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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

A Brief History of U.S. Army Intelligence

The American Revolution was large standing professional army Army and retard the development of
one of the great upsets of history. A would be needed. The British professionalism in its ranks. But it
small colonial force, made up experience had taught America that would also shape its character, calling
mostly of militia, eventually de- regular armies were engines of into play in all of its wars the quali-
feated the splendid disciplined ranks oppression. Instead they would ties of resourcefulness and ingenuity.
of the professional British Army, depend upon their militia. When These characteristics would be espe-
with a grateful nod to French naval dangers reared, determined Ameri- cially apparent in the field of military
power. It was a vision that shaped can males would pull their hunting intelligence, which was forced to re-
the American Army over the centu- rifles off the wall and they would invent itself in every campaign. While
ries to come. The ideas of freedom prevail. the British Army formed a Depart-
and democracy would cloak the This anti-standing-Army attitude ment of Military Knowledge as early
Americans in invulnerability. No would inhibit the growth of the U.S. as 1803 to collect terrain and Order

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

of Battle information on potential scout British positions and gather in- trol of intelligence operations and al-
foes, no such organization existed in telligence on their movements and ways placing the gathering of infor-
the U.S. Army until 1885, and then intentions. mation about the enemy uppermost
it was on an insignificant scale. It was from the ranks of in his command priorities.
The Revolutionary War, with the Knowlton’s Rangers that Captain Washington was not only a
appearance of the Continental Army Nathan Hale stepped to undertake an spymaster but a master of deception
in 1775, is thought to be the begin- espionage mission, one that would operations, the most striking of which
ning of American military history, ultimately result in his capture and was the battle of Yorktown where the
even though many of its key partici- present him the opportunity to de- British were frozen in their vulnerable
pants were seasoned in the French and clare while standing on the British positions by an ingenious campaign
Indian War. It was that earlier war on gallows, “I regret that I have but one of misinformation. The American
the North American continent that live to give for my country.” Revolution was a laboratory for rudi-
gave the American Army its unique No lesser fate was handed down mentary intelligence gathering and it
personality, its hardy resourcefulness, to Knowlton and his Rangers. The was given form and purpose by the
its frontiersman’s distaste for author- intrepid colonel had been killed in ac- Commander in Chief of the Ameri-
ity, and its irregular way of fighting, tion on 16 September and his com- can forces himself. General Washing-
even though it rested solidly on En- pany was decimated in the battle. This ton is eminently quotable on the sub-
glish military traditions. was not an auspicious beginning for ject of the importance of good intel-
The Revolutionary War was one U.S. Army intelligence. But there ligence.
of generalship, tremendous courage would be some important triumphs However, for all of Washington’s
and suffering, and, not surprisingly, in the months and years to come, as emphasis on intelligence in the new-
military intelligence. Because it was well as some unforgivable tragedies. born American Army, after the war’s
impossible to know where one’s sym- Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a Yale end in 1783 no intelligence organiza-
pathies lie, it was also difficult to classmate of Captain Nathan Hale tion had been institutionalized and
know whom to trust. Spies were ev- and an officer in the Second Connecti- that discipline would be largely ig-
erywhere on both sides. General cut Dragoons, was a veteran of some nored over the next century.
George Washington relied heavily hard fighting at Long Island, White The explorations of men like
upon the use of spies and his ledgers Plains, Brandywine, Germantown Captain Meriweather Lewis and Sec-
show that he spent $17,000 on his and Monmouth. The former Con- ond Lieutenant William Clark in
network of paid informants. To safe- necticut high school superintendent 1804 up the Missouri River and the
guard security, Washington would would be charged with superintend- reconnaissance of First Lieutenant
not reveal the identity of these men ing a network of spies in and around Zebulon M. Pike into Colorado and
and this secrecy became the subject of his native Long Island. Tallmadge also New Mexico in 1806 can rightly be
the novel The Spies by James Fenimore had a hand in counterintelligence ef- seen as intelligence operations as their
Cooper. forts, exploiting the capture of the object was the acquisition of infor-
The year 1776 appears on the British operative Major John Andre mation about unknown terrain. But
Army’s military intelligence emblem, which led to the exposure of Benedict they were peacetime efforts by adven-
a reference to the formation of Arnold as a turncoat and spy. turous soldiers.
Knowlton’s Rangers as a recon and The Culper Ring was the best It would take the War of 1812 to
intelligence unit during the American known net run by Tallmadge, with remind the amateur American Army
Revolution. Realizing how blind he ample direction and advice from Gen- that intelligence was a function of
was to the British movements around eral Washington. In this role he was warfare that could not be ignored
New York, General George Washing- seen as a proto-G2, serving the com- without deadly consequences. In
ton instructed Lt. Col. Thomas mander. But, as several historians of August Colonel William Hull surren-
Knowlton, another experienced vet- this period are quick to point out, dered Detroit to the British, having
eran of the French-Indian war, to Washington acted as his own intelli- fallen victim to their clever misrepre-
handpick a company of volunteers to gence officer, never relinquishing con- sentations of their strength. Tragic

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

loss would befall the Americans again scouts and spies. In the field, intelli- terrogate a few prisoners.
two years later when British troops gence was the job of Indian scouts and Deception was used repeatedly
marched through Washington, torch- spies. William Henry Harrison had during the War of 1812, mostly by
ing the capitol and the White House. 13 “spies and scouts” in his employ the British, to misrepresent strength.
Both of these defeats and others can when he marched on his way to the At the siege of Fort Wayne, Tecumseh
be traced to faulty or absent tactical Battle of Tippecanoe. The British also sought to convince the small Ameri-
intelligence, although the U.S. Army depended heavily on the help of In- can force that he had been reinforced
was woefully unprepared in most dians for intelligence purposes. En- by British artillery by setting up
other respects as well. terprising Indians like Tecumseh regu- dummy guns made from logs, dem-
Secretary of War John larly captured the mail to learn of the onstrating the military sophistication
Armstrong, who took office in Feb- American’s situation. of this Indian adversary.
ruary 1813, was known to have strong Sometimes prisoners and desert- By the time of the 1846 Mexican
opinions about the requirement to ers could be the source of informa- War, the intelligence art was still un-
obtain good intelligence. The intelli- tion and at least one commander, formed and did not exist in the cur-
gence systems of the day were con- Brig. Gen. Zebulon Pike, took advan- riculum of the U.S. Military Acad-
ventions like cavalry reconnaissances, tage of a lull during the attack of Fort emy or in the drill manuals of the day,
cavalry screens, outposts, pickets, York in April 1813 to personally in- but only in the minds of some offic-

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

ers as an ill-defined requirement akin heretofore unknown natural history massing forces and supplying armies.
to reconnaissance. In spite of know- of some of the most exciting wildlife They also became the obvious target
ing nothing of the terrain or the habitats in the world. These men for sabotage.
enemy’s numbers or dispositions, the ranged over America’s great South- During the Civil War the U.S.
American units under Zachary Taylor west, campaigned during the 1846- Army began using the telegraph, not
were able to succeed in Northern 48 Mexican War, surveyed the new only to link major headquarters, but
Mexico only because of the extraor- border with Mexico, opened wagon tactically, in the form of the “Flying
dinary mettle of their soldiers. train trails, provided tactical maps for Telegraph.” This was the name given
Winfield Scott, moving on the the Indian-fighting Army, mapped to the Beardslee magneto-electric tele-
Mexican capitol after landing at transcontinental railroad routes and graph set, the American army’s first
Veracruz, was likewise blinkered, but produced, in just twenty years, one electric weapon. It was portable,
he was ably served by a soldier with of the most comprehensive scientific hand-operated, without batteries, and
an acute insight into the exigencies of inventories ever made of any part of could signal over several miles of in-
warfare. Colonel Ethan Allen the earth. They were men like John sulated field wire. For the first time
Hitchcock spent a considerable C. Fremont, William H. Emory, the U.S. Army had an electronic Com-
amount of his time as Scott’s Inspec- Lorenzo Sitgreaves, Amiel W. mand, Control and Communications
tor General seeing to the intelligence Whipple, George H. Derby, John G. (C3) system. And, for the first time,
needs of his commander, relying on Parke and George Stoneman. telegraph lines were tapped and mes-
informers and his Mexican Spy Com- The American Civil War, like the sages intercepted.
pany. A life of philosophic inquiry American Revolution, was an occasion Captain Anson Stager, head of the
may well have honed his clarity of for widespread human intelligence Military Telegraph Service, established
vision which allowed him to foresee operations, owing to the fact of an in 1861, developed a route transposi-
the possibilities presented by a native identical language and the shared cul- tion cryptosystem to provide an el-
intelligence and reconnaissance com- tural backgrounds of the protagonists. ementary safeguard against wiretap-
pany. But the Mexican Spy It was an easy matter to conceal alle- ping. It scrambled the words of a mes-
Company’s contribution was not giances and pass through the familiar sage according to a prearranged pat-
Scott’s sole tactical intelligence tool. countryside. It was also the brink of tern and, although far from sophisti-
The purpose of intelligence was also the modern era of warfare, employ- cated, it defied Confederate
notably served by daring reconnais- ing new technologies like railroads, decryption, at least according to em-
sances made by young engineering telegraphs, photography and lighter ployees of the Military Telegraph Ser-
officers like Robert E. Lee and George than air ships. This opened new av- vice.
B. McClellan. enues for intelligence exploitation. The Federals on the other hand
During and after the war, the of- With the proliferation of new con- had little trouble with the Confeder-
ficers of the Army Corps of Topo- cepts of warfare came the attendant ates’ Vigenere polyalphabetic substi-
graphical Engineers were assigned a potential for intelligence opportuni- tution system, owing to their habit
mission unique in U.S. Army history. ties. It became incumbent upon the of only partially encrypting the mes-
They were to reconnoiter routes intelligence operative to invent ways sages and leaving substantial plaintext
through rarefied and intimidating to seize these chances. Signals intelli- clues. The possibility of using the
mountain ranges, canyons awesome gence was born. Codes were deci- vulnerable telegraph to send mislead-
in their vastness, down rushing rivers phered with regularity by both sides. ing messages was not lost on either
and across parched deserts, so that the Aerial reconnaissance emerged with side, and both made good use of
American people could expand west- Thaddeus Lowe and his balloon disinformation.
ward to Pacific shores and so that the corps. The role of cavalry was rede- It was during the Civil War that
Army outposts placed to protect the fined. Special operations were the Army Signal Corps first began
pioneers could be supplied overland. launched to infiltrate battle lines and attempting aerial surveillance from
At the same time they would observe spread havoc in the enemy’s rear. Rail- lighter-than-air balloons overlooking
and record a plethora of data on the roads brought a new dimension for enemy lines. (During the Mexican

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

War a civilian balloonist suggested Yorktown, Lowe took Brig. Gen. moved slowly, there was no longer any
their use, but the idea was rejected as Samuel P. Heintzelman, one of the doubt as to the object of the Confed-
impracticable.) Thaddeus S. C. Lowe, corps commanders, aloft and de- erates.
a 28-year-old New Hampshire me- scribed the intelligence value of the It was one of the earliest recorded
teorologist, demonstrated the useful- observation flight: instances of an intelligence analyst
ness of balloons as observation plat- The entire great fortress was keeping the commander informed.
forms to President Lincoln in 1861 ablaze with bonfires, and the greatest But the value of Lowe’s observations
when he sent the first air-to-ground activity prevailed, which was not vis- were deemed marginal by most com-
telegraph message. The president au- ible except from the balloon. At first manders. Little could be seen from
thorized the formation of an Army the general was puzzled on seeing more great distances, especially when the
Balloon Corps with Professor Lowe, wagons entering the forts than were enemy’s positions took advantage of
commissioned a captain, at its head. going out, but when I called his at- foliage cover. Lowe’s salary was cut
By the end of 1861, Lowe had a fleet tention to the fact that the ingoing from $10 per day to six, an insult in
of seven balloons and nine aeronauts wagons were light and moved rapidly Lowe’s mind. He resigned in protest
to man them. In March 1862 with (the wheels being visible as they passed and the balloon corps was deactivated
McClellan’s Army of the Potomac each camp-fire), while the outgoing in April 1863.
facing Confederate positions at wagons were heavily loaded and

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

It was at the time of the Civil War Maybe the best combat com- deputy John C. Babcock, a volunteer
that photography was introduced as mander of the Civil War, Phil in the Sturgis Rifles and, after his en-
a means of recording military infor- Sheridan was called by William listment expired, a civilian order-of-
mation. Thaddeus Lowe had used Sherman “A persevering terrier dog— battle expert with the Topographical
cameras to take pictures from the bas- honest, modest, plucky and smart Department. It was Babcock who
ket of his balloon. enough.” He was also remembered stayed on after Pinkerton resigned to
In the American Civil War the as the best informed commander of prove that accurate information could
principal intelligence gathering arm of the war, relying on a highly organized be assembled about the enemy’s num-
the U.S. Army was the cavalry. Early spy network and reconnaissance. bers. Third in command was Cap-
in the war, however, they could not What we call intelligence today, tain John C. McEntee.
be said to live up to the present-day Sheridan called “that great essential of The bureau employed some 70
motto of the Military Intelligence success, information.” This careful at- “guides” to gather intelligence in the
Corps, “Always Out Front.” Rather tention to intelligence would serve field. Using information collected
the cavalry seldom ventured very far him well again in the Indian Wars from their own scouts, from south-
from its infantry and artillery support. when he assembled an intelligence ern refugees and deserters, from in-
Its sorties were marked by timidity, network composed of scouts who had tercepted communications, from bal-
and therefore its usefulness as the eyes much experience with the Indians and loon observations, from military pa-
of the army was hooded. That is un- could keep him informed, not only trols, prisoner interrogations, and
til the arrival upon the scene of a “Man of enemy movements, but of their in- from open sources like newspapers,
on Horseback”—Brig. Gen. John tentions. they were able to write informed and
Buford. The lack of any official intelli- coordinated intelligence summaries
Buford recognized that the gence gathering body was keenly felt for the commander. Sharpe also ben-
Union cavalry was no match for the in the opening years of the Civil War. efited from a windfall of information
better mounted Confederate cavalry. A railroad detective named Allan provided by the Richmond under-
He also knew that the use of horse- Pinkerton became the secret service of ground, a highly organized and far-
men as shock troops with sabers the Army of the Potomac, telling its reaching spy organization improbably
drawn was a thing of the past. Massed commander, George McClellan, that directed by Elizabeth Van Lew, a 44-
formations of cavalry only made big the Confederates facing him were year-old abolitionist in 1862 and a
targets for the more accurate, farther double the strength they actually were resident of the southern capitol.
ranging and more rapid-firing rifle. and feeding the cautious McClellan’s Among Van Lew’s sources was Mary
Instead he called upon his Indian- penchant for inaction. Pinkerton and Bowser, a freed slave who was planted
fighting experience and used the cav- his men were better at counter intel- as a housemaid in the home of
alry like dragoons. The horse offered ligence than they were at pinpointing Jefferson Davis. The Bureau of In-
mobility, but when it came to fight- order-of-battle information. They formation was the first case in the U.S.
ing he dismounted the troops and had snagged some southern spies in Army of a modern military intelli-
them seek cover. In this way he was Washington. The detective also gence organization, comparing intel-
able to repel charge after charge of con- seemed more at home with a politi- ligence from a number of sources and
federates in the saddle. This meant cal kind of espionage. evaluating it before passing it along.
that Buford could keep his cavalry out Military intelligence took on a The head of the bureau was promoted
on reconnaissance without fear of be- more professional look in early 1863 to brigadier in March 1864. It would
ing beaten off by the enemy. This he when Colonel George H. Sharpe, seem that the U.S. Army had realized
did tenaciously, taking many impor- Assistant Provost Marshal of the the importance of the intelligence
tant prisoners and gathering some very Army of the Potomac, formed the function and the necessity of having
useful intelligence information such Bureau of Information to provide a it performed by a distinct unit of spe-
as a letter from Lee outlining his plan more efficient and systematic collec- cialists. But at war’s end, the bureau
for the campaign found in the pocket tion of military information from all was disbanded and its members re-
of J.E.B. Stuart’s adjutant. sources. Sharpe appointed as his turned to civilian life. The lesson

