The Metaphysics of Polytheism in Proclus Edward P.

Butler

But apparently the One neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted. (Plato, Parmenides 141 E

!ntrodu"tion

#his dissertation see$s to restore the do"trine of the henads to its proper pla"e at the "enter of our understanding of Pro"lus% metaphysi"s. #o do this, it is ne"essary to "orre"t two $ey mista$es made by modern "ommentators on the henadology. #he first is the tenden"y to o&erloo$ uni'ue logi"al and stru"tural "hara"teristi"s of the henadi" manifold setting it apart from any onti" manifold, that is, any multipli"ity of beings. On"e we see that a logi" really distin"t from that whi"h applies to beings applies to supra(essential entities, the henads will no longer seem, as they might otherwise, a mere stru"tural "omplement within the system. )e shall see, in short, the work the henads do. #he whole "on"ept of the supra(essential or e*istential, that whi"h lies beyond being, will therefore a"'uire for us true "ontent, whereas otherwise it might seem mere hyperbole or obs"urantism. #o arri&e at a contentful interpretation of Pro"lus% $ey philosophi"al "on"epts is a re'uirement of hermeneuti" "harity, and we must not allow an

2 appearan"e of e*oti"ism su"h as Pro"lus may present to us in one respe"t or another to e*"use us from the burden of ta$ing him seriously as a philosopher, +ust as we must not assume that be"ause his dominant medium is "ommentary, that we shall not find in him originality of thought. #he se"ond problem whi"h has hindered the "ontemporary understanding of the henadology has been the inability of "ommentators to integrate the religious and philosophi"al dimensions of the do"trine. #he henads are also the ,ods- and this has "aused ine*pli"able problems for "ommentators who would not, to put it bluntly, find it so diffi"ult to grasp the interplay and interdependen"e of philosophy and theology in a .hristian, /ewish or 0uslim philosopher. !n su"h a "ase, one would re"ogni1e the positi&e "ontribution that the attempt to rationally arti"ulate a religious position "ould ma$e to a philosopher%s thought- one would not see the philosopher in 'uestion as merely engaged in an e*er"ise of spe"ial pleading. 2u"h an attitude toward the relationship between religion and philosophy is perfe"tly defensible on its own grounds, but it must be applied with fairness a"ross the board. 3n impli"it assumption in the ba"$ground for many "ommentators with respe"t to the henadology seems to be the following4 if the identity of the henads and the ,ods is to be ta$en seriously, then the philosophi"al signifi"an"e of the henads must be minimal, while if their philosophi"al signifi"an"e is to be affirmed, then their identity with the ,ods must be a mere "on"ession to &ulgar opinion, e&en if the &ulgar opinion is Pro"lus% own. 5pon either alternati&e, the integration of the philosophi"al and theologi"al dimensions of the henadology is pra"ti"ally ruled out from the start.

3 )hat is the sour"e of this presupposition6 One "ould attribute it simply to the diffi"ulty that modern "ommentators ha&e often found ta$ing the "lassi"al paganism of the )est seriously. #he images of 7omer%s Olympians seem in"ompatible with either sin"ere piety or profound theologi"al refle"tion. !ndeed, it is a habit of long standing to see the birth of philosophy itself in the )est as a fun"tion of the progressi&e estrangement from paganism. #his &iew, of "ourse, features in a parti"ular metanarrati&e of the spiritual history of the )est. #o tra"e the history of this metanarrati&e and "riti"i1e the notions upon whi"h it rests is not the tas$ of this dissertation. 8or does this metanarrati&e suffi"e by itself to e*plain the "omple* of assumptions whi"h ha&e pre&ented the proper grasp of the henadology. !nstead, we may find upon e*amination that the roots of the in"apa"ity to integrate the philosophi"al and theologi"al dimensions of the henadology lie in the first problem ! outlined, namely the in"omplete understanding of the spe"ial logi" of supra(essential e*isten"e in Pro"lus. 9or it is not merely a 'uestion of a refle*i&e "ultural bias pri&ileging monotheism, but beyond this, of a logi" of unity and multipli"ity for whi"h intelligibility "an only "ome at the "ost of redu"ing multipli"ity to unity and the di&erse to the same. #he thesis of this dissertation is that Pro"lus interprets the prima"y of unity in the 8eoplatoni" tradition as the prima"y of individuality, and the first prin"iple of 8eoplatonism, the One !tself, as the prin"iple of indi&iduation. 9urthermore, the One !tself, despite its hypostati1ation for dis"ursi&e purposes, is a"tually not different from ea"h member of the ultimate "lass of indi&iduals4 the One is ea"h henad. Pro"lus "an thus be seen, from different points of &iew, as a monist or a pluralist, for while there is for him a single prin"iple from whi"h all of reality depends, and in that respe"t he is

4 un'uestionably a monist, that prin"iple is also really many. !t is not, howe&er, as many henads that the One is the first prin"iple, for the first prin"iple "annot be many. !nstead, the One is the first prin"iple as each henad individually. #hat is, it is in the uniqueness of ea"h henad that the first prin"iple is manifest, not in that henad%s membership in any group or "lass. 9ailing to grasp the true nature of the relationship between the henads and the One, "ommentators ha&e naturally seen a tension between Pro"lus% polytheism and his 8eoplatonism. 9or they ha&e assumed that the unity of the One !tself must trump the multipli"ity of the henads, ma$ing of polytheism a mere appearan"e &eiling an underlying unity. But in this they ha&e failed to ta$e seriously the negations laid upon the One in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, for Pro"lus the most "anoni"al of Platoni" te*ts. 9or the One neither is, nor is one. 8aturally this does not mean that it simply fails to e*ist or that it is onti"ally many. )hen ! say that the One is not onti"ally many, what ! mean is that the ultimate sour"e of Being is not many principles, but +ust one, the prin"iple of indi&iduation. But that sour"e is no one thing. Pro"lus is not therefore a pluralist in the sense of, say, Empedo"les, for whom there is a dis"rete set of distin"t prin"iples, themsel&es beings, whi"h "onstitute all the rest. !nstead, we might say that for the purposes of ontology, he is a monist, while existentially, that is, with referen"e to the supra(essential realm, he is a pluralist. #his distin"tion between ontologi"al and e*istential registers of philosophi"al refle"tion parallels the distin"tion between philosophi"al and theologi"al dis"ourse- and this is why the two misunderstandings pre&enting a proper grasp of the henadology, namely the distin"t logi" of unity and multipli"ity appli"able to supra(essentials and the relationship between the philosophi"al and theologi"al dimensions of the henadology,

5 depend upon ea"h other. 9or if the distin"tion between philosophi"al and theologi"al dis"ourse were fully "ollapsed in Pro"lus, then he would be either a pluralist : la Empedo"les, betraying his 8eoplatonism, or his polytheism would be a mere appearan"e, inasmu"h as the many ,ods would in e&ery respe"t simply deri&e from a One whi"h, whether produ"ing them or "omprising them, either way totalizes them. But this would, in a word, redu"e Pro"lus% philosophy to nonsense. 7is protestations to the "ontrary, the relationship between the One and the henads would be in e&ery way assimilable to that between any other prin"iple and its produ"ts;parti"ipants, and while we might still find worthwhile material in his ontology, his a""ount of the supra(essential domain would be at best uninteresting and at worst a philosophi"al embarassment. )hat we find instead is a do"trine of remar$able subtlety, for the distin"tion between philosophi"al and theologi"al dis"ourse for Pro"lus is that between a dis"ourse of classes and a dis"ourse of proper names. #he philosopher, e*"ept for purposes of illustration, has nothing to do with parti"ular deities, but only with classes of ,ods. 7enads, while they are all supra( essential by nature, fall into "lasses based upon their a"ti&ities with respe"t to Being. !n this way we "an spea$ of "lasses of deities mirrored by the hierar"hy of onti" hypostases, all the way up to the "lass of ,ods simpliciter, whi"h is the "lass "orresponding to the One !tself. 7owe&er, ea"h henad is also an indi&idual ,od with a proper name and an identity primordially distin"t from the rest. #o deal with parti"ular, named ,ods is the pro&in"e of the theologian and, of "ourse, the indi&idual worshiper. #he proper domain of philosophy, that is, the domain of form, is bounded abo&e and below by a domain of indi&iduals, below by those indi&iduals falling short of formal unity or identity, namely indi&iduals li$e us, those who fall under infima species, abo&e by those indi&iduals

6 transcending formal unity, and who are thus un"ir"ums"ribed by the laws go&erning the unity and multipli"ity of onti" sets, namely the henads. !n the onti" realm, all multipli"ity is subordinate to unity- and in this sense, that is, ontically, the same "an be said for the henads. ,ods are formally subordinate to the 'uality of ,odhood- this is no more and no less than analyti". 9or this reason, it would ma$e no sense to spea$, as an Empedo"lean pluralist would, of an ontic multipli"ity of first prin"iples, for then they would be no longer first. 2u"h a dis"ourse merely fails to ta$e sto"$ of its own ta"it presuppositions. #he multipli"ity of the henads ta$es pla"e in a different register whi"h grounds the realm of forms and upon whi"h therefore the latter "an ma$e no "laims. But this is not to withdraw support from the realm of 9orm- rather, the story whi"h must be told through the henadology is how the realm of formal unity "omes into being from out of the realm of trans"endent indi&iduality. !t is not a story of the des"ent from unity to multipli"ity < this o&ersimplified pi"ture of the generi" 8eoplatoni" system has held sway for too long. !nstead, it is the story of the "onstitution, the emergen"e, of one type of unity out of another. #he $ey to this emergen"e is the distin"tion between the e*isten"e, or hyparxis, of ea"h ,od and that ,od%s powers, or dunameis, for it is out of this opposition that the opposition between the supra(essential and Being arises. #he distin"tion between hyparxis and dunamis resembles the distin"tion between an agent and that agent%s a"tions. #he ,ods "an be "lassified a""ording to their dunameis, but the 'ualities they possess, as "ompared to the 'ualities possessed by beings, are more a$in to things the henads do rather than things they simply are. #his is important, be"ause it is the tenden"y of Platoni" ontology to redu"e indi&idual beings to bundles of 'ualities.

7 #he 'ualities possessed by the ,ods are as spe"ifi" as we "an dis"ern, as generi" as simply being ,ods. 2tudents of "omparati&e religion ha&e "arried out su"h "lassifi"ations literally for thousands of years. #hus we "ompare deities of different pantheons a""ording to their fun"tional "hara"teristi"s, su"h as =eus and !ndra, or >emeter and !sis. !f we stipulate, howe&er, whi"h students of "omparati&e religion ha&e not always done, that these are indeed merely comparisons between really distin"t entities, and are not therefore to be ta$en for identifications, then we are "onfronted by the problemati" lying at the ne*us of philosophy and theology for Pro"lus. 9or if the logi" of unity and multipli"ity go&erning the realm of forms go&erned also the ,ods, then not only would =eus and !ndra be one to the degree that they e*hibit "ommon 'ualities whi"h will ma$e of them parti"ipants in some "ommon form, but all the ,ods will be one insofar as they parti"ipate in the 'uality of ,odhood, and the realm of form in general will ha&e the same priority o&er the ,ods as o&er any other entities instantiating this or that assemblage of 'ualities. #he ,ods would be, li$e onti" indi&iduals, +ust bundles of 'ualities, e*"ept they would be the first bundles. #hus would the henadology "ollapse into tri&iality. !nstead, in Pro"lus% system, the 'ualities one ,od possesses in "ommon with another for us, their "ommon dunameis, ha&e no "apa"ity to unify the ,ods o&er and against their uni'ue indi&iduality. 9or the uni'ueness of ea"h henad is something abo&e and beyond formal determination- it is not gi&en by their re"ipro"al or dia"riti"al differentiation from the rest (omnis determinatio est negatio , e&en if that is how it is gi&en for us, that is, e&en if that is as far as we "an "ogni1e it. #he realm of form is the "reation of the ,ods, the residuum of their a"ti&ity- there "an be no 'uestion of deri&ing them from it. !nstead, Pro"lus must a""ount for how the realm of form "omes to possess the power it has for us,

8 the power to grasp, on its own terms and within its own limits, the ,ods themsel&es, that is, "lassify them e&en so far as to spea$ of their "ause and unity, whi"h is, e*istentially spea$ing, nothing at all. But it is "on"ei&ed by &irtue of turning the intelle"tual stru"tures generated by di&ine a"ti&ity ba"$ upon the ,ods themsel&es. #he a""ount of the emergen"e of formal unity is primarily to be gleaned from the Platonic Theology, and therefore the last three "hapters of this dissertation are de&oted to a "lose reading of this te*t. #he genesis in 'uestion is not, of "ourse, a genesis in time and spa"e, but an ideal "onstitution. #he s"hema of this genesis is pro&ided by the negations of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, whi"h for the 3thenian s"hool of 8eoplatonism after 2yrianus had the signifi"an"e of laying out, in the language of philosophy, the su""essi&e ran$s of the ,ods, as well as indi"ating the hierar"hy of onti" hypostases. #he ran$s or "lasses of ,ods and the onti" hypostases are essentially one and the same, the hypostases being the uni&ersal dimensions of the ,ods% a"ti&ity. #he series of 'ualities whi"h are denied of the One !tself < and therefore denied of each ,od qua absolutely uni'ue indi&idual < represent the fundamental ontologi"al determinations indispensible to the "ognition of reality, su"h as 5nity and 0ultipli"ity, )hole and Part, 2ameness and >ifferen"e. Ea"h ran$ in this hierar"hy represents at on"e a manifested power of some "lass of ,ods, as well as the reserving of the ,ods of this "lass of their trans"endent indi&iduality, for it is none other than this trans"endent indi&iduality of ea"h ,od that is the One !tself. #he manifested powers of the ,ods are thus the ideal stru"tures around whi"h beings a"hie&e "on"retion- the onti" hypostases and intelligible forms thus generated, the prin"iples that populate the philosophi"al ta*onomy, are not the ,ods

9 themsel&es, but the results of their a"ti&ity. Being is "onstituted by the a"ti&ity of the ,ods. 3t e&ery le&el of Being, the "ondition of the possibility of the mode of being "orresponding to that le&el is the e*isten"e of an order of ,ods manifesting in itself the appropriate stru"ture. E&ery ,od is a supra(essential henad, regardless of the le&el or le&els of Being at whi"h their a"ti&ity is manifest. #he ,ods do not themsel&es "ome to be- but they lend themsel&es, as it were, to Being%s generation. 3t first, they lend themsel&es simply as the indi&iduals they are, befitting their primordial indi&iduality, in whi"h lies their supra(essential status. #he intelligible order of ,ods, then, whi"h is treated in the third boo$ of the Platonic Theology, whi"h "orresponds to and constitutes Being !tself, Being qua Being, e*presses not a disposition of ,ods relati&e to ea"h other but the "hara"teristi"s inherent in ea"h and e&ery ,od. E&ery ,od is, by default and e&en if manifesting him;herself at no subse'uent le&el, an intelligible ,od. 9or this reason, the intelligible order ta$es the form of three triads, whi"h in themsel&es "orrespond to the three ma+or onti" hypostases of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t. #he presen"e of these 'ualities nas"ently in e&ery ,od pro&ide the "ondition of the possibility of the manifestation of any ,od at any le&el of Being in prin"iple. #his order of ,ods is dis"ussed in the fifth "hapter of this dissertation. #he se"ond tier of manifestation is the le&el of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods. #his "orresponds to the se"ond onti" hypostasis, that of ?ife. 7ere for the first time ,ods emerge together. 7owe&er, the nature of this "o(emergen"e is not yet su"h as would allow us, had the pro"ession of Being gone no further than this, to "onstitute a philosophical system. #herefore, instead of forming a logi"al class, the ,ods emerging together at this le&el "onstitute a "ommon field whi"h is "on"ei&ed in terms at on"e proto(

10 spatial and mythi"al. !n other words, the des"ription proper to this le&el ma$es use only of those determinations whi"h ha&e "ome into being with this le&el. #he members of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order of ,ods are disposed relati&e to ea"h other, but not as members of logi"al "lasses or spe"ies but as o""upying a "ommon mythical space. #his spa"e is also, from an abstra"t &iewpoint, the s"ene of intelle"tion, that is, the mo&ement of thought prior to the hypostati1ation of relations. #his order of ,ods is dis"ussed in the fourth boo$ of the Platonic Theology and in the si*th "hapter of this dissertation. #he third tier of manifestation is the le&el of the intelle"tual ,ods. On"e again, that a ,od is an intelle"tual ,od does not mean that s;he is a"tually at the le&el of the onti" hypostasis of !ntelle"t, but that s;he is a supra(essential ,od whose activity is su"h as to "onstitute as its residue the onti" hypostasis in 'uestion. #he emergen"e of intelle"tual being is a""omplished by the a"ti&ity of an order of ,ods amongst whom an additional "hara"teristi" "omes forward4 the new element present in the intelle"tual order of ,ods is narrativity. #he ,ods of this order are not merely present together, they engage in activity together, whi"h ta$es the form of mythological narrative. 8arrati&e a"tion implies fully re"ipro"al relations of the ,ods to ea"h other, and hen"e the hypostati1ation of relations themsel&es. #he members of the intelligible order of ,ods < whi"h is e&ery ,od simply qua ,od < had no relationship to ea"h other. @ather, ea"h simply contained the 3ll. )ithin their potentialities, their dunameis, were the potential for many spe"ifi" relations to other deities, but these were not to be fully a"tuali1ed as relations, that is, as thirds beside the two deities "on"erned, until the intelle"tual order. #his is be"ause relation in general a"hie&es "on"retion in the intelle"t. #he "on"retion of

11 relation permits at last the genuine unification of the ,ods into a "lass represented by the power to 'uantify o&er 3ll the ,ods. !ndeed, with the emergen"e of intelle"t, all that is ne"essary for philosophy is in pla"e- the ,ods ha&e pro&ided humans with the "apa"ity to understand the "osmos at the same time that they ha&e imparted to the "osmos itself a fully intelligible stru"ture. 3nd so when we spea$ of an intelligible or an intelligible(and( intelle"tual class of ,ods, we are regressi&ely applying to these orders of ,ods prior to the emergen"e of intelle"tual being "hara"teristi"s appropriate to intelle"tual being. Ea"h stage of the emergen"e of Being from the a"ti&ity of the ,ods is also a stage of theologi"al hermeneuti"s4 the ,ods as indi&idual i"ons, then together as in a pla"e, then as a"tors determined re"ipro"ally against one another in mythologi"al narrati&e. But how are we to understand the appli"ation of this s"hema to "on"rete religious te*ts6 ! ha&e a&oided, in my brief resume of the stages of the "onstitution of Being abo&e, spea$ing of the spe"ifi" deities and te*ts to whi"h Pro"lus has re"ourse in the Platonic Theology. #his is be"ause it is my thesis that the latter are meant to be illustrative rather than e*hausti&e. Pro"lus% goal in the Platonic Theology is not to e*hausti&ely "atalogue the "ompany of the ,ods- he ne&er says as mu"h. @ather, his goal is to show how Plato is in harmony with Hellenic theology. #he Platonic Theology is, in other words, the appli"ation of Pro"lus% system to a parti"ular tas$. #hat Pro"lus% own religious pra"ti"e e*tended beyond the 7elleni" ,ods is "lear from the a""ount of his biographer. #hese are important points, for they follow from the prin"iples underpinning his philosophi"al system as a whole. #he indi&idual deities dis"ussed in the Platonic Theology must be there as representati&es of the classes of deities in 'uestion, for a philosophi"al dis"ourse about hypostases "an only "onne"t to a theologi"al dis"ourse in pertaining to a class of

12 deities. Only a theologian "an, through intelle"tual inspiration, that is, by parti"ipating in the &ery "onstitution of the "osmos by the ,ods with whom s;he is in "onta"t, affi* parti"ular deities to roles within the "osmos. #his is the tas$, in other words, of myth and of re&elation rather than of diale"ti"s. )hen a theologian, that is, a theologian in the full(blooded sense, li$e the authors of the Orphi" theogonies, gi&es an a""ount of the a"ti&ities of parti"ular ,ods in the "onstitution of the "osmos, what is the status of su"h an a""ount a""ording to Pro"lus6 9or Pro"lus, re&elation and diale"ti" ea"h possess their own perfe"tion and their own truth and neither needs to or e&en could assert its hegemony o&er the other. #he philosopher deals with forms and with "lasses, the theologian with parti"ular indi&iduals. 8othing said by the one "ould possibly affe"t the other. !t is not for the philosopher to say what deities a"tually fill whi"h "lasses- for this, the philosopher may turn to the pre( e*isting "orpus of mythologi"al material as raw data from whi"h to abstra"t formal, that is, intelligible, "ontent. 8or is it for the theologian to assert that the ,ods they worship fill uniquely the positions in the hierar"hy of Being that are dis"ernible through reason. 2u"h a statement simply la"$s any "ontent at all, being an improper hybrid of two distin"t modes of dis"ourse whi"h "annot be made to fit together in that fashion. )hat would be the status, then, of the "laim that all the ,ods of different national pantheons are really the same limited set of deities under different names, or that all of the &arious deities are merely names of one ,od6 #hese, too, are statements without "ontent, inasmu"h as they abrogate the relations between theologi"al and philosophi"al dis"ourse whi"h arise from the fundamental hypothesis of the e*isten"e of the ,ods. 9or if indi&iduality is the ultimate form < and this is the meaning this dissertation proposes

13 that Pro"lus a""ords to the do"trine of the One !tself < then the &ery regime of 9orm upon its own assumptions refuses to be pla"ed abo&e that of the proper name, and the mo&e whi"h would assimilate deities to one another based upon their fun"tions, that is, subordinate indi&iduality to fun"tion, e*isten"e to 'uality, "annot get off the ground, for it sub&erts itself. !t would no more ma$e sense to say that deities from two different "ultures who are both demiurgi" deities, are for that reason the same, than it would to say that the positing of the One !tself prior to Being means that all the ,ods are really one. 9or to posit the One !tself prior to Being is no more than to posit, in the onti" language of prin"iples and "lasses, a domain of absolute indi&iduality prior to the domain of formal unity.

One final note is re'uired with respe"t to the method of this study. #he goal of this wor$ is not to do +usti"e to any parti"ular te*t of Pro"lus%, but to do +usti"e to the do"trine of the henads itself. ! thus present a synoptic a""ount of the do"trine drawing upon all of Pro"lus% te*ts. !t is my "on&i"tion, based upon my study of Pro"lus% te*ts, that there is no reason to posit any important "hanges in the do"trine of henads o&er the "ourse of his "areer, nor that there are differen"es in the do"trine from te*t to te*t re'uiring mu"h in the way of spe"ial treatment. #his is not to say that different te*ts do not pro&ide different perspe"ti&es on the do"trine in a""ord with the spe"ial aims of those te*ts- and ! dis"uss at se&eral points the spe"ial aims, in parti"ular, of the Elements of Theology and the Platonic Theology, prin"ipally in order to "lear up "ertain misunderstandings as to these aims. But this is not a matter of differen"es in the do"trine, but at most of different aspe"ts of the do"trine whi"h are highlighted by different sorts of treatment. 3s often as

14 not, the differen"es that may appear from te*t to te*t are a result of the refinements Pro"lus "ontinually attempted to ma$e in his ways of expressing the no&el elements of the do"trine of the henads in a fashion that best "on&eyed its harmony and "ontinuity with histori"al Platonism- for it was e&er Pro"lus% "on&i"tion that, were they only properly understood, philosophers of worth would not be seen to "onfli"t with one another.

15 A ote !n the Texts of Proclus

Passages from the Elements of Theology and the Parmenides "ommentary appear for the most part as translated by >odds and by 0orrow and >illon, respe"ti&ely, with the e*"eption that they ha&e been modified throughout to a""ord with stylisti" "hoi"es, su"h as "apitali1ing the names of hypostases or the word ,ods, as well as to standardi1e the translation of important te"hni"al terms and, at times, to render them more literal. #his is typi"ally the approa"h with other modern (ABth "entury English translations of an"ient te*ts in this dissertation as well. #ranslated passages from the Timaeus "ommentary, the Platonic Theology, and other te*ts of Pro"lus referred to in passing, freely in"orporate elements from the 9ren"h translations as well as from the early 1Cth "entury English translations of #homas #aylor in order to embody what ! regard as the "learest, most literal and most systemati"ally fruitful reading of the ,ree$ te*t. .itations of the Platonic Theology DPTE appear in the following format4 boo$ number, "hapter number, page number in 2affrey and )esterin$%s 9ren"h edition, line number in the ,ree$ te*t- and "itations from all other te*ts in the series of ?es Belles ?ettres are done in analogous fashion. )here the boo$ number, "hapter number, or page number is e&ident from "onte*t, these may be omitted, starting from the boo$ numberreferen"es more general in s"ope may omit line number or page number. .itations from the Timaeus "ommentary D"TE are by &olume and page of >iehl%s edition. #hose from the Parmenides "ommentary D"PE are a""ording to .ousin, e*"ept for the ?atin se"tion, the numbers of whi"h are followed by a F, all of whi"h is in a""ord with the marginal numbering in 0orrow and >illon%s translation. .itations from the #ratylus "ommentary

16 D"#E are by the paragraph numbers in Pas'uali%s edition- "itations from 0arinus% life of Pro"lus are "ited by the paragraph numbers in Boissonade%s edition. .itations from the $epublic "ommentary D"$E are by &olume and page of Froll%s edition.

17

.hapter 14

,eneral .hara"teristi"s of 7enadi" 0ultipli"ity

3 useful te*t from whi"h to begin our in'uiry "omes from Pro"lus% "ommentary on Plato%s Parmenides. !n this passage, Pro"lus e*pli"itly "ontrasts the mode of e*isten"e of the forms with that of the henads4

all the henads are in ea"h other and are united with ea"h other, and their unity is far greater than the "ommunity and identity among beings. !n these too there is "ompounding of forms, and li$eness and friendship and parti"ipation in one another- but the unity of these former entities, inasmu"h as it is a unity of henads, is far more uniform and ineffable and unsurpassable- for they are all in all of them, whi"h is not the "ase with the forms. #hese Dthe formsE are parti"ipated in by ea"h other, but they are not all in all. 3nd yet, in spite of this degree of unity in that realm, how mar&elous and unmi*ed is their purity, and the indi&iduality of ea"h of them is a mu"h more perfe"t thing than the

18
differen"e of the forms, preser&ing as it does unmi*ed all the di&ine entities Dta theiaE and their proper powers distin"t DGE ("P 1B4H. 11(AI

!n this passage there is nothing whatsoe&er of the One !tself- rather, it is a 'uestion of a straightforward "ontrast between henads and forms or, more simply, beings. #he te*t lays out a series of "ontrasting "hara"teristi"s. #he henads are all in all or all in each, in whi"h lies their unity (hen%sis . 8oti"e that this unity is not a matter of their union with or in the !ne, but the presen"e of all the henads in each other. #he unity of the henads thus "on"ei&ed far e*"eeds that whi"h beings possess by &irtue of the "orresponding phenomena among them, namely "ommunity, identity, "ompounding of forms, li$eness, friendship, and parti"ipation in one another. #his latter, in parti"ular, is mentioned twi"e, and thus ma$es the "learest "ontrast to the all in all of the henads, whi"h is mentioned three times. 2o far, it would seem as if what is at sta$e here is a differen"e in the degree to whi"h entities are united with each other, with the &arious relationships mentioned as e*isting among beings ser&ing to unite them with ea"h other to a lesser degree than that to whi"h the henads are united with ea"h other. 5nity then would be a matter of the redu"tion of differen"e to identity. But then Pro"lus pro"eeds to "ontrast the purity and indi&iduality Didiot&sE of the henads to the differen"e Dheterot&sE of the forms. !t "annot be a matter, then, of entities simply be"oming more united with ea"h other, and hen"e less differentiated from ea"h other, as we as"end to the One !tself. 3 henad is both more united to the other henads than a being is to other beings, and also more distinct from the other henads than a being is from other beings. #here are only two options4 Pro"lus is either simply positing an irrational coincidentia oppositorum, or propounding a philosophi"al do"trine of more subtlety than

19 has hitherto been appre"iated. #hat he intends what he says here to bear philosophi"al weight is indi"ated by his remar$s a page later4 2o mu"h, then, may be said "on"erning the situation of the primal henads and their "ommunion with and distin"tion from one another, of whi"h we are wont to "all the one parti"ularity Didiot&taE, the other unity Dhen%sinE, distinguishing them thus also by name from the sameness and differen"e manifested at the le&el of @eal Being (1B4C . #he attempt to establish te"hni"al terminology respe"ting the differen"e in 'uestion hardly seems "onsistent with an appeal to a coincidentia oppositorum beyond our rational powers. ?et us pro"eed, then, to try to better understand what Pro"lus means by the "ontrast he draws here.

3mong the "hara"teristi"s attributed to beings in the passage "ited abo&e, the ones that stand out espe"ially are sameness or identity (tautot&s , differen"e (heterot&s , and parti"ipation (methexis in one another. #hese are both the most fre'uently repeated "hara"teristi"s, and also those with the "learest systemati" fun"tions in Pro"lus% thought. Parti"ipation is perhaps the most familiar of all "on"epts in histori"al Platonism, whi"h is not to say that there is a uniform do"trine with respe"t to it. !ndeed, for Pro"lus, parti"ipation has different 'ualities at different le&els of Being, whi"h is his "hief strategy for handling problems with the "on"ept. )hat is important for our purposes, howe&er, is to figure out what general "hara"teristi"s of parti"ipation are here being denied of the henads. 9or Pro"lus% remar$s here, where he "ontrasts the all(in(all of the henads to the parti"ipation in ea"h other of the forms, should be seen in the light of his re+e"tion elsewhere of henads parti"ipating altogether, that is, not +ust in ea"h other, but in anything. Pro"lus states in proposition 11H of the Elements of Theology, for instan"e, that

20 the ,ods ha&e no attribute by parti"ipation, but all a""ording to hyparxis De*isten"eE or impli"it in their "ausality Dkat'aitianE and at "n Tim. !, JI4, we read that e&ery ,od is essentiali1ed Dousi%taiE in being a ,od, or rather is supra(essentiali1ed Dhuperousi%taiE, but there is not anything whi"h is parti"ipated by him- be"ause the ,ods are the most an"ient and &enerable of all things. #his latter passage is parti"ularly signifi"ant, inasmu"h as it e*pli"itly states that the fa"t that the ,ods possess a "ommon "hara"teristi" does not mean that they parti"ipate in something. #his, we must re"ogni1e, would represent a "lear brea$ with one of the most basi" a*ioms of Platonism, namely that "ommon "hara"teristi"s belonging to "oordinate entities are to be e*plained by referen"e to their "ommon parti"ipation in some single prin"iple of a higher order of being than they. !n Pro"lus, parti"ipation as su"h tends to be superseded by a more general relationship, that between a manifold (pl&thos or "lass (taxis and its prin"iple or monad, with its "omplementary "on"epts of pro"ession from (pro(dos and re&ersion upon (epistroph& the prin"iple. #he basi" "on"epts are laid out in prop. A1 of the Elements, whi"h states that e&ery "lass originates from a monad and pro"eeds to a "oordinate DsustoichonE manifold, and the manifold of any "lass is "arried ba"$ to one monad. !n the body of the proposition, we read that

sin"e G in e&ery "lass there is some "ommon element, a "ontinuity and identity in &irtue of whi"h some things are said to be "oordinate Dhomotag&E and others not Dheterotag&E, it is apparent that the identi"al element is deri&ed by the whole "lass from a single prin"iple. #hus in ea"h "lass or "ausal "hain there e*ists a single monad prior to the

21
manifold, whi"h determines for the members of the "lass their uni'ue relation Dhena logonE to one another and to the whole.

8oti"e that the relationship of members of su"h an order to one another and to the whole is mediated by the monad prior to the manifold in 'uestion, the monad being e'ui&alent to a single logos uniting the members of the order- and through the monad the series or "lass is one (mia, A1.K . #his prin"iple of mediation, where beings relate to ea"h other indire"tly through a superior prin"iple, "an be generali1ed to the whole of Being. 3t "P LBJf we read that +ust as there must e*ist G prior to all beings the 0onad of Being, through whi"h all beings qua beings are ordered with respe"t to one another, so we see$ to $now of them, in so far as they are beings, what sort of monad they ha&e whi"h embra"es and unifies them. 3nd again, all beings are a"tually from a single monad whi"h is and is "alled primarily Being, by whi"h they are and are named beings a""ording to their respe"ti&e "lasses DtaxinE- and from this monad all beings are sympatheti" with one another and are in a sense identi"al, as being from the One Being- indeed, all things, insofar as they parti"ipate in the One Being, are in a sense the same as one another and one (LB4 . Ontology, therefore, is monadology. #he "on"ept of the monad with respe"t to Being is to e*press the parti"ipation of any sort of being whatsoe&er in unity as a being, that is, as su"h and su"h a type of being, in short, spe"ifi" or formal unity, whi"h is essentially a play of identity and differen"e. #he unity of beings is thus a unity of mediation, as mu"h when we are spea$ing of the unity of some being as su"h a $ind of being, for as far as form "an determine the indi&idual, as when we are spea$ing about the unity of beings with the whole of Being, their identity in and with Being. 9or the unity whi"h is granted

22 to beings through stru"tures of mediation also under"uts their unity in the sense of indi&iduality or uni'ueness be"ause of the holisti" system into whi"h they are folded by the &ery stru"tures from whi"h they deri&e determina"y. )e read in prop. II that e&ery being is related to e&ery other either as a whole or as a part or by identity or by differen"e. )e "an see this as an a*iom of the uni&ersality of mediation with respe"t to beings, inasmu"h as the part is, naturally, mediated by the whole- that whi"h is identi"al to another is mediated by that 'uality with respe"t to whi"h the two are identi"al, or with respe"t to whi"h something is self(identi"al- things whi"h are different are mediated, li$ewise, by that 'uality in respe"t to whi"h they differ- and finally, the whole is itself mediated by the parts, for e&en the whole(before(the(parts of, e.g., prop. IL, that is, the whole in its "ause or the form of ea"h thing G pre(e*isting in the "ause, is still a whole of parts albeit prior to them (prop. LJ . )hat ! am "alling the uni&ersality of mediation with respe"t to beings is in fa"t e*pressed in Pro"lus in terms of the uni&ersality of mereology or the logi" of whole and part. 9or of the four relations whi"h e*hausti&ely determine beings, identity and differen"e are ultimately subordinated by Pro"lus to relations of whole and part. 9or identity and differen"e are simply the positing of beings in relation to, that is, mediated by, "lasses of whi"h they are or are not members. 3nd a""ording to prop. L4, e&ery spe"ifi" form is a whole, as being "omposed of a number of indi&iduals Dek pleion%n huphest&kenE ea"h of whi"h goes to ma$e up the 9orm. 9urthermore, e&en the atomi" indi&idual is a whole as being atomi", although it is not a 9orm, (i.e. it is a whole with only abstra"t or dependent parts from whi"h Pro"lus "on"ludes that )holeness is the more e*tensi&e predi"ate than 9orm, and thus ontologi"ally prior. !ndeed, we "an thin$ of

23 the parts whi"h "onstitute a form either e*tensionally, or intensionally, as we "an see from a dis"ussion at "P 11BK on the distin"tion between the One, whi"h is without parts, and that whi"h is merely said to be partless. #he geometri"al point, e.g., is partless, but

the definition of the point is made up of "ertain "omponents, and all the elements "omprising it hold the ran$ of parts in relation to that whi"h is "omprised of them. 2imilarly the monad, be"ause it is not made up of distin"t parts as is e&ery number deri&ed from it, is partless- but be"ause it is "omprised of "ertain elements whi"h ma$e it a monad and ma$e it differ from a point, one would not be wrong in "alling these "omponents of the definition of the monad Mparts%- for those things that ma$e up the definition of ea"h form are assuredly parts of it, and it is made up of them as of parts, and it is a whole e*perien"ing oneness only as an attribute, but not being the One !tself, whereas only that whi"h is simply One is "omposed neither of "ontinuous parts nor of distin"t ones nor of "omponent ones, being solely One and simply One, not something unified.

(#he term monad retains here its earlier, mathemati"al "onnotations, as it often does for Pro"lus . #here is another, similar dis"ussion of the different senses of the term part at "P 111J. Primal Being alone is prior to )holeness, a""ording to prop. LJ, inasmu"h as being is predi"able e&en of parts qua parts. Of "ourse, if to pr%t%s on is prior to )holeness, the henads must a fortiori be prior to )holeness as well, for e&ery ,od is abo&e Being, abo&e ?ife, and abo&e !ntelligen"e (prop. 11K , that is, the first three onti" hypostases of later 8eoplatonism. #his is the meaning of the "onstant epithet of the henads, namely supra(essential (huperousios .

24 >is"o&ering mediation and holism underneath onti" unity brings us to the point where we "an see the "ontrast posed in the passage with whi"h ! began this "hapter at last as a "onfrontation between two modes of unity. !t is important to situate the "ontrast in terms of modes of unity for the differen"e in 'uestion must be lo"ated at the &ery point where Being and the supra(essential domain "onfront ea"h other. !f we re"all to mind the order in whi"h ontologi"al terms emerge in the negations of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, then we shall see that whole and part only emerge through the a"ti&ity of the se"ond ran$ of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods, that is to say, the se"ond ran$ of the order of ,ods "orresponding to the se"ond onti" hypostasis of ?ife. "dentity and difference, for their part, do not emerge until e&en later, being produ"ts of the intelle"tual ,ods. )nity and multiplicity are the first produ"ts of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods, and the first ob*ective produ"ts of the ,ods in general.

#he stru"ture of monad and manifold is broad enough to en"ompass e&en the relationship between the One and the henads in prop. A1, whose "orollary "ites these as the "ulmination of a series of e*amples of monads and manifolds. #here is 8ature and the many natures, 2oul and the manifold of souls, !ntelle"t and the manifold of intelle"ts, while for the One prior to all things there is the manifold of henads, and for the henads the upward tension DanatasisE toward the One. )e shall see +ust how far this analogy goes, for li$e e&ery analogy in Pro"lus it has its proper sphere of appli"ation beyond whi"h what is, properly used, a heuristi" de&i"e, be"omes an obsta"le to understanding. #he purpose of displa"ing the "on"ept of parti"ipation in fa&or of the more generi" "on"ept of pro"ession and re&ersion upon a prin"iple (arch& seems to ha&e been that

25 different types of relationship to the prin"iple be"ame possible. One su"h is differen"e is that between pro(dos in a narrower sense, whi"h denotes the produ"tion of inferior hypostases by superior, su"h as the generation of 2oul by !ntelle"tion, and hupobasis, whi"h denotes the produ"tion of, e.g., intelle"ts by !ntelle"t. 3nother type of differen"e, howe&er, within the generi" "on"ept of "ausation e*pressed by the monad do"trine, "on"erns the &ery status of the "ausati&e prin"iple in relation to its produ"ts. 3t "P 11CB, there is an interesting "onsideration of the appli"ability of the notion of differen"e to the relationship between the One and the 0any (polla , the "onte*t being the affirmation at Parm. 1JCe that the One "annot be other than, or the same as, either itself or another, that is, the negation of identity and differen"e with respe"t to the One, to whi"h "orresponds the third order of the intelle"tual ,ods. Pro"lus e*plains that despite their trans"enden"e of differen"e (heterot&s as su"h, there is still differentiation among the ,ods.

D#Ehe 0any qua different are ne"essarily also in all ways Mother% DallaE, but are not different than the One. 9or as he himself has de"lared, what is Mdifferent% DheteronE is different than another- and so, e&en if they should be "alled Mothers% DallaE and different than the One, one would not say it in the sense that they ha&e made a pro"ession from it by means of >ifferen"e G let us grant that there is a de"lination DhuphesisE from the One to these- but not e&ery de"lination is the produ"t of >ifferen"e, but only that de"lination whi"h is in the realm of the forms.

Pro"lus goes on to e*plain that the others than the One will be "alled different than the One insofar as by be"oming other than each other, they are separated from the One,

26 whi"h absolutely re+e"ts the title of re"ipro"al otherness Dt&n all&l%n pros&gorianE. 3nd so in the supra(essential realm, that is, the realm of the henads, instead of the differen"e of superior forms from inferior, we must postulate trans"enden"e Dhuperoch&nE, instead of that of inferior from superior, de"lination DhuphesinE, and in pla"e of the distin"tion Ddiakrise%sE of "oordinates Dhomostoich%nE from ea"h other, indi&idual pe"uliarity Didiot&taE. #he 0any of the present passage are thus e&idently the henads, whose indi&iduality < note the use of idiot&s, whi"h was introdu"ed as a te"hni"al term at "P 1B4C < is "ontrasted with the re"ipro"al otherness of the forms, the distin"tion of "oordinates from ea"h other, other than(ness or determinate differen"e of beings that are "oordinate, that "an be assigned to a "ommon order or redu"ed to "ommon elements (stoicheia . #he passage therefore "onstitutes an important amplifi"ation of the passage from 1B4H 'uoted at the beginning of the "hapter. !t is parti"ularly important inasmu"h as it deals more with the aspe"t of distin"tion and differentiation among henads and among forms, and it also brings in the One. #he 0any (that is, the henads are other (allos in relation to the One, but not different (heteros than the One. #his would seem to be nonsense if it were not for the e*planation that what "omes to be other than or different from the One, does so through "oming to be other than its "oordinates. #hat is, when determinate relation amongst "oordinate entities arises, so too does a determinate relationship arise between them and their prin"iple, ultimately the One. 9or onta, there are four types of relation (pros all&la , namely whole and part, identity and differen"e (prop. II ET - but the henads trans"end relation (schesis on a""ount of their purity (amig&s (prop. 1AI , inasmu"h as relation is a 'ualifi"ation of being (prosthesis tou

27 einai (prop. 1AA . #he different position relati&e to the One of the henads and the forms is therefore a matter of the emergen"e, in the forms, of mediating relationships among them. 2imultaneously to these, a relationship emerges between the forms and the One, where no "learly defined relationship e*isted between the One and the henads. #he term allos refers to this looser, generi" form of differentiation. #here are two rele&ant spe"ies of relationships in 'uestion here4 the &erti"al relationships of superior and inferior entities, and the hori1ontal relationships of entities on the same le&el to ea"h other. 9or the single &erti"al relationship between the superior and the inferior whi"h is, among the forms, "hara"teri1ed by differen"e, Pro"lus substitutes in the supra(essential realm the two "omplementary notions of trans"enden"e and de"lination. #hese notions are not important in themsel&es. )hat matters, rather, is the strategy of brea$ing up the single relation into two, be"ause of the way it fore"loses mediation. @ather than a single substantial relation mediating two henads < and hence uniting them in some third < the relationship e*ists as a potential in ea"h of the members. #his potential is a"tuali1ed and becomes a substantial relationship, a third, when the hypostasis of intelle"t is fully "onstituted. )e shall ha&e more to say below about this do"trine of relations among the henads as well as the way Pro"lus applies it to mythologi"al hermeneuti"s. #he spe"ial importan"e of the hierar"hi"al relationship < for the hori1ontal relationship among the forms of re"ipro"al otherness or the distin"tion of "oordinates he substitutes simply the idiot&s, the indi&idual pe"uliarity, of the henads < the reason why it is singled out here, is be"ause were the relations of subordination between more uni&ersal and more spe"ifi" henads to be granted the status su"h relations possess among forms, then the more uni&ersal henads would be more henadi"

28 than the more spe"ifi" ones. But there are not degrees among the ,ods. Pro"lus is 'uite "lear that e&en an infra(intelle"tual ,od is still altogether a henad4 the assimilati&e ,ods ("onstituti&e of the form of ?i$eness, that is, of assimilating parti"ipants to the forms they parti"ipate are a""ording to their hyparxeis, beyond essen"e and multipli"ity- but a""ording to the parti"ipations of them whi"h re"ei&e the illumination of a pro"ession of this $ind, they are "alled assimilati&e (PT N! 1I. LC. L(1B 7ere we see, ! belie&e, the formal stru"ture distinguishing the multipli"ity of forms, and, by e*tension, of beings in general, from that of the henads. .oordinate terms, terms subsumed under a single "lass, are other than one another, that is, they are re"ipro"ally or diacritically distinguished, whi"h implies mediation. #he ,ods% trans"enden"e of relation lies in their trans"enden"e of mediation. But how "an this be if they are sub+e"t to the rules go&erning the relationships between monads and their manifolds in prop. A16 #he henads "annot pro"eed from the One either by hupobasis or by pro(dos, for either of these imply some sort of decline, and there is no de"line from the One to the henads. 9or if the One de"lined, as it were, from unity to multipli"ity, then we would need to posit the a"ti&ity of some prin"iple of materiality as responsible for this multipli"ation. Pro"lus resists this, for e*ample, at PT !! L. KB. AB(A4 9or if the ,ood is multiplied through wea$ness DastheneianE, the whole of things will pro"eed through a diminution DhuphesinE, rather than through a superabundan"e of goodness. #he language of diminution here re"alls the des"ription of hupobasis at "P L4I, where it was defined as the produ"tion by a monad of things as if from the entirety of their natures but diminished for parti"ular instan"es, their spe"ifi" "hara"ter being preser&ed but be"oming more partial in them, li$e, e.g., intelle"ts from !ntelle"t. Huphesis is also the relationship between more

29 uni&ersal and more spe"ifi" henads, and therefore the pro"ession from the One to the henads "annot be li$e that from, e.g., the intelligible to the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods. But neither "an the henads "ome about by pro(dos, that is, by a "hange in essen"e, as in the "ase of the produ"tion of the pro"ession of images from paradigms (ibid , for this mode of "ausation does not e&en e*ist among intelligibles, mu"h less supra(essentials4 the forms are "alled paradigms of beings, while Being is "ause, and not paradigm, of all that "omes after it- for paradigms are "auses of things differentiated Ddi&r&men%nE in their Being and whi"h ha&e essen"es "hara"teri1ed by differen"e DdiaphorousE (PT !!!. KA. A(L . 2imilarly, in a remar$ at PT !!!. J. 1A1(A we read that4 in the first "auses G the motion of the "ause Ddoes notE, bringing about a diminution of power, entail the generation of the whole of things into dissimilitude and indefiniteness Deis G aoristianE. #he point of this passage is to rule out the sort of role in the produ"tion of the henads that might otherwise be en&isaged for some prin"iple a$in to the Pythagorean indefinite < aoristos < >yad. !t is not some sort of proto(materiality that gi&es rise to the many ,ods, nor is their multipli"ity a de"line. 3s for matter, ! will dis"uss it in detail later on. ?et it suffi"e to say for now that matter is, insofar as it has any e*isten"e, a product of di&ine a"ti&ity and not a "ause of anything with respe"t to the ,ods. )hile Pro"lus may e*tend to the relationship between the One and the henads the stru"tures truly appropriate rather to beings, he is at the same time "onstantly aware of the properties he wishes the henads to ha&e in order to render with fidelity his "ombined philosophi"al and theologi"al &ision. !ndeed, it seems to be a matter for him of balan"ing two sets of e*igen"ies. One is the no&el "hara"teristi"s of the henadology, some of whi"h

30 it probably already possessed prior to him, others whi"h were doubtless his "ontributionthe other, the inherited "orpus of Platoni" thought spanning hundreds of years, with respe"t to whi"h Pro"lus% goal is to be as syn"retisti" and "on"iliatory as possible. O&er the "ourse of his "areer, he "an be seen persistently refining the manner in whi"h he e*presses the do"trine in order to stri$e the best possible balan"e of these two sets of demands. 2ometimes these efforts are 'uite subtle, and easily elude a reading insuffi"iently fine(grained. 9or e*ample, 9ran"es"o @omano has noted for the first time a distin"t propensity throughout Pro"lus% wor$ to use the term aitia in referen"e to the One, as opposed to aition, seemingly in order to a&oid the hypostati1ing "onnotations of to aition.1 ,i&en his strong tenden"y to downplay his own no&elty and to harmoni1e his thought with that of his prede"essors, we must be espe"ially sensiti&e when reading Pro"lus to gi&e due weight to those moments in whi"h he permits himself a no&elty, whether it be o&ert or subtle. ,i&en what @omano has pointed out about the use of aitia to refer to the One, whi"h is already e&ident in the Elements, we should not a""ord more weight than is merited to the e*tension of the stru"ture of monad and manifold to the One and the henads. !ndeed, a""ording to prop. A1, a monad is simply that whi"h has the relati&e status of a prin"iple (arch&s echousa logon . !n turn, an unparti"ipated prin"iple has the relati&e status of a monad (monados echon logon (prop. AJ . #he designation monad "arries the minimum of ontologi"al "ommitment, inasmu"h as it is appli"able e&en to the indi&iduals under infima species. #he most spe"ifi" !deas are those that are parti"ipated by indi&iduals, su"h as 0an, >og, and others of the sort. #heir Mma$ings% ha&e as their immediate result the generation of indi&idual unities Dtas en tois atomois
1 ?%!dOe de .ausalitO dans la Th+ologie Platonicienne de Pro"lus in Proclus et la Th+ologie Platonicienne, Actes du #olloque "nternational de -ouvain ./01/2 3ai /4456 en l7honneur de H8 98 :affrey et -8 ;8 <esterink, eds. 3. Ph. 2egonds P .. 0. 2teel.

31 monadasE < 0an of indi&idual men, >og of parti"ular dogs, and 7orse and ea"h of the rest in li$e manner ("P LJK . 2imilarly at "P LKA monad is used to refer to the many separate indi&iduals under some !dea, e.g., the infinity of e*isting men under the !dea of 0an. #he "ommonality between these usages of monad and those more a$in to prop. A1 is the idea of some "ommon logos in a multipli"ity, with the degree to whi"h we are entitled to hypostati1e that logos being &ariable. #he $ey, then, is to understand what aspe"ts of monadi"ity are really appropriate to the relationship between the One and the henads and whi"h are not. #he important "on"ept here seems to be mode of pro"ession. !n the passage from "P 11CB "ited abo&e, Pro"lus "ontrasted the mode of pro"ession of the henads from the One to the pro"ession by differen"e of the forms. Pro"lus spea$s at "P L4K of three modes of pro"ession4

!n general, pro"ession o""urs either by way of unity Dhen%sinE, or by way of li$eness Dhomoiot&taE, or by way of identity Dtautot&taE < by way of unity, as in the super"elestial henads, for there is no identity among them, nor spe"ifi" li$eness, but unity only- by way of identity, as in the indi&isible substan"es, where that whi"h pro"eeds is somehow the same as what it "ame from, for being all safeguarded and held together by eternity, they manifest in a sense the identity of part to whole- and by way of li$eness, as in the beings of the intermediate and lowest le&els, whi"h, though intermediate, are the first to wel"ome pro"ession by way of li$eness, whether in some "ases it be identity and differen"e or li$eness and unli$eness that is their "ause.

#he pro"ession by identity of this passage is e&idently the same as the pro"ession by differen"e of 11CB, sin"e identity and differen"e share the same formal stru"ture. !n the

32 s"heme of the four onti" relations identity and differen"e were both redu"ible to relations of whole and part, be"ause beings are identi"al and different with respe"t to the "lasses < i.e. wholes < of whi"h they are parts. !dentity and differen"e also arise simultaneously in the intelle"tual order. #here are thus for our purposes only two modes of pro"ession here, the pro"ession by unity of the henads, and the pro"ession by identity(and(differen"e of beings, with pro"ession by li$eness in"luded under the latter (whether in some "ases it be identity and differen"eG , +ust as the form of ?i$eness emerges in the infra( intelle"tual orders where what is at sta$e are degrees of assimilation of parti"ipants to the forms. Beings also pro"eed by identity, be"ause to be is on some le&el to be identi"al, as a part of Being, with the whole of Being. 3ll that is, is the same as Being be"ause e&ery being is, and is one < a monad of some sort and an h&n%menon, a unified entity, +ust li$e Being !tself. Being is one and many, identi"al and different, li$e all the beings themsel&es, for Being a""epts all the determinations the One re+e"ts in the first hypothesis. )hat, then, is this pro"ession by way of unity Pro"lus a""ords to the henads, and how does it differ from pro"ession by way of identity6 )e find the same formulation in the Platonic Theology !!! J. 11f, where, after ha&ing laid out a line of reasoning essentially the same as that of prop. AH of the ET, i.e. that DeE&ery produ"ing "ause "onstitutes Dhuphist&sinE things li$e to itself before the unli$e, he "on"ludes that

!t is ne"essary therefore that it Dthe OneE must produ"e from itself, prior to all other things, a unitary manifold Dpl&thos heniaionE and a series DarithmosE most a$in to its "ause Dt& aitia suggenestatonE. 9or if e&ery other "ause "onstitutes a progeny similar to itself prior to that whi"h is dissimilar, mu"h more must the One re&eal after this manner

33
things posterior to itself, sin"e it is beyond li$eness, so the One !tself must produ"e a""ording to unity Dkat' hen%sinE things whi"h primarily pro"eed from it. 9or how "an the One gi&e subsisten"e to its progeny e*"ept unitarily Dheniai%sE6

!t is not +ust a 'uestion, then, of the sorts of things that a produ"ing "ause brings to light or re&eals (ekphainei , but also of how it re&eals them. Physis, we read, produ"es physi"ally (phusik%s , psyche psy"hi"ally (psuchik%s , nous intelle"ti&ely (noer%s (!!! J. 1A . !t is all too easy to o&erloo$ these dis+un"tions and the "orresponding di&ersity, failing to thin$ through the real differen"es in how these entities emerge or are posited in the unfolding of the system. @ight now, howe&er, we are "on"erned with +ust one su"h "ausal relationship, that by whi"h the One brings forth the henads unitarily. )hat are the "hara"teristi"s of this series so a$in to its "ause that it trans"ends the &ery e"onomy of li$eness and unli$eness whi"h is the "ondition of the possibility of pro"ession itself6

!f that whi"h primarily produ"es all things is the One, and the pro"ession from it is unitary, it is ne"essary that the manifold then"e produ"ed should "onsist in self1perfect henads most allied to their producing cause Dhenadas autoteleis huparchein t% paragonti suggenesterasE. 9urther still, if e&ery monad "onstitutes an appropriate series, as was before demonstrated, by a mu"h greater priority must the One generate a series of this $ind. 9or in the pro"ession of things, that whi"h is produ"ed is fre'uently dissimilar to its produ"ing "ause through the dominion DepikrateianE of differen"e4 for su"h are the last of beings, whi"h are far distant from their proper prin"iples. But the first series, whi"h is "onnas"ent DsumphuomenosE with the One, is uniform Dhenoeid&sE, ineffable, supra( essential, and perfe"tly similar to its "ause. 9or in the first "auses, neither does the

34
intrusion of differen"e separate from the generator the things begotten, and transfer them into a different "lass, nor does a motion of the "ause, bringing about a diminution of power, entail the generation of the whole of things into unli$eness and indefiniteness DaoristianE- but the "ause of all things, being unitarily Dheniai%sE raised abo&e all motion and di&ision, has established about itself a di&ine series, and has united D sun&n%senE it to its own simpli"ity. #he One therefore prior to beings has gi&en subsisten"e to the henads of beings. (1A. 11 < 1J. K

!n the last beings, a gulf of differen"e separates produ"er and produ"t- in the first series, howe&er, the differen"e approa"hes 1ero4 the henads are "onnas"ent with the One. #here is no differen"e to separate them from their prin"iple, for they would then la"$ the &ery unity, that is, indi&iduality, integrity, and simpli"ity each in itself that is the &ery "hara"teristi" imparted them by the One. #hey would fall short in their unity were the One to be set o&er and abo&e them. #his is what ma$es the series, or arithmos, of the henads ineffable4 the "hara"ter of ineffability refers to the impossibility of drawing the inferen"es in respe"t to this series whi"h would apply to any other "lass (taxis . 9or instan"e, the resolution of the aporia of the #hird 0an lies in re"ogni1ing the impossibility of pla"ing parti"ipants and the form in a "ommon "lass in respe"t of the "hara"teristi" imparted by the form, that is, in re"ogni1ing the trans"enden"e of the form. Qet here, su"h a status is denied the One as "ause of the henads, not be"ause, li$e inferior "lasses of forms, it falls short of su"h trans"enden"e, but rather be"ause it surpasses trans"enden"e. Pro"lus dis"usses at PT !! J. AJf the nature of the li$eness whi"h is sublated in the relationship between the One and the henads4

35
it is ne"essary that e&ery thing whi"h is produ"ed with referen"e to, and on a""ount of it D&i1. the "ause of all beingsE, should ha&e a "ertain relation DschesinE with it, and through this also, a li$eness to it. 9or e&ery relation of one thing towards another, is predi"ated in a twofold respe"t, either from both parti"ipating one thing, whi"h affords to the parti"ipants a "ommunion with ea"h other- or from one of them parti"ipating the other G 7en"e it is ne"essary G either that there should be a "ertain third thing the "ause of the relation, or that the prin"iple should impart to the natures posterior to itself a tenden"y to itself, and that desire through whi"h e&erything is preser&ed and e*ists.

#he referen"e to a third thing puts us in mind of the problemati" of the #hird 0an. #o a&oid an infinite regress of relations and "auses of relations, the first series must relate to its "ause through a desire < and hen"e a li$eness < whi"h does not "ause us to posit any relation at all. Propositions AC and JA of the ET a""ount for pro"ession and re&ersion in general, and thus the entire domain of onti" produ"tion, by means of li$eness. #hat the form of ?i$eness only arises in the infra(intelle"tual orders means that its appli"ation to the highest rea"hes of the system "an only be regressi&e or retrospe"ti&e. !n this way the system "an be le&elled, in abstra"tion, to the state of its full intelle"tual determination, whi"h tends to be Pro"lus% strategy in the Elements. !n a"tuality, this in&ol&es pushing the lower(order prin"iples to their limits and beyond to their nullifi"ation. 7en"e the likeness whi"h would, analogi"ally or regressi&ely, apply to the produ"tion of henads by the One, is not li$eness to anything different, but the &ery sublation of li$eness, the desire imparted to the henads for the One < re"alling the anatasis of the "orollary to prop. A1 < a desire for self. #his is e&ident simply from the nature of the "hara"teristi" imparted by the One. #he One or the ,ood is s%stikon hekastou, that whi"h "onser&es and holds together the being

36 of ea"h se&eral thing, (ET prop. 1J . >esire of the One, therefore, is desire as autopoiesis, a self(produ"tion. !n desiring the One;,ood, entities desire their indi&idual integrity. 3t "P K4F Pro"lus spea$s of a natural stri&ing after the One in e&erything4 )hat else is the One in oursel&es e*"ept the operation and energy of this stri&ing6 !t is therefore this interior understanding of unity, whi"h is a pro+e"tion and as it were an e*pression of the One in oursel&es, that we "all Mthe One.% 2o the One !tself is not nameable, but the One in oursel&es. 3gain, we should rather say that it is not the One that we "all Mone% when we use this name, but the understanding of unity whi"h is in oursel&es (ibid . #his stri&ing is aptly referred to at PT !! H. KI. AK(I as a desire for the un$nowable nature and the sour"e of the ,ood. !f for beings, the guarantor of this integrity is their form, then it is through the mediation of the form that the being desires itself, and "onstitutes itself through re&ersion upon its form. #his means that for beings, the desire(for(self leads to the sublation of the self as narrowly "on"ei&ed. 9or any being, re&ersion upon its form will re&eal that the gi&en being is mediated by the whole of Being. #here is the "a&eat, howe&er, that beings parti"ipate, not only in onti" "lasses, but also in di&ine series- and it is only through parti"ipation in su"h a series that a being has real subsisten"e as an individual rather than as instantiating form. #wo modes of re&ersion are thus possible for indi&idual beings4 one by way of form, whi"h is mediated by the whole of Being, the other by way of theurgi" sunthemata and re&ersion upon the tutelary deity. ! will dis"uss this more in subse'uent "hapters. 9or the henad, howe&er, there is, e*istentially, only itself. 9or as we read at 9ecem 9ubitationes R. IJ, #he One and the ,ood e*ist, in effe"t, in three ways4 a""ording to "ause, and this is the first prin"iple- for if this is the good and is it through itself, it is

37 inasmu"h as it is "ause of all goods and all henads- or a""ording to e*isten"e, and this is ea"h ,od, sin"e ea"h of them is one and good e*istentially- or a""ording to parti"ipation, and this is what there is of unity and goodness in substan"es.A #his "orresponds to prop. IK of the Elements, whi"h states that all that subsists in any fashion is either a""ording to "ause in the mode of a prin"iple Darchoeid%sE, or a""ording to e*isten"e DhuparxisE or a""ording to parti"ipation in the mode of an image Deikonik%sE. But the interesting thing about the way in whi"h the a*iom is applied in the passage from 9ec. 9ub. is that usually when Pro"lus spea$s of something subsisting kat'aitian it is a matter of seeing the produ"t as pre(e*istent in the produ"er (prop. IK , as when we would spea$ of the subsisting of intelle"t in Being kat'aitian. But here, the subsisten"e of the One !tself kat'aitian a"tually posits it in things whi"h ostensibly are from it, namely all goods and all henads. 3nd yet this is the One and the ,ood as first prin"iple. )here it is a matter of the subsisten"e of the One and the ,ood kath'huparxin, whi"h is generally where we "ontemplate ea"h thing in its own station, neither in its "ause nor in its resultant (prop. IK , the One and the ,ood e*ists as each ;od. !n the produ"tion of the henads from the One, then, the normal e"onomy of "ausal pro"ession seems to brea$ down. !t has to, be"ause what the One imparts, with surpassing perfe"tion, to ea"h ,od is that ,od%s uni'ue and absolute indi&iduality. The !ne would sacrifice its own perfection were it to subsist as something over and above the ;ods= lest each ;od be less one. #his is the ultimate "onse'uen"e of pursuing the "on"ept of unity to its radi"al "on"lusion. 3 One o&er the many or subsuming the many must as a result impart a lesser degree of unity to them. Pro"lus says in the passage 'uoted abo&e from
A Existentiam, Existens render hyparxis in this passage a""ording to .arlos 2teel, Huparxis "he1 Pro"lus in Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel eoplatonismo ed. 9. @omano P >. P. #aormina (?eo 2. Ols"h$i Editore4 9iren1e, 1CC4 p. C4. #he "orresponden"e is, at any rate, e&ident from the parallel stru"ture of ET prop. IK.

38 PT !!!. J. 1A that the henads are suggen&staton in relation to the One, a term whi"h "an on the one hand simply mean most a$in, but suggen&s also means cognate, to the e*tent that, a""ording to !saeus (H.JB, "ited in ?iddell;2"ott p. 1IIB , the term would not properly be applied to the relationship between parents and "hildren. ,i&en the "ommon analogy between "ausation and parentage, the "onnotation is important, and reinfor"ed by sumphuomenos in the same passage, again on the one hand simply "onnas"ent or "onnatural but also literally born with. Pro"ession by unity, of whi"h the henads are the sole e*ample, is in an important sense not pro"ession at all. #here is no One beyond the henads, only not through some failure of unity, but from ea"h henad%s perfe"t unity. Pro"ession by unity is not a 'uestion of the multipli"ity of the henads &anishing into the One, as if the One is something simply per"ei&ed by us through aspe"ts, adumbrations or perspe"ti&es. #he One is not one, and its purpose is not the subordination of multipli"ity. #he unity whi"h opposes multipli"ity emerges at the beginning of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. #he unity represented by the One is individuality, whi"h in its perfe"tion is present in a "lass of absolute and primordial indi&iduals, the ,ods. #he te"hni"al term for the type of unity possessed by the henads is heniaios, unitary. Prior to Pro"lus the term usually simply means a unifying agent. 5nitary -ogos is for 3ristides Suintilianus (9e 3usica ! J. C an epithet of the demiurge, where unitary is glossed as ma$ing the many and di&erse beings to rest by indissoluble bonds in one "omprehension- similarly !ambli"hus, 9e 3yst. N!!! J. AIK. I, whi"h reports an ostensibly Egyptian do"trine respe"ting a supreme unitary "ause of all things whi"h masters the indeterminate nature (t&s aoristou phuse%s as or in "on+un"tion with a

39 "ertain determinate measure (tinos h%rismenou metrou . 8otably, howe&er, the term is also used in the plural by !ambli"hus, "n ic. Arithm. H1. 1K, whi"h e*plains that all multipli"ity whi"h is brought together a""ording to summation (s%reia or herding together (sunagelasmos it is possible to dis"riminate (diakrinai into heniaia. Heniaia are here ob&iously integral indi&iduals whose assemblage into a "ommon body is ad&entitious in relation to their own indi&iduality. #his is 'uite "onsonant with the use of the term in Pro"lus with respe"t to the henads, the 'uality of whi"h is perhaps best "on&eyed at ET prop. 1AL, on the simpli"ity and self(suffi"ien"y of the ,ods. >eities are perfe"tly unitary, and as su"h are

simple in an espe"ial degree G whereas the "omposite is dependent, if not upon things e*ternal to it, at least upon its own elements, the perfe"tly simple and unitary, being a manifestation of the One whi"h is identi"al with the ,ood, is wholly self(suffi"ient- and perfe"t simpli"ity is the "hara"ter of deity. Being a pure e*"ellen"e, deity needs nothing e*traneous- being unitary, it is not dependent upon its own elements.

#he 'uality of being unitary, then, is a matter of the integrity and autonomy of an indi&idual irredu"ible to its elements, whi"h "ontrasts with the lesser integrity of that whi"h parti"ipates unity, possessing unity merely as an attribute, the unified or h&n%menon ("f. "P 11BK . But what ma$es a unified indi&idual less indi&idual than a unitary indi&idual is more than +ust that the former is a bundle of 'ualities with only an ad&entitious unity, as we might say of a "omposite substan"e- for e&en hypostases li$e Being !tself are unified rather than unitary < prop. 11K of the Elements states "ategori"ally that e&ery ,od is abo&e Being, abo&e ?ife, and abo&e !ntelle"t be"ause

40 Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t are not henads but h&n%mena. #he 'uestion, rather, goes to the &ery nature of the unity in 'uestion. Prop. 1H of the ET states that DeE&erything whi"h by its being DeinaiE bestows a "hara"ter on others itself primiti&ely possesses that "hara"ter whi"h it "ommuni"ates to the re"ipients. #hus Being is also itself a being, and with respe"t to its unity, whi"h unifies beings qua beings with ea"h other, is itself also unified, that is, a monad. #he monad is the ultimate e*pression of the prin"iple e*pressed in prop. 1H, be"ause it unifies others and is unified itself. 3s a result, it is only the positing of a manifold li$e that of the henads abo&e and beyond the su""ession of monadi" manifolds that pre&ents an infinite regress of the #hird 0an &ariety. #he multipli"ity of the henads is different from that "onstituted by monads in a "ru"ial respe"t4 the henads are not unified by any monad abo&e them- that is, they form no whole. !nstead, the role whi"h would be played by a monad abo&e them, the role played nominally by the One !tself, is played in reality by each henad for ea"h "ontains the all and grounds the whole, rather than that whole being grounded, as in e&ery other "ase, by some uni'ue prin"iple. Pro"lus sometimes e*presses the spe"ifi" differen"e in the manifold "onstituted by the henads by the use of the term arithmos, as he does in the passage from PT !!!. J. 11 and at ET prop. 11J, &i1. #he series of the ,ods is unitary in its totality DPas ho theios arithmos heniaios estinE. #he henads are formally and fun"tionally distinguished as an arithmos heniaion, a unitary series or set, from the ordinary pl&thos, whi"h is go&erned by the rules laid out in prop. A1. (O%0eara, in Pythagoras $evived, remar$s on the broad, non(mathemati"al sense of a group or "lass that Pro"lus gi&es to the term arithmos, noting astutely that Pro"lus distinguishes the henadology in this way from a

41 theologi1ing arithmeti" that would, e.g., attribute them Dthe henadsE to parti"ular members of a numeri"al series (ABK - ! re&isit this 'uestion in "hapter I. #he use of arithmos helps to distinguish a unitary manifold from a unified one, the former ha&ing its unity se"ured through the all(in(ea"h of the members, the latter by a unifying monad. 2ee also "P 1A1A, whi"h refers to the totality of the di&ine series Dpas te theios arithmosE, in &irtue of whi"h is the being, or rather pre(being DproeinaiE, of the ,ods and of the whole di&ini1ed "lass of being Dpasa h& ektheoumen& taxis t%n ont%nE. #he pre( being of the ,ods is here se"ured, not as one might otherwise e*pe"t, simply by referen"e to the One, but to the totality of the arithmos itself- it is as mu"h as to say that the ,ods possess their ,odhood from themsel&es. Arithmos stands in for pl&thos, for the latter notion has a distin"t position in the pro"ession of Being, namely in the intelligible( and(intelle"tual order (see "hapter I . !n this order a number of "ru"ial "on"epts first emerge4 unity and multipli"ity (pl&thos , whole and part, finite and infinite. #his is also where the negations of the 9irst 7ypothesis of the Parmenides begin. 3nd so Pro"lus "an say that a multipli"ity of henads is dis"ernible first in the first ran$ of the intelligible( and(intelle"tual ("P 1BC1 , that is, a manifold that unifies. #he distin"tion between a unitary and a unified manifold is e*pressed ni"ely at "P I41f, where Pro"lus e*plains that the One e*ists otherwise in the ,ods than in the beings that "ome after the ,ods- in the one "ase, it is self(suffi"ient, not li$e something e*isting in a substratum G 2o in the former "ase the One truly is, while in the latter "ase it e*ists as a "hara"ter in something (my emphasis . By "ontrast we read at "P CLB that e&ery form is a whole e*perien"ing as an attribute the One within it but not being that One, and at 11BK, that those things that ma$e up the definition of ea"h form are

42 assuredly parts of it G and it is a whole e*perien"ing oneness only as an attribute, but not being the One !tself G Dwhi"h isE solely One and simply One, not something unified. #he point of the passage from I41 "annot be that the One e*ists among the ,ods as something separate < some one thing different from the rest, and so forth6 < nor "an it be to fold the ,ods into it. 3t PT !!! 4. 1AJ(4, for instan"e, Pro"lus e*plains that by establishing the henads, neither ea"h as one only, in the same manner as the One !tself, nor ea"h as one and many, li$e Being, we not only preser&e the trans"enden"y of the first, but also ensure that the henads pro"eeding from it are un"onfused either with respe"t to themsel&es, or to the one prin"iple of them. 3nd yet if the unity of the henads "onstituted a whole, rather than the all(in(ea"h of a unitary set, the henads would pre"isely not be un"onfused with respe"t to ea"h other, nor to the One !tself, for if the One were really a monad de"lining into multipli"ity then the henads would be "ontained in the One as effe"ts in their "ause. #he One is not in the henads in the way that a monad is in its pl&thos, by uniting them through a "ommon "hara"teristi", for the "hara"teristi" the henads possess in "ommon is none other than irreducible uniqueness and individuality. #his uni'ueness and indi&iduality is not negati&e, a fun"tion of ea"h henad%s dfference or discernibility from e&ery other, but positive. E&ery henad is different from e&ery other, but this is its onti" distin"tion, whi"h is the shadow of a superordinate supra(essential distin"tion. #heirs is not an indi&iduality borne upon identity and differen"e, but e*pressed in the proper name. 3n ordinary monad would mediate the relationship of the henads to ea"h other while also reser&ing its own differen"e and subsisten"e. #he One does not mediate the henads be"ause the One truly is each henad. This is the One%s self(suffi"ien"y < it is self(

43 suffi"ient as each henad. @ather than a summum genus, then, at the top of a Porphyrian tree, the One is primarily a principium individuationis, hen"e the "onsistent stress by Pro"lus on the individuality of the henads in "ontrast to the re"ipro"al difference of beings. !t is "learly the indi&iduality of the henads whi"h is the property they re"ei&e from the One, for otherwise the passage from 1B4H would simply pose the henads as a multipli"ity more unified, i.e. e*perien"ing a greater degree of fusion, than the whole of Being, instead of going to pains to e*plain that the henads possess an indi&iduality more perfe"t than the differen"e distinguishing beings. 9urthermore, the unity des"ribed in prop. 1J of the Elements as being the "ontribution of the One;,ood is manifestly indi&idual integrity, for it is des"ribed as that whi"h "onser&es and holds together the being of ea"h se&eral thing Ds%stikon kai sunektikon t&s hekast%n ousiasE prote"ting it from dispersion (skedasmos . #here is nothing in the proposition to imply that the fun"tion of the One is anything other than, as >odds "hara"teri1es it, the ground of indi&iduality (p. 1CC . 3nd the all(in(ea"h of the henads is in fa"t the ground of their indi&iduality, inasmu"h as that whi"h has no other outside it, that has its other in itself, is more individual than that whi"h "onfronts an other through differen"e- therefore the all( in(ea"h of the henads is the One !tself. !n perfe"t a""ord, then, with the "on"lusion of the 9irst 7ypothesis of the Parmenides that the One neither is, nor is one, we should say that the One is as ea"h henad or, we might e&en say, as henads, rather than as the hypostati1ed entity that, for our own "on&enien"e, that is, in order to be able to refer to the phenomenon of di&ine "ausality in generi" fashion, we refer to as the One !tself. !n this sense, there is no such thing as the One !tself, if by that we mean something different than the henads. #hus we may "learly and une'ui&o"ally distinguish the One from the One(

44 that(is, the 0onad of Being, whi"h subsists itself as something unified. #he so("alled first prin"iple would thus, more properly, be first principles. 3nd indeed, we read at 1B4H that

!t is the same to say Mhenad% as to say Mprin"iple%, if in fa"t the prin"iple is in all "ases the most unifi"atory element Dto henik%tatonE. 2o anyone who is tal$ing about the One in any respe"t would then be dis"oursing about prin"iples, and it would then ma$e no differen"e whether one said that the thesis of the dialogue Dthe ParmenidesE was about prin"iples, or about the One.

)hat is remar$able about this passage is the la"$ of "on"ern that Pro"lus e&in"es about the radi"al dispersion of the One a"ross the entire hermeneuti" field of dis"ourse about archai. #he pluralism thus entailed implies no relati&ism for him.

#he radi"al autonomy of ea"h henad is se"ured in large part be"ause of the spe"ial way in whi"h relations subsist amongst the henads. Pro"lus dis"usses the status of relations in the supra(essential realm at "P CJI4

#here is yet another sense in whi"h relati&e might be used, one more perfe"t and more suitable to self(substantiating entities, in referen"e to "ases where a thing, being primarily for itself, is also for another, that other thing being also primarily for itself- as for instan"e the intelligible is for itself and the !ntelle"t is for itself, and through this &ery relation the !ntelle"t is united with the intelligible and the intelligible with the !ntelle"t, and the !ntelle"t and the intelligible are one thing. )hereas a father in this realm, e&en though he is naturally a father, yet is not first for himself, and only then father of someone else, but he is what he is solely for another, in that realm any paternal "ause is

45
primarily for itself, "ompleting Dpl&r%tikonE its own essen"e, and only then bestows an emanation Dpro(donE from itself upon things se"ondary to it- and any offspring e*ists for itself, and only then deri&es from something else. 2o when we spea$ of things being relati&e to ea"h other in that realm, we must remo&e from them any notion of bare relation, de&oid of essen"e- for nothing of that sort is proper to the ,ods. !nstead of relati&ity we must apply the "on"ept of self(identity, and prior e&en to this self(identity the e*isten"e DhuparxinE of ea"h entity in itself- for ea"h thing e*ists primarily for itself, and in itself is united to e&erything else Dta allaE G 2u"h an entity #here, then, is non(relational, though produ"ti&e of a relation.

Parti"ularly interesting in this passage is that the dimension of the for itself as present in hypostases li$e !ntelle"t and Being ser&es ultimately to unite them, sin"e in their &ery nature they "o(posit ea"h other. #hus in prop. 11K of the ET the henads are said to trans"end Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t inasmu"h as these three, though mutually distin"t, are ea"h impli"it in the other two. #hey a"hie&e their self(substantiation by returning, as parts, to their originating wholeness, whereas the for itself of the henads, by establishing their e*isten"e prior to determination by their relations, sa&es them from being dissol&ed into a third term whi"h would embody the being for another of those relations. !nsofar as relations "ome to be for another, the di&erse relata "ome to be unified in some one (re"all "P 11CB, where a determinate relationship between entities and their prin"iple < differen"e from the prin"iple < arose through "oordinate entities "oming into determinate relations to ea"h other < "oming to be other than ea"h other . !nstead, the relations emerge in the "onte*t of a henad fulfilling its essen"e, that is, through the "onstitution of Being by di&ine a"ti&ity. !n a similar &ein, at C4A Pro"lus remar$s that theologians employ the terms 0astership !tself and 2la&ery !tself to

46 indi"ate the "ontrolling and subser&ient powers among the ,ods- as indeed the paternal and maternal fa"ulty appears in one form at the di&ine le&el, and in another at the le&el of the forms, not being e&en among these a mere relationship, but rather a generati&e power and a substan"e suitable to ,ods. #he ,ods ha&e, naturally, relationships among ea"h other, but unli$e beings, a ,od is for itself prior to these relationships, whi"h do not therefore limit them in the way su"h relationships limit beings. !nstead, the relationships are present in"ipiently as the powers of ea"h deity. Pro"lus distinguishes e*pli"itly between the powers of the ,ods and their hyparxis, or e*isten"e, a term whi"h we ha&e already en"ountered a few times. Hyparxis, whi"h ! will generally lea&e untranslated hen"eforth, is a te"hni"al term in 3thenian 8eoplatonism referring to the existential dimension of the henads inasmu"h as they are prior to Being !tself and to the opposition of Being and 8on(Being.J Prior to the general opposition of hyparxis or e*isten"e to Being is the opposition between "onsidering the ,ods with respe"t to their huparxeis and with respe"t to their dunameis. 3t "P 11AH, for instan"e, intelle"tual shapes are $nowable and e*pressible as pertaining to the powers of the ,ods, not to their substan"es Dtais huparxesin autaisE, in &irtue of whi"h they possess the "hara"teristi" of being ,ods, and to their intelle"tual essen"es, and it is through these that they be"ome manifest to the intelle"tual eyes of souls. #he "ontrast between hyparxis and power in the nature of the ,ods "an also be e*pressed in terms of hen%sis, the unity or integrity of the di&ine indi&idual, as in ET prop. CJ, "on"erning the infinitude of superior prin"iples relati&e to inferior ones4 though they Dthe inferiorsE unfold the powers "ontained in it Dthe superiorE, yet it has something
J 9or the history of the term hyparxis in 8eoplatonism, see Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel eoplatonismo ed. 9. @omano and >. P. #aormina (9iren1e4 ?eo 2. Ols"h$i Editore, 1CC4 .

47 unattainable in its unity Dhen%sinE. #he powers of the ,ods are also mentioned at PT !!! A4. HI4 )e must ne&er thin$ therefore that all power is the progeny of essen"e. 9or the powers of the ,ods are supra(essential, and are "onsubsistent with the henads themsel&es of the ,ods. 3nd through this power the ,ods are generati&e of beings. #he powers of the ,ods are, then, although in opposition to their e*isten"e, still themsel&es supra(essential. 3nd indeed, it is in the opposition between hyparxis and dunamis that the opposition between the supra(essential and onti" domain ta$es root. 9or not only are the ,ods generati&e of beings through their powers, but one might say that it is through their powers that they themsel&es "an be treated as beings < grouped into "lasses, for instan"e, as we shall see. #he distin"tion between the powers and the hyparxeis of the ,ods ser&es a &ery pra"ti"al purpose in Pro"lus, be"ause it enables him to a""ept "onfli"ting stories about the ,ods. !f a""ording to 7esiod, O$eanos and #ethys are the siblings of Fronos and @hea, while the Timaeus has it that O$eanos and #ethys are rather the parents of Fronos and @hea, both "an ne&ertheless be true, be"ause what "omes first is the indi&iduality of @hea, say, in whom < be"ause all the other ,ods are in her in some way < is a power of being(daughter(of(#ethys as well as a power of being(sister(to(#ethys, while in #ethys there is li$ewise a power of being(mother(of(@hea and a power of being(sister(to(@hea. !n +ust this way, Pro"lus says of 7estia and 7era that ea"h of these di&inities, together with her own proper perfe"tion, possesses, a""ording to parti"ipation, the power of the other ("# 1JC . #he referen"e to parti"ipation here is on the one hand merely analogi"al < later in the same te*t, Pro"lus will simply refer to the 3rtemis and the 3thena whi"h Fore "ontains (1LC < but also appropriate to a point further on in the

48 pro"ession of Being when ,ods will indeed parti"ipate ea"h other, through the mediation of the demiurgi" intelle"t. !t is at that point that these relations of powers "ome to be for another, a pro"ess whi"h ! will dis"uss in more detail later. 3t any rate, we see here the appli"ation to mythologi"al hermeneuti"s of the &ery do"trine whose te"hni"al formulation we read at "P 11CB, by whi"h what would be relations between beings mediating them, are instead powers possessed by ,ods without any re"ipro"al otherness "onstituting a third. 0any e*amples of di&ine series are pro&ided in the Platonic Theology in whi"h some myth or attribute is assigned to a higher or lower emanation of a parti"ular deity than some other with whi"h it "onfli"ts. #here is thus a higher and a lower Persephone, for instan"e4 the former is the Orphi" Fore whose union with =eus "on"ei&es >ionysos, while the latter is the Fore abdu"ted by 7ades into the 5nderworld. Pro"lus spea$s as well of two 3phrodites and three 3thenas. #his pro"ess is in no way ad hoc, but has real systemati" signifi"an"e. 9or when Pro"lus opposes unity and multipli"ity among the ,ods, it is ne&er a 'uestion of opposing a phenomenal multipli"ity of deities to a more sublime unity, but rather a matter of the distribution of the powers present integrally at the summit of each deity among the lower hypostases of that deity- hen"e prop. 1AK of the ET4 9rom that station wherein he first re&eals himself e&ery ,od pro"eeds through all the se"ondary orders, "ontinually multiplying and parti"ulari1ing his bestowals, yet preser&ing the distin"ti&e "hara"ter Didiot&taE of his proper nature. 9or e*ample, Pro"lus dis"usses the multitude of the powers of 3pollo ("# 1L4(K , whi"h are, in their totality, not to be "omprehended, nor des"ribed by us. 9or when will man,

49 who is merely rational, be able to "omprehend not only all the idioms of 3pollo, but all those of any other ,od6 #hese powers, howe&er,

subsist in the ,od himself in an united manner and e*empt from other natures, but in those attendants of the ,ods who are superior to us, di&isibly and a""ording to parti"ipation- for there is a great multitude of medi"inal, propheti", harmoni", and arrow( darting Di.e. possessing the 'ualities of 3polloE angels, daimons and heroes, suspended from 3pollo, who distribute in a partial manner the uniform powers of the ,od.

3gain, at "$ !, 14L. AI(JB, we read that, gi&en the e*isten"e of an 3pollonia"al series DseirasE we must, in regard to a gi&en 7omeri" te*t, "onsider who the 3pollo is that sits with =eus and the Olympian ,ods- who, that "on&ol&es the solar sphere- who the aerial 3pollo is- who the terrestrial- who, that presides o&er #roy- and who, that is the pe"uliar guardian of 7e"tor, and so forth. !n this way the indi&iduality (idiot&s of ea"h ,od finds its way down to the lowest rea"hes of Being without in any way "ompromising the supra(essential status of the ,od. Pro"lus% mythologi"al hermeneuti" e*presses his attitude toward the status of myth, whi"h flows in turn out of the do"trine of the henads. #he multipli"ity of in"onsistent narrati&es about a gi&en deity is not dealt with by him either by downgrading the myths to mere allegories, or by dogmati"ally "hoosing some one as true and dismissing the rest as false. #he e*isten"e of su"h a multipli"ity of narrati&es about the ,ods does not dismember the ,ods, for the indi&iduality of ea"h ,od is pri&ileged o&er the narrati&es in whi"h they feature. But this does not mean that the myths are +ust stories humans tell about the ,ods. 0yths are not, for Pro"lus, representations of the di&ine- they are

50 re&elations from the di&ine and play an infrastru"tural role, so to spea$, in the "onstitution of Being. #hey are, li$e the powers of the ,ods, supra(essential in origin, although they are also transitional between the ,ods and Being. 0yths, for Pro"lus, form ea"h an armature for some le&el of Being- whi"h le&el in parti"ular we must learn by e*amining the myths themsel&es. !t is not a 'uestion here of the "on"rete mythi" te*t, but of the di&ine a"ti&ity of whi"h the myth is a residue. >ue to its spe"ial status, e&ery myth is true. But this multipli"ity of truths is not in itself relati&ism, inasmu"h as the myth shares the supra(essential status of the ,ods. On"e a fully onti" dis"ourse has been "onstituted there is only one truth, whi"h su"h a dis"ourse approa"hes asymptoti"ally insofar as it frees itself of mythologi"al elements. #he wor$ of philosophy is to fashion itself into +ust su"h a dis"ourse, refle"ting in its &ery eman"ipation from the "ontents of re&elation, its autonomy relati&e to the "ir"umstan"es of its emergen"e, the perfe"tion of the emergen"e of Being from the ,ods. Philosophy thus lies at the end of the pro"ess of the emergen"e of Being from the supra(essential hyparxis of the ,ods, a pro"ess whi"h begins from the distin"tion between the powers or attributes of the ,ods and their hyparxeis and then pro"eeds through the "onstitution of mythi" narrati&es. #his is a pro"ess of in"reasing abstra"tion from the ,ods whi"h ends, at last, in intelle"tual determinations whi"h "an be turned ba"$ upon the ,ods and applied to them li$e any other domain of ob+e"ts, e&en though they are not, in fa"t, li$e any other domain of ob+e"ts. 8or is myth e*hausted in the pro"ess of the emergen"e of intelle"tthere "an be no final demythologi1ation in whi"h all mythologi"al "ontent has been metaboli1ed, so to spea$, into rational "ontent. #his is be"ause the primary fun"tion of the myth is not to help us understand something, but rather to do something, to play our

51 role in the "onstitution of Being. #his performati&ity is the essen"e of theurgy, and e*presses a fundamental "hara"teristi" of all language for Pro"lus, rooted ultimately in the power of ea"h ,od%s name to in&o$e their presen"e to the worshiper. 9rom this site of emergen"e, di&inity infuses language through myth, whi"h persists as a li&ing "onta"t of dis"ourse with its origins. #hat "ertain genres of dis"ourse ha&e as their goal total eman"ipation from myth no more means that the myths lose their &itality, than does this "ontinued &itality of the myth mean that the eman"ipation in 'uestion has failed. Philosophy is not redu"ible to myth nor myth to philosophy- myth informs philosophy and philosophy interprets myth. #he myth e*ists as a means for humans to "ontinue indefinitely forging anew their "onne"tion to the ,ods and is, in this respe"t, an ine*haustible instrument, a to$en of di&ine a"ti&ity "onstantly operating on le&els that will always be beyond our grasp, for they bear witness to the "onstitution from above, as it were, of the onti" hypostases whi"h we "an only grasp from below. But that does not mean that in the labor of interpretation we do not "onstantly "ontribute, in our roles as mi"ro"osmi" demiurgi, to the &ery same tas$, namely the "onstitution of the "osmos.4

Polycentric Polytheism, An Historical Example

#he distin"tion between the relationship of parts mediated by the whole, on the one hand, and the all(in(all or all(in(ea"h on the other hand has profound impli"ations for Pro"lus% theology, for it represents the differen"e between subordinating the many ,ods

4 3 dis"ussion of what ! ha&e "hara"teri1ed as the theurgi"al performati&ity of dis"ourse for Pro"lus is to be found in 2ara @appe%s $eading eoplatonism, on19iscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus= Proclus and 9amascius (.ambridge4 .ambridge 5ni&. Press, ABBB , "hap. H, ?anguage and #heurgy in Pro"lus% Platonic Theology.

52 to the One as if they were but names, aspe"ts, or adumbrations of it, and preser&ing the pure and radi"al autonomy of ea"h henad. #he nature of Pro"lus% theology "an best be des"ribed, ! thin$, by borrowing a term >iana E"$ has used to des"ribe 7induism, namely poly"entri" polytheism. Essentially the same stru"ture has been proposed by Eri$ 7ornung with respe"t to Egyptian religion. !t shall be worthwhile to analy1e the stages in 7ornung%s argument. 9irst, 7ornung gi&es an a""ount of the "on"ept of the none*istent in Egyptian thought (pp. 1LA(HK from whi"h we may dis"ern that the Egyptian "on"ept of the none*istent (tm wnn, nn wn Dp. 1LJE is a$in in an important way to the 8eoplatoni" One- for the none*isten"e before the "reation is des"ribed as that state in whi"h there were Mnot yet two things%, (1LI, 'uoting #offin Texts !!, JCIb and !!!, JHJa . #he "onse'uen"es of this underlying ontology, in whi"h absolute unity is e'ui&alent to none*isten"e, are reinfor"ed a""ording to 7ornung by a logi" "hara"teristi" of Egyptian religious thought whi"h 7ornung "ompares to the "on"ept of "omplementarity in physi"s (A41 , by whi"h for the Egyptians an e*"lusi&e unity or oneness of god was unthin$able, in the full sense of the word, be"ause they thought in terms of "omplementary propositions (A4J . Ontology and logi" thus "on&erge, so that an absolute unity and trans"enden"e of god, indeed any absolute feature of god, is "ontrary to the Egyptian "on"eption of the e*istent- only a none*istent ,od "an ha&e absolute 'ualities (A4A . 7ornung would ha&e it that the opposition monotheism;polytheism G is too narrowly formulated (AKA to "hara"teri1e Egyptian religion. Egyptian religion, then, would be neither monotheisti" nor polytheisti". But we must understand this position in light of the data 7ornung pro&ides in the "ourse of his study on the substanti&e &alue of

53 polytheism in Egyptian religious thought. 7ornung stresses that DdEespite the multipli"ity of the names and forms of gods and despite the phenomenon of syn"retism, the Egyptians atta"h great importan"e to maintaining the uni'ueness of ea"h of their deities (1HK , e*plaining that the apparent "ontradi"tion in logi" between the epithet Muni'ue%, < also without e'ual, (ibid < and the many deities to whom it is applied is easily e*plained. E*tended and more pre"ise forms of the epithet ma$e "lear its true referent, whi"h is the uni'ue "hara"ter of the di&ine in general. E&ery Egyptian god is Muni'ue in his fashion% G 4 there is no god who is the same as him. !n the daily "ult ser&i"e the priest must de"lare before the god who is being worshiped, M! ha&e not e'uated your nature with that of another god% G E&ery deity DisE uni'ue and in"omparable, despite the many "hara"teristi"s they share in "ommon (1HI . #his attitude bears ob&ious resemblan"e to the status of the henads in Pro"lus. #he only instan"e in whi"h uni'ue is properly understood as implying absolute oneness, 7ornung e*plains, is when referen"e is being made to the "reator god, who was uni'ue in the beginning and Mmade himself into millions (through his wor$ of "reation %, that is, in the fleeting transition from none*isten"e to e*isten"e (1HI . #his on"e again goes ba"$ to Egyptian ontology, where absolute oneness is none*isten"e. #his "ontinuum from none*isten"e or unity to e*isten"e and multipli"ity, howe&er, is not a statement "on"erning the absolute number of deities that there are or were, but rather a statement about the way the ,ods lend themsel&es to the "on"retion of the "osmos. 3 ,od, in ma$ing him;herself real, ma$es him;herself many, whi"h is at on"e the be"oming real of the world. #he ,ods, in be"oming real, be"ome the world, in&ol&ing and impli"ating themsel&es in the multipli"ity of the world. )e shall see in the latter part of

54 this dissertation how a$in this is to the emergen"e of "osmi" order from henadi" indi&iduality in Pro"lus. 3 statement e&en that a "ertain ,od "reated the others would not sa"rifi"e the autonomy of the other ,ods to that one, under the "onditions of the Egyptian onto(logi" "on"erning absolute attributes and the ,ods. 8o statement about the relationship between one ,od and the others has the power to rule out other, "ontradi"tory statements. #herefore the ,ods are not limited by the relationships e*isting amongst them, su"h relational statements ha&ing no power o&er their autonomy. #herefore beyond the opposition of monotheism and polytheism that 7ornung re+e"ts as a way of thin$ing about Egyptian religion, one might infer a deeper polytheism, while there is no "orresponding deeper monotheism to be inferred from his a""ount. 0oreo&er, 7ornung e*plains that the fa"t that literally any god "an be the Mgreatest% of all the gods should warn us against isolating the Mgreatest god% as a figure separate from the other deities. #he same is also true of the statement that one god "reated all the others and of the use of nTr Dthe Egyptian generi" term for deityE for a god in the instru"tion te*ts. !n ea"h "ase we find that the spe"ifi", well($nown deities of the Egyptian pantheon were meant, ne&er a supergod behind the gods (1HH . .ertain fun"tions or roles < greatest ,od, "reator ,od, et". < "an be performed by any deity, but this does not mean that the multipli"ity of ,ods are somehow less real than the "osmi" fun"tions or roles they perform. 9rom a basi" misunderstanding about the relationship between indi&idual identity and fun"tion it is easy then to pro"eed to posit a supergod of whom the a"tual ,ods are but aspe"ts or e*pressions or manifestations or limitations. 3ll of this "omes from superimposing a logi" of concepts o&er a logi" of

55 individuals. !n the logi" of "on"epts, unity always trumps multipli"ity- in the logi" of e*isten"e, as the Egyptians understood, the indi&idual is irredu"ible and in"ommensurable with any other and the indi&idual%s uni'ueness is the supreme &alue. #he "omparability of all of this to the henadology should already be apparent, but it will be"ome more so o&er the "ourse of this dissertation. 3 religious pra"ti"e, "ommon to Egypt and other polytheisti" so"ieties, whi"h has o""asion mu"h debate is $nown as monolatry, referring to the worship of one god at a time but not of a single god (AJL . 3s 7ornung des"ribes it in the "ase of Egyptian religion, it is as if DiEn the a"t of worship, whether it be in prayer, hymn of praise, or ethi"al atta"hment and obligation, the Egyptians single out one god, who for them at that moment signifies e&erything (AJI - more su""in"tly, god is a unity in worship and re&elation, and multiple in nature and manifestation (A4A . #his prin"iple also grounds Pro"lus% distin"ti&e model of piety- for instan"e a passage from "T !, A1A, e*plains that it is ne"essary to obser&e a stable order in the performan"e of di&ine wor$s, so that, preser&ing segregation from e&ery other pursuit, and thus be"oming alone, we may asso"iate with solitary deity, and not endea&or to "on+oin oursel&es with multitude to the One. 9or he who attempts this effe"ts the &ery opposite, and separates himself from the ,ods. #his passage illustrates ni"ely the way that the language of unity and multipli"ity so important in Platonism generally is deployed by Pro"lus in a manner ne&er "onfli"ting with his polytheism- for here the integrity of the indi&idual worshiper appro*imates them to the supra(essential indi&iduality of the "hosen deity. .orrelati&e to monolatry is the possibility, at least in prin"iple, of dis"erning, in meditation upon a gi&en deity, the refle"tions of all the other ,ods, whether more or less

56 distin"tly. !n the Egyptian "ase, this manifests in highly theologi"ally sophisti"ated manifestations of syn"retism, where two, three and e&en four deities are "ombined < 3mun(@e, Ptah(2o$ar(Osiris, 7arma"his(Fhepri(@e(3tum. >eities are also "ombined who ha&e widely di&ergent forms or are of opposite se*. #he most important feature of this pra"ti"e is that it does not mean that the deities in 'uestion ha&e been %fused,% Me'uated,% or Midentified%, (C1 for as 7ans Bonnet e*plains

the formula 3mun(@e does not signify that 3mun is subsumed in @e or @e in 3mun. 8or does it establish that they are identi"al- 3mun does not e'ual @e. !t obser&es that @e is in 3mun in su"h a way that he is not lost in 3mun, but remains himself +ust as mu"h as 3mun does, so that both gods "an again be manifest separately or in other "ombinationsK

8oti"e in this passage the sublation of identity and differen"e, in terms reminis"ent of those Pro"lus uses to des"ribe the relationship of all(in(ea"h among the henads. 7ornung adds to Bonnet%s remar$s that one is reminded of "hemi"al "ompounds- li$e them, syn"retisti" "ombinations "an be dissol&ed at any time into their "onstituent elements, whi"h "an also form part of other "ombinations without sa"rifi"ing their indi&iduality G 3mun(@e is not the synthesis of 3mun and @e but a new form that e*ists along with the two older gods (CL . #he uni'ueness of ea"h deity in a polytheisti" system has generally only been understood either as a "rude and unrefle"ti&e di&ersity, or by re"ourse to some monothei1ing hermeneuti". 3nd yet it should not be hard by now to dis"ern, in these distin"ti&e "hara"teristi"s of Egyptian polytheism (whi"h are ne&ertheless paralleled in
KSuoted in 7ornung (p. C1 . 2ee also 7ans Bonnet, On 5nderstanding 2yn"retism, trans. /ohn Baines, and Egyptian 2yn"retism4 7ans Bonnet%s .ontribution by /ohn Baines, in !rientalia &ol. IH, 1CCC.

