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LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION SECRETARY G.R. No.

127882, January 27 2004

INC.

VS.

DENR

In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of which the FTAA was executed. Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to the FTAA, cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul it. In other words, they contend that petitioners are not real parties in interest in an action for the annulment of contract. Public respondents contention fails. The present action is not merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As the case involves constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal standing. Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity WMCP points out that the petition was filed only almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.

FACTS: On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. On April 9, 1995, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. But shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, (March 30th), the President entered into an Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMC Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. Subsequently, DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942 which was also later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are present to raise the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942. HELD: When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The constitutional question is the lis mota (cause of the suit) of the case. Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The power of j udicial review, therefore, is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing. Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous peoples cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. These petitioners have standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury. They claim that they would suffer irremediable displacement as a result of the implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence. They thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAAs validity.

The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same. La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements; (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void; (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and (d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. Issue :

Whether

or

not

Republic

Act

No.

7942

is

unconstitutional.

Ruling : The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral productionsharing agreement; (6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement; The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA

between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter. In January 2001, WMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals. EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. HELD: First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. The 1987 Constitut ion, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nat ions natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources. When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent,

conditional or connected, must fail with them. Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract. Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations. These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down. La G.R. December Facts: Bugal-BLaan No. 1, v. Ramos 127882. 2004

The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources. Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal Blaan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the States need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our countrys competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGBDENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources? Held:

effect, no impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned. Case Digest of Estrada vs. Desierto (March 2, 2001)
Petitioner: Joseph E. Estrada Respondents: Aniano Desierto (GR#146710-15) et al. and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GR#146738) Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Ponente: Justice Puno Facts: The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately after the oath-taking of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (to be referred to in the rest of the digest as GMA) as president of the Republic of the Philippines (RP). On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as Erap) was elected as President of RP with GMA as his vicePresident. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. And because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000. Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila. Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as candidate, to regain stability in the country but such a move did little to quell the wave against him. Two rounds of negotiations were held between Eraps camp and that of GMA in the early hours of 20 January 2001 and at 12nn of the same day, GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang and is now faced with legal action against him by the Office of the Ombudsman among other things. Issues: 1) Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy 2) Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President 3) If the petitions are justiciable, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an acting President 4) Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada 5) Whether petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity Held: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Congress in passing such provision is merely to prevent public officials from escaping liability to stop pending investigation. It does not apply to petitioner. 3) The law states that Congress has the sole authority to say whether a President is incapable of performing the duties required of him of his office. Given the resolutions passed by Congress immediately after GMAs oath-taking and the fact that both houses filed bills signed by GMA into law, the Court recognizes that petitioners inability to perform was permanent and also, the Court would have no jurisdiction to change the decision already done by Congress on his capacity as President. 4) Regarding immunity from suit, history shows us that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not retain the 1973 Constitution provision on executive immunity. Also, the Impeachment court has become functus officio. It is, then, untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. 5) As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecutuion. Case Digest: Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Disierto

G.R. No. 146710-15 FACTS:

02 March 2001

After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the Presidents administration started resigning one by one. In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate. The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President submitted two letters one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether the petitioner resigned as President; and Whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning

Yes,

Yes impliedly No No No

Ratio Decidendi: 1) While the 1987 EDSA People Power Movement is considered by the Court as a non-justiciable event, EDSA 2, as it has come to be known, is very much different from the 1987 EDSA People Power Movement (EDSA 1). EDSA 1 is extra-constitutional, hence, there would be no legal basis if such an event was put to the courts. EDSA 2, on the other hand, is intraconstitutional as it is based on the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and assembly. Even in GMAs oath -taking ceremony, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. 2) The Court used a Totality Test as an authoritative window to ascertain petitioner Estradas state of mind on this issue. On reading the then Executive Secretary Angaras diary published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the proposed snap elections, 2) he did not object to Senator Pimentels dignified exit proposal, and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week left to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his resignation letter, Erap 1) acknowledged GMAs oath-taking as President, 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as President, and 3) his gratitude in the letter is on a past opportunity he served as President. On his defense, Erap cites sec. 12 of Republic Act 3019 which states that a public officer cannot resign pending legal action, in this case the impeachment trial. A reading of history tells the Court that the intention of

RULING:

1.

2.

For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country. This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign. Petitioners contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in

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