Paper for Workshop on Quentin Skinners Historiography of Political Thought

The Center for Political Thought Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences Academia Sinica 3 !arch " #3 Su$mitted $y %iang &u'(ang

Inspired by some historians in the late 1960s, notably Peter Laslett and J. G. A. Pocock, Q entin !kinner has initiated a series o" articles a#ainst the dominant "orms o" analysis "or addressin# iss es $ith re"erence to modern politics. Amon# these $orks the article %&eanin# and 'nderstandin# in the (istory o" Ideas) in 1969 deser*es come attention, "or it is in this article that !kinner "irstly de*eloped his criticism a#ainst the traditional, both the a*ailable te+t al and conte+t al, $ays o" st dyin# political tho #ht. ,his article $as later reprinted in %&eanin# and -onte+t) edited by James , lly in 19../, lly 19..0. ,hirty years later, !kinner has recollected it in his %1isions and Politics), $ith m ch abbre*iation and e+tensi*e re*ision/!kinner 2002/I0, 31n0. ,his paper "oc ses on disc ssin# this latest *ersion and a s mmary o" it $ill be #i*en. 4ather than disc ssin# the details o" $hat a proper method sho ld ha*e, !kinner spent most o" his e""ort in demonstratin# $hat is $ron# $ith the traditional $ays. In the *ery be#innin# !kinner tries to sho$ $hat ass mptions he considers " ndamentally $ron# in traditional $ays, s ch as Arth r Lo*e5oy)s idea o" % nit ideas). (e then introd ces $hat these $ron# ass mptions may ca se in the st dyin# o" history o" ideas. 6hat !kinner really is doin# is to establish a patholo#ical ta+onomy abo t traditional method. In the "inal part, !kinner brie"ly mentions $hat elements a proper method sho ld take into acco nt. In the pre"ace !kinner challen#es the classical ass mption that a determinate set o" %" ndamental concepts) is the key to the interpretation o" classic te+ts. (e contends that history o" ideas is the history
1

o" reco#nisable acti*ities. (o$e*er, since di""erent acti*ities share at least some "amily resemblances, it is nlikely to reco#nise these acti*ities $ith a set o" nchan#ed *ocab laries rather than $ith some preconception abo t $hat $e e+pect to "ind. 7y "ailin# to do so historians risk to e+pect $hat someone says determines ho$ $e percei*e the a#ent to be doin# $hich the a#ent $o ld not ha*e accepted as the $ay o" $hat they $ere doin#. ,he main p rpose o" this article is to nco*er ho$ s ch modes o" method in"ect the classic st dy o" history o" ideas.

The !ythology of Anachronism) %o*e+oy

!kinner contends that the classical approach #enerates se*eral types o" %mytholo#y). ,he "irst problem, $hich he considers the most persistent one, is anachronism. ,he #eneral "eat re o" this "allacy consists in the improper e+pectation that each classic $riter holds some constit ti*e doctrine on the topic o" the s b5ect. 7y committin# this "allacy, historians compile an e+pected %doctrine) thro #h con*ertin# some scattered or incidental remarks by a classic theorist into one piece. &ore speci"ically, !kinner ar# es that anachronism takes t$o "orms in this "allacy. ,he "irst one "oc ses on the indi*id al thinker and claims that this $riter %may be %disco*ered) to ha*e held a *ie$ abo t an ar# ment to $hich they cannot in principle ha*e meant to contrib te/!kinner 2002/I0, 600. 7y "indin# some "amiliar ima#es in the $orks, historians credit the de*elopment o" this e+pected doctrine to the classic theorists, $itho t takin# into acco nt $hether the classic theorist is ac8 ainted $ith this idea. 7esides the "ormer "allacy, the other seems more insidio s and is abo t the de*elopment o" some % nit idea) itsel". It asserts that some e+pected %doctrine) may lie "ar apart in di""erent theories in di""erent times. It traces the morpholo#y o" some #i*en doctrine and tries to set o t an ideal type o" this doctrine. ,he problem in this type o" "allacy lies in the "act that the doctrine in 8 estion too readily slides into some or#anic entity. It pres ppose the e+pected doctrine #ro$s and each classic theorist n rt res its #ro$th. ,he search "or appro+imation to the ideal type in anachronism sets o t some anticipations "or the appearance o" later doctrine, and conse8 ently meas res the achie*ement o" the classic theorists by ho$ m ch they attrib te to the establishment o" s ch a doctrine. ,his criterion, ho$e*er, leads to t$o kinds o" historical abs rdity. ,heorists $ill be praised i" they are considered cond ci*e to the the doctrine the historian is set to e+pect, or be criticised i" they "ail to come p $ith it.

