1 zucHARD E.

V/rNNrE (68048)
COTINTYCOTINSEL
2 COLINTYOF ALAMEDA
a
J RICHARDS,WATSON & GERSHON
A Professional
Corporation
-/1 SAYREWEAVER-(rr69s7)
T. PETERPTERCE (160408)
5 355SouthGrandAvenue.4ó,hFloor
LosAngeles,CA 90071
6 Telephone: (213)626-8484
Facsimile:(213)'626-007
B
7 ppierce@rwglaw.com

8 Attomeysfor Defendants,
MARY V. KING. et al.
9

I ' 10

t1 UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT

z.= 1,2
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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I I RUSSELLALLEN NORDYKE, er at., CaseNo. CV -99-04389-MJJ
o r j
u1 *
15 Plaintifß,
k Y DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF MOTION
-== T 16
AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
¡¡l 3 v. JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' THIRD
o k AMENDED COMPLAINT OR,IN THE
É

<
,

- r zà
q
L7 MARY V. KING, er al., ALTERNATIVE, FOR PARTTAL
( J 9 SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
,. 1 8I INDIVIDUAL CAUSESOF ACTION;
'r*.Jt" .
ñY¿ ' nI l MEMORANDUM OF POINTSAND
AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATIONS
OF RICK K. PICKERTNG,T. PETER
20 1 PIERCEAND JAMES KNUDSENIN
,rl SUPPORTTHEREOF

,rl t\qqg:lt for JudicialNoticeandAppendix

of CalifomiaAuthoritiesfiled coniúrrentlvl

:'^ll DEPT.:
JUDGE:
DATE:
TIME:
1i
HonorableMartinJ. Jenkins
JulyI1,2006
9:30a.m.

DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JÙDGMENT

oN PLAINTIFFS;Mõ
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 I TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on
July 11,2006,at 9:30 a.m.,or as soonthereafter
as
a
J the mattermay be heardin courtroom
11 0f the above-entitledcourt, l0catedat
45|Golden Gate
4 Avenue' san Francisco,california, defendants,
MaryV. King, Gail steele,wilma chen,
Keith
5 carson, scott Hagg erty, the county of
Alameda, and the county of AramedaBoard
of
6 supervisors(collectively "county''),r will
and do herebymove the court for an order,
pursuant
-
to FederalRule of civil procedure 56,
subparagraphs(b) and (c), granting summaryjudgment
to
8 the County on plaintifß' Third Amended
Complaint.
9 This motion will be madeon the grounds
that there is no genuineissueas to any material
10 lactand that the county is entitledto judgment
as a matter of law for the following reasons:
ll 1' The county's ordinancebanrLingthe possession
of firearïnson county property
Z . =
O = T2 (the "ordinance"), as applied to plaintiffs,
. 1 . < satisfiesthe First Amendment under united
{/¡ P states v.
î v ã
r-rJ 3
13 O'Brien,39t U.S. 367(1968).
t 9 i
- z

= 3 t4 2' The ordinance, as appliedto plaintifß,

O Î - is a reasonabletime, place or manner
< n \
I _ Y
< ù
15 restriction'Heffron v' Int'l soc'yfor
Krishna consciousness,
rnc.,452 u.s. 640 (19g1).
_= =i tó
u)1 3' Plaintiffs lack standingto assertany
Õ ä constitutionalas-appliedchallengeto the
É,ø 1 -
< àz
-f-
L I ordinance banningthe possessionof firearms
on county property. Before mounting a challenge
( J 9
.....-È 18 in court' plaintifß must nirstdemonstrate
t.
how they will conducttheir tradeshowsconsistent
with
V.Y¿ t9 the Ordinance.

20 4' once the court upholdsthe ordinance

againstplaintifß' free expressionclairn
2I under the First Amendment,the court
shoulddeclineto continueexercisingsupplemental
22 jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
relatedclaim for relief under the california
constitution. (JnitedMine
aa
ZJ ll/orkersv. Gibbs,3ggU.S. 7TS(1966).
.tA
LA

25

26 I rhe
referenge"Çou1ty defendants"includes
countvorAlameda only the county of Alamcda and the
27 Board.oi-íup;;ì;;^. d'rhiräilåùr"*"¿ iíit, oiããiorFebruary
'"ãu'iJ;;;; name
individuaióin"".,ã. r4,
33f,åfiårîä,ïff*l,i'o à;r;ä;, inanexcrusivery
28
-1-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MO
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
t206t\0002\877766.4
 1 5. The Ordinance passesmuster under the California Constitution's protection of free

2 expressionbecausethe Ordinance doesnot prohibit speechabout firearms or about

any other
a
J topic. Separatelyand independently,the California SupremeCourt has employed
for analysis
4 under the California Constitution the O'Brien and time, place or manner standards
that federal
5 courts use for First Amendment analysis,and the Ordinance satisfies those
standards.
6 6' Plaintifß' as-appliedequalprotectionchallengefails becausethe groupsto which
-
plaintifß comparethemselvesare not similarly situatedto plaintiffs.
If any similaritiesexisted
8 betweenplaintiffs and thosegroups,the County had,arationalbasisfor distinguishing
how the
9 Ordinanceappliesto plaintiffs and how the Ordinanceappliesto the other groups.

10 7' Plaintiffs' facial equalprotectionchallengeto the Ordinance'sexceptionfor

11 personsholding a valid firearms licenseis without merit. The County

reasonablyexemptedthose
z-= T2
O Ë licenseesfrom the ordinance's prohibition on possessionof firearïns.
- *
L ô P
( v d
U J 3
13 Shouldthe Court concludethat eitherthe free expressionclaim or the equalprotection
t 9 ¿
z.? T4 claim survivesthis summaryjudgmentmotion, the County moves in the alternative
for partial
O tri
':
<J'l
l - v 15 summaryjudgment on the remainingclaim. See (Jnited Statesv. Alisal Water
< è Corp.,431 F.3d
_= =i I6 6ß (9thcir. 2005) (affirming District court's grant of partial summaryjudgment).
<¡tf
Õ ã
É.ø
< -z I7 This motion is basedupon this Notice, the Memorandumof Points and Authorities
'-1-
below,
( J 9
^) È 18 the attachedexhibits and declarations,the concurrentlyfiled Requestfor
'. JudicialNotice, the
.D.
E9¿ T9 concurrentlyfiled Appendix of California Authorities,all pleadings,recordsand papers
on file in
20 this action,and upon such other evidenceas presentedat or before the hearing
of this motion.
2I DATED: 1une2,2006 RICHARD E. WINNIE
COTINTYCOLINSEL
22 COLINTYOF ALAMEDA
23 zuCHARDS,WATSON& GERSHON
A ProfessignalCorporation
24 SAYRE VúEÁ.VBR.
T. PETE
25
By:
26
Attorneys for Defendants
27 MARY V. KING, ET AL.
z8 -2-
DEFENDANTS'
NoTICEoF MorIoN ANDMorIoN FoRsuMMARy JUDGMENT
oN plarNrrr.¡sîrnrn¡
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
1206t\0002\877766.4
 I TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 PAGE(S)
a
J I. INTRODUCTION AND STIMMARY OF ARGIIMENT

4 III. FACTUALANDPROCEDT'RALBACKGROTIND .... ...4

5 ru. ARG[rMENT.... ........6
6 A. The OrdinanceSatisfiesO'Brien And The Reasonable"Time place Or
Manner" StandardEven If The County Had Applied The OrdinanceTo
7 Plaintiffs'TradeShows ........6
8 1- TheCounty's important interestin protectingthe public justifies
any incidentallimitation on plaintiffs' expreõsive'conduõt
resulting
9 fromtheOrdinance ......6
10 2- separatelyand independently,the county's ordinance is a
reasonabletime_,place or mannerrestrictionof plaintiffs'
il expressiveconduct(assumingany). .......L4
z.= T2
O Ë 3. Plaintifß have_preventedthe County from applying the Ordinance
- é to their trade shows_aqq, therefore,þtaintirri iaók s"tandingto assert
( , P
r v ¿ 13 a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o t h e O r d i n a n c .e. . . .
u J 3 ..... 16
L 9 ¿
2,2 T4 B. This Court Should Decline To ExerciseSupplementalJurisdictionOver
O # Plaintifß' StateLaw Free ExpressionClaim
U1 \
15 I7
k E C. Altematively, Plaintiffs' StateLaw FreeExpressionClaim Fails As A
_= =i I6
<¡t a Matter Of Law 18
ê k
È . ø
< zì
T
t7 D. Even If Plaintiffs' Had standing T9 Maintain An As-Applied Equal
( J 9 ProtectionClaim,TheirClaimFailsAsAMatterofLaï 19
.-' a 18
i. t. IV. CONCLUSION .
eY¿ T9 25
DECLARATION OF RICK K. PICKERING . . .
20 26
DECLAÌìATIONOF T. PETERPIERCE
2L 30
DECLARATIONOF JAMES KNT'DSEN J I
22

23

24

25

26

27

28
-l-
DEFENDANTS'
NorlcE oF MorloN ANDMorIoN FoRsuMMARyiirocrt¡eNr oNIpLnl¡¡rtFFS'TI-trRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
t2061\0002\877766.4
 I TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 PAGE(S)
a
J CASES:

4 Abboud v. 1N^S
140F.3d843(9,hCir. 1998) . . . . .22
5
Associat.ionof National Advertisers v. Lungren
6 44F.3d726(9thCir.t994) ......10
Attorney General v. Irtsh People, Inc.
684F:2d928(D.C.Cii.T982) ........19
I
Bruce v. Ylst
9 351 F.3d 1283(gthCir. 2003) . . .23
l0 Califoryg,Assn. of the Physically Handicapped,Inc. v. FCC
721F.2d667 ( g t hC i r . 1 9 8 3 ) ...23
11
Charter-Commc'ns,Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz
z.= L2 203 F.Supp.2drr}2(N.D.cãl. 2001)
o
. 1 <
= . . . 10
U1 P
r v
rrJ
¿ 13 Christy v. Hodel
3
t 5 ¿ 8 5 7 F . 2 d r 3 2 4 (C
9 ti rh.1 9 8 8 ) ........22
2.9 t4
Ori Clark v. Comm.for Creative Non-VÌolence
ø t E
l - Y
< _ o
i5 468 U.S.288 (1984) . s. 14. 1 5
-== i T6 Clementev. Stateof California
t n 1
ê E 40 Cal.3d202 (Cal. t9S5) t1
É . ø
< - L7
T z
( J 9 Clementev. State of California,
.:. < 18 4 0 C a 1 . 3 d 2 0 2 , 2 1C9a l . R p t r4. 4 5 ( C a li.9 8 5 ) j . .. .......
i. -
'y. il
'at¿9¿
T9 Crownover v. Musick
9 C a 1 . 3 d 4 0 5 ( C1a9l 7. 3 ) .......18
20
Freeman v. City of SantaAna
2T 6 8 F . 3 d1 1 8 0 ( 9 d ' C1i r9. 9 5 ) .......19
22 G.K. Ltd. Travelv. City of Lake Osweso
4 3 6 F . 3Ld0 6 4 Q C
t ti r . 2 0 0 6 ) . " . . . . ...:.. .........7
23
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons
24 24Cal.4th468(Ca1.2000) ........ i8
25 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness,Inc.
452U.S.640(1e81)... . . . . 1 .1 4 . 1 s
26
Jewsfor Jesus,Inc. v. Port of Portland
27 200s WL 1109698(D.Or.200s) . . . . . 16.17
28 -ii-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICE
OF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
I 2061\0002\877766.4
 I TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
(Continued)