57 important ways by those E"$ dis"erns in 7indu polytheism , the stru"ture of the henadi" arithmos. !t is not a 'uestion here of an histori"al relationship, but of a "ommon logi"al stru"ture emerging from and arti"ulating polytheisti" praxis. Pro"lean theology pro&ides a theoreti"al framewor$ with whi"h to understand the poly"entri"ity of polytheism. #he One is truly and fully manifest in ea"h of the henads, ea"h of whi"h "an as su"h ser&e as the "enter in a system whi"h would therefore posit the others on its periphery < hen"e poly"entri"ity. 3t the same time, there "an be no unique "enter, for this would totali1e and, as it were, crystallize the entire field for another, and the indi&iduality of the henads trans"ends mediated unity or unity for another. #his "rystalli1ation, as ! ha&e referred to it, "an o""ur only, for Pro"lus, at the le&el of the !ntelle"t, where it represents a $ind of embedded stru"ture within polytheism, as ! shall dis"uss in detail later. #he pla"ement of the henads prior to this mode of unity with a fi*ed "enter pro&ides the spa"e for a pluralism founded on the understanding < whether impli"it or e*pli"it < that the deity who is now at the "enter "an be, from another perspe"ti&e, at the periphery and &i"e &ersa. #he opposing perspe"ti&e has been to see su"h phenomena within polytheism either as indi"ating an e&olution toward monotheism, or as presupposing < e&en logi"ally entailing < an underlying or impli"it monotheism. 0ore re"ently, howe&er, s"holars su"h as E"$ and 7ornung are beginning to understand the way monolatry fun"tions within polytheisti" systems where it represents neither a tension, nor an e&olutionary tenden"y toward monotheism. #he problem that 7ornung diagnoses among those who ha&e attempted to understand Egyptian theology on the basis of a "rypto(monotheism is immediately understandable on the logi"al basis of the distin"tion ! drawn between onti"

58 manifolds and the henadi" manifold. .ommentators ha&e been unable to grasp the monolatrous and syn"reti" pra"ti"es within polytheism without assuming that there must be some 3bsolute before whi"h or into whi"h the 0any e&aporate into mere names or aspe"ts < a whole, in essen"e, of whi"h they are parts. !ndeed, the problem is one that seems to arise where any notion of pluralism is "on"erned, and stems from opposing an atomi1ed and fragmented multipli"ity, with its attendant aporeti" relati&ism, and a totali1ing and homogeni1ing unity. #he genius of the henadology lies in ha&ing disaggregated issues of indi&iduality and autonomy from the logi" of part and whole, in terms of whi"h it is fundamentally impossible to "onstitute a radi"al and systematic pluralism.

59

.hapter A4

#he ,ods and Being

#o the opposition between the supra(essential or e*istential dimension, that is, the domain of hyparxis, and the realm of Being "orresponds a "lear distin"tion between two ways of spea$ing of the ,ods, as we read at "T !, JBJ, where, in "ommenting on the passage from Tim. AH" whi"h states that DiEt is diffi"ult to dis"o&er the ma$er and father of this uni&erse, and when found, it is impossible to spea$ of him to all men, Pro"lus remar$s that someone may say, do we not assert many things about the demiurge, and about the other ,ods, and e&en of the One !tself6 #o whi"h we reply, we spea$ indeed about them Dperi aut%nE, but we do not spea$ of each of them itself Dauto de hekastonE. 3nd we are able indeed to spea$ scientifically Depist&monik%sE of them, but not intellectually Dnoer%sE. #he distin"tion here is between, on the one hand, the familiar

60 "on"ept of epist&m&, whi"h is always of the spe"ies, and on the other hand a no&el no&sis of proper names whi"h would deal with particular henads. !ndeed, one finds that Pro"lus, when spea$ing philosophi"ally refers to "lasses of ,ods, taxeis united by "ommon powers or fun"tions, lea&ing to theologians the dis"ourse about parti"ular, named henads. #he possibility of treating of the ,ods by taxeis rather than indi&idually allows the ,ods to fit into ontology, that is, allows them to be treated s"ientifi"ally. #his ontologi"al or epistemi" treatment e*tends all the way to "lassifying the ,ods qua ,ods, a "lassifi"ation e*pressed by the monad of the One or the ,ood. )e read at PT !! K that in ea"h order of beings, through li$eness to it Dthe first "auseE there is a monad analogous to the ,ood, whi"h has the same relation to the whole series "on+oined with it that the ,ood has to all the orders of the ,ods. 8ote that the One;,ood is a monad in relation to the orders of the ,ods, not the indi&idual ,ods. 2u"h is the proper "orresponden"e of all onti" terms to supra(essentials. #his "orresponden"e also e"hoes in the remar$ at "P L4F that positi&e propositions apply rather to the monads of $inds of being, for the power of generating things is in these. #he first prin"iple is before e&ery power and before assertions, in whi"h note the +u*taposition of kinds of being with powers, in whi"h the "onne"tion of the ,ods to ontology lies. #o say that the first prin"iple is prior to power is the same as to say that the indi&iduality of ea"h deity "omes before their powers, the powers of the ,ods being those "hara"teristi"s whi"h, sin"e they are sus"eptible to abstra"tion, tend toward the unifi"ation of the ,ods into a whole for another.

61 #he twofold distin"tion between hyparxis and dunamis is not enough, howe&er. )e must distinguish also between the dunameis of the ,ods and their a"ti&ities, energeiai. 8ot all ,ods, for e*ample, are intelle"tual ,ods, but that does not mean that all ,ods do not possess a di&ine !ntelle"t. !t is intelle"tual ,ods that are treated in ET prop. 1IJ < 3ll those henads are intelle"tual whereof the unparti"ipated !ntelle"t en+oys parti"ipation. #he nature of unparti"ipated entities will be dis"ussed further below, but we may understand it here to refer simply to the hypostasis of !ntelle"t. #he parti"ipation of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t in the members of a parti"ular "lass of deities "orresponds to those deities% activity. Prop. 1IB, on the other hand, refers to the nature of the di&ine !ntelle"t possessed by each deity and whi"h "onstitutes the henadi" dimension of !ntelle"t4 3ll di&ine intelle"t is perfe"t and uniform Dhenoeid&sE- it is the primal !ntelle"t, and produ"es the others from itself. Pro"lus here e&en refers to this di&ine !ntelle"t as filled with di&ine henads. #his is the power of intellect in ea"h deity. #o understand this distin"tion, we must go deeper into the nature of the relationship between the henads and Being. #he heart of the "ontrast e*pressed in the passage from "P 1B4H with whi"h ! began "hapter 1 is a "ontrast between supra(essential and onti" modes of unity, or for that matter, modes of multiplicity, for to different modes of unity must ne"essarily "orrespond different modes of multipli"ity. Or at any rate, this is the point whi"h Pro"lus seems to be ma$ing4 that the absolute opposition between unity and multipli"ity is relati&e to the opposition between modes of unity and modes of multipli"ity. )e witnessed o&er the "ourse of the last "hapter the "on&ergen"e of two "hara"teristi"s of the henads, that is, their all in all and their "onsummate indi&iduality. #hese are indeed simply two sides

62 of the same "oin. )hat ma$es the indi&idual being an indi&idual, albeit to a far lesser degree, is that it possesses only abstra"t parts. #he supreme indi&iduality, then, that possessed by henads, must be one in whi"h not +ust the other henads, but all of >eing is indi&isibly present in ea"h one. #hus at "T !, JBH Pro"lus says that ea"h of the ,ods is the uni&erse, but after a different manner, and again at !, J1A that ea"h of the ,ods is denominated from his pe"uliarity, though ea"h is "omprehensi&e of all things. 9ollowed through to its limits, this has profound impli"ations for the a"ti&ity of the henads in relation to Being. 3t "P 1BIC, we read that ea"h parti"ipated One is a prin"iple of unifi"ation Dhen%tikonE for all Being G and ea"h of the ,ods is nothing else than the parti"ipated One. 7e goes further at "T !, ABC, e*plaining that all beings are the progeny of the ,ods, by whom they are produ"ed without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established G 3s all things howe&er pro"eed, so li$ewise, they are not separated from the ,ods, but radi"ally abide in them, as the "auses and sustainers of their e*isten"e G all beings are "ontained by the ,ods and reside in their natures. On the other hand, we read at "P ICB that among the ,ods the !ntelle"t in ea"h is dire"tly filled with a di&ine ?ife by whi"h it is unified with the intelligible prin"iple itself and with its own foundation in Being. #he foundation would seem to be up(ended here, insofar as the henads are prior to Being, and "annot be de"lined from the monads of Being, ?ife, and !ntelle"t in the way that parti"ular beings, li&ing things, and intelle"ts are. Being "annot, e*"ept in an inferior sense, "ontain the henads. !t must rather be the "ase that Being, ?ife, and !ntelle"t are in fa"t contained by ea"h henad, +ust as beings themsel&es are4 the ,ods do not subsist in, but prior to these DBeing, ?ife and !ntelle"tE, and they produ"e and "ontain these in themsel&es, but are not defined in them (PT ! AI .

63 Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t are, in this way, multiplied as many times as there are henads, but for Being, et al. to be so multiplied does not plurali1e these monads essentially, be"ause +ust as the multipli"ity of parti"ipants beneath them (posterior to their essen"e does not affe"t their specific unity, neither do the many henads prior to them < and prior to essen"e altogether. By spe"ifi" or essential unity ! mean, not that whi"h would be sub+e"t to a definition, for forms li$e Being ha&e no definitions. #he uni&ersal "hara"teristi" of essentiality is rather diacritical being, where entities are defined not by a set of abstra"t "hara"teristi"s, but by their position in a diale"ti"al system. !t is this mediation whi"h the henads trans"end- moreo&er, ! will dis"uss at length in subse'uent "hapters how dia"riti"al being emerges, stage by stage, from henadi" hyparxis. #he many henads in whi"h Being is "ontained also do not plurali1e it be"ause the henads are not "ogni1able as a multipli"ity in the ontologi"al sense, that is, a multipli"ity that opposes unity only insofar as it immediately implies it, a multipli"ity, in short, whi"h unifies its members and subordinates their di&ersity to unity, until the intelligible(and( intelle"tual le&el, whi"h "orresponds to the hypostasis of ?ife. Prior to this stage in di&ine emanation, we are only "on"erned with ea"h indi&idual henad, not with relationships among them < for with relationship "omes mediation, and with mediation, unifi"ation of the related terms on the basis of the relation. !f more than one henad "orresponds to a single monad < using monad here as a generi" term for any onti" unity < that neither renders the henads identi"al, sin"e they only share in the monad something on the order of a power or fun"tion, nor does it multiply Being in a manner rele&ant to ontology. #he henads themsel&es, "on&ersely, only "ome to be "ontained within Being as a unified set through the medium of their powers, whi"h represent potential relations among them.

64 One might say, to "onstru"t a typi"al 8eoplatoni" triad, that there is a sense in whi"h the ,ods contain the intelligible, both contain and are contained in the intelligible(and( intelle"tual, and are contained in the intelle"tual, as we shall see in "hapters K(L.

!n order to go more deeply into the relationship between the henads and Being, it is ne"essary to in&estigate a term whi"h Pro"lus uses to refer to spe"ifi"ally onti", rather than supra(essential, unity. 2upra(essential unity is referred to by the term heniaios, unitary, while onti" unity is referred to as the unified, h&n%menos. (8ote in this respe"t the "omment of 2() in &ol. K of their Th+ologie Platonicienne (p. 1LC, note 1 to p. I1 that in Pro"lus %unifiO% est une synonyme d% Mintelligible%. #he meaning of unified is demonstrated by its operation in the early propositions of the Elements of Theology. !n prop. 4, for instan"e, we read that all that is unified is other DheteronE than the One !tself. #he use of heteros here is no a""ident, inasmu"h as the unified possesses a relationship to the One whi"h is one of the four onti" relationships, namely that of differen"e. #o this differen"e "orresponds the status of the unified as a parti"ipant, something whi"h has unity as an affe"t, and has undergone a pro"ess of be"oming one (prop. A . But that there is not +ust the One and the unified emerges in prop. I. 7ere, Pro"lus elaborates on the e'ui&o"ation manifest in prop. 1, whi"h said that e&ery manifold in some way Dp&E parti"ipates unity. 9or prop. I e*plains that e&ery manifold is "omposed either of unified groups or of henads. Only perhaps >odds% translation presumes too mu"h here- better perhaps simply to translate literally that E&ery manifold Dor Mall multipli"ity%E is either from h&n%mena or from henads. 9or >odds assumes the argument

65 to be a matter of re+e"ting infinite di&isibility. #his, howe&er, was already a""omplished by prop. 1. !nstead, we should read prop. I as reprising the argument about infinite di&isibility only in order to pro"eed to follow up on the impli"ations of the p& in the former proposition, that is, to introdu"e the different ways of parti"ipating unity. #he problem is that Pro"lus% language is ambiguous with respe"t to "omposition and "ausation. )e shall ha&e o""asion later to see another instan"e where the "auses of a "omposite are treated li$e its "onstituents. 2o we must be sensiti&e to the transition. 3 manifold "annot simply be "onstituted of manifolds to infinity, Pro"lus e*plains- we must finally arri&e at ultimate "onstituents. #hese are either h&n%mena or henads- and Pro"lus e*plains the differen"e between these as lying in the fa"t that if it parti"ipates unity Dor, Mparti"ipates the One%E it is an h&n%menon, while if it is one of those from whi"h is the first h&n%menon, a henad Dei de ex'h%n to pr%t%s h&n%menon= henasE. !t matters &itally how one ta$es first unified here. !f it is simply a matter of saying that the henads are members of the first unified group, as >odds translates, then we ha&e mo&ed no further beyond the infinite di&isibility argument than to gi&e a name to the ultimate units. But Pro"lus is not ma$ing su"h a banal point. #he henads are those things from whi"h come the first h&n%menon, namely >eing "tself. #he infinite progress whi"h is to be a&oided is one of causes of unity, not of units. 3s su"h, the argument "losely resembles the #hird 0an problem from the Parmenides, only applied to unity. )here there is something unified, that is, parti"ipating unity, or possessing unity as an affe"t or attribute, there must be a "ause of that unity. #hat "ause "annot, in the last analysis, be something itself unified- it must be a henad. #he proposition "ontinues4 9or if the One !tself is, there is a first parti"ipant of it and a first h&n%menon. 3nd this is from the henads Dtouto de ex

66 henad%nE- for if from h&n%mena, the h&n%mena in turn Twill beU from some things Dek tin%nE, and thus to infinity. #here must be then a first h&n%menon from henads. )hy should we not simply ta$e the proposition as referring to the "onstituents of a first unified group as >odds ta$es it6 9irst of all, prop. 11K e*pli"itly "ontrasts the henads to Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t inasmu"h as the latter are not henads but h&n%mena. !nterestingly, Pro"lus goes on in this proposition to e*plain that Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t "annot be pure unities insofar as they, though mutually distin"t, are ea"h impli"it in the other two. #hat is, ea"h of the three ma+or onti" hypostases is mediated by the other two, on"e again unders"oring the holism of Being. But to return to the point at hand, that Being is the first h&n%menon, and not a unified set of henads sa"rifi"ing their autonomy to an hypostati1ed One !tself, we may turn ne*t to prop. 1AH, whi"h e*plains that beings of an order relati&ely near to the ,ods, "an parti"ipate the di&ine henads without mediation- whereas the rest, be"ause of their de"lension and their e*tension into multipli"ity, re'uire the mediation of prin"iples more unified than themsel&es if they are to parti"ipate what are not h&n%mena, but pure henads. #his refers to the ne"essity of beings parti"ipating the ,ods through re&ersion Depistroph&E of the onti" prin"iples to whi"h they owe their immediate e*isten"e as whate&er sorts of beings they are. 2u"h prin"iples are the spe"ifi" forms "onstituti&e of beings, as well as onti" hypostases su"h as Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t. 3s it happens, beings are not limited e*"lusi&ely to re&erting upon their formal "auses, but "an also re&ert as members of di&ine series whi"h ha&e the possibility, at least, of determining them, not merely as a "ertain type of being, but as this indi&idual. But this is not our "on"ern here.

67 #he referen"e to h&n%mena whi"h parti"ipate the henads dire"tly (ames%s is e"hoed in prop. 1JK, whi"h seems at first to imply a stri"t limitation upon the total number of henads, by lin$ing them one(to(one with the genera of beings. #he proposition posits that for ea"h henad there is some being that parti"ipates it immediately, and the role of this latter with respe"t to a "lass of indire"t parti"ipants is su"h that the parti"ipant genera of beings are identi"al in number with the parti"ipated henads. !t would thus seem as though there are only as many henads as there are genera of beings. But as >odds points out (p. ALA , it is un"lear what gen& these might be. 9urthermore, after stressing in the body of the proposition that there "annot be two or more henads parti"ipated by one TbeingU, nor one henad independently Ddi&r&men%sE parti"ipated by se&eral TbeingsU, Pro"lus appears to flatly "ontradi"t himself (as noted by >odds, p. AHA when he says, in props. 1IA(K that it is a class of henads whi"h is parti"ipated by to ont%s on, another whi"h is parti"ipated by unparti"ipated !ntelle"t, and so forth. #his at any rate seems to rule out what we might "all a restri"ti&e interpretation of 1JK. #hat after the stri"tures of 1JK Pro"lus feels no "ompun"tion whatsoe&er at saying that to ont%s on is atta"hed to the first ,ods, indi"ates that there is something we are missing about what he intends by the argument in 1JK. #o begin with, if open "ontradi"tion is to be a&oided, the parti"ipation of the hypostases of 1IA(K in their respe"ti&e "lasses of deities must not "onstitute the parti"ipation in the first pla"e or immediately of two or more henads by a single being that is re+e"ted in 1JK. 7ow "ould the multipli"ity in 'uestion in the latter propositions not be of the $ind that is ruled out in the former6 One possibility is that, e.g., to ont%s on parti"ipates, not in a multipli"ity of deities of the intelligible "lass, but rather in any

68 single deity of that class. )hat is the sense of su"h a stipulation, and what would be its point6 #he stipulation, so interpreted, would mean that there is a multipli"ity of deities a&ailable for parti"ipation at ea"h le&el that is not "ontrolled ontologi"ally. 9or as the distin"ti&e "hara"ters Didiot&t%nE of the henads &ary, so the beings whose nature is identified with theirs DsumphuomenonE "annot but &ary also (prop. 1JK . #he multipli"ity in 'uestion, were it not a genuinely supra(essential multipli"ity, "ould not be parti"ipated immediately by one and the same being, for reasons that are tautologi"al to state4 were it a multipli"ity structured within Being, it would be a multipli"ity structuring Being. 2u"h a multipli"ity stru"tured in and structuring Being is the hierar"hy of classes of ,ods to whi"h "orresponds the hierar"hy of onti" hypostases. But the multipli"ity within su"h "lasses is not an onti"ally stru"tured one, for the simple reason that ea"h is a "lass of ;ods, that is, of supra(essentials, not of beings. #he differen"e between a stru"tured and an unstru"tured multipli"ity, in the sense ! am using the terms, is simple4 a stru"tured multipli"ity is hierar"hi"ally organi1ed, e&en if the hierar"hy in 'uestion is only that between a monad and a "lass of beings parti"ipating e'ually in it, as in prop. 1C. Prop. 1JK rules out that the "lasses of deities referred to in props. 1IA(K "ould be stru"tured in su"h a manner, whi"h is only natural, inasmu"h as the latter "lasses are not "lassifi"ations of henads with referen"e to something whi"h they would parti"ipate, whi"h is the prin"iple of organi1ation for all onti" sets, but "lassifi"ations of henads with respe"t to that whi"h parti"ipates them, that is, the onti" hypostases "onstituted by the a"ti&ity of the ,ods. One e*igen"y whi"h "ould be ma$ing itself felt in su"h a do"trine is the e*isten"e of di&erse pantheons belonging to different "ultures. #he ,ods in these pantheons, while

69 they bear a "omple* and organi" relationship to the fellow members of their own pantheons, bear no relationship to the ,ods of other pantheons other than fun"tional analogy, whi"h is refle"ted in "ommon "lassifi"ations with respe"t to parti"ipating prin"iples. #he e*isten"e of deities from di&erse "ultures whi"h share fun"tional analogies is not a manifestation of any "ommon parti"ipation by the deities in 'uestion, but rather a "ommon parti"ipation of, say, !ntelle"t in them. But the multipli"ity of ,ods in su"h a "lass is not an affair for ontology, for it falls at on"e abo&e and below the sphere of Being. On the one hand, it refers to the ineffable plurality of ,ods whi"h lies beyond any formal unifi"ation, the sheer fa"ti"al multipli"ity of ,ods- on the other, it refers to that same plurality as manifested in the a""idental +u*taposition of di&erse pantheons whi"h are seen as it were from the outside li$e artifa"ts. #his is in a""ord with the well( $nown Pro"lean prin"iple that what is prior to Being is the "ause of that whi"h lies posterior to Being. )ere it a 'uestion, in su"h a multipli"ity, of the multipli"ity of intelle"tual ,ods, say, within a single pantheon, there would be no +ustifi"ation for the idea of a multipli"ity parti"ipated by a single onti" prin"iple, for as we shall see in "hapters K(L, when a gi&en pantheon is sub+e"ted to philosophi"al interpretation, there is always a spe"ifi" monad e*pressing the position of ea"h deity within the integrated system, the hena logon, of the pantheon. #he multipli"ity of ,ods spo$en of as parti"ipated by, e.g., Being or !ntelle"t is, rather, the same type of undetermined multipli"ity as mentioned in prop. 14C, whi"h demonstrates that the total number of ,ods must be finite. #here "an be, howe&er, no absolute determination of how many ,ods there are, be"ause this is simply not a 'uestion upon whi"h ontology "an ha&e any pur"hase. 9or 2yrianus, similarly, there "an be no $nowledge of the a"tual number of

70 ,ods4 One must say therefore that while ta theia are infinite in power, in number they are sub+e"t to limitation- but to how great a number they are limited, the partial soul "annot say, sa&e that there is so great a number as the prin"iples of these send forth inasmu"h as they wish to introdu"e another "orresponding to another "lass of beings, ("n 3etaph. C14bJ(I . #hat is, there "annot be fewer ,ods than there are "lasses of beings (and we must read here not +ust any beings, but ont%s onta , for the real arti"ulation in Being is furnished by di&ine a"ti&ity and the differen"es within a gi&en pantheon- but the determination is not re"ipro"al, and neither the total number of deities nor the total number of pantheons is delimitable any further than to finitude. 2imilarly, at "T !!!, 1A we read that the number and nature of the ,ods is $nown to the ,ods themsel&es di&inely while the Parmenides tea"hes us in a human manner, and philosophi"ally, and philosophi"al $nowledge remains for Pro"lus, as 3ristotle stressed, $nowledge of the uni&ersal and of the parti"ular as an instantiation of the uni&ersal. 2imilarly, when Pro"lus posits, in introdu"ing the third intelligible triad at PT !!! 14. 4C, that there are not more beings than henads, nor more henads than beings, but rather ea"h pro"ession of Being parti"ipates the One. 2in"e this uni&erse also, a""ording to ea"h part of itself, is go&erned by soul and intelle"t, the intelligible must a fortiori in its first, middle and last hypostases parti"ipate the intelligible ,ods, we will understand this, in a""ord with the pre&ious dis"ussion, not as determining the total number of henads, but as determining that no pro"ession of Being is to be posited as arising from no di&ine illumination unique to it. Ontology must mirror theology. #his means that for ea"h hypostasis there must be at least one henad whose a"ti&ity is spe"ifi" to that hypostasis. 2oul, for instan"e, as a no&el hypostasis relati&e to !ntelle"t, "annot merely be the produ"t

71 of the manifestation of intelle"tual ,ods on a lower le&el, but must possess its own "lass of deity who guarantee it a dire"t deifi"ation- >ionysus would be a henad of this "lass. )here the number of ,ods is more numerous than the pro"essions of Being, we ha&e failed to pursue to the fullest the philosophi"al hermeneuti" of myth in order to dis"ern the spe"ial "ontribution of ea"h ,od in the system to our ontology. #his would not be a mere problem in a""ounting, but would most li$ely refle"t an impo&erishment in our ontology. #hat the ontology be ri"her than the theology would imply an imposition of s"ar"ity upon the field of re&elation, as Pro"lus would ha&e diagnosed in dogmati" monotheisms su"h as .hristianity < hen"e the "harge of impiety fre'uently le&elled by pagans against .hristians < unless there were otiose elements in the ontology, a "ondition to be diagnosed diale"ti"ally. #he differen"e between the parti"ipation of Being in but one henad, as per 1JK, and in a "lass of henads, as per 1IA, is that 1JK ser&es to di&ini1e Being < or, indeed, whate&er onti" hypostasis is in 'uestion < immediately (ames%s and to di&ini1e beings qua beings indire"tly through their parti"ipation in Being !tself, or whate&er other formal prin"iple, while 1IA ser&es to "lassify a group of deities whi"h are assembled, as it were, empiri"ally, a""ording to a fun"tional similarity. 0embership in su"h a "lass will be determined with referen"e to i"onography, mythology, and other "hara"teristi"s of the ,od in 'uestion. !n this sense, >odds is "orre"t when he says that Pro"lus, in in"luding the "lassifi"ations of 1IA(K is trying to do&etail into his system "ategories whi"h were older, although the stress here should not lie upon the supposed anti'uity of su"h "lassifi"ations, whi"h simply "orrespond to the onti" hypostases, and thus re'uire no anterior origin, but rather upon their empiri"al appli"ation. #hey are used to "lassify ,ods

72 empiri"ally, whi"h is not to say that they do not thus represent a $ind of parti"ipation. But the parti"ipation that they ultimately e*press is a parti"ipation whi"h "an only o""ur from one deity to one hypostasis. 9or +ust as an indi&idual must en"ounter one deity at a time in order to en"ounter that deity as profoundly as they are "apable (on whi"h see below so too a prin"iple is di&ini1ed in its immediate relationship to a deity. #his means that !ntelle"t is di&ini1ed in the manifestation of, e.g., =eus as an intelle"tual ,od. #he realm of prin"iples e*tends itself (anateinetai to single ,ods, indi&idual deities, to be di&ini1ed be"ause the transition from onti" e*isten"e to supra(essential e*isten"e is a transition from formal unity to ineffable indi&iduality. #he threshold that is "rossed from the realm of form to the realm of e*isten"e is a gateway into the fa"ti"al and the uni'ue. 3 single henad "ould not be di&idedly (di&r&men%s parti"ipated by more than one being be"ause the di&ision between these two beings would ha&e to be itself an onti" relationship- and onti" relationships are e*hausted by whole and part, identity and differen"e (prop. II . 3 relationship of whole and part manifestly establishes a disposition of one term o&er the other- while identity and differen"e subordinate both terms to a form in respe"t of whi"h they are the same or different. #hat two terms "annot be on the same le&el, so to spea$, as parti"ipants of a henad, but rather must assume a hierar"hi"al disposition, is an argument against deities from different "ultures simply being different names for some single ,od. 9or Pro"lus e*pli"itly re+e"ts a hierar"hy of languages whi"h would ma$e one more di&ine than another, a thesis !ambli"hus, for one, a""epts. But this is an issue whi"h ! shall ta$e up later in detail. !t is important to mention it here, howe&er, to emphasi1e the intimate relationship between philosophi"al and theologi"al problemati"s in the henadology, lest we should ma$e the mista$e, as many

73 "ommentators ha&e, of thin$ing that these two dimensions of the do"trine are merely e*ternally related. !n this way, the "ardinal do"trine of 8eoplatonism, the pre(eminen"e of unity and its identity with the ,ood, is identified by Pro"lus with the primordial nature of individuality in relation to all other determinations. 3nd one "ould s"ar"ely "laim that the profundity of the "ombined theologi"al and philosophi"al refle"tion embodied here is redu"ible to the simple e*igen"ies of either religion or philosophy. #o summari1e the dis"ussion so far, ! am proposing that the first h&n%menon of prop. I is to be identified with the immediate parti"ipant of ea"h henad in prop. 1JK. 3""ording to prop. 1JH, Being is the first and highest of all the parti"ipants of the di&ine "hara"ter Dt&s theias idiot&tosE whi"h are thereby di&ini1ed Dektheoumen%nE. ?et us try to get more spe"ifi" about what this h&n%menon is. !t is not unparti"ipated Being, whi"h parti"ipates in the "lass of intelligible ,ods, for as dis"ussed abo&e this latter does not parti"ipate one(to(one. @ather, it seems to ma$e the most sense to identify it with the Being possessed by each ;od. 9or the ,ods, although in themsel&es supra(essential, possess ea"h of them Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t after a fashion, or else they would not be able to generate these latter through their a"ti&ity. #hese are the 'ualities referred to in prop. 1A1, whi"h states that all that is di&ine Dpan to theionE has an hyparxis whi"h is goodness, a power whi"h is unitary, and an understanding Dgn%sinE that is se"ret and in"omprehensible Dkruphion kai al&ptonE to all se"ondary entities ali$e. #hese three traits "orrespond e*a"tly to the three intelligible triads, whi"h shall be dis"ussed in full detail in "hapter K. Ea"h one of these triads is the nu"leus, so to spea$, around whi"h is generated the "orresponding hypostasis, Being !tself "orresponding to the hyparxis or e*isten"e of the ,od, ?ife "orresponding to the power, and !ntelle"t to the gn%sis of the

74 ,od. #he first h&n%menon and the highest parti"ipant is therefore, for Pro"lus +ust as it is for >amas"ius, the 0i*ed of the Philebus as radi"al Being (for Being as the first h&n%menon in >amas"ius, see >P !!, KIff . #herefore, when we read that DeE&ery ,od begins his "hara"teristi" a"ti&ity Dt&s oikeias energeiasE with himself Daph'eautouE, and has established first in its own nature the "hara"ter Didiot&taE distin"ti&e of its bestowals, (ET prop. 1J1 we should understand that this distin"tion, at first parado*i"al, between a ,od and that ,od%s idiot&s < for if the idiot&s is the distin"tion of the ,od, as we ha&e seen from, e.g., "P 1B4H, then how "an the establishment (idrusthai of that &ery idiot&s be seen at the same time as an activity of the ,od, who is ob&iously already a distin"t indi&idual and agent < we should understand this distin"tion to refer to the &ery first site at whi"h emerges the distin"tion between the supra(essential and the onti" realm. 7ere ea"h ,od produ"es him;herself. 9or this is Being in the highest sense, the Being of each ;od. Ea"h ,od is at on"e in their supra(essentiality the agent of the mi*ture, and as primal >eing the 0i*ture itself, a $ind of onti" double of the ,od%s supra(essential indi&iduality. #he unified, therefore, is in the first pla"e the onti" manifestation of ea"h ,od. #he telos of the unified, howe&er, lies not in the sort of unity possessed by ea"h henad, but in the unity of forms. 9ormal unity is mediated and holisti". #herefore the transition from supra(essential unity to onti" unity is not fully a""omplished until the transition from absolute indi&iduality to dia"riti"al determination or spe"ifi" unity is "omplete. #herefore, although radi"al Being emerges in the third moment of the first intelligible triad, this has no "on"rete meaning until the full "omplement of intelle"tual determinations has arisen. #he status of the two prin"iples of ?imit and !nfinity and their

75 produ"t, the 0i*ed, with respe"t to the henads has &e*ed "ommentators. #he natural "onte*t of su"h a dis"ussion is the a""ount of the first intelligible triad in "hapter K. !n essen"e, howe&er, on"e we understand that the intelligible order itself represents a transition from one mode of unity to another, and that the determinations that unfold within it are as yet determinations, not of a multipli"ity of henads determined in common, but of ea"h henad "onsidered in its absolute indi&iduality, "ontaining all the other ,ods and the whole of Being as well, then it be"omes simple to see ?imit and !nfinity as nothing more and nothing less than the two primary aspe"ts of ea"h deity from whi"h emerges, so to spea$, diale"ti"ally, the whole of Being. )e might "hara"teri1e these two aspe"ts as parti"ularity and uni&ersality- what is most important is not to "onfuse them with the indi&iduality and plurality of the ,ods, as if it were be"ause of the 5nlimited;!nfinity, for instan"e, that there are many ,ods, or be"ause of ?imit that that number is finite. #his would be the ultimate "ategory mista$e. ?imit and !nfinity are prin"iples of >eing. ?imit is a prin"iple of Being deri&ed from the hyparxis of the ,od whi"h imparts to beings parti"ularity. !nfinity is a prin"iple of Being deri&ed from the power(s of the ,od. #his power or potentiality is the multipli"ity within ea"h ,od and imparts uni&ersality to beings, the first "lassifi"ation being that "lassifi"ation of deities with referen"e to their powers whi"h forms the hierar"hy of onti" prin"iples a""ording to the interpretation of the Parmenides pioneered by 2yrianus. #he $ey te*t with respe"t to ?imit and !nfinity is ET prop. 1KC4 E&ery "lass DtaxisE of ,ods is from the two initial prin"iples Dek t%n pr%t%n arch%nE, ?imit and !nfinity- but some manifest predominantly the "ausality of ?imit, others that of !nfinity. .ru"ial here is that it is e&ery taxis, that is, e&ery "lass or better yet, e&ery classification of ,ods that

76 is deri&ed from ?imit and !nfinity. ?imit and !nfinity are the most generi" prin"iples by whi"h the ,ods are classified. #his is espe"ially, although not e*"lusi&ely, "lassifi"ation by gender. #hose deities in whom ?imit predominates are mas"uline, those in whom !nfinity predominates, feminine. 7en"e at "T !, AAB, we read that the di&ision of male and female "omprehends in itself all the plenitudes Dpl&r%mataE of the di&ine orders Ddiakosm%nE. 3gain, #imaeus, ele&ating himself to all the ,ods, &ery properly "omprehends the whole orders of them Dtas holas aut%n taxeisE in a di&ision into these genera, that is, ,ods and ,oddesses, at Tim. AL". ?imit and !nfinity are not absolutely identified with gender, howe&er. #hey are, rather, 'ualities gi&ing rise to gender as well as other fun"tional "hara"teristi"s. 7en"e @hea, for e*ample, is female, but at the same time a member of an order of paternal deities. #he designation of ?imit and !nfinity as archai is also signifi"ant. )hene&er the term prin"iple arises, we must remember that archai are a parti"ular "lass of beings, and while the term may o""asionally be used in a looser sense (as in the passage from "P 1B4H about how other philosophers dis"ourse in general about prin"iples , its te"hni"al sense is ne&er altogether absent. !n this fashion, it is similar to the ontologi"al determinations whi"h arise se'uentially in the Parmenides. 8otwithstanding the fa"t that the One, in parti"ular, is fre'uently referred to as the 9irst Prin"iple, and the henads sometimes as first prin"iples, the whole "ategory of prin"iple is subordinated to that of fountain or sour"e (p&g& , the latter emerging first in and through the third intelligible triad, with further instan"es of the "lass in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, while the former emerges in the intelle"tual order. ! shall, naturally, ha&e more to say about this in the rele&ant "hapters. Pro"lus e&en subordinates archai to p&gai at PT

77 N! 1, while "iting the Phaedrus (A4Kd to the effe"t that the first prin"iple is unbegotten, a term whi"h, to a "asual reading, would imply suprema"y. #his is be"ause Pro"lus subordinates the prin"iples% "ondition of being unbegotten or ungenerated to the fountains% "ondition of being self1generating or self1generated < autogenes. #he fountains are thus "learly more a$in to the self("onstituting nature of the henads. #o be ungenerated is still inferior to the "apa"ity of the henads to fabri"ate a generation for themsel&es, a pla"e, that is, within Being. #his is essentially be"ause, to put it in terms more blunt than Pro"lus would prefer, the ungenerated, li$e the unparti"ipated, of whi"h ! shall spea$ later, is an abstra"tion or hypostatization from the "onditions of generation and parti"ipation. 3ffirmations emerge immediately from "orresponding negations, whi"h is the basi" insight of the 2yriani" interpretation of the negations in the Parmenides. 3s su"h, the ungenerated or unparti"ipated refers immediately to the generated and the parti"ipated4 in effe"t, the term ungenerated refers to the immediate "ause of that whi"h is generated as its negation. #he self(generated p&gai, on the other hand, are analogous to the henads as authupostata, and to that e*tent prior e&en to the negation of generation, prior, that is, to the opposition of the generated and the ungenerated, while the ungenerated archai, by "ontrast, are the immediate "auses of generation. #hus, when in prop. CC Pro"lus refers to the first prin"iple of ea"h series as agen&tos, it is not the same as saying they are authupostata, as >odds may "laim, depending upon how one ta$es his ambiguous phrasing, &i1. showing in what sense they Dthe prin"iplesE are authupostata (p. AKA . One should say, rather, that in their unbegottenness archai are analogous to authupostata, +ust as archai and p&gai are said by Pro"lus to bear the relationship of part to whole (see below .

78 #he do"trine "on"erning p&gai and archai has been little remar$ed upon by "ommentators, despite the "onsisten"y with whi"h Pro"lus repeats it throughout his wor$, with the e*"eption of the ET. .ommentators li$ely assume that the normal philosophi"al usage of the term arch& "annot be affe"ted by the more te"hni"al do"trine, +ust as the e*pli"it emergen"e of unity and multipli"ity, whole and part, and finitude and infinity in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order "annot ha&e an impa"t on the deployment of these "on"epts throughout the whole of the system (see "hapter K . !n fa"t, the deployment of p&gai prior to archai plays an important role in the system, for p&gai are a "lass of entities transitional between the members of di&ine series and the forms and their parti"ipants. 8ote in this regard "T !, J1C, the highest summit of e&ery series DseirasE is fontal. P&g&, appropriated by Pro"lus from the #haldean !racles, refers to the intelligible forms, that is, the forms prior to intelle"t- see for e*ample "T !, 4K1, where the third intelligible triad, or 3nimal !tself is "alled the fountain of fountains. 8ote also in this regard PT !! I. 4B. K(I where the ,ood is "alled the fountain of truth that unifies intelle"t and the intelligibles. #he One is "alled a fountain again at !! L. 4H. 1J. #his e*presses ni"ely the ontologi"al "onte*t in whi"h the One emerges, as the ultimate pre"ipitate of the "on+un"tion of the noeti" and noeri" spheres. 2imilarly, the One is the fountain of the ,ood at PT !! H. KI. AI, &ery mu"h li$e an intelligible form. #he henads are represented by #ruth in a list of negations at ibid. 4H. J (see also 2()%s note A, p. 1BH , showing their e'ui&alen"e to the One. 0a+er"i$, in her note on frag. 4C of the !racles, glosses the fountains as the sum of the !deas "onsidered as a whole, and the prin"iples as the parti"ular or di&ided world(shaping !deas, in a""ord with "P 11CJ, where Pro"lus e*plains that ?i$eness is in the se"ondary realms what !dentity is in those

79 prior to them, and 5nli$eness similarly answers to >ifferen"e, Tand what !dentity is on the le&el of whole and fountain, thatU ?i$eness is on the le&el of part and, as it were, MPrin"iple%, and the first offspring of !dentity and >ifferen"e are the ?i$e and the 5nli$e, where the la"una has been filled by the editors on the basis of PT N! 1. #he relationship between !dentity and >ifferen"e on the one hand, and ?i$eness and 5nli$eness on the other, is parallelled with that between fountains and prin"iples a little later at "P 11CH4

!dentity is more "omprehensi&e than ?i$eness, and >ifferen"e than 5nli$eness, and they ha&e the same relation to these as Mfountains,% in the terminology of the theologians, ha&e to the prin"iples that pro"eed from them, or whi"h the most uni&ersal monads ha&e to more parti"ular monads, whi"h are generated in a primary way from them but e*hibit an inferior essen"e and power.

#he parallelism between identity(and(differen"e and the fountains, on the one hand, and li$eness(and(unli$eness and the prin"iples, on the other, has to do with the respe"ti&e roles of these forms. !dentity(and(differen"e is being "ompared to the intelligible paradigm, that is, the third intelligible triad, the lo"us of intelligible form and the fountain of fountains. ?i$eness(and(unli$eness, whi"h regulate assimilation to the paradigm, are li$ened to prin"iples inasmu"h as the latter are intra(intelle"tual and e*press, as the produ"ts of the !ntelle"t, the "on+un"tion of the intelle"ti&e sphere with that of @eal Being. !n a"tuality, the form of sameness(and(differen"e "orresponds to the third "lass of the intelle"tual order of ,ods (the sphere of the demiurge while li$eness( and(unli$eness "orresponds to the hyper"osmi" "lass of infra(intelle"tual ,ods, the assimilati&e ,ods who are responsible for beings becoming like their forms.

80 #o return to the theme at hand, howe&er, namely the two archai ?imit and !nfinity, we read in the Platonic Theology, at the beginning of the dis"ussion of this dyad, let us survey with intellect Dt% n% the%r&s%menE the biformed prin"iples pro"eeding from DproelthousasE and posterior to Dthe OneE (!!! L. 1JA- my emphasis , whi"h appropriately follows after and "ontrasts with a "onsideration of the One in more mysti"al terms Dtou mustikou telousE, and pre"edes a dis"ussion of ?imit and !nfinity as the two prin"iples DarchaiE of the di&isions Ddiakosm%nE of the ,ods (ibid . 0ore subtly, following the dis"ussion "ited abo&e from "T !, AAB, whi"h spo$e of #imaeus ele&ating himself to all the ,ods and "omprehending the pl&romata of their in the di&ision into the genera of female and male, ,oddesses and ,ods, we read at !, AA1 that the sublimest end of theory is to run upward to a di&ine intelle"t- and as all things are uniformly "omprehended in it, to arrange the dis"ussion of things agreeably to this "ausal "omprehension. !t is a""ession to a di&ine intelle"t, not the di&ine intelle"t, per se, that terminates theoreti"al as"ension4 from there one need only "arry out an analysis of that di&ine intelle"t in order to "onstitute the prin"iples prior to intelle"t. ?imit and !nfinity are pi&otal in this pro"ess, whi"h is none other than the di&ine method of the Philebus, hen"e its spe"ial relationship to the intelle"t. #he term diakosmos, o""urring in the passage from PT !!! L, is an e*ample of the impulse in Pro"lus to find parallel &o"abulary to refer to the henads whi"h does not "arry the ontologi"al impli"ations of terms su"h as taxis, or that at least preser&es the distin"tion between the supra(essential and onti" realms. )e "an see this in ET prop. 11B, &i1. 9or not all things are of e'ual worth, e&en though they be of the same "osmi" order Ddiakosm&se%sE, that is, the same di&ision of the "osmos. #he body of the proposition

81 refers to monads- but the use of diakosmos here allows Pro"lus to en"ompass di&isions or arrangements more general than those "o&ered by the stri"t language of the proposition, probably be"ause he has in mind the distin"tions in ran$ among the henads whi"h, qua henads, are prior to su"h "lassifi"ations although "apable of being subsumed under more global di&isions, as it were. Pro"lus seems in"onsistent in the use of diakosmos. !n prop. 14K, for instan"e, he says at first that DtEhe distin"ti&e "hara"ter Didiot&sE of any di&ine "lass Dtaxe%sE tra&els through all the deri&ati&e entities Dt%n deuter%nE and bestows itself upon all the inferior $inds, but then immediately follows with, DfEor if the pro"ession of beings e*tends as far as do the orders DdiakosmoiE of ,ods, the distin"ti&e "hara"ter of the di&ine powers, radiating downwards, is found in e&ery $indG Perhaps the best indi"ation, howe&er, of what he intends is pro&ided by the sorts of 'ualities that he uses as illustrations4 ! intend that if, for e*ample, there be a purifying deity, then purgation is to be found in souls, in animals, in &egetables, and in minerals- so also if there be a prote"ti&e deity, and the same if there be one "harged with the "on&ersion or the perfe"tion or the &itali1ing of things. )e "an glean from this that, ideally, diakosmoi represent 'ualities of the ,ods ha&ing no stri"t "orresponden"e to "lasses of beings qua beings.#he taxeis of the ,ods, then, would be most properly those orders "orresponding to the pro"ession of Being, i.e. intelligible, intelligible(and(intelle"tual, intelle"tual et al. !t should also be noted that Pro"lus at least on"e (at "T !, 1IB e*plains diakosm&sis as applying to pro"ession and suntaxis to re&ersion- but he does not seem to obser&e this order elsewhere. 8or does he state whether the two pro"esses would result in diakosmoi and taxeis with the same e*tensions. )here diakosmos is used more loosely, we "an

82 e*pe"t that the reason is that terms whi"h apply to the ,ods in their intera"tions with beings are fre'uently ta$en as more generi" than terms applying to beings alone. #he diakosmoi or diakosm&seis are, in the Elements of Theology, howe&er, the eight "lasses enumerated in props. 1K1(C. #hese "lassifi"ations represent a $ind of phenomenologi"al sur&ey of di&ine attributes, whose systemati" fun"tion in the stru"tural e"onomy of the Elements has been most $eenly dis"erned by 3nni"$ .harles(2aget, for whi"h see the a""ount in the appendi* on pre&ious literature "on"erning the henads. .harles(2aget has analy1ed these attributes as the "onditions of the possibility of any systemati" refle"tion whatsoe&er. #he most important thing to understand about them, howe&er, is their distin"tion from the "lassifi"ations "orresponding to onti" hypostases. #he Elements of Theology has at on"e a wider s"ope of in'uiry and a stri"ter method than any of Pro"lus% other wor$s. Only the "ommentary on the Parmenides has a similar breadth, but its method is free(form and we only possess part of it. !n more free(form te*ts, Pro"lus is free to simply allude to the e*isting "orpus of religious te*ts whi"h supply the empiri"al data with respe"t to the identity and a"ti&ities of the ,ods whi"h is the ob+e"t of the philosopher%s hermeneuti" and the worshiper%s de&otion ali$e. #he "lassifi"ation of di&ine attributes in props. 1K1(C, howe&er, is a determination of the supra(essential realm with no re"ourse to religious te*ts. 3s .harles(2aget "orre"tly dis"erns, it is a matter of a $ind of trans"endental in'uiry, in whi"h Pro"lus see$s to determine a priori and without any re"ourse to empiri"al data the global "hara"teristi"s of the di&ine from the starting point of the "onditions of the possibility of philosophi"al spe"ulation at all. But this is not a matter of determining the ,ods as things in themsel&es, as it were, or "onstru"ti&ely, but analyti"ally from the premise of the

83 e*isten"e of the "ogni1ing sub+e"t. #his is different from the diale"ti"al in'uiry into the onti" hypostases as "arried out in the Parmenides. #he latter is also an analyti" of the di&ine, but "arried out on a different basis, that is, upon the premise of the ob*ect, Being, rather than the "ogni1ing sub*ect. #he spe"iali1ed nature of the in'uiry in the Elements e*plains why we do not see mu"h of the diakosmoi enumerated here elsewhere in Pro"lus% wor$. #he terms o""asionally re"ur, but not in the systemati" organi1ation they ha&e in this wor$, whi"h means essentially that they are not to be ta$en as the same. #his is not be"ause they are an aborti&e e*periment abandoned by Pro"lus, but be"ause outside of the rigorous stru"ture of a trans"endental in'uiry, it is natural simply to refer to a"tual religious te*ts to supply the supra(essential attributes of the ,ods, whi"h are then interpreted by the philosopher as they pertain to the nature of Being, rather than as they pertain to the nature of the ,ods. #he eight diakosmoi are un"onne"ted to the stru"ture of the onti" hypostases be"ause they are a 'ualitati&e di&ision of the ,ods that refers to the elements stru"turing our e*perien"e of the ,ods rather than to the ,ods as things in themsel&es. #he eight diakosmoi are supposed to be deri&ed, in a fashion Pro"lus does not spe"ify, from the "on+ugation, so to spea$, of the two prin"iples of ?imit and !nfinity. 8or need we mu"h "on"ern oursel&es with the method of this deri&ation either, for it is not a "onstru"tion, a "onstitution of the ,ods, but an analysis of the ,ods a""ording to the di&ine method of the Philebus. #his method, whi"h comes from the ,ods, is naturally the tool whi"h we would apply in understanding them, but that is a far "ry from positing ?imit and !nfinity as a pair of abstra"t prin"iples from whi"h the ,ods < the most an"ient and &enerable of all things ("T !, JI4 < are somehow, absurdly, to be generated. !t would be no less

84 absurd, indeed, than it would be to attempt to deploy the Fantian pure "on"epts of the understanding positi&ely as if they were themsel&es noumena. #he 'uestion whether ?imit and !nfinity lie abo&e or below the henads is thus poorly posed. One might perhaps best "hara"teri1e them as parallel with the henads, inasmu"h as they form, along with the One and the 0i*ed, a s"hemati" representation or analysis of the whatness or essence of ea"h supra1essential henad. ?imit and !nfinity are the first prin"iples of the diakosmoi of the ,ods, while it is the 0i*ed that is the first and highest diakosmos of the ,ods (PT !!! 1A. 14B(1 sin"e e&ery deity possesses both ?imit and !nfinity in their nature. #his is within the broader systemati" "onte*t of the notion of diakosm&sis, rather than the spe"ifi" "onfines of the in'uiry in the Elements. #he diakosmos of the 0i*ed thus in"ludes all su"h "lassifi"ations as "onstituted the diakosmoi in the Elements. 9or

of the ,ods themsel&es, some are "oordinate with ?imit, but others with !nfinity, both a""ording to their whole orders Ddiakosm&seisE and a""ording to parts4 a""ording to whole orders, be"ause e&ery paternal, "onne"ti&e, and demiurgi" series is defined a""ording to ?imit- but e&ery &i&ifi" and effe"ti&e series, a""ording to !nfinity- and a""ording to parts, be"ause of the paternal and of the &i&ifi" series, some belong to the order of ?imit, but others to that of !nfinity. ("T !, 441

!n other words, the paternal diakosmos, although ha&ing an o&erall fun"tionality more "hara"teri1ed by ?imit, ne&ertheless has in it ,oddesses, su"h as @hea, who by &irtue of their femininity, are "oordinate with !nfinity. #he analysis of di&ine 'ualities a""ording to ?imit and !nfinity en"ompasses all other "lassifi"ations be"ause in "on"ei&ing of a

85 parti"ular ,od as representing a perfe"tly distin"t mixture of these primordial 'ualities, we sum up, as it were, the totality of that ,od%s onti" "ommitments, his;her footprint within Being. But it does not matter, as ! ha&e said, +ust how far we "ould a"tually "arry the ontologi"al analysis of some gi&en deity, on"e we understand that no henad is reducible to its onti" "ommitments.

)e shall learn mu"h more about these matters when we ta$e up ?imit, !nfinity and the 0i*ed as the first intelligible triad. 9or now, howe&er, ! wish to ta$e up the other side of the distin"tion that arose +ust now between the orders of the ,ods "onstituted by 'ualities not "orresponding to the hierar"hy of onti" hypostases and those that are mirrored in the pro"ession of Being, the goal being to understand the nature of the "orrelation between "lasses of deities and the onti" hierar"hy. Pro"lus dis"usses this 'uestion at PT !!! K, where he as$s whether ea"h henad has the same number of parti"ipants, or some more numerous parti"ipants than others, and, if the latter, whether the parti"ipants of the superior or of the inferior henads are more numerous. 7e draws upon the analogy of numbers, of whi"h some are more simple, but others more "omposite, e*"eeding in 'uantity, but suffering diminution in power. )hen he transfers the analogy to the henads, howe&er, it is the participants whi"h are diminished in power but greater in number4

the henads whi"h are nearer to the One are ne"essarily parti"ipated by the first and most simple essen"es- but those whi"h are more remote are parti"ipated by more "omposite essen"es, whi"h are less in power, but are greater in number and multitude. 9or, as a rule, in the intelligible domain additions are subtra"tions of power- and that whi"h is nearer to

86
the One G is more uniform DhenoeidesteronE, and is +oined with DsunestinE more uni&ersal "auses of Being. (1H. 1B(L

)hat does it mean for henads to be nearer or further from the One, inferior and superior6 ,i&en all that we ha&e learned about the uni'ue nature of the relationship between the One and the henads, it is "lear that e*pressions of relati&e distan"e with respe"t to the One are potentially misleading. On the one hand, those henads are simply nearer to the One qua first prin"iple (that is, qua monad who are parti"ipated by a more uni&ersal "lass of beings. !n this regard, the ran$ing lies, stri"tly spea$ing, among beings rather than among the henads. But there is a sense in whi"h deities more distant from the One are inferior in relation to those who are "loser. 9or we read in ET prop. 1AI that more uni&ersal ,ods, who are nearer to the One and who "ause more numerous effe"ts, generate more spe"ifi" ,ods, who are the "auses of fewer effe"ts, by generating from themsel&es through superfluity of poten"y se"ondary pro"essions inferior to those prior to them. #his refers to the series of a single deity, by &irtue of whi"h there are two 3phrodites, three 3thenas, and so forth. #hese series are the paradigm of what 3. .. ?loyd "alls P(series or 'uasi(genera in the realm of Being and whi"h seem to ha&e e&ol&ed from 3ristotelian pros hen e'ui&o"ation. #he inferior le&els of su"h a series are indeed further from the One, inasmu"h as their degree of indi&iduality, whi"h is the "hara"teristi" bestowed by the One, is inferior to the e*pressions of the same deity in a higher order. #his is demonstrated by the "ontrary or "ontradi"tory "hara"teristi"s, offi"es and relations that may be possessed by pro"essions of the same deity on different le&els, whi"h render them less uniform, henoeid&s. But the "ondition of universality is relati&e to the "ondition of

87 specificity, and we must as$ in respe"t to the superfluity of poten"y, what e*a"tly it is that is o&erflowed. !t is the intelle"tuali1ed "on"eption of a deity whose boundaries are too narrow to pre&ent the deity%s powers from o&erflowing a single form, so that a su""ession of emanations of the same deity appear on different le&els- hen"e the =eus who is the demiurge of the Timaeus is more uni&ersal than the =eus who is apportioned a third of the uni&erse along with Poseidon and 7ades, who is in turn more uni&ersal than the =eus who appears as one of the ,ods in the Phaedrus. 3t PT !!! I. 1J1, Pro"lus ma$es an important general remar$ about the stru"ture of parti"ipation of the onti" hypostases in the henads4

!f it is ne"essary that the supra(essential henads, whi"h are the ,ods, sin"e they deri&e their subsisten"e from the unparti"ipated "ause of all things, should be parti"ipated, some of them by the first orders Ddiakosm%nE in beings, others by the middle, and others by the last orders, as was before demonstrated, it is e&ident that some of them deify DektheousinE the unparti"ipated portion of being, but that others illuminate DkatalampsanE life, others intelle"t, others soul, and others bodies. 3nd of the last henads indeed, not only bodies parti"ipate DmetecheiE, but li$ewise soul, intelle"t, life and essen"e.

#he fa"t that a gi&en henad illuminates body, the lowest manifestation of Being, does not affe"t that henad%s supra(essential status- for although the last among henads, it still must, in order to be parti"ipated by bodies, be parti"ipated at all the inter&ening le&els. )e "an e*trapolate from this that intelle"tual henads must also be parti"ipated by ?ife and Being, the two hypostases prior to !ntelle"t, and so forth. #his would mean that all of the henads are in some way of the intelligible "lass, regardless of what other le&els of

88 being re"ei&e their a"ti&ity. )hy are they not all of the intelligible "lass, then6 )hy do we hear nothing of, e.g., Fronos prior to the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order6 #he $ey lies in the "ontrast between illumination and participation. Pro"lus uses the same term, katalampein, to deal with the problem of how the One parti"ipates Being, after a fashion, at PT !!! 4. 1I. AJ(4. 9urthermore, at PT !! 4 (JJf , e*tending Plato%s analogy of the 2un and the ,ood from the $epublic, Pro"lus identifies the henads with the light of the 2un. 7e goes on to e*plain that we must not say that the intelligible is united to the 9irst after the same manner as the light, but the latter through its "ontinuity DsunecheianE with the ,ood is established in it without a medium Dames%sE- while the former, through this light, parti"ipates of a &i"inity to the ,ood. 7ere we see e*pressed again the basi" differen"e of the henadi" arithmos from other multipli"ities4 its relationship to the One is not mediated by a 'uality imparted through parti"ipation. #he intelligible "lass of henads is said to illuminate true Being (katalampon to ont%s on in prop. 1IA of the ET. )e may thus ta$e deifi"ation thus as synonymous with illumination. 3 gi&en henad may deify or illuminate Being alone, or ?ife, or !ntelle"t, and so forth, but a henad that is participated by 2oul, for instan"e, must also be parti"ipated by !ntelle"t, by ?ife, and by Being. #he relationship of parti"ipation, we might say, lies within Being, whereas a henad illuminates regions of Being in a special way as an e*pression of its pe"uliar nature (we shall see later that Pro"lus "on"ei&es this as e*pressing a ,od%s will . 3n intelle"tual henad need not illuminate ea"h le&el of Being prior to !ntelle"t- s;he need not, in other words, ha&e a manifestation at the le&el of ?ife, the order of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual. But that does not mean that the henad in 'uestion does not possess (in a unitary and supra(essential mode (ET prop. 11H ?ife

89 and Being, in the e*ample. #he regions of Being illuminated by a "ertain array of deities < those whi"h, in the passage immediately following this one, Pro"lus refers to as suspended from one order or another of henads < are determined by loo$ing at the "hara"teristi"s and relations attributed to gi&en deities in myth, ritual, and i"onography. #hese are interpreted philosophi"ally to yield the rele&ant monadi" stru"ture, whi"h not only pro&ides information about the nature of the hypostasis "o("onstituted by this di&ine array, but may permit "ross("ultural "omparison of similar mythologi"al stru"tures as well. )e might brea$ down di&ine "hara"teristi"s into three "ategories, namely (1 the regions of Being en+oying parti"ipation in a gi&en deity, whi"h must in"lude Being !tself, if no other < in this respe"t note PT !!! AH. 1LA(J. AI(L4 there is for ea"h di&ine apportionment Ddianom&n the%nE a "orresponding DoikeionE intelligible multipli"ity < (A the regions of Being spe"ifi"ally illuminated by a gi&en deity, of whi"h there must be at least one, although that one "ould be any of the onti" hypostases (in"luding Being, ta$en in a narrower sense, as we shall see in "hapter K - and lastly, (J the di&ine "hara"teristi"s referred to abo&e whi"h o""ur at e&ery le&el of Being and therefore do not ser&e to uni'uely determine any one le&el (ET prop. 14K, 1K1(C . #hese latter are important insofar as theurgists must be able to "ommen"e their as"ent to any deity from the lowest le&els of Being. #hese 'ualities also refle"t a pre(ontologi"al per"eption of the ,ods and their immediate attributes, that belongs to a dis"ourse more iconic than narrative, a distin"tion about whi"h ! shall ha&e more to say. #he relationships established among the ,ods through their illuminations of su""essi&e le&els of Being and the parti"ipation of those hypostases in them results in two

90 sorts of relationships of subordination. #he first is that in whi"h a gi&en deity, who in"ludes, of "ourse, all the other deities for him;herself, in manifesting him;herself on a "ertain le&el, posits "ertain other deities in relationships of priority or posteriority to themsel&es. 2u"h a relationship is, for e*ample, that of =eus to his father Fronos or to his son >ionysos or either of these to =eus. #hese deri&e from what we might designate the illuminati&e "hara"teristi"s, inasmu"h as hierar"hi"al relationships among the ,ods are the paradigms of "orresponding relationships among onti" hypostases, +ust as relationships among deities on the same le&el, so to spea$, are paradigmati" of the arti"ulation within a single onti" hypostasis. !n the "ase of these, then, ontology is more or less dire"tly read off from mythology. 3ll mythologi"al a"tion refers to the "onstitution of Being, for e&erything the ,ods do shadows forth supra(essentially a way of being, inasmu"h as Being is an e*"resen"e of di&ine a"ti&ity. #he other $ind of subordination is that within the series of a single henad, e.g., that between the =eus who belongs to the order of the intelle"tual ,ods and the =eus belonging to the order of the ruling ,ods. #he latter is a more spe"ifi" emanation or manifestation of the former. #hese relationships deri&e primarily from the parti"ipated "hara"teristi"s, and arise espe"ially from the harmoni1ation of "ontrary or "ontradi"tory "hara"teristi"s of a gi&en deity in the whole fabri" of the mythos of a "ulture. 7ere, then, myth is +u*taposed against myth, while the trans"endent indi&iduality of the parti"ular henad is affirmed o&er the a"ti&ities of that henad with respe"t to different regions of Being. )e $now why, from an histori"al point of &iew, there are "onfli"ting stories about the ,ods, but what does this e*press about the supra(essential reality of the ,ods6 )e need not patroni1e Pro"lus nor belittle his system by assuming that any aspe"t of its

91 appli"ation is merely ad hoc. #he histori"al situation refle"ts a supra(essential reality. 9or if no unified metanarrati&e e*ists in"orporating all of the sides that a single deity has, ne&ertheless, shown to beings, this is be"ause of a surplus of that deity%s manifestation beyond any single ontologi1ing reading. @ather, the deity in 'uestion has been a parti"ipant in se&eral different ontologies whi"h a""identally o&erlap for us. 7ow "an there be su"h a""idents6 9irst, be"ause the unity of ontology is itself li$e all onti" or formal unity4 a specific unity o&er &arying instantiations. 2e"ond, a""idents are themsel&es merely the e*pression of "ausality prior to form. )e, as indi&iduals posterior to form, are re"epti&e to su"h "ausality. 3nd so we glimpse the unity of a gi&en henad abo&e and beyond the formal multipli"ity of that henad%s a"ti&ities from a sympatheti" &antage point, the indi&idual at the bottom of the system per"ei&ing the indi&idual at the top.

92

.hapter J4

#he !ntegrity of Pantheons

0y "on"ern until now has been predominantly with the manifold of the henads in general and the uni&ersal "hara"teristi"s of their relationship to Being. 7owe&er, the "ausality of ea"h henad, insofar as ea"h henad or ,od is the One !tself, ma$es itself felt not in that whi"h is universal or formal at all, but in that whi"h is particular, a""ording to the a*iom that the highest prin"iple has the furthest rea"h. #he identity of ea"h ,od with the One is manifest, therefore, in that aspe"t of the ,od whi"h es"apes the rea"h of formal determination. #herefore in a dis"ussion of universal "hara"teristi"s we operate at a le&el inferior to that proper to the ,ods. )e re"all that Pro"lus distinguishes between the different possible dis"ourses about the ,ods in +ust this way at "T !, JBJ, where he distinguishes a dis"ourse about the ,ods, from that whi"h would spea$ of each of

93 them itself. )e ha&e seen that the element of di&ine indi&iduality is designated by the term idiot&s, but that this term fun"tions ambiguously, referring on the one hand to the supra(essential parti"ularity of ea"h ,od, and on the other hand to something established through the a"ti&ity of the ,od, whose indi&iduality is presupposed. #he latter is the 0i*ed, the produ"t of the first intelligible triad. #his is a uni&ersal or ontologi"al designation, a formula e*pressing the "onditions of our ontologi"al apprehension of the ,ods, in whi"h we understand the ,ods as agents with respe"t to Being- the 0i*ed simply designates ea"h ,od as a spe"ifi" pattern of "ausality. But we glimpse nothing through su"h a formal designation of the idiot&s of a ,od insofar as this refers to the really indi&idual hyparxis of the ,od. )hat most "learly e*presses the supra1essential aspe"t of di&ine indi&iduality. differentiates the ,ods from one another other and is at the same time not redu"ible to form is ea"h ,od%s proper name. But this "an only be the "ase if the proper name of the ,od is not understood in the same way that a word is. 3 word designates an essen"e, but there are different words in different languages that designate the same essen"e. )ords are thus merely instantiations of that essen"e in di&erse languages. !f the names of the ,ods are li$e words in this way, then the ,ods "annot be differentiated e*"ept by the fun"tions they perform with respe"t to Being and the distin"tion between the supra( essential and onti" domains must "ollapse into "omplete irrele&an"e. 9or the indi&idual distin"tion of the henads, sin"e it is not onti", is either a systemati" &oid or it has the status of a pla"e reserved for something whi"h "an only be supplied by fa"ti"al re&elation, that is, the proper names of indi&idual henads or ,ods. #he system, on this interpretation, would await its appli"ation to a "on"rete body of religious te*ts. )hen this

94 appli"ation ta$es pla"e, as for instan"e in the Platonic Theology, it is as if the "ir"uit "onne"ting diale"ti" and re&elation is "omplete. 3nd yet be"ause the system does not demand appli"ation to one body of religious te*ts rather than another, the per"eption of the ne"essity of this appli"ation itself has lapsed. )e are a""ustomed to philosophy either pla"ing itself prior to re&elation, or ma$ing itself the handmaid of some parti"ular re&elation, and so are ill(prepared to re"ogni1e the sophisti"ation of the approa"h embodied in the henadology. !t is ne"essary, before going any further, to address an issue in "onne"tion with this whole in'uiry whi"h "an only arise due to the poor o&erall grasp of the do"trine of the henads. #he terms henades and theoi ha&e, stri"tly spea$ing, e*a"tly the same e*tension in Pro"lus. #he notion that there are ,ods that are not henads has only arisen due to the inability of "ommentators to grasp that the fa"t that there are ,ods manifest at e&ery le&el of Being without those ,ods therefore possessing in themselves a status inferior to the supra(essential. 3nd yet Pro"lus nowhere gi&es any indi"ation that this was his &iew and, as should be at least beginning to be"ome "lear by now, it is in no way ne"essitated by the substan"e of the do"trine. #here are e'ui&o"al usages of the term henad in Pro"lus, but not of theoi. #he e'ui&o"al usage of the term henad to refer to what are properly monads is dis"ussed in the ne*t "hapter, with the e*"eption of one type of e'ui&o"al usage of the term whi"h shall be ta$en up in the latter part of this "hapter be"ause it has more to do with the "on"erns of the present "hapter. 7enad, as a philosophi"al term, "an be used by the philosopher e'ui&o"ally, on"e the stri"t sense of the term is graspedbut theos, as the ob*ect of philosophi"al analysis, "annot be used e'ui&o"ally lest the entire in'uiry lose its fo"us. #he reader should a""ordingly bear in mind throughout this

95 in'uiry that where&er ! say henad ! mean a ,od and where&er ! say ,od or use the name of a spe"ifi" deity ! am referring to a henad.

#he way to approa"h the problem of the indi&idual distin"tion of the henads in its supra(essential dimension lies in an aspe"t of di&ine manifestation whi"h only enters obli'uely into Pro"lus%s philosophy, that is, the di&ersity of "ultures, ea"h with their own ,ods, for here alone "an the problem of the status of the di&ine name be posed in the way ! ha&e outlined abo&e. 3lthough in his sur&i&ing wor$s Pro"lus only applies his system to the philosophi"al e*pli"ation of the 7elleni" theology, Pro"lus does not only re"ogni1e the ,ods of the ,ree$s. 3""ording to his biographer, his own religious pra"ti"e in&ol&ed the worship of deities from se&eral "ultures (?ita Procli 1C , and 0arinus reports that he felt this degree of "osmopolitanism to be in"umbent upon the philosopher4 one ma*im that this most ,odfearing philosopher had always at hand and was always uttering was that a philosopher ought not to worship in the manner of a single "ity or the "ountry of a few people Dt%n par'eniois patri%nE, but should be the "ommon priest Dtherapeut&nE of the entire world (ibid . #he "ru"ial 'uestion is how this personal e"le"ti"ism of his own religious pra"ti"e fits into his systemati" perspe"ti&e on the nature of di&ine e*isten"e. 7e "learly does not thin$ that any single "ulture has a monopoly on the truth about the ,ods, nor do ! suggest, although this is more diffi"ult to pro&e, that he belie&es all "ultures worship the same ,ods under different names. 3s ! ha&e e*plained, for Pro"lus to ha&e subs"ribed to su"h a do"trine would ha&e the most dire "onse'uen"es for the substan"e of the henadology.

96 8or does Pro"lus, at any rate, "learly a&ail himself of the notion in any te*t we possess. 0u"h of Pro"lus% do"trine about the names of the ,ods "omes from his "ommentary on the #ratylus. 7e says at "# KL that the names of the ,ods are honorable and &enerable, and worthy of the greatest respe"t to the wise. On this a""ount they say it is not proper that the ,ree$s should use the Egyptian, 2"ythian, or Persian names of the ,ods, but su"h as are ,ree$. 9or those presiding o&er pro&in"es DklimatarchaiE re+oi"e when they are denominated in the diale"ts of their proper regions. #he interpretation of the passage depends in part upon what is meant by klimatarchai. )e $now from a passage in Olympiodorus ("n Alc. p. AB.1 that it refers for the latter, and possibly Pro"lus as well, to a parti"ular "lass of en"osmi" deities. 3re we to understand that the 'uestion of su"h names is only rele&ant at the en"osmi" le&el, that is, as applying only to the lowest emanations of the ,ods, and that the same ,ods simply possess different names in different pla"es6 On the other hand, Pro"lus "ould simply be referring to the ,ods in general, insofar as "ertain regions are "onse"rated to them, the term klimatarch&s referring originally to the go&ernor of a pro&in"e. #he problem is that Pro"lus is not "on"erned, in su"h a passage, with the type of 'uestion ! ha&e raised. 7e writes in an en&ironment in whi"h "ross("ultural syn"retism had been a fa"t of life for "enturies. 7e does not wish to inter&ene o&ertly in religious pra"ti"es, but he does see a role for the philosopher as a referee of sorts in the relationships between the religions of different "ultures. #his role of the philosopher as referee emerges in parti"ular, it would seem, when it is a 'uestion of maintaining the di&ersity of beliefs and pra"ti"es against o&errea"hing ideologies.

97 3""ordingly, his "on"ern here is with the notion, 'uite "ommon in later anti'uity, that the ,ree$ di&ine names were simply inferior names for the deities who "ould be a""essed more effe"ti&ely through the use of Egyptian, .haldean, or other barbari" names. 2ee espe"ially in this regard !ambli"hus, !n the 3ysteries N!! 4. AKI and N AKLff. Pro"lus shares with !ambli"hus his re+e"tion of the earlier 7ellenisti" notion that one should routinely translate, e.g., the names of Egyptian ,ods into those of fun"tionally "orresponding ,ree$ ,ods, so that #hoth be"omes 7ermes, 3mun be"omes =eus, and so forth. 7en"e !ambli"hus stresses that names do not entirely preser&e the same meaning when translated into another language- rather, there are "ertain idioms in ea"h nation whi"h "annot be signified by language to another nation (AKL . !n fa"t, the reason that the di&ine names and prayers of the ,ree$s la"$ the effi"a"y of those of the barbarians is be"ause they are "ontinually "hanged through the inno&ation and illegality of the ,ree$s, insofar as they are naturally studious of no&elty, and are "arried about e&erywhere by their &olatility, whereas the barbarians are stable in their manners, and firmly "ontinue to employ the same words (AKC . But Pro"lus re+e"ts the "laim by !ambli"hus that the names and prayers of the ,ree$s are ineffi"a"ious, as well as the "laim that any language is "loser to the di&ine than any other, as when !ambli"hus "laims that the ,ods ha&e shown that the whole diale"t of sa"red nations, su"h as those of the Egyptians and 3ssyrians, is adapted to sa"red "on"erns- on this a""ount we ought to thin$ it ne"essary that our "onferen"e with the ,ods should be in a language allied to them (AKI . 3gain4 as the Egyptians were the first of men who were allotted the parti"ipation of the ,ods, the ,ods when in&o$ed re+oi"e in the Egyptian rites (AKH . #hat Pro"lus re+e"ts this preferen"e of one nation

98 o&er another is "lear, not +ust from the passage "ited abo&e, but also from a passage in his "ommentary on Alcibiades ", where he says, in regard to souls, that the stable and eternal nobility of birth in souls depends upon the ,ods around whom they ha&e been sown G the dis"rimination that has regard to the "ity(states of our world and the pla"es on the earth is absurd and the "ause of "on"eit in souls (11J . But what is the appropriate &alue that is to be a""orded to "ultural di&ersity6 3nd does Pro"lus share the &iew that !ambli"hus seems, at least, to hold, that the same ,ods are worshiped under different names by different peoples, albeit without assigning priority to any one set of names o&er another6 )hat is "lear is that in the #ratylus "ommentary Pro"lus stresses, against those who would attribute names, not to the ,ods, but to the angels, daemons and heroes, i.e. to subordinate "lasses of di&ine entities, that names are in the ,ods themsel&es, and in those ,ods that are allotted the highest order ("# L1 . #his is signifi"ant, sin"e names, and the indi&iduality they "onnote, are thus not simply a symptom of the de"lination of the di&ine toward beings. 7e posits three "lasses of names, whi"h pro"eed from the hyparxis, power, and intelle"t, respe"ti&ely, of ea"h ,od. #hese represent, as we ha&e seen, the three intelligible triads, whi"h represent aspe"ts possessed by ea"h and e&ery ,od qua ,od. #he first "lass of name is des"ribed by Pro"lus as "hara"ters of light, the se"ond as e*hibited in the inarti"ulate e&o"ations of the theurgists, while the third is the "lass of the proper name. @e"all that Pro"lus made the distin"tion, at "T !, JBJ between a s"ientifi" dis"ourse about the ,ods in general and an intelle"tual dis"ourse about indi&idual ,ods. #hese intelle"tual names < i.e. "orresponding, not to the

99 hypostasis of !ntelle"t, but to ea"h ,od%s own intelle"t, that is, the third intelligible triad < are the "ulti" names of the ,ods,

the di&ine names through whi"h the ,ods are in&o$ed, and by whi"h they are "elebrated, being re&ealed by the ,ods themsel&es and re&erting to them, and produ"ing to human $nowledge as mu"h of the ,ods as is apparent. 9or through these we are able to signify something to ea"h other, and to "on&erse with oursel&es about the ,ods. >ifferent nations howe&er parti"ipate differently of these, as, for instan"e, the Egyptians, a""ording to their nati&e tongue, re"ei&ing names of this $ind from the ,ods- but the .haldeans and !ndians in a different manner, a""ording to their proper tongue- and in a similar manner the ,ree$s, a""ording to their diale"t. #hough a "ertain di&inity therefore may be "alled by the ,ree$s Briareus, but differently by the .haldeans, we must ne&ertheless admit, that ea"h of these names is the progeny of the ,ods, and that it signifies the same essen"e.

One might well assume that Pro"lus states here e*a"tly the &iew ! ha&e "laimed him not to endorse. But on"e again, if we read on to what immediately follows, one "an at any rate no longer be sure4 But if some names are more and others less effi"a"ious, it is not surprising, sin"e of things whi"h are $nown to us, su"h as are daimonia"al and angeli" are more effi"a"ious- and, in short, of things denominated, the names of su"h as are nearer are more perfe"t than the names of those that are more remote (L1 . )hether Pro"lus means us to understand that names "on&eyed by angels and daimons are nearer to the ,ods, be"ause they are "ommuni"ated to beings superior to us and so "loser to the ,ods, or that su"h names are nearer to us in that they ha&e been transmitted to us without the medium of tradition, at any rate, we read elsewhere that some, meeting with daimons

100 and angels, ha&e been taught by them names better adapted to things than su"h as ha&e been established (K1 . 3gain, at "# 1AA we read that

many daimons ha&e thought fit to unfold the nature of the ,ods, and ha&e also deli&ered names adapted to the ,ods G by whi"h theurgists in&o$ing the ,ods in the worship adapted to them were fa&orably heard by the di&inities. 0any daimons also, in appearing to men of a more fortunate destiny, ha&e unfolded to them names "onnas"ent with things themsel&es, through whi"h they ha&e rendered the truth about beings more "onspi"uous.

!f the "on"ern in the passage from L1, as at KL, is the "laim that the di&ine names of, e.g., the Egyptians are more effi"a"ious in general than those of other "ultures, then the point Pro"lus is ma$ing "hanges a""ordingly. 8o "ulture possesses a language whose inherent "apa"ity to parti"ipate the di&ine intelle"t, and thus the intelle"tual names of the ,ods, is greater than another%s. 3""ordingly, Pro"lus poses a hypotheti"al "ase4 even if one and the same deity should happen to possess names in two different languages < and noti"e that Pro"lus "hooses here, not a "elebrated "ase of syn"retism, su"h as =eus and 3mun, or >emeter and !sis, or e&en Plato%s famous e'uation of 3thena and 8eith in the Timaeus, but rather a far more marginal figure, indi"ating his e*treme relu"tan"e to a"tually embra"e the "ounterfa"tual hypothesis < it still would not be the "ase that the .haldean name, in the e*ample, would be more effi"a"ious.I @ather, ea"h of these names is the progeny of the ,ods, where we note that Pro"lus does not say, of the ,od in 'uestion, in this "ase Briareus, but of the ,ods in general, that is, ea"h name is e'ually divine. !f, of two names for the same thing, one is more effi"a"ious, it may be be"ause it is of the "lass
I >illon, in #he 0agi"al Power of 8ames in Origen and ?ater Platonism, (in 7anson P .rou1el (1CHK , p. A1B , paraphrases this passage while unfortunately eliminating the counterfactual phrasing whi"h is e*pli"it in the ,ree$.

101 whi"h are deli&ered by angels, daemons or heroes in a spe"ial re&elation tailored to a narrow "onte*t, or it may be nearer to us in some other way. Pro"lus is, in short, see$ing to e*plain why some people may ha&e e*perien"ed greater effi"a"y in the use of foreign names4 it is not be"ause some language is altogether "loser to the di&ine than another, but be"ause there are many "lasses of names. 3s su"h, we might be inad&ertently "omparing the effi"a"y of two names whose status relati&e to the realm of the di&ine in general is not "omparable, the effi"a"y in 'uestion being the stri"tly pragmati" effi"a"y of getting any di&ine results at all, that is, "onta"ting the di&ine in general. !t would be odd, at any rate, that Pro"lus would be referring to ;reek names when he spea$s of names that are more effi"a"ious, sin"e as we ha&e seen from the passage in !ambli"hus, it was "ommon to a""ord in"reased effi"a"y to foreign names of the ,ods < espe"ially Egyptian and .haldean names < and not to ,ree$ ones. !f we should "on"lude that Pro"lus belie&ed that the same ,ods were worshiped under different names in different "ultures, we would of "ourse need to e*plain what he thought he was doing in writing hymns to foreign deities and obser&ing their festi&als, as 0arinus relates < 0arinus spe"ifi"ally mentions .ybele, 0arnas of ,a1a, 3s"lepius ?eontu"hos of 3s"alon,L #heandrites of the 3rabs, and !sis of Philae, adding that one "ould almost say that he obser&ed with the proper rituals the signifi"ant holidays of e&ery people and the an"estral rites of ea"h (1C < sin"e a""ording to the interpretation whi"h ! ha&e "riti"i1ed, these a"ti&ities would simply "onstitute a less effe"ti&e means of "onta"ting the same ,ods whom he "ould rea"h with perfe"t ade'ua"y through 7elleni" methods. !t "an only be that Pro"lus saw these ,ods as distin"t indi&iduals, that in fa"t it is his understanding of the ,ods as absolute indi&iduals that allows Pro"lus to worship
L Perhaps the Phoeni"ian ,od Eshmoun ( eoplatonic :aints, p. HL n. A11 .

102 su"h an e"le"ti" assortment of deities ta$en apart from their respe"ti&e pantheons. 3nd yet Pro"lus% goal is not to li'uidate the pantheon as su"h- he operates within a single pantheon for the purposes of the Platonic Theology. !t is signifi"ant that Pro"lus does not in"lude in the Platonic Theology all the ,ods he $nows, for it shows that there are other hori1ons for him beyond the perspe"ti&e embodied in this te*t. But to return to the issue of the "ross("ultural comparison of deities, the reason ! ha&e ta$en su"h "are to "lear the spa"e ! ha&e with respe"t to Pro"lus% attitude toward su"h "omparison is for the sa$e of "ertain profound possibilities inherent in the system he "reated. #he relationship between henads and the monads parti"ipating them ma$es it possible to understand those "hara"teristi"s and powers that deities of different "ultures ha&e in "ommon as refle"ting parti"ipation in distin"t deities by the same monads, sin"e the unity of these monads is a unity of essen"e rather than an indi&idual unity. 3s su"h, it is no longer ne"essary, gi&en the "on"ept of indi&iduality embodied in the henadology, to identify the indi&idual with a set of distinguishing 'ualities. Of "ourse, e&en gi&en su"h a notion of indi&iduality, there would always be more than enough differen"es in the series of 'ualities or asso"iations depending from, e.g., >ionysos, on the one hand, and Osiris, on the other, that there would be no 'uestion of indis"ernibility if, as in the "ase of "orporeal indi&iduals, disposition in spa"e represented a failsafe means of dis"erning indi&iduals. But in the "ase of entities that are at on"e e&erywhere and nowhere, what would pre&ent us from simply dissol&ing all the 'ualities of both into a single "on+un"tion, with the "ontrary or "ontradi"tory attributes distributed among different hypostases as Pro"lus does in the series he posits emanating from ea"h di&ine indi&idual6 3 possible "ounter(argument is ad&an"ed by Pro"lus in a defense of

103 the e*isten"e of a multipli"ity of ,ods that might be "alled the argument from measure, o""urring at "P 1B4C4

E&en as we ta$e our start from sense(per"eption in a"'uiring understanding of the differentiation of in"orporeal essen"es, so it is on the basis of the &ariation in in"orporeal essen"es that we "ogni1e the unmi*ed distin"tness of the primal, supra(essential henads and the parti"ular "hara"teristi"s of ea"h G 2o then, as we "ontemplate the e*tent of the whole in"orporeal realm whi"h is spread out beneath them and the measured series of &ariations down from the hidden le&el to that of distin"tness, we de"lare our belief that there e*ists parti"ularity and order e&en in the henads themsel&es, along with their unity. 9or it is on the basis of the differen"es in the parti"ipants that we dis"ern the distin"tions within the parti"ipated- for things that parti"ipated without &ariation in the same thing "ould not ha&e e*hibited su"h differen"es relati&e to ea"h other.

.ompare the measured series of &ariations here with the referen"es to the measured pro"ession of the generation of beings at "P 1BCB and to the measures of the generation of the di&ine genera and the beings unified by the ,ods at PT !! 1A. LA. A1(A. #hat there is measure in the pro"ession of Being is an epistemi" presumption assuring us that we "an draw "on"lusions about "auses from their effe"ts, hen"e assuring the intelligibility of the uni&erse. )ere there a gap in this "hain, it would be"ome ne"essary to introdu"e a fa"tor &oid of meaning or e&en a prin"iple opposed to meaning, an element of pure fa"ti"ity, "han"e or disorder. #he differen"es among the parti"ipants would, in the last analysis, ha&e to be attributed to some substrate or material "ause. #his is an appli"ation of what >odds "hara"teri1es as Pro"lus% prin"iple of .ontinuity (p. A1I , e.g. that the 'ualitati&e inter&al between any term of the pro"ession and its immediate "onse'uent is

104 the minimum differen"e "ompatible with distin"tness. !n the "ase ! ha&e been dis"ussing, the "ultural differen"es between Egypt and ,ree"e, say, would on the "ompeting interpretation, ha&e to be attributed entirely to non(ideal fa"tors, rather than to the parti"ipation of different ,ods. #here "an be, perhaps, no proof that this would in itself be unpalatable to Pro"lus, although one would suspe"t as mu"h- what is "lear though is the unpalatable "onse'uen"es there would be for the system. #he 'uestion of matter ! ta$e up at the end of this "hapter and then again in the "hapter on the intelle"tual ,ods- but what about the other end of the s"ale6 9or the "onse'uen"e of dismissing the "ulturally distin"t names of the ,ods to mere parti"ipants of "ommon onti" fun"tions, rather than the onti" fun"tions themselves as parti"ipants in "ommon of primordially distin"t supra(essential indi&iduals, would be to dissol&e all the ,ods into the One. #his would be the ultimate "onse'uen"e of redu"ing the ,ods to sets of 'ualities or attributes. #his would lead to irrationalism, inasmu"h as a fa"tor opa'ue to or e&en hostile to intelligibility would ha&e to be "alled upon as the sour"e of the real distin"tion of the ,ods, not to mention what it would do to the trans"enden"e of the One to introdu"e into it that sort of potentiality. 3""ordingly, when Pro"lus refers to the One as ,od < whi"h he does not do, for that matter, as often as he appears to in "ertain English translations < it does not refer to one ,od in the monotheist sense, but refers indifferently to any ,od or to the generi" 'uality of ,odhood, in a""ord with "enturies of usage of ho theos whi"h rarely if e&er implied, in and of itself, some shift toward monotheism. !t is true, on the other hand, that prior to the do"trine of the henads there had been no thoroughgoing attempt to e*press in metaphysi"al terms the stru"tural foundations of polytheist pra*is,

105 for there was no way to re"on"ile existential plurality with a monism with respe"t to principles, that is, intelle"tual monism. #he distin"tion Pro"lus offers between deities and their powers or fun"tions, as e*pressed in the parti"ipation of monads in henads, has the potential to pro&ide a &ehi"le of mediation between the religions of different "ultures. 9or Pro"lus "an spea$ of, e.g., the Fronian monad ("# IJ, 1B4 when he means to refer to the position in the stru"ture of hypostases or monads o""upied by Fronos, so that =eus is said to be the son of Fronos inasmu"h as =eus being the demiurgi" intelle"t, pro"eeds from another intelle"t, superior and more uniform, et al. (1B4 . 3gain, at "# 1L1, he e*plains that Persephone is allotted triple powers as "omprehending three monads of ,ods. One "an easily see how this point of &iew would ha&e helped Pro"lus to render the sort of aid in re"tifying lo"al "ults that 0arinus reports of him. )here elements of the "ult had been lost or forgotten, he would ha&e been able, based upon his dis"ernment of the monadi" stru"ture, whi"h in its abstra"t "hara"ter "onstitutes a sort of unit of measure applied to the ,ods, to fill the gaps with appropriate, presumably indigenous, material. 9or instan"e, on a trip to ?ydia, Pro"lus a"'uired "lear $nowledge of their "ustoms D&i1. Mthe more an"ient rites still pra"ti"ed there%E, and for their part, if through length of time they had negle"ted any of the pra"ti"es, they learned from the philosopher%s dire"tions to ser&e the ,ods more perfe"tly (1K . 3gain, on his so+ourn in 3drotta, again in ?ydia, Pro"lus resol&es a dispute among the nati&es as to what ,od or ,ods fre'uented the pla"e and were honored there, sin"e different tales pre&ailed among the lo"als (JA . 0arinus portrays the solution as arri&ing to Pro"lus in a re&elation, but the a""ount displays ne&ertheless a se'uen"e of hermeneuti"al inferen"es based upon the "hara"teristi"s

106 reported by the lo"als, by means of whi"h the opinion of some, that the deity was 3s"lepius and of others that the lo"al deities were the >ios"uri, were harmoni1ed by Pro"lus by as"ribing the "ult to the twin sons of 3s"lepius, 0a"haon and Podilarius. By $eeping the henadi" and monadi" registers < that is, the identity and the fun"tions of deities respe"ti&ely < separate and distin"t, one is able to a"$nowledge the similarities between "ertain deities without &iolating their integrity either by "onflating, e.g., >ionysos and Osiris, nor, a fortiori, by "ollapsing all the ,ods into an hypostati1ed One. #he One must be, in relation to the henads, neither a whole "ontaining them as parts nor represented by them in its aspe"ts or adumbrations, nor a father, nor a "reator. 9or as Pro"lus reminds us at PT !!! 4. 1AJ(4, we must at on"e preser&e the trans"enden"y of the first Dprin"ipleE with referen"e to the things posterior to it, and also maintain un"onfused the henads whi"h pro"eed DproelthousasE from it, with respe"t to ea"h other as well as to their uni'ue prin"iple. #o "onflate distin"t deities "ould be seen as a type of disrespe"t of the di&ine name, for as it is not holy to beha&e in a disorderly manner towards the statues of the ,ods, so neither is it be"oming to err about names ("# K1 . )e are reminded of the Egyptian priest, who DiEn the daily "ult ser&i"e G must de"lare before the god who is being worshiped, M! ha&e not e'uated your nature with that of another god%, (7ornung 1HK . But there is a more profound issue here, for one would &iolate the integrity of the pro"ession of Being itself by ma$ing the di&ersity and parti"ularity the ,ods embody in the ri"hness of their "ultural "onte*t a produ"t of entropy, for if the ,ood is multiplied through wea$ness, the whole of things will pro"eed through a diminution, rather than through a superabundan"e of goodness. 3""ording to this prin"iple, the measured series of &ariations in the s"ale of being must

107 in"lude as well an a""ount respe"ting the integrity of di&erse "ultures as something more than a wea$ness in the re"eption of the di&ine. 9or how "ould the &ery means of a""ess to the ,ods be a symptom of their de"line6 )e find, therefore, in the polytheism of Pro"lus, something trans"ending e&en what /an 3ssmann has "alled "osmotheism. 7e points out, 'uite "orre"tly, that the ine&itable "onstru"tion of "ultural otherness G is to a "ertain degree "ompensated by te"hni'ues of translation, and that DaEn"ient polytheisms fun"tioned as su"h a te"hni'ue of translation.

#hey belong within the emergen"e of the 3n"ient )orld as a "oherent e"umene of inter"onne"ted nations. #he polytheisti" religions o&er"ame the primiti&e ethno"entrism of tribal religions by distinguishing se&eral deities by name, shape, and fun"tion. #he names are, of "ourse, different in different "ultures, be"ause the languages are different. #he shapes of the gods and the forms of worship may also differ signifi"antly. But the fun"tions are stri$ingly similar, espe"ially in the "ase of "osmi" deities- and most deities had a "osmi" fun"tion. #he sun god of one religion is easily e'uated to the sun god of another religion, and so forth. Be"ause of their fun"tional e'ui&alen"e, deities of different religions "an be e'uated. (3oses the Egyptian, A(J

)hile 3ssmann%s analysis is ade'uate with regard to the histori"al de&elopment of polytheism through most of anti'uity, in Pro"lus we see the return of the "on"ept of indi&iduality o&er and abo&e fun"tional e'ui&alen"e. 8or does this "ome about as a regression to a more primiti&e stru"ture, but through the sublation of the paradigm of translation. 9un"tional e'ui&alen"e, now o""urring within its own register, need no longer imply identity. #he intelle"tual a""omplishment of "osmotheism is rightly praised by

108 3ssmann4 #he different peoples worshipped different gods, but nobody "ontested the reality of foreign gods and the legitima"y of foreign forms of worship (J - but on"e this insight has been established through the labor of translation, differen"e no longer requires translation in order to demand respe"t. #his does not mean that we stop translating or trying to translate, but the goal of translation is no longer the redu"tion of the different to the same. 3ssmann seems not altogether unaware that there is more to be found in polytheism than its "osmotheisti" potential- for while he spea$s of a return of the repressed in regard to "osmotheism, manifesting itself in "osmotheisti" mo&ements su"h as 8eoplatonism, 7ermeti"ism, al"hemy, "abala, 2pino1ism, >eism, and pantheism, he ne&ertheless "onfesses that DnEobody ta$ing part in this dis"ourse e&er went so far as to intone Mpraise of polytheism.% #his remained for postmodern philosophy to formulate (A1L .

!n this "hapter ! ha&e tried to show how the most "ru"ial philosophical issues in the henadology ha&e no hope of proper resolution if we di&or"e the philosophi"al and religious dimensions of the do"trine. By persistently regarding one side or the other of the do"trine as inessential, "ommentators ha&e fore"losed any possibility of truly understanding and appre"iating the ri"hness of Pro"lus% "ontribution. #he henadology represents a genuine negotiation between religion and philosophy whi"h attempts to fully respe"t the "laims of ea"h. )e ha&e despaired in ad&an"e of the &ery possibility of su"h a negotiation ha&ing a su""essful out"ome if we assume from the outset that the en"ounter between these two domains of human thought "an only result in the "apitulation of one to the terms of the other. One may not, indeed, "are for the terms of the settlement. On the

109 one hand, it reser&es to religious dis"ourses and not to philosophi"al spe"ulation the right to fill the "lass of absolute indi&iduals, the henads, with entities the terms of whose e*isten"e is prior to ontologi"al determinations. On the other hand, it denies to any religious dis"ourse the right to deny the e*isten"e of the ,ods of any other religious dis"ourse. !n either "ase, the attempted statement simply fails to ma$e sense due to the register in whi"h the two dis"ourses operate. 3 philosopher "an only spea$ of "lasses and of formal entities, not of indi&iduals, and so they "an posit no a"tual ,ods but only types of ,ods "orresponding to formal designations. 3 theologian or mythographer "an posit the e*isten"e of entities, but not their non(e*isten"e, be"ause non(e*isten"e is an ontologi"al determination inasmu"h as it presupposes uni&ersal 'uantifi"ation. But uni&ersal 'uantifi"ation re'uires a mediated unity of the members of the "lass, whereas the e*istential dis"ourse of the theologian a"tually applies only to a single henad or to a "o(emergent set of henads. #herefore the denial of the e*isten"e of other ,ods in a religious dis"ourse only asserts that the ,od with whi"h the dis"ourse in 'uestion is "on"erned has no other ,ods in his;her "o( emergent set, i.e. that the set in 'uestion has the &alue of one. !t is a statement, in other words, that merely re&erts ba"$ upon the deity in 'uestion, as a statement about or 'ualifi"ation of the terms of that parti"ular deity%s manifestation in Being. !t is, in short, something that deity has affirmed about him@herself. .orrelati&ely, on"e the register in whi"h uni&ersal 'uantifi"ation "an operate has been rea"hed, one has lost the power to say that any particular deity e*ists or does not e*ist, for at this le&el one "an only determine "lasses of entity. 8or "ould one hope to establish monotheism by the simple appeal to intelle"tual monism, for the "on"epts of unity and multipli"ity ha&e re&ealed

110 themsel&es as distin"t in the supra(essential and onti" registers, and this distin"tion is not a matter of redu"ing both to spe"ies of a genus. #he two modes of unity (and the two modes of multipli"ity form, instead, a 'uasi(genus, su"h that the one mode of unity arises from out of the other and unity is said, appropriately enough, pros hen.

