational calculations. As Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen focused on negative emotions, such as anxiety, sadness, fear, and anger, Isen (2008) considers the role that positive emotions have on decision-making processes. Contrary to previous studies, which found that positive emotions lead to careless thinking (Mackie and Worth, 1989, 1991; Bless et al., 1990; Schwarz, 2002), Isen argues that positive affect can benet thinking and decisionmaking (2008: 548). This is not to say that all emotions, at all times, have a positive impact on processes of ethical deliberation but rather that they are capable of doing so. Having established that reason and emotion are dissociable and that emotions so not necessarily have a detrimental effect on processes of ethical deliberation, what remains to be considered is the extent of the role accorded emotions in ethics. At one end of the spectrum, a minimalist argument maintains that emotions help us to identify injustices. This argument is most prominently articulated by Amartya Sen who acknowledges the importance of emotions in diagnosing injustices, but argues that they must be coupled with reasoned scrutiny, lest they become uncritical and disengaged (2009: vii, viii, x). In thus arguing, Sen sees no irreducible conict between reason and emotion but rather maintains that they complement one another in processes of reective thought (2009: 1, 39). What is more, he explicitly evokes the moral sentiment theories of Hume and, in particular, Smith, when he argues that our sentiments and psychological concerns must be subjected to reasoned reection (2009: 50). In particular, Sen draws on Smiths notion of the impartial spectator, although not by name, when he insists that we view our sentiments from a certain distance from us to ensure that our judgements are impartial (2009: 45). For Sen, the process of ethical deliberation thus entails two steps. First, our emotions help us to identify injustices. We respond with anger, horror, resentment, or indignation to the injustices we experience ourselves and witness in others. These negative emotions, all of which signify different forms of disapprobation, provide provisional judgements about the occurrence of an injustice. Second, the judgements entailed by our emotional designation of a particular action as unjust are either justied or discarded in rational terms in a manner akin to consulting the impartial spectator. As the earlier discussion of Greenes work revealed, for consequentialists, such as Sen, this means incorporating both emotional responses and rational reection in a weighing process, while for deontological
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cosmopolitans this entails formulating a rational justication for an essentially emotional judgement.19 Combining this minimalist position with an understanding of the indivisible relationship between reason and emotion established earlier, an intermediary argument contends that emotions help us to identify injustices and then contribute to the formulation of reasoned justications, both deontological and consequentialist, of those judgements. However, if we are to accept Humes idea that ethics requires action (1998: App. 1.2), that it is not, as Onora ONeill (1986a, b) put it, a spectator sport, then we must consider whether emotions not only help us to identify injustices, and contribute to the formulation of reasoned justications of those judgements, but also guide actions undertaken in response to those injustices. Evidence of a link between moral emotions and moral actions can be found in studies of moral judgement in psychopaths and, again, in patients with damage to the ventromedial area of the prefrontal cortex which demonstrate that emotions constrain immoral behavior and motivate moral actions (Haidt, 2001: 823). As Hervey Clecklys landmark study, The Mask of Sanity (1941) revealed, psychopathic behavior can be explained by the absence or attenuation of the major emotional accompaniments that ordinarily restrain immoral behavior (1976: 371). Further studies have suggested that the disconnection between cognition and affect that this entails occurs at the neurological level as psychopaths and other aggressive criminals exhibit different neural activity in the prefrontal cortex to noncriminal and non-psychopathic subjects (Raine, 1997). This nding echoes Damasios work on patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. As discussed earlier with reference to the cases of Phineas Gage and Elliot, such patients experience loss of emotional responsiveness to the world in general and to ones behavioural choices in particular, what Damasio calls acquired sociopathy (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2001: 824). Like the psychopaths of Clecklys study, [w]ith no moral sentiments to motivate and constrain them, patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex simply do not care about the pain they cause and the lives they ruin (2001: 824). In the case of Elliot, this was seen in his inability to understand the impact that his reckless behaviour had on his family and resulted in divorce (Damasio, 1994: 37). Emotions, it thus seems, at the very least help to constrain unjust or unacceptable behaviour. However, others argue that rather than simply constraining unjust behaviour, emotions help to motivate ethical action. As Carver et al. note,
19
See Scanlon (2001) for a discussion of Sens particular version of cosmopolitanism.
[t]he notion that motivation and emotion are linked has long been a staple of emotion theories (2000: 741). For some, that connection is absolute, with the emotions system constituting the primary motivational system for human behavior (Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971; Izard and Ackerman, 2000: 253), while for others, emotions are just one factor that motivates behaviour (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991a, b). Either way, a connection between emotion and motivation is posited. Where specically ethical behaviour is concerned, Batson and Shaws (1991) empathy-altruism hypothesis posits the existence of a connection between emotions and helping others. In particular, their study found that the more empathy felt for a person in need, the more motivation to have that need reduced (Batson and Shaw, 1991: 114). As Cialdini explains, when we pay attention to anothers suffering, we hurt in a way that frequently leads to helping (1991: 124). That hurt, he continues, in a manner akin to Hume and Smiths understanding of sympathy, is vicarious and it is emotional. It is, in short, a second-order, affective response to anothers pain (1991: 124). While debate has been waged over whether or not in this context help is a function of altruism or egoism, directed at alleviating suffering or need for the primary benet of the victim or the person witnessing, and vicariously experiencing their suffering (see exchange between Batson and Shaw, 1991 and their critics), it remains the case that emotion motivates ethical action. As we will see in the following section, this connection is of particular pertinence when we consider the problem of motivating action to alleviate world poverty.
Sentimentalist cosmopolitanism and the problem of poverty