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

about the key role intelligence could was one way military intelligence was realized the threat posed by the tele-
play would have to be relearned, the employed with ingenuity and effec- graph and severed the lines, thus ef-
next time by young officers in the tiveness. A prominent example was fectively disrupting American com-
decades to come who studied Euro- the Apache campaign in Arizona and munications. But the Indians took
pean armies seeking a more profes- New Mexico between 1862 and their jamming efforts one step further,
sional U.S. Army. 1886. Their use in Arizona, as both employing deception. They would
With the Civil War at an end, the spies on the reservation and as recon- cut the wires where they passed
American Army turned its attention naissance patrols in the field, was through a tree or were attached to a
to the frontier where a different kind given credit for bringing the renegade pole and then join the wires with a
of warfare would occupy them for the Apaches to bay and significantly piece of rawhide. When the U.S.
next quarter of a century. The low shortening the Apache campaigns. Army rode the line looking for the
intensity conflict of the Indian Wars In the 1870s, the telegraph was break, they would not be able to lo-
once again drew forth the resource- employed extensively in the Arizona/ cate the broken line without much
fulness that would become the hall- New Mexico theater of operations to effort. One response to this problem
mark of the American Army leader. quickly relay intelligence of Apache was to field an experimental back-up
The use of Indian Scouts by U.S. movements and to get orders out to communications system, the helio-
Army commanders on the frontier the far-flung outposts. The Apache graph.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The Apache Scout is usually 1882 when informants alerted the gether with a handful of clerks,
thought of as falling within the cat- Army to the intentions of renegades crowded into a single room in the
egory of human intelligence because to attack the reservation at Camp State, War and Navy Building. His
of his job as a long-range reconnais- Goodwin and breakout Loco and his modest shop was named the Division
sance man, but the Indian’s skills at Warm Springs people to join them of Military Information, a subsection
tracking resemble the techniques used in raiding. The information, how- of the Reservations Division of the
by the imagery interpreter. Imagery ever, did not prevent Geronimo, Juh, Miscellaneous Branch of the Adjutant
intelligence studies the earth’s surface Chato, and Nachez from doing just General. It was not until 1889 that
for clues to identify and locate enemy that. the office was charged with assem-
activity. Today that is accomplished It is now necessary to shift our bling “Military data on our own and
mainly by photographic, radar, infra- attention from the exhausting verti- foreign services which would be avail-
red, or electro-optic images, some cal chases over Southwestern moun- able for use of the War Department
conveyed from platforms in space. tain ranges after Apache renegades to and the Army at large.” Here would
The Apache too scrutinized the the cooler heights of the Army hier- be filed maps and monographs, re-
ground for signs of enemy activity, archy in Washington, D.C. This is ports and rosters. The Adjutant Gen-
but he gathered his images from as where, according to one observer who eral, in a letter to the field, asked “all
close to the earth’s surface as you can noticed that staff officers spent most officers” to “make report on anything
get. Occasionally his platform was of their time in billiard parlors, “the which it may be desirable for the gov-
the back of a horse. balls flew the thickest.” But it was ernment to know in case of sudden
The American Army had used also where organizational decisions war.” The determination of what was
Indians as guides ever since its incep- were made, and while the Army in military intelligence and what was not,
tion, but they were employed as ci- the field was hunting for Geronimo, was left to the “discretion of the of-
vilians. It was not until an Act of the Army staff was making room for ficers.” It was a minor archive that
Congress in July 1866 that Indians military intelligence. would grow quickly since the void it
were actually enlisted and became an In his memoirs, Ralph Van was filling was so wide.
official unit of the U.S. Army. Gen- Deman claims that the 1885 If being lumped under “Miscel-
eral George Crook made extensive use establishment of a military intelligence laneous” was not humbling enough,
of Apache scouts in Arizona territory division under the Adjutant General the office had to endure the sneers of
to track down Apache renegades. was the result of the Secretary of War their naval colleagues who’s Office of
Crook would emphasize their worth asking for information on a foreign Naval Intelligence (ONI) had been es-
in his official report: “I cannot too nation’s military might and learning tablished three years earlier. When an
strongly assert that there has never that nothing was known about it. Army officer was found to have bor-
been any success in operations against Whether this was the germination of rowed a report from ONI, the Navy
these Indians, unless Indian scouts the Army’s first headquarters level in- chief was outraged enough to write,
were used. These Chiricahua telligence organization, or whether the “Such an incident as this served to
scouts...were of more value in hunt- War Department simply saw a need make me doubly cautious, especially
ing down and compelling the surren- to build a military reference room to in dealing with these Army people,
der of the renegades than all other house the influx of reports being writ- who in matters of tact or discretion
troops...combined. The use of Indian ten by touring military observers, this seem to me to be a lower order of
scouts was dictated by the soundest event is accorded the significance of intellect than the mule.” It was an
of military policy.” being the beginning of an MI estab- early example of the begrudging co-
On the reservation where many lishment within the U.S. Army. operation that was to plague joint
Indian factions intrigued against each While the organization of the operations over the next century.
other and the U.S. Army, a network little MID is now thought of as a Four years later, the Military In-
of “Confidential Indians” would re- watershed, it certainly was not formation Division (MID) was ex-
port to the military any plans or dis- thought of as greatly important by panded to encompass a network of
satisfaction. This proved useful in Major William J. Volkmar, who to- military attaches. The attache system

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

which Congress had authorized in ies, bookstores and publishers lists in Marine employee. He was found out
1889 involved the stationing of of- order to give early notice of any new and earned the distinction of being the
ficers in four major European capi- or important publications or inven- first attache to be expelled for espio-
tols and one in St. Petersburg. Their tions or improvements in arms, or in nage. Jefferson Coolidge, an Ameri-
job was to observe the training and any branch of the service; also give can diplomat in France voiced his
exercises of foreign armies and make notice of such drawings, plans, etc.; puzzlement at Borup’s actions, call-
reports on their relative strengths and which may be of importance and ing them “perfectly useless,” since we
weaknesses. A War Department within your power to procure. were not at war with France and did
memo exhorted them to: The attache in France in 1892 was not yet possess a Navy with which to
Examine into and report upon all Captain Henry Dana Borup, who was invest Toulon.
matters of a military or technical char- following instructions of the War Attache duty was usually reserved
acter that may be of interest to any Department to collect “drawings, for officers who had personal wealth,
branch of the War Department and plans, etc. which may be of impor- since the Army lacked the funds to
to the service at large. Keep in- tance and within your powers to pro- support them overseas. This criterion
formed...of the occurrence of all mili- cure,” when he tried to buy some was seldom a guarantee that the atta-
tary exhibitions and trials of Ord- plans for the fortification of the sea- che had any knowledge of intelligence
nance.... Examine the military librar- port of Toulon from a Ministry of work. The MID with its attaches

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

soon would have a chance to prove In 1893 the MID thought its 1898 of Andrew S. Rowan. A lieu-
its worth. Tensions with Spain were work sweeping enough to warrant tenant with the Military Information
building. four branches. A Progress in Mili- Division in Washington, he was en-
American support for Cuban in- tary Arts Branch compiled informa- trusted with a job directed by the
surrectionists against an increasingly tion sent in by attaches and observ- president himself. Chosen by his boss,
oppressive Spanish regime brought the ers. Information about the Canadian Arthur L. Wagner, the Chief of MID,
United States and Spain ever closer to border was processed by the North- to carry out McKinley’s instructions,
war. When an unexplained explosion ern Frontier Branch. A Spanish- Rowan first traveled to Jamaica, then
sunk the U.S. battleship Maine in Ha- American Branch kept an eye on de- by small craft landed on the shores of
vana harbor on February 15, 1898, velopments in Spanish possessions in Cuba. Guided by Cuban rebels,
the incident was thought to have been the Caribbean. The readiness of state Rowan cut through the jungles of the
caused by Spanish treachery and it National Guard units was monitored island until he reached the headquar-
precipitated the war, which was offi- by the Militia and Volunteer Branch. ters of General Garcia. There he con-
cially declared by the U.S. Congress The MID was in good hands in ferred with the rebel leader, elicited
on 25 April. It was a war which Presi- 1897. Its chief was Major Arthur L. information about the strength and
dent William McKinley had souught Wagner, who was a respected military disposition of Spanish forces on the
to avoid and for which the United educator and thinker, but, more island, discussed Garcia’s suggestions
States was ill prepared. From a mili- importantly, a believer in intelligence. for joint American-Cuban operations
tary intelligence standpoint, however, He brought to the job a professional- against the Spanish, then returned to
the U.S. Army was the best prepared ism and a voice for intelligence re- the U.S., taking with him two of
it had ever been in its history. form. His MID consisted not only Garcia’s most knowledgeable aides to
It was the first American war in of 11 officers, but a network of 40 furnish intelligence information to
which a military intelligence function officers stationed at National Guard the American military. His exploits
was up and running before the war headquarters around the country, who were the subject of a post-war, best-
began. While the work of the Mili- reported directly to MID. He had selling essay entitled “Message to
tary Intelligence Division would be 16 attaches, 10 civilian clerks and 2 Garcia,” which lauded the virtue of
considered rudimentary and slight by messengers, occupying four rooms, self-initiative. Rowan retired in 1908
today’s standards, it was unusual for and an annual budget of $3,640 to as a Colonel and in 1922, after a cam-
the U.S. Army to have even this fun- keep the whole thing going. It had paign by General Nelson Miles and
damental degree of knowledge about been assembling information about other friends, Congress bestowed
its adversary on the battlefield. Cuba since 1892, mostly from emi- upon him the Distinguished Service
During the 1890s, the MID ac- gres living in New York and from trav- Cross.
complished much with its dozen of- eling Army officers like Captain In 1898 Wagner set up a war
ficers, not only monitoring the pre- George P. Scriven who toured Cuba room in the White House, next door
paredness of American militia and in 1893. to the State, War and Navy building
National Guard units, but preparing The output of MID was prodi- in which MID was located. Then,
over 50,000 card file entries of infor- gious during the years under Wagner’s his staff work completed, he turned
mation received; producing much leadership. Anticipating the war with over the reins of MID to Capt. Louis
needed maps of Mexico, Canada, Spain, MID produced special studies, C. Scherer. Another of the officers
Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philip- orders of battle, and maps on Cuba, he left behind to assume the intelli-
pines; and completing studies on for- Puerto Rico and the Philippines. gence work was Lieutenant Ralph Van
eign armies. By the time the Span- Wagner convinced the leadership to Deman.
ish-American War started, the U.S. send Lieut. Albert Rowan on an es- Appointed to the staff of General
Army attache in Madrid had com- pionage mission to Cuba, and Lieut. Nelson Miles, the Army’s Com-
piled much useful information on H. H. Whitney to Puerto Rico. manding General, Wagner was able to
Spain’s military capabilities. A basic example of human intel- use his influence to organize the Bu-
ligence operations was the mission in reau of Military Information which

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

would be assigned to the General of his field MI concept, Wagner said: reportedly used in Puerto Rico dur-
William R. Shafter’s V Corps to cen- ...No use was made of the Bu- ing the Spanish-American War.
tralize and collate all intelligence in- reau of Military Information. ...I About the use of observation balloons
formation in the theater. As vision- believe that a bureau...would be of in the Spanish-American War, a cum-
ary as this organization was for its day, great value; but the utilization of such bersome device hard to move down
it would not get off the ground due a bureau implies a certain degree of the narrow trails and an inviting tar-
to petty rivalries. General Shafter system and intelligent organization in get for enemy fire, Wagner had this
would dismiss the Bureau of Military the military force to which it is at- to say: “For the first time in military
Information, believing that Wagner tached. history a balloon was seen practically
was sent by Miles to spy on him. Wagner would be the first to agree on the skirmish line, and it will prob-
Without a job, Wagner volunteered that “Intelligence is for commanders.” ably be the last time that such an ex-
to lead reconnaissance patrols behind By the turn of the century, cameras ploit will be witnessed. It is hard to
enemy lines to gather intelligence for were being attached to large kites understand what fantastic conception
Brig. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, the (which were cheaper and more por- of the art of war could have caused
Second Division commander. table than balloons) and the shutters such a reconnaissance to be seriously
Remarking after the war on the triggered with clock devices or fuses. contemplated in the first place.”
failure of General Shafter to make use These kite surveillance devices were

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12
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

In August 1903 the Military In- tion; headed by Capt. C.T. Mencher. the Military Information Section of
formation Division became the Sec- One of the early successes of the the Army War College had even less
ond Division, one of the three main new Second and Third Divisions act- to do with intelligence duties, instead
divisions of the new General Staff, the ing jointly was anticipation of insur- being charged with doing “current
others being the First Division in rection in Cuba and the preparation General Staff work.”
charge of all Army administration and of a plan for U.S. Army intervention. In 1898 an Insurgent Records
the Third Division in charge of plans. The Cuban Pacification plan was put Office was created in the Manila head-
One of the new chief of staff ’s early into effect after requests for aid from quarters of the Expeditionary Force
actions was to issue a call for quali- the new Cuban government in 1906. in the Philippines to sift through and
fied officers to assist the Second Di- As part of the occupation forces, a translate the boxes of captured docu-
vision in translating Russian, German, branch office of the Second Division ments that could furnish valuable in-
French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese was created in Havana and “engaged formation to the field commanders.
and Japanese documents. in collecting valuable statistical and The importance and scope of the of-
The job of the Second Division topographical information.” fice grew and so did the staff, finally
was spelled out as “collection, arrange- The Third Division planners, es- becoming the Military Information
ment, and publication of historical, sentially the members of the Army Division of the Adjutant General’s
statistical, and geographical informa- War College, relied extensively on in- Office, Headquarters, Division of the
tion; War Department Library; sys- formation provided by the Second Philippines, on 13 December 1900.
tem of war maps, American and for- Division and worked closely with The new agency was performing all
eign; general information regarding them. So when the Third Division tactical and counter intelligence tasks
foreign armies and fortresses; prepa- moved into its new quarters in the for the Philippines, recruiting Filipino
ration from official records of analyti- War College Building at Washington agents and working closely with the
cal and critical histories of important Barracks, D.C., it recommended that MID in the War Department. It was
campaigns.” It was also responsible the Second Division move there too eventually merged with the War De-
for the system of military attaches. to facilitate coordination between the partment MID on 18 June 1902, re-
The first chief was Major William two staffs. While objected to by the ceiving its funding from Washington
Dorrance Beach who was supported military information people, the and serving as a branch of the MID
by only five officers and the same four Chief of Staff approved the move and in the War Department. This had the
rooms in the State, War and Navy it was completed in May 1908. A disadvantage of excluding the local
Building. He organized the division month later the chief directed the commander from the direction of
into six sections: 1. Military Attache merger of the Second and Third Di- intelligence work.
and Manila Office Section; to be con- visions into a Second Section. Its Its first chief was Lt. Colonel Jo-
trolled by the Division Chief, assisted chief would be the president of the seph T. Dickman, who would later
by Capt. J.C. Oakes. 2. Clas- War College. A Military Information be a major general and lead the Third
sification, Card Indexing and Library Committee was created in this new U.S. Army over the Rhine to occupy
Section; to operate under the super- organization, along with a War Col- Germany in November 1918. He
vision of Capt. H.C. Hale, the Divi- lege Committee. The mission of the was seconded by Captain John R.M.
sion Secretary. 3. Map and Photo- Military Information Committee was Taylor who would be assisted by
graphs Section; directed by Capt. not much different from the one as- Capt. Ralph Van Deman. It was Van
H.M. Reeve. 4. Historical Section; signed to the second division in 1903, Deman who set up a Map Section and
to which any officer of the Division but centralization followed and the ordered terrain reconnaissances.
may be assigned as required. 5. intelligence function was virtually Unlike Cuba, where informants
Monograph Section; to which all of- absorbed into the War College. A were plentiful, little was known about
ficers of the Division will be auto- mission statement issued in February the Philippines at the time of the
matically assigned and provided with 1912 showed fewer true intelligence Spanish American War. The research-
appropriate work projects of a con- tasks and more work related to the ers in MID seemed to have neglected
tinuing nature. 6. Publication Sec- education of the Army. By May 1915 these far-away Pacific islands and their

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

data was not always up to later stan- the Philippines from the last Ency- der and a world war to revive the in-
dards. The aide to Maj. Gen. Wesley clopedia Britannica! telligence craft in the second decade
Merritt, commanding, Capt. Thomas The Spanish-American War for of the 20th century.
B. Mott gave this picture of the MID the first time presented this young Despite the reorganization of
product in the summer of 1898: nation as a global power. Military Army by Secretary of the Army Elihu
General Merritt had charged me, intelligence had little or no effect on Root and the creation of a general staff
when in Washington, with collecting its outcome, but because of the com- after the turn of the century, intelli-
data concerning the Islands and one mitment of a dozen officers, military gence, originally the Second Division
document had been handed me [by intelligence spread out from its few of the general staff, was increasingly
MID] with special recommendations rooms in the War Department to the ignored in favor of the more robust
as to its care and early return, for it provinces of Cuba and the jungles of Third Division, or plans division.
was “confidential.’ I read it eagerly the Philippines. But as memory of There were too few voices defending
when I got back to Governor’s Island, the war receded, so too did intelli- the importance of intelligence to an
but as the first pages seemed familiar, gence work shrink until the word dis- Army leadership absorbed with plans
I compared it with other papers I had appeared altogether on the Army’s or- and operations. One of the few ad-
already collected. Lo and behold, it ganizational charts. It would take vocates of a stronger military intelli-
was a transcription of the article on some troubles along the Mexican bor- gence organization within the U.S.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Army, Ralph van Deman, would be During the Punitive Expedition Captain Parker Hitt was 34 years
recognized only when the United into Mexico in 1916 led by General old in 1911 when the Signal School
States was on the brink of a war. But John J. Pershing, human intelligence at Fort Leavenworth conducted its
before he could be heard, another (HUMINT) and signals intelligence first conference on military
Army commander was conducting a (SIGINT) took on new proportions. cryptology. The infantry officer had
rehearsal along the uneasy Mexican Although an embryo intelligence staff interrupted his studies in civil engi-
border for the full-scale war in Eu- had been organized in 1903 as part of neering at Purdue University to join
rope. In the mountains of northern the Army’s General Staff, it was up the Army in 1898. He served in the
Mexico, John J. Pershing would learn to General Pershing to organize his Philippines, Alaska and California
some things about intelligence. own field intelligence network. He before attending the Signal School
Political instability in Mexico, realized that good intelligence was and then becoming an instructor at
which often spilled across the border necessary if he was to track down the that institution. He possessed a flair
in the form of bandit raids and refu- bandit/revolutionary Pancho Villa. for solving ciphers and deciphered
gee exoduses, resulted in a troop Pershing appointed an intelligence coded messages intercepted from
buildup along that border as early as officer to his staff, Major James A. Mexico from both the agents of
1911. In 1914 it was proposed by Ryan, 13th Cavalry, and started an “In-Pancho Villa and the Constitutional-
the Chief, Army War College Divi- formation Department.” Later, when ists, the latter code becoming known
sion, who also chaired the Military five separate districts were established
as the Mexican Army Cipher Disk.
Information Committee of the War in the Mexican theater of operations, Hitt wrote the U.S. Army’s first pub-
College, that some officers along the he instructed the district command- lication on cryptology in 1915 when
border be invested with intelligence ers “to organize [their] own agents andhis Manual for Solution of Military
duties. This was adopted but with establish as far as possible [their] own
Ciphers was printed at Fort
the proviso that they not cross into service of information.” Leavenworth. From 1914 to 1917,
Mexico, limiting their work to the The Information Department Hitt developed a code machine that,
interrogation of refugees. That ban employed a network of agents who after some improvements by Joseph
was lifted after Pershing mounted his were reported to have penetrated Mauborgne, Chief of the Signal
Punitive Expedition. Villa’s camp. The department re- Corps’ Engineering and Research Di-
We know that at least one intelli- ported in 1917 that it “soon was able vision, would become in 1922 the
gence officer crossed into Mexico. In to decipher any code used in North- Army’s M-94. It was used up until
1916 a lieutenant of the First Arizona ern Mexico. Thereafter, by tapping World War II. In the 1930s it was
Infantry, Sidney F. Mashbir, was asked the various telegraph and telephone replaced by the M-138a, which incor-
by the Department Commander, wires and picking up wireless messages porated some more improvements
Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, to con- we were able to get practically all theon Hitt’s prototype. As a Colonel,
duct a secret reconnaissance of north- information passing between the vari- Parker Hitt went to France with the
ern Mexico to check out persistent ru- ous leaders in Mexico.” American Expeditionary Force (AEF)
mors of a sizable Japanese military in 1918 and served on Pershing’s staff
presence. Mashbir, an Arizonan fa- Apache scouts from Fort Huachuca before becoming the Chief Signal
miliar with the Sonoran desert, with accompanied the 10th Cavalry and Officer for the 1st Division.
the help of his Papago (today Tohono others from Fort Apache joined the Known as the Father of Military
Oodham) spies, found Japanese ra- 11th Cavalry on their long scouts into Intelligence, Ralph Van Deman had
tion tins and Kanji written on rock Mexico in search of the bandit/revo- worked as a young lieutenant in the
faces that confirmed that Japanese lutionary, Pancho Villa. It was the Military Information Division in the
military exercises were being con- last time Indian Scouts were used in days of Arthur Wagner, who we then
ducted and that Japanese patrols may U.S. Army operations, though they must call the “Grandfather of Mili-
have even crossed into the United remained as part of the U.S. Army tary Intelligence.” He was influenced
States to obtain water. until 1947. by the scholarly Wagner who had a
firm conviction in the importance of

