September 1982

82 30

RTI Project No. 44U-2265 Contract No. EMW-C-0677 FEMA Work Unit 1239A

FINAL REPORT

STATE-OF-THE-ART ASSESSMENTSHELTER HABITABILITY

Prepared for: Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

Research Triangle Institute P.O. Box 12194 Research Triangle Park, North Carollna 27709

September 1982

RTI Project 44U-2265 Contract No. EMW-C-0677 Work U n i t 1239A

FEMA Review Notice

This report has been reviewed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved f o r publication. Approval does not s i g n i f y that the contents necessarily r e f l e c t the views and p o l i c i e s of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

FINAL REPORT

STATE-OF-THE-ART-ASSESSMENT-SHELTER HABITABILITY
Prepared by:
M. Wright R. Chessin M. Laney

L. cox

Prepared f o r : Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D. C. 20472

Approved f o r Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

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T Y P E O F REPORT L PERIOD COVERED

STATE-OF-THE-ART ASSESSMENT-SHELTER HABITABILITY

7. AUTHOR(e)

FINAL
6.

October 1981Se p tem be r 1982

P E R F O R M I N G ORG. R E P O R T N U M B E R

RTI/2265/00/04F
8.
C O N T R A C T O R G R A N T NUMBERfa)

Wright, M. D . ,
9.

R. Chessin, M. Laney, and L. Cox

10.

Contract No. EMW-C-0677

PROGRAM ELEMENT, P R O J E C T , TASK A R E A & WORK U N I T NUMBERS

P E R F O R M I N G O R G A N I Z A T I O N N A M E A N D ADDRESS

Research Triangle I n s t i t u t e Research Triangle Park, North Carolina

11. C O N T R O L L I N G O F F I C E N A M E A N D ADDRESS

27711
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Work Unit 1239A

REPORT D A T E

Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D. C. 20472

14.

September 1982
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NUMBER O F P A G E S

192
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9. K E Y WORDS (Continue

on reverse aide If nesessary

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state- of- the- art she1 t e r habi tabi 1 i ty nuclear weapons e f f e c t s future research needs
10. A B S T R A C T

reverse s i d e if necessary ad identity by block number)

. The objectives of t h i s study were t o assess the state- of- the- art of s h e l t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y research, t o describe nuclear weapons e f f e c t s and mitigation techniques, t o summarize current c i v i l defense programs and policies, a n d t o identify future research needs related t o s h e l t e r

Fo r m 1 Jan 73

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habitability. The work consisted of an extensive review of civil defense l i t e r a t u r e , a review of noncivil defense l i t e r a t u r e t h r o u g h computer searches, and personal communications with individual researchers. The information obtained was summarized into a state- of-the- art assessment of research related t o shelter habitability. General conclusions were listed t o identify areas where there i s general agreement among researchers. Recommendations for further study were made for areas where there i s disagreement among researchers and where there are i m p o r t a n t unanswered questions.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The a u t h o r s o f t h i s r e p o r t wish t o acknowledge t h e s u b s t a n t i a l contributions o f the following individuals: P r o j e c t Officer,

M r . Donald A.

B e t t g e , FEMA

who p r o v i d e d h e l p f u l guidance throughout t h e study, Mr.

Donald Johnston o f RTI who o f f e r e d v a l u a b l e suggestions r e l a t i n g t o occupant response data, and D r . James C. M u l l i g a n o f North C a r o l i n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y

who a s s i s t e d i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f research r e l a t e d t o s h e l t e r environmental control.

A B STRACT
The o b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s study were t o assess t h e s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t o f s h e l t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y research, t o describe nuclear weapons e f f e c t s and m i t i g a t i o n techniques, t o summarize c u r r e n t c i v i l defense programs and p o l i c i e s , and t o i d e n t i f y f u t u r e research needs r e l a t e d t o s h e l t e r habitability. The work c o n s i s t e d o f an extensive review o f c i v i l defense

