b. Pilapil vs.

Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1 Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2 Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4 On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7 On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14 On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15 On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16 We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in

point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case. Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21 In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so. To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22 In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.) We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ... It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ... Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ...25 Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other. The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce. Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein. WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. c. People vs. Zapata and Bondoc, 88 Phil 688 In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the other sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed. The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complains must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of

adultery complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.. Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is a instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person the offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there would be plurality of acts performed seperately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520).In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last acts of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provincional release during the pendency of the case in which they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them(S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210). Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second places complaint the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts(Viada [5th ed.] Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard [2nd ed.] Vol. 5, pp. 57-58). The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the appellees. Feria, Pablo, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur. Paras, C.J., Bengzon and Montemayor, JJ., concur in the result. Paras, C.J., Mr. Justice Reyes voted for the reversal. d. US vs Mata, 18 Phil 490 The evidence of record conclusively establishes the performance of the ceremony of marriage between the defendant, Jacinta Mata, and the complaining witness, Marcial Taedo Tiu Chiu, and leaves no room for doubt of the existence of the alleged carnal relations between this woman and the codefendant, Quiterio Sarmiento. The judgment of the trial court convicting them of the crime of adultery must, therefore, be affirmed, unless it be held, as contended by counsel for the defendants, that the evidence also shows that the marriage between the complaining witness and Jacinta Mata was bigamous, and that, in view this fact, the carnal relations between the defendants should not be adjudged to have constituted the crime of adultery. There is evidence in the record which undoubtedly tends very strongly to establish the contention of counsel for defendants that at the time when the complaining witness married the defendant, Jacinta Mata, he had a wife in China; but we do not deem it necessary to make an express finding in this regard, because we are of opinion that in the absence of proof of a formal judicial decree declaring the nullity of the second alleged bigamous marriage the acts complained of constitute the crime of adultery. Article 433 of the Penal Code, defining and penalizing the crime of adultery, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Adultery shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Adultery is committed by the married woman who lies with a man not her husband, and by him who lies with her knowing that she is married, although the marriage be afterwards declared void."cralaw virtua1aw library It is quite clear from the peculiar phrasing of the last paragraph of this article, that the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect. The reason for this provision is thus stated by Groizard, in his commentary upon similar provisions contained in article 488 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "At no time does the bond of matrimony contain a defect which by itself is sufficient to dissolve the union. The marriage must be declared to be null in order that the bond may be severed. Until it is so declared, until by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken, and the attack on the family exists the adultery reunites the essential conditions required for its punishment. This abundantly satisfies the reason and furthermore is expressly set out in our statute."cralaw virtua1aw library Counsel for appellants contends that the provision under consideration is intended merely to declare that, notwithstanding the fact that the marriage is subsequently annulled because of the adulterous conduct of the woman, nevertheless the penalty prescribed by the code is to be imposed and enforced. But the language of the article itself does not justify such a restricted construction, and an examination of the earlier provisions of the Spanish laws upon this subject, from which this article was undoubtedly drawn, disposes of the idea that such could have been the intention of the Spanish lawmaker. Law 81 of Toro, which is law 4, title 28, book 12 of the Novisima Recopilacion, prescribed that it will not serve as an excuse to the adulterers to allege and prove "by divers reasons that the marriage was null on the grounds that the contracting parties were relatives by blood or affinity within the fourth degree, or that either of them was bound by a former marriage, or has taken the vows of chastity, religious vows, or for any other reason whatever, as they ought not to have done that which they had no right to do."cralaw virtua1aw library In the discussion of this case among the members of the court, the question arose whether the provision of article 433 under consideration may not have been modified or abrogated by necessary implication by the publication of General Orders, No. 68, December, 1899, whereby "certain provisions respecting marriage" were put in force by the command of the Military Governor during the period of the military occupation of these Islands by the American military forces. Section III of that Order is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the life of a former husband or wife of such person, with any person other than the former husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning, unless "(1) The former marriage has been annulled or dissolved. "(2) Unless such former husband or wife was absent, and not known to such person to be living for the space of seven successive years immediately preceding such subsequent marriage, or was generally reputed and was believed by such person to be dead at the time such subsequent marriage was contracted; in either of which cases the subsequent marriage is valid its nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal."cralaw virtua1aw library Keeping in mind the conditions under which this order was published, and the objects which where sought to be obtained by its provisions, we are of opinion that it was not intended to have the effect, and that it did not have the effect of abrogating those just and humane provisions of the Spanish law which secure to the innocent party to a bigamous marriage certain rights in the communal property acquired during the existence of the bigamous relations, and which legitimate the offspring of such unions and recognize the right of inheritance of such offspring from the offending spouse. The bigamous marriage, as a marriage, is declared to be illegal and void from the beginning, but this provisions is not necessarily in conflict with those statutory provisions of the Spanish law which prescribe the status of the children resulting from the bigamous relations of the party, or the rights of property arising, not as a result of the bigamous marriage but of the communal relations existing thereafter between the parties. The gist of the crime of adultery under the Spanish law, as under the common law in force in England and the United States in the absence of statutory enactment, is the danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, whereby the rights of the real heirs may be impaired and a man may be charged with the maintenance of a family not his own. And since, under Spanish law, legitimate heirs may be begotten of a bigamous marriage, the danger of the introduction of spurious heirs is not less real as a result of the infidelity of the wife of a bigamous marriage than it is in the case of a lawful wife; logically, therefore, the

incontinence of the wife of a bigamous marriage, as long as the bigamous relations exist, was deemed by the Spanish legislator to constitute the crime of adultery, and penalized in like manner as is the martial faithlessness of a lawful wife. The fact that the law is otherwise in those jurisdiction where legislation has been largely influenced by the doctrines and principles of the common law of England is a natural consequence of the failure of the system of jurisprudence to recognized the existence of heritable blood of the father in the fruits of a bigamous marriage. But it would seem in those State where such children are, by statute, legitimized, a consistent system of penal legislation would demand the penalization of the incontinence of the wife of a bigamous marriage equally with that of a lawful wife. Certainly, in this jurisdiction, a statute declaring bigamous marriages illegal and void from the beginning ought not to be held to repeal by necessary implication the provisions of the Penal Code penalizing as adulterous the incontinence of the wife of bigamous marriage unless it be held further to repeal by necessary implication the statutes legitimizing the offspring of bigamous marriages; and as we have said no such effect can or should be given to the General Order under consideration. We conclude, therefore, that the provisions of the code penalizing as adultery the infidelity of the wife of a bigamous marriage continue in full force and effect. We find no error in the proceedings of the court below prejudicial to the rights of the appellants, and the judgment convicting them of the crime of adultery and the sentence imposed upon them by the trial court should therefore be affirmed. Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur. e. US vs Serrano, et al., 28 Phil 230 After trial of the above-named appellants for the crime of adultery, charged in a complaint filed by Bernardo Alega, the husband of Faustina Ananais, the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, on December 24, 1913, found them guilty and sentenced them to penalty of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. From this judgment they have appealed. It was fully proved that Faustina Ananais, while legally married to Bernardo Alega, lay several times with Agapito Serrano and that he, knowing that the said woman was married, also by several times with her. These facts were not denied by counsel for the defendants and were expressly admitted by them at the trial. There is no proof that the complainant, Bernardo Alega, abandoned his wife, the accused, and left her in poverty without means of obtaining a livelihood, and eventhough he had done so, such abandonment could not serve her as an excuse nor free her from the criminal responsibility she incurred by her breach of the fidelity she owed her husband, for she has means within the law to compel him to fulfill the duties imposed upon him by marriage. Neither was it proved that her husband wrote her the letter presented by the defense at the trial, which states that he authorized her to consort with whomsoever she pleased and informs her of his purpose not to live with her again. On the contrary, he testified that it was his wife, the accused, who separated from him and, notwithstanding his entreaties, would not resume their marital life. This statement is corroborated by the fact that the accused remained separated from her husband, after the latter had been absent some time from the town where he had his residence, and continued her criminal relations with the other defendant, Agapito Serrano, notwithstanding her husbands presence in the same locality where they both were. It was this conduct of hers that brought about the filing of the complaint. Finally, there is nothing that can less justify the conduct both of the woman and her accomplice and that is less entitled to consideration as a ground of defense in their behalf or of exemption from the criminal responsibility which they have incurred, than the plea of the defense that she lay with the man for a money payment, because, as the prosecution says, an immoral consideration, as the price of sexual intercourse, or an immoral agreement, such as is invoked by the defendant, is no agreement at all in the eyes of the law, nor can it ever serve to justify a criminal act which, while it violates morality and good customs, tends to disturb social order by relaxing family ties. Both the accused having confessed and having been convicted of the crime of adultery, provided for and punished by article 433 of the Penal Code, and the commission of the said crime not being attended by any circumstance that modifies their responsibility, the penalty as imposed upon them by the lower court, in the medium degree, is proper. No error was incurred in the judgment appealed from, which is in accord with the merits of the case and with the law. We therefore affirm the said judgment, with costs in equal parts against the defendants and appellants. The defendant Agapito Serrano, who is now in prison, will be allowed one-half of the time he has been held in detention. Arellano, C.J., Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur. f. US vs Topio, et al., 35 Phil 901*

g. People vs Infante, 57 Phil 138 This is an appeal from the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Branch VIII) in three rape cases under the following titles and captions: Criminal Case No. B-495, People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Lor;Criminal Case No. B496, People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Ruiz; and Criminal Case No. B-497, People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Ruiz. The three accused, Leonardo Lor y Villamor, alias "Ronnie", 23 years old, driver and resident of Barrio Concepcion, Hilongos, Leyte; Alfredo Ruiz y Baer, alias "Fredo", 26 years old, laborer and resident of Bo. Concepcion, Hilongos, Leyte; and Domingo Ruiz, alias "Ngoy", 24 years old, single, student and resident of Bo. Concepcion, Hilongos, Leyte, are all charged of (sic) the crime of Rape according to the Information filed by First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcial B. Estela dated October 29, 1975, respectively as follows: "I N F O R M A T I O N "The undersigned Assistant provincial Fiscal accuses Leonardo Lor alias Ronnie of the crime of rape, committed as follows: "That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1975, in the municipality of Hilongos, province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, and taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle (2/26/76 mbe) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Juanita Lamadura, 14 years of age, much against her will and consent. "Contrary to Article 335, Revised Penal Code. "Baybay, Leyte, October 29, 1975. "s/t/ MARCIAL B. ESTELA 1st Assistant Assistant Provincial Fiscal." "I N F O R M A T I O N "The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Alfredo Ruiz alias Fredo of the crime of rape, committed as follows: "That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1975, in the municipality of Hilongos, province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, and taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle (2/26/76 mbe) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Concepcion Lor, 23 years of age, much against her will and consent. "Contrary to Article 335, Revised Penal Code. "Baybay, Leyte, October 29, 1975. "s/t/ MARCIAL B. ESTELA 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal." "I N F O R M A T I O N "The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Domingo Ruiz @ Enggoy of the crime of rape, committed as follows: "That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1975, in the Municipality of Hilongos, province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, and taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle (2/26/76 mbe) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Victoria Erit, 18 years of age, much against her will and consent. "Contrary to Article 335, Revised Penal Code. "Baybay, Leyte, October 29, 1975. "s/t/ MARCIAL B. ESTELA 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal." The three accused were arraigned on February 19, 1976, and all pleaded not guilty to the charge. On February 26, 1976, the manifestation of the prosecuting Fiscal to insert in the information of the three criminal cases the phrase originally found in the amended complaint stating "and by means of motor vehicle" after the word "nighttime", without any objection from the defense counsels, was granted by the Court. On March 11, 1976, the three accused were again re-arraigned on the amended complaint without objection from the defense counsels and all of the three accused again pleaded not guilty. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the three criminal cases be tried jointly (pp. 65-68, rec.). On August 31, 1977, after both parties had presented their evidence, the lower court promulgated judgment, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Leonardo Lor y Villamor, alias "Ronnie", in Criminal Case No. B-495; Alfredo Ruiz y Baer, alias "Fredo", in Criminal Case No. B-496; and Domingo Ruiz y Baer, alias "Enggoy", in Criminal Case No. B497, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as provided for in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each one of said three (3) accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and for Leonardo Lor to pay Juanita Lamadura; for Alfredo Ruiz to pay Concepcion Lor; and for Domingo Ruiz to pay Victoria Erit, the sum of P6,000.00 each as indemnity for damages, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED (p. 211, rec.). On the same day, the defense filed its notice of appeal (p. 23, rec.) from the above decision. On January 16, 1979, the accused-appellants, through counsel, filed their Brief with this Court. On March 29, 1979, the People filed its Brief. On September 17, 1981, during the pendency of this appeal, this Court granted (p. 317, rec.) the withdrawal of appeal dated August 15, 1981 (p. 315, rec.) filed by Alfredo Ruiz and Domingo Ruiz. Thus, this appeal reviews only the conviction of appellant Leonardo Lor. WE note that under date of November 4, 1981, the three plaintiffs, Concepcion Lor, Victoria Erit and Juanita Lamadura, filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint in favor of Leonardo Lor (p. 319, rec.). The motion was accompanied by a copy of the affidavits executed by Juanita Lamadura and Concepcion Lor exempting Leonardo Lor from any participation in the commission of the crime charged (pp. 320 & 322, rec.). Juanita Lamadura affixed her fingerprint on the motion to withdraw complaint and on her own affidavit. WE note, however, that both documents were written in English. Juanita Lamadura has no educational attainment at all, and does not know how to read and write (p. 17, Appellee's Brief, p. 296, rec.). WE find no showing that the documents aforestated were read and explained to her in a language or dialect she understood prior to her affixing of her fingerprint thereon. WE find said documents suspect. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint flied by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may be (Article 344, Revised Penal Code). Granting that the aforementioned documents filed by Juanita Lamadura operate as a pardon, the same do not bar US from deciding the present appeal. The pardon that operates to divest the court of jurisdiction to continue hearing a case involving a private offense is one that is given before the institution of the criminal prosecution (People vs. Infante, et al., No. 36270, August 31, 1932, 57 Phil. 138), and not that which is given, as in the present case, during the pendency of the appeal thereon. Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above-quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender and the offended party (People vs. Miranda, No. 38171, October 6, 1932, 57 Phil. 274). Thus, WE resolve to review Leonardo Lor's appeal on the merits. The appellee's Brief describes the factual setting for the People thus: xxx xxx xxx ... complainants Victoria Erit, Concepcion Lor and Juanita Lamadura who are all working as housemaids in the poblacion of Hilongos, Leyte, went to Barrio Concepcion, Hilongos, Leyte which is seven (7) kilometers away, to see a drama on August 23, 1975, shown to the public in connection with the celebration of its barrio fiesta (pp. 46-47, 64, 58, 107, 120, tsn, March 18, 1976; p. 15, tsn, April 2, 1972; Exhibit "B" in Criminal Case No. B-496). "After the showing of the drama at about 1 1:00 o'clock that evening, each of the girls, who were not companions in coming to Barrio Concepcion, looked for a motorcab to take them back to the Poblacion of Hilongos. It was at this time that the three girls came to the motorcab driven by Leonardo Lor with two male passengers whom the girls did not know at that time and who happened to be Alfredo Ruiz and Domingo Ruiz" (pp. 47-48, 107-108, 120-121, tsn, March 18, 1976; p. 16, tsn, August 2, 1976; Exhibit "B" in Criminal Case No. B-496). "The driver, Leonardo Lor, allowed the three girls to board the motorcab after informing them that he was taking passengers to the poblacion. Juanita Lamadura got inside the motorcab and occupied a seat by the side of Leonardo Lor. Concepcion Lor stayed at the vacant seat on the front where Alfredo Ruiz was already seated. Victoria Erit occupied the vacant seat at the back where Domingo Ruiz was already seated" (pp. 48, 107, 109, 121-122, tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 16-17, 1920, tsn, April 2, 1976; Exhibit "B" in Criminal Case No. B-496). When they were all seated, Leonardo Lor drove the motorcab towards the Poblacion of Hilongos but upon reaching the crossing to Barrio Proteccion of Hilongos, Leyte, he diverted the motorcab towards Barrio

Proteccion of Hilongos. Barrio Proteccion is about three (3) kilometers from Barrio Concepcion (pp. 48, 109, 122-123, tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 12, 20, tsn, April 2, 1976; Exhibit "B" in Criminal Case No. B-496). "When the girls noticed that they were proceeding in a different direction, Victoria Erit asked Leonardo Lor where they were going. Leonardo Lor answered that he was proceeding to the river because he would drop the P.C. soldier who was one of the passengers, at the same time pointing to Alfredo Ruiz. Juanita Lamadura also asked Leonardo Lor what road they were taking because the road is not the one leading to the Poblacion. Leonardo Lor told her that there was a P.C. soldier whom he would like to drop at Barrio Proteccion. Concepcion Lor was angry with Leonardo Lor but Leonardo Lor told Concepcion Lor that the P.C. was to get off at Barrio Proteccion" (pp. 48-49, 109, 121-122, tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 12, 20, tsn, April 2, 1976; Exhibit "B" in Criminal Case No. B-496). "When the motorcab reached the Salog River in Barrio Proteccion, Leonardo Lor parked the motorcab by the side of the river along the dried river bed. Then, Alfredo Ruiz, whom Leonardo Lor pointed to as the P.C.. alighted first and pulled Concepcion Lor from the motorcab. Victoria Erit was pulled from the motorcab by Domingo Ruiz, the brother of the alleged P.C., Alfredo Ruiz. Then Juanita Lamadura was pulled by Leonardo Lor and dragged away from the motorcab (pp. 49-50, 54-55. 85-86, 103, 109-111, 125-126. tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 19-20, tsn, April 2, 1976; Exhibit 'B' of Criminal Case No. B-496)'" [pp. 5-8, Appellee's Brief; p. 296, rec.], Said Brief then continues with a narration of Juanita Lamadura's plight as follows: "After reaching a remote place, Leonardo Lor mashed the breast of Juanita Lamadura and held her. Juanita Lamadura struggled until she was able to run a distance of about six (6) arms length, but she was overtaken by Leonardo Lor. After catching up with her, Leonardo boxed her stomach. She did not fall on the first blow. It was the second blow that caused her to fall. She lost consciousness (pp. 11 1-112, 126-127, tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 3-5, tsn, April 2, 1976). 'When she regained consciousness, she had no more panties. She felt pain all over her body and pain inside her genital organ. She found her genital organ bleeding. She suffered pain in her genital organ because Leonardo Lor mounted on her. When she regained consciousness, she found Leonardo Lor standing where she was lying down. She found her panties on the place where she fell (pp. 112- 113, 117, tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 5-6, 9, tsn, April 2, 1976). 'She put on her panties and she started crying on the place where she fell. Then she went back to the motorcab (pp. 112-113, tsn, March 18, 1976; pp. 6, 10, tsn, April 2, 1976)" [p. 8, Brief for the Appellee; p. 296, rec.] xxx xxx xxx "Juanita Lamadura reported the incident to her landlord by the name of Lando Urgel She told her landlord that one of the men took advantage of her. Upon advise by her landlord she reported the incident to the police department of Hilongos" (pp. 115-166, tsn, March 18, 1976; p. 14, tsn, April 2, 1976) [pp. 12-13, Appellee's Brief; p.296, rec.] xxx xxx xxx After reporting the matter to the police authorities, the three complainants reported to Dr. Antonia Ladion, a resident physician of the Hilongos General Hospital for examination. Dr. Ladion examined Juanita Lamadura, Concepcion Lor and Victoria Erit on August 26 and 27, 1975' (pp- 7, 9-10, 18-19, 22, tsn, March 11, 1976; pp. 25-26; tsn, April 2, 1976). The examination she conducted on Juanita Lamadura on August 26, 1975 was only an external physical examination because the three girls refused to have an internal examination on this date (pp. 27-28, 35-36, tsn, March 11, 1976; pp. 81, 83, tsn, March 18, 1976). "The findings in her physical examination on Juanita Lamadura on August 26, 1975 is shown in a Medical Certificate which she issued now marked as Exhibit "1" for Criminal Case No. B-495. Her findings show that she did not find any marks such as blue marks, no contusions, and no external wounds on her body" (pp. 1011, 26, 27, tsn, March 11, 1976). "It is possible that since Juanita Lamadura came to the physical examination three (3) days later some marks could no longer be seen" (p. 18, tsn, March 11, 1976). "In the internal examination she made on Juanita Lamadura on August 27, 1975, she issued a medical certificate which is Exhibit "A" in Criminal Case No. B-495. Her findings are that she found lacerations of the hymen at 11:00 o'clock and 1:00 o'clock. These lacerations were already healed. The scars were fresh scars. The examination shows negative for the presence of spermatozoa" (pp. 11-14, 18, 30-31, tsn, March 11, 1976) [pp. 14-15, Appellee's Brief; p. 296, rec.]. xxx xxx xxx "Juanita Lamadura is a 15 year old girl who comes from Barrio Tagnate, Hilongos, Leyte which is around ten (10) kilometers from Barrio Concepcion. Barrio Tagnate is not accessible by motor vehicle since it is a mountainous area. The means of transportation is by carabao or horse riding. She has no educational attainment at all and she does not know how to read and write" (pp. 63, 105-106, tsn, March 18, 1976) [pp. 16-17, Appellee's Brief; p. 296, rec.]. xxx xxx xxx