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

intelligence. Van Deman was an in- had the opportunity to draw an that Europe would provide all the infor-
tellectual in his own right, a graduate extensive experience when he was as- mation that we needed if we entered
of Harvard, Yale, and Miami Medi- signed in 1915 to the Army War Col- the war in Europe. Repeated brief-
cal School, with degrees in both law lege, the organization that had ab- ings by Van Deman failed to move
and medicine, first entering the Army sorbed the functions of intelligence the chief, a man who President Will-
as a surgeon. He would carry on the and relegated it to an obscure com- iam Taft thought was “wood to the
crusade for a professional intelligence mittee. middle of his head.” When Brig.
organization within the U.S. Army. Following the lead of his boss, the Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, Macomb’s suc-
While his wife was going up for Chief of the War College Division, cessor resubmitted the recommenda-
plane rides with the Wright brothers Brig. Gen. H.H. Macomb, Van tion to form an intelligence section
in the Virginia countryside [thus earn- Deman sought to convince the Army just one week after Congress declared
ing the distinction of being the first Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh L. war, it was again firmly turned down.
woman passenger], Van Deman in Scott that a separate intelligence func- Van Deman resorted to other means,
1909 was laboring in obscurity, but tion was needed in the Army’s gen- enlisting the support of his British
acquiring more experience than any eral staff. He wrote a staff study to intelligence counterparts to urge the
other officer in the American Army that effect, but was turned down by case at higher governmental levels,
about the subject of intelligence. He Scott who thought that our allies in and even using an unnamed woman

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16
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

writer who had influence with Secre- The new organization was more Intelligence Police (CIP) organized in
tary of War Newton D. Baker. With than a staff agency, but an operational August 1917. The CIP had 750
suggestions now coming from Scott’s department with control of all field agents in France, where they were
superiors, he reversed himself a few intelligence units in the Army. headquartered near Bordeaux, and 500
days later in April 1917. Van Deman was named the chief of in the United States. They would be
When a separate Military Intelli- the new Military Intelligence Section cut back to 28 in the year following
gence Section was organized in May (MIS). Starting small with three of- the armistice.
1917 by Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, ficers and two clerks, it grew with the Van Deman had ultimately ac-
Chief of the War College Division, it force of an idea whose time had fi- complished his goal of restoring in-
was given these functions: nally come, with 282 officers and 948 telligence to equal footing with the
(a) The collection, collation and civilians in the outfit by war’s end. other general staff sections in the War
distribution of military information. Van Deman benefited from his close Department, as had originally been
This will be understood to embrace liaison work with British intelligence, envisioned in 1903.
every class of military information, particularly Colonel Claude Dansey The intelligence organization
formerly handled by the Information of the British Security Service who would undergo yet another reforma-
Committee or by the War College provided a handbook on intelligence tion. Taking over as the new chief of
Division as a whole. organization and methods. This gave staff in March 1918, Maj. Gen.
(b) The supervision of the duties structure to the organization which Peyton C. March viewed the Military
of our Military Attaches abroad, in- was divided into positive and nega- Intelligence Division as “a minor ap-
sofar as those duties pertain to the col- tive branches, positive intelligence pendage to the War Plans Division,”
lection of military information. being information about the enemy which was not quite true as it was as-
(c) Officers and Intelligence Of- and negative corresponding with the signed to the Executive Division of
ficers at posts or stations and with job of today’s counter intelligence. the General Staff. March wanted to
commands in the field in matters re- The Military Intelligence Section was place MI back on the General Staff.
lating purely to military intelligence. made up of these subsections: In his 26 August 1918 reorganization,
(d) The consideration of ques- MI meant military intelligence, there were four divisions on the gen-
tions of policy to be promulgated by with “intelligence” replacing “infor- eral staff: Operations; Military Intel-
the General Staff in connection with mation,” a British usage that now ligence; Purchase, Storage and Traf-
all matters of military intelligence. became institutionalized in the U.S. fic; and War Plans. Replacing Van
(e) The supervision and control Army, although there were examples Deman who was on his way to France,
of such system of military espionage of its use at least back to 1907 when Marlborough Churchill was pro-
and counterespionage as shall be es- an appointment was made for an “In- moted to brigadier and appointed
tablished, by authority of the Chief telligence Officer for the Hawaiian Director of Military Intelligence. His
of Staff or the Secretary of War, dur- Islands.” Earlier in American history, division would:
ing the continuance of the present intelligence was a synonym for have cognizance and control of
war. “news.” military intelligence, both positive
(f ) Cooperation with the Intelli- The MIS would later become re- and negative, and shall be in charge
gence Sections of the General Staff of sponsible for training all of the offic- of an officer designated as the direc-
the various countries at war with Ger- ers and NCOs needed in tor of military intelligence, who will
many, in connection with military Europe in each battalion intelligence be an assistant to the Chief of Staff.
intelligence work in the United States section and those sections in regimen- He is also the chief military censor.
and with our forces in the field, ei- tal, divisional and corps headquarters. The duties of this division are to main-
ther at home or abroad. The Military Intelligence Section also tain estimates revised daily of the mili-
(g) The preparation of instruc- filled the AEF G-2’s request for 50 tary situation, the economic situation,
tions in military intelligence work for sergeants with investigative experience and of such other matters as the Chief
the use of our forces in the field. and the ability to speak French. This of Staff may direct, and to collect,
became the nucleus of the Corps of collate, and disseminate military in-

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

telligence. It will cooperate with the ments; disburse and account increased, so too did the sophistica-
intelligence section of the general for intelligence funds; cooperate tion and interpretative content of the
staffs of allied countries in connection with the censorship board and with intelligence summaries.
with military intelligence; prepare in- intelligence agencies of other depart- By the Fall of 1918, these sum-
structions in military intelligence ments of the Government. maries were being distributed to the
work for the use of our forces; super- One of the jobs accomplished by Army Chief of Staff, the Secretary of
vise the training of personnel for in- the MI section since its inception was State and the President. The main
telligence work; organize, direct, and the production of daily and weekly source of information was the mili-
coordinate the intelligence service; intelligence summaries that covered a tary attache network, but reports sup-
supervise the duties of military at- wide range of subjects, not only mili- plied by the Office of Naval Intelli-
taches; communicate directly with de- tary, but political, social and eco- gence and the State and Justice De-
partment intelligence officers and in- nomic areas as well. Early efforts were partments were relied upon as well.
telligence officers at posts, camps, and characterized by rudimentary collec- The MI section also drew upon the
stations; and with commands in the tion techniques, like newspaper clip- services of “confidential agents, spe-
field in matters relating to military in- pings and even brochures provided by cial informants, and distinguished
telligence; obtain, reproduce and is- the French General Staff, and super- foreign visitors.” In 1922, with its
sue maps; translate foreign docu- ficial assessments. But, as resources staff reduced, the MI division cut back

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18
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

production to a weekly basis. Force (AEF) staff, General Pershing in neutral countries.
To respond to an increasingly took the four main staff sections from In the AEF, intelligence was now
pressing need for interpreters in the the French (Personnel, Intelligence, recognized as a critical element of war-
American Expeditionary Force in Operations, and Logistics) and added fighting. Up and down the com-
France, the Secretary of War approved the British prefix “G” for General mand structure could be found G-2s.
the commissioning a limited number Staff. So his intelligence staff, led by Starting at the infantry battalion, an
of officers who could qualify as in- Colonel Dennis E. Nolan, a Spanish- intelligence staff officer could call
terpreters. In July 1917, a Corps of American veteran and close friend of upon a reconnaissance platoon of 15
Interpreters was created in the Na- Van Deman, became the G2 with scouts, 11 observers, and 2 snipers, a
tional Army which would fall under these various subsections and duties: total of 28. The regimental intelli-
the supervision of the Chief of Staff G2A (Information): 1-Order of gence officer had eight observers. Each
with a close affiliation to the Mili- Battle and Strategic Intelligence, 2- division had a G-2 who also was as-
tary Intelligence Section. Exams were Translation/Interpretation and Tech- signed men to act as observers. At
conducted around the country with nical Intelligence, 3-Situation Maps the Corps level, the G-2 could rely
the ranks of the corps filling up with and Aerial Reconnaissance, 4-Summa- upon observation posts, balloons, aero
17 captains, 41 first lieutenants and ries and Terrain Studies, 5-Artillery squadrons with both visual and pho-
72 sergeants. It sent men to all the Target Development, 6-Radio Intel- tographic recon, and flash or sound-
major field headquarters and to the ligence and Carrier Pigeons, and 7- ranging teams which targeted enemy
MIS. Dissemination and G2 Journal. artillery. These tools gave him the
American neutrality at the outset G2B (Secret Service): 1-Coun- ability to look five miles beyond the
of World War I was shattered when a terespionage Policy and Investigation enemy’s front-line positions.
coded message from German Foreign of Atrocities, 2-Dissemination of In- In addition to those assets at
Secretary Arthur Zimmerman to the formation from Secret Sources and corps, the field army headquarters had
Mexican government was intercepted Control of Intelligence Contingency a radio intelligence section working
by the Americans and deciphered by Funds, and 3-Index of Suspects, Con- on decoding and translating enemy
British Intelligence. The trol of the Civil Population and messages. Intercept was done by a
Zimmerman telegram proposed an Counterespionage Operations. Signal Corps radio section at GHQ
alliance between Germany and G2C (Topography) in Chaumont, using a combination
Mexico in the event of war with the G2D (Censorship) 1-Press Rela- of direction-finding equipment, lis-
United States. If the alliance proved tions and Press Censorship, 2-Censor- tening posts, and induction coils
victorious, Mexico would regain ship Regulations and Postal and Tele- placed near enemy ground lines.
Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. As graphic Censorship, and 3-Photo- Communications security was under-
a result, border outposts at Douglas, graph and Movie Censorship and taken by the Signal Corps.
Naco and Nogales were strengthened. Visitors. A Radio Intelligence Subsection
The lessons Pershing learned G2E (Intelligence Corps) (RIS) was created under the Ameri-
about the value of military intelligence Nolan had far-reaching plans for can Expeditionary Force G-2 early in
during the 1916 Punitive Expedition his intelligence network, extending it 1917, long before the first American
caused him to place great reliance beyond the collection of battlefield fighting forces would arrive. Coop-
upon this tool during World War I intelligence. He wanted his G-2 to erating with their French and British
when he commanded the American reach beyond the front in France and allies counterparts, they prepared for
Expeditionary Force and organized a Belgium and collect strategic intelli- the coming joint operations.
G2 section along French and British gence from theaters in Italy and When the American First Army
examples. An intelligence section ex- Macedonia, places where the AEF arrived in France, a three-man RIS was
isted in every battalion and higher might be expected to fight later in the formed on 12 June 1918 with
command. war. For this purpose he formed a “Code” and “Goniometric” (Direc-
Adopting an organizational sys- G-2 Secret Service unit which also had tion Finding) sections. Commanded
tem for his American Expeditionary a counterespionage staff with stations by First Lieutenant Charles H. Matz,

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

it was enlarged to three officers and the division RIS. ered sending up the infantry without
eight men by the armistice. The First The goniometric teams used the artillery support. Goniometric sta-
Army RIS was responsible for analyz- portable SCR-83 radio receiving sets tions warned that all the enemy radio
ing and translating communications with six-foot-square antennas. Two stations were still operating in their
intercepted by the Signal Corps radio stations could triangulate signals trans- former positions, a solid indicator the
intelligence operators, and locating mitted by enemy radios and pinpoint enemy was still there. General John
enemy radio stations based on bear- their locations. By analyzing traffic Pershing decided to attack only after
ings plotted by Signal Corps “gonio” and combining that information with a four-hour artillery preparation, thus
operators. These Signal Corps radio direction-finding, they could deter- saving the lives of considerable infan-
intelligence personnel had arrived in mine the depth of the enemy echelons trymen. In that same battle, SIGINT
France in December 1917 and had and compile a daily order of battle. alerted the Americans to a German
undergone training enabling them to One indication of the value of counterattack, giving the strength and
intercept messages at the rate of 25 this kind of information occurred at exact time three hours before it was
words per minute and to translate 15 the battle of Saint Mihiel in Septem- launched.
words per minute from the German. ber 1918 when American command- The GHQ also had 450 sergeants
All of their intercept, direction-find- ers, believing the Germans to have in its Corps of Intelligence Police by
ing, or wire-tap stations were tied into withdrawn from the salient, consid- war’s end. The AEF G-2 had a psy-

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20
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

chological warfare mission, bombard- tary establishment.... There was no to be handed down during World
ing German troop concentrations conception of the modern Intelligence War I, was later commuted by Presi-
with 3 million propaganda leaflets de- Service which, with specially trained dent Wilson to life imprisonment.
livered by balloon, plane and infan- personnel, would make systematic Witzke was released from
try patrols. and continuous effort to find out and Leavenworth prison in 1923, owing
Perhaps a tribute to its versatile record the strength, position, situa- in part to his heroism during a boiler
capabilities, G-2 also collected some tion, and movements of the enemy.... explosion incident.
marginal missions, like publishing the During the World War, under the The Witzke case was not only an
new Stars and Stripes newspaper, con- name of Military Intelligence, there example of good Army counter in-
sidered a morale builder, supervising was built up in the American forces a telligence, but was illustrative of one
eight Army artists in the theater, and carefully organized system represented of the more dubious functions of the
being the principal section for press by an Intelligence Service group at ev- MIS, the “counterespionage among
relations. Having the department re- ery headquarters from that of the bat- the civilian population” charged to the
sponsible for keeping the Army’s se- talion on up to include the War De- MI-4 subsection. Encroaching on ci-
crets also charged with releasing in- partment. vilian jurisdictions, domestic security
formation to the press was not a On 1 February 1918 in Nogales, became one of the largest areas of MIS
sound idea. It would foster distrust Arizona, Lothar Witzke, carrying a operations during and after the war.
and hamper Army press relations in Russian passport identifying him as One of the areas in which the Army
the years to come. Pablo Waberski, was taken into cus- focused was “Negro subversion and
Like Van Deman’s organization tody as a suspected German spy and political demagoguery,” disseminating
back in Washington, Pershing’s AEF saboteur. He was arrested at gunpoint counterpropaganda in black commu-
G2 would be a model for supporting by two U.S. Army agents, members nities in the Southeast. The Army
tactical organizations. In his book, of Van Deman’s Military Intelligence investigated what they considered to
Military Intelligence: A New Weapon Section. Upon his person was an en- be anarchist or revolutionary organi-
in War, published after the war, Walter coded letter from the German consul zations like the Industrial Workers of
C. Sweeney wrote: in Mexico City charging him with the World, the Communist party, the
There is nothing new in a recog- undercover operations in the United Communist Labor Party, and the
nition of the necessity of having ample States. In fact this German naval of- Union of Russian Workers. After an
information of the enemy upon ficer had been responsible for several incident in October 1922 in Oregon
which to base military plans. The suc- incidents of sabotage, including the in which the American Federation of
cessful plan of campaign always has famed Black Tom explosion. It was Labor was included among these or-
been and always will be based upon this message, decrypted in Washing- ganizations, a wave of protests was
knowledge of the strength, situation, ton by MI-8, the code and ciphers sparked and field commands were
plans and intentions of the enemy. section of the Military Intelligence ordered by the War Department not
What is new, however, is that in Section, that led to his conviction for to involve themselves in the collec-
recent years there has been such an spying. The damning message read: tion of unauthorized domestic intel-
increase in the amount of informa- “The bearer of this is a subject of the ligence.
tion of the enemy to be gathered, and Empire who travels as a Russian un- After the war, General
so many changes in the means and der the name of Pablo Waberski. He Marlborough Churchill, the succes-
methods of collecting and utilizing it, is a German secret agent. Please fur- sor to Van Deman as Director of
as to make necessary the creation of nish him on request protection and Military Intelligence in Washington,
an entirely new organization or sys- assistance; also advance him on de- made the case for a separate intelli-
tem to keep track of it.... mand up to 1,000 pesos of Mexican gence organization within the War
Before America entered the gold and send his code telegrams to Department.
World War, the Military Intelligence this embassy as official consular dis- At present, the Military Intel-
Service, as a coordinated and cooper- patches.” Convicted by a military ligence Division is one of four coor-
ating system, did not exist in our mili- court, his death sentence, the only one dinate divisions of the General Staff....