1 i t e r a t u r e , a review o f n o n c i v i l defense l i t e r a t u r e through computer searches, and personal communications w i t h i n d i v i d u a l researchers. The i n f o r m a t i o n obtained was summarized i n t o a s t a t e - o f - t h e a r t assessment o f research rel ated t o s h e lt e r h a b i t a b i l i t y . General conclusions

were l i s t e d t o i d e n t i f y areas where t h e r e i s general agreement among researchers. Recommendations f o r f u r t h e r study were made f o r areas *here

t h e r e i s disagreement among researches and where t h e r e are important unanswered questions.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page

............................ I- 1 A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I- 1 B . Summary o f Weapons E f f e c t s and M i t i g a t i o n Techniques . . . . I - 2 1. Nuclear Weapons E f f e c t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I - 2 2 . M i t i g a t i o n Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I - 4 C . C i v i l Defense Programs and P o l i c i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . I- 6 1. H i s t o r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 2 . Current Programs and P o l i c i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I- 9 D . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11 I 1 . S h e l t e r H a b i t a b i l i t y Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 1 A . C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f S h e l t e r H a b i t a b i l i t y Elements . . . . . . I I - 1 1. Thermal Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 1 2 . Chemical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 4 3 . B i o l o g i c a l Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 5 4 . Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 7 B . S t a t e - o f - t h e - A r t Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 8 1. Thermal Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I - 8 a . Thermal Environmental P r e d i c t i o n . . . . . . . II- 8 b . Thermal Environmental Control . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13 c . Thermal Environmental M o n i t o r i n g . . . . . . . . . 11-24 2 . Chemical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-24 3 . B i o l o g i c a l Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-26 a . C i v i l Defense Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-27 b . D i s a s t e r - R e l a t e d H e a l t h Studies . . . . . . . . 11-41 c . Research on Al 1e r g e n s and Communicable D i seases . . 11-47 4 . Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-58 a . L i g h t i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-59 b . Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-60 c . Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-60 C . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-61 I I I. S h e l t e r Standards and Occupant Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I - 1 A . S h e l t e r Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III- 1 1. Thermal Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I - 1 2 . Chemical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I - 4 3 . B i o l o g i c a l Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I - 5 4 . Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I - 6 . Occupant Responses ( P h y s i o l o g i c a l ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I - 7
I

Background

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Title Page

. . . 2. .
1

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . 111-50 ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-51 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . 111-53 . ... . . . . . . . 111-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-54 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111-58 111-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-60 C . Occupant Responses (Psychological) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-60 1. Research Approaches Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-61 2 . Psychological Factors I d e n t i f i e d as Being Important . . 111-66 3 . L i k e l y Impacts o f the Psychological Factors o f Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-66 4 . Recommendations f o r Minimizing the Negative Impact . . . o f Responses t o t h e Psychological Environment . . . . . 111-72 a . S h e l t e r Manager S e l e c t i o n and T r a i n i n g . . . . . . 111-72 b . P u b l i c Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-73 c . S h e l t e r F a c i l i t y / A c t i v i t y Planning . . . . . . . . 111-74 D . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-78
c

Occupant C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a Age. Sex. Race. and Urban-Rural b State o f Health Responses a t Standard Conditions a Normal Population ( 1 ) Thermal Environment ( 2 ) Chemical Environment ( 3 ) B i o l o g i c a l Environment ( a) Communi cab1 e D i seases ( b ) Acute and Chronic Conditions ( 4 ) Other Considerations b S e n s i t i v e Population ( 1 ) Thermal Environment ( 2 ) Chemical Environment ( a ) Carbon Dioxide ( b ) Carbon Monoxide ( c ) N i t r o g e n Oxides ( d ) Smoke ( 3 ) B i o l o g i c a l Environment ( 4 ) Other Considerations Responses t o Non-Standard Conditions a Normal Population (1) Thermal Environment ( a ) Heat ( b ) Cold ( 2 ) Chemical Environment ( a ) Carbon Dioxide (b) Carbon Monoxide ( c ) Nitrogen Oxides ( d ) Smoke ( 3 ) B i o l o g i c a l Environment ( 4 ) Other Considerations b S e n s i t i v e Population (1) Thermal Environment ( 2 j Chemical Environment ( 3 ) B i o l o g i c a l Environment ( 4 ) Other Considerations

....... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111111- 7 . . . 7 ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 111- 9 . 111-15 ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111-15 111-15 .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . 111-20 . . . . . . . . . 111-22 ..... .. .. .. .. .. .1 11-23 111-27 .. . . . . . . . . . . . 111-28 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-31 . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-36 ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111-37 111-38 ..... .. .. .. . . . . . 111-40 . . . . . . 111-41 ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111-41 111-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-41 ...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111-46 111-44 . 111-47 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 111-49

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Title

IV.

