Plato's Parmenides

First published Fri Aug 17, 2007; substantive revision Fri Jun 17, 2011

The Parmenides is, quite possibly, the most enigmati o! Plato"s dialogues# The dialogue re ounts an almost ertainly !i titious onversation bet$een a venerable Parmenides %the &leati 'onist( and a youth!ul )o rates, !ollo$ed by a di**ying array o! inter onne ted arguments presented by Parmenides to a young and ompliant interlo utor named +Aristotle, %not the philosopher, but rather a man $ho be ame one o! the Thirty Tyrants a!ter Athens" surrender to )parta at the on lusion o! the Peloponnesian -ar(# 'ost ommentators agree that )o rates arti ulates a version o! the theory o! !orms de!ended by his mu h older namesa.e in the dialogues o! Plato"s middle period, that Parmenides mounts a number o! potentially devastating hallenges to this theory, and that these hallenges are !ollo$ed by a pie e o! intelle tual +gymnasti s, onsisting o! eight strings o! arguments %/edu tions( that are in some $ay designed to help us see ho$ to prote t the theory o! !orms against the hallenges# 0eyond this, there is pre ious little s holarly onsensus# 1ommentators disagree about the proper $ay to re onstru t Parmenides" hallenges, about the overall logi al stru ture o! the /edu tions, about the main sub2e t o! the /edu tions, about the !un tion o! the /edu tions in relation to the hallenges, and about the !inal philosophi al moral o! the dialogue as a $hole# The Parmenides inspired the metaphysi al and mysti al theories o! the later 3eoplatonists %notably Plotinus and later, Pro lus(, $ho sa$ in the /edu tions the .ey to the hierar hi al ontologi al stru ture o! the universe#
1# 4vervie$ o! the /ialogue 2# The 5ntrodu tory )e tion6 7eno"s Argument 128a912:e ;# )o rates" )pee h6 The Theory o! Forms 12:e91;0a <# Problems !or the Theory o! Forms 1;0a91;<e <#1 The &=tent o! the Forms 1;0a9e <#2 The -hole>Part /ilemma 1;0e91;1e <#; The Third 'an Argument 1;2a9b <#< Forms as Thoughts 1;2b9

<#? The @i.eness Aegress 1;2 91;;a <#8 The Breatest /i!!i ulty 1;;a91;<e ?# Co$ to )ave the Forms6 The Plan o! the /edu tions 1;<e91;7 8# The /edu tions 1;7 9188 8#1 The First /edu tion 1;7 91<2a 8#2 The )e ond /edu tion 1<2b91??e 8#; The Appendi= to the First T$o /edu tions 1??e91?7b 8#< The Third /edu tion 1?7b91?Db 8#? The Fourth /edu tion 1?Db9180b 8#8 The Fi!th /edu tion 180b918;b 8#7 The )i=th /edu tion 18;b918<b 8#: The )eventh /edu tion 18<b918?e 8#D The &ighth /edu tion 18?e9188 7# 1on lusion 0ibliography A ademi Tools 4ther 5nternet Aesour es Aelated &ntries

1. Overview of the Dialogue Plato"s Parmenides onsists in a riti al e=amination o! the theory o! !orms, a set o! metaphysi al and epistemologi al do trines arti ulated and de!ended by the hara ter )o rates in the dialogues o! Plato"s middle period %prin ipally Phaedo, Aepubli 559E, )ymposium(# A ording to this theory, there is a single, eternal, un hanging, indivisible, and non>sensible !orm orresponding to every predi ate or property# The theoreti al !un tion o! these !orms is to e=plain $hy things %parti ularly, sensible things( have the properties they do# Thus, it is by virtue o! being in some $ay related to %i#e#, by parti ipating in, or parta.ing o!( the !orm o! beauty that beauti!ul things %other than beauty( are beauti!ul, it is by virtue o! parta.ing o! the !orm o! largeness that large things are large, and so on# Fundamental to this theory is the laim that !orms are separate !rom %at least in the sense o! being not identi al to( the things that parta.e o! them# 5n the metaphysi s o! his middle period, Plato does not provide a theory