a
J

Johnson v. Robison
4 41sU.S.36T(1e74)
5 Johnson v. Robison,
41s U.S. 361,S.Cr.1160,39 L.Ed.2d,38g
(1974)
6 . . .22
Los Ang^eles
Alliance_for Survwal v. City of Los Angeles
-
22Cal.4th352(Cat.2000)
..... iB
8 Madsen v. Boise State (Jniversitv
976F.2d r2I9 (9thCir. {sez¡
9 . T6.L7
Mlikotin v. Cíty of Los Angeles
10 6 4 3 F . 2 d 6 5 2 1õ9i'rh. t e a t ¡ .......23
11 Morris v. Municìpal Court
32 CaL3d553(Cat.I9BZ)
z.= L2 l8
O =
T <
L ô P
Nordykev. King
r v ã
ur3
t3 319F.3dt 185(9'hCir.2003)
t 9 ¿
I4 One World One Famiþ
Noy r. City and County of Honolulu
2 O
1 ; Â
O y j
ø t *
76F.3d 1009 (9'hCir. 199ô
l - V
o _ o
15
People v. Shuey
-== Í L6
<n1 13 Cal.3d835 (Cat. Lgjs)
o k 11
É,ø
<
- T zt
T7 People v. Shuey,
( J 9 13 Cal.3d835,120Cat.Rptr.83(Cal. tg75)
.,N a 18 1t
\ .Y. PTI, Inc. v. Phílip Morris, Inc.
ú9¿ 19 100F.Supp
.2d II79 (C.D.Cal.2000) t0
20 Snyder v. Massachusetts
2 9 1U . S e
. 7( 1 9 3 4 )
2T .......22
Snyder v. Mossachusetts.
22 2 9 1U . S . 9 7 , 5 S
4 . C r . 3 3(01 9 3 4 ) 22
23 SpoknneArcade, Inc. v. Citv of Spokane
7s F.3d663 (9thCir. ré16¡ . . . . 10. 1l
24
Stockton Theatres,Inc. v. palermo
25 4 7 C a L . 2 d 4 6 9 ( Cta9ls. 6 ) .......ll
26 Stockton Theatres,Inc. v. palermo.
47 Ca1.2d469,304p.2d7 (Cal. 1956)
27 11

28
-fl1-
DEFENDANTS'NorIcE
oF MorIoN ANDMorroN FoRsuMMAny ruocprpNT oN pLATNTTFFS'EìRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
1206t\0002\877766.4
 I TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
2
a PAGE(S)
J

TeenRanchv. Udow
4 3 8 9 F . S u p p . 2 d 8( W
2 7. D . M i c h . 2 0 0 5 ) ......22
5 ThePitt Newsv- Fisher
215F.3d354(3'dCir.2000) . . . li
6
UnitedMine Workersv. Gibbs
7 388U.S.7Ts(1966)
8 United Statesv. Alisal Water Corp.
431 F.3d 643(9'hCir. 2005)
9
United Statesv. O'Brien
10 3e1 U.S. 367 (1968) L-3,6-9,13
1 ,g
11 Vancev. Bradley
440 U.S. e3 (1979)
z.= T2
O =
(n? virginia PharmacyBoard v. virginía citizensconsumercouncil
r v ¿
rJJ 3
13 4 2 5U .S .7 4 8(1 9 7 6 ).. . . . . l/l
l l

r 9 ;
2 . 9 l4 lltard v. Rock Against Racism
O V
U),: 4 e 1U . S . 7 8( 119 8 e ) .......e
15
k Y Washingtonv. Glucltsberg,
_= = Í 16
t n S 521 U.S. 702, 117S.Ct.2258,138L.Ed.2d772 (1,997) . . . . 22
a k
M . q
< Zà L7 WesfernStatesPaving^Co.y. Iïqhington StateDept. of Transp.
T
( J 9 407 F.3d.983(9thCir. 2005) . . . . . a/1
z.a
- - + 18
,. ' ¡r. Wine &. Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island
V¿Va. 19 418 F.3d36 (1'tCir. 2005)

20

2L STATUTES:
22 27 C.F.R.g 478.100(b)
(re88) t2
23 3 9 1U . S . , 3 7 6
24 468U.S.,295.
25 CaliforniaPenalCode:
26 Section12071(bX1XB) t2
27 Section(a)(1)(A)& (E) 25
28
-lv-
DEFENDANTS'
NOTICEoF MorIoN ANDMorroN FoRsuMMARyruocveur oN pLAINTTFFS'THIR;
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
1206t\0002\877766.4
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
2
I
PAGE(S)
California Penal Code: (Continued)
4
Section1202L 25
5
Section12050 25
6
Section12050(a)(
1)(A) 25
Section 12050(d) 25
8
Section12051(a)(1) 24
9
F e d e r a l R u l eosf C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 5 6 ( f ) ........3
10

11
z.= T2
o Ë
-( r s9
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13
c 9 ¿
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Os'
c n :
15
k *
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É

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q

à t7
T Z
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18
)
. , t
r.{¿ t9
20

21.

22

23

24

25

26

27

28
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLATNT
1206t\0002\87'7766.4
 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES2
2
a
J I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4 In the wake of a shooting on the Alameda County ("County'') Fairgroundson July 4,

5 1998'the County adoptedOrdinanceNo. 0-2000-22 ("Ordinance")banningthe possession

of
6 firearms on County property. Alarmed not only by this holiday shooting in a crowded venue,
but
also by the recentnumber of gunshotdeathsand,injuries within its borders,the County sought
to
I reducethe risk of gun violence on its own properry.

9 Plaintifß, the operatorsof tradeshowsat which thousandsof guns are displayedand sold,

10 respondedswiftly by filing this lawsuit,now winnowed to as-appliedfree expressionand equal

11 protection claims. In rushing to court, plaintiffs rebuffed multiple invitations of the Alameda
z.= t2 County Fair Association to explain how plaintifß would conduct their shows und,erthe
O =
T <
(.rIP
t v ¿
r ! 3
13 Ordinance. Plaintiffs insteadclaimedit "impossible" to operatea"profitable gunshow,,under
t 5 ¿
z.? T4 the Ordinance. Neither the U.S. Constitutionnor the California Constitutionrecognizesany right
oyj
(n*
j - Y 15 to conducta profitable enterprise.The governingcaseauthoritiesexpresslystatethat the
< o
-=È f 16 financial impact of a regulation has no place in a constitutional analysis of that regulation.
<n1
Ê k
É.ø
< àz
--f-
L7 Accordingly, plaintiffs must first demonstratehow they would conduct their trade showsunder
( J 9
18 the Ordinance,and must do so before bringing an as-appliedconstitutional challengein court.
.U
7¿V¿ 1,9 otherwise, plaintiffs have no standingto maintain this lawsuit.

20 Aside from plaintiffs' lack of standing,the applicationof the Ordinanceto plaintifß

2l passesconstitutionalmusterunderthe four-factorinquiry set forth in United Statesv. O'Brien,

22 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673,20 L.Ed.2d672 (1965). The Ordinanceis within the constitutional
ôa
¿J power of the County; the Ordinance furthers the important governmentalinterest of reducinggun

24 deathsand injuries; that governmentalinterestis unrelatedto the suppressionof free expression;

25
' The County
26 earlier filed a Motion for SummaryJudgmentfor hearingon April 25,2006.
Plaintifß soughta cbntinuanceof the hearingund;;F.d.CÞ."s0(Ð on tft" grói"¿ thåt they'
required more time discovery. fne Court granted thè'requestãnd vacatedthe
27 lo^^co¡nplete
hearingdate. Plaintiffs, however,did noi propou"d ani additionaldiicovery on the Countyafter
the Court vacatedthe hearine date.
28 -3-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 1 and the incidental restriction on plaintifß' alleged free expressionrights is no greaterthan

2 necessaryto further that interest. For thesereasons,the Ordinanceis valid under both
the federal
a
J and California constitutions.

4 Separately,the application of the Ordinance to plaintifß constitutesa reasonabletime,

5 place or manner restriction. The Ordinance is applied without referenceto the

content of
6 plaintifß' expression(assumingany); the ordinance servesthe important governmental
interest
7 of reducing gun deathsand injuries; and the Ordinance leavesopen ample alternative
chan¡rels
8 for plaintifß to expressthemselves. Courts have upheld regulations under both the federal
and
9 Californi a constitutions using this analysis.

10 Plaintiffs' as-appliedequalprotectionclaim fails for two separateand independent

11 reasons.First, the groupsto which plaintiffs comparethemselvesare not similarly

situatedto
z = T2 plaintiffs. Second,any difference in treatmentbetweenplaintiffs and the other groups
O Ë is
- s
(/¡ P
r v a
rrJ 3
13 reasonablebecauseit is directly relatedto the centralgoal of the Ordinance.
c 9 ¿
z,? I4 The last part of plaintifß' equalprotectionclaim is a facial challengeto the Ordinance's
o n ':i
u)
15 narrov/ exception for personslicensedto carry firearms. Plaintiffs cannot meet
k E their burden of
_= = i L6 showing that under no circumstancescould the exceptionbe validly applied.
<¡t I
Õ k
É

<
.

t
q
t7 The City is entitledto judgment as a matterof law on plaintifß' Third Amended
T z
( J 9
ts
18 Complaint.
- v .
Eþ. t9 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

20 On August 17, 1999,the AlamedaCounty Board of Supervisorsadoptedan ordinance

2l making illegal the possessionof firearmson County property. Nordyke v. King,3 19

F.3d I l g5,
22 1188(9'h Cir.2003); Seealso Third AmendedComplaint ("TAC") at 40. On Septemb
fl er Zg,
23 1999,the Board of Supervisorsamendedthe original ordinanceby adoptingOrdinance

24 No. 0-2000-22 (hereafter"Ordinance") (a copy of which is attachedhere as Ex. A). The

25 Ordinanceprohibits possessionof firearmsand ammunitionon County property (Ex. A,

26 subd.(b)).

27 The importantpublic safetyconcernunderlyingthe Ordinanceis statedin the findingsof

28
-4-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061\0002\8'17766.4
 1 the Board of Supervisors:

2 "The Board of Supervisorsfinds tlat gunshot_fatalitiesand injuries are of epidemic

proportionsin AlamedaCounty. Durlng the first five yearsoithe 1990's879
a
J homicides were coÍrmitted usiäg firearñrs,and an addít¡t" l1,aÃz uí"ii*, *"."
hospitalize$ sunshot injuriðs. Firearms are the leading of ãLutn among
/1
1 young people1t|
b:l*991$t9 9g9sof 15 and 24 in AlamedaCóunty. "*rc BetweenJuly 1]
1996 and June 30, 1997, 136 iuvenileswere arrestedin Oaklaná for gun-relateá
5 offenses. On July 4, 1998a shooting incident on the Atameda Cóurriy Èaitgtounas
resultedin severalgunshotwounds,ãtherinjuries ana pánicãmãrg ãii goers.
6 Prohibiting the possessionof firearmj on Cõunty ptop"tty *iiip.òäãti íhe public
health and safety_bycontributing_tothe reductioi ärgunrírot iuärities ano iri¡uries
"7
in the County." [Ex. A, subd. (a)]

8 The County has filed a separateRequestfor Judicial Notice of the Ordinanceand

its
9 findings- The Declarationof then-Sergeant
JamesKnudsenfiled September2g,1999, and,
10 attachedhere for the Court's convenience,details the aftermath of the shooting
at the Countv
11 Fairgrounds on July 4, L998.
z.= t2
O = After plaintiffs claimed that they could not profitably conduct their trad,eshows under
. . f < the
L Ô P
r v & 13 Ordinance,the GeneralManager of the Alameda County Fairgroundsrequestedin
LlJ3 writing on
L 9 ¿
-a o T4 September7, T999that plaintiffs explain how they would conduct their trade
; ;
show at the
O i
q n =
15 Alameda County Fairgrounds(Ex. B; Declarationof Rick K. Pickering at
k E 113). plaintiffs'
-== i 1.6 counselrespondedin writing one week later that it "will not be practicalor profitable,,
<¡l a to provide
Õ k
É . ø 1 n
< zì L I the requestedwritten plan (Ex. C; Pickeringdecl-at 4).3 Approximately one
T !f month later,
( J 9
18 plaintifß' counsel again declined to provide an explanation: "I cannot
find any languagethat
'i
D.
'^2Ya
L9 requires them to submit a written plan such as the one you requested"(Ex.
D; pickering decl. at
20 J[5)' After this Court refusedon November 3,1999 to enjoin enforcementof the Ordinance,
2I plaintifß were notified that until they demonstratedcompliancewith the
ordinance,the Alameda
22 County Fair Associationcould not reservespacefor plaintifß' trade shows(Ex. pickering
E;
23 clecl'at fl 6). To date,plaintiffs havencvcr explainedhow they w<lulclconduct
their eventat the
24 County Fairgroundsconsistentwith the County's Ordinance(pickering decl. at\7).