#hree modes of unity are ultimately rele&ant to our in'uiry. )e are basi"ally familiar with two of them by now, namely the unity of the henadi" indi&idual and the formal or spe"ifi" unity of beings. But there is a third whi"h we are only beginning to grasp, namely the unity of the national pantheon. #his unity has been inferred negati&ely from the argument ! ha&e pursued against the idea that the ,ods of the many nations (ta ethn& are merely different names for the same limited set of ,ods whi"h would, on this a""ount, be mat"hed one(to(one with the genera of Being and e*haust the supra(essential realm, in this way possessing no surplus o&er Being, +ust as the religious dis"ourse would possess no surplus o&er the philosophi"al dis"ourse, amounting to a mere allegori1ation of abstra"t prin"iples, a tableau &i&ant illustrating the philosopher%s arguments and no more. But if there is a real unity to national pantheons, and the ,ods who populate them are not identi"al with their fun"tional "ounterparts in other pantheons, then what is the prin"iple of unity in su"h a pantheon6 9irst, how is a pantheon delimited6 )hy do +ust so many ,ods belong to a gi&en pantheon6 !f the "on"ept of a pantheon is to ha&e any rele&an"e to a philosophi"al in'uiry, it "annot be determined merely by nationality, for su"h a grouping has no substantiality e*"ept for anthropology. @ather, there must be a prin"iple of unity for a pantheon whi"h has signifi"an"e for the ,ods in&ol&ed, and not +ust for us, +ust as the

111 powers of the ,ods are themselves supra(essential, e&en though they are that in the ,ods whi"h inclines toward Being. !nstead, we should regard a pantheon as delimited by the fi*ing of a one(to(one "orresponden"e of ,ods to onti" fun"tions. 2in"e ea"h ,od "ontains, for him;herself, the whole of Being, the parti"ipation of a ,od in a pantheon whi"h itself represents the whole of Being, must e*press the a"tuali1ation of only a narrow sli"e of that ,od%s potential. 3nd this e*istential fa"t is not without anthropologi"al manifestation4 the role whi"h a gi&en 7elleni" deity, for instan"e, plays in relation to the set of Olympians is mu"h narrower than the role whi"h that deity plays at their "ult "enter, alone or in asso"iation usually with +ust a small number of other deities. #he different si1es of the groupings in whi"h a ,od is en"ountered refle"t different degrees of arti"ulation of a logos about the role of the ,ods with respe"t to Being. #herefore the histori"al de&elopment of a metanarrati&e in"orporating a number of lo"al deities into a national pantheon of n members, a labor of integration performed by poets and mythographers o&er "enturies, has as its "ondition of possibility the e*isten"e of a logos about Being with a not(less(than(n(fold arti"ulation. )hen we are tal$ing about a pantheon, then, in some sense more robust than the merely anthropologi"al, we are tal$ing about a "olle"tion of deities who, with no irre&o"able sa"rifi"e of that indi&idual autonomy by &irtue of whi"h ea"h "ontains the whole of Being, are ne&ertheless present to the worshiper also from the perspe"ti&e of a single whole of Being, or of di&ine a"ti&ity with respe"t to Being, a pan(theon or totality, of whi"h ea"h represents a part. )hat are the limits of su"h a whole6 .ould a pantheon grow to really in"lude all the ,ods6 7ere we must be "areful. 3 pantheon is not a logi"al set o&er whi"h we may

112 'uantify- it is a supra(essential "olle"ti&e. #he bonds between the ,ods in it are forged, not by fun"tional identity, but by mythologi"al in"ident, narrati&e relationships, and i"oni" +u*taposition. )hile we "an, with the intelle"t whi"h "omes to us ultimately from the ,ods, turn the lens of our ontologi"al "ategories upon the ,ods themsel&es, analy1ing and "omparing them, the sort of bonds whi"h "reate a pantheon "an only "ome to us through a new story. 3nd, needless to say, the stories that are told about the ,ods are not, for a reader su"h as Pro"lus, mere produ"ts of human fan"y. 3 register of +ust how seriously Pro"lus ta$es myth is that he pla"es it on an e'ual footing with mathemati"s as images in whi"h we may sur&ey paradigms, and through the former pass to the latter ("T !!, A4I . 3nd it would be no e*aggeration at all to say that for Pro"lus the dis"o&ery of a new myth would be +ust as diffi"ult as the dis"o&ery of a new theorem of mathemati"s. 3s su"h, the grouping of ,ods into a pantheon in the substanti&e sense must be regarded for all pra"ti"al purposes as an elective assemblage representing the will of the ,ods in&ol&ed. #he passage from hypar"ti" or e*istential autonomy, howe&er, into su"h an assemblage in&ol&es the passage into a multipli"ity go&erned by onti" rules. 3nd +ust as onti" manifolds are mediated by their monads, so do narrati&es ha&e fi*ed "enters and peripheries, with some "hara"ters playing larger roles than others. #his narrati&e logi" plays itself out in the 7elleni" theology and in Pro"lus% a""ount thereof, in the spe"ial importan"e a""orded the deity identified with the demiurgi" intelle"t. #his deity is, for the ,ree$s, =eus < at least in Pro"lus% +udgment. !t is =eus qua all(perfe"t unparti"ipated intelle"t ("# CC , that is, be"ause it is this deity, among the ,ods of the ,ree$s, in whom the monad of the demiurgi" intelle"t parti"ipates, : la ET prop. 1IJ4 3ll those henads are

113 intelle"tual whereof the unparti"ipated !ntelligen"e en+oys parti"ipation. 7en"e DoEf the many demiurgi there is one demiurge, in order that all things may be "onse'uent to ea"h other, the One, the intelligible paradigm, the one intelligible demiurge, the one only( begotten world (Tim. CAb ("T !, J1Bf . Pro"lus fre'uently stresses the analogy between the demiurge and the One- not only are the One and the >emiurge both Fings in the "onte*t of the se"ond Epistle, but Pro"lus refers at "P IBF to a bit of .haldean lore in whi"h Ad, the word for one is redupli"ated to name the demiurge4 Adad. #hey do not say that it "omes immediately ne*t to the One, but only that it is "omparable to the One by way of proportion- for as the former is to the intelligible, so that latter is to the whole &isible world. #his analogy arises be"ause the entire "hain of hypostati" monads "rystalli1es with the fi*ing of any deity to a single onti" position. )ith this fi*ing, two sorts of hierar"hies immediately emerge. 9irst, all those other deities with whom the fi*ed deity has mythologi"al relations are fi*ed in those positions, forming the nu"leus of a unified system of Being. #his is the "enter. 3t the periphery lies all the attributes, in"idents and relationships of the ,ods in the nu"leus that "onfli"t with those in the nu"leus. #hese are seen as still belonging to the system, but at its periphery, inasmu"h as they represent the manifestation of the deities in the gi&en system at different le&els of Being. 9rom a broader perspe"ti&e, howe&er, these "ould also be seen as the residuum within the system of the possibility of other systemati" dispositions of the pantheon, one in whi"h, for instan"e, =eus might ha&e a smaller and more peripheral role, whi"h "ould ha&e "ome about through any number of histori"al a""idents. !t is neither a 'uestion here of a full blown theodi"y, in whi"h things had to turn out as they did, nor of an

114 abandonment of su"h a""idents to "han"e- a different "onfiguration of the metanarrati&e would ha&e refle"ted the a"tuali1ation of a different potential logos. #his sele"tion or fi*ing of a deity to an ontologi"al position is not a &oluntaristi" a"t by a gi&en worshiper- rather, it e*presses an hermeneuti"al engagement with a religious tradition, the endea&or to distill from the religious te*t the philosophi"al truths it in"orporates without redu"ing the mythologi"al dis"ourse to a mere allegori"al garment for these ideas. #he e*isting wor$s of ,ree$ theologians are thus used as so mu"h empiri"al testimony to the ontologi"al roles played by the ,ods of different pantheons, whether it is a 'uestion in Pro"lus of pro&ing that the Platoni" demiurge of the Timaeus is =eus, or as >amas"ius will later dis"ern in the theologies of se&eral other nations the deities parti"ipated by the intelligible triads. #he spe"ial role a""orded to the demiurge in Pro"lus manifests his allegian"e to the prin"iple that 3ristotle e*pressed at 3etaphysics R!! 1B by 'uoting 7omer to the effe"t that the rule of many is not good- let one the ruler be (1BLIa . 9or indeed, the substan"es of the uni&erse are not a plurality of unrelated parts in Pro"lus, nor does his polytheisti" theology mean that things are go&erned badly. 3s Philip 0erlan has e*plained, 3ristotle%s statement is hardly an assertion of monotheism, sin"e there is an ineliminable multipli"ity of unmo&ed mo&ers in his own system. !ndeed, as 0erlan points out in regard to 1BLAb 1J(JB, 3ristotle as a matter of fa"t employs, in other passages, the same tones of rapture in e*tolling M,ods% whi"h he here ma$es use of in e*alting M,od%, &i1. 9e #aelo ! C, ALCa 1H and Eth. ic. R H, 11LHbL (3ristotle%s 5nmo&ed 0o&ers, Traditio 4, 1C4I pp. 1(JB . 2u"h passages show the degree to whi"h 3ristotle spea$s indifferently of ,od and the ,ods. #he prima"y a""orded the first unmo&ed

115 mo&er e*presses not monotheism but rather henotheism < what 0erlan refers to as subordinationism < a do"trine within polytheism a""ording to whi"h the multipli"ity of ,ods a"$nowledge a single ruler in order that relationships of "enter and periphery be fi*ed for the subse'uent orders of being (the term henotheism is sometimes used to refer to the phenomenon ! ha&e pre&iously referred to as monolatry, but this usage is to be a&oided . 0erlan also "alls attention to the signifi"an"e for 3ristotle%s do"trine of the issue of whether spe"ies ordered hierar"hi"ally < i.e. the unmo&ed mo&ers deployed about their ruler < may form a genus. 9or Pro"lus, su"h 'uasi(genera ha&e their paradigm in the form of di&ine series. #his a""ounts for the e*tra(logi"al status of 'uasi(genera and may pro&ide a "lue as to the genesis of the "on"ept of the henadi" arithmos in the +u*taposition of two problemati"s < on the one hand, the infinite regress posed by the unity of the "on"ept of 5nity from the Parmenides- on the other, the 3ristotelian problem of the relationship among the unmo&ed mo&ers, who "annot be subsumed under a genus due to the aforementioned logi"al diffi"ulty. #he solution lies in the formula of a henotheism that emerges from the matri* of a poly"entri" polytheism as the latter%s "ollapse into determina"y in the "onstitution of !ntelle"t. !n Pro"lus there is a class of intelle"tual deities $nown as rulers, i.e. the ,ods of the Phaedrus. #he "ommon 'uality among these ,ods is, of "ourse, the paramount role that they play in the as"ent of the parti"ular soul, at on"e the "riti"al moment in the "onstitution of the hypostases and the most hidden in the system itself, for it +oins three uni'ue entities in their uni'ueness4 a uni'ue human being, a uni'ue di&inity, and a uni'ue world(order, a "on+un"tion whi"h is the essen"e of theurgy. )e "an glimpse the

116 signifi"an"e of this moment in the system in the remar$ from "P 1B4H about the tradition among men of old who termed in"orporeal essen"e as a whole MOne,% and the "orporeal and in general the di&isible MOthers%- so that in whate&er sense you too$ the One, you would not de&iate from the "ontemplation of in"orporeal substan"es and the ruling henads (my emphasis , where the "onta"t between the parti"ular soul and its tutelary deity elicits, in effe"t, the One !tself, and by impli"ation all the inter&ening hypostases. ,uided by the metaphor of so&ereignty, we must understand the demiurgi" intelle"t as a position, a throne, as it were, that "ould be o""upied by different deities in the 7elleni" theology +ust as it is, naturally, o""upied by different deities within the pantheons of different nations. )ithin the ,ree$ religious field alone, it is "lear that, for e*ample, the onto(theology of Empedo"les de("enters =eus in fa&or of a demiurgi" 3phrodite, although Pro"lus is of the opinion that all the ,ree$ theology attributes this position to =eus ("T !, J1I . !n Egyptian religion, we "an see far more stri$ing manifestations of this phenomenon. 3s 7ornung remar$s,

!t is "hara"teristi" of the Egyptian "on"eption of god that the epithet Mgreatest god% "an be gi&en to the most &aried deities, often in a single te*t G #he fa"t that literally any god "an be the Mgreatest% of all the gods should warn us against isolating the Mgreatest god% as a figure separate from the other deities. #he same is also true of the statement that one god "reated all the others and of the use of ntr Dthe generi" term for deity in EgyptianE in the instru"tion te*ts Dthat is, the edifying or ethi"al te*ts sometimes $nown as )isdom ?iteratureE. !n ea"h "ase we find that the spe"ifi", well($nown deities of the Egyptian pantheon were meant, ne&er a supergod behind the gods. (1HL(H

117 Parti"ularly rele&ant to the "on"ept of the demiurge in the Pro"lean system are 7ornung%s remar$s about the epithet nb1r1*r, usually translated lord of all. 7owe&er, the translation Mlord of all% G "an easily gi&e rise to a falsifi"ation of the Egyptian "on"eption of god. M?ord of all% is not what is meant, but 'uite literally Mlord to the end% < to the spatial and temporal end of the "reated world (AJK . !n similar fashion, the demiurge is at on"e supreme and stri"tly limited in his fun"tion of "onstituting the whole of the "osmos qua whole in a system where the logi" of wholes and parts is subordinated to henadi" indi&iduality < see, for instan"e, "T !, J1Jf4 =eus therefore, "omprehending in himself wholes, produ"es in "on+un"tion with 8ight all things monadi"ally and intelle"tually. )here suprema"y is subordinated to indi&iduality, suprema"y is, as it were, no longer itself supreme. 7ornung goes on to e*plain the breadth of appli"ation of the $ey demiurgi" epithets4

By the end of the Old Fingdom at the latest, the Egyptians had de&eloped their "on"eption of a supreme being who is $ing and lord of all that is "reated, and is also the "reator and sustainer of e&erything that e*ists. !n Egypt, howe&er, the 'ualities of this supreme being do not atta"h to a parti"ular deity, but may be attributed to any deity, e&en to relati&ely unimportant lo"al gods. !n our sour"es the 'ualities of a "reator god and ruler are most "ommonly found attributed to the sun god @e and gods who are "ombined syn"retisti"ally with him G DbutE at any time an Egyptian belie&er "ould "redit some other deity, who was for him the most important god in the "ult in his home town, or who in"orporated a region of the world whi"h was signifi"ant to him at the time, with all the supreme attributes of di&ine power, e&en if the deity was not "ombined syn"retisti"ally with @e or 3mun. (AJK(I

118 #he logi"al stru"ture 7ornung so perspi"uously demonstrates is none other than that whi"h ! ha&e attempted to arti"ulate in relation to the henadology. #he order of impli"ation is from di&erse and in"ommensurable henotheisms to the re"ognition of monolatry, whi"h in turn finds its supra(essential ground in the radi"al or poly"entri" polytheism of the henadi" arithmos. #he demiurge is both henad and monad. Pro"lus ma$es spe"ifi" referen"e to the dual nature of the demiurgi" intelle"t at "P LIJ. #he passage begins from a "onsideration of how the "osmos is both one and many G not only in its bodily e*panse G but also in the in"orporeal li&es it "ontains. 9or there are ,ods in it, and daemons- men, animals, and plants, et al. 8oti"e that e&en the ,ods "an be said, in a "ertain sense, to be "ontained in the "osmos (e&en if Pro"lus means here stri"tly the "lass of encosmic ,ods, these are ;ods nonetheless < &i1. ET prop. 1IK < and all ,ods are supra(essential, regardless of their "lass . )hen"e, then, has this "osmos su"h a "hara"ter G as to be both one and many6 >oes it not "ome from the ,od who fashioned and fitted it together6 But from what sour"es did he fashion it or when"e did he pro&ide it with its unity and multipli"ity6 )as it not from his own essen"e6 #hus the demiurgi" intelle"t is both one and many through the whole of itself. !ts plurality is a spe"ifi" unity DhenoeidesE, its unity is multiple Dto hen pepl&thusmenonE, and there is nothing you "an ta$e within it that is not both one and many. Ea"h of the forms, then, is both a unity and a multipli"ity, (LIA < that is, the demiurge is in a way consubstantial with the forms. 8e*t Pro"lus ta$es up the 'uestion of the nature of the intelle"t%s unity, whi"h is, on the one hand, not to be understood

119
as the di&ine "hara"ter Dtheot&taE of !ntelle"t, by whi"h !ntelle"t is both father and ma$er of all things Dt%n hol%nE. 9or this di&inity "annot parta$e of plurality- it is the generator of all the plurality it "ontains, and it is not lawful that what is generated should be parti"ipated in by its generator. But neither "an we ta$e it to be the one that is, as it were, the entirety of the forms. 9or again we seriously restri"t its power when we spea$ thusalthough this one and many are the full "omplement Dpl&r%maE of the forms, yet this "hara"ter does not embra"e the whole nature of the >emiurge.

7a&ing "arefully ruled out identifying the proper unity of the !ntelle"t either with the deity it parti"ipates, nor with the mere totality of the forms, Pro"lus has "leared a spa"e for the entity in 'uestion4

#he one, then Dto hen, i.e. the One in the !ntelle"tE, must be said to be that whi"h is the wholeness of the entire demiurgi" intelle"t, that to whi"h the theologian is loo$ing when he says, One "ame to be, (Orph. fr. 1IH . 9or it itself "ontains all things on an intelle"tual le&el- it is a single intelle"t embra"ing many intelle"ts, and an intelle"tual "osmos whi"h is a monad of self(perfe"ted Dautotel%nE intelle"ts. 9or not only does it "ontain the whole "ompass of the !deas but also many other wholes, as the theologians ha&e taught us. )e must then "all that single wholeness the henad that per&ades all wholeness, if we are to preser&e its "hara"ter as being Dto ousi%des aut&sE (for wholeness is a real being DousiaE - and on the other hand by the plurality we must understand the more spe"ifi" ran$s DtaxeisE of beings that are "omprehended by this wholeness, and none of whi"h appears without a share in wholeness- for anything whate&er that you might ta$e parti"ipates in the whole and in its intelle"tual "hara"ter, if this language be permitted. 5nity and plurality are the most general of all $inds of beings whate&er, and it is through them that the demiurgi" !ntelle"t himself is the "ause of all forms. (LIJf

120 #here are three entities in 'uestion, then, when we spea$ of the !ntelle"t4 an immanent monad, whi"h is really +ust the pl&r%ma of the forms- an intelle"tual deity- and a trans"endent(monad(cum(henad whi"h mediates these. #his latter is a One whi"h "omes to be, hen"e a monad, a parti"ipant in unity < for see ET prop. J4 !n so far, then, as they undergo a pro"ess of be"oming one, they parti"ipate unity. !t is a One, howe&er, whi"h "ontains all things intelle"tually, whi"h is itself an intelle"tual "osmos. 3 single intelle"t embra"ing many intelle"ts < not +ust many ideas < it is a monad in relation to the many di&ine intelle"ts, ea"h of whi"h is for its own part autotel&s. !t "ontains many other wholes, inasmu"h as all the taxeis of beings are present in it as well. #he spe"ifi" referen"e to theologians is inspired probably by the Orphi" &erse in whi"h =eus swallows Phanes (the intelligible intelle"t and "omes thus to "ontain the whole of things in himself (Orphi" fr. 1A1, 1AJ . By this a"t, =eus be"omes not only the monad of the other di&ine intelle"ts, but also the uni&ersal henad, so to spea$. 9or we re"all that intelligible intelle"t returning to the prin"iples of the whole of things G be"omes the plenitude of forms, and is all things intelle"tually and at the same time intelligibly, "omprehending in itself the "auses of beings, and being full of the ineffable and e*empt "ause of all things, "onstitutes the monad of the ,ods- when"e also, Plato ! thin$ "alls it the !dea of the ,ods (PT !!! 1C. 1KA . #hroughout the Parmenides "ommentary, Pro"lus "riti"i1es those < the Platonist Origen is a fre'uent target, but Porphyry seems also to ha&e held this < who would attribute to the One the "hara"teristi"s appropriate to the demiurge. But the impulse is natural, sin"e the demiurge represents the greatest integration of different modes of unity in the system through being both henad and monad. #he "entrali1ing fo"us on the

121 demiurge also pro&ides the nearest appro*imation of monotheism in the polytheisti" system of Pro"lus, and the most monotheisti" pronoun"ements in pagan anti'uity were generated in meditation upon the position of the demiurge- and the argument from design remained a perennially popular mode of monotheisti" apologia into modernity. #he entity whi"h thus arises is "alled by Pro"lus the henad that per&ades all wholeness, be"ause it represents the philosophi"al "ore of the entire system. !t is, in fa"t, the One( that(is, the 0onad of Being- but its essentiality, as it were, its ousi%des, "an only be supported through and as a henad, for the ousi%des of ousia, so to spea$, "annot be another ousia, lest an infinite regress set in. Pro"lus e*plains at "T !, 44L that the >emiurge himself is a monad through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm Dintelligible intelle"tE G and both the >emiurge and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligible monad DBeing !tselfE. #he analogical relationships "onstituted among monads are abo&e all what enable us to as"end in philosophi"al refle"tion to the higher prin"iples, the hypostases. #his is the golden "hain whi"h =eus girds around the whole he "onstitutes ("T !, J14 - this is diale"ti". 3t "P 11BBf Pro"lus "hara"teri1es the geometri"al order by whi"h e&erything deri&es from the One as the golden "hain of beings. 2o too at "P I4Af and elsewhere, Pro"lus will spea$ of an analogous relation between the >emiurge and the "ontents of the "osmos, and the One and all things whatsoe&er. !t would not be inappropriate to say that insofar as it is ne&er stri"tly "orre"t to treat the One as an hypostasis, when we do thin$ of it in that way, rather than as ea"h henad, we do so by &irtue of this analogi"al relationship with the demiurge. 8ote in this regard the referen"e at "$ !, CH. 4(I to the demiurgi"

122 monad as the first prin"iple4 9or the di&isions DdiaireseisE of the ,ods, and of the genera posterior to the ,ods, depend on that first prin"iple. #hrough a deeper understanding of the interplay of henad and monad in the demiurgi" intelle"t we be"ome more sensiti&e to the nuan"es manifested when Pro"lus refers to the demiurgi" monad as su"h, as when at "P 11CJ he says that the whole assimilati&e order Dof the ,odsE pro"eeds from the demiurgi" monad and imitates the identity there by means of its li$eness G while it imitates the demiurgi" otherness by means of its unli$eness. #hese are not 'ualities of, e.g., =eus that are being imitated, but rather of the demiurgi" monad, whi"h is unders"ored by the fa"t that it is an order of ,ods, that is, a "lass of deities ha&ing in "ommon "ertain fun"tions or powers, that pro"eed from it. )e see this also in the te*t at hand, where the demiurgi" !ntelle"t himself, that is, the deity in 'uestion, is the "ause of all forms through unity and plurality, that is, the monads at the intelligible(and(intelle"tual le&el that determine ante"edently the monad of intelle"t, while in turn the intelle"t is father and ma$er of all things through its di&ine "hara"ter, that is, the deity it parti"ipates. ! mentioned earlier the a""eptan"e by Pro"lus of the 3ristotelian di"tum that beings should not be go&erned badly. #his is made e*pli"it at "T !, AIA, where Pro"lus "ites it with the following "omment4

?et there, then, be one ruler, one "ause of all things, one pro&iden"e, and one "hain of beings- let there be also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many $ings, &arious "auses, a multiform pro&iden"e, and a different order- yet e&erywhere multitude has an arrangement about the monad G 9or if, as 3ristotle says, all things are arranged with a &iew to form, it is ne"essary that there should be a "ause of the "oordinationG

123

Pro"lus "arefully modulates the appli"ation of 3ristotle%s a*iom with his referen"es to one "hain of beings, the "oordination of manifolds and monads, and arrangement a""ording to form, all of whi"h signal that the a*iom will not apply une'ui&o"ally to the supra(essential domain. #he 9irst .ause, howe&er, as if representing the entire poly"entri" henadi" domain, is "o(posited with the demiurge. #he One qua hypostasis lies along the analogi"al "hain of beings, ta$ing the pla"e of the henads in a "onte*t where only the order of Being, the "hain of onti" hypostases, is really important. 7e pro"eeds to "ite the prin"iple whi"h will "laim priority o&er 3ristotle%s a*iom4

what is said in the Philebus (AJd, ALb appears to be more uni&ersal than this a*iom Dof 3ristotle%sE, &i1. that e&erything whi"h is mi*ed subsists from a "ertain "ause of the mi*ture G 3ll that is said here therefore, is analogous to what is said in the Philebus, &i1. the demiurge to the One, form to ?imit, matter to !nfinity, and that whi"h is generated to that whi"h is mi*ed. But the latter are more uni&ersal than the former- be"ause the latter are beheld in all things, but the former are seen in mundane natures only.

#he relationship of the demiurge to form and matter is thus understood by Pro"lus as a spe"ifi" instan"e of the more uni&ersal stru"ture manifest in the relationship between the One, the dyad of prin"iples $nown as ?imit and !nfinity, and the produ"t $nown as the 0i*ed. 2imilarly, in another passage Pro"lus subordinates demiurgi" generation to the triad from the Philebus of ?imit, !nfinity, and the 0i*ed. #here ("T !, JH4f , Pro"lus argues that the origin of matter is prior to the demiurge inasmu"h as Plato, in his des"ription of matter, "hara"teri1es it a""ording to the maternal and paternal 'ualities

124 deri&ing from ?imit and !nfinity. !n subordinating the realm of hylomorphism to the prin"iples applying analyti"ally, so to spea$, to ea"h indi&idual henad, Pro"lus in effe"t finds a new pla"e for indi&iduality abo&e and beyond the domain of spe"ifi" unity.

#he position of the demiurge is merely a spe"ial "ase of the relations that obtain between all deities and the monads that parti"ipate them and represent the abstra"t ideality of their powers or fun"tions. 7owe&er, the relation between these two a*es is also "hara"teristi" of all things whatsoe&er, be"ause e&erything is in some way both being and di&ine. #he passage from "P CLB, whi"h ! 'uoted in passing in the first "hapter, after stating that e&ery form is a whole e*perien"ing as an attribute the One within it but not being that One, asserts as well that e&erything possesses some ne"essarily un$nowable di&ine to$en, by reason of whi"h ea"h thing has been allotted a different ran$, pla"e and "ir"uit in the uni&erse a""ording to a parti"ular number Dor Mseries%E and shape (for ea"h of these things has been allotted to them by the "reati&e agen"y in &irtue of a "ertain se"ret $inship towards the ,ods . 3gain, at "T !, A1B, we read that inanimate beings as well as souls ha&e been allotted by nature symbols DsumbolaE G some of whi"h are allied to this, but others to that series of ,ods. !n the "ase of souls, this impression of symbols is to be tra"ed to the >emiurge4 prayer attra"ts to itself the benefi"en"e of the ,ods, through those ineffable symbols whi"h the father of souls has disseminated in them (ibid . !t bears noting that Pro"lus uses nearly the same words (drawn from !r. #hald. fr. 1BH at PT !! H. KI. A1 to refer to the relationship between ea"h being and the One4 #hus ea"h being, in entering into the ineffable of its own nature, dis"o&ers the symbol of the father of the all. #his demonstrates again the strong analogies between the

125 One and the >emiurge, espe"ially inasmu"h as the latter passage "omes from a dis"ussion of the One as the first of the #hree Fings of the se"ond Epistle. !t should be noted in this "onne"tion that when Pro"lus refers to the One as a father he is referring a"tually to any gi&en deity understood in its paternal aspe"t, whi"h is the same as to say, in its intelligible aspe"t. #his do"trine will be dis"ussed in the "hapter on the intelligible ,ods. )e "an see these symbols as an alternate nature belonging to e&ery being, whi"h has, in addition to its position in an ontologi"al dis"ourse and by &irtue of an altogether different set of "oordinates, a position in a theologi"al dis"ourse. #he union of these two registers suffi"iently determines any gi&en being not only with referen"e to infima species, that is, qua form or essen"e, but also with respe"t to its utmost "ontingen"y and pe"uliarity, qua di&ine, di&ine "ausality prior to substan"e a""ounting for the entity posterior to substan"e as su"h, namely the indi&idual qua indi&idual. 5nderstanding better the relationship between the ,ods and the atomi" indi&iduals under infima species will open up for us far(ranging "onse'uen"es of the henadology. !t is appropriate, moreo&er, to raise these issues at this point, be"ause they "on"ern the status of the demiurge as well as the unity of the pantheon- for what all these ha&e in "ommon is referen"e to a single regime of Aorm. #he te*t whi"h is our starting point is the passage from "P 1A1C(AB whi"h >odds (p. 1CJ addu"es in support of the notion that, in addition to the di&ine henads, there is a "lass of henads whi"h are simply indi&isible units. #he point of the passage is that the One is the "ause of all things insofar as it is the "ause of the henads from whi"h all things deri&e, that is, DoEne should not say that the "auses of all things are in the One, but that one may "onsider the One the "ause of all things as being the "ause of henads, seeing that all things deri&e their e*isten"e from these. #his

126 must be understood in relation to the do"trine, elaborated espe"ially at "P HAK, of the non( paradigmati" "ausation of the indi&idual4

#hese "onsiderations show that it is absurd to admit !deas of indi&iduals. But sin"e e&erything that "omes to be "omes to be from a "ause, we must also posit "auses of indi&iduals4 if you want a single "ause, it "ould be the order of the uni&erse- or if se&eral, you "ould name the motion of the hea&ens, the parti"ular natures, the properties of the seasons, or the &arious regions, or the ;ods that superintend these causes, for all of these are in&ol&ed in the ma$ing of indi&iduals. (emphasis mine

)hat is "onfusing about the rest of the passage, howe&er, is that Pro"lus obser&es no distin"tion between a manifold%s constituents and its causes. 3nd so he deliberately &a"illates between saying that, e.g., Being, derives from the henads and that it consists of henads. !n this fashion, he "an refer to henads from whi"h as elements the unified entity deri&es. But we must not thin$ therefore that some new sense of henad is introdu"ed here. @ather, Pro"lus sees the distin"tion between these modes of "ausation, namely by prin"iples and by elements, &anishing as all the lo"i of "ausality "on&erge in the henads. #his gi&es a "ertain elegan"e to his argument for the &ery reason that he is able to adapt arguments against infinite di&isibility, su"h as the following4

D3Ell things are either henads or numbers DarithmosE- for that whi"h is not a henad, but is unified, if it deri&es from some limited amount of henads, is a number, and this would be a primary number as deri&ing its e*isten"e from indi&isibles- for ea"h henad is indi&isible- the other is a number of beings and is made up of beings and not from indi&isibles. ("P 1AAB

127

#his passage reads one way if we translate arithmos as number, another way if we translate it as series. 9or indeed, from the perspe"ti&e of the henads, there are only the henads and their series, that is, their pro"essions. #hese series are what deri&e from a limited amount of henads, that is, from the intera"tion < and hen"e the determina"y < of henads, and are the primary series. )e shall ha&e more to say below about su"h di&ine "hains. #he se"ond tier is that of series;numbers of beings, whi"h are "onstituted by the intera"tion of series rather than henads dire"tly. Pro"lus "ontinues, now using the di&ini1ed soul (i.e. soul as parti"ipating the henadi" domain as an e*ample. #he One

is the "ause of the di&ine 2oul also, inasmu"h as the essen"e of this as of all beings is deri&ed from henads G for di&ine souls, inasmu"h as they are intelle"tual, ha&e intelle"t as their "ausal prin"iple, inasmu"h as they are, Being, and inasmu"h as they are unitary, the One, deri&ing their substan"e from it, inasmu"h as ea"h of them is a multipli"ity of "ertain henads- these henads it has as elements, but ea"h indi&idually also has a one as unifying its multipli"ity, for whi"h reason, indeed, ea"h is what it is as a whole and not as a disorgani1ed multipli"ity. (1AAB

!n"identally, we see here how Pro"lus in"orporates the !ambli"hean do"trine of the hen t&s psuch&s, namely as the monad of the soul, its wholeness, qua henad. 7ere it is simply a one unifying its multipli"ity so as not to "onfuse it with the henads it has as elements. #hese latter are either the ,ods that superintend the "auses of fa"ti"al indi&iduals, as in the passage from "P HAK, or the deity or deities of whose series

128 indi&idual beings may "onstitute parts. Pro"lus seems indifferent as to whether we refer to the di&ini1ed soul as deri&ed from henads or ha&ing henads as its elements. #he $ey to understanding how Pro"lus "an spea$ this way about the henads is that he resists re"ourse to an absolute dualism of form and matter to e*plain the de"line in the le&els of being, whi"h G obs"ures the parti"ipation of lower elements in the uni&ersal and perfe"t essen"es ("P CBJ . !nstead, he e*plains the de"reasing re"eption of higher prin"iples by those inferior to them by the composition of causes (on this see esp. ?loyd, p. 11Lff < that is, ultimately, by the many henads. #his is how the soul "an be said to be composed of henads. #he appropriate "omparison in this "ase would not be >emo"ritean atoms, but rather a multipli"ity of a*es of "ausality that, in their "on+un"tion, determine the indi&idual beyond the furthest e*tent of that indi&idual%s formal determination. !t is this "ausal multipli"ity into whi"h the monadi" unity of the indi&idual being may be analy1ed. #his is the matter whi"h differentiates instantiations of the same form. 3s ! ha&e e*plained, it "annot be some sort of proto(materiality that gi&es rise to the many ,ods, nor is their multipli"ity a de"line. 2in"e the One is ea"h henad, the de"line in the le&els of Being "omes about, instead, through the re"ipro"al determination of the powers of the ,ods against ea"h other in a "ommon field < through the unifi"ation of them, rather than their multipli"ity. 9or the indi&idual distin"tion of the henads is not a re"ipro"al differentiation, whi"h would only diminish their indi&iduality. #he notion that power or potentiality, dunamis, plays a "ru"ial role in the de"line of the le&els of Being is 'uite "orre"t, howe&er, on"e we understand the signfi"an"e of the dunameis of the henads, namely that their dunameis are the aspe"ts of the ,ods whi"h are sus"eptible to unifi"ation in a third or for another in a manner that the ,ods themsel&es, that is, their

129 hyparxeis, are not. Pro"lus alludes to this pro"ess of "oming together in his a""ount of the prin"iples of ?imit and !nfinity at PT !!! C. 4B. 7ere Pro"lus "riti"i1es the Plotinian "on"ept of intelligible matter. 9or !nfinity, he e*plains, is not the matter of ?imit, but the power of it, nor is ?imit the form of the !nfinite, but the hyparxis of it. But Being "onsists of both these, as not only standing in the One, but re"ei&ing a multitude Dpl&thosE of henads and powers whi"h are mingled into one essen"e DousianE (4(H . 8oti"e how the unity of the henads only "omes about through a mingling posterior to their hyparxis. !t is this mingling that produ"es the de"line- not the e*isten"e of many ,ods, but their "oales"en"e in and through the !ntelle"t. 9or the ,ods are only finally mingled into one essen"e, and Being itself "ompleted, in the hypostasis of !ntelle"t, that is, in a single formal regime. Ea"h henad possesses a di&ine mind or intelle"t, whi"h is represented in parti"ular by the third intelligible triad (on whi"h see "hapter K , and this di&ine intelligen"e is the a"ti&ity of ea"h henad as su"h. #he a"ti&ity of the intelle"tual ,ods, howe&er, is pre"isely to "onstitute among themsel&es the hypostasis of !ntelle"t. 3 spe"ial pla"e among the intelle"tual ,ods belongs to the demiurge, and the stru"ture of demiurgi" sovereignty is essential to the stru"ture of the !ntelle"t for Pro"lus. 7is or her e*er"ise of so&ereignty in and through the intelle"tual order means that in a sense it is the demiurge%s perspective whi"h is a"tuali1ed in the "onstitution of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t, and whi"h is at the same time the "onstitution of the whole of Being intellectually, that is, with all the "hara"teristi"s (identity and differen"e, et al. that are at on"e appropriate solely to the !ntelle"t and yet, in the "ompleted system, "hara"teri1e the whole hierar"hy. 9or we "an s"ar"ely spea$ of hypostases that are not identi"al to themsel&es or as beings and

130 different from ea"h other, and so forth. #he unity of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t, as represented by the ena"tment of demiurgi" so&ereignty, means a "hange in the status of all the ,ods, inasmu"h as all are in ea"h. 9or through the "on"ept of so&ereignty we "an thin$ of the intelle"tual "onstitution of Being as in some way the "oming to ob+e"ti&ity of a single di&ine mind, namely that of the demiurge, in whi"h the potential relationships between deities, whi"h are "ontained in that di&ine mind inasmu"h as all the ,ods < and thus all of their potential relations < are in ea"h ,od, are a"tuali1ed as well. But many of these potential relations are "ontradi"tory < for instan"e, in an e*ample ! referred to earlier, @hea is both sibling to O$eanos and #ethys as well as daughter of O$eanos and #ethys. .ontradi"tory relationships, in their a"tuali1ation, do not a"tuali1e as "ontradi"tion be"ause they are segregated onto separate le&els of manifestation, hen"e bringing about the dis+un"tions that "hara"teri1e the ontologi"al hierar"hy, the de"line in Being. Plotinus and his followers err, a""ording to Pro"lus, when they as"ribe a "ertain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essen"e. #here are for Pro"lus no &ague prin"iples or prin"iples of &agueness. #here is only the intera"tion of multiple prin"iples, whi"h results in the last parti"ipants re"ei&ing some prin"iples to a degree that obs"ures others on"e the relations between henads ha&e been plotted onto a single field with a fi*ed "enter and periphery. #he ultimate "onse'uen"e of this for beings is that some things are assimilated to the form by &irtue of one poten"y, others of two, and others of more than that. 3nd hen"e it is that so("alled M"hains% appear ("P CBJ . #he fa"t that beings e*perien"e greater pro*imity to one prin"iple than another is be"ause the relationship between the prin"iples themsel&es has been fi*ed, as when, a unit of measure

131 ha&ing been applied to a "ontinuum, the distan"e between any two points on that "ontinuum is no longer both one and infinite at the same time, but possesses a dis"rete number, that number also possessing a dis"rete position in its own order whi"h thus interposes itself between the two points. #he "ommon field on whi"h the henads "ome to be posited is a whole of whi"h they are parts, its mediation granting to ea"h a relati&e position. #he henads are, for themsel&es, an a"entri" or, better, a poly"entri" set, the possibility of a uni'ue "enter emerging in stages, "ulminating in the "onstitution of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t. )e shall see how a "ru"ial stage in the emergen"e of this "ommon field is the emergen"e of place, topos, in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. Being is fully "onstituted at the point that it possesses the ob+e"ti&e determinants with whi"h to shift the "enter of gra&ity, as it were, from the Being "ontained in ea"h henad to the hypostasis of Being !tself. !t is only on"e the balan"e shifts in this fashion that the "o( emergent fields of di&ine a"ti&ity form distin"t and dis+un"t le&els of Being. #he manifestations of materiality, then, while they ha&e their ultimate "ause in the multipli"ity of henads, would not "ome to e*pression if the henadi" manifold did not "ollapse into uni"ity at a "ertain point. ! refer to manifestations of materiality, rather than matter, inasmu"h as there is really no hypostasis of 0atter as su"h. 0atter, inferior to Being, deri&es from the One, whi"h is superior to Being4 this s"hemati" a""ount is "orre"t but also potentially misleading if we do not understand that what is meant is the "omposition of "auses represented by the manifold of henads. 2tri"tly spea$ing, there is no more in Pro"lus a dis"rete something that is the One than there is su"h a thing as 0atter.

132 Ea"h henad, although in itself the 3ll, has a series depending from it, whi"h represents its re"ipro"al distin"tion or >ifferen"e from the rest < not its primordial distin"tion qua henad, whi"h is thin$able by us as its simple e*isten"e as, e.g. =eus rather than @hea, but its difference < while its hyparxis and the primordial uni'ueness and supra(essential indi&iduality it bears is prior to the series depending from the henad and must always represent a surplus beyond the sum of the terms in the series. !n the a"ti&ation of the potential relations that the powers or poten"ies of the ,ods represent, series are formed that interfere with, that is, are determined against ea"h other. #he role of dunamis, of potentiality, in relation to the phenomena of materiality is that the powers, the dunameis, of ea"h deity are that in respe"t of whi"h they are re"ipro"ally determined. One must, stri"tly spea$ing, distinguish here between the ontologi"al determination of deities in relation to ea"h other, namely as ha&ing this or that parti"ipant, and so being intelligible ,ods, intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods and so forth, and the mythologi"al determination of deities in relation to one another through narrati&e in"ident, e.g. =eus being the father of >ionysus by Persephone in the Orphi" myth. #he latter are properly supra(essential, +ust as the powers of the ,ods are supra(essential (PT !!! A4. 1I4(K4 the powers of the ,ods are supra(essential G and through this power the ,ods are generati&e of beings . 2imilarities and differen"es of i"onography and attribute, the bases of "lassifi"ation, meanwhile, should be attributed to the former "ategory, whi"h e*tends all the way to the "lass represented by the uni&ersal 'uantifi"ation 3ll the ,ods. #he separate emergen"e of these modes of determination will be treated in subse'uent "hapters. 9or now, howe&er, it is suffi"ient to spea$ in general terms of the emergen"e of all types of relation among the henads into

133 "on"reteness rather than troubling with the different le&els of relation and their orders of emergen"e, espe"ially sin"e the final site of emergen"e for all of these modes of relation is the demiurgi" intelle"t, in whi"h the unity of the ,ods is ultimately grounded. But although we ha&e a""ounted for the de"line in the le&els of being, we ha&e not stated what matter is, insofar as it is at all. 0atter is "omplementary to form, and thus it is to the "ulminating moment of the emergen"e of form that matter tra"es its subsisten"e as a residuum of this emergen"e. #here will be more to say about this pro"ess in the "hapter on the intelle"tual ,ods. !t will be useful, howe&er, to pro&ide a pre&iew of "ertain aspe"ts of this pro"ess here, espe"ially as they relate to what ! ha&e referred to as the "oming to ob+e"ti&ity of a parti"ular di&ine !ntelle"t. )e read at "P CB4 that DtEhe one Paternal !ntelle"t defines for all other entities the measures of their parti"ipation and the "ontributions of ea"h to the "osmos, assuming in ad&an"e the beginnings and middles and ends of ea"h "hain of forms, and de"rees how far the "hara"teristi" 'uality des"ending from ea"h must rea"h. #hat whi"h is begun in the paternal or intelligible intelle"t is "ompleted by the demiurgi" intelle"t, for at H1L we learn that the demiurge "ontains the unitary measure whi"h is to go&ern the pro"ession of parti"ular souls < the site of the ultimate di&ision of the forms. #he fundamental le&el of this pro"ess, howe&er, is only dis"ernible indire"tly in the system. !t is alluded to here by the referen"e to the paternal intelle"t as one, in the sense of singularity. )e shall see in the a""ount of the third intelligible triad that it pe"uliarly determines ea"h ,od as monogenes, or only( begotten. #his represents the one(to(one fi*ation of ,ods to hypostases embodied in prop. 1JK of the Elements of Theology, dis"ussed in the pre&ious "hapter.

134 #he fi*ation of deities to hypostases is at the same time the fi*ation of the relationships between deities. #here is no way to establish priority in this pro"ess, for a unified narrati&e "on"erning the emergen"e of the ,ods and their a"ti&ities in the uni&erse "omes about in ideal simultaneity with a unified hierar"hy of onti" hypostases, that is, a unified narrati&e about Being. 8arrati&e implies a telos, a goal, and e&ery myth has its own telos. O&er the "ourse of history, howe&er, a metanarrati&e assigning an o&erar"hing telos to the disparate mythi" narrati&es (whi"h ne&ertheless "ontinued to e*ist de&eloped. #his unified metanarrati&e is manifest in 7elleni" theology parti"ularly in the emergen"e of =eus as $ing of the ,ods and demiurge of the "osmos. #he histori"al pro"ess of the de&elopment of a unified mythologi"al metanarrati&e is, in other words, the image of the ideal pro"ess of the emergen"e of !ntelle"t. #hat is, inasmu"h as all the ,ree$ theology attributes the fabri"ation of the whole of things to =eus (t% 9ii t&n hol&n d&miourgian ("T !, J1I , it is =eus in and around whom, as the fi*ed "enter, the relationships of the other deities are a"tuali1ed or as it were "rystalli1ed for another < he is, in short, that uni&ersal Other. 7en"e at "T !!!, ABBf we read that4 7omer ("lliad N!!! K G represents =eus G be"oming himself, as it were, the "enter of all the di&ine genera in the world, and ma$ing all things obedient to his intelle"tion. #o =eus belongs what we might "all the "anoni"al perspe"ti&e on the henadi" manifold for ,ree$ theology. #his moment "orresponds to the religious phenomenon of henotheism, whi"h refers to the belief in one deity as supreme among the other ,ods. )e might refer to this as mono"entri" polytheism in "ontrast to the poly"entri" polytheism whi"h represents with greatest fidelity the henadi" arithmos in its hyparxis.

135 By ma$ing of the rest of the ,ods a whole < noti"e that he is responsible for t&n hol&n d&miourgian, that is, the fabri"ation of a whole qua whole < he disposes the other ,ods relati&e to himself. #hat the demiurgi" wholeness is an emergent order is reinfor"ed by the referen"e at "P H44f to the different "auses prior to the intelle"tual produ"ing all these "reatures, Tboth immortalU and mortal, prior to the cosmos as a whole (emphasis mine . #he relationship of the ,ods to this emergent wholeness shows forth in interesting fashion in a passage of the Timaeus "ommentary where Pro"lus is dis"ussing the phrase ,ods of ,ods from Tim. 41a. 7ow those that are allotted the world by their father are "alled ,ods of ,ods, and a""ording to what "on"eption, "annot easily be indi"ated to the many- for there is an unfolding of one divine intelligence in these names (!!!, ABA- my emphasis . One might "hara"teri1e this diffi"ulty as that of seeing beyond the "onfines of one%s parti"ular henotheism, in whi"h the dispositions of the ,ods in relation to ea"h other are "aptured from a singular perspe"ti&e. #he diffi"ulty lies, in other words, in stepping outside one%s world so as to per"ei&e it as a parti"ular world order beyond whi"h lie the possibility of others. #hus the henotheism "hara"teri1ing the per"eption of the ,ods a&ailable to a being below the le&el of the demiurgi" intelle"t gi&es way, upon deeper refle"tion, to kathenotheism or monolatry, whi"h in&ol&es the impli"it re"ognition of other possible world(orders, finally opening out onto the pure and radi"al polytheism represented by the henads in their supra(essential hyparxis. #his ideal su""ession, one will note, turns on its head that order whi"h is "ommonly gi&en or presumed in e&olutionist histori"al a""ounts of theologi"al stru"tures. #he pro"ession of the intelle"tual and subse'uent orders of the ,ods ta$es pla"e under the imprimatur of the demiurge, whi"he&er ,od might, in a gi&en world(order,

136 o""upy that position- Pro"lus has at any rate no doubt that for the ,ree$s that ,od is =eus. #he words uttered by the demiurge a""ording to the Timaeus, ,ods of ,ods, are thus demiurgi" or fabri"ati&e su"h that this one di&ine intelle"tual "on"eption whi"h is the first and most simple pro"ession from the demiurge, deifies all the re"ipients of it, and ma$es them demiurgi" ,ods, parti"ipated ,ods, and ,ods in&isible and at the same time &isible (!!!, ABK . )e "an read parti"ipated here in the sense that parti"ipation of beings in the henads is fully "onstituted only at the point that the beginnings and middles and ends of ea"h "hain of forms, and G how far the "hara"teristi" 'uality des"ending from ea"h must rea"h ("P CB4 has been determined. #he determination of the dimensions of the "hains o""urs in stages between the intelligible and the demiurgi" intelle"ts < and, indeed, "ontinues beyond the intelle"tual order, +ust as the issue of the so&ereignty of =eus is not fully resol&ed until the status of >ionysos has been rendered e*pli"it. )e "ould also read the referen"e to parti"ipation in the sense that the henads now parti"ipate in each other li$e the forms do, sin"e they are now mediated by a whole. 9or the infra(intelle"tual deities, although they are e&ery bit as mu"h ,ods and henads as to their hyparxis, in their activity are "o(emergent with other deities whose a"ti&ity with respe"t to higher le&els of Being determines the a"ti&ity of the ,ods whose illumination of Being ta$es pla"e on a lower le&el. #his determination or mediation by the "onstitution of onti" hypostases by prior orders of ,ods and "onse'uent parti"ipation howe&er does not affe"t in any way the supra(essential status of the ,ods manifesting on a lower le&el, sin"e any infra(intelle"tual ,od is also a ,od of the intelligible order at any rate- e&ery manifestation of a ,od on an order subse'uent to the intelligible order is a secondary manifestation.

137 #he a"t of the demiurge fi*es the other ,ods of the pantheon around his;her "enter, as well as also fi*ing the hypostati" monads, and thus allowing them to be di&ini1ed after a fashion, for, e.g., the One Being, in whi"h there is the first parti"ipation Di.e. whi"h is the first parti"ipantE is ,od of ,od (!!!, ABL . #his "an help us to understand the tenden"y of Pro"lus to refer to hypostases as ,ods. )hereas the ,ods proper re"ei&e a se"ondary deifi"ation from the demiurge as demiurgi" ,ods, the monads re"ei&e their primary deifi"ation. #here is similar terminology at "T !, 44I, where we read that as the whole >emiurge is a "reator totally and monadi"ally, so he produ"DesE many ,ods G monadi"ally, the referen"e being spe"ifi"ally to all the emanations of the ,ods whose s"ope of a"ti&ity lies in the realm below the le&el of the demiurgi" intelle"t. But there is also a broader s"ope to the notion, for the demiurge "reates everything, albeit monadi"ally. 9or the whole "hain of the hypostases is in some way "onstituted, or at least "an only a"hie&e its final form, through the demiurgi" fabri"ation. !n regard to the se"ond deifi"ation of the ,ods by the demiurgi" utteran"e, one may note as well a passage at PT !! L. 4C. 1I(L, where Pro"lus says that the ,ods themsel&es ena"t the order whi"h is in them Den autois taxin diethesmothet&sanE, the latter term < diethesmothet&san < as noted by 2() (p. 1BC n. J is the same term applied at Tim. 4A>4 to the >emiurge%s legislation of the souls. #he demiurge "ould not be the ,od of ,ods if s;he did not e*press in some pri&ileged fashion that 'uality of all in each whi"h is the defining "hara"teristi" of ,ods qua ,ods. #hat is, what is inherent in ea"h ,od is actualized in the demiurge. Ea"h ,od, in possessing a di&ine
intelle"t, is the demiurge potentially or after 7is or 7er own fashion. One might

"ompare the remar$ in the Avyakta

)panisad (K.1 with respe"t to the ,od !ndra < li$e =eus a di&ine so&ereign < that !ndra

138 was made of all the ,ods, hen"e he be"ame the greatest. 2imilarly, the ,oddess >urga, in the 9evi 3ahatmya ("hap. A is said to ha&e emerged from the "ombined splendor (te*as of the other ,ods in order to se"ure the uni&erse against the for"es of "haos, a different way of en&isioning the demiurgi" fun"tion. #his is not to say that !ndra or >urga are reducible to the other ,ods whom they, in a sense, epitomi1e or of whom they are the 'uintessen"e. 8o ,od%s nature is redu"ible to their relations, otherwise the simple fa"t of ,ods ha&ing familial relationships would ser&e to redu"e any deity with parents to those parents. But this is spe"ifi"ally re+e"ted by Pro"lus, for whom as we ha&e seen, a son, e.g., in the supra(essential realm is for himself prior to his relationship to a father ("P CJI . #he signifi"an"e of a demiurge li$e =eus, !ndra or >urga "ontaining the other ,ods is rather with respe"t to beings, for they offer up their perspe"ti&e as that through whi"h all the others may be per"ei&ed. .oburn, in his study of the 9evi 3ahatmya, "ompares the "rystalli1ation of >urga out of the te*as of the other ,ods to the des"ription in the -aws of 3anu of the pla"e of the $ing in human affairs, for the $ing is also des"ribed as formed of parti"les of all the ,ods, su"h that he surpasses all "reated beings in lustre (te*as (p. AKf . #he "omparison is fruitful espe"ially inasmu"h as it both hear$ens ba"$ to the "omposition of the indi&idual being out of henads, and gestures forward to the e*istential telos of the indi&idual being as demiurge in the sphere of their own embodiment, a "entral element in the interpretation of theurgy in ,regory 2haw%s study of !ambli"hus, Theurgy and the :oul. #he pro"ess of fi*ing or "rystalli1ing the systemati" disposition of the henads and the "orresponding establishment of the series of monads "an be "ompared to sele"ting a unit of measure for a "ontinuum- for a""ording to prop. 11L of the ET, e&ery ,od is the

139 measure of beings < hen"e in "hoosing a ,od, we "hoose a measure for all of Being. !n the same te*t we ha&e been "onsidering, the power possessed by the phrase ,ods of ,ods is as an in&o"ation G "olle"ti&e and "on&erti&e of multitude to its monad, that "alls upwards the natures whi"h ha&e pro"eeded to their one fabri"ation, and inserts a boundary and di&ine measure in them (!!!, ABA . #he transition from the henadi" to the monadi" register "an in this way be represented as the passage from "ontinuous to dis"rete 'uantity sin"e the 0any G is more general than that whi"h is a whole and has parts- for what if the 0any were infinite, while that whi"h has parts would in all "ases be "omposed of a finite number of parts6 2o that if something has parts, it will be in need of 0anyness, but if it is a multipli"ity it is not ne"essarily a whole ("P 1BCC . !t is not that the henads are infinite in number, be"ause we $now from ET prop. 14C that there are a finite number of them. @ather, they are measures that are not measured, prior to the demiurgi" in&o"ation that is, and so resemble an ine*haustible "ontinuum in their surplus, e*"ess or remainder relati&e to monadi" being, whi"h is both measure and measured. #he metaphor of a remainder left after the appli"ation of a unit of measure to a "ontinuum brings us to the point where we may understand at last +ust what matter is, and how it, as that whi"h is posterior to Being, deri&es from that whi"h is prior to Being. 3t "T !, JH4ff, Pro"lus is in&estigating whether a""ording to Plato, two prin"iples of wholes are to be admitted, 0atter and ,od. #he demiurge, at any rate, "ould not ha&e gi&en subsisten"e to matter, Pro"lus e*plains, for Plato says, at Tim. KAd, that these three things pre"eded the generation of the world4 Being, Pla"e, and ,eneration- and that ,eneration is an offspring, but Pla"e a mother. 0atter is thus di&ided a""ording to the

140 maternal and paternal pe"uliarity (idi%ma , and therefore "onstitutes an arrangement prior to the demiurge, for the 'ualities of mas"ulinity and femininity deri&e from ?imit and !nfinity. #hese two prin"iples are, howe&er, "o(e*tensi&e with the ,ods themsel&es, as a generi" e*pression of the immediate onti" footprint of ea"h ,od, whi"h "onsists, primally, of the opposition between hyparxis and dunamis, or parti"ularity and uni&ersality. #herefore the demiurge, a""ording to the unity whi"h he "ontains, a""ording to whi"h li$ewise he is a ,od, is also the "ause of the last matter, inasmu"h as su"h things as he produ"es a""ording to the One, so many he does not produ"e a""ording to Being (!, JHIf . !n other words, the demiurge is the "ause of matter qua deity simpliciter, rather than qua demiurgi" deity. 0atter is, as it were, "aused by all the ,ods. #hat is, matter, as that whi"h lies outside all form in a pri&ati&e sense, e*presses that whi"h surpasses form. #he supra( essential "orrelate of form is the "o(emergen"e of deities in pantheons, for it is the stages of this emergen"e whi"h "onstitute the different le&els of form or of Being. But deities are not appropriated into e&en the pantheon in whi"h they are "o(emergent without remainder, and there are, of "ourse, deities belonging to different patheons who bear no relationship to one another that is grounded supra(essentially. 2u"h deities are merely ob+e"ts for comparison. #he inability of any regime of form to e*hausti&ely determine or totalize the ,ods, who remain always and inelu"tably absolute indi&iduals prior to and beyond any ele"ti&e assemblage for the sa$e of beings, is li$e the inability of any parti"ular unit of measure to di&ide a "ontinuum without remainder. /ust as the One !tself is a way of e*pressing the absolute indi&iduality and uni'ueness of ea"h ,od positively, so matter is a way of e*pressing negatively that uni'ueness as the inability of any

141 restri"ted theology or mythologi"al metanarrati&e to "ompletely "ontrol and appropriate e&en the ,ods who enter into it, mu"h less those ,ods who ha&e no relation to it, su"h as the ,ods of other nations. #he di&ine manifold prior to the demiurge is the disorderly motion of Tim. JBa, in whi"h nature, prior to being ordered by the demiurge, parti"ipates of forms, and possesses "ertain tra"es and representations, being mo&ed in a "onfused and disorderly manner. 9or the phantasmal Deid%likaiE and indistin"t presen"e of forms produ"es different motions in it, as #imaeus says farther on (4Bb, 4Jb . #hese, howe&er, all the orders of the ;ods prior to the demiurge illuminate ("T !, JHL- my emphasis . #he orders of the ,ods prior to the demiurge < whi"h a"tually means all the ,ods, qua intelligible < "onstitute that whi"h the demiurge re"ei&es and adorns with numbers G insertDingE in them order (!, JHH . #he demiurge re"ei&es Being, whi"h has already re"ei&DedE a multitude of henads and powers whi"h are mingled into one essen"e (PT !!! C. 4B . !n this way we are able to understand how Pro"lus is able to "ite as pre"edent for his do"trine the report of !ambli"hus that a""ording to 7ermes Di.e. the EgyptiansE materiality Dhulot&taE is produ"ed from essentiality Dek t&s ousiot&tosE (!, JHI . #he histori"al pro"ess by whi"h di&erse ,ods are harmoni1ed into the unity of a national pantheon and their myths integrated into a metanarrati&e with a "ommon telos is thus not merely hermeneuti", but also ontologi"al. #his harmoni1ation is something re'uired by us, insofar as our own intelle"ts, whi"h are "onstituted by the stru"tures of identity and differen"e, whole and part, must, li$e the demiurge, organi1e e*perien"e into a well(ordered or go&erned whole in whi"h the substan"es of the uni&erse are mediated, posited relati&e to a fi*ed "enter. #he domain of the demiurge is "onstituted by form and

142 matter, howe&er, and "onfronts, therefore, at its fringes or periphery, the unformed or matter itself, whi"h manifests the prin"iples prior to form in alluding to parallel orders of forms, organi1ations in whi"h the gi&en being would o""upy a different position. One might "all su"h a parallel order a different world, insofar as a world is simply a kosmos, a disposition of elements whi"h might be otherwise disposed. #he 'uestion of whether su"h a being would be the identi"al being under a different world(order or in a different world, or of the status of the elements prior to any disposition, is not "learly established. But this ambiguity is a &irtue of sorts, for sin"e it is impossible to "learly demar"ate world(orders, there are no sharp borders between "ultural territories, only a shading of one into another through gray areas of ambiguous determination and dual "iti1enship. Pro"lus in fa"t uses the metaphor of "iti1enship (politis at "T !!!, ALI to refer to the soul%s membership in different orders at the same time, although the orders in that "ase fit into ea"h other as more partial into more total forms of life rather than subsisting in parallel. #he notion of "ultures e*isting in parallel, not redu"ible to some underlying unity, may ne&er ha&e 'uite o""urred to Pro"lus- but it is an impli"ation we are entitled to draw from the stru"tural e*igen"ies of the system he "rafted. !n "rafting that system, Pro"lus was not guided by a notion of "ulture su"h as we ha&e today, whi"h "ould only ha&e "ome about through the ebb and flow of uni&ersalism and relati&ism. #he unity of the national pantheons as su"h is therefore tantamount to a stru"tural un"ons"ious in the system. )hat did guide Pro"lus, and issued in the systemati" stru"ture in 'uestion, was an o&erriding "on"ern with the indi&iduality and uni'ueness of ea"h deity, whi"h was refle"ted at on"e in the way his system "asts the dominant Platoni" "on"ern with unity, and in his e"le"ti" personal pra"ti"e, whi"h was not bound by the limits of the 7elleni"

143 national pantheon upon whi"h he ne&ertheless e*erts su"h e*traordinary effort in the Platonic Theology, but instead by the particular deities, of whate&er national origin, to whom he felt a pe"uliar affinity. 3 further 'uestion arising from this a""ount, howe&er, is the following. 7ow mu"h of Pro"lus% philosophy must we regard, on its very own terms, as a pe"uliarly 7elleni" re&elation6 7ow mu"h of the philosophical "ontent of the system is a"tually determined by the e*istential parti"ularity of the deities that inform it, and thus relati&i1ed6 #he answer is that whate&er in the system "annot stand on the strength of argument, of diale"ti", must be attributed to its theophani" side- whate&er, in short, is ines"apably "ulturally spe"ifi". #his may sound "ir"ular, but the only way in whi"h to separate the "ulturally spe"ifi" from that whi"h trans"ends the unity of the dis"rete "ulture < systemati"ally, the unity of a pantheon < is through the labor of +ustifi"ation. 3t the end of this labor, it will not be a 'uestion of ha&ing separated wheat from "haff, howe&er, but of ha&ing distinguished one sort of di&ine gift from another.

144

.hapter 44

7enads and 0onads

!n this "hapter, ! will dis"uss a range of fa"tors that e*plain instan"es in whi"h Pro"lus seems to treat what are properly monads as henads and &i"e &ersa, whi"h will at the same time pro&ide opportunities to in&estigate many other aspe"ts of the do"trine of the henads. 7enads and monads are parti"ularly to be distinguished from one another inasmu"h as the two terms made their entran"e into Platoni" thought in the Philebus (1Kab seemingly as synonyms, and be"ause among the sur&i&ing wor$s of Pro"lus we find no simple statement of the distin"tion between henads and monads. #his was probably due to the fa"t that the histori"al usage of the term monad lo"ated it s'uarely within ontology, ma$ing it largely unne"essary to distinguish it from the henads, who are supra(

145 essential. #he monad, after all, is first and foremost the number one, and had been so for a long time before Pro"lus. #he histori"al stages through whi"h there "ame to be the distin"ti&e do"trine of supra(essential henads identi"al with the ,ods are not our "on"ern here. ?et it suffi"e to say that Pro"lus% master 2yrianus seems already to ha&e possessed a do"trine ha&ing at least its broad outlines in "ommon with Pro"lus% insofar as we "an dis"ern, whereas the possession by !ambli"hus of su"h a do"trine, or the e*tent and nature of the do"trine%s ante"edents in Plotinian thought, must remain debatable. #he possibility of referring to monads as henads "auses Pro"lus sometimes to spe"ify the henads proper in a &ariety of ways, e.g., as di&ine henads or self( "omplete;self(perfe"t (autotel&s henads, as in prop. 114 of the ET4 E&ery ,od is a self( "omplete henad, and e&ery self("omplete henad is a ,od. But it would be a mista$e to presume that the e*planation for su"h a spe"ifi"ation is that the term henad is systemati"ally ambiguous- rather, it is a 'uestion of the possibility of extending the term, of e'ui&o"ation. 9or instan"e, monads "an be referred to as henads be"ause they pro"eed from the One, albeit in a different way than the henads. Prop. I4 of the ET states that DeE&ery prin"ipial monad Darchik& monasE gi&es rise to two series DarithmonE, one "onsisting of substan"es "omplete in themsel&es Dautotel%n hupostase%nE, and one of irradiations whi"h ha&e their substantiality in something other than themsel&es, while its "orollary e*plains that from this it is apparent that of the henads some pro"eed Dpro&lthonE self("omplete from the One, while others are irradiated states of unity Dellampseis hen%se%nE. #hese irradiations are monads, while it is the henads proper that pro"eed self("omplete from the One < although note that the term used here, pro&lthon, is not the normal term for pro"ession in Pro"lus, whi"h is rather pro(dos. Pro"lus uses a

146 more generi" term most li$ely so as to in"lude the pro"ession by way of unity of the One in the henads, whi"h "ould be "onsidered so different from onti" pro"ession as to re'uire a distin"tion of spe"ies. The first reason for equivocation therefore is that monads are henads when considered in respect of their procession from the !ne. )hy does Pro"lus shift from spea$ing of monads in the proposition to spea$ing of henads in the "orollary6 #he proposition refers initially to monads be"ause the prin"iple it states applies generically to monads and henads ali$e. #he One is, in effe"t, a monad in the "orollary be"ause it is being treated as a prin"iple or hypostasis, as the One !tself. 0onads are the natural terminologi"al "hoi"e for generi" "onte*ts, both be"ause the philosopher must fre'uently spea$ of the henads as if they were beings, that is, ontologi"ally or monadically, and also be"ause the term monad has a far wea$er denotation than henad, insofar as it is used to refer e&en to beings with minimal substantiality li$e indi&idual sensible "omposites. #he need to spea$ of the henads as if of beings arises be"ause in ontologi"al "onte*ts the whole domain of henadi" indi&iduality has little rele&an"e. !n ontology, as we ha&e seen, one "an spea$ only, at most, of classes of ,ods, not of indi&idual ,ods. #herefore the monad, whi"h always represents a class of some $ind < e&en the atomi" indi&idual is, qua monad, a "lass of one < is the logi"al "hoi"e. The second reason for equivocation therefore lies in the generic applicability of the term BmonadC to henads in ontological contexts8 )e "an also dis"ern a generi" intention from the use of the term arithmos, or series. #his is a term applying both to the series depending from henads, whi"h are also "alled seirai, or "hains, as well as to the series depending from monads, whi"h are taxeis, or "lasses, e*"ept of "ourse in the "ase of the generation of a se"ondary hypostasis

147 from a monad by pro(dos, su"h as 2oul from !ntelle"t. )e ha&e seen that the term arithmos is also appli"able to the totality of the henads, in preferen"e to spea$ing of them as a pl&thos, whi"h is impli"itly a whole. 3n e*"eption whi"h perhaps, as it were, pro&es the rule is in ET prop. 14C, whi"h states that DtEhe entire manifold of di&ine henads is finite in number. 7ere the henads "an be determined as a pl&thos be"ause they are the sub+e"t of a purely logi"al inferen"e, a monadi" determination. ?i$e p&g&, the term seira is appropriated by Pro"lus from theology (7omer, &ia the Orphi"s4 >odds, p. ABHf . Pro"lus uses theologi"al or mythologi"al terminology, sometimes 'uite dis"reetly, to signal a shift in his dis"ourse from the ontologi"al to the henadi" register. 3 "hain is ideally to be distinguished from a taxis, as an e*pression of pro"ession, pro(dos, as opposed to de"lension, hupobasis ("P L4I . ! "all the distin"tion between seira and taxis ideal be"ause, as >odds notes (p. ABC Pro"lus is in"onsistent in its appli"ation. !n"onsisten"y in this "ase results from the homonymous usage of seira. .hain "an be either the genus spe"ified by taxis < and seira will be a$in to arithmos in this way < or it "an refer spe"ifi"ally to the di&ine series depending from ea"h deity, the first pro"ession in the stri"t sense < that in&ol&ing a "hange in essen"e < and whi"h are in turn paradigmati" relati&e to the subse'uent ontic series4 the first, in other words, of 3. .. ?loyd%s 'uasi(genera (The Anatomy of eoplatonism, "hap. J, pp. LIff . !n the "orollary to the proposition, on the other hand, it is the term henad whi"h has seemingly broadened to en"ompasses monads as well. #his is be"ause although the term monad is more generi", the henads are existentially prior. #he monads are thus treated in the "orollary as lesser henads despite the fa"t that in the proposition they legislate o&er the henads. But sin"e the henads ha&e in fa"t nothing o&er them, they "an only be

148 legislated o&er by what "omes after them and emerges from them. !n our "lose reading of the Platonic Theology, we shall see how the abstra"t domain of the monad emerges from the henadi" sphere in a series of stages. !t must be noted that >odds (p. AJK identifies the ellampseis here with the One of the soul, hen t&s psuch&s, an entity prominent in the thought of !ambli"hus and rather less so in Pro"lus. ! must disagree with >odds here. )here Pro"lus uses the "on"ept of the hen t&s psuch&s he does so, ! thin$, more as a matter of honoring !ambli"hus than anything else, e*"ept insofar as the monad representing the indi&idual is also deri&ati&ely a henad, in the same manner ! ha&e been dis"ussing. Pro"lus seems to prefer the term, deri&ed from the !racles, flower of the soul to refer to the soul%s deifi"ation- he uses the two terms synonymously at "P 1BL1. 7ere again we ha&e an instan"e of the use of theologi"ally tinged terminology to indi"ate an entity transitional between the di&ine and onti" spheres. !t would ma$e mu"h more programmati" sense, howe&er, for Pro"lus in this proposition to be establishing the e*istential pedigree of the monads than to be e*patiating on an entity tangential to his thought. #he irradiated henads here are thus in my &iew "learly monads, whi"h represent, as we ha&e seen, the attribute or "hara"ter of unity in manifolds. #he e'ui&o"al usage of henad in su"h a passage is +ustified inasmu"h as Pro"lus is affirming the substantial e*isten"e of monads whi"h might otherwise be regarded as ha&ing some sort of intentional ine*isten"e, parasiti", as it were, upon their e*tensions. #his way of thin$ing of monads is an ob&ious "on"ern, espe"ially in the early parts of the Parmenides "ommentary, sin"e it e"hoes "riti'ues of the !deas by Peripateti"s and others. !t is only qua henad that beings are truly se"ured in e*isten"e, for thus they sublate their mediation into immedia"y, ta$ing their mediation up into themsel&es. !t is in this sense

149 that Pro"lus says that the Parmenides is about all things G insofar as all things are deified (I41 . #he henads are li$e ?eibni1%s monads, in that they are the ultimate simples in the uni&erse- but whereas the "orporeal atoms of >emo"ritus possess indi&isibility by fiat, as if the pro"ess of di&ision "ould simply be halted, ?eibni1ian monads and Pro"lean henads ali$e are atomi" by &irtue of ha&ing nothing outside them, windowless indeed be"ause ea"h has its other, its outside, in itself. #he Pro"lean monad "an also be regarded in this fashion when we see shining through its abstra"t parti"ularity the essential moment of mediation and holisti" determination that gi&es it its meaning. #he parti"ular is mediated by the form and, as su"h, by the whole. But this does not affe"t the fundamental distin"tion between henads and monads. #he henads are not dia"riti"ally determined with referen"e to a whole, while the monad a"hie&es a deified status by manifesting the whole in the part, i.e. through re&ersion upon its "auses. 3lthough, as ! said, Pro"lus does not state a programmati" distin"tion between monads and henads, he does, at "P HHB, address a narrower 'uestion, namely why 2o"rates in the Philebus (1Kab sometimes "alls the forms henads and sometimes monads. !n this dialogue the terms henad and monad seem 'uite inter"hangeable. 9or Pro"lus, howe&er, there is no 'uestion but that the sub+e"t matter of the Philebus is indeed the forms, and thus monads. #he 'uestion is why, sin"e the dialogue "on"erns the forms, does 2o"rates refer to the forms sometimes as henads6 Pro"lus e*plains that with respe"t to the One they are monads be"ause ea"h of them is a plurality and a single being and a life(prin"iple and an intelle"tual form, but with respe"t to the things produ"ed from them and the series whi"h they establish, they are henads. #he forms are monads, in other words, through their status as beings, h&n%mena, and so forth, while they are henads

150 as causes, be"ause the henads are the ultimate "auses of all things, gi&en that the One operates, stri"tly spea$ing, prior to "ausality (see, e.g., PT !!! H. J1. 1I and is a "ausal agent only deri&ati&ely, through the henads whi"h are the real first "auses. #he effi"ient "ausality of the forms, in parti"ular, whi"h Pro"lus is always $een to emphasi1e in his "riti"isms of 3ristotle, e*"eeds the "ompass of the form qua form, in&iting referen"e to the domain of the henads. #he forms possess their "ausal effi"a"y deri&ati&ely from the henads, not from individual henads, but as the generi" poten"ies and attributes of the di&ine whi"h they represent. #o be more spe"ifi", we shall see that the highest forms are p&gai and are in effe"t transitional entities between the di&ine and onti" domains. Here then= we have a third reason for equivocation= namely that monads are called henads with respect to their causal efficacy= derived as is all causal efficacy= from the henads= and with respect to the henads' existential priority. A fourth reason for equivocation is that forms are called henads in light of their transcendence over what comes after them. #oward the bottom of "P LBC, Pro"lus is enumerating se&eral different ways of arguing to the priority of the One Being o&er plurality. #he first is "hara"teri1ed as a logi"al pro"edure, based on the signifi"ation of being, whi"h must be either homonymous or synonymous. #he se"ond is more s"ientifi", deri&ing from :ophist A4Jbff, "on"erning the identity and differen"e of a multipli"ity of beings. 7e goes on to "ite a third, more theologi"al starting(point, as follows4

E&erything that is parti"ipated and e*ists in others, its parti"ipants, has its a""ess to being from the unparti"ipated. )hat is parti"ipated be"omes plurali1ed along with the things under it, be"oming a part of ea"h of them and sharing its own essen"e with the realities

151
that parti"ipate in it. But the pure and unmi*ed beings that e*ist in themsel&es are fundamentally prior to parti"ulars that e*ist in things other than themsel&es.

#here are a number of other instan"es in the "ommentary where Pro"lus spea$s of a pe"uliarly theologi"al approa"h to a philosophi"al problem. )hat is it in parti"ular that ma$es the approa"h here theologi"al6 !t seems to be the re"ourse to an intuition that is for Pro"lus pe"uliarly theologi"al- the intuition, namely, of eminence, whi"h a"'uires programmati" importan"e with the introdu"tion of the aporia of the #hird 0an, be"ause the latter "on"erns the "oordination of the monad to its manifold. #he referen"e to theology here is almost phenomenologi"al, in that Pro"lus finds in religious e*perien"e the basi" intuition of the state of eminen"e or trans"enden"e "ommon to henads and to trans"endent monads. 8oti"e that it is at +ust after the point in the Parmenides where the forms themsel&es ha&e been found to be un$nowable that Parmenides begins spea$ing of the ,ods (1J4b(d . )e should re"all as well the passage from "P 11CB "ited in the first "hapter, where Pro"lus substituted trans"enden"e in the supra(essential realm for the differen"e of superior to inferior forms, and de"lination for the differen"e of inferior to superior forms. #he maieuti" fun"tion of the aporia of the #hird 0an in the "onte*t of the dialogue is to for"e us to as"end from the monads immanent in the manifolds to the trans"endent monads, when"e we shall pro"eed to the henads themsel&es. #he ad&ent of the henads is prefigured by the brea$through from immanent to trans"endant monads- and this re'uires us to "larify what is meant by a trans"endent monad. 9rom one perspe"ti&e, all monads are in fa"t "oordinate with their manifolds, as we ha&e seen from prop. A1 of the ET4 E&ery "lass has its beginning in a monad and pro"eeds to a manifold "oordinate therewith. But within the "ategory of the "oordinate

152 (sustoichon , there is still room for degrees of relati&e trans"enden"e, su"h as we find e*pressed within the logi" of part and whole in the notion of a whole(before(the(parts (prop. IL . #he limit of this relati&e trans"enden"e is the "ategory of the unparti"ipated or imparti"ipable, amethektos. 3 prin"iple whi"h is amethektos is not, despite its name, ne"essarily without parti"ipants. @ather, for Pro"lus the unparti"ipated simply has the relati&e status of a monad Dor Mthe formula of a monad,% monados echon logonE as being its own and not another%s Dheautou on kai ouk allouE, and as trans"ending the parti"ipants (prop. AJ . !n addition, parti"ipated substan"es (hupostaseis e*perien"e an upward tension (anateinontai toward unparti"ipated hyparxeis (ibid . #he "ategory of the unparti"ipated is thus broad enough to a""omodate the summits of the !deas and the henads too. #he henad is both authupostaton, and hen"e its own, and trans"ends its parti"ipants, and the referen"e to hyparxeis indi"ates that a referen"e to the henads is intended. E&en if the term hyparxeis here is being used generi"ally to in"lude beings and supra(essentials ali$e, it would seem that we are to in"lude the henads in this "ategory at least in some respe"t. But the unparti"ipated is a term "learly belonging more properly to monads, sin"e the henads are fre'uently "ontrasted with the One in that they are parti"ipated and the One is not. !ndeed, the term establishes in se&eral pla"es a spe"ial bond between the One and monads. But then what are we to ma$e of the implied superiority of the unparti"ipated to the parti"ipated6 >oes this pla"e monads, as unparti"ipated, prior to henads6 !n a way, yes, but in another way, no. #o begin with, there is the issue of the anatasis that would seem to be posited between the henads and the One if it is the unparti"ipated monad and they are the parti"ipated. !n the "orollary to prop. A1 there is also referen"e to an anatasis toward the

153 One (eis to hen . But it would seem unli$ely that we are to gi&e a metaphor su"h as this more weight than all that we ha&e seen about the a"tual stru"tural "hara"teristi"s of the henadi" multipli"ity and that we $now about the One from the Parmenides. )hile ea"h henad may possess a dire"tedness toward its own integrity, so to spea$, there is not literally an entity, some one thing, toward whi"h it is thus dire"ted. 9or this would ma$e the unity of a henad lie in something other than itself, that is, in a relation, whi"h would ma$e nonsense of the henadology. E&ery series of wholes, we read in prop. 1BB, is referable (anateinetai to an unparti"ipated prin"iple and "ause (aitian . !t does no &iolen"e to Pro"lus% point in the former proposition to grant it the more anodyne reading >odds gi&es to anateinesthai in the latter. !n prop. 1JK, we read that whate&er is di&ini1ed (ektheoumenon possesses an anatasis toward one di&ine henad- and indeed, one should say that the tension with respe"t to henads is that of the henad%s series of manifestations on different le&els of Being toward the henad%s supra(essential hyparxis, its pro"ession into Being, for anatasis is spe"ifi"ally asso"iated with re&ersion in prop. JK, and remaining, pro"eeding and re&erting, the famous "y"le of "ausality, are only true of the series depending from henads, and not of henads themsel&es, for all re&ersion seems to be the resolution of something into that from whi"h its being di&ides it Daph'ou di&r&tai kat'ousianE, i.e. from whi"h it is di&ided a""ording to being < thus do the spe"ies of Being resol&e into their genera and the atomi" parti"ipants into their spe"ies. But where the di&ision in 'uestion approa"hes 1ero, the tension in 'uestion is no longer stri"tly spea$ing upward (ana( or the resolution into some other but an integrati&e systole and diastole li$e the 2toi" teinein, the affirmation of the rootedness of that whi"h is di&ini1ed in that whi"h is beyond Being. #hus the e*pli"it "ontrast between hypostasis

154 and hyparxis in prop. AJ, whi"h would refer in a being to the relationship to di&ine "ausality and therefore something separate, refers in a henad to the relationship between the two aspe"ts of its nature. !n the Elements, the rule is always more important than its limiting "ase- while we must understand the signifi"an"e of the One as unparti"ipated in relation to the henads, we need not be led astray by the impli"ations of anatasis in this regard. #he unparti"ipated term is e*plained with re"ourse to the same general logi" applying to any monad or arch& in prop. 1BB, as a fun"tion of the identity (tautot&s of members of a series with respe"t to some "hara"ter. 3s all beings DontaE are from one Daph'enosE, so too are all the members of any series Dpasa seira aph'enosE (ibid , as if the notion of the beyond of Being and the negations applying to the One had no rele&an"e. 3nd in fa"t, they do not, for it is a 'uestion here of a logi", or rather an analogi" that supersedes the di&ide between Being and the supra(essential. 3ll unparti"ipated monads are analogous to the One and insofar as they too are affe"ted by a "ommon "hara"ter DtautonE, namely their analogy to the One, so far we "an refer them to the One G as prin"iples of a "ertain order of things they are dependent from the prin"iple of all things. 9or the prin"iple of all things is that whi"h all parti"ipate. 3re we to ta$e the henads as "o&ered by this panta6 !f it is a 'uestion of whether, from the perspe"ti&e of beings, we "an identify a "ommon "hara"teristi" in the henads li$e the "ommon "hara"teristi"s uniting "lasses of beings, then yes. But then there is the matter of the nature of this "hara"teristi". 3nd if the "hara"teristi" is to be absolutely uni'ue indi&iduals, then in this respe"t a "ommon "hara"teristi" uniting the "lass would "ontradi"t the &ery nature of the "hara"teristi" in 'uestion. !t is a parado*- but not one for

155 whi"h we need by any means despair of arri&ing at a rational e*planation. 9or it is a 'uestion, +ust as we saw with the archai ?imit and !nfinity, of a stru"ture, a logos, with rele&an"e to beings, whi"h is superimposed upon the henads and e*ists so to spea$ in parallel with them. !n passages li$e PT !!! A. 1Bf, Pro"lus again stresses the analogy between the One !tself and the unparti"ipated monads, for in e&ery "ase the first trans"endent genus Dto pr%tiston genos ex&r&menonE will ha&e a ran$ DtaxinE analogous to the One G 7en"e prior to the forms whi"h are in other things, those are established whi"h subsist in themsel&es- e*empt "auses prior to "oordinate Dsuntetagmen%nE, and unparti"ipated monads prior to parti"ipated (11. K(1A . #he entire tenor of the passage in fa"t signals that the sub+e"t matter is ontology, despite the fa"t that the sub+e"t is the One !tself. !n addition to the referen"es to forms and taxeis, there is also the "ontrast of being in itself and being in another, whi"h belongs to the order of !ntelle"t (see "hapter L . #he term for "oordinate here is also narrower than sustoichon, for entities may be sustoichia in some respe"t while not a"tually belonging to the same taxis, as implied by suntetagmenon. 3gain, at !!! H. 1JA(J, in establishing the ne"essity for positing the two prin"iples of ?imit and !nfinity, Pro"lus argues that

the pro"ession of the di&ine orders originates DarchetaiE, not from things "oordinated Dkatatetagmen%nE and whi"h e*ist in others, but from things e*empt Dex&r&men%nE, and whi"h are established in themsel&es. 3s therefore the One is prior to things unified Dh&n%men%nE, and as that whi"h is passi&e relati&e to the One has a se"ond ran$ DtaxinE after the unparti"ipated unity Dhen%sinE, thus also the two prin"iples of beings, prior to

156
being parti"ipated by and mi*ed with beings, are themsel&es by themsel&es the "auses of the whole of things.

8ote again the opposition of in itself and in another, and the opposition of the One as hen%sis to the h&n%menon, rather than as heniaios, or unitary. )hen the One is spo$en of as heniaios, its identity with the indi&idual henad is meant, whereas hen%sis opposes the h&n%mena more dire"tly. 8oti"e that the h&n%mena are a se"ondary ran$, taxis, after the unparti"ipated hen%sis, whereas in the passage "ited in the first "hapter from PT !!! J. 1A. AJ(I we read that in the first "auses there is no intrusion of differen"e to transfer the things begotten into another "lass;ran$ DtaxisE from the generator. )hen Pro"lus spea$s of the One as a hypostasis, that is, as the One !tself or the 9irst Prin"iple, it fre'uently seems that he does so in terms that are e*pli"itly ontologi"al, as if, li$e Plato himself in the Parmenides, DhEe hypothesi1es @eal Being and One Being, and by means of this hypothesis he as"ends to the One !tself, whi"h he himself in the $epublic (K1Bb des"ribes as Mnon(hypothesi1ed%, ("P 1BJJf . #he One, as an hypostasis, is the produ"t of a philosophi"al inferen"e from the hypothesis of Being !tself, while its hyparxis, its true e*isten"e, lies in the henads, as in the passage from 9ec. 9ub. R 'uoted in the first "hapter. One must "ulti&ate in this regard the "apa"ity to swit"h ba"$ and forth between "omplementary perspe"ti&es4 one ontologi"al, in whi"h a hierar"hy of monads, ea"h of whi"h possesses merely specific unity, su""eed ea"h other up to the One !tselfthe other e*istential (i.e. from hyparxis , in whi"h ea"h member of the poly"entri" henadi" arithmos "ontains the potential of re&ealing to its worshiper the "ontents of its di&ine intelle"t, in whi"h the other henads "oales"e into mono"entri" disposition around it and the aforementioned stru"ture of hypostases is di&ini1ed. #his mo&ement is "ompleted

157 in the appli"ation of the philosophi"al hermeneuti" to the fa"ti"al sa"red te*t, whether this be a myth or re&ealed te*t. !n this hermeneuti"al en"ounter, the two dimensions of di&ine a"ti&ity in the world are, as it were, reunited, the one whi"h leads to re&elation, the other whi"h leads to diale"ti". #he e*istential perspe"ti&e, meanwhile, spea$s of the mode of e*isten"e of the di&ine in general, and ser&es to mediate between philosophy and religion at the same time that it establishes the limits of ea"h. #he unparti"ipated prin"iple arises as a s"hemati" or ontologi"al depi"tion < for all ontology, as e*hibiting formal or spe"ifi" unity, is essentially schematic < of the relationship, ultimately, between hypostasis and hyparxis, Being and the supra(essential. #his is the dis+un"tion whi"h the dis+un"tions at the le&el of the forms between parti"ipants and parti"ipated prin"iples issue in, +ust as the ine*isten"e of the One !tself is the ultimate issue of the method of negation whi"h is so distin"ti&e in the Parmenides a""ording to the interpretation of 2yrianus. 9or at e&ery le&el of Being, the sign of "ausation is negation, for whate&er is the "ause of some predi"ate in the robust sense must be that whi"h re*ects the &ery predi"ate in 'uestion, at least in the sense that it is predi"ated of the parti"ipants. 3t "P LBIff Pro"lus attempts a systemati" a""ount of the ontologi"al status of the monad qua monad and its deri&ation from the One4

8either is plurality anywhere un"oordinated with the One, nor is it di&ided from itself, nor is the One without offspring and de&oid of the plurality belonging to it- the One is the leader of se"ondary monads, and e&ery plurality has the unity appropriate to it. 9or all the pluralities, intelligible and intelle"tual as well as those in or abo&e the "osmos, are atta"hed to their own monads and ordered with respe"t to one another. 3nd the monads in

158
their turn are from one monad, so that the plurality of monads is not di&ided from itself, nor a mere plurality de&oid of unity. 9or it would not be right that the "auses that unify other things should themsel&es be di&ided from one another.

#he One is here the supreme monad, with a fun"tion a$in to a summum genus. 3 plurality, pl&thos, depri&ed of its monad, would be di&ided from itself, that is, unthin$able as a whole or "lass. #he One, already the "ause of the monads, sin"e there is nothing more di&ine than unity e*"ept the One !tself (LBL , must also ser&e as the monad of monads. 3 "ause first e*er"ises upon itself the power it imparts to others- and so as monads unify "lasses of beings and Being !tself, so must the One (that is, the henads unify the monads themsel&es into a "lass, of whi"h the One !tself is the monad. !n unifying the "lass of monads the One, so to spea$, unifies itself, be"oming a monad in formula (logon echon, ET prop. AJ . 2ee also, in this regard, "P 114J4 all "lasses whate&er owe their subsisten"e to the One Dapo tou henos hupest&sanE, as well as "$ !, 1JJ. 1C(AB, where the ,ood is referred to as the one prin"iple of wholes Dt%n hol%nE from whi"h all the di&ine orders Ddiakosm%nE < that is, the classifications of the ,ods by their powers < pro"eed. #here are surely "ases in whi"h t%n hol%n should be rendered simply of e&erything, but the possibility of a more te"hni"al referen"e to wholes should ne&er be disregarded, espe"ially insofar as Pro"lus has always a&ailable to him some form of pan with whi"h to e*press the "on"ept of totality, whi"h is at any rate logi"ally distin"t < as will be"ome "lear in the dis"ussion of the third intelligible triad in "hapter K. Prop. CC of the ET states that DeE&ery unparti"ipated term arises qua unparti"ipated from no "ause other than itself, but is itself the first prin"iple and "ause of all the

159 parti"ipated terms- thus the first prin"iple of e&ery series DseiranE is always without origin Dagen&tosE. 5nparti"ipated monads thus share after a fashion in the status of henads as autotel&s and authupostaton, self("onstituting. #hese epithets refer to the fa"t that ea"h henad, with no sa"rifi"e of its supra(essential status, furnishes for itself its own hypostasis, its own subsisten"e or Being- in addition, autotel&s refers to the perfe"tion whi"h is a "hief "hara"teristi" of the third intelligible triad, that is, the di&ine intelle"t of ea"h ,od. #he monad possesses deri&ati&ely a lesser form of authupostasis inasmu"h as it does not re"ei&e from an e*ternal sour"e that "hara"ter in respe"t of whi"h it is unparti"ipated. #here may thus be superior terms from whi"h it is deri&ed, but it pro"eeds from them not qua unparti"ipated but qua parti"ipant. 7owe&er, as originating a series it has primiti&ely what it has imparti"ipably4 so that qua unparti"ipated it is un"aused, another way in whi"h it resembles a henad. 7owe&er, as we ha&e seen in the dis"ussion of p&gai, it is spe"ifi"ally the "hara"teristi" of being ungenerated that relates su"h agen&ta to the &ery realm of generation, albeit in this "ase ideal and not mundane generation. #he dependen"e of monads from the One is spe"ifi"ally from the One as 9irst Prin"iple, while the do"trine with respe"t to p&gai and archai pro&ides us with further indi"ation that the One, qua 9irst Prin"iple, is a monad, and therefore, notwithstanding its logical priority, would in fa"t, from a "ertain perspe"ti&e, be subordinated to the henads were the henads and the One to be posited on a "ommon field or synopti"ally. #he whole point, then, is that they are not to be so posited, for the image of a One abo&e and beyond the henads is pre"isely the $ind of hypostati1ation that would lead us astray.

160 !t is as if in all their "hara"teristi"s e*"ept for being unparti"ipated the unparti"ipated monads are lesser henads. #he middle term whi"h mediates between unparti"ipated monads and parti"ipated henads is the transcendence "ommon to both. E&ery henad is parti"ipable, and they are in this fashion distinguished from the One, whi"h is imparti"ipable. But +ust as the agen&tos was, in its &ery negati&ity, lin$ed dire"tly to generation as the "ause of it, so too the amethektos, in its negati&ity, pertains dire"tly to parti"ipation, and not the parti"ipation we would attribute to henads, either, for in prop. AJ the argument to the unparti"ipated is by &irtue of the fa"t that e&ery parti"ipated term, be"oming a property of that parti"ular by whi"h it is parti"ipated Dtinos genomenon huph'ou metechetaiE, is se"ondary to that whi"h in all is e'ually present and has filled them all out of itself. #he dis"ussion seems "learly to be distinguishing within the scene of participation, between the immanent "hara"teristi" in the parti"ipant and the entity that is parti"ipated. #hese two senses of metechomena ha&e been re"ogni1ed by P. 3. 0ei+er. #he unparti"ipated monad is really +ust a pla"eholder- it registers a "ausality in"ommensurable with the parti"ipant entity and says nothing more. )e ma$e a mista$e, therefore, to pla"e unparti"ipated monads on a par with the henads as if the former possessed an e*isten"e at all "omparable to the latter. ?i$e all monads, the unparti"ipated is simply a formula, one whi"h is both indispensible and analytic for e&ery in&o"ation of parti"ipation- the ultimate instan"e of it, that whi"h is ne"essitated by the phenomenon of parti"ipated unity, is unparti"ipated unity, the One !tself. But this unparti"ipated unity, if we should in'uire as to its e*isten"e, is simply the trans"enden"e of ea"h henad, for the illumination of Being, the parti"ipation of Being by the One, does not render the unity of ea"h henad thereby an ontic unity. 3lthough the henads are

161 parti"ipated, they are not parti"ipated in the sense that Pro"lus refers to here, i.e. be"oming a part of G and sharing its own essen"e with the realities that parti"ipate in it, for su"h as these are parti"ulars that e*ist in things other than themsel&es < see in this respe"t the a""ount in ET H1(A of the ch%rist%s metechomenon, that whi"h is separately parti"ipated. 3t least they are not parti"ipated in this way on"e we separate their supra(essential nature from that essence whi"h is a produ"t of their activity and can therefore be shared by its parti"ipants, at least in the broad sense that the whole s"ene of parti"ipation is onti"- for supra(essentials do not simply re*ect essen"e, they produce essen"e. )ith all of this in mind, we are e'uipped to pi"$ up the passage from "P LBL at a turning(point in the te*t after the passage whi"h "ites the need for the "lass of monads to be itself unified under some monad. Pro"lus, although hitherto spea$ing all along of monads, suddenly says

#hus all the many henads must be from the One, and from them the pluralities, both the primary pluralities and the ones that su""eed them- and always those that are further away from the One are more plurali1ed than those that pre"ede them, but e&en so e&ery plurality has a twofold henad, one that is "oordinate with it Dsuntetagmen&nE and one that trans"ends it.

#his is one of the most notorious instan"es of e'ui&o"ation between henads and monads. )hy does Pro"lus swit"h his terminology6 9or one thing, the dis"ourse has shifted from an as"ent to the One from su""essi&e manifolds, to a pro"ession from the One into su""essi&e manifolds. 3nd we $now that it ma$es a differen"e whether an ob+e"t is

162 re&ealed in the order of pro"ession or the order of re&ersion. #he 9irst Prin"iple, for instan"e, is said by Pro"lus to be "alled the One with respe"t to pro"ession, the ,ood with respe"t to re&ersion. 3nd it is e&ident from the te*t that follows that the trans"endent henad is in fa"t the unparti"ipated monad. Pro"lus uses as his e*amples the !deas of 0an, Beauty, E'uality and /usti"e, whi"h are ea"h doubled, one trans"endent and before the many, one parti"ipated and in the many, e*plaining that as ea"h of the $inds Deid%nE is double, so also e&ery whole is double. 9or the $inds are parts of wholes, and the unparti"ipated whole is distin"t from the parti"ipated. #he referen"e to the logi" of whole and part "onfirms that our "on"ern here is with monads, and that the trans"endant monad(cum(henad is to be understood as an whole(before(the(parts. 8either the trans"endent nor the "oordinate henads here are, then, really henads in the stri"t senserather, it is a 'uestion of the deri&ation of the two "lasses of monad from the One. Emerging from the foregoing "onsideration of the meaning of unparti"ipated terms and the signifi"an"e of negation or dis+un"tion for thin$ing "ausality, is a final sour"e of e'ui&o"ation this time applying not so mu"h to henads and monads as to the system as a whole4 A fifth reason for equivocation is the tendency to analogize any important dis*unction to the dis*unction between the ontic and supra1essential domains. 9re'uently in Pro"lus, a dis+un"tion rele&ant to the "onte*t at hand in a gi&en dis"ussion is allowed to determine the stru"ture of the hypostases, espe"ially when it is a 'uestion of as"ension or re&ersion, and this "an help to e*plain e'ui&o"al usages at times as well as a general fluidity in the denomination of the hypostases. #his "omes about be"ause beings must parti"ipate the higher "auses through their own pro*imate "auses- as su"h, the &iew through the immediate dis+un"tion is the phenomenologi"ally a""urate, e&en constitutive

163 perspe"ti&e. 3t "P LBB, for instan"e, it is e*plained that !ntelle"t loo$s at ?ife and Being as one- and atta"hing itself to ?ife, when it sees the unity of ?ife and Being, it atta"hes itself also to Being. 3nd in the same fashion, the indi&idual intelle"t, seeing the unity of parti"ipated and unparti"ipated !ntelle"t, turns through the one to the other. 2imilarly, at LAB we read that for tertiary beings, the beings prior to themsel&es be"ome for them one intelligible order, appearing as a unity owing to their bene&olent purpose. 3nd we read at 1B4H about men of old (Pythagoreans who de"ided to term in"orporeal essen"e as a whole MOne,% and the "orporeal and in general the di&isible MOthers%- so that in whate&er sense you too$ the One, you would not de&iate from the "ontemplation of in"orporeal substan"es and the ruling henads. #he referen"e to ruling henads here may be "al"ulated, sin"e these are the ,ods of the Phaedrus, through whom the parti"ular soul is assimilated to the forms. 9urthermore, Pro"lus e*plains at PT !!! A1. L4f a "ompli"ated series of e'ui&o"ations by means of whi"h Plato himself, and his most genuine dis"iples, fre'uently "all all DtrueE beings intelle"t, and the first intelle"ts are essen"es, so that the henads are fre'uently "alled intelligibles, and beings intelligible intelle"ts. Pro"lus does this himself in parti"ular in ET prop. AB, where he opposes the One to the !ntelle"t, allowing this dis+un"tion to elide the domain of Being in the stri"t sense. #hese are all fa"tors whi"h must be ta$en into a""ount when we en"ounter e'ui&o"al usages of the term henad, lest we be"ome "onfused about the do"trine "on"erning the henads proper. !ndeed, one "ould see the di&isions of the hypostases within Being as essentially fluid be"ause of their monadi" homogeneity, whi"h imparts to them a basi" "ommensurability. #he manifold of the ,ods, who resist subsumption in a totali1ing unity above them, perhaps finds an e"ho in the impossibility of subsuming the trans"endent monad into a

164 "lass with the beings that "ome after it- they remain, rather, pure and unmi*ed G in themsel&es. ("P LBC . #his would be another sense in whi"h the approa"h at "P LBC might be "hara"teri1ed as theologi"al.