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

This staff organization is essential to ment General Staff to resemble his This marked the beginning of a
success. It is especially vital in intelli- AEF structure. Effective 1 Septem- period of decline for the intelligence
gence administration, ...[since] it is ber 1921 there would be five General function, as its head was only autho-
obvious that national policy must de- Staff Divisions: The Personnel Divi- rized to be a colonel, while all the
pend on correct predictions concern- sion (G-1), the Military Intelligence other chiefs were general officers.
ing the international future. Division (G-2), the Operations and They were to be called henceforth
[In sum] there must be a G2 Training Division (G-3), the Supply “Assistant Chiefs of Staff.” In 1920
in the War Department ...performing Division (G-4), and the War Plans the G-2 was authorized 234 people
a similar function, not only with the Division (WPD). This organization (79 officers) and $400,000. It reached
War Plans Division in the initiation would be duplicated down to divi- a low point in 1939 with a total of
and perfection of plans, but concur- sion level, with battalions and com- 69 personnel (20 officers) and
rently with the State Department in panies adopting the “S” prefix to de- $89,450 dollars. The division under-
the work of prediction upon which lineate their S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4. went an almost annual reorganization
national policy is based. The G-2 lost the Negative Branch between 1919 and 1939 at the insti-
Soon after becoming the Chief of and added the formal duty of “press gation of each new chief.
Staff of the Army, General John J. relations.” The advances in weaponry by
Pershing reorganized the War Depart- World War I created a stalemate in the

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

trenches of France. A part of the new George W. Goddard. Goddard pio- growing importance of aerial recon-
technology was full blown aerial sur- neered many of the advances in aerial naissance. Maj. Joseph T. McNarney,
veillance to determine enemy strong recon, experimenting with infrared Air Corps, was assigned to MID in
points and direct artillery fire. Sau- photography, and long-focal length August 1926 to act as chief of the new
sage-shaped balloons with tail fins for camera lenses. On 20 November section. He would:
stability were tethered in the thou- 1925 he took the first night aerial 1. Handle all questions on poli-
sands along the trenches and used by photograph, using a flash-powder cies pertaining to the use of Air per-
both sides for observation. Observa- bomb with timing fuses to light the sonnel in combat intelligence.
tion balloons could reach an altitude city of Rochester, New York, from 2. Handle in connection with the
of between 1,200 and 1,800 meters, above, while a camera shutter was Map section all questions on policies
depending on whether it carried one opened in his airplane. He foresaw pertaining to serial photographs and
observer or two. A fighter pilot the need of getting the photographs mapping.
named Frank Luke, Jr., from Phoe- to the users in a timely manner, and 3. Handle in connection with the
nix, Arizona, earned the reputation as in 1927 he took an aerial picture of Communications Section all ques-
the “Arizona Balloon Buster.” the federal penitentiary at Fort tions on policies pertaining to codes
Aerial reconnaissance also in- Leavenworth, Kansas, developed the or communications between airplanes
cluded airplanes. Cameras were aimed shot in the plane, and transmitted the and the ground.
from the cockpit by photographers/ picture telegraphically to New York In Europe during World War I,
observers. Most of the pictures were within twenty-three minutes. Be- the code analysts in the Intelligence
taken at oblique angles rather than tween 1936 and 1939 he worked on Section of the General Staff (G2) su-
pointed straight down. Fighter planes a stereoscopic camera that employed pervised the code compilers of the
were developed with the express pur- two lenses and a strip camera. The Signal Corps. Some of the men who
pose of shooting down the reconnais- strip of film was electronically moved worked at making and breaking the
sance planes. The first American tac- through the camera in synchroniza- codes of the war in GHQ in the Ra-
tical surveillance flight of World War tion with the plane’s ground speed, dio Intelligence Section of G2 were
I was made on 15 April 1918 by eliminating blurs that had existed be- Major Frank Moorman, later the
Major Royce of the 1st Aero Squad- fore. Army’s Chief Signal Officer, Lieut. J.
ron. Another champion of aerial pho- Rives Childs, Corporal Joseph P.
Great importance was placed on tography between wars was Captain Nathan, Lieut. William F. Friedman,
aerial photography by both the Ger- A. W. Stevens, who devoted his time and Lieut. Herbert O. Yardley. They
mans and the allies. Near the war’s to long-distance photography as a so- would form the nucleus of America’s
end, during the Meuse-Argonne of- lution to the vulnerability of recon cryptology development.
fensive in 1918, the U.S. Army re- planes to both fighters and ground Back in the U.S., MI-8 was op-
ported that 56,000 aerial shots were fire. Along with pilot Captain St. erating a radio intelligence service with
printed for use by the American Clair Streett, he set a two-man air- a line of listening posts along the
Army. Between 1 July and 11 No- plane altitude record of 37,854 feet Mexican border. The 14 radio trac-
vember 1918, 1.3 million aerial pho- in 1928, and later established another tors spaced along the border were
tos were taken. And the products were record for long-distance photography eventually replaced with permanent
approaching a “real time” usefulness when he took a picture of Mount stations. A large station in Houlton,
as the time between a photograph Rainier from a distance of 227 miles. Maine, pulled in signals from the
being taken and the time it was de- One of the first intelligence manu- North Atlantic.
veloped, printed and interpreted, was als to be published was the Tactical Following the war, America’s
as little as twenty minutes. Interpretation of Aerial Photographs cryptology work would be a joint
The Army had formed an aerial which came out in 1925. undertaking of the War and State
photography school in Ithaca, New An Air Section within the Mili- Departments under Herbert O.
York, in 1917. One of its first gradu- tary Intelligence Department was cre- Yardley, whose inflammatory book
ates and instructors was 2d Lieut. ated in 1926, in recognition of the about his work christened the effort

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

the “American Black Chamber.” His Cryptanalyst of the U.S. Army Sig- for any training. He also developed
cryptology section was an outgrowth nal Corps, as its chief. In 1930 the some extension courses for an Officer
of the organization he had worked for Signal Intelligence Service was created, Reserve Corps program. By 1934 the
under military intelligence in the war. staffed by Friedman, three junior SIS school was formed with 1st Lt.
The crowning achievement of the cryptanalysts and two clerks. The W. Preston Corderman as the instruc-
Black Chamber was the breaking of official name was the Signal Intelli- tor. Nine regular Army officers would
the Japanese diplomatic codes in gence Section, Office of the Chief receive extensive training in commu-
1920. In 1929 Secretary of State Signal Officer, but Friedman called it nications intelligence there by 1941.
Henry L. Stimson closed the nation’s the Signal Intelligence Service and that Signals intelligence field work was
only code-breaking office, declaring became the more common usage. brought together in the 2d Signal Ser-
“Gentlemen do not read each other’s Friedman thought the purpose of the vice Company established at Fort
mail.” new agency should be to organize and Monmouth, New Jersey, in January
When the American Black Cham- prepare “for operations at maximum 1939.
ber closed down, the Army decided efficiency in war.” The giant of U.S. Army cryptog-
to enlarge its cryptology operations Friedman conducted some short raphy, William Friedman, became the
and appointed William Friedman, courses in cryptology from 1930 to Chief Cryptanalyst of the Signal
now a civilian employee and Chief 1933 despite the absence of funding Corps in 1922. His many publica-

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24
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

tions made him preeminent in the developments. In major countries the Alfred Price’s book, The History of
field. His series of Army texts, Mili- attache was authorized an assistant in U.S. Electronic Warfare. During the
tary Cryptanalysis, are the most lucid the form of an Air Attache to look at 1904 Japanese bombardment of the
presentations on the solution of basic the technology of air warfare. The Russian naval base of Port Arthur, a
ciphers that have ever been published. attache in Germany was especially ac- Russian radio operator on shore heard
As the Army mobilized for World tive between 1935 to 1939, making radio signals from Japanese scouting
War II, the Signal Corps cryptogra- good use of the U.S. officers who were craft used as spotters and correctly
phy effort expanded under the lead- attending the German War Academy. guessed their mission. Using his spark
ership of Major General Joseph Chosen for their proficiency in the transmitter, he successfully confused
Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer, and German language, these student of- the signals and unwittingly opened the
Friedman. He reached the peak of ficers mingled at the highest levels in era of electronic warfare. Some of the
his career when he and his team solved the German War ministry and wrote early landmarks in EW follow. An
the Japanese PURPLE code system in authoritative studies on various as- elementary radio direction was placed
1940. The strain of this endeavor, signed aspects of the German Army. aboard the U.S. Navy coal ship Leba-
however, led to a nervous breakdown Their reports found their way back non in 1906. The Navy bureau chief
and his medical retirement as a colo- to the Intelligence Branch. (The Posi- wrote that “the system will have a far-
nel in the Signal Corps reserves. tive Branch was reorganized in Feb- reaching effect on the safety of vessels
ruary 1922 and emerged three years at sea, and will possibly play an im-
Friedman and the other inventors later as the Intelligence Branch of portant part in naval warfare by mak-
in the SIS developed the M-134A MID.) ing it feasible to locate the direction
Code Converter in 1937, signing their The National Defense Act of of the enemy’s fleet.” Scientists at the
individual patent rights over to the 1920 created a military intelligence Naval Research Laboratories at
Secretary of War. The machine saw reserve within the Officers Reserve Anacostia discovered in 1922 that the
limited production because of small Corps. It became effective on 4 Au- radio signal that they were sending
budgets and only 69 were in use just gust 1921, adopting the secretive across the Potomac River was inter-
after Pearl Harbor. Used for high- Sphinx as its symbol. The ACofS, rupted by passing ships, leading to the
level communications, it was called G-2, WDGS, Brig. Gen. Dennis E. discovery of a principle upon which
the SIGABA. Nolan, saw this as a way to expand radar would be founded.
The Corps of Intelligence Police, the number of military intelligence A provisional Radio Intelligence
continued after the war, performing specialists in time of war. But because Detachment was organized at Fort
security tasks for the Versailles peace of a number of factors, not the least Monmouth, NJ, in 1934. In 1936
talks, conducting investigations in the of which was the lack of an authori- engineers at the Naval Research Lab
U.S. Army occupation forces in Ger- zation to grant commissions to re- built a 28 Mhz pulsed radar that
many, and functioning in Army de- cently demobilized intelligence per- could detect aircraft 10 miles away.
partments, notably in the 8th Corps sonnel, the MI Reserve never reached Subsequent models increased the
Area which encompassed the Mexi- its full potential, averaging only about range with the addition of megahertz.
can Border. The number of noncom- 635 officers in the years 1921 to 1941. With information from NRL, the
missioned intelligence police hit an At the time of the Japanese attack, the Signal Corps Lab at Fort Monmouth
all-time low of 15 in 1934. The or- MI Reserve was “woefully inadequate also tested a 110 Mhz pulsed radar.
ganization was revitalized in 1940 to fulfill its assigned mission of pro- The NRL also developed a ground
when its authorized staff was raised viding a proper cadre of military in- direction finder.
to 288. The were redesignated the telligence officers for required use in Between wars the Regular Army
Counter Intelligence Corps, U.S. war,” according to Maj. Gen. Sherman intelligence staff was again pared away
Army, on 1 January 1942. Miles, the G-2 at the beginning of to peacetime levels. Now called the
Attaches continued, between the World War II. War Department G2, there were 20
two world wars, to be a first line source Electronic warfare got its start officers and 48 civilians on staff.
of information on foreign military early in the century, according to General Dwight Eisenhower remem-

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

bered the “shocking deficiency” in in- more or less over the coffee cups.” pline, as its several separate functions
telligence assets that hampered plan- The length of this section on sought to organize, reorganize and
ning. “The fault was partly within World War I is indicative of the rise merge themselves into some kind of
and partly without the Army. The of intelligence to a fully functioning meaningful whole best suited to carry
American public has always viewed part of military operations both on out the intelligence mission. Army
with repugnance everything that the War Department General Staff Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Jo-
smacks of the spy: during the years and in the field in Europe. In the seph McNarney, himself once assigned
between the two World Wars no decade following the war, however, to the Military Intelligence Depart-
funds were provided with which to the intelligence effort, with the excep- ment back in 1926, said that the
establish the basic requirement of an tion of some internal security mis- Army G-2 “was always a headache for
intelligence system—a far-flung orga- sions and codebreaking, would col- the War Department and was reorga-
nization of fact finders.” General lapse to almost negligible levels. nized continuously and unsuccessfully
George C. Marshall voiced a similar If the World War I experience had throughout the war.”
view of the pre-war situation. “Prior reformed intelligence as an equal part- The shortage of trained intelli-
to World War II, our foreign intelli- ner with the other general staff sec- gence officers and enlisted specialists
gence was little more than what a tions, World War II would be a time in the American Army prompted
military attache could learn at dinner, of constant redefinition for the disci- General Eisenhower to select British

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26
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

officers as his G2, a practice he con- level enemy prisoners in U.S. prison sumed the duties its name implies
tinued from the campaign in North camps. The Military Intelligence Ser- until the Office of Strategic Services
Africa to war’s end. General Omar vice coordinated the activities of in- picked up this mission in December
N. Bradley expressed the problem this telligence production both overseas 1942.
way: and in the United States. It was made In April 1943 the Military Infor-
The American Army’s long up of men who were specialists in a mation Division was given the task
neglect of intelligence training was variety of fields, including language of managing the Army’s World War
soon reflected by the ineptness of our students and language experts, schol- II history program. The Historical
initial undertakings. For too many ars in areas like history, geography and Branch was formed in August 1943
years in the preparation of officers for economics, world travelers, journal- with Lt. Col. John M. Kemper as its
command assignments, we had over- ists, and professional investigators. first chief. It was removed from G-2
looked the need for specialization in At first, the transfer of MID’s responsibility in 1945.
such activities as intelligence.... In operational functions to MIS was Under G2 was the Corps of In-
some stations, the G2 became the largely a paper exercise, since the G- telligence Police, which was renamed
dumping ground for officers ill-suited 2, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)
for command. I recall how scrupu- wished to maintain control over all in 1942. With the mission of recruit-
lously I avoided the branding that intelligence assets so as to be in the ing, training and administering Army
came with an intelligence assignment best position to advise the Chief of counterintelligence personnel, the
in my own career. Had it not been Staff on intelligence matters. Corps performed security investiga-
for the uniquely qualified reservists Months after the creation of the tions in the United States and sent 17-
who so capably filled so many of our Military Intelligence Service, a new man detachments to combat divisions
intelligence jobs throughout the war, Special Branch was formed to process overseas. One of its first and most
the Army would have been pressed.... communications intelligence, an out- influential chiefs was Colonel H.
Talking about both the Army and growth of the Army’s inability to put Gordon Sheen.
Navy, Secretary of War Henry L. MAGIC intercepts in the hands of the When the CIC was established in
Stimson concluded at the end of 1943 proper commanders before the Pearl 1942, it had an authorized strength
that the “intelligence services are pretty Harbor tragedy. It was headed by of 1,026. When Germany surren-
bum.” Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. dered in May 1945, that figure had
The G-2 in the War Department Other added missions to affect the risen to 7,500. In Washington, D.C.,
was the largest element of the Gen- MIS were some inherited field offices the headquarters would be located in
eral Staff. Because of the McNarney in New York, San Francisco and New a single room in the Munitions Build-
reorganization of the Army staff, the Orleans. In April 1942 a fourth ing until they were evicted to a series
G-2 was reduced to 16 officers and branch office was set up in Miami to of other accommodations in the city.
10 others, with 342 officers and counter Axis operations in Latin They eventually settled into a private
1,005 enlisted and civilian personnel America, which grew to become a home on North Charles Street in Bal-
moved to a newly created Military In- semi-independent intelligence agency timore. Their activities were far-rang-
telligence Service. The Military In- with extensive operations in Central ing and diverse, calling upon a
telligence Service was formed in and South America. It was known resourcefulness that would character-
March 1942 as part of a general Army successively as the American Hemi- ize their efforts in all theaters.
reorganization that relegated general sphere Intelligence Command, the In the United States during the
staff sections to just planning func- American Intelligence Command, and war, over 13,000 members of the
tions. This created the need for an the American Intelligence Service. CIC “pushed nearly a billion doorbells,
operating agency of G2 that could The MIS opened offices in Lon- making more than two and a quarter
control intelligence work in the Zone don and Washington to analyze cap- million background investigations
of the Interior, such as training for tured documents under its Military and running down leads for thousands
combat-bound soldiers in escape and Intelligence Research Section. The of complaint cases [against suspected
evasion and the interrogation of high- Psychological Warfare Branch as- subversives].” In the U.S. the CIC

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

was responsible for the security of the ily they captured enemy radio trans- erations.
Manhattan Project, the secret scien- mitters and maps of enemy In Europe teams of CIC men fol-
tific work on the atomic bomb, and minefields. In Italy between Octo- lowed U.S. forces into combat with
performed censorship duties for all ber 1944 and April 1945, the CIC the mission of scouting out and cap-
mail arriving from overseas. Counter captured 200 German agents in the turing German work on the atomic
Intelligence Corps detachments were Fifth U.S. Army area, including Dr. bomb and rocketry, and taking into
assigned to each Army division in the Kora, the commander of a German custody German scientists. This was
North African, European and Pacific intelligence unit known as Abwehr known as the “ALSOS” Mission, led
theaters, with a total of 241 CIC de- Kommando 190. CIC agents were by Col. Boris Pash who with daring
tachments operating during the war. airdropped into Normandy on D- and imagination personally led his
The CIC detachment in Tunisia Day. They played an important part teams into enemy-held territory. In
conducted psychological warfare op- in the Battle of the Bulge and the addition to German and Italian sci-
erations in the prolonged fighting at counteroffensive that followed, entists, they seized over 70 tons of
El Guettar. In North Africa and Italy, blunting the subversion campaign of uranium and radium products that
CIC agents accounted for hundreds Col. Otto Skorzeny who had infil- were shipped to the U.S. for use in
of prisoners from whom they ex- trated English-speaking Germans in American nuclear projects.
tracted valuable information. In Sic- U.S. Army uniforms to disrupt op-