25 In addition to the brief factualbackgroundset forth above,a few additionalundisputed

26
3 Mr. Kilmer
27 admittedthe authenticityof this letter in his declarationdatedSeptember30,
1999,filed in supportof plaintiffs' unsuccessfulapplicationfor a restrainingorder uttä u.t
injunction.
28
-5-
DEFENDANTS,NoTICEoFMoTIoNANDMoTIoNFoRSUMMARYJ
AMENDED COMPLAINT
1206t\0002\877766.4
 1 facts are introduced below as they becomerelevant to the analysis.

2 TII. ARGUMENT
a
J

5 The Counfy hasnot yet appliedits Ordinanceto plaintiffs' tradeshowsbecause,as will be

6 explained fuither below, plaintifß have refusedto provide the information necessaryfor

determining how theirtrade shows may be held under the Ordinance. The Court should

I neverthelessuphold the Ordinanceas appliedto plaintifß. The OrdinancereadilypassesFirst

9 Amendmentmusterbasedon the Court's earlierdiscussionof United Statesv. O'Brien,391

U.S.
10 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673,20 L.Ed.zd 672 (1968)("O'Brien"), in its Orderdenyinginjunctiverelief.

11
z.= T2 I. The County's important interest in protecting thepublic justifies any incidental
(_,, Ê
- <
ø r P
( v ¿
r.! 3
T3 limitation on plaintiffs' expressiveconduct resultingfrom the ordinance.
c9¿
2.3 1.4 Plaintifß speculatein the TAC that their possessionof firearïns on County property
Oni
(n\
l---: V
< _ È
15 during their "gun shows" conveysa political messagethat otherswill understand.Thus,
-== i t6 plaintiffs concludethat possessingf,rrearmsis protectedexpressiveconduct. That conclusion
<tl 1
| J <
É . q
1',7 doesnot assistplaintiffs, as the County now explains.a
< à
- T Z
( J 9
- r
18 The SupremeCourt iteratedin O'Brien: "This Court has held that when 'speech,and
Ð.
7¿9¿ 1,9 'nonspeech'
elementsare combinedin the samecourseof conduct,a sufficiently important

20 governmentalinterestin regulatingthe nonspeechelementcanjustify incidentallimitations

on
2l First Amendmentfreedoms." 391 U.S. at376. As this Court recognizedin its November3,

22 1999order fatp.7] ("Order") denyinginjunctive relief, a governmentregulationis constitutional

aa
¿J even though it incidentally limits speech"[1] if it is within the constitutionalpower of the

24

25 4 Plaintifß
recentlyserved^gpon the County (1) a host of selÊservingdeclarations
executedby-yariousof the.plaintiffq (2) a video rõpioãuctionof interviewJof other individuals,
26 and (3).an alleged-"expert's"report. ihe declaratiôns,interviewi u"a purport to
reveal "messages"that gun posiessionallegedly.onuéyr. AII of these"*p.Jti"pott
itêms areirrelevant
27 becausethe County assumeifor purposesõf tnis motioí that the possessionof a gun hassome
communicative aspect,thus triggèring the O'Brien analysis.
28 -6-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
t206t\0002\877766.4
 I Govemment; [2] if it furthers an important or substantialgovemmental interest;
[3] if the
2 governmentalinterestis urrelated to the suppressionof free expression;andl4lif the incidental

J restriction on allegedFirst Amendment freedomsis no greaterthan is essentialto the furtherance

4 of that interest."391 U.S. at377.

5 This Court already concludedthat the four-prong O'Brien test is satisfied. See Order at

6 pp. 7-8. With respectto the first O'Brien factor,the County's ban on the possessionof firearms

7 on County property is within the County's constitutional police power and plaintiffs have never

8 disputedthat.

9 Turning to the secondfactor, the Ordinancebanning possessionof firearms on County

10 property furthers the sameimportant public health and safety interest which this Court aLready

11 has recognized: reducing the risk of gunshot fatalities and injuries in the County. See Order at
z.= L2 p. 7. The purposeof the Ordinanceis clear on its face:
O =
- #
c ô P
r v ¿
ur3
13 "The Board of Supervisorsfinds that gunshot fatalities and injuries are of
o = -"pt¿*i"_proportions in Alameda County. During the first five yearsof the
= 2 t4 1990's 879 homicides were committed úsing fireãrms, and an additional T,647
O i victims were.hospitalizedwith gunshotinjuães. Fireárms are the leading
tt) =
15 causeof death among young people betwéenthe agesof 15 and 24 in Alámeda
k E
_= = Í Çoy!Y; BetweenJuly 1, 1996añd June30, 1997:ß1juveniles were arrested
t n J
T6 in Oaklandfor gun-relatedoffenses. On luiy 4, tqgg a snootingincidenton
ô E the Alameda County Fairgroundsresultedin severalgunshot wõunds, other
M , ø
< àz I7 injuries and panic among fair goers. Prohibiting the
-1 iossessio" ofi"Lurïns on
( J 9 County property will promotg.tþe public healthãnd räf"ty by contributing to
i ,
18 the reduction of gunshot fatalities ànd iniuries in the Cou-ntí."
,,- D. (Ex. A, subd.(a)).
V{¿ 19
"[T]hose challenging the legislativejudgment must convince the court that the legislative
20
facts on which the classification ts apparently basedcould not reasonablybe conceivedto be true
2T
by the governmentaldecisionmaker."vancev. Bradley,440 U.S. 93, rl1, 99 S.Ct. g3g,59
22
L.Ed-zd 17l (1979) (emphasisadded). Courtserectsuch a high hurdle for constitutional
ZJ
plaintiffs because"[courts] generallydefer to the legislativebody passingthe law in determining
24
whether the government's ends are advancedby a regulation." G.K. Ltd. Travel v. CÌty of Lake
25
Oswego,436F.3d 1064,1073(gthCir. 2006).
26
As the face of the Ordinancemakesclear,firearmswere involved in over 2,000deaths
27
and injuries in Alameda County during a f:e-year period (Igg0-ßg5) beforethe adoptionof the
28

AMENDED COMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 I Ordinance. Furthermore,during the IndependenceDay celebration on July 4, Iggg,several

2 people sustainedgunshotwounds on the sameFairgroundswhere plaintiffs hold their

trade
J shows. It is reasonablefor a legislator to conclude that banning the possessionof firearms
on
4 County property will reducethe risk of deathsand injuries attributed to guns. This Court should

5 defer to the reasonedjudgment of the County's Board of Supervisorson that issue.

6 V/ith respectto the third O'Brien factor, this Court already found that the County's

Ordinanceis unrelatedto the suppressionof free expression- See Order at pp. 8-9. The
Court
8 correctly determinedthat the comments of a County Supervisorcannot serve as a basis for

9 concluding that the Ordinance suppressesfree expression. ,S¿eOrder at pp. 8-9. The Court
may
10 not considerthe motives of individual legislatorsin evaluatingthe legality of legislativeaction.

11 Indeed,the Court aptly noted in its earlier Order denyinginjunctive relief that courts',.will
not
z.= t2 strike down an otherwiseconstitutionalstatuteon the basisof an allegedillicit legislative
O =
- <
<tr P
r v ¿
U J 3
13 motive."'Orderat p.9,lines 1-2,quotingO'Brien,391U.S. at 3g3.
t 9 ¿
-
a
o
=
1,4 Whether a statutesuppressesfree expressionmust be determined, therefore,without
oYi
<n\
15 regardto the motives of the legislators who voted to adopt it. Here, the Ordinanceseeks
k E to
-== i 1,6 protect the public health and safety without regard,to the suppressionof speech. See Ord.erat
<na
o k
É.ø
< ì
- T z
T7 p' 8, lines 10-11. A ban onPosse.s.s
ion of ftrearmson County property doesnot in anyway
( J 9
18 interfere with plaintiffs' right to voice their views about guns, or about whether there is
'--g or should
ñ{. t9 be a right to own guns, or about any other topic related to guns (or not). The Ordinance
simply
20 doesnot regulate in any way what plaintiffs may or may not say when they visit County property.

2T The fourth and final O'Brien factor - that the incidental restriction on speechbe no

22 gteaterthanis essentialto fuither the government'sinterest- also is satisfied.

At the outset,this
^ 1
¿) factor assumessomerestrictionon speech.But as this Court observedearlier,the Ordinance
here
24 does not restrict or suppressspeechat all and, therefore,the fourth factor is not implicated.
See
25 Orderat p. 9, lines 12-14.

26 Furthermore,even assumingsome incidental restriction on speech,the Ordinanceis

27 narrowly tailored to achieve the important govemmental interest of protecting public safety
at
28
-8-
DEFENDANTS'
NorIcE oF MoÏoN ANDMorroN FoR suMMARy ruocueNr oN pLAINTIFFS;ìffi
AMENDED COMPLAINT
t206r\0002\877766.4
 I public events. As the Court observedin its previous Order, severalpotentially less onerous

2 alternativessuchas requiring the licensingor registrationof weaponsto be possessed

in public,
a
J arepreemptedbyCalifomialaw.
SeeOrder atp.g,linesg-11. Itisdifficulttoconceiveof a
4 non-preemptedway to prevent fuither ittjury from firearms on County property that is more

5 narrow than prohibiting the possessionof firearms on county property.

6 As all four O'Brien elementsare satisf,red,the Ordinance, even if it were to incidentally

impact speechat all (and it doesnot), is a justifiable incidentallimitation becauseit servesan

8 important governmentalinterest by regulating non-speechpossessionof firearïns on County

9 property. Plaintifß' First Claim for relief for violations of the First Amendment fails as amatter

i0 of law, and the County is entitled to judgment on that claim.

l1 h tryrng to avoid O'BrÌ.en s fatal impact, ptaintiffs will argue that the Ordinancehas not
z.= t2
( J = actually reducedthe risk of crime at gun shows. But the degreeto which the Ordinancehas or
Ø l P
l v -
r ! 3
13 hasnot achievedthe County's goal at gun showshasno place in a constitutionalanalysis. The
c 9 i
z.= t4 County's important governmentalinterest in reducing gun violence need not be tetheredto
O ø
v ) l
l - ¿ 15 plaintiffs'individual circumstances.,SeeClarkv. Comm.þr CreativeNon-Violenc¿,468U.S.
< _
_= =T 16 288,296-297,104 S.Ct. 3065, 82L.Ed.2d22l (1,984)(ín as-applted challengeto regulation
u1 =
ô k
E . ø
< - t7 prohibiting sleepingovernightin a federalpark, "the validity of th[e] regulationneednot be
- Z
( J p
18 judged solely by referenceto the demonstrationat hand"); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 49I
"rë
V¿9¿ t9 U'S. 781, 801, 109 S.Ct.2746,105L.Ed.2d661 (1989)(emphasisadded)(evenif challengeto

20 rnunicipalnoiseregulationwas an as-appliedchallenge,city's justification for regulationwould

2L be upheldbecause"the validity of the regulationdependson the relation it bearsto the overall

22 problem the govemment seeksto correct, not on the extent to which itfurthers the government's

23 interestsin an individual case.");One'tí/orld OneFamily Now v. City and Countyof Honolulu,

24 76 F.3d 1009, 1013n.6 (9thCir. 1996)(citing above-quotedlanguage in Ward) (in defending

25 againstas-appliedchallengeto ordinancebanning sale of message-bearingshirts on city streets,

26 the validity of the ordinancedid not dependon the extent to which it furthered the city's interest

27 with regard to plaintiffs' sales,but dependedon the extent to which it furthered the city's overall

28 -9-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
1206r\0002\877766.4
 1 goal of protecting public safety).