5ntil we ha&e be"ome sensiti1ed to the "onnotations of the terms as ! ha&e dis"ussed them in this "hapter, it "an seem at times as if Pro"lus uses them indifferently, for the one term is simply substituted without warning or "omment. 3t H1A, for e*ample, he "alls 0an 7imself an intelligible henad from whi"h pro"eeds first a hea&enly, then a fiery, airy, watery and earthy 0an in a""ord with the intelligible tetrad of forms in the third order of intelligibles (the 3nimal !tself of the Timaeus . ?ater on we read that the whole number of men in this world G depends upon that intelle"tual henad we ha&e "alled 0an 7imself, e*tending the e'ui&o"al usage begun already, sin"e the men here naturally depend immediately upon the intelle"tual order rather than the intelligible. But then we read a little later that it is e&ident that these monads De.g., 0an 7imselfE are more parti"ular than those dis"ussed earlier, that is, the e*isten"e(gi&ing forms of HBC4 unity, plurality, li$eness, unli$eness, rest and motion. #he passage has "on"erned monads all along, but uses the term henad in order to emphasi1e the rootedness of the 7uman form in the &ery highest rea"hes of 9orm, namely the third intelligible triad or intelligible intelle"t, whose "hara"teristi" of elementality we shall dis"uss in "hapter K. )hat is intriguing about passages that seem to blur henads and monads is that they seem to arise from a relu"tan"e on Pro"lus%s part to pla"e henads and monads in a "ommon field within whi"h they might be determined against one another. 3 rare e*"eption is at "P 1B4L, where we read that not only with them but in all other "ases we

165 "an find the monads as leading the series Darithm%nE whi"h belong to them, and the henads of the monads being the most basi" origins of the things Dpragmat%nE,H subordinating monads to henads. #he phrase henads of the monads should also be "ompared to phrases o""asionally used by Pro"lus su"h as henads of beings or e&en henads of the ,ods. 2u"h phrases simply establish the henads as prior to beings in general < or in the "ase of the phrase henads of the ,ods, prior to the lesser emanations of ea"h ,od within his;her own series < without further spe"ifying the nature of the relationship. #he impossibility of subsuming henads and monads themselves under a single genus is perhaps the ultimate e*planation for the sometimes "onfusing usage of these terms. )e do not find Pro"lus determining henads and monads against one another be"ause the One, after all, is not a genus "ontaining henads and monads as spe"ies. #he relationship between these two types of entity might be "hara"teri1ed rather as complementarity. 5p to a point, the ontologi"al or monadologi"al dis"ourse and the theologi"al or henadologi"al dis"ourse are both self(suffi"ient. But either e&entually "alls the other into play, the ontologi"al dis"ourse when "onfronted with "ertain aporiae emerging, for Pro"lus, in the Parmenides itself, the stri"tly theologi"al dis"ourse when it is for"ed to refle"tion and +ustifi"ation, a pro"ess whi"h began as far ba"$ as the Preso"rati"s. #he integration of theologi"al and philosophi"al dis"ourse whi"h Pro"lus see$s does not "onsist of redu"ing either to the terms of the other. #he henads, although e*istentially prior to the monads, "an ne&ertheless from within the monadi" perspe"ti&e < and the perspe"ti&e of philosophy is ultimately monadi" < be seen as pro"eeding from a monad or prin"iple of pure indi&iduation. #he monadology%s rea"h here e*"eeds its grasp,
H 2ubstituing for 0orrow and >illon%s translation that whi"h appears in P. 3. 0ei+er, Parti"ipation in 7enads and 0onads in Pro"lus% Theologia Platonica !!!, "hs. 1(I in !n Proclus and his "nfluence in 3edieval Philosophy ed. E. P. Bos and P. 3. 0ei+er (?eiden4 E. /. Brill, 1CCA p. II n. I.

166 howe&er4 the henadi" indi&idual eludes identifi"ation with its "olle"tion of attributes and hen"e belongs, so to spea$, in the "lass of un"lassifiable entities. 7en"e ! use the term "omplementarity to e*press the essential ambi&alen"e of the refusal to fully integrate the henadi" and monadi" dimensions of the system into a single perspe"ti&e lest either dimension would ha&e to surrender its autonomy as a result. #his does not pre&ent, howe&er, an a""ount of the emergence of the monadi" from the henadi" perspe"ti&e, whi"h is the sub+e"t of the "lose reading of the Platonic Theology in "hapters K(L of this dissertation.

#he e*amination of e'ui&o"ation in the use of the terms henad and monad has helped us to further "larify the relationship between the henads and the One. 9or the final stage in our general e*amination of the henadology before we embar$ on the "lose reading of boo$s three through fi&e of the Platonic Theology, whi"h will tra"e the a"tual stages of the emergen"e of monadi" from henadi" unity, we "an refine our understanding of this relationship by e*amining Pro"lus% "riti'ue of an important "ompeting interpretation of the 9irst 7ypothesis of the Parmenides, whi"h posits a different relationship between the One and the henads. !n "hap. AJ of boo$ !!! of the Platonic Theology and also at "P 1BI4ff Pro"lus e*plains and refutes an e*egesis, perhaps to be attributed to !ambli"hus, of the 9irst 7ypothesis of the Parmenides4

!t is not true, as some say it, that in the 9irst 7ypothesis the sub+e"t of the dis"ourse is ,od and the ,ods Dperi theou kai the%nE- for it would not be lawful for Parmenides to "oordinate DsuntatteinE multipli"ity with the One Dto pl&thos t% heniE nor the One T,odU Dton henaE with the multipli"ity Dt% pl&theiE Tof the ,odsU, sin"e the &ery first ,od Dho

167
pr%tistos theosE trans"ends wholes in e&ery way. On the "ontrary, in the 9irst 7ypothesis, Parmenides denies of the 9irst not only being but also unity itself Dauto to henE- but, that this does not suit the other ,ods, this is e&ident to anyone. !t is not true, furthermore, as these authors "laim, that in the 9irst 7ypothesis Parmenides treats of the intelligible ,ods- they maintain that it is to these ,ods that are related the negations, be"ause they are united Dsun&n%ntaiE with the One and that they surpass in simpli"ity and in unity all the genera of ,ods. 7ow, indeed, "an the similar and the dissimilar, the "onne"ted and the separated, and all the other attributes denied of the One, pertain to the intelligible ,ods6 8o, if they are right, ! thin$, to say that the attributes denied are properties of the ,ods, they are wrong to say that they are all the properties Dsee belowE of the intelligible ,ods, without ta$ing into a""ount that, a""ording to this thesis, it would ha&e to be that the sub+e"t of the intelligible ,ods is treated a se"ond time in the se"ond hypothesis, for that whi"h Parmenides denies in the 9irst 7ypothesis, he affirms in the se"ond. (PT !!! AJ. HA

#he properties of HA.1L represent a "orre"tion by the editors, for the te*t a"tually reads homoiot&tes, li$enesses of the ,ods, "orre"ted by 2affrey P )esterin$ to idiot&tes, properties. But li$enesses is defensible here, inasmu"h as the ontologi"al "lassifi"ations of the ,ods "orresponding to the negations "ould be seen to be of the order of li$enesses of the ,ods, sin"e li$eness is an infra(intelle"tual "hara"teristi", and "lassifying the ,ods ontologi"ally manifests the stri&ing of the human soul toward the intelle"tual apprehension of the ,ods. )hat is the problem Pro"lus has with the interpretation of the 9irst 7ypothesis as "on"erning ,od and the ,ods6 !t is first and foremost that this represents an illi"it "onflation of different le&els of dis"ourse. !t is not a 'uestion here of a theological do"trine in whi"h the many ,ods are subordinated to a single ,od, that is, a form of

168 henotheism, although it "ould easily be ta$en for su"h. Pro"lus e*plains that it would not be lawful (themis for Parmenides to "oordinate multipli"ity with the One (to hen , and then essentially repeats the statement, only this time with a gendered One, ton hena. #he latter statement is a spe"ifi" appli"ation of the general prin"iple- but the method of appli"ation is not in a""ord with a subordinationist theology, but rather in a""ord with the poly"entri" polytheism whi"h ! ha&e e*pli"ated in Pro"lus. #he One !tself is not ton hena, for that whi"h neither is, nor is one is not mas"uline either. @ather < and this is something ! shall dis"uss further in "hapter K < ton hena refers to the aspe"t of ea"h ,od "orresponding to ?imit- in a word, to the summit of ea"h ,od prior to wholes (t%n hol%n , whi"h means in the first pla"e prior to the whole of the series proper to that ,od. 3 se"ond point whi"h "on"erns Pro"lus in the do"trines he "riti"i1es is that they posit the other ,ods as united with the One. #he "ommentators in 'uestion, then, whoe&er they may be, are not themsel&es henotheists so mu"h as a pe"uliar $ind of monotheists, inasmu"h as they imagine all the ,ods differentiating themsel&es from One ,od along with Being. !t is 'uite possible that these "ommentators did not wish to affirm an anti(polytheist position, but simply "ould not find their way to a formulation in whi"h the logi" of monism "ould be satisfied alongside an e*istential pluralism. !nstead, they were for"ed to "onflate the supra(essential and onti" domains. 3n important a""ount "ould well be gi&en of the history of the attempts by philosophers to formulate a metaphysi"s ade'uate to polytheisti" praxis. )e find >amas"ius "omplaining at one point (9P !!! I4;@. !, AKL(H that

nearly all the philosophers prior to !ambli"hus "on"ei&e the plurality of the ,ods in this way, Tnamely thatU there is TbutU one supra(essential ,od, while the others are

169
substantial Dousi%deisE, being made ,ods by illuminations from the One, and that the plurality of supra(essential henads are not self(perfe"t Dautotel%nE hypostases, but di&ini1ations Dthe%se%nE whi"h are illuminated from the One ,od Dtou monou theouE and whi"h are "ommuni"ated to substan"es.

3s su"h, we should perhaps see !ambli"hus, if indeed it is to him that the ,od and the ,ods interpretation of the 9irst 7ypothesis belongs, not as representing a truly different point of &iew from Pro"lus, but as la"$ing the proper "on"eptual apparatus to ma$e the point he wishes to ma$e without misleading and undesirable "onse'uen"es for the point of &iew whi"h he and Pro"lus substantially share. E&en Plotinus, who would generally be understood as ha&ing far less interest in the issues surrounding polytheism than !ambli"hus, and who is generally thought of as possessing at most a benign indifferen"e to polytheism, if not an a"ti&e disaffe"tion, "an be seen struggling with the issue of the indi&iduality of the ,ods in a passage from Ennead N. H. C, where we find a number of formulations anti"ipatory of Pro"lus% solution, albeit whi"h are not seemingly systemati"ally applied by Plotinus in his own thought. )e read that

ea"h ,od is all the ,ods "oming together into one Dsunontes eis henE- they are different DalloiE in their powers, but in that one(many they are all one Dt& de mia ekein& t& poll& pantes heisE, or rather the one T,odU is all Dho heis pantesE- for he does not fall short DepileipeiE if all those "ome to be Dpantes ekeinoi gen%ntaiE. #hey are all together DhomouE and ea"h one again apart in a position without separation Den stasei adiastat%E, possessing no per"eptible shape < for if they did, one would be in one pla"e and one in another, and ea"h would no longer be all in himself < nor does ea"h ,od ha&e parts

170
different DallaE from himself belonging to other DalloisE ,ods than himself, nor is ea"h whole DholonE li$e a power "ut up DkermatistheisaE whi"h is as large as the measure of its parts.

8oti"e in this passage that the unity whi"h Plotinus a""ords to the ,ods seems not to be a unity in some third, but rather the presen"e of all the ,ods in ea"h ,od, as we "an see from the mas"uline heis whi"h is used twi"e. Plotinus is also "learly "on"erned here that the ,ods not be differentiated reciprocally from one another, in whi"h "ase the "oming to be of others would diminish ea"h. !t seems that Plotinus does not wish the relations between the ,ods to "onstitute a mediation of them whi"h would diminish their reality as indi&iduals. #his is already, as it will be for Pro"lus, a matter of the unifi"ation of the ,ods by &irtue of the abstra"tion of their "ommon parts < that is, powers < into monadi" unities. 8or does Plotinus wish for a ,od to be redu"ible to its parts, that is, its "hara"teristi"s measured within Being. #he strategy of the unnamed "ommentators with respe"t to the 9irst 7ypothesis not only has the "onse'uen"e of dissol&ing the indi&idual distin"tion of the ,ods into an abstra"t unity, but also, as Pro"lus points out, eliminates what he sees as the stru"turing fun"tion of the negations of the 9irst 7ypothesis as indi"ating the di&ine orders, and damages the elegan"e of the dialogue%s stru"ture for Pro"lus inasmu"h as the transition from negation to affirmation is no longer identi"al to the transition from the supra( essential to Being, with the negations themsel&es < whi"h are in fa"t the powers "onstituti&e on the one hand of the se&eral di&ine orders, and thus of the onti" hypostases < as the bridge between the two.

171 3 se"ond passage "on"erning this ,od and the ,ods interpretation of the 9irst 7ypothesis o""urs in the "onte*t of the "ommentary of Pro"lus on the first lemma, Parm. 1JL . 4(K, of the 9irst 7ypothesis, beginning by the following 'uestion4 !t is ne"essary to say first what is the aim of the 9irst 7ypothesis4 does it "on"ern only ,od Dperi theou mononE, or ,od and the ,ods Dperi theou kai peri the%nE, as some say6 )e must be "areful not to pre+udi"e our reading with the monothei1ing "onnotations the singular term ,od has for us. 9or Pro"lus, the term ,od without any further spe"ifi"ation is the name of a 'uality, ,odhood, as it were, or a term referring indifferently to any ,od. Pro"lus begins by "arefully unders"oring that the dis"ourse is about a sub+e"t DpragmatosE whi"h has hyparxis, and it is not the "ase, as some ha&e supposed Dapparently Origen the Platonist, "f. 0orrow P >illon p. 41Cn.E that this One in its absolute form Dtouto mon%s henE is without substan"e DanhupostatosE, and that this hypothesis produ"es impossible "on"lusions (1BIK . #he One, Pro"lus argues, has indeed subsisten"e (huphest%s although not Being (ousi%des (1BII . 3s far as its hyparxis goes, we ha&e seen in the passage from 9ec. 9ub. R that the hyparxis of the One is ea"h ,od. #his seeming dispersion of the One into the many ,ods is, howe&er, altogether different from denying the e*isten"e of the One as an hypostasis. )e "an see what the latter would mean from Pro"lus% gloss of Origen%s position4 for Origen, the point of the first hypothesis is something li$e a reductio ad absurdum. !t is important to stress that this is how Pro"lus understands the argument that the One is anhupostatos, lest it should be thought that the interpretation of this dissertation renders the One without subsisten"e. 7e goes on to deal with the possibly !ambli"hean reading that we ha&e already en"ountered4

172

8e"essarily then, if indeed only the di&ine is supra(essential, and all that is di&ine is abo&e Being, the present argument "ould be either only about the primal ,od Dtou pr%tou theouE, who is alone DmonosE supra(essential, or else it is about all the ,ods also whi"h are after him, as some of those whom we re&ere would hold. 2o they argue that sin"e e&ery ,od, inasmu"h as he is a ,od, is a henad (for it is this element, the One, whi"h di&ini1es all being , for this reason they thin$ it right to +oin to the study of the 9irst a dis"ussion of all the ,ods- for they are all supra(essential henads, and trans"end the multipli"ity of beings and are the summits of beings. But if we were to say that both the primal "ause DaitianE and the other ,ods are one DhenE, we would ha&e to allot one and the same hypothesis to all of them- for we would ha&e to say that the dis"ussion "on"erned the primal One in no way more than it "on"erned all the rest of the henads. But if this primal Dpr%tistonE One, as indeed is &ery mu"h the &iew of these authorities, is simply and solely One Dpant%n mon%s estiE, and un"onne"ted with e&erything else, and unparti"ipated, as they say, Msnat"hing itself away% (!r8 #hald. fr. J.1 from wholes;e&erything, and un$nowable to e&erything, as being trans"endent, whereas ea"h of the other henads is somehow parti"ipated, and is not only a henad but also parta$es in the multipli"ity proper to it, and in some substan"e either intelligible or intelle"tual or psy"hi" or e&en "orporeal (for parti"ipation pro"eeds e&en down this far < why should that One whi"h is not re"$oned with DsunarithmoumenonE beings, nor ran$ed DsuntattomenonE at all with the 0any Dtois polloisE, be pla"ed in the same hypothesis with henads whi"h are parti"ipated in by beings, and ser&e to "onfer "oheren"e DsunektikaisE on the 0any6

Pro"lus e*plains ne*t that the One is +ust li$e other unparti"ipated prin"iples, insofar as we do not get the same a""ount DlogosE gi&en of the unparti"ipated and the parti"ipated soul- for the properties of the parti"ipated would ne&er a""ord with those of the

173 unparti"ipated, and so with the unparti"ipated !ntelle"t and the many intelle"ts, for the former holds the ran$ of monad Dmonados epeiche logonE, while the latter that of number whi"h has "ome into being Dhuphest&kotosE around this monad (1BIL . 3s we ha&e seen, it is "ommon for Pro"lus to refer in this fashion to the One, when "onsidered as an hypostasis, that is, as the One !tself, as a monad and a""ording to an analogy with all the other unparti"ipated prin"iples, namely the onti" hypostases. )hat is potentially misleading in the present passage is of "ourse the way that Pro"lus refers to the One as a henad alongside < or rather prior to < the other henads. But that he "an hardly mean us to really ta$e it in this way is "lear from his statement that the primal ,od is alone supra(essential. !t would be absurd, on the basis of this single statement, to throw aside the numerous others where Pro"lus refers to all ,ods as supra(essential, or to assume on the basis of this te*t that all the other ,ods are only supra(essential e'ui&o"ally. @ather, the primal ,od is each ,od in his;her primal aspe"t, in whi"h s;he is, indeed, ea"h one alone- for as we shall see in "hapter K, the three intelligible triads are "hara"teristi"s of ea"h ,od, and it is only in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, dis"ussed in "hapter I of this dissertation, that we ha&e to do with the "hara"teristi"s of a group of deities in common. Pro"lus e*plains that while e&ery ,od is one- yet the Mone% in ea"h ,od is not separate in the same way, nor in the same way un$nowable, nor in the same way un"ir"ums"ribable, as the primal One itself (1BIH . 3nd indeed, the point of the present interpretation is in no way to usurp the systemati", that is to say diale"ti"al fun"tion of the One !tself, for as Pro"lus puts it, e&en as man in the stri"t sense is so in &irtue of his soul, so ,od in the stri"t sense is so in &irtue of the One Dho kuri%s theos kata to henE- for

174 in ea"h "ase there is a dominant element Dto kuri%tatonE in all those whi"h ma$e up the totality of the entity Dt%n sumpl&rount%nE a""ording to whi"h ea"h member of the totality Dhekaston G t%n pant%nE subsists Dhuphest&keE (1BIC . But +ust as the One !tself is rarely presented by Pro"lus without the "hain of analogy whi"h leads up to it by the logi" of the other imparti"ipable monads < and note again at 1BIH this &ery rhetori"al trope again < so too the analogy here, while entirely "orre"t so far as it goes, is ne&ertheless a 'uestion of proportionality, a logos. 9or the kuriotaton of the ,od is its own hyparxis, its own absolute indi&iduality, not, as in the "ase of man%s soul, something whi"h would tend to compromise that indi&iduality.

!t follows ne"essarily, then, that the 9irst 7ypothesis is about ,od alone, in so far as he is the generator of the plurality Dpoll%nE of ,ods, he himself being trans"endent o&er multipli"ity and un"onne"ted with those T,odsU who ha&e pro"eeded forth from him. !t is for this reason that e&erything is denied of this One, as being established as superior to all things and trans"endent o&er all things, and produ"ing DparagontosE all the "hara"teristi"s Didiot&tasE of the ,ods, while itself being undefinable and un"ir"ums"ribable in relation to all of them. 9or it is not a parti"ular one Dti henE, but simply One Dhapl%s henE, and it is not intelligible or intelle"tual, but it "onstitutes DhupostatikonE both the intelligible and the intelle"tual henads. 9or in e&ery ruling;prin"ipial Darchik%sE order Dtaxe%sE the parti"ipated multipli"ity should be presided o&er by the unparti"ipated and primal Dpr%tourgonE form, or e&en a "ausal prin"iple superior to form Deidous kreitton aitionE. (1BIC

Pro"lus goes on to "ite a number of e*amples of this basi" metaphysi"al prin"iple, on"e again "onstru"ting the "hain of analogy all the way from the forms in matter, whi"h ha&e

175 prior to them the immaterial forms, to end on"e again in the affirmation that beyond the multipli"ity Dpoll%nE of parti"ipated henads there is DestinE the unparti"ipated One, trans"endent, as has been said, o&er all the di&ine orders Ddiakosm%nE (1BLB . #he emphati" use of einai here seems ironi", after all the stress whi"h has been laid on the supra(essential status of the One, and yet it is from the e*isten"e of the di&ine diakosmoi, the onti" "lassifi"ations of the ,ods, that this One !tself deri&es, not its hyparxis, whi"h is simply ea"h ,od, but its hupostasis, its subsisten"e as that one thing we "all the One !tself. !t is, rather the hyparxis, the real e*isten"e of the One, whi"h is referred to as he in su"h a passage. !f we ma$e the mista$e of ta$ing this One as a ,od beyond the ,ods, then we are ma$ing of the One a parti"ular one, ti hen.

176

.hapter K4

#he #hree !ntelligible #riads

!n the following "hapters, ! will tra"e the emergen"e of onti" or monadi" unity from henadi" indi&iduality through a "lose reading of boo$s three, four and fi&e of the Platonic Theology, whi"h detail this pro"ess through a "omple* hermeneuti" into whi"h three elements "hiefly enter4 first, the diale"ti" impli"it in henadi" indi&iduality itself, whi"h unfolds in stages ea"h of whi"h "onstitute some dis"rete ontologi"al determinationse"ond, the te*ts of Plato, whi"h are the prin"ipal sour"e of the ontologi"al determinations lin$ed together in the a""ount- and third, the "orpus of 7elleni" mythology, insofar as it is e*pli"itly mentioned by Plato or not. #he hermeneuti" e*emplified in the Platonic Theology represents the li&ing heart of Pro"lus% system, for it is in the philosophi"al interpretation of myth that philosophy returns to its own di&ine

177 sour"es, for the philosophi"al interpretation of myth has as its issue an a""ount of the "onstitution of the "osmos whi"h is ne"essarily also an a""ount of the emergen"e of the "onditions whi"h ma$e philosophy possible. #he di&ine orders whi"h are treated of in these "hapters, namely the intelligible, intelligible(and(intelle"tual, and intelle"tual orders of ,ods, are those illuminations of Being whi"h lea&e the onti" hypostases of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t respe"ti&ely as their tra"e or after(image. #he produ"t of ea"h intelligible triad, e.g., is Being, 'ualified in three different ways. #here is an additional dimension to the intelligible triads, howe&er, for these also represent the Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t possessed by ea"h and e&ery deityhen"e ea"h triad is also a 'ualitati&e determination of the henad as su"h. )e may briefly "hara"teri1e these determinations as individuality in and through the first triad, measuring the whole of >eing in and through the se"ond triad, and allness or totality, i.e. the all(in(ea"h of the henads, in and through the third. 2in"e e&ery onti" hypostasis is also a "lass of deities, this means that the intelligible order manifests itself on parallel planes4 on the one hand, it "on"erns the unfolding of the inalienable possessions of ea"h deity, while on the other, it deals with the illumination of the most primordial stratum of Being by a particular "lass of deities. #his "orresponds, in effe"t, to the distin"tion between Being in the broadest generi" sense, in whi"h it in"ludes ?ife, !ntelle"t, and the infra( intelle"tual hypostases within itself as its spe"ies, and Being !tself or Being stricto sensu, ont%s on. Being in the broad sense "orresponds to the presen"e in ea"h deity of the whole of Being, a""ording to whi"h ea"h deity possesses 'ualities "orresponding to the three intelligible triads as summari1ed in ET prop. 1A14 3ll that is di&ine Dpan to theionE has a

178 substan"e DhuparxinE whi"h is goodness, a unitary DheniaianE poten"y, and a $nowledge Dgn%sinE whi"h is se"ret and in"omprehensible Dal&ptonE to all se"ondary entities ali$e. #his trinity of 'ualities, as we shall see, represents the three intelligible triads themsel&es, whi"h are that whi"h is possessed by e&ery deity irrespe"ti&e of the regions of Being they illuminate and by &irtue of whi"h e&ery deity is parti"ipable all the way down to the le&el of, e.g., herbs, stones, and statues. 9or the presen"e in ea"h deity of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t in their radi"al forms is what se"ures for ea"h deity the possibility of illuminating any le&el of Being. !n this sense, e&ery ,od is an intelligible ,od, for e&ery ,od illuminates Being and is parti"ipated by Being in the broad sense. Being in the narrow sense, by "ontrast, "orresponds the "lass of deities illuminating the intelligible summit, so to spea$. Pro"lus instantiates this "lass through the Orphi" ,od Phanes, while a "ross("ultural sele"tion of intelligible ,ods in this sense is pro&ided by >amas"ius (9P !!! A. 1KC(IL , whose a""ount ! shall dis"uss further when ! ta$e up the third intelligible triad, for it is within the intelligible intelle"t that this "lass is posited. 3fter the intelligible order, the duality in 'uestion no longer applies, and so hereafter, we will be "on"erned stri"tly with the "lasses of deities illuminating parti"ular regions of Being. But the deities in these "lasses remain an"hored, as it were, in the intelligible by &irtue of the three intelligible triads whi"h pro&ide the "onditions of the possibility of their manifestation upon these su""essi&e le&els.

#he first intelligible triad "onsists of ?imit, !nfinity and the 0i*ed or 0i*ture. #he third boo$ of the Platonic Theology details the pro"ess of emergen"e of radi"al Being, whi"h is in effe"t a pro"ess undergone by ea"h and e&ery ,od, not literally and

179 temporally, but in an ideal and analyti"al sense. #here is no One from out of whi"h Being and all the rest are produ"ed, for the One is not a "ause or a produ"er (PT !! C. KL. A1(4KC. 14(I, A4 . #he &arious modes of "ausality < the about whi"h, the on a""ount of whi"h and the from whi"h < all subsist in the intelligible ,ods (IB. AI(H . But in that "ase, when Pro"lus "alls the One the henad of henads and the ,od of ,ods (!! 11. IK. 11(1A , how are we to understand these epithets6 .ause itself is &ested in the ,ods themsel&es. #he One is the fountain of the ,ods, p&g& t%n the%n,C the di&inity of the di&ine, whi"h rests in nothing other than their &ery indi&iduality. !t is this integral indi&iduality that sets them apart from all other entities, for the entities whi"h "ome after them are all essentially wholes or parts, and so it is this whi"h is the sour"e (p&g& of di&inity, it is this whi"h is the One. #he One is that prin"iple of indi&iduation from whi"h the ,ods deri&e their indi&iduality and uni'ueness. )hen"e are we to suppose that these parti"ularities Didiot&tasE "ome to the unitary DheniaioisE ,ods other than from that whi"h is prior to them6 (!! C. I1. 1(A , Pro"lus as$s. But that whi"h is prior to them is simply what is established unitarily (heniai%s abo&e all the di&ine orders (!! 1B. IA. 1B , and what is so established is nothing other than ea"h unitary henad, prior to any of the orders to whi"h they might belong. Pro"lus e*plains that the a""ount in the Parmenides pro"eeds from the monads whi"h subsist in the di&ine genera (ibid. AA , that the negations "ould not ha&e begun from the ,ods that are Dunited to;unified byE the 9irst Dapo t%n h&n%men%n t% pr%t% the%nE, for this genus is with diffi"ulty distinguished DdusdiakritonE from the One, sin"e being by nature of the (&ery ne*t ran$ it is most unitary and o""ult and trans"endently similar to its engenderer
C )e will ha&e more to say about fountains when dis"ussing the third intelligible triad, whi"h is itself the fountain of fountains ("T !, 4K1 .

180 (AI(C . #hat the genus of the intelligible ,ods is unitary does not mean that they are all fused together. !t is not they who are diffi"ult to distinguish, but rather the One !tself is diffi"ult to distinguish from this class, for the One is "on"ealed in the intelligible ,ods (!! 11. IK. 1K . #he logi" by whi"h it emerges is rather with referen"e to the system as a whole, that is, literally, through the logi" of whole and part4 9or the last of things subsists only for the sa$e of something else, but the first is that only for the sa$e of whi"h all other things subsist (!! C. KH and see also "P 111I . #he One !tself is thus the mirror image of those dependent parts, moments or abstra"ta that are the last and least of things. !n order to properly grasp the signifi"an"e of the One to the henadology, we must at on"e re"ogni1e the imperfe"tion of "on"ei&ing of the One as an hypostasis and also fully a&ail oursel&es of the monolatrous &ision of ea"h henad as the One. #he point is not to pose a negati&e theology of the One !tself against a positi&e theology of the henads. @ather, theology is henadology. ,rasping the One as an hypostasis, the One !tself, is simple and "omprehensi&e, but ob&iously misleading. #he sheer experience of the One as impli"ity in the indi&idual henad qua indi&idual is, by "ontrast, absolutely se"ure in its ground, but fragmentary inasmu"h as it must lea&e unspo$en the radi"al autonomy of the other henads. )e re'uire the hypostasis of the One, properly understood, so that the "lass of all the ,ods "an ha&e its appropriate unity, a unity that does not totali1e them but rather brings out the trans"enden"e of ea"h. !t is really a simple matter of the logi" of general terms4 if uniqueness be a 'uality, how "an it be shared in "ommon among the uni'ue entities lest by its &ery presen"e in them as a "ommon 'uality it ma$e them less uni'ue. #he prin"iple would thus "ause the opposite of the 'uality it is supposed to impart. #he pe"uliar status of the One is a response to +ust this dilemma. )hen Pro"lus

181 says that the One is beyond e&ery parti"ipated multipli"ity Dpl&thousE of henads ali$e (!! 1A. LJ. AJ , the signifi"an"e of this statement for him is that we see the One positively in ea"h henad in the priority of that henad to the "lasses of whi"h that henad is a member and whi"h pertain to the powers with whi"h that henad illuminates Being. #he e*empt and unparti"ipated "ause of all beings and the ,ods that produ"e beings (!!! L. AC. 1B(A , that is, the "ause whi"h is beyond all "auses, be they paternal or maternal (JB. I(L , is honored by silen"e and by the unity Dhen%seiE superior to silen"e (L(H . #hat whi"h "omes after the unity Dhen%sinE of uni&ersal di&inity Dt&s hol&s theot&tosE < the One being synonymous, in effe"t, with the uni&ersal 'uality of ,odhood as su"h < is the dyad of prin"iples (11(1J representing the most uni&ersal fun"tional "hara"teristi"s of the deities after di&inity simpliciter. 3s we ha&e seen, ?imit and !nfinity represent the appli"ation of the di&ine method of the Philebus to the attributes of the ,ods. !n the Elements of Theology, Pro"lus attempted to analy1e all the attributes of the ,ods from these prin"iples. 7ere, howe&er, they represent the most basi" attribute of ea"h ,od, namely his or her gender < hen"e the referen"e to maternal and paternal "auses. #he term hen%sis here is the same term used in ET prop. 1J to refer to the a"tion of that whi"h "onser&es and holds together the being of ea"h se&eral thing- as su"h, a more appropriate translation in many "onte*ts might be integrity. )hat is being held together here is the 'uasi("lass of di&inities under the 'uality of ,odhood, a 'uasi( uni&ersal (holos through whi"h the ,ods ha&e their being ,ods, to einai theoi (JB. A , in whi"h the referen"e to being in the ,ods, who are all supra(essential and henads, is both a ne"essary e'ui&o"ation and "orre"t insofar as the ,ods, who a"tually parti"ipate nothing, are only "lassed from the perspe"ti&e of Being. But hen%sis also signifies that

182 integrity prior to determina"y and diremption whi"h is prior to utteran"e and silen"e ali$e, and whi"h is in itself the uni&ersal "hara"teristi" of di&inity, utteran"e on our plane being analogous to the e*pressions of power by the ,ods. #he illumination of Being by the ,ods begins from ?imit and !nfinity. )hat is prior to this is, as Pro"lus puts it, the pe"uliar "hara"ter Didiot&taE of the One in all its purity (!!! H. J1. 1B , the domain of the ,ods in the purity of their indi&idual uni'ueness, prior to any analysis or synthesis. #his idiot&s is not "aptured in the notion of the hypostati1ed One !tself- for as he reminds us here, the 9irst is not truly one4 it is superior e&en to the One (J1. 1A(J . #he 9irst is neuter here, as at the beginning of "hap. H, whi"h "on"erns the two prin"iples of the orders Ddiakosm%nE of the ,ods, whi"h "ome after the 9irst (JB. 1K(I . Pro"lus uses the neuter in this fashion to spea$ most stri"tly of the first prin"iple. 8oti"e, for e*ample, the "riti'ue of Origen at "P 1BCI. AIff4

!f, then, the One !tself (neut. and the primal entity Dpr%tonE are the same, and the primal entity (neut. is ,od, it is plain that the One !tself (neut. and ,od are the same, and that is not some parti"ular (neut. ,od, but ,od himself Dsi"4 autotheosE. #hose, then, who say that the first (mas". is >emiurge or 9ather are not "orre"t- for the demiurge and the father is a parti"ular (mas". ,od. #his is ob&ious, for not e&ery ,od is demiurge or father, whereas the first (neut. is simply ,od Dhapl%s theosE and all ,ods are ,ods through it, but only some, su"h as are demiurges, through the demiurge, and fathers, through the primary demiurge or father. ?et the One then be termed simply ,od, as being the "ause for all ,ods of their being ,ods Dpasin aition tou einai theois tois theoisE, but not for some parti"ular ,ods, as for instan"e demiurgi" or paternal or any other parti"ular type of godhead Dallo echousin eidos ti theot&tos merikonE, whi"h is a type of 'ualified di&inity Dho d& poion esti theonE, not di&inity in the simple sense.

183

! ha&e e*"ised from the passage any instan"e in whi"h 0orrow;>illon use the term 9irst ,od where only 9irst is found in the ,ree$ te*t, and ha&e indi"ated the gender of the terms used in order to e*press the "ontrast between the 9irst of Pro"lus, whi"h is the neuter One !tself or autotheos, ,od !tself, so to spea$, and whi"h resembles a typi"al Platoni" uni&ersal li$e autoanthr%pos, and the 9irst of Origen, whi"h is mas"uline, a father and a demiurge. #he phrase 9irst ,od, by "ontrast, refers in its o&ert mas"ulinity to the aspe"t or element of ?imit in each deity, as at JB. A where deities get to einai theoi, their being ,ods from the 9irst ,od (mas". . Ea"h ,od, that is, gets his or her being( ,od from the ?imit(phase of their own entity. 3""ordingly ! suggest that a better translation of ho pr%tos theos would be primary >eity, as the state of (any deity prior to the analysis and synthesis of poten"ies that attends the illumination of Being, thus a&oiding the "onfusion stemming from a phrase whi"h seems to imply that, e.g., all the ,ods deri&e their being(,ods from some particular (mas"uline deity from whom they differ. But what is the differen"e between the "ontribution made to a deity by autotheos and by ho pr%tos theos6 )hen Pro"lus e*plains the "ontributions of the three supra(essential prin"iples to the 0i*ture, or radi"al Being, the third moment of the first intelligible triad (!!! C. JL. AJ(H , he e*plains that from ,od (i.e. autotheos it re"ei&es parti"ipation in ineffable unity (hen%se%s arr&tou and the wholeness of its subsisten"e (t&s hol&s hupostase%s , while from ?imit (i.e. ho pr%tos theos it re"ei&es its hyparxis, its monoeides and its stable "hara"ter (monimon idiot&ta . 3onoeides here is largely synonymous with the more "ommon e*pression in Pro"lus, henoeides, but it also bears

184 referen"e to the singularity of entities whose form is instantiated only on"e, the 2un, for instan"e- su"h entities are monadi" in a spe"ial sense, whi"h ! shall ta$e up later on. 8or need the "ontribution of !nfinity, the se"ond moment of the first intelligible triad, to the 0i*ed "on"ern us +ust now. #he 0i*ed is a $ind of onti" refle"tion of the "onstitution of ea"h henad. )e re"all the use of hen%sis and idiot&s at "P 1B4C, where the former was the te"hni"al term Pro"lus offered for the "ommonality, koin%nias, of the henads, in "ontrast to onti" tautot&s, while the latter was the term offered to e*press the distin"tion, diakrisis, of the henads, in "ontrast to the heterot&s of beings. 7ere, hen%sis is a 'uality parti"ipated in by the 0i*ed, deri&ing from autotheos, or uni&ersal deity, while idiot&s is deri&ed from the aspe"t of ?imit or primary deity. ! referred abo&e to the relationship between hen%sis and silen"e, whi"h here arises again in the form of ineffability, whi"h refers spe"ifi"ally to the impossibility of drawing inferences from the unity possessed by supra(essential entitiesthe 0i*ed, howe&er, possesses this unity only deri&ati&ely, by parti"ipation. "diot&s referred to the indi&idual pe"uliarity of the henads, in "ontrast to the distin"tion of "oordinates from ea"h other at "P 11CB, and it also o""urs in ET prop. 14K to refer to the distin"ti&e "hara"ter that a di&ine order bestows upon deri&ati&e beings, and whi"h is here affirmed to be stable or "onstant, monimon, o&er &ariations. !t represents thus the integrity of the series of manifestations of ea"h ,od as e*pressions of that ,od, but first and foremost represents that primordial distinguishing element whi"h is in ea"h ,od from nowhere else than him;herself, and whi"h is e*pressed most dire"tly in the name of the ,od. #he 0i*ed is further "hara"teri1ed as a whole or uni&ersal (holot&s from autotheos. 2imilarly, at JH. 1(J, the 0i*ed is one from ?imit, not1one from !nfinity, and a whole

185 from the 9irst, i.e. the 9irst Prin"iple or the One. #his e*presses ni"ely some of the aspe"ts ! ha&e stressed in the relationship between the One !tself and the henads. )hat is one as such is the ?imit(aspe"t, the particularity of ea"h deity, his;her indi&iduality or idiot&s whereas the One !tself is aligned rather with the unity(cum(uni&ersality of the 0i*ed. #he One !tself arises from the third moment, from Being, in the moment of separation between the supra(essential and the onti", in whi"h the ,ods separate from that whi"h they produ"e. #his is the ontologi"al moment "orresponding to the diale"ti"al moment in whi"h Plato in the Parmenides, hypothesi1es @eal Being and One Being, and by means of this hypothesis he as"ends to the One !tself, whi"h he himself in the $epublic (K1Bb des"ribes as Mnon(hypothesi1ed% ("P 1BJJf . Ho pr%tos theos is the phase of the deity "orresponding to and "ausati&e of ?imit. !t represents at on"e the mas"uline 'uality in deities < whi"h is synonymous for Pro"lus with their indi&idual integrity < and also the primary intelligible manifestation of ea"h deity, whi"h is e*pressed spe"ifi"ally in the "on"ept of the paternal. 3t !!! A1. L4, for e*ample, Pro"lus is "ommenting on Plato%s referen"e to ho pr%tos theos in the si*th Epistle as patera. But the 9irst, Pro"lus e*plains < in the geniti&e, hen"e with gender indeterminate, but presumably the neuter 9irst Prin"iple < surpasses the ran$ DtaxinE of father. @ather, what is primarily paternal is in the intelligible ,ods. !n fa"t, *ust as the intelligible ;ods are henads primarily= so too are they fathers primarily (L(H, my emphasis - see also ET prop. 1K14 3ll that is paternal in the ,ods is of primal operation Dpr%tourgonE and stands in the position of the ,ood Den tagathou taxeiE at the head of the se&eral di&ine ran$s Ddiakosm&seisE. One might also note that in his fragmentary "ommentary on the #haldean !racles, Pro"lus refers to the paternal order as

186 re"ei&ing and uniting as"ending souls, thus performing the same fun"tion for the indi&idual soul that the ?imit(aspe"t of ea"h ,od does for the multipli"ity in him;her. #he possession by ea"h deity of the "omponents of ?imit and !nfinity is prior to the fa"t that the relati&e proportions of these yield the mas"ulinity and femininity of deities- hen"e Pro"lus will sometimes posit male and female as o""urring later in the pro"ession (e.g., at "T !, 1JB as &ested in the third intelligible triad, intelligible intelle"t or 3nimal !tself . #his is be"ause ?imit and !nfinity as "auses ran$ prior to their effe"ts, and any "lassifi"ation whi"h the ,ods share in "ommon with beings, su"h as gender, must be posterior to the ,ods% "ausality or agen"y. Being paternal is a fun"tional designation among the ,ods, and not a pure designation of gender, as we "an see from @hea, who belongs to a paternal order of intelle"tual ,ods. #hat whi"h is feminine "an be paternal, apparently, but that whi"h is neuter "annot. 2in"e the One !tself is beyond unity and "ausality, there must be a certain One prior to Being Dti pro tou ontos henE whi"h gi&es subsisten"e to Being and is the primary "ause of it (!!! H. J1 . ?imit is this "ertain One < we might otherwise "hara"teri1e it as the this(ness of this deity. )e see e*pressed here the one(to(one relationship essential to di&ini1ation in prop. 1JK of the ET and whi"h was dis"ussed in "hapter A of this dissertation. !nfinity, meanwhile, is a power in it < that is, in ti pro tou ontos hen < generati&e of Being. 9or e&ery thing whi"h produ"es, produ"es a""ording to its own power, whi"h is allotted a subsisten"e between that whi"h produ"es and the things produ"ed, and is of the one the progression and as it were e*tension, but of the other is the pre(arranged generati&e "ause (ibid . !nfinity, the se"ond moment of the first intelligible triad, is thus the first positing of power, upon the mediating fun"tion of whi"h

187 between the ,ods and Being ! ha&e fre'uently remar$ed. Of the two prin"iples, ?imit and !nfinity, 2o"rates says in the Philebus (AJ . C(1B that ,od Dton theonE has e*hibited DdeixaiE the ?imit and the !nfinity of beings. )hen Pro"lus appropriates this terminology later, and says that the first intelle"tual ,od e*hibits DdeiknusinE from himself a""ording to unity Dkat' hen%sinE the twofold forms of "on&ersion (N JL. 1JL. 1J(K , he helps us to better grasp how we are to understand this former e*hibition. 8ote first that kat'hen%sin, whi"h was used to "hara"teri1e the produ"ti&e relationship between the One and the henads, ser&es to "hara"teri1e the relationship between any deity and that whi"h they re&eal. ?imit and !nfinity are e*hibited or indi"ated by the "ausal a"ti&ity of ho theos, a given deity. #he use of ho theos ta$es us out of the realm of the abstra"t uni&ersality of autotheos, and into that of the "on"rete uni&ersality of any parti"ular deity in his@her very particularity < the uni&ersal of the parti"ular. #he ?imit and !nfinity of beings in turn ser&e to dis"lose (ekphainei the un$nowable and unparti"ipated "ause (JA. 1J(K . )e are not to understand some lower, onti" manifestation of ?imit and !nfinity by the ?imit and !nfinity of beings. ?imit and !nfinity simply are the aspe"ts of limitation and infinitude of beings- in this respe"t note also the referen"e at "P HBI to ?imit and !nfinity as prin"iples of Being. #hey dis"lose the One by pro&iding ontologi"al indi"es for its "ausal manifestation. #he Being thus produ"ed is not the One !tself, but uniform DhenoeidesE, possessing its pro"ession from the One through the power whi"h brings it forth and re&eals it from the One, but its o""ult unity Dkruphion hen%sinE from the hyparxis of the One (J1f . #he distin"tion here between Being%s pro"ession and its o""ult unity is between the fun"tions of ?imit and !nfinity, as we "an see from the "ontrast between power and

188 hyparxis, whi"h stand in here for the former. Being pro"eeds from the One, that is, a"hie&es separation from the ,ods, through power, for as we ha&e seen, the powers of the ,ods are that pertaining to them whi"h may be abstra"ted from their indi&iduality, an abstra"tion whi"h is the basis for the emergen"e of the onti" hypostases. #he hyparxis of the One, as we re"all from the passage from 9ec. 9ub. R, is ea"h henad, and so the hidden unity of Being is "learly the Being "ontained within ea"h henad. ?imit and !nfinity e*press here in their a"ti&ity therefore the distin"tion between Being as an hypostasis separate from the ,ods and Being as "ontained wholly within ea"h. #his Being belonging to ea"h ,od is hidden in se&eral senses4 first, inasmu"h as ea"h ,od remains supra(essential, and therefore the Being in ea"h of them is really ea"h ,od%s hyparxis, and thus not only is it not something separate from ea"h of the ,ods, numeri"ally one, unifying them, it is also not really Being insofar as it is rather e*isten"e, hyparxis. #o "onsider this moment in ea"h henad as a moment of Being is to posit the prin"iple of ?imit. ?imit and !nfinity are a s"hemati" representation of ea"h deity in its primary emergen"e into Being. #he deity at on"e re&eals and o""ults itself, whi"h both preser&es the deity%s supra(essential status and se"ures the relati&e autonomy of the intelligible produ"t. #he deity qua intelligible is 0i*ture in the first intelligible triad, di&ine intelle"t in the third triad, the deity thinking itself and so constituting or hypostatizing itself (we re"all the epithet authupostatos with referen"e to the henads , analy1ing itself and refle"ting itself. 9or when we spea$ (hotan G leg%men of the remaining and pro"eeding of the di&ine orders (the phrase at JA. AJ(4 is simply that whi"h is of the ,ods, a "ommon shorthand in Pro"lus for e&erything dependent upon the ,ods themsel&es < remaining and pro"eeding being "onstituti&e of beings qua beings

189 and hen"e of the "lasses of deities, that is, the activities of deities with respe"t to Being < this is attributable respe"ti&ely to ?imit and !nfinity, as is the unity and multipli"ity (hen and pl&thos posited in ea"h su"h "lass (i.e. its set(theoreti"al "hara"teristi"s , and the oppositions posited among the ,ods, not merely as simple oppositions, but also as produ"ing hierar"hy, sin"e the powers of the ,ods, by &irtue of whi"h "lassifi"ations of deities emerge and whi"h "ome from !nfinity, are subordinate to the ?imit in ea"h ,od, that is, its onti" parti"ularity. By subordinating the unlimitedness of ea"h ,od to its ?imit, its thisness, Pro"lus reaffirms in the realm of Being what is most salient about the realm of di&inity, namely the indi&iduality of deities. #he point in stressing the "lassifi"ations of deities as distin"t from those same deities in their absolute indi&iduality is not to denigrate them as merely a posteriori- that Being has not the "apa"ity to totali1e the ,ods does not render it without substan"e. @ather, the possibility of "lassifying the ,ods lies in their activities (energeiai . #he emergen"e of Being lies in the e*pression of di&ine power through a nu"lear triadi" stru"ture of e*isten"e, potentiality and a"tuality. #his triad is e*pressed in a manifold of different ways by Pro"lus, the first of whi"h is the first intelligible triad, namely the prin"iples of ?imit, !nfinity, and the 0i*ed. #he ne*t e*pression of it lies at the le&el of the three intelligible triads, ea"h triad also e*pressing this stru"ture. 9inally, the triad of hypostases, Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t, e*press this same stru"ture on the broadest s"ale, +ust as the triads within them do. 5nderstanding this triad, therefore, is tantamount to understanding the whole of the system. #he heart of it lies in "on"ei&ing ea"h deity, ea"h henad, as first, an absolute indi&idual (e*isten"e - second, as possessing "ertain attributes sus"eptible of abstra"tion (potentiality - and third, as "onstituting or hypostati1ing

190 him;herself and thus informing Being (a"tuality . )e shall learn mu"h more about this triadi" stru"ture as we see ea"h of its moments elaborated. >eities e*hibit or indi"ate ?imit and !nfinity, while ?imit and !nfinity re&eal the One. >eities only re&eal the One through ?imit and !nfinity be"ause the One as such is a pre"ipitate of ontology. )e "an see the hypostasis of the One as arising, in fa"t, first and foremost from an analysis of the 0i*ture or radi"al Being into its elements (diairesis G t%n stoichei%n, J4. 1L from whi"h we deri&e ?imit and !nfinity, in whi"h is dis"losed the One as their "ondition of possibility. 3s su"h, the dyad of ?imit and !nfinity is the intermediary allowing us to e*tend (anateinetai, 1C our refle"tion to the ineffable and un$nowable prin"iple. But the gap between essen"e and the supra(essential "annot be bridged so unproblemati"ally as that. On the one hand, ?imit and !nfinity are "onstituents of Being. Being is the first of beings and that whi"h is most of all. 3nd yet to be is to be a mi*ture, not only of ?imit and !nfinity, but also and inherently, of Being and 8on(Being. 9or Being !tself is an essen"e "onstituted by supra(essentials, re"ei&ing a multitude of henads and powers whi"h are mingled into one essen"e (!!! C. 4B. L(H , and supra( essentials, while surpassing Being in e*"ellen"e, are ne&ertheless non1beings4 9or if ?imit and !nfinity are supra(essential, essen"e may appear to ha&e its subsisten"e from non(essen"es. 7ow therefore "an non(essen"es produ"e essen"e6 (JH. 1J(I . @emember that ?imit and !nfinity here mean the same as the henads and powers, respe"ti&ely, of the pre&ious 'uote, sin"e ?imit and !nfinity are +ust a s"hematism of di&ine a"ti&ity. #he answer to the dilemma of non(beings (supra(essentials "onstituting Being is, of "ourse, as has been stressed throughout this dissertation, that supra(essential natures are not themsel&es ta$en up into Dpareil&mmen%nE the mi*ture of it Dthat whi"h is primarily

191 BeingE, but, these remaining trans"endent, se"ondary pro"essions from them "oales"e Dsumphuomen%nE into the subsisten"e DhupostasinE of essen"e (A4(L . 8oti"e that the pro"essions from the multiple ,ods coalesce into the unity of Being, for as ! ha&e stressed, in a &ery important respe"t, multipli"ity precedes unity in Pro"lus. Being arises from the negation of 8on(Being, in that it arises from pla"ing the powers and a"ti&ities of deities, their &ery manifestation as the fa"t of manifestation itself, o&er their pure e*isten"e, and thus imposes a unity upon their supra(essential or e*istential multipli"ity. #he se"ondary pro"ession of essen"e from the supra(essential "orresponds to the status of the 0i*ed as the product of ho theos as opposed to the dyad of ?imit and !nfinity whi"h is exhibited or indicated by the ,od (poiein G deixai, !!! C. JI. 1A(I . 8egotiating the proper terms in whi"h to des"ribe the status of ?imit and !nfinity pro&es "hallenging for Pro"lus. On this o""asion, Pro"lus e*plains somewhat "lumsily that ?imit and !nfinity are henads deri&ing their hypostasis from the One Dapo tou henos hupostasaiE and as it were DoionE manifestations DekphanseisE from out of the unparti"ipated and &ery first unity Dapo t&s amethektou kai protist&s hen%se%sE (1J(K . !t is "lear from his e'ui&o"ations that Pro"lus does not truly wish to regard ?imit and !nfinity as themsel&es henads, be"ause of the "onfusion that would hen"e result. @ather, we should say that they are henads by &irtue of one of the e'ui&o"ations dis"ussed in "hapter 4 of this dissertation. Pro"lus% stated do"trine is rather that there is only one henad to ea"h intelligible triad (stated une'ui&o"ally at "P 1BC1 . #his latter formulation is misleading for its own part- it refers in fa"t to the notion that the first intelligible triad represents an < that is, any < intelligible henad, the se"ond represents an;any intelligible( and(intelle"tual henad, and the third represents an;any intelle"tual henad (see the

192 dis"ussion of !!!. 14. K1 below . #here is always a reason in the immediate "onte*t of a passage for any e'ui&o"al use of terms by Pro"lus. )hat he wishes to "on&ey in the present passage by "alling ?imit and !nfinity henads is that ?imit and !nfinity belong on the side of the One with respe"t to the fundamental "left between essen"e and the supra( essential, a do"trine "riti"i1ed at some length by >amas"ius, as ! shall ta$e up in the dis"ussion of the third intelligible triad inasmu"h as the latter "orresponds to the third moment of the first triad. #he One !tself is also referred to as a henad at !!! J. 11. A44 sin"e the prin"iple of the whole of things is a henadG < whi"h indeed it is, only none in particular insofar as it is each henad. #hat is to say, it is not another henad in addition to all the others, nor does it in some fashion in"orporate them all as its parts or aspe"ts. One "an say, then, either that the One is the "ause of the 0i*ture or, as 2o"rates does in the 'uote from the Philebus, that ho theos is the "ause of the 0i*ture, where ho theos "an be ta$en to refer to the One as already "hara"teri1ed by ?imit < not the ?imit that will be an ingredient in the 0i*ture, but that ?imit(aspe"t whi"h is indistinguishable from ea"h deity as their particularity. 3long the same lines, we "ould understand ho theos as en"ompassing the indi&idual deity in the whole of his < or her, se*ist usage notwithstanding < supra(essential nature and so in"luding the One, ?imit and !nfinity ali$e, to the e*"lusion of the 0i*ture, whi"h is "onstituted of the se"ondary pro"essions of ?imit and !nfinity whi"h e*press, ta$en as a whole, the One, that is, the unity of ea"h deity prior to its ontologi1ation as a 0i*ture of ?imit and !nfinity. #he deity as 0i*ture is a parti"ular pattern of a"ti&ity, a mere inde* of that deity%s supra(essential indi&iduality.

193 3 better indi"ation of how Pro"lus understands the henadi" disposition of the first intelligible triad is to be deri&ed from the following passage4

?imit is a ,od pro"eeding to the intelligible summit, from the unparti"ipated and first ,od, measuring and defining all things, and gi&ing subsisten"e to e&ery paternal, "onne"ti&e, and undefiled genus of ,ods. But !nfinity is the ne&er(failing power of this ,od, re&ealing all the generati&e orders, and all infinity, both that whi"h is prior to essen"e, and that whi"h is essential, and also that whi"h pro"eeds as far as to the last matter. 3nd that whi"h is 0i*ed is the first and highest order of the ,ods, "omprehending all things o""ultly, deri&ing its "ompletion indeed through the intelligible "onne"ti&e triad, but unitarily "omprehending the "ause of e&ery being, and establishing its summit in the first intelligibles, e*empt from the whole of things. (!!! 1A. 44f

?ea&ing aside for the moment some of the "ompli"ated terminology deployed here, its basi" stru"ture is simple enough4 ?imit is a ,od, !nfinity is the power of this ,od, and the 0i*ed is an order, or diakosmos, under whi"h this ,od is subsumed. 9rom ?imit and !nfinity, furthermore, are deri&ed "ertain "lassifi"ations of deities, whi"h are ne&ertheless posterior to the 0i*ed as the first and highest "lassifi"ation of the ,ods. #he distin"tion between ?imit as a ,od and the unparti"ipated and first ,od is not, as ! ha&e e*plained, a distin"tion between two dis"rete deities. Both are simply theos, not theos tisthey are phases of the ,od, in the sense of any ,od. ?i$e the first, the se"ond intelligible triad also is a ,od Dtheos, not theos tisE, possessing a prolifi" power, and re&ealing from and about itself Daph'eautou kai peri heautonE that whi"h is se"ondarily Being (!!! 1A. 4I . 3gain, we are not to thin$ of the relationship between the deities represented by these two triads as representing the

194 dispositions toward ea"h other of a dis"rete set of deities, an impossible "onfiguration prior to the intelligible intelle"t and not fully arti"ulated until the intelle"tual order, but as moments of any ,od. 3nother way of loo$ing at it is offered by Pro"lus, when he remar$s that the first triad is an intelligible ,od primarily, that whi"h "omes after it, an intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,od, and the third, an intelle"ti&e ,od (!!! 14. K1 . #he triads represent, from this perspe"ti&e, the indi&idual deity who will be a member of these "lasses, prior to the "onstitution of the "lasses themsel&es, whi"h is the signifi"an"e of primarily here. #his is really the only sense in whi"h the three intelligible triads "ould refer to three ;ods. E&en in this latter sense, howe&er, we are really dealing with three classes of ,ods and not three ;ods, for the sense of, e.g., an intelligible ,od is not tis theos no&tos, but theos no&tos uni&ersally. 7ow, then, should we understand the relationship between the first and se"ond triads6 Pro"lus e*plains that whereas the first triad subsists from and is united to the One (hupostasan G sun&n%men&n , the se"ond triad pro"eeds from the first and deri&es "ompletion by terms analogous to the triad prior to it. 9or in this also it is ne"essary that Being should parti"ipate, and that the One should be parti"ipated, and li$ewise that this One whi"h is se"ondarily One, should be generati&e of what is se"ondarily Being. ?i$e the relations among the ,ods, the relationship between the One and Being is not simple, but "omple*. #he relationship between any two ,ods does not "onstitute a third term whi"h would lie between them and dispose them for another- instead, it e*ists in the first pla"e as a power, in ea"h member of the pair, of being(so(disposed toward the other. 3s Pro"lus puts it, these are powers productive of a relation. #his relation, when a"tuali1ed

195 or produ"ed, is none other than a dis"rete onti" hypostasis. 7ere we see the same do"trine e*pressed, only in abstra"t or monadi" terminology. )e read at "P 1BCA that the One and Being are plurali1ed separately. )e learn more about this pro"ess at PT !!! AL. CHf, in whi"h the parts "ontained in the intelligible multipli"ity "onsist of the "on+ugations, as it were, of the One(that(is and Being(whi"h( is(one. #he intelligible multipli"ity referred to here is not the multipli"ity "ontained in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, whi"h is a multipli"ity of henads in relation to ea"h other, whi"h we shall be "on"erned with in the ne*t "hapter. !nstead, this is the multipli"ity through whi"h the henads propagate themsel&es in the lower orders, a vertical, so to spea$, rather than a horizontal multipli"ity, for the One and Being generate, through their four possible "ombinations < that is, a single relationship ta$en four ways < ,ods, angels, daimons and mortal animals, formed respe"ti&ely by (1 the One(that(is, in relation to the One(that(is- (A the One(that(is, in relation to Being(that(is( one- (J Being(that(is(one, in relation to the One(that(is- and (4 Being(that(is(one, in relation to Being(that(is(one. #his system is nothing other than the whole "omposed of the One and Being whi"h power mediates- and the se"ond intelligible triad is power and the first whole, the whole, that is, whi"h is formed by the One and Being as "onne"ted by power +ust as the powers of the ,ods ser&e to "onne"t the henadi" and onti" domainsthe systemati" relationship between the One and Being simply e*presses the relationship between the ,ods and the uni&erse in abstra"t terms. #he produ"t of this "on+ugation is the "hain "onne"ting ea"h ,od to the lowest Beings, a "hain "omposed of, in the first pla"e, the illumination by that ,od of whate&er parti"ular orders of Being they will, as manifested in myth and i"onography, and then by angels, daimons and mortal beings

196 depending from that ,od and a"ting as "onduits for lower beings to "onta"t them. #his dissertation does not "on"ern itself with angelology and demonology, but let it suffi"e to bear in mind that the !ntelle"t, e.g., illuminated by the intelle"tual ,ods is itself a real being, ont%s on, not an intelle"t in the sense that its own parti"ipants are. #he further pro"ession of su"h an hypostasis depends on the e*tension of di&ine a"ti&ity represented by su"h beings as angels and daimons. #o return to the abstra"t a""ount, howe&er, we should note that power will not be fully reali1ed in its mediating fun"tion until the third intelligible triad, of whi"h we read that the third henad < that is, ea"h henad as possessing a di&ine intelle"t < "onstitutes as a medium between itself and Being a power by means of whi"h it fills Being and "on&erts it to itself (!!! 14. 4C , thus fully e*ternali1ing power itself and rendering the hypostasis of Being fully separate and distin"t from the ,ods- but we shall ha&e more to say about that at the appropriate time.

Pro"lus e*plains a""ording to the following logi" why there should be a se"ond intelligible triad, an argument whi"h at the same time shows that "ertain of the basi" stru"tures of parti"ipation and of onti" produ"tion are established in and by this triadi" hypostasis4

!n e&ery "ase parti"ipated deity "onstitutes about itself;in relation to itself D peri heaut&nE that whi"h parti"ipates it. #hus whole souls "onstitute bodies together with their "auses, and partial souls generate, in "on+un"tion with the ,ods, irrational souls. 0u"h more therefore, do the ,ods produ"e all things in "on+un"tion with the One. 7en"e, as the first of the henads generates the summit of Being, so li$ewise the middle henad "onstitutes the middle Being. But e&erything whi"h generates, and e&erything whi"h ma$es or produ"es,

197
possesses a power prolifi" of the things produ"ed, a""ording to whi"h it "arries forward DproageiE, empowers DdunamoiE and "onne"ts;"onser&es DsunecheiE its progeny. !n turn therefore, there will be a se"ond triad re&ealed analogously to the first. (!!! 1A. 4K. 1Hf

#he "onne"tions between the stages of Pro"lus% argument here are not at first "lear. 7e begins by e*plaining that parti"ipated deity establishes a relationship between itself and its parti"ipant- note at !!! 14. 4C that the third henad, that is, the henad in the third intelligible triad, whi"h is not some particular henad but a phase of the henad as su"h, "onstitutes intelligible intelle"t in relation to itself. 7e ends by affirming that there must be a se"ond intelligible triad analogous to the first. #he se"ond intelligible triad represents the relationship between the ,ods and the middle Being, enabling the ,ods to "arry forward, empower and "onser&e that whi"h they produ"e. 3nd what they are "arrying forward, empowering and "onser&ing through the se"ond intelligible triad is not only the middle Being, but all the further pro"essions of Being, insofar as the se"ond intelligible triad is the first su"h se"ondary pro"ession. #he first intelligible triad represents the immediate separation of the ,ods and Being, or the immediate produ"tion of Being, depending upon how one "hooses to assess it. #here is a se"ond triad, and thus a further pro"ession of the ,ods, an arti"ulation and spe"ifi"ation, as it were, of the "ontent of the first triad, whi"h does not merely remain implicit in the first triad, but instead unfolds in subse'uent hypostases. )hy does the first triad e*pli"ate itself in subse'uent hypostases6 7ere the referen"e to the One is signifi"ant. )hat "ould it mean for the ,ods to "o(produ"e (sumparagousin with the One6 9or in "onsidering some ,od and the One, there are not two entities. #his is, perhaps surprisingly, the for"e of the a fortiori. #he presen"e of the One in the "ausal a"ti&ity of ea"h ,od is mu"h more than

198 the presen"e of subse'uent prin"iples in the "ausal a"ti&ity of their inferiors, for the One is none other than ea"h ,od, whereas in the "ase of subse'uent prin"iples there is differen"e separating them from their parti"ipants. #he relationship of parti"ipation is, in fa"t, nothing other than this play of sameness and differen"e, li$eness and unli$eness. #his is why the henads do not parti"ipate the One. )hat does this "ooperation really mean then6 !t means the e*"ess of ea"h henad, qua supra(essential, o&er that henad%s onti" e*pression. !t is this whi"h dri&es onward the e*pli"ation of what is impli"it in the first moment of onti" e*pression, that is, the first intelligible triad. 9urthermore, and "ru"ially, this e*pli"ation ta$es the form of a reprodu"tion of the parti"ipated term "orresponding to ea"h ran$ of parti"ipants. #he produ"tion of subse'uent terms "omes about through the original prin"iple reproducing itself. )e see this elementally in the manifestation of indi&idual deities at subse'uent le&els of Being, =eus for instan"e. #his has the effe"t that parti"ipation implicates the parti"ipated term, whi"h lea&es a tra"e of itself on the le&el of the parti"ipant. )e "an truly $now something about the ,ods, therefore, be"ause they re&eal aspe"ts of their nature in the e*er"ise of their powers, and this is the "ondition of the possibility of the meaning we are able to attribute to the uni&erse by inferring from the effe"ts the nature of the "ause. #he se"ond intelligible triad "orresponds, o&erall, to the moment of !nfinity in the first triad, for, as Pro"lus e*plains, the three prin"iples that "ome after the 9irst organi1e into diakosmoi the intelligible genus of the ,ods, so that ?imit dis"loses the first, !nfinity the se"ond, and the 0i*ed the third triad or diakosmos (!!! 1J. 4L. 1J(I . 3gain, at AB(AA, he says that the idiot&s, or parti"ularity, of these monads < for there is one henad per intelligible triad, but three monads < unfolds the intelligible order

199 DdiakosmonE of the ,ods. #he se"ond intelligible triad also foreshadows the intelligible( and(intelle"tual order on the s"ale of the entire pro"ession of Being. 7en"e we find in the se"ond triad many of the "on"epts whi"h will be essential for the organi1ation of deities into "lasses, for the moments of the se"ond triad are (1 one DhenE, deity Dtheot&taE or hyparxis- (A power- and (J se"ondary Being or intelligible ?ife (!!! 1A. 4I. A(K . #he important distin"tion between a deity%s power and his;her hyparxis emerges here from laten"y into di"hotomy. #he "on"ept of the One is here for the first time as well, although the opposition between unity and multipli"ity is not themati1ed until the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. #he synonymy of one, deity, and hyparxis is stri$ing here. )hat is one in the highest sense, that is, what is most integral, manifests primary e*isten"e, whi"h is prior to Being and 8on(Being, namely hyparxis, and e*isting in this way is the 'uality of being a deity. #he first moment of the se"ond triad also "ombines within itself that whi"h the 0i*ed re"ei&ed (JL. AJ(I from the One, namely unity, and from ?imit, namely hyparxis, these attributes now being essentially inseparable from ea"h other, a being%s integrity indi"ating their intensity of e*isten"e. By way of "omparison, the three moments of the third intelligible triad are 1 limit, unity (henas , or hyparxis- A infinity or power- and J mi*ture, substan"e (ousia , life (zo& or intelligible intelle"t (nous no&tos . #he "hara"teri1ation of the first and se"ond moments, then, would be altogether "onstant from the se"ond to the third intelligible triad, were it not for the additional "hara"teri1ations of them as limit and infinity respe"ti&ely and the dropping out of theot&ta or di&inity as a "hara"teri1ation of the first moment. #he latter signifies, we might say, the shift in the "enter of gra&ity toward ontology from theology, while the former indi"ates that the prin"iples of ?imit and

200 !nfinity are firmly established qua prin"iples, archai, in the moment of intelle"tual re&ersion e*pressed by the third triad, all intelle"tion being a re&ersion or "on&ersion, epistroph&. 3nother way of grasping this is to see ?imit and !nfinity as emerging out of the refle"tion upon form whi"h is fundamental to the third triad, whereas what is "entral to the se"ond intelligible triad is the opposition between hyparxis and power, between the indi&iduality of ea"h deity and their onti" e*pressions, whi"h "an be abstra"ted from them. 3s for the third moment, the moment of the produ"t, the se"ond and third triads ha&e ?ife in "ommon, albeit for different reasons. #he se"ond triad generates intelligible ?ife in the sense of Eternity, whi"h is in some sense identi"al to ?ife !tself. Pro"lus "ites Plotinus in this respe"t4 Plotinus, e*hibiting in a most di&inely inspired manner the pe"uliarity of Eternity a""ording to the theology of Plato, defines it to be an unlimited life, at on"e manifesting DprophainousanE the entirety of itself and re&ealing its own Being (1H. IB. 1H(AA- Enneads !!! L (4K , K. 1C(AH . Espe"ially important in this definition of ?ife is the des"ription of a bringing forth of self whi"h is at on"e a dis"losure of positionality in relation to Being. #hus "ausality impli"ates the "ause itself, whi"h is e*a"tly what happens in the e*pression of di&ine power, in whi"h the ,ods, affe"ting and indeed effecting Being, are also, through the &ery tra"es of this power, re"uperated into ontology. #he zo& that is the produ"t of the third triad, howe&er, is the hypostasis of ?ife, of whi"h it is the summit as intelligible intelle"t, and of whi"h we shall ha&e more to say at the appropriate time. #he dupli"ation of ?ife in the se"ond and third triads displays a "ausal pattern typi"al of Pro"lean metaphysi"s "on"isely stated in prop. 1BH of the ET, the emergen"e of whi"h "an therefore be tra"ed to the transition between the se"ond and third intelligible

201 triads. !n e&ery "ase, our goal should be to reunite the a*ioms of Pro"lean metaphysi"s with the moments of their systemati" emergen"e in the pro"essions of the ,ods. #he a*iom is as follows4

E&ery parti"ular member DmerikonE of any "lass DtaxeiE "an parti"ipate the monad of the ran$ Ddiakosm&seiE immediately supra(+a"ent in one of two ways4 either through its own uni&ersal Dholot&tosE, or through the parti"ular member of the higher "hain DseiranE whi"h is "oordinate DsustoichouE with it in respe"t of its analogous relation to that "hain as a whole.

#his may seem merely an ar"ane e*pression of the system%s infrastru"ture, but it "an be understood in a more basi" sense as e*pressing the relationship between effi"ient and formal "ausation. !ntelligible intelle"t is the effi"ient "ause of ?ife or the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order as a $ind of e*trusion from itself- and yet its produ"t manifests a li$eness of intelligible intelle"t%s own effi"ient "ause. #here is a $ind of transmutation, then, in the se"ond generation, of effi"ient into formal "ausality. )hy does the "hain of effi"ient "ausation de&elop these paradigmati" 'ualities6 One way of answering the 'uestion would be to point to the prin"iple that was +ust highlighted in respe"t to intelligible life, namely that the ,ods e*press their nature through their powers, that is, through their e*pressions in the realm of Being. #his is the 3r"himedean point, we might say, for the whole of Pro"lus% ontology4 Being has meaning be"ause the ,ods re&eal their nature in their a"ti&ity, rather than &eiling it. #hrough the analogi"al doubling of the parti"ipated prin"iple in the parti"ipatory relationship, the ,ods be"ome measures of the whole and whole measures, doubling themsel&es into;as Being.

202 #he emergen"e of formal from effi"ient "ausality is a hallmar$ of the passage from the domain of the intelligible in the stri"t sense to that of the intelle"t in the broadest sense. )e read at "P L44 that no intelligible is a "opy of another intelligible. !ntelligible being is indi&isible, whereas a "opy is partly li$e and partly unli$e its pattern- note the re"ourse to the logi" of whole and part. #here are, Pro"lus e*plains, cause and effect among the intelligibles, and monads and series (arithmoi , but no patterns and "opies. 7en"e the One, he e*plains, is the cause of intelligibles, but not their pattern. )e $now of "ourse that stri"tly spea$ing the One is not a "ause either, but he means here by the One, ea"h ,od. #he point, at any rate, is to distinguish "ausality in a more generi" sense from that spe"ifi" mode of "ausality subsisting between pattern and "opy. #hen he says something 'uite intriguing4 7en"e intelligible substan"e pro"eeds toward itself in the way in whi"h the intelligible pro"eeds from the One. #he intelligible pro"eeds from the One, we $now, in the powers of the ,ods, whi"h in their e*teriority permit the determination of the ,ods for another. Pro"lus tells us here that this is also the &ery way in whi"h intelligible substan"e pro"eeds toward itself. #hat is, sin"e the powers of the ,ods also re&eal their natures, and in general the nature of the "ause "an be inferred from the effe"t, intelligible substan"es pro"eed toward themsel&es in refle"tion upon their own agen"y, a pra"ti"al refle"tion from whi"h arises the formal dimension of "ausality. #he e*teriority of the ,ods is the interiority of intelligible substan"e (that is, of any substan"e qua substan"e , and it is in refle"tion upon their own agen"y that substan"es be"ome most di&ine. #he fundamental paradigmati" relationship is that of ai%n to chronos, the pattern, one might say, of the pattern;"opy relationship in general, and whi"h is established in the

203 se"ond intelligible triad, for Pro"lus identifies the se"ond intelligible triad with the Eternity of the Timaeus. 3s he e*plains it, D+Eust as the limit of #ime Di.e. the instantE is partless, so the limit of Eternity is the henad (!!! 1H. IB. K(I . #he "omparison is most apt inasmu"h as the instant or now is both "onstituti&e of time and yet belongs to a different order altogether, a measure whi"h "annot be measured ("ompare the des"ription of the se"ond intelligible triad as an un"ir"ums"ribed measure at "T !!!, 1BK e*"ept through an alienation of its proper nature, so that it is no longer a now but a then. #his is what ma$es the differen"e, we might say, between the third triad, whi"h is the intelligible paradigm, and the se"ond triad, whi"h is "onstantly referred to as measure. 3 parallel distin"tion will play itself out, as we shall see, between the se"ond triad as wholeness and the third as allness. But for now, we read that the se"ond intelligible triad

is measured uni'uely Dmonoeid%sE from the unity Dhen%se%sE prior to it, but measures the third triad by the power of itself. 3nd it abides stably in the first triad, while establishing in itself the triad whi"h is ne*t in order. !t binds to itself the intelligible "enter, and establishes one intelligible "oheren"e- "ausing that whi"h is o""ult and uniform in the first triad to shine forth, but "olle"ting the intelligible multipli"ity of the third triad, and "omprehending it on all sides. (PT !!! 1J. 4H

Eternity is dis"ussed as a measure in props. KA(K of the ET, in whi"h ai%n represents that whi"h measures by the whole in "ontrast to chronos, whi"h measures by parts (prop. K4 . 7en"e e&ery eternity measures by simultaneous appli"ation of the whole measure to the thing measured. )e read further at prop. 11L that DeE&ery ,od is a measure of beings. #hat there are a multipli"ity of su"h eternities indi"ates that ai%n

204 represents the power of ea"h henad to a"t as a measure of the whole of Being, for the essen"e of power lies in the o""ult "omprehension of the whole, as ! shall dis"uss below. 2in"e ea"h ai%n measures as a whole, and sin"e we are not yet dealing with a set of henads disposed toward ea"h other, it ma$es sense that the se"ond intelligible triad should be itself measured uni'uely, a "on"ept whi"h re"urs with respe"t to the third intelligible triad, whi"h is the only(begotten (monogenes 3nimal !tself of the Timaeus. #he henad%s determination in and through the se"ond intelligible triad as singular (mian "orresponds here to the intelligible%s a"hie&ement of a "ontinuity, "oheren"e or "ohesion (sunoch&n . 3 "ontinuum e*presses infinity in an integral or unified form, for a "ontinuum is that in whi"h infinite power is in&ested, so to spea$- a "ontinuum is also that whi"h offers itself up to the appli"ation of measure. #he single "on"ept thus "ontains an a"ti&e and a passi&e moment, as if measure and the measured are held in suspension or flu* until the moment of self(measurement represented by the intelligible intelle"t. 2ingularity first be"omes "on"rete in the se"ond intelligible triad as that "oheren"e or "ohesion that is elemental unity per&ading multipli"ity. #his is the most uni&ersal form of the integrity of the li&ing indi&idual, for e&ery animal is held together DsunechetaiE by the life in it ("T !, AIL . Power, the determination par excellence of the se"ond intelligible triad, is an o""ult or hidden multipli"ity (to kruphion pl&thos , whi"h lends to Being its 'uality of being all things o""ultly or in a mode of hiddenness (panta kruphi%s (JC. A(4 . 3 di"hotomy is impli"it in power between this o""ult multipli"ity and to pl&thos pantelos, "ompleted or a""omplished multipli"ity- and this di"hotomy "orresponds in turn to that between power in its hiddenness, h& kruphia dunamis, and power a"tuali1ing and re&ealing itself (h& dunamis kat'energeian kai

205 heaut&n ekph&nasa (11(14 . !n this systole and diastole, as it were, the se"ond intelligible triad finds its dyadi" "hara"ter. But the "on"ept of a hidden and infinite multipli"ity < for the se"ond triad "orresponds to the !nfinity of the first < is also present in the idea of "ontinuity or the "ontinuum as the unlimited dimension of time (!!! 1H. KC. A4(K . #he "omple* of ideas pertaining to "ontinuity, sunecheia, is essential to the se"ond triad, Pro"lus fre'uently referring to the triad < as well as the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, whi"h "orresponds to the se"ond triad (see "hapter I < as "onne"ti&e, sunektik&s, as at !!! 1A. 4K. C- hen"e the 0i*ed deri&es its "ompletion through the intelligible "onne"ti&e triad, that is, "omes to fruition in the third intelligible triad through the a"ti&ity of the se"ond. #he "on"ept of the "ontinuum also "arries with it the meaning of "onser&ing, sunechei, as at !!! 1J. 4H. 1 < the se"ond intelligible triad "onser&es Tin BeingU or perhaps "onsolidates the middle (mesot&ta of the intelligibles- "p. 4H. I(H, where it binds to itself the intelligible "enter and establishes one intelligible "oheren"e Dsunoch&nE. #he "ontinuum conserves be"ause it represents an in&estment of infinite power whi"h be"omes generati&e or prolifi" of form in the moment of self(measurement. #hat the emergen"e of coherence "arries with it for Pro"lus the se"uring of a center is signifi"ant as well in that it pro&ides the first "on"rete notion of mediation in the opposition and relation of "enter to periphery. #he se"ond intelligible triad is the site of the first wholeness, for it is the whole formed by the One and Being as united by Power. #he operation of the se"ond triad "an thus be dis"erned in the three types of whole, namely the whole prior to parts, the whole from parts, and the whole in the part (on whi"h see also ET props. IL(C 4

206
through the wholeness whi"h is prior to parts, eternity measures those henads of the di&ine "lasses Dtas henadas metrei t%n thei%nE whi"h are e*empt from beings- but through the wholeness whi"h deri&es its subsisten"e from parts, it measures the henads whi"h are "oordinate with DsuntetagmenasE beings- and through the wholeness whi"h is in a part, it measures all beings and whole essen"es. 9or these wholenesses being parts of the di&ine henads, they possess partibly what pre(e*ists unitarily in the henads. 3nd moreo&er, eternity is nothing else than perpetual Being Dto aei onE, the "onne"tion Dsunoch&sE radiated Dellampomen&sE upon Being by the henad. 3s for the whole, it "onsists of two parts, namely the One and Being, power e*isting as the "olle"tor of the parts. (!!! AL. C4. AIf

)hen the henads enter into ontology, they are seen through the lens of the logi" of whole and part. #heir summits are treated as unparti"ipated monads, wholes prior to their parts, while as "oordinate with beings, that is, as generati&e of the taxeis of beings, they belong in some sense to a "ommon whole with the beings (an idea whi"h will be e*pressed more fully in the third intelligible triad . Beings then e*perien"e di&inity for themsel&es in the inheren"e of the whole in ea"h of them as a part, by ta$ing up the whole into themsel&es. Beings e*perien"e their di&inity as &irtual parts of the henads, not in the sense that henads ha&e parts, but in the sense that ea"h henad is generati&e of the whole of Being, that is, the wholeness of Being or Being%s subsisten"e as a whole. Beings a""ess the deities through su"h a whole, that is, through the ai%n(fun"tion of ea"h deity through whi"h it is a measure of and by the whole, in the sense of ET prop. K4. !n other words, beings are the parts of the henads inasmu"h as they are measured by them. #he whole through whi"h beings a""ess the henads also refers to the "on+ugation of the One(that(is and Being(that(

207 is(one dis"ussed at PT !!! AL. CH, through whi"h are generated the angels, daimons and heroes that form a "onduit between the ,ods and beings. !n the te*t +ust "ited we also see the "on"ept of irradiation, ellampsis, "ome into play. Eternity is the "onne"tion radiated upon Being by the henad as the measure of the whole of Being, ea"h henad in its ai%n(fun"tion gi&ing dimension, as it were, to Being as a "ontinuous whole or "ontinuum. Ellampsis is a near synonym for katalampsis (en1 lamp% for kata1lamp% , the illumination of, e.g., ET props. 1IA(J, and whi"h e*plains how the One "an be said to parti"ipate Being (as distin"t from the parti"ipation of Being in the One . Ellampsis has a spe"ifi" importan"e, howe&er, in relation to the monadi" "onstru"t of the unparti"ipated prin"iple, the One being the unparti"ipated prin"iple par excellence. 8egations in Pro"lus fre'uently designating that whi"h is the pro*imate "ause of the negated term, the unparti"ipated prin"iple is pre"ipitated out of the s"ene of parti"ipation itself. )e see the signifi"an"e of irradiation to the "ategory of the unparti"ipated in prop. AJ of the ET, where we read that

DeE&ery parti"ipated term G be"oming a property of that parti"ular by whi"h it is parti"ipated, is se"ondary to that whi"h in all is e'ually present and has filled them all out of itself. #hat whi"h is in one is not in the others- while that whi"h is present to all ali$e, that it may irradiate Dellamp&E all, is not in any one, but is prior to them all.

/ust as the do"trine of illumination preser&ed the One < that is, the ,ods < from the "onse'uen"es of parti"ipating Being, so irradiation preser&es the trans"enden"e of the prin"iple in the s"ene of parti"ipation, in response to the "on"erns that arose out of the problems raised in the first part of the Parmenides. )e see here as well the metaphor of

208 centering or centrality, noted abo&e in respe"t to the se"ond intelligible triad, transformed into the abstra"t mediating stru"ture of the monad in relation to its multipli"ity, as we saw in prop. A14 2in"e, then, in e&ery "lass there is some "ommon element, a "ontinuity DsunecheiaE and identity in &irtue of whi"h some things are said to be "oordinate and others not, it is apparent that the identi"al element is deri&ed by the whole order from a single prin"iple. #he referen"e to continuity alerts us again to the origins of this fun"tion in the se"ond intelligible triad. .ausality a"'uires depth and "omple*ity with the emergen"e of the se"ond intelligible triad. #he stable establishment of beings "omes about by the se"ond triad but on account of the first Dhuph'ou G di'hoE (!!! 1H. KC , e&o$ing the effi"ient and final "ause, respe"ti&ely- moreo&er, in the Timaeus "ommentary, perpetual Being, that is, to aei on, the se"ond intelligible triad, simply is the three "auses, the di'ho, the pros ho, and the huph'ou. )e glimpse the pros ho as well, perhaps, in a remar$ su"h as that of !!! 1A. 4I. AA where the henad of the se"ond intelligible triad dis"loses se"ondary Being in relation to itself Dperi heautonE. #he whole stru"ture of "ausality, then, is "onstituted from the se"ond intelligible triad, +ust as form will be "onstituted from the third. #he se"ond triad is, in one sense, the dire"t DprosechesE measure of all beings and "oordinate with that whi"h it measures, (KC. 1I(L , +ust as the first triad is the unity Dhen%sisE of all the intelligibles and in a way "oordinate with them. But in another sense, as the effi"ient "ause par excellence, it has trans"enden"e and, moreo&er, a "laim to pre(eminen"e in its own fashion, as do each of the intelligible triads. 3t !!! 1I. KK. AA, Eternity is that from whi"h "omes Being and ?ife to all things- again, at KL. 1(4, Eternity is the "ause of Being, of eternal ?ife and of !ntelligen"e, and measures the essen"es, powers and

209 a"ti&ities of all things, in referen"e to whi"h 2() "ite (p. 1JJn a passage from the Timaeus "ommentary ("T !!!, 14 , where we read that

Eternity is the "omprehension and union of many Dpoll%nE intelligible henads. 7en"e it is said by the Ora"les to be father1begotten light, be"ause it illuminates all things with unifying light G 9or being full of paternal deity, whi"h the Ora"le "alls the flower of intelle"t, it illuminates all things with intelle"t,1B with "ognition e&er "onstant, and with the ability of re&ol&ing and a"ti&ating DenergeinE eroti"ally about the prin"iple of all things.

Eternity represents the "omprehension, perioch&, of many henads < note that it is not a multipli"ity, pl&thos, of henads, but simply many, pollai < insofar as it represents generi"ally their illuminati&e "hara"ter. #he spe"ifi" "hara"teristi"s of the "ognition imparted through Eternity are noteworthy, inasmu"h as they "ombine desire with motion as foundational determinations of intelle"tion. #he possibility of highlighting in this way the pe"uliar eminen"e of the se"ond intelligible triad may a""ount for something noted by >odds (p. A4L n. A , namely the la"$ in the Elements of Theology of an a""ount of ?imit "orresponding to the a""ount of !nfinity in props. HL(CA, where !nfinity falls between the 9irst and Being as the seeming sole mediator between the supra(essential and onti" domains. E&en if the fun"tions of ?imit ha&e been ta$en up into the One !tself in this te*t, and unless there are a number of propositions missing, it is "lear that !nfinity re"ei&es greater emphasis here than in the

1B !n the Ora"le fragment Pro"lus 'uotes here (4C , the spe"ifi" phrase is imparting a paternal intelle"t to all the fountains and prin"iples, where the fountains represent intelligible form and the prin"iples, intelle"tual form. Paternal intelle"t is the intelle"t possessed by ea"h ,od qua ,od, the fountains and prin"iples mediating between di&ine intelle"t and the world.

210 Platonic Theology or the "ommentary on the Parmenides- for one must ta$e into a""ount not only the dis"ussion of Eternity and !nfinity in props. HL(CA, but also the earlier dis"ussion of Eternity in props. KA(K. #his "ould be a""ounted for by the importan"e possessed by the "luster of "on"epts "orresponding to the se"ond intelligible triad < not +ust !nfinity and Eternity, but also power and the "on"epts of whole and part < for the pe"uliar pro+e"t of the Elements. 2in"e this "luster of "on"epts has its origin in the !nfinity whi"h is the se"ond moment of the first intelligible triad, the role of !nfinity in the Elements e*pands a""ordingly. )e must re"ogni1e that the system possesses this $ind of fle*ibility in what is emphasi1ed at a parti"ular time, in a parti"ular te*t, rather than seeing in e&ery "hange of emphasis a "hange in do"trine. 3 fuller dis"ussion would be appropriate to an essay "on"erned pe"uliarly with an analysis of the stru"ture, aims and method of the Elements, but in general ! thin$ it "lear that the Elements "an be "hara"teri1ed as a te*t "on"erned, not with the hierar"hy of onti" hypostases, as are, albeit in somewhat different ways, the Parmenides "ommentary and the Platonic Theology, but rather with the essential nature of causality as su"h, an in&estigation belonging to theology inasmu"h as the ,ods epitomi1e "ausality, agen"y and effi"a"y in the uni&erse. !nfinity is important to the in'uiry insofar as the primary infinity is infinite power- its status in an hierar"hy of hypostases is merely s$et"hed. #here is no "orresponding s$et"h of the hypostasis of ?imit be"ause the Elements is in general not terribly "on"erned with the domain of hyparxis. 3ll the propositions up to 11J, where the dis"ussion of the ,ods begins, are presented with little or no "onsideration to ere"ting an hierar"hi"al "hain of hypostases su"h as we get in its full detail in the Platonic Theology. #he abbre&iated "hain of hypostases "onsists simply of the ,ods, into whom @eal Being

211 is, as it were, resol&ed, followed immediately by !ntelle"t and 2oul. #here is something to be said for su"h a presentation, whi"h "on"entrates on modes of "ausality rather than on products. #he streamlined and sharpened a""ount in the Elements "omes, howe&er, at the "ost of a flattened perspe"ti&e, in whi"h Being is "onstituted through the intera"tion of two terms alone, hen%sis and dunamis, whi"h are simply seen to diminish in intensity. )e ha&e seen that there is a uni'ue a""ount of the fun"tional attributes of the ,ods as well in the Elements (prop. 1K1(C , rooted in the uni&ersal fun"tions of the di&ine as such. By "ontrast, the orders of the ,ods treated in the Platonic Theology are those "orresponding to the onti" hypostases. #he a""ount of the di&ine diakosmoi uni'ue to the Elements is su"h as would present itself to a refle"tion abstra"ting from the opposition between hyparxis and Being, from whi"h the onti" hypostases are rather deri&ed. .harles 3nni"$(2aget has argued that the a""ount of the di&ine diakosmoi in prop. 1K1(C has the effe"t, rather, of pro&iding the trans"endental "onditions for the in'uiry into "ausality as su"h. 9rom our present perspe"ti&e, we "ould add that in this respe"t, the Elements is written from within the hori1on of the se"ond intelligible triad, with a "orresponding emphasis on "ausality and the e*pression of power, the Platonic Theology from within that of the first intelligible triad, in whi"h parti"ularity and produ"t, ?imit and 0i*ture, ha&e pride of pla"e, and in whi"h as well the opposition between Being and the supra( essential is present at its sharpest and hen"e most generati&e. #he first triad, Pro"lus e*plains (!!! 1H. KC. H , is the unity (hen%sis of all the intelligibles. 2in"e it supplies to them their unity, that is, the parti"ularity of their determinations, the intelligibles ha&e this triad in common, the other sense of unity, that of an en"ompassing genus. By the first triad are established all things- and that whi"h

212 e*ists and is established in the first pla"e is Eternity, through a $ind of doubling of the deity in its e*ternali1ed power. Pro"lus reminds us that the Eleati" 2tranger "alls Being the first power, and defines Being as power (JC. 4f- :ophist A4L >(E < we ha&e then a "on"reti1ation of the 2tranger%s ontology here. #he triads unfold the stru"ture already present in the first4 ?imit is a ,od, !nfinity is the power or ?ife of this ,od, that by whi"h and in whi"h the ,od shows itself, shining forth as Being%s measure and, at the same time, as what lends itself to measure, as 'uality and "ontinuum, while the 0i*ed is the !ntelle"t of the ,od, its ob+e"tified logos, as it were, whi"h is in the first triad the ,od%s elemental constitution, while in its fuller e*pli"ation in the third triad it will represent the ,od%s thin$ing of him;herself or self(analysis. 3lready in the se"ond triad we ha&e the building blo"$s of ontology, for Eternity establishes ?imit and !nfinity in "ommon Den taut%E, for it is henad and power- and a""ording to its One Dkata to henE, it is ?imit, but a""ording to power, infinite (1H. IB. 1(A . Eternity e*presses the opposition, within the henad, of ?imit and !nfinity- hen"e it is henad and power, the dynamism of the opposition between ea"h ,od%s absolute indi&iduality and their power(s , present in this triad as their measuring fun"tion, in whi"h there is also a moment of being(measured, and hen"e in"ipient ob+e"tifi"ation. #he instability of the dyadi" relationships within the se"ond intelligible triad, that is, in ea"h henad as conceived through the se"ond intelligible triad, brings forth the third intelligible triad, to resol&e the superimposition within the se"ond intelligible triad of two opposing standards of &alue, the one of being, the other of doing.