Page

Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study

A.

B.

. . . . . . . . . IV- 1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV- 1 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV- 4

vi

LIST OF TABLES Number 11-1 Incidence of Respiratory, Infective, and Parasitic Diseases, Percent Distribution, and Number of Acute Conditions Per 100 Persons Per Year in the United States, 1980 Page

11-2
111-1

111-2

. . . . . . . 11-55 Number o f Cases and Cases Per 100,000 Population o f Reported Communicable Diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-56 Age Distribution of U.S. Population, 1980 ( I n Thousands) . . . 111- 8 Incidence of Acute Conditions Per 100 Persons B y Condition Group, U.S. Per F o r t n i g h t . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 111-11
Percent Distribution of Persons With Limitation of Activity. Due t o Chronic Conditions, By Degree o f Limitation According t o Sex and Age, 1980

111-3

111-4 111-5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-13 Reported Communicable Disease Incidence, U.S., 1980. Annual. . 111-25 Reaction t o Stressful Environmental Stimuli . . . . . . 111-67

vi i

T-

I.
A.
Introduction

BACKGROUND

I n recent years, c i v i l defense planners have emphasized two major a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r p r o t e c t i n g t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e event o f a n u c l e a r a t t a c k on t h e U n i t e d States. The f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e would be implemented

should an a t t a c k occur suddenly, w i t h o u t warning, and c o n s i s t s o f s h e l t e r i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e immediate v i c i n i t y o f t h e i r l o c a l e a t t h e t i m e o f attack. The second a l t e r n a t i v e would be implemented d u r i n g a p e r i o d

o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s t h a t c o u l d l e a d t o war and c o n s i s t s o f r e l o c a t i n g (evacuating) p o p u l a t i o n s o f l i k e l y t a r g e t areas i n t o areas o f lower r i s k where s h e l t e r from f a l l o u t would be provided. The success o f both a l t e r n a t i v e s

depends on t h e a b i l i t y o f people t o be housed i n a s h e l t e r f o r an extended t i m e and t o emerge w i t h s u f f i c i e n t from t h e attack. h e a l t h and energy t o implement a recovery

Success, then, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l environment o f

shel t e r s be maintained a t c o n d i t i o n s n o t s e r i o u s l y o r i r r e v e r s i b l y d e t r i m e n t a l t o occupants. S h e l t e r s may be considered i n t h r e e classes:

(1) general, o r personnel,

s h e l t e r s , u s u a l l y e x i s t i n g b u i l d i n g s brought i n t o s e r v i c e as s h e l t e r s d u r i n g a c r i s i s ; ( 2 ) s p e c i a l , o r working, s h e l t e r s such as emergency o p e r a t i n g centers; and ( 3 ) singl e-purpose s h e l t e r s erected s p e c i f i c a l l y t o p r o v i d e shel t e r d u r i n g an emergency. The l a t t e r two classes are constructed and equipped f o r They are t h e r e f o r e more l i k e l y t o have

s p e c i f i c shel t e r purposes.

environmental c o n t r o l systems designed i n t o them than i s t h e f i r s t class, which normal l y depends e i t h e r on e x i s t i n g environmental c o n t r o l systems designed f o r o t h e r purposes o r on e x p e d i e n t l y i n s t a l led environmental c o n t r o l systems.