2 This Court also has no authority to engagein an after-the-factdeterminationof whether

a
J legislation has bqen "effective" or "successful" in achieving its statedgoal. That type of exercise

4 by thejudiciary would amountto impermissiblysecond-guessing

the wisdom of legislators. See
5 Association of National Advertísersv. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 736 (9thCir. lgg4) (courts should

6 not secondguessa legislativedecision);Charter Commc'ns,Inc. v. County of SantaCruz,Z03

.7
F.Supp.2d1102,1109G\f.D.Cat.
2001) (deference
to legislativeprocessappropriatebecause
8 legislators are far better equippedthan judici ary to amassand evaluateinformation bearing upon

9 legislativequestions);
PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,I00 F.Supp.2dltTg,lZ03 (C.D.Cal.2000)

10 ("it is not the province of the courtsto second-guess

the wisdom of the legislature'schoice" to
11 protect the health and safety of its citizens by decreasingthe supply of available cigarettes).
z.= T2 Thus, the County's Ordinancebaruringpossessionof firearms on County property is valid
o =
:trÍ
ø r P
r v &
r.rJ 3
L3 if at the time the Ordinance was adopted, the County reasonablyconcluded that it could achieve
t 9 ¿
z.? L4 its statedgoal. Basedon the evidencecited on the face of the Ordinance,a legislator reasonably
oti
< n =
15 could have concludedthat the Ordinancewould help reducethe risk of gun violence.
k E
-== i t6 Moreover, the premise underlying plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is fatally flawed.
<¡t 5
u : <
E ø
< à
' T z
17 Plaintiffs speculateit is "impossible" to conduct a "gun show" under the Ordinance becauseno
( J 9
:- -
. k 18 one will want to attend if there are no firearms, and the decreasein attendancewill substantiallv
..,9
7¿Y¿ T9 reduceplaintifß' profits (TAC atll44,45, 68).
20 The Constitution (and in particular the First Amendment), however, doesnot guarantee

21, plaintiffs a profit on their tradeshows. In SpokaneArcade,Inc. v. City of Spokane,T5 F.3d 663

22 (9'hCir. 1996),plaintiffs challengedan ordinanceregulating adult arcades. Id. at 664-665.

^a
LJ Plaintiffs arguedthat the ordinance"would severelydecrease
ftheir] profitability." Id at 665.
24 The Ninth Circuit discountedthis claim as "irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis." Id. at

25 665. The First Amendmentis concernedonly with "whether a challengedprovision prohibits

26 entry into a market where the aggrievedparty might exerciseher rights, and distinguishesthis

27 inquiry from any examination of successwithin the market at issue." Id. at 666. "[I]n the

28 -10-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
t206r\0002\877766.4
 1 absenceof any absolutebar to the market it is irrelevantwhether'[a regulation]will resuit in
2 lost profits, higher overheadcosts,or even prove to be commercially unfeasiblefor an adult

J business.'[citations.]"Id. at 666. "Evenif the costsof compliancewere so greatthat World

4 Video would be forced out of business,the ordinancesdo not pose any intrinsic limitation on the

5 operation of the arcades,but merely increaseWorld Video's vulnerabilitv to such market

6 forces. . ." Id. at 667.

.|
Other circuits agreewith the Ninth Circuit on this point of law. See Wine & Spirits

8 Retailers,Inc. v. RhodeIsland,4l8 F.3d 36,47 (1't Cir. 2005) ("[plaintiff s] real complaintis

9 that [the statute] will have the incidental effect of suppressingor eliminating the market demand

t0 for the particular type of businessadvice that [plaintiff] offers . . . . That circumstancedoesnot

l1 suffice to hoist the red flag of constitutional breach: the First Amendment does not guaranteethat
z.= t2 speechwill be profitable to the speakeror desirableto its intendedaudience.");Thepitt Newsv.
( J Ë

U ) P
É .

LrJ 3
d 13 Fisher, 2I5 F.3d 354, 366 (3'dCir. 2000) ("'[E]conomic loss . . . doesnot constitutea first
t 9 ¿
z.= t4 amendmentinjury. The inquiry for First Amendment purposesis not concemedwith economic
o rí
q n E
15 impact; tather, it looks only to the effect of [an] ordinanceupon freedom of expression.'
k Y
_= = i T6
<¡> a [citations.]") (internalquotationsomitted.).Accordingly, plaintifß' concernsthat they cannot
ê k
M , ø
< ì L7 profitably conducta "gun show" are irrelevantto any constitutionalanalysis.s
T z
( J 9
- ,- k
l
18 Furthermore, "gun shows" are def,rnedunder federal and state law without referenceto
.-9
Xt-{¿. L9 firearms sales or vendors. Under federal and California law, a "gun show" is "a.function
20
' Plaintiffs
2L 1ake.ryuglrof the passingobservation s rn Norclykev. King, Z2gF.3d,1266, '
l?9q.(9:'cir. 2000), .an!.i2Nqrdytce i. t<tn{,27cat. tiB7s,BBz,"n 8 c;i.Rîrr.2d.76r (cal.
2002),thatit would be difficutt to conductäprofitablegunrho* without guris. SeeTAC at p. 9,
22 n. 2. Thoseobservations, however,arenot germaneto lhe constitutionalq"uestions beforethe
ôô Court.Furthermore,thoseobservations areiot, asplaintiffs erroneouslyuil"g" (TAC at\ 4i),
ZJ
"the law of the case." The "law of the case-_doctrine preservesthroughouttñe ittigation'iegai
a/1
LA
conclusions reachedby anappellate goury.Wåenanappellate court'rstatesin itsãfiniòn ã
principleor rule of lu* n-ecesiary to thedecision,thatiriincipleor rule ¡ecomesthe law of the
caseandmustbe to thro_ugho_ut its subsequenfprogress. . ."' Clementev. Stateoj
25 "{4"1q{
a_0
Çglrf9ry,to, Çq1,3d 20??zLL,2t9 car.Rprr. ++i lcat^.19i5),citingrioptn r. ihu"y, tícat.:¿
831,841, 120Cal'Rptr.83
26 çal. 1975).Tiredoctriàedoesnóí applito observatiottr
plaintiffscanconducta profitable
(i... *fråtrt.t
gunshow)superfluous to thedecision."The discuòsion or
determination of a poinfnotnecessary to thé dispositionof a questio"tft"t is ãàcisiveof the
27
lPleal is generally_rgegdgd asobiterdictumandnot asthe law of the case." StocktonTheatres,
Inc. v. Palermo,47 Cal.2d469,474, 304p.Zd7 (Cal. 1956).
28 -11-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061
\0002\877766.4
 1 sponsoredby any national, stateor local organization,devotedto the collection, competitive use,
a
L or other sporting use of firearms, or an organizationor associationthat sponsorsfunctions

J devoted to the collection, competitive use, or other sporting use of firearms in the community."

4 27 C.F.R. $ 478.100(b)(1988);seealso Cal. PenalCode g 12071(bX1)(B)(adoptingfederal

5 definition by reference). Thesecontrolling statutesdo not require, or even encourage,that "gun

6 shows" be venuesfor firearms vendors or firearms sales. The statutesare silent on theseissues.

Thus, the heart of plaintifß' lawsuit - that the Ordinancehas renderedtheir "gun shows"

8 unprofitable - is born of a financial concern not even recognizedby the federal and state

9 definitions of "gun shows."

10 The featuresofplaintiffs' trade shows identified in their own TAC demonstratethat it ¿s

11 possible for plaintiffs to conduct their trade shows consistentwith the Ordinance. The TAC lists
z . =
O = L L
1 1 15 primary purposesfor plaintiffs ' tradeshows:
- <
U ) ?
u Q l J "[1] To obtainpoliticat information regardingmy ConstitutionalRights,
rrru -bear
t 9 ¿ including but not limited to the right toleep ãnd firearms; t2l To
- 3
a =
1 4 assemblewith other individuals and oryarlàations to discussthe issuesand
O ñ genping legislatio_nthat effect my Constitutional Rights, including but not
P Þ
< -
t5 limited t^o,myyght to own, possêss,and trade fireaimsi[3] To oñtain the
latest information regarding
= i
L6 -the.safe,responsibleand lawfül ownership and,
(, :i
storageof firearms;l+] fg obtain the latèst information regarding the firearms
U < industry.,with specific referenceto_developmentsin technõlogy aîd safety;
É, ø 1- ' '[S]'
<
- Z
à rl To purchaseand./orsell firearms, hrearm âccessories.ammutrÏiion. safetv
+
( J 9
e
devicesand_ gun safes;[6] To petition political cand,idates,both thóseelécted
:-ã 18 and curently campaigning,on issuesof governmentpolicy;
[7] To obtain
. t . information from þolitical candidates,bo-ththosein om""'u.t¿äampaigning,
7.Y 19 on issuesof governmentpolicy; [8] To obtain and|oroffer for sateirisióricãi
and philosophic information from organizationssympatheticto, but not
20 directly involved, with firearms issues;[9] To oUtäinmørmatión and engage
in the trade.of sta_mps and_coins;t10l Tò óbtaitt information and engageinîn.
2T trade of knives;.[11] To obtain inlormation and engagein the tradeöf"antiques
and./orother collectibles;[12] T9 obtain informatiõn-*d in the tradeof
22 historical and military mernoiabilia;[13] To obtain informaiioã
"ngug"and engagein
the tradeof political suchàs: 6uttons,bumper-stickers,t-shirt"s,"
^a _souvenirs
L) books and signg¡[1a] To circulateand sign petitions for stateaná local
initiatives;_[and][15] To engagein the feìtowstripand affiliation of like-
24 minded individualsin a market-placeof ideasanä products,and to enjoy our
common cultureand collective heritage." (TAC afl sl (a) through (õ)).
25

26 All of these15 purposesmay be fulfilled wìthout thepresenceof afirearm. The only

27 listed purposefor which the presenceof a firearm may be preferableis the purchaseand saleof

28 -12-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
t206t\0002\877766.4
 I that firearm. More importantly, the Ordinancecan accommordate
plaintifß' statedgoals; the
2 Ordinancecontainsan exceptionto the ban on possessionof firearms,allowing the following
a
J activities on County property: "The possessionof a firearm by an authorizedparticipant
in a
-A motion picture, television, video, danceor theatrical production or event,provided that
when
5 such firearm is not in the actual possessionof the authorizedparticipant, it is secured prevent
to
6 unauthorizeduse." (Ex. A, subd.(f(a)). The unqualifiedrvord "event" preserves
the possibility
- that any number of eventsmay satisfy the exception. The Alameda County Fair Association
has
8 approvedeventsother than motion picture,television,video, danceand theatricalproductions

9 where authorizedparticipantshave possessedfirearms, and those firearms have been

secured
10 when not in the actualpossessionof the participant(,seepickering decl. at 13).
lJ
11 Accordingly, plaintifß could engagein any number of activities using firearms - for
z.= 12 - as permittedby the Ordinance'sexpressexception
examplehistoricalre-enactments
O = to the ban
(/1 P
-e
(v
L¡J 3
13 (Ex. A, subd.(f(a)). The Ordinance,therefore,may be appliedin such awayas
to allow
t 5 ¿
- - o 1.4 plaintifß to conduct their trade shows at the county Fairgrounds.
O #
cr1 *
15 But plaintiffs have chosennot to conduct their trade shows at the County Fairgrounds.
= Y
_= =i t6 Plaintiffs want thousandsof attendees(TAC at 45) to mill about, pick up thousands
c n 5 fl of firearms
Õ k
M , ø
< à T7 (TAC at tf 60.9), handle them, exchangethem back and forth with eachother
and with dealers,
)_¿
L J 9
,/^: Q 18 becausethey believethat this activity will maximize theirprofits. That activity is inconsistent
U
4Y¿. t9 with the Ordinance'sexceptionrequiring firearmsto be securedwhen not in someone,s

20 immediatepossession(Ex. A, subd.(f(a)). Strippedto its core,plaintiffs' disagreement

with the
2T Ordinance is not that it bans their trade shows entirely or even in substantial part,but that
it does
22 not allow plaintifß to have the type of "gun show" (thousandsof fireanns present)
that makes
aa
¿) the most profit. The First Amendmentdoesnot provide any such guarantee.