9or !kinner, anachronism ass mes the classic theorist intended, or e*en co ld ha*e intended, to do $hat they are cens red "or not ha*in# done. ,his is apparently be##in# the 8 estion, since all the pres mptions, $hich are s pposed to be tr e, are only tr e hypothetically.

The !ythology of Coherence) Strauss

,he second type o" mytholo#y !kinner mentions re"ers to the "act that some o" the classic $riters are considered by historians not alto#ether consistent, or e*en "ailin# to #i*e any systematic acco nt o" their belie"s. (istorians $ho admit this mytholo#y are set to belie*e that classic $riters m st hold some coherent *ie$s on the themes they de*elop. It $ill then become easy "or historians to #i*e systematic acco nt too readily $hen paraphrasin# their te+ts. (o$e*er, !kinner ar# es that this ass mption o" coherence cannot s stain d e to t$o %metaphysical) reasons in a pe5orati*e sense. 9irstly, in the interest o" e+tractin# a messa#e o" ma+im m coherence, historians are *ery likely to improperly trim statements o" intention that a thors make abo t $hat they are doin#, or e*en to disco nt $hole $orks that may seem to impair the coherence o" their systems o" ideas. !econdly, in searchin# "or coherence, those incompatible messa#es or $orks $ill be ass med preocc piedly as %anomalies) and are e+cl ded "rom the s pposed coherent system. A #ood e+ample o" this mytholo#y, accordin# to !kinner, is Leo !tra ss, $ho maintains that the key to decodin# these anomalies lies in nderstandin# the threat o" persec tion. 9or !tra ss, this threat may alter the $ay classic theorists make their *oice and there"ore historians ha*e to read bet$een the lines in order to reco*er the real meanin# o" these passa#es. (o$e*er !kinner contends this approach commits at least t$o lo#ical "allacy. :ne is that theorists are not al$ays dissidents. ,hey are not al$ays #ettin# a$ay "rom persec tion. ,he other, similar to the "ormer, is that it seems to pres ppose there m st e+ist some hidden meanin#s $hich a$ait to be reco*ered. (istorians $ho are nable to see this "ail their 5ob. 7 t i" $e ask a " rther 8 estion that ho$ $e can be so s re o" the e+istence o" the hidden meanin#s, the ans$er $ill be circ lar; beca se the theorists are heterodo+ to the re#ime. !kinner th s concl des that this approach cannot s stain.

The !ythology of Prolepsis

,he a"orementioned t$o mytholo#ies arise "rom the "act that historians o" ideas are set by some pre<5 d#ement in e*al atin# the de"inin# characteristics o" the discipline to $hich the $riter is s pposed to ha*e contrib ted. Alon#side o" the abstract le*el in the $riter)s theory, !kinner "inds that a
=