1-1

For many years, c i v i l defense researchers have sponsored and conducted s t u d i e s t o i d e n t i f y problems associated w i t h s h e l t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y and t o d e f i n e techniques f o r m a i n t a i n i n g a h a b i t a b l e shel t e r environment. These

s t u d i e s have c o n s i s t e d o f a n a l y t i c a l and experimental p r o j e c t s , as w e l l as equipment design and development. The r e s u l t s o f these s t u d i e s have been used

as t h e basis t o e s t a b l i s h minimum standards f o r t h e i n t e r n a l s h e l t e r environment and t o develop guidance f o r i n s t a l 1 i n g expedient environmental c o n t r o l systems i n shel t e r s . No recent s t u d i e s have attempted t o assemble t h e r e s u l t s o f s h e l t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y research i n t o a s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t assessment.
As w i t h most o t h e r

areas o f study, such an assessment i s needed p e r i o d i c a l l y t o a i d planners i n i d e n t i f y i n g a d d i t i o n a l research and development needs. The o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e

research described h e r e i n have been t o conduct a s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t study o f s h e l t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y and t o i d e n t i f y remaining research necessary f o r adequate assurance t h a t shel t e r plans are workable. The remainder o f t h i s chapter b r i e f l y summarizes nuclear weapons e f f e c t s , m i t i g a t i o n techniques, and c u r r e n t c i v i l defense p o l i c i e s and programs. Subsequent chapters d e s c r i b e t h e important elements t h a t determine shel t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y , present t h e s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t assessment, and make recommendations f o r f u r t h e r study.

B.

Summary o f Nuclear Weapons E f f e c t s and M i t i g a t i o n Techniques

1 .

Nuclear Weapons E f f e c t s Nuclear weapons explosions d i f f e r from conventional weapon

e x p l o s i o n s i n two very s i g n i f i c a n t ways.

F i r s t , n u c l e a r explosions can be

many times more powerful than explosions o f t h e l a r g e s t conventional weapons, and, second, t h e energy release from n u c l e a r weapons d i f f e r s from conventional weapon energy release. While almost a l l o f t h e energy release from a
1- 2

conventional weapon i s i n t h e form of b l a s t and shock, t h e energy release from

a n u c l e a r weapon i s i n t h e form o f thermal energy, b l a s t and shock, and

nuclear radiation. The p r o p o r t i o n of t h e energy released i n each form depends

on t h e weapon y i e l d , h e i g h t o f b u r s t , and o t h e r f a c t o r s .

A t y p i c a l energy

d i s t r i b u t i o n from a f i s s i o n weapon detonated i n t h e a i r below 40,000 f e e t i s

35 percent thermal r a d i a t i o n , 50 percent b l a s t and shock, and 1 5 percent

nucl ear r a d i a t i o n . Nuclear r a d i a t i o n energy i s u s u a l l y considered as having two separate components, i n i t i a l n u c l e a r r a d i a t i o n and delayed ( o r r e s i d u a l ) r a d i a t i o n , o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o as f a l l o u t . The i n i t i a l n u c l e a r r a d i a t i o n i s t h a t e m i t t e d

from t h e f i r e b a l l and t h e r a d i o a c t i v e c l o u d w i t h i n t h e f i r s t minute a f t e r a n u c l e a r explosion.

It c o n s i s t s o f neutrons and gamma rays given o f f almost

i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y and t h e gamma rays e m i t t e d by f i s s i o n products and o t h e r r a d i o a c t i v e m a t e r i a l s from t h e weapon. Fal l o u t r a d i a t i o n comes from

r a d i o a c t i v e s o l i d and l i q u i d p a r t i c l e s t h a t f a l l t o e a r t h from a n u c l e a r weapon's cloud. These p a r t i c l e s form when m a t e r i a l s vaporized by the i n t e n s e

heat o f a n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n condense t o form p a r t i c l e s t h a t c o n t a i n o r a r e a t t a c h e d t o f i s s i o n products o r o t h e r r a d i o a c t i v e m a t e r i a l s . F a l l o u t r a d i a t i o n c o n s i s t s almost e n t i r e l y o f gamma rays. The amount o f

energy released as f a l l o u t r a d i a t i o n depends on t h e h e i g h t a t which a weapon i s detonated and t h e weapon design.