24 The ordinance, as appliedto plaintiffs, must be upheld under o'Brien.

25

26

27 /t/
28
-13-
DEFENDANTS'NorlcE
oF MorIoNANDMorIoNFoRsuMMAniruocueNToNpLAINTIffiRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 1 2- Separatelyand índependently,the County's Ordinance is a reasonabletime,place or

2 manner restriction of plaintiffs' expressiveconduct (assumingany).

a
J A regulationwhich hassomeimpacton speech(evenassumingthe Ordinancedoes)will

4 be upheld as a reasonabletime, place or manner restriction if it was ad,opted"without reference

5 to the content of the regulatedspeech,"if it "servefs] a signif,rcantgovernmentalinterest," and

if
6 it "leave[s] open ample aitemative charurelsfor communication of information." Heffron v. Int,l

soc'yfor KrÌshna consciousness,

1nc.,452u.s. 640,64g,101s.ct. 2559,69 L.Ed,.2d,zgg
8 (1981)' quoting Vtrginia PharmacyBoard v. Virginia CÌtizensConsumerCouncil, 4z5IJ.S.
74g,
9 771',96S.Ct. 1817,48L.F,d.zd346(1976). This Court alreadyhasupheldthe Ordinanceas
a
10 valid time, place or mannerregulation. ,SeeOrder at pp. 9_10.

11 Plaintifß' pre-enforcementas-appliedchallengeto the Ordinanceis similar to the pre-

=.= T2 enforcementas-appliedchallengerejectedin Clark v. Community
O = for Creative Non-Violence, 46g
- é
( , P
r v &
u J 3
13 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct.3065, 82L.Ed.zd22l (1984). There,the Court uphelda regulationthat,
c 5 ¿
2.2 L4 when applied to plaintiff demonstrators,prohibited them from sleepingin a park while they
o i
r¡E
15 campednear the White Houseto call attentionto the plight of the homeless.Id. at289-290. The
k F
_= = i 16 Court found the prohibition to be a reasonabletime, place or mannerregulation. Id. at293-299.
<¡¡ a
u <
É.ø
< à L7 First, the prohibition was content-neutral;it was not appliedto regulatethe plaintifß,
T z
L J 9
18 message.Id- at 295. Similarly,theplain languageof the Ordinanceheredemonstrates
that it is
'.'-!2l
l

T¿9¿. L9 content-neutral. As this Court has held, the Ordinance simply regulatesthe possessionof guns.

20 It doesnot regulatethe contentof plaintifß' expression.Plaintiffs are free to discusswhatever

2T subjectsthey like when on Countyproperty.

22 Second,the prohibition in Clark furtheredthe govemment'ssubstantialinterestin

23 maintaining parks in an attractivecondition, available for all to use. Id. at296. The Court did
.tA
LA not examinewhether the regulationfurtheredthe govemment'sinterestwith respectto plaintifß'

25 desireto sleepovernight in the park: "it is evidentfrom our casesthat the validity of this

26 regulation need not bejudged solely by reference to the dentonstrationat hand." Id. at297

27 (emphasisadded)- The govemmentvalidly could prohibit campingin generalwithout having to

28
-r4-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF MOTIONAND MOTION FOR S{.IMMARYJI.IDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 t justify its regulation in referenceto the demonstrators'particular activity.
Id. at29:..
2 The Ordinance here furthers a significant, and urgent, public purpose:reducingthe risk of

J shootingsand gun violence on County property. This Court statedin its earlier Order denying

4 injunctive relief that this governmentalinterest is all the more compelling under Heffronbecause

5 the activity being regulatedtakesplace at the County's public fairgrounds. Order at p. 10, lines

6 L3-I4. Seealso Nordyke v. King, supra,,27 Cal.4thatp. 882 (Califomia SupremeCourt

observed"a county is given substantialauthority to manageits property, including the most

8 fundamentaldecisionas to how the propertywill be used"). Under Clark,the Countyneednot

9 show that the Ordinance furthers a goveffrmentalinterest in the specific circumstancesof

10 plaintiffs' trade shows.

11 Third, the prohibition on sleepingin Clarkpreservedother avenuesof communication;

z.= l2 the demonstratorsstill were allowed to maintain their syrnbolic tent cities and to maintain shifts
O ;
- f
c ô P
t'v
r ! 3
& 13 of demonstratorsthroughoutthe day and night. 468 U.S. at295. The Ordinancehereleaves
t 9 ¿
z.? 1,4 open ample alternative charurelsof communicationjust by the fact that it doesnot close any
O Y i
t n E
+ v 15 channel of communication. Plaintifß are free to communicate their views about firearms while
-== i I6 on County property. Plaintiffs also are free to communicatetheir views about frrearmswhile
tn5
É.ø
< zt L7 possessingthose firearms on any private property on which plaintiffs may arrangefor their
T
( J p
18 events- Furthermore,a recentvisit to the Nordyke plaintiffs' website- "TS TradeShows"-
\ u .
ñY. 1.9 revealedthat in 2005, the Nordykes held eight gun shows in California- five at the Santa Clara

20 Counfy Fairgroundsin SanJose;one at the ModestoCounty Fairgroundsin Modesto;one at the

2l Glenn County Fairgroundsin Orland; and one at the Agri-Center in Tulare (Ex. F; Declarationof

22 T. PeterPierce at\2). A separatevisit to a websitelisting gun, knife, and hunting showsin

23 California in 2003, 2004 and2005revealed,Z2gun showsin Califomia in 2005 alone(Ex. G;

24 Declaration of T. Peter Pierce at fl 3). Plaintiffs have many alternative forums in which to

25 communicate their views about firearms, both with and without possessingfirearms.

26 The Ordinance'sstatusas a reasonabletime, place or mannerregulationis a separateand

27 independentreasonwhy the County is entitledto judgment as a matter of law on plaintifls' First

28 -i5-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
t2061\0002\877766.4
 I Claim alleging violations of the First Amendment.

2
a
J 3. Plaintffi haveprevented the Countyfrom apptying the Ordinance to their trade shows

4 and, therefore,plaintffi lack standing to assertany constitutional challenge to the Ordinance.

5 A person challenging the government'sapplication of a regulation must first subject

6 himself or herselfto that regulationbeforebringing the as-appliedchallenge.In Madsenv. Boise

State UniversÌty,976F.2d l2I9 (9ù Cir. Igg2), a collegestudentallegeddiscriminationbecause

8 the universify did not offer free handicapparking permits on campusbut provided free non-

9 handicapparking. Id. at 1220. The studentdid not appty for a handicappermit and did not seek

10 a waiver of the handicappermit fee. Nor did he pay the fee and seek a refun¿. Id.

11 The Ninth Circuit held that the studentlacked standing to challengethe handicapparking
z.= T2 permit fee without first subjectinghimself to the required proceduresfor obtaining the permit:
O =
( , P
r v &
ur3
13 "There is a long line of cases,hgyøever,that hold that aplaintiff lacks standingto
c9¿ challenge^arule or policy to which he has not submitted hiil;lf Uy ã.tuuffy
2.3 I4 applyrng for the desiredbenefit. ._.. tïl Requiring aparty to have ácmal\y'
Orl confronted the policy he now challerì[ðs iniourt"has seíeral prudentiafand
< n \
15 practical advantages.To begin with, ît establishesthe existenceof a well-defined
k E conkoversy between the_partie.s.
-== i . . . tf] Requiring a formal application as a
<¡t a
I6 condition for brin-ginga lawsuit also ièrves ihe sa"lutaryobjeitive of ensuringthat
Õ k only thoseindividualswho cannot,resolve their disputáswithout judicial
É . ø
<
- T zì
I7 intervention wind up^in-court.. . tIl Finally, ,"quiring a formal åppiiðãtion as the
( J 9 normal prerequisite for bringing a èàseto cõurt timits îhose who can claim injury
,n-. Q. 18 from a policy-that qay not havð harmed them at all, or that they máy *t hur6
t ' u known about." Madsen, 976 F-2d at 1220-1222. "u"r,
7¿9¿ T9

20 Seealso Jewsfor Jesus,Inc. v. Port of Portland,2}}5 WL 1109698(D.Or. 2005) (plaintiffs did

2I not have standing to bring as-appliedconstitutional challengesto the regulation of speech

22 activities at Portland lnternational Airport becauseplaintiffs did not apply for the permit required

23 to conduct their activities).

'\ /l
LA Plaintifß have not sought permission to conduct their trade shows at the Fairgrounds,

25 consistentwith the Ordinance,despitehaving receivedmultiple invitations to do so. The General

26 Manager of the Alameda County Fairgroundsrequestedin writing on September7, L999 that

27 plaintifß explain how they would conduct their trade show at the Fairgroundsconsistentwith the

28 -16-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR STIMMARYJUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
r206t\0002\877766.4
 1 Ordinance(Ex. B; Pickering decl. at tf 3).

2 Plaintifß' counselrespondedto the request,stating it "will not be practicalor profitable',

a
J to conduct a "gun show" under the Ordinance(Ex. C; Pickering decl. at,lf 4). One month later,

4 plaintifß' counsel agaíndeclinedto provide a plan as to how plaintiffs would conduct a show

5 consistentwith the Ordinance: "I carutotf,rndany languagethat requires them to submit a written

6 plan suchas the one you requested"(Ex. D; Pickeringdecl. at

J[5). After this Court refused.on
November 3, 1999 to enjoin enforcementof the Ordinance,plaintiffs were notified that until they

8 demonstratedhow they would comply with the Ordinance,the Alameda County Fair Association

9 could not reservespacefor plaintiffs' trade shows (Ex. E; pickering decl. at 6).
tf
10 To date,plaintiffs have never provided a plan for conducting their trade shows at the

ll County Fairgroundsconsistentwith the County's Ordinance (Pickering decl. at 7). The County
fl
=.= t2
o = explainedabove in great detail how plaintiffs could hold their eventswithout violating the
T <
U ) P
r v &
rrJ 3
13 Ordinance. Plaintiffs, however, have opted not to conduct their trade shows attheFairsrounds
t 9 ¿
2.2 t4 becauseof financial concerns,and not becauseit is impossibleto do so.
O ø
<¡'l \
15 Thus,in order to mount an as-appliedconstitutionalchallenge,plaintifß must first
k E
-== i 16 provide detailsas to how they would conducttheir trade showsconsistentwith the Ordinance.
t¡t 5
É,ø
< ì T7 Until they do so, the County camot apply the Ordinance to plaintifß, and plaintiffs have no
T z
( J p
^. Z. 18 standingto maintain their "as-applied"free expressionand equalprotectionclaims. Madsen,976
g
7'þ 19 F.Zdat 1220-1222;Jewsfor Jesus,Inc., 2005WL 110969g,p. *6.

20 The County is entitied to judgment on plaintiffs' Third Amended.Complaint for this

2l separateand independentreason.

22

23 B.
24 .
25 If this Court grants summaryjudgment to the County on plaintifß' federal free expression

26 claim, the Court should declineto exerciseany further supplementaljurisdiction over plaintiffs'

27 statelaw free expressionclaim. See UnitedMine Workersv. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,86 S.Ct. 1130.

28 -r7-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FORSUI\4MARYJUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
I 2061\0002\877766.4
 I l'6L-Ed-zd218 (1966). Plaintifß have never even allegedwhich provision of the Califomia

2 Constitution is implicated here.

a
J

4 C.

5 Law.

6 The Califomia SupremeCourt has determined,that free expressionrights guaranteed,

by
7 the California Constitution are not violated unless a personhas been prohibited from speaking.