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28
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CIC units played an even more themselves with local economic, po- While the Army Air Forces did
important role in the postwar occu- litical and social conditions, and cul- the aerial reconnaissance, the Army
pation of both Germany and Japan, tivated well-placed informants. retained a small recon capability by
investigating and apprehending war In the first two months of 1944 using their L-4 “Grasshoppers” when
criminals, rounding up Nazis, and the CIC headquarters was abolished, they were not flying their normal ar-
countering Communist subversion. its school transferred, and its staging tillery observation missions.
For instance, the 970th CIC Detach- area closed down, perhaps the victim In the allied invasion of Sicily in
ment in the American Zone of Oc- of enemies in the Army bureaucracy. July 1943, deception operations con-
cupation in Germany, picked up over It was combined with the Provost vinced Hitler that the blow was go-
120,000 Nazis after the war. Marshal General, briefly called the ing to fall in the Balkans and that is
In the European theater, many of Security Intelligence Corps, and its where he moved his reinforcements,
the CIC’s counterespionage duties Zone of Interior missions were turned allowing the allies to avoid massive
were usurped by the OSS. But in the over to the Army Service Forces. The casualties. Deception operations were
Pacific that was prevented by a com- overseas CIC detachments continued carried out by what was called the “A”
mand directive from General to function as before. The Counter Force, a forerunner of Eisenhower’s
MacArthur’s headquarters, proscrib- Intelligence Corps would reemerge as Ops “B” deception unit before the
ing the OSS from operating in the a separate entity before the war was Normandy landings. The operations
Southwest Pacific Area. There was over. A new CIC center and school included a body washed up on the
another important difference in CIC were opened at Fort Meade, then coast of Spain with documents show-
operations in the Pacific. With fewer Camp Holabird, in July 1945, and ing that the allies would next move
urban areas to secure or captured sol- the office of the Chief, Counter In- on Greece and Sardinia. The ruse sug-
diers to interrogate, the CIC was able telligence Corps was reestablished gested Sicily was just the cover target
to devote more of their time assisting under the Intelligence Division of the for the invasion of Sardinia. Other
with combat intelligence and in work- Army Service Forces in July 1945, techniques included an inflated allied
ing on captured documents. In the with the Security Intelligence Corps Order of Battle fed to the Germans
Leyte campaign, CIC took into cus- being reassigned from the Provost by radio traffic, double agents and
tody officials working for the Japa- Marshal General. rumor. The enlarged OB led the
nese and in Luzon in January 1945, The World War II infantry divi- Germans to believe the allies had the
30 CIC detachments came ashore sions incorporated a cavalry reconnais- capabilities to carry out these ambi-
with the invasion force. sance troop. Each of their regiments tious assaults around the Mediterra-
The CIC secured and captured also had an Intelligence and Recon- nean. Rumors were spread about
enemy headquarters, interrogated naissance (I&R) Platoon which pro- troop movements to the areas of the
prisoners, and impounded enemy vided patrols, observation posts, and notional assaults. Radar reflectors and
documents. They arrested or sur- performed other tactical intelligence jamming devices were used at the
veilled any suspected enemy agents. collecting missions on behalf of the time of the actual landings in Sicily
They surveyed and protected public S2 or regimental intelligence officer. to cloak the invasion, while feints and
utilities, supply depots or any other This was typical of the tactical intel- phoney radio communications di-
potential targets of sabotage. They ligence organization of World War II verted German attention to other
seized radio stations and telephone and reflected a growing appreciation landing sites.
switchboards, halting all communi- of an organized military intelligence Deception operations took the art
cations and turning over any commu- effort. Teams of interpreters, inter- to new levels before the Normandy
nications data to Signal Corps person- rogators, Order-of-Battle specialists invasion when small deception units
nel. They shut down presses and and photo interpreters were allocated imitated larger tactical formations by
seized mail for censorship teams. to each division by theater-level mili- fielding mock equipment like inflat-
They cooperated with local provost tary intelligence services. Corps and able tanks. To complete the picture
marshals on matters of law and or- armies were also supported by intelli- for German analysts, the Signal Se-
der. CIC operatives familiarized gence detachments. curity Agency’s Protective Security

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

Branch broadcast elaborate signals to nology by the National Defense Re- (Direct Noise Amplifier) were the first
simulate the communications net- search Committee. Its mission was models. The requirements for ECM
work of a large unit. Large German to further microwave radar research equipment rose drastically in the Eu-
formations were pinned down at Pas and to investigate ways to counter ropean theater. The Normandy in-
de Calais by what they thought was a enemy radars. vasion called for 30,000 high fre-
U.S. Army Group across the channel The National Defense Research quency transceivers, 10,000 VHF ra-
from them, thereby preventing their Committee formed the Radio Re- dios, 3,000 radars and 100 radar
reinforcement of the defenses around search Laboratory in December 1941, ECM devices. At the end of the war,
the Normandy beachheads. using a name designed to conceal its 4,100 jammers along with other vari-
A World War II forerunner of the real purpose, within the Radiation Lab ous intercept receivers were being used
unattended ground sensor was the at Massachusetts Institute of Technol- by Supreme Headquarters, Allied
microphone that, according to a 1940 ogy. Its job was to work on electronic Expeditionary Force. The headquar-
field manual on observation, was con- countermeasures. Scientists working ters had asked for 10,000 ground and
nected by wire to a “sound-ranging” out of the Camp Evans Signals Labo- airborne jammers and for 1,500 tons
station manned by observation per- ratories, Camp Coles Signal Labora- of chaff.
sonnel of a field artillery battalion. tories, the aircraft radio research The U.S. Army Signal Intelligence
“When conditions are favorable, laboratories, and the Radio Research Service in the European Theater of
sound-ranging can locate hostile bat- Laboratories (RRL) at Harvard Uni- Operations was responsible for pro-
teries with considerable accuracy and versity developed van-mounted direc- viding ULTRA. At the theater level,
may even be used to adjust fire on the tion finding and intercept systems; Signal Security Detachments dissemi-
batteries’ location.” portable direction finding equipment nated ULTRA intelligence furnished
The Japanese used for their high- like the SCR 206; a jammer deployed from England down to Army level,
est codes a machine cipher that was by parachute called the CHICK (AN/ and integrated the ULTRA intelli-
extremely difficult to break. William CRT-2), and the RADAR CHICK gence with Army and Army Group
Friedman solved some of the Japanese (AN/CPT-1) which was an expend- SIGINT passed up to them. The
coded dispatches and then went on able radar jammer. Improvements in- contributions of SIGINT to allied
to painstakingly duplicate the ma- cluded multi-scanners jammers that operations was made possible only
chine that produced the codes. These would eliminate friendly frequencies through unprecedented cooperation
machines and the codes they created from the jamming spectrum. between the intelligence agencies of
were called PURPLE by the Ameri- The first U.S. Army radar, the Britain and the United States.
cans and the flow of information in- SCR-268 coastal and anti-aircraft gun Communications intelligence
tercepted from the Japanese was code- control set, went into production in was collected in the field by signals
named MAGIC. Access to the Japa- 1941. S-27 Receivers, built by intelligence platoons at the division
nese codes gave the Americans a tre- Hallicrafters in Chicago, became in level until November 1943 when sig-
mendous advantage but it was largely 1941 the standard receivers used by nal service companies at the corps level
wasted when a series of missteps led the British and U.S. Ferrets (modi- were assigned that task. They had or-
to the failure to warn in time the fied B-17 bombers) for ELINT mis- ganic intercept, direction-finding, and
commander in Hawaii of the attack sions in World War II. General Ra- analysis capabilities. At the Army level
on Pearl Harbor. This failure would dio made the P-540 Receiver and medium grade enemy communica-
lead to a congressional investigation Tuning Unit in 1941 which would tions were exploited by a radio intel-
and a major shakeup of intelligence become the basis for the ELINT re- ligence company made up of eight
activities and organizations after the ceivers used during World War II. officers and 150 men. They operated
war. Production of “jammers” was from 12 to 15 intercept positions and
Turning to the area of electronic started at the Delco Radio plant in as many as three direction-finding sta-
warfare, the U.S. Radiation Labora- Kokomo, Indiana, in April 1943. tions. At the Corps headquarters, the
tory was established in October 1940 Known as “Anti-Radar Devices,” the mission was direction-finding and the
at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- APT-2 Carpet and APT-1 DINA intercept of low-grade enemy

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30
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

communications, plain text and low- tion-finding receivers, the source of During World War II, the Army
grade field ciphers. This was accom- the message could be determined and Air Corps assumed the mission of
plished by four officers and 100 men the quantity of the message traffic aerial reconnaissance, mostly using P-
in a Radio Intelligence Company, could be analyzed to detect enemy 38s, also known as F-5As, configured
working under the supervision of the buildups and deployment. A definite without guns or ammo but with their
corps G-2. They manned eight to ten military advantage was handed to the distinctive long-range fuel tanks un-
intercept positions and one direction- allies by signals intelligence. der the wings. On some occasions
finding position. The SIS was renamed the Signal armed F-6s were also used so that pi-
At the end of the war, every corps Security Service in 1942, and again lots could attack targets of opportu-
and army headquarters had an organic changed to the Signal Security Agency nity. So large had the number of
Radio Intelligence company, while an in 1943. There were 935 people photo recce planes grown by 1943,
Army Group had a battalion. But it working for the agency at the begin- that the Air Corps flew as many as
wasn’t until the 113th Signal Radio ning of the year and 3,455 at the end 200 missions in one month in 1943
Intelligence Company landed at of 1943. By June 1944 the effort and delivered over half a million prints.
Normandy in June 1944 that the first grew to employ over 5,100 civilians The photo planes were assigned to
tactical radio intelligence unit was at its Arlington Hall headquarters. In tactical reconnaissance squadrons in
fielded. It was estimated that 26,000 December 1944 the operational con- 1944.
U.S. soldiers were involved in work- trol of SSA was transferred from the Training in the several intelligence
ing with communications intelligence Signal Corps to the War Department disciplines was carried out in a range
by the end of the war. G2, its chief customer, and renamed of schools across the country. The
In the Battle of the Bulge in De- the Army Security Agency on 15 Sep- Signal Corps operated its SIGINT
cember 1944 and January 1945, tember 1945. It opened a training school for officers and civilians at Ar-
Third U.S. Army received airborne school at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia, lington Hall, its headquarters and a
jamming support, but jamming was which later would be moved to former junior college for girls, while
infrequent because the Army Air Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and then to Fort enlisted personnel were trained at Vint
Force was reluctant to fly into heavy Devens, Mass. Hill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia.
antiaircraft and fighter concentrations For secure communications, the The Counter Intelligence Corps con-
and intelligence officers did not want Wehrmacht confidently depended on ducted CI training at its U.S. Army
to deny themselves the good infor- their electromechanical code machine Investigative Training School in Chi-
mation they could get from signal which allowed for each encoded char- cago. The Military Intelligence Ser-
intercepts. acter to have 1.5 million permuta- vice Language School gave language
The second world war saw the tions. Called the “Enigma,” the ma- training to second generation Japa-
emergence of Electronic Warfare and chine was thought to be impregnable. nese-Americans at Fort Snelling, Min-
Electronic Intelligence with the intro- But British cryptanalysts solved the nesota. For most intelligence person-
duction of a range of electronic break- workings of Enigma. The informa- nel, the Military Intelligence Training
throughs, foremost among them the tion gleaned from Enigma intercepts Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland,
use of long-range radio signals, or ra- was codenamed ULTRA and gave al- was the training site. There, in an old
dar, to guide planes and ships to their lied forces a decided intelligence ad- National Guard Armory, 19,669
target. The U.S. Army Signal Intelli- vantage. combat intelligence specialists were
gence Service was able to exploit ra- Signals intelligence was carried graduated during the war.
dio communications by intercepting out in the Pacific by a joint Ameri- In the Pacific theater, General
them and passing them along to the can-Australian agency known as the Douglas MacArthur developed his
code-breakers who would apply care- Central Bureau organized on 15 April own intelligence apparatus, combin-
fully gathered information about the 1942. Radio intercepts were handled ing several different joint and com-
enemy’s encrypting machines and by the U.S. Signal Intelligence Ser- bined organizations under his G-2,
mathematical theory to decipher the vice and the Australian Special Wire- Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby.
codes. Using high frequency direc- less Group.

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

Working out of Australia, the of Honor winner. Exactly one year the missions of the former Signal Se-
Central Bureau performed code work later President Roosevelt ordered that curity Agency and its operating arm,
and the Allied Intelligence Bureau did the office be renamed the Office of the 2d Signal Service Battalion. It was
clandestine operations. In the South- Strategic Services (OSS) and placed also responsible for signals intelligence
west Pacific Area, the AIB replaced the under control of the Joint Chiefs of and communications security of all
Office of Strategic Services which was Staff. According to Allen Dulles, the Army assets in the field. The first head
prohibited from operating in the the- agency recruited some of the nation’s of the Army Security Agency was
ater by MacArthur’s policies. It used best historians and scholars to man its Brig. Gen. W. Preston Corderman
Australian coast watchers, many of research and analysis desks. The OSS who, as a first lieutenant, was the sole
them stay-behind agents, to report on was given a charge “to collect and ana- instructor at the Signal Intelligence
Japanese fleet movements. In the lyze strategic information and to plan Service’s first formal school in 1934.
Philippines, native agents and guerilla and operate special services.” Some Its all-encompassing mission was di-
forces were used to good advantage. of its special services included drop- minished toward the end of the de-
An important arm of ping teams behind enemy lines to sup- cade as some of its functions were
MacArthur’s reconnaissance capabili- port resistance movements, gather turned over to the Air Force Security
ties was a commando organization intelligence, spread disinformation, Service and the joint-service Armed
known as the ALAMO Scouts, who carry out sabotage missions, and un- Forces Security Agency, which would
were trained for patrolling behind dertake counterespionage work. OSS become the National Security Agency
enemy lines. conducted espionage and partisan in 1952.
The Allied Translator and Inter- operations which captured the public’s Acting on a proposal of William
preter Section (ATIS) used as many imagination, largely because of the Donovan of the old OSS, President
as 2,000 American Nisei soldiers to descriptions of their colorful exploits Truman called for the establishment
provide interrogation and translation published by their literary members of a permanent central intelligence
services from headquarters level down after the war. The ranks of the OSS agency that would operate as an arm
to the front lines. During the war the were filled with some 8,000 Army of the executive branch of govern-
ATIS language teams translated personnel. One of the most notable ment to counteract Communist tac-
350,000 captured documents and of these special operatives was Col. tics of “coercion, subterfuge, and po-
debriefed 10,000 prisoners. The Carl Eifler who commanded the litical infiltration.” Congress passed
unit’s duties carried over into the post- famed Detachment 101 in Burma and the National Security Act of 1947.
war disarming of Japan and her colo- secured the vital Stilwell Road. It created the Central Intelligence
nies. The section was headed by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong was Agency which would be responsible
Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir, himself a chief of the Military Information for coordinating the intelligence ac-
student of Japanese and former un- Division in 1942 when the OSS came tivities of the various government
dercover agent in Tokyo. along and was determined to have his departments and make evaluations
Technical intelligence (TI) teams own foreign intelligence unit. He cre- and recommendations to the Na-
began to be deployed to the Pacific in ated what became known as the tional Security Council. In 1947 the
December 1942 to speedily examine Grombach Organization, named af- CIA vowed “Bigger Than State by
captured enemy equipment in order ter its head, Colonel John V. ’48,” and it would succeed, receiving
to make use of its technical character- “Frenchy” Grombach, to run highly a larger budget allocation than the
istics. secret operations in Europe from State Department a year later.
The Office of the Coordinator of 1942 to about 1947. Little is known While Donovan succeeded in
Information was established on 11 about this shadowy Army unit and winning over the administration to
July 1941 to conduct covert opera- its competition with the OSS. his recommendations concerning the
tions and supply information neces- The Army Security Agency was need for a national intelligence appa-
sary to the national security. At its formed under the command of the ratus, the CIA did not do away with
head was William J. Donovan, a New Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Military Intelligence Division.
York lawyer and World War I Medal on 15 September 1945. It absorbed But recommendations from within

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32
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

the Army for a Military Intelligence U.S. Army intelligence emerged When North Korean forces rolled
Corps failed to convince the War De- from World War II with an outstand- across the 38th parallel with its So-
partment of its need in peacetime and ing record, not only in SIGINT, but viet-made armor in June 1950, the
intelligence functions would continue in all areas of combat intelligence as Republic of Korea and its sponsor, the
to be performed by officers drawn well. It was a heady time for the Army United States, were taken by surprise.
from other branches. A Strategic In- intelligence officers, former wartime A desperate perimeter set up around
telligence School was opened in 1947 S2s and G2s, who assembled at Fort the southernmost city of Pusan just
as part of the Army’s school system. Riley, Kansas, in 1946 to open the barely prevented the peninsula from
With the formation of the De- Intelligence School. They felt they being completely overrun. General
fense Department and the Central In- had a lot of lessons to pass along and Douglas MacArthur’s brilliantly con-
telligence Agency by the National De- some wrote books on how to perform ceived left hook, landing United Na-
fense Act of 1947, Army intelligence the intelligence function. But post- tions forces at Inchon behind the en-
became subordinated to the larger in- war demobilization would decimate emy lines, succeeded in pushing the
telligence role played by these organi- their ranks and reduce the American now disorganized North Korean
zations. Further, most of its aerial Army to its customary peacetime Army to the northernmost reaches of
capabilities were sheared away by the shell. Few realized that America’s next their country. But the UN allies were
new U.S. Air Force. war was only a few years away. surprised a second time by the Chi-