I f a f i s s i o n weapon i s detonated a t a

h e i g h t such t h a t t h e f i r e b a l l does n o t touch t h e ground, f a l l o u t i n t e n s i t y i s much lower than f o r weapons detonated a t o r near t h e e a r t h ' s surface. S i m i l a r l y , f a l l o u t from a f u s i o n (thermonuclear) weapon i s g e n e r a l l y much l e s s t h a n t h a t from a f i s s i o n weapon because o f t h e s m a l l e r q u a n t i t y of f i s s i o n fragments produced.

1-3

Thermal r a d i a t i o n from a nuclear weapon can produce severe burns on exposed i n d i v i d u a l s and may cause eye damage a t g r e a t d i s t a n c e s from t h e explosion. Thermal r a d i a t i o n i s a l s o capable o f i g n i t i n g f i r e s i n combustible These f i r e s c o u l d

m a t e r i a l s a t s u b s t a n t i a l d i s t a n c e s from t h e explosion. produce a d d i t i o n a l personnel casual t i e s .

The distances over which thermal

r a d i a t i o n i s a t h r e a t depends on weapon y i e l d , h e i g h t o f b u r s t , atmospheric c o n d i t i o n s , and t h e presence o f i n t e r v e n i n g obstacles. B l a s t e f f e c t s c o n s i s t o f b o t h a i r b l a s t and ground shock. The a i r b l a s t

i s composed of an overpressure and b l a s t winds t h a t accompany t h e shock f r o n t as i t moves away from t h e detonation. d i s t a n c e from t h e b l a s t center. and i n d i r e c t l y . Both e f f e c t s decrease i n i n t e n s i t y w i t h

B l a s t e f f e c t s produce i n j u r i e s both d i r e c t l y

D i r e c t i n j u r i e s r e s u l t from exposure o f t h e body t o t h e h i g h I n d i r e c t i n j u r i e s r e s u l t from t h e

pressure associated w i t h a b l a s t wave.

impact o f m i s s i l e s on t h e body o r from displacement of the body as a whole by t h e b l a s t winds. Nuclear r a d i a t i o n c o n s i s t s of high- energy neutrons and gamma rays t h a t emanate from a nuclear explosion. R a d i a t i o n i n j u r i e s r e s u l t when t h e The

r a d i a t i o n penetrates t h e body and damages or destroys body c e l l s .

s e v e r i t y o f t h e i n j u r y i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e t o t a l r a d i a t i o n dose r e c e i v e d by t h e body and t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e over which t h e dose i s received [l].

2.

M i t i g a t i o n Techniques* M i t i g a t i n g t h e e f f e c t s o f n u c l e a r weapons i s best achieved by the

use o f a personnel s h e l t e r .

Any sol i d , opaque m a t e r i a l , such as a w a l l , h i l l1,

o r t r e e , can p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l s from d i r e c t i n j u r y by thermal r a d i a t i o n i f t h e m a t e r i a l i s between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t h e f i r e b a l l . Inside a shelter, Other

*Most

o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n is based on i n f o r m a t i o n i n Reference 1 . references a r e c i t e d as appropriate.

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p r o t e c t i o n c o u l d be obtained by a v o i d i n g e x t e r i o r w a l l openings through which thermal r a d i a t i o n may e n t e r t h e s h e l t e r .

To prevent f i r e s from being s t a r t e d

i n t h e s h e l t e r , e x t e r i o r w a l l apertures should be covered by an opaque, noncombustible m a t e r i a l . P r o t e c t i o n from combustion products t h a t emanate from any f i r e s i g n i t e d near a s h e l t e r by thermal r a d i a t i o n may be more d i f f i c u l t t o achieve than p r o t e c t i o n from i n i t i a l thermal r a d i a t i o n . One o f t h e more e f f e c t i v e

countermeasures i s t o c r e a t e a p o s i t i v e pressure i n s i d e t h e s h e l t e r by mechanical v e n t i l a t i o n . Otherwise, a sealed b a r r i e r may be r e q u i r e d [2,3].

Use o f a p o s i t i v e pressure r e q u i r e s a source o f uncontaminated v e n t i l a t i n g a i r and, i f such a source i s a v a i l a b l e , would n o t adversely a f f e c t s h e l t e r habitability. Use o f a sealed b a r r i e r c o u l d i n t e r f e r e w i t h s h e l t e r

v e n t i l a t i o n i f b a r r i e r s are needed on a l l s h e l t e r e x t e r i o r surfaces.