Global poverty is one of the most pervasive problems confronted by scholars and practitioners of international relations and, indeed, citizens of the world. Despite its magnitude, however, theorists such as Thomas Pogge argue that this problem is not insoluble (2005: 1). On that basis, most normative theorists agree that there exists some form of duty to assist those living in poverty around the world (Tan, 2010: 257) or to rectify actions that have caused and exacerbated such levels of global inequality (Pogge, 2002; Risse, 2005: 9).20 Where fundamental disagreement lies is over the basis and nature of that duty (Tan, 2010: 257). Thus, deontological cosmopolitans variously argue in favour of a positive duty to provide subsistence to those in need (Shue, 1996), a negative duty not to cause harm (ONeill, 1986a, b) and, following from that, an
20
For an exception to this see Nozicks (1974) entitlement theory.
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obligation to rectify harms, including poverty, unjustly inicted on others (Pogge, 2002; 2005), and a duty to assist burdened societies (Rawls, 1999: 106113).21 Utilitarian cosmopolitans, most prominently Peter Singer, similarly argue that rich of the world have a moral obligation to assist the poor, only they base their claims on a good maximization calculation. Although Singer is a self-identied preference utilitarian, he attempts, like Pogge (2002; Satz, 2005: 46), to present an ecumenical argument in favour of assisting those living in poverty. His arguments are thus broadly cosmopolitan in orientation but designed to appeal to and inspire action in people who are not utilitarians or who do not engage in utilitarian forms of reasoning (2002c: 127). For this reason, they form the focus of the following discussion. For almost 30 years, Singer has lamented the appalling poverty endured by approximately one-fth of the worlds inhabitants and chastised those of us living in absolute afuence for not doing enough to alleviate it (1972; 2002a, b, c; 2009). His original article on the subject, Famine, Afuence, and Morality (1972), was written in response to the East Bengal refugee crisis, which saw some nine million people plunged into destitution and absolute poverty. In it, Singer argued that the failure of rich nations and individuals to alleviate the extreme poverty of the Bengali refugees was morally indefensible. To make his point, Singer drew on the drowning child and the starving refugee scenarios, outlined above, to highlight the inconsistency inherent in our willingness to save the drowning child and reluctance to help the starving refugee; if we ought to rescue the drowning child, we ought to save the starving refugee. In a cosmopolitan ethic, the proximity of the individual needing our help is of no moral signicance (Singer, 1972: 231232). In his most recent book, the drowning child analogy has been paired, to similar effect, with the story of a Ghanaian child dying of measles (2009: 4). These paired analogies and the simple fact that, 30 years on, he is still arguing that the worlds rich inhabitants have failed in their moral obligation to assist the poor, make it clear that widespread inaction poses the greatest challenge to the task of poverty reduction.22 Singers latest work addresses precisely this problem of inaction and asks, in particular, why we do not give more to the impoverished and what can be done to inspire people to help. According to him, a range of
21 Note that Rawls does not acknowledge a duty to assist those living in poverty but rather a a duty to assist burdened societies to become well-ordered that may facilitate poverty reduction and relief (Jones, 2010: 123). 22 The Singer solution to world poverty has not been without its critics. See, for example, Kupers (2002) debate with Singer in Ethics and International Affairs.
psychological factors, including parochialism, a sense of futility, and diffusion of responsibility, help to explain why we do not do enough to assist those living in poverty (2009). However, a sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic provides an alternative answer to these questions. In order to illustrate how it does so, we return to Singers pair of dilemmas and the question presented above: why do we save the drowning child but not the child with measles? Considered in rational terms, the decision-making process evoked by the drowning child scenario begins with the observation that a child is drowning and a rational judgement that drowning is bad. It is followed by a rational deliberation that considers whether I ought to rescue the child. For Singer, this is a utilitarian calculation that