o! the nature o! the parta.ing relation# 0ut in the Parmenides, Plato onsiders t$o a ounts o! the parta.ing relation# A ording to the !irst +Pie 'odel, a ount, !or E to parta.e o! F is !or the $hole or a part o! F to be in E %as a part o! E(# A ording to the se ond +Paradigmatisti , a ount, !or E to parta.e o! F is !or E to resemble F# 5n the !irst part o! the dialogue, Plato sets out reasons !or thin.ing that, on either o! these a ounts o! parta.ing, the theory o! !orms is internally in onsistent# 5mmediately !ollo$ing these riti isms, Plato des ribes a general method o! training designed to save the !orms# The method onsists o! a series o! eight /edu tions %$ith an Appendi= to the !irst t$o( !o using on onsequen es that may be derived !rom positing the being o! a parti ular !orm and onsequen es that may be derived !rom positing the non>being o! that !orm# 5n the se ond part o! the dialogue, Plato instantiates this method, ta.ing the !orm, the one, as his e=ample# Plato sho$s, in parti ular, that $hether the one is or is not, the one %and also things other than the one6 the others( have none o! a series o! pairs o! ontrary properties %$holeGdivided, in motionGat rest, sameGdi!!erent, li.eGunli.e, equalGunequal, olderGyounger(# Plato also sho$s that, $hether the one is or is not, the one %and also the others( have %or, at least, appear to have( all o! these ontrary properties# 2. The Introductory Section: eno's !rgument 12"a#12$e The dialogue"s narrator is 1ephalus, $ho has 2ust arrived in Athens a!ter a trip !rom his home in 1la*omenae# 1ephalus runs into Plato"s hal! brothers, Adeimantus and Blau on, and as.s them to on!irm the e=isten e o! someone $ho has ompletely memori*ed a onversation that Parmenides and 7eno on e had $ith )o rates# Adeimantus on!irms that his hal! brother, Antiphon, an re ite the onversation in toto, having heard it !rom a !riend o! 7eno"s, Pythodorus, in $hose house the onversation too. pla e# 1ephalus, Adeimantus, and Blau on then pay a visit to Antiphon, $ho, a!ter a bit o! prodding, agrees to replay the onversation# As most s holars agree, the onversation putatively re orded by Pythodorus, passed on to Antiphon, and then re ounted to 1ephalus, is almost ertainly !i titious# This hypothesis partly e=plains

$hy Plato hose to !rame the dialogue at third remove# As Antiphon tells the story, the noted &leati philosophers, Parmenides %then around 8? years old( and 7eno %then around <0 years old(, have ome to Athens !or the Breat Panathenaea# Caving heard o! their arrival, a youth!ul )o rates %then around 20 years old( and some !riends o! his have ome to Pythodorus"s house to listen to 7eno read !rom his boo.# At the end o! 7eno"s per!orman e, Pythodorus, Parmenides, and Aristotle, $ho have been $aiting outside the house, return and $itness an e= hange bet$een 7eno and )o rates# The e= hange begins $ith )o rates" summary o! the general stru ture o! one o! 7eno"s arguments6 1#5! the things that are are many, then they are both li.e and unli.e# 2#3othing an be both li.e and unli.e# )o, ;#The things that are are not many# 7eno then e=plains that he intends this argument as a .ind o! de!ense o! Parmenides" monism6 2ust as others have argued that monism leads to absurd results %7eno may be thin.ing here o! the sorts o! absurdities mentioned by Plato at )ophist 2<<b92<?e(, so pluralism su!!ers onsequen es that are, i! anything, even more absurd# %. Socrates' S&eech: The Theory of 'orms 12$e#1%(a )o rates then ob2e ts to 7eno"s argument by denying premise %2(# Cis lengthy ob2e tion depends on the theory o! !orms arti ulated in Plato"s middle period dialogues# 4ne o! the main prin iples o! this theory is 1ausality %Phaedo 100 <98, 100d79:, 100e?98, 101b<98, 101 <9?(6 %1ausality( Things that are F %other than the F( are F by virtue o! parta.ing o! the F# Another ru ial prin iple is 100b897; Aepubli <78b10, <:0a11(6 )eparation %Phaedo 7? 119d2,