8 SeeGerawanFarming, Inc. v. Lyons,24 Cal. th468,4g1-4g2,l0l Cal.Rptr.2d 470(CaL2000).

9 As explained above, the Ordinance does not prohibit speechand,is unrelatedto the suppression

10 of free expression. The Ordinancemerely prohibits possessionof firearms on County property.

11 Furthermore,as noted above,the Ordinanceis valid under United Statesv. O'Brien,39l

z.= T2 U.S. 367 (1968),as an incidentallimitation on any expressiveconduct. The CaliforniaSupreme
O =
- Í
{/¡ P
É.æ
r.rr 3
13 Court has squarelyapplied the O'Brien analysis to uphold regulations challengedunder the
r.9 ;
z.= t4 California Constitution- SeeCrownoverv. Musick, g Cal.3d 405, 419-428,107Cal.Rptr.6g1
O ø
(/) a
15 (Cal- 1973) (employing O'Brien analysisto uphold local ordinancesagainst free expression
k E
-== i r6 challengeunder article I, section9 of the California Constitution),ovemrled on othergrounds,
tn3
o k
É.ø
<
--l- -z 17 Morris v. Municipal Court,32 Cal.3d553, 186 Cal.Rptr. 494 (Cal. 1982).6Accordingly,
( J 9
18 O'Brien compelsjudgment for the County under the California Constitution for the samereasons
' . 3
l . _

7¿9¿ t9 it compelsjudgment for the county under the First Amendment.

20 Separatelyand independently,the Ordinance satisfiesthe California Constitution under

2I the sametime, place or manner analysis set forth above. In analyzinglocal ordinancesunder the

22 California Constitution'sguaranteeof free expression,the California SupremeCourt has

23 squarelyappliedthe United StatesSupremeCourt's time, place or manner analysis.See Los

''t /1
LA AngelesAlliancefor Survivalv. City of Los Angeles,22Cal.4th352,364&.n.7,93 Cal.Rptr.2d,r

25 (Cal. 2000) (local regulationsbaruringcertain solicitationsshould be consideredcontentneutral

26
6-l\ I974,J!e
27 year afterCrownover,wasdecided,the protectionsof free expressionwere
removed from article I, section 9 and addedto article I, iectiôn 2 (where they remäin) of the
California Constitution.
28 - 18-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
1206t\Q002\877766.4
 1 for purposesof analysisunder the Califomia Constitution). Accordingly, the abovetime, place

2 or manner analysiscompelsjudgment for the County under the California Constitution for the
a
J samereasonsit compelsjudgment for the counfy under the First Amendment.
A
a

5 D.
6 Claim. Their Claim Fails As A Matter Of Law.

Plaintiffs have no standing to maintain an as-appliedequal protection claim for the same

8 reasonthey lack standingto assertan as-appliedfree expressionclaim - they refuseto subject

9 themselvesto the terms of the Ordinancebasedon the fiction that it is "impossible" for them to

10 comply with the Ordinance.

11 Aside from their lack of standing,plaintifß' equalprotectionclaim fails on the merits.

z.= 12 To establishan equalprotection violation, a plaintiff must show "that the law is applied in a
( f ;
. r <
U1 ?
*e
fv
lrJ 3
13 discriminatory manner or imposesdifferent burdenson different classesof people." Freeman v.
t 9 ¿
-
z
O
;
I4 City of SantaAna,68 F.3d 11g0,11g7(9thCir. 1995).
O n
L n ^
t - Y 15 The first step in the equal protection analysisis to identify how the allegedly offending
< d
_= = f L6 regulation classifiesgroups. Id. at T187. Plaintiffs contendthat the Ordinancehere applies in
<na
Õ ä
É

<
.

' T zì
q
T7 such a way that they and other participants in their trade shows are banned from possessing
( J 9
, ' ' . F
18 firearmson County propertywhile participantsin "a motion picture, television,video, dance,or
',,-_þ
T¿9¿. I9 theatricalproductionor event" are exceptedfrom the ban (Ex. A, subd.(f(a)). Indeed,plaintifß

20 have statedthat if their "gun shows" were included within this exception, they would not have

2l suedthe County (TAC at fl 53).

22 The classificationof groupsis not actionableon an equalprotectiontheory,however,

23 unless the group to which plaintifß belong is sÌmilarly situated to the group againstwhich

24 plaintiffs comparethemselves."Once the plaintiff establishesgovernmentalclassification,

it is
25 necessaryto identify a 'similarly situated'classagainstwhich the plaintiff s classcanbe

26 compared." Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187, citing Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc-, 684F.2d,

27 928, 946 (D.C.Cir. 1982).

28
-19-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FoR SUMMARY JUDGMENToN PLAINTIFE'
Tñi6
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
1206r\0002\877766.4
 I Insofar as plaintifß wish to bring firearms on County property as part of their trade

2 shows,they are not similarly situatedto authorizedparticipantsin "a motion picture, television,

J video, danceor theatrical production or event." Plaintiffs allege that their "gun shows" "bring

4 hundreds,if not thousands,of firearms to one location, where examination is both convenient,

5 and educational" (TAC at ti60.9). These firearms are exhibited, displayed, and sold (TAC at

6 1[ 17)- Plaintiffs also admit that attendanceat eachof their shows at the County Fairgroundsis at
a
leastapproximately4,000 people(TAC at fl 45). Plaintifß also allegethat all potentialbuyers

8 and sellersmust physically examine a firearm before it is sold (TAC at 60.k).

!f
l
9 In sharpcontrast,the Ordinance's exception for "a motion picture, television, video,
I 10 danceor theatrical production or event" allows possessiononly by an authorizedparticipant in
-l

11 the production or event, and not by anyonewho may enter the Fairgroundsto observethe
' ? z

o = T2 production or event. Furthermore,under the Ordinance,when an authorizedparticipant is not in

(.r)P
r v &
rrJ 3
13 actual possessionof the f,trearm,it must be securedto prevent unauthorizeduse. There are no
c 9 ¿
2.2 I4 facts, however, showing that plaintifß and other vendors and patrons at their trade shows secure
O i
U1 .*
15 their firearmsfrom possessionby otherswhen the firearmsare not in their actualpossession.
k E
_= =i t6 Nor would they have any incentive to do so; California law does not require that firearms be
< n A
â k
É . ø
< t 17 securedoutsidethe immediatepossessionof an authorizeduser.
T z
( J 9
- r
E 18 The marked differencesbetweenplaintiffs' shows and the eventsexceptedfrom the
'--þ
7¿Y¿ T9 Ordinance are vividly illustrated by examining the two eventsat the Fairgroundsto which

20 plaintifß seekto comparethemselves- (1) Outdoor and SportsmanShows; and(Z)The Scottish

2T Games(TAC at tf 90).

22 Firearmstypically arenot evenpresentduring the Outdoor and SportsmanShows,held

23 every February (Pickering decl. at'llf 9, 12). In February 2004, during the Outdoor and

24 SportsmanShow, Mr. Pickering observedan exhibitor settingup a display advertisinga future

25 paintball eventat anothervenue(Pickeringdecl. at

1110). The display included a mannequin
26 with gogglesand camouflagegear,holding a paintballrifle strappedin his hand. The County

27 Fair Associationhad not given previouspermissionfor the display (Pickeringdecl. at

fl l0). The
28 -20-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 I paintball rifle was not connectedto any air supply and was not attachedto a paintball cannister

2 (Pickering decl. at 1T10). Furthermore,a paintbalt rifle is not subject to the Ordinance'sban on

J firearms possessionon County property; the Ord.inancedefines a"frreaffi" as a gun from which

4 is expelled "a projectile by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion" (Ex. A,

5 subd. (d)). A paintball rifle doesnot involve expulsion of a projectile by any form of combustion

6 (tickering decl. at ll t0).

-
At the February2005 Outdoor and SportsmanShow, Mr. Pickering observedfour or five

8 people shooting at paper targetswith air-soft guns, not previously approved for use at the show

9 (Pickeringdecl. at 1111). An air-soft gun is a replicaof a pistol or a rifle, is spring-load.ed

and
10 shootsround plastic pellets larger than BBs (Pickering decl. 11). It was determinedthat an
fl
11 air-soft gun did not violate the Ordinance'sprohibition againstfirearms(Pickeringdecl. at
111l).
z.= T2 An air-soft gun falls outside of the Ordinance's def,rnitionof "firearms," and thus outsideof the
O =
- É
( , P
( v æ
rrJ 3
13 prohibition on firearms,beóauseit expelsplastic pelletsnot by the force of any form of
c 9 ¡
z.? I4 combustion, but by the operationof a mechanicalspring (pickering decl. at 1l).
o # 11
L n q
15 The Scottish Gamesinvolve historical re-enactmentsof gun battles that occurredfrom the
k E
_= =i t6 1600sto the 1900s(Pickeringdecl. at 1113). The re-enactments
<¡t 5 involve rifles with blank
Õ k
É . ø
< à L7 cartridges;no aÍlmunition is used (Pickering decl. at 13). A public addressannouncersetsthe
' T z fl
( J 9
18 scenefor the audienceby describing the particular battle being re-enactedand the period in
'
.'-þ
V¿91 T9 history during which the battle occurred (Pickering decl. at 13). Participants are requiredto
1t
20 have the rifles in their actualpossessionand when not in their possession,to securethe rifles

2I (Ex. A, subd. (f(a); Pickeringdecl. at 13). The ScottishGamesfall within the broadexception
11
22 in the Ordinance.
^a
¿) Plaintifß are not similarly situatedto the paintball exhibitor, to the four of five people

24 using air-soft guns, or to those re-enactinghistorical gun battles. First, the paintball gun and the

25 air-soft guns do not fall within the definition of "firearm" in the Ordinance becauseneither

26 involves the expulsionof a projectileby combustion. Second,the participantsin re-enactments

27 of historical gun battles are required either to have the guns in their immediate possessionor

28 -2r-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'
THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
1206t\0002\877766.4
 1 otherwise to securethem so unauthorizedpersonswill not use them. It bearsrepeatingthat
if
2 plaintiffs wished to conduct historical re-enactments,they could do so. But presently
as
a
J constituted- with thousandsof individuals being able to handle firearms without oversight
of
4 any act of possession- plaintiffs' gun shows are not similarly situatedto the other shows

5 plaintifß have identified in attempting to establishan equal protection violation.

The County is
6 entitledto judgment on plaintifß' equalprotectionclaim for this reasonalone.

7 Furthermore,even if plaintiffs were similarly situatedto the operatorsof the Outdoor and

8 SportsmanShows or the Scottish Games,the County need show only a rational basis for

9 distinguishingbetweenplaintifß and the other operators."'[Vy']herethe law classifiespersons

on
10 a non-suspectbasis for the exerciseof liberties which are not fundamentalconstitutional
rights,'
11 the law will be upheld if it rationally relatesto a legitimategovernmentobjective.
[citations.],'
Z . =
o ; l2 Christy v. Hodel,857 F.2d L324, 1331(9'hCir. 1988).?"[T]he governmentmaydistinguish
:trs
( , P
r v ¿
ur3
13 betweengroupsif the distinction 'is reasonable,not arbitrary and restsupon someground
of
t 9 ¿
2.2 T4 differencehaving a fair and substantialrelation to the object of the legislation. . .'
oYi [citation.],,
Ø)*
15 Abboud v. INS,140F.3d g43, B4g(9,hCir. 199g).
k *
_= =i I6
<r¡ 5
7 There
É.ø
t7 is no "fundamental right" at stakehere. The Ninth Circuit in this casehas alreadv
<
T z
à decided that there is no indivi{ryl.rigtrt to possessafrearm, and it n"."iruäty fbú"*;
( J 9 åäËä -
is no such "fundamental right." It is ãoubtful at best tnat poésessionof a fireír''fot
18 .rprérriu"
j¡ so rooted in the traditions and conscienceof the American people and
,þ P"tp_o,,t^",t
"tmplted tn -a,ri8lt
ñY¿ T9 the conc^ept of ordered liberty'' so as to be ranked "fundamental."'Seà lT/ashingtonv.
Glucl<sberg'
521u.s_._7_02:]2r,117
s.c_i.7258,138
L.Ed2d77ztrq9zi(quotrngsnyder-v.
20
Massachusetts,2gl.
U.S.97,105,54S.Ct.330(tSl+¡¡.