requires me to weigh up the relative cost of getting my clothes muddy with the benet of saving a childs life. This deliberation might similarly rest on a deontological appeal to a positive duty to render assistance to those in need or uphold their fundamental rights. The moral judgement that follows says that I ought to rescue the child. Finally, I undertake the ethical action of rescuing the child. As Singer conceives it, the decision-making processes involved in the case of the child dying of measles is identical. It begins with the observation that a child is dying of measles and a rational judgement that dying of measles is bad. It is similarly followed by a rational deliberation, and moral judgement that I ought to help, and ends with the ethical action entailed by donating money to a charity that will provide medicines for the child. The moral inconsistency Singer identies in our willingness to rescue the drowning child but not the child dying of measles is thus largely a function of his assumption that both scenarios utilize the same rationalist processes of moral decision-making. What is more, it rests on the rationalist assumption that reason is necessarily capable of motivating action (Nagel, 1978: 32). According to his reasoning, it is indeed the case that the widespread lack of action to alleviate poverty is inexplicable. However, if we recognize the place of emotions in making moral judgements and motivating ethical actions, the decision-making process looks quite different (Snare, 1991). As with the rational process, the rst scenario begins with the observation that a child is drowning. Diverging from the rational approach, according to the sentimentalist process what follows next is an emotional response, possibly horror, derived from witnessing the unfolding situation, and as evoked by the childs response through a Humean notion of sympathy. The moral judgement associated with that emotional response is that drowning is bad. This emotionally driven moral judgement motivates an ethical action, rescuing the child. Rational deliberation follows after the action and seeks to justify the decision to rescue the child in consequentialist or deontological terms.
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However, the case of the child dying of measles presents a different decision-making process. It begins with an observation that a child is dying of measles and an emotional response, possibly anger, or sadness, which brings with it an initial moral judgement of disapprobation. The rational deliberation that follows then considers whether the original emotional response and its associated moral judgement were justied. If it concludes that they were, then the moral judgement is conrmed. However, a further rational deliberation considers whether I have an obligation to address the wrong I have identied. As we saw above, most rationalist cosmopolitan theories afrm that, as someone living in afuence, I do have an obligation to assist. The nal step in the process then entails either an ethical action, donating money to a charity that will provide medicine for the child, or inaction. In the case of the drowning child, an emotional response leads directly to an ethical action, whereas in the case of the child dying of measles, rational deliberations are permitted to over-ride judgements based on emotions. That is, the motivation to action provided by the initial emotional response is disrupted in the rst case. In part, this is a function of time. In the rst case, there is little, if any, time to deliberate about what to do; the child must be rescued before it is too late. In the second, our lack of geographical proximity to the child in need appears to diminish the urgency of their situation and, as such, more time is afforded to undertake rational deliberations. This would seem to suggest that action in cases such as this requires an emotional response strong enough to withstand the reasoning process even when that process conrms that we ought to act. Further evidence of the role that emotions play in identifying injustices and motivating ethical actions in response to them is not difcult to nd. Since the early 1980s, when pictures and footage of hundreds of thousands of famine stricken Ethiopians were beamed around the world, charities have relied on evoking strong emotional responses to motivate donations to their various causes. In the Ethiopian case, iconic pictures of emaciated mothers cradling their dead and dying children were used to great effect and inspired millions of people to contribute to the aid relief effort. Showing terrible pictures of suffering, coupled with an appeal to human sympathy proved an effective way of mobilizing a response within television audiences (Philo, 1993: 119). However, this impact was not merely coincidental. Rather, the producers of the earliest documentaries covering the Ethiopian famine, such as Seeds of Despair, which documented the rst waves of famine victims arriving at the Korem relief camp, lobbied for their work to be aired with an accompanying appeal for viewers to donate to the aid effort (Philo, 1993: 105106). Thus, even