%)eparation( The F is itsel! by itsel!, at least in the sense o! being separate !rom, and hen e not identi al $ith, the

things that parta.e o! it# A ording to )eparation, li.e things are li.e by parta.ing o! a separate !orm o! li.eness and unli.e things are unli.e by parta.ing o! a separate !orm o! unli.eness# Although the properties o! being li.e and being unli.e are ontraries, they are not ontradi tories# As )o rates emphasi*es, it is possible !or sensible things to parta.e o! both li.eness and unli.eness, and hen e be both li.e and unli.e# )o rates does not e=plain ho$ this is supposed to be possible, but $e an e=tra t an e=planation !rom $hat he says later in his spee h about the properties o! being one and being many, and !rom $hat the Phaedo tells us about the properties o! being tall and short# At Parmenides 12D , )o rates laims that he himsel! is one %being one among the seven persons $ho are present( and many %in having many parts6 rightGle!t, !rontGba ., upperGlo$er(# At Phaedo 102b !!#, )o rates points out that )immias is taller than )o rates %and hen e tall(, but that )immias is also shorter than Phaedo %and hen e short(# Thus, )immias is both tall and short# 1learly )o rates envisages the possibility o! sensible things being both li.e in one $ay and unli.e in another# For e=ample, )o rates is li.e Plato %in that ea h is a philosopher( and unli.e 'eletus %in that one, but not the other, is a poet(# 0eing li.e Plato, )o rates is li.e# 0eing unli.e 'eletus, )o rates is unli.e# Cen e )o rates is both li.e and unli.e# The general prin iple here is 5mpurity>)6 %5mpurity>)( )ensible things are impure inasmu h as they an %and, in !a t, o!ten do( have ontrary properties# 5t !ollo$s !rom 5mpurity>) that premise %2( o! 7eno"s argument is !alse# 0ut )o rates is $illing to grant that 7eno is not entirely mista.en# Ce insists that although it is !ar !rom surprising to be told that sensible things have ontrary properties, he $ould be astonished to learn that !orms have ontrary properties# )o rates, then, holds that !orms are pure, in the !ollo$ing sense6 %Purity>F( Forms annot have ontrary properties# A ording to Purity>F, not only is it the ase that the one annot be both one and many and the li.e annot be both li.e and unli.e, but it is also the ase that the one annot be both li.e and unli.e and the li.e annot be

both one and many# %3oti e that Purity>F and 5mpurity>) together entail 3on>5dentity, the laim that no !orm is identi al to any sensible thing# A similar !orm o! argument appears at Phaedo 7<b9 , a passage in $hi h )o rates argues that $hereas sensible things that are equal are also unequal, the equal is not unequal, and hen e the equal is not identi al to any equal sensible thing#( )o rates" spee h there!ore arti ulates some o! the basi elements o! the theory o! !orms, namely 1ausality and )eparation, along $ith 5mpurity>) and Purity>F# The theory to $hi h )o rates alludes is ri her than his brie! des ription o! it suggests# As the dialogue pro eeds, the interlo utors invo.e a number o! additional middle period prin iples# 4ne prin iple that plays an important role in the sequel is 4ne>over>'any %see Aepubli ?D8a897(6 %4ne>over>'any( For any plurality o! F things, there is a !orm o! F>ness by virtue o! parta.ing o! $hi h ea h member o! the plurality is F# 5t is !rom this prin iple that Plato in!ers, by means o! the Third 0ed Argument %Aepubli ?D7 19d;(, the prin iple o! Hniqueness6 %Hniqueness( For any property F, there is e=a tly one !orm o! F>ness# %3oti e that the on2un tion o! 4ne>over>'any and Hniqueness entails 1ausality#( The sequel also depends on yet another important middle period prin iple, )el!>Predi ation6 %)el!>Predi ation( For any property F, the F is F# For e=ample, the beauti!ul is beauti!ul %&uthydemus ;01b?, 1ratylus <;Dd?98, Cippias 'a2or 2D2e897(# 5t is lear that the point generali*es to all properties, in luding the property o! being large %see Phaedo 100 <98, 102e?98(# %3oti e that Purity>F and )el!>Predi ation together entail the prin iple that the F annot possess the property that is ontrary to F, instan es o! $hi h appear throughout the middle dialogues %Cippias 'a2or 2D1d19;, Phaedo 102e?98( and in )o rates" spee h %Parmenides 12Db19;, 12Db89 1(#( And !inally, the sequel also repeatedly re!ers to the prin iple o! 4neness6