similar problem may also occ r in describin# some indi*id al $ork. ,his "allacy !kinner names the mytholo#y o" prolepsis. As the "ormer t$o mytholo#ies, this "allacy pres mes the asymmetric relation bet$een the si#ni"icance a historian may claim to "ind in a #i*en episode, and the real meanin# o" the episode itsel". >e*ertheless, $hat is special in this "allacy is that the historian spontaneo sly ass mes the #i*en te+t sho ld bear the s pposed si#ni"icance, rather than the real meanin#, o" the episode, e*en i" no direct or indirect e*idence can be "o nd in this te+t. !kinner s mmarises the common "eat re o" this "allacy in the "orm that the si#ni"icance o" the episode hidden in the te+t is to be learnt sometime later. (e labels historians $ho commits this "allacy %parochial) as they are ha nted by some #i*en *anta#e points. &ore speci"ically, !kinner claims, s ch parochialism incl des t$o "orms. 9irst historians s ally take some statement in a classic te+t as reference to s pport their *anta#e point. 7 t !kinner ar# es some re8 irements ha*e to be bet i" this "orm o" parochialism stands. ,o see $hether $riter A has in"l ence on $riter 7, the "ollo$in# conditions sho ld be " l"illed; /I0 that 7 is kno$n to ha*e st died A)s $ork? /ii0 that 7 co ld not ha*e "o nd the rele*ant doctrines in any $riter other than A? /iii0 that 7 co ld not ha*e arri*ed at the rele*ant doctrines independently. !kinner claims this mytholo#y cannot bear the test. ,he other "orm stems "rom the "act that historians s ally se their *anta#e points to describe the sense o" a classic te+t. (ere historians risk to immerse the #i*en te+t in some alien elements. 9rom these mytholo#ies !kinner concl des some methodolo#ical lessons. 1. :ne cannot say or mean somethin# $hich he or she is nable to say or mean. It may be possible "or one to kno$ others better than themsel*es, b t to say that one can kno$ somethin# o t o" his or her co#nition is 8 ite a di""erent thin#. 2. -onse8 ently, to criticise a classic theorist "ailin# to en nciate some alle#edly doctrine is be##in# the 8 estion, since the alle#edly doctrine does not e+ist in the time o" that theorist. =. ,he acti*ity o" thinkin# is ne*er a patterned or p rposi*e acti*ity o" ni"ormity. It closely links to the operation o" $ords and meanin#, $hich *aries tremendo sly in di""erent times.

What is said *ersus What is meant

A"ter analysin# speci"ic iss es in the traditional approach, !kinner t rns to disc ss the #eneral "eat res o" it. Proponents o" the traditional approach belie*e s ch dan#ers are not " ndamentally
@

s b*ersi*e and th s can be a*oided $ith care. 7 t this !kinner p ts in do bt. 9or him, this approach treats the classic te+ts in the history o" ideas as %sel"<s ""icient ob5ects o" en8 iry), namely %concentratin# on $hat each $riter says abo t each o" the canonical doctrines and thereby seekin# to reco*er the meanin# and si#ni"icance o" their $orks)/!kinner 2002/I0, A90. ,his cannot #i*e any proper acco nt o" the te+ts. ,he " ndamental reason lies in that i" $e $ish to nderstand any s ch te+t, $e m st be able to #i*e an acco nt not merely o" the meanin# o" $hat $as said, b t also o" $hat the $riter in 8 estion may ha*e meant by sayin# $hat $as said/!kinner 2002/I0, A90. !kinner spells o t some reasons $hy "oc sin# on $hat is said is ins ""icient. 9irst and the most ob*io s one is the meanin#s o" the terms o"ten chan#e o*ertime. It $o ld be abs rd to apply the meanin# o" some term only a*ailable in some time to the same term in di""erent times. ,he second reason seems more delicate both in terms o" philosophy and literat re. !kinner ar# es that "oc s on $hat is said can only re*eal the literal meanin# o" a sentence or a $ork. (o$e*er, i" the $riters deliberately employ some obli8 e rhetorical strate#ies, notably irony, in their $orks, the literal meanin# co ld be misleadin# since it may be 8 ite di""erent "rom $hat the $riters really mean by sayin# so. ,he third is more intractable than the second since a more obli8 e strate#y may be applied. It is said $hat is $ritten directly re"lects and correspond to $hat a #i*en $riter means, e*en the $ritten messa#es seem 8 ite incompatible to other e*idences. In this case $hat is said bears and e+ha sts all the meanin#s and no other in"ormation is le"t. ,he meanin# o" a te+t is considered strictly adherent to $hat is said and th s the $riter says $hat is said $ith sincerity. >e*ertheless this contention seems o*ersimpli"ied. 7earin# in mind John A stin)s speech<act theory, $hich de*elops o t o" latter L d$i# 6itt#enstein)s conception o" lan# a#e, !kinner ar# es that the meanin# in any serio s only do $e need to kno$ $hat is said b t also $hat the speaker is doing in sayin# it. Altho #h !kinner does not #i*e a detailed analysis abo t the implication o" speech<act theory in the application to the history o" ideas in this article, he does #i*e some terse remarks $hich s ""ice to the demonstrate the ins ""iciency in the traditional approach. Intentional "orce is so important to the meanin# o" any tterance that any en nciation o" a tterance is de"icient $itho t it. ,his is perhaps one o" the most prominent "eat re in !kinner)s methodolo#y $hich distin# ishes his approach "rom the
3

tterance

consists in the intended "orce iss ed by the speaker. In order to #rasp the meanin# o" an tterance, not