before the Band-Aid movement had gathered momentum British viewers had donated 9 million in response to the suffering they witnessed in Seeds of Despair and Michael Buerks similar reports for the BBC (Philo, 1993: 119). As Jenny Edkins notes, however, these appeals were widely denounced by experts in the development and aid industries. For them, involvement of the public in responding to the Ethiopian famine was a short-term, unthinking, emotional response, unhelpful to longer term work (Edkins, 2000: 103). Understanding famines as failures of development and modernization to be overcome by progress and more advanced technologies development professionals favoured a depoliticized approach (2000: xv). In doing so, they not only discounted popular humanitarian responses as being too emotional but also viewed emotions expressing connections caring, compassion, sympathy, guilt as being unhelpful (Edkins, 2000: 104105). With this, the developmental approach to famine relief was characterized as a knowledge-based solution while the emotional humanitarian approach called for action without knowledge to save lives in the immediate future without waiting for political analysis (Edkins, 2000: 120). Although Edkins argues that the drive to nd technological solutions has been immensely damaging to the actual treatment of famine, she is similarly critical of the emotionally led popular response. Signicantly, however, the basis of her critique is not that emotional appeals do not work to inspire action on the part of the general population but rather that they have, in the past, brought with them, several undesirable sideeffects. In particular, Edkins identies a problem of divergence between the moral principle at stake, which we ought to assist those facing starvation, and the implementation of that principle. Although Band Aid and Live Aid worked extremely well to mobilize the populous and politicize the problem of famine, much of the revenue raised was used to ill-effects, either as inappropriate aid or as forms of aid prone to misuse (2000: 149). However, these sorts of implementation problems do not, as Edkins acknowledges, mean that we should do nothing. Nor do they imply that sentimental approaches ought not to be used to rally popular support for famine relief. On the contrary, examples such as these demonstrate that when applied to ethical problems such as that posed by world poverty, sentimental approaches work to inspire action. What they do suggest, however, is that such approaches need further development to ensure that actions undertaken as the result of emotional responses are, indeed, effective and appropriate. In the end, Singer appears to acknowledge the role that emotions play in identifying injustices and motivating ethical actions. After all, he
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recognizes that for all their serious limitations, the analogies he uses are useful devices for eliciting peoples intuitions and focusing their thinking (Kuper, 2002: 117). Beyond provoking peoples intuitions and thought however, Singers analogies are carefully crafted to inspire us to contribute to poverty reduction; that he chooses analogies involving harm to children is no accident. In approaching the problem of world poverty in this way, Singer therefore implicitly provides the answer to his own questions. First, we do not give as much to help alleviate poverty as we ought to because we often lack a strong emotional connection to those we ought to help. Second, to motivate people to contribute more we need to establish that connection and provide the practical means according to which emotional moral judgements are translated into action before the impetus to help is lost. What is more, as Edkins critique makes clear, this also means developing ways in which the well-intentioned motivation to assist those living in poverty is channeled into actions that contribute to that end.
Conclusion