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

nese intervention which drove UN/ trained interrogators. The Intelli- or organization. But the war would
US forces, now under Gen. Matthew gence Department, opened in 1947 provoke postwar appraisals and result
Ridgway, back south of Seoul. A UN at Fort Riley’s Army Ground School in some important changes in intelli-
offensive would regain a line roughly was not graduating anywhere the gence organization and professional-
approximating the old 38th parallel numbers needed. It took over three ism. The changes took hold just in
border. Bitter fighting marked the months to get the 60th Signal Ser- time for another war in Asia.
stalemate over the next two years be- vice Company, an ASA unit, to Ko- The National Security Agency
fore a truce was concluded in July rea to support the Eighth U.S. Army was created in 1952 to eavesdrop on
1953. with communications intelligence. the enemy. Its mission was to pull
In August 1950, Colonel T.F. Van By war’s end the ASA’s 501st Com- radio transmissions out of the ether
Natta, an Instructor at the Command munication Reconnaissance Group and decode them. The agency’s em-
and General Staff College, was writ- was providing support with three bat- phasis on closely guarded secrecy
ing in Military Review that the intel- talions and five companies. among its employees caused some to
ligence system had been substantially Detachments of MI specialists, interpret its acronym as “Never Say
improved and sound doctrine estab- CIC, and ASA personnel were at- Anything.” NSA’s establishment
lished. He urged commanders to tached to each division. As they were marked a shift in intelligence gather-
learn how to use intelligence and to in World War II, 17-man CIC detach- ing away from the infiltrated or re-
realize that it was their responsibility. ments were assigned to each division cruited agents that had provided in-
He cautioned them not to expect the and they largely succeeded in protect- formation from time immemorial to
G-2 to know what the enemy in- ing rear areas against enemy intelli- electronic surveillance. Russian pen-
tended to do, but to concentrate on gence actions. As intelligence special- etration of British intelligence services
capabilities. He said the results a com- ists were graduated from the Intelli- had compromised spy networks and,
mander gets from intelligence will gence Department, they were shipped to some minds, made the use of hu-
depend on the “quality of the people to Korea to MI units like the 500th man agents too untrustworthy.
he uses and the amount of personal MI Service Group and the 163d MI In the period following the Ko-
attention he gives.” Service detachment which supported rean War, intelligence became a
Korea was another crisis for Army tactical units. growth industry as it began to garner
intelligence, as it was in fact for the The commander’s tools in the new respect. New agencies and pro-
entire post-World War II U.S. Army. Korea fighting were limited to pris- fessional forums flourished. In 1955
General James Van Fleet, who com- oner interrogation and aerial recon- the Signal Corps transferred its
manded the Eighth U.S. Army from naissance. There was little in the way proponency for electronic intelligence
1951 to 1953, remarked that since of SIGINT. Allied commanders were and warfare to the Army Security
World War II “we have lost through also hamstrung by the prohibition of Agency which became a field operat-
neglect, disinterest, and possible jeal- overflights or agent penetrations be- ing agency under the Army Chief of
ousy, much of the effectiveness in in- yond the Yalu, into Chinese territory. Staff instead of being subordinate to
telligence work that we acquired so This blinded them to the size and im- the Acofs, G-2. The U.S. Army Se-
painfully in World War II.” In his minence of the Chinese intervention. curity Agency was made a major
opinion, the Army had not “yet ap- Aerial reconnaissance played an Army command in 1964.
proached the standards we reached in important role in Korea, such as de- In 1956 the G2 in the
the final year of the last war.” livering photos of the Inchon area Department of the Army was
With the dismantling of almost prior to the landing there. The Air redesignated the Assistant Chief of
all of the Army’s intelligence special- Force effort was hampered by the ini- Staff, Intelligence (ACSI), a two-star
ist training following World War II, tial lack of Army photo interpreters. billet. Thus intelligence was once
the Korean War found the U.S. Army For military intelligence, the Ko- again relegated to a secondary position
without order of battle specialists, rean War was fought in World War II as Personnel, Operations, and
photo interpreters, technical intelli- terms. Little had changed in the in- Logistics were all reorganized as
gence analysts, or even language- telligence arena in either technology Deputy Chief of Staff positions filled

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34
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

by Lieutenant Generals. developed by Polaroid. The satellite Staff for Intelligence as one of the
To complement communications program had been receiving high pri- voting members.
intelligence, the CIA initiated a pro- ority funding since 1955 and in 1959 Lessons from the Korean War
gram of imagery intelligence over the the National Reconnaissance Office and “Operation Sagebrush,” a 1954
Soviet Union in 1956, using a plane was formed under Air Force auspices maneuver held in Louisiana,
called the U-2, designed by Kelly to control the satellite systems which prompted a new tactical intelligence
Johnson at Lockheed Corporation. began operating in 1960. organization known as Military Intel-
Able to fly at 70,000 feet, the U-2 When the Department of Defense ligence Organization (MIO).
could stay above enemy missile ceil- was reorganized in 1958, an Intelli- Adopted in 1958, MIO tailored the
ings. In 1960, however, a new high gence Directorate, J2, was set up un- intelligence support to Army theaters
altitude defense missile brought down der the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS of operation by assigning military in-
a U-2 and its pilot, Gary Powers, was J2 would be disestablished five years telligence personnel to an MI Battal-
captured. The incident caused Presi- later as a result of the Defense Intelli- ion, rather than assigning them
dent Eisenhower to cancel U-2 flights. gence Agency’s assumption of many individually to tactical units. Subor-
The aerial surveillance mission was of its roles. Concurrently, a United dinate elements of the battalion
continued by satellite reconnaissance States Intelligence Board was created would perform specialized tasks for
employing high-resolution cameras with the Army’s Assistant Chief of the tactical commander like collec-

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

tion, interrogation, technical intelli- counterintelligence: Performing secu- to enemy strength figures, keeping the
gence and counterintelligence. The rity investigations of personnel need- numbers low so that the war would
MI battalion was usually assigned to ing clearances and supporting opera- not be seen in defeatist terms by poli-
a field army, while divisions were sup- tional security. ticians back in Washington. The
ported by MI detachments. The Army Intelligence and Secu- myth was fueled by some Army of-
First established as the U.S. Army rity Branch was created on 1 July 1962 ficers and a CIA analyst named Sam
Intelligence Center in September to meet the need for a career field for Adams, whose own calculations ar-
1954, the U.S. Army Intelligence the increasing number of officers per- rived at much higher numbers. The
School was opened at Fort Holabird, forming intelligence missions. It was problem lay in interpretation. If you
Md, on 1 May 1955 to teach coun- made up of strategic and combat in- counted irregular forces who were
terintelligence, combat intelligence telligence officers from both the In- sympathizers to the Communist
and area studies. It replaced the old telligence Corps and the Army Secu- cause and would be expected to pro-
Intelligence Department at Fort rity Agency. It was the Regular vide logistic and service support from
Riley’s Army Ground School. Army’s first MI branch. An organi- time to time, but were unarmed and
The Defense Intelligence Agency zation for Military Intelligence Re- not part of a trained fighting organi-
(DIA) was created in 1961 by Defense serve officers had existed in one form zation, the numbers would be high.
Secretary Robert McNamara so that or another since 1921, the latest be- However, if you discounted these Self
all defense intelligence operations ing the Army Intelligence and Army Defense and Secret Self Defense
would be coordinated at a single and Security Branches formed for reserve forces, as MACV J-2 did in their
central high-level agency rather than officers in 1952. The Regular Army’s monthly Order of Battle Summary,
be handled separately by the intelli- Army Intelligence and Security because they did not consider them
gence services of the Army, Navy and Branch was redesignated the Military to constitute a significant threat to
Air Force. Collection requirements Intelligence Branch in 1967. allied combat forces, the numbers
and estimates now were prepared at American involvement in Viet- would be lower.
DIA. The agency assumed operations nam steadily increased as the instabil- Army intelligence received an-
of the U.S. Army Strategic Intelli- ity of the South Vietnamese govern- other undeserved blow when the press
gence School and in 1965 became re- ment led to greater possibilities of a criticized it for failing to warn of the
sponsible for the military attache sys- Communist insurgent victory in the Tet Offensive when in fact intelligence
tem. The move was seen by many in South. Escalating from a small advi- correctly predicted the attack to the
the separate services as an effort to sory role in 1961, the U.S. commit- day and pinpointed what forces would
strip them of their autonomy. Allen ted air power and ground forces in be involved. If intelligence was to be
Dulles disagreed. “DIA was not a 1965. While the military fought on faulted, it would only be for failing
merger of the intelligence branches of the often ill-defined battlefields of to appreciate the scale of the Tet Of-
the armed services, but primarily an Vietnam, the politicians found them- fensive.
attempt to achieve maximum coor- selves faced with growing anti-war Maj. Gen. Joseph A.
dination and efficiency in the intelli- sentiment at home. Army intelligence McChristian became the first Army
gence processes of the three services.” would be asked to contribute its MACV J-2 on 13 July 1965. His
The Counter Intelligence Corps know-how on both fronts until the first move was to organize the Com-
was renamed in 1961 as the U.S. withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973. bined Intelligence Center-Vietnam
Army Intelligence Corps, and in 1965 Following the peace agreement in (CICV), a centralized intelligence
it became a major field command of January 1973, the last intelligence analysis and research facility in Saigon.
the Army known as the Intelligence unit pulled out by March, ending for Every kind of intelligence data being
Corps Command. It had subordinate them what had been a mixed experi- collected flowed into this center for
Military Intelligence Groups support- ence. analysis and storage in an IBM com-
ing each Army area in the United States The unpopularity of the war gave puter. Captured documents, Order
with a network of regional and field rise to the myth that the Army was of Battle information, terrain studies,
offices. Their primary work was “managing” its intelligence in relation POW interrogation reports, technical

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36
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

intelligence reports, information from can and 100 South Vietnamese. The Philip Davidson who reorganized the
covert agents, and photo interpreta- American staffing for these centers Army intelligence units to more effi-
tion was brought together from both came from the 519th MI Battalion ciently support the units in the field.
U.S. and RVN sources. McChristian which also supplied the manpower for The U.S. Army Intelligence Com-
considered the CICV “one of the fin- the MI detachments serving with mand (USAINTC) was established in
est supports of combat intelligence ARVN corps, divisions and provin- 1965 as a major Army command
that was ever deployed in support of cial headquarters. They not only (MACOM) to handle counterintelli-
our forces in wartime.” trained the ARVN counterparts but gence functions in the United States,
The U.S. and the South Viet- provided intelligence of U.S. field in- collecting domestic intelligence in the
namese operated four intelligence cen- telligence advisors and the U.S. intel- event federal troops were called out
ters in 1967. They were the Com- ligence community. Lt. Gen. Will- to intervene in riots. It operated with
bined Intelligence Center, Vietnam; iam E. Potts, Gen. Creighton Abrams’ seven Army counterintelligence
Combined Military Interrogation J-2, would gradually between 1969 groups. With the widespread antiwar
Center; Combined Document Ex- and 1972 turn these centers over to feeling and unrest, the FBI was hard
ploitation Center, and Combined the Vietnamese. pressed to meet the demands of pre-
Materiel Exploitation Center. The On 1 June 1967, McChristian paring domestic intelligence and the
CICV employed about 500 Ameri- was replaced by Army Maj. Gen. U.S. Army Intelligence Command

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

filled the void. This involvement bat troops were committed in that
with civilian intelligence brought criti- year, the 704th Intelligence Corps with the RVN Army. The 509th
cism and recriminations for the Army Detachment, a detachment of the Radio Research Group ran a field sta-
which ended its domestic collection 500th Intelligence Corps Group, and tion and provided support through its
in 1970. The Defense Investigative the 3d Radio Research Unit were on tactical units to units down to brigade
Service came into being to perform duty in Vietnam. But there were level. Combat troops had their own
the background investigations neces- shortages of specialists, especially lin- organic intelligence assets.
sary to grant security clearances, a job guists. Another unique type of unit to be
that had made up 90 percent of Lieut. Gen. Harry W. O. introduced in the Vietnam War was
USAINTC’s mission. Significantly Kinnard, commanding the 1st Cav- the Long-Range Reconnaissance Pa-
cut back in mission and personnel, alry Division in 1965, commented on trol (LRRP) which consisted of four
USAINTC was closed down in 1974. the early problems with identifying to six-man teams inserted into enemy
It was replaced by the U.S. Army In- the enemy: territory to gather intelligence or sub-
telligence Agency (USAINTA), a field When I took the 1st Cavalry mit battle-damage assessments. The
operating agency of ACSI. Division to Vietnam in 1965, I knew Military Assistance Command, Viet-
The U.S. Army Security Agency that finding the enemy would be one nam, Studies and Observation Group
(USASA) became a major army field of our toughest jobs. It occurred to (MACV-SOG) was a joint service
command in 1964 and then became me that perhaps we would be able to unit under the command of the Com-
known as the U.S. Army Intelligence identify the guerrilla, a farmer by day mander-in-Chief, Pacific
and Security Command (INSCOM) and a fighter by night, by the dark (CINCPAC), which inserted intelli-
in 1977. circles under his eyes.... As it turned gence teams into enemy territory by
Army Chief of Staff Harold K. out, our surveillance was just about land, sea or air.
Johnson approved on 1 July 1967 the that unsophisticated. It was during the Vietnam War
recommendations of the Norris But improvements were on the that military intelligence reached a
Board, a body specially created to look way. By the 1968 Tet Offensive, potential unparalleled in history. Us-
at the Army’s intelligence programs there were 2,500 intelligence special- ing the latest electronic gear to detect
and organization. As a result, the old ists in country under the supervision the enemy, both from the air and the
Army Intelligence and Security of the U.S. Military Assistance Com- ground, hostile concentrations were
Branch, which had included the Army mand, Vietnam (MACV), J-2. In pin-pointed and enemy traps were
Security Agency (ASA), now became Saigon the 525th Military Intelligence avoided or surprised. Ground surveil-
the Military Intelligence Branch. The Group exercised command and con- lance radars were employed, side-
MI mission changed from one of trol over the 135th MI Group, a looking airborne radar (SLAR) was
combat service support to combat counterintelligence unit; the 149th deployed and a variety of night ob-
support. And now the Army began MI Group, which engaged in posi- servation devices were used which
studying the possibility of moving the tive collection; the 1st MI Battalion took advantage of infrared and im-
Intelligence School from Fort (Aerial Reconnaissance); and the age-intensification.
Holabird and centralizing the train- 519th MI Battalion, which operated The first use of Unattended
ing for the many intelligence special- the joint US/RVN intelligence cen- Ground Sensors (UGS) was made by
ties. ters. The combined intelligence cen- the Marines at Khe Sanh in 1968.
The early years of the war found ters shared jointly gathered intelli- They were credited with contribut-
military intelligence assets inadequate gence, translated captured documents ing to the successful defense of the
and unsophisticated, a situation which and interrogated prisoners. There was Marine base and would evolve in both
had become the pattern in every a center at MACV and at each of the sophistication and numbers deployed.
American war. In 1965 there were four corps areas in which the Repub- The UGS could detect the presence
200 U.S. army officers serving as in- lic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) oper- of the enemy by acoustic, seismic, or
telligence advisers with Republic of ated. There were over 600 intelli- magnetic indicators which were sent
Vietnam troops. When U.S. com- gence advisers on the ground now back to monitoring stations.

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38
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The combat intelligence battalion bodian border in 1970, expressed his currence of an event to the time the
that was assigned to a division during feelings on being in the Military In- report reached the hands of the user
the Vietnam War was organized as telligence Branch, created only three could range from 15 minutes in the
follows: A headquarters and headquar- years earlier: case of a triggered ground surveillance
ters company was responsible for ...possibly unlike the non-MI radar to 72 hours in the case of an
command and control, communica- Branch officer, I felt as an MI officer agent report. In between were elapsed
tions, radar, remote sensor and vehicle working as a combat division G2 that times of 20 minutes for an airborne
maintenance, and supply services. I was at the zenith of my professional personnel detector, 50 minutes for an
Ground surveillance radars and re- and personal satisfaction. I was play- unattended ground sensor, an hour
mote sensors were deployed by a ma- ing first fiddle for a varied and skilled and a half for a usually reliable intelli-
teriel exploitation platoon of the assemblage of intelligence players that gence report, known as “special intel-
HHC. An intelligence operations were part of my chosen career field. I ligence,” four hours for SLAR and air-
company furnished counterintelli- felt, as an MI officer, I had greater borne infrared, five and one-half hours
gence and interrogation support for command of the multiple types of for prisoner interrogation, and six
the division and manned the battle- intelligence support I could get for the hours for intelligence civic action pro-
field information control centers division. As an MI officer, I could gram. These processing times were
(BICC) and battlefield information talk nose-to-nose with other MI too long to be useful to the com-
centers (BIC). Long-range reconnais- people on the quality and timeliness mander who was dealing with a fast-
sance for the division was provided of their support, and as an MI officer moving, guerilla force which de-
by the ground recon-naissance and sur- I could eradicate any hangups MI per- pended a great deal on deception.
veil-lance company. An aerial target sonnel might have about supporting After Vietnam, the U.S. Army
acquisition and combat surveillance an infantry division. There is no ques- was determined to find a better way
company had the job of providing tion in my mind that the MI special- to organize and focus its intelligence
both aerial electronic surveillance and ists, sergeants, warrant officers, lieu- assets to more efficiently serve the
imagery inter-pretation through the tenants, captains, and majors that I combat commander.
use of utility and attack helicopters. worked with each day passed the test In the final years of the Vietnam
Some concepts growing out of the in the 4th Infantry Division, because War, and over the decades that fol-
Vietnam experience were the Surveil- when the division commander re- lowed, Army intelligence faced a
lance, Target Acquisition, Night Ob- ceived a richly deserved promotion, thicket of challenges and alternating
servation (STANO) program, an in- he specified he wanted another MI bouts of contraction and growth. The
tensive management system for sur- officer for his G2. last quarter of the 20th century would
veillance operations and products; and Despite all of the acknowledged be a time of self-definition and re-
the Integrated Battlefield Control success of intelligence support in Viet- emergence as an equal partner with
System (IBCS), a program designed nam, there were still deficiencies, most operations, personnel, and logistics.
to aid the commander’s decision- of which could be categorized under With the war in Southeast Asia
making process by combining all of “untimely response.” It was General over, the emphasis pivoted to the
the technological tools. Patton who remarked that he liked European theater where intelligence
Perhaps the single greatest reason intelligence, “like eggs, the fresher the was expected to counter the superior
for the improved intelligence appara- better.” The appetite for intelligence numbers of the Warsaw Pact forces
tus in the Vietnam War was the sense is and always will be insatiable. The with the celerity of its early warning
of professionalism instilled by an MI result is often an information over- information.
branch. During the war in Vietnam, load that strains the ability of the sys- The MI community would be
the Military Intelligence Branch grew tem to process and disseminate the transformed, not only by its own
to 7,000 officers and became the fifth analyzed information in a timely man- frenzy of reorganization, but by
largest branch. Colonel William F. ner. changes taking place in the U.S. Army
Strobridge, the G2 in the 4th Infan- In Vietnam, depending on the as a whole. In 1972 the draft was dis-
try Division operating along the Cam- source, the time elapsed from the oc- continued, drying up a reservoir of