213 !n the third intelligible triad, or intelligible intelle"t, e&ery;all intelligible multipli"ity is re&ealed Dpan to no&ton ekphainetai pl&thosE (!!! 14. 4C. 1C , and as su"h, it is here that all that has "ome before a"'uires determina"y. !t is in and through the intelligible intelle"t that there are three intelligible triads, for they are "onstituted as moments of an intelligible multipli"ity in the intelle"tual re&ersion (epistroph& of the third triad upon its own prin"iples. !ndeed, it is here that we "an for the first time spea$ of remaining, pro"eeding and re&erting, the "y"le of onti" produ"tion so well($nown to students of 8eoplatonism. #he intelligible ,ods do not, howe&er, parti"ipate in this "y"le, as do the ,ods who pro"eed to the illumination of subse'uent le&els of Being, whi"h ! shall dis"uss in future "hapters. !nstead, this "y"le represents moments of Being !tself. 3 further all(important fun"tion of the third intelligible triad is as the paradigm for the fabri"ation of the world by the demiurgi" intelle"t. !n this fun"tion, it is identified with the 3nimal !tself of the Timaeus. 3s the paradigm, intelligible intelle"t displays three "losely related "hara"teristi"s4 totality, uniqueness, and organicity. )hereas the se"ond intelligible triad was a;the whole and a;the measure, the third intelligible triad is an;the all and a;the paradigm. )e might regard intelligible intelle"t as the form of 3llness !tself4 9or when"e is allness deri&ed to these mundane forms < i.e. the forms in the world, sin"e the world always "onsists of all forms < e*"ept from one "ertain "ommon form6 ("T !, 44J . 3llness is distin"t from wholeness insofar as a whole has all of what belongs to it and is the belonging together of its parts, whereas the 3ll has all that there is, "on&eys the sufficient determination of its elements or terms, and relates espe"ially to notions su"h as perfe"tion, a""omplishment, fulfillment and teleology. 3s intelligible allness or totality, the third triad is all things intelligibly, !ntelle"t, ?ife and

214 Essen"e, a"tually and e&idently Dkat'energeian kai ekphan%sE, whereas the first triad or primary Being was all things a""ording to "ause Dkat'aitianE and the se"ond triad was all things inasmu"h as it manifests DprophainonE all things (14. 4C. A1(J . !ntelligible intelle"t, as all(perfe"t DpantelesE and re&ealing in itself intelligible multipli"ity and form (KB. J(4 a""ordingly is the limit DperasE of all intelligibles (4C. AJ(4 not +ust in the sense of lying at the e*tremity of this order, but as "onstituti&e of these terms in their full determina"y and distin"tion, as we "an say of the intelle"tual generally. #he relation of the three triads to the first prin"iple has now "oales"ed into the stru"ture of remaining, pro"eeding and re&erting, this stru"ture itself ha&ing a"hie&ed "on"retion4 ea"h of these three moments < remaining, pro"eeding, and re&erting < are uniform Dhenoeid&E and intelligible (KB. 1B(1 . #he triads announ"e mysteriously;mysti"ally Dmustik%s apaggellousiE the perfe"tly un$nowable "ausality of the primary and unparti"ipated deity. #he first triad announ"es the deity%s ineffable unity, the se"ond his;her surpassing all powers and the third his;her generation of the totality of beings (1I(AB . #he triads "an do this insofar as they are "apable of "ontaining Dch%r&saiE the unity Dhen%se%sE, the powers, and the totalities Dpant%nE of the prin"iple surpassing beings G and re&ealing intelligibly the "ause prior to intelligibles (AB(K . )hat is announ"ed mysteriously or mysti"ally, that is, what is latent or impli"it in the triads, is the supra(essential indi&iduality of ea"h deity, for the intelligible triads e*press uni&ersally or generi"ally the nature and fun"tions of deities who are ea"h of them really perfe"tly uni'ue. #he emergen"e of the determinations "orresponding to ea"h intelligible triad < unity, power (or hidden multipli"ity , totality (manifest

215 power;multipli"ity < as determinations of Being would tend to assimilate the ,ods to Being, their produ"t- therefore the deity also negates these determinations at the same time that they are produ"ed as ontologi"al determinations. 7en"e the unity "orresponding to the first triad is at the same time re+e"ted as a ground for inferen"e, being ineffablethe e*pression of power is re+e"ted insofar as it would determine the deity re"ipro"ally against the others and thus for another- and the totality, the world generated by the deity is separated from them as a totality of beings whose borders "annot "ontain it and whi"h remains relati&e to the deity a limited whole posited within the thought of intelligible intelle"t, as we shall see. 3lienating the totality in this way from the ,od qua ,od, howe&er, not only frees the deity from being "aptured, as it were, in intelligibility and the s"ene of parti"ipation, and hen"e redu"ed to his;her position or determinations, but also frees the totality for full intelligibility lest its own totality be "on"ei&ed as somehow la"$ing. 9or it la"$s nothing, i.e. no being- it is all(perfe"t. !ts unity or uniformity, is of a different order altogether and is plurali1ed neither by the many ,ods nor by the many world(orders or world( &ersions attendant upon the many ,ods who thin$ the "osmos. Be"ause its "enter of gra&ity lies with the powers, in the "enter or "ommons, so to spea$, rather than with the indi&iduality of deities, it is sublimed or distilled from them and is not pre+udi"ed in its truth by their e*isten"e, is not diminished or degraded relati&e to them. !ndeed, as ! shall dis"uss later, it is something more e&en than uniform or henoeides, it is uni'ue, monadikos or only(begotten;sole of its genus, monogenes. 9or now, howe&er, we should note how the suffi"ien"y of the intelligible intelle"t with respe"t to form is signified in the rather odd use of the term &d&, already, in respe"t to the third triad. 9or

216 e*ample, primary Being is most uniform, the se"ond is pregnant with multipli"ity and originates distin"tion Ddiakrise%s archomenonE, and the third is already all(perfe"t and re&eals in itself intelligible multipli"ity and form (KB. 1(4 . 3gain, Being is all things a""ording to "ause and o""ultly- ?ife ma$es multipli"ity appear DprophaineiE and pro"eeds from the unity of Being to manifestation DekphansinE- the third is already all intelligible multipli"ity and the order DdiakosmosE of intelligible forms (!!! 1A. 4I. L(1B . 3nswering to this already of the totality of forms we shall find, in "hapter L of this dissertation, a re"ipro"ating use of again in the intelle"tual order. But it also e*presses here the same "laim to pre(eminen"e in a defined field that ! already referred to with respe"t to the se"ond intelligible triad, for the "ategories of the intelle"t "an possess totality and suffi"ien"y with respe"t to the system as a whole while yet failing to "omprehend, in the sense of totali1ing, the henads in their indi&idual hyparxeis. #he triads re"ei&e di&idedly Ddi&r&men%sE the unitary authority Dto heniaion kratosE of the 9irst (KB. A4(K . #here are two ways of loo$ing at this re"eption of the kratos of primary deity. On the one hand, we "an see it as a di&ision in the sense that the three triads ta$en together re"onstitute the full patrimony, as it were. 3nd as ! ha&e e*plained, the three triads represent three dimensions of ea"h henad or ,od. But another way of understanding it would be that ea"h triad re"ei&es separately the authority of primary deity, ea"h embodying the first prin"iple in its own way, so that ea"h is in a sense the whole. #his will in turn underwrite, so to spea$, the illuminati&e manifestation of the "lasses of ,ods "orresponding to the hypostases of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t whi"h unpa"$ the potentialities of the three intelligible triads as aspe"ts innate in ea"h deity. #hat is, it is this whi"h ma$es it possible that a gi&en deity may illuminate uni'uely, say,

217 !ntelle"t, without ha&ing also to present a manifestation at or illuminate the prior le&el of ?ife. 3 little further on we read that DtEhe TintelligibleU ,ods, though they are allotted a simpli"ity e'ually e*empt from all the di&ine orders Ddiakosm%nE, still fall short of the unity Dhen%sisE of the 9ather (KB. AIf , where 2() has supplemented oi theoi on K1.1 to read oi noetoi theoi. #he supplementation would seem to matter little, be"ause either way it is "lear that Pro"lus wishes to distinguish the status of the ,ods as trans"ending their orders or "lassifi"ations, a trans"enden"e whi"h manifests itself at the le&el of the intelligible. )e re"all that while the One surpasses the ran$ of father, the intelligible ,ods are fathers primarily Dor Min the first pla"e%E +ust as they are henads primarily (!!! A1. L4. L(H - and again, prop. 1K1 of the ET4 3ll that is paternal in the ,ods is of primal operation Dpr%tourgonE and stands in the position of the ,ood Den tagathou taxeiE at the head of all the di&ine orders Ddiakosm&seisE. 7ere we see the sense of the distin"tion drawn here between the 9ather and the ,ods who trans"end e'ually (or ali$e, homou the di&ine orders. !i theoi in PT !!!. KB. AIf refers to the primordial multipli"ity of the ,ods in the intelligible order, in whi"h the ,ods are ta$en all together, as it were, prior to the illuminations of Being that dispose them into their se&eral orders but posterior to ea"h deity in its "on"rete indi&iduality or paternality, so to spea$. )e shall ha&e o""asion later to remar$ again upon this primordial "olle"ti&ity of the ,ods, whose possibility is granted by the se"ond intelligible triad, foreshadowing the di&ine multipli"ity whi"h will emerge in the illumination of the hypostasis of ?ife. #he multipli"ity of the many ,ods trans"ending alike the di&ine orders is naturally not the multipli"ity of the ,ods (li$e Phanes who are specifically intelligible, i.e. illuminate Being !tself, Being determined against ?ife, !ntelle"t, et al. @ather, it is the intelligible

218 ,ods in the sense that every ,od is an intelligible ,od in the first pla"e. 8or, therefore, is it a matter here of a constituted multipli"ity of ,ods, but simply of the many, neither the singularity of ea"h ,od for him;herself nor yet the spe"ifi" manifolds of deities pro"eeding to the illumination of dis"rete regions of Being. 9inally, although it is the e*istential basis for the logi"al or 'uantifi"ational set of all the ,ods, that latter set will not be possible to "onstitute until the emergen"e of !ntelle"t, that is, intelle"tual intelle"t. >amas"ius raises an interesting problem in regard to the third moment of the first intelligible triad and, by e*tension, the third intelligible triad. 7e "laims that "ertain of the more re"ent philosophers < and he has been ta$en to mean Pro"lus here < say that while ?imit and !nfinity are henads, the third moment is a substantial and "omposite monad (9P !!! A. 11B . >amas"ius "riti"i1es this position at some length. )hy, when the theologians spea$ of the father or of power, do we understand these as henads, while when they spea$ of paternal intelle"t, we pass o&er into another genus6 9urthermore, !ntelle"t must "ommen"e from a henad, +ust li$e life and substan"e. !ndeed, these philosophers themsel&es arrange, in the intelle"tual, unitary intelle"t prior to the substantial- a fortiori, they should do the same thing in the intelligibles. !ndeed, if the intelle"tual and subse'uent henads are to emerge from a mi*ed and "omposite intelle"t, how does our "on"eption differ from that whi"h ma$es the soul "ome from the body, or the intelle"t from the soul6 3nd the !unges, the 2yno"hVs and the other ,ods, are we to suppose that they are not unitary but substantial6 #his would pla"e us in "ontradi"tion with oursel&es and with the ,ods (111 . ! will not ta$e up the way in whi"h >amas"ius himself deals with the problem, but rather e*plore the ramifi"ations of this problemati" in Pro"lus.

219 !t is diffi"ult, at first, to s'uare what >amas"ius says with Pro"lus% position at all, inasmu"h as Pro"lus seems to hold, rather, that there is one henad to ea"h intelligible triad < ! ha&e e*plained already the sense in whi"h this is to be ta$en < and so only one henad in the first triad, not two. 3s he e*plains it, the first triad is an intelligible ,od primarily, that whi"h "omes after it, an intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,od, and the third, an intelle"ti&e ,od. 3nd these three deities and triadi" monads gi&e "ompletion to the intelligible genera. #hey are monads a""ording to their deities Dkata tas theot&tas tas heaut%nE, sin"e all else depends from the ,ods, powers and beings ali$e, but they are triads a""ording to a separate di&ision (!!! 14. K1. C(1K . #he powers and beings here refer to the se"ond and third moments of ea"h triad whi"h depend from the first. #his tends to teles"ope the subse'uent emanations of the deity into his;her paternal summit. #his "orresponds to the independen"e of the activity of deities in relation to their fundamental "onstitution and is ne"essary so that the regions of Being illuminated by a gi&en deity < or those not illuminated by that deity < do not alter the fa"t that e&ery deity possesses being, life and intelle"t for itself and is parti"ipable at e&ery le&el down to the "orporeal le&el of herbs, stones and statues (to whi"h list one might add texts "onsidered in their materiality . #hus the o&erall tenden"y, at least in the Platonic Theology, is to pose the ?imit( element of the deity against both the moment of !nfinity;power;eternity as well as that of 0i*ture;substan"e;intelle"t, the se"ond and third moments of the first triad and, more broadly, the se"ond and third triads in toto. #hus the problemati" to whi"h >amas"ius points would be in fa"t radi"ali1ed, be"ause it would apply not only to radi"al !ntelle"t, but to radi"al ?ife as well, both of whi"h would la"$ henadi" foundation. But we ha&e

220 seen that Pro"lus also poses ?imit and !nfinity together against the 0i*ed when he 'uotes 2o"rates to the effe"t that ,od has e*hibited DdeixaiE ?imit and !nfinity < for they are henads deri&ing their subsisten"e from the One, and manifestations, as it were, from the unparti"ipated and first unity < whereas he ma$es DpoieinE the mi*ture and blends DsunkerannunaiE it from the first prin"iples (!!! C. JI. 1B(I . 3nd so it is from here that >amas"ius deri&es his "on"ept of Pro"lus% position. >oes this not ma$e Being !tself (for the 0i*ture is radi"al Being epiphenomenal at its &ery roots, inasmu"h as we "an e*pe"t only as mu"h substantiality from Being as it "an se"ure from its parti"ipation in the henads6 But on >amas"ius% interpretation of Pro"lus, Being is not an immediate produ"t of the ,ods- and this is true in a "ertain respe"t, as we ha&e seen, for Being arises from the opposition between ea"h deity%s absolute indi&iduality and the elements into whi"h that indi&iduality "an be analy1ed. #o this e*tent, then, >amas"ius is "orre"t. But what he does not properly appre"iate is that with the third intelligible triad, ea"h ,od truly infuses Being with di&inity, thus "ompensating for the position radi"al Being has in the first intelligible triad, and laying the groundwor$ for the intelle"tual order of ,ods, whi"h represents the final unfolding of the 0i*ed. 2in"e the third moment of the first triad unfolds in the third triad itself, we must see how Pro"lus deals with the syn"reti" or blended "hara"ter of Being in his a""ount of the intelligible intelle"t. )e $now that the hypostasis of !ntelle"t, when fully de&eloped, will en"ompass di&erse henadi" or unitary realities, whi"h reser&e in some way their in"ommensurability, into a monadi" or uniform stru"ture that "an "omprehend them, but only after the fashion of a uni&ersal. #his is foreshadowed in the third intelligible triad4

221
!t appears to me that intelligible intelle"t, returning to the prin"iples of the whole of things, a""ording to the "on&ersion of itself, be"omes the plenitude of forms and is all things intelle"tually and at the same time intelligibly, "omprehending in itself the "auses of beings, and, being full of the ineffable and e*empt "ause of all things, "onstitutes the monad of the ,ods- when"e also, ! thin$, Plato "alls it the !dea of the ,ods. (PT !!! 1C. IKf

#he intelligible intelle"t is the !dea of the ,ods be"ause it is the !dea of totality or allness, and as we $now, the ,ods are all in ea"h. But the 'uestion "onfronting Pro"lus is what sort of legitima"y "an be a""orded to this !dea in itself, inasmu"h as no !dea "an en"ompass the ,ods. #his mi*ture or syn"retism must then be one to whi"h they lend themsel&es without sa"rifi"ing their autonomy. #here are three stages to this mo&ement of syn"retism. 9irst, the ,ods "onstitute themsel&es into "o(emergent sets or pantheons, whi"h is represented first of all by the "onstitution of a "ommon pla"e, or topos. #his ta$es pla"e in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, as ! shall dis"uss in the ne*t "hapter. 2e"ond, they engage in the "ooperati&e a"tions represented in mythi" narrati&e, paradigmati"ally the "onstitution of "osmos out of "haos. #his moment, ta$ing pla"e in and through the intelle"tual order of ,ods, whom ! dis"uss in "hapter L, and "ontinuing into the infra(intelle"tual orders whom ! do not dis"uss in this dissertation, "arries within it the seeds of the final moment. 9or the "onfrontation between "haos and "osmos is that between matter and form, and it is through the "onstitution of the dualism of form and matter that the final emergen"e of intelle"tual being ta$es pla"e. )ith this, the mo&ement is "ompleted whi"h began in the supra(essential totality of ea"h henad, and ends in the

222 power of the intelle"t to 'uantify o&er the set of 3ll the ,ods, the final emergen"e of the !dea of the ,ods. 0ost of this mo&ement still lies ahead of us- the 'uestion before us now is understanding that stage of it whi"h is "hara"teri1ed by the third intelligible triad, intelligible intelle"t per se. !ntelligible intelle"t is at on"e the li&ing, indeed animal, intelligen"e of ea"h ,od as well as a sublimated or abstra"ted logos < the world%s paradigm. #his duality is already present in the Timaeus- but as is generally the "ase in Pro"lus, it is far less important to re"onstru"t for oursel&es what Plato was trying to do, than to understand the way in whi"h Pro"lus appropriates the Platoni" te*t for his own purposes. Pro"lus a"$nowledges this duality in intelligible intelle"t when he remar$s that 3nimal !tself and the paradigm, albeit both represented by the third intelligible triad, are ne&ertheless not the same4

But though we should posit 3nimal !tself, whi"h has the forms of the elements, this also is the paradigm of the tra"es of the elements. 2o far, howe&er, as it is animal, it is the paradigm of this uni&erse now possessing life. 2imply "onsidered, then, 3nimal !tself and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. 9or Eternity li$ewise, whi"h always e*ists, is the paradigm of #ime, but is not an intelligible animal.

3nd yet his final "on"lusion is that 3nimal !tself is the third intelligible triad G the fountain of all intelle"tual life, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis. ("T !, 4AB, my emphasis . #he mo&ement in the passage, then, is from distinguishing the animality and paradigmati" fun"tion of the third triad, to a reaffirmation of their identity in the same hypostasis. #he referen"e to Eternity as a paradigm should not lead us to "on"lude

223 that the paradigmati" fun"tion is to be transferred to the se"ond intelligible triad (Eternity . #he se"ond triad is ne&er truly a paradigm for Pro"lus but a measure, to whi"h "orresponds the distin"tion between the third triad as totality or allness and the se"ond as wholeness. !t is a 'uestion, then, of a distin"tion between that within the paradigmati" fun"tion of the third triad that is already present in the measuring fun"tion of the se"ond, and what is no&el. 3s su"h, he distinguishes two le&els of fun"tion in it4 the first, in whi"h it is animal, and the paradigm of this uni&erse now possessing life, and has the forms of the elements, and a se"ond, in whi"h it is the paradigm of the traces of the elements. #he tra"es of the elements represent the remainder or pre"ipitate of interpretation in a world(order. 3s a surplus or e*"ess of demiurgi" a"ti&ity, these tra"es mirror the realm of disorderly motion prior to the world(ordering a"ti&ity of the demiurgi" intelle"t. #he distin"tion between animal and paradigm is thus between life, the now, and the forms of the elements, on the one hand, and elemental tra"es, on the other. #he "on"ept of elementality is apparently the middle term between these two dimensions of intelligible intelle"t, and we shall ha&e more to say of it later. 9irst, howe&er, it is ne"essary to further "larify the position of the intelligible intelle"t relati&e to the world(order or "osmos "onstituted in and by the intelle"tual order of ,ods. 3 $ey problem Pro"lus sets for himself with respe"t to the third intelligible triad is the status of the paradigm in relation to the demiurge, that is, to the fa"ti"al world order(s . #he problem as he states it is whether and how the paradigm is in the demiurge. 7a&ing "on"luded that the paradigm must be prior to the demiurge, Pro"lus as$s whether it is seen by him Dthe demiurgeE or not seen by him. !t must be seen by him, he determines,

224

for it is absurd that our soul should see it, and spea$ about it, but that it should not be seen by intelle"t, and by a total intelle"t. But if the demiurge sees the intelligible, does he see it through being "on&erted to himself, or does he only per"ei&e it e*ternal to himself6 !f, howe&er, he only sees it e*ternal to himself, he sees the image of Being, and possesses sense instead of intelligen"e. But if "on&erted to himself, the ob+e"t of his intelle"tual per"eption will be in himself. 2o the paradigm is prior to and in the demiurge- intelligibly prior to him, but intelle"tually in him. ("T !, JAJ

!n positing that the paradigm is seen, Pro"lus emphasi1es both the autonomy the paradigm must possess relati&e to the demiurge, for &isibility re'uires that the &isible stand off from the &iewer, and also that the paradigm is something we see too, and thus something we possess in "ommon with the demiurge. But we must be "areful here, inasmu"h as Pro"lus will say une'ui&o"ally at "T !, 4JK that whereas the world is one &isible animal, "omprehending in itself all animals, intelligible animal also is one, but is not &isible. #he 'uality of visibility, then, originates in that whi"h is prior to intelligible animal, namely the se"ond triad, the realm of powers < and perhaps it would be appropriate to "onne"t this &isibility with the e*pression of power that "hara"teri1es the se"ond intelligible triad and is also the means by whi"h the ,ods illuminate Being. #he &isible was that whi"h possessed the disorderly motion of Tim. JBa and whi"h all the orders of the ,ods prior to the demiurge illuminate ("T !, JHL . #hat it is &isible, Pro"lus e*plains, is meant to indi"ate that it is not in"orporeal and without 'uality.

#hus they Dthe words Me&erything that was &isible%E signify neither matter, nor the se"ond substrate DbodyE- rather, the &isible nature is that whi"h already parti"ipates of forms, and

225
possesses "ertain tra"es and refle"tions, being mo&ed in a "onfused and disorderly manner. 9or the phantasmal and indistin"t presen"e of forms produ"es different motions in it. (ibid

Nisibility here stands for that surplus or trace e*"eeding the demiurgi" ordering of the world that "an thus be "arried o&er and integrated into different potential world(orders, the term eid%likos, phantasmal, ha&ing some sense also of symbolical, the realm of the symbol representing an e*"ess o&er intelle"tual form < though la"$ing the spe"ifi" theurgi"al referen"e of sumbola or sunthema. )hat is it ultimately that is the e*"ess or surplus of the formati&e a"ti&ity of the demiurge6 !t is on the one hand, of "ourse, matter. But matter is only a "ipher. )hat really e*"eeds the demiurgi" kosm&sis is that supra( essential totality of all the ,ods in ea"h ,od, insofar as this totality fails to be incorporated into the demiurgic cosmos. #hat is, the e*"ess of the demiurgi" world(order is at on"e the residual autonomy of ea"h ,od in the pantheon abo&e and beyond their fun"tional role in the di&ision of labor impli"it in the "ooperati&e a"tion of mythi" narrati&e, and the di&ine Other, all the other ,ods who exist, but who are not members of some gi&en "o(emergent set of deities, not members of some gi&en pantheon. Behind the mas$ of "haos or of matter, then, lie other people's ;ods, as well as that in the members of the pantheon that inelu"tably trans"ends their own role in the arti"ulated pantheon stru"ture. #he &isibility of the intelligible only finds its &isionary "omplement among the intellectual ,ods4 the demiurge is said to see 3nimal !tself4 for sight is the pe"uliarity of the intelle"tual ,ods. 9or the theologist "alls intelligible intelle"t eyelessG ("T !!!, 1B1 . !n the gap between an sightless &isibility and a &ision whi"h "an ne&er absolutely possess

226 the ob+e"t of its ga1e, the distan"e being "onstituti&e of the ga1e itself, lies the spa"e of the )orld, whi"h a""ording to the whole of itself is the thing seen, and the eye G #he whole world therefore is sight and that whi"h is &isible, and is truly "omprehensible by sense and opinion G it is itself all things, that whi"h is sensible, the sensorium, and sense- +ust as the demiurge of it is intelle"t, intelligen"e, and the intelligible (!!, H4 . #he demiurge en"ompasses intelle"t, intelligen"e and the intelligible ali$e, but not qua demiurge. #he demiurge en"ompasses all things insofar as s;he is a ,od. 2o too, the totality or "ompleteness of the world, if it is to be real totality, lies not in any world(order but also in the in"ommensurable remainder that es"apes the demiurgi" utteran"e in its intelligibility if not in its materiality, whi"h alone ser&es to register the "ausality of that whi"h is beyond Being. #his dilemma of real totality, whi"h must somehow in"orporate the &ery prin"iple of itself that must, a""ording to 8eoplatoni" logi", remain outside the totality, is "entral to >amas"ius% argument against a 9irst Prin"iple as su"h (9P !. 1ff . #he supra(essential, then, in its negative moment, enters into the sphere of the demiurgi" system as matter. )e shall return to this in "hapter L. But here, prior to the demiurgi" utteran"e and the pre"ipitation of matter, the essen"e of the third intelligible triad as the paradigm of this uni&erse now possessing life, lies rather in an animal "ons"iousness whi"h we might "hara"teri1e, indulging oursel&es in an ana"hronism, as an intelligen"e "orresponding to those organi1ations we $now as e"osystems, that embody a pre( refle"ti&e interdependen"e and a lived totality whi"h would be the "omplement of the purely formal totality of 3llness !tself. )e read that the forms are "alled paradigms of beings, while Being is "ause, and not paradigm, of all that "omes after it- for paradigms are "auses of things differentiated

227 Ddi&r&men%nE in their Being and whi"h ha&e essen"es "hara"teri1ed by differen"e DdiaphorousE (KA. A(L . #he distin"tion between paradigm and "ause thus "learly has something in "ommon with that between the stru"tures of onti" and henadi" multipli"ity dis"ussed in the first "hapter of this dissertation. #his is on a""ount of the broad, generi" sense of "ausality whi"h allows it to apply to supra(essentials whereas the "ausality of paradigms is by definition onti". #he fle*ibility of the notion of "ause is illustrated in the tenden"y, noted by @omano, for Pro"lus to use the feminine aitia to refer to the "ausality of the One rather than the neuter aition, most li$ely be"ause the One does not e*er"ise its "ausality as some one thing. Paradigms are ob&iously the "auses of beings as parti"ipants and as ha&ing their unity in mediation. Being as pure cause, howe&er, must represent instead radi"al Being as the immediate re"epta"le of di&ine power. Paradigmati" or diacritical >eing, as we might better "hara"teri1e it, depends upon the 3llness of the third intelligible triad- and this pro&ides the "riterion for distinguishing the paradigmati" a"ti&ity of the se"ond and third triads. #he se"ond triad is paradigmati", as ! ha&e argued, only in the se"ond generation. 9or it is properly a "ause rather than a paradigm, a""ording to the distin"tion stated abo&e- and as we read at "T !, AJC, though Perpetual Being Dthe se"ond intelligible triadE is said to pro"eed from a "ause, yet it must not be asserted that it is generated a""ording to all "auses, but that it is a""ording to them. 9or it is di ho (that on a""ount of whi"h and pros ho (that with relation to whi"h and huph'ou (that by whi"h . But at "T !, 41C we read that Perpetual Being was the paradigm of disorderly generation, sin"e from then"e forms without distinction were present with the disorderly nature prior to the generation of the uni&erse. !n this fashion matter parti"ipates of the forerunners of forms G prior to the fabri"ation of the world, when a""ording to the

228 hypothesis, the demiurge was absent (!, JHH . Hypothetically, for the pro"ess in 'uestion is not itself a temporal one < indeed, how "ould it be, inasmu"h as the relationship between Eternity and #ime, whi"h are whole( and part(measures respe"ti&ely, is en"ompassed in the se"ond intelligible triad < but the e*pression of an analysis wor$ing ba"$ward from a "onstituted world(order to its elements. 9or Plato saw that whi"h is formless prior to forms, though it is ne&er separate from them. #hus too, that whi"h is in&ested with form, though yet without distin"tion, is assumed prior to order, though it ne&er was prior to it, but is "onsubsistent with order (!, JCK . 3lso hypotheti"al, we might say, is the status of form without distin"tion, paradigmati" without dia"riti"al Being. 9orm without distin"tion "an be nothing other than the multipli"ity of in"ommensurable measures represented by the se"ond intelligible triad. 3nother way of loo$ing at this would be to see in the pseudo(paradigmati" aspe"t of Eternity the inheren"e of a "ertain independen"e for "ertain whole(and(part relationships, "ertain asso"iati&e "omple*es, relati&e to their in"orporation into a #otality. #hese "omple*es are paradigmati" with respe"t to the #otality inasmu"h as #otality must translate the in"hoate hanging together or "ontinuity of the asso"iati&e "omple* into stru"tured relationships. )e learn more about the nature of this le&el of form at "T !!!, 1A, where Pro"lus "hara"teri1es Eternity (the se"ond triad as the one "omprehension Dperioch&E of the intelligible henads, by whi"h he e*plains that he means the ideas of the intelligible animals and the genera of all these intelligible ideas, and that it is at on"e the summit of their multipli"ity and the "ause of the immutable permanen"y of all of them. )hat Pro"lus means here is that the se"ond triad represents the totality of the ,ods in the most

229 primordial sense. 3fter the emergen"e of !ntelle"t, this will simply be e*pressed as the 'uantifi"ational totality of the ,ods4 3ll the ,ods. But the e*istential basis for this 'uantifi"ation is a set that, as we ha&e seen, does not abide by the rules of onti" sets, in whi"h the multipli"ity of the members is subordinated to a totali1ing unity, a one(o&er( the(many. 3s su"h, the totality of the ,ods does not enter into the 'uantifi"ational totality without remainder. 3s intelligible animals in the se"ond triad < whose animality is really the foreshadowing of the se"ond hypostasis, ?ife < the ,ods do, howe&er, be"ome proto( or 'uasi(ideas whi"h "an be "lassed into genera, e&en if these are not yet really proper ideas or genera. #his is be"ause the se"ond triad "ontains the totality of the ,ods as a continuum of powers, and the powers of the ,ods are the basis for their "lassifi"ation. #his "omprehension is not in the many intelligibles, nor "olle"ted from them, but present with them trans"endently and disposing them and as it were forming them by itself and ma$ing this to be a simultaneous whole. #he "omprehension of the ,ods as powers, intelligible animals or measures, while it does not itself belong among the intelligible multipli"ity, forms and disposes the intelligibles and forms a whole with them < whi"h is nothing other than a pi"ture of the "ompleted system in whi"h a domain of ,ods ho&ers at on"e atop and alongside the hypostases of Being. 3gain, Pro"lus refers to intermediate natures, whi"h are indeed more united Dh&n%menaiE than all(perfe"t multipli"ity Di.e. the third triadE, but display the labor D%dinaE and representation DemphasinE of the generation of wholes and of their own "ontinuity Dsunoch&sE (ibid . #he number and nature of these are $nown di&inely to the ,ods, but are taught to us in a human manner by the Parmenides. #hese intermediate natures, then, are the e*pressed powers of the ,ods in whi"h the "ontinuity or infinite poten"y of ea"h ,od

230 is onti"ally doubled as a dis"rete form or measure. !n this way, absolute indi&iduality gi&es way to the indi&iduality of dis"ernibility. #hese intermediates are taught to us by the Parmenides insofar as they are the bases for the "lassifi"ations of the ,ods into the taxeis whi"h are laid out in systemati" fashion in this dialogue. #he powers of the ,ods are thus the first intermediates in the system of Pro"lus, a system whi"h is $nown for its stress on the importan"e of dis"erning the intermediaries between e&ery produ"er and its produ"t. )e see this parti"ularly in, e.g., ET prop. AH, whi"h >odds (p. A1I "hara"teri1es, feli"itously sin"e we ha&e +ust been spea$ing of the se"ond intelligible triad, as Pro"lus% prin"iple of continuity. )hile se"ondary Being G engenders the multipli"ity of beings without being itself a multipli"ity, the third is itself the manifold of beings, for it is where Being is differentiated DPT !!! 14. K1. A4(LE. 0oreo&er, form itself is by definition ti on, a "ertain being, rather than hapl%s on, Being simpliciter (A1(A . 3""ordingly the intelligible animal is ti on, fa"ti"ally singular, uni'ue or only(begotten. #he final "onstitution of fa"ti"al Being ta$es pla"e through the a"ti&ities of the demiurge, howe&er. #he demiurge "ontains the paradigms of the forms of indi&iduals4 #here e*ists indeed in the demiurge intelligible animal, that is, a pro"ession of 3nimal !tself, but it "ontains not only four forms of en"osmi" realities Dpragmat%nE, namely the forms of the four elements, but also all the multipli"ity of forms (in fa"t, the paradigms of indi&idual Datom%nE forms pre( e*ist in the demiurge, while 3nimal !tself, by means of the intelligible tetrad, "onstitutes all li&ing things holisti"ally Dholik%sE (1K. KJ. I(1K . )e "an dis"ern the presen"e of the intelligible animal in the demiurge in that the ultimate pro"ession of the forms into fa"ti"al manifestation ta$es pla"e as images of his allness ("T !, JCB . But intelligible

231 animality has, in a sense, already produ"ed the manifold of beings out of itself, for it represents the sele"tion of the "onstituti&e elements of the "osmos, in some sense a self1 constitution of the "osmos before the demiurge%s a"ti&ity. #his a"ti&ity will essentially in&ol&e the other deities in relation to the demiurge, and so intelligible animal is both within and without the demiurge. #he intelligible animal in the demiurge is, unli$e 3nimal !tself, not monogenes, only(begotten or sole of its genus but subsists in "on+un"tion with the &i&ifi" Dz%ogonik&sE "ause, together with whi"h he "onstitutes the se"ond genera of Being (KJ. 1I(L . 3gain, we read that the natures prior to the third triad are not all(perfe"t;"omplete Dpantel&E sin"e they are e*empt from the di&ision into multipli"ity. But the natures posterior to it Dthe third triadE are not only(begotten. 9or they pro"eed together with others- the male with the female, and those that are of a demiurgi" together with those of a generati&e Dgenn&tik%nE "hara"teristi" (K4. 1A(I < that is, they e*press the demiurge%s own animality. #he point here "on"erns not only the emergen"e into "on"retion of the dyadi" se*ual relationships among the ,ods, whi"h bring about the "on"retion of the &arious $inship relations among them as well, but the emergen"e of an e*pli"itly oppositional or diale"ti"al stru"ture among the moments of the onti" hypostases as well, as we shall see in the ne*t "hapter. #he ambiguity of the term monogenes, meaning both sole of its genus and only(begotten, is e*ploited by Pro"lus in order to "reate a parallelism between the relations of gender and $inship among the ,ods and the di&ision of genera into spe"ies in the realm of Being, whi"h simultaneously ma$es the point that di&ision "omes about through the e*pli"it emergen"e for another of the moments dynami"ally opposed in the genus but suspended, so to spea$, +ust as the se"ond intelligible triad was in labor with

232 D%dineiE the intelligibles, without being a multipli"ity of beings (K4. 1(A . #he produ"tion of indi&idual beings in the "onte*t of the demiurgi" world(order "omes about through the a"tuali1ation of the demiurge%s dunamis < not qua demiurge but qua deity < for "ertain relationships (parti"ularly se*ual, in this a""ount . #hese relations, in be"oming a"tuali1ed or "on"rete, "onstitute the fa"ti"al world( order, whi"h is mirrored in the "onstitution of the philosophi"al system itself, inasmu"h as this depends upon the deployment, in the intelle"tual order, of principles (archai . #he paradigm is the "ause G of the produ"tion of form DeidopoiiasE, and of the order Dtaxe%sE in the forms. But the demiurge is the "ause of order G 9or forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm- but the demiurge, re"ei&ing forms from the paradigm, arranges them by numbers;series Darithmois diakosmeiE and inserts in them order DtaxinE ("T !, JHH . !t is not a 'uestion here of the distin"tion, within generi" "ausality, of a spe"ifi"ally paradigmati" "ausality, but of the "ausality of the paradigm of paradigms, the third intelligible triad, di&ine intelle"t itself, as distin"t from the "ausality of the demiurgi" intelle"t, an opposition whi"h is as mu"h within the demiurge as anywhere else, for it is the "ontrast between that intelle"t whi"h s;he has simply qua ,od and that intelle"tual activity "onstituti&e of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t. #he distin"tion, "onsidered as intra(intelle"tual, that is, between intelligible intelle"t and intelle"tual intelle"t, between the produ"tion of forms by the paradigm and their final disposition by the demiurge, e*presses a proto(intelle"tual organi1ation of the ob+e"t of the intelle"t. #his is the domain of the p&gai, fountains or sour"es, whi"h stand to prin"iples, archai, in the relation of wholes to parts < albeit that the system "onstituted by the intelle"t%s re&ersion will "onsist of prin"iples all the way to the furthest limit of its

233 "on"eption, namely the One !tself. 9ountains will "ontinue to play important roles in the emergen"e of the system, as we shall see- they represent its lived moments. But when we ti"$ off the hypostases on the 8eoplatoni" ladder of Being, it is prin"iples we enumerate. #he nature of intelligible form, that is, form as it is present in the intelligible intelle"t, is dis"ussed at se&eral points in the Parmenides "ommentary. #hus, for e*ample, in a dis"ussion of the "ontributions made by the different le&els of form to the per"eptible forms, after tra"ing the self(motion and eternity in sensible forms to the se"ond intelligible triad, Pro"lus e*plains that

ea"h form e*ists as a manifold Dpl&thos huparcheinE, but is "onstituted in a""ordan"e with its own pe"uliar number;series Dkat'arithmon idion huphestanaiE and filled with the numbers;series appropriate to it Dsumpepl&r%sthai tois oikeiois arithmoisE, and hen"e the forms are &ariously deri&ed, in a way un$nown to us, and ineffable, from different di&ine ran$s. #his feature "omes from the summit of the intelligibles(and(intelle"tuals, from the forms established there in a se"ret and ineffable manner. ("P HBJ

#he summit in 'uestion is the third intelligible triad, the summit of any order lying in the order abo&e it. #he "on"eption underlying this passage seems to be that an e*istent manifold belonging to ea"h form, whi"h is se"ret and ineffable inasmu"h as it belongs to no order within whi"h it "ould be "on"eptuali1ed, re"ei&es by &irtue of intelligible form a position in relation to the di&ine ran$s, from whi"h the form deri&es a pe"uliar mode of subsisten"e, both in itself and in "hains of asso"iation with others. #his

234 relationship of deri&ation between the forms and the di&ine ran$s is ineffable and un$nowable be"ause it is impossible to further "ategori1e di&ine "ausality as su"h. !f we are to ta$e seriously the whole notion of pre(intelle"tual form, then this subsisten"e and determination by way of arithmoi spo$en of abo&e should not be understood as the same $ind of determination that applies to intelle"tual forms (form in the narrow sense . Be"ause it pertains to the deri&ation of forms from the di&ine ran$s, we should loo$, in order to "hara"teri1e it, to the symboli" or asso"iati&e relationships lin$ing dis"rete elements into the "onstellations that lend myths their i"oni" "onstan"y o&er ine&itable &ariations.11 3s Pro"lus puts it in another passage "on"erning the "hara"teristi"s "onferred upon the lower forms from the higher, from the primal le&el Di.e. the summitE of intelligible(intelle"tual forms ea"h DformE bears a to$en, not sus"eptible to $nowledge, of its own paradigms, that is, the worlds to whi"h it "an belong, a""ording as ea"h has been allotted one or other di&ine "hara"teristi" (CIC . !ntelligible forms are not a""essible to epist&m&, s"ien"e, but rather only to gn%sis, $nowledge in the sense of insight ("P CA4 and whi"h is used to "hara"teri1e di&ine intelle"t (the third intelligible triad in ET prop. 1A1. Prior to the "on"eptual determination of ob+e"ts lies a narrati&e, poeti"al and aestheti" "onstitution of the ob+e"t, and this is what is grasped under the notion of intelligible form. #he intelligible(and( intelle"tual forms, Pro"lus e*plains, are superior to our partial Dmerist&sE understanding G for we "annot in our present state pro+e"t DproballeinE the understanding that would be ade'uate to them (CAK , pro+e"tion being the method by whi"h we subsume parti"ulars

11 #he term i"oni" "onstan"y originates with Blumenberg (<ork on 3yth pp. 14Cff , but ! am indebted rather to the profound and "on"ise dis"ussion of the relationship between i"oni"ity and narrati&ity as aspe"ts of a more general, non(narrati&e "on"ept of myth that en"ompasses both in 3ssmann%s Egyptian :olar $eligion in the ew Dingdom pp. JH(41.

235 under rele&ant "on"epts. )e do not e&en now, one might add, regard myths as individual produ"tions. )e may attribute their generation to different e*ternal agen"ies than Pro"lus does, but that does not affe"t the stru"ture of the "laim. Opinion assisted by rational dis"ourse is in general only "ompetent to dis"ern the bare fa"t of their Dthe intelligible forms%E e*isten"e ("P CC4f . #he entities beyond the realm of the intelle"tual Fings are ob+e"ts of "ontemplation for souls that are di&inely possessed and are being initiated into a mysti"al &ision, (CJ1 for the trans"endent forms G may be "ontemplated only by the di&ine !ntelle"t and only illumination from the intelle"tual ,ods renders us "apable of +oining oursel&es to those intelligible(and(intelle"tual forms (C4C . #his illumination begins from mythologi"al hermeneuti"s and e*tends itself through theurgi"al pra*is, ending perhaps in new re&elations4 as for those forms that are abo&e !ntelle"t G the $nowledge of them is beyond our efforts to a"hie&e and is of automati" Dautophu&sE
pro&enan"e, a"hie&able only by ,od(possessed souls (CKB .

!t would be a mista$e, then, to interpret merist&s, in the passage from CAK, so as to understand that the gn%sis of intelligible form is e*istentially

denied us- it is in"ompatible, howe&er, with the partial Dmerist%nE "on"eptions of our souls (C4C < that is, as possessing partial intelle"ts. But the

trans"enden"e of this state is autophu&s, natural or spontaneous for the human organism as a whole, i.e. as more than intelle"t alone. #his a""ords, as well,

with Pro"lus% understanding of the sa"red te*t4 no sa"red te*t possesses the authority to displa"e others, the general interest being in the proliferation of

re&elations, the sheer fe"undity of the di&ine illumination of Being, whi"h sustains the world itself. #he world is not other than the many world(&ersions,

the pro"ess of forming a "osmos. !t is the fabri"ation of world(&ersions through demiurgi" utteran"e < an a"ti&ity belonging to us in the name of the

demiurge, so to spea$ < that sustains the world and is the substan"e of the world qua world, or the fulfillment of the "on"ept of the )orld !tself.1A 8or

does the ,ods% trans"enden"e of !ntelle"t render them ina""essible- on the "ontrary, it ensures that they possess a free "hannel for e*er"ising their

1A #he do"trine of Pro"lus that the demiurge supplies the "osmos with finite dollops of the power of e*isting (the term is from 2orab+i, p. AK1 , thus +ustifying the "laim in Tim. AL>(AH3 that the "osmos is always "oming(to(be ("T !, AII(H , might be mentioned here. #he moment in whi"h the soul e*istentially or theurgi"ally intuits the "osmos may be properly understood as the moment in whi"h the "osmos re"ei&es su"h a 'uantum of power. 9or the demiurgy of the soul and its signifi"an"e for the "osmos, see 2haw 1CCK.

236
pro&iden"e (pronoia or pre(intelle"t in Pro"lus% interpretation, ET prop. 1AB , their a"ti&ity in the world. #he fa"t that neither they, nor we, "an be

subsumed under any dis"rete intelle"tual world(order without remainder is "ru"ial to ma$ing this possible. But nor does the e*isten"e of this remainder

render the intelle"tual world(order a mere shadow, as in some ,nosti" interpretations of the status of the demiurge. 3s long as demiurgi" hegemony is not

allowed to "ut off polytheism at its roots, these roots "ontinue to feed the demiurgi" fabri"ation, pre&enting it from be"oming a mere hus$ or shell, a fate

whi"h might otherwise fa"e it on a""ount of its abstra"t uni&ersality.1J 2o too, the irredu"ibility of mythi" dis"ourse to that of the intelle"t preser&es the

fe"undity of myth for e&er new interpretations and appropriations.14 )e remember that Pro"lus, in a""epting 3ristotle%s a*iom that beings not be

go&erned badly, adds ne&ertheless a "a&eat4 ?et there be one ruler, one "ause of all things, one pro&iden"e, and one "hain of beings- but let there also be

together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many $ings, &arious "auses, a multiform pro&iden"e, and a different order ("T !, AIA .

?et us return, howe&er, to the metaphor of &ision as it pertained to the relationship between the demiurge and the paradigm. #he paradigm must ha&e, in relation to the demiurge, an irredu"ible independen"e without being altogether e*ternal- suffi"iently independent that we "an, in some sense, see it too, lest the order of the world be unintelligible to us, but not so e*ternal to the demiurgi" intelle"t that "ontingen"y slips into the gap, as if the demiurge wor$s from a plan into whi"h s;he has only imperfe"t insight. 9urthermore, if the paradigm is "ompletely e*ternal to the demiurge, then the demiurge, although a deity and thus a henad, would be subordinate to what is, in one respe"t at least, a formal entity. 3nd if the paradigm is subsumed into the demiurge, it will be impossible to distinguish the demiurge%s own intelle"t, qua deity, from his intelle"tual function as an intellectual ;od. 2in"e the third intelligible triad represents the
1J #he 'uestion of whether the "onfrontation with ,nosti"ism may ha&e led, in diale"ti"al fashion, to the emergen"e of a new, more intelle"tually sophisti"ated post(!ambli"hean polytheism is beyond the s"ope of this dissertation, although deser&ing further refle"tion. 14 2omething similar "ould be said in defense of the hierar"hi"al &iew of the uni&erse typi"al of Platonism in general4 by segregating off the realm of the ideal, one not only pre&ents the burden of measuring up to the norm from falling s'uarely on the parti"ulars, but also preser&es the ideal from being e*hausted in any singular appropriation.

237 di&ine intelle"t in ea"h and e&ery ,od, every di&ine intelle"t, that is, e&ery ,od, would not only "ontain the whole of Being as a henad, but would also really be the demiurge. 9rom a different perspe"ti&e, if we "annot distinguish the deity from the fun"tion, the henad from the monad, then we will be left with nothing, ultimately, but a "a"ophony of demiurgi" utteran"es < that is, "on"rete theologies < with no possibility of philosophi"al mediation, a welter of sealed world(&iews utterly blind to ea"h other. #he solution is for the paradigm to be intelligibly prior to the demiurge, but in the demiurge intelle"tually. )hereas in another "onte*t, intelligibility was what threatened the independen"e of the many ,ods, intelligibility here "reates a spa"e for the radi"al autonomy of the ,ods relati&e to ea"h other, with the intelle"tual le&el as the site where the perspe"ti&e of ea"h deity upon the rest may emerge into ob+e"ti&ity as an a""ount of the world in whi"h they are at the "enter. #he paradigm, in its intelligible priority, is any ,od, whereas qua Phanes, e.g., the paradigm is indeed in =eus, the demiurge, a""ording to the Orphi" myth in whi"h =eus swallows Phanes whole and thus "omes to "ontain the uni&erse itself. #he third intelligible triad "an thus be seen as 1 the intelle"t of any ,od, in"luding =eus (whi"h is in the purest sense identi"al to a ,od%s animality - A the independent world(paradigm as e*pressed in a spe"ifi" mythologem, su"h as the one where the paradigm is Phanes- or J the independen"e of the paradigm(fun"tion from the fun"tion of demiurgy as an abstra"t, uni&ersal statement of the independen"e of the philosophi"al and theologi"al dis"ourses.1K

1K !n his remar$s on the intelligible forms in the Parmenides "ommentary, Pro"lus refers se&eral times to the "omplementarity of philosophi"al and theologi"al approa"hes to the problems raised (C1J. 14(K- CAJ. 4Bff- CJB. JJ(L P CJ1. C(11 . #his is a trope throughout the "ommentary, of "ourse, but has spe"ial rele&an"e to the domain of pre(intelle"tual form with whi"h we are "on"erned in the third intelligible triad.

238 #he Orphi" mythologem about Phanes and =eus e*presses an intelle"tual state of affairs, as indeed would seem to be the fun"tion of mythologi"al narrative as su"h. #he iconic mode is, by "ontrast, appropriate to the intelligible forms, from whi"h deri&e the "onstellations of terms operati&e within highly di&erse &ersions of what may ne&ertheless be regarded as the same myth. ! am indebted here to the remar$s of 3ssmann, who defines an i"on as an e*pression or arti"ulation of "ontent that "an be reali1ed in both language and image (Egyptian :olar $eligion, JH . !"ons are mythi"al images whi"h at any time "an de&elop into stories (41 , but whereas stories deri&e their spe"ifi" "oheren"e and dynami" as a result of o&er"oming an initial state of defi"ien"y in a series of episodes whi"h are teleologi"ally interrelated, i"ons may, e.g., form a "y"le in whi"h the beginning and end are "onstantly "rossing o&er into ea"h other, and there is ne&er a transition to a final state (JC . #he two regimes of i"oni"ity and narrati&ity ha&e a "orresponding effe"t on the ,ods, who are seen through them as if through a lens. !n parti"ular, we find that in the narrati&e or mythi"al dimension the nature of a god unfolds in "onstellations, in whi"h he forms a relationship with other gods both a"ti&ely and passi&ely. #hese gods be"ome su"h an intrinsi" part of his a"ti&e (and passi&e "hara"ter de&elopment or Mself(reali1ation% that they form a 'uite indispensible aspe"t of his person in the guise of a Mpersonal sphere% (41 . #he harmony of this latter formulation with the basi" "on"ept of monadi" being as essentially diacritical is espe"ially noteworthy. #he demiurge being "on&erted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas whi"h is in himself, is also "on+oined to the monad of the all(&arious orders of forms G 9or 3nimal !tself is also in him, yet not monadi"ally, but a""ording to a "ertain di&ine number;series

239 ("T !!!, 1BA . 3s su"h, the demiurge is "omprehended by intelligible animal a""ording to the reason of "ause, and is not so "omprehended as a part, so as to be imperfe"t ("T !, 4JJ . #he relationship between the demiurge and 3nimal !tself is, in other words, not one in whi"h the demiurge would be subsumed under a more uni&ersal form, but is instead causal. )e "an see this from the simple fa"t that it is the sub+e"t of a myth. #his is not to say, howe&er, that the relationship between the two functions, that is, the demiurgi" intelle"t and intelligible intelle"t, as a matter of ontology, do not ha&e +ust su"h a relationship to one another.

! ha&e drawn a distin"tion between the basi" possessions of e&ery deity and the domains of Being whi"h they illuminate. )e must turn, then, in "losing, toward a "onsideration of the class of deities "orresponding, in their a"ti&ity or illumination, to the third intelligible triad, whi"h "onsists of deities who are e*perien"ed as the world%s paradigm < intelligible ,ods in the narrow sense. 3 deity is the world%s paradigm in lending him;herself to the "onstitution of a world(order, that is, a world(&ersion, either alone or in "on+un"tion with a separate demiurge. E&en if paradigm and demiurge are not separate in a gi&en theology, howe&er, for the philosopher a distin"tion between the deity as intelligible and as intelle"tual would be ne"essary. #hat this distin"tion may sooner or later ta$e on a theologi"al form is demonstrated by the "ase of ,nosti"ism (it does not matter here that the Platoni" distin"tion between paradigm and demiurge was itself a "atalyst for the emergen"e of the ,nosti" mythology- what matters is that a mythology embodying these ideas emerged at all, for from a Pro"lean perspe"ti&e, myth always trans"ends the histori"al "ir"umstan"es of its emergen"e .

240 #he intelligible paradigm is, in its full ideality, that stru"ture whi"h permits the full e*pression of the powers of the ,ods4 for if there were no intelligible paradigm, Pro"lus as$s, how would the intelligible ,ods be fathers of wholes6 (PT !!! 1K. K4. 1B(1 . #he paradigmati" fun"tion as a basi" possession of ea"h deity ma$es it possible for us to thin$ the world through a gi&en deity be"ause that deity already thin$s the world. #he paradigm thinks e&en if it does not, for its own part, see. !t thin$s as an animal and is at on"e the animality of the ,ods as well as what animates the world4 he DPlatoE "alls 3nimal !tself the paradigm of the world "onsidered as li&ing. #he world hangs together, at bottom, organi"ally, that is, in the way organisms hang together with ea"h other in their en&ironment. #his is the world of the intelligible forms, or fountains. #he intelligible forms

do not ha&e su"h $nowledge of our realm as do the intelle"tual forms, that is to say a separate $nowledge of human things as human, and in general of the indi&idual forms and of the sense(realm, but they ha&e a unitary, general and monadi" $nowledge of all things ran$ed under a single genus, ! mean, for instan"e, the hea&enly and the aerial, or the watery or the terrestrial, be it the whole "lass of ,ods or of superior "lasses of being, or of mortals, it $nows them as being di&ine and as being li&ing things simplyG and their power is too great for it to be immediately responsible for generating us- for it produ"es ,ods, as has been said often before, and it presides o&er ,ods, but not o&er souls- but it is from the intelle"tual "lasses and forms that the multitude of souls and the su""essions of men and of other animals ha&e "ome forth. ("P CIK

!n the ne*t two "hapters, we shall find different fun"tions performed by intelligible forms, or fountains- their fun"tion here, within the sphere of the fountain of fountains

241 that is the intelligible intelle"t, is elemental. #he intelligible forms produ"e ,ods in the sense that the origins of the ,ods within >eing, not yet in the sense of their parentage, whi"h will "ome later, but rather in the sense of their elemental "omposition, are "onstituted on the le&el of intelligible form. #he notion of a "omposition of the ,ods out of some set of elements does not differ essentially from the notion of their "on"eptions and births. !nstead, it is a "ase of a more primal mode of a"ti&ity appropriate to the illumination of a more primal stratum of Being. 7erein lies the essen"e of the illumination of Being in the narrow sense, Being !tself4 the "onstitution of ea"h ,od. 7ow else are the ,ods to illuminate the originary stratum of Being than through fashioning for themsel&es origins6 7en"e in the theologies analy1ed by >amas"ius a""ording to the intelligible triads, it is generally a mi* of deities and elements that fill out the intelligible order- and see in this respe"t 9P !!! A. 1KL. A1(A, where the summit of the unified, i.e. intelligible intelle"t, is analogous to Melementality% Danalog&sei G t% stoichei%t%E, in the sense of that whi"h is formed from the mi*ture of elements. !n attempting to grasp this elemental thin$ing, we should distinguish as >amas"ius does, e&en if Pro"lus does not, between the notion of elementality in itself or as su"h and the fa"ti"al set of four elements belonging either to the 7elleni" theology, when seen in the light of their numinosity, or to a parti"ular moment of the e&er e&ol&ing probabilistic a""ount of the uni&erse offered by physi"ists an"ient and modern (Tim. ACd .

242

.hapter I4

#he Order of the !ntelligible(and(!ntelle"tual ,ods

#he ne*t order of ,ods is the intelligible(and(intelle"tual, "orresponding to the hypostasis of ?ife. 3s Pro"lus e*plains it, these ,ods are so named be"ause they are at on"e ob+e"ts of intelle"tion to the ,ods posterior to them < the intelle"tual ,ods proper < and therefore intelligible, while also intelle"tually per"ei&ing the ,ods prior to them, and so intelle"tual. !n this respe"t we will re"all that 3nimal !tself, the third intelligible triad, was designated in the Timaeus (JB > A the most beautiful of the ob+e"ts of intelle"tion. !n e*pli"ating this order, we are no longer "on"erned with the distin"tion between the "onstituti&e elements of ea"h deity and the region(s of Being illuminated by &arious deities, but solely with the latter. #he intelligible and intelle"tual order is a produ"t of the a"ti&ity of deities already fully "onstituted in their hyparxis and who now pro"eed to the

243 e*pli"ation of the Being whi"h is founded upon them. #his will in&ol&e for the ,ods of this order, +ust as for those of ea"h subse'uent order, a ta$ing ba"$ up into themsel&es or positing in relation to themsel&es of that Being whi"h has "ome into e*isten"e through their own e*isten"e simply qua ,ods. #he uni&ersal stru"ture of this order, whi"h is that of a proto(intelle"tual organi1ation of the intelle"tual field, would be instantiated differently in different "ultures- but we ha&e no e*amples of this sort of e*egesis, as >amas"ius pro&ided us in the "ase of the intelligible order. Pro"lus% own a""ount of this "lass of ,ods is, in a""ord with the pro+e"t of the Platonic Theology, stri"tly 7elleni". !t is our responsibility, howe&er, in a systemati" reading, to distill from the a""ount those uni&ersal "hara"teristi"s whi"h would allow one to apply the "ategory of intelligible(and( intelle"tual ,ods beyond the 7elleni" theology. #he first intelle"tual ,ods, < that is, the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods < being essentiali1ed a""ording to ?ife Dkata t&n z%&n ousi%menousE, "on+oin unparti"ipated intelle"t and the intelligible genus of ,ods (PT !N 1. L . ?ife is the essen"e of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order and the se"ond hypostasis in the triad of Being, ?ife, and !ntelle"t. 3s Pro"lus e*plains a little earlier, in ea"h "lass (taxis there are three "auses4 the "ause of remaining, the "ause of pro"eeding, and the "ause of "on&ersion. @emaining, pro"eeding and "on&ersion or re&ersion are "hara"teristi"s of ea"h onti" "lass "orresponding to the three intelligible triads, that is, the hyparxis, power, and gn%sis possessed by ea"h ,od (ET prop. 1A1 , whi"h are a"tually moments in the relation of ea"h ,od to him;herself. #his a"t of self(relation or onti" ob+e"tifi"ation both establishes the &ery onti" prin"iples in relation to whi"h remaining, pro"eeding and "on&ersion o""ur for beings < that is, it a"tually brings into being the onti" hypostases < and establishes

244 this tripartite pattern of relationship to prin"iple < with the differen"e that ea"h ,od is, as it were, his;her own prin"iple. #he three intelligible triads thus establish a pattern of relation to prin"iples for beings whi"h is, in the first pla"e, a relation(to(self for ea"h ,od. 0oreo&er, Pro"lus sees the onti" hypostases themsel&es as embodying these elemental dispositions4 !ntelle"t, he e*plains, is spe"ified or formali1ed, eidopoieitai, a""ording to "on&ersion, ?ife a""ording to pro"ession, and Being by remaining. #his pro"ess of formali1ation or eidopoiesis is how the hypostases "ome to be. Being is the intelligible Dno&tonE, but ?ife is intelligen"e Dno&sisE (!N 1. L. A4 . #his intelligen"e is analogous to the se"ond intelligible triad, a "ontinuum de&eloping the "apa"ity to measure itself and a primary relationality from whi"h the members of the relation emerge into determina"y. !n the "ase of the se"ond intelligible triad, howe&er, it was a matter of the diremption within the di&ine indi&idual, whereas here a true relationship among ,ods is forged. )ith respe"t to the se"ond intelligible triad and the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order ali$e, relations of seriality, of priority and posteriority, are less important than the proto(spatial relationship of "enter to periphery. Pro"lus obser&es that we "hara"teri1e the whole progression of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods a""ording to the middle, that is, in relation to the se"ond intelligible(and( intelle"tual triad. By the same to$en, the intelligible order is "hara"teri1ed by its first triad and the intelle"tual order will be "hara"teri1ed by its third, the demiurgi" intelle"t. #his is no me"hani"al su""ession- rather, the nature of this dominan"e is different in ea"h order. !ndeed, it is be"ause a different system of &aluation is applied in ea"h "ase that the se"ond and third hypostases "an yet be original in their own ways. #his originality has its guarantee in the fa"t that the roots of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t lie in "hara"teristi"s

245 possessed by ea"h ,od, and therefore ea"h hypostasis is di&ini1ed directly. #his does not dissol&e the onti" hierar"hy, howe&er- for, as we shall see, the ,ods in their manifestation establish among themsel&es hierar"hi"al relationships as part of their a"ti&ity with respe"t to Being, and these enter into the "onstitution of Being. But +ust as these hierar"hi"al relationships do not diminish the autonomy of ea"h ,od qua ,od, so too subse'uent hypostases do not simply "ollapse into their priors < but it is only the fa"t of an immediate relationship to the di&ine that pre&ents this, and that sustains the di&ersity within Being. Being is "hara"teri1ed Dkharakt&rizetaiE a""ording to di&ine hyparxis, ?ife a""ording to power, and !ntelle"t a""ording to intelligible intelle"t. 9or as Danalogon gar estinE Being is to hyparxis, so is !ntelle"t to Being (L. AI . #his mar$ or "hara"ter impressed upon Being by the ,ods is alternately des"ribed as a se"ond henad imparted to Being from the One !tself, whi"h ! ha&e des"ribed as an onti" doubling of ea"h henad4 /ust as the One !tself whi"h e*ists prior to DproEparkhonE Being gi&es to Being from itself a se"ond henad, so too ?ife whi"h has re"ei&ed subsisten"e DhupostasinE prior to !ntelle"t, generates an intelle"ti&e life (H. 4(L . >eities, gi&ing themsel&es to Being, ma$ing onti" doubles of themsel&es, as it were, "hara"teri1e or lea&e the seal of hyparxis upon Being. !ntelle"t represents then a doubling of a double, or rather the double%s refle"tion into itself. #he hypostasis of ?ife generates an intellective life, produ"ing !ntelle"t in produ"ing itself and produ"es itself in produ"ing !ntelle"t. 2o too the determination par excellence of the henad qua being is as the authupostaton, self( "onstituted, or autogenes, self(begotten. )e need loo$ no further for the e*pression of the "ausal effi"a"y of the ,ods4 they "onstitute the uni&erse in "onstituting or generating

246 themsel&es, albeit in their nature they are altogether prior to "onstitution and generation ali$e. #he intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is determined as substance, that whi"h truly is, ont%s on (!N I . )hat truly is parti"ipates of Being, and so is not Being !tself- a "ontrast is hen"e established between Being whi"h parti"ipates Being < substan"e, true Being < and Being whi"h parti"ipates the ,ods alone, whi"h re"ei&es the seal or impression of di&ine hyparxis. #his truth of substan"e must, in the first pla"e, e*press the truth of the relation between the ,ods and Being. But this pro"ess of the generation of hypostases "annot simply be "arried forward upon the initial momentum. #he simple e*isten"e of the ,ods is not enough to affirm the truth of Being, and substan"e as a determination of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is this affirmation. #he ,ods must "onstitute relations among each other in order to affirm their relation to Being and thus se"ure Being%s autonomy. 5nparti"ipated ?ife G is illuminated by ,ods who are allotted a unity Dhen%sinE se"ondary to the o""ult subsisten"e of intelligibles, but pre"eding a""ording to "ause the separation Ddiakrise%sE of intelle"tual natures (!N 1. H . 5nparti"ipated ?ife, that is, the monad or hypostasis of ?ife, re"ei&es its illumination from ,ods who ha&e abandoned their hiddenness (kruphios so as to be "arried in the di&isions of themsel&es as in a &ehi"le Depokhoumenoi tais heaut%n diairesinE (H. AA . #hese di&isions are none other than the "lasses of the ,ods (in the sur&i&ing fragment of his "ommentary on the #haldean !racles, Pro"lus refers to the eternal orders as the temples and habitations of the ,ods . #hat they are "arried in these as in &ehi"les emphasi1es the inability of any of their "lassifi"ations < e&en their "lassifi"ation as ,ods < to totali1e them. #he

247 intelligible ,ods (that is, ea"h ,od qua member of the first order of ,ods, not the narrower "lass of intelligible ,ods are both monadi" and triadi", triadi", naturally, in their analysis into three moments "orresponding to ?imit, !nfinity and 0i*ture, but with referen"e to the di&ided essen"e of triads, they are monads re&ealing from themsel&es whole Dor Muni&ersal%, holasE triads (C. 14(K . 7ere, the opposition between monadi" and triadi" is manifest in the "hara"teri1ation of the triad as a whole or uni&ersal opposing the indi&iduality of ea"h henad. #he intelligible ,ods, in their triadi" progression, do not depart from a unitary hyparxis, while the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods e*hibiting DepideiknumenoiE in themsel&es the distin"tion DdiakrisisE of the monads, and through di&ine differen"e, pro"eed into multipli"ity, and a &ariety of powers and essen"es (1H(A1 . #he formal or uni&ersal aspe"ts thus dis"ernible in the ,ods as the three intelligible triads a"hie&e "on"retion through the further a"ti&ity of those ,ods who pro"eed to the illumination of the hypostasis of ?ife. #hey do this by "onstituting themsel&es as a multipli"ity of ,ods in relation to each other, in short, a pantheon. 2in"e a pantheon is a whole of whi"h ea"h ,od is a part, and in whi"h a di&ision of labor, so to spea$, is instituted among them, the partial orders Dmerikai diakosm&seisE of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods are allotted a mu"h greater di&ision (than the intelligible ,ods so as to unfold to us a multipli"ity of ,ods whi"h "annot be "omprehended by the numbers within the de"ad (!N 1. 1B . !t is not a 'uestion here of a simple passage from a lesser to a greater magnitude, but rather from di&ine solipsism, as it were, to "o(operati&e a"tion, as we shall see in the further de&elopment of this order.

248 !n the se"ond "hapter of the fourth boo$, Pro"lus pro&ides us with a "omparison of the powers in the intelligible and the intelligible(and(intelle"tual orders, whi"h is helpful for e*pli"ating both. !ndeed, the e*egesis of the intelligible triads is not truly "ompleted until the hypostases of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t ha&e been fully unfolded. 9or in intelligibles there were three primarily(effe"ti&e Dor Mprimordial,% pr%tourgoiE powersone "onstituting the essen"e of wholes Dousiopoios t%n hol%nE, another measuring things whi"h are plurali1ed, and another being produ"ti&e of the forms of all generated natures Deidopoios t%n apogenn%men%n hapant%nE (!N A. 11. AL(C . #he natures of the intelligible triads with respe"t to beings are elegantly "aptured in this brief summary. #he a"ti&ity of the first is ousiopoi&t&s, the se"ond metr&t&s, the third eidopoi&t&s, while that toward whi"h they orient themsel&es is for the first, wholes, for the third, generated totality;totalities, and for the se"ond, the pro"ess of multipli"ation or plurali1ation a""ording to the measure it pro&ides. Pro"lus pro"eeds to determine the powers of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual in relation to these,

one by its &ery Being DeinaiE produ"ing the life Dz%opoiosE of se"ondary natures a""ording to a "ertain intelligible "omprehension Dkata tina no&t&n periokh&nE, another being "onne"ti&e of e&erything whi"h is di&ided Dsunectik& pantos tou di&r&menouE, and imparting by illumination the intelligible measure to those natures that relin'uish the one unity Dt&s hen%se%s t&s miasE, and another supplying all things with figure Dskh&maE, shape Dmorph&nE, and perfe"tion. (A. 1A. 1(I

#he intelligible(and(intelle"tual triads, that is, the "lasses of ,ods within the order of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual, are the collective, connective, and perfective. #he

249 aforementioned powers in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual are thus the powers displayed by three "lasses of ,ods, whereas the powers in the intelligible were those possessed elementally by ea"h ,od as su"h4 hen"e the greater di&ision of the partial orders in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual, whi"h e*press a multipli"ity of ,ods whi"h "annot be "omprehended by the numbers within the de"ad. )here there was only one ,od in the intelligible order < namely, each ,od "onsidered as absolutely indi&idual and uni'ue, there is a large number of ,ods in this order. But this is not the generation of multipli"ity, for polytheism is not generated, it is the absolute and fundamental hypothesis in the thought of Pro"lus from whi"h all else depends. !t is the generation, rather, of relation amongst the ,ods, the possibility of whi"h is "reated by the auto(diremption of the ,od as indi&idual. Ea"h ,od "ontains all the rest- by a"tuali1ing "ertain potential relationships with other ,ods, ,ods manifest themsel&es in "o(emergent sets. #his "o(emergent manifestation simultaneously permits relations to a"hie&e autonomy, which actualizes the virtual determinations of the intelligible triads into hypostatic form. #he first intelligible(and(intelle"tual power is manifest, as Pro"lus says here, in a certain intelligible "omprehension. #he use of tina here alerts us to a degree of fa"ti"al determination. 3ll things are in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods vitally as they are in the intelligible ,ods intelligibly (!N J. 14 . )hat is the differen"e between "ontaining all things intelligibly and &itally6 !t is the latter that is a certain "omprehension, a "olle"ti&e whi"h is gi&en, whi"h truly is and whi"h by its &ery being is life(produ"ti&e (z%opoi&t&s of se"ondary natures. 7en"e the three intelligible(and(intelle"tual triads are places and represent the first spatiality, not, howe&er, in the sense in whi"h we thin$ of spa"e as a

250 &oid, but as a life(gi&ing spa"e or scene. #hey are, spe"ifi"ally, the s"ene of intelle"tion, of no&sis. #he intelligible(and(intelle"tual triads as su"h display a greater degree of "on"retion than the intelligible triads did. 9or, as we read,

in the intelligible order, ea"h triad had only the third part of being, for it "onsisted of ?imit and !nfinity and their mi*ture, and this mi*ture was essen"e D ousiaE in the first triad, intelligible life in the se"ond, and intelligible intelle"t in the third. #he natures prior to these were henads and supra(essential powers, whi"h gi&e "ompletion to the whole triads Dtas holas triadasE. But in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, ea"h triad has essen"e, life, and intelle"t G 7en"e the first triad G was in intelligibles ?imit, !nfinity, and Essen"e- for Essen"e was that whi"h was primarily mi*ed. But here the first triad is Essen"e, ?ife and !ntelle"t, with appropriate henads. 9or Essen"e is suspended from the first deity, ?ife from the se"ond, and !ntelle"t from the third. 3nd these three supra( essential monads re&eal the monads of the first triad. (!N J. 1I

Ea"h intelligible triad had only a third part of Being be"ause ea"h was simply a different way of "on"ei&ing of each henad, the relation of henads to Being remaining one(to(one, that is, ea"h henad "ontaining the whole of Being. #he whole or uni&ersal triads, then, only re"ei&e "ompletion, that is, "on"retion, from be"oming identified with henads that pro"eed to the illumination of subse'uent le&els of Being. !n this fashion we understood the remar$ of Pro"lus that the first triad is an intelligible ,od primarily, that whi"h "omes after it, an intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,od, and the third, an intelle"ti&e ,od (!!! 14. K1 . #his was the sense in whi"h there were three henads in the intelligible order4 not that there are fa"ti"ally three, but that the three triads re'uire, as the

251 "ondition of the possibility of their own gi&enness or intelligibility, henads of these three orders. #his pro"ess of arti"ulating the moments impli"it in the immediate opposition of the supra(essential to Being, the One to Being, ea"h ,od to his;her onti" refle"tion < all of whi"h are +ust different terminology for the same thing < begins in the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order. #he intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is an order "onstituted by illumination or true Being, whereas the aspe"t of illumination was se"ondary in the intelligible order, emerging only in and through the third intelligible triad. !llumination is grounded in the third intelligible triad, the aspe"t of ea"h ,od whereby it is a paradigm or totality. #he third intelligible triad is, in this respe"t, the site from whi"h illumination pro"eeds to "onstitute di&ine orders rea"hing ba"$ward, so to spea$, as well as forward, +ust as the order of principles, on"e it emerges in the intelle"tual order, will be able to "onstitute prin"iples rea"hing all the way ba"$ to the first prin"iple, the One !tself. But the illuminati&e order "onstituted in and through the third intelligible triad did not yield the multipli"ity we are spea$ing of here, that is, a multipli"ity of intelligible, intelligible( and(intelle"tual, and intelle"tual ,ods- rather, it "onstituted a "lass of intelligible ,ods in the narrow sense, as illustrated in the "ross("ultural a""ount of this order in >amas"ius. !lluminati&e orders of ,ods are always "apable of being "ompared a"ross "ultures, for in these orders it is a matter of the fun"tional analysis of di&ine activity. #he intelligible order alone has a double sense, in whi"h we "an mean by it not the illuminati&e order of intelligible ,ods in the narrow sense (Phanes, for instan"e , but all the ,ods. 3s su"h, the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order "onsists of triads ea"h of whi"h represents a type of deity and ea"h moment of whi"h is potentially a dis"rete di&ine position- hen"e we ha&e for the first time in this order the possibility of "omple* dispositions of deities in relation

252 to ea"h other within a "ommon field. #hus, where the first, se"ond and third intelligible triads were, qua henads, an intelligible, an intelligible(and(intelle"tual, and an intelle"tual ,od respe"ti&ely, the ran$s of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual, e.g., are made up of classes of intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods. #he se"ond intelligible triad was, Pro"lus e*plains, a supra(essential henad, power and intelligible and o""ult life, while in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, essen"e, life and intelle"t are all &ital Dz%tikaE, and are suspended from the ,ods who "ontain the one bond Dsunechont%n ton hena sundesmonE of the whole of this order. 9or as the first henads were allotted a power unifi" DhenopoionE of the middle genera, so the se"ond henads after them display the "onne"ti&e parti"ularity Dsunectik&n idiot&taE of primarily( effi"ient "auses (!N J. 1If . #he se"ond intelligible triad, li$e the first, "onsists of a henad, whi"h is represented by the first moment of the triad (the moment "orresponding to ?imit , a power, and a resulting mi*ure or produ"t (the intelle"tual moment "ontaining the opposition of the first two moments . !n the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, by "ontrast, a whole "lass of ,ods "orresponding to this order are present together, as shall be demonstrated 'uite literally by the lo"ation here of the di&ine ban'uet of the Phaedrus. #he monads of this order are suspended from these ,ods, who form a united lin$ or bond, desmos, for the whole order (t&s hol&s diakosm&se%s . 7en"e something that was not possible in the intelligible order, namely the synopti" grasp of the three triads together, "an "ome to fruition. 9or while the intelligible order in the narrow sense had a supra(essential "onstitution, as we "an see from the ability of >amas"ius to identify groups of deities in &arious "ultures in whom it is "onstituted, this was a "onstitution with &ery limited internal stru"ture- many of the parts were filled not by ,ods but by elements.

253 !ndeed, in Pro"lus% a""ount of the 7elleni" theology, there was only Phanes filling out this order. By "ontrast, only the presen"e of deities together in a field of +oint a"tion will really be able to underwrite the systemati" relations between monads. )hen Pro"lus says that as the first henads were allotted a power unifi" of the middle genera, so the se"ond henads after them display the "onne"ti&e parti"ularity of primarily(effi"ient "auses, he means that the first henads, that is, the henads in their supra(essential hyparxeis, pro&ide the prin"iple of unifi"ation for the series that pro"eed from them. #hus is ea"h ,od grounded, so to spea$, in the intelligible order, in the broad sense, su"h that his;her identity is not dispersed through his;her a"ti&ities at different le&els of Being. #he se"ond henads "an be understood in two ways. On the one hand, they are a new order of ,ods, relati&e to deities whose illumination of Being lies in the intelligible order in the narrow sense. #hose deities who pro"eed to the illumination of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, howe&er, are also se"ondary in relation to their own foundations in the intelligible order, sin"e e&ery ,od possesses the 'ualities embodied in the three intelligible triads and is in this sense an intelligible ,od. !t is not that the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods are subordinate to the intelligible ,ods as if some ,ods were the "auses of other ,ods, for all hierar"hi"al dispositions among the ,ods are with respect to beings, that is, they are part of the activity of those ,ods, and do not tou"h their indi&iduality. @ather, the foundation of ea"h ,od in the intelligible order broadly understood is that ,od%s self(identity o&er and against their di&erse a"ti&ities. )here there is a relationship of subordination of one "lass of ,ods to another "lass, by "ontrast, it will be a matter of the establishment of su"h a relationship of subordination between the ontic principles "onstituted by the "ooperati&e a"tion of the ,ods in

254 'uestion. )e shall learn more about this in the a""ount of the intelle"tual order of ,ods in the ne*t "hapter. !t is in the sense of the ,ods of the present order unfolding their own potentialities that the pro"ession as se"ond or se"ondary henads e*poses a 'uality possessed in the primordial < lit. primarily( or first(effi"ient < "auses. #he parti"ular 'uality e*posed here is a "onne"ti&e or "ontinuous aspe"t- namely, the "apa"ity of the henads to o""upy a "ommon field with ea"h other, to relate to ea"h other and arrange themsel&es in the "onstellations that form the nu"lei of mythologi"al narrati&e, as we shall see. #his is an unfolding of determinations present already in the se"ond intelligible triad, in parti"ular its moments of "ontinuity, measurement, and power as kruphios or latent multipli"ity. !n the se"ond intelligible triad, the ,od measured the "ontinuum of him;herself through the e*pression of power, whereas here the e*pression of power shall, as we will see, "onstitute a "ommon spa"e or "ontinuum between ;ods. 9inally, in "ontrast to the third intelligible triad, whi"h was a henad, power and intelligible intelle"t, the third intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad "onsists of three supra(essential ,ods, who are the suppliers of di&ine perfe"tion, imitating the all(perfe"t intelligible triad (!N J. 1L . But by these three ,ods we must already understand three types or species of perfe"ti&e deities who are, in turn, a spe"ies of intelligible(and(intelle"ti&e ,ods- for on"e we ha&e "rossed the threshold from unitary into monadic multipli"ity, the indi&idual is hen"eforth identifiable purely by infima species, e&ery unit representing an appropriately determined class.

#he interpretation of Phaedrus A4Ie4(A4H"A leads Pro"lus to assign to the three intelligible(and(intelle"tual triads the designations of the supra("elestial pla"e, the

255 hea&en, and the sub("elestial ar"h, respe"ti&ely. #he first triad, the supra("elestial pla"e, is in addition the site of a number of other determinations drawn from this dialogue, and so rather more spa"e will be gi&en in the su""eeding pages to the dis"ussion of it than to the se"ond and third triads. !n addition to the determinations drawn from the Phaedrus, the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order also has its series of "onstituti&e determinations drawn from the Parmenides. #he nature of this order has to be dis"erned, therefore, by +u*taposing the parallel material so as glean that "ommon nature whi"h a""ording to Pro"lus manifests itself ali$e in the two a""ounts. #he dis"ussion of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order should properly begin, not from the first, but from the se"ond triad, that is, from the middle. )here ea"h of the intelligible triads was an"hored, as it were, from its first moment, whi"h represented in ea"h the henad itself, and the triads as a whole unfolded the s"hema of the first triad, the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is "hara"teri1ed from the middle, as is illustrated by the spatial relationship of the first and third triads to the middle triad, the hea&en. #he formal stru"ture of the intelligible, intelligible(and(intelle"tual, and intelle"tual orders respe"ti&ely is su"h as to highlight in the first, the element of singularity, in the se"ond, the element of process, and in the third, the element of product4 the intelligible ,ods are espe"ially defined a""ording to hyparxeis and summits, on whi"h a""ount also they are "alled fathers, and unitary ,ods, for the One and father are in them the same, as well as the intelle"tual ,ods DwhoE are defined a""ording to ends or e*tremities, and on this a""ount all of them are denominated intelle"ts and intelle"tual. #he intelligible(and( intelle"tual ,ods, howe&er, being middles, espe"ially present themsel&es to &iew a""ording to the middles of the triads (JC. 11A. ALf . #he &ery "on"ept of the intelligible(

256 and(intelle"tual order is grounded in no&sis, that is, intelligence- it is the scene of intelle"tion. 3s su"h, it falls to this "enter to posit within itself the e*tremes of no&ma and nous ali$e. #he intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is a place as well as a pro"ess. 7ea&en is the intelligen"e of the first intelligibles. 9or sight, says he DPlatoE, loo$ing to the things abo&e, is 7ea&en. 7en"e 7ea&en subsists prior to the totality of di&ine intelle"t DproEparkhei tou theiou nou pantosE G and it intelle"tually per"ei&es DnoeiE the things abo&e, and su"h as are beyond the "elestial "lass (K. A1. AB(K . 3 "ertain degree of "onfusion naturally arises be"ause Pro"lus spea$s synonymously of the henad Ouranos and the hea&en, ouranos. Pro"lus is e*pli"ating an henadologi"al and ontologi"al stru"ture through a spe"ifi"ally 7elleni" theology, but it is in"umbent upon us to attempt to distinguish, to the degree we "an, the purely systemati" stru"ture from Pro"lus% use of that stru"ture in the philosophi"al interpretation of 7elleni" myth and the mythopoeti" "ontents in Plato. 3s su"h, we need to determine how mu"h of the semanti" range of ouranos is essential to the parti"ular moment in the pro"ession of Being with whi"h we are "on"erned. #his may seem at first artifi"ial- why separate what is ine*tri"ably intertwined in Pro"lus6 9irst, it is not ine*tri"able, gi&en that we "an "ompare to the present te*t different e*pressions of the "orresponding moments of the system (i.e. the a""ounts of the triads from the Parmenides . 8ot only "an, but must, lest the differen"es between e*pressions of the system are to be allowed to fragment the system itself, an interpreti&e strategy for whi"h there is no need or +ustifi"ation. 3nd from this first point, it is no leap to arri&e at the more profound re"ognition that if there is a single system with di&erse e*pressions in different of Pro"lus% te*ts, then that system "ould be e*pressed e&en outside of an 7elleni" "onte*t, if its basi" presuppositions be suffi"iently portable-

257 and it is my argument, of "ourse, that they are. 9or this reason, ! engage with the spe"ifi"ally 7elleni" material to bring forth a systemati" stru"ture whi"h follows wholly from the basi" presuppositions of the system, namely the emergen"e of monadi" unity from henadi" indi&iduality. )e "an, at least, a&oid the "onfusion that would result from interpreting ouranos, whether we mean the ,od Ouranos or the ontologi"al notion, as the sensible hea&en. @ather, as Pro"lus e*plains,

the "ir"ulation mentioned in the Phaedrus is intelligen"e, through whi"h all the ,ods and souls obtain the &ision DtheasE of intelligibles. But intelligen"e is a medium between intelle"t and the intelligible. !t must be said therefore, that the whole of hea&en is established a""ording to this medium, and that it "ontains the one bond Dton hena sundesmonE of the di&ine orders Ddiakosm%nE, being the 9ather of the intelle"tual genus, but being generated from the Fings prior to it, whi"h also it is said to see. (K. A1f

7ea&en is the uni'ue bond of the di&ine orders be"ause it is the prin"iples of "ontinuity and "omprehension whi"h permeate the intelligible(and(intelle"tual and "onstitute its o&erall 'uality and systemati" fun"tion. #he a"t or pro"ess of intelle"tion, the hea&enly "ir"ulation, is the a"tuality of intelligible and intelle"t simultaneously or in the same ideal lo"ale. But how are we to understand the &ision granted to all the ,ods of the intelligible6 >oes not this subordinate the henads to Being6 #his would be espe"ially strange, inasmu"h as the prin"ipal argument that Pro"lus ad&an"es against the identifi"ation of the Phaedran hea&en with the sensible hea&en is that under that interpretation the leaders of whole souls, i.e. the ,ods of the Phaedrus, would be

258 "on&erted DepistrephousinE to the sensible hea&en, and e*"hange the intelligible pla"e of sur&ey Dt&s no&t&s peri%p&sE for an inferior allotment (K. 1C. 1L(C . But is not su"h an intelligible high pla"e, peri%p&, also inferior to the ,ods6 #his raises the "riti"al issue of the relationship between the ,ods and the !deas. >o we not see the ,ods themsel&es, in the Phaedrus, raising themsel&es to the "ontemplation of the intelligible6 )hate&er Plato saw in it, howe&er, may not be altogether germane to how Pro"lus sees it. 9or what is the purpose, the fun"tion, of di&ine intelle"tion, for Pro"lus6 2in"e the mode of e*isten"e of the ,ods trans"ends that of intelle"tion, their intelle"tion "an only be on behalf of those ontologi"ally posterior to them, their nous a pro1noia, a pre(intelle"t whi"h ta$es the form of pronoia, or pro&iden"e. #he ,ods $now sensibles, not by a "on&ersion to them, but by "ontaining in themsel&es the "auses of them. 7en"e "ogni1ing themsel&es, they $now sensibles "ausally, and rule o&er them, not by loo$ing to them, and &erging to the sub+e"ts of their go&ernment, but by "on&erting through lo&e inferior natures to themsel&es (K. 1C. AIf . 2ensibles are a produ"t of the self("ognition of the ,ods, a pro"ess whose in"eption we dis"erned already at the le&el of the intelligible intelle"t. #here, we saw that ea"h ,od possessed an ideal "apa"ity to operate as the world%s paradigm. Ea"h ,od, as a measure of the whole, "an, in applying this measure to themsel&es, so to spea$, "onstitute in an a"t of refle"tion the whole a""ording to the unit of measure s;he embodies. #his was e*pressed in the determination of the whole represented by the se"ond intelligible triad as a totality in the third. #hose ,ods who illuminate !ntelle"t (that is, those in whom the unparti"ipated intelle"t parti"ipates "arry this pro"ess foreshadowed in the intelligible triads through to a further dimension, in whi"h it shall be a totality of divine intellect (K.

259 A1. AA(J , i.e. an hypostati" monad, a produ"t in "ommon, as it were, of the ,ods, emerging from the moment parallel to the measurement of the se"ond intelligible triad, namely the no&sis of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. #his intelle"tual totality is the point of the "onstitution of the world of sensibilia, its inferior mode of unity mar$ed by dia"riti"al relationships among all its parts and the "onse'uent ontologi"al interferen"e of prin"iples, whi"h manifest the phenomena asso"iated with materiality. #he proper pla"e for the dis"ussion of these issues will be in the ne*t "hapter, de&oted to the intelle"tual order. )hat is needed now is to understand what happends in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order whi"h a"ts as the intermediary between the intelligible triads and the intelle"tual order, that is, between a series of determinations arising from the analyti" of ea"h ,od qua ,od, and a fully "onstituted hierar"hy of autonomous onti" hypostases, autonomous in that the "riteria for their e*isten"e is no longer theophani" but diale"ti"al. !n the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, we see the ,ods and the intelligibles pro"eeding together, as it were, or the intelligibles "arried within the pro"eeding ,ods, and the establishment of a field or plane, a topos, where the as"ending souls with the assistan"e of their tutelary deities will ha&e spread out before them the full system of truth. !n ea"h deity is "ontained all the other henads and the whole of Being. !n intelle"tual deities, howe&er, this impli"ated totality is explicated, and a system of relationships to a set of other deities and a "ommon field of a"tion posited. 3bo&e the le&el of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, of "ourse, these relationships and this field &anish, for when we "onsider ea"h deity in his;her hyparxis, there is no e*ternality. @elationships would introdu"e a diale"ti" of otherness into the henads that would end in their totali1ation or subsumption, the re&o"ation of their indi&iduality.

260 However, "onsidered onti"ally, and hen"e a""ording to a mode of unity whi"h does not threaten their hyparxeis, we "an "onsider the ,ods as a"ti&e in a dis"rete field and possessing relationships, not only among ea"h other but also with the intelligible ob+e"ts of this domain. #his is not the domain, we must note, delimited by the e*tension of the "on"ept all the ,ods- rather, it is a domain in whi"h lies the "ultural spe"ifi"ity that ma$es the Phaedran hea&en an Hellenic hea&en < there will be no 'uestion of the ,ree$ ,ods rubbing shoulders with foreign ,ods at their ban'uet. #he &ery notion would display a fundamental mis"on"eption. #he ,ods are not subordinate to any place, they do not lie in a pla"e li$e mere ob+e"ts, but rather "onstitute a pla"e for themsel&es, and do so, furthermore, not out of some la"$ but be"ause it ma$es possible the emergen"e of intelle"t, whi"h must emerge in a pla"e or s"ene. #he place of the ,ods, then, e*presses their pro&iden"e, and is not +ust a lo"ation in whi"h they find themsel&es, as if thrown into a world. !f, as sometimes "an be obser&ed in "ases of religious syn"retism, for e*ample the fusion of ,ree$ and Egyptian religion in the 7ermeti"a, or the fusion of Buddhism and indigenous .hinese religion in "ulti" #aoism, we see the deities of different "ultures mi*ing together in relation to ea"h other, this would show, for the Pro"lean thin$er, the e*tent to whi"h the hermeneuti"al fusion of hori1ons "onstituting a new intelle"tual "osmos, the new realm for human thought that is 7ermeti"ism or #aoism, is "ausally dependent upon prior a"ts of di&ine intelle"tion whi"h ha&e "reated a new topos within whi"h this en"ounter "an ta$e pla"e and in the footsteps of whi"h, as it were, human intelle"ts may tread. #his would be a topos not "onstituted anymore of translation, that is, of the e'ui&alen"e of powers that we note among deities of different "ultures, for this is

261 an effort to whi"h human intelligen"e is ade'uate, but of the "o(positing of deities from different "ultures in a "ommon field in whi"h they intera"t, an intera"tion whi"h must o""ur through re&elation, on the le&el of i"ons or mythi" narrati&es, not the "on"ept. !t is not a 'uestion, in su"h a fusion, of something li$e the interpretatio ;raeca of Egyptian ,ods, where #hoth is "alled 7ermes, for this is merely "lassifi"ation. 8o one who has studied the 7ermeti"a "an fail to distinguish it from the efforts at translation pra"ti"ed by an 7erodotus. !nstead, it is a 'uestion of a really distin"t produ"t arising from the interpenetration of "ultures. !n the no&elty of the latter lies, we may say, something supra(essential. !n "ultures that ha&e fused &ery e*tensi&ely o&er great spans of time, it may ta$e philologi"al dete"ti&e wor$ to determine that any fusion e&en too$ pla"e, so natural does the intera"tion of the many ,ods in their "ommon topos seem to us. #he historian of ,ree$ religion will assure us that the Olympian pantheon is the result of su"h a synthesis. But to be the result of su"h a pro"ess of "ultural integration does not ma$e the integrity of the new "ultural form epiphenomenal, sin"e the ultimate simples in the pro"ess are not the original "ultural units that ha&e been integrated into the new, polyglot stru"ture- these, rather, lie on the same ontologi"al le&el as the new formations. #he simples or atoms in this pro"ess are, rather, the indi&idual deities, prior to their lo"ation in any topos. )here these identities be"ome blurred by syn"retism sour"es of "onta"t with the di&ine realm may be lost to humanity- hen"e the "on"ern of Pro"lus to maintain the integrity of lo"al "ults. #he philosopher, a""ording to Pro"lus, must trans"end nationality in his religious life- but we must understand that trans"enden"e in a""ord with the dominant "on"epts of his system. 9irst, one trans"ends the national pantheon in the dire"tion of better grasping the absolute uni'ueness and indi&iduality of ea"h ,od, not in

262 the dire"tion of dissol&ing the ,ods of e&ery nation into fun"tional "lassifi"ations, hen"e dissol&ing the supra(essential into Being and redu"ing theology to ontology. 8or "an one, simply by fiat, "onstitute a single massi&e polyglot pantheon, for the bonds whi"h hold together a pantheon are myths, not "on"epts. #here is no indi"ation that Pro"lus attempted to fashion su"h a super( or pseudo(pantheon- at any rate, it is "lear that he $new many more ,ods than he in"luded in the Platonic Theology, and it is 'uestionable that he and 2yrianus ali$e would regard the e*a"t number of ,ods as un$nowable by humans < albeit finite < if the number were as small in magnitude as the number of ,ods treated in the Platonic Theology. #here is a differen"e between the pla"es whi"h the ,ods "onstitute mythi"ally, su"h as the pla"e of the national pantheons, and the abstra"t "on"eptual spa"e of 'uantifi"ation, whi"h is also the produ"t of di&ine a"ti&ity, but on a different le&el altogether. Both ha&e &alue for Pro"lus and both are preser&ed by him- in fa"t, the former is in some respe"t the "ondition of possibility for the emergen"e of the latter. 8either needs to abolish the other to guarantee its autonomy, for Olympus, e.g., is "onstituted mythologi"ally, the spe"ies intelle"tually. #his differen"e between the spa"e of myth and the ontologi"al set of all the ,ods or all the intelle"tual ,ods and so forth, will be se"ured when the intelle"tual order has fully established itself from out of the intelligible( and(intelle"tual to the intelle"tual order, as we shall see. !ssues of "ultural spe"ifi"ity will, of "ourse, be with us e'ually in the intelle"tual order and subse'uently, but in ea"h "ase they will ha&e a different status and a rele&an"e appropriate to the order of Being whi"h is there "onstituted.