Contemporary normative International Relations theory is marked by an overwhelming bias towards reasoned reection at the expense of reective thought driven by the emotions. Drawing on the central claims of moral sentiment theory, as well as developments in decision neuroscience and psychology, this article has argued that bias, and the marginalization of emotions from normative theories of International Relations that has accompanied it, cannot be justied. In particular, it has demonstrated that the three assumptions on which rationalist cosmopolitans base their claim that emotions ought to be subjugated by their master, reason, are unfounded. First, as Hume and his fellow moral sentiment theorists argued, emotions are not inherently self-interested but, when manifested in accordance with the principles of humanity, reect the experiences of others. Thus, through the function of sympathy, humans are capable of expressing genuinely benevolent sentiments. On that basis, it follows that moral judgements entailed by the experience of a moral sentiment are not necessarily self-interested but may constitute legitimate universally applicable moral judgements. Second, following from this, as Smith demonstrated through his use of the impartial spectator, emotions are capable of contributing to impartial judgements. Third, Hume argued, contrary to the rationalist assumption that they are entirely separable, that reason and emotion are inseparable and indivisible modes of reective thought. This claim, as we have seen, has been conrmed by studies of patients with brain damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
fMRI studies that have found that emotion is essential for reason and that emotions play a role in making moral judgements, including those undertaken from a cosmopolitan perspective. What is more, as subsequent psychological studies have shown, this interaction between reason and emotion is not necessarily detrimental to decision-making processes but may actually aid and enhance it as well as motivate ethical action in response to moral judgements. This is not to suggest that reason ought to be replaced by emotion in processes of ethical deliberation or even that emotions are infallible tools for making moral judgements. Rather, it is to argue that a holistic, practical cosmopolitan ethic must include both. From an empirical perspective, the need to include both reason and emotion in cosmopolitan ethics is clear: as studies of brain activity reveal, both are engaged in making moral judgements. In practical terms, emotions, as we have seen, not only help us to identify injustices but also motivate actions. Further development of a sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic might thus benet from an examination of Humes theory of motivation in conjunction with neurological and psychological studies of what motivates people to respond to injustices. However, the research conducted to date makes it clear that far from being a slave to reason, emotion makes reasoned moral judgement possible and drives the ethical actions that are essential to holistic cosmopolitan ethics.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Chris Brown, Ian Hall, Wes Widmaier, the anonymous referees, and editors for the insightful and helpful critiques they provided for various drafts of this paper. This research was supported under the Australian Research Councils Discovery Project funding scheme (Project DP 0985708). References
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Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 145

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 147

Rationalist cosmopolitan ethics

Ethics in rational cosmopolitanism

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 149

Emotion in rationalist cosmopolitanism

See also ONeill, 1997.

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Moral sentiment theory

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 153

Reason and sentiment

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 155

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 157

The legacy of moral sentiment theory

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 159

Reason and emotion in decision neuroscience and psychology

Reason and emotion in decision neuroscience

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 161

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 163

Cognition and affect in political psychology

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 165

See Scanlon (2001) for a discussion of Sens particular version of cosmopolitanism.

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 167

Sentimentalist cosmopolitanism and the problem of poverty

For an exception to this see Nozicks (1974) entitlement theory.

Moral sentiment theory and international ethics 169

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