2t of a firearm for expressivepurposesconstituted a fundamentalright

t^^.1
(and :+ru^u:^1t^lPo.t-tession
tt does not), the C-ounty'sOrdinance has already
iasied muster under the First Amendñrãnt.
Federal courts have held ururformly when r r.guÍuhon affecting r fu"dñ;;tur
22 Jhat right ru*i"Ë;
First Amendment scrutiny, the regulation needruñriur ã"ty rationãl Uasisre"iew for"equal
^a
¿J
q1*99fi91.purp_oses.
seeJohnsonv.Robison,4l5u.S.36i, 375n.r4,94S.ci 1160,39L.Ed.zd -
t*8:.1:_?l:)^('Unquestionably,
thefreeexerciée
of religionié a tundamental
constltutío"ur
rfitri.
However,since. . . theAct doesnot violate.{ppellee'lrightof freeexerciseof religion,*" fiuì"
24
,.ou|plv the challengedclaslification{forËqualprotection'p".por.rl u stan¿aràof
i:_:::Ti9.3 lo
scruttnystncterthatthetraditionalrationalbasistesf ZeenRànchv. Udbw,'3AlË.Supp.tign
25 ); ,
841.(W.D.Mich.2005)("PlaintifßcontendthattheDãfendants' discriminaióryfteatmenr is
subjectto sfrict scrutinybecausethediscriminatorypgltcvinfringesFirct Ailädment rights.
26 Becausethis Courthasalreadydeterminedtfratpláintifß d; not Ëavea meritoriousFree"speech --^
or FreeExerciseclaim,theirEqualProtectionclaimis subjectto rationalbasisreview.'1.'
27

28
-22-
DEFENDANTS'
NOTICEoF MoTIoN ANDMoTIoN FoR suttarr¿envIuDcMENT oN plnrul¡'r's'86
AMENDED COMPLAINT
t2061\0002\877766.4
 1 Here, the County has made the policy choice through its Ordinanceto reducethe risk
of
2 gun violence on its own property: the Ordinance bans the possession
of fireanns on County
a
J property. The County's decision was made in the wake of a shooting on
County property, and
4 after hundredsof homicides committed with guns within the County's borders.
Any legislator
5 would reasonablyconclude that the risk of gun violence is greaterunder the
circumstancesof
6 plaintiffs' "gun shows" than it is under the circumstancesof one of
the exceptedevents. It is
7 therefore reasonableto apply the firearms ban to an event (1) that has no restrictions
on which
8 attendeesmay possessa firearm, and(2) that does not require firearms to
be securedwhen not in
9 someone'simmediatepossession.It also is reasonableto exceptfrom that ban those
events
10 (1) that limit firearmspossessiononlyto participantsin the events,and (2)
that require.the
1l firearms to be securedagainstpossessionby anotherpersonwhen not in the immediate
= = 12 possessionof the original possessor. Thesedifferencesbetweenplaintifß'
(]= "gun shows,,and the
T <
<J1 ?
ur3
f y ¿ 13 exceptedeventshave a fair and substantialrelationship to the Ordinance's legitimate
safety
L 9 ¿
z.? T4 purpose of reducing the risk of gun violence on county property.
O y i
Ø, I
15 Thus, plaintiffs are incorrect that the Equal Protection Clauseis violated becausetheir
Qtr
-== Í T6 "gun shows" are not includedwithin the Ordinance'sexception. "The
<n1 Constitutiondoesnot
ô k
É.ø
< à I7 require that laws treat every individual exactly alike to withstand constitutional
' T z
[] attack.',
( J 9
' a 18 Mlikotinv. cityof LosAngeles,643F.2d,652,653(9,hcir. 19gl). ..Treatingtwogroups
-g
ú{¿ T9 differently does not necessarilyviolate the equal protection
[clause]." California Assn. of the
20 Physically Handicapped,Inc. v. FCC, Tzl F.2¿,667, 670(9,hcir. 19g3). .,[T]he
Equal
2l ProtectionClause. . . doesnot ensureabsoluteequality." Bruce v. ylst,351 F.3d
12g3,l2gg (9th
22 Cir' 2003)- Given the ordinance's statedgoal, the admittedfeaturesand circumstances
of
23 plaintiffs' trade shows, and the circumstancesof the other events
to which plaintiffs compare
24 themselves,it cannotbe said that the County's distinction betweenplaintiffs' trade
showsand the
25 other events is arbitrary or unreasonable.

26 The final aspectof plaintifß' failed equalprotectionclaim involves afacialchallenge

to
27 anotherof the exceptionsto the possessionban. The Ordinance exceptsfrom the ban
on firearms
28
-23-
DEFENDANTS'NoTIcEoFMoTIoNANDMoTIoNFoRSUMMÁ
AMENDED COMPLAINT
t206t\0002\877766.4
 1 possessiona 'þerson holding a valid licenseto carry a firearm issuedpursuantto
[California]
2 PenalCode section12050"8(Ex. A, subd.(f)(3)). Plaintiffs believethe exceptionon its face
a
J violates the Equal Protection Clausebecausethe exception allows all firearms dealersholding a

4 valid state license to possessfirearms on County property, but prohibits all firearms dealers

5 without a valid license(and not subject to other exceptions)from doing so (TAC atl92).

6 Plaintifß' claim is basedupon the flawed premise that section 12050enablesfirearms

-
dealerswith a licenseto carry their inventory into a gun show, but prohibits those dealerswithout

8 a licensefrom doing so. Section t2050 doesnothing of the sort. A licenseissuedpursuantto

9 section 12050 allows a personto carry a specific weapon,identified,in the license, and concealed

10 on the person. Sections12050(a)(1)(A)& 12051(a)(1).Thus,with respecrto firearmsdealers,

11 section T2050meansonly that those dealerswho have a license caî carrya ftrearmconcealedon
z.= L2 their personson the Fairgrounds,provided it is the firearm identified in the permit, and it is
O =
-< ns?
r v a
rrJ 3
I3 carriedconcealedon the person. Section 12050hasnothing to do with what inventory a dealer
* =
z.= T4 may carry onto the Fairgrounds.
O :1t'
c ô *
15 Furthermore, the exception has nothing to do with firearms dealersat all; it doesnot even
k E
-== i 16 mention dealers. It simply exemptsfrom the possessionban anyperson (whether a dealeror not)
<ns
Õ k
ú,ø
< àz
-a-
T7 holding a permit under a California statuteauthorizing the carrying of a concealedweapon.
( J 9
18 Even worse for plaintiffs, "'[a] facial challengeto a legislativeact is, of course,the most
:g
V¿V¿ t9 difficult challenge to mount successfully,since the challengermust establishthat no set of

20 circumstancesexistsunderwhich the Act would be valid.'

[citation.]" lTestern Statespaving Co.
2T v. WashingtonStateDept. of Transp.,407F.3d 983, 1991(9thCir. 2005). Thus, plaintiffs are left

22 with the daunting task of showing that under no set of circumstanceswould it be valid to allow

23 one person holding a valid licenseunder California Penal Code section 12050 to carrya firearm

24 on County property, and at the sametime prohibit anotherperson without such a license from

25 carrying a ftteartn on County property. Plaintiffs cannot meet this heaw burden.

26

27 8 Statutory references
- hereinafterare to the California Penal Code unless otherwise
noted.
28 _24_
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
 I Under section 12050,a personmust (1) establishgood causefor issuanceof a licenseto

2 cafiy a firearm, and (2) complete a training course on the safety and use of a f,rrearmbefore
a
J receivinga licenseto carrya firearm (Section 12050,subds.(a)(f
)(e) & (E)). Even worse, some
4 people who do not have licensesto carrymay have applied for and beendenied licenses
because
5 they have been convicted of a felony (Section l2050,subd. (d); section lZ02L). Given the

6 Counfy's important interest in reducing gun violence, the County may reasonablyallow a person
- with a license (i.e. one who has taken a training course)to carrya concealedfirearm on County

8 property, and to prohibit a personwithout a license (i.e. one who has not taken atraíningcourse

9 or who may be a convicted felon) from carrying a concealedfirearm on County propeny.

l0 Accordingly, plaintifß cannot show that the exception for licenseesis invalid under all

11 circumstances.
z-= T2 For all of the abovereasons,the City is entitledto judgment as a matterof law on
o ;
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13 plaintifß' equal protection claim.
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<¡t a IV. CONCLUSION
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< àZ l7 For all of the foregoingreasons,the Countyis entitledto judgmentasa matterof law on
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.4',a Q 18 plaintifß' Third AmendedComplaint,andthe Courtshouldgrantthe County'smotionfor
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T9 summaryjudgment.
20 DATED: June2,2006 RICHARD E. WINME
COTINTYCOTINSEL
2l COT]NTYOF AIAMEDA
22 zuCHARDS,V/ATSON& GERSHON
23
T.P
24

25
CE
26 Attomeys for Defendants
MARY V. KING, ET AL.
27

28
-25-
DEFENDANTS'
NOTICEOFMOTIONANDMoTIoN FoR SUMMARYruDGMENToN PLATNTIFETHÏRF
AMENDED COMPLAINT
12061\0002\877766.4
i,.,-)

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 1 DECLARATION OF RICK K. PICKERING

2 I, Rick K. Pickering, declare:

a
J 1. I am the Chief Executive Officer of the Alameda County Agricultural Fair

4 Association ("County Fair Association") and GeneralManager of the Alameda County

5 Fairgrounds ("Fairgrounds") and I have served in those capacitiessince Januaryof 1999. I am

6 also familiar with the operation of firearms basedon my personalexperiencewith firearms. I

- own three pistols, two rifles and one shotgun. I am a former instructor for the National Rifle

8 Association regarding the mechanicsand handling of various firearms.

9 2. I have personalknowledge of the mattersset forth below and could and would

10 testify competently to those matters if called as a witness in this case.

11 3. On September7,1999, as part of my dutiesas GeneralManagerof the

= = t2 Fairgrounds, I sent a letter to plaintiffs Russell and Sallie Nordyke asking them to explain how
\ J =

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13 they would conduct their trade shows at the Fairgrounds in compliance with the Alameda County
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2.9 L4 Ordinance ("Ordinance") which bans the possessionof firearms on the Fairgroundsand on other
(O/ ) *tri
15 County property. A true and correct copy of my letter is attached.hereas Exhibit "8."
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_= = Í L6 4.
<¡t a In responseto that inquiry, I receiveda letter datedSeptember16, 1999from Mr.
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T7 Donald Kilmer, the Nordyke's lawyer. A true and correct copy of Mr. Kilmer's letter is attached
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; ' ' . ç 18 as Exhibit "C." Ill that letter,Mr. Kilmer assertsit would "not be practicalor profitable" for the
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VzVa. 19 Nordykes to conduct a "gun show" under the Ordinance.

20 5. On or aboutOctober 20, L999,I receiveda secondletter from the Nordykes'

2T lawyer. In that letter (attachedhere as Exhibit "D") Mr. Kilmer statedhe could not find any

22 languagein the Ordinance"that requires [the Nordykes] to submit a written plan such as the one

¿J you requested."

24 6. On or aboutJanuary5,2000,I notified the Nordykes in writing that until they

25 demonstratedhow they would comply with the Ordinance,the County Fair Associationcould not

26 reservespacefor their trade shows. A true and correct copy of my letter to the Nordykes is

27 attachedhere as Exhibit "E."

28 -26-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTION FORSUMMARY JTIDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLATNT
1206r\0002\877766.4
 1 7. To date,the Nordykes have never made any attempt to conduct their trade shows

2 atthe Fairgroundsin compliancewith the Ordinancenor have they provided to me a written plan
a
J for conducting their shows at the Fairgroundsconsistentwith the Ordinance.