263 #he first triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is the supra("elestial pla"e (huperouranios topos of the Phaedrus. !t is distinguished from the unparti"ipated and o""ult genus of the intelligible ,ods, Pro"lus informs us, by the presen"e of so great and distin"t DdiakekrimenonE a di&ine multipli"ity there, &i1. truth, s"ien"e, +usti"e, temperan"e, the meadow, and 3drastia G 9or neither do the fountains of the &irtues, nor the distin"tion and &ariety of forms, pertain to the intelligible ,ods (I. AA. 1B(L . 9irst, we must note that the pl&thos in 'uestion here is not a pl&thos of ,ods, but di&ine in a different sense4 these are the fountains of the &irtues, p&gai being intelligible forms, di&ine relati&e to the !ntelle"t. !n this way, those &irtues indispensable to the emergen"e of !ntelle"t are rooted nearer to the ,ods. !t is important to ta$e seriously the distin"tion between intelligible and intelle"tual form. P&gai are li$e intelle"tual forms, apparently, in that they too are distin"t, diakekrimenos. #hat is, they form a dia"riti"ally organi1ed set. >istin"tion always has this sense of mediation for Pro"lus, and therefore it "on&eys as mu"h unification as differentiation, and so the &irtues, for instan"e, are not autonomous indi&iduals li$e the ,ods, but are ea"h essentially mediated by the unity or wholeness of the set of whi"h it is a part. )hat is different between the intelligible and intelle"tual forms is not spe"ified here, and yet one thing we "an note immediately is that "on"epts su"h as truth and s"ien"e are infrastructural in relation to the forms we shall en"ounter in the intelle"tual order, su"h as identity and differen"e, and in the infra( intelle"tual orders, su"h as li$eness and unli$eness. !n the latter we may note an interesting parado*. )hy do li$eness and unli$eness, whi"h are indispensible to the Pro"lean "on"eption of pro"ession ("f. ET prop. AH , arise in the infra(intelle"tual orders, while truth and epist&m& arise prior to !ntelle"t6 #here is no point here in stepping

264 outside the system and attributing to mere te*tual e*igen"ies "hoi"es that, gi&en the fle*ibility of 8eoplatoni" interpreti&e s"hemata, "ould always ha&e been different. ?i$eness and unli$eness, referring as they do to that whi"h appro*imates a form, are appropriately applied to pro"essions in the higher orders of Being insofar as those pro"essions are understood by us through the lens of the fully "onstituted hypostasis of !ntelle"t. #he labor of "onstituting that !ntelle"t, howe&er, is borne by those for"es whi"h are really prior < and su"h is the role of the p&gai and, a fortiori, the ,ods. !n this way we "an begin to appre"iate the spe"ial nature of the geneti" a""ount put forward in the Platonic Theology as +u*taposed against the stati" a""ount of the Elements of Theology. )e "annot e*pe"t, therefore, the multipli"ity of the &irtues in the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order (whi"h is indeed in some respe"ts still a &irtual multipli"ity to possess the same stru"ture as the multipli"ity of intelle"tual "on"epts. 3 further 'uestion raised by the abo&e te*t is why Pro"lus refers to the intelligible genus of the ,ods as unparti"ipated. !s not the parti"ipability of ,ods inherent in their being ,ods6 !n the position here of monads at the head of a series, howe&er, the ,ods in their intelligible summit are being distinguished from their e*tensions into Being. /ust so has Being in the strict sense been sealed off, so to spea$, preparatory to the pro"ess by whi"h !ntelle"t is brought forth. #his "orresponds to the emergen"e of Being as an ob*ect suitable for intelle"tion. !n the Parmenidean attribution of the first intelligible(and( intelle"tual triad, we find >ifferen"e posed between the One and Being4 9or here the many subsist through >ifferen"e Dheterot&sE whi"h distinguishes DdiakrineiE Being and the One (AL. LC. AKf . 9rom this interposition number "omes to be- and this is the many whi"h is denied of the One in the first negation of the Parmenides, that is, a

265 multipli"ity in whi"h ea"h member is subordinated to the unity of the whole. >id numbers not possess su"h a unity, the units in the number se&en would ne&er form a sum. 7ere we "an see the old generi" notion of henades as mere units "oales"ing with the Pro"lean stri"t sense of henads as ,ods. 9or in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order the ,ods form the unity of a pantheon. #he ,ods are absolute indi&iduals, and the ultimate entities in the uni&erse- and so when they form a "ooperati&e unity, it is the first su"h unity o&er differen"e and the paradigm for all the rest. #his is why Pro"lus stresses the multipli"ity of ,ods in this order. !t is not as if there ha&e only now "ome to be many ,ods. @ather, what is new in this order are dispositions of ,ods in relation to ea"h otherand these dispositions will in"rease in "omple*ity in the intelle"tual order. )e grasp number by &irtue of an analogy between the units in the sum and ob+e"ts disposed meaningfully in relation to one another. #his meaningful relation "annot, howe&er, draw its origin from idly s"attered beings- instead, the first su"h meaningful relation are the figural dispositions formed by "o(emergent sets of ,ods in the "ooperati&e a"tion displayed in myth and i"onography. Pro"lus thus formulates his own uni'ue response to a longstanding Platoni" problem "on"erning the unity of the units in a sum. #he negations of the Parmenides begin from the first triad of the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order, ta$ing up the intelligible order only at the end, where we read that the One neither is, nor is one. #his order of presentation is not merely a matter of "on&enien"e a""ording to Pro"lus% interpretation, although he a"$nowledges a rhetori"al ne"essity for Parmenides not to begin with the highly parado*i"al denial of the One%s being and unity. But e&en rhetori"al ne"essity is not without its intelligible foundations. )ith the beginning of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order begins the emergen"e of

266 dia"riti"al differen"e whi"h, on"e it rea"hes its "ulmination in the intelle"tual order < where the opposition of !dentity and >ifferen"e arises < will be "apable of "onstituting the system to its furthest limits, while ne&ertheless subordinated in its own being to a dis"rete position in the onti" hierar"hy. ,i&en the systemati" importan"e of the Parmenidean mo&es at this point, it will be best to pla"e aside for the moment the Phaedran supra("elestial pla"e in order to e*amine the first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad as 8umber, after whi"h we will be in a mu"h better position to understand this pla"e as the site of the fountains of the &irtues. 9or we do not yet understand, for one thing, what is the differen"e between differen"e as it appears here and the differen"e to whi"h identity is opposed in the intelle"tual order. #he first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad is

analogous to the One Being. 9or the One Being is there Din the first intelligible triadE o""ultly, intelligibly, and paternally- but here, in "on+un"tion with >ifferen"e, it generates number, whi"h "onstitutes the distin"tion of forms and reasons. 9or >ifferen"e itself first shines forth DprophainetaiE in this order, being power and the dyad in intelligibles, while here it is a maternal and prolifi" DgonimosE fountain. 9or there power was "olle"ti&e of the One and the One Being- on whi"h a""ount also it was ineffable, as e*isting o""ultly in the One and in hyparxis. But here >ifferen"e separates Being and the One. 3fter this it multiplies DpollaplasiazeiE the One, pro"eeding generati&ely Dgenn&tik%s proFousaE, and "alls forth Being into se"ond and third pro"essions- brea$ing DthruptousaE Being into many beings and fra"tioning DkermatizousaE the One into more partial henads while, "ompleting the de"lension a""ording to ea"h of these, the wholes remain. (AL. LC. 1If

267 >ifferen"e in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is thus a de&elopment of the dyadi" nature of power into a fountain, that is, an intelligible form. #he dyadic nature of power was not remar$ed upon by Pro"lus in the a""ount of the se"ond intelligible triad. !t would be within the "onnotations of the "on"ept for the Platoni" reader, to be sure, gi&en the long history of the Pythagorean opposition between the One and the !ndefinite (aoristos >yad. #his way of e*pressing the fundamentally dual nature of beings has largely gi&en way, howe&er, in Pro"lus, to the more stri"tly Platoni" pair of ?imit and !nfinity. 7e "hara"teri1es power as essentially dyadi" here largely be"ause this aspe"t of it is rele&ant at +ust this point. 7owe&er, dyadi" stru"tures were e&erywhere in the a""ount of the se"ond intelligible triad, beginning of "ourse from the opposition between the deity as indi&idual and his;her powers, whi"h are abstra"tible. #his was the rift generati&e of Being !tself- and all the other dyads flow from that one. 3nd yet here we read that power%s fun"tion there was fundamentally to hold together the One and Being, while here it separates them. 3nd this is immediately understandable, for Being is not "reated in a moment of repulsion of the ,ods from that whi"h arises as an e*pression of their own poten"ies. But in its fun"tion of holding together the One and Being, that is, ea"h ,od and that whi"h s;he produ"es, the moment of differen"e between the ,od and Being remains latent, ineffable or o""ult. Emerging for its own sa$e, differen"e in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order now allows the distin"tion between the ,ods and that whi"h they produ"e to be spo$en. #he first result of this distin"tion is, howe&er, as we ha&e seen, a spa"e of "ooperati&e a"tion and unity. #his spa"e for "ooperati&e a"tion between ,ods "omes from the prior diremption of ea"h ,od who "ooperates with another, a letting(be(different of the relation e*isting between the two ,ods, a relation

268 whi"h would otherwise remain ineffable within the hyparxis of ea"h, but ne&er emerge for itself as a moment of linkage between two ,ods. #his is the differen"e, then, whi"h allows us to spea$ of ,ods beside ea"h other and in relation to ea"h other. #he supra("elestial pla"e is analogous to the first intelligible triad, but Pro"lus e*plains that whereas the first intelligible triad was paternal, subsisting a""ording to di&ine unity and ?imit, the supra("elestial pla"e is maternal, subsisting a""ording to !nfinity, and the power of !nfinity- for this order is feminine and prolifi", and produ"es all things by intelligible powers. 7en"e Plato "alls it a pla"e, as being the re"epta"le of the paternal "auses, bringing forth and produ"ing the generati&e powers of the ,ods into the hypostases of se"ondary natures (1B. JJ. 1A(AA . #hat it should produ"e by intelligible powers points to the new status a""orded that power whi"h was the &ery indis"ernibility of the One and Being < deities and their di&ine produ"ts < in the intelligible order. #he intelligibility of powers as such points to the in"reasing independen"e of produ"t from produ"er, in whi"h that whi"h was simply the union of the two is now a nas"ent third term between them4 a pla"e or s"ene of and for onti" produ"tion. #his pla"e or s"ene is also, we read, really e*isting essen"e (ousian t&n ont%s ousan (1B. JJ . #he "lass DtaxisE of ,ods pro"eeding to the illumination of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual "onstitute essence in opposition to the monad of Being, to hen on, or that whi"h is simply intelligible (hapl%s no&t& , for this "lass falls short of the unity of that triad Di.e. the first intelligible triadE, and parti"ipates of Being, but is not simply Being. 7en"e Plato "alls it essen"e DousianE, and really e*isting Dont%s ousanE, as re"ei&ing this intelligible and essential Dousi%desE T"hara"terU a""ording to the essen"e of that whi"h is primarily Being. 3gain, the "hara"teristi"s of this "lass of ,ods are "onstituti&e of this phase of

269 Being, and not of these ,ods in themsel&es. !t is a 'uestion, rather, of the activity of the ,ods in this "lass. !n "onstituting a spa"e or "onte*t in whi"h Being "an be"ome an ob+e"t, that is, e*press its own essence, it is ne"essary for these ,ods to be"ome re"epta"les, as it were, for something whi"h is ultimately their own product, namely that whi"h is primarily Being. )e re"all from !!! A1. L4 as well as ET prop. 1K1 that as the intelligible ,ods are henads primarily, so too are they fathers primarily, and that all that is paternal in the ,ods is of primal operation Dpr%tourgonE and stands in the position of the ,ood Den tagathou taxeiE at the head of the se&eral di&ine ran$s Ddiakosm&seisE. 2o then in their diremption or re"epti&ity to self, whi"h is the pre"ondition to ob+e"ti&e relations and "ooperati&e a"tion amongst ea"h other, the ,ods of this "lass, the first ran$ in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, are maternal < and of "ourse, +ust as there "an be henads that are feminine and also fathers, so there "an be those who are both mas"uline and maternal. #he supra("elestial pla"e, we read, re"ei&es the paternal "auses, the generati&e powers of the ,ods, and brings forth from them something no&el, namely se"ondary hypostases, se"ondary and tertiary de"lensions of Being. #hese "ome about through a $ind of refle* upon originary Being whi"h "onstitutes a double of Being that is ousia, the first parti"ipant in >eing, whereas Being parti"ipates the ,ods alone. #his mo&ement of refle*i&ity and di&ine self(diremption will rea"h its "ulmination in the "omple* a"ti&ity of ,ods upon each other whi"h we see in the intelle"tual order. >ifferen"e was power in the intelligibles, while here it is a fountain, that is, an intelligible form. 3s power, it had not truly "ome forth as itself, as >ifferen"e, inasmu"h as the standpoint of dia"riti"al Being had not been established. !n the se"ond intelligible triad, the powers of ea"h ,od did not yet "onstitute a mediating spa"e between ,ods, but

270 rather, preparatory to this, the site of the diremption of the indi&idual ,od, the site of an otherness within him;herself, on the one hand, while on the other hand it represented a plane of anonymous powers abstra"ted from any di&ine indi&idual. Power was ineffable there sin"e dis"ourse re'uires a dia"riti"al standpoint, and power as it e*isted in the intelligible order did not pro&ide a medium for the ,ods to a"t with ea"h other or upon ea"h other. >ia"riti"al Being has the form of 8umber. !s arithmos to be translated without further ado as number here, or does it retain the sense of series or set whi"h we ha&e pre&iously en"ountered6 )hile it is "lear from the Parmenides that what emerges at this point is indeed number, it would be a mista$e to dispense with an awareness of the other "onnotations of the term in Pro"lus, espe"ially sin"e Pro"lus resists the identifi"ation, pre&alent in Pythagoreani1ing strains of Platonism, of ea"h ,od with a particular number. @ather, number retains a generality with respe"t to the ,ods that fore"loses any one(to(one "orresponden"e. #he number emerging in the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order is rather the form of ontologi"al multipli"ity as su"h, whi"h emerges from the diremption of ea"h ,od in two ways4 first, as the "oming together of ,ods into the unity of a set- and se"ond, as the beginning of the pro"ess of ,ods manifesting themsel&es on su""essi&e le&els of Being, "reating their own series or arithmoi. >ifferen"e multiplies the One, pro"eeding generati&ely, and "alls forth Being into se"ond and third pro"essions- brea$ing Being into many beings and fra"tioning the One into more partial henads while, "ompleting the de"lension a""ording to ea"h of these, the wholes remain (AL. HB. 1(I . #he generati&ity of >ifferen"e "orresponds to the maternality of the supra("elestial pla"e- power is no longer, as it were, without issue or at least without legitimate issue, for now the relationship between prin"iple and produ"t is

271 re"ipro"al. !n produ"ing su""essi&e onti" hypostases, the ,ods manifest themsel&es as "orresponding partial henads, +ust as ,ods offer themsel&es up to the unity of a "o( emergent set or pantheon as a part of a whole in whi"h they "laim only their share, tim&. #he fra"tioning of the One into more partial henads has e'ually these two senses. )e denominate the ,ods that subsist a""ording to ?ife intelligible and intelle"tual, not as gi&ing "ompletion to intelle"t, nor as being established a""ording to intelle"tual intelligen"e, and imparting to intelle"t intelligen"e Dto noeinE and to the intelligible the being("ogni1ed Dto noeisthaiE, but we gi&e them this appellation as deri&ing their subsisten"e DhupostantasE from the intelligible monads and generating all the intelle"tual hebdomads (H. ALf (we shall lea&e aside for the moment the pre"ise signifi"an"e of the intelle"tual hebdomads . /ust as in the Parmenides negations signify "ausation, so here one suspe"ts that the "are with whi"h Pro"lus indi"ates what the intelligible(and( intelle"tual ,ods are not, indi"ates something about what the beings of this order are. #he ,ods of this order, in an a"ti&ity of refle"tion, be"ome hypostati1ed, so to spea$, ta$ing hypostasis from the monadi" or essential "omponents of the intelligible order, in a gesture that is for Pro"lus feminine or maternal. #he diremption whi"h was impli"it in the intelligible order thus be"omes "on"rete as the ,ods of this order ta$e up into themsel&es the intelligible produ"t (indeed, in the form of literal nourishment, troph&, at the ban'uet and hen"e generate the di&ine underpinnings of the !ntelle"t. But if this is the first en"ounter of the ,ods with Being qua Being, it is for that reason the se"ond pro"ession of Being !tself, its first ha&ing been the tra"e or &estige of the di&ine hyparxis, or e*isten"e. 7en"e we read that in the intelligible, the One was of Being, and Being of the One, through the ine*pressible and o""ult unity Dhen%sinE of them, and their

272 subsisten"e in ea"h other (AH. HA. AJ(K . #he integrity of the ,ods in the intelligible order < that is, in their summits < was su"h that no ontologi"al differen"e, that is, no distin"tion between themsel&es and their nature or 'uality, "ould gain pur"hase. 8ow, with the emergen"e of real differen"e between Being and the One, that is, between Being and the ,ods, the ,ods rea"t to the Being in their presen"e and "onstitute, as their first *oint a"t, that &ery presen"e, the s"ene of intelle"tion whi"h is also the ban'uet. #his s"ene is, on the one hand, the lo"us of the &irtues, on the other hand, number < both of whi"h define the possibility of intelle"tion in different ways.

9irst intelligible number re&eals itself to us, whi"h is "onne"ted to D sunech&sE multipli"ity. 9or e&ery number is multipli"ity. But with respe"t to multipli"ity, one $ind subsists as unified Dh&n%men%sE, and another $ind with distin"tion Ddiakekrimen%sE. 8umber, howe&er, is distin"t multipli"ity, for there is differen"e in it. 9or in the intelligible, there was power, and not differen"e, and this power generated multipli"ity, and "on+oined DsunaptousaE it to the monads. 8umber therefore is in "ontinuity with intelligible multipli"ity. (AH. H1. J(1B

#he sense of the "ontinuity here is that number is "ontinuous with or de&elops out of the multipli"ity impli"it within ea"h ,od. #he henads be"ame units of measure through the se"ond intelligible triad- now these units are "omparable with ea"h other. #he multipli"ities whi"h were "on+oined to the monads are the powers and a"ti&ities whi"h were inseparable from the ,ods, the produ"ts from their produ"ers, but are no longer so united to them. #hese multipli"ities are of se&eral $inds4 the multipli"ity represented by the parti"ipability of ea"h ,od down to the lowest le&els of Being, and whi"h leads to the

273 generation of sub(di&ine members of the ,od%s series su"h as angels and daimons, not to mention herbs, stones and so forth- the multipli"ity represented by the illumination of different regions of Being, whi"h leads to the distin"tion between, say, intelligible and intelle"tual manifestations of the same deity- the multipli"ity of the di&ine "ompany, as it were- and the multipli"ity of the dis"rete monads and triads with whi"h ontology "on"erns itself. 3ll of this unfolds itself from an original position in whi"h there are only the ,ods and their powers, the latter pregnant with the "apa"ity to emerge into determina"y as 'ualities, a"ti&ities, and e&ents. 8umber is dia"riti"al Being, the model of distin"t multipli"ity as su"h, be"ause ea"h number is "onstituted of units, that is, parti"ipates unity- as su"h, all numbers possess a "ommon measure in one sense, although relations of in"ommensurability emerge in a different "onte*t. >ia"riti"al Being is feminine, within Pro"lus% "on"eptual set, be"ause mas"ulinity represents for him singularity, autonomy and indi&iduality, whereas femininity represents all that whi"h problemati1es the integrity of the indi&idual. Beyond insight into the gender "on"epts animating 8eoplatoni" metaphor, the formulation enables us to dis"ern on"e again the "ontrast between the modes of unity represented by the henad and the monad. 7en"e, when Pro"lus e*plains that di&ine number is feminine ("hap. JB , he has in mind on the one hand the generati&ity of series in general, su"h that ea"h ,od e*presses a femininity of sorts in bringing forth a dependent series of manifestations from themsel&es, and also the dissolution of henadi" indi&iduality into "lassifi"ation and the attendant unification. 7en"e we read that >ifferen"e distinguishes the One from Being and fra"tions DkatakermatizousaE the One into many henads and Being into many beings (HC. 1B(1A . #here is a differen"e,

274 howe&er, Pro"lus e*plains, whi"h is prior to that differen"e (to heteron whi"h is a genus of Being- for this latter is ousi%des and in no way pertains to supra(essentials. #he primary differen"e is primarily present with the henads themsel&es, and distinguishes and produ"es many henads from one Dapo t&s miasE (HC. A1(J . Pro"lus subtly guides our interpretation by the fa"t that it is the One, to hen, whi"h is fra"tioned while it is from one henad (mias, feminine, must refer to one henad that many are produ"ed, apergazetai, whi"h has a sense of finishing. #he two "hara"teri1ations "arry distin"t "onnotations4 the former is the abstra"t pi"ture of a prin"iple de"lining into multipli"ity, the latter of ea"h henad produ"ing from the primordial diremption of him;herself the other ,ods and the whole ob+e"ti&e hierar"hy of Being so as to ta$e this ob+e"ti&ity ba"$ up into themsel&es, refle"ting it and se"uring its a&ailability to our refle"tion. #he differen"e in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order imitates intelligible power, and is prolifi" of many henads and of many beings (C1. 1(J , for power is the basis of the +u*taposition of the ,ods, from whi"h relati&e disposition of ,ods to one another arises an onti" manifold of forms, and from ea"h impli"it relation be"oming "on"rete a host more are generated. )hat else therefore is it, Pro"lus as$s, than the feminine nature of the ,ods6 G 3nd how "ould it otherwise separate number from itself and the forms of number and TitsU powers, unless it was the "ause of the di&ine pro"essions in a feminine manner6 (CB. ALf . #he primordial differen"e of whi"h he spea$s is, of "ourse, feminine inasmu"h as it is, in the first pla"e, the !nfinity that is the se"ond moment of the first intelligible triad. #he powers of the ,ods, that whi"h problemati1es their indi&iduality, is their femininity, here a full(blown maternity inasmu"h as it separates from itself number and its forms and powers, inasmu"h as all of these moments are ob+e"tified or

275 hypostati1ed now. #his at on"e brings number in some sense to the ,ods < and we ha&e seen already a preferen"e in Pro"lus to refer to the multipli"ity of the ,ods as an arithmos < while at the same time separates the ,ods from number qua number, whose forms and powers are monadi". #here is always a stri"t "orresponden"e between these pro"edures4 the be"oming fully autonomous of an ontologi"al determination, and the attendant insulation of the ,ods, as supra(essential, from being determined by it. #he intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, as the first solely "onstituted by di&ine illumination of a region of Being, represents at on"e the site of a "ertain di&ine reser&e, inasmu"h as not every deity will illuminate this region. #his holding ba"$ "an be seen, in $eeping with the determination of this region as the s"ene of no&sis, as e*pressing a dis+un"tion within di&ine intelle"tion between a pro&idential intelle"tion manifest in illuminating the posterior pro"essions of Being, and a purely self(dire"ted intelle"tion, li$e that of 3ristotle%s unmo&ed mo&ers, "hara"teristi" of the intelle"t of ea"h and e&ery ,od. )hat is the appropriate relationship between the ,ods and number6 3t AC. HK. AA(J we read that di&ine number is that a""ording to whi"h the genera of the ,ods are di&ided Ddi&r&taiE, and ordered Ddiakekosm&taiE by appropriate numbers. 7ere Pro"lus lo"ates the determination of the di&ine diakosmoi a""ording to ?imit and !nfinity of whi"h we are already familiar from the Elements of Theology props. 1K1(C. #he greatest benefit in reading the Elements is to be deri&ed from identifying the order in whi"h the determinations dis"ussed there arise in the geneti" a""ounts of the Parmenides or the Platonic Theology. 8umber is in this "onte*t that whi"h underwrites ontologi"ally the di&ine method of the Philebus, for we read that the monad and dyad < the two pr%tourgous dunameis < are

276

the power generati&e of wholes and the power whi"h "olle"ts into union all progressions. 9or a""ording to the monad, it "olle"ts intelle"tual multipli"ity and "on+oins it to intelligibles- but a""ording to the dyad it produ"es multipli"ity and distinguishes DdiakrineiE it a""ording to differen"e. 3nd a""ording to the odd number it "olle"ts the many orders DdiakosmousE into indi&isible DadiairetonE union- but a""ording to the e&en numbers, it prolifi"ally manifests DekphaineiE all the genera of the ,ods. Being established as the medium DmesosE between the intelligible ,ods and the intelle"tuals, and gi&ing "ompletion to the one bond of them, "arried in the highest intelle"tuals Dakrois tois noeroisE but united to intelligibles, it unfolds the intelligible multipli"ity, "alls forth its o""ult and unitary DheniaionE nature into distin"tion DdiakrisinE and prolifi" generation, while it also "olle"ts that whi"h is intelle"tual into union and impartible "ommunion. (AC. H4. K(1H

#he monad and dyad seem here to be prin"iples of the e*pansion and "ontra"tion, so to spea$, of pree*isting 'ualia, rather than of their generation < in short, li$e a means for ordering a manifold. #he intelle"tuals here are seemingly not the intelle"tual ,ods, but intelle"tual hypostases, inasmu"h as Pro"lus is dis"ussing here di&ine number, whi"h arises through the a"ti&ity of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods, and not the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods themsel&es. !t is a 'uestion, here, of that whi"h is a medium between the unitary nature of the ,ods and the effort of intelle"t to grasp them. 9or the intelligible number of the intelle"tual genera possesses parti"ularities Didiot&tasE whi"h "annot be grasped Daperil&ptousE by human reasoning DlogismoisE, albeit it is di&ided into two pr%tourgous dunameis (AC. H4. 1(K . #he phrase intelligible number of the intelle"tual genera means that whi"h is intelligible relati&e to the intelle"tual ,ods,

277 i.e. the ,ods prior to them. #his status of relati&e intelligibility has been remar$ed upon earlier by Pro"lus in "hap. 1B, where the supra("elestial pla"e is intelligible relati&e to hea&en, the se"ond intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad. Fronos, similarly, though an intelle"tual ,od, is said to be intelligible relati&e to the demiurge be"ause he, Fronos, is the summit of the intelle"tual order. But one must perhaps also maintain the ambiguity of the term arithmos here, and re"ogni1e that the intelligible ordering, that is, the di&ine stru"ture underlying the intelle"tual genera, is a""essible to logismos only so far as the identifi"ation of it with the two pr%tourgos dunameis and the method deri&ing from them. #he intelligible(and(intelle"tual order thus be"omes the site of the "onfrontation, so to spea$, between the di&ine, whi"h is here intelligible in an eminent sense, as at PT !!! A1. LK. AA(J we read that the henads are fre'uently "alled intelligibles, and beings intelligible intelle"ts, and that whi"h is finally truly separate from them, namely intelle"t and its resour"es. #he pla"ement of di&ine number in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order posits arithmeti" as infrastru"tural relati&e to e&ery other intelle"tual a"hie&ement, lying "loser to the ,ods than the "on"epts of the intelle"t. !ndeed, number has about it a mystery and an impenetrability whi"h resembles the ineffable indi&iduality of the ,ods, and yet it e*hibits already many of the "hara"teristi"s of rational and dis"ursi&e thought. 3s su"h it "onstitutes an appropriate medium for the e*pressions of di&ine power. #he side of number whi"h truly belongs to the ,ods is ob&iously the qualitative dimension, that e*ploited by the Pythagoreans in their own mathemati"o(theologi"al spe"ulation.1I 8umber lies at the heart of the "lassifi"ations of the ,ods, as the purest e*pression of the nature of their a"ti&ities with respe"t to Being. But number is not supra(essential- it is not,
1I 2ee, for instan"e, the Theology of Arithmetic attributed to !ambli"hus.

278 for instan"e, on a""ount of number that there are many ,ods. #he two aspe"ts of number, the 'ualitati&e and the 'uantitati&e, are rather both established by di&ine a"ti&ity, the former indi&idual, the latter "ooperati&e. 8umbers belong to the domain of e*pressions of di&ine power, that is, they are formal, and so if for a "ertain Pythagoreanism 3thena "orresponds to the number se&en, this is to be seen as a way of "hara"teri1ing the a"ti&ity of this ,oddess with respe"t to Being, no different than saying she is a ,oddess of +usti"e. 2u"h formal determinations do not tou"h her supra(essential indi&iduality- any number of deities from different pantheons manifest the same 'ualities but the possession of su"h "ommon powers in no way determines two deities as the same or as parti"ipating in something "ommon < rather, it is something "ommon whi"h parti"ipates them. #he same thing, naturally, goes for the 'uantitati&e dimension, a "ertain "onfiguration of deities in relation to one another being "ommon to any number of different myths < this insight indeed pro&ides the possibility of a stru"tural analysis of myth, e&en if the latter ne&er a"tually a"hie&es a reduction of the mytheme to a matheme.

#he first and most abstra"t determination of the first triad of the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order, then, is the One, >ifferen"e, and Being4 #hese three things therefore, ha&e appeared to us from the beginning, a""ording to the distin"tion DdiakrisinE of the One from Being, namely the One, >ifferen"e, and Being. 3nd these are three monads, >ifferen"e neither being the same with the One nor with Being. (J1. CA. I(C . But due to the a"ti&ity of >ifferen"e, these monads brea$ down into three dyads4 the One in "on+un"tion with >ifferen"e, >ifferen"e in "on+un"tion with Being, and the One in "on+un"tion with Being. #hese dyads, moreo&er, be"ome three triads when we begin

279 Darkhomen%nE at one time from the One, at another time from Being, and at another from >ifferen"e (J1. CA. 1H(C . #he e*a"t pro"edure here is far from "lear, but we "an see in it ne&ertheless another dimension of the emergen"e of number from di&ine a"ti&ity4 in releasing these analyti" determinations into proper manifestation, it be"omes possible for these ideal operations to generate summations whi"h in"rease the total magnitude of the system. 3ll of this "omes about through the manifestation of relations between ,ods and their powers, those powers with the powers of other ,ods, and ,ods with ea"h other. Beginning from the One, from >ifferen"e, or from Being, engenders as well a""ording to Pro"lus three types of number4

3nd thus far primary deity Dh& protist& theot&sE re&eals itself, being prolifi" of the first numbers- a""ording to the One, of the unitary, a""ording to >ifferen"e, of the generati&e, and a""ording to Being, of the essential. 2in"e howe&er from this deity whi"h is intelligible that whi"h is posterior to it pro"eeds, it is e&idently ne"essary that the monad, dyad and triad, should ha&e prolifi" power. #hese powers therefore, Parmenides "alls on"e, twi"e, thri"e (Parm. 14J E 1(L . 9or ea"h of these is a power whi"h is the "ause of the abo&e(mentioned essen"es, whi"h produ"e either distin"tly or in "ompli"ation Dkata sumplok&nE. 9or there, with respe"t to their generations Dapogenn&seisE, some of them are entirely pe"uliar Didiai pant%sE, but others are "ommon to them and to se"ondary natures. (J1. CJ. 1(1A

#his is surely not one of Pro"lus% "learer pronoun"ements on any sub+e"t, espe"ially insofar as the result is simply a triad of "lasses of number modelled on ?imit, !nfinity and the 0i*ed, namely the oddly(odd, e&enly(e&en and e&enly(odd. )hat is "lear, howe&er, is that the se"ondary pro"ession of the ,ods re'uires that the monad, dyad and

280 triad ali$e must be a""orded prolifi", gonimos, power. #hat is, whereas the dyads and triads of the intelligible < that is, the se"ond and third moments of ea"h intelligible triad < tended to fold into their appropriate monads, the dyad and triad are here produ"ti&e, whi"h is as mu"h as to say that they are truly present in their determina"y or denumerability. @eferring to them, as Pro"lus now does, as the dyad and triad, already emphasi1es this. #he sense of on"e, twi"e and thri"e then is that of really distin"t powers rather than a stati" analysis of "onstituents, their "hara"teri1ation by counting in&o$ing a se'uentiality whi"h is the &ery beginning of the narrati&ity that will be dis"losed through the intelle"tual order. )hereas the powers of the three intelligible triads seemed li$e di&erse perspe"ti&es upon the gi&en deity, these perspe"ti&es are now "on"ei&able as powers in their own right. #he unfolding of the powers of monad, dyad and triad into "orresponding unitary, generati&e, and essential series unfolds a "omplete ontologi"al stru"ture in whi"h a multipli"ity of supra(essential ,ods, a multipli"ity of their powers or measures,1L and a multipli"ity of onti" terms are dis"losed. #hese multipli"ities, e*isting a""ording to a "ommon measure now, "an be spo$en of as generated, that is, as positing their "auses, with their a"ti&ity determined along one a*is by the opposition between distin"tion and "ompli"ation < i.e. mutual repulsion and a"tion in "ommon < and the opposition between idiot&s, parti"ularity or indi&iduality, as a repulsion of that whi"h is subse'uent to them, and a "ommunity with the subse'uent pro"essions of Being whi"h is the ground of di&ine pro&iden"e on behalf of them. #hat these ideas should be e*pressed in the "onte*t of an esoteri" theory of number is perhaps
1L Perhaps we are to understand the generati&e series as "omprising the angels, daimons and mortal animals of the di&ine series whi"h "onstituted, along with the ,ods, the parts "ontained in the intelligible multipli"ity from the "on+ugation of the One(that(is and Being(whi"h(is(one in the se"ond intelligible triad (PT !!! AL. CHf . E&erything in the se"ond intelligible triad, of "ourse, pertains intimately to the intelligible( and(intelle"tual order.

281 less surprising on"e we understand that the ambiguity of the term arithmos, meaning on the one hand series and on the other number, is itself "onstituti&e for the effort of Pro"lus to arri&e at a notion of the status of number in whi"h are to be seen the tra"es of primordial powers "ommon to and "onne"ti&e of Being and !ntelle"t, without reducing these powers to their purely mathemati"al e*pressions. )hether or not he is altogether su""essful in this endea&or is less important ultimately than his originality in see$ing to "ompose a "omprehensi&e a""ount of the ideal genesis of all the determinations of Being < as deri&ed from the diale"ti" of the Parmenides as well as from the rest of the Platoni" "orpus < from the fundamental posit of the e*isten"e of the ,ods, by drawing out the "onse'uen"es of their nature. #he One and Being ea"h be"ome many (polla gignetai, J1. C4. 11 through the a"ti&ity of >ifferen"e in the first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad4

E&ery part DmorionE of Being parti"ipates of the One- but e&ery henad is "arried as in a &ehi"le in a "ertain portion DmoiraE of Being. Ea"h of these, howe&er, is multiplied, intelle"tually distinguished Ddiakrinetai noer%sE, fra"tioned DkatakermatizetaiE, and pro"eeds to infinity. 9or as in intelligibles, we attribute infinite multipli"ity to the third triad, so here, in this triad we assign infinite number to the third term of the triad. (C4. 1A( 1C

Being parti"ipates the One, and is hen"e a whole, ea"h being qua being a part. 3 distin"tion between part, morios (dim. moros , and portion or share, moira, seems to arise here, howe&er, as if there is a distin"tion to be made between the di&isions of Being and the apportionment, so to spea$, of the One in ea"h henad. !ndeed, were there not, the

282 distin"tion between theology and ontology would "ollapse. But it is not the same thing to dis"ern the esoteri" sympathies of beings, their membership in one or another di&ine series, and to e*pli"ate their ontologi"al "lassifi"ation. )hat is the formal basis of the distin"tion between the two types of portion6 )e read a little further on, 7ow "an the portions of the One be e'ual to the fra"tions DkermasinE of Being6 9or in infinites there is not the e'ual (CK. J(4 . #he portions of the One, that is, the henads, do not "orrespond to the fra"tions or intelle"tual di&isions of Being. #he latter "an be e'uali1ed with ea"h other, whereas henads are fundamentally incomparable. !t is for this reason that the henads must, in their illumination of Being, constitute a ground for their own "omparability. #his in"ommensurability between the henadi" and onti" multipli"ities manifests itself in a feature of number. #here is an infinite succession of numbers, but not an infinite number4 how "an there be an infinite number, sin"e infinity is hostile to the nature of number6 (CK. 1(J . Pro"lus "ontrasts this to the infinity embodied in the third intelligible triad4 9or as in intelligibles, we attribute infinite multipli"ity to the third triad, so here, in this triad we assign infinite number to the third part of the triad (C4. 1I( 1C . #he third intelligible triad was the world(ordering paradigm impli"it in ea"h henad, the totality prior to the potential infinity represented by the number serie- and so the relationship between totality or infinite multipli"ity and infinite number seems to prefigure the relationship of form to its instantiation in general. #he differen"e between henadi" portions and onti" fra"tions and the impossibility of e'uating them, is thus both a s"hemati" representation of the opposition between the ,ods and Being, as well as a basi" ontologi"al stru"ture. )e ha&e already seen in "hapter J of this dissertation how the distin"tion operates in the broader sense

283 between lo"ating some being within the unitary world(order represented by ea"h henad and lo"ating that being a""ording to the regime of monadi" unity, whi"h is the unity of infima species. )e understand that the "onte*ts in whi"h we ta$e the being are fundamentally irredu"ible- that is, we do not e*pe"t the portion of Being in whi"h a gi&en henad is "arried to be mapped ontologi"ally onto the stru"ture of Being !tself. #his se"ures the irredu"ibility of di&ergent di&ine series as well as the autonomy of ontology from theology. 3 bull is a mammal and a 'uadruped in a sense fundamentally different from that in whi"h it is an a&atar of =eus in the myth of Europa, and this latter from the sense in whi"h the ba of Osiris is immanent in the 3pis bull at 0emphis. #he bull of =eus and the 3pis bull represent di&ergent di&ine series, "omparable but irredu"ible for their own part to ea"h other or to a "ommon measure, whereas the being of the bull, its position a""ording to ontologi"al "oordinates, is by its &ery nature a "ommon measure. #his distin"tion between the portions of the One, or the portions of Being in whi"h the henads are "arried li$e &ehi"les, on the one hand, and the parts or fra"tions of Being, what we might "all essential units, seems to be at sta$e in the "riti"ism of Plotinus in "hap. JA. #he immediate issue is the relationship of number to the third intelligible triad, 3nimal !tself. Pro"lus re+e"ts the idea that number is present in 3nimal !tself as distin"t, multiform and the produ"t of >ifferen"e, as opposed to intelligible and o""ult number as "omprehended in the monad (JA. CK. AB(1 . !n number,

ea"h of the parts is no longer an intelligible whole, as in 3nimal !tself. 9or that is a whole of wholes- and e&erywhere the One was with Being in its parts, and 3nimal !tself was only(begotten G if he should "all intelligible animal number, in this "ase, there will be distin"tion and differen"e in the ,ods, whom we ha&e asserted to be established abo&e

284
wholes, a""ording to supreme unity Dakran hen%sinE. 9or all se"tion Dtom&E and di&ision originate from the intelle"tual ,ods- sin"e here >ifferen"e pro"eeds, adorning things in "on+un"tion DsundiakosmousaE with the One and Being. 7ow, therefore, does the fra"tioning of the henads, or the multiform nature of beings pertain to intelligibles6 (CI. 4(A4

#he whole of wholes represented by 3nimal !tself is none other than ea"h henad "on"ei&ed as "ontaining all the other henads < and, a fortiori, all of Being < and thus itself a whole of wholes. 0oreo&er, as we ha&e seen in the last "hapter, its pertaining to ea"h henad singularly is also its only(begottenness. #he portions of the One were not different from the parts of Being there, be"ause Being there did not possess the autonomy it only really begins to a"hie&e in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. 9istinct number in the third intelligible triad would ma$e the third triad no longer the world%s paradigm, but rather the world, "ollapsing the domain of demiurgi" e*e"ution, an una""eptable "onflation of ontologi"al registers. Only gi&en this separation "an we spea$ of a form of #otality or 3llness represented by the third intelligible triad. #he fra"tioning of the henads, in whi"h dis"rete roles, so to spea$, belong to ea"h, o""urs on a different stage than that in whi"h ea"h rests in his or her totality, for it belongs to a "onte*t interior to a parti"ular mythos, a parti"ular "o(emergent set or pantheon of ,ods. On"e we grasp something of the true ontologi"al import of number in his system, it is easy to see why Pro"lus "an, in passing, refer appro&ingly to the Pythagorean asso"iation of 3thena with the number se&en, sin"e there is no fear, for Pro"lus at least, of "onfusing the ,oddess with the number4 the ,oddess is prior. 8or would the dis"o&ery of another deity asso"iated with that number re'uire us to posit the two deities as one and

285 the same- it is no different than dis"o&ering any other pattern of a"ti&ity as "ommon between two deities. .on&ersely, the domain of pure number theory rests se"urely on its ontologi"al foundations without fear of interferen"e from the theologian. !n this lies the signifi"an"e of the do"trine Pro"lus briefly elaborates in "hap. J4, in whi"h he distinguishes, among monadi" numbers, that is, numbers as sets of monads or units, between the form of ea"h number and the unity or hen%sis of the form. )e "an only $now ea"h number a""ording to its form, that is, as a set of so(and(so many monads, whereas the form, a""ording to its hen%sis, is un$nowable to us (J4. 1B1. 11(1A < 'ualitati&e as opposed to 'uantitati&e number. #his is the differen"e between monadi" and unitary number4 monadi" number redu"es to the One, while the uni'ueness of ea"h unitary number is analogous to the indi&iduality of the ,ods. Both are un$nowable, not in the sense that we $now nothing of or about them, but with respe"t to a te"hni"al definition of $nowledge as $nowledge of or through the "ause. 8or are numbers, naturally, un$nowable in the same way and in the same degree as the ,ods- but they do possess within themsel&es a model of the distin"tion we re"all from "T !, JBJ between spea$ing indeed about the ,ods (peri aut%n as opposed to spea$ing of ea"h of them as su"h (auto de hekaston . Sualitati&e number, although belonging within the domain of the powers of the ,ods, is eminent with respe"t to other powers in its mystery, whi"h tends to outstrip dis"ursi&e a""ount. 9or there is something different in asso"iating 3thena with the number se&en, and asso"iating her with, say, the tutelage of heroes. #he latter is e*pli"able to a degree that the former is not. 3s su"h, the former has a more infra( stru"tural position, "loser to re&elation than to doxa.

286 #he anagogi" fun"tion of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order as a whole is espe"ially on display in the se"tion of the Phaedrus that "on"erns Pro"lus, and this fun"tion lies at the heart of further determinations of the first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad "oming from this dialogue. #he supra("elestial pla"e is the plain of truth, whi"h is di&ided a""ording to a multipli"ity of forms, and possesses a &ariety of powers, and the meadow whi"h is there nourishes souls, and is &isible DhoratosE to them, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with ineffable unity Dhen%sinE, but not being $nown to them by intelligen"e (I. AJ. H(1J . #his plain of truth is nothing other than the field of a"ti&ity of the ,ods, the prin"ipal &ehi"le of their illumination of the posterior hypostases. !t is the "ommon positing of the ,ods whi"h "an be seen by souls, in whi"h respe"t one might "ontrast it to the disorderly motion prior to the demiurgi" diakosm&sis, or to matter itself, whi"h insofar as it "an be "onsidered an hypostasis at all, e*presses the un"ir"ums"ribed totality of the ,ods as the prin"iple of that whi"h is liminal to any gi&en world(order. #he nourishment afforded souls in the supra("elestial pla"e is an illuminating hen%sis, the ultimate integration of the soul and its "on"entration in what Pro"lus refers to elsewhere as the flower of intelle"t and what !ambli"heans seem to ha&e meant by the One of the soul. #he result of this illumination is the &ision of the stru"ture of the intelligible, and we must ne&er forget that this pla"e is the staging( ground, so to spea$, for the e*pli"ation of the intelligible hypostases. #he ,ods themsel&es also feast upon the intelligible, as we read in the des"ription of the third triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, the sub("elestial ar"h, whi"h represents the perfe"ti&e "lass of ,ods. #hat this is the site of the "onne"tion of the ,ods to the intelligible goods rather than the supra("elestial pla"e, whi"h is

287 ne&ertheless the pla"e where these intelligibles < the Beautiful, the )ise, the ,ood < reside, indi"ates the reason why the ,ods feast upon intelligibles, whi"h are after all posterior to them ontologi"ally- namely, in order to "onstitute the intelle"tual orders. !t is not, that is, a 'uestion of sustenance for them qua ,ods. @ather, it sustains the pro+e"t of the "onstitution of Being. #he intelligibles, as we ha&e seen, essentially reflect the ,odsby ta$ing this refle"tion ba"$ up into themsel&es, and feasting upon it, the ,ods e*tend themsel&es to the direct "ausation of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t, rather than the latter merely emerging as a se"ondary or tertiary diminution of di&ine poten"y. #hat the generation of !ntelle"t should e*press a moment of genuine di&ine intentionality was, we re"all, the "on"ern of >amas"ius in his own e*pli"ation of the third moment of the first intelligible triad. #his moment has the 'uality of a return to themsel&es and to wholeness, and in this way the "ommunity between ,ods and humans in the Phaedrus "an be preser&ed. 0oreo&er, one might fruitfully "ompare, as homologous moments, the di&ine feasting in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order with the demiurgi" en"ounter with matter in the intelle"tual order, to be dis"ussed in the ne*t "hapter. #he idea of a "ommon ground for souls and the ,ods is e*pressed in "hap. C, where we read that Plato, in this dialogue, ele&ates DanageiE souls and the ,ods themsel&es first to the fountains, that is, the domain of intelligible form, through the liberated leaders (apolutoi h&gemonoi , a "lass of intelle"tual ,ods, then to the leaders of perfe"tion, who illuminate us, and prior to our souls, whole souls, and prior to these, the ,ods themsel&es, then to the "onne"tors Dor Msustainers%, tous sunectikousE of all the intelle"tual orders, that is, the ,ods who fill the middle of the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order. 2in"e the triad of remaining, pro"eeding and re&erting is "onstituti&e of

288 all beings, the ,ods who pro"eed to the illumination of posterior hypostases must re&ert as well upon their "auses, whi"h refers ultimately to their supra(essential hyparxeis, but immediately to their "o(emergent intelligible "auses. #hat is, +ust as the ,ods ban'uet upon the intelligible not for their own sustenan"e, but for the sa$e of beings, so too the ,ods "onstitute the stru"tures of Being as mu"h in their re&ersion as in their pro"ession, affirming Being in the &ery pattern of their return through it. 3n intelle"tual deity su"h as =eus, then, does not simply withdraw himself dire"tly into his supra(essential summit, but re&erts upon the prior orders of the ,ods with whom he is "o(emergent and whi"h represent the paradigms of the onti" hypostases, the as"ent to whi"h is thus made a&ailable to the philosopher%s diale"ti"al refle"tion. #he supra("elestial pla"e is the "ommon ground of all things, in whi"h all are disposed in relation to ea"h other. 7en"e we read that the supra("elestial pla"e ele&ates all things at on"e, a""ording to one "ommon unity Dmian hen%sin koin&nE, as far as to the intelligible father, and generates and produ"es them as far as to matter, being established between the unitary and the multiplied ,ods Dte heniai%n the%n kai t%n pl&thuomen%nE (11. JH. H(1A , where the unitary ,ods are synonymous with the intelligible father, namely the ?imit(aspe"t or parti"ularity of ea"h ,od, his or her summit. #o this "ommon field upon whi"h all things may be laid out (we re"all the referen"e to an intelligible high pla"e or pla"e of sur&ey, periop& "orresponds the genus of true 2"ien"e whi"h is said to be established about the supra("elestial pla"e. #his s"ien"e is truth itself and a deity whi"h is the fountain of all intelle"tual $nowledge and the first effi"ient "ause of undefiled and immutable intelligen"e (14. 44. 1(J . !ndeed, 2"ien"e, #emperan"e and /usti"e are here

289

three fountains G intelligible deities, and the fountains of intelle"tual &irtues, and not G as some thin$ they are, intelle"tual forms. 9or Plato is a""ustomed to "hara"teri1e these by the term Mitself%, as for instan"e 2"ien"e !tself and /usti"e !tself G But here when he says /usti"e herself, #emperan"e herself, and 2"ien"e herself, he appears to unfold to us "ertain self(perfe"t DautoteleisE and intelligible deities G (44. 1B(1C

/ust as we ha&e stressed before that the mas"ulinity of ho theos implies parti"ularity rather than fa"ti"al gender < not, in other words, a mas"ulinity e*"luding femininity < we see Pro"lus here distinguishing the feminine from the neuter designation of 2"ien"e, #emperan"e and /usti"e not insofar as the former instantiate fa"ti"al femininity, but be"ause the feminine designation indi"ates parti"ularity, that these are certain deities, theot&tas tinas, indi&iduals, rather than intelle"tual forms, whi"h possess an altogether different mode of unity. 8or should we understand the "ategories of fountain and deity to be "onflated here, although, as we ha&e seen, the pro*imity of these terms is "onstantly affirmed by Pro"lus. 9ountains are the di&ine roots or sour"es of !deas, mediating between the latter and the ,ods. #hey are the numinous "omponent of the !dea, and therefore are positions or fun"tions of parti"ular henads. #hey emanate from the third intelligible triad, be"ause they represent the aspe"t of ea"h deity as potential world( paradigm. 9or the deities who pro"eed to the illumination of the intelligible(and( intelle"tual hypostasis, howe&er, this paradigmati" fun"tion be"omes operational4 they parti"ipate in the "onstitution of a fa"ti"al world order. #hus we read that 2"ien"e illuminates the ,ods with $nowledge as the first intelligible triad imparts essen"e to all things, #emperan"e measures the energies of the ,ods, and "on&erts ea"h of them to

290 itself, imitating the "onne"ti&e and measuring power of the se"ond intelligible triad, while /usti"e imparts to them Dthe ,odsE the "ause of the distribution Ddianom&sE of uni&ersal ,oods Dt%n hol%n agath%nE a""ording to desert Dkat'axianE (44. AK(I .

3nd through 2"ien"e ea"h of the ,ods intelle"tually per"ei&es that whi"h is prior to himself, and is filled with intelligible unity- but through #emperan"e he is "on&erted to himself, and en+oys a se"ondary unity, and a ,ood "oordinate to the "on&ersion to himself- and through /usti"e he guides the natures posterior to himself Min a silent path,% as they say, measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapted to ea"h. #hese three fountains therefore "ontain;sustain DsunechousinE all the a"ti&ities Dtas energeiasE of the ,ods. (44. AIf

)hat is prior to the ,ods is the fruit of the self(analy1ing di&ine "ognition- hen"e it is an intelligible unity. #emperan"e seems to "orrespond to the moment of "o(emergen"e, in whi"h is a "on&ersion to self for the ,ods out of diremption and relation- while /usti"e pertains espe"ially to the relationship to beings. #he fountains in the supra("elestial pla"e operate on behalf of souls and ,ods ali$e. 3s the ,ods deploy themsel&es throughout < and so "onstitute < dis"rete regions of Being, these fountains e*press the impli"ation of deities in the realm of Being, or better, that whi"h is impli"it in deities from the standpoint of >eing. #he ,ods who pro"eed beyond the intelligible order are no longer impassi&e, but "onstitute themsel&es as if they were beings a""ording to the same formulae that shall guarantee the integrity of souls as well, pro&iding a bond between souls and the ,ods, albeit what is the human "ondition is, for the ,ods, a manifestation of "hoi"e and &olition. #he &irtues thus play a role in the system no less important than

291 the hypostases < indeed, one "ould argue that they are more important, sin"e hypostases are properly understood as principles whereas the &irtues are fountains. )e "an shed some light based on this on what "an only appear as the o&er( elaboration of the moments "ontained in the first triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual. 9or the supra("elestial pla"e represents a "ertain "eiling, as it were, en"losing intelligibility in no&sis, inasmu"h as what lies beyond, insofar as it is truly beyond, pertains rather to the ,ods qua ,ods. )e read that the supra("elestial pla"e is allotted an intelligible trans"enden"y with respe"t to the other intelle"tual ,ods. 7en"e the intelligible ,ood of it is rendered manifest from its being $nown by !ntelle"t. #his intelligible therefore, in the same manner as that whi"h is truly Being Dto ont%s onE, arri&es to it from the unitary ,ods. 9or they are primarily and imparti"ipably intelligibles, and the first effi"ient "ause of all intelligibles (1J. 4J. 1(I . #he unitary ,ods are all the ,ods insofar as they do not pro"eed to the illumination of Being and are, to that e*tent, unparticipated. #he term is surprising, inasmu"h as we read in prop. 11I of the Elements that e&ery ,od is parti"ipated e*"ept the One- but this passage from the Platonic Theology simply "onfirms that the One is, in su"h a passage, a faGon de parler for that whi"h "annot be spo$en in su"h a dis"ourse as the Elements, that is, ea"h ,od in his;her &ery uni'ueness. E&ery ,od is parti"ipable, but at its limits su"h parti"ipation surpasses ontological parti"ipation and thus parti"ipation in the stri"t sense. Beings that belong to the series of some ,od, for instan"e, whether we mean the manifestations of that deity at su""essi&e le&els of illumination (e.g., the =eus who is demiurge &ersus the =eus who shares the "osmos with Poseidon and 7ades or their pri&ileged syne"do"hes (the "ult statue or the sa"red beast, not as types but as this one ha&e a relationship too particular

292 to that ,od, too e*pressi&e of that ,od%s uni'ueness, for the relationship to be "hara"teri1ed in the formal manner of parti"ipation. !n +ust this way the ,ods are the effi"ient "auses of intelligibles without being paradigmati" "auses, for otherwise there would be no end of forms of forms. #he imparti"ipability of the ,ods goes in tandem with this effi"ient "ausality, in whi"h something is withheld in the &ery a"t of produ"tion. #his withholding is not defensi&e- rather, it ensures the independen"e of the entities produ"ed. #he intelligible ,ood as well as to ont%s on, that is, Being as a being or truly( e*istent essen"e, Being as truth(of(Being, arise in the s"ene of intelle"tion. #hat the emergen"e of these intelligible hypostases from the henadi" domain remains for its own part only partially illuminated is indi"ated by the referen"es Pro"lus ma$es to the $ind of $nowledge we may possess of the entities nati&e to the site of this emergen"e. #his "lass, being the summit of the intelle"tual ,ods, is un$nown and ineffable a""ording to its own parti"ularity Dt&n heaut&s idiot&taE, and is to be $nown through intelligible impressions Dsunth&mat%nE (11. JK. 1L(AB . 3gain, we read that in the supra("elestial pla"e the mysti" impressions of intelligibles shine forth G and also the un$nown and ineffable beauty of "hara"ters Dt%n kharakt&r%nE (C. JB. 1A(14 . :unth&ma is generally to be translated as symbol, in a""ord with its importan"e in theurgy, but it is more re&ealing, ! thin$, of the systemati" fun"tion of sunth&mata to render them here, as #aylor does, as impressions, i.e. as a dependent moment of e*perien"e. 3gain, the ultimate intelligibles are li$e "hara"ters, insofar as the latter, while indispensible to dis"ourse, "annot themsel&es be "aptured within synta"ti" or semanti" "ategories. #his is their ineffability, whi"h pla"es them prior to any gi&en alphabet. 2o too, in the a""ount of di&ine names in the #ratylus "ommentary, the primordial forms of the names of the ,ods

293 were as "hara"ters of light. #he di&ine name in its primiti&e nature retains thus an element of the materiality of language, so that e&en if two ,ods had names whi"h translated into the same epithet in different languages, they would ne&ertheless still be different names. #o return to the 2"ien"e, #emperan"e and /usti"e of the supra("elestial pla"e or the first triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, we read that these three ,oddesses ha&e as their defining parti"ularities Dtas aph%rismenas idiot&tasE G the plain of truth, the meadow, and the nourishing "ause of the ,ods TthatU are posited there (1I. 4H. AAf . #o these moments from the Phaedrus "orrespond stru"tural moments of the "o( emergen"e of the ,ods4 one of them unites DhenoiE the monads of all the ,ods and "olle"ts DsunageiE them about the intelligible- another effe"ts this about the pro"essions of the ,ods- and another about their "on&ersions (1I. KB. 1L(C . #he monads of the ,ods refers either to the ,ods as the heads of their own di&ine series or to the ,ods as sub+e"ts of ontologi"al pro"esses. #he ontologi"al moments of remaining, pro"eeding and re&erting are understood here as three unifications, e*pressing the pi&otal role of fountains, and espe"ially &irtues, as transitional between the mode of unity of the henads and that of beings. )e shall ha&e o""asion to remar$ in the ne*t "hapter upon the "osmogoni" fun"tion of the &irtues in the intelle"tual order. 7ere it is a matter of the ,ods establishing their simple presence within Being- but sin"e nothing the ,ods do with respe"t to Being is without immediate signifi"an"e for beings, the &irtues in 'uestion arise as primary e*pressions of this elementary stage of di&ine a"ti&ity. !n the first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad, the ,ods are first posited as intelligible ob+e"ts themsel&es upon a "ommon field with the primary intelligibles, hen"e 2"ien"e-

294 #emperan"e regulates their pro"ession, whi"h as an emergen"e in common is also a unifi"ation of the henads- while their re&ersion (i.e. upon the intelligible opus manifests radi"al /usti"e. 0ore "ould ob&iously be said about the way in whi"h the formal stru"ture of these &irtues is gi&en by their origins in these basi" stru"tures of di&ine a"ti&ity, but su"h an a""ount would belong to a dis"ussion of 8eoplatoni" ethi"s. #hat the &irtues are "onsidered as deities here is a fun"tion of the te*t with whi"h Pro"lus wor$s. !n a different fa"ti"al theology, these fountains "ould be operated on behalf of the rest of the ,ods in the pantheon by deities possessing these fun"tions as attributes rather than the deified "on"epts with whi"h Pro"lus is "onfronted here. #he &ery fa"t that they are e*pressible as "on"epts indi"ates that they are not essentially deities, stri"tly spea$ing. One "ould perhaps +ust as easily say that the &irtues in 'uestion arise dire"tly from the aforementioned patterns of di&ine a"ti&ity. 3 similar 'uestion "ould be posed in relation to the intelle"tual order, namely whether it is possible for the fun"tions of the demiurge to be performed by a "lass of intelle"tual deities possessing a 'uite different stru"ture, in that what is essential to the "onstitution of !ntelle"t is narrati&ity and "osmogenesis rather than, say, the "on"ept of so&ereignty. But that is not to say that !ntelle"t as "onstituted by one set of mythi" determinants is indistinguishable in stru"ture from !ntelle"t as "onstituted by a &ery different set of su"h determinants. )hat is important in general, howe&er, is that we ha&e rea"hed the stage at whi"h deities operate in relation to ea"h other, with parti"ular deities pro&iding intelligible orientation for the illuminati&e opus. #his orienting fun"tion of ,ods on behalf of ea"h other, whi"h e*presses the part;whole relationship to Being essential to the illuminati&e a"ti&ities of the ,ods, is not to be "onfused with whole(to(whole relationship ea"h ,od

295 possesses to Being e*pressed by the three intelligible triads, an intelligibility "orrelati&e to no parti"ular illumination. !nstead, what is established in and through the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is a reflected intelligibility. #he nourishing "ause referred to abo&e is, we read, a "ertain intelligible unity, "omprehending in itself the whole perfe"tion of the ,ods, and filling the ,ods with &igor D"ulmination6 akm&sE and power, in order that they may bestow a pro&idential attention to se"ondary natures, and may possess an immutable intelligen"e of su"h natures as are first (1K. 4I. L(11 . !t is a "ertain unity by &irtue of the emergen"e of fa"ti"ity in this order. )e read in PT !! H that we are for"ed to spea$ of the One !tself as if of a certain thing- but here the unity is no longer an intelle"tual "ompromise formation, but has real gi&enness, as we "an see from the re"ourse Pro"lus has to mythologi"al material in this order. #he two sour"es of di&ine nourishment mentioned in the Phaedrus, ambrosia and ne"tar, are the perfe"tions of the ,ods qua ,ods (4L. L and "orrespond to ?imit and !nfinity respe"ti&ely. But both of these are subordinate to the one fountain of perfe"tion and seat DhestiaE to all the ,ods, namely nutriment in general, the ban'uet of the dialogue, whi"h is the intelligen"e Dno&sisE of the ,ods qua ,ods G the plenitude Dpl&r%maE of intelligible goods, and the uniform Dhenoeid&sE perfe"tion of di&ine self( suffi"ien"y DautarkeiasE (4L. ALf . #he nourishment in 'uestion is thus nothing other than the appropriation to themsel&es of the intelligible and their disposition into a uniform perfe"tion, that is, ultimately, a single world(order (the term perfection being persistently asso"iated with the third intelligible triad . #his represents, to a degree, a sa"rifi"e of their autar"hy to uniformity, the ban'uet, howe&er, symboli1ing the "onsensual and "elebratory nature of this emergent organi1ation.

296 #his "on&o"ation of the ,ods establishes law for beings, and hen"e a final aspe"t of the first triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, of whi"h we ha&e seen so many sides < arithmeti"al, aretologi"al, topographi" < appears, namely the $ingdom of 3drastia, in the pla"e where the measures of a life free from harm Dap&monos, in the sense of blamelessnessE to souls are defined DaphorizonE G from the &ision of these intelligible goods (1L. K1. K(L . #he law of 3drastia is distinguished as thesmos, a sa"red law, from the nomoi, mere laws, attributed to, e.g., Fronos and =eus, for the Fronian ,ods are essentially e*empt from the laws of =eus Dt%n 9ii%n nom%nE, and the "onne"ti&e and perfe"ti&e ,ods Di.e. of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual orderE from the Fronian lawsbut all things are obedient to the sa"red law of 3drastia, and all the distributions DdianomaiE of the ,ods and all measures and guardianships DphrouraiE subsist on a""ount of this (KA. 14(H . ,ods of higher taxeis are not sub+e"t to the laws of ,ods of subordinate taxeis be"ause they essentially trans"end the dianomai of those taxeis. #he $ingdom of 3drastia, as the sour"e of all these dianomai, supersedes all of them4 it is, as it were, >istribution !tself prior to any parti"ular distributi&e regime. #he ines"apable guardian power of this triad, and the immutable "omprehension of order Dtaxe%sE per&ading e&erywhere, pre(subsist in this ,oddess. 9or these three deities not only re&eal and "olle"t DsunagousinE all things, but they are also guardians, a""ording to the Ora"le, of the wor$s of the father, and of the intelligible One Dtou henos tou no&touE (KA. J(C . #he intelligible One and the 9ather are one and the same, namely the ?imit(aspe"t of ea"h deity. 3nd indeed, it is under the ideality of >istribution !tself that the power and wor$s of ea"h deity are prote"ted, lest any parti"ular distribution be allowed to subordinate the parti"ularity of the indi&idual deity, and the infinite generati&ity that

297 flows from it. >istribution%s ideality with respe"t to any fa"ti"al distribution is thus li$e that ideality of 8umber, ali$e a determination arising in the first intelligible(and( intelle"tual triad, whi"h pre&ented the ,ods from being redu"ed to fa"ti"al numbers. #he guardian fun"tion whi"h first "omes to light here will be per&asi&e in the intelle"tual order, as we shall dis"uss in the ne*t "hapter- let it suffi"e to say that it pertains parti"ularly to the determina"y or diakrisis that a"hie&es its final form in that order. #he three parti"ularities, idiot&tas, of the first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad < and by parti"ularities here we must understand spe"ifi"ally the fun"tions performed by deities lo"ated in this "lass < are disclosive (ekphantorik&n , collective (sunag%gon , and defensive (phrour&tik&n (1H. KJ. AK(I . #he first triad re"ei&es in itself the plenitude Dpl&r%maE of forms from the intelligible paradigms and produ"es its own meadow Dleim%nE from the fontal summit whi"h is there. But from the one intelle"t it gi&es subsisten"e to the three &irtues, perfe"ts all itself by intelligible impressions, and in its ineffable bosoms re"ei&es the whole of intelligible light (K4. J(C . #he meadow is another term from the Phaedrus, its imagery appropriate here, for the pl&r%ma represented by the third intelligible triad has be"ome a topos, the site, in parti"ular, of the intuition of the intelligibles, where the light of the ,ods be"omes "on"rete and hen"e fertile, a meadow watered so to spea$, from the fountains that are intelligible form. Pro"lus remar$s on the negation, in the Phaedrus, of color in this order, treating it li$e a negation from the Parmenides, e*pressing the "ausal power of this order o&er the "on"reti1ation of illumination4 if 7ea&en is sight beholding the things abo&e, the intelligible of it may &ery properly be "alled "olor whi"h is "on+oined with the sight ("hap. 1A . 8egations e*press the most immediate trans"enden"e, "ausal trans"enden"e,

298 and so here, within the s"ene of intelle"tion, "olor falls on the side of the no&sis as the moment of seeing, the re"eption of illumination, the fa"ti"ity of dis"losure, while the "olorless light of the supra("elestial stands +ust beyond, preser&ing itself from appropriation. #he +u*taposition of light and place in this order may be signifi"ant, we note, with respe"t to the &ery singular do"trine of Pro"lus reported by 2impli"ius ("n Phys8 I11(I1J that pla"e is light. #his seems to ha&e its higher(le&el analogue in the pla"e of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, whi"h is nothing other than the spa"e "reated by di&ine illumination.

#he se"ond triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, the hea&enly "ir"ulation of the Phaedrus, "onsists, a""ording the Parmenidean stru"ture, of three "ru"ial pairs of opposites4 One and 0any, )hole and Part, 9inite (peperasmenon and !nfinite (apeiron . Pro"lus lays out a stru"ture of mediation su"h that in the first intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad >ifferen"e is the medium between the One and Being, in the se"ond triad )hole is the medium between the One and the 9inite, and in the third, the Perfe"t is the middle of that whi"h has E*tremes and of 9igure (JC. 11A . 8oti"e that )holeness is not a medium for its own triad but for the first and third triads, that is, for the entire order. !n +ust this way the whole order of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods may be seen as ha&ing its subsisten"e in the middle, that is, the hea&en as "ommon pla"e. !n its most abstra"t form, this pla"e is )holeness !tself, from whi"h is deployed the &ery logi" of whole and part so indispensible to the philosophi"al system. 9rom the point of &iew of the hypostases, what has o""urred is that sin"e the distin"tion of henads and beings from number e*tends to it Dthe se"ond intelligible(and(intelle"tual triadE, the One and Being, whi"h we ha&e said

299 >ifferen"e di&ides, be"ome wholes, and the things pro"eeding from these are the parts of them (JK. 1BJ. C(1A . #his is what allows us to spea$ of the hypostases of the One and Being, for su"h monads are "onstituted a""ording to the logi" of parts and wholes. #he predominant "hara"teristi" of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is sunech&s, whi"h has the triple sense of connecting, containing, and continuity. !n the intelligible( and(intelle"tual order, the ,ods posit themsel&es upon a "ommon topos < or really a host of "ommon topoi of different $inds, as well as the supra(essential topoi of myth, be it Olympus or Funlun < whi"h is in turn the root of all mediation for beings. #hese originary spa"es of mediation "onne"t all things and "ontain all things. But the moment of "ontinuity represented by the intelligible(and(intelle"tual also sustains all things < a fourth and final sense of sunech&s < inasmu"h as it represents the investment of infinite power. #his in&estment is "ashed out in the appli"ation of intelle"tual measure to this "ontinuum in the intelle"tual order. Pro"lus "ompares the "elestial order to the sensible hea&en espe"ially in that

#imaeus says that this TsensibleU hea&en also "ompresses on all sides the elements that are under it, and that on this a""ount, no pla"e is left for a &a"uum. 3s, therefore, the apparent hea&en is "onne"ti&e of all things that are under it, and is the "ause of their "ontinuity and sympathy < for the inter&ention of a &a"uum would interrupt the "ontinuity of things, and the sub&ersion of this "ontinuity would destroy the sympathy of bodies < so also that intelle"tual hea&en binds all the multipli"ities of beings into an indi&isible "ommunion, illuminating ea"h with an appropriate portion DmoiranE of "onne"tion. (AB. KC. 1Hf

300 #he intelle"tual hea&en is thus the ultimate sour"e of that prin"iple of "ontinuity in pro"ession that >odds dis"erns in prop. AH of the Elements (pp. **ii, A1I . #his prin"iple states, a""ording to >odds, that the 'ualitati&e inter&al between any term of the pro"ession and its immediate "onse'uent is the minimum differen"e "ompatible with distin"tness, (A1I . #hus does pro"ession o""ur always through a measured series of &ariations ("P 1B4C , &a"uum being e'ui&alent to essential irrationality. #he proposition itself is posed in terms of li$eness and unli$eness4 E&ery produ"er DparagonE "onstitutes Dhuphist&sinE things li$e to itself Dta homoiaE before the unli$e. ?i$eness and unli$eness are determinations internal to the intelle"t, "onstituted by the order of hyper"osmi" ,ods. #he notion of a minimum distin"tion, howe&er, whi"h is essential to their operation in the proposition, is the "ontribution of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, the s"ene of no&sis. 9rom out of this "ontinuum emerge su"h intelle"tual atoms as unity, wholeness and finitude in their determinate or oppositional form, as well as number. #he sunoch& is the intelligen"e of intelligibles, and the intelligible of intelle"tuals (AA. IK. 1H , the intelligible of intelle"t being an intelligen"e or no&sis, +ust as the true !deas are said to be thoughts in the sense of a thought(pro"ess of !ntelle"t in the true sense, in fa"t of the Paternal !ntelle"t, in whi"h both true beings are thoughts and thoughts true beings ("P HCK . #hus does the intelle"tion of a single di&ine mind posit the ,ods as a unified multipli"ity through the "rystalli1ation of its own perspe"ti&e, its own totality, #otality being the operation spe"ifi" to the paternal intelle"t, i.e. the third intelligible triad.

#he third triad of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order is the perfe"ti&e "lass of ,ods, the teletar"hs into whose perfe"ti&e empire (telesiourgon h&gemonian souls

301 are initiated in their as"ent, for the first mysteries are there (A4. LJ. I . 9rom the world( paradigm, then, whi"h was impli"it in ea"h ,od as seen through the aspe"t of the third intelligible triad, we ha&e arri&ed at the point of the institution of an a"tual regime, so to spea$, in whi"h initiation < the ta$ing as truth of some mythi" dis"ourse < plays the role of "iti1enship- su"h is the beginning of apodeixis. #hrough this triad e&erything whi"h is perfe"t is self(suffi"ient DautarkesE and subsists in itself- e&erything whi"h generates is perfe"t, and generates in its prime DakmazonE- and e&erything whi"h aspires after its proper prin"iple is "on+oined to it through its own perfe"tion (AK. L4. 1K(C . #he referen"es to self(suffi"ien"y and to prin"iples are not a""idental, for in the intelle"tual orders < telos being a "hara"teristi"ally intelle"tual determination < we shall obser&e the emergen"e of prin"iple, whi"h will be "ontrasted with the fountains in respe"t of the latter%s self(begottenness, prefigured in the present triad%s bestowal of autarchy, the negation of prin"iple in that whi"h possesses its own prin"iple (arch& . #he basi" attribute of the ,ods from whi"h this order deri&es is their 'uality of being self(perfe"ting (self( "onstituting and self("ogni1ing 4 Perfe"tion is triple, one indeed being prior to parts < su"h is the perfe"tion of the ,ods G the henads of the ,ods are self(perfe"t, and subsist prior to essen"es, generating multipli"ities and not being generated together with them (AK. L4. ALf . #he other perfe"tions are that whi"h "onsists of parts su"h as is the perfe"tion of the world and the perfe"tion whi"h is in parts. Perfe"tion, thus is di&ided after the same manner as wholeness (LK. 1K(L , and this answers for the triadi" di&ision of the perfe"ti&e order. #o refer to the ,ods as self(perfe"t, then, is already to refer to them monadi"ally, as wholes(before(the(parts- in parti"ular, as perfectors of beings, granting initiatory insight into the laws of essen"e a""ording to whi"h beings are

302 "onstituted qua beings. 7en"e we find Pro"lus pausing to "riti"i1e those who are ignorant of this di&ine order, and do not maintain the whole fountain of perfe"tion, and who ha&e re"ourse to entelechias, being ignorant of the perfe"tion whi"h is separate from sub+e"ts and willingly embra"e the resemblan"es of true perfe"tions (A4. L1. 14( A1 . #he problem with the Peripateti"s he "hastises here is that they posit a desire toward essen"e on the part of beings whi"h finds no fulfillment, li$e the "ult of a ,od in whom there is no initiation and of whom there is no &ision. But sight is nothing else than light (AA. IL. 1I and thus the illumination of the ,ods "annot fail to bring with it their "orresponding appearan"es4 this triad Dthe third intelligible(and(intelle"tual triadE opens the "elestial paths, being established under the "elestial "ir"ulation, and e*hibits the self( splendid Dor Mimmediate%, autophan&E appearan"es DphasmataE of the ,ods (AI. LL. 4(I . #he same prin"iple was at wor$ in the intelligible order, by &irtue of whi"h the powers of the ,ods, their "ausal effi"a"y, "ould not fail to dis"lose, at the same time, something of the truth of their natures. !ndeed, it is this relation that is "onstituti&e of truth itself, perhaps the most important of the many "riti"al "on"epts founded in this order. #ruth is the a""ordan"e of some being with its being, or essen"e, or of a deity%s manifestations or powers with their supra(essential nature. #he determination of the third intelligible(and(intelle"tual triad deri&ed from the Parmenides is extremity, to eschaton. #his "ounts as the first or intelligible moment of the triad, while the se"ond, or intelligible(and(intelle"tual moment is perfection, whi"h is e*pli"ated as the perfe"tion whi"h "onsists of parts, namely beginning, middle and endand the third or intelle"tual moment of the triad "onsists of figure, with its three "hara"ters of "ir"ularity, re"tilinearity, and the mi*ed figure "onsisting of both right

303 and "ir"ular lines (JL. 1BHf . Pro"lus e*plains that in the third moment of the "onne"ti&e triad, whi"h was the opposition of the 9inite and !nfinite, the One was said to be the 9inite, but here it is said to ha&e an e*tremity, as re"ei&ing a""ording to parti"ipation the "apa"ity to limit the many Dh%s kata methexin to perat%tikon t%n poll%n katadexamenonE (1BH. 11(J . )hat limits the many a""ording to parti"ipation is the unity of a "ommon field, whi"h a"hie&es a new degree of determina"y here as figure. )e "an dis"ern as well the imprint of the intelligible intelle"t (the third intelligible triad , whi"h was #otality. #otality be"omes "on"rete here as that whi"h has limits. #he repeated allusions in Boo$ !N to the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order as a $ind of "ir"umferen"e whi"h "onne"ts, "ontains and sustains all things e*presses this idea, the eschata in 'uestion being the terms at the e*tremes of the entire system whi"h are posited through the middle represented by the s"ene of intelle"tion. 2till impli"it at this stage is the power of exclusion whi"h is an essential moment in e*tremity- for now, to be at the limits is a matter of the relation of periphery to "enter within a field of "o(emergent deities. !t will await the moment of hylomorphism in the intelle"tual order for the further sense of es"hatology to emerge. 9igure represents, we might say, that disposition of ,ods in relation to one another whi"h will blossom in the intelle"tual order into narrative incident. 3 spe"ifi" instan"e of the eschata asso"iated with this order are the passages to infinity whi"h ea"h of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual triads in&ol&es in its third moment (JC. 11J. I(1B 4 for the limit DperasE of the first triad is number, of the se"ond, infinite multipli"ity, and of the third, the re"tilinear, whi"h itself parti"ipates of the nature of the infinite. Peras has here a new sense whi"h was impli"it in it from the start, namely of a

304 limit distinguishing a"tuality from potentiality, an opposition whi"h is "ontained in ea"h of the infinites emerging in this order and whi"h is "hara"teristi" of !ntelle"t, inasmu"h as the intelle"t at on"e possesses methods for pro"eeding to infinity, as well as an always una"tuali1ed reser&e of matter. #his reser&e "an be understood in one of two ways, as ! ha&e indi"ated pre&iously. !t may be seen, on the one hand, as representing the o""ultation of the henad in his;her summit and that a""ompanies the deity%s a"ti&ities of illuminations li$e a shadow of sorts. 2u"h is the material upon whi"h the demiurge wor$s when seen from within the demiurge%s own perspe"ti&e qua intelle"t. Hua deity, by "ontrast, the deity who is the demiurge would per"ei&e no alterity and hen"e no matter. By "ontrast, we may see the infinite pro"ess as already accomplished. 7en"e the demiurge%s matter is, in fa"t, illuminated by all the ,ods prior to him;her. #his all, the totality of all the ;ods, is something altogether different from the dis"rete topoi generated within the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order4 it is no Olympus, 3sgard, Failasa, 3menti or Funlun. #he absolute totality of the ,ods, by "ontrast, "an only "orrespond to the "a"ophony of disparate &oi"es before we ha&e sele"ted some parti"ular one whi"h will be our signal while the rest are regarded as noise4 the moment of initiation. #his metaphor of signal and noise finds a parallel in ?eibni1, for whom sensation e*presses the limit of a monad%s powers of "ognition and matter the limit of a gi&en regime of form or intelligibility. )here ?eibni1 falls short, howe&er, is that the multipli"ity of ?eibni1ian monads &anish into a single absolute monad of whi"h they "an only be moments. #he ?eibni1ian "on"ept of the monad is thus e'ui&o"al, for"ed to en"ompass both ?eibni1%s ,od and his "reatures, while dissol&ing the latter into the former. #his e'ui&o"ation is e*pressed in ?eibni1%s &ery dis"ourse, whi"h in"orporates

305 theologi"al "ontent undigested, so to spea$, and without a systemati" distin"tion between philosophi"al and theologi"al dis"ourse. #he "ausality e*isting between ?eibni1%s ,od and his "reatures, their "reation, would be understood by Pro"lus as relationship stri"tly within the intelle"t, and hen"e presupposing a "ertain initiation. #hat is to say, the relationship of "reature to "reator has a "onte*t for Pro"lus whereas it is absolute for ?eibni1. #he immediate "onte*t or topos of this intelle"tual relationship is none other than the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. #his "onte*t, moreo&er, rea"hes beyond the limits of the intelle"t to the ins"rutability of matter, for ea"h of the Dintelligible(and( intelle"tualE triads a""ording to its limit DperasE is "arried DepibateueinE in the material worlds Dtois enulois kosmoisE, and "omprehends a""ording to one "ause the infinity of the natures that are generated in them (11J. 1B(J . #he sense of epibateuein is of a fighter in a "hariot, or a soldier or mer"hant aboard a ship, as opposed to the rowers and seamen, or metaphori"ally, the a"t of ta$ing one%s stand upon something (?P2 AHH - it is parti"ularly apt for the situation of the henads that pro"eed to the illumination of the !ntelle"t, sta$ing their "laim, as it were, within the intelligible and perfe"ting the world through #hought.

306

.hapter L4

#he Order of the !ntelle"tual ,ods

#he intelle"tual order is at on"e an end and a new beginning. !t is the end of the "y"le of e*pressing or unfolding the elements of the first intelligible triad and the beginning of a se"ondary, infra(intelle"tual pro"ession into the realm of soul, with whi"h we "annot "on"ern oursel&es in this dissertation. #he infra(intelle"tual ,ods are still supra(essential henads- we do not lea&e off our a""ount with the intelle"tual order be"ause with it we ha&e e*hausted the orders of the ,ods. But Pro"lus tells us that the intelle"tual order of ,ods terminates the whole pro"essions Dtas holas pro(dousE of the ,ods (N 1. I. H . #hat we are to understand tas holas here as 'ualifying the pro"essions as wholes rather than as something li$e the totality of pro"essions is e&ident, first, from the fa"t that there are subse'uent orders of ,ods, but furthermore, from the

307 "orresponding statement further on that the intelle"tual hypostasis of the ,ods G binds to itself all the partial pro"essions Dtas merikas pasas pro(dousE of the ,ods (I. 1H . #he intelle"tual order, then, is the end of the whole orders, and the beginning of partial ones. )hat is the signifi"an"e of whole and part here6 #he "on"epts of whole and part emerged in and through the se"ond intelligible(and( intelle"tual triad. But the new determinations arising in the intelle"tual order permit these "on"epts to be de&eloped with mu"h greater "omple*ity. #he determinations of the intelle"tual order drawn from the Parmenides are4 in another;in itself (1JHaA(bL - in motion;at rest (1JHbH(1JCb4 - identity;differen"e (1JCbK(1JCeI . #hese determinations are "ru"ial to the emergen"e of hypostases li$e 2oul inasmu"h as these arise no longer from the primordial analysis of the di&ine indi&idual whi"h was e*pressed by the three intelligible triads, but rather within !ntelle"t, as a fun"tion of its internal arti"ulation as a "osmos "onstituted in relation to the demiurge, whose station is represented by the all( important "on"epts of identity and differen"e. #he infra(intelle"tual orders of ,ods ha&e an espe"ially intimate relationship to the demiurge. #he ruling or assimilati&e ,ods are said to be suspended from the demiurge (N! 1. I. 4 and wo&en together in "ontinuity with the demiurge (N! 1. K. 11(J , a phrase we en"ounter also at N 11. JL. AH, where we read of the demiurge of wholes, and all the multipli"ity of ,ods whi"h is wo&en together with him. #his wea&ing, as we shall see, has mu"h to do with the emergen"e in the intelle"tual orders of mythi" narrative. But the demiurge has an e*traordinary position not +ust in respe"t to the infra(intelle"tual ,ods, but all the ,ods, be"ause the formati&e potential of the determinations of the intelle"t e*tend to the limits of Being and thus en"ompass all the ,ods noeti"ally4 )hat other ,od is it who reigns o&er all the ,ods,

308 e*"ept the "ause of their subsisten"e and essen"e6 (N A1. LL. AKf , namely the demiurge. >emiurgi" so&ereignty thus be"omes a figure for the power of "on"epts li$e identity and differen"e to e*tend all the way to the 9irst Prin"iple, the appropriation of the ,ods into relationship to the demiurge as so&ereign, as well as the limitations upon that so&ereignty, representing the possibilities and limitations of their appropriation into philosophi"al dis"ourse. Pro"lus is thus notably "areless about whether it is all the ,ods, or merely the en"osmi" ,ods, o&er whom the so&ereignty of the demiurge is e*er"ised. !f he imparts to his progeny to be M,ods of ,ods% DTim. 41 3 LE, in a mu"h greater degree it suits him to be "elebrated as the ,od of all the ,ods (LH. J(I . !t belongs to the demiurgi" monad to "ongregate all the ,ods into their most honourable habitation Doik&sinE G to "on&ert all the ,ods to himself, and to sur&ey the whole world G )ho "an "on&ert all the ,ods in the world Den t% kosm%E to himself, but the fabri"ator of their essen"e, and of their allotment in the uni&erse Dt&s en t% panti diakl&r%se%sE6 (LH. 1A( A4 . #he e'ui&o"ation results from an analogi"al sense whi"h "an be a""orded to the term en"osmi". #he en"osmi" ,ods are, stri"tly spea$ing, the mundane ,ods. But in another sense, all the ,ods are in some fashion ta$en up into the demiurgi" kosmos. 3ll the orders of the ,ods originate from a monad be"ause ea"h of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole pro"ession of the ,ods (N 14. 4K. K . #he monadi" organi1ation of the ,ods is a disposition relati&e to the totality formed by the su""essi&e illuminations of Being. E&ery taxis of the ,ods is a whole united to itself through the whole Dhol& di' hol&s heaut& h&n%men&E (N AH. 1BJ. I(L , and thus in"orporated into that "osmos that the demiurge "onstitutes a whole from wholes (N AB. LJ. 14 . !t would ma$e no sense

309 to loo$ at a single "lass in isolation- we must loo$ either at the indi&idual ,od, or at the "o(emergent sets whi"h are fi*ed, not +ust to the monad of their own "lass, but to the demiurgi" monad and to the whole of the monadi" hierar"hy of Being. )e ha&e seen this already in the way that ,ods pro"eeding to the illumination of parti"ular le&els of Being re&ert, not dire"tly upon their supra(essential hyparxeis, but instead upon inter&ening le&els of Being "onstituted by their "o(emergent set, the fellow members of their pantheon. #he terms used to e*press the relationship of the monads of this series to the rest of the ,ods < "onstitution, subsisten"e, hypostasis < are ontologi"al. 7en"e the subsisten"e of the ,ods has the "ause of its generation from the imparti"ipable One (N 14. 4K. L - 3nimal !tself "onstitutes the ,ods (N 1I. KK. AB - the demiurge is the hypostati" "ause of ,ods (1I. KK. AI . !t is subsisten"e (hupostasis and essen"e (ousia that the ,ods re"ei&e from their so&ereign,1H "learly distinguishing the e*tent of this su1erainty from their supra( essential hyparxeis. #he subsisten"e and essen"e of the ,ods are their works on behalf of Being and their position in an abstra"t onti" hierar"hy, not, as these are for beings, that without whi"h they would not e*ist. 9or e&en the assimilati&e ,ods below the intelle"tual order are a""ording to their hyparxeis, beyond essen"e and multipli"itybut a""ording to the parti"ipations of them whi"h re"ei&e the illumination of a pro"ession of this $ind, they are "alled assimilati&e (N! 1I. LC. L(1B . #hrough the demiurgi" monad the multipli"ity of "auses is distinguished DdiakrinetaiE, and all the monads of the ,ods re&eal themsel&es DanaphainontaiE a""ording to the demiurgi" pro"ession (N JC.
1H 8ote the remar$ at N 11. JL. 1L(H that the "auses of the subsisten"e of all the ,ods are fontal flu*es Drheumata p&gaiaE, that is, something on the order of intelligible forms or fountains, but less determinate, li$e the &estiges of forms that "ause the disorderly motion of pre("osmi" or pre(demiurgi" nature (that is, nature as thinkable without the a"ti&ity of the demiurge . 8ote also that the One is sometimes referred to as a fountain.

310 144. 1(J . #he first =eus (the demiurge , we read, imparts to the 3ll the determinate di&ine Daphoriz%n G to theionE and from all things wea&es a single polity (N A4. CB. AA( 4 . #he form of 3llness, we re"all, lay in the third intelligible triad- and this form a"hie&es, through the re"ognition of the demiurge%s so&ereignty, di&ine determina"y, for this determina"y lies in the re"ognition of some parti"ular deity as demiurge and so&ereign. )e shall "ome to understand in mu"h more detail what it means for all the ,ods to be gathered in this way into a single polity. #hese relationships between monads and henads are less parado*i"al on"e we re"ogni1e the differen"e between what subsumption under a "lass (a monad means for henads in "ontrast to beings4 3ll the &i&ifi" pro"essions are suspended from one &i&ifi"ation, and the demiurgi" orders are e*tended to one fabri"ation Dlit. Mdemiurgy%E (N 14. 4K. 11(4 . #he "lassifi"ation of the ,ods, their submission to monadi" unifi"ation, is a""ording to the nature of the unifi"ation of their productions. #he intelligible(and( intelle"tual ,ods di&ide all things triadi"ally- but the demiurge di&ides the world into fi&e parts, and di&ides the "ir"les of the soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the "elestial spheres or the se&en parts of the soul. )e must say, therefore, that he is entirely se"ondary to the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods, and he is the "ause of se"ondary goods to the world (N 14. 4C. A1(I . !t is not the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods themselves that are di&ided triadi"ally- the triad e*presses rather the pattern in whi"h they di&ide the 3ll. #hey are di&ided a""ording to what they do. #his is the sense in whi"h 3nimal !tself "onstitutes the ,ods < namely, as the paradigm of totality, of 3llness. One would not, thus, say that, e.g., Phanes "onstitutes the ,ods, or, rather, if some

311 fa"ti"al theology said this one would e*plain it philosophi"ally a""ording to the role of the third intelligible triad. !t is in light of this distin"tion between the ,ods and their wor$s that we may read the do"trine of the demiurgi" will. 7is will is the progeny of the a"ti&ity of his goodness, bounding DhorizousaE the end DtelosE of his power (1L. IB. 1L(C . 7is will is his goodness actualized, passing o&er from supra(essentiality into energeia. #he goodness of the demiurge is nothing other than demiurgi" deity- that is, his goodness is not a "ertain habitus DhexisE of good and a power, or a form itself by itself e*isting prior to many goods, but an ineffable Mparti"ipation% Dmetal&psisE1C of ,ood, and the One of the demiurgi" "lass (N 1L. IB. H(1A . !n short, through will, his power is go&erned and is extended to one intelligible ;ood (IB. A4, my emphasis . #he supra(essential goodness whi"h ea"h ,od is be"omes, in and as di&ine will, an intelligible good. 3nd whereas the supra(essential good of ea"h ,od is indistinguishable from that ,od%s identity and is e*pressed by that ,od%s proper name, the intelligible ,ood shall be one thing, namely the "osmos. 3 slightly different way of putting it emphasi1es the distin"tion between the di&ine parti"ularity Didiot&taE of the demiurge and the intelligible "ause whi"h is in him, and the unified Dh&n%men&nE "ause of wholes whi"h he "ontains (N 1L. I1. 4(I . 9or be"ause there is deity Dtheot&sE in him whi"h desires Dephiemen&E to adorn and arrange DdiakosmeinE all things, and an hyparxis whi"h is e*tended to the pro&iden"e of wholes, on this a""ount he establishes the prin"iple of demiurgy (IB. 14(I . >esire here e*presses that it no ne"essity "onstrains a ,od to illuminate +ust those regions of Being in whi"h s;he re&eals him;herself, but "hoi"e. #his desire is a broader term, then, than that
1C 8ote that Pro"lus de"lines to use the normal term for parti"ipation here, +ust as later in the same passage, he will assert that the demiurge is filled with Mparti"ipation% DmetousiasE of the One (IB. A1(A . #hus does Pro"lus maintain the fundamental do"trine by whi"h the ,ods parti"ipate in nothing, stri"tly spea$ing.

312 will whi"h is pe"uliarly manifest in the demiurgi" "osmogenesis as the e*pression of the type of desire essential to a ,od of the intelle"tual order. /an 3ssmann, in a dis"ussion of the nature of myth in his Egyptian :olar $eligion, remar$s on the internal relationship between action and narrativity in relation to the ,ods, in a way that sheds light on why di&ine will and narrati&e dispositions emerge together in the intelle"tual order. !n the mythi"al dimension, that is, the dimension of narrati&ity, as opposed to i"oni"ity,

the gods appear as Mpersons%, i.e. role(bearers in "onstellations of a"ts. #heir de"isi&e "hara"teristi" is personality, Ma"ti&e% and Mpassi&e% G #hus the "on"ept of a"tion assumes a de"isi&e theologi"al signifi"an"e. 3"tions are always "ommuni"ati&e, i.e. they ha&e a meaning whi"h "an be reali1ed only in relation to the parti"ipant(s . 3""ordingly, the "on"ept of "onstellation is implied in the "on"ept of a"tion. !t is impossible to thin$ of the god as an a"tor without relating him to beings that gi&e his a"tions meaning and purpose. (41

#he potential for su"h "onstellations or dispositions of the ,ods in relation to ea"h other ha&ing been established in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, action now follows, in the form of narrati&e mythi"al episodes and what is, in effe"t, the greatest narrati&e of all, the narrati&e of demiurgi" world("onstitution, the "on"reti1ation of the demiurgi" will. #he emergen"e of narrati&ity in this order and its relation to dia"riti"al or mediated being is rendered e*pli"it in remar$able fashion through the se&enth monad of the order, the separati&e monad or separati&e di&inity, diakritik& theot&s (N J. 1L. 1K . #his monad represents, not a deity, but a range of incidents from mythi" narrati&e, in"luding

313 but not ne"essarily limited to the "astrations of Ouranos and Fronos. )hy is the se&enth monad asso"iated with a genre of in"ident rather than a personality6 !s this simply be"ause there is no appropriate personality a&ailable in the 7elleni" pantheon6 ! would argue that this is not the "ase. 9or we shall see that to ea"h of the monadi" positions in this order o""upied by deities "orrespond guardians, whose fun"tion ! shall dis"uss later- but there is no guardian a""orded the se&enth monad. #his indi"ates that the position is not to be o""upied by a deity, but represents the "ommon fun"tion or mediation of the order as a whole. #he dia"riti"al di&inity, we read, a""omplishes the di&isions DdiaireseisE and segregates Dch%rizousaE the Fronian genera from the Ouranian, and the /o&ian from the Fronian, and separates DdiakrinousaE the whole intelle"tual order from the natures prior to and posterior to it, dis+oins the different "auses in it from ea"h other, and always imparts to se"ondary natures se"ondary measures of royalty DbasileiasE (J. 1L. 1I(A1 . #he des"ription blends mythologi"al and philosophi"al determinations. On the one hand, it is parti"ular 7elleni" deities whi"h are mentioned here, and not monadi" positions- but on the other hand, it is their genera that are di&ided, i.e. that whi"h belongs to them in the realm of Being. #hen again, the separation or distin"tion of the whole intelle"tual order (holon ton noeron diakosmon and the dis+oining or deta"hment of the "auses in it results in the distribution of appropriate measures of royalty, deploying again the bridging "on"ept of so&ereignty, whi"h e*presses in general the pro"ess of apportioning roles within the pantheon and monadi" sine"ures, so to spea$, to parti"ular deities. #he pe"uliar mediating fun"tion performed by the se&enth monad belongs irredu"ibly to mythi" narrati&e, and therefore would be properly identified as su"h, and not with any parti"ular deity, under any fa"ti"al theology

314 to whi"h the system of Pro"lus were to be applied. 9urthermore it seems that Pro"lus sees in this role not +ust mythi" narrati&e in general but espe"ially that genre whi"h he is at su"h pains, in his "ommentary on the $epublic, to defend from Platoni" "ensure, the "lass, that is, of mythi" narrati&es re'uiring an esoteri" interpretation more urgently than others, insofar as they represent, on their fa"e, a negation of the proper ethi"al disposition of souls. >oes not this negation fun"tion in a way li$e those others ! ha&e +ust dis"ussed, drawing as they do a dis+un"tion between modes of understanding and "lasses of auditors, for he DPlatoE thin$s that all su"h parti"ulars Dthe Mtragi"al e'uipment of myths% (tas tragikas t%n muth%n diaskeuas E will be "ondemned by the multitude, through ignoran"e of the ar"ana they "ontain- but that they will indi"ate to the wise "ertain mar&elous inner meanings DhuponoiasE (1L. AKf 6 !t is in the ne"essity of esoteri" interpretation, after all, that a distin"tion between le&els of dis"ourse is established whi"h "annot but, in a system su"h as Pro"lus%, refle"t a "orresponding ontologi"al distin"tion.

#he "ontent of the whole orders of the ,ods is gi&en in the moments of the first intelligible triad. ?imit predominates in the intelligible order, and so the determinations of this order manifested themsel&es as 'ualifi"ations of ea"h ,od individually. !n the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, the element of !nfinity or Power predominates, and so the moments in that order were moments of continuity among the ,ods. 7ow, then, does the element of 0i*ture operate in the intelle"tual order6 !n the first intelligible triad, the moment of mi*ture referred to the "omposition of elements in the di&ine indi&idual, in parti"ular the opposition between the hyparxis and the power(s of the ,od, the former e*pressing the irredu"ible indi&iduality of ea"h ,od,

315 the latter all the fa"tors whi"h tend toward diremption in the integral indi&iduality of the ,od. @adi"al intelle"t represents the resolution of this "onfli"t in a logos of the di&ine indi&idual. !n the third intelligible triad, intelligible intelle"t, we saw ea"h ,od as essentially a paradigm of the world inasmu"h as all the ,ods, and hen"e all that is or "an be, are in ea"h, but from a uni'ue perspe"ti&e. Ea"h ,od is thus a unit of measure for the 3ll- but it is through the intelle"tual order of ,ods that the measure is applied. #he "ompletion of the mo&ement beginning in the first intelligible triad sees the domain of the logos e*tend its borders to the 9irst Prin"iple itself, the principium individuationis, the fountain of di&inity. #his "omes about through the emergen"e of the "on"eptual resour"es ne"essary to fully distinguish the indi&iduality of the henads from the opposition of uni&ersality and parti"ularity "onstituti&e for beings. !n the system of ob+e"ti&e idealism, su"h an epistemologi"al moment is no less a "osmologi"al moment. #he pe"uliar "osmologi"al moment e*pressi&e of the a"hie&ement of this distin"tion is the emergen"e of a single di&ine intelle"t to o""upy the position of the demiurgi" monad, in whom individuality and specificity "oin"ide, and based upon that &ery "oin"iden"e, find the ground of their distin"tion. #his deity, moreo&er, "onstitutes the fa"ti"al world(order a""ording to his;her irredu"ibly uni'ue perspective. 3 "ase "ould be made that our tas$ would not truly be "omplete without an a""ount of soul, whi"h would en"ompass the means by whi"h indi&idual human souls engage with the di&ine and dis"ern the onti" hypostases- but a "omprehensi&e a""ount of 8eoplatoni" psy"hology is impossible in this dissertation. #herefore, instead of ending with an a""ount of the human indi&idual, who e*perien"es the gap between formal and indi&idual unity as something integral to the human "ondition, and who is thrown into a world, we end with an a""ount of the

316 demiurgi" indi&idual, who resol&es the opposition between these two modes of unity in the fabrication of a world. !n order to understand the spe"ial position of the demiurge, we must return to the problem of the philosophi"al system and its "on"rete appli"ation. !n the fifth boo$, as nowhere else, we find Pro"lus fre'uently stressing that he is operating, at least for the purposes of the Platonic Theology, within the field of a "ommitted 7ellenism, the dominant "on"ern of this te*t being to establish that Plato wishes to operate within this field as well- that, for instan"e, Plato wishes we 7ellenes to identify the demiurge of the Timaeus with =eus, and so forth. !mpli"it, howe&er, within this pro+e"t is the understanding that for others the ,ods o""upying the monadi" positions will be different. #hese monads, as ! ha&e tried to e*plain, do not represent the #ruth with respe"t to whi"h a "on"ession has been made to limited minds that they may "lothe it in nati&e dress. @ather, they represent a spe"ifi" or formal unity in "ontradistin"tion to the uni'ueness of the di&ine indi&idual whi"h is e*pressed by the name. 8ames are not li$e words, whi"h e*press a "ommon idea differently in different languages. )e do not translate the names of human beings- a fortiori are the names of the ,ods untranslatable. 9or etymology is not translation. E&en where a ,od%s name "ould be gi&en a "on"lusi&e etymology < and how rarely is this possible < it would not establish that deity as being the same as a deity whose name, in another language, bore a similar etymology. #he differen"e between languages, with respe"t to words, is "ontingent- with respe"t to names, essential. #he ,ods are prior to that distin"tion between form and matter whi"h is "onstituti&e of su"h "omparati&e linguisti"s. ,ods with a "ommon form simply e*er"ise some fun"tion in "ommon for us, that is, with respe"t to Being4 this is the relation of ,ods to uni&ersals.

317 7en"e we find Pro"lus e*horting us to turn, at one point, from the indefinite and "ommon Daoristou G kai koin&sE do"trine about these ,ods to the ,ree$ tradition Dph&m&nE "on"erning it, as deli&ered to us by Plato, and demonstrate that he as far as to the &ery names follows the theologians of the ,ree$s (N JK. 1AL. H(1A . 3 deity belongs to the ,ree$ pantheon, we might say, by &irtue of ha&ing some sort of relationship to =eus. #o be at the "enter of a pantheon in this fashion is to be the demiurgi" intelle"t- for a pantheon to be ordered in this way, that is, for sovereignty or, at any rate, cosmic organization to emerge in it through mythi" narrati&e, is the "ondition of the emergen"e of intelle"t as su"h. 7en"e we read that we must e*tend the intelle"t that is in us to the unparti"ipated and di&ine intelle"t (N 1. I. 11 , and that the intelle"tual hypostasis of the ,ods G is denominated intelle"tual be"ause it generates an indi&isible and di&ine intelle"t (I. 1C . #he intelle"t to whi"h we e*tend our own, upon whi"h, that is, we re&ert, is the produ"t of the intelle"tual ,ods. 3s su"h, it is not what we spea$ of when we spea$ of the intelle"t of ea"h ,od, that aspe"t of the di&ine person whi"h is e*pressed by the third intelligible triad. @ather, it is an intelle"t whi"h is the produ"t of the entire pantheon of our "ultural spa"e, albeit the formali1ing poten"y of the attributes of intelle"t in&ites the progressi&e sublimation, so to spea$, of the philosophi"al system < the final representation of the +oint human and di&ine labor of intelle"t < from its mythologi"al origins. #he twin epithets of unparti"ipated and indi&isible applied to the intelle"t generated by the ,ods affirm its "ausality in relation to its produ"tions, the spe"ifi" intelle"ts, by barring them from being "lassed together with it in respe"t of the 'uality it uni'uely imparts to them- and +ust as the unparti"ipated refers immediately to parti"ipation, of whi"h it is the "ause, so too, the indi&isible properly applies to that

318 whi"h pro*imately negates, that is, causes di&ision. .on&ersely, this dis+un"tion between the unparti"ipated monad and its produ"ts, whi"h "an only result in a "ertain opa"ity, a "on"ealment of its own origins, has the effe"t of con*oining it to the prin"iples prior to it4

E&ery unparti"ipated intelle"t is said to be the intelle"t of the natures prior to itself, and towards them, from whom it is produ"ed, it has an intelle"tual "on&ersion, and in them as first(effe"ti&e "auses Dor Mprimordial,% pr%tourgoisE it establishes itself. )hen"e also the demiurgi" intelle"t is the intelle"t of the natures abo&e itself, pro*imately of its own father, from whi"h li$ewise it pro"eeds, but eminently of the intelligible henads beyond. (JL. 1J4. 1J(A1

#he father of the demiurgi" intelle"t is the henad of the intelligible intelle"t, whether this be some deity other than the demiurge, as Phanes in Pro"lus% 7elleni" theology, or whether it be the demiurge him;herself qua henad, the henads all beings fathers in this respe"t. 9or now what is important is the status of unparti"ipated intelle"t as a produ"t of the intelligible "auses in whi"h it is established and upon whi"h it re&erts. #he separation(and(relation embodied in imparti"ipability e"hoes in the a""ompaniment of ea"h of the intelle"tual monads by a guardian monad that is "onsubsistent with it. )e shall see later on how some of the determinations arising in this order are attributed to the prin"ipal monads while others are attributed to the a"ti&ity of these guardians. )hat are the intelle"tual ,ods being guarded from, sin"e there is no fear that the ,ods G will sustain mutation, and that on this a""ount they stand in need of the sa&ing aid of guardian "auses ("# 11B 6 8or are the natures in need of su"h "areful separation simply the orders immediately pre"eding and immediately su""eeding the intelle"tual, whose su""ession in

319 the onti" hierar"hy would seem to "all for no spe"ial mediation. @ather, the defensi&e stru"tures of this order are so elaborate on a""ount of a separation far more profound between the intelle"tual order and all of the others, inasmu"h as here the surfa"es of irre"on"ilable orders of e*isten"e glide a"ross ea"h other, insulated from a"tual "onta"t. )e "an gain a better sense of this abyss of the intelle"t from a "onsideration of the position of matter in relation to the demiurge%s formati&e a"ti&ity. #o really understand the status of matter, we must approa"h it under the rubri" of what we might "all terminal being. 9or forms G Ddo notE e*tend their a"ti&ity only as far as to those beings whi"h, without transition, are always able to en+oy them with in&ariable identity, but on a""ount of the abundan"e of their power and their trans"endent goodness G they li$ewise produ"e by their a"ti&ities the last hypostases, whi"h are in"apable of remaining imma"ulate and immutable, and whi"h ran$ among parti"ipants alone, i.e. ha&ing no parti"ipants of their own (93: JIf . #here are a"tually two definitions of the e*tremity of "ausal pro"ession. #he first is that whi"h merely parti"ipates, but has no parti"ipants. 2u"h a being is the least "omplete or perfe"t, teleios, of things, for (ET prop. AK DtEhe more "omplete is the "ause of more, in proportion to the degree of its "ompleteness G 3nd the less "omplete is the "ause of less, in proportion to its in"ompleteness G 9rom this it is apparent that what is most remote from the prin"iple of all things is sterile and a "ause of nothing. #he se"ond definition is the "ontingently parti"ipating, as in ET prop. IJ4 E&ery unparti"ipated term gi&es rise to two orders of parti"ipated terms, the one in "ontingent parti"ipants Dtois pote metechousiE, the other in things whi"h parti"ipate always and in &irtue of their nature Dsumphu%sE.