From the appellee's Brief, WE observe two things. First, there were no positive signs of physical violence nor traces of the alleged rape on the body of Juanita Lamadura. After the assault, Juanita Lamadura underwent two physical examinations. On August 26, 1975, three (3) days after the assault, Dr. Antonia Ladion conducted an external physical examination on Juanita because the latter refused to have an internal examination on that date. The examination showed no pertinent findings of marks of violence. On August 27, 1975, Juanita agreed to an internal examination. The examination showed negative for the presence of spermatozoa. Only healed lacerations were found with the observation that the scars were fresh. Nonetheless, WE note that the absence of any marks of violence on the body of the victim does not negate the commission of rape (People vs. Balbuena, et al., G.R. Nos. L-44859-60, April 27, 1984). The same can be explained by the fact that the external physical examination was conducted on the victim three days after the assault. The marks could have healed by then. During the period of three days after the sexual assault, she must have urinated and thereby expelled all the spermatozoa. The important consideration in the crime of rape is not the emission of the male semen but the penetration of the male penis into the female genital organ (p. 34, Appellee's Brief citing People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450, People vs. Selfaison, 1 SCRA 235, People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980, People vs. Llamas, 3 C.A. Rep. 232). Second, having been dragged away from the rest of her companions before the alleged assault on her chastity was made, Juanita Lamadura's testimony is the only available evidence on the assault itself. This, however, does not preclude conviction for the offense charged. After all, her testimony (supra) is credible and sufficient to warrant a conviction. It is a rule consistently adhered to that the lone testimony of the victim in the prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction, the rationale being that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is the offended party's testimony (People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 50450, March 16, 1984; People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 889; People vs. Macaya, et al., 85 Phil. 540). WE note that at the time of the taking of her testimony, Juanita Lamadura was only 15 years old (p. 105, tsn, March 18, 1976). She was unlettered. It is inconceivable how she could have concocted a story of rape with such convincing details unless she had been the victim of such a detestable assault. Juanita Lamadura is a simple provincial lass doing the menial tasks of a housemaid. Her own provincial sentiments proscribe exposing herself to the shame and humiliation of being publicly known as a rape victim, unless she in fact was. She braved the consequences of such exposure. In weighing the testimony of the complainant in an accusation for rape, the rule often applied by the courts is that the testimony of the victim, whose chastity has not been questioned, is generally accorded credence because such offended party would not have fabricated facts that could bring shame and dishonor on her. Nor would she disclose her humiliating experience at a public trial, and thug give rise to gossip and slander, unless her motive was to bring to justice the person who grievously wronged her (People vs. Balbuena, supra People vs. Pimentel, No. L-38423, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 695). It is unthinkable that an unmarried teenager a high school student, would endure the shame and humiliation of being publicly known that she had been ravished, allow an examination of her private parts and undergo the trouble and expense of a court proceedings if her motive was not to bring to justice the person who had grievously wronged her" (People vs. Vidal, et al., G.R. Nos. L-4887678, January 30, 1984; People vs. Garcines G.R. No. L-32321, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 653; People vs. Savellano, L-31227, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 320; People vs. Canastre 82 Phil. 480). It is true that while rape is an abominable crane, it is an accusation easy to make, hard to prove, and still harder to defend by the person accused (People vs. Olalia, G.R. No. L-50669, March 12,1984; People vs. Reyes, Nos. L-36874-76, September 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 126). So that such charge, based on the lone and uncorroborated testimony of the victim, must be regarded with utmost caution and examined with the greatest care. To warrant conviction, the testimony of the victim must be clear and free from serious contradictions, and her sincerity and candor, free from suspicions (People vs. Olalia, supra People vs. Lacuna, et al., No. L-38463, December 29, 1978, 87 SCRA 364). Indeed, during her external physical examination, she refused an examination of her private parts because according to her nothing happened. She testified and signed an affidavit wherein she declared that the accused did everything to her except one thing (p. 4, Appellant's Brief). She filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness, but then later changed the charge to one of rape (Ibid., pp. 2-7). Nonetheless, these enumerated facts do not deviate from her sincerity and candor and the veracity of her accusation for rape. Her conservative and provincial values put her on guard. She was equally ashamed and afraid for her life (Ibid., p. 25). Only her sense of justice overwhelmed her hesitation. Against the appellee's version, Leonardo Lor (23 years old, at the time his testimony was taken, single, and a resident of Barrio Concepcion, Hilongos, Leyte [tsn, p. 2261) claims that he was not with Juanita Lamadura at the time of the alleged rape. Accordingly, he remained in the motor cab with Concepcion Lor while the two other complainants went in pairs with his two other companions. He maintains that he stayed behind with Concepcion Lor and did nothing but talk with Concepcion through the two hours or so that they stayed by the river bank. Appellant's version defies belief. The three complainants, including Juanita Lamadura herself, positively Identified Leonardo Lor as the one who dragged Juanita to a secluded area where he took advantage of her.

It is undisputed that the three victims did not know any of the accused; and neither did they (the victims) know one another (Ibid., p. 35). Considering that all the three victims reside in the province, their outlook provincial and conservative, it is hardly natural for them to have easily acquiesced to go with the three accused separately and to separate secluded areas. On the other hand, as correctly observed by the lower court (p. 156, rec.), the three accused knew one another and were friends. If Leonardo did not participate in the commission of any criminal design, but admittedly was only present when his two companions were perpetrating their own criminal designs, how is it that he did not show any effort to prevent the crime against two of the complainants taking place a short distance away from him. That he was an active participant in a criminal design is borne by the fact that he was driving the motor cab on which the other accused and the three victims rode. He directed the course of the trip. He actively represented one of his companions as a P.C. soldier. He conferred with the two other accused before taking the three victims in his motor cab. He participated in the deception that culminated in his own forcible defloration of the helpless Juanita Lamadura The information filed against Leonardo Lor alleges as aggravating circumstances nighttime, use of motor vehicle and taking advantage or abuse of superior strength. The general rule is that the aggravating circumstance must have been purposely sought by the offender to facilitate the commission of the offense. There is no showing that the offender, Leonardo Lor, purposely and deliberately sought nighttime to perpetrate and facilitate the commission of his criminal design. (People vs. Coderes Nos. L- 32509, April 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 255; People vs. Apduhan, Jr., No. L-19491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798; People vs. Condemena, No. L- 22426, May 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 910). WE find that the use of motor vehicle was deliberately sought to facilitate the commission of the crime. Leonardo Lor did not immediately take the victims into the motor cab when the latter hailed it. Instead, he conferred with his two male companions, the present co-accused. It was only after their brief conference that Leonardo Lor agreed to take the victims in the motor cab. At this time, the criminal design of all the three accused to sexually assault the three girls, began to be evident. Henceforth, Leonardo Lor was to take the three girls in the motor cab; and unknown to said victims, he was to take them and his co-accused to a secluded place by the river bank; there, he and his co-accused were to drag their respective partners to separate places to consummate the rape. Clearly, said motor cab was used to facilitate the commission of the rape and aggravated the crime. (People vs. Famador No. L-36553, March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 310; People vs. Ong, et al., No. L-37908, October 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 267). For superior strength to aggravate a crime, it must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of the same (People vs. Bello, No. L-18792, February 28,1964, 10 SCRA 298). There must also be notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor (People vs. Cabiling, No. L-38091, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285). No such showing appears in the present case. The fact that the victim was only 14 years old at the time of the assault while the aggressor was 23 years of age does not reflect notoriety of inequalities in strength. In People vs. Parayno (No. L- 24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3), abuse of superior strength was not considered despite the fact that the accused was 61 years old while the victim was only 9 years old. While the aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud (Paragraph 14, Article 14, Revised Penal Code) was not alleged in the information, there is evidence that the same was employed to facilitate the commission of the crime. To convince the victim that the change of route during the trip was a necessity, Leonardo Lor told the victims that they had to drop a P.C. soldierpassenger somewhere near the river bank. Fraud, which constitutes deceit and manifested by insidious words and machinations, is illustrated in the case of the offended party's stepfather who, taking advantage of the absence of her mother, took the young girl away and told her she was to be taken to the house of her godmother, but instead she was taken to another house where she was raped (People vs. de Leon, No. 26867, August 10, 1927, 50 Phil. 539). Similarly, there is also deceit or fraud where accused "lured a minor girl to go with him and look for her sister Liza who was allegedly waiting for the offended girl somewhere at Junquera Street but instead, accused upon reaching said destination, dragged the girl to a secluded area and there raped her (People vs. Famador 173 SCRA 310). There is craft, which is cunning or trickery, where accused pretended to buy a pig from his victims, and then thereafter, taking advantage of his victims' goodwill, stabbed one of them, then robbed the other (People vs. Lobetania, No. L-56973, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 297). Craft was also present where "accused Revotoc asked permission from -his employer allegedly to go home to Pangasinan at 4:00 p.m. on the day the offense was committed. He even borrowed P50.00 from his employer. He brought with him his clothes placed in a travelling bag. At 10:00 p.m. of the same day, he went back to the store with his coaccused. He knocked at the door and when asked who he was he mentioned his name. To place the victims off-guard and to gain entrance at that unholy hour, he pretended that he was going back to the store because he failed to take a ride to Pangasinan. By reason of his pretension, the unsuspecting Chinese opened the door to welcome him. Thereafter, Revotoc and de Vera entered the place, and with Diaz standing guard, they perpetrated the crime. The agent gravating circumstance of craft is therefore present" (People vs. Revotoc, No. L-37425, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 22). Finally, the nearest house to the river bank, site of the crime, was about 300 to 450 meters away. This qualifies the place as uninhabited. A place where there are no people or any number of houses within a perimeter of less than 200 meters is uninhabited (Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review by Gregorio, p. 66, citing Decision Supreme Court of Spain, July 9, 1894).

The fact that Leonardo Lor, together with his co-accused deliberately brought the three victims to the said river bank, is proof that said uninhabited place was purposely sought for the commission of the crane charged. While uninhabited place is not aggravating when there is no showing that accused selected the place of commission of the crime (People vs. Capillas, No. L27177, October 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 173), said aggravating circumstance is present in the instant case, where there was a deliberate selection of an isolated place for the perpetration of the crime (People vs. Ong, No. L-37908, October 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 267). WHEREFORE, FINDING LEONARDO LOR (IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. B-495) GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE AGGRAVATED BY FRAUD OR CRAFT, THE USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE, AND UNINHABITED PLACE, HE IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA, AND ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY JUANITA LAMADURA IN THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY. HE IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND SUPPORT THE CHILD SHOULD THE OFFENDED PARTY HAVE GIVEN BIRTH TO ONE BY REASON OF THE OF OFFENSE, AND TO PAY THE COSTS. SO ORDERED. Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concurs in the result. Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave. h. People vs Guinucud, et al., 58 Phil 621 This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, convicting the appellants of the crime of adultery. The prosecution was instituted by the complaint of the husband of Rosario Tagayun, named Ramon Palattao. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty but on the hearing, admitted the facts alleged in the information but presented evidence to prove that Ramon Palattao consented to the adultery, which fact, if established, bars any prosecution under article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The pertinent paragraphs of said article are as follows: ART. 344. Prosecution of all crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. It appears from the evidence in this case that the husband, Ramon Palattao, in April 1930, abandoned and deserted his wife, Rosario Tagayun, then aged 21, and their child. After that abandonment, Rosario lived with her mother but made repeated efforts to win back her husband. She went to the justice of the peace of San Pablo, Mariano Castaeda, who testified that he called Ramon and endeavored to persuade Ramon to take his wife back, but Ramon refused. Thereafter, at the request of the mother of Rosario, the barrio lieutenant, Mariano Tumaliuan, took Rosario and her child to Ramon's house but she was refused admission by the said Ramon. Thereafter, on July 3, 1930, the husband, Ramon, induced his wife, Rosario, to sign the document which appears in the record as Exhibit 1. He brought the document in duplicate to the house of Rosario's mother where both of them signed both copies, he keeping the original and leaving her the carbon copy. Exhibit 1 is as follows: COUPLE'S AGREEMENT We, Ramon Palattao and Rosario Tagayun, man and wife, enter into the following agreement: That in view of the fact that, I, Ramon Palattao, the man, cannot stay and live with the parent of Rosario Tagayun in barrio Lattu; and that in view of the fact that I, Rosario Tagayun, the woman, cannot live with the parent of Ramon Palattao in barrio Auitan; We mutually agree by this present to separate from each other and that Ramon Palattao can and I gave him the privilege to love or marry another woman; so also Rosario Tagayun can accept or be married to another man; We also agree that, as to the baby Leslie who is our child, it is our right to have him by turn and we are bound to support him jointly; Finally we state also that each of us has to find his or her means of existence and neither of us has the right to bother the other as to his or her livelihood; In witness whereof we sign at barrio Lattu in the municipality of San Pablo, province of Isabela, this 3rd day of July, 1930. (Sgd.) ROSARIO TAGAYUN (Sgd.) RAMON PALATTAO At the time said Exhibit 1 was signed, Rosario and her child were living with Rosario's mother and there is no evidence of any misconduct on her part at that time or that she contemplated any illicit relations with any other man. On the other hand, we are convinced from the conduct of the husband Ramon that he solicited the signature of Rosario to said agreement in his own interest and because he desired to have "the privilege to love or to marry another woman". At the trial of this case, he denied that the signature in Exhibit 1 was his signature. This was a palpable falsehood as a comparison with his signatures on other documents in the files plainly shows. He even had the effrontery to deny his signature to a motion for continuance which he filed in the justice of the peace court. He admitted on cross-examination that, for more than a year before he filed the complaint in this case, he knew that his wife Rosario and her coaccused Alfonso were living together in the same house. During all that time he took no action whatever to vindicate the honor or his name or to resent the open offense to the integrity of his home, doubtless, because he felt bound

by the alleged agreement to give his consent to Rosario's conduct or because he expected her to reciprocate. As this court stated in the case of People vs. Sensano and Ramos (p. 73,ante), he was "assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the 'offended spouse," and his conduct as shown by the evidence in this case warrants the inference that he consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. The agreement above referred to (Exhibit 1) is void in law. (Cf. People vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34145, promulgated October 22, 1931.) 2 Whilst the agreement, Exhibit 1, is void in law, it is nevertheless competent evidence to explain the husband's inaction after he knew of his wife's living with the coaccused and to show that he acquiesced in her conduct. The expression "if he shall have consented" in article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which bars the "offended" husband from instituting a prosecution, has no reference to any consent or agreement prior to the commission of the offense but relates to an express or implied acquiescence subsequent to the offense. This consent or acquiescence need not be express but may be inferred from the conduct or the long continued inaction of the husband after learning of the offense. The husband who is truly "offended", within the meaning of the statute, will not sit passively by and allow his name and the honor of his family to be flagrantly sullied by the notorious adultery of his wife. Apart from that, the fact that he abandoned and deserted his wife and child, in spite of all her efforts to maintain their home intact, shows a callous indifference to every moral duty imposed upon him as her husband and the father of their child. In this case, the very thing happened which he might have foreseen and probably did foresee when he abandoned his wife and deceived her into believing that she was free when she signed the said agreement a year and a half before the offense was committed. His consent to the offense before it was committed was void but his tolerance of and acquiescence in the offense after it was committed demonstrate that it is a hypocritical pretense for him now to appear in court as the "offended party" and bar his right to prosecute his wife.1awphil.net Very apt in this connection are the following paragraphs in Groizard's commentaries on similar provisions in the Codigo Penal of Spain: A su vez, transigir un marido con su deshonor, consentir el adulterio y luego ir a los tribunales querellandose de la mujer y de su complice, es ser dos veces indigno: la primera, al conocer y no vindicar la ofensa recibida, y la segunda, haciendola publica, con dao de toda la familia, despues de haber demostrado que personalmente le afectaba en poco. (Page 48, Groizard's Codigo Penal, Vol. 5.) A las limitaciones de que acabamos de hablar, nosotros aadiriamos otra que encontramos establecida en algunos codigos que en las concordancias figuran. Fijariamos un plazo, mas o menos largo, para la presentacion de la querella, pasado el cual, negariamos al marido el derecho de producirla. El marido que tiene conocimiento de la violacion de la fe conyugal, y deja pasar cuatro o sees meses sin acudir a los tribunales demandado reparacion de las injurias, debe suponerse que tacitamente las ha perdonado. Espacio ha tenido suficiente, cuando la herida chorreaba sangre, para ejercer el derecho que la ley le daba; si no lo hizo en un termino prudencial, no es justo que indefinidamente tenga a la mujer bajo la amenaza de un castigo vergonzoso que cohiba perpetuamente su espiritu, impidiendo su arrepentimiento y dificultando la conciliacion conyugal, y con ella la paz de la familia. (Page 49, Groizard's Codigo Penal, Vol. 5.) The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio. Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, and Vickers, JJ., concur. 2. Article 334. Concubinage. c. US vs Macabagbag, et al., 21 Phil 257* d. US vs Campos Rueda, 35 Phil 51 The important question presented by this appeal is whether or not the crime charged had been committed "con escandalo" (under scandalous circumstances). From the record it appears that on the 25th of October, 1915, Luisa Goitia de la Camara presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in which she charged the said defendants with the crime of "amancebamiento." The complaint alleged: That on or about and during the period comprised between the 1st of June, 1915, and the date of the filing of this complaint, the said accused, Jose Campos y Rueda, being united in lawful marriage to the complainant, Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, within the jurisdiction of this court, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and maliciously, and with scandal, did have, outside his conjugal home, a concubine named Aurora Arroyo, his coaccused, with whom the said accused lived in concubinage; an act committed in violation of law. On that complaint the defendants were duly arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and were tried. On the 4th of January, 1916, the Honorable Richard Campbell, judge, after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, reached the conclusion that the defendant, Aurora Arroyo, was not guilty of the crime charged, for the reason that she was ignorant of the fact that her codefendant, at the time the alleged illicit relation took place, was a married man. He further found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant Jose Campos Rueda was guilty of the crime charged

and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of one year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay one-half the costs. From that sentence the defendant Jose Campos Rueda appealed to this court and presented the following assignment of errors: 1. The court erred in making the following findings of fact: First. (a) That the defendant had made certain proposals to his wife, and that, as she refused to accept them, he subjected her to such abuse that she found herself obliged to separate from him. (b) That the logical inference from his testimony is that the said proposals were against nature. Second. That, on several occasions the accused slept in the same room with the codefendant, Aurora Arroyo, in the latter's house, where besides herself, her mother and her two sisters also lived. Third. That the accused had carnal intercourse with the coaccused, Aurora Arroyo, in the parlor of the house of the said defendant. Fourth. That, on several occasions, the accused was seen riding in a carriage in company with the codefendant, Aurora Arroyo. 2. The court also erred in not taking into account the testimony of the witnesses for the defense. 3. The court erred in holding that there had been scandal in the relations between the accused Jose Campos and his codefendant Aurora Arroyo, and in holding that this scandal was proven. 4. The court erred in holding that the crime of concubinage, as defined in the Penal Code, was proven. With reference to said assignments of error, we deem it advisable to discuss the third first. Passing over, for a moment, the question whether or not the defendants had had illicit relations, but admitting that they had, only for the purpose of the argument, we proceed to an examination of the record for the purpose of ascertaining if such acts were committed con escandalo. If the record fails to show that the alleged criminal acts were committed con escandalo, then of course, in accordance with article 437 of the Penal Code, the sentence of the lower court should be revoked. From an examination of the record it appears that the appellant was united in lawful wedlock with the prosecuting witness a few months before the commencement of the present action: that they had separated, and that the wife (the prosecuting witness) had returned to her mother's home to live. The record further shows that the appellant had visited the house of his codefendant, where her mother and sisters lived, on several occasions; that the appellant and his codefendant had been seen riding in a carriage together; that they had gone together to a certain theater; that certain questionable conduct had taken place between them in the house where the codefendant lived with her mother and sisters. These facts were proved by witnesses who did not live in the vicinity or neighborhood where the appellant's codefendant and her mother and sisters lived. The record shows that said witnesses had been employed, in one way or another, to watch the appellant and his codefendant, and that they went to the home of the codefendant of the appellant for that purpose. The prosecution presented some proof to show that the appellant had taken undue liberty with the person of his codefendant in the tienda of her mother and sisters. The codefendant, her mother and sisters lived in a thickly populated district of the city of Manila. None of the alleged facts relating to the conduct of the appellant and his codefendant were proved by any of the citizens of the vicinity where the mother of the appellant's codefendant lived. Several of the neighbors were called as witnesses during the trial of the cause and none of them had seen any conduct on the part of the appellant and his codefendant which aroused their suspicions or caused them to believe that the relations of the appellant and his codefendant were not what they should be. If the appellant and his codefendant had been associated together under scandalous circumstances, it would seem that at least some of the neighbors or persons living in that vicinity might have been found, who had observed such conduct. If the conduct of the appellant in relation with his codefendant had been con escandalo in fact, it would seem to have been unnecessary for the prosecution to have gone into another part of the city to find witnesses to prove that fact. The mere fact that it was necessary to employ spies for the purpose of watching the conduct of the appellant, in relation with the fact that none of the people living in the vicinity had observed any suspicious conduct on his part in relation with his codefendant, gives rise to a serious doubt that the acts were committed con escandalo.lawphil.net In the case of United States vs. Casipong and Hongoy (20 Phil. REp., 178) this court said, in a case very analogous to the present: Nothing would be easier than to adduce proofs of the criminal act, . . . for if they have lived publicly in concubinage and in sight of everybody, various witnesses, residents not only of the place of residence of the offended wife and her husband but also of the barrio . . . to which the unfaithful husband removed in order to live with his paramour, could have testified. In the present case there is no contention that the appellant lived in the house with his codefendant and her sisters. He only visited her house from time to time. We do not now attempt to define the particular acts which constitute escandalo as that term is used in article 437. Each case must depend upon its own particular facts. It is sufficient for the present case to say that the acts and conduct of the appellant with his codefendant were not such as to produce a scandal nor to set a bad example among the neighbors in the community where said alleged acts are said to have taken place. There seems to have been no publicity of the alleged immoral acts. We have arrived at this conclusion for the reasons stated in the case of United States vs. Casipong and Hongoy (20 Phil.