%4neness( &a h !orm is one# 4neness and Hniqueness are di!!erent prin iples6 to say that a !orm is one is to say not that it is unique, but rather that it is something that an be ounted# For Plato in!ers the oneness o! the beauti!ul !rom the !a t that the beauti!ul and the ugly are t$o, the oneness o! the large !rom the !a t that the large and the small are t$o, and so on %Aepubli <7?eD9<78a8, ?2<b;9D(# Thus the sense in $hi h ea h !orm is one is similar to the sense in $hi h )o rates is one, in being one among many %Parmenides 12D :9d2(# ). Pro*lems for the Theory of 'orms 1%(a#1%)e At the on lusion o! )o rates" spee h, Parmenides arti ulates si= di!!erent lines o! riti ism dire ted at the theory o! !orms#
).1 The +,tent of the 'orms 1%(a#e

Parmenides begins by questioning )o rates" initial a eptan e o! the laim that there is a separate !orm orresponding to every predi ate or property# )o rates e=presses on!iden e in the e=isten e o! separate !orms o! 2usti e, beauty, goodness, and every !orm o! that sort, un ertainty about the e=isten e o! separate !orms o! humanity, !ire, and $ater, and outright s.epti ism about the e=isten e o! separate !orms !or hair, mud, and dirt# 5t is un lear $hy )o rates !inds himsel! in doubt about the e=isten e o! !orms !or natural .inds %su h as humans and $ater( and stu!!s or mi=tures %su h as hair and mud(# For some ommentators, )o rates simply ma.es +a $rong admission, as a result o! his youth and ine=perien e %Allen 1DD7, 12<; see also )ayre 1DD8, 7<(# A!ter all, Plato alludes to a !orm o! bee at 'eno 72b9 , a !orm o! shuttle at 1ratylus ;:Dd, and !orms o! bed and o! table at Aepubli ?D8b# Although shuttles, tables, and beds are arti!a ts, and hen e perhaps relevantly di!!erent !rom natural .inds, su h as human beings and $ater, there seems no reason to thin. that humans di!!er !rom bees in regard to $hether they have orresponding !orms# Co$ever, it is di!!i ult to understand $hy Plato $ould pen a onversation in $hi h a hara ter $ho embodies his o$n middle period theory $ould admit something he has no good reason to admit#

4ne possibility %see Bill 1DD8, 22( is that Plato is alluding to the middle period thesis that only ertain types o! properties summon the understanding to thin. about !orms# For e=ample, in the Aepubli , )o rates laims that $hereas +the soul isn"t ompelled to as. the understanding $hat a !inger is, sin e sight doesn"t suggest to it that a !inger is at the same time the opposite o! a !inger, %?2;d298(, the soul is ompelled to as. $hat the large is and $hat the small is $hen sight suggests to it that the inde= !inger is both big %relative to the pin.y( and small %relative to the middle !inger(# 5! !orms $ere merely posited to e=plain the ompresen e o! ontrary properties in sensible things, then there $ould be no need to posit a !orm orresponding to properties %su h as $ater and dirt( that have no ontraries# Co$ever, this is unli.ely to be the sour e o! )o rates" $orry here, !or the Aepubli passage does not dis uss metaphysi al reasons !or positing the e=isten e o! !orms, but rather dis usses the psy hologi al and epistemi question o! $hat prompts the soul to thin. o! !orms that have already been posited# Another option %Ai .less 2007, ?<9??; see also 'iller 1D:8, <8( is that Plato means us to re ogni*e a tension bet$een )el!>Predi ation and )eparation %or 3on>5dentity( in the theory o! !orms# 4n the one hand, the !a t that 2usti e is 2ust, beauty beauti!ul, and goodness good does not suggest that 2usti e, beauty, and goodness are on rete, sensible things# That is, )el!>Predi ation gives us no reason to deny that 2usti e, beauty, and goodness are separate !orms, numeri ally distin t !rom sensible things# 0y ontrast, i! there are !orms !or human and mud, then )el!>Predi ation requires that the human be a human being and the mud be muddy# 5t is di!!i ult to see ho$ human things and muddy things ould be non>sensible# )o )el!>Predi ation gives us at least some reason to deny that there is a !orm !or human and mud that is distin t !rom every sensible thing# This interpretation meshes $ell $ith )o rates" remar. that hair, mud, and dirt +are in !a t 2ust $hat $e see, and that it is !or this reason that +it"s too outlandish to thin. there is a !orm !or them, %Parmenides 1;0d;9?(#
).2 The -hole.Part Dilemma 1%(e#1%1e