320 3s ea"h series ends in "ontingent parti"ipants, so too the whole pro"ession of Being ends in the irredeemably in"omplete, that whi"h "annot reprodu"e itself, what "an be only parti"ular. 2o una&oidable is this state of affairs that if those beings alone should e*ist whi"h always re"ei&e the impressions of the forms then the e*"ellent beings would be the last in the s"ale of beings, and eternal things would ha&e the ran$ of matter. 7en"e they would ha&e all the properties whi"h we are a""ustomed to as"ribe to generable and "orruptible natures, sterility and debility G (93: JL . #his is undoubtedly a "urious way of formulating the problem, for it implies that the 'ualities, su"h as sterility and debility, whi"h belong to terminal being, are thin$able independently of the status of su"h beings as sub+e"t to generation and "orruption, whereas we might rather e*pe"t that one of these sets of attributes was the ground of the other. !nstead, sterility and debility seem to deri&e from the basi" "onditions of "ausality e*plained in props. AK and IJ, and if there were no natures sub+e"t to generation and "orruption, the "onditions of sterility and impoten"y would simply apply to the last ran$ of eternal beings. #his is as mu"h as to say that in the "ounterfa"tual, there would be eternal beings that were themsel&es utterly contingent. One is reminded of the .artesian do"trine that ,od "ould ha&e posited a different set of mathemati"al truths for the world. 9or Pro"lus, this would represent a "ategory mista$e. But the fa"t that this "ontingen"y and fa"ti"ity manifests itself in the realm of generation does not alter the fa"t that its origin lies in prin"iples suffi"iently primordial that were there to be no realm of generation, we "ould imagine the eternal elements of Being bearing the burden of su"h "ontingen"y, and the uni&erse suffused with "han"e and a""ident to its "ore.

321 #here are two ways in whi"h the a""ession of demiurgi" order to Being is "on"ei&ed in Pro"lus. #he first is the taming of the disorderly motion that pre(e*ists the "osmosthe se"ond is the appli"ation of measure to a "ontinuum. #he disorderly motion, whi"h is the anterior state of the world "omes from the first "omposite, whi"h with the representation of all the forms in itself, as it were, in "onfusion, in being mo&ed, produ"es "haos DinordinatumE. 9or the tra"es of different forms, leading to di&erse motions, impart a flu"tuating "hara"ter to the entire motion (93: LJ . )e re"all that this disorderly motion e*pressed the illuminations of the ,ods prior to the demiurge ("T !, JHL - here we ha&e a more pre"ise a""ount of this state of being in itself, as a contradictory whole,AB an ideal state transitional between the e*isten"e of ea"h deity for itself and the ordered totality that represents the imposition of demiurgi" so&ereignty upon the whole. On"e demiurgi" so&ereignty has been established, "ontradi"tions are resol&ed through the hierar"hi"al organi1ation of Being. #he demiurgi" "osmos e*presses a single point of &iew, while in the "ontradi"tory whole, a multipli"ity of "ontradi"tory &iewpoints are held in a "haoti" suspension. !n the "ontradi"tory whole there is, and in a sense it is only here that there is, the set of all the ,ods su"h that it is neither a "o(emergent set li$e the pantheon of 7elleni" deities under the so&ereignty of =eus nor the philosopher%s abstra"t 'uantifi"ation. #his "haoti" totality was glimpsed by us before in the dis"ussion of the se"ond intelligible triad, whi"h represented wholeness prior to the totality of the third triad, and measure prior to the third triad as paradigm. But the se"ond triad was also the "ontinuum relati&e to the third triad%s intelle"t, whi"h is the application of measure to this "ontinuum. #he two moments of the indi&idual deity represented by the se"ond and third
AB .ompare the following formulation4 #he forms and powers of e&il, therefore, are not effe"ti&e, but are impoten"e and debility, and an incommensurable communion among similars and in their mi*ture (93: CA, my emphasis .

322 intelligible triads thus represent, respe"ti&ely, that deity as "ontinuum with the power to impose measure upon itself, and the deployment of that potentiality in the deity%s rendering itself a paradigm through its a"ti&ity in the illumination of Being. #he "ontinuum and disorderly motion are relati&ely synonymous as e*pressions of the a"ti&ity of the se"ond intelligible triad. 9rom the se"ond to the third intelligible triads, howe&er, it was a matter of a metamorphosis in the indi&idual deity, whereas the analogous transition from the intelligible(and(intelle"tual to the intelle"tual order is a matter of the organi1ation of a "olle"ti&ity of deities. !t is more appropriate, thus, at this stage, to spea$ of disorderly motion, for the hypostasis of ?ife has arisen in the interim. #he problems arising in the intelle"tual order, problems of hylomorphism and terminal being, manifest an aspe"t of the se"ond intelligible triad whi"h "ould, howe&er, ha&e no pla"e in the intelligible ,ods themsel&es, namely a remainder resistant to measure. !f we tra"e the origins of this remainder ba"$ to the transition between the se"ond and third intelligible triads, then its roots appear to lie in the impossibility of any ,od representing arti"ulately or through form, that is, expressing through their paradigmati" fun"tion, the real henadi" uni'ueness and indi&iduality of the other ,ods. #he relations between the ,ods are, most authenti"ally, relations of power, while the mythologi"al "onstellations that dispose them relati&e to ea"h other and in relation to a narrati&e telos e*ist for the "onstitution of hypostases and the illumination of Being < ultimately, in other words, for us. But form is li$e a measure whi"h "annot be applied to the "ontinuum without remainder. #his remainder was not at issue in the "ongregation of ,ods upon a "ommon field in the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order- but then the nature of the supra("elestial pla"e remained &ery mu"h on the far side of the di&ide between henadology and

323 monadology, as was e&ident from its predominantly mythologi"al determinations. #he topos emerging from out of the a"ti&ities of the intelle"tual order is of a different matter altogether- it is no Olympus, but rather the fa"ti"al world(order. !t thus represents the furthest a""ession of form, whi"h must formali1e the ,ods down to the &ery remainder itself. Fnowing the demiurge, it is ne&ertheless impossible to pro"laim him to all, as famously remar$ed in the Timaeus (AH . J(K . 3 "lear reason for this state of affairs is that people e*perien"e the demiurgi" fun"tion through different deities, and the point is not to subordinate the deities to their fun"tions. #he trans"endent uni'ueness of ea"h ,od, whi"h is e*pressed positi&ely in the ,od%s uni'ue name, is e*pressed negatively in the aspe"t of in"ommensurability e*isting between and among the ,ods. !t is not that the ,ods ha&e nothing in "ommon- they ha&e in "ommon pre"isely their absolute indi&iduality, but this is something prior to form and measure, e&ery measure being the perspe"ti&e, so to spea$, of some ,od, and so they are incommensurable ta$en in this way. )ith respe"t to form, ea"h ,od is a paradigm, a form of forms, so to spea$. But where there is form, there is matter. !n the transition from the se"ond to the third intelligible triad, then, and a fortiori in the transition from the intelligible(and(intelle"tual to the intelle"tual order of the ,ods, there is a "risis of hylomorphism. #he demiurge, in his;her formati&e a"ti&ity, "onfronts in matter and disorderly motion the latent presen"e of all the other ,ods. !f matter has any power at all to resist, e&en passi&ely, the demiurgi" will, it "an only ha&e re"ei&ed it from the illumination of all the prior orders of the ,ods, as we read at "T !, JHL. #hat whi"h is, in its supra( essential nature, unitary indi&iduality and uni'ueness, is manifest in terminal being as

324 matter. 2et off from the demiurge and shrouded in obs"urity, an indeterminate mass defines the radian"e of the indi&idual. )hereas truth emerged in the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order, for it lies elementally in the "o(emergent "onstellations of the di&ine indi&iduals, the possibility of radi"al untruth is grounded in the intelle"tual order. #he demiurge engages with the disorderly motion that represents the remainder of "o( emergen"e, the tra"es of forms whi"h are none other than the possibility of different regimes of form. #he matter upon whi"h the demiurge wor$s is the other ,ods themsel&es, not as "o(emergent with the demiurge, not, for e*ample, as the other ,ods in the 7elleni" pantheon are in relation to =eus, but in their radi"al refusal of relation. E&en the deities who are "o(emergent with, e.g., =eus, possess ne&ertheless their pre(e*istent autonomy in respe"t of whi"h they too are matter in relation to the demiurge%s formati&e a"ti&ity. !ndeed, e&en =eus himself is matter to himself, insofar as he himself, as a henad, tran"ends his fun"tion as demiurge. #he other ,ods, in their absolute refusal of relation to the demiurge, represent the surplus of produ"ti&ity in the 9irst Prin"iple o&er any regime of forms. #his surplus or e*"ess, although manifesting only negati&ely in the system itself, pro&ides the "apa"ity to es"ape the system in the moment of its greatest rigidity, namely the moment at whi"h the system is rendered no longer indefinite and "ommon but determinate and parti"ular by the fi*ing of all the monadi" positions to the members of a single pantheon. !t is easy to see how this fi*ity "ould be"ome sterile and &irulent, for any other tradition be"omes immediately in"omprehensible. !s not the answer, then, to refuse to a"$nowledge any in"ommensurability, in the name of the age(old and "i&ili1ing paradigm of translation, of "osmotheism6 But then the "osmotheisti" philosophy has simply displa"ed the

325 disparate theologies altogether, asserting itself as the &oi"e of a uni&ersal reason with the authority to subordinate re&elation to itself. 7ow will this reason, though, "leanse itself of parti"ularity6 !t must aspire, in its own a"t of demiurgy, to "on'uer its materiality altogether if it is to legitimi1e its "laims. #he disappointment attendant upon its failure may, furthermore, result in a s$epti"ism that, ironi"ally, ta$es for granted the ultimate triumph of parti"ularism. #he ultimate sour"e of disorder < and, indeed, of e&il insofar as it e*ists at all < is nothing other than the One !tself. 9or it is not in the "o(emergen"e of deities in pantheons that we see the onti" impression of the One, that is, in their "ooperation, but abo&e all in their in"ommensurability and in their foreignness to ea"h other. #ranslation arri&es to pat"h o&er this rift, and indeed there is no gap that the monad "annot bridge, for Being abhors a &a"uum. But the beyond of Being lies in the moment of the renun"iation of translation. #his means that any regime of forms, despite its di&ine pedigree, is sub+e"t to the eruption of a foreign element in"on"ei&able within the "onfines of the "osmos it fashions. #he further this formati&e a"ti&ity pro"eeds, the more fo"used is this resistan"e. #hus, for the demiurge, this resistan"e "rystalli1es into matter itself, the pseudo( hypostasis or parhupostasis, the manifestation of ne"essity. 0atter, we read in the essay on e&il, is neither good nor e&il but ne"essary (93: LK . #hat whi"h is ne"essary is all that is for the sa$e of good, has a referen"e to it, and whate&er has a generation subsists on a""ount of it, and matter, spe"ifi"ally, is produ"ed by di&inity as ne"essary to forms, whi"h are in"apable of being established in themsel&es (LI . 9orms "an ne&er possess the integrity of the supra(essential indi&idual- hen"e the further a gi&en deity see$s to e*tend their formal hegemony through cognizing the other deities < that is

326 to say, lending more and more of their own nature to the a"ti&ity of illumination < the more fo"used the resistan"e, the sharper the alterity that must finally emerge. #he demiurge must not only subordinate the deities "o(emergent with him < a pro"ess whi"h would ha&e its histori"al limit in the redu"tion of originally independent deities to the status of "reated beings in the ser&i"e of the demiurge (a pro"ess in itself ne&er fully "ompleted and rife with possibilities for the re"onstitution of in"ommensurable differen"es within the momentarily unified field < but must also tame the nameless "haos that is the "a"ophony of the ,ods of the others < other tribes, other nations. 3s mu"h as this dynami" resembles that intoleran"e of differen"e that is su"h an important "onstituent of human e&il, we must not lay upon the ,ods the burden of this resemblan"e. @ather, it would seem as if humans err in distorting the balan"e between Being and the di&ine, de&oting the whole of their power to the totali1ing program of world("onstitution, as if there were in them no e"ho of an order prior to wholes. !n this, ironi"ally, they fail in their role as parts, for a part of an infima species, had it no referen"e at all to a higher order, an order, namely, of the indi&idual qua indi&idual, "ould only represent with respe"t to the form a potentially malignant aberration.

#he intelle"tual hypostasis of the ,ods is filled G from the intelligibles whi"h ha&e established in themsel&es unitarily all multipli"ities, and o""ultly "ontain the manifestations DekphanseisE of the ,ods and the hyparxeis of intelligibles (PT N 1. I. ABf - that is, the hypostasis of intelle"t is the dis"losure of the onti" repository of di&ine illumination. #he intelligibles in 'uestion here, whi"h are "arefully distinguished by Pro"lus from those intelligibles "oordinate with intelle"t and those whi"h are only

327 di&ided from intelle"t by the "on"eption of the mind are the intelligible forms or fountains, p&gai, whi"h sit at the "rossroads, as it were, between theologi"al and philosophi"al dis"ourse. 3s the hyparxeis of intelligibles, that is, the di&ine roots or sour"es of intelligibility, the fountains are said, li$e the ,ods themsel&es, to "ontain the onti" multipli"ities unitarily, heniai%s. #he fountains "ontain the onti" multipli"ities unitarily be"ause ea"h one is a sour"e of illumination to the whole of Being. !n the intelle"tual order prin"iples, archai, shall emerge from fountains. #he demiurge is said to "omprehend all the genera and ha&e the fountain of the forms, be"ause he generates all the partial streams DochetousE and imparts to them from himself by illumination all the measures of subsisten"e (JB. 11A. AK(C . #hese streams or "hannels are ob&iously the prin"iples, whi"h ha&e the status of parts in relation to the holisti" fountains. )hat does the status of prin"iple in relation to fountain mean for the philosopher, whose diale"ti"al labors are toward the dis"ernment of prin"iples6 !n "hap. JA of Boo$ 9i&e, Pro"lus will spea$ of more fountains, whi"h lie under the "ontrol of the se"ond intelle"tual monad, e.g. 7elleni" @hea4 the fountain of souls, the fountain of the &irtues, the fountain of physis. #he fountain of souls is the .rater of the Timaeus, whi"h unitarily "ontains the whole and perfe"t arithmos of them Dthe soulsE (JA. 11H. 4 . Pro"lus also remar$s, in his desire to ground firmly in Platoni" soil the .haldean terminology of fountains, that Plato, in the -aws (N!! HBH > I "alls Mfountain of understanding% Dp&g&n tou phroneinE the power of phron&sis whi"h is essentially inherent in souls and whi"h is produ"ti&e of the &irtues in us (1AB. 1(4 . #he generati&ity of the fountain is what is stressed here, in relation to whi"h the prin"iple will appear as an abstra"t result. 3 similar impression "an be gleaned from Pro"lus% "itation of -aws ! IJI

328 > I(H, where pleasure and pain are fountains imparted to us by nature. #he prima"y of fountain o&er prin"iple is e*istential, mar$ing the site of the unfolding of the prin"iples in a li&ing reality and an e*periential "onte*t. #his e*istential prima"y gi&es to p&gai their essential pro*imity to the di&ine, for the prima"y of the ,ods to Being is one of e*isten"e < hyparxis < as well. But the "on&ergen"e runs in the other dire"tion too. >eities operate as fountains when they are the pro*imate "ause of an hypostasis. 7en"e the demiurge, li$e the deity of the intelligible intelle"t before, is fontal- and thus if the .rater is "oordinate with the demiurge, and e'ually "onstitutes with him the genera of souls, it is indeed ne"essary that this .rater should be fontal, in the same manner as the whole demiurge (J1. 11K. L(1B . #he demiurge is 'ualified as whole (holon here be"ause of the partial demiurgi pro"eeding from him, but also be"ause the fontal demiurge operates within Being, and is e&en, qua fountain, indistinguishable in some respe"t from the hypostasis of !ntelle"t in its imparti"ipable summit. 2ignifi"antly, Pro"lus e'uates fontal with royal, as in the passage from the Philebus (JB > 1(A where =eus is said to possess a royal soul and a royal intelle"t (J1. 11K. 1J(K - and indeed we ha&e already seen that so&ereignty is a "ru"ial bridging "on"ept between the henadi" and monadi" registers. #he emergen"e of prin"iple from fountain is represented most distin"tly in the "ase of the .rater, the fountain of souls. #he .rater is, on the one hand, the royal soul a""orded to =eus in the Philebus, and on the other, the generati&e monad of souls. !t is this latter aspe"t whi"h is e*pressed in the prin"iple, for of these two, the name of Mprin"iple% is more allied DsuggenesteronE to souls than that of Mfountain,% as being nearer to them a""ording to order DtaxinE (J1. 11I. 1B(A . #his is illustrated, for Pro"lus, by the

329 passage in the Phaedrus where we read that prin"iple is unbegotten, inasmu"h as it is ne"essary that e&erything whi"h is generated should be generated from a prin"iple (11I. 1I(L . #he unbegottenness of prin"iple refers, as its negation, to the "ondition of generation from whi"h we raise oursel&es through our diale"ti"al labors. 3s su"h, the distin"tion between fountain and prin"iple is parti"ularly rele&ant to the site of the emergen"e of soul from intelle"t. But its rele&an"e does not end there- rather, as high as we as"end the ladder of diale"ti", that is, all the way to the 9irst Prin"iple, we do so by the method by whi"h the unbegottenness of prin"iple is dis"losed here, that is, by negation, step by step, +ust as the taxeis are dis"losed in the Parmenides. 3nd in fa"t, it is the demonstration from the Phaedrus that soul is the "ause of all motion that Pro"lus uses in the Parmenides "ommentary (CCH as the paradigmati" "ase of demonstrating "ausation from negation, for

if we only postulate that something is the "ase, and then find out what is the "onse'uen"e of that, we will not in all "ases dis"o&er what it is of whi"h the thing postulated is the essential "ause. !f, howe&er, we also demonstrate that, if it is not the "ase, the same result does not follow as would ha&e followed if it had been the "ase, then it be"omes plain that after all this is the "ase be"ause that is the "ase- for otherwise this would follow, e&en if that was postulated not to be the "ase, if that were not by its own nature the "ause of this G !t is not, then, suffi"ient to e*amine what follows if something is the "ase, but one must also in&estigate what follows if it is not the "ase, if one is going to see and understand of what the thing postulated is a cause= or what attributes belong to it in and of itself. (emphasis mine

330 #he breadth of the role en&isioned for this method, whi"h allows us to rise as far as to the prior to Being, whi"h is the "ause of all beings, trans"ending the multipli"ity inherent in beings, (CCCf does not stop Pro"lus from dis"erning that in general, negations are produ"ts of >ifferen"e at the intelle"tual le&el and it is only in the "onte*t of one thing being that another thing is said not to be. 2o the hypothesis is not "on"erned with that whi"h in no way is, but with what to an e*tent is and to an e*tent is not, or what is this and is not that (1BBB . 8egation at on"e allows us to rise as far as to that whi"h is prior to Being, and yet is also the produ"t of an intelle"tual determination. 8egation establishes about something what attributes belong to it in and of itself < in itself being, li$e >ifferen"e, a determination of the intelle"tual order, and these attributes are ontologi"al "oordinates pertaining to the relationship among parts in a whole. !t is this networ$ of relationships that are the multipli"ity inherent in beings. #rans"ending this multipli"ity again through the same power of negation, we arri&e finally at the henad, the ;od generi"ally, but this method la"$s the power to "on"ei&e this henad, with a proper name. !n the intelle"tual order the "omplementarity of deity and diale"ti" is e*pli"itly represented in the +u*taposition of fountain and prin"iple. Prior to souls there is a twofold di&ine monad G the one indeed being fontal, but the other prin"ipial Darchik&sE (11K. 1C(A1 , the latter of whi"h may be identified with the hypostasis of 2oul, while the former is the .rater. #he identifi"ation of this fontal monad with the .rater of the #imaean allegory is to be regarded on the same footing as the identifi"ation of the demiurgi" monad with =eus- should we wish to spea$ indefinitely or "ommonly we would refer simply to the fountain of soul or, perhaps, the intelligible form of soul. #he

331 .rater, or fountain of souls, is su""eeded by the prin"ipial monad (archik& monas of souls, whi"h is more pro*imate to souls than the fountain, but established abo&e them as their fe"und DgonimosE "ause (J1. 11L. 1(K . )e see here the full proper order of "ausal su""ession applying to the system itself as a whole4 from the ,ods, through the fountains, to the prin"iples. #he fountains, as we ha&e seen, form a mu"h looser system than the prin"iples, whi"h latter we may regard as synonymous with the system of hypostases. #he fountains all fall under the paradigmati" fun"tion of the third intelligible triad, whi"h was the fountain of fountains. Originating in the paradigm or intelligible intelle"t prior to the world(formati&e a"ti&ity of the demiurgi" intelle"t, they form a $ind of infrastru"ture ser&ing as tou"hstones for the world(dis"erning a"ti&ity of the intelligent soul. #his is espe"ially "lear in the "ase of the &irtues, whi"h are world(dis"losing in their fun"tion, but it is e'ually important in the "ase of fontal 2oul and fontal 8ature, both of whi"h ground the sense of "ommunion among li&ing beings that is an indispensible part of generating a "osmos. 9or whereas the fountain of the &irtues in the intelligible(and( intelle"tual order referred to 2"ien"e, #emperan"e and /usti"e, the fountain of the &irtues here is e*plained by Pro"lus with spe"ifi" referen"e to the demiurgi" fun"tion of &irtue. 7e 'uotes Tim. J4 B J(H to the effe"t that the demiurge

"onstituted hea&en one DhenaE, alone DmononE and solitary Der&monE, but through virtue able to "on&erse DsuggignesthaiE with itself, and being in want of no other thing, but suffi"iently $nown and friendly itself to itself. 3t one and the same time therefore the world is animated, li&es through the whole of its life a""ording to &irtue, and possesses from the &irtues as its highest end, friendship with itself, and an all(perfe"t $nowledge of

332
itself. 9or it is itself suffi"iently $nown and friendly to itself through &irtue. (N JA. 11H. 1I(AJ

2in"e the demiurge%s a"ti&ity "onsists in bringing order and harmony into a pre(e*isting, though minimally arti"ulate, di&ersity and "omple*ity, what are needed at the formati&e le&el are not sour"es of di&ersifi"ation, but sour"es of unifi"ation and organi1ation. #he fountains are the forerunner of the prin"iples in this respe"t, though prin"iples will belong, in some sense, to the philosopher alone, while the fountains seem to be of su"h a nature that they are dis"erned 'uite as ade'uately by the poet and the artist as by the diale"ti"ian, if not indeed more so, sin"e they tend to ha&e the fun"tion, within diale"ti", of e&ident premises4 2in"e there is < or should be < su"h a thing as &irtueG (and so forth . #he demiurge fabri"ates the soul of the uni&erse Dtou pantos psuch&nE an image DeikonaE of all the "lasses of the ,ods, +ust as as he fabri"ates this sensible world an image of intelligibles (N 4. 1C. K(L . #hese "lasses are roughly dis"ernible in the stages of the soul%s "onstitution4 the demiurge first "onstitutes the whole essen"e of the soul, then di&ides it into numbers, binds it by harmonies, and adorns it with figures, namely the re"tilinear and the "ir"ular. 9inally, he di&ides it into one "ir"le and se&en "ir"les. )hen"e therefore are this monad and hebdomad deri&ed, e*"ept from the intelle"tual ,ods6 9or figure, number and true being are prior to them (L(1J . 9igure, number and ont%s on are prior to the intelle"tual ,ods not, naturally, qua ,ods, but they are prior to this class, for they are determinations of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, as we saw in the last "hapter. #he all(soul is an image, not of the ,ods immediately, but of their classes, itself an intelle"tual mode of organi1ation based upon identity and differen"e. 3s

333 su"h, we may say that these "lasses first truly "ome into e*isten"e through the a"ti&ity of the demiurge, whi"h means moreo&er that their fun"tion in the demiurge%s fabri"ation of the soul is no merely "ontingent appli"ation. #he ,ods of the intelle"tual order, we should say, refle"t upon themsel&es and generate an image of the prior orders. #his is responsible for the remar$able multipli"ation in this order beyond the primary monads. #here are se&en intelle"tual monads4 three fathers (the se"ond of whi"h is, in fa"t, @hea in the 7elleni" theology , three undefiled or imma"ulate (achrantoi guardian di&inities (identified with the Fouretes , and the dia"riti"al monad. #hese monads then pro"eed to ramify themsel&es su"h that ea"h monad is the leader of an intelle"tual hebdomad "on+oined with it, and e*tends this hebdomad from on high, from the summit of Olympus Di.e. the intelligible( and(intelle"tualE as far as to the last, terrestrial orders (A. 1A. 1(J . #hese are the monad and hebdomad that manifest themsel&es in the demiurge%s "onstitution of the all(soul. #he stru"ture of the dependent hebdomads refle"ts the prior orders of Being4 e&ery hebdomad has the first monad intelligible- the se"ond, whi"h is triadi", intelligible(and( intelle"tual- and the third triad intelle"tual. 3ll these li$ewise subsist as in intelle"tuals, for they are "hara"teri1ed a""ording to the pe"uliarity of the "onstituti&e monad (A. 1J. 1B(K . #his stru"ture with its bewildering profusion of hebdomads must be understood as the produ"t of a refle"ti&e a"ti&ity on the part of the intelle"tual ,ods the ramifi"ations of whi"h "reate an armature, so to spea$, for the nas"ent 2oul and by the same token for the system itself. 9or this monadi" re"apitulation of the pre"eding orders of Being is a recapitulation only, to borrow 7egel%s phrase, for us < within the system itself it is the

334 first e*pression of the onti" hierar"hy whi"h is fully monadi", that is, fully eman"ipated from the theologi"al organi1ation. #he stru"ture of the hebdomad is a ramified triadi" stru"ture with a monad and two triads. #he geometri"al e*pansion of the number of moments between the intelligible( and(intelle"tual order and this one represents in"reasing determina"y. But what "an we say about the spe"ifi"ity of the hebdomad6 2pe"ifi"ally, why not an ennead, in whi"h we would see the triadi" stru"ture fully e*panded6 )e "ould say that the remaining determina"y re'uires the further pro"ession of the infra(intelle"tual orders of ,ods. ?i$eness and unli$eness, for instan"e, emerging through the a"ti&ity of the hyper"osmi" ,ods, are indispensible determinations for the philosophi"al system, as we "an see from the importan"e of li$eness in ET prop. AH. #he hedomad therefore represents a lesser determina"y relati&e to the ennead. But we should note as well the abandonment, in the intelle"tual order, of the stru"ture of triadi" monads whi"h has dominated the prior orders. #he stru"ture of triadi" monads "orresponds to a pro"ession where ea"h moment is a "ertain adumbration of the whole. #he hebdomad, howe&er, is a stru"ture dominating its moments. #his e*presses the shift in the "enter of gra&ity, as ! ha&e "hara"teri1ed it, toward ontology and the unifi"ation of the ,ods. #his &iew draws support from the unusual e*pression that Pro"lus uses in referen"e to the intelle"tual hebdomad, "alling it an hebdomadi" ai%n (N JL. 1J4. K(I . )e re"all that an ai%n is defined in props. KA(K of the ET as that whi"h measures by the whole in "ontrast to chronos, whi"h measures by parts (prop. K4 . #he stru"ture of the intelle"tual order is one in whi"h the parts are subordinated to the whole. .ompare this to the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, whi"h maintained the stru"ture of triadi" monads whi"h were ea"h in some sense the whole. #he

335 mediation undergone by the ,ods of that order was a""ordingly rather mythopoeti" than "on"eptual4 a pla"e, a ban'uet, a hea&enly "ir"ulation. 7ere the mediation is monadi", represented on the one hand, by the se&enth or dia"riti"al monad, whi"h stands for the "omple* narrati&e arti"ulation whi"h "omprehensi&ely stru"tures the pantheon, in prin"iple lea&ing no deity unin"orporated in the "osmogeneti" a""ount- and on the other hand by the new intelle"tual determinations, in parti"ular in itself;in another and identity;differen"e, whi"h lea&e no being < or ,od insofar as that ,od is "onsidered as illuminating some region of Being < unin"orporated into the "osmos of diale"ti". ?et me stress again at this point something that has been with us throughout the reading of the Platonic Theology, namely the role of dis"rete number in the a""ount of the di&ine orders. #he transition to new orders of magnitude in the monadi" stru"ture is not a 'uestion of "ounting the number of ,ods as one would number some "olle"tion of beings. Pro"lus will stress this in regard to the dode"ad of the liberated or hyper"osmi" ,ods, the se"ond order after the intelle"tual4

One must not "onsider this number as "onsisting of twel&e monads, for number among the ,ods is not of this nature, but as "onsisting in a parti"ularity Didiot&tosE of hyparxis. 9or as the dyad among them Dthe ,odsE presides o&er prolifi" power, and the triad, o&er the first perfe"tion, thus also the dode"ad Damong the ,odsE is a symbol DsumbolonE of all(perfe"t pro"ession. (N! 1H. HI. AB(K

#he status of su"h 'ualitati&e number was, of "ourse, already dis"ussed in the pre&ious "hapter, for it is in and through the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order that it emerges. #he number represents, before 'uantity, a 'uality or power, a pattern of a"ti&ity, in whi"h

336 respe"t it is no different than any other di&ine power, but for the intimate relationship between arithmeti" and ontology itself. 2e"ondly, number "ontributes the potential for the "omple* dispositions of ,ods in relation to ea"h other that underlie the mythi" narrati&es "hara"teristi" of intelle"tual di&inity, in whi"h we find the pantheon fully arti"ulated and the intera"tions among ,ods that pro&ide the poets their topoi and the teletar"hs their esoteri"a. >is"erning the number of an order of ,ods, then, is not a matter for 'uantitati&e re"$oning. !t is, rather, synonymous with dis"erning the potentialities for "omple*ity, arti"ulation and relationship among the ,ods, of themsel&es indefinite in number, who pro"eed to the illumination of that order. )e should note, in this respe"t, that Pro"lus does not propose in the Platonic Theology (! A. C to treat of all the ,ods, but rather of

all those "ommon "on"eptions "on"erning the ,ods whi"h Plato deli&ers G the uni&ersal orders of the ,ods, enumerating their pe"uliarities, defining their pro"essions after the manner of Plato, and referring e&erything to the hypotheses of theologians- and, in the end, spea$ing "on"erning the ,ods whi"h are "elebrated in &arious pla"es in the Platoni" writings, whether they are hyper"osmi" or en"osmi", and referring the theory respe"ting them to the uni&ersal genera of the di&ine orders.

)hether indeed, as some suspe"t, there is referen"e here to a missing or ne&er "ompleted "on"luding se"tion (&i1. in the end of the Platonic Theology whi"h would ha&e treated "omprehensi&ely of the parti"ular deities whose names feature in Plato%s writings, there "an be no 'uestion that Pro"lus has already, throughout the treatise, spo$en of most, if not all, of the deities in 'uestion- if a planned se"tion is missing or was ne&er "ompleted, it is

337 reasonable to thin$ that it would simply ha&e "onstituted a "atalogue of sorts of the deities mentioned by Plato and their "lassifi"ation a""ording to the systemati" theology presented in the te*t. But what is truly important here is the la"$ of any "laim on Pro"lus% part to ha&ing presented in the te*t all the ,ods4 instead, he has gi&en us the di&ine orders and only so many parti"ular deities as are mentioned by Plato. #hrough the subordinate hebdomads the ,ods of the intelle"tual order e*press the roots in the intelligible order that they, li$e all ,ods, possess, namely the supra(essential "orrelates of Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t indi"ated by the three intelligible triads. #he first monad of the hebdomad is intelligible inasmu"h as those who are wise in all di&ine "on"erns "all the One and hyparxis intelligible (JH. 1JC. A4(K . #hat is, the One and hyparxis are intelligible for the theologian, supra(essential for the philosopher. !t should go without saying by now, howe&er, that this does not mean that the theologian spea$s of the One and hyparxis per se- rather, theologians spea$ of parti"ular deities < this is how they spea$ of the One and hyparxis. But the intelle"tual ,ods also re"apitulate, in the hebdomadi" arti"ulation of their a"ti&ity, the series of hypostases from Being to !ntelle"t. #he hypostasis of !ntelle"t differs from the intelle"t of the third intelligible triad in the reversion upon the intelligible "arried out by the intelle"tual ,ods. 3 prior mode of re&ersion was e*hibited in the pre&ious order when the ,ods too$ into themsel&es the intelligible as nutriment, whereas in the intelle"tual order it ta$es the form of ,ods re&erting upon prior "o(emergent deities. =eus, therefore, re&erts upon Fronos and upon Phanes. 8arrati&e in"ident being interposed between =eus and Fronos, we see the a"ti&ity of the dia"riti"al monad- for as Pro"lus points out, the myth in the ;orgias DKAJ 3 J(KE separates the empire of =eus from the $ingdom of Fronos, and "alls the former

338 the se"ond from, and more re"ent Dne%teranE than the latter (JI. 1JA. 1I(C . #his proto( temporal separation at on"e imparts temporality to the "onstitution of wholes and also "orresponds to the mythi"al narrati&e, whi"h emerges fully formed at the le&el of the intelle"tual ,ods, in "ontrast to the i"oni"ity of myth on the higher planes. 0ythi" narrati&e as narrative is always, we may say, an a""ount of the stru"ture and organi1ation of the !ntelle"t, a stru"ture whi"h in turn manifests itself in the soul, for the demiurge, fabri"ating the soul one whole, separates DdiakrineiE it into parts and multiformed DpolueideisE powers (JI. 1JJ. A(J . 0ythi" narrati&ity has thus a spe"ial referen"e to the emergent soul. #he following passage illustrates some of the "omple*ity of the multiple relationships between intelle"t and intelligible in this order4

#he first father of the ,ods in this order D&i1. the intelle"tualE at the same time is allotted a paternal trans"enden"y with respe"t to those posterior to him, and is the intelle"t of the first intelligibles. 9or e&ery unparti"ipated intelle"t is said to be the intelle"t of the things prior to itself, and towards them, from whom it is produ"ed, it has an intelle"tual "on&ersion, and in them as first(effe"ti&e Dpr%tourgoisE "auses it establishes itself. )hen"e also the demiurgi" intelle"t is the intelle"t of the natures abo&e itselfpro*imately of its own father, from whi"h it pro"eeds, but eminently of the intelligible henads beyond. #he first $ing in intelle"tuals, therefore, is both an intelle"tual father and a paternal intelle"t. 7e is the intelle"tual father of the ,ods that pro"eed from himself, but the paternal intelle"t of the intelligibles prior to himself. (JL. 1J4. 1J(A4

#he basi" idea in this passage is the double sided relationship possessed by intelle"tual ,ods in regard to the di&ine a"ti&ity prior and posterior to them. @elationships of sub+e"t

339 and ob+e"t, if not a"ti&ity and passi&ity, are essential to the intelle"tual order. #he unparti"ipated intelle"t, that is, the hypostasis of !ntelle"t, the produ"t of the a"ti&ity of the intelle"tual ,ods, is the intelle"t of the things prior to itself, namely the first intelligibles, whi"h is to say the totality of the ,ods, the intelligible order of the ,ods in the broad sense of the term, be"ause it formali1es them. #hat is, it embodies the refle"tion upon the totality of the ,ods of the intelle"tual ,ods. #hought thin$ing itself is the first form and the first identity, but be"ause it is in the first pla"e ea"h ,od thin$ing him;herself, it is also the thought of all the other ,ods. #he hypostasis of intelle"t is, of "ourse, unparti"ipated be"ause the relation between that whi"h is formali1ed and the form is not formali1ed, on pain of infinite regress. )ithin this stru"ture, the first intelle"tual monad "an be seen as both sub+e"t and ob+e"t, a duality arising immanently within him;herself. 9or s;he both "ogni1es the totality of the ,ods and is "ogni1ed as part of that totality. #his duality e*presses itself in the relationship of the first intelle"tual monad to the demiurgi" intelle"t, the third monad. #he demiurgi" intelle"t refle"ts its father, whi"h, depending upon the fa"ti"al theology in play "ould refer either to the paternal trans"enden"y of the &ery ,od identified with the demiurgi" intelle"t or to another ,od with whom the demiurge is "o(emergent as =eus is with Fronos. But a more arti"ulated theology is ob&iously more suited to the demands of the ontologi"al arti"ulation and determina"y of the intelle"t. 3nd so it is natural that the paternal should here be embodied in a mythologi"al relationship of paternity. #his relationship is the pro*imate intelle"tuality of the demiurge, e*pressing his;her dis"rete position in the pantheon. 3t the same time, howe&er, the demiurgi" intelle"t is eminently the intelle"t of the intelligible henads < meaning here all the ,ods.

340 #his eminen"e refers to the presen"e of all the ,ods in the ,od of the demiurgi" intelle"t qua ,od. #his trans"endent intelligen"e, whi"h is inherent in e&ery ,od, rea"hes e*pression through the demiurge in that s;he spea$s for all the ,ods < in his;her formati&e utteran"e, for his;her "o(emergent pantheon, of whi"h s;he o""upies the "enterin the materiality whi"h "annot without remainder be in"orporated into the demiurgi" world(order, for the Others. #he distin"tion between intellectual father and paternal intellect whi"h is applied to the first intelle"tual monad e*presses the dual nature of the ,ods of the intelle"tual order generally. 2;he is the intelle"tual father of the ,ods that pro"eed from him;her as e*pressing the relationship of father and son, whi"h entails a proto(temporality newly emergent at the le&el of intelle"t. )e re"all the passage from "P CJI dis"ussed in "hapter 1 of this dissertation, whi"h spe"ifi"ally addressed the sense of relationships su"h as father and son among the ,ods. )e should say that what is pe"uliarly no&el in this order and "onstituti&e of this relationship is the attribute of being a "hild of some other ,od, of being the younger. 8ote in this regard "P IHIf4 =eus and >ionysus are "alled by the theologians Mboys% and Myoung men% G and in general the intelle"tual order, when "ompared with the intelligible and paternal, is "alled Myoung%. Being a paternal intellect, by "ontrast, e*presses the immediate relationship of the first intelle"tual monad to the intelligible as su"h, whi"h has a"'uired signifi"ant "omple*ity by this stage in the pro"ession4 on the one hand, to be a paternal intelle"t is simply to be a di&ine intelle"t for itself as it were- but to be a di&ine intelle"t as well as an intellectual ;od is also to embody the paternal "hara"ter of the pre&ious intelligible hypostases insofar as they are generati&e of !ntelle"t qua hypostasis or diale"ti"ally. #here is thus a parallel between,

341 e.g. Fronos as the "ause of =eus and the intelligible as "ause of the intelle"tual- and this relation of "ausality between the intelligible and the intelle"tual is en"apsulated and, indeed, established in the relationship of father to son that e*ists between these two deities. Pro"lus e*plains that Fronos (the first intelle"tual monad "omprehends in himself the intelligible of the demiurgi" intelle"t and the pl&r%ma of beings (K. A1. C(1B . 3nd yet, at the same time,

Fronos is an all(perfe"t intelle"t, and the mighty =eus is li$ewise an intelle"t. Ea"h therefore being an intelle"t, ea"h is also e&idently an intelligible. 9or e&ery intelle"t is "on&erted to itself- but being "on&erted to itself a"ts DenergeiE upon itself. 3"ting howe&er towards itself, and not towards e*ternals, it is at on"e intelligible and intelle"tual- being intelle"tual, so far as it "ogni1es DnoeiE, but intelligible, so far as it is "ogni1ed DnoeitaiE. 7en"e also the intelle"t of =eus is to itself intelle"t, and to itself intelligible. 3nd in a similar manner the intelle"t of Fronos is to itself intelligible, and to itself intelle"t. But =eus indeed is more intelle"t, and Fronos more intelligible. (A1. 1H( AI

!ntelligibility and intelle"tuality are here ob&iously the e*"res"en"e of more fundamental narrati&e relationships of sub+e"t and ob+e"t among deities, for the status of being relati&ely more intelligible or more intelle"tual "an only be understood on this basis4 it is a matter of being more the thin$er or more that whi"h is thought. !t is no a""ident that su"h relationships among deities do not present themsel&es in the prior orders, for the mediation whi"h they imply is "onstituti&e of the determinations of the !ntelle"t. #he essential nature of intelle"t is su"h that there are two aspe"ts to the intelle"t

342 of =eus. !n regard to the self(dire"ted a"ti&ity of his intelle"t, he is the e'ual of Fronos, while with respe"t to the e*ternal a"ti&ity of his intelle"t, he is more intelle"tual than intelligible. !n this latter respe"t, that is, by &irtue of its e*ternal a"ti&ity, his intelle"t has a spe"ifi" position in the onti" hierar"hy, namely the demiurgi" intelle"t. As the demiurgi" intelle"t, rather than the intelle"t of a deity simpliciter, it has its intelligible (that is, the ob+e"t of its intelle"tion in the appropriate "o(emergent deity, that is, the one whose e*ternal a"ti&ity is su"h as to supply the pro*imate intelligibility for the demiurgi" intelle"tion. #he intelle"tual of Fronos is intelligible- but the intelligible of =eus is intelle"tual (AA. 4(K . Fronos plays an intelligible role within intelle"tuals as a fo"al point for the "o(emergent deities of this order- but what does it mean that the intelligible of =eus is intelle"tual6 !n one sense, it simply means that the intelligible of =eus is Dronos. But in another sense, it refers to the illumination by =eus of !ntelle"t, sin"e the intelligible of any ,od is that region of Being that they illuminate. But they do not illuminate these regions without at the same time affirming the prior illuminations. #herefore =eus, as an intelle"tual ,od, relates to those ,ods he at on"e contains, as a unitary deity, yet also posits prior to himself by order of illumination, as intelligibles. #hese relationships emerge in and through myth, representing his e*ternal a"ti&ities, his wor$s and his will. 7en"e =eus has the intelligible of his father, whi"h he binds, as the myth says, while he sees 3nimal !tself (AJ. I(H , that is, the hypostati1ed intelligible intelle"t. But Pro"lus is "areful to e*plain to us that =eus does this by self1 reflection4 9or entering into himself, he pro"eeds into the intelligible prior to himself, and by the intelligible whi"h is in himself, "ogni1es that whi"h is prior to himself (AA. Cf . #he point is important be"ause it applies to all intelle"t4 3nd thus the intelligible is

343 not e*ternal to intelle"t. 9or e&ery intelle"t possesses that whi"h is in itself without differing DadiaphoronE with respe"t to itself. But again, it "ogni1es in itself that whi"h is prior to itself (ibid . 2o what is prior to =eus in one way is not in another way- and it would seem that the ability of intelle"t < e&en, mutatis mutandis, the intelle"t in us < to "ogni1e its other in itself, without loss of integrity, is a lega"y be'ueathed to it in the last analysis from the unitary ,ods, ea"h of whom, "ontaining all the others, is able to a"tuali1e any of the host of potential relationships e*isting amongst themsel&es and the others, so as to "onstitute the regions of Being in whi"h we li&e and thin$. 3lthough this dissertation shall not tra"e the path from the ,ods to humans, we must not ignore the ways in whi"h the di&ine "ondition e"hoes in the human "ondition. 3nother relationship "onstituti&e of the intelle"tual order, e&idently, is that between the demiurge and the intelligible intelle"t or 3nimal !tself. 3nimal !tself intelligibly "omprehends in itself the whole /o&ian series DseiranE- but =eus the demiurge of the uni&erse Dtou pantosE intelle"tually pre(establishes in himself the nature DphusinE of 3nimal (N AL. 1BB. A(K . #he relationship in 'uestion is not that between =eus and Phanes, but between =eus and the third intelligible triad. !t is thus the relationship between a henad and a monad. #he monad 3nimal !tself "omprehends the /o&ian series or "hain intelligibly be"ause the a"ti&ity of that "hain lies in the illumination of Being by &irtue of di&ine intelle"t. 3s su"h, this series is "omprehended in the ob*ect of the /o&ian intelle"t, the series e*pressing the intentional ob+e"t or ob+e"ti&e a"ti&ity of the ,od. #he physis of 3nimal !tself, howe&er, is intelle"tually pre(established in =eus4 pre(established be"ause =eus, as a parti"ular deity with a proper name, represents the highest order of e*isten"e. )ithin his intelle"t < and now we are not, in effe"t, spea$ing

344 of the hypostasis of !ntelle"t but of that intelle"t whi"h is in =eus as there is a di&ine intelle"t in e&ery ,od < 3nimal !tself is pre(established in its nature, as indeed "ould be said of any ,od, for ea"h ,od possesses the possibility of "onstituting all the onti" hypostases. !n =eus as sub+e"t, the physis of 3nimal !tself is pre(established, while in 3nimal !tself as ob+e"t, the /o&ian "hain or pro"ession is "omprehended. #his distin"tion between the nature and hypostasis of the the third intelligible triad is signalled subtly by the fa"t that at line 4 Pro"lus simply says the nature of 3nimal, rather than 3nimal "tself. #he distin"tion is ne"essary inasmu"h as the a"ti&ity "onstituti&e of the hypostasis of intelligible intelle"t is separate from the presen"e of the di&ine intelle"t whi"h is an inseparable "omponent of e&ery deity. #his is none other than the distin"tion "onstantly obser&ed in this dissertation with respe"t to the intelligible order, by whi"h represented at on"e the attributes of e&ery ,od qua ,od and also a parti"ular order of ,ods. #o the former sense would belong the natures of the three triads, while the latter, the illuminati&e a"ti&ity of a parti"ular type of deity, would establish them as hypostases. #he latter is, as ! ha&e indi"ated, manifest in the a""ount of >amas"ius of the di&erse mythologies respe"ting the intelligible order. 3nother aspe"t of the relationship between the demiurge and 3nimal !tself emerges in a dis"ussion of the different manners in whi"h the two "an be regarded, whi"h permits an interpretation of "ertain epithets a""orded to the one or the other that might otherwise seem to undermine the hierar"hi"al relationship between these hypostases. 3ll(perfe"t and intelligible animal is parti"ularly "onsidered by #imaeus a""ording to a formal nature Dkata t&n eidetik&n phusinE and not a""ording to the unity Dhen%sinE whi"h is in it and an hypostasis whi"h is abo&e the forms of the 3ll Dhuper ta eid& tou pantosE (N AC. 1BL.

345 1B(4 . But both indeed, ! mean the demiurge and 3nimal !tself, parti"ipate of unity Dmetechei t&s hen%se%sE and prior to a formal essen"e Deidik&s ousiasE are "ontinuous with the One Dt% heni sunechetaiE (1BL. 1L(C . #he phrase parti"ipate of unity here is a harmless e'ui&o"ation meaning simply that one must ha&e regard in any "ase first to how matters stand with respe"t to the hierar"hy formed by modes of unity. #he phrase "ontinuous with the One on the other hand is an interesting e*ample of the terminology Pro"lus uses to e*press the e*traordinary relationship between the henads and the One. 7e goes on to e*plain that if you "onsider the henads whi"h are in them, that is, in the demiurge and 3nimal !tself, you must admit the henad of the paradigm D3nimal !tselfE to be intelligible, but the demiurgi" henad to be intelle"tual, and that an intelligible hyparxis is nearer to the first One G than an intelle"tual hyparxis (1BL. 1C(AJ . #hat is, if we "ompare henad to henad, then the henad whi"h is in, that is, illuminates the position of, the third intelligible triad < that would be Phanes, in the 7elleni" theology < is naturally prior to the henad whose a"ti&ity lies in the intelle"tual order (and it should no longer be ne"essary to point out that henads are ne&er literally intelligible or intelle"tual . But be"ause #imaeus "ompares the demiurge qua henad to 3nimal !tself qua monad, it is possible for the demiurge to re"ei&e epithets e*pressing a priority o&er 3nimal !tself. #hat this is indeed the "ase is indi"ated, for Pro"lus, by the referen"e to the demiurge as the best of "auses while the paradigm or 3nimal !tself is the first of forms (1BH. 1B(A - for to generate, to produ"e, and to e*er"ise pro&iden"e are the pe"uliarities of ,ods so far as they are ,ods (1BH. J(4 . !n the $epublic, for e*ample, 2o"rates

346
does not say that the sun is the "ause of generation until he has de"lared him to be the progeny of the supra(essential prin"iple of all things, +ust as #imaeus does not begin the fabri"ation of the uni&erse until he has "elebrated the goodness of the demiurge of wholes. 9or ea"h Dthe demiurge and the sunE is ali$e a produ"er Dhupostat&sE a""ording to the ,ood G and not a""ording to the intelle"t whi"h is in them, or life, or any other form of essen"e Dt&s ousias eidosE. (1BH. 1C(AL

>eity is ali$e goodness and "ausality par excellence. #he passage ser&es also to further "larify the distin"tion between the third intelligible triad insofar as it forms an aspe"t of ea"h and e&ery deity, and insofar as it is embodied by Phanes and forms an independent hypostasis. 8oti"e how a""ounts "an be, to "oin a phrase, more monadi" or more henadi", that is, they "an &ary in the relati&e proportions of stri"tly philosophi"al and stri"tly theologi"al material within them. #he a""ount in the Timaeus is essentially monadi"4 it names no ,ods sa&e 3thena and the Egyptian 8eith, and this in its prolegomena- its a""ount is only plausible, and the demiurge%s di&inity, his hyparxis, is merely indi"ated through his epithet the best of "auses and, a fortiori, the impossibility of spea$ing him to all people, whi"h indi"ates monadically, that is, in uni&ersal fashion, his particularity. #here are other pla"es in Plato%s wor$, howe&er, a""ording to Pro"lus, where the demiurge is identified as =eus, and whi"h are therefore more henadi" a""ounts of the same matters. 0ost henadi" of all, of "ourse, is an a""ount su"h as the Orphi" theogony, where the intelligible order of ,ods is itself illuminated and, "onse'uently, depi"ted in the Egg, Phanes, et al. !n the latter, whi"h is a wor$ of re&elation rather than philosophy, all of the prin"iples of the philosopher are figures of myth.

347 #he demiurge, we read, stably Dmonim%sE fi*es in himself all things Dta pantaE and again;in turn DpalinE produ"es them from himself imma"ulately Dachrant%sE (AL. 1BA. 1( A . #he term achrantos here alludes to the fun"tion of the guardian "lass of intelle"tual ,ods (identified by Pro"lus with the 7elleni" Fouretes who are the "auses and leaders of imma"ulate purity, from whom an infle*ible power pro"eeds to all the di&ine genera (N JJ. 1A1. K(C . #he "hara"teristi" of imma"ulate purity is inseparably lin$ed to the "hara"teristi" of infle*ibility, to akliton, in the des"riptions of this "lass. #hey are the infle*ible guard of wholes (1A1. 1J and they preser&e the whole pro"essions of the fathers undefiled DachrantousE and supply them with infle*ibility in their powers and immutability Dto atreptonE in their a"ti&ities (1AA. A(K . #he power of purity that the imma"ulate ,ods impart G both to the Tintelle"tualU fathers and to the other di&ine orders establishes the di&ine orders and, by e*tension, all the "lasses of beings, as dis"rete and intelle"tually organi1ed. )e read, for instan"e, that it is on a""ount of the immutable guard or defensi&e order "orresponding to the demiurge that all the demiurgi" powers are firmly Dmonim%sE established in themsel&es and all the forms are a""ording to supreme trans"enden"y e*empt from se"ondary natures (N J4. 1AJ. A4(K . #he new fun"tion "ontinues into the subse'uent orders as well, there being an undefiled order of the ruling ,ods as well (PT N! 1J . #heir presen"e in the intelle"tual and infra(intelle"tual orders indi"ates that with intelle"tual organi1ation "omes the essential possibility of "ontamination and interferen"e of form with form. )ere this dissertation to "ontinue into a dis"ussion of the si*th boo$ of the Platonic Theology, there would be more to say about the fun"tions of su"h guardians in relation to the o&erall mission of the ruling ,ods, namely to establish the stru"tures "onstituti&e of approximation to the form.

348 !n the intelle"tual order, howe&er, the intelle"tual determinations are shared out between the guardians and the prin"ipal intelle"tual ,ods. !n itself and in another, motion and rest, and sameness and differen"e are the determinations of the intelle"tual order of the ,ods a""ording to the interpretation of the Parmenides in the s"hool of 2yrianus. Of these, the determinations in itself, rest (or permanen"y, stasis and difference are attributed to the guardian "lass. #he determination of being in themsel&es is, of "ourse, a "ardinal determination of the trans"endent forms in the Parmenides. #he most important impli"ation of being in themsel&es for the forms is that they "annot be "lassed with their parti"ipants in respe"t of the 'uality they impart, +ust as the guardian "lass preser&es, e.g., for the demiurge the trans"enden"y of his essen"e G through whi"h he is ina""essible and unre&ealed to the partible DmeristoisE genera of ,ods (1AJ. A1(A . #he opposition of in itself and in another, whi"h is here brought into immediate pro*imity with essential "on"epts of narrati&ity su"h as agen"y and re"epti&ity, and in fa"t the whole range of asymmetrical orientations, se"ures the dis+un"tions whi"h form the s$eleton, so to spea$, of the onti" hierar"hy. #he dis+un"tions thus effe"ted between ,ods manifesting on supra( and infra(intelle"tual le&els of Being "onstitute the pri&ilege of narrati&e "oheren"e o&er indi&idual integrity whi"h at last permits the order of the hypostases and of diale"ti" to separate itself from the order of mythi" re&elation. 9or the manifestations of =eus in su""essi&e orders, for instan"e, are not to be +u*taposed with ea"h other upon a "ommon field, lest the "ontradi"tions in the epithets and narrati&e in"idents attributed to =eus as demiurge and the =eus who shares su1erainty with Poseidon and 7ades, or the =eus who is among the ,ods who guide souls in the Phaedrus, should be"ome &i"ious. !nstead, the series of =eus must organi1e itself

349 a""ording to the pros hen stru"ture familiar from 3ristotle, and whi"h 3. .. ?loyd has dubbed the 'uasi(genera or P(series- and the imma"ulate or guardian "lass of intelle"tual ,ods is responsible for separating the head of su"h a series, so to spea$, from its tail. 3 'uestion naturally arises as to the status of the guardian "lass, for the ,ods of this "lass seem imperfe"tly distinguished from the ,ods of the prin"ipal intelle"tual monads. >oth terms of the oppositions "onstituti&e of this order belong to the three "hief monadsit is simply that the determinations attributed to the guardian "lass belong to the intelle"tual fathers by virtue of their guardians. #his ambiguity is perfe"tly reasonable insofar as the identifi"ation of these guardian fun"tions is with an anonymous multipli"ity of ,ods, and not with fully indi&idual ,ods whose autonomy would thus be in"onsistently and improperly infringed. #his la"$ of differentiation among the guardian "lass seems to foreshadow the sub(di&ine orders of angels and daimons, howe&er, in whi"h su"h multitudes are "ommon in light of the lesser degree of indi&iduality manifest below the henadi" realm. #he operations of su"h beings would, again, be a matter appropriate to a "omprehensi&e dis"ussion of 8eoplatoni" psy"hology. #he determinations of in itself and in another arise in the first intelle"tual monad in a""ordan"e with matters we ha&e already "onsidered abo&e. #he first $ing and father of the intelle"tual ,ods G is in himself and in another. !nsofar as he is a whole intelle"t, his a"ti&ity is dire"ted to himself, but so far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himself, he establishes in another the all(perfe"t intelligen"e Dpantel& no&sinE of himself (N JL. 1JK. 1I(A1 . #he opposition of in himself and in another applies to this ,od (Fronos in the 7elleni" theology ontologi"ally, for in the Parmenides, this ,od appears to us as a pure

350 intelle"t (1JH. 1A(J notwithstanding that this wholeness is also a deity (AB(1 . 3s an intelle"tual ,od, that is, a ,od whose a"ti&ity lies in the illumination of Being, spe"ifi"ally that le&el of Being whi"h is !ntelle"t, the first $ing of the intelle"tual ,ods surrenders the autonomy of his all(perfe"t intelligen"e. #his latter term has "lear referen"es, first to the third intelligible triad, through the term pantelos, and se"ondly to the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order, through the term no&sis. #his no&sis is en all% be"ause through the intelle"tual order it emerges as an autonomous < indeed, ultimately philosophical < intelle"tion. En all% has thus the sense of ob*ectivity. #his ob+e"ti&ity "omes about through the establishment of "omprehensi&e mediation among the ,ods through the dia"riti"al monad, whi"h represents mythi"al or "osmogeneti" narrati&e in general. #his mediation is at on"e a unifi"ation of the ,ods into an ob+e"ti&e totality, as well as a multipli"ation relati&e to their supra(essential disposition of unitary indi&iduality. Pro"lus refers elsewhere to the first intelle"tual monad as the intelle"t that is multiplied a""ording to intelle"tions Dtas no&seisE (N JC. 14I. 14 , be"ause the ,od of this monad thinks another < we "ould say, thin$s him;herself as another < in order to establish the onti" !ntelle"t, hen"e multiplying his perfe"t simpli"ity in granting ob+e"ti&ity to his;her thoughts as formal ob+e"ts. Hua henad, of "ourse, there is no other for a ,od, for ea"h is the 3ll, an aspe"t represented by the third intelligible triad. #he pro"ess of illumination, howe&er, is a pro"ess of surrendering autar"hy and "onstituting, in stages, genuine alterity from out of di&ine selfhood. #hrough its determinations of in another and in itself, the intelligible deity of intelle"tuals < that is, the first intelle"tual monad, the one in the intelligible position, as it were, with respe"t to the rest of the order < e*hibits DdeiknusinE from himself

351 a""ording to unity Dkat' hen%sinE the twofold forms of "on&ersion (JL. 1JL. 1J(K , the twofold "on&ersion being of things towards themsel&es and towards their "auses, the re&ersion upon the "ause e*pressing being in another while the re&ersion upon the self e*presses the in itself. #he summit of intelle"tuals, we read, pours forth from itself the whole and all(perfe"t form of "on&ersion (1JL. 1(J . 3ll(perfe"t is, as ! ha&e noted pre&iously, an epithet of the third intelligible triad (whi"h is also "onnoted by the referen"e to form , and its appli"ation here resonates with this monad%s e*hibiting from himself a""ording to unity the forms of re&ersion. !n other words, that the form is all( perfe"t "orresponds to its e*hibition kat'hen%sin. #he latter was the term used for the pro"ession of the henads from the One, while the term deiknusin re"alls the terminology used with respe"t to ?imit and !nfinity in the Philebus (AJ . C(1B 4 ,od Dton theonE has e*hibited DdeixaiE the ?imit and the !nfinity of beings. 3nd when we say that ea"h of the di&ine orders at on"e remains and pro"eeds, we re"ogni1e that it remains fi*ed a""ording to ?imit but pro"eeds a""ording to !nfinity (!!! H. JA. AJ(I - so then the e*hibition in the intelle"tual order of the forms of re&ersion "orresponds to the e*hibition in the intelligible order of the radi"al origins of onti" pro"ession and re&ersion. #his e*hibition amounts to the e*emplary or paradigmati" presen"e of these 'ualities in the ,od (all(perfe"t being an epithet of the paradigm and the ,ods qua paradigms whi"h does not "ompromise the di&ine integrity insofar as these 'ualities pro"eed kat'hen%sin. #he determinations of motion and rest "orrespond to the se"ond intelle"tual monad (7elleni" @hea , whi"h we ha&e already dis"ussed as the site of the fountains of soul, &irtue and physis. 0otion and rest in the intelle"tual order represent the "ulmination of

352 the de&elopment of the powers of the ,ods, whi"h now ta$e the form of the a"tions and rea"tions of ,ods upon ea"h other "onstituti&e of mythi" narrati&e. #his narrati&ity, whi"h is the intelle"tual produ"t of the ,ods, o""urs within the noeti" spa"e, so to spea$, established by the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order. Parmenides demonstrates that the One in this order is mo&ed, be"ause it pro"eeds Dpro&lthenE from the "auses of all ?ife that are pla"ed abo&e it Dhuperkeimen%nE, (JH. 14B. ALf but

the rest "oordinate with this motion is not one "ertain genus Dhen ti genosE of Being, as neither is motion, for beings indeed parti"ipate naturally of the genera of Being, but the supra(essential goods of the ,ods are e*panded abo&e Dhuper&pl%taiE the "lass of beings. !f, therefore, Parmenides here, positing the One !tself by itself, sur&eys in it motion and rest, he e&idently does not attribute the elements of Being to the ,ods, but assigns to them pe"uliarities that are appropriate, all(perfe"t and trans"ending wholes. 3nd thus asserting that the One is mo&ed and at rest, by motion, indeed, he imparts the &i&ifi" hyparxis of the ,ods G (141. 1Hf

#his is a fine passage in whi"h to note the way that Pro"lus spea$s inter"hangeably of the One in its &arious determinations and the orders of the ,ods. #hat the One is mo&ed and at rest signifies a parti"ular hyparxis, a parti"ular mode of e*isten"e, of the ,ods, a spe"ifi" good of the ,ods on behalf of Being. #he One !tself by itself, a term prominently applied earlier in the Parmenides to the !deas, is that in whi"h one dis"erns and from whi"h one infers these parti"ular modes of di&ine e*isten"e. But the distin"tion between the ,ods and Being is ne&er permitted to lapse4 the ,ods do not lie on the side of Being, so to spea$, but remain supra(essential, and do not represent a de"lension of

353 some one thing into multipli"ity through Being, whi"h remains e&er a product of the ,ods, and not their "ause. )e arri&e finally at the basi" stru"tural determinations of the demiurge. #he determinations arising in the third monad of the intelle"tual order a""ording to the e*egesis of the Parmenides a"hie&e a new order of "omple*ity, in that the One is no longer demonstrated to be simply identical or different, as it was in itself or in another, or moved and at rest, but is demonstrated to be identical with itself and different from itself, and different from other things and identical with other things (14J. 1C(AA . #he identity(with(self of the demiurge is a symbol Dsunth&maE of his proper, that is, paternal, hyparxis (144. 1H(C . #he use of the term sunth&ma is signifi"ant here, insofar as it shows the relationship between a ,od%s hyparxis < whi"h is e'uated here with their paternal or peras aspe"t < and the forms asso"iated with the monadi" positions they o""upy. #he form of identity(with(self is, in relation to the supra(essential "hara"ter of the ,od, li$e the sunth&mata, to$ens used in theurgi"al in&o"ation, those items in the physi"al realm < in"enses, stones, images < that "an be used as bonds between the human and di&ine.A1 But there is more here- the demiurge is, in a way, also himself a symbol4 9or being one DheisE, and the e*empt father and demiurge of wholes, he establishes his proper unity Dt&n oikeian hen%sinE in himself. 3nd in him Parmenides espe"ially e*hibits DdeiknusiE the uniform DmonoeidesE and that whi"h is a$in DsuggenesE to ?imit (144. 1C( AA . #he unity whi"h the demiurge establishes in himself (est&sen en heaut% "omes from the demiurge positing himself in relation to the uni'ue "osmos whi"h is the produ"t of his formati&e a"ti&ity and the uni'ue (monogenes paradigm whi"h that "osmos e*pli"ates, a
A1 2ee the e*"ellent dis"ussion of the role of sunth&mata in theurgy in ,regory 2haw Theurgy and the :oul, The eoplatonism of "amblichus (5ni&ersity Par$4 Penn. 2tate 5ni&. Press, 1CCK , in whi"h there are also in&aluable refle"tions on the relationship between theurgy and demiurgy.

354 relationship in whi"h he affirms or symboli1es his unity. #he demiurge is the point at whi"h the henadi" and monadi" registers, registers of internal and external unity respe"ti&ely, are fastened, so to spea$, to one another. #he hen%sis of a ,od is not, to begin with, something whi"h is either established or e&en oikeios, and so the deployment of su"h terminology is no more a""idental than the use of in himself. @ather, it e*presses the transition from the unitary to the uniform. #he demiurge%s exclusive position in relation to the "osmos and the paradigm symbolizes within Being his supra(essential hyparxis. Establishment is always something done by a ,od in regard to Being, and it in&ol&es re"ipro"ity and mediation. #he demiurgi" powers are firmly established in themsel&es (J4. 1AJ. AK - the ,od of the first intelle"tual monad, produ"ing from himself whole "auses G in turn establishes them in and "on&erts them to himself at the same time that he establishes himself in analogy (analogon with the first order of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods and the first intelligible triad (JL. 1JK. 1A . )hat the demiurge is said to establish in himself here is his own unity, and in this fashion he be"omes a way of e*hibiting or indi"ating (deiknunai the ineffable indi&iduality and uni'ueness of ea"h ,od, that is, of the ,ods in general. 2;he is the e*emplary ,od. )e re"all that ?imit and !nfinity were e*hibited by ho theos, that is, paternal deity in general, and that the two forms of re&ersion were e*hibited by the first intelle"tual monad. 7ere it is that whi"h is akin to ?imit that is e*hibited. But the demiurgi" e*hibition is the pre"ondition for the former e*hibition, that is, the e*hibition of ?imit by ea"h ,od qua ,od. #he demiurge e*emplifies the formal dimension of deities as su"h, whi"h, be"ause ea"h ,od is the 3ll, is a"tuali1ed in and through be"oming the unit of measure for the "osmos. 3nd it is through deities being posited in relation to a "osmi"

355 whole, that is, ontologi"ally, that the elements of ?imit and !nfinity emerge in the first pla"e. #he determinations of identi"al(with(other(things and different(from(other(things "orrespond to the two aspe"ts of the demiurge%s "ausal power, the former being that through whi"h the demiurge is present to all that he produ"es and is the same in all that he orders DdiakosmeiE, pre(establishing in himself the generati&e essen"e of wholes (144. AK(L , while the different from other things manifests his imma"ulate purity, (14K. I(L through whi"h he is separate Dch%ristosE from wholes, is dis+oined Ddiest&kenE from them, and is unparti"ipated by other things (14I. 1(A , maintaining a unity separated Dekbeb&kuianE from multipli"ity (14I. H(C . #he array of terms for separation, whose &ariety "annot be ade'uately translated, demonstrates that the hindran"e that pre&iously e*isted in regard to mediated relationships has been fully remo&ed at this stage. #he trans"enden"e of the demiurge o&er the "osmos now impli"ates the demiurge himself re"ipro"ally- it is a standing apart, a for"eful repulsion. #he determination of differen"e(from(other(things e*presses the a"ti&ity of the guardian order "oordinate with the demiurge, as did the subsisten"e in self of the first intelle"tual monad and the subsisten"e at rest of the se"ond. #hat these respe"ti&e deities should be primarily and as su"h in another and in motion, and that the demiurge should be determined with e'uiprimordiality as identical with him@herself and identical with other things shows that it is not a matter of pro"eeding from onti" determinations implying ontic unity, su"h as sameness, rest and subsisten"e(in(self, to their opposites, whi"h imply ontic multiplicity. @ather, sin"e the ,ods are prior to onti" unity and multipli"ity ali$e, the logi" of the illumination of the !ntelle"t, rather than a logi" of the

356 de"lension of the di&ine, dri&es the disposition of the "on"eptual moments in relation to the ,ods of the order. #his logi" re'uires the ,ods to be in the first pla"e in a position of going out from themselves, and only returning to themsel&es in a se"ondary moment. #his is essentially be"ause, as ! ha&e stressed, pro"ession and re&ersion ali$e are performed by deities as part of the establishment of Being, and not, as it were, to se"ure their own position. !n this sense, e&en the re&ersion of the ,ods is a $ind of pro"ession, in that in ea"h "ase it establishes new onti" stru"tures. #he guardian order of the demiurge is the "ause of separate Dch%rist&sE pro&iden"e (14I. 11(A . #his separate pro&iden"e "orresponds to the imparti"ipability of the demiurge. ,ods qua ,ods are parti"ipatedhowe&er, as we read in ET prop. 1I1 3ll the true Being Dto ont%s onE whi"h is atta"hed to the ,ods is a di&ine intelligible and unparti"ipated, for the monads, that is, prin"iples or hypostases of Being arising from di&ine a"ti&ity, are unparti"ipated. 2eparate pro&iden"e may be "hara"teri1ed as the formal, uni&ersal or unparti"ipated moment of pro&iden"e, that is, pro&iden"e whi"h "annot be identified with any parti"ular pro&idential instan"e. #he determination of difference from self, finally, e*presses the a"ti&ity of the se&enth intelle"tual monad, whi"h distinguishes DdiakrineinE the demiurgi" monad itself from itself (14I. AJ(4 . )e ha&e already spo$en of this dia"riti"al monad in respe"t to the status of the narrati&ity "onstituti&e of the intelle"tual order and the emergent soul, but the other side of this monad%s a"ti&ity is in respe"t to the system itself, a properly philosophical narrati&ity, for this monad separates Ddiist&siE the demiurgi" intelle"t from the ,ods prior to it, and distinguishes DdiakrineiE the monads in it from ea"h other (14L. 1J(K . #he demiurgi" intelle"t is di&ided from itself, from the other ,ods, and di&ided in

357 itself, analy1ed, as it were, into monads, insofar as the &ery system to whi"h the philosopher%s dis"ourse appro*imates, and whi"h e*tends in a measured series of &ariations down from the hidden le&el to that of distin"tness ("P 1B4C lies within this intelle"t, a ,od thin$ing the 3ll.

358

.on"lusion

#he pro"ession of the henads and their "onstitution of Being does not end with the intelle"tual order. #here would be mu"h of &alue in treating of those infra(intelle"tual orders of ,ods treated in the si*th boo$ of the Platonic Theology and at &arious points in other of the wor$s of Pro"lus. !t would pro&ide an a""ount of how the indi&idual soul, through the whole "ompass of its a"ti&ities < ethi"al, aestheti", and eroti", hermeneuti" and symboli" < establishes itself as a demiurge in its own domain, "onstituting a meaningful "osmos out of the "haos of its embodied state. !t would also help to flesh out some of my remar$s through the "ourse of this dissertation about the way in whi"h the system "onstitutes itself phenomenologi"ally for the sub+e"t. But for this &ery reason, the natural method of pro"eeding in su"h an a""ount should be from the soul upward, so to spea$, rather than from the ,ods downward. 2u"h an a""ount would a""ordingly re'uire mu"h an"illary material on 8eoplatoni" psy"hology and theurgy. 9urthermore, the trun"ation of the Platonic Theology after the si*th boo$ would not allow an entirely

359 satisfying e*position, for whi"h we would need to sur&ey the "ompleted "osmogeneti" progress from the intelle"tual to the mundane orders. !nstead, ! ta$e this opportunity to draw some broader obser&ations in "on"lusion. #he henadology as ! ha&e presented it in this dissertation introdu"es themes of e*istentialism and pluralism into the edifi"e of histori"al Platonism. 2ior&anes has already used the term e*istentialism in passing with respe"t to the Pro"lean "on"ept of hyparxis (1LA . But the signifi"an"e of thin$ing of Pro"lus as an e*istentialist is that he remains, ne&ertheless, a Platonist. Pro"lus does not simply oppose E*isten"e to Beingrather, as ! ha&e tried to show in my interpretation of the Platonic Theology, he gi&es an a""ount of the evolution of Being from E*isten"e. #he henads negate the determinations of onti" unity, a""ording to whi"h the unity of ea"h being is a fun"tion of its unity with the others, that is, its subsumption into a greater whole, a mediating third term- yet the henads also establish these onti" stru"tures in the first pla"e. #he henadology is therefore unli$e an atomisti" pluralism, for atomism lea&es itself in"apable of a""ounting for the moment of mediation. #he henadology, by "ontrast, attempts to "arry out the transmutation of the unity of the unitary indi&idual into the unity of Being. #he fundamental nature of this pro"ess is refle"ted in the fa"t that there is no higher genus of unity of whi"h these two modes of unity would be spe"ies. !nstead, their intelligibility lies only in the pro"ess of generating the one out of the other. E*isten"e is, for Pro"lus, inseparable from indi&iduality, and indi&iduality from plurality. #hat the henads ha&e no other above them does not, by any means, imply that ea"h henad does not ha&e others with it. Pro"lus% polytheism, far from being "ontingent in relation to his philosophi"al system, or worse yet, in"onsistent with it, is in fa"t essential to it. Pro"lus% philosophy

360 would not fun"tion were its sub+e"t singular, insofar as no "ontent "ould be gi&en to the distin"tion between E*isten"e and Being at the system%s in"eption, nor "ould any a""ount be gi&en of the status of matter at its end. #he system would begin with the abstra"t and end with the abstra"t. #he henads are primordially with ea"h other, but in su"h a fashion that, instead of under"utting their indi&iduality, demands that the first mediation be a"hie&ed among them rather than beyond them. #his pro"ess amounts to the generation of intersub+e"ti&ity out of plural sub+e"ti&ities, so that in the "ompleted synthesis of the system, the irredu"ible uni'ueness of ea"h henad and the moment of "ommunity in the !dea are e'ually indispensable. #hrough the geneti" stages of diremption, "o(emergen"e and appropriation into a "osmos or world(order tra"ed through the third, fourth and fifth boo$s of the Platonic Theology we "an tra"e the emergen"e of intelle"tual "ons"iousness from pre( and proto(intelle"tual "omponents. 0ilestones in this pro"ess are the p&gai, the fountains or intelligible forms. 3s the a""ount has unfolded, we ha&e seen the fountains play di&erse roles, and they are not, it would seem, meant to be so rigidly organi1ed as the hypostases. Pro"lus nowhere offers us a list of the fountains meant to be e*hausti&e or demonstrati&e. !n general, howe&er, we "an "hara"teri1e them as ethi"o(aestheti" regulati&e ideas. #hey are dis"losi&e of philosophy itself < we re"all the fountain of 2"ien"e, for e*ample < and yet it is diffi"ult to fi* them unambiguously within the "onfines of the philosophi"al system. #his does not mean that they are not open to a "ertain rational inspe"tion- but as the presuppositions of rational in'uiry and the ines"apable e*istential context of that in'uiry, they are always in&estigated after the fa"t of their emergen"e and at their own instigation. 7a&ing their origin in the third intelligible triad, the moment of #otality or 3llness, they

361 "annot, in parti"ular, be grasped in an a""ount that pres"inds from the rele&ant totalities, su"h as that of nature, of the soul, of the ethi"al "ommunity, or of e*isten"e itself < that is, the totality possessed by the indi&idual whi"h has its other in itself. #he "on"eption of E*isten"e as essentially plural indi&iduality "asts fresh light upon one of the fundamental tas$s whi"h metaphysi"s set for itself at its in"eption, namely the problem of multipli"ity. #he problem with whi"h the Parmenides begins is =eno%s "riti'ue of multipli"ity (1AL >(E . Perhaps we do not need to be partisans of any parti"ular interpretation of this dialogue to see the point of this e*er"ise as not being, in the end, to deny the e*isten"e of multipli"ity and thus to "lea&e one world into two, without hope of mediation, but to "all attention to the la"$ of a way of "on"ei&ing of multipli"ity whi"h does not redu"e it to unity. #o "reate two worlds, and subordinate one to the other, already implies the ine&itable re&ersal of &aluation with no real ad&an"e in understanding. !nstead, we "an see =eno%s "riti'ue as a "hallenge. #he absolute multipli"ity that re+e"ts all unifi"ation is ne&ertheless, in parado* and "ontradi"tion, brought to unity under the sign of this &ery re+e"tion (that is, the many are like ea"h other or unified by their re+e"tion of unity . #he theory of 9orms whi"h 2o"rates proposes is not meant to sub+ugate multipli"ity to unity further, for the submission of multipli"ity in its most abstra"t form has already been se"ured by =eno. @ather, the theory of forms attempts to balan"e the "laims of unity and multipli"ity su"h that multipli"ity "an be affirmed in its being, despite the "entripetal for"e of intelligibility first "learly dis"erned by the histori"al Parmenides. #he theory of forms emerging from Parmenides% maieuti" in the dialogue < a""epting, along with Pro"lus, that it is an impro&ed theory of forms whi"h emerges at

362 the end of this pro"ess, instead of a re+e"tion of the theory < fails, howe&er, to settle the problem of multipli"ity in its radi"al form. #his problem manifests in two prin"ipal ways. 9irst, there is the problem of the indi&iduals instantiating infima species. 3t the end of the dialogue between Parmenides and 2o"rates, the relationship between parti"ulars and the forms has been rendered aporeti" at the same time that its diale"ti"al ne"essity has been affirmed. 2e"ond, there is the aporia of unity itself as the ground of the di&erse ways of being one, whi"h emerges impli"itly from the #hird 0an problemati". #his aporia is the sub+e"t of the se"ond part of the dialogue and gi&es birth to the distin"ti&e 8eoplatoni" "on"ept of the One !tself. E&en if there had ne&er been, within the "ourse of histori"al Platonism, a thin$er who "on"ei&ed the do"trine of the One as a means to the affirmation of multipli"ity, we should find oursel&es led to dis"ern this as an out"ome of the diale"ti" of the Parmenides from the moment that we "ommitted oursel&es to an interpretation of this dialogue as ha&ing any positi&e out"ome at all < e&en if the result was only an unfulfilled potential relati&e to the subse'uent de&elopment of Platonism. #here is a symmetry between =eno%s "riti'ue of multipli"ity and the "on"lusion of the first hypothesis4 =eno shows that multipli"ity, in its intelligibility, must redu"e to unity, while the "on"lusion of the first hypothesis is that the absolute unity "an be neither intelligible nor singular. 3bsolute unity, then, properly "on"ei&ed, holds out the promise of "oming to the res"ue of multipli"ity. Pro"lus ta$es up this "hallenge by positing e*istential indi&iduality as the absolute form of unity, to whi"h the other modes of unity are disposed pros hen. #his absolute unity is pre"isely not singular in 'uantity- it is many, polla, without forming a manifold, pl&thos. Ontologi"ally

363 spea$ing, it represents a power that "annot be "ir"ums"ribed within the limits of ontology, a power trans"ending form, the power of the proper name. 8e"essity thus ta$es on a new form in Pro"lus. 8e"essity, in the last analysis, is the multipli"ity of the ultimate indi&iduals and the totality of ea"h. !t is this whi"h dri&es the whole mo&ement "onstituti&e of Being, whose telos is the expression by the ,ods of the presen"e of all in ea"h. !t is this whi"h dri&es the emergen"e from them of that whi"h is one, other and ob+e"t to them all. 3t the end of the pro"ess of ontogenesis, after the "onstitution of 9orm, lies that "lass of imperfe"t or partial re"ipients at the periphery of any gi&en formal regime, whi"h thereby e*presses negati&ely the e*isten"e of other centers without those other "enters being in"orporated as dependen"ies of the regime in 'uestion. #he imperfe"t re"eption of form thus stands as the negati&e refle"tion of henadi" indi&iduality and as the sign of the "ompletion of the e*pression by the henads of their e*isten"e. #his allows us to answer a final 'uestion. Aor whom is the henadi" arithmos, that is, that multipli"ity of the ,ods whi"h is neither a parti"ular pantheon of "o(emergent deities, nor the ontologi"al appropriation of the ,ods as if they depended from a monad that is the One !tself, whi"h the philosopher%s faGon de parler, but that plurality of the ,ods whi"h is the ultimate ne"essity6 Aor whom is the awareness of polytheism as such or in itself6 )e must regard it as being the spe"ial pro&in"e of the indi&idual who "an ta$e sto"$ of their own be"oming, their own flu*, a fun"tion whi"h in itself trans"ends intelle"tion. )e share in the nature of the demiurge, the e*emplary di&ine indi&idual within the Pro"lean system, both in our a""ess to intelle"t and in our essential a""ess to something beyond the intelle"tual, whi"h "orresponds in us as in the demiurge to our

364 indi&iduality, be it e&er so different in the two instan"es, the one prior to form, the other posterior to form. #a$ing sto"$ of the henads must fundamentally transform our image of the Platoni" uni&erse. 8o deity is e&er "onstrained on"e and for all by the aspe"ts of themsel&es they ha&e shown to us in history as we ha&e $nown it. #hey "ould always ha&e dis"losed more and may yet, if we are "apable of re"ei&ing this illumination. )e no longer "onfront a uni&erse whi"h "an only iterate the same forms indefinitely, with no real a""ess of no&elty possible, but rather, a uni&erse in whi"h the formal dimension is "onstantly "hallenged and renewed by a""ess to the pre(intelligible domain of e*isten"e or hyparxis.

365

3ppendi*4 3 @e&iew of 2ele"ted ?iterature on the 7enads

The eo1Platonists, A :tudy in the History of Hellenism by #homas )hitta$er, And edition (.ambridge 5ni&ersity Press, 1C1H .

)hitta$er pro&ides a "areful, insightful and sympatheti" o&er&iew of the philosophy of Pro"lus. 3s for the henads, his a""ount is drawn "hiefly from the ET. 7e remar$s that DmEu"h has been written upon the 'uestion, what the henads of Pro"lus really mean, (1LJ but unfortunately does not "ite any parti"ular wor$s. 7e e*pli"itly re+e"ts the notion that the do"trine is merely an attempt to find a more definite pla"e for polytheism than was mar$ed out in the system of Plotinus, and appro&es of the attempt to find in it a more philosophi"al meaning (ibid . !t does not o""ur to )hitta$er that the attempt to arti"ulate in a philosophi"ally rigorous fashion the presuppositions underlying

366 polytheisti" religious pra"ti"e might be at least as legitimate qua philosophy as the medie&al attempt to philosophi"ally arti"ulate the prin"iples of the monotheisti" religions. )hitta$er%s brief remar$s on the henads ne&ertheless show signifi"ant insight. Pro"lus see$s the "ause of plurality in things at a higher stage than the intelligible world, in whi"h Plotinus had been "ontent to find its beginning. Before being and mind are produ"ed, the One a"ts as it were through many points of origin, (ibid, my emphasis . )hitta$er demonstrates ab ovo in this latter remar$ the essential insight whi"h is re'uired to grasp the signifi"an"e of the do"trine. )hitta$er does not attempt to answer in thoroughgoing fashion the 'uestion of how the a""ount of the One as a "ausal agent is to be re"on"iled with its absolute negati&ity. But he does re"ogni1e the problem, as$ing what is the meaning of M"reation% by the One6 !t means, for both philosophers DPlotinus and Pro"lusE, essentially this4 that without unity in and o&er the system of things there would be no parti"ular e*isten"e as an a"tually reali1ed thing. !t does not mean that abstra"t unity, without the latent e*isten"e of a many as it were in its own right, "alls it from nothing into being (AJKf . #he One indeed "annot be regarded as an abstra"t unity, and he "orre"tly dis"erns the holisti" determination of parti"ular beings. 7e is "orre"t, furthermore, that the many must e*ist, somehow, in its own right, < i.e. as many points of origin < but finding no ready solution he falls ba"$ on the impra"ti"able notion of laten"y. 3gain, howe&er, he dis"erns the rele&ant problemati" when he e*plains 8eoplatonists as stri&ing to a&oid the

bringing of "haos into order by a sort of a""idental "oming together of ,od and an independent 0atter G 7en"e the apparent stringen"y of their immaterialist monism. 9or a real understanding of their position, howe&er, we must e'ually a&oid attributing to them

367
the ideas of &olitional "reation and of Mpantheisti" absorption.% #he many are ne&er finally absorbed into the One- and therefore, on 8eoplatoni" prin"iples, there was ne&er a time when they did not in some sense e*ist as a many. On this, Pro"lus is more e*pli"it than Plotinus. (AJI

)hitta$er remar$s again later, this time in spe"ifi" referen"e to the Timaeus "ommentary, that DiEn the metaphysi"al do"trine the element of pluralism, as already noted, be"omes more e&ident on "loser e*amination, referring to the indissolubility of the mundane ,ods, who are indissoluble (alutoi by their own nature in so far as that nature is di&ine. #hey are said to be at the same time resoluble (lutoi not in the sense that they are destru"tible, but be"ause, not being perfe"tly simple, their "omponents, as "ontained in uni&ersal 0ind (signified by the 9ather and 0a$er , "an be dis"riminated in thought- in other words, they are mentally analysable (AHHf . 3lthough needing far more elaboration, this is a reading perfe"tly "onsonant with the interpretation of the lower orders of the ,ods in this dissertation. 3gain, )hitta$er remar$s with referen"e to the "ommentary on the $epublic, spe"ifi"ally the "ommentary on the nuptial number of $ep. N!!!. K4K(I ("$ !!. LC , that the impossibility of "omplete dedu"tion from the superior order of "auses is re"ognised Dby Pro"lusE. 2in"e Pro"lus "annot admit the emergen"e anywhere of something from nothing, this means, as has been noted before, that there is an element of e*pli"it pluralism in his do"trine (JBA . #here are further instan"es of )hitta$er%s "are with the do"trine. !n an area of the do"trine whi"h is prone to misunderstanding, )hitta$er re"ogni1es (1LKf that henads parti"ipated in by, e.g., !ntelle"t or 2oul are no less henads than those parti"ipated by Being- and as we ha&e already seen he understands that ,ods are ,ods for Pro"lus

368 regardless of the le&el of Being at whi"h they manifest themsel&es. 7e sees the monad as the unity of a group, and does not "onflate monads and henads, and remar$s on the spe"ial status of the demiurge as 0onas monadum (AK1 . ,i&en his profound insight into Pro"lean pluralism, )hitta$er "ould easily ha&e hit upon the present interpretation of the henadology had he only ta$en note of the distin"tion Pro"lus draws in the Parmenides "ommentary between the nature of di&ine multipli"ity and that "hara"teristi" of the !deas.

The Elements of Theology, And ed., "ommentary by E. @. >odds (O*ford4 .larendon Press, 1CIJ .

>odds supplements his translation with an e*tensi&e "ommentary, &ery useful philologi"ally but somewhat less so philosophi"ally. !n the 'uestion of the histori"al roots of the "on"ept of henads prior to Pro"lus this dissertation ta$es no interest. )ith respe"t to the substan"e of the do"trine, >odds has at least more dis"ernment than he has sympathy. 7e $nows better than to see in the henads the parts or attributes of the One, e&en if he "an find no better substitute than the e'ually una""eptable, and possibly indistinguishable, notion that they are aspe"ts of the goodness of the One (AKC, ALB(1 . !n pla"e of sympathy, he ma$es do with open antipathy, "alling the theologi"al side of the do"trine a singular e*ample of the sur&i&al of an obsolete "reed in mummy form < a mode of preser&ation whi"h be"omes possible only when the "reed is already dead (AKC . #o the e*tent that he attempts to +ustify this denun"iation, he does so by "harging that

369

this epist&monik& theologia resulted in depri&ing the gods of all personality, and e&en of all identity G so that =eus, for e*ample, appears as fi&e different gods ea"h of whom symboli1es the M+o&ial% prin"iple on different planes of reality G #hat 7omer%s Olympians, the most &i&idly "on"ei&ed anthropomorphi" beings in all literature, should ha&e ended their "areer on the dusty shel&es of this museum of metaphysi"al abstra"tions is one of time%s strangest ironies. (AIB

One s"ar"ely $nows what to ma$e of this attempt to impose one%s own aestheti" preferen"es on a religion in whi"h one has no spiritual interest. Pro"lus, by "ontrast, li$e >amas"ius and others of the 3thenian 3"ademy, plainly had su"h an interest, and it is rather >odds who wishes to ma$e a museum pie"e of their religion by &esting it solely in 7omer%s hands. But the poets are already for Plato no more and no less than herm&n&s, interpreters, of the ,ods ("on KJ4e . >odds thin$s that to analy1e the nature of the ,ods is to depri&e them of interest- but he does not see that the whole essen"e of the henadology is to safeguard the indi&iduality and generati&ity of ea"h of the ,ods by prying them free from the a""retions of tradition insofar as the "onfli"t among these would tend to smother it. 9or >odds, it is proof that Pro"lus is far from treating his Mgods% as persons that at "T !!! 1H4. A1 he a""epts both the statement of 7esiod that O"eanos, #ethys, Fronos and @hea were all of them begotten by Ouranos upon ,e, and the statement of the Timaeus that O"eanos and #ethys were the parents of Fronos and @hea (AIB n. J . 3nd yet the genius of the henadology from a theologi"al perspe"ti&e is pre"isely that it is able both to preser&e "onfli"ting traditions li$e these, per"ei&ing them ea"h as e*pressing different aspe"ts of the deities in 'uestion, while simultaneously

370 affirming the indi&iduality of ea"h ,od trans"ending any relations or dia"riti"al determinations, with the effe"t that no single tradition about him;her "an hegemoni"ally fore"lose the possibility of others. )hat is, indeed, ironi" is that >odds fails to see at the heart of the henadology pre"isely that affirmation of indi&iduality abo&e and beyond merely formal determination that represents the true ad&an"e of the do"trine beyond "lassi"al Platonism, pro&iding the possibility of a new bond being forged between the indi&iduals at the top and at the bottom of the system, respe"ti&ely. >odds fails utterly to understand the deep moti&es of the system and the foundation of Pro"lus% world(&iew in the e*isten"e of really indi&idual deities. 7en"e he presumes to find in Pro"lus a loose usage of the term theos whi"h he sees Pro"lus +ustifying in what he terms an important passage of the Platonic Theology (! AL. IJff . But the passage, whi"h he merely "ites rather than 'uoting, says nothing of the $ind. @ather, it "on"erns the narrow 'uestion of how generations or births of the ,ods in mythologi"al dis"ourse < in"luding the myths in Plato < are to be understood. !t is not, here, a matter of e'ui&o"al referen"e to things whi"h are generated, as ,ods, but rather a matter of the indi"ation through symbols of the progression of the ,ods to the illumination of Being. #he differen"e between mythologi"al and diale"ti"al in&estigation is thus attributed to the differen"e between mysti"al and intelle"tual e*perien"e of the di&ine. #here is nothing here whatsoe&er to hint at an e'ui&o"ation with respe"t to the term theos. 3 similar "arelessness is e&ident in >odds% "iting "T !, JBJ. 1H to the effe"t that the method of analogy "an ne&er e*haust the "ontent of the di&ine or fully e*press its essen"e. 2o far as it goes, this is indeed true- but what >odds misses entirely in the te*t

371 that, on"e again, he merely "ites rather than 'uoting, is the remar$able and important distin"tion that Pro"lus ma$es here when he says that as philosophers, we spea$ about the ,ods, but we do not spea$ of each of them itself. )here >odds "an see only a rather trite assertion of our inability to fully "ogni1e the di&ine, Pro"lus is a"tually saying something mu"h more important, distinguishing the in&estigation of the "hara"teristi"s of classes of ,ods, and ultimately the "lass of the ,ods simpliciter, from that in&estigation whi"h "an only be "arried out in the authenti" en"ounter of an indi&idual worshiper with an indi&idual deity. >odds tries to blunt the impa"t of the statement in prop. 11H that the ,ods ha&e no attribute by parti"ipation by ma$ing this an instan"e of "hara"ters deri&ed trans&ersely from the monad by its "o(ordinate metechomena, and tra"es this do"trine to prop. 1C (AIJ . But the latter proposition merely refers to two different $inds of parti"ipation, one primiti&e and one transient, and ne&er implies that the former might be regarded as no parti"ipation at all. >odds wishes to preser&e an a""ount of the relation between the One and the henads whi"h would be e*a"tly parallel to that whi"h subsists between intelligen"es and the !ntelligen"e or between souls and the 2oul (ALB , but the do"trine that the henads do not parti"ipate is "onsistent with the whole of Pro"lus% thought whereas the opposing do"trine is not e&en "onsistent within the limited parameters of the Elements, an in"onsisten"y whi"h >odds attributes to Pro"lus himself, &iolating the prin"iple of hermeneuti" "harity. 3gain, >odds finds in the use of the e*pressions more uni&ersal and more spe"ifi" (holik%teros and merik%teros with respe"t to the henads in prop. 1AI an illustration of the redu"tion of the Mgods% to hypostati1ed logi"al "ounters (AIL - but

372 this utterly ignores the fa"t that it is the relationship between the pro"essions of the ,ods on subse'uent le&els, whi"h is really a matter of different "onfigurations of emergen"e, that founds the onti" relationships li$e uni&ersality and spe"ifi"ity. #o do +usti"e to the differen"es as well as the analogies between the types of relationship manifested in di&ine pro"ession and those manifested among beings is not to be e*pe"ted in a summary a""ount su"h as the Elements- so the burden falls on the interpreter not to assume that the ,ods are thus redu"ed to a status where merely onti" determinations "an be applied to them uni&o"ally. >odds also presumes to find in ?imit and !nfinity prin"iples trans"ending e&en the henads (A4L on the basis of nothing more than prop. 1KC, whi"h merely deri&es e&ery order (taxis of ,ods from ?imit and !nfinity. But on what basis are we supposed to assume that prin"iples of "lassifi"ation pre"ede the ,ods6 )hat manner of entity are ?imit and !nfinity supposed to be6 Pro"lus does not simply posit entities out of the ether without grounding their manner of e*isten"e. 7e posits the ,ods, and all agen"y in the uni&erse is redu"ible to their a"ti&ity, the highest s"hemati1ation of whi"h "onsists in the "ontrast between ea"h ,od%s limit(aspe"t and their infinity(aspe"t. #his does not impart a radi"al duality into the henad (AH1 for the &ery reason that ?imit and !nfinity, as the highest of forms, are instruments of the di&ine illumination of Being, and are rele&ant for us and to us. #hey are arise from an analysis of the nature of the ,ods the ground of whi"h is no real "omposition.

Porphyry's Place in the eoplatonic Tradition, A :tudy in Post1Plotinian eoplatonism by 3ndrew 2mith (#he 7ague, 1CL4 .