Rep., 178) and the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of the 16th of June, 1888, and the 25th of February, 1896. Our conclusion, therefore, with reference to the thrive assignment of error is that the alleged relation between the appellant and his codefendant did not exist con escandalo. In view of that conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error for the reason that the crime described in the complaint is not punishable under article 437 of the Penal Code, nor any other article of said Code unless the act complained of had been committed fails to con escandalo. Therefore, for the reason that the proof show that the alleged crime had been committed in violation of article 437 of the Penal Code, or of any other provision of said Code, we are of the opinion that the judgment and sentence of the lower court must be reversed. Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered revoking the sentence of the lower court, dismissing the complaint and discharging the defendant from the custody of the law, and without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered. Torres, Carson, Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur. e. People vs Pitoc, et al., 43 Phil 760* 3. Article 335. When and how rape is committed (Repealed by Sec. 4, RA 8353) 4. Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness b. People vs Collado, 60 Phil 610 Taking advantage of the fact that Paula Bautista, a young married woman, was alone in her house which is situated in the eastern part of the town of Bacnotan, of the Province of La Union, with no companion but her three-year old child who was then asleep, the accused, between 3 and 4 in the afternoon of July 31, 1933, went to the house of said woman on the pretext of asking for a glass of water, stealthily approached her and, without giving her an opportunity to defend herself, embraced and kissed her and caught hold of her breasts. When Paula Bautista recovered from the shock, she defended herself as best she could and in spite of the fact that the accused threatened to kill her with a dagger if she did not accede to his desires, she bit him on the right side of the chest thereby forcing him to release her instantly. Simultaneously therewith, she cried for help and, picking up a bolo nearby, she tried to strike him with it. However, the accused, who is stronger and more agile than she, succeeded in holding he by the arms and they were found in this position by Crispulo Ariola who was the first to come to her aid. Realizing that his designs had been frustrated and having been surprised in such situation by Ariola, he did not go down the stairs but jumped from the house to the ground, fleeing from the scene of the crime with theutmost speed. These are the facts as found by the trial court in which this court agrees after having carefully reviewed the record and the evidence. In view of the above facts, the trial court sentenced the accused to an indeterminate penalty of from two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, with the corresponding accessories of the law, with costs. Not agreeing with the sentence imposed upon him, the accused appealed therefrom to this court, assigning in his brief four alleged errors as committed by the trial court. In support of his contention that the trial court actually committed the errors assigned by him, the appellant cites some portions of his own testimony and later alleges that the crime imputed to him is absolutely improbable on the ground that at that time he knew that about 6 meters from the house of the offended party Paula Bautista, her cousin Crispulo Ariola and the witness for the defense Paulino Palaroan were conversing, claiming furthermore that at the time when he is alleged to have committed the acts of lasciviousness on the offended party, which is referred to in her testimony, the witness for the defense Laureano Nebrija was in her house, thus conveying the idea that it would have been folly on his part to commit the crime with which he is charged. The fact when he went to the house of the offended party the accused knew that said two witnesses Ariola and Palaroan were not far away, does not make it improbable for him to have committed the crime charged, because, inasmuch as the offended party was alone in the house and furthermore her husband was absent, having gone to Manila about a month ago to work as an agent, and, in addition thereto, the accused had threatened to kill her if she did not accede to his desires, at the same time showing her a dagger, he must have believed that she would neither offer any resistance nor give a cry of alarm. Moreover he might have thought that said two witnesses Ariola and Palaroan would not continue conversing at the same place after he had left them. That the witness for the defense Laureano Nebrija was not in the offended partys house when the crime was committed, should be believed notwithstanding the fact that he testified that he was present and witnessed said incident from the beginning, because aside from his testimony and that of the appellant, there is nothing in the record to prove the contrary. Ariola and Palaroan did not testify that they had seen said witness come out of the offended partys house either before or after the appellant had escaped therefrom, in spite of the fact that they were only 6 meters away. Furthermore, Crispulo Ariola and Luis Cariaso, the other witness for the prosecution who was the second to come to the aid of the offended party, testified that when they went up into the house they fond only said offended party and her small child, not mentioning the appellant who, as was stated, fled as soon as he saw Crispulo Ariola come up into the house. Furthermore, leaving aside the witness Palaroans statement to the fiscal when the latter summoned him to testify on what he knew about the incident that he knew nothing about the case, Palaroan could not but admit that after he had arrived at his boarding which is about 25 meters from

Paula Bautistas house and also after said witness Ariola had gone up into the latter house, he saw the appellant walking rapidly. This shows that the appellant actually came out of said house with the utmost speed and that Palaroan left Ariola when the appellant went to the offended partys house to ask for a glass of water. On the other hand if, according to the appellants version, all that happened consisted in the offended party having reproached him because she had heard, that he had been spreading false reports that she was his mistress or that the two were maintaining illicit relations, it does not account for the fact that before reproaching him she permitted him to drink water in her house. The evidence shows that upon going up into the house, the appellant asked the offended party for a drink which, according to him was given him. What really happened, according to the evidence, is that the appellant upon seeing that the offended party, whom he had courted before her marriage, although in vain because she paid no attention to him, was alone, he was led into temptation, thus again proving the old age that opportunity makes the thief. There is no doubt that the offended party cried for help notwithstanding the witness Palaroans testimony that he heard no such cry coming from the offended partys house. Her cry was heard by Crispulo Ariola and Luis Cariaso and, if we are to believe said witness Palaroan, it was also heard by Ariolas father named Agaton Ariola at his house about 25 meters distant from tha t of the offended party. Palaroan testified that while he and Crispulo Ariola were 6 m eters from the offended partys house and therefore nearer to said house than Agaton Ariola, Palaroan heard Agaton Ariola tell his son Crispulo to go and find out what was happening at the offended partys house. This shows that said offended party actuall y cried for help for, otherwise, Agaton Ariola, who was very much father than said witness Palaroan, could not have heard it. The foregoing proven facts really constitute the crime of facts of lasciviousness defined in article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and punished therein with prision correccional. Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of dwelling had been proven at the trial, although it was not alleged in the information, it should have been taken into consideration by the trial court on the ground that the appellant had committed the crime in the offended partys own dwelling. In the case of United States vs. Campo (23 Phil. 368), this court, in view of the reasons therein stated, held that although a complaint or information contains no allegation that generic aggravating circumstance of any kind were present in the commission of the crime, said circumstances may be proven at the trial and, if proven, must be taken into consideration in imposing the corresponding penalty. Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is modified by imposing upon the appellant an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, with costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Street, Abad Santos and Vickers, JJ., concur.

c. People vs Balbar, 21 SCRA 1119 On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room whereschoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without warning and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant embraced her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which complainant sustained slight physical injuries. Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the latter charge upon written complaint filed by the offended party duly sworn to before the Clerk of Court. The information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority is hereunder quoted: The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Camba, Municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, braced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the saidteacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravatingcircumstances of having committed it inside the public school building and during school classes. CONTRARY TO LAW. The information for Acts of Lasciviousness reads: At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case the undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio of Cumba, Municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of Miss EsterGonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself close to her, embracing and kissing her against her will and by means of force, and as a consequence thereof said offended party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused her pain and tenderness on the right side of the trunk on the posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may require3 to 4 days to heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance that the same was perpetrated inside the public school building and during

class hour. CONTRARY TO LAW. The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that "(a) with respect to Criminal Case No.823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a sufficient cause of action and that it charges two offenses in a single complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for Acts of Lasciviousness, . . . that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint charges two offenses." On August 16, 1962, over the opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations. Said the court: After reading the informations in both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the acts committed by the accused as alleged in the two informations constitute one offense. As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 841, the grounds alleged in support thereof are: (1) that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; and (2) that the criminal complaint charges two offenses. Without discussing the merits of these grounds above-quoted, the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal Case No. 841 should be dismissed or quashed for the reason that the offense charged therein is already absorbed in the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 823. Thus, the dispositive portion of the order reads: WHEREFORE, it is the opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823 which charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the reason that the same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. And, as to the information in criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on the ground that the acts complained of is already included in Criminal No. 823.From this order, the Government interposed the present appeal. Stated differently in the rationale of its order, the court a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on the following ground: That "while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the main allegations of the information may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important element of the crime of direct assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This essential element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority. . . .This being the case and since . . . sufficient allegations are contained in the information in question to hold the accused responsible for an offense, the Court believes that the information is sufficient in substance to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries." Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance." (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code.)By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148." This special classification is obviously intended togive teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly erroneous. Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity. With respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the conclusion reached by the court a quo. Although it is true that the same acts may constitute more than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an examination of the events which gave rise to the filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does not appear to have been committed at all. It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct makes one amendable to the provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover. (U. S. v.Gomez, 30 Phil. 22, 25) The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time under which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd designs can hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or lascivious. It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not necessarily bring the case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with respect to thedismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the same is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. d. US vs Basilio, 9 Phil 16 Before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fausto Basilio was charged by the fiscal of said province with the crime of abuses against chastity in that, at about 6 p.m. on the 3d of April, 1906, the young woman Marcelina Dy-Oco being then and there in the house of Casimiro Macapagal, which is situated in the barrio of Santa Lucia, town of San Fernando, the accused willfully and feloniously and lewdly abused the said young woman.

From the record of the case the following facts appear to have been proven: That on the evening in question Marcelina Dy-Oco was a visitor at the house of Casimiro Macapagal in San Fernando; that as she approached the door to the upper story at the side of the stairway in company with Lucia Macapagal, the daughter of the owner of the house, and another woman named Eugenia David, the accused, who was also in the house and apparently waiting for her near the aforesaid door, suddenly placed himself behind Marcelina and seized her by the waist, caught her breast, and kissed her, trying to drag her toward a small room of the house, and refusing to let her go in spite of the efforts made by other women to free her from the assailant; that for this reason the women cried out and thereupon two neighbors, named Hilarion Yusi and Santiago Yusi, went to her assistance; the first named seized the accused and with a push made him release his hold. It should be noticed, however, that the offended party was well acquainted with the accused, although she never had anything to do with him because he is married to a cousin of her, and as he has a house of his own the statement that the accused lived in the house where the affair occurred is not true. The fact described above constitutes the crime of abuses against chastity, defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the external acts committed against the person of the injured party, as seen by the witnesses present, are not characteristic of the crime of attempted rape, nor of an intent to commit such offense, but do constitute the offense of abuses against the chastity and are contrary to good morals. The supreme court of Spain, upon establishing the rule as to the application of an article of the Penal Code similar to the one in force in these Islands, declared in its judgment in cassation rendered on the 7th of October, 1890, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "In attempted crime, it is an essential condition, that the external acts which constitute the offense be directed with a constant intent toward the commission of an offense punished by law; that by reason of the absence of such intent and of its necessary tendency, and also for reasons of moral order, the voluntary desistance of the guilty party excludes the attempt from punishment; that such desistance does not imply the absolute irresponsibility of the guilty party with respects to acts previously committed by him if the same constitute by themselves a crime, for the reason that, as they were freely carried out, they are within the nature of a consummated crime - that is, they involve the voluntary character of the act, and the actual damage done to a lawful right; and further, because if the desistance on account of its relation to the intended purpose weakens the connection between the latter to the acts prosecuted and prevents the punishment of the attempt or other offense, not for the damage inflicted but in part for that intended, this is no wise affects either past or anterior acts which violated other rights."cralaw virtua1aw library Would the act forcibly placing the hand between the legs of a woman over 12 years of age, or without force if she be under that age, constitute the crime of abuses against chastity or simply an offense against good morals? The supreme court of Spain has decided that the former and the more serious classification is the proper one:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Considering that the act committed by the appellant, described in the first question in the case, it not being done over and above the clothing of the young woman, . . . is unquestionably one of the abuses against chastity, which abuses when committed under any of the circumstances that characterize the crime of rape, among which is the use of force, constitute the crime punished by article 454 of the code, properly applied by the trial court because it has been set forth that the appellant employed force in carrying out the acts duly proven."cralaw virtua1aw library The accused in this case, who did not plead guilty, states that on the evening in question he had a conversation with the injured girl at the house of Casimiro Macapagal, where he lived, and where the said girl, whom the deponent was courting, used to call; but he denied the acts attributed him in the complaint, and in order to prove his allegation he cited a resident, Ramon Dayrit, who by his testimony confirmed the truth of the charge since he stated that upon hearing the noise in the house he went to it and there he found Hilarion Yusi, who had seized the accused, thus confirming the fact that it was this witness who separated Fausto Basilio from the injured party, Marcelina Dy-Oco, whom he was embracing and would not release; the fact that the accused had amorous relations with the said girl, which, however, has not been proved, not being sufficient to justify the abuse committed by him. The culpability of the accused as the proven and convicted author of the crime of abuses against chastity is evident. In the commission of this crime no aggravating nor extenuating circumstance is present; therefore, the adequate penalty should be imposed in its medium degree. For the reasons above set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. Fausto Basilio is therefore sentenced to the penalty of three years and seven months of prision correccional, to the accessory penalties of article

61 of the Penal Code, one half of the time of his detention to be allowed in his favor, and to pay the costs of this instance. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur. Willard, J., dissents. 5. Article 337. Qualified Seduction c. US vs Arlante, 9 Phil 595 Upon the appeal of the accused from the final judgment whereby he has been sentenced to one year eight months and twentyone days ofprision correccional, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the injured woman in the sum of P500, to maintain the offspring by the payment of P8 monthly to the mother until further orders from the court, and to pay the costs, it appears: That the accused had carnally abused two orphan girls, relatives of his wife, who were sheltered in his house; that they respectively gave birth to a boy and a girl, one of them on the 5th of November, 1905, this being the one who now files the complaint for seduction, and the other on the 15th of October of the same year, the latter appearing in the case as a witness for the prosecution. No error whatever, either of fact or law, can be assigned with respect to the consideration given to the proofs when convicting the accused herein, for even by the evidence produced by the defense, such as the declaration of the wife of the accused, the facts are corroborated and further confirmed. The crime punished in the cause is the one included in paragraph 1 of article 443 of the Penal Code, which is essentially different from that referred to in paragraph 3 of the same article, the difference being that in this latter kind of seduction fraud or deceit is required, while in the other the act would not be punished were it not for the character of the person committing the same, on account of the excess of power or abuse of confidence of which the offender availed himself. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended person, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used. And even though the accused were not, as a matter of fact, in charge of the keeping of the offended girl, it is beyond doubt that, as she was a domestic, the crime is included within paragraph 1 of said article. Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of servant, the term is applied to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in this sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has been properly used. (Decision in cassation dated November 11, 1881,) For the foregoing reasons, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant, and it is so ordered. Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur. d. People vs Fontanilla, 23 SCRA 1227* e. People vs Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81 The existence of grave misgivings as to appellant Nicanor Alvarez committing the crime of rape for which he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, misgivings engendered by the telltale circumstances of time and place, caused hesitancy on the part of this Tribunal to grant his petition to withdraw his appeal, submitted after the briefs for both the State and the defense had been filed and the case was ready for decision. More specifically, it is not easy for the judicial conscience to be at ease with the conclusion that his guilt had been shown beyond reasonable doubt on such tenuous and ambiguous proof as that of the offense having been perpetrated on June 6, 1969 in a small room where appellant, his wife, his infant son and the offended party, his sister-in law, had retired for the night, without any outcry or visible sign of protest on her part, without any weapon to intimidate her being used, and what is more, without her reporting such alleged assault to her parents until January of 1970 when she was close to her eighth month of pregnancy. It may further be remarked that such an appraisal of the matter was aided considerably by the well-documented, both as to facts and the law, and, therefore, highly persuasive, brief of counsel de oficio, the late Attorney Alberto Cacnio. This is not to say, however, that for having taken advantage of a young teenager over whom appellant did exercise moral ascendancy, he should be exculpated. If he were not to suffer for such a misdeed, that would be an affront to one's sense of justice. It is fitting and appropriate therefore that such an act falls within the concept of qualified seduction. For that crime, appellant should be held responsible. It was on the basis of a complaint for rape signed by the offended party herself that an information was filed on May 11, 1970 against appellant Nicanor Alvarez. It is worded thus: "That on or about June 6, 1969, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape and have sexual intercourse with the herein complaining witness, [Loreta T. dela Concepcion], a virgin 13 years of age and sister-in-law of the herein accused, while she was asleep by putting himself atop of her body, against her will

and without her consent." At the hearing, two witnesses testified for the prosecution, a certain Dr. Honesto Marco, who issued a medical certificate after examining the complainant on January 23, 1970, fully seven months and sixteen days after the alleged rape, to the effect that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy something rather obvious from her physical 2 condition, and the complainant. It was therefore solely on the basis of the testimony of the offended party herself that the lower court in the decision now on appeal, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. There is need then to dwell at length on what was testified to by her. After identifying appellant and stating that he was a brother-in-law, his 3 wife being an elder sister, she was asked whether she was the complainant, and after answering affirmatively, identified her 4 amended complaint. When asked why she filed a case against her brother-in-law, this was her reply: "Because of what had 5 happened to me. He raped me in his house in June 1969." The next inquiry was why she was in his house, to which she had 6 this to say: "Because he asked permission from my father that should take care of his [accused's] son." She admitted that both 7 the son, then almost one year old, and her sister were in the house. The location of the house of the accused in Filoville 8 Subdivision in Naga City was next mentioned. From 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 6 up to the following morning, she 9 was there precisely to take care of the baby. When she arrived in the afternoon at five o'clock the day before, the accused was 10 not present, returning only at around 9:00 o'clock that evening." The next question was what happened afterwards, to which 11 she responded: "Something happened. He raped me." This was followed by a query as to whether it occurred in the presence 12 of the sister, and without hesitation, she affirmed categorically: "Yes, sir." The fiscal then sought to ascertain whether the 13 sister offered any opposition to such act of her husband. There was equally a categorical denial thus: "No, sir." Then, when questioned as to where the wife was sleeping when the husband returned at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she replied: "In the 14 15 sala." As to the complainant herself, it "was also there in the sala where she slept." The distance was about six meters 16 17 away. The child was beside the mother. When asked whether she resisted the alleged rape, she answered: "Yes, I resisted, 18 but I could not overcome his strength, because he was stronger than me I was already weak." Then the fiscal specifically sought to determine whether she shouted. This was her response: "As I said, I was weak and tired. After I tried to shout my 19 voice came out and that was the time when I called for my sister." As to whether that shout came after she had been raped, 20 again she affirmed categorically: "I was already raped." She repeated that she was not able to shout while she was being 21 raped because her voice could not come out, as she "was already tired." As to how the act was perpetrated, she stated that 22 she "felt that his body was over [her] body." She maintained that she was asleep at the outset, but after waking up, she 23 resisted, but he, on the other hand, "stayed there and continued doing [it] ." She added that during that time, he threatened 24 to kill her if she ever revealed to anybody what was done. The Court then took over the examination, and when reminded that after being raped, she said she was able to shout, there was a query as to whom it was addressed, and she answered: "To 25 26 the wife of the accused, my sister." She was, however, "not able to wake up." She did alleged that she reported to her 27 sister the following morning, surprisingly, the sister "did not say any word." Nor she notice whether she got angry or not with 28 her husband. She admitted that while she did struggle, no part of her dress was torn. She did not, however, report to her mother or father "because [she] was afraid and that [she] might be punished, because [she knew] that what had happened to 29 [her] was bad." It was not after January of 1970 she informed her parents, causing the court to make this relevant 30 observation, "So, [it was] already 8 months from the time you were raped?" When asked, on cross-examination, why she kept the incident a secret for a period several months, her answer was that she "was afraid the accused and [her] 31 32 parents." Again, the court took over the questioning, asking why that was so, and she answer "He might do it again." When asked specifically whether all that the accused would do, if he would thus get mad was to rape her again, she was candid 33 enough to admit: "Yes, sir." To complete the story, it must be mentioned that a child was born on March 15, 1970, a little over nine months after the above occurrence. In the light, or more appropriately, the obscurity, of the above testimony, what need is there to analyze the evidence offered by the appellant, the only other witness? For the insufficiency of the above declaration of the accused was quite glaring. It would be to overturn a host of doctrines as to the indispensability of showing the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. There moreover, the constitutional presumption of innocence, which clearly has not been 34 overcome There is no justification then for the decision now on appeal. It is thus evident why, as mentioned at the outset, the 35 holding that appellant was guilty of rape through the use of force or intimidation cannot stand. It is different, of course, as will be shown, as far as his culpability for qualified seduction is concerned. 1. Considering the severity of the penalty in prosecutions for rape and the difficulty attending the ascertainment of the facts as they did occur, the judiciary being left to choose between what usually are conflicting versions from the only two parties who could truthfully testify on the matter, it is imperative that the utmost caution be shown. Nowhere is the oft-quoted aphorism of Chancellor Van Fleet to the effect that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, in conformity with the common experience and observation of mankind, of more relevance than in 36 cases of this character. Reference to the rigorous analysis and appraisal in the well-written brief of counsel de oficio, so logical and realistic, would demonstrate that credulity had not only been strained by the version of the offended party; it had snapped. Thus: "The story of the incident as elicited in the ... complaining witness's testimony, that is, that, she was raped before the very eyes of her sister, wife of herein accused-appellant, without the latter raising a finger, challenges human credulity. Viewed from human observation and experience not even a confirmed sex maniac would dare do his thing before the eyes of strangers, how much more for a healthy husband before the eyes of his very wife? Then, again, testimony that her sister

before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place did not lift a finger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this piece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that the natural reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than passive [acquiescence]and the natural response of a sister would be to 37 protect the virtue of a younger sister from abuse of her husband." 38 This is another case therefore where an excerpt People vs. Dramayo, on the primary of the constitutional presumption of innocence is highly relevant. Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge be and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime has been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral 39 certainty." Appellant is therefore entitled to a reversal of the decision insofar as it would hold him liable for rape. 2. It does not follow, however, that appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape means that his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character. If that were so, it may be, considering the facts of this case, cause for right-thinking men and women to discern a gap or fissure in the legal order, one that cries moreover to be bridged. Our criminal law is not susceptible 40 to such a reproach, it being clear from the information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were included in 41 the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is entitled to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced adolescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound by the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to 42 by him, how close she felt towards him. As early as 1908, in the leading case of United States v. Arlante, the penalty for qualified seduction was rightfully visited on an accused whose conduct was similar to the appellant. The facts, as set forth in the very able opinion of no less than Chief Justice Arellano, reads as follows: "That the accused had carnally abused two orphan girls, relatives of his wife, who were sheltered in his house; that they respectively gave birth to a boy and a girl, one of them on the 5th of November, 1905, this being the one who files the complaint for seduction, and the other on the 15th of October of 43 the same year, the latter appearing in the case as a witness for the prosecution." To the possible objection that in that case the offended parties were sheltered in the house of the accused, reference may be made to a latter portion of the same opinion where Chief Justice Arellano pointed out: "And even though the accused were not, as a matter of fact, in charge of the keeping of the offended girl, it is beyond doubt that, as she was a domestic, the crime is included within paragraph 1 of said article. 'Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of a servant, the term is applied to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in this sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has been 44 45 properly used." There is a Court of Appeals decision, People vs. Lauchengco, penned by Justice Gutierrez-David and concurred in by Justices Alex Reyes and J.B.L. Reyes, all three of whom serve in the Supreme Court, that follows closely the Arlante ruling thus: "We believe that this contention of the appellant is untenable and that he was properly charged and convicted of qualified seduction. He was the master of the house. <re||an1w> The offended party was not a mere servant. She was treated as one of the family because she was the cousin of appellant's wife. Hence, in his capacity as head of the family and master of the house, appellant was, for all intents and purposes, the custodian of the complainant. But even though he were not clearly or formally entrusted with the custody of the offended party, it is beyond doubt that, as the latter was serving in his house or was therein as a domestic a term embracing 'persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in this sense, a part thereof' ... the appellant upon taking advantage of his authority and abusing the confidence and trust reposed on him as master of the house, violated the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 337 46 47 of the Revised Penal Code." The latest case in point, People v. Fontanilla, this Court speaking authoritatively through the voice of Justice Castro, indicates why it is not deceit, but rather, abuse of confidence, that qualifies this offense. As was made clear by him: "Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla also claims that there is no evidence on record supporting its veracity. Granting this to be correct, it is nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 'is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than