Two a c t i o n s t h a t can be taken t o reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n j u r y from

b l ast e f f e c t s o f nuclear weapons i n c l u d e s t r u c t u r a l s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e s h e l t e r and p r e v e n t i o n o f a i r b l a s t e n t r y i n t o t h e s h e l t e r . Structural

s t r e n g t h e n i n g reduces t h e susceptabil i t y o f a s h e lt e r t o s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e and thereby reduces t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f i n j u r i e s caused by such f a i l u r e s . Prevention o f a i r b l a s t e n t r y i n t o t h e s h e l t e r can reduce i n j u r i e s caused by whole body t r a n s l a t i o n and by m i s s i l e s , as w e l l as d i r e c t i n j u r i e s from the overpressure. Strengthening o f a s h e l t e r s t r u c t u r e can be achieved by adding

i n t e r m e d i a t e supports t o reduce span l e n g t h s and by otherwise strengthening s t r u c t u r a l members. These a c t i o n s should n o t have a s i g n i f i c a n t adverse

impact on shel t e r h a b i t a b i l i t y . P r e v e n t i o n o f a i r b l a s t e n t r y i s accomplished by c l o s i n g s h e l t e r e x t e r i o r openings w i t h b l a s t - r e s i s t a n t coverings. Such c l o s u r e s w i l l p r o h i b i t adequate

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s h e l t e r v e n t i l a t i o n i f permanent c l o s u r e s are used.

The s i t u a t i o n can be

a l l e v i a t e d by p r o t e c t i n g v e n t i l a t i o n openings w i t h b l a s t c l o s u r e valves. P r o v i d i n g p r o t e c t i o n from t h e n u c l e a r r a d i a t i o n t h a t n u c l e a r weapons produce r e q u i r e s t h a t s h i e l d i n g m a t e r i a l be p o s i t i o n e d between t h e r a d i a t i o n source and t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t o be protected. I f p r o t e c t i o n i s t o be provided

a g a i n s t i n i t i a l n u c l e a r r a d i a t i o n , t h e s h i e l d must be e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t both gamma rays and neutrons. P r o t e c t i o n from fal l o u t r a d i a t i o n r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t Gamma-shield e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s a Neutron s h i e l d i n g i s

t h e s h i e l d be e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t gamma rays.

f u n c t i o n o n l y o f t h e mass o f t h e s h i e l d i n g m a t e r i a l .

more complicated ,because neutrons must f i r s t be slowed by an element w i t h h i g h atomic inass and then captured by elements w i t h low atomic mass. Gamma rays

a r e c r e a t e d i n t h e slowing process, and a gamma s h i e l d must thus be included. Concrete and damp e a r t h are good compromise m a t e r i a l s f o r both neutrons and gamma rays. S h i e l d i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s can be improved by adding boron o r Expedient r a d i a t i o n p r o t e c t i o n i s o f t e n provided by p l a c i n g Any a c t i o n s

i r o n t o concrete.

e a r t h a g a i n s t e x t e r i o r w a l l s and r o o f s o f s h e l t e r s t r u c t u r e s .

t h a t cover e x t e r i o r openings i n t o s h e l t e r s can adversely a f f e c t t h e a b i l i t y t o v e n t i l a t e t h e shel t e r . Therefore, t o prevent such d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s ,

s p e c i a l s h i e l d i n g procedures must be employed.

C. C i v i l Defense Programs and P o l i c i e s

1 .

History Modern c i v i l defense i n t h e United S t a t e s had i t s beginning d u r i n g

World War I when t h e Secretary o f War, as chairman o f t h e National Defense Council (NDC), was made r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c i v i l defense. Councils were

e s t a b l i s h e d a t S t a t e and l o c a l l e v e l s t o handle m a t t e r s such as morale, c o n s e r v a t i o n o f food and o t h e r resources, p u b li c h e a l t h , and " Americanization" o f a l i e n s d u r i n g t h e war years. I n 1339, t h e NDC and l o c a l c o u n c i l s were
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