4 8. BetweenJanuaryt999 andOctoberIggg,Iattended two of the tradeshows

5 conductedby the Nordykes at the Fairgrounds- I observedat least severalhundred firearms on

6 display- Some were lying on display tables such that people were picking them up and handling

them and inspecting them at will. Some firearms had cables through the trigger guardsin order

8 to prevent removal. However, many firearms did not have cables,or any other device, that

9 would have preventedtheir removal by anyonewho handled them.

10 9. I understandthat the Nordykes are claiming that, in some cases,firearms as

t1 defined in the Ordinance are allowed attheFairgrounds notwithstanding the ban on possessionof
z.= T2 firearms on the Fairgrounds. Basedon my personal experienceas a gun owner and NRA
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13 instructor, and basedon my work as GeneralManager of the Fairgrounds,I am not aware that
" = I4 any firearms subject to the ban, and not within an exception to the ban, have been allowed on the
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15 Fairgrounds.
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-=È i L6 10. ln February2004,I observedat the Fairgroundsan exhibitor erectinga display
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'a 18 gogglesand camouflage gear,holding a paintball rifle strappedin his hand. The County Fair
i
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V¿9¿ r9 Associationhad not given previouspermissionfor the display. The paintball rifle was not

20 connectedto any air supply and was not attachedto a paintball cannister. A paintball'rifle is

2t poweredby compressedair and doesnot expel a projectile (the paint ball) by combustion. Under

22 thesecircumstances,it was my understandingthat the Ordinance did not prohibit the paintball

23 rifle. To confirm my understanding,after observing the paintball rifle, I contactedthe Alameda

24 Counfy Sheriffs Departmentand askedwhether the rifle was prohibited under the Ordinance. I

25 was told by Lieutenant JamesKnudsenthat the paintball rifle was not prohibited under the

26 Ordinance.

27 lt. At the February2005outdoor andSportsmanShow,I observedfour or five

28 ft -,

DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS' THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT
I 206l\0002\877766.4
 1 people shooting at paper targetswith what I knew from my experienceto be air-soft guns. Those

2 gunshad not beenpreviouslyapprovedfor use at the show. An air-soft gun is a replicaof a

a
J pistol or a rifle, is spring-loadedand shootsround plastic pellets. The pelletsare expelledby
the
4 operationof a mechanicalspring and not by the force of any form of combustion. Under these

5 circumstances,it was my understandingthat the Ord,inancedid not prohibit those air-soft guns. I

6 subsequentlycontactedthe Alameda County Sheriff s Department to confirm whether or not

thoseair-soft guns were prohibited under the Ordinance. Lieutenant JamesKnudsen conf,rrmed

8 that the air-soft guns were not prohibited unrderthe ordinance.

9 L2. As indicatedabove,becausethe "projectile" of the paintball rifles and air-soft

10 guns I observedwere not expelled by combustion, thoseitems are not consideredfirearms and

11 arepermitted under the Ordinancewhile the firearms of the type displayed and marketedby the
z = t2 Nordykes at their trade shows are prohibited. I have never observedon the Cognty Fairgrounds
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13 during the Outdoor and SportsmanShows a firearm capableof expelling a projectile through the
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2.2 1,4 force of combustion.
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15 13. After my appointmentas CEO of the County Fair Associationand General
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_= = i L6 Manager of the Fairgrounds,I have observedthe Scottish Gamesat the County Fairgroundson
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< à I7 severaloccasions.I have seenas part of the ScottishGameshistorical re-enactments
of gun
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i A 18 battlesthat occurredfrom the 1600sto the 1900s. A public addressannouncersetsthe scenefor
i ,

-(Z
æ{. t9 the audienceby describing the particular battle being re-enactedand the period in history during

20 which the battle occurred. As part of enforcingthe Ordinance,it is requiredthat only those

2l personsdirectly participatingin the historicalre-enactmentbe allowed to handleor possessthe

22 rifles. Also, those rifles are required to be unloaded or loaded with blank cartridges. No
aa
ZJ ammunition is allowed and to my knowledge no live ammunition has ever been used during the

24 ScottishGames. If it cameto my attentionthat live ammunitionwere being usedor considered,

25 we would take immediatestepsto preventand prohibit such a situation.

26 I declareunder penaltyof perjury under the laws of the United Statesof America that the

27 foregoing is true and correct.

28 -28-
DEFENDANTS'NOTICEOF MOTIONAND MOTIONFORSTMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFFS'THIRD
AMENDEDCOMPLAINT
t206r\0002\877766.4
 I Executed
or Muchfi.. 2006.
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 I DECLARATION OF T. PETER PIERCE

2 I, T. PeterPierce,declare:

J 1. I am an attorney admitted to practice in the Stateof Califomia and before this

4 Court, and I am the attorney primarily responsible for representingdefendantsin this action. I

5 have personal knowledge of the matters set forth below.

6 2. Attached here as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of a document I printed

1 from the Nordykes' website- "TS Trade Shows."

8 3. Attachedhere as Exhibit "G" is a true and correctcopy of a documentI printed

9 from a websiteshowing the number of gun, knife and hunting showsin Californiain2003,2004

10 and 2005.

11 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United Statesof America that the
z = T2 foregoing is true and correct.
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28 ' -30-
ON PLAINTIFFS' THIRD
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JTJDGMENT
AMENDED COMPLAINT
t 206I \0002\877766.4
 ñn õ¡.J Ll-
Fax:714-9962J0
Sep 28 '99 î2:16 ?.n

Rrü{ARD E. wINNfE (Srace Bar No-

ÛRlGii'iåL
68048}
COUNTY COTJNSET
COUNIY OF ÀLAMEÐÀ.
Ft!-fi-:
I22I Oak StreeL.
Oakland, California
Suite 463 sEFAI ß99
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(s10l zzz-6?00 ''fi' i'irr'-"" ': '
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SÀYRE Í^'EAVER (sLaee Bar No-
11695")
GARY E. cANs {Scace ear
ño. 8953?}
RTCHARDS, [,{ATSON & GERSHOñ
À Profesgional corporatioi
Montgomery Sereät, Suite- 9 + geO
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14
San Franei_sco, Califårnia
(415) 42L_8484 4_46TL

'ã'tt'orneys for Defendants

M=y v,. Kins, Gair steere, wirma chan,
Keich Carson, Hà-ggeìc',
_:::": Boarã-of
County of Àlameda r,he Counry of Alameda, and rhe
IO Supervisors

11
T'NTTED STATES DISTRICT EOURT
L2
FOR TT{E ¡TORTHERN DISTRTCT
OF CÀI,IFORNIÀ
13
sAI{ .fosE DMSrot{
14
RUSSELL ÀLLnr NORDYKE
t5 and SÀtTJTE Case No- C-99-2094?-Eä[
ANN NORDYKE, dbA tS'INEOÈ fc)
sHows.
16 Honorable Edward A. Infante.
Plaintiffs, Chíef Magistrace Judge
L7 vs-
DECLARA'TION OF SERGEANT
1B v: KrNc. cArt STEELE¿T,III,MA JAMES KN{.'DSEN IN SUPPORT OF
ï15-I
CHAN. KEITH CARSON, SCOTT' DEFENDÀNTS' MEMORÀNDUM OF
l q
THE COUN:rYoF er,euÈne, ãrroHAGGERTY, POTNTS AI{D AUTHORITTES .TN
coumty oF ar.eMEDABoARDöF lHE OPPOSITTON TO PT¿ATNTTFFS' EX
20 SUPERVISORS, PARTE MOTION FOR å. TEMPOR.ARY
RESTRÀTNING ORDER
2L Defendant.g. Hearing Date: None Set
22

23 Sergeant Jamee Knudsen statee and declarea:

24 I am a Sergeant t¡ith the Alameda County Sheriff.s
25 DeparLment, v¡here I have served as a depucy sheriff for rwenty_
26 eighb (28) yeara. I h a w e personal knowledge of the facr6 set
2'I forth below and if called upon to t,estify. could and would cest.ify
28 compet.ent Iy thereto.
x{ Fros.
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 tûfitb tf, Fax:214-99062J0
sep 28 i99 12:t6 P.30

1 1- A-6 a deputy sherif f for Àrameda councy, r hawe been

2 aeeigned to Lhe Alamed-a councy Fair on the Fourth of .July for each
3 Fourth of ifuly for the last twenty year6.
4 2- r was bhe Àdministra.ive sergeant assigned to thre
5 Alarneda county Fair at Lhe Àramed¿ county Fairgrounds on Jury 4,
6 1998' At 6:oo p-m- r vrent of f duty. However, at. approximacery
't
8:2o p-m.. shots r{ere heard coming from the dÍrection of Lhe
B carniwal area. T v¡as calred back Lo duty .o assist in handring
9 citizen and media carrs regarding the incid.enc. As part of my
10 duties as Àdrainistrative Sergreant, f was assigned Co prepare an
11 "afLer action¡' report regarding the inci.dent - rn connection with
L2 t'hac aeeign*ent. r incervievred. numerous eyewítneÉises, including
13 Law enforcement and emer.gency response personnel, and othere at
14 the scene. r arso compired the investigative reports of the
15 incident, and rewiewed evidence, incruding a nurnber of wideotapes
16 of the incÍdent.
l7 3. My final reporr, entit.led ',Afcer Action Report,
18 ïncident at the Alameda CounEy F a i r , .July +, I99sr, i6 on fÍle in
19 the Sheriff,e Office a n d I have reviewed it in connection with
20 preparing thj-s declaration-
2L 4' Based on the information r compired for my reporc, r
22 deterrnined that twelve peopre euffered injuriee in the incident-
23 of thoee injured', eight receiwed gunshoc. wounds and Ehe remaining
24 individual-s were injured in che crocrd panic thar folrowed the
2S incident- The youngest gunshot wound victirn was eÍghc yeare ord
26 ac che time of the incident. Two other gun shot victims were under
2'l ttre age of eighteen years ord., and two were eigtrteen years otd-
28 ///
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Fax:714-%2J0
Sep 2A '99 l2:LZ p-Jl

1 5- Based on the information r com¡liled for my report r

2 also concluded that emergency response teame were called to the
3 scene and came to the 6cene, including medical hericopters. Based
4 on my anarysls of che evidence awailabre regarding the eize of the
5 crowd at the time of the shooting, r estimate that at that r.ime,
6 approximat'ely 4oroo0 peopre were on the fairgrounds. The evidence
7 r colrected for my report incrudes ewidence thaE a number of
I explosive devices were heard going off after the initiar gunshocs,
9 adding to the confusion a¡rd panic. Furttrer. the croc¡d panic was
10 not limited to the Ímmediace area of the shooEíng but involved the
11 entire faírground,s, as per'ons tried to free frorn the area. As rny
L2 report details, the rncÍdent commander carled for outsid,e porice
13 agsist'ance within mornents of che shootings and a number of locar
L4 police departments respond.ed.. A Eotal 0f 15? deputies and police
15 officers assisLed in containing Che crowd. and restoring order Co
16 ttre fairground.s.
L7 6' As my report detairs, a youngi man in poseession of a
l8 loaded grnm handgun,
also in posseseion of an addÍtionar_ magazine
. 1 9 of ammunicion' wa' arrested at the scene and has been charged. in
20 the shooEinge.

2L 7' Seweral video recordÍngs showÍng the crowd deneicy

22 prior to the shooting and the panic that ensued afEer the incident
23 are part of the of ficiar report of the incidenc. r revier.¡ed theee
24 vídeotapee Eo prepare my report- The t,apeÊ are on file in the
25 Sheriff, e Office.
26 ///
27 ///
2A ///
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Sep 28 -j99 12:78 P-32
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I I declar€ und€r ¡renalt¡. of perJrrry of Ch<: 1¿r¡rs of che

2 srar€ of Californla thac Èhe foregoing íg cruc and correct and
f, thac rhis declarqcÍon y¿a6 execuÈed SepCember- 27. 1999 at Oakland,
<t Cal: forrrio..

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