it does the simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of 48 confidence which implies deceit or fraud.'" Nothing remains to be added except that in a situation like the present, where, in keeping with Filipino mores, a younger sister is called upon to be of help to those ahead of her and to stay, even if intermittently, in the latter's house, especially so after marital ties are formed and children born, may give rise to situations of this character considering that among the poorer elements of our society, all the members of a family are huddled together within briefest confines, and insistence on personal modesty and privacy is practically out of the question. If the ascendancy of a brother-in-law, instead, were used for moral purposes, then, certainly, there is more than a justification for adherence to the view first announce in the landmark Arlante decision that thereby the offense qualified seduction was in fact committed. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court of November 18, 1970, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is reversed and set aside, and another decision entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified seduction and given the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum and two years eleven months ten days of prision correccional as maximum. He is sentenced further to recognize the child born of such relationship and to pay P5,000.00 as damages. No pronounce as to costs. Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.1wph1.t f. People vs Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144 It is unfortunate that in a number of cases involving sexual offenses, the person indicted is a-stepfather or a common-law husband taking advantage of a daughter of the spouse, a stranger by blood, but to all intents and purposes as much a member of the family. So it is in this appeal from a conviction of the accused Felipe Ramirez y Camatis for the crime of rape. He received the penalty of reclusion perpetua twice for the two separate occasions where, as found by the lower court, he employed force on a daughter of his common-law wife and thus succeeded in having intercourse with her. 1 There was no denial about the commission of such acts; his defense, however, was that there was consent on her part, as indeed there had been previous instances where he had access to her. In his brief, he did emphasize the weakness of the proof for the offended party. He could rely then on the constitutional presumption of innocence, 2 his guilt not having been shown beyond reasonable doubt. A careful study of the records of the case calls for an affirmative response to such a plea. This is not to condone what was done. It is reprehensible. There was a failure, however, to demonstrate his culpability for the crime of rape. 3 So we dispose of this appeal. The prosecution presented three witnesses, the complainant, Felicisima Briones, then sixteen years of age, her seventy-year old grandfather, Basilio Mendoza, and the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, Jr. As is to be expected in cases of this nature, the principal testimony came from the complainant. When called to the stand, she testified that the first time she was raped was on the morning of September 29, 1967 when the accused, the common law husband of her mother, taking advantage of the fact that she was alone in the house, suddenly embraced her, brought her inside the room, and then gagged her, with a gun pointed at her. 4 Thus he was able to have sexual intercourse with her. 5 Her exact expression was, "kinuha ang aking pagkababae." 6 She admitted having allowed the accused to take such liberty in these words: "I agreed because what can I do; I have already fought back but I could do nothing. 7 She added: "I fought back but I was overwhelmed," 8 She used the phrase, "talong-talo po ako." 9 He left her right afterwards; all she could do was to cry. 10 Her mother arrived, but she did not report that she was deflowered as she was afraid, the accused having warned her that should she "reveal the matter, she would be killed as well as [her] brothers and sisters and [also] her mother." 11 She further testified that in well-nigh similar fashion, the language employed being almost Identical, the same act was perpetrated by the accused on the morning of October 2, 1967. 12 Again, she fought back but [she] was overwhelmed." 13 Likewise, it was her fear that prevented her from revealing to her mother what did transpire the second time. 14 She gave birth to a child on May 22, 1968, seven months and twenty-five days after the first sexual act. 15 Her pregnancy was not made known to her mother until about five months had elapsed. 16She pointed to the accused as being responsible for it. 17 When her grandfather was told about the matter, he told her that a case would be filed. 18 It was not too searching a cross-examination to which she was subjected but there were additional facts elicited from her that cast further doubt on the claim of force having been employed. It was only after five months from September 29, 1967, that is, in February of 1968, when upon her pregnancy becoming noticeable, the allegation that she was raped was first made, while all the while, she stayed with her mother and the accused in the same house. 19 At no time till then did she ever complain to anybody of the misdeed which she would not impute to him.20 She has an uncle and an aunt living in the same barrio but when she visited them in October, 1967, she never mentioned Such incident. 21 With her in the same house was also her grandfather, Basilio Mendoza, but again, it was only after five months that he was acquainted with the alleged rape. 22 Thus it was obvious that she had the opportunity to complain against the misdeed for a rather lengthy period of time, but she never availed herself of it.23 It likewise must be noted that there was an elder sister, also a resident of the place, but she was also kept ignorant of the matter. 24 Moreover, from her answers to certain questions on cross-examination as to the mode in which the alleged rape was consummated, appellant's guilt was far from clearly shown. She was compelled to admit that when the act was performed, the gun was not pointed at her. 25 The accused was alleged to have placed himself on top of her with one hand holding her two hands, although later on released, at which

time on both occasions, the act of intercourse took place. 26 Thereafter, as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened, she continued her task of weaving a mosquito net. 27 She performed her household chores, and for the ensuing period of time until she could no longer hide the fact of pregnancy, all did appear to be well. Nor did the testimony of Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr., the medico-legal officer, help her case any. Rather, the impression conveyed was to the contrary. When asked whether it would be a fair summary that complainant was subjected to such alleged abuse, this is his answer: "I would rather say that she had previous sexual intercourse which corresponded to the examination, that was on September 29, 1967 as well as October 2, 1967, Your Honor, and furthermore such intercourse resulted in pregnancy which at the time of the examination she was five months, moving to six months, on the way, Sir. 28 On cross-examination the doctor was asked the question whether it is possible that prior to September 29, 1967 and October 2, 1967, the complainant had engaged in sexual intercourse. This is the categorical reply: "Maybe long before September 29, Sir. 29 When pressed further as to whether it could have occurred, say the last week of August, 1967, he reiterated such an opinion: "Well, based on the age of pregnancy as well as the age of the laceration. In my honest opinion, ... sexual intercourse could have occurred a month earlier than September 1967." 30 Continuing along the same line and taking note of the birth of the child on May 22, 1968, which indicated that the period was less than nine months, the query was made as to whether it is usual to give birth earlier than nine months. Again, the doctor was not equivocal: "It is unusual to give birth earlier than nine months. They could have given birth [after] six months to a live infant, but it is not [likely, especially in the case] of women who give birth to a first child wherein it is suspected such delivery could have occurred earlier." 31 It becomes readily understandable why appellant could seize on the glaring weakness of the case for the prosecution as to the alleged employment of force. Even from the most objective standpoint, doubts about his guilt for the crime of rape, not fanciful but real, cannot easily be erased. There is much from the evidence of the prosecution itself that reinforces the assertion that there had been prior sexual relationship between him and the complainant. It is not easy to accept the view, even on the assumption that On two separate occasions there was access to her person, that she was compelled against her will to submit. Even the filing of the complaint can reasonably be ascribed to the insistence of her grandfather, who urged her and her mother to do so by way of vindicating a grievous offense to the family honor. What was done by appellant is certainly inexcusable. It is offensive to morals. Rape was not committed, however; the constitutional presumption of innocence had not been overcome. 1. The pronouncement in People v. Dramayo 32 as to the extent of the protection accorded by the Constitution to a person indicted for a criminal offense once again possesses relevance. Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their bhalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for coviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. 33 There has been recently a number of cases where appellants were quite successful in obtaining a reversal based on such a principle. 34 2. Appellant therefore perpetrated what, without exaggeration, could be denominated a dastardly deed. A reasonable, not a fanciful doubt, however, being a legitimate inference from the evidence of record, no conviction for rape, the offense of which he was accused, could lie. At that, is there no criminal liability on the basis of qualified seduction? It is to be remembered that from United Stales v. Ariante 35 a 1908 decision, with Chief Justice Arellano, no less speaking for the Court, such an offense under appropriate circumstances could be the basis for a criminal prosecution. As a matter of fact, in two recent decisions, People v. Alvarez, 36 and People v. Samillano,37 while the appellants were acquitted, the commission of the crime of rape not having been shown, this Court found them guilty of qualified seduction. Such a result, regrettably, is not warranted here. The information was quite definite that this accused, "armed with a deadly weapon, a firearm, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of a fifteen-year old girl, one Felicisima Briones Mendoza, ...." 38 it is the even more recent case, People v. Castro, 39 then, that finds application. As was set forth in the opinion of Justice Aquino: "Appellant Castro may possibly have committed qualified seduction, of which one form is 'the seduction of a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of age, committed by' a "domestic" (Art. 337, Revised Penal Code). La voz domestico se refiere a las personas que habitualmente viven bajo el mismo techo pertenecen a misma casa y forman en este concepto parte de elia' (2 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal 12th Ed. 560). By reason of the intimacy and confidence existing among various members of a household, opportunities for committing seduction are more frequent (U.S. v. Santiago, 26 Phil. 184; U.S. v. Ariante 9 Phil. 595; People v. Samillano, L-31375, April 22, 1974, 56 SCRA 573). It may be argued that Castro was a domestic in relation to Miguela. We do not make any finding that he committed qualified seduction. Since he was definitely and squarely charged with rape, he cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. The complaint in this case is not susceptible of being construed as charging qualified seduction. It is alleged in the indictment that Castro, 'by means of force and intimidation', willfully had carnal knowledge of Miguela Micua against her will. That charge does

not include qualified seduction. Much less can qualified seduction include rape. Hence, Castro cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the rape charge (See sees 4 and 5, Rule' 120, Rules of Court). The rape charge did not place him in jeopardy of being convicted of qualified seduction. He is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (Sec. 1[c] Rule 115, Rules of Court; See. 1[17], Art. 111, Old Constitution; Sec. 1[19], Art. IV, New Constitution." 40 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of January 8, 1969 in criminal cases Nos. 2698 and 2699 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas of the Eighth Judicial District finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is reversed and set aside. Appellant Felipe Ramirez y Camatis is acquitted with costs de oficio. Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur. Antonio, J, took no part. 6. Article 338. Simple Seduction b. People vs Iman, 62 Phil 92 In June, 1932, Crispin Iman, the accused, began courting Corazon Arcadio, the complaining witness, a young girl 17 years of age. For two months his efforts had been unsuccessful. But in August of the same year, after persistent struggle and through promise of marriage, his efforts were reciprocated. On two occasions, the second being April, 1933, they were on the verge of separation, the girl being tired of his indecent proposals repeated time and again during his visits. But every time the complainant intimidated to the accused her determination to sever their relations because of her importunities he renewed his protestations of love and the lovers quarrel was thus patched up. One day in the month of May, 1933, Crispin went to the house of his finance, her parents then being absent, and availing himself of that opportunity, with a renewal of his promise to make her his wife, he succeeded in betraying her. Believing that she was already lost for having granted him that first favor, the complainant thereafter yielded without restraint to his desires and since then a carnal union replaced their platonic love. Beginning from the month of October following, upon becoming aware of her pregnancy, the complainant asked the accused if he was ready to fulfill his promise and while at the beginning he answered in the affirmative, in the end he told her that he was not, because he was engaged to another girl. In said month for a period of two weeks or more, the accused and the complainant lived together in the formers house. In view of such unbearable situation, her parents intervened and report ed the matter to the chief of police of Plaridel. The officer sent for the accused who, on November 7th, renewed before the chief of police his promise to marry the complainant. In the end, however, the accused refused to fulfill his promise on the pretext that neither his confessor nor his parents approved of the marriage; that he never loved the complainant; and that he was a Catholic while the girls parents were members of the Aglipayan Church. Their carnal relations culminated in the pregnancy of the girl who gave birth to a baby boy on March 9, 1934. The letters Exhibits C, C-1 and C-2, as to the genuineness of which we entertain no doubt, written by the accused to the complainant in September, 1933, corroborate the existence of amorous relations between them and that the accused had given to the complainant his promise to marry her. In one of said letters, Exhibit C-2, the accused calls father the father of the complainant. The facts above set out, disclosed by the complainants testimony, her affida vit Exhibit 1 presented by the defense itself without any qualification or condition, as part of its evidence, and by Exhibits C, C-1 and C-2, their existence being, therefore, established by the record in this appeal, constitute, the crime of seduction, defined and punished in article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit, carnal knowledge of a woman above 12 and less than 18 years of age, of chaste life and good reputation, accomplished by means of deceit, the usual form of which according to the doctrine of this court, being an unfulfilled promise of marriage (U.S. vs. Salud, 10 Phil. 302; U.S. vs. Lopez, 14 Phil. 593; Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 27, 1911; April 30, 1915; November 15, 1912; November 20, and December 12 and 26, 1914; October 14, 1871; December 24, 1887; October 7, 1874; October 19, 1898). The appellant contends that, assuming it to be true that in June, 1932, he promised to marry the complainant, inasmuch as the first carnal act took place in March, 1933, nearly one year thereafter, in the absence of proof that during said interval of time he reiterated such promise, it can not be said that the complainant consented to the act upon the faith that such promise would be fulfilled. In the first place it is not true that such promise was made by the appellant only in June, 1932, for it is a fact that it was reiterated shortly before the first sexual act took place between the accused and the complainant as shown by affidavit Exhibit 1, presented in evidence by the accused himself, and by the complainants answers to questions made to her on this point by the defense counsel. But even if it were true that said promise was made only once, namely, in June, 1932, the circumstance that it has been reiterated and that the sexual act took place eleven months thereafter does not detract from the existence of the offense. The weight of authorities on this question is against the appellants theory. Promise of marriage is one of the essential elements, recognized by the courts, constituting deceit in the crime of seduction and, inasmuch as such fact is established in the decision of the trial court, the appellants contention as to the necessity that said promise be reiterated under circumstances of strong probability, or that the same has been given before or after the woman has yielded to the importunities of the man carries no weight. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 27, 1911.) Except where the rule may be otherwise by reason of the construction put upon the particular statute, the general rule is that it is not necessary that the promise be made or renewed at the time, it being sufficient that there was a previous promise through means of which the seduction was accomplished. (57 C.J., 50.)

We do not think that the promise to marry must have been the immediate (in point of time) inducement to the coition; a yielding upon the faith of a previous promise would be sufficient. (State vs. Smith, 145 S.E., 287.) The second assignment of error is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the sexual intercourse between the parties was not had under promise of marriage. The prosecuting witness testified that she did not submit herself to the defendants sexual embraces until after the promise was made in March, and the defendant himself fixes the first date of such intercourse in the June following. The theory upon which this assignment is rested by counsel, as we understand it, is that, in order to bring the case within the statute, the intercourse must take place either at the time when the promise is made or immediately following it. In our opinion no such limitation can be fairly implied from the words of the act. Its purpose is to protect every young woman of the class mentioned, who, confiding in the honesty of the promise, yields to the solicitations of him who, as she believes, will sooner or later be her husband, and permits him, as favor, to enjoy in advance of the marriage ceremony those privileges which after marriage become his of right. The fact that she does not surrender her body to the sexual embraces of her supposed future husband until by lapse of time she has become entirely accustomed to the idea that sooner or later she will become his wife, does not take her out of the protection of the statute. (State vs. Slattery, 74 New Jersey Law Reports, 241-243.) It is contended by appellant that there is no proof in this record to show that appellant referred to or repeated the marriage engagement between the parties when he obtained carnal intercourse with Addie Hardin, in the hotel at Van Alstyne; to state the proposition in a different form: that, to constitute seduction at the time the carnal knowledge was obtained, appellant must have then promised to marry the party seduced, or that he must have alluded to the contract of marriage; that it is not sufficient if the parties be engaged to be married, but the engagement or promise must be used at the very time the carnal knowledge was obtained. We do not concur in this contention. The record shows that the appellant was engaged to be married to Addie Hardin; that he had requested her mother to permit him to marry her, to which she had agreed. The record shows that, when they went to the hotel, both claimed to be man and wife. Now, we hold that, if the promise to marry was the moving coast cause, that is, if the carnal intercourse was the consequence of a prior promise of marriage, it does not matter whether this promise was repeated or not at the time the parties had carnal intercourse with one another. This question arose in Armstrong vs. People (70 N.Y., 38). In that case the prosecutrix testified that the promise of marriage was made in the latter part of May, and that the illicit intercourse took place on August 5th thereafter, at the house of Doctor Kimball. The Supreme Court of New York held that, if the promise made in May (being before the seduction) was the cause of the illicit intercourse, that would be sufficient. If the rule were otherwise, in jurisdictions in which the prosecutrix is not permitted to testify, it would be almost impossible to convict; and it would be a rare case, indeed, that proof could be made that the promise of marriage was made at the time of the intercourse, and, even if such proof could be made, it might smack strongly of barter and sale. At any rate, in this state the prosecutrix was not a competent witness; and, under that state of the law, prosecutions have been sustained, all the necessary elements of the crime being established by circumstantial evidence. (Bailey vs. State, 38 Southwestern Reporter, 185, 186.) With respect to this particular question the court has met with some difficulty because the complainant, far from asserting directly and categorically that the first sexual act she had with the accused was due precisely to the deceitful promise of marriage made by him, stated that one day in the month of May, 1933, shortly after having reiterated to her such promise the accused made her drink a potion, causing her to believe that it would help her digestion, as a consequence of which she was overcome by a general ill feeling to the point of almost losing her consciousness, and while in such a state the accused succeeded in lying with her. Hence, the appellant contends that in the instant case one of the essential elements of seduction defined and punished in article 338 of the Revised Penal Code is wanting, to wit, that the act be accomplished be means of deceit The court holds that there is no sufficient evidence showing that the accused made his sweetheart drink a sleeping potion, and that it was not the means employed to accomplish his purpose. It may then be said that if such were the case, the accused employed no deceitful means, because barring the sleeping potion the offended person has mentioned no other means. The court believes, however, that in order to establish the existence of seduction, a positive and direct statement of the offended party that she yielded to the accused because she was induced and deceived by his promise of marriage, and not for the mere satisfaction of carnal desires, is not necessary, it being sufficient that the conduct of the offended person and the accused and the circumstances of the case, taken as a whole, show that her consent was secured by means of said promise, as in the instant case. For what other conclusion can be inferred from the fact that the accused and the complainant, having been engaged since June 1932, she attempted on two occasions to break their engagement simply because he had been annoying her with demands for sexual favor in advance? Had this womans virtue of chastity not been built upon a strong foundation, would she not have succumbed to the first attempts, without allowing almost one whole year of their engagement to elapse, before the accused succeeded in overcoming, through reiterated promises of marriage, the complainants last line of resistance, erected against his stubborn importunities? As to her, therefore, it was not the frailties of the flesh which caused her to deviate from the path of virtue; it was no other than his repeated protestations that he would not leave her in disgrace would redeem in the near future his promise of marriage therefor made. Similar cases to the one at bar, upon substantially the same facts, have been decided by courts of last resort, wherein it was held that the essential elements of the offense of seduction were present.

When the judgment admits as facts of record the amorous relations with a view to marriage between the accused and the offended party, and her abandonment after her pregnancy, the court having also held that those facts constitute the crime of seduction defined and punished in article 458, No. 3, of the Penal Code, it is evident that the intervention of the deceit in the offense is admitted and consequently, the appeal based on the lack of evidence showing that fraud intervened in the offense can not be sustained. (Decision of December 2, 1873, Gazette of March 1, 1874.) Considering that the promise of marriage given to a member of the opposite sex, above 12 years and less than 23 years of age, voluntarily unfulfilled and without justifiable cause to prevent it, for the wicked purpose of committing an unlawful act, constitutes the deceit referred to in article 458, paragraph 3, etc. (Decision of October 7, 1874.) The case of State vs. Horton (100 N.C. 443; 6 Am. St. Rep., 613; 6 S.E., 238), is authority for the position that the state is not required to show that the defendant, in so many words, promised to marry the woman if she would agree to submit to carnal intercourse with him, or, in other words, to show the causal relation between the promise of marriage and the seduction by any set form of words; but it is sufficient if the evidence is such as to convince the jury to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt that the woman is influenced by the promise and the main intended that she should be, or so purposely acted as to produce the impression on her mind that he would keep his promise if she would comply with his request. The jury are to draw their own seduction from the testimony, provided there is even inferentially any evidence of a purpose to violate the statute. (State vs. Ring, 115 Am. St. Rep., 759-761.) . . . The only serious question presented is whether the circumstances are such as to justify a finding that the seduction was effected with fraud or deceit. When we consider the relation in which these parties had been living in the house of Benedicto Lopez, to whom the girl was related, and who was the adopted father of the defendant, the evident serious nature of the promise to marry, as shown by the testimony of the girl, and the subsequent conduct of the defendant, it is apparent that under the authorities the court properly found that the deceit which is an essential element of the crime of estupro was present. . . . (U.S. vs. Lopez, 14 Phil. 593.) The fact that the accused and the young woman seduced lived for months, or during a great many days, in the same house in Tanauan, San Juan de Bacoor, and Lipa, gave opportunity for the intimacy that sprung up between them, the man causing the girl to believe that after some time they would be wedded; so much so that, in response to a remark made by the mother, the girl replied that by reason of her love affairs with the accused her future was assured; undoubtedly trusting to the deceitful promises given by the defendant, a distant relative of hers, it is easily understood how she consented to be seduced by her lover who, willfully failing to comply with the promise so persistently given, has shown that he only made the same with the wicked purpose of committing an unlawful act. (U.S. vs. Salud, 10 Phil. 206.) . . . proof of circumstances warranting the inference that sexual intercourse would not have been accomplished in the absence or such promise, is sufficient, . . .. (57 C.J., 77; People vs. Wallace, 109 Cal., 611; 42 P., 159; People vs. Santos, 8 Puerto Rico, 348.) The defense of the accused consisted in denying everything except that the admission of which would not in his judgment to be prejudicial to him. He denies having had carnal relations with the complainant, or that he ever courted or wooed her. He denies having had carnal relations with her, or that he is the father of the child born of the complainant in March, 1934. When confronted with the fact that the boy resembles him, he gave two explanations both childish and nonsensical, namely, that during the complainants pregnancy she must have taken a fancy for him, and that one Teopisto, who according to the ac cused, had love relations with the complainant, bears a great resemblance to him, only that Teopisto is shorter, thereby implying that the child who resembles him and therefore resembles Teopisto may be Teopistos as well as his (defendants) child. With respect to the nature and extent of his relations with the complainant, the accused only admits that they became friends because she often came to draw water from the well in his yard and that as outward expressions of such friendship, the complainant used to tickle the accused, who in turn kissed her or fondled her breast, and beyond that they dared not venture but discreetly restrained on time the impulses of the flesh. From the evidence of the defense it maybe inferred that the complainants chastity literally was shattered to pieces by reason of her frequent visits to the well in the yard of the accused, and thus as far as he is concerned, the unavoidable fate of the earthern vessel taken to the spring once too often, was repeated in her case. When the accused appeared before the chief of police of Plaridel whose good offices were sought by the complainants parents, he made, according to him, before said official, this statement: If their purpose is that I marry their daughter, supposing that she really loves me, they should give me time because may parents are in Bohol and I want to consult them. When he returned from Bohol he did not fulfill his word and said that neither from his parents nor his confessor, before whom he presented his case, did he receive the necessary encouragement for him to marry the complainant. The accused surmises that this prosecution was instituted not by reason of the grave offense which he inflicted upon the complainant in seducing her and abandoning her afterward, but upon the instigation of the Aglipayanos of Plaridel (he being a Catholic), with whom he had a litigation. The trial judge acted correctly and in conformity with the truth in disregarding the whole story concocted by the accused were both truth and logic, ingenuity and common sense, are conspicuous by their absence. Wherefore the court finds Crispin Iman guilty of seduction by means of the false promise of marriage under article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, committed against Corazon Arcadio, seventeen years of age, of chaste life and good reputation. As held in the case of State vs. Smith (145 S.E., 287):