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

college-trained manpower; by 1973 major field commands. The ASA ran training at the U.S. Army Security
the strength was cut by half, causing its own training schools and under- Agency Training Center and School
some leaders to refer to it as “a hol- took its own research and develop- at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, while
low Army;” and in 1976 women sol- ment. It encompassed a network of the U.S. Army Intelligence School at
diers were assimilated across the Army listening posts around the world Fort Holabird, Maryland, carried out
rather than segregated in the now de- called field stations, and operated schooling in general military intelli-
funct Women’s Army Corps. aloft in specially configured U-21s gence. In 1966, Maj. Gen. Joseph A.
In 1970 a former MI officer, called Special Electronic Mission Air- McChristian, the Assistant Chief of
Christopher Pyle, wrote an article craft. This vast effort was indicative Staff for Intelligence, asked that the
detailing Army surveillance of legiti- of the predominant role that SIGINT Army’s intelligence training be exam-
mate political organizations like the had assumed in the Cold War. Be- ined for the purpose of consolidating
National Association for the Advance- cause of its self-sustaining command the fragmented training that was
ment of Colored People, supervised structure and the cloak of secrecy that spread over several commands and
by the U.S. Army Intelligence Com- shrouded its operations, it was conducted at different schools. The
mand at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It thought to be separated from the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold K.
triggered congressional investigations Army main stream by a metaphorical Johnson, responded by forming the
and resulted in the June 1970 Adju- “green door.” Norris Board to evaluate intelligence
tant General directive which halted all Since 1965 the U.S. Army Intel- programs. He approved the Norris
Army involvement in domestic intel- ligence Command performed the Board recommendations on 1 July
ligence. Recriminations lingered in the HUMINT and counterintelligence 1967.
public mind over the next decade missions for the Army. With seven As a result of the initiative of Maj.
about the part played by Army coun- subordinate groups in the continen- Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, the
terintelligence in reinforcing the FBI tal United States, it conducted back- Norris Board deliberations, and the
at times when domestic intelligence ground investigations on Army per- overcrowded conditions at Fort
was collected on anti-war activities. sonnel and became involved in do- Holabird, it was determined to con-
The Army was a reminder to many mestic intelligence work during the solidate MI training at a single new
of the divisions over the Vietnam War height of the anti-Vietnam War location. In 1971 the concept became
that tore the fabric of American soci- movement. This latter role was the a reality when the Intelligence School
ety. subject of much civilian criticism of was moved from the banks of Colgate
The special problems that faced the government and was dropped in Creek to the foothills of the
Army intelligence in those uncertain the early 1970s. At the same time Huachuca Mountains. From its incep-
postwar years included the lack of any the Intelligence Command was tion in 1971, the U.S. Army Intelli-
central organization. The pieces that whittled away to two subordinate gence Center and School contributed
made up the MI mosaic were often groups, and its mission of perform- a host of innovations and programs
scattered, isolated and uncoordinated. ing background checks was turned that would revamp the MI commu-
They needed to be cemented together over the Defense Investigative Service nity.
in some more practical organization. specifically created for that purpose. The Commanding General of the
This fusion did not happen all at once, Eventually, it was discontinued en- Intelligence Center and School was
but incrementally and tentatively. tirely in 1974 and succeeded by the made the proponent for the Military
Since 1945 the Army Security U.S. Army Intelligence Agency which Intelligence Branch in 1983. As such,
Agency (ASA) controlled the Army’s assumed the HUMINT missions for he became concurrently the Chief,
code and signals intelligence through the Army. Military Intelligence. In October
a vertical organizational structure in One of the most far-reaching 1989, the CG of the Intelligence Cen-
which all its units reported directly changes to the MI structure was the ter and School became Fort
upward. In 1955 it took over all Elec- establishment of a home for military Huachuca’s installation commander,
tronic Warfare responsibilities and in intelligence training at Fort making Army intelligence the lead
1964 it became one of the Army’s Huachuca. Heretofore, ASA did its agency at that historic site.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

In 1974 the Chief of Staff di- or make the electronic warfare weap- tions at the echelon above corps. It
rected a study to determine the best onry available to the Army as a whole. pooled a number of its newly acquired
organization to carry out intelligence Likewise, it determined that intelli- production functions into an Intelli-
and electronic warfare missions. gence was inefficiently organized in gence and Threat Analysis Center in
Called the Intelligence Organization vertical lines which did not intersect. 1977. In 1978 it took over the U.S.
and Stationing Study (IOSS), its The U.S. Army Security Agency Army Russian Institute and in 1980
chairman Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Ursano was merged with the U.S. Army In- it gained the Special Security Group
announced its recommendations in telligence Agency and its intelligence which disseminated Sensitive Com-
1975. It resulted in a basic restruc- production components formed a partmented Information (SCI) to the
turing of military intelligence assets, new major Army command on 1 entire army.
one that would completely revamp January 1977 called the U.S. Army The former Foreign Science and
the intelligence organization and how Intelligence and Security Command Technology Center of the Army Ma-
they did business. The Ursano Board (INSCOM). The “green door” of teriel Command and its Missile and
found that intelligence production ASA had been unhinged. Now Space Intelligence Center both came
was compartmentalized, especially INSCOM had the mission of accom- over to INSCOM in 1983 and were
within ASA which did not share its plishing multi-discipline intelligence, combined with the Intelligence and
product with the tactical commander security, and electronic warfare func- Threat Analysis Center to form the

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

short-lived Army Intelligence Agency, During the 1980s, INSCOM various components of the intelli-
a field operating agency of ACSI. also operated a number of specialized gence picture and enabled electronic
It was INSCOM, the Army’s Ser- intelligence, counterintelligence, and warfare to assume a more useful place
vice Cryptologic Element (SCE), that support organizations. They were the in the commander’s arsenal. In Oc-
supported operations of both the 902d MI Group which was respon- tober 1976 the first CEWI battalion,
NSA and Defense Intelligence Agency sible for the Army’s counterintelli- the 522d MI (CEWI) Battalion, was
(DIA). INSCOM’s 704th MI Bri- gence throughout CONUS; the Spe- activated. After a series of field tests,
gade, formerly the CONUS MI cial Security Group, the agency that it was decided to activate CEWI units
Group, exercised command and con- controlled the Sensitive Compart- Armywide during 1983. In the words
trol over many of INSCOM’s sub- mented Information traffic to the of one observer, “the intelligence com-
ordinate agencies and provided staff major Army commands and accred- munity had gone all out tactical.”
personnel for the National Security ited the facilities; the Central Secu- The line companies performed the
Agency, at Fort Meade, MD. rity Facility which oversaw the work functions of collection and jamming,
When INSCOM took over the of the Investigative Records Reposi- ground surveillance through radars
Army Security Agency’s mission and tory and the Freedom of Information and sensors, and service support, while
assets, it assumed control of a network and Privacy Office; the U.S. Army the headquarters company handled
of fixed installations called field sta- Russian Institute at Sheridan Barracks collection management, counterintel-
tions at Berlin and Augsburg, Ger- in Garmisch, Germany; and the For- ligence, interrogation, and aviation
many; Sinop, Turkey; Okinawa and eign Language Training Center, Eu- personnel. Airborne collection bat-
Misawa, Japan; Pyongtaek, Korea; rope. INSCOM moved into its new talions were redesignated as Military
Key West, Florida; and San Antonio, headquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, in Intelligence Battalions (Aerial Exploi-
Texas. In 1986 the station at 1989. tation) as part of the 1985 reorgani-
Okinawa was shut down, but others Field intelligence units, following zation and they combined aerial sur-
came on line during that decade at the Ursano report, were no longer veillance with imagery interpretation.
Kunia, Hawaii, and Panama. These controlled by the Assistant Chief of CEWI groups became brigades in
stations housed sophisticated Staff for Intelligence, but integrated 1985.
SIGINT equipment and were recog- into the normal Army command A test for the tactical capabilities
nizable by their large antenna arrays. structure, making them responsive to of MI and its organization arose with
In 1987 MI brigades and battalions the tactical commander. The old ASA the launching of an invasion of
were organized to provide the Army units were absorbed into combat elec- Grenada in the Carribean, thought
personnel at these field stations units tronic warfare and intelligence necessary by President Ronald Reagan
with which to identify. (CEWI) units which combined Army to protect American citizens and in-
INSCOM also fielded intelligence and security disciplines. terests.
multidiscipline MI groups to support The Yom Kippur War of 1973 vali- Operation URGENT FURY, the
theater-level Army operations around dated the theories of many Army code name for the U.S. invasion of
the world. The original four groups thinkers who saw an increasing role politically torn Grenada, involved
were the 66th (the largest in Munich, for electronic warfare. Joint Task Force 120, commanded by
Germany), 501st (at Yongsan, a neigh- The new multi-disciplined CEWI Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III.
borhood of Seoul, Korea), 500th (lo- units supported divisions with CEWI Army Major General H. Norman
cated at Camp Zama in the suburbs battalions and corps with CEWI Schwarzkopf was his deputy. The is-
of Toyko, Japan), and 470th (at groups and later brigades. This gave land of Grenada had been divided
Camp Clayton, Panama). A fifth, the the tactical commander better control into two zones of responsibility, the
513th MI Group, was added in 1982 over electronic warfare, signals intel- northern part to be occupied by the
at Fort Monmouth, NJ, to support ligence, operational security, and Navy and Marines, and the southern
contingency operations for the ground surveillance radar which were portion belonging to the Army and
Army’s Central Command. now integrated into one unit. They Air Force. Navy SEALs landed on
eliminated the old isolation of the 24 October 1983 at 2200 hours on

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

the northeast coast to reconnoiter sion began arriving at 1405 hours. The 525th Military Intelligence
what would be Marine landing The U.S. citizens attending medical Group of the XVIII Airborne Corps
beaches. On the southern tip of the schools on the island were rescued, the supported the 82d Airborne Division
island, an Air Force AC-130 Spectre, dictator General Austin and his body- with tactical intelligence collected and
armed with infrared sensors and low- guards were taken into custody, and produced in its Intelligence Opera-
light TV cameras was taking a look the island was cleared of all resistance tions Center. It was a windfall for
at the Point Salines airfield in prepa- by D+5. Eleven soldiers, three Ma- military intelligence as tons of cap-
ration for the 1st and 2d battalions rines and four Navy SEALs died in tured documents gave important in-
of the 75th Rangers to jump in. Operation URGENT FURY and 116 formation about Cuban and Soviet
The Marines landed on 25 Oc- U.S. personnel were wounded. The intelligence activities in the Western
tober, took the defenders by surprise, loss of Grenada was a severe setback hemisphere. Captured Soviet-manu-
and secured the Pearls airport by 0630. for Cuban prestige and a signal that factured military equipment kept
The Rangers encountered stiffer resis- U.S. interests in the Caribbean would technical intelligence specialists busy.
tance from Cuban forces, but by mid- be upheld by force, if necessary. Most Did MI’s tactical CEWI units
morning of the 25th the runway at of the 82d Airborne was withdrawn meet the test of the URGENT FURY
Port Salines was open and the lead in November and all U.S. combat operations? According to John F.
elements of the 82d Airborne Divi- forces were out by December. Stewart, Jr., the commander of the

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

525th MI Group, “CEWI works.” assume the new position of DCSINT Police Force was formed and the U.S.
He found intelligence and electronic in the Pentagon. Army began civil-military operations
warfare units under his command to The Military Intelligence Corps in earnest. Penonome Prison was sur-
be responsive to the tactical com- was founded on 1 July 1987, the 25th rendered without a fight and mop-
mander. anniversary of the establishment of the ping-up of hold-out Panamanian
The United States Military Liai- first Regular Army intelligence branch. Defense Forces began. Joint patrol-
son Mission (USMLM) to the Com- The MI Corps would embrace all ling was undertaken with the Pana-
mander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Army intelligence personnel, includ- manians. Dictator Manuel Noriega,
Forces in Germany (GSFG), was an ing civilians, in the tradition of the after taking sanctuary in the Vatican
outgrowth of the 1947 Potsdam Army regimental system. Maj. Gen. embassy, surrendered to U.S. forces
Agreement, dividing Berlin into zones Julius Parker, Commanding General on 3 January.
of occupation. Housed in a building of the Intelligence Center and School, Intelligence support for military
designed by Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief became the first head of the Corps in operations was provided by the 470th
architect and Minister of Munitions, activation ceremonies at Fort MI Brigade stationed in Panama and
the liaison mission’s job was to insure Huachuca. It was a milestone that its 29th MI Battalion, along with the
that terms of the Potsdam agreement General Parker, called “a recognition intelligence assets of the organizations
were met by the Soviets in their zone. and celebration of our evolution from making up the joint task force. MI
This involved unrestricted travel for a plethora of diverse and separate in- doctrine proved itself flexible enough
the members of the mission and pre- telligence agencies into the cohesive to support contingency operations
sented a unique window into East MI community we enjoy today. In like JUST CAUSE. One participant
Germany. A casualty of the Cold short, it symbolizes the fact that Mili- credited a large part of the U.S. Army’s
War, Lt. Col. Arthur D. Nicholson, tary Intelligence has truly arrived.” success in Operation JUST CAUSE
was a military intelligence officer serv- In late 1989 MI would have an- to Intelligence Preparation of the
ing with the U.S. Military Liaison other test of its ability to support the Battlefield.
Mission at Potsdam, East Germany, combat commander when President One of the most shaping devel-
when he was gunned down by a So- George Bush decided intervention in opments in recent years for Army in-
viet sentry in 1985. He was on a mis- Panama was necessary to stop the drug telligence was the 1987 publication
sion to observe Soviet facilities, as trafficking of Panamanian dictator of the Army Intelligence, Electronic
provided for in a long-standing inter- Manuel Noriega. Warfare, Target Acquisition Master
national agreement, when he was Operation JUST CAUSE, 20 Plan, or AIMP. It was a coherent plan
killed. December 1989 to 31 January 1990, for guiding intelligence systems and
Since 1956 the two-star Assistant depended on meticulous planning, organizations into the age of high-tech
Chief of Staff for Intelligence occu- rapid force projection, the element of warfare. It evaluated future threats,
pied a lesser niche in the Department surprise, and a versatile, professional determined requirements, and pre-
of the Army hierarchy, symbolic for joint force. On D-Day simultaneous pared a response that addressed all of
some of the back seat to which Army attacks took place across the isthmus the systems that would need to be
intelligence had been relegated. In of Panama. Nine separate task forces developed and procured in order to
1987 the Assistant Chief of Staff for each were given specific objectives, modernize Army intelligence for a
Intelligence on the Army staff was which were largely accomplished dur- range of contingencies. It was the
upgraded from a two-star position to ing the first day of the operation. On genesis for the Intelligence Revolution
a three-star job and renamed the D+1 the Panama Canal was reopened and would stock the Army intelli-
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to traffic, the Marriott Hotel was gence arsenal with electronic weap-
or DCSINT. Now Army intelligence taken and hostages there protected, onry. This singular, visionary plan
had been reestablished at the Army and Task Force Bayonet began civil- would be reassessed by the 1991 MI
staff level on an equal footing with military operations in Panama City to Relook and revised in 1993 to take
the other Deputy Chiefs. Lt. Gen. handle the growing flow of refugees. into account the lessons of the Gulf
Sidney T. Weinstein was the first to On the second day the Panamanian War.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

In 1989 all of the traditional There would also be a greater reliance ates within the ODCSINT. The In-
threats to the security of the United on reserves, like the Utah National telligence Systems Directorate was re-
States and her allies and all of the an- Guard’s 300th MI Brigade, to pro- sponsible for the major collection sys-
ticipated scenarios were overturned vide linguists in times of crisis. tems, such as SIGINT, PHOTINT
and made unlikely by the dissolution The MI Corps took its share of and HUMINT. The Counterin-
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw cuts in the Army downsizing of the telligence Directorate made policy for
Pact alliance. The Berlin Wall that 1980’s and 1990’s. In Europe where security and counterintelligence activi-
had stood for so many years at the the Soviet threat had all but disap- ties. The Foreign Intelligence Direc-
symbolic divide of East and West peared, three field stations were closed torate was involved in the production
came down in an exuberant celebra- down. Field Station Berlin atop of intelligence, determining collection
tion of the demise of the cold war. Teufelsberg, a cold war landmark, requirements, and preparing techni-
Germany was reunited in October closed its gates in 1992. Field Sta- cal intelligence. The Foreign Liaison
1990 and there seemed little need of tion Augsburg was closed in 1993, as Directorate coordinated intelligence
the large American Army presence in was Field Station Sinop, which had a matters with allies.
eastern Europe. The U.S. Army un- commanding view of the Black Sea INSCOM was the operating in-
derwent a major retrenchment, from that Turkish port since 1951. telligence arm for the U.S. Army, di-
shrinking in manpower and money The 66th MI Brigade moved its head- rectly subordinated to DCSINT. It
to a much more compact contingency quarters from Munich to Augsburg was not only involved in collection,
force. Doctrine began to redefine the in 1992. With the inactivation of the analysis, and counterintelligence, but
military services as a force-projection VII Corps, the 207th MI Brigade and performed SIGINT/COMSEC mis-
team, a small but mobile force rely- a number of MI battalions assigned sions on behalf of the National Secu-
ing upon technology to overcome its to the divisions had their flags cased. rity Agency.
stripped down combat formations. The Army Intelligence Agency As the turn of the century drew
Army intelligence, because of the was organized in 1985 as the field closer, MI soldiers found themselves
AIMP, was well positioned to reevalu- operating agency for ACSI, coordinat- engaged in a wide array of operations
ate its role in the new order. Follow- ing all intelligence production. It other than war, from peace keeping
ing the Desert Storm experience, an picked up remaining pieces of intelli- in Somalia to drug interdiction op-
MI Relook panel was reinstituted gence production that had been as- erations in the American hemisphere.
with Brig. Gen. John F. Stewart, Jr., signed to the Army Materiel Com- What would be the role of Army
the G2 for Army forces in Gulf War, mand and the Office of the Surgeon intelligence without the traditional
as its head. In view of the new U.S. General. As part of Army streamlin- Soviet adversary? A dangerous but
Army structure, and the reorientation ing in the post-cold-war era, it was miscalculating Iraqi strongman would
of the mission to force projection, the disestablished in 1992, its functions help the U.S. Army provide some of
panel made a number of recommen- being divided up by INSCOM and the answers to that question.
dations. It called for giving the com- DIA. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded its
bat commanders a complete picture In a January 1993 ceremony at oil-rich and defenseless neighbor Ku-
of the battlefield and targets by using Fort Devens, the colors of the 112th wait. The United Nations Security
the array of interacting systems envi- MI Brigade were cased. Its functions Council condemned the attack and
sioned in the AIMP to relay the best were absorbed by Fort Huachuca units four days later invoked economic
and most current information from as part of the Army’s reconsolidation. sanctions against Iraq. Operation
the national and theater levels, while It was one of four MI brigades to be DESERT SHIELD officially began
at the same time allowing them to deactivated out of a total of eighteen. on 7 August and by 9 November
share their own information with Atop the U.S. Army intelligence President George Bush was announc-
those at comparable and higher lev- organization in 1993 was the Deputy ing that as many as 400,000 U.S.
els. This would allow for a smaller Chief of Staff for Intelligence troops were slated to be deployed to
MI force structure, but one that was (DCSINT), who controlled the Persian Gulf. The U.N. resolved
still responsive to commanders. INSCOM, as well as four director- on 29 November to use “all necessary