373 2mith dis"usses the henads with respe"t to their "onne"tion to theurgy and the "on"ept of the sunth&mata, to$ens of the di&ine in the realm of Being, shedding light on their nature and a"ti&ity as su"h by e*tension. Based on a series of passages from Olympiodorus whi"h he "orrelates with passages in Pro"lus, 2mith "on"ludes that (1 #heurgy is "on"erned with uniting, and (A #he theurgi" &irtues are somehow parallel with the other &irtues rather than simply abo&e them G #he parallel nature of theurgi" &irtue means that it is present and effi"a"ious at all le&els of reality (11Lf . #heurgi" &irtues are distinguished by Olympiodorus as heniaiai or unitary by "ontrast with the onti" &irtues whi"h are substantial or substantifying, ousi%deis, and as possessing hyparxis in "ontrast to the ousia of the onti" &irtues, thus embodying, in terminology familiar from this dissertation, the distin"ti&e "hara"teristi"s of the supra(essential realm, whi"h is represented within Being by the a"ti&ity of the sunth&mata independent of and parallel to the regime of the 9orms. #he independen"e of the two regimes of sunth&mata and of 9orms, manifests itself in the different stru"ture !ambli"hus a""ords to the epit&deiot&s, or suitability, for parti"ipation in forms as "ompared to the suitability to parti"ipate in sunth&mata. 3s 2mith points out, the "ontinuity of 8eoplatoni" ontologi"al pro"ession seems to brea$ down here, (1AL inasmu"h as the normal order of re&ersion up the hierar"hy of onti" hypostases has been, as it were, bypassed and a more dire"t mode of "onta"t with the di&ine "reated (1AI . 2mith e*plains that

!ambli"hus% epit&deiot&s for di&ine manti" is o&er and abo&e normal epit&deiot&s for form. Pro"lus distinguishes sunth&ma and 9orm. #his seems to imply that the di&ine "hannel whi"h aids in as"ent is different from the ontologi"al pro"ession of 9orm. On a broader basis Pro"lus distinguishes henads and ta no&ta. #he henads in their

374
manifestation at different le&els are independent of the no&ta or 9orms. #hus theurgy whi"h wor$s through the henads leads to a di&or"e of the spiritual as"ent from the "ontemplation of 9orms. (1AL n. L

2mith re"ogni1es, further, that the a"ti&ity of the supra(essential realm with respe"t to beings is to impart a unity whi"h is to be understood as idiot&s, that is, indi&idual pe"uliarity. #his is already impli"it from the &ery notion of the sunth&ma, whi"h is often not +ust a parti"ular type of being but a parti"ular di&ini1ed indi&idual. E&en if the sunth&ma is a type of being < say, a parti"ular spe"ies of herb or stone < its signifi"an"e to the theurgi" ritual lies not in its position in the onti" hierar"hy, but its relation to "ertain myths and the attributes of parti"ular deities. Putting together the pie"es in a manner that 2mith does not, inasmu"h as the metaphysi"s of the henads is not his "hief "on"ern, one "ould "on"lude that the unity "orresponding to the One and "onferred by it beyond the bounds of that unity < namely, the unity of the infima species < is also a generi"ally distin"t mode of unity, that is, indi&iduality. !nstead, 2mith fo"uses on the "onse'uen"es of this do"trine for human e*isten"e4 referring to the Pro"lean do"trine that humans ma$e "onta"t with Being through the flower of the intelle"t while they "onta"t the One through the flower of the whole soul, he notes that DtEhis stage differs from the others in being not a further refinement in&ol&ing an e&en loftier part of man but in attempting to reintegrate man as a whole. Pro"lus seems dissatisfied with the gradual whittling away of the indi&idual to its Mhighest% element and, perhaps, wanted to restore a more realisti" pi"ture of the mysti"al aspirant as a "ons"ious human being, (1A1 . 2mith e&en refers earlier to this whittling away of the indi&idual as an infinite regress (or rather progress to whi"h the do"trine of the flower of the whole soul attempts to "all a

375 halt. #his e"hoes the point made in this dissertation with respe"t to the infinite regress generated by formal unity and terminated by henadi" unity, only seen from the &iewpoint of entities near the bottom of the onti" hierar"hy rather than those at the top.

7. >. 2affrey and ?. ,. )esterin$, Th+ologie Platonicienne li&re !!!, introdu"tion, "hapitre !, ?a >o"trine des 7Onades >i&ines "he1 Pro"lus4 Origine et 2ignifi"ation (1CLH .

#he e*traordinary a""omplishment of 2affrey and )esterin$ with respe"t to the editing and translating of the entire si* &olumes of the Platonic Theology is in no way belittled by pointing out the short"omings of their a""ount of the henads in the introdu"tion to the third &olume. #hey announ"e at the outset the outlines of their interpretation of the do"trine at the same time that they propose a theory as to its histori"al origins4 8ous entreprenons don" de dOmontrer 'ue l%in&ention de la thOorie des hOnades "omme di&initOs intermOdiaires entre l%5n(Bien, premier dieu, et les dieu* intelligibles, est due au maWtre de Pro"lus, le philosophe 2yrianus (i* . !t is unfortunate that the histori"al and substanti&e issues surrounding the henadology ha&e not here been disaggregated, sin"e it be"omes diffi"ult to determine whether 2affrey and )esterin$%s presupposition as to the "ontent of the do"trine < and ! say presupposition insofar as the abo&e interpretation is not +ustified in the "ourse of the introdu"tion < is intended as support for their histori"al argument, or to be supported by it. #he statement abo&e as to the status of the henads is, at any rate, in"orre"t, and formulated not on the basis of the

376 te*ts of Pro"lus, but on the basis of a pre"on"eption of how they must be understood, whi"h will be"ome "learer as we go on. #hey begin from the notion of a fundamental e'ui&o"ation in the use of the term henad4 ?e mot MhOnade%, "he1 Pro"lus, dOsigne : proprement parler les dieu*, hOnades(prin"ipes de "ha'ue ordre de dieu*. 0ais il sert aussi : dO"rire l%5n, premier dieu, au(del: des hOnades di&ines. Puis, il dOsigne les dieu* de "ha'ue ordre, intelligible, intelle"tif, dOmiurgi'ue, et". (*i&(*& . #o begin with, this throws their original formulation into ambiguity, an ambiguity whi"h they would foist upon Pro"lus. But the e'ui&o"ation is misidentified- for if there is e'ui&o"ation to be dis"erned here, it is not between the ,ods simpliciter and the ,ods of ea"h order, for these are all +ust henads. #he e'ui&o"ation is ob&iously in referring to the One as a henad, for of "ourse the One "annot be a henad. 8or does it seem that the "on"ept of the One as first ,od is properly understood here, for to posit the One as a ,od beyond the ,ods is in no way "onsonant with the stru"ture of the henadi" multipli"ity. #he One is not to be understood as something beyond the henads, and we must as$ whether we ha&e met the minimal re'uirements of an engaged reader if we "annot follow Pro"lus% thought e&en so far as to refrain from reifying the One straightaway in this fashion. 3 further dimension of their interpretation whi"h shows the looseness with whi"h they deal with Pro"lus% "on"epts is the notion that "ha'ue ordre de rOalitOs di&ines a son hOnade propre 'ui gou&erne "et ordre, et le premier dieu, l%5n, supOrieur : tout "es hOnades, en est la sour"e uni'ue. .%est pour'uoi on peut le nommer l%7Onade des hOnades (*&ii . 7ere the "ausal analogy we ha&e seen Pro"lus use to argue for the One !tself from the logi" of parti"ipation, namely that ea"h instan"e of parti"ipation implies an unparti"ipated prin"iple, is allowed to

377 dominate the whole pi"ture of the henadi" realm, "ompletely obs"uring its uni'ue "hara"teristi"s. !t is simply presupposed that Pro"lus would heedlessly "ontradi"t himself by hypostati1ing the One in this fashion- and furthermore, there is no e&iden"e for the stru"ture here attributed to the di&ine orders. #he unity whi"h he attributes to a go&erning henad seems to be rather the monadic unity of the order, whereby the intelle"tual ,ods are intelle"tual by &irtue of the parti"ipation of the monad of intelle"t in them- in short, monads are here ta$en for henads.
)ith respe"t to the following passage from "P 1BII, they Dpossibly !ambli"heansE argue that sin"e e&ery ,od, inasmu"h as he is a ,od, is a

henad (for it is this element, the One, whi"h di&ini1es all being , for this reason they thin$ it right to +oin to the study of the 9irst a dis"ussion of all the

,ods- for they are all supra(essential henads, and trans"end the multipli"ity of beings, and are the summits of beings, 2affrey and )esterin$ remar$4

D>Eans "e "as, le mot MhOnade% est employO dans un sens trXs gOnOral et non te"hni'ue, "%est seulement le nom mOtaphysi'ue de dieu G >on" dans "e te*te

< : supposer 'ue Pro"lus reproduise e*a"tement le &o"abulaire de /ambli'ue <, MhOnade% ne designe pas un degrO dans la hiOrar"hie des dieu* < "e 'ui sera

le "as dans la thOologie de Pro"lus <, elle est seulement une dOsignation des dieu*, 'ui met en &aleur leur unitO, "%est(:(dire "e par 'uoi ils sont des dieu*.

3utrement dit, nous "royons possible 'ue /ambli'ue ait employO le mot d%hOnade, mais s%il l%a fait, "%est d%une maniXre 'ui ne s%O"arte pas de l%usage

"ommun de "e terme, par le'uel on dOsigne une unitO. Par "onsO'uent, nous sommes "onduits : admettre 'ue, lors'ue Pro"lus parle des hOnades dans le

deu*iXme te*te de l%"n Parm. et lors'u%il e*pose au dObut du li&re !!! de la Th+ologie platonicienne sa thOorie des hOnades, il ne parle pas de la mVme

"hose. (***iii(***i&

!t is indefensible to dismember the do"trine of the henads in this fashion before e&en attempting to understand it as a unified theory. 3nd what is this

"ommon usage of the term henad, when at any rate we ha&e already read abo&e that DoEn &a &oir 'ue, en fait, l%emploi du mot henas est rarissime

a&ant Pro"lus G le mot ne se ren"ontre prati'uement 'ue dans la langue philosophi'ue G .ette situation G est en elle(mVme signifi"ati&e (*i 6 On the

"ontrary, it is pre"isely as the metaphysi"al term for deity that henad has its systemati" fun"tion for Pro"lus. 3nd if this were a non(te"hni"al use of the

term, why would it ha&e the &ery te"hni"al modifier supra(essential atta"hed to it, although 2affrey and )esterin$, in their "itation, trun"ate the te*t

378
before arri&ing at it6 )e are to belie&e that it is on a""ount of

l%O'ui&o'ue 'ui plane sur le nom d%hOnades, donnO

peut(Vtre par /ambli'ue : tous les dieu*, mais restreint par Pro"lus : un degrO des dieu*, intermOdiaire entre l%5n Premier >ieu et les degrOs de l%Vtre, with the note that par MhOnades%, nous entendons i"i les autoteleis henades selon la distin"tion Onon"Oe par Pro"lus lui(mVme dans El. theol. YY I4 cor. et 114, par opposition au* illuminations d%unitOs 'ue "onstituent les sOries dOpendant de "es hOnades (***& . ! ha&e attempted to show, howe&er, that there is a better interpretation of the "orollary to prop. I4, namely that the illuminations in 'uestion are monads, whi"h furthermore a""ords with the a""ount of illumination of Being by the henads of ea"h "lass whi"h is gi&en in the Platonic Theology. #heir interpretation, by "ontrast, grows further and further out of tou"h with Pro"lus% te*ts the further one follows it. )e read further on, for instan"e, that DdEe "ette faZon Di.e. from the 14 "onditional syllogisms of the 2e"ond 7ypothesis of the ParmenidesE, se trou&ent dOfinies 'uator1e hOnades 'ui "ommandent "ha'ue degrO de la hiOrar"hie de tous les dieu* (l . But no te*tual support is offered for the presumption that the number of henads is a"tually limited by the number of hypotheses, and that these latter do not merely denote the number of onti" classes of deity- and were prop. 1JK offered in support of this &iew, one would ha&e to a""ount for props. 1IAff, as ! ha&e already dis"ussed in the body of this dissertation. )ith this one simple presupposition, the entire distin"tion between the onti" and the supra(essential domains is abolished by 2affrey and )esterin$, ma$ing the whole do"trine of the henads an e*tra&agant tri&iality. 9urthermore, when they remar$, inno"ently enough, that D"Ee 'ui prO"Xde nous a permis de retrou&er, "royons(nous, le "hemin par"ouru de /ambli'ue : 2yrianus, 'ui

379 aboutit : l%in&ention des hOnades di&ines. .e "hemin est essentiellement "elui de l%e*OgXse de la deu*iXme hypothXse du Parm+nide (lii , they "ir"um&ent a"$nowledging the roots of the do"trine in the e*egesis of the first hypothesis, and the e*igen"ies pla"ed upon the "on"eption of the One by the diale"ti" of unity. #his has to do, it would seem, with the illi"it hypostati1ation of the One whi"h they hold. One must note the in"onsisten"y with whi"h 2affrey and )esterin$ on the one hand attribute the in&ention of the &ery do"trine of di&ine henads to 2yrianus and Pro"lus, as opposed to !ambli"hus, while at the same time wishing to argue that !ambli"hus possessed a do"trine of henads as a metaphysi"al term for all deities, in order to a&oid admitting that the latter is the do"trine of Proclus, regardless of whether it also was that of !ambli"hus. 2yrianus and Pro"lus, a""ording to this latter argument, be"ome the originators only of the do"trine whereby the henads are sandwi"hed between a supreme 9irst ,od and a host of lesser ,ods, a do"trine in fa"t in&ented by 2affrey and )esterin$ themsel&es. D?E%5n, par son Vtre mVme, fait(il &enir : l%e*isten"e d%autres unitOs, les hOnades 'ui sont des Me*isten"es unitaires% ou 'ui forment une Mmultipli"itO unitaire%, Otant plus de l%un 'ue de l%Vtre, et 'ui permettent le dObut du pro"essus de la parti"ipation de l%unitO, par le'uel de pro"he en pro"he tous les Vtres pro"Oderont dans l%e*isten"e (l&ii . !n a passage su"h as this, one must note that no effort has been made to penetrate beneath the smooth surfa"e of the elementary formulations to try to really understand what a unitary multipli"ity might be, or what it might mean to be more of the One than of Being, or the nature of the pro"ess by whi"h the parti"ipation of unity "omes about. #he wor$ of e*egesis has thus in an important sense not e&en begun. 2imilarly, we read that elles Dthe henadsE produiront : leur tour la pro"ession indOfinie des Vtres, et mVme +us'u%au* non(

380 Vtres, par la parti"ipation progressi&e et "ontinuellement dOgradOe de leur unitO par les Vtres (ibid . But this is not simply a degradation- the phenomena of degradation "ome about be"ause of the produ"tion by the henads themsel&es of relationships among them abstra"ted from their own supra(essential e*isten"e. 5nless we understand the new spa"es of manifestation that are generated in this way by di&ine a"ti&ity, we "annot appre"iate the gains and losses a""ompanying the pro"ession of Being. !n this way mis"onstruing the do"trine of the henads "an lead to a "orruption of the whole understanding of Pro"lus% metaphysi"s in the dire"tion of a dualism whi"h Pro"lus in fa"t stri&es against. !n their most signifi"ant a""ount of the role of the henadology in Pro"lus% system, we read that

?a thOologie des hOnades di&ines permet : Pro"lus de rO"upOrer l%ontologie "omme une partie dOri&Oe de l%hOnologie. En effet, la s"ien"e du tout premier prin"ipe imparti"ipable, l%5n, est tout entiXre nOgati&e- sa seule mOthode est bien la nOgation de tout. .%est la thOologie nOgati&e, fondOe sur le modXle de la premiXre hypothXse du Parm+nide, et 'ui a OtO e*posOe par Pro"lus au li&re !! de la Th+ologie platonicienne. 0ais la thOologie des hOnades di&ines est, 'uant : elle, une s"ien"e positi&e, sur le modXle des "on"lusions affirmati&es de la deu*iXme hypothXse du Parm+nide. .ette s"ien"e(l: est la s"ien"e de l%Vtre en tant 'u%Vtre, de l%Vtre intelligible et de tous les Vtres 'ui en dOri&ent, "%est l%ontologie par "onsO'uent, e*posOe : la lumiXre de l%hOnologie. .ar, dans "ette "on"eption de l%ontologie, on n%aura dit le dernier mot sur "ha'ue ordre de rOalitOs, 'ue si l%on remonte +us'u%: l%hOnade di&ine "orrespondante : "et ordre. .%est pour'uoi, par"e 'ue les Vtres sont sortis de l%5n par l%intermOdiaire des hOnades, l%ontologie, s"ien"e des Vtres et thOologie des dieu*, prend sa sour"e dans l%hOnologie, s"ien"e de l%5n et "OlObration du Premier >ieu. 3u surplus, on peut se demander si l%une des raisons d%Vtre de la thOorie des hOnades di&ines n%est pas l%organisation de "e monde des hOnades, "onZu

381
"omme un dOdoublement, : un plan supOrieure, du monde de l%Vtre, nou&el ordre rendu nO"essaire pour poser le point de dOpart de la parti"ipation des Vtres et leur lien a&e" l%5n imparti"ipable. (l&iii

#here is only a &ery pallid notion here of what might "onstitute the spa"e of the henadology, as distin"t from henology, whi"h as an utterly negati&e s"ien"e should a"tually ha&e no designation, "onstituting in effe"t the residue of a rea"tion between ontology, or monadology, and the henadology, whi"h is theology as a positi&e s"ien"e. #he s"ien"e of beings qua beings is monadology, not henadology- rather, the henadology is first philosophy in the sense that it is the s"ien"e of the noblest domain of ob+e"ts. 0oreo&er, "elebration of the 9irst ,od is no more an a""urate des"ription of Pro"lus% pro+e"t than are the henads merely a doubling of the world of Being, although perhaps we must redu"e the henads to the latter in order to "on&ert Pro"lus to the former. 2affrey and )esterin$ go on to argue (l&iii(li* for the absolute limitation of the number of henads to the number of onti" prin"iples, that is, the utter redu"tion of the henads to an anne* of ontology, against whi"h ! ha&e argued at suffi"ient length in the body of this dissertation to ob&iate ta$ing up the argument again here. 3 perfe"t te*t in whi"h to obser&e how their interpretation drifts free of Pro"lus% te*ts is the following, whi"h "on"erns the same issue of "ollapsing the henads into ontology4

!l faut remar'uer nOanmoins 'ue "es Onumerations d%hOnades "he1 Pro"lus restent tou+ours in"omplXtes. /amais par e*emple, il n%OnumXre "omplXtement les 'uator1e hOnades 'ui doi&ent en prin"ipe "orrespondre au* 'uator1e "on"lusions de la deu*iXme hypothXse du Parm+nide, fondant les 'uator1e propriOtOs "ara"tOristi'ues. 8ous ren"ontrons i"i une des limites de l%e*posO de Pro"lus. 2%il affirme 'uel'ue part 'ue M"e

382
'u%il y a de plus remar'uable dans la thOologie s"ientifi'ue de Platon% ("T !!! 1B. L(H "%est le "lassement rigoureu* des dieu*, +amais, du moins dans les O"rits "onser&Os de lui, il n%a pris la peine d%en OnumOrer le "lassement "omplet et systOmati'ue. (l**

7ere the basi" misunderstanding is "rystal "lear, for there is nothing in"omplete in Pro"lus% a""ount. #he fourteen "on"lusions of the se"ond hypothesis detail fourteen taxeis of ,ods, whi"h "onstitutes in Pro"lus% estimation the best possible ontologi"al "lassifi"ation of the ,ods. #here is no ideal pantheon of fourteen ,ods to play the role of deified onti" prin"iples in this allegori"al tableau vivant imagined by this interpretationfor as Pro"lus, and 2yrianus too, point out, the a"tual number of ,ods that e*ist is not something humans "an $now. )e "an say only that they "annot be infinite in number, nor fewer than would be needed to a""ount, in a measured fashion, for the real di&ersity in the uni&erse. #he refusal to go further in the dire"tion of a positi&e enumeration of the ,ods lies ultimately in what Pro"lus, in the fifth "hapter of the first boo$ of the Platonic Theology, attributes to the theology of Plato as its superiority o&er all others4 it pla"es first unity. )hy is unity a superior "hara"teristi" on the basis of whi"h to understand the nature of the ,ods than any of the other notions Pro"lus mentions in this "hapter6 8amely be"ause unity in this "onte*t means individuality, and thus "oin"ides with the determination to grasp ea"h ,od as him;herself, rather than by redu"ing the ,od to an instantiation of some foreign prin"iple. One might in'uire further why it should ha&e been the "ase that neither Pro"lus nor 2yrianus felt themsel&es "apable of "ounting as high as fourteen6

383 #he distortion of the most basi" aspe"ts of Pro"lus% pro+e"t are espe"ially "lear in their remar$s on Pro"lus% mythologi"al hermeneuti", what they "all the Pro"lean demythologi1ation4

3insi, dans la mesure o[ la thOologie "omme s"ien"e a supplantO la thOologie symboli'ue ou mythologi'ue, 'ui Otait la thOologie traditionelle depuis les origines de la pensOe gre"'ue, on peut dire 'ue "ette nou&elle thOologie s"ientifi'ue a opOrO une sorte de MdOmythologisation%. 0ais il est O&ident 'ue "ette MdOmythologisation% atteint son a"hX&ement "omplet, lors'ue les dieu* du panthOon olympien sont de&enus les hOnades di&ines. ?ors'ue Pro"lus nous dit ("# 14B;HB. K(I 'ue la propriOtO 'ui dOfinit la dOesse 7estia, "%est MVtre en soi(mVme%, et "elle 'ui dOfinit la dOesse 7Ora, "%est Metre en un autre%, nous sommes de&ant un "as de MdOmythologisation% "omplXte. (l**i(l**ii

)hat e&iden"e are 2affrey and )esterin$ prepared to addu"e that it was Pro"lus% goal to repla"e, e.g., 7estia with a "ult of being in(itself and so forth6 2"ientifi" theology is ne&er intended by Pro"lus as a repla"ement for mythologi"al theology. 2affrey and )esterin$ seem to ha&e in mind a pro"ess in whi"h the ,ods are metaboli1ed into henads- but this demythologi1ation is the effe"t, rather, of their own erasure of the distin"tion between the onti" and supra(essential realms, rendering the ,ods perfe"tly &a"uous and otiose "on"eptions and thus foisting onto Pro"lus an utterly foreign pro+e"t of the effe"ti&e elimination of the ,ods. Pro"lus% goal is manifestly to dis"o&er the roots of Being in the di&ine, not the dissolution of the di&ine into Being. #his fundamental m+connaissance plays itself out further in a "uriously patroni1ing a""ount of Pro"lus% personal religiosity4

384
0ais, par"e 'ue Pro"lus Otait un gOnie, il sa&ait garder "on+oints l%ordre de la thOologie s"ientifi'ue et "elui de la piOtO populaire 'ui n%est autre 'ue la dO&otion du "\ur. 3. /. 9estugiXre l%a bien montrO (Pro"lus et la religion traditionelle, dans 0Olanges Piganiol, Paris 1CII, p. 1KH1(1KCB, reprodu"ed in Etudes de philosophie gre"'ue, Paris 1CL1, p. KLK(KH4, the te*t "ited, p. KHA(KHJ 4 M.omment e*pli'uer l%allian"e, dans l%]me religieuse de Pro"lus, de "ette piOtO toute simple et de la re"her"he du >ieu "a"hO6 .%est i"i 'ue le problXme intOresse au plus haut point la psy"hologie religieuse. ?e fait est 'ue la re"her"he de >ieu est diffi"ile, elle est longue, elle suppose de pOnibles dOpouillements, elle passe par "e 'ue les mysti'ues nomment des Mnuits%, la nuit des sens, la nuit de l%entendement, elle aboutit : un >ieu dont l%essen"e mVme est in"omprOhensible et ineffable, bref au >ieu !n"onnu. Or la mVme ]me religieuse 'ui aspire : "e >ieu !n"onnu aspire aussi : un "onta"t plus immOdiat a&e" des formes du >i&in plus a""essibles, moins sOparOes. >e l: &ient, "he1 beau"oup de mysti'ues "hrOtiens, la tendre dO&otion : la Nierge. Et +e m%e*pli'ue de mVme, dans le "as de Pro"lus, sa tendre dO&otion : 3thOna. !l n%y a l:, +e le rOpXte, rien 'ui m%Otonne4 ou plut^t "ette piOtO me semble naturelle, et "omme le "omplOment nO"essaire de la "ontemplation intelle"ti&e. (l*ii

#hese are fine words, but they ha&e nothing to do with Pro"lus. Pro"lus is not engaged in a sear"h for a hidden or un$nown ,od- this is sheer monothei1ing pro+e"tion and most ana"hronisti" as the referen"es to medie&al .hristianity unders"ore. #he &ery inacessibility of the
di&ine to whi"h 9estugiXre points is an artifa"t of a theology to whi"h Pro"lus does not as"ribe. 9or him, all is still, as it was for #hales, full of ,ods.

9urthermore, what ne"essitates the e*planation of his de&otion, tender or otherwise, to 3thena on what appear to be psy"hoanalyti" grounds6 #his

re&eals the fundamental presupposition upon whi"h the interpretation of the henadology offered by 2affrey and )esterin$ is based, namely that there "an

be no re"on"iling Pro"lus% gross or primiti&e polytheism with that ethereal and intelle"tuali1ed monotheism "ontemporary "ommentators would wish

to fashion out of the do"trine of the One !tself, whi"h is, ne&ertheless, of one pie"e with the diale"ti"al pro"edure by whi"h it and the other hypostases

emerge in human "ons"iousness, and not a religious postulate at all.

385

-'Architecture du divin8 3ath+matique et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus by 3nni"$ .harles(2aget (Paris4 ?es Belles ?ettres, 1CHA .

.harles(2aget sees an analogy between the Plotinian theory of number as a s$et"h (paraskeu& for beings (Enn. N!. I. 1B and the Pro"lean theory of the henads. .ar toutes deu* +ou*, : l%endroit du dO&eloppement pro"essif, le mVme r^le4 fournir une rIgle de d+ploiment J la pluralisation de l'essence, (1HJ , this rule being a$in to a rhythm of pro"ession. 3s su"h, she regards it as no a""ident that the word henads appears in Plotinus% te*t, and that it appears already to ha&e a sense distin"t from that of monads, inasmu"h as il ren&oie bien : "ette premiXre prOsen"e plurifiOe du prin"ipe < tandis 'ue le terme de monas est tou+ours en relation a&e" des "onsidOrations numOri'ues (ibid . By tra"ing deeper roots for the do"trine of the henads than most, .harles(2aget ma$es it seem less li$e a do"trine that Pro"lus inherited fully("onstituted from its originator, either 2yrianus or !ambli"hus, and more li$e Pro"lus% "ontribution to a line of in'uiry already old and ha&ing passed through a number of hands. #his a""ords with this dissertation%s strategy of loo$ing at the do"trine of the henads e*"lusi&ely as it fun"tions in the e"onomy of Pro"lean thought. #he distin"tion between the supra(essential and the onti" domains, as represented by henads and monads respe"ti&ely, is re"ogni1ed by .harles(2aget, but not greatly elaborated upon. ?a suite des monades is one of prin"ipes simples 'ui sont, dans l%Vtre, les analogues des hOnades, prin"ipes d%unitO (AB4 . #he &agueness whi"h besets this analogy is a "hief "on"ern of .harles(2aget%s, parti"ularly inasmu"h as she sur&eys Pro"lus% system e*"lusi&ely through the Elements of Theology. #his is not to say that she

386 ma$es the mista$e of ta$ing the Elements as a suffi"ient statement of the Pro"lean system, nor e&en as the integral wor$ that we might assume it to be, gi&en the e*pe"tations arising in us due to the geometri"al form of the wor$. But she e*plains that DnEous a&ons &oulu, pour notre part, +ouer le +eu proposO par Pro"lus, "elui d%une Elementatio o[ "ha'ue proposition s%affirme dOmonstrable en une suite finie de propositions G .%est seulement aprXs a&oir Oprou&O les limites de l%armature logi'ue 'ue, en raison de "es limites mVmes, nous a&ons "hangO de mOthode et "onsidOrO les affinitOs de notions (A1B n. 1 . 2he is 'uite "lear, though, about the ne"essity of re"ogni1ing these limits. Pro"lus

se donne un "hamp latent de sens dont 'uel'ues a*iomes e*pli"itOs en reprOsentent l%Omergen"e partielle G ?a 'uestion 'ue nous posons dOsormais : l%Elementatio n%est plus "elle de la stri"te &aliditO dOmonstrati&e, mais plut^t "ette autre4 "omment Pro"lus ou&re(t(il un espa"e ontologi'ue, "omment en dOploie(t(il les dimensions et subsidiairement, "omment, une fois "et espa"e ou&ert, introduit(il ou "onstruit(il dans "et espa"e un nou&el ob+et6 (AAJ

By not assuming < in the absen"e, indeed, of any e*pli"it statement from Pro"lus as to the nature and goals of the Elements < that the te*t is an authoritati&e statement of Pro"lus% system whi"h is to be understood as determining the semanti" field of the rest of Pro"lus% wor$, without those other wor$s re"ipro"ally determining it, .harles(2aget a&oids a trap that is laid for the modern reader by the appropriation of the geometri"al method by authors su"h as 2pino1a and )ittgenstein. #he Elements "omes into its proper light as a parti"ular mode of presentation of Pro"lus% system and a presentation of parti"ular

387 aspe"ts of that system. .harles(2aget ta$es no stand on the 'uestion of the position of the Elements in a "hronology of Pro"lus% wor$s and the "orrelati&e 'uestion of an e&olution in Pro"lus% thought, and neither does this dissertation. 9undamentally, it ma$es little differen"e whether the te*t is seen as manifesting an as"esis of purely epistemi" in'uiry that abstra"ts from the material needed to fill out the "on"ept of the mode of unity < namely, as this dissertation argues, the fore(understanding of the proper names of the ,ods as representing primiti&e sites of enun"iation < or as an earlier stage of Pro"lus% thought in whi"h only the perspe"ti&e from within ontology had been de&eloped. .harles(2aget diagnoses &ery shrewdly the short"omings of the a""ount in the Elements whi"h would ha&e moti&ated su"h an e&olution in Pro"lus% thought, or whi"h simply demand of us that we distinguish the pla"e of the Elements in the broader "onte*t of Pro"lus% wor$. 9or DsE%il y a une logi'ue dans l%organisation du tout et si l%5n y +oue un r^le, "%est la logi'ue 'ui est prin"ipe de "ette produ"tion- et le prin"ipe du systXme, 'uels 'ue soient les raffinements de l%e*pression : son Ogard, est un OlOment du systXme (A4B . !ndeed, the &ery term element (stoicheion is an onti" term, and we should not be surprised that the One is, in this te*t, "ompletely absorbed into what .harles(2aget "alls the networ$ of beings (rOseau des Vtres . .ompletely la"$ing from this te*t is the "hara"teristi" most proper to the supra(essential domain4 the absolute indi&iduality of the proper name. .harles(2aget spea$s, indeed, of a dOmesure du "hamp thOologi'ue with respe"t to l%insertion Dwith the dis"rete dis"ussion of the henads from prop. 11J onE de "elui 'ui parle en un point du systXme ne peut plus Vtre mas'uOe, "ar le systXme est in"apable de produire les distin"tions di&ines4 le di&in ne se "onnaWt 'ue par ses dOri&es, gi&ing the in'uiry the "hara"ter of a dOmar"he rOgressi&e (A44 .

388 Pro"lus is "areful ne&ertheless to stay within the bounds of the in'uiry as he has laid it out (rather than within the bounds we might ha&e mista$enly assumed the in'uiry to ha&e , inasmu"h as he does not introdu"e e&en here proper names, but only two a*es of purely formal determinations of the henads, the one a*is being that of intelligible, intelle"ti&e, psy"hi"al and "osmi" henads "orresponding to (or s$et"hing in the Plotinian sense the monads of the onti" series (props. 1I1(K , the other a*is being that of the "lasses of fun"tional "hara"teristi"s deli&ered in props. 1K1(H. .harles(2aget%s reading of the latter is brilliant, in that she distinguishes that these "hara"teristi"s 'ui ne trou&ent au"une "orrespondan"e dans des Vtres parti"uliers, a"tually pertain to that by whi"h le di&in, origin de tous les Vtres et mainteneur de leur ordre, garantissait G la possibilitO du systXme 'ui le dit (AKB . 9or le di&in n%est pas pour lui DPro"lusE (seulement une prOsen"e en "ha'ue Vtre, "%est aussi une 'ualitO stru"turale du tout des Vtres G ?a distin"tion des hOnades selon leurs dOri&Os ne nous dit +amais 'ue leur fon"tion partielle, : l%Ogard de sOries parti"uliXres. Or, "%est le di&in "omme puissan"e d%englobement 'ue nous "her"hons maintenant (ibid . 3s su"h, the stri"tly ontologi"al mode of in'uiry represented by the Elements is ta$en there to its furthest limits. .harles(2aget e*plains that the "lasses of deities enun"iated in props. 1K1(H ren&oient bien : l%O"onomie gOnOrale du systXme, (AK1 and prOsentent don", sur le mode religieu*, les a*iomes du systXme pro"lien, whi"h are4 'u%il y ait un prin"ipe, "orresponding, we might say, to ea"h deity prior to any "lassifi"ation- 'u%il y ait un engendrement : partir de "e prin"ipe, "orresponding to the "lassifi"ation of deities as genn&tikon- 'ue tous les engendrOs s%a""omplissent selon leur perfe"tion propre, a""omplissant ainsi "elle de l%ensemble par eu* "onstituO, "orresponding to the "lassifi"ation of deities as

389 telesiourgon- and 'ue "ette perfe"tion se maintienne pure de toute altOration, "orresponding to the "lassifi"ation of deities as phrour&tikon (AKA . .harles(2aget notes that Pro"lus in"orporates into his system terms that "omportent une M"ouleur%, une e*pressi&itO par la'uelle se disent l%admiration et le dOsir. 0ais "e sont aussi des mots du systXme, des mots non seulement intOgrOs dans le systXme : la maniXre dont les mathOmati'ues ont intOgrO l%in"ommensurable, mais des mots 'ui renfor"ent le systXme (AKJ . By the in"orporation into the system of terms e&o$ing desire and other aspe"ts of li&ed e*perien"e, whi"h is present e&en in the Elements, and to a far greater degree, of "ourse, in a te*t li$e the Platonic Theology, Pro"lus generates what .harles( 2aget refers to as un rOseau d%e*igen"es o[ la dOmesure dis"ursi&e se trou&ait : la fois fondOe, nourrie et +ustifiOe (ibid . !t is one of the goals of this dissertation to e*plain how the dis"ursi&e e*"ess of theology is in"orporated into the Pro"lean system without being redu"ed to philosophy, nor philosophy redu"ed to theology. 2ome in"isi&e thoughts in this dire"tion are pro&ided by .harles(2aget%s remar$s on Pro"lean topology (AC1ff . 7er "omments "on"ern the "onse'uen"es in the Elements of the la"$ in Pro"lus of a metalanguage, whi"h manifest on two planes, that of the integration of prin"iples and that of the interferen"e of "odes. #he former is seen in the fa"t that le modXle du dO&eloppement de toutes les sOries est aussi la premiXre sOrie (les hOnades , de mVme 'ue le prin"ipe de "ha'ue sOrie (la monade en est aussi le premier terme (ACA . #he henads and the monads are thus integrated into the series with respe"t to whi"h they are supposed to be models. #his problemati", whi"h "an be understood as a radi"ali1ation of the aporia of the #hird 0an, is "ited in this dissertation as one of the prime reasons for the uni'ue stru"ture a""orded the manifold of the henads. )ithin the "onte*t of the

390 Elements, howe&er, there is only the status of (relati&e imparti"ipability to ele&ate henads (at least in a "ertain respe"t and monads (at least "ertain among them abo&e their deri&ati&es. 0ais "e "ara"tXre, 'ui de&ient une simple diff+rence, ne les arra"he pas au systXme des Vtres4 l%imparti"ipable est aussi parti"ipant (les hOnades, de l%5n, les monades, de leur "auses . .es 'uasi(Vtres sont liOs au systXme, dXs lors 'u%ils sont pensOs selon 'uel'ue lien, f_t(il de diffOren"e (ibid . #he "harge is irrefutable with respe"t to the Elements, although in all fairness Pro"lus points the way to the solution when he states (in prop. 11H that the henads ha&e no property by parti"ipation, whi"h means that when they are understood, in a""ord with prop. 1, to parti"ipate unity in some way, the latter phrase is meant to imply an e'ui&o"al use of the term. #he argument of this dissertation is that although the henads < and e&en the One !tself < are indeed integrated into the system of beings < in the Elements, that in the system as a whole they are not, for they do not parti"ipate in the One nor are they "aused by it, except from the perspective of ontology. 3nd so, when .harles(2aget dis"erns that les hOnades trans"endent tous les ordres, mais elles "onstituent nOanmoins le premier d%entre eu* (ibid , he would be "orre"t but for the fa"t that the henads do not form a "lass of the sort Pro"lus lays out in prop. A1, whi"h is disposed under or around a monad. #hat the henads "onstitute a "lass disposed under or around the One !tself as monad is a ne"essary fi"tion of philosophi"al dis"ourse, true in a 'ualified fashion insofar as the henads, through their a"ti&ity generati&e of Being, allow themselves to be "aptured in the system of their own "reation. .harles(2aget notes that lors'ue Pro"lus utilise le mVme mot, "ausalitO, ou parti"ipation, pour mar'uer le lien 'ui unit aussi bien le prin"ipe et sa sOrie, 'ue les

391 termes de la sOrie entre eu*, il y a l: une ambiguitO plus gra&e than that affe"ting mathemati"s, whi"h a pu se "onstituer "omme s"ien"e sans 'ue soient Olu"idOs le r^le e*a"t de l%unitO et la nature du nombre (ACA . 3s an e*ample, she draws our attention to the way that imparti"ipability is ontologi"ally mediated in prop. 1H1, where a di&ine and parti"ipated !ntelle"t is posited as the mean term between the di&ine and imparti"ipable !ntelle"t and the parti"ipated and non(di&ine !ntelle"t. But %imparti"ipO% n%est pas un prOdi"at du mVme ordre 'ue Mdi&in%. .e n%est pas une simple diffOren"e de degrO "ar Mimparti"ipO% signifie la rupture de la "ommunautO de rang 'ui est une "ondition prOalable : l%ad+on"tion d%une diffOren"e (ACJ . .harles(2aget notes that in the Platonic Theology (!! K. JC, C(1L Pro"lus "orre"ts ("orrige this wea$ness, in re"ogni1ing that mVme lors'ue des termes sont "ontigus, la distan"e 'ui les sOpare n%est pas tou+ours la mVme (ibid , inasmu"h as, in the latter te*t, he e*plains that the trans"enden"e of the ,ood o&er all beings is greater than that of the !ntelle"t o&er that whi"h "omes after it. But this prin"iple is already stated in prop. 1JB4 !n any di&ine order the highest terms more "ompletely trans"end those immediately subordinate to them than do these latter the subse'uent terms. .harles(2aget does not remar$ on the latter proposition- but it implies that the s"ope of the problem is somewhat missed by her. 9or she falls into her own trap in thin$ing that a genuine rupture "ould be e*pressed on a 'uantitati&e s"ale of distan"es. 9or what it is worth, the 'uantitati&e fa"tor is already a"$nowledged by Pro"lus in the &ery te*t of the Elements- what remains unspo$en in this te*t is the radi"al integration, not of the henads into Being, but of the whole system of Being into each henad whi"h is the prin"iple topi" of this dissertation.

392 #he se"ond of the insuffisan"es de la topologie pro"lienne is that, +ust as le prin"ipe de ressemblan"e effa"e la dis"ontinuitO entre prin"ipe et dOri&Os, so le prin"ipe d%isomorphisme effa"e la distin"tion entre le "ode et le dO"odO, entre le "ode et le message (AC4 . #he la"$ of a metalanguage means that l%on ne peut dOpasser le systXme pour en e*poser l%e*iomati'ue, 'ue l%on rest dans le systIme, 'ue tout langage demeure le langage d%un "ertain ni&eau, mVme s%il semble a&oir puissan"e pour interprOter la totalitO. #his absen"e of a metalanguage is not "onsidered by .harles(2aget a defe"t, howe&er, sin"e l%on songe au* "riti'ues modernes issues de )ittgenstein : l%Ogard de la pseudo(independen"e des mOtalangues, but a dis"ordan"e is registered within Pro"lus% own thought between "ette re&ersibilitO modXle;appli"ation et l%e*igen"e pro"lienne d%un terme premier aschetos, au(del: de, non tou"hO par "e 'ui &ient aprXs lui, (AC4 n. 4B . #he demand that the prin"iple be without relation or schesis to the whole is addressed, as this dissertation intends to show, by the e*emption of the henads from the rules whi"h apply to beings, all relations among whi"h "onstitute a third term between the relata, whereas the henads possess a relation, stri"tly spea$ing, neither to ea"h other nor toward Being, sin"e ea"h "ontains the whole of Being within it and the relations between henads are borne in ea"h henad as a potential(for(being(so(disposed toward the other henad, whi"h pseudo(relations only be"ome a"tuali1ed within the ambit of Being and the monadi" mode of unity, for whi"h the henads "onstitute a "lass under the One. .harles(2aget has a pro&o"ati&e sense of what is possible in Pro"lus% system, whi"h would ha&e benefited from a "loser inspe"tion of the impli"ations of the henadology when ta$en in its full ri"hness, beyond the narrow "onfines of the Elements. 2he sees in Pro"lus, for instan"e,

393

le sentiment de la differen"e d%ordre entre stru"ture libre et stru"ture liOe G .he1 Pro"lus, une stru"ture est liOe 'uand elle de&ient une certaine stru"ture, 'uand, par e*ample, h& psuch& de&ient psuch& tis G .%Otait l: une maniXre originale de reprendre la diffOren"e platoni"ienne entre l%!dOe et ses manifestations sensibles. 0ais le prin"ipe des ressemblan"es a "onduit Pro"lus : faire de toute stru"ture libre la premiXre des stru"tures liOes. (AC4

9rom a broader perspe"ti&e, howe&er, it is no longer a 'uestion of merely effa"ing a distin"tion, for the henad sublates the &ery opposition between free and bound stru"ture that is "riti"al to ontology. 7enadi" indi&iduality, whi"h is e*pressed ineffably by the proper name of ea"h deity, forms as its onti" pre"ipitate the opposition between uni&ersality and parti"ularity whi"h is negotiated by the ambiguity of the inde*i"al tis "ombined with a "lass term. 3s su"h, there is something no&el here that goes well beyond simply e*pressing the differen"e between the !dea and its parti"ipants in an original manner, inasmu"h as the whole edifi"e of Platonism is preser&ed while a new, fundamental le&el of stru"ture is re&ealed en"ompassing it. #he nature of the effa"ement of the distin"tion between "ode and message of whi"h .harles(2aget spea$s is that Pro"lus ne laisse +amais : un ni&eau Opistemologi'ue sa sOmanti'ue propre. .orrigeant la partialitO du langage, il en Omousse la rigeur, and in order to bring totality to manifestation, il surdOtermine "ha'ue figure, "ha'ue rapport. !l produit par l: une diffraction du sens, et un dOmembrement de la totalitO partielle < i.e., a parti"ular "ode in whi"h le tout se dire simplement sur un mode parti"ulier, li$e mathemati"s < en &oulant l%Ogaler : l%ensemble des totalitOs (ACK . On the one hand, it

394 is as if Pro"lus s'uanders the possibilities of maintaining the rigor of the original dis"ourse in its &ery partiality- but seen in the broader "onte*t of an attempt to e*plain the "onditions of possibility of totality as such, whi"h this dissertation finds essential to the henadology, and freed of an unnatural an*iety that the parti"ular "odes would not be de&eloped in their full ri"hness were they to be situated in su"h a "onte*t, it no longer seems that we should ne"essarily prefer the pro+e"t that Pro"lus does not, in the end, "arry out, namely that of a mathesis universalis. 9or "e serait, sans doute, a""order trop de &aleur : un seul "ode, : un seul langage4 le philosophe parle, et passe, entre les langages (ACI . 8o philosopher "ould be said to embody more profoundly in their thought this prin"iple than Pro"lus, for whom the la"$ of a truly uni&ersal metalanguage ser&es the higher purpose of indi"ating the differen"e between the supra(essential and onti" modes of unity, whi"h are in"apable of assimilation within a proper genus.

?a #hOorie des 7Onades et ?a 0ysti'ue de Pro"lus, by .hristian ,uOrard (9ionysius I, 1CHA .

,uOrard%s essay begins by "ontesting the tenden"y of s"holars to dismiss the henadology as a mere attempt to donner un fondement d%apparen"e mOtaphysi'ue : la thOologie polythO`ste et mythologi'ue gre"'ue, ainsi opposOe au "hristianisme triomphant (LJ . ,uOrard sees this attitude toward the henadology as insuffi"iently "orre"ted in what he sees as ha&ing be"ome the authoritati&e reading, attributed to >odds, in whi"h a double fun"tion is attributed to the henadology, a theologi"al fun"tion basi"ally in a""ord with the pre&ious, deflationary interpretation < although it should be

395 noted that the re"ognition of a +ustifi"atory theologi"al fun"tion in medie&al .hristian, /ewish and !slami" philosophy has not been deflationary either in effe"t or in intent <

side by side with a systemati" fun"tion. ,uOrard is not satisfied with this double fun"tion "on"ept of the henadology- rather, he aspires to re"o&er the unity of the theologi"al and systemati" fun"tions of the do"trine of the henads. 3n initial stage of ,uOrard%s argument see$s to pose the Pro"lean do"trine of the henads in dire"t "ontrast to the !ambli"hean theory, as reported by >amas"ius, of a&ant la premiXre triade intelligible, deu* premiers prin"ipes, : sa&oir le prin"ipe absolument ineffable et ensuite le prin"ipe non("oordonnO a&e" la triade, as well as that of Porphyry, for whom le PXre de la triade intelligible est le Prin"ipe uni'ue de toutes "hoses, (L4f, 'uoting >amas"ius, 9P !! 1 . Pro"lus "ontinues, of "ourse, to re+e"t Porphyry%s approa"h, but abandons !ambli"hus% solution in fa&or of one in whi"h la multipli"itO doit immOdiatement pro"Oder de l%5n rede&enu Premier, (LK . ,uOrard goes on to present an interpretation of the relationship between the One and the henads mu"h in harmony with that of this dissertation. #he first proposition of the Elements of Theology, he stresses, is not to be interpreted as saying that the henads parti"ipate the One- instead, in a""ord with the "hoi"es already made by translators #rouillard and >odds ali$e, as he puts it, il ne faut en effet pas mettre de ma+us"ule : "et un gOnOral Di.e. the to hen of the first three propositionsE 'ui n%est pas l%5n, (n. A1 p. LI . #he importan"e of this point for ,uOrard is that

aprXs l%5n sera nO"essairement le nombre hOnadi'ue, 'ui, "ontrairement : la do"trine +ambli'uienne, n%est 'ue la somme MuniOe% des 5ns et non pas une hypostase indi&iduelle. >e la sorte, les Vtres ne parti"iperont pas : "e 'ui serait un unifiO, mais bel et bien : des

396
5ns. >ans une telle opti'ue, il ne saurait Vtre 'uestion d%un 5n parti"ipO, ni de parti"ipation : un unifiO. !l faut, au "ontraire, 'ue la parti"ipation : l%un soit la parti"ipation : des 5ns. (LI

2in"e ,uOrard%s interest is primarily in the "onse'uen"es of the henadology for beings, rather than in e*pli"ating the status of the henads themsel&es, he does little to draw out the impli"ations of this do"trine of Ones. 3nd yet he suggests he is not unaware of the possibility of +ust su"h an interpretation as this dissertation offers by his pro&o"ati&e remar$ that DiEl "on&ient de rappeler 'ue, Mstri"to sensu% "he1 Pro"lus, il n%y a pas d%hOnologie, mais une hOnadologie, (n. AI p. LI . #he first proposition of the ET, when it Onon"e 'ue tout parti"ipe obligatoirement : l%un G signifie O&idemment 'ue tout parti"ipe : l%5n par les 7Onades, et non 'ue l%5n soit parti"ipO ou qu'il soit un, (LL, emphasis mine . 3s this dissertation argues, there really is no One, there are only !nes, that is, the henads. ,uOrard%s way of loo$ing at the situation is go&erned by his interest in the impli"ations of the henadology for beings. 7en"e he says that the henads ne sont don" pas des Mparti"ipants% : l%5n, mais de pures Mparti"ipations%, (ibid and that there is, besides them, only the irradiated states of unity of prop. I4. #his nearly e*a"tly the interpretation of this dissertation, namely that at the heart of Pro"lus% system is the opposition between henadi" and monadi" modes of unity. Entre elles Dthe henadsE et l%5n, il ne faut pas Otablir un rapport de methexis, mais de simple pro(dos, (LH - as this dissertation e*plains, the import of this fa"t is that it pre&ents the henads from losing their autonomy to the One, and so preser&es polytheism, but also the principle of irreducible individuality itself, from su""umbing to the e*igen"ies of onti" logi". 7ere we see how

397 theologi"al and philosophi"al e*igen"ies "an "oin"ide without imposing any artifi"ial split upon Pro"lus% thought or demeaning the philosophi"al signifi"an"e of the henadology. ,uOrard "alls the fa"t that les 7Onades sont autonomes et ne "onstitutent pas un hypostase unifiOe the hori1ontal "hara"teristi" of the henads- he pro"eeds to analy1e the signifi"an"e of the &erti"al dimension of the henadology. 7ere again, ,uOrard anti"ipates some of the insights basi" to this dissertation. One of the $ey points of this dissertation is that the hierar"hi"al manifestation of the henads as intelligible, intelligible(and(intelle"tual, intelle"tual and e&en infra(intelle"tual ,ods does not ma$e them any less henads in their hyparxis. #he tension between their a"entri" or poly"entri" e*isten"e and their hierar"hi"al manifestation, whi"h grants to Being its hierar"hi"al nature, is resol&ed in the a""ount offered in the Platonic Theology of the emergen"e of the latter from the former. ,uOrard draws from his basi", albeit unde&eloped, insight into this state of affairs, its anti(hierar"hi"al impli"ations for beings. !n "ommon with "ertain other authors, su"h as 2mith or ,rondi+s, ,uOrard is best able to dis"ern the "hara"teristi"s pe"uliar to henadi" e*isten"e through the "onse'uen"es for the soul and its possibilities for re&ersion. #hat there are orders of the ,ods pro"eeding to the last orders of Being means that, as ,uOrard puts it, la parti"ipation : l%un est parti"ipation au* 5ns et non : l%unitO de l%Vtre 'ui prO"Xde, (LC . #hat is, beings are di&ini1ed directly at ea"h le&el, so that their opportunity for re&ersion does not arise e*"lusi&ely from re&ersion upon all the hypostases lying between them and the 9irst Prin"iple on the onti" ladder. ,uOrard "on"ludes his essay by endorsing in the strongest terms the "omments of #rouillard, who opposed BrOhier%s "hara"teri1ation of the Pro"lean system as one in whi"h "ha'ue

398 rOalitO reste : sa pla"e, dans une hiOrar"hie figOe, by arguing for a tenden"y in Pro"lus whi"h porte : "onsidOrer tous les ordres, mVme les derniers, "omme des rayons immOdiatement issus du "entre uni&ersal. #ous de&iennent des modes, non pas Ogau*, mais dire"ts de l%5n, (H1 . !ndeed, as ,uOrard points out, la primautO de l%un sur l%Vtre prend i"i tout son sens, namely, from the poly"entri"ity of the henads. !n asserting that DlE%idOe de hiOrar"hie, fondamentale dans tout le platonisme, ne &aut plus G par rapport au* dieu*, the henadology truly does represent something rO&olutionnaire dans la pensOe gre"'ue "lassi'ue, (ibid .

Pro"ession and >i&ision in Pro"lus by 3. .. ?loyd, in :oul and the :tructure of >eing in -ate eoplatonism, :yrianus= Proclus and :implicius, ed. by 7. /. Blumenthal and 3. .. ?loyd (?i&erpool4 ?i&erpool 5ni&ersity Press, 1CHA .

?loyd%s "on"ern in this essay, in a""ord with his seminal wor$ in e*pli"ating the logi"al stru"tures of 8eoplatoni" thought, is the assimilation of the two s"hemes of pro"ession and di&ision in Pro"lean thought. #hese two s"hemata are most easily seen +u*taposed in the do"trines of pro"ession and de"lension offered by Pro"lus at "P L4Kf. #he former is illustrated by, e.g, the generation by !ntelle"t of 2oul, the latter by the generation by !ntelle"t of intelle"ts. #he "on"ept of these twin pro"esses allows Pro"lus to treat ea"h monad as "on&entional genus or spe"ies independently of its being also "ause of a 8eoplatoni" pro"ession into different hypostases (J1 . ?loyd re"ogni1es that Pro"lus wishes to assimilate these two sorts of generati&ity under a more generi" "on"ept or, at any rate, some "ommon origin. 7owe&er, the 'uestion of what sort of assimilation

399 is appropriate simply restages the original opposition between pro"essional and di&isional s"hemata, sin"e assimilating pro"ession and de"lension (using the former term, for now, in its te"hni"al sense, rather than the looser sense in whi"h Pro"lus uses it to refer to the &ery assimilation whi"h ?loyd wishes to e*pli"ate by means of a more generi" "on"ept employs the di&isional s"heme, while a""ounting for them with respe"t to a "ommon origin or "ause employs the pro"essional s"heme. ?loyd e*presses s$epti"ism about the possibility of assimilating the two s"hemata by generali1ing the di&isional s"heme. 3s he puts it, the di&ision s"heme represents as it were a mi"ro(ontology Dunder ea"h hypostati" monadE and if one wished, hori1ontal series in the general Di.e. &erti"alE s"heme. But ! do not thin$ there is a pla"e su"h as >odds en&isages for hori1ontal series in the ma"ro(ontology (J1 . ?loyd s$et"hes out one possible a""ount whi"h would attempt to generali1e the di&isional s"heme. #he de"lining degrees of parti"ipation in the prin"iples "ould be understood 'uantitati&ely, as the re"eption of a greater or smaller number of the forms possessed by their "ause. But this de&i"e founders inasmu"h as the des"ent from 2oul to di&ine, angeli" and daemoni" uni&ersal and parti"ular souls respe"ti&ely entails "ross(di&isions meaning that the des"ent "ould not be refle"ted by a single Mdi&ision% or tree of Porphyry- for it would entail all solar souls being di&ine, while in fa"t di&ine solar souls while leading the series of all solar souls are only one sub(genus or superordinate spe"ies of solar souls, (JA . #he importan"e of the inability to redu"e these two s"hemata to one in this fashion goes immediately to the status of the henads, for if in &iew of the dependen"e of all Being on supra(essential entities and these presumably on -imit and the )nlimited, one is to en&isage either one or an e*tremely restri"ted number of genera, the "onsistent pla"ing

400 of the terms in a di&ision would surely be impossible or alternati&ely so mu"h further distort the rules that it would no longer be re"ogni1able as a di&ision (ibid- my emphasis . But this is e*a"tly the problem- the henads are not dependent upon ?imit and the 5nlimited. Pro"lus nowhere generates them from this dyad- at most, he attempts to deri&e the fun"tional "lassifi"ations of the ,ods from this pair. But the ,ods are not merely differentiated ontically, that is, a""ording to classes, they are primordially individuals. ?imit and the 5nlimited;!nfinity are "on"epts e*pressi&e of what we might "hara"teri1e, along with ?loyd, as the internal and e*ternal a"ti&ities of each henad (JJf . #hey are uni&ersals, but "ontrary to the "ase among onti" indi&iduals, there are no uni&ersals pre"eding the henads, for they do not parti"ipate. Or rather, they parti"ipate in Being and the di&erse onti" stru"tures through their illumination of Being. #his is how Pro"lus sol&es the problem of the One%s parti"ipation in Being from the $epublic- and as always, what is said about the One "on"erns, stricto sensu, the henads. #herefore, although ?imit and !nfinity, in a""ord with the do"trine of the Philebus, ser&e an in&aluable e*planatory fun"tion within ontology, there "an be no 'uestion of a reduction of the di&ersity within Being nor a fortiori the multipli"ity of indi&idual henads or ,ods to some "al"ulus of these fun"tions ta$en as ontologi"al primiti&es. )hat is ontologi"ally primiti&e is the analysis of ea"h ,od as a mixture of two different attitudes, so to spea$, in relation to the pro+e"t in whi"h ea"h one engages of "onstituting the whole of Being. ?loyd re+e"ts the &iew a""ording to whi"h the henads are thought of as beha&ing differently from the rest of reality whi"h is forms < a $ind of Malternati&e% or Mparallel% system (JK . 3nd yet his reasons for re+e"ting this &iew are not entirely "lear. Of "ourse,

401 as "an be seen from the literature re&iewed in the present se"tion, e&en where this point of &iew has been tentati&ely presented, it has ne&er been de&eloped in the detail of this dissertation. 3 more "ogent presentation of the nature of the differen"e between henadi" and formal reality would naturally ha&e the effe"t of sharpening the "riti"isms a""ordingly. ?loyd leans hea&ily on the fa"t that Pro"lus spea$s of the diale"ti"al e*position of theology < that is, the theologi"al interpretation of the Parmenides < as using diale"ti"al names in pla"e of the sa"red names of traditional theology. ?loyd wishes the reader to thin$ that the names in 'uestion are the names of the ;ods. But in fa"t he ignores in this regard the &ery sense of the te*t whi"h he paraphrases (JK . #he passage is therefore worth 'uoting at length4

his &iew D2yrianus%E is that ea"h of these di&ine orders has been named symboli"ally by Plato Din the ParmenidesE, and all ha&e been e*pressed by philosophi" names, neither by su"h names as are "ustomarily "elebrated by those who "ompose theogonies, nor by those whi"h re&eal their hyparxeis, su"h as are the epithets of the di&ine genera gi&en out by the ,ods, but rather, as ! said, by names familiar to philosophers, su"h as )hole, 0ultipli"ity, ?imitlessness, ?imit, whi"h are suitable for appli"ation to them, all ha&ing their proper ran$, and portraying without omission all the di&ine stages of pro"ession, whether intelligible, intelle"tual, or supra("osmi", and that thus all things are presented in logi"al order, as being symbols of di&ine orders of being. ("P 1BI1f

! ha&e emphasi1ed here the indi"ations that the whole dis"ussion "on"erns classes of ,ods rather than the ,ods themsel&es. #hat there is a properly philosophi"al manner of "lassifying the ,ods, whi"h answers to different purposes than those "lassifi"ations

402 offered within dis"rete theologiesAA does not mean that the philosophi"al mode of "lassifi"ation is superior to the theologi"al, nor e&en if it did would it be "orre"t to infer that Pro"lus intends the philosophi"al "lassifi"ation to repla"e the theologi"al. 3nd abo&e all, none of this has anything to do with the ,ods themsel&es. !ndeed, the idea, whi"h ?loyd seems to wish to put forward, that Pro"lus would ha&e his reader repla"e the ,ods of traditional "ult with some sort of philosopher%s "ult of ideas and hypostases, "an only be regarded as bi1arre, gi&en the e*traordinary interest displayed by Pro"lus in preser&ing traditional "ultus. ,i&en this degree of misunderstanding, it is not surprising that ?loyd fails to see that the henads represent an alternati&e or parallel system to the forms, for he thin$s they are merely the most general attributes of reality whi"h are entailed by the remaining attributes, that is, the forms (JK . But to say that the ,ods are inferred from the forms does &iolen"e to the whole fabri" of Pro"lus% thought. )e are gi&en $nowledge of the ,ods dire"tly through re&elation, and nothing "ould be more foreign to Pro"lus% attitude toward the ,ods than to "hara"teri1e them in su"h a manner as ?loyd does. ?loyd displays here the typi"al short"omings of modern interpreters of Pro"lus in failing to grasp or e&en pursue the true ri"hness of the en"ounter between philosophy and theology in Pro"lus. But he 'ui"$ly be"omes mired in attempting to e*pli"ate his &iew of the henads, and soon has to admit his un"ertainty (JKf . Basi"ally, the problem is that be"ause he "onfuses henads and hypostases, he imagines the pro"ession of the henads to be su"h that DbEelow the plane of !ntelle"t (or perhaps of 2oul the aspe"t of henads as gods tends to e"lipse their aspe"t of prin"iples. 2o what are regarded as henads tend to be
AA #he theologi"al "lassifi"ations show the hyparxeis of the ,ods be"ause they are, as we would say, "ulturally spe"ifi", being inseparable from the symbology and mythology of a dis"rete "omple* of di&ine manifestation and re&elation.

403 not so mu"h wholeness, similarity and the li$e, as "on"rete entities whi"h "an be re"ogni1ed as gods, su"h as the sun or guiding stars (JI . 9irst of all, Pro"lus does not ha&e the sort of diffi"ulty in re"ogni1ing what is a ,od that ?loyd e&idently does- and it is hard to see how the aspe"t of henads as ,ods fails to be "lear to Pro"lus at e&ery le&el of Being, from the highest rea"hes of the intelligible right down to the physi"al. 3fter all, he gi&es spe"ifi" e*amples of parti"ular deities manifesting on e&ery su"h le&el and spe"ifies that su"h deities are still henads a""ording to their hyparxeis, e&en on the infra( intelle"tual le&el of manifestation. 2e"ond, how would ?loyd e*plain that the manifestations of the ,ods on the "on"rete le&el are as li$ely, if not more so, to be in the form of, e.g., "ult statues as stars6 )ould he really ha&e us belie&e that someone as pious as Pro"lus would ha&e us see the "ult statue of a deity as a representation of an ontic prin"iple li$e wholeness or similarity6 But what ?loyd goes on to say is e&en less "oherent4 #his is supported by the logi"al segregation of a "lass of self(subsistent entities < ?loyd seems to ha&e in mind here the 'ualifi"ation of the ,ods as self("omplete henads in ET prop. 114, whi"h a""ording to this dissertation distinguishes the henads proper from what are, in fa"t, monads possessing deri&ati&e di&inity from their parti"ipation in the ,ods < for sin"e non(self(subsistent is e'ui&alent to Min a sub+e"t%, the abstra"t properties "annot be self( subsistent in any dia"osm below that of the Platoni" !deas- and this further distin"tion is important be"ause only the self("omplete are to be identified with ,ods (JI . ?loyd should re"ogni1e that there is a lot more going on in Pro"lus than the Platoni" !deas, that with the introdu"tion of the henads, ideas in general no longer o""upy the sole pride of pla"e that they did throughout the pre&ious history of Platonism. But e&en on his own

404 terms, if it is in the lower dia"osms that the aspe"t of henads as gods tends to e"lipse their aspe"t as prin"iples, how then does it ma$e sense that here it is only qua prin"iples or abstra"t properties dependent upon a sub+e"t that the henads are self( "omplete and hen"e ,ods6 ?loyd%s real problem is &ery simple, although he seems blind to it4 presupposing that the ,ods represent nothing abo&e and beyond the onti" hypostases, "ontrary to e&erything Pro"lus says on the sub+e"t, he depri&es himself of the &ery "on"eptual resour"es he would need to understand the do"trine at all. 3s he puts it, D"Eertainly henads are regularly des"ribed as huperousioi. But they generate "hains of henads with members in e&ery dia"osm below intelle"t down to at least the "elestial (JK . !n essen"e, ?loyd "annot understand how the ,ods "an be at on"e supra(essential and manifest themsel&es in the lower rea"hes of Being. But it is no different for a ,od to manifest him;herself at the le&el of Being !tself than, say, at the hyper"osmi" le&el. #hese are all posterior to the ,od%s own mode of e*isten"e, and so no spe"ial dispensation is re'uired, broadly spea$ing, for the subse'uent orders. ?loyd presupposes that whi"h he wishes to demonstrate4 that in no way do the henads represent a parallel system to that of the forms. !t is only on a""ount of "onflating the henadi" and onti" domains that the term huperousios be"omes so perple*ing for him, on"e he has ruled out the possibility that the term signifies any real differen"e. )e "an see this most "learly in ?loyd%s misreading of an important te*t dis"ussed in this dissertation, namely "P 1B4H. 7ere, all that ?loyd "an see is that the henads are des"ribed in effe"t, as ha&ing all the positi&e and formal properties of forms but to a greater degree (JI . But in fa"t Pro"lus lays out in this passage a series of spe"ifi" "hara"teristi"s with respe"t to whi"h henadi" e*isten"e differs fundamentally from the

405 mode of e*isten"e of the forms. #he henadi" "hara"teristi"s are +u*taposed with the "orresponding formal "hara"teristi"s to contrast them, not to posit a differen"e of degree, as is shown by the fa"t that Pro"lus see$s to de&elop a distin"t and parallel terminology to refer to the henadi" "hara"teristi"s. #hat there is a "orresponden"e, a parallelism, is a result of the fa"t that formal being is a product, an effect of henadi" e*isten"e. But sin"e ?loyd presupposes that there is no differen"e between the two, naturally he "an see no point in the "ontrast beyond hyperbole. #his, along with other aspe"ts of ?loyd%s reading of the henadology, &iolates the prin"iple of hermeneuti" "harity by imputing to Pro"lus in too many pla"es what amounts to an empty &erbosity and the henadology a do"trine without substan"e. ?loyd a"tually re"ogni1es that DeEa"h henad has also its indi&idual "hara"ter. !ndeed, he says that

! mention this be"ause the differen"es Dbetween their parti"ipantsE "ould presumably ha&e been a""ounted for by the effe"t of the dia"osm in the "ase of superordinate and subordinate spe"ies and of parti"ipated forms in the "ase of "o(ordinate spe"ies. 7ad that been so henads would simply ha&e been the plurality of parti"ipated unity or ?imit. !n many pla"es the property of being di&ine whi"h they "onfer (as well of "ourse as being di&ine themsel&es is identified by Pro"lus with unity, unity being also goodness. But sin"e he did not "onfine himself to this it seems to follow that "riti"s of the henads are right to suppose, e&en if they ha&e not produ"ed mu"h argument for this supposition, that their identifi"ation with traditional gods is built into the theory. (JIf

9irst of all, the fun"tional role of the henads in the theory lies pre"isely in that there must be something beyond form in order to a""ount for the e*isten"e of that whi"h "annot be

406 suffi"iently determined by form alone. 9urthermore, the differen"e between parti"ipating in ?imit and the unity of the henads is that the former is a unity of characteristic, whereas the latter is true indi&iduality. But it is only at the e*tremities of Being that we "an prise the two apart. On"e we re"ogni1e that the henads represent a distin"t mode of unity from formal unity there "an be no grounds for regarding the henads as systemati"ally otiose. 3nd on"e the ne"essity is established, on purely systemati" grounds, of a non(infinite multipli"ity of absolute indi&iduals, ea"h of whi"h has the 3ll in itself and is autonomous, with no term abo&e it, then the identifi"ation of this set with the set of traditional ,ods is no grounds for "riti"i1ing the system either, sin"e it is simply finding empiri"al "onfirmation for entities whi"h are posited trans"endentally. 9or as Pro"lus e*plains in PT ! J, all the metaphysi"ians who "ame before him "all the first and most self(suffi"ient prin"iples of things, ,ods, whate&er be the status parti"ular theories a""ord to these prin"iples, e.g., "orporeal, psy"hi"al or intelle"tual. Plato, as interpreted by Pro"lus, pro&ides a superior theology in that the nature of these prin"iples is unity, that is to say, indi&iduality. #herefore, whereas the other theologies represent a reduction of religious dis"ourse to some alien dis"ourse, the Platoni" theology alone is a theology of di&ine individuals. 7en"e the importan"e of maintaining the distin"tion between a s"ientifi" dis"ourse about the ,ods, whi"h "an only spea$ of "lasses of deities, as opposed to dis"rete theologies, whi"h "on"ern parti"ular deities. #he fa"t, then, that Pro"lus spea$s of only so many deities in the Platonic Theology as are a"tually named in Plato%s te*ts or in te*ts of 7elleni" theology that Pro"lus regards as belonging to one and the same tradition, is not to be "onstrued as an affirmation that these are the only ,ods who e*ist, or that any others must be redu"ible to these. !ndeed, the deities who are mentioned by

407 name in this te*t are to be thought of as mentioned rather than used, to borrow a distin"tion from "ontemporary linguisti" philosophy. #he Platonic Theology is an application of Pro"lus% system to a spe"ifi" pro+e"t, namely demonstrating the harmony of Plato and the ,ree$ theologians. #o thin$ that this single appli"ation e*hausts the system itself would be to fail to grasp the essen"e of "ommentary as a philosophi"al genre.

Pro"lus et >amas"ius by /oseph .ombXs, in Proclus et :on "nfluence ed. ,. Boss and ,. 2eel (=uri"h4 Editions du ,rand 0idi, 1CHL .

#he "on"ern of .ombXs in this arti"le is to elu"idate the >amas"ian "riti'ue of the Pro"lean system, a tas$ not without promise for stimulating fresh insights into Pro"lus% own thought. >amas"ius fre'uently, as .ombXs puts it, rO&eillait G une e*igen"e 'ui sommeillait dans la pensOe de Pro"lus, (AJ1 . .ombXs says, for instan"e, that bien 'ue Pro"lus ne &oie dans l%5n 'u%un nom purement fon"tionnel : notre usage, pour suggOrer le prin"ipe ineffable, "ar toute multipli"itO en &ient, et 'uoi'u%il insiste sur le "ara"tXre in"onnaissable de "e prin"ipe, >amas"ius, 'uant : lui, fait preu&e d%une "riti'ue plus entiXre, (AAL but he does not probe an important 'uestion raised by the relationship between the Pro"lean and >amas"ian henologies. >o we understand the Pro"lean do"trine of the One so well that we "an say +ust how mu"h >amas"ius% henology is different6 !s it possible that >amas"ius is presenting in a no&el and undoubtedly pro&o"ati&e fashion what he "onsiders to be the Pro"lean henology, properly understood6

408 >amas"ius undoubtedly introdu"es a rupture into the henology entre l%5n dont il y a 'uel'ue saisie et "e dont il n%y a absolument au"une appro"he, and "ette rupture G a""use la relati&itO du systXme entier des notions les plus hautes : partir de l%5n antOrieur lui(mVme 'ui, par un "^tO, s%enra"ine dans l%!neffable et, par un autre, prOlude au langage(ob+et (AAHf . 3nd yet the sour"e of this rupture < and "orresponding relati&ity < lies entirely within the ambit of Pro"lus% own "on"erns about the dangers of hypostati1ing the One. But where Pro"lus% solution lies, as this dissertation argues, in an affirmati&e pluralism of absolute henads, >amas"ius% lies in e&a"uating the position of the One !tself altogether in fa&or of the absolutely ineffable, on the one hand, and a One "orresponding to ?imit in the Pro"lean system on the other. ! would "ontend that this "ontrast has mu"h to do with the different temperaments of the two authors. Pro"lus is e"le"ti" and "on"iliatory, or as .ombXs puts it, Pro"lus rO&Xle G une nature de mOtaphysi"ien dont le propre est d%Vtre spontanOment "rOatri"e, tout en intOgrant et en ordonnant d%emblOe di&ers donnOs (AAJ . !mportant among Pro"lus% "on"iliatory pro+e"ts is not only integrating the pre&ious history of Platonism into his own system, but also and "ru"ially pro&iding a stru"ture for mediating between philosophi"al and theologi"al dis"ourses. Pro"lus thus lea&es a spa"e or gap within the properly philosophi"al dis"ourse to be o""upied by di&erse positi&e theologies < a relati&ity of sorts < with the philosophi"al framewor$ ser&ing the impli"it purpose of pre&enting any one of these from assuming a hegemoni" degree of appropriation of the entire philosophi"o(theologi"al field. >amas"ius, au "ontraire, est un philosophe de nature analyti'ue et rOfle*i&e, (ibid . >amas"ius engages in the same sorts of analyses of "ulturally spe"ifi" henads a""ording to their uni&ersal monadi" fun"tions that Pro"lus did

409 (9P !!!, part A , and therefore endorses in general the Pro"lean hermeneuti"al strategy and its ontologi"al impli"ations as dis"ussed at length in this dissertation, while for his own part "hoosing to ta$e up, as it were, only the negati&e element of Pro"lus% pro+e"t. 3nd here perhaps is where we would find the hidden "ore of differen"e between Pro"lus and >amas"ius, namely in >amas"ius% s$epti"ism about the power of philosophy to mediate between religious dis"ourses and to su""essfully thin$ for its own part on either side of the di&ide between philosophi"al and religious dis"ourse. 7e prefers, a""ordingly, to "on"entrate his efforts on drawing limits to the positi&ity of spe"ulati&e thought. 3nother aspe"t of >amas"ius% system dis"erned by .ombXs whi"h sheds light, in turn, on "orresponding features of Pro"lus% system lies in the unfolding of the intelligible triads. >amas"ius "riti"i1es the a""ount in Pro"lus of the status of the mi*ed, the third moment of the first intelligible triad. 3s .ombXs puts it,

3 la suite de Platon, Pro"lus le "onsidXre "omme rOsultant du mOlange 'ue le dieu opXre entre le limitant et l%illimitO, de sorte 'ue l%Vtre est Mfait%, produit par l%5n antOrieur 'ui est la "ause du mi*te. >amas"ius, de son "^tO, estime 'ue les parti"ipations des deu* prin"ipes, sous la motion de l%5n, ne suffisent pas : a""omplir "e premier mi*te- penser le "ontraire re&iendrait d%ailleurs : "on"e&oir les deu* prin"ipes "omme des OlOments, et le premier mi*te "omme leur "omposO a posteriori, purement passif, alors 'u%il est plus "omposant 'ue "omposO, et "ela a priori. (AJB

#his is not an altogether +ust "hara"teri1ation of Pro"lus% position. Plato, it is true, presents us with little more than what .ombXs "hara"teri1es as le s"hXme artifi"ialiste G de la produ"tion du mi*te premier par le dieu, (AJ1 but Pro"lus has already, in

410 ad&an"e of >amas"ius, introdu"ed far more subtlety into the do"trine. #his dissertation argues that the first intelligible triad is not an operation of synthesis or fabri"ation performed upon elements whose pre(e*isten"e would naturally render the unity of the resulting mi*ture ad&entitious, but rather represents the self(diremption of ea"h henad in its illumination of Being. !t is, indeed, the produ"tion of Being by a ,od,AJ but the produ"tion in 'uestion is in no respe"t artifi"ial, for it is nothing other than a representation of the a"ti&ity of ea"h ,od with respe"t to Being, whi"h is "onstituted at ea"h of its le&els by the pro"ession of su""essi&e "lasses of deities. #he elements of ?imit and !nfinity are the elements of parti"ularity and uni&ersality in ea"h ,od, the diale"ti" of whi"h produ"es the unfolding of Being. @adi"al Being < >amas"ius% unified (h&n%menon < is an a priori "omposite (syntheti" a priori6 in .ombXs% phrase, in whi"h is fi*ed l%indisso"iation originelle de l%union et de la distin"tion, "ar elles apparaissent ensemble, et pour la premiXre fois, en lui et a&e" lui. ?e premier mi*te manifeste, en mVme temps 'ue lui, ses propres OlOments 'ui sont uns et plusieurs sans Vtre les deu* prin"ipes ni leurs simples parti"ipations (AJ1 . #his dissertation argues that in Pro"lus, the primary mi*ture is the onti" double, so to spea$, of ea"h deity, whi"h is at on"e "apable of de"omposition into its elements in a way that deities are not, and yet has the fi*ity granted by its "ausal relationship to the deity, whi"h does not ma$e of Being an unintelligible a posteriori "omposite be"ause the deities do not produ"e something fundamentally other than themsel&es. Ea"h deity produ"es itself within and as Being in their pro"ession. But ea"h deity is still also and
AJ Being is a"tually the produ"t of a ;od in one respe"t, namely the "ontainment of the whole of Being within ea"h henad (see the passage from the Elements of Theology "ited by .ombXs below in whi"h the multipli"ity of Being is referred to as unitary in itself , the produ"t of the ;ods in another respe"t, namely that the properly onti" mode of e*isten"e arises from the interferen"e of the ,ods with ea"h other in their manifestation. #he origin of this interferen"e does not, from a fully unitary perspe"ti&e, represent an influen"e e*ternal to ea"h ,od, for ea"h ,od "ontains all the other ,ods.

411 always, inalienably, a henad and supra(essential. .ombXs, unsurprisingly, fails to a""ord Pro"lus the sophisti"ation of >amas"ius with respe"t to the emergen"e of the first intelligible triad be"ause he reprodu"es unthin$ingly a thoroughly onti" relationship between the One and the henads, in whi"h

elles Dles hOnadesE sont toutes, en effet, dans l%5n de faZon impli"ite, mais le premiXres : se manifester sont le limitant et l%illimitO 'ui anti"ipent toute pro"ession- 'uant au* autres hOnades (et il y en a autant 'ue de sOries et de fon"tions diffOrentes , elles ne se manifestent 'u%: partir du premier ordre des intelligibles(intelle"tifs, lors'ue la premiXre alteritO est &enue s"inder l%un(Vtre dans la dualitO proprement dite de l%un et de la substan"e. (AAIf

7ere an a""ura"y about the bare and abstra"t e*ternal features of the do"trine is "ombined with an in"apa"ity to dis"ern in the do"trine its inner logi" and broader signifi"an"e, whi"h alone "an render it "oherent. 9irst, the relationship between the henads and the One "annot be one of inheren"e or "ontainment of the henads in the One, regardless of whether it is impli"it or not, at the ris$ of ma$ing the negations applied to the One !tself in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides mere empty words, whi"h they assuredly are not for Pro"lus. 8oti"e that in the "ru"ial passage at "P 1B4H, where Pro"lus distinguishes the mode of e*isten"e of the henads from that of the 9orms, he says that the unity of the henads is a unity of all in all, that is, of all the henads in ea"h henad, not all the henads in the One. 8ote that >amas"ius refers to the moments "orresponding, in his system, to ?imit and !nfinity as hen panta and panta hen respe"ti&ely. #his "learly e*presses two "omplementary dimensions of the all in all of the henads from "P 1B4H.

412 )ith respe"t to ?imit and !nfinity as henads, Pro"lus usually states that it is ?imit alone whi"h represents a henad, while !nfinity is the power of this henad. 3nd again, we must be "autious in how we understand the designation of ?imit as a henad. !t is not some parti"ular henad o&er and against the others- rather, it is an element of ea"h henad, and is, in this respe"t, each henad, +ust as the One neither is, nor is one, but is each henad. )hy else is it that, as .ombXs notes, a multipli"ity of henads posited together upon a "ommon field is first a&ailable at the le&el of the intelligible(and(intelle"tual order6 !t is be"ause prior to that point, we are only dealing with individual deities qua individual. !n this respe"t, Pro"lus is really no different than >amas"ius, who, if he at first wished, : la suite de son maWtre !sidore, to regard the three moments of the first intelligible triad as three henads, ne&ertheless ultimately de"ided parler d%unifiO pur, de &ie pur, et d%intelle"t pur Di.e., the three intelligible triadsE, en tant 'u%ils sont antOrieurs : la distin"tion proprement dite de l%hOnadi'ue et du substantiel, la'uelle ne sur&ient 'u%a&e" la premiXre alteritO dans la premiXre triad des intelligibles(intelle"tifs, (AJA . #he three intelligible triads are suspended in this fashion between henadi" and onti" e*isten"e be"ause they are the inherent "hara"teristi"s of ea"h and e&ery deity, whi"h ma$e it possible for deities to manifest themsel&es sele"ti&ely at different le&els of Being without sa"rifi"ing their supra(essential e*isten"e. 9or in possessing the three intelligible triads in themsel&es, ea"h deity possesses the whole of radi"al Being, radi"al ?ife and radi"al !ntelle"t, whi"h allow them to illuminate Being as intelligible, intelligible(and( intelle"tual, or intelle"tual deities, or to manifest on more than one of these le&els. !f there are deities who only manifest themsel&es at the infra(intelle"tual le&el, then they do so in e*pli"it "orrelation with one or more other deities manifesting at the !ntelle"tual le&el.

413 3""ording to .ombXs, >amas"ius arri&es at a do"trine whereby

on peut 'ualifier le stru"turalisme des mi*tes de stru"turalisme de l%auto"onstitution unitaire et de son dO&eloppement, puis'ue la stru"ture triadi'ue ne fait 'u%un a&e" la genXse mVme des dieu*. .ette stru"ture se lit bien : tra&ers la dynami'ue de la triade de l%Vtre pur, d%abord "omme premier indiff+renci+ (adiakriton , ensuite "omme en train de se diff+rencier (diakrinomenon dans la &ie pure, enfin "omme complItement diff+renci+ (diakekrimenon dans l%intelle"t pur. (AJAf

.ombXs a"$nowledges that "ette triade du dO&eloppement par mode de manifestation est dO+: utilisOe par Pro"lus, but elle de&ient "entrale "he1 >amas"ius (AJJ n. 4K , but the importan"e in Pro"lus of the emergen"e of what this dissertation refers to as dia"riti"al being is far from being properly appre"iated. #his dissertation argues that this emergen"e is the sub+e"t matter of the Platonic Theology. .ombXs is "orre"t that what is in&ol&ed is the &ery genesis of the ,ods, but only if we understand that the genesis of the ,ods within >eing is but a relati&e genesis, at least for Pro"lus, and probably for >amas"ius as well, although it is not my purpose here to determine this. #he ,ods "ome into Being, so to spea$, from their supra(essential mode of e*isten"e whi"h is ne&er sa"rifi"ed in the pro"ess. #he proof of this within ontology is that the logi"al distin"tion between henadi" e*isten"e and dia"riti"al being "an be grasped in purely philosophi"al terms. 3s this dissertation e*plains, the distin"tion lies in the mediated 'uality of all dia"riti"al being. #o emerge into dia"riti"al being from henadi" e*isten"e is to mo&e from a domain of absolute indi&iduality into a realm where indi&iduals are determined by their infima species and their a""idents, that is, their position in a dia"riti"ally organi1ed

414 whole. #his is simultaneously to mo&e from a realm of absolute pluralism, in whi"h ea"h henad is so&ereign, into a progressi&ely "entrali1ed intelle"tual domain. !n the domain of the intelle"t, on"e it is fully "onstituted, there will be no pla"e for proper names as su"h, and the henads will ta$e their pla"e as a "lass under a monad, +ust li$e souls under 2oul or beings under Being. #his latter stru"ture is good for most, if not all, of the philosopher%s purposes. .ertainly there is no reason why a philosopher should e&er have to spea$ of a parti"ular deity, use a parti"ular proper name. )hat is ne"essary, howe&er, is to re"ogni1e that su"h a henadi" organi1ation e*ists parallel to and trans"ending the dia"riti"al system of beings, and to understand how dia"riti"al being emerges from out of the a"ti&ity of henads. #his is the same as to say, how the ,ods pro"eed to the illumination of Beingand this is the tas$ Pro"lus ta$es up in the Platonic Theology. )hen .ombXs says that D"Ehe1 Pro"lus, l%Vtre, la &ie et l%intelle"t intelligibles Otaient les prin"ipes de la "lassifi"ation des dieu*- "he1 >amas"ius, ils ne sont "ela 'u%en Otant d%abord les prin"ipes mVmes de leur "onstitution, les prin"ipes de la dOifi"ation par les'uels les dieu* sont faits dieu*, (AJ4 he seems again to both re"ogni1e the outlines of the do"trine and miss its underlying logi". 9or it is true that for Pro"lus, all onti" determinations originate from determinations of the ,ods. But the sense of this deri&ation seems somehow lost on .ombXs. !ntelligible Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t, what ! fre'uently refer to as radi"al Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t, represent, li$e ?imit and !nfinity, and e&en, in a "ertain sense, the One !tself, the produ"ts of an analyti" of the di&ine. #his analyti" re&eals through radi"al Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t the potentiality for ea"h henad, in prin"iple, to manifest itself as an intelligible, intelligible(and(intelle"tual, or intelle"tual ,od, that is, to be parti"ipated by beings on one or more of these le&els. #hey represent

415 thus the reser&e of possibility possessed by ea"h ,od. !n a sense, they do indeed represent, then, for Pro"lus as mu"h as >amas"ius, the prin"iples of the "onstitution of the ,ods, espe"ially if we understand "onstitution itself, hypostasis, as an inherently ontologi"al term, and so the "onstitution of the ,ods refers to their presen"e and a"ti&ity within >eing. .ombXs may be right that "he1 >amas"ius, Mintelligible% (no&ton n%indi'ue pas un ni&eau infOrieur : Munitaire% (heniaion , as it does for Pro"lus. But we must understand what it would mean to "ollapse the henadi" and intelligible domains. )hile on the one hand, it remo&es a supra(essential domain that may, for >amas"ius, ha&e been, ultimately, too parado*i"al to tolerate, it would do so at the pri"e, whi"h >amas"ius may ha&e been willing to pay, of infusing the whole system of Being with the relati&ity .ombXs spo$e of earlier. >amas"ius di&ini1es the whole of Being in a way that, rather than e*tending further than in Pro"lus the rights of intelle"t with respe"t to re&elation, would in fa"t shrin$ its borders. #he ground on whi"h the philosopher stands be"omes, in fa"t, perilously small. .ombXs remar$s that DoEn pourrait lire le Trait+ des Premiers Principes "omme une phOnomenologie de l%]me 'ui pro+ette en arriXre d%elle( mVme &ers l%!neffable les nO"essitOs d%un dis"ours antOrieur, (AAC and yet the >amas"ian system "annot fail to ta$e on the "olor of its first moment, whi"h is fran$ly "onstituted by a di&ination (manteuetai (9P ! 4. 1J . .ombXs e*plains that e&en for Pro"lus, l%intelligible tend &ers l%unitaire, whi"h is natural, inasmu"h as the intelligible is the produ"t of the a"ti&ity of the ,ods. But this tenden"y does not affe"t the profound and indeed rigorous distin"tion between the unitary and onti" modes of e*isten"e detailed in this dissertation. .ombXs adds a referen"e to ET prop. 1JH that la pluralitO de l%Vtre est Munitaire% (heniaion . But this is

416 not simply a matter of a tenden"y- the whole of Being is contained in ea"h henad, unplurali1ed be"ause its mode of e*isten"e is one for whi"h spe"ifi" identity alone is rele&ant, this being intelligible indi&iduality. 0aintaining this distin"tion prote"ts the boundaries between reason and re&elation4 re&elation "on"erns parti"ular, named henads su"h as =eus, while reason deals only with classes of henads. @e&elation belongs to the highest truth, if not the broadest. @eason belongs to an inferior le&el, it is true- yet it is able to e*tend, in the manner appropriate to it, to the first prin"iple itself, whi"h as prin"iple of indi&iduation, e*presses in the domain of reason what the simple e*isten"e of the many ,ods as absolute indi&iduals shows. .ombXs re"ogni1es that, after all, !ntelligible Being, ?ife and !ntelle"t are not merely, for Pro"lus, simples prin"ipes formels de "lassifi"ation des dieu*, mais des prin"ipes 'ui puisent leur pou&oir distributif dans la di&inisation mVme : la'uelle ils parti"ipent (AJ4 but what he seems to miss is that Pro"lus% whole pro+e"t is to understand how, through di&ine a"ti&ity, classification, the most basi" ontologi"al pro"edure, be"omes possible. #his is the wor$ of the intelligible, intelligible(and( intelle"tual, and intelle"tual orders of ,ods, who through their a"ti&ity ma$e it possible for the soul of the philosopher to "onstitute "lasses all the way up to the first prin"iple. But this pro+e"t "an only e&ade .ombXs when, ha&ing argued for an effa"ement of the distin"tion between the unitary and intelligible domains in >amas"ius, he demonstrates a la"$ of grasp of the distin"tion to begin with, inasmu"h as he thin$s that it is by some sort of e*tension of the term that Pro"lus est mVme allO +us'u%: appeler les Mdieu* intelligibles% des MhOnades%, (AJK when there is no reason at all to be the least surprised at this4 intelligible ,ods are henads, as are intelligible(and(intelle"tual ,ods, and

417 intelle"tual ,ods, and so forth e&en down to the infra(intelle"tual ,ods. 3ll ,ods are henads and all henads are ,ods, but for rare instan"es of e'ui&o"ation dis"ussed in this dissertation. #he "lassifi"ations of the ,ods arise due to their different a"ti&ities with respect to >eing, but this differential a"ti&ity does not affe"t their supra(essential hyparxis. )ithout re"ogni1ing this basi" fa"t, no +usti"e "an be done to Pro"lus% system.

Parti"ipation in 7enads and 0onads in Pro"lus% Theologica Platonica !!!, "hs. 1(I by P. 3. 0ei+er, in !n Proclus and his "nfluence in 3edieval Philosophy, ed E. P. Bos P P. 3. 0ei+er (?eiden4 E. /. Brill, 1CCA .

0ei+er sets out to demonstrate that the term metechomenos has two senses in Pro"lus, the one meaning the form immanent in the parti"ipant, the other that whi"h is parti"ipated in, that is, the entity with whi"h the immanent form originates, (IL - he also see$s to "larify a number of issues pertaining to the Pro"lean do"trine of parti"ipation. 7e has relati&ely little to say about the henads as su"h- but sin"e problems of parti"ipation must ultimately be "arried ba"$ to the first parti"ipated entities, whi"h are the henads, and sin"e, by "ontrast, imparti"ipable is only e&er said of monads and of the One !tself, a dis"ussion of the problem of parti"ipation and unparti"ipated prin"iples "annot fail to in&ol&e a "onsideration of henads and monads. 3nd yet 0ei+er%s a""ount suffers from a la"$ of any deep "onsideration of the relationship between henads and monads. 9or if, as this dissertation argues, the irradiated states of unity referred to in the "orollary to prop. I4 of the ET as lesser henads pro"eeding from the One are, in fa"t, monads, whi"h result from the henads% a"ti&ity of illumination (katalampsis , then the

418 remar$s about metechomena in prop. AJ whi"h trouble 0ei+er, sin"e they seem to imply that the henad, inasmu"h as it is parti"ipated, would belong to its parti"ipant and re'uire the parti"ipant as its substratum (IC , must be dealt with in light of an a""ount of the relationship between henads and monads, and furthermore, an a""ount of the position of the $ind of in'uiry "ondu"ted in the Elements with respe"t to Pro"lus% broader system. )e must not assume, be"ause of the e*pe"tations "reated in us by the use of more geometrico < more an appearan"e at any rate than a reality in the Elements < that this te*t spea$s authoritati&ely and in isolation for Pro"lus% &iews on e&ery issue, rather than representing merely a parti"ular aspect of his system, the purely ontologi"al aspe"t. 9or no supra(essential is a""ounted for in this te*t with respe"t to its existence, or hyparxis, but only in its onti" "ausality, its hypostasis. Obser&e how these two terms intera"t in prop. AJ4 all parti"ipated hypostaseis are lin$ed by upward tension (anateinontai to unparti"ipated hyparxeis. 3ll parti"ipation implies an unparti"ipated- this is merely an instan"e of the uni&ersal ontologi"al prin"iple of "ausation through negation, a prin"iple at the &ery heart of Pro"lus% interpretation of the Parmenides4 !ndeed, if ! may state my &iew in summary, ! would say that e&en as the One is the "ause of all things, so these negations Di.e. of the first hypothesisE are the "auses of the "orresponding assertions G 9or this reason also the "ausal prin"iples among those entities following upon the One ha&e negations of what is se"ondary to them predi"ated truly of themsel&es, ("P 1BLKf . One should also note the passage immediately pre"eding this one, in whi"h the mode of negation appropriate to physi"al attributes, su"h as 0otion, is dis"ussed. 0otion itself does not mo&e, and this is an e*ample of the prin"iple that negation is predi"ated of something whi"h is not itself

419 re"epti&e of a gi&en "hara"teristi", but is the "ause of those things in whi"h it resides being re"epti&e of the asserted "hara"teristi", (1BLK . #he latter mode of negation is only denied of the One be"ause it in no way "omes to be in those things of whi"h it is the "ause, but the "hara"teristi"s that are negated, not only of the One, but of, e.g., 2oul (1BLI are still negated precisely inasmuch as these are the causes of the latter characteristics. 8oti"e, in this regard, the "are with whi"h Pro"lus addresses the problem of how it is possible at all for anything to follow from what is not the "ase, whi"h he ta$es to be a 'uestion of what "an arise on the basis of the non(e*istent (CCC . )hat is important is to understand at on"e how mu"h and how little is implied by this sort of diale"ti"al pro"edure. ,i&en parti"ipation, there must be an unparti"ipated. )hen Pro"lus identifies the unparti"ipated tout court with the domain of hyparxis as opposed to that of hypostasis, he alerts us to the limits of the in'uiry represented by the Elements. )e should not imagine that the unparti"ipated prin"iples posterior to the One, whi"h are defined simply as the parti"ipants of the "orresponding "lasses of ,ods, are entities whi"h we might pla"e alongside the ,ods themsel&es. 9or their mode of unity is distin"t4 indeed,the mode of unity of a hypostasis is such as to be sufficiently determined by a dialectical procedure. Amethektos, then, does not signify an entity whi"h happens not to be parti"ipated or that has imparti"ipability as a 'uality so mu"h as that to whi"h the phenomenon of parti"ipation generally, or some parti"ular instan"e of parti"ipation, essentially refers as its "ause- note the dis"ussion at "P 1BL4 of the undefined field of referen"e of negations, whi"h tend to simplify things from distin"tion and definition in the dire"tion of being un"ir"ums"ribed, and are thus suitable to those who are being drawn up from

420 what is partial towards the whole and from the aligned towards the unaligned and from the sli"ed(up type of $nowledge towards that type of a"ti&ity whi"h is un"ir"ums"ribable and unitary and simple. #here are other e*amples in this dissertation of this anagogi" fun"tion of negation. 5nparti"ipated intelle"t, then, refers simply to the supra(essential "ause of intelle"t, without further spe"ifi"ation. 9or further spe"ifi"ation, we would need to refer to +ust su"h an a""ount as we find in the Platonic Theology, where the emergen"e of !ntelle"t from its priors is e*plained through the logi" of the ,ods% manifestation whi"h "onstitutes Being. 5nparti"ipated entities are thus really onti" pla"eholders for supra(essentials, in"luding and most notoriously the unparti"ipated One, whi"h is a pla"eholder on the one hand, for the aberrant set represented by the henads, a multipli"ity failing to obser&e the rules of onti" multipli"ities, and on the other hand for the genus of unity whose two spe"ies would be henadi" and monadi" unity, but whi"h is pre"isely lacking, for it "annot be a unity itself. But that onti" logi" or ontology is superseded in this way does not mean that it loses its appli"ation altogether, for it is by ta$ing it to its limits that the supra(essential domain is re&ealed. 3nd indeed, when the supra(essential domain is re&ealed, it is re&ealed as that of whi"h onti" logi" is the product, and whi"h is its refle"tion, e&en if does not, for that, apply uni&o"ally to its produ"er(s . )ithout su"h basi" re"ognitions, an in&estigation su"h as 0ei+er%s will ine&itably tend to obs"ure almost as mu"h as it "larifies, for the a""ounts in the Elements, the Parmenides "ommentary, and the Platonic Theology (the other "ommentaries falling easily in line with the latter two are not to be ad+usted to ea"h other in pie"emeal fashion but beginning from and ne&er losing sight of the parti"ular pur&iew of ea"h.

421

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