The statute making seduction a crime is not to punish illicit intercourse, but to punish the seducer who by means of a promi se of marriage, destroys the chastity of an unmarried female of previous chaste character, and who thus draws her aside from the path of virtue and rectitude, and then fails and refuses to fulfill his promise, a character despicable in the eyes of every decent, honorable man. Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, sentencing the accused to four months to arresto mayor, to indemnify Corazon Arcadio in the sum of P500, to acknowledge the child had by him with her and to give it monthly support in the sum of P15 until it arrives at the age of majority, the same is hereby affirmed with the costs of both instances to the appellant. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur. c. US vs Suan, 27 Phil 12 This is an appeal by the defendant, Pablo Suan, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Palawan convicting him of the crime of seduction. Aniceta Saldivia, the offended party, testified that she was 14 years old; that in 1911 she was one a pupil in school at Coron, Palawan; that Pablo Suan was one of her teachers; that in the month of September, 1911, he began making love to her and promised to marry her; that after the engagement in the following month began having sexual intercourse with her; that Exhibit C to M are letters written to her by the defendant and delivered to her by her cousin Alejandra Obispado, a school girl who lived at their house and who knew of her illicit relations with the defendant; that she had sexual period of seven months; after she became a pregnant the defendant stopped coming to her house; and that in June 1912, she gave birth to a child. This testimony of the girl is true. The defendant showed conclusively that the offended girl had illicit relations with various young men at various times before he had carnal relations with her. Upon this point the trial court said: The court cannot shut its eyes to the fact that as no attempt was made on the part of the Government to deny the allegations that Aniceta Saldivia had indulged in sexual intercourse with a number of persons apparently in a promiscuous manner, the said Aniceta might well be regarded by the accused as more or less a public woman. The fact remains that by his own confession he did not know this until after she and he had entered upon their unlawful carnal relations. Nevertheless, the court is willing to regard the circumstance as an extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused. The defendant, by means of a promise of marriage, had sexual intercourse with the offended girl. At the time these illicit relations began the defendant did not know that Aniceta had been having illicit relations with a number of young men prior thereto. Do these facts constitute the crime of seduction? Paragraph 1 of Article 443 of Penal Code, under which the defendant was convicted and sentenced, reads as follows: The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under twenty three years of age, committed by an person in public authority, priest, servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who in any capacity shall have charge of the education of the woman seduced, or shall have her under his care, shall be punished by prison correccional in its minimum and medium degrees. Viada (vol. 3 p. 132 ), speaking of seduction, says: Should we have to define seduction we would say that it shou ld be understood in general to be unlawful carnal intercourse with an married woman or a widow of good reputation more than 12 years of age and less than 23. We say with an unmarried woman or widow, as should it be with a married woman, it would not be seduction, but adultery; we say that the unmarried woman must be more than 12 years of age, as should she be younger, the act would not constitute the crime of seduction, but that of rape; and finally, we say of god reputation, because should the carnal intercourse be with a public woman or with one of corrupt practices the acts would constitute simply fornication subject only to moral and religious penance, but by no means to a legal penalty. In Websters International Dictionary virgin is defined as a woman who was had no carnal knowledge of man: a maid. The meaning of the expression a virtuous . . . female, as used in reference to the crime of seduction, was explained by the supreme court of Georgia in Washington vs. State (124 Ga., 423; 52 S.E., 910) as follows: The court instructed the. jury that it was a question for them to determine, from the evidence submitted, whether the woman alleged to have been seduced was virtuous at the time of the alleged seduction that is, had she at that time had sexual intercourse with another man? If she had, she was not a virtuous woman; if she had not, she was a virtuous woman. This charge was excepted to on the ground that it confined the jury to consideration of her physical chastity, and eliminated all consideration of the jury of any fact or circumstance tending to show her want a moral chastity. this exception was not to well taken. The court, in this instruction, was giving to the jury the legal meaning of the expression a virtuous female, as applied to a w oman who had never married, in reference to the crime of seduction, and the definition given was substantially correct. The general rule is that unmarried females who are virgins are virtuous; and those who, by their own consent, have ceased to be virgins , are not virtuous. (ONiell vs. State, 85 Ga., 383, 407, 408; 11 S.E., 856, 857.) The jury should treat (the woman alleged to have been seduced) as virt uous unless the evidence, direct or circumstantial, should satisfy them that she had lost her virtue, by having illicit intercourse. (McTyier vs. State, 91 Ga., 254; 18 S.E., 140.) The supreme court of North Carolina in affirming the conviction of the one Crowell (State vs. Crowell, 116 N. C., 1052; 21 S.E., 502), who had been convicted of seduction under promise of marriage, remarked as follows: The precedents sustain the definition given by the court that an innocent and virtuous woman is one who has never had illicit intercourse with any man,

and who is chaste and pure. (State vs. Ferguson, 107 N. C., 841; 12 S.E., 574) the court properly refused to go further and charge that the prosecutrix must have had a mind free from lustful and lascivious desires. The case of Clemons vs. Seba (131 Mo. App., 378; 111 S. W., 522) was a civil case for breach of marriage promise, accompanied with seduction. In that case the Kansas City court of appeals defines and comments upon the crime of seduction as follows: Seduction, in general terms, means to withdraw one from the path of rectitude. It is a leading astr ay. And, as applied to intercourse with a woman under a promise of marriage, it implies that a woman of previous chaste character, has been induced to consent to unlawful sexual relations by persuasion and the promise to marry. Therefore, evidence of previous unlawful intercourse with other destroys the very basis upon which seduction must rest, viz., previous chastity, and would relieve the case of such aggravating circumstance. the evidence should have been admitted. (State vs. Patterson, 88 Mo., 89; 57 Am. Rep., 374; State vs. Wheeler, 94 Mo., 252; 7 S. W., 103; State vs. Sharp, 132 Mo., 165; 33 S. W., 795; Broyhill vs. Norton, 175 Mo., 190; 74 S. W., 1024; Cole vs. Holiday, 4 Mo. App., 94) . . . The case above cited (State vs. Patterson and State vs. Wheeler) were based on a statute making one guilt of a felony who, under promise of marriage, seduces a woman good repute. But the reasoning of the cases applies to a civil case of this character. Those words, or those of like character, are not in the Michigan statute, and yet the supreme court of that State held that previous intercourse with other men went to disprove seduction, as that word is understood to mean in this connection. (People vs. Clark, 33 Mich., 112.) That case is quoted and approved in the State vs. Patterson. The Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 35., p. 1294), after defining seduction, gives other definitions in a footnote, a mong which is the following: The word seduce, as found in the statute, imports not only illicit sexual i ntercourse, but it imports also a surrender of chastity; a surrender of the womans personal virtue. The statute is for the protection of the chastity of unmarried women, and the existence of the virtue at the time of the intercourse is a necessary ingredient of the offense; for, as has been often said, the woman who has lost chastity, the prostitute, may be the victim of rape, but is not the subject of seduction. The American and English Encyclopedia of Law (1st ed., vol. 21, p. 1046) sums up the decision as to what is meant by chaste character in reference to the crime of seduction, in the following language: The statutes generally require that the woman seduced must have had a previous chaste character, and that must be alleged in the indictment. Probably this averment must be made even though the statute makes no mention of chastity, as that, as has been stated, is regarded by the courts as an essential feature of the offense; but it is generally held that character, as used in this statutes, means ac tual personal virtue and not merely reputation, . . . . The authorities seem unanimous that prior absolute chastity on the part of the woman is an essential element of the crime of seduction, especially s when made a requisite by the express words of the statute. As we have seen from the authorities cited above, the reputation of the woman is not the test; it is a matter of physical conditions, of past conduct, of actual purity. The fact that the man may have considered her a virgin does not see, to change the rule. His ignorance of her previous immortal and unchaste practices cannot make her a virgin in the eye of the law. We therefore agree with the Attorney-General that the defendant did not commit the crime of seduction. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant acquitted while the costs de officio. Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., concurs in the result. d. US vs Sarmiento, 27 Phil 121 The defendant and appellant in this case convicted in the court below of the crime of seduction (estupro) and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of four months, to pay the sum of P500 to the complaining witness Petronila Silverio by way of civil indemnification for the injury done her, to support the offspring of the illicit relation between the parties, if any there be, and to pay the costs of the trial. The evidence of record conclusively establishes that the accused and the young woman whom it is alleged he seduces were both employees of the Alhambra tobacco factory, and that friendly if not intimate relations had been established between them while at work in the factory; that at an early hour on the morning of April 29, 1913, and long before the factory opened, they met in the interest at a point some little distance from the factory, and almost immediately thereafter entered a street vehicle, which was called and hired by the accused; that they drove to the house of one Jacinto Rodriguez, a friend of the accused, who provided him with a room in which the couple stayed for about an hour; that during that period they had breakfast with the family of Rodriguez and later went to the factory, arriving there about 8 oclock; that the young woman we nt to her home about 1 oclock, and returned to the factory that afternoon, accomp anied by her aunt and some ten or twelve other relatives and friends; that finding the accused the party demanded that he go at once to a minister and marry the girl; that despite some protests, the party compelled him to go with them; that the minister decline to marry the couple, it appearing from the cedula of the accused that he was a married man; and that thereafter these criminal proceedings were instituted at the instance of the young woman and her aunt. The information charges that the accused induced the young woman to have sexual intercourse with him by means of deceit, to wit, under promise of marriage. The only evidence of record in support of this allegation s the testimony of the young woman herself. In her first account of the incident she stated that the promises of marriage were made while he was having

intercourse with me, but later on in the course of her testimony, and in reply to a question as to whether the accused had made any such promises on any other occasion, she said that he had also promised to marry her while they were in the street vehicle, on the way to the house of Jacinto Rodriguez. We do not think that a conviction of the crime of estupro (seduction) can be sustained on this evidence. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement,and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consent merely from carnal lust, and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. (43 Cent. Digest, tit. Seduction, par. 56.) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions, or wiles, which are calculated to have, and do have that effect, and which are result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer. (People vs. Smith, 132 Mich., 58.) The penalty prescribed in the third paragraph of article 443 of the Penal Code, which defines and penalizes this offense, cannot be imposed unless it appears that the alleged seduction was accomplished by means of deceit. That is to say, of course, that the penalty cannot be imposed unless it appears that the woman was induced to yield her body to the seducer by means of some deceit. Hence, where the deceit alleged is a promise of marriage, it must appear that the woman was induced to yield her body to the seducer by means of such promise, and that she surrendered her virtue in reliance upon its fulfillment. Manifestly a promise of marriage made after sexual intercourse has taken place, or after the woman has yielded her body to the mans illicit embraces, cannot be held to have induced the woman to surrender her virtue. Nor can a promise of marriage made by a married man, where the woman knows that he is married before she surrenders herself, be said to have induced her so to do; for in such a case it is clear that there was no reliance on the promise. And, indeed, it was frequently been held that in any case wherein it appears that the surrender of the woman was not made in reliance upon a promise of marriage, a conviction of the crime of seduction cannot be sustained on the ground that such a promise had been made, though proof of a promise a marriage followed by carnal relations will generally be sufficient to sustain the inference that they were induced by such promise, in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary. See many cases cited under Note 80, 35 Cyc., 1335. In the case at bar the evidence in support of the alleged promises of marriage is neither satisfactory nor convicting; and even if the testimony of the woman in this regard be accepted as true, it raises a grave doubt as to whether she was in fact induced to yield her body by means of the promises to which she testified. Upon her own testimony, the first promises of this nature were made after she had voluntarily, and of her own free will, gotten into the street vehicle. No satisfactory explanation of the conduct of the young woman, in accompanying the accused in the street vehicle, was offered at the trial, nor does one suggest itself at this time, other than that she had already made up her mind to enter into illicit relations with the accused when she entered the vehicle. having in mind the friendly if not amorous relation already existing between the couple; the early hour at which they met, long before the opening of the factory in which they were employed; the short discussion, promptly followed by the calling of a street vehicle; the rarely acquiescence of the young woman in getting into the vehicle and driving to the house of a friend of the accused, where they were evidently expected; and all that occurred thereafter; we are strongly inclined to believe that everything had been planned the night before, the early hour and the place of meeting having been selected and agreed upon so that the couple might consummate their amorous relations without fear of discovery by the young womans family. But however this may have been, we think that the weight of the evidence sustains a finding that the intercourse between the couple was induced by mutual desire, and that she had made up her mind to surrender herself to her lover before she got into the vehicle, and before the alleged promises were made by him, if indeed it be a fact that he made any such promises. There is evidence in the record to the effect that she knew the accused was a married man, long before they had their illicit relations, and this evidence, though hardly sufficient to sustain an affirmative finding on this point. tends to confirm us in our doubt of the truth of her statement that she was induced to yield her virtue to the accused by the alleged promises of marriage. Let judgment be entered reversing the judgment entered in the court below, and acquitting the defendant and appellant of the offense with which he is charges in the information, with the costs n both instances de officio. Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

7. Article 339. Acts of Lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party 8. Article 340. Corruption of Minors c. Alimagno vs People, 120 SCRA 699 Petitioners Francisca Alimagno and Jovita Melo were convicted, as principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime of corruption of minor, as defined in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code, by the City Court of San Pablo, and sentenced as follows: ... The accused Francisca Alimagno, to suffer the penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days as maximum, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not be more than one-third of the principal penalty herein imposed and to pay the proportionate costs; the accused Jovita Melo, to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not be more than one-third of the principal penalty herein imposed and to pay the proportionate costs.

The Court of Appeals modified the decision with respect to the subsidiary penalty, thus: However, the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency of the defendants to pay the respective indemnities imposed upon them should be eliminated from the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision. (Rep. Act No. 5465). Moreover, it should be ordained therein that in the event of insolvency of one of them, the other should be subsidiarily liable thereto, with right of reimbursement, pursuant to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, with the modification indicated above, the decision appealed from, being in keeping with the evidence and the law, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. The main facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote: Complainant Filomena de la Cruz, who was undisputedly born on August 10, 1946 at Calamba, Laguna (Exh. B), was employed in the house of Pita Alvero at San Pablo City as a domestic helper for a period of only nine (9) days from November 20, 1964 to November 29, 1964. On November 27, 1964, she came to know defendant Francisca Alimagno who was bringing money to her employer Pita Alvero. On said date, defendant Alimagno tried to convince her to leave the house of Pita Alvero, promising her a better job. Defendant Alimagno, having gained her confidence, succeeded in thus persuading her to leave the house of Pita Alvero. Hence, on November 29, 1964, after leaving a self-explanatory note, Exh. A, which was admittedly written by accused Francisca Alimagno herself, which reads: Ako ho ay nagtanan kasama ko ay lalake. Your Utusan complainant abandoned the house of her mistress and went with defendants Francisca Alimagno and Jovita Melo in a jeep, together with a man and a driver. They then proceeded to Barrio Putol, San Pablo City, where she was brought to a hut thereat and there allowed to be ravished by a man. whom she saw for the first time, after the latter had covered her mouth with a rag and tied her hands, so that she was rendered speechless and helpless from offering any resistance, so much so that he was able to satiate his lust with her until 12:00 o'clock midnight. Thereafter, she was brought by the man to the house of defendant Jovita Melo only to be transferred later to the house of defendant Francisca Alimagno, where she stayed for more or less three days until she was found there and taken back by Leovigildo Perez and Pita Alvero. The two thereafter brought her to the Police Department for the corresponding investigation. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in convicting them of the crime of corruption of minor upon wholly unsubstantial and inherently conflicting evidence; (2) in not holding that the facts, as found by it and the trial court, do not constitute the crime of corruption of minors as defined and penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) in not holding that the minor referred to in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code should be below 18 years of age; (4) in not holding that a person who is already corrupted can no longer be the victim of corruption of minors committed through abuse of authority or confidence; (5) in not acquitting the petitioners of the crime of corruption of minors; and, (6) in not holding that the penalty imposed upon petitioner Melo is incorrect. Petitioners argue that they were convicted upon unsubstantial and inherently conflicting evidence. This contention is devoid of factual basis considering the findings of the Court of Appeals which are hereunder reproduced if only to demonstrate that the same were made after a thorough analysis of the evidence, and hence are beyond this Court's power of review: Appellants (herein petitioners) further contend that the lower court erred in not finding that even before November 29, 1964, the complainant Filomena de la Cruz was already a corrupted person and therefore she could no longer be the victim of the crime of "Corruption of Minors" penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that from her own statement, Exh. 1, she admitted that she had sexual intercourse with other men. This argument is clearly untenable. Complainant, who does not know how to read and write vehemently denied the contents of Exh. 1, saying that it was not the statement she gave to the police. Indeed, she testified that previous to the incident, she did not have any coition with any man and the trial court so believed her. In any event, even assuming it to be true, Article 340 does not prescribe that the persons corrupted be of good reputation, as in the case of simple seduction under Article 338, much less that they be virgins, as in qualified seduction under Article 337, both of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that the above-mentioned traits are of no consequence. ... xxx xxx xxx With regard to the letter (Exh. A), appellant Francisca Alimagno admitted having written the same out of pity to the complainant Filomena de la Cruz (tsn., p. 70, April 22, 1966). But, if she had nothing to do with complainant's sexual adventure, it is strange why she wrote said letter, containing false averments, and then took the complainant away from the house of Pita Alvero, without the knowledge and consent of the latter. She, being a friend of Pita Alvero, should have known that her actuation in writing the letter was ill-advised and morally wrong. Her admission that she wrote the same clearly indicates her plan to facilitate or promote the prostitution or corruption of the complainant. Appellant Francisca Alimagno testified that the witness for the prosecution Leovigildo Perez was demanding P5,000.00 from her and later was reduced to P2,000.00 (tsn. p. 83, April 22, 1966) to quash the case against her. On cross-examination, she (Francisca Alimagno) said that Perez was asking the aforesaid amount on the ground floor of the Secret Service Division. The pertinent portion of her testimony read, thus: Q You stated that Leovigildo Perez asked P5,000.00 from you, can you tell where Leovigildo Perez asked P5,000.00 from you? A At the ground floor, sir.