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A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

means” to oust Iraqi forces from Ku- Union. Battalion was deployed from Europe.
wait and gave them a deadline of 15 Some units, like the 101st Air- Tactical intelligence, or informa-
January 1991 to do so. Three days borne Division, enjoyed good linguist tion on the specific enemy formations
before the deadline, the U.S. Congress support. The 132 linguists of the expected to be engaged, was produced
granted President Bush the authority 101st were instrumental in debrief- at Corps level and below. It flowed
to employ military force. The day ing some 400 Kuwaiti refugees before upward from battalion, brigade, di-
after the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal the DESERT STORM phase. vision and corps “2” shops, eventu-
passed, on 16 January, the U.S. and Another difficulty was the scope ally coming together at the 513th MI
coalition forces launched a massive air of the operations themselves. The Brigade, a unit under the operational
strike against strategic targets in Ku- land area was large and intelligence had control of ARCENT, where it was
wait and Iraq that opened the the early mission of enforcing the fused with strategic intelligence pulled
DESERT STORM phase of the op- blockade of Iraq, one that required all down from national levels of intelli-
eration. The ground attack began on air, sea, and ground traffic to be moni- gence gathering. This information
24 February. One hundred hours tored 24 hours a day. As the crisis was intended to give the theater com-
later, on 28 February, Iraq agreed to a worsened and military action became mander a broad overview of the de-
temporary cease-fire and it became a possibility, thousands of targets veloping situation. The Foreign Ma-
permanent on 3 March when they within Iraq and Kuwait had to be teriel Intelligence Battalion of the
accepted conditions for a permanent identified and photographed and the 513th MI Brigade was kept busy ex-
end to the shooting. deployments and movements of en- ploiting an unprecedented windfall of
A key to the quick and over- emy forces had to be plotted. Over- captured equipment. They were as-
whelming victory was the rapid and head reconnaissance had to be de- sisted by members of the U.S. Army
efficient mobilization of logistic ployed in a map-making effort for the Foreign Science and Technology Cen-
forces to support the campaign. The theater of operations. ter. Upon its return to the U.S. after
22d Support Command marshaled The aerial recon effort was ham- Desert Storm, the 513th would relo-
300,000 soldiers, 12,000 tracked pered by the deletion from the inven- cate to Fort Gordon, GA, where it
combat vehicles, and over 100,000 tory the previous year of the SR-71 would collocate with a new Regional
wheeled vehicles in support of the Blackbird. This aircraft’s high-alti- SIGINT Operations Center
U.S. Army Central Command’s com- tude and high-speed allowed it to (RSOC).
bat forces. photograph 30-mile swaths of enemy The commander in the field had
In the Army’s history of the Gulf territory at 2,000 miles per hour and much more technology to deploy and
War called Certain Victory, Brig. Gen. do so outside the range of air defense many more decisions to make than
Robert H. Scales, Jr., gave an idea of weapons. any of his predecessors in history. But
some of the problems Army intelli- Because of the requirement for a with all the added complexities, he
gence faced in that conflict. There was rapid buildup of large numbers of had little tactical information to go
the lack of Arab linguists, notably troops in the theater, the combat units on, either because his organic intelli-
those familiar with the Iraqi dialect; a were sent in first, followed by their gence units had not yet become op-
paucity of HUMINT from the supporting units. So in the first erational in the theater, or if they had
closed, tightly supervised Iraqi soci- months of the crisis, the troops on deployed they were positioned far to
ety; the limited use of radio or radar the ground were blinded by the lack the rear to avoid tipping off the en-
by the Iraqis to deny SIGINT; and of their own tactical intelligence emy of allied intentions. It was not
the absence of good maps of the Ku- which arrived over the next five until 19 January when the intelligence
waiti theater. months. Assigned to XVIII Airborne units moved into to their forward
One of the advantages for the Corps, the 15th MI Battalion did not positions that they could begin to
U.S. forces was its familiarity with the arrive until mid-October to provide work on those enemy units to their
Soviet equipment it would encoun- the Army’s only aerial collection. To front. The strategic intelligence col-
ter, the fruit of years of technical in- reinforce INSCOM signals intelli- lected by national-level agencies was
telligence directed at the Soviet gence in the theater, the 204th MI of little use to the commander, ex-

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46
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

cept in those cases where imagery lo- tion of Iraq, but encircling it on the gun camera footage, defector reports
cated enemy emplacements to his ground. It contained a little galaxy and other close-in sources of intelli-
front. The Defense Intelligence of satellites like the Keyhole, which gence, and the more cautious CIA
Agency was not staffed or trained to was said to be able to see things as which relied mainly on satellite pic-
provide the kind of tactical intelli- small as a compact disc, or the cloud- tures. From the point of view of the
gence a field commander needs. Scales piercing Lacrosse designed to keep its ground commander, it was better to
cited an example of a national analyst eye on the movements of the War- err on the side of lower damage than
who saw Iraqi troops movements as saw Pact forces. In addition to the be surprised by an enemy stronger
training maneuvers while an experi- picture-taking satellites, there were than expected.
enced Army officer “familiar with the the listening kind, like the Magnum With as many as 3,000 sorties per
last-minute starts and stops of tacti- and Vortex. day, BDA was a tough picture to bring
cal maneuver saw the moves as a final In the earth’s atmosphere cruised into focus. There were subjective fac-
shift to attack positions.” 23 different kinds of aircraft, adding tors like the characteristically optimis-
At the Department of Defense, a their imagery, electronic and eaves- tic pilots’ reports, sometimes called
Joint Intelligence Center was set up dropping capabilities to the fray. The “ego BDAs,” and natural obstacles like
in August to combine the service-spe- U2s alone took more than one mil- cloud cover and imprecise wide-angle
cific tactical intelligence. The DOD lion feet of film. Enemy airspace was photos. To arrive at some kind of
Joint Intelligence Center was the work cross-hatched with allied aircraft, consistent baseline, different formu-
of Brig. Gen. John Stewart, Jr., who mostly American, bristling with an- las were used and then discarded if
drew heavily upon the Army person- tennae. Rivet Joint and Senior Span they proved flawed. Eventually, by
nel in the Intelligence and Threat platforms locked on enemy commu- early February Brig. Gen. Stewart, put
Analysis Center. The Army’s Intelli- nications frequencies. Notably miss- in charge of BDA by the CINC, ar-
gence and Threat Analysis Center pro- ing was the SR-71 Blackbird which rived at a formula that seemed to give
duced templates showing every Iraqi had been mothballed a year earlier. a reasonable basis for estimating the
division in and around Kuwait on Imagery piled up in Saudi Arabia enemy’s losses and effective strength.
1:50,000 scale maps. They depicted by the truckload. By one author’s He assigned his highest confidence to
Iraqi obstacle defenses, tanks, armored estimate, “there were 200 tons of in- high-resolution U2 photos, gave a 50
vehicles, artillery tubes, vehicles, com- telligence ‘product’” by war’s end. percent weight to the F-111 and F-
mand posts, and supply dumps, and This unprecedented volume caused 15E gun-camera footage, and reduced
were updated daily right up to the end problems for the hundreds of analysts A-10 pilot reports to one-third.
of the war. General Stewart was trans- stretched in a chain from the Joint SIGINT was of little use since the
ferred to the theater in December to Imagery Production Complex at Iraqis were all but off the air. He
function full time as the ARCENT, Riyadh Air Base, to CENTCOM’s proofed his resulting figures by con-
or Third Army, G2. The Joint Intelligence Center, to the centrating a second time on a few en-
CENTCOM J2 was Brig. Gen. John Pentagon’s own JIC, to the National emy units and comparing the results
Leide. Photographic Interpretation Center with his initial estimates. If they were
High above the cradle of land in the Navy Yard in D.C. The the same, he could confirm that his
between the Tigris and Euphrates Riv- workload was too overwhelming and formula was consistent. Stewart had
ers in February 1991 was amassed the the process could not meet the de- to justify his methods and his assess-
most impressive array of intelligence- mand for timely answers, especially ments to Defense Secretary Richard
gathering esoterica ever assembled in in the realm of Battlefield Damage Cheney and JCS Chairman Gen.
one place. It was as if civilization, now Assessment. Colin Powell on 9 February when
in the prime of life, had returned to The question of just how de- those officials spent a day in Riyadh
its birthplace to show off what it had graded the enemy units actually were being briefed by Gen. Schwarzkopf
learned over the intervening years. would be a point of contention be- and his staff.
The intelligence arsenal was not tween the military on the ground in Satellite coverage produced vast
only hovering dome-like over the na- the theater who were able to factor in amounts of photos, but never enough

Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. 47
A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA

to satisfy tactical commanders who A JSTARS package was deployed To give the commander a better
were desperate for detailed photogra- to Saudi Arabia in mid-January. It close-in picture, the Pioneer Un-
phy of targets in their area of respon- consisted of two E-8A aircraft (spe- manned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) were
sibility. There were not always pro- cially modified Boeing 707s), and six called upon. There were six Pioneer
cesses in place to disseminate satellite ground station modules. Each ground UAV systems deployed to Operation
imagery at the national level down to station was manned by a sergeant and DESERT STORM—One each on
the tactical users. An exception was two specialists. They were located at the battleships Wisconsin and Missouri,
the XVIII Corps which, as the nation’s CENTAF Tactical Air Command three with the Marine Corps, and one
contingency force, had their own sat- Center, ARCENT Main, ARCENT system deployed with an Army task
ellite transmission capability, the Tac- Forward, XVIII Corps, VII Corps, force. The latter was a 36-man pla-
tical Exploitation of National Capa- and with the Marine headquarters. toon of five UAVs sent from Fort
bilities (TENCAP) Imagery Exploita- Special modifications were made to Huachuca on 10 January. It arrived
tion System, back at Fort Bragg. The the two aircraft to enhance datalink in the theater on 26 January and
Army force structure had eliminated connectivity to the Riyadh-based launched its first mission on 1 Febru-
the aerial exploitation units at divi- headquarters. Self-defense systems ary in the VII Corps. The soldiers
sion and corps level, choosing to de- were added to the planes to increase from Company E, 304th MI Battal-
pend on imagery produced at higher their survivability in the event air su- ion, 111th MI Brigade, operated a
levels and transmitted to them via periority was not achieved. The range 400-pound, prop-driven airplane
digital bandwidths. The communi- of the JSTARS was also doubled for mounted with a television camera
cations systems for this imagery was the Gulf War deployment. The that was capable of day or night moni-
still in development and not ready for JSTARS increased the limited cover- toring of the battlefield. The UAV
the battlefield. The gap was filled age that was provided by Side-Look- had two ground pilots, one to make
with off-the-shelf software and pro- ing Airborne Radar (SLAR) missions takeoffs and landings and another to
totype equipment. flown by the Mohawk battalions as- fly it down range. It had a payload
Two battlefield surveillance sys- signed to VII and XVIII Corps. operator to monitor the onboard cam-
tems were deployed in Operation On one occasion when B-52s ar- era, a mechanic to perform mainte-
DESERT SHIELD/STORM with rived on station and cloud cover pre- nance, and an electronic technician.
remarkable success. These were the vented them from finding targets, the The Pioneer, with its 100-mile range,
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Ra- CENTCOM Air Force commander, 24-hour capability, and near-real-time
dar System (JSTARS) and the un- Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, turned data link, could provide targeting in-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV). The to JSTARS. Pfc. Timothy Reagan on formation and act in a reconnaissance
JSTARS was in developmental stages. duty in the ground station pointed role.
It consisted of a synthetic aperture out an Iraqi convoy that he had on TROJAN SPIRIT, a satellite that
radar mounted in an Air Force Boeing his screen and Horner directed the air transmitted secure voice and digital
707 that could operate in a targeting strike against it, destroying the con- imagery to trailer-mounted terminals,
mode or as a surveillance system, or voy and demonstrating the value of was another system that was rushed
in both modes simultaneously. The both JSTARS and its operators. to the battlefield from the testing labs.
near-real-time information passed When the ground war began, It arrived in February, was fielded and
back to air or artillery weapons sys- JSTARS provided the ARCENT G2 its operators trained.
tems was detailed enough to target the capability of tracking all Iraqi Despite the admirable efforts to
attacks while the surveillance field of movements and determine what their rush the means of disseminating im-
vision was 25x20 kilometers, large plan of action was. These situational agery intelligence to the field, it was a
enough to watch movement in the assessments were extremely important case of too little too late, and most of
entire Kuwaiti theater of operations. to the corps commanders who could the mountain of imagery was moved
The system allowed the commander readjust their attack plans at various by old fashioned courier. “Through-
to see to a depth of 150 kilometers in points in the decision-making process. out January and February, daily cou-
all kinds of weather. riers carried 200 pounds of annotated

Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.


48
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

photos, maps overprinted with Iraqi The DIA formed support teams up until they were attacked.
templates, and other intelligence at the various corps and ARCENT to A high-profile job for Army in-
documents, moving 27 tons of ma- access the national military intelligence telligence was locating the Scud
terial from one end of the theater to data and imagery base. launchers that played such havoc with
the other.” The commanders were A four-day target development the coalition. The long-range, high-
often frustrated in their efforts to get effort, focused the national collection frequency signals used to control the
up-to-date intelligence. systems, the theater U-2 and RF-4C Scud missiles were vulnerable to jam-
To fill the void of qualified lin- Phantom II reconnaissance aircraft, ming by the TLQ-17 Sandcrab,
guists, Lt. Gen. Charles B. corps aerial exploitation battalions, manned by a platoon from the 201st
Eichelberger, Deputy Chief of Staff and the airborne radars they employed MI Battalion. The jamming forced
for Intelligence, paved the way to re- against a host of possible key targets the Iraqis to resort to less secure com-
cruit and train young Kuwaitis in the like command and control facilities, munications which could be inter-
United States, most of them attend- artillery, armored formations and lo- cepted. But the effort expended to
ing college, and ship them to the the- gistics bases. Enemy deserters were direct intelligence assets at the Scud
ater as sergeants in the Kuwaiti Army also questioned about targets. A pri- sites slowed the targeting missions for
to act as linguists in intelligence units. ority list was developed by the the ground war.
ARCENT G2 and revalidated right

Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. 49
The Sandcrab jammer was posi- your dispositions were, and we
tioned in northern Saudi Arabia, with the findings of the House Armed Ser- had no way to monitor your com-
its 5,000 watts of power and a mas- vices Committee’s report on Intelli- munications. We knew you were
sive transmitter. It was ready to go to gence Successes and Failures in Opera- going to attack only when you
work jamming enemy transmissions, tions DESERT SHIELD/STORM is- overran our front line posi-
raising the old electronic warfare de- sued on 16 August 1993. The Over- tions....”
bate of whether it was better to forego sight and Investigations Subcommit- Ironically, when talking about his
jamming in favor of intercepting the tee concluded that: own Army’s lack of sophisticated in-
enemy signals. A compromise was Intelligence collection...was telligence, he could have been describ-
reached whereby Sandcrab jammed generally very good and deserving ing the U.S. Army in the early stages
only the encoded beginnings of Iraqi of praise. of the Korean War just 40 years ear-
transmissions, causing the enemy to Intelligence distribution over- lier.
become confused and send in the all was very poor, particularly
clear. when it came to serving air fight-
The Iraqi COMSEC would have ing units. Both the hardware and
to be rated as good however, but this the people failed.
was achieved by not talking on the Intelligence analysis was
radio at all or using secure land lines mixed. The concept was brilliant.
that had not been severed by the but the count of dead Iraqi tanks,
bombing, a measure that crippled the APCs and artillery pieces exposed
ability of units to communicate a major systemic failure in the
readily. Despite their prolonged si- ability to accurately make battle-
lence, just before the ground war al- field damage assessment.
lied intelligence targeted for destruc- Overall, DESERT STORM
tion what were believed to be signal could be adjudged as an overwhelm-
nodes, but left four intact in the hopes ing success for U.S. Army intelligence.
that the enemy would resume radio In addition to the above-stated opin-
contact in the heat of battle. And they ion of the commander of the coali-
did, leading to valuable NSA inter- tion effort, this conclusion was ex-
cepts which, in conjunction with pressed by a captured Iraqi officer
JSTARS, brought into view a vivid who noted:
picture of their movements and in- We had a great appreciation
tentions. of your intelligence system; we
The commander of allied forces knew from our experience in the
in the Gulf War, Gen. H. Norman Iranian War that at all times you
Schwarzkopf, gave military intelli- could see us during day and night
gence top marks during Congressional and knew where we were on the
testimony on 12 June. Overall, he ground. If we communicated,
said, “it was excellent. We had very, you could both hear us and tar-
very good intelligence support. We get us, and if we talked too long,
had terrific people. We had a lot of you would target us and destroy
capabilities.” But he did find areas, us with your ordnance. On the
like battlefield damage assessment, other hand, as we looked at our
real-time imagery, interoperability, intelligence system, we had no
and overly caveated intelligence esti- idea where you were on the
mates, that could use improvement. ground, we had no intelligence
His experience was incorporated into system capabilities to see what

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