pre*alent conte+t al analysis. As he e+po nds that B$Ce cannot e*en hope that a sense o" conte+t o" tterance $ill necessarily resol*e the di""ic lty /in decidin# the meanin# o" an tterance0, "or the conte+t itsel" may be ambi# o s. 4ather $e shall ha*e to st dy all the *ario s conte+ts in $hich the $ords $ere sedDall the " nctions they ser*ed, all the *ario s thin#s that co ld be done $ith them/!kinner 2002/I0, .@0. 9or !kinner, e*en the s al conte+t al analysis is "ar "rom eno #h since it i#nores the intention o" the $riter in $ritin# these $ords, $hich is the key to catch the " nctions the $ords. ,his #oes $ith a " rther problem that by ne#lectin# the intentional "orce, not only e*ery statement is taken to "ind its meanin# independently, b t so is the $riter. ,he $riter is tho #ht to earn his or her importance d e to his or her contrib tion to a lon#<lastin# and persistent doctrine. ,his, in !kinner)s point o" *ie$, $o ld be a mistake, since e*ery tterance is iss ed in some partic lar occasion, "or some partic lar p rpose, and $ith some partic lar reason, i" the meanin# o" the tterance is /at least partly0 determined by the intentional "orce in it. ,o s mmarise. ,here co ld be no %perennial iss es) in history o" ideas. ,he mistake o" it lies in s pposin# that there is only one set o" 8 estions $hich e*ery theorist en#a#es in.

Concluding Remarks
A"ter criticisin# the traditional approach, !kinner lea*es t$o short positi*e concl sions indicatin# $hat an appropriate method sho ld consist o". ,he "irst is his reminder o" the need "or conte+t. As a"orementioned, it is tr e conte+t is *ital in decidin# the meanin# o" an tterance. (o$e*er $hat co nts as conte+t is still in 8 estion. !kinner contends that the importance o" conte+t lies in the "act that it is cond ci*e to decide $hat an tterance is intended to mean, and ho$ that meanin# is intended to be taken. ,o p t this brie"ly, e*ery te+t is a "orm o" tterance /in a broad sense0, and e*ery tterance happens in the occasion o" comm nication. I" it is the case, the proper de"inition o" conte+t con"lates three le*els in the acti*ity o" comm nication; /I0 the " ll ran#e o" comm nications, $hich is con*entionally per"ormed on the #i*en occasion by the iss in# o" the #i*en tterance? /II0 the lin# istic conte+t, $hich concerned $ith the reco*ery o" intentions? /III0 the social conte+t, that is, the ltimate "rame$ork "or helpin# to decide $hat con*entionally reco#nisable meanin#s it mi#ht in principle ha*e been possible "or someone to ha*e intended to comm nicate.
6

,he other concl sion concentrates on the philosophical *al e o" st dyin# the history o" ideas. !ince the traditional approach pres pposes the *ery e+istence o" %perennial iss es), one /perhaps the ma5or0 p rpose in the st dy o" history o" ideas is the "ind the rele*ance bet$een classics and the c rrent iss es. It is ass med that some se" l lessons, $hich is cond ci*e to sol*e o r problems, can be learnt "rom history, since the rele*ant doctrine is hi#hly e*ol*ed. !kinner totally discards s ch a pres mption. 9ollo$in# his pre*io s analysis, %perennial iss es) does not e+ist b t only di*erse moral ass mptions and political commitments a*ailable to *ario s iss es in di""erent times. ,his indicates the "act that the si#ni"icance in st dyin# history o" ideas consists not in re*ealin# the sameness b t rather in comparin# the di""erences. &ore importantly, this does not deny the philosophical *al e o" st dyin# history o" ideas. -ontrary to this, this is the *anta#e point, in !kinner)s opinion, the re*eal the di""erences bet$een s. 7y learnin# $hy these di""erences happen, $e are disposed to kno$ the limitation and contin#ency in o r thinkin#, and to nderstand $hy di""erent thinkin#, either in di""erent times or in di""erent c lt res, deser*es o r appreciation.

References
!kinner, Q entin. 2002. Visions of Politics. = *ols. -ambrid#e, >e$ Eork; -ambrid#e 'ni*ersity Press. , lly, James, ed. 19... Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. -ambrid#e, '.F; Polity Press.