Q Are you referring to the Office of the Secret Service Division? A At the ground floor but not within the office of the Secret Service Division. Q Was that when you were called by the Secret Service men? A Yes, sir. Q Did you immediately denounce Perez to the police what he was asking from you? A No, sir. Q Why did you not tell or report the matter to the police? A Because we called up Atty. Alvero and asked him to assist us. Q And you told Atty. Alvero that Leovigildo Perez was asking you P5,000.00? A No, sir, he just told me go home. Q In other words when Atty. Alvero arrived he just told you to go home? A Yes. sir. (tsn., pp.100-101, Ibid.) If there is truth on the matter that Leovigildo Perez was extorting money from her (Francisca Alimagno) for the purpose of quashing the case, appellant Alimagno should have reported or denounced immediately to the police such attitude of Perez, inasmuch as they were near the office of the Secret Service Division or told the matter to Atty. Alvero, but she allegedly kept the matter to herself. The truth, however, is that it was appellant Alimagno who made an offer of P50.00 to Leovigildo Perez to drop the case against her. Thus, the pertinent portion of his (Perez) testimony reads: A The truth is that the spouses went to our residence and asked me to accept the amount of P50.00 and drop the case. I told them to ask the complainant, but the complainant refused and said that let the court decide the case. xxx xxx xxx Q In your answer you refer to the spouses, will you please specify whom you are referring to? A The spouses, Alimagno, Sir. (tsn., pp. 145-146, June 1, 1966) The above-quoted testimony of Leovigildo Perez was strengthened by the testimony of Detective Sergeant Francisco Escondo, a disinterested witness for the prosecution who testified, thus: Q Will you please tell the conversation between you and the accused for the second time? A They seek our service to help them in settling the case. Q What was your answer? A I told them, its up to you. (tsn., pp. 14-15, June 7, 1965.) On cross-examination, the same witness further testified, thus: A After Francisca Alimagno had talked with the complainant she requested us to help them to settle this case. t.s.n., p. 22, Ibid.) It is clear from the foregoing testimony, of both witnesses for the prosecution that the appellants made an offer of compromise for the settlement of the case. These overtures made by the appellants to have the case settled out of court are indicative of a guilty conscience and it is well-settled in this jurisdiction that an offer of compromise is an evidence of guilt. (People vs. Manzano, CA-G.R. No. 00204-R, Nov. 29,1962.) We find no reason in this case to depart from the rule which limits this Court's appellate jurisdiction to review only errors of law "accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. (Evangelista vs. Abad Santos, 51 SCRA 416.) On the question raised that petitioners could not be guilty of the crime of corruption because the offended party is more than eighteen years of age at the time the alleged offense is committed, the point to consider is whether "under age" means below eighteen or twenty-one years old. Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any person who shall habitually or with abuse of authority or confidence, promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of persons under age to satisfy the lust of another, shall be punished by... Petitioners contend that in "crimes against chastity, like seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and consented abduction, the age of the victim is pegged at below 18 years of age; ... that the phrase 'person under age' (in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code) was meant by the lawmakers to refer to persons below 18 years of age." (p. 61, Petitioner's Brief.) We cannot subscribe to this view. Article 402 of the Civil Code provides that "majority commences upon the attainment of the age of twenty-one years." When the lawmakers specifically provide "persons under age", instead of "below eighteen years of age", they could mean no other than that the offended party must be below 21 years old, and not below 18 years of age. The same is true in Acts of Lasciviousness in Article 336. White Slave Trade in Article 341, and Forcible Abduction in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, where the age limit is not set at eighteen. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, page 1623, Book II, states that "Art. 340 was taken from art. 444 of the old Penal Code. The requisites of the crime of corruption of minors are that the accused acted habitually or with the abuse of authority or confidence; that he promoted or facilitated the prostitution or corruption of persons below 21 years of age and that he so acted in order to satisfy the lust of another." (emphasis supplied). However, We take note of the recommendation of the Solicitor General that with respect to petitioner Jovita Melo who was found guilty as accomplice in a consummated crime where the penalty is arresto mayor, medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), and where there is no modifying circumstances present, the penalty in its medium period

should be imposed, or not less than 3 months and 11 days nor more than 4 months and 20 days. Otherwise stated, the petitioner Jovita Melo should suffer the penalty of 4 months and 20 days, instead of 6 months of arresto mayor. WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. With costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part. 9. Article 341. White slave trade b. People vs Nuevas, GR No. L-154, 18 March 1946 [76 Phil 276] The defendant Jesus Nuevas was accused in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of Batangas of a violation of article 341 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "ART. 341. White slave trade. The penalty of prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, in any manner, or under any pretext, shall engage in the business or shall profit by prostitution or shall enlist the services of women for the purpose of prostitution."cralaw virtua1aw library It was proved during the trial of this case that about three or four months previous to September 22, 1945, the accused and appellant contracted the services of four women of ill repute whom he brought to and maintained in a certain house in the barrio of Alangilang, Batangas, Batangas, to engage in prostitution. He furnished them food and lodging and in return received one-half of their earnings from their illicit traffic with colored soldiers. On the afternoon of September 22, 1945, the bawdyhouse maintained by the defendant was raided by the police and the four women, together with the defendant, who was in that house, were brought to the police station for investigation, as a result of which the present case was filed against the accused. Two of the said women, Emilia de la Cruz and Juanita Fernandez, as well as the sergeant of the military police (Angelo Murano) who made the arrest, testified to the facts herein stated. The defendant was the only witness who testified in his own defense. He claimed that he was a resident of Manila but that on September 22, 1945, he went to the house in question "to collect a debt from people who owes me money" ; that the owner of the house was an old widow; that the lessee, whose name is Moises Santos and who at the time of the trial was probably in Manila, according to him, was the one who owed him P150. The trial court did not believe the uncorroborated testimony of the accused but believed that of Sergeant Murano and the two women, Emilia de la Cruz and Juanita Fernandez. Sergeant Murano testified that his duties were to pick up girls of ill fame, vagrants, and prostitutes; that at about 2 p. m. on September 22, 1945, after receiving a tip that the receiving a tip that the house in question was a brothel, he and his companions raided it and found there thirteen colored soldiers, three of whom were in three different rooms, each with a girl; that in that same house he found the accused, who then and there, upon being questioned, declared that he was not the owner of the house but that the owner had left him in charge; that the women also then and there told him that they had been splitting their earnings with the accused; that the colored soldiers also told him that they paid the girls P10 for each intercourse. Emilia de la Cruz, twenty-one years of age, single, testified and pointed to the accused Jesus Nuevas as "our manager," with whom she split fifty-fifty her earnings as a prostitute. She affirmed that her charge was P10 a coition. Juanita Fernandez, also twenty-one years of age, single, testified that she knew the accused Jesus Nuevas "because he is our manager" ; that it was the accused who, four months before, contracted her to serve as a prostitute in a house located in the barrio of Alangilang which she said was rented by the accused from the owner, whom she did now know; that it was the accused who was paying for her meals in that house; that she received from her customers P10 for each coition and paid onehalf of it to the accused. The only assignment of error made by the appellant is that the trial court erred in convicting him on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. He argues that under article 341 of the Revised Penal Code the prosecution (a) must identify the alleged house of ill fame, (b) must prove it to be really a house of ill fame, and (c) must further prove that the accused is either the owner or the lessee of the house. We find such contention untenable. Article 341 penalizes three acts: (a) engaging in the business of prostitution, (b) profiting by prostitution, or (c) enlisting the services of women for the purpose of prostitution. Any person committing any one of these acts comes within the purview of said article. The proofs show beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant (a) enlisted the services of women for the purpose of prostitution and (b) profited thereby. Even if the appellant were not the lessee of any particular house, he could not escape the penalty imposed by the law for the immoral and illicit trade in which he engaged. As a matter of law, once it was proved that the accused had enlisted the services of women for the purpose of prostitution, he was criminally liable even if there were no proof that he had shared in the profit. And even if there were no

proof that he had enlisted the services of women for the purpose of prostitution, he would still be criminally liable because there is indubitable proof in this case that he shared in the income of the prostitutes. Finding the appellant guilty of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, we affirm the sentence appealed from with the sole modification that the maximum of the penalty imposed shall be three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, with costs against the Appellant. De Joya, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur. c. People vs Sta Maria, GR No. 12875-R, 21 June 1957* 10. Article 342. Forcible abduction c. People vs Crisostomo, 46 Phil 780* d. People vs Torres, et al., 62 Phil 942* e. People vs Toledo, 83 Phil 777* 11. Article 343. Consented abduction b. People vs Crisostomo, 46 Phil 775* c. People vs Amante, 49 Phil 679 This is an appeal taken by the accused Eligio Amante, Francisco Sanchez, Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, convicting them of the crime of abduction with consent, with rape, and sentencing the first three to seventeen years, four months and one day reclusion temporal, and the last named on account of being under 18 years of age, to twelve years prision mayor, with the accessories of the law and all of them, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party Patronicio Botardo in the sum of P500, and each to pay one-fourth of the costs of the action. In support of their appeal, the appellants Vicente and Francisco Sanchez assign the following errors alleged to have been committed by the lower court in its judgment, to wit: (1) The lower court erred in not giving the accused Vicente and Francisco Sanchez the benefit of reasonable doubt, in view of the contradictory testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution; (2) the lower court erred in holding that the relations, which, according to the prosecution existed between the offended party Patrocinio Botardo and the accused, were against the will of the former and were brought about by the use of force. The accused Pedro Amante and Eligio Amante assign the following alleged error as committed by the lower court in its judgment: to wit: (1) In not acquitting the accused Pedro and Eligio Amante for reasonable doubt; (2) in convicting said accused Pedro and Eligio Amante of the crime of abduction with rape. The following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial of the case: Mariquita Motos, mother of Jose Sanchez, uncle of the accused Vicente Sanchez, at that time, was erecting a house in the municipality of Baao, Province of Camarines Sur, under the supervision of head carpenter Julio Amante, and the herein accused Eligio Amante, his brother, and Pedro Amante, his son, as carpenters. All of them were residents of the municipality of Ligao, but during the course of construction of the house they lived in Mariquita Motos house. The other accused Francisco Sanchez is also Vicente Sanchezs uncle. Patrocinio Botardo, a young girl 15 years of age and a pupil in the fourth grade of the public school of Baao, lived alone with her mother, Martiniana Botardo, in said municipality. On an afternoon early in the month of July, while Patronicio Botardo was going to the market with her mother, she met Vicente Sanchez who was taking a walk in company with Pedro Amante, and taking advantage of the opportunity, Vicente Sanchez introduced Pedro Amante to the girl. Pedro Amante began to visit Patronicio Botardo at her house. After two or three visits, Pedro Amante, who had also attended the public school of his town, began to make love to the girl and proposed marriage to her. Patronicio Botardo told Pedro Amante that she could not accept his proposal unless he first asked her mother and because she was still going to school. On the afternoon of July 8, 1925, Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez together called upon Patrocinio at her home. Vicente Sanchez tried to persuade her to marry Pedro Amante saying that he was a good man; but she insisted in her refusal, because Pedro Amante had not as yet spoken to her mother On July 22, 1925, Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante called on her again and spoke to her mother. They afterwards spoke to the girl alone and tried to persuade her to accept the proposal of marriage. That night the mother and daughter did not sleep in their house but in the house of the formers cousin in order to keep her company. During their absence, Vicente Sanchez entered Patrocinio Botardos house and took her clothes from her trunk. The following day, before sunrise, Martiniana Botardo left for Iriga to sell fish. Patrocinio Botardo had asked her mothers permission to go to her aunt Simeonas house t o iron some clothes. Before leaving Martiniana Botardo told her daughter to return to their house after ironing the clothes, but not if it was too late so she would not take cold. At 7 oclock that morning Patrocinio Botardo left her house and went to th e market, and from there she went to her aunt Simeonas house. Before arriving at her aunts house she met the accused Vi cente

Sanchez and Eligio Amante, who persuaded her to follow them by train from the station at Baao to the municipality of Iligao, Province of Albay, in order to marry Pedro Amante. As she was already predisposed to marry Pedro Amante, she agreed and they went to the railroad station at Baao. Upon arriving there, Vicente Sanchez and Eligio Amante said to her: We should first go to the chapel, lest your mother might find you her, referring to the San Juans Chapel. The offended party at first hesit ated, but Vicente Sanchez said to her: Let us take the train at San Juan, because my fiancee Pascuala is there. Upon arriving at Sa n Juan, where they said they would take the truck, Vicente Sanchez and Eligio Amante took her to the house of one Josefa Sto. Domingo, and upon arriving there, Vicente Sanchez said: We had better go along the road for Pascuala and Pedro Amante ought to be there. They immediately went downstairs and followed a long path, bordered by tall weeds, in the direction of a coconut grove. Upon arriving at a certain place, Vicente Sanchez said to them: Let us go back because Pascuala and Pedro are not there. They did so, and upon arriving at Josefas house, Vicente Sanchez left them saying: I am going to town for a moment, you wait here with Eligio Amante. Just as Vicente had left to buy something to eat, Francisco Sanchez arrived. Eligio Amante then said: Let us go to the coconut grove because Vicente, Pedro and Pascuala ought to be there now. Francisco Sanchez agreed saying: Let us go now to the road because they might be awaiting for us. As Patrocinio Botardo refused to go with them, Eligio Amante said to her: As you will not with us, I will tie you with a panela (rope). Patrocinio Botardo th en remarked: Am I a carabao that you need to tie me?; and Eligio Amante replied: Certainly, if you do not want to come with us I will tie you with this rope. When a young woman elopes she has an earnest desire to carry it to a finish. Francisco Sanche z and Eligio Amante told her afterward that somebody had told them that Vicente was waiting for them on the road. Whereupon she consented to go, and they left the house. Upon seeing that they were going to a forest where there was no road, Josefa Sto. Domingo said to them: That is not the way to the road. Patrocinio Botardo repeated the same remark, but Eligio Amante insisted, saying: This is the way to the road. When they were a good distance from the house, Vicente Sanchez left them saying: You go ahead, I will meet you on the road. While Eligio Amante and Patronicio Botardo were alone, the former insisted upon taking the latter to an Indian almond tree (talisay). Patronicio Botardo wanted to take the way that led to the road, but Eligio Amante took hold of her hands and wanted to take her to a bamboo grove. She refused to go with him and said: What shall we do there? and Eligio Amante replied: Why wont you go with me?, why wont you obey me? Obey me because it will only take a few minutes. As she resisted, he took hold of her hands an d feet, threw her on the ground, and tried to violate her. She stood up, but he again took hold of her hands and feet and threw her on the ground; and as she was down, he held and mounted her. The girl succeeded in getting up again, but she could not stand and dropped down. Eligio Amante then lay down beside her but she stood up for the third time. For the fourth time, he threw her on the ground and held her hands. Weakened by exhaustion, Patrocinio Botrado tried to shout, but could not do so, because Eligio Amante covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Having completely overpowered her, he raised her dress and succeeded in violating her. It was then about 8 oclock in the morning. After having sexually abuse her, Eligio Amante invited her to stand up and le ave the place with him. They had not gone very far when Francisco Sanchez appeared, and addressing Eligio Amante, said: Eligio, first go and buy tub a, for I want a drink of tuba very much. When Eligio Amante had left, Patrocinio Botardo said to Francisco Sanchez: Your companion wanted to violate me; and Francisco said: Why did you not shout, she replied that she could not because Eligio Amante covered her mouth with a handkerchief. A little later, Eligio Amante returned and said There is no tuba, I w as unable to buy it. He then turned and walked toward a coconut grove. Francisco Sanchez, who remained alone with the girl, wanted to take his turn and violate her, but as she resisted, he said to Eligio Amante: She refuses. Whereupon Eligio Amante pinn ed her to an inclined coconut tree and held her by the feet, while Francisco Sanchez held her by the hands and threatened her with a knife, saying: if you do not consent, I will stab you with this knife. At the same time, Eligio Amante raised her dress, and Francisco Sanchez, after slapping her face, caught her around the neck. Francisco Sanchez was thin and weak, but with the aid of Eligio Amante, he succeeded in violating the girl, who was greatly weakened by the resistance which she offered against the two satyrs. After violating the girl, Francisco Sanchez and Eligio Amante left her alone, and immediately thereafter Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez appeared. Upon seeing them, the girl wanted to flee, but Vicente Sanchez said to her: Now that we are here, will you go? and she replied: Naturally, because Francisco Sanchez and his companion wanted to violate me. Exhausted and weakened she sat on the trunk of a guava tree, when Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez approached her, the latter saying: Please me also, now that Francisco and Eligio have already abused you. I do not want to, she replied. Vicente Sanchez then said: Why not?, I have helped you so that your mother might not overtake you! As the girl refused to consent t o their lewd desires, Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante took hold of her hands, and she said: Why do you hold me, you are like dogs. The girl had not as yet recovered her strength, and it was an easy matter for Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante to throw her on the ground, which they covered with their shirts. She wanted to shout, but Vicente Sanchez covered her mouth with a handkerchief and violated her, while Pedro Amante held her feet and looked on. When Vicente Sanchez had satisfied his passion, Pedro Amante took his turn, notwithstanding her protest and remarks, telling him that the actions of his companions were more than those of animals. Pedro Amante took hold of her hands, and succeeded in violating her. After the consummation of the carnal act, Pedro Amante helped the girl to stand up and to walk until they arrived near Josefa Sto. Domingos house, where he left her. Vicente Sanchez then said: You wait here. I will see if Pedro is in Josefa Sto. Domingo s house, promising to return for her. As she thought that it was probably about 11 oclock and Vicente Sanchez has not yet arrived, she went alone to Josefa Sto. Domingos house and inquired for Vicente Sanchez. The former replied that he had already gone. After a short while Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante arrived. She aske d the former: Why did you leave me?,

you promised to return for me. He then replied: I merely went to get you dress and Eligio Amantes shirt. Pedro Amante gave her his shirts and told her that he would go to the house where Vicente Sanchez stayed and get her clothes. When Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante had left, Patrocinio Botardo asked Josefa Sto. Domingo to let her lie down for a short time because she felt very weak. Josefa Sto. Domingo asked her: Why are you so weak? and she replied: Because t hose four men violated me. Josefa Sto. Domingo gave her a mat and a blanket upon which she lay down, while the former prepared the food. Patrocinio Botardo fell asleep and Josefa St. Domingo awakened her to eat. While she was eating, Pedro Amante arrived with her clothes, and told her that she should go on ahead to the municipality of Oas, Province of Albay, and wait for him there. She asked Pedro Amante: Why wont you go with me, after taking me away from home, now you want to leave me alone? After eating, Pedro Amante said to her: You dress because I have to take an auto, and he gave her P0.75 to pay her fare from Baao to Oas, telling her that he could not go with her because he already found work, but that he would go to Ligao the following Saturday to get her and marry her. After having waited together on the road for some time at about 2 oclock in the afternoon a truck for Oas came along and she took it. Upon arriving at Oas, the girl went to her aunt Florencia Angelos house where she estopped to wait for Pedro Amante. She remained in Oas for about three weeks, but Pedro Amante did not appear, and she did not want to return to Baao because she was ashamed of what had happened to her. After three weeks her mother, Martiniana Botardo, came to get her, but she did want to go with her mother saying that she was ashamed because Pedro and Eligio Amante, and Vicente and Francisco Sanchez had violated her. Martiniana Botardo then returned to Baao to tell Juan Botardo, her brother, what had happened, who went back to Oas with her to get the girl. When all of them had returned to Baao, Juan Botardo filed a complaint against Pedro Amante, Eligio Amante, Vicente Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez and Norberto Ibala, husband of Josefa Sto. Domingo. When the girl left the house with Pedro Amante, Josefa Sto. Domingo saw that the blanket which she had used was stained with blood, which could not be removed by the first washing. Upon examination of Patrocinio Botardo by Dr. Bienvenido P. Caro on August 12, 1926, he found the girls hymen ruptured and a large amount of mucouslike secretion in the vaginal canal due to a slight inflammation of the vagina, which might have been caused by a sexual intercourse. The defense of the accused consists of a general denial and an alibi. Vicente Sanchez claims that on July 21, 1925, he went to Naga, a distance of 30 kilometers from Baao, to order a silk shirt from his sold sewing woman Esperanza Margallo, living in his aunt Pilar Sanchez house until the following day, when he returned to Baao, arriving there at 3 oclock in the afternoon. The accused Francisco Sanchez attempted to prove that on July 15, 1925, at the request of his sister Pilar, he went to Naga to supervise the repairs on her house and did not return to Baao until the 4th of the following August. The accused Pedro and Eligio Amante tried to prove that during the day in question, they were working on the construction of Mariquita Motos house in Baao, and that they had no left the place. Josefa Sto. Domingo, testifying as a witness for the defense, denied having seen any of the accused in, or in front of, her house, and said that Patrocinio Botardo had been in her house accompanied by two unknown men different from the accused. She also stated that what she had testified to in the preliminary investigation was taught her by Juan Botardo, who told her that if she did not testify as he wanted her to, her husband would not be excluded from the complaint and would not be released. Juan Botardo, on cross-examination, denied having induced Josefa Sto. Domingo to testify against the accused and said that he included Josefa Sto. Domingos husband in the complaint because he believed him to be in connivance with the accused. The defense points out several contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. A careful examination of said contradictions shows that far from destroying the probative force of said testimony they strengthen the same, inasmuch as it will be seen therefrom that neither could there have been a conspiracy nor a preconceived plan as to what they were to testify to Considering the varied points of view of persons and their perceptive ability, it is but natural that they should differ in the narration of their observations. It is psychologically impossible that they should agree in all details. Hence, when the testimony of two witnesses agrees even in its minutes details, it cases to be an accurate statement of the subjective truth. There is no question that Patrocinio Botardo was taken from her home and brought to Josefa Sto. Domingos house. Neither is there any question that she was taken from Josefa Sto. Domingos house to a coconut grove where she was outraged. The only question to determine is whether or not she was outraged by two unknown persons or by the four herein accused, one after the other. The offended party is a young girl fifteen years of age against whom there cannot be the least doubt as to her chastity and honor. Like all maidens of her race, the loss of her virginity made her so ashamed that at first she did not want to return to her town where two of those who had outraged her lived. A girl has hardly begun to know the ways of the world, and who has such a high and delicate regard for purity, is not capable of fabricating a bestial and shameful act of which she was a victim; her own sentiment of purity would rebel against such an idea, inasmuch as she would be exposed to the scorn and disrespect of honest people. This is shown by the fact that she was ashamed to tell even those who had violated her that she had been violated, and in accusing those who first had sexual interclose with her, she only to those who succeeded them that they wanted to violate her. Her attitude in having confidence in Pedro Amantes promise after she had been vi olated by him and the other accused, would seem to belie her testimony on the alleged outrage which she had suffered at the hands of the accused, but if the position in which she found herself and the loss of what all reputable women consider as their most precious possession are taken into

consideration, it is not strange that in order to save herself from dishonor she should still continue believing him, as a drowning man who clings to the smallest floating object to save himself from drowning. Taking into consideration all the evidence for the prosecution and the circumstances of the case not overthrown by the weak not to say improbable proof of the alibi of the accused, the mind is forced to rest on the conviction that the offended girl has told the whole truth. This is not the first case in the annals of the courts of justice of the Philippines when inhuman and depraved men have taken advantage of the weakness of a poor innocent girl, and have successively satiated on a single occasion, their bestial lust. For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the evidence presented art the trial proves beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of each and everyone of the accused of the complex crime charged, and finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed in all its parts, with costs against the appellants. So ordered. Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions ROMUALDEZ, J., with whom concurs AVANCEA, C.J., dissenting: The evidence of the prosecution does not convince me beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants are guilty of rape. I think they are guilty only of abduction with consent. 12. Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness a. Samilin vs CFI, 57 Phil 298* c. People vs Orcullo, 111 SCRA 609 This is a petition for certiorari filed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City praying that the order of the respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 be set aside and that said case be ordered reinstated and tried on the merits. The petition alleges that on September 4, 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City filed an information with the City Court of Cagayan de Oro, Branch I, charging the respondent Venida Peralta alias Edat Peralta with oral defamation committed as follows: That on or about August 17, 1978, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Gumamela Extension Street, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to cast undue shame, public ridicule, discredit, disrepute and contempt against one Lydia Flores, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and shouted the following words towards the latter: "Hostess ug nangabit, bisan unsa lang oten and nakapaslak "; which approximately means in English.- "A hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina", or words of similar import, directed to the said Lydia Flores, in the presence and with the hearing of many people, well-knowing that what she uttered were not only defamatory but downright false, causing the offended party by said utterance to suffer undue shame, public ridicule, disrepute, discredit and contempt, to the great damage and prejudice of the said Lydia Flores. Contrary to Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. Cagayan de Oro City, September 1, 1978. (SGD) EFREN L. LAMPIOS Special 1 Counsel which information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40117; that on November 3, 1978, Criminal Case No. 40117 was set for arraignment and the accused- respondent pleaded not guilty; that on February 2, 1981, the accused-respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground that the crime alleged constituted an imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio; that on February 10, 1981, the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 on the ground that the offense alleged in the information is a private crime which can be instituted or filed only by the offended party; that on February 27, 1981, the City Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 2 40117; and that on March 11, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration. In his comment filed on November 3, 1981, the private respondent contended that the wordings "Hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" are in unequivocal terms and can be readily understood as imputing to the offended party the commission of the act of adultery, she being a married woman, hence the crime charged consists in the imputation of an offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and can be brought only upon complaint filed by the offended 3 party as provided in paragraph 5, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. 4 The Solicitor General was required to comment on the petition and on the opposition of the accused. The pertinent portion of the comment of the Solicitor General filed on December 18, 1981, reads:

The main issue to be resolved is whether the derogatory remarks "A hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" imputes adultery or prostitution. Petitioner submits that the remarks impute prostitution rather than adultery. The word "hostess" has acquired a notorious connotation. It has a peculiar reference to one who works in nightclubs and "misters to the pleasures of men for fee". The expression "any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" definitely describes and only refers to the work of a prostitute, and not that of a mere adulteress. It is alleged by accused-respondent that the remarks imputed adultery, because the word "paramour" was mentioned, thereby implying complainant to be a married woman who was carrying on an affair with a man not her husband. It must be pointed out that since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as married, she should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood as imputing prostitution, and not adultery. Assuming arguendo that complainant is married and that the remarks, while imputing acts of prostitution to her and in effect charged her with adultery, the information can still be filed without her complaint. The case of People vs. Hong Din Chu, 33 SCRA 199, 202 is in point. As thus alleged it is clear that, while the utterance in effect also imputed on her the commission of adultery, the offended party being a married woman, the disreputable conduct she was particularly charged with was the crime of prostitution, not adultery. And it may be pointed out that prostitution and adultery are not one and the same thing, the first is a crime against public morals, committed by a woman, whether married or not, who, for money or profit, habitually indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, whereas adultery is in the nature of a private offense committed by a married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband. In short, the essential element in prostitution is not simply a woman's entering into marital relations with a man other than her husband, if she happens to be married, but the existence of pecuniary or financial gain as inducement to, or consideration for, that woman's engaging in sexual activities. Thus, to call a married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her an adulteress a violator of her marital vows: it is to charge her of having committed an offense against public morals, of moral degeneracy far exceeding that involved in the maintenance of adulterous relations. It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged defamatory remark by the accused specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission of prostitution, which is a public crime that can be prosecuted de oficio, the information filed under the signature of the Assistant City Fiscal duly conferred jurisdiction upon the lower court to try the case. (Emphasis supplied) This ruling is a mere reiteration of previous pronouncements made by this Honorable Court in People v. Santos, 98 Phil. 11 and Mangila v. Lantik, 30 SCRA 82. Still for another reason, assuming arguendo that adultery which is a private crime, and prostitution which is a public crime, are both imputed to complainant, criminal action may still be instituted without her complaint because public interest, which is always paramount to private interest, so requires (People v. Yu, 1 SCRA 199). It must be noted that it is only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution (People v. Padilla, 105 Phil. 45). In this case, however, the derogatory remarks of accusedrespondent, not only do not clearly show the elements of adultery, but on the contrary, such remarks indubitably impute the crime of prostitution. Therefore, the information for libel can be filed without the 5 complaint of the offended party. The submission of the Solicitor General is well taken. Indeed, the words quoted in the information are indubitably an imputation of the crime of prostitution which can be prosecuted de oficio. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 of the City Court of Cagayan de Oro City is set aside, and the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, is ordered to reinstate said criminal case and to try the same on the merits. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana JJ., concur. d. People vs Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11 Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo, Branch V, presided by the respondent Judge Ricardo M. Ilarde, granting the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 13086, entitled, "People of the Philippines, plaintiff versus Cecile Santibaez and Avelino T. Javellana accused." The information in Criminal Case No. 13086 was filed on March 4, 1981 by City Fiscal Ricardo P. Galvez. It reads:

The undersigned City Fiscal upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party Efraim Santibaez, copies of which are thereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B" hereby accused CECILE SANTIBAEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA of the crime of adultery, committed as follows: That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Cecile Santibaez being lawfully married to Efraim Santibaez, which marriage at that time has not been legally dissolved, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her coaccused Avelino T. Javellana, a man not his husband and who in turn knowing fully well that his co-accused was then lawfully married to Efraim Santibaez, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn complaint for adultery filed by Efraim Santibaez against herein private respondents, Cecile Santibanez and Avelino T. Javellana, with the Integrated National Police, Iloilo Metro Police District, Iloilo City, on November 4, 1980, which complaint was immediately forwarded to the Office of the City Fiscal for preliminary investigation. Said complaint reads: COMPLAINT The undersigned accuses ATTY. AVELINO JAVELLANA, a resident of CPU Compound, Jaro, Iloilo City, and Cecile Santibaez. a resident of Candido Subdivision, Iloilo City, for the crime of adultery ... xxx xxx xxx (Sgd.) EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ (Signature of complainant) SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of November, 1980 in the City of Iloilo: (Sgd.) RICARDO P. GALVEZ City Fiscal Annex "B" of the information is the affidavit-complaint dated November 6, 1980 executed by Efraim Santibaez, sworn to and filed before City Fiscal Galvez on November 7, 1980, wherein Santibaez recounted in detail the antecedents which brought about the apprehension in flagrante of privaterespondents. The same is quoted as follows: I, EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ, of age, married, and a resident of Fundidor Molo, Iloilo City, after having been duly sworn to according to law depose and say: That I am legally married to Cecile Soriano in a Civil Marriage solemnized by Judge Vicente Santos, City Court of Pasay City on March 22, 1974 but subsequently remarried in a religious ceremony before Rev. Panfilo T. Brasil at the Parish Church of La Paz, iloilo City on July 18, 1974, xerox copies of the aforesaid marriage contracts are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B", forming integral parts of this affidavit; After our marriage, I built a house for our permanent residence and as our conjugal home in Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City and furnished it with all the comforts well within my means; At the start of our marriage, I was led to believe by my wife of her total concern, love and devotion to me valid in turn I lavished her with all the material comfort at my command and even tried to build up her social status by sending her as a delegate to the Zonta World Conference at Washington, D.C. last July, 1980 without any company. As a token of my love and unfailing trust we went sightseeing and on second honeymoon to Hongkong only last month. Sometime during the last week of October, 1980, while I went on my normal work routine to Passi Sugar Millsite in Passi Iloilo, my son Edmund took me aside in confidence and told me that he has some very delicate matters to take up with which may be misinterpreted by me or may be taken by her in a wrong light; however, he said hat the his valid dignity of the family is at mistake and I have to know it whatever be the consequence. After I gave him the go signal, he narrated to her that my wife Cecile Sorianosos has been unfaithful to me and has been. having illicit relationship with another man. Of curse, I was taken aback and stunned so I asked him for the source of his information. He informed me that our maid Elsa Barios and our driver Loreto Reales had beeen aware of the relationship and the man usually went to my house and even slept there whenever I was in Manila. I got angry and blamed our maid and the driver for not telling me but Edmund told me that they were afraid to tell because they were threatened. After I have calmed down, I commended that if I confront my wife about her illicit relationship, she will surely deny it. So I thought that the best way was to catch her red-handed in the act of infidelity so that she could not deny it. anymore. I suggested to Edmund to think of a plan so we can catch his wife red-handed. After several days of planning we agreed to put our plan of action in operation on November 3, 1980 since I will be leaving for Manila in the morning of that day. Our problem was how to catch my wife in the very act of having sexual intercourse with her lover considering the fact that our master's room was air-conditioned with all windows framed by glass jalousies closed and covered by curtains. At first we thought of breaking down the main door with a sledge hammer so we could take them by surprise, later we abandoned the Idea because of legal complications, Finally, I thought of removing a glass of the jalousy so the inside of the bedroom can be seen from the outside once the curtain can be brushed aside by means of a thin wire and the persons on bed could be seen clearly since the bed is on the same level as the opening of the window. After several experiments whenever my wife was out, I found out that my wife cannot notice the removal of the glass jalousy since our windows are screened from the inside of our room.

As pre-arranged, I removed one jalousy glass of the window of our master room so that the people inside our room could be seen actually from the outside and the moment my wife and her lover is seen in the act of sexual intercourse. Having completed all the plans to effect our plan of operation, I told my wife that I Qfor Manila on that day. I instructed my son Edmund to inform me immediately of the result of the plan of action as soon as possible. Almost midnight of November 3, 1980, I was informed by my daughter-in-law Rebecca that the operation was successful and resulted in the arrest of my wife and Atty. Bob Javellana inside our bedroom. I know Atty. Bob Javellana for quite a time and we have been close friends. As a friend he has come to our house at Molo Iloilo City oftentimes to discuss matters about the court case between the Iloilo City Government and St. Therese Memorial Chapel which is a business which I have given to my wife Cecile. Atty. Javellana knew that Cecile Sorianosos is my legally married wife. When I returned to Iloilo City from Manila on November 4, 1980, I was shown the photographs taken inside our master bedroom and I am attaching hereto the photographs which are marked as Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and "J". That I am formally charging my wife, Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of Qcomplaint against them (pp. 4-5, Original Records). Sometime in January 1981, i.e., before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation then being conducted by the Fiscal's Office, Efraim Santibaez learned that he was sick of cancer and decided to leave for the United States for medical treatment. Before his departure, he executed a holographic Will, dated January 10, 1981, a portion of which provided: I do hereby disinherit my second wife Cecilia Sorianosos of any and all inheritance she is entitled under the law as my wife on the ground that she had given cause for legal separation by committing acts of adultery with Atty. Bob Javellana in the evening of November 3, 1980 in my conjugal abode at Candido Subdivision and as a result of which I charged her and Atty. Bob Javellana for adultery with the Fiscal's Office and I filed a case of legal separation against her in Civil Case No. SP- 11-309 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Iloilo City for which act of infidelity, I can never forgive her. 2 On January 15, 1981, after several requests for postponement, private respondents submitted their memorandum to the Fiscal's Office; and on February 19, 1981, Fiscal Galvez issued a resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case for adultery against private respondents. On February 26, 1981, Fiscal Galvez was informed by relatives of Efraim Santibaez that the latter had died in the United States on February 16, 1981. This notwithstanding, he prepared the information in question on March 3, 1981, and on the following and filed the same with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Private respondents filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the offended party had not filed the required complaint pursuant to the provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed and the offended spouse," Finding merit in the position taken by private respondents, respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the case. The city fiscal moved for a reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the present recourse. The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there has been compliance with the requirement of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, that "the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party " We rule in the affirmative, We are aware that in a long line of decisions, 3 this Court has maintained strict adherence to the requirement imposed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." 4 Thus, the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse. And this, to Our mind, should be the overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For needless to state, this Court should be guided by the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law. In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibaez, to bring his wife and her alleged paramour to justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which he filed his complaint with the police [annex "A", supra]; the strong and unequivocal statement contained in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal's Office that "I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against them" [Annex "B", supra]; his filing of a complaint for legal separation against Cecile Santibaez with the local Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; and finally, in disinheriting his wife in his Last Will and Testament dated January 10, 1981. In quashing the information, respondent judge relied upon Our decision in People vs. Santos 5 to the effect that a "salaysay" or sworn statement of the offended party, which prompted the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and then to file an information in court, was not the complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, the "salaysay" executed by complainant Bansuelo was not considered the complaint contemplated by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how the crime of rape was committed against her. However, in the affidavit-complainant submitted by Efraim Santibaez, the latter not

only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting the crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically charged private respondents with the said offense. Thus That I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against them. Moreover, in Santos, this Court noted that the information filed by Rizal Provincial Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas "commenced with the statement "the undersigned fiscal accuses Engracio Santos with the crime of rape," the offended party not having been mentioned at all as one of the accusers." In the instant case, however, the information filed by the city fiscal of Iloilo reads as follows: The undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended party Efraim Santibaez, xerox copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B" ... Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibaez contains all the elements of a valid complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. 6 What is more, said complaint-affidavit was attached to the information as an integral part thereof, and duly filed with the court. As held in Fernandez vs. Lantin, 7 the filing in court of which affidavit or sworn statement of the offended party, if it contains all the allegations required of a criminal complaint under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance of the law. Thus: ... in a case where the Fiscal filed an Information charging the accused with "telling some people ill the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo (a married woman) was a paramour of one Sangalang, a man not her husband", and Fausta Bravo did not subscribe to the complaint this Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since the accused imputed to Fausta Bravo the commission of adultery, a crime which cannot be prosecuted cle oficio, the Information filed by the Fiscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court of origin. lt must be noted, however, that this error could be corrected without sustaining the motion to quash and dismissing the case. Pursuant to section I of paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 77, under which the Assistant City Fiscal conducted the preliminary investigation the statement of the complainant was sworn to before the aforesaid Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the recitals in said worn statement contain all those required of a complaint under the rules i copy of said verified statement of the complainant should be filed With respondent Court in order to comply with the requirements of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; otherwise, the respondent Fiscal should file with said court a verified complaint of the offended party Upon these premises, We cannot but conclude that the adultery charge against private respondents is being prosecuted "upon complaint filed by the offended party." WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The orders of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch V, in Criminal Case No. 13086, dated May 21 and September 14, 1981, are hereby set aside, and respondent judge is directed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. No costs. SO ORDERED. Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos and Relo , JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., J., and De Castro, J., are on leave. e. People vs Miranda, 51 Phil 274* 13. Article 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity b. People vs Velo, et al., 80 Phil 438* d. People vs Bayani, 262 SCRA 688 Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993 with the court below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed in the following manner: That on or about the 28th day of June, 1992, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Moreno Bayani, by means of force and intimidation with the point [sic] of a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against her will. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] The complaint was duly certified by OIC-City Prosecutor Marilyn Ro. Campomanes. No bail was recommended for the temporary liberty of the accused, and a warrant for his arrest was issued on 4 March 1993.[3]

On 12 April 1993, the trial court denied[4] the motion of the accused for bail[5] and the motion of Romeo Maganto, PNP Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, asking that the accused, who allegedly voluntarily surrendered to Maganto on 24 March 1993,[6] be detained at the PNP Detention Center instead of the Provincial Jail. The trial Court further ordered Maganto to Immediately bring the accused to court. On 14 June 1993, the accused filed another motion for bail contending that while the charge is *for+ a capital offense the evidence of guilt is not strong.[7] Primarily, the accused assaulted the complainants credibility based on her affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation,[8] upon which a resolution[9] was issued finding a prima facie case against him and recommending that the information be filed in court. The prosecution, in opposing the motion for bail, presented Dr. Eden Baraoidan, a Medical Specialist II of the Provincial health Office who conducted the medico-legal examination of the complainant on 6 January 1993, and the complainant herself. The medico-legal report prepared by Dr. Baraoidan contained the following pertinent findings: xxx II. Internal Examination: - Pubic hair -- scanty - Labia majora -- coapted at its entire length - Labia minora -- coapted at its entire length - Vaginal rugosities -- no prominent - Vagina -- admits two (2) fingers with ease - Hymen -- lax, with old lacerations at 3, 5 and 7 corresponding to face of clock. - Cervix -- enlarged, soft, bluish - Uterus -- enlarged to about 7-8 months size. - Adnexae -- negative for masses and tenderness. III. Laboratory Examination 1. Pregnancy Test -- Positive 2. Sperm Determination -- Negative for Spermatozoa[10] Dr. Baraoidan declared that she found several healed abrasions below and at the sides of the complainants navel and that the complainants enlarged cervix connoted pregnancy; further, the complainants uterus was enlarged to about 7 -8 months size and the fetal heartbeat was located at the right lower quadrant. As regards the non-prominence of the vaginal rugosities, the passage of two fingers into the vagina, and the presence of hymenal lacerations, it was possible these were due to sexual intercourse.[11] The complainants testimony was faithfully summarized by the People in the Appelles Brief, which we adopt and quote below: In 1992, Maria Elena Nieto was a fourth-year high school student of St. Lawrence Academy, a Catholic School of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She was then fifteen (15) years old. At that time both her parents were abroad as overseas contract workers (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 26, 45 and 51-52). She was born in San Juan, Ilocos Sur. However, on July 19, 1989, Maria Elena together with her brother and an older sister moved to Barangay Manayon, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to live with her paternal grandmother Rosalina B. Nieto, her uncle Eugenio Nieto and his family. There, she met appellant. Appellant was a neighbor. He was close to her paternal uncles, Eugenio and Rudy Nieto. One of her uncles is appellants kumpadre. Maria Elena called him uncle and the latters wife auntie. Appellant often went to her grandmothers house. She was considered a relative. (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 25-29, including preceding paragraph). At about 6:00 in the morning of June 28, 1992, appellant went to their residence. He asked her if she could accompany him to visit a friend in Laoag City. She told appellant to ask permission from her grandmother who consented (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 29-30). At 9:30 of that same morning, appellant fetched her. At about 11:30 a.m., they reached Laoag City. They proceeded to a boarding house near the Northern Christian College (NCC). There appellant visited a woman. While Maria Elena was taking her merienda in the kitchen, appellant and the woman were outside the house talking. She noticed by their actions that they were quarreling. After about thirty (30) minutes, appellant called for her and they left. She was made to understand by the appellant that the woman he intended to visit was not around (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 30-34). Appellant brought her to a restaurant, the City Lunch and Snack Bar. At that time, Maria Elena did not know the name of the restaurant. Neither did she know then that the second floor of the restaurant was a hotel. It was her first time to be in such place. Appellant invited her for lunch there. She declined as she was still full and suggested that they go home. Appellant, however, called for a tricycle and told her *w+e will first go to a friend of mine before going home (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 35). He brought her to the third floor of a certain building (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 35). While there, Maria Elena was made to wait outside and he went to talk with somebody (Ibid. p. 36). Upon returning, appellant told her that it was in the second floor where the person he wanted to talk with was (Ibid). They proceeded to the second floor of the building (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 36).

Upon reaching the door of a room at the second floor of the building, appellant took hold of her wrist. She tried to free herself, but all the more appellant took hold of her wrist and he opened the door (ibid) with a key (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 36). After opening the door, appellant pushed Maria Elena inside. She wanted to run away but was prevented by appellant, who pulled her hair. Appellant then locked the door. Appellant pushed her hard making her kneel down on the floor beside the bed, her stomach was against the edge of the bed. All that time, appellant was holding her hair, pressing her head against the bed (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 37-38). Maria Elena struggled to free herself. This prompted appellant to tighten his hold on her hair and he poked a gun against her right temple. Appellant then told her *y+ou remove your pants, otherwise, I will shoot you. (Ibid, p. 39). Maria Elena became so nervous and felt she was becoming unconscious. Out of fear, she complied with appellants order (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 38-39). While Maria Elena was removing her pants, appellant removed his pants, too. Thereafter, appellant pushed Maria Elena to the bed and forced her to lie down. He ordered her to open her thighs and then he went on top of her. She struggled but felt weak. Appellant successfully had sexual intercourse with her. While doing this, appellant was holding his gun in his right hand (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 39-40). Thereafter, Maria Elena wanted to leave. However, appellant pointed his gun at her and threatened to kill her if she revealed the rape incident to anybody (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 40). After a while, appellant repeated the sexual intercourse for two more times. All the while, appellant was uttering indecent words at her, among them, This is something very delicious. You will be longing for this (TSN, ibid, p. 41). Appellant repeated his threat to kill her as well as members of her family, if she related the rape incident to anybody (ibid). They left the room at about 3:00 in the afternoon. Appellant brought her to the Five sisters Emporium, where she was made to board a tricycle. She went home alone (TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 72-74). In view of the threats of appellant, Maria Elena did not immediately relate the incident to her family. She was forced to divulge the rape committed by appellant against her, when her family noticed her tummy was bloating (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 42). At that time, Maria Elena and Ambrosio Malapit, Jr., were sweethearts. They started their relationship on June 12, 1992. On her suspected pregnancy, Ambrosio was confronted by her sister Maria Elizabeth. In turn, her boyfriend confronted her. She related to him the rape incident (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 42-43). The incident was reported by Ambrosio to the principal of St. Lawrence Academy, who went to Maria Elenas house in order to verify. She related to the principal what appellant did to her including his threats to kill her and her family (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 43). The school took the initiative of hiding her. She stayed for one (1) week in the house of a teacher of Divine Word College, Laoag City. Thereafter, she was transferred to Madre Nazarena in Laoag City, an institution run by nuns. She stayed there for less than a month (TSN, August 29, 1993, pp. 43-45). The rape incident was reported to the NBI. Accompanied by NBI agents, she went back to the scene of the crime. It was only at that time that she learned that the building where appellant brought her was a motel, Dragon Inn (TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 41). On March 21, 1993, Maria Elena gave birth (Exhibit B; TSN, August 29, 1993, p. 46).[12] After the complainant underwent a lengthy cross-examination, the hearings on the motion for bail ended on 20 October 1993.[13] On 18 November 1993, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for bail.[14] The prosecution presented no additional testimonial evidence for trial on the merits,[15] but submitted its documentary exhibits[16] which were admitted by the trial court.[17] The defense presented the accused and Bernard Javier, the information officer of the Dragon Inn. The accused not only admitted having sexual intercourse with the complainant on the 28th day of June 1992; he asserted, in the main, that the complainant was his mistress and that the further acts of sexual intercourse after the said date were with her consent. His detailed testimony brought out the following salient facts: He first came to know the complainant in August 1989 at her grandmothers house which he frequent ed -- at least thrice a week -- for drinking sprees with her uncles. At that time, his wife was in Singapore and returned only in November 1991. He would pay for the drinks and at times, the complainant would buy them for him. On occasion, she requested that she keep the change, which he always granted knowing she was a student. In December 1991, the complainant asked him for P500.00 for a trip to Ilocos Sur, and then to Manila where her aunt lived. He would see her at home when she was alone and sometimes kiss her. At the end of her classes in March 1991, she asked him for P100.00 as she was going to Manila for vacation.[18] On 27 June 1992, at around 4:00 p.m., while he was riding on his motorcycle, the complainant who was then carrying a child flagged him down and asked that they go to Laoag City to buy things she needed for her school project and visit her friend. He agreed.[19] The following day, they left for Laoag City at about 9:30 a.m. They took a minibus and sat beside each other on the second from the last seat. Upon arrival at Laoag City at around 11:30 a.m., the accused suggested that they first eat lunch at City Lunch before buying the things she needed at the nearby Five Sisters. While eating, the complainant told him that she had a boyfriend, and he remarked that he was not surprised as he would see her boyfriend at her house. She then told him that she did not know how to thank him for all the help he extended to her and her grandmother. From that, he gathered that she was amenable to checking-in or going to bed with him, so he replied that she was very dear to him and intimated that if she really

cared for him they would go to a room upstairs and check in. She responded, however, that the place was magulo (noisy); so he suggested that they go to Dragon Inn. She agreed, and they left by tricycle.[20] At Dragon Inn, the accused approached the man at the information counter (Javier) and told the latter that he would check in with his wife. Javier then took the registry book and asked the accused what name to write down. The accused answered: Mr. And Mrs. Moreno Bayani, with address at Badoc, Ilocos Norte. Javier then told the accused that firearms had to be left at the information counter. Despite the accuseds negative reply, Javier conducted a body search on the accused in compliance with the inns house rules. Finding nothing, Javier accompanied them to Room 8 on the second floor. After engaging in foreplay for more than thirty (30) minutes, the accused and the complainant undressed themselves and had sexual intercourse twice. [21] While resting after the coitus, the complainant cried while divulging details about her dysfunctional family. He told her to stop crying as he was ready to help her, and if she got pregnant he would consider the child as his. He also promised to support her until death and bound himself to give her P100.00 a week. She replied that she would be thankful if he would fulfill his promises.[22] At past 3:00 p.m., Javier knocked at the door and notified them that their time was up. The complainant announced they would go to Five Sisters to buy the things she needed for her school project and asked for P400.00. After the accused gave her P500.00, they dressed, left the room, and checked out. They took a tricycle to Five Sisters where she bought school supplies and health and beauty products. At about 3:30 p.m., the accused dropped-off the complainant at the bus terminal as he had to see a classmate of his to get his AFPLA, Inc. passbook. After she left, the accused got his passbook and reached Manayon, Bangui, at around 6:30 p.m.[23] In July 1992, the accused and the complainant had sexual intercourse three or four times, and during the second week of August, they had sexual intercourse in the accuseds house as his wife was not around. It was at that time that the complainant informed him that she had missed her period, to which, the accused answered: Since God blessed what we did, as I have said at the Golden Dragon I will fulfill it, provided you will behave and avoid meeting with your boyfriend. They had sexual intercourse three to four times during the months of September and October and once about the last week of November 1992, at which time she asked for P5,000.00 as she was going to Manila to visit an aunt.[24] The complainants Manila trip did not materialize. Sometime during the first week of December 1992, the accused left the complainants house at about 8:00 p.m. after a drinking session, but she had not yet arrived. He then hid at the waiting shed near the complainants house where he could see whether she came home with her boyfriend. Shortly, a bus arrived from Laoag City and he saw her and her boyfriend alight from the bus and then go to her house. Feeling jealous, the accused wanted to confront her boyfriend, but since he did not come out after five minutes, the accused merely went home.[25] At 11:30 a.m. the next day, the accused waited for the complainants dismissal from school and confronted her about being with her boyfriend the night before. As she denied the charge, they quarreled. She then asked him to return her ring, and he promised to do so the following day as it was not with him at that time. He went to the complainants house to return her ring only on the following week,[26] but she threw it back at him. As they continued to quarrel, he told her that he had to go as she could not fulfill her promise not to be with her boyfriend. She then asked, How about my pregnancy? to which, he answered: You bring that to your boyfriend because I am not sure that is my child. That was the last time the accused saw the complainant until the arraignment.[27] As to the complainants motive to falsely testify against him, the accused claimed that she harbored hatred against him becau se he did not stand up for her pregnancy and that she lost a boyfriend; moreover, the accused was not able to give the amount of P5,000.00 in December 1992.[28] Defense witness Bernard Javier corroborated the accuseds testimony as to the couples checking -in at the Dragon Inn and further declared that upon checking-out he noticed that the complainant was happy and even laughing.[29] The prosecution presented as rebuttal witnesses Romeo Nieto and Rosario Nieto, the complainants uncle and father, respectively. Romeo testified that the accused came to his house where the complainant resided bringing gifts (powder, soap, cotton, and milk) for the complainant and offered to amicably settle the case. In all, the accused came thrice for the purpose: (a) on 15 December 1993, with a certain Maj. Armando Alio[30] when Romeo told them that he had no authority to settle the case as the complainants parents were arriving from abroad in January 1994; (b) on 5 January 1994, with the secretary of Congressman Roque Ablan; and (c) on 30 April 1994, with Vice-Governor Mariano Nalupta, Jr.[31] Rosario, the complainants father, testified as to his familys earnings (his salary, his wifes salary, rental income). He then denied that their family was dysfunctional, and that he and his wife were separated.[32] The defense presented as sur-rebuttal witness Col. Armando Alio, Chief Inspector of the Provincial Command and the Supervisor of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Jail. He admitted that he spoke with Romeo Nieto on 15 December 1993, but denied that the accused was present and that they brought gifts. Col. Alio further declared that he did not see Romeo to compromise the case, but merely to inquire as to when the complainants mother would arrive. Finally, Col. Alio confirmed that on 30 April 1994, he and Vice-Governor Nalupta went to see Romeo and the complainants mother, but was unable to meet with the latter.[33] After the parties submitted their memoranda, the trial court promulgated the decision appealed from. It gave full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution and found:

The private complainant herein was only about twelve (12) years old when she first met the accused who was about thirty-two (32) years old and a married man. He was a close friend of [her] uncles. One of [her] uncles is thekumpadre of the accused. They were neighbors. The accused frequented the house of the private complainants grandmother. The private complainant called him uncle while she called the accuseds wife auntie. He was considered a relative. Under these circumstances, the Court finds nothing wrong when on June 28, 1992, the grandmother of the private complainant allowed the private complainant to accompany the accused to Laoag City to visit a friend. In the words of the private complainant, she and her grandmother had trust and confidence in the accused. As to the insinuation of the accused that it was incredulous for the private complainant to allow her granddaughter to visit a girlfriend of the accused who is a married man, the private complainant explained that the accused only told her grandmother that he would visit a friend. Moreover, there is nothing incredulous when the private complainant consented to go with the accused to visit the latters girlfriend after her grandmother gave her permission. To reiterate, she had trust and confidence in the accused. A fifteen (15) year old girl is not expected to entertain malice in her mind as to why a man, whom [she] calls uncle and very much wellknown within her family circle, although a married man, would ask her to accompany him to his girlfriend. The Court finds the testimony of the private complainant on this matter candid and sincere and within the realm of the mind of a fifteen (15) year old girl: xxx Under this factual backdrop, the private complainant could not have any inkling on what was actually on the mind of the accused. So, she went along with the accused in a building which turned out to be a motel. There were no people inside the building except for a man with whom the accused talked to. Again, the Court rules that at this point in time the fifteen-year old private complainant who considered the accused an uncle was not expected to know the sinister plan of the accused against her. The court finds the account of the private complainant on what transpired between her and the accused on June 28, 1992 replete with details which could not have been concocted by the private complainant. The tears she shed while narrating on how she was ravished by the accused were real. True, there were inconsistencies on some details between the private complainants testimony and her affidavit. But these are minor inconsistencies which do not affect her credibility. Besides, she had satisfactorily explained these discrepancies.[34] As to the version of the accused, the trial court observed: The accuseds insistence that he and the accused mutually agreed to have sexual intercourse on June 28, 1992 and that there after they maintained a sexual relationship does not inspire belief. The accused pictured the fifteen (15) year old private complainant as one who belongs to a broken family and was in dire need of financial help which he readily gave. xxx The easy manner which the private complainant consented to the sexual overtures of the accused is incredulous. She is a very charming girl and does not look destitute so as to succumb immediately to the sexual overtures of the accused. In fact, at the time she was well-supported by her family. It is not disputed that both of her parents are overseas contract workers. In this regard, the accused himself admitted that the private complainant told him that her father gave her financial support. Indeed, this Court does not give credence to the accuseds stance that the private respondent agreed to have a sexual relationship with the accused who is twice her age in exchange [for] the financial help allegedly extended to her by the accused. xxx The Court observed that the testimonies of both the accused and Bernardo Javier jibed in even the smallest details. To the mind of the Court, their testimonies were rehearsed and do not inspire credence. xxx In fact, the Court observed that both the accused and Javier answered immediately to the questions without even a pause or a semblance of recollection on what happened on June 28, 1992 about two (2) years ago before they testified in court. xxx The accuseds stance that he and the private complainant continued their sexual relationship after June 28, 1992 is highly preposterous. Contrary to the stand of the accused, there is nothing in the medicolegal examination of the private complainant which can conclusively show that after June 28, 1992, the private complainant had several sexual intercourse.[35] The trial court also debunked the accuseds claim that the delay in reporting the case was further proof against the claim of rape. The trial court cited our rulings in People vs. Rejano[36] and People vs. Yambao[37] and noted: In the instant case the private complainant was only fifteen (15) years old at the time she was raped by the accused. She had considered the accused as a close relative and called him uncle. He was very close to her uncles. And yet he raped her. When he forced himself unto her, he threatened her with a gun. Thereafter, he repeatedly threatened her not to relate the incident to anybody, otherwise, he would kill not only her but her family. The accused continued to go to the house of the private complainant even after June 28, 1992. Certainly, the combination of these circumstances put the fifteen-year old private complainant in constant fear, not only for her life but for her whole family as well. In the mind of the fifteen-year old private complainant, the accused would make good of

his threat to kill them. His constant presence in their house alone reminded her of the threat. He need not repeat his threat after June 28, 1992. This was manifested when after the private complainant divulged the rape committed against her by the accused she was immediately taken out from their house.[38] The trial court likewise disregarded the accuseds theory of ulterior motive. Thus: The Court does not give credence to the alleged motive of the private complainant in filing the rape charge against the accused. The private complainant does not seem to be so sophisticated and callous to falsely charge the accused with rape and expose herself to public trial and possibly public embarrassment. [39] As to the accuseds claim of lack of resistance on the part of the complainant, the trial court observed: [I]n the instant case, the accused pointed a gun at the private complainant. The accuseds pointing a gun and simultaneously threatening to kill her if she did not submit to his lustful desires created in the latters mind real fear for her life whic h deprived her of will to resist him. Finally, it found as sufficiently established the accuseds efforts to amicably settle the case. Thus: Finally, the Court is convinced that the accused tried to amicably settle the case with the private complainants mother as testified to by Romeo Nieto It is inconceivable that Romeo Nieto, an ordinary citizen could have the courage to drop the names of highly-placed and influential officials in the province Despite the protestations of the accused and Major Alio the Court has no doubt that the accused was present in all the three (3) occasions related by Romeo Nieto wherein they were looking for the private complainants mother. The mere denials of the accused and Major Alio cannot overcome the positive testimony of Romeo Nieto. At any rate, his non-presence during these occasions cannot erase the fact that the highly-placed and influential provincial officials went there on his behalf -- that was to ask for a compromise deal. It would be absurd to assume that these highlyplaced and influential officials went to the residence of Romeo Nieto on their own without the knowledge of the accused. Verily, the attempt of the accused to amicably settle the case is an admission of guilt of the crime charged against him.[40] The accused seasonably appealed from the decision. In his Appellants Brief, he assigns the following errors to the trial court: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINANT AND THE APPELLANT WERE LOVERS AND THAT THEY AGREED TO A LOVE TRYST AT THE DRAGON INN. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE APPELLANT EMPLOYED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION IN THEIR LOVE TRYST AT THE DRAGON INN. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AND DECLARING THAT THE DELAY IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WAS DUE TO THE REPEATED THREATS OF THE APPELLANT TO THE COMPLAINANT. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINANT AND APPELLANT CONTINUED THEIR LOVE AFFAIR AFTER JUNE 28, 1992. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED FALSELY AGAINST THE APPELLANT DUE TO EVIL MOTIVE. VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT OFFERED TO COMPROMISE THIS CASE, FOR THE REASON THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THE SAME. VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE ON A SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT CHARGING THE APPELLANT OF [sic] THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING THEREON WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION. The People, through the Appellees Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, refuted the accuseds arguments, and in closing, recommended that apart from the FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.000) PESOS as indemnity, appellant should be made to support his illegitimate child with Maria Elena, in conformity with Article 345(3) of the Revised Penal Code. We find no merit in the appeal. We reiterate the controlling guidelines and principles in rape cases: (1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[41]

The credibility then of the complainant is of paramount importance. On this score, it is doctrinally settled that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, or its evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. The recognized exceptions to the doctrine are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances weight and substance which could have affected the result of the case.[42] After a careful perusal of the testimony of the witnesses in this case and a review of the findings and conclusions of the trial court, we find no reason to depart from this doctrine nor apply its exceptions. The first five errors assigned are but a mere rehash of the accuseds arguments in his memorandum filed with the trial court. The trial court ably and correctly disposed of them in the challenged decision as shown in the portions thereof earlier quoted. We adopt the trial courts resolution on those issues and commend the trial judge for her exacting analysis of the facts. We wish, however, to add some points to show the utter lack of merit of the accuseds propositions. The accuseds insinuation that it was incredulous for the complainants grandmother to allow her granddaughter to visit the accuseds girlfriend, knowing all to well that the accused was a married man, is baseless. On cross-examination, the complainant explained that the accused told her grandmother that he would visit a friend. Thus: q And precisely also, you heard the accused tell your lola that she would permit you to go with him to Laoag in order that you would accompany him to visit his girlfriend in Laoag, is that not correct? a Yes, sir, because she trusted him. q Did not your grandmother ask the accused why he was visiting a girlfriend when he was very much married? a No, sir. q And did not your grandmother tell him, It is not good for you to be bringing my granddaughter if you are visiting your girlfriend? a No, sir, because he did not directly say that he would visit a girlfriend but a friend only.[43] As to the use of the word girlfriend in her affidavit, the complainant satisfactorily explained that she narrated her story in Ilocano to a certain Atty. Geologo, who then translated it into English. It was only after the complainant read the English translation that she noticed certain things lacking in the affidavit, however, Atty. Geologo said it will be in court where I will tell everything.[44] At any rate, a sworn statement or affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestions and inquiries. Its infirmity as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience. As such, affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.[45] As to the finding of the trial court regarding the use of force and intimidation, it must be emphasized that force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. So must it likewise be for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol. And where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault a s to make the victims participation in the sexual act voluntary.[46] In the instant case, with the trust reposed by the complainant in the accused who she even called uncle, the disparity in their ages, coupled with the complainants tender years and the fact that the accused is a policeman, we can pay no heed to the accuseds avowal that the complainant should have used stronger force or resistance against his acts. As regards the presence or absence of a gun, we need only state that the accused being a policeman must have a duly issued firearm. He did not testify otherwise, nor that he left it in the police station or in his house. The testimony of Bernard Javier as to the body search pursuant to the inns house rules does not persuade, as correctly found by the trial court. There is no evidence of the thoroughness of the search and if indeed the inn had that rule, Javier should have presented a printed copy thereof. The accused next points to the seven-month lapse before the complainant reported the incident and invokes the ruling in People vs. Paragsa[47] where this Court, in acquitting the defendant-appellant therein, took into consideration a three day lapse. In addition, the accused disputes the trial courts finding that the delay was attributable to repeated threats made even after 28 June 1992. The accuseds reliance on Paragsa is unavailing. The court therein took pains to point out that there were numerous *c+ircumstances *which+ negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged,[48]e.g., the sweetheart theory was substantially corroborated by two defense witnesses, the absence of lacerations along the vaginal walls despite the medicolegal examination being conducted a mere three days after the incident, the complainants narration was done in a matter-of-

factly fashion, material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the complainant and the only other prosecution witness. Plainly, these circumstances are absent in this case. As regards the alleged finding of the trial court that the accused repeatedly threatened the complainant even after 28 June 1992, the accused misreads the decision of the trial court. The court a quo did not so find when it held: When he forced himself unto her, he threatened her with a gun. Thereafter, he repeatedly threatened her not to relate the incident to anybody, otherwise, he would kill not only her but her family. The accused is a police officer and on [sic] his admission continued to go to the house of the private complainant even after June 28. Certainly, the combination of these circumstances put the fifteen-year old private complainant in constant fear In the mind of the fifteen-year old private complainant would make good his threat to kill them. His constant presence in their house alone reminded her of the threat. He need not repeat his threat after June 28, 1992.[49] Clearly, the trial court did not even imply that any threat was made after 28 June 1992, but was merely referring to and consistent with the complainants testimony on direct examination that the accused threatened to shoot her before the first incident of rape, then after the second and third incidents, he threatened to kill her and her family if she ever told them; with both threats having been made on the same day: q As the accused tried to tighten his grip on your hair and poked a gun against your right temple, what did he do? a He said, You remove your pants, otherwise, I will shoot you. xxx q After he was able to do what he wanted to do, did anything else happen after that? a He repeated for two more times, sir q After doing this act for two more times and saying very indecent words, according to you, what else happened? a He repeated his threats to me, sir. q What is that threat? a That he will kill me, including my family, if ever I will tell what happened, sir.[50] (emphasis supplied) In no manner, therefore, may the accused derive comfort from the complainants delay in reporting the crime in the instant case, especially in light of the father figure the accused presented to the complainant. This Court has observed that a six month delay in reporting a rape committed by a father against his daughter is justified in light of threats.[51] Turning now to the sweetheart or mistress theory posed by the accused, again, such must fail. Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant on the date and time in question, the accused bears the burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence.[52] However, as the People astutely cite, the defense failed to present any love letters, pictures, or mementos.[53] Moreover, as regards the complainants ring which she allegedly gave to the accused, if this were true, then in light of the shift in the burden of evidence, it was incumbent upon the accused to provide the circumstances surrounding this gift, if only to provide some semblance of support for his defense. With respect to the accuseds fifth assigned error, he ascribes the following to the complainant to justify her falsely bringing this case against him: Her boyfriend must have pressed her to explain why she was pregnant and who caused her pregnancy. To mollify and preserve her relationship with her boyfriend, she had to concoct the alibi that she was raped by appellant. And to convince her boyfriend, she had no alternative but file this false complaint against appellant. But this ploy of hers boomeranged because she not only lost her boyfriend but also appellant who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love ... having lost them both, she was forced to file this complaint, to cover her immorality and to protect her school, a Catholic managed school, from being exposed to public shame.[54] The accuseds argument deserves scant consideration. It is sheer speculation. Bearing in mind the above discussion as regards the credibility of witnesses, it is worth repeating that the trial court lent full credence to the complainants testimony: The Court finds the account of the private complainant on what transpired between her and the accused on June 28, 1992 replete with details which could not have been concocted by the private complainant. The tears she shed while narrating on how she was ravished by the accused were real.[55] This Court, after a thorough examination of the transcript of stenographic notes, is in full accord with the above observation of the trial court. Moreover, we find that the accused failed to present evidence to prove the presence of any ulterior or improper motive on the part of the complainant. In this light, this Court has ruled: Considering a Filipinas inbred modesty and antipathy in airing publicly things which affect her honor, it is difficult to be lieve that she would admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. A complainant would not risk ruining her future and exposing herself to ridicule if her cha[r]ge were not true. If she does undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, suffer scandals, embarrassments and humiliation (such action would indubitably invite, as well as allow, an examination of her private parts), it is due to her desire to bring justice to the person who had abused her. When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the offended party was actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[56] Turning now to the accuseds sixth assigned error, he argues:

Clearly, forgiveness is different from compromise. All that the appellant and those who intervened for him was to ask for forgiveness. The mother of the complainant did not testify in court or any [sic] close to her that the appellant or any of his intercessors offered to compromise the case. The finding of the trial court offered to compromise the case is without factual basis.[57] Oddly, the accused takes inconsistent positions on this matter. On one hand, he claims above that he sought forgiveness, but on the other hand, while testifying as regards a meeting with the complainants mother during the conduct of the trial, the accused claimed that he did not ask for forgiveness because what they charged against *him+ is not true. [58] At any rate, the accuseds attempt to split hairs between forgiveness and compromise is unavailing. While compromise is an agreement made between two or more parties as a settlement of matters in dispute,[59] the term forgiveness necessarily implies a consciousness of wrongdoing or guilt.[60] It has been held, therefore: [T]he weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensure therefrom.[61] (emphasis supplied) As such, we adopt the pertinent portions of the lower courts ruling on this subject and declare that no reversible error was committed in appreciating the accuseds plea for forgiveness as an implied admission of guilt, in accordance with 27(2), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[62] This can only be buttressed by the persistence of the accuseds intercesso rs in attempting to see the complainant at least thrice.[63] The accused finally contends that *t+he signature appearing at the bottom of the complaint wa s not identified by the complainant and presented as evidence by the prosecution.[64] This likewise deserves not even a passing glance. Prosecutions in the Regional Trial Courts are always commenced by information, except with respect to certain felonies which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, such as rape.[65] As regards these felonies, this Court has held: Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 110 section 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure require that the offenses of abduction and rape shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by t he offended party. Compliance with this is a jurisdictional and not merely a formal requirement. The Rules of Court further provides that evidence which has not been formally offered shall not be considered by the court Applying these rules to the case at bar, it is admitted that the sworn complaint of [the victim] was not formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. This failure to adhere to the rules however is not fatal and did not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Jurisprudence reveals that if the complaint in a case which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is forwarded to the trial court as part of the records of the preliminary investigation of the case, the court can take judicial notice of the same without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence for the prosecution.[66] (citations omitted) In the instant case, the complaint was filed with the trial court on 24 February 1993, thus it formed part of the records of the case and the trial court could have validly taken judicial notice of the same, without doing violence to 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.[67] On a final note, the Court addresses the Solicitor Generals recommendation that the accused should be made to support his illegitimate child with the complainant, in conformity with Article 345(3) of the Revised Penal Code. While it has been held that recognition of offspring of rape cannot be ordered in the absence of evidence,[68] in this instance, however, before both the trial court and this Court, the accused expressly admitted paternity of the complainants child thus giving rise to the oblig ation to provide support, i.e., But this ploy of hers boomeranged because she not only lost her boyfriend but also Bayani who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love, if she would not see anymore her boyfriend.[69] With this judicial admission twice recited, the accused has indisputably admitted his paternity of the complainants child. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring as part of the sentence.[70] With the passage of the Family Code, however, the classifications of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction have been eliminated. At present, children are classified as only either legitimate or illegitimate,[71] with no further positive act required of the parent as the law itself provides the childs status. As such, natural children under the Civil Code fall within the classification of illegitimate children in the Family Code. Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,[72] with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201[73] of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 28 April 1995 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Criminal Case No. 6433 is AFFIRMED in toto. Furthermore, accused-appellant MORENO BAYANI is ordered to support his illegitimate child Tracy Jhuen Nieto in an amount to be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, called only to determine the amount and terms of support, with support in arrears to be reckoned from 28 April 1995. Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.