A!ter leading )o rates to $orry about $hether there is indeed a !orm orresponding to every property, Parmenides derives a number o!

absurdities !rom the result o! ombining the theory o! !orms $ith a parti ular on eption o! the parta.ing relation, the Pie 'odel# A ording to the Pie 'odel, parti ipants literally get a share o! the !orms o! $hi h they parta.e, in a $ay analogous to the $ay in $hi h those $ho parta.e o! a pie literally get a share o! the pie# The Pie 'odel omes in t$o versions6 a ording to the -hole Pie 'odel, !or E to parta.e o! F is !or E to get the $hole o! F as its share o! F %i#e#, !or the $hole o! F to be in E(; a ording to the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel, !or E to parta.e o! F is !or E to get a %proper( part o! F as its share o! F %i#e#, !or a %proper( part o! F to be in E(# -hat Parmenides goes on to argue is that the theory o! !orms is internally in onsistent on either version o! the Pie 'odel# )uppose, !irst, that parta.ing on!orms to the -hole Pie 'odel# 3o$ imagine that there are at one time three sensible F things, A, 0, and 1, ea h separate !rom ea h o! the others# A ording to 1ausality, ea h o! A, 0, 1 is F by virtue o! parta.ing o! the F, and hen e ea h o! A, 0, 1 parta.es o! the F# Biven the -hole Pie 'odel, it !ollo$s that the F is, as a $hole and at a single time, in ea h o! A, 0, 1# Thus, the $hole o! the F is in A, the $hole o! the F is in 0, and the $hole o! the F is in 1# 5!A, 0, and 1 are in separate pla es, then 1ausality and the -hole Pie 'odel together require that one and the same !orm be, as a $hole, in separate pla es at the same time# Parmenides on ludes that, on this pi ture, the relevant !orm $ould be +separate !rom itsel!, %Parmenides 1;1b2(# 4n some interpretations %'ein$ald 1DD1, 1;91<; Allen 1DD7, 1;0; Ai .less 2007, ?79?:(, Plato thin.s o! the laim that a !orm is separate !rom itsel! as an absurdity in itsel!# 4n other interpretations %Teloh 1D:1, 1??; 'iller 1D:8, <:; )ayre 1DD8, 78(, Plato does not treat this result as absurd in itsel!# Absurdity only arises $hen this result is ombined $ith the !urther thought that nothing that is separate !rom itsel! ould be a single thing# %5n this ase, the same !orm $ould have to be three things, rather than one thing#( For the laim that the relevant !orm is not one ontradi ts 4neness, the laim that every !orm is one# )o rates tries to avoid the relevant absurdity, ho$ever it is understood, by supposing that a !orm is li.e a day, in the !ollo$ing sense6 2ust as a day an be in many separate pla es at the same time $ithout being separate !rom itsel!, so a !orm an be in many separate pla es at the same

time $ithout being separate !rom itsel!# Parmenides does not thin. mu h o! )o rates" suggestion# Ce immediately ounters that )o rates" day is li.e a sail6 a day an be in many separate pla es at the same time only inasmu h as di!!erent parts o! it are over the separate pla es, 2ust as a sail an over many separate people only inasmu h as ea h person is overed by a di!!erent part o! the sail# Parmenides" point, then, is that the only $ay to ma.e sense o! )o rates" day analogy is to redu e it to the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel, the very model against $hi h Parmenides goes on to argue# A number o! s holars have bal.ed at Parmenides" assimilation o! the day analogy to the sail analogy %1herniss 1D;2, 1;?; Pe . 1D?;, 1;2; 1rombie 1D8;, ;;09;;1; )prague 1D87, D8; 'iller 1D:8, <D9?0; )ayre 1DD8, 78(# They have assumed that, $hether a day is thought o! as a time>interval or as the sun"s rays %the light o! day(, it is in !a t possible !or one and the same day to be in separate pla es at the same time# Co$ever, it does not in !a t ma.e sense to suppose that a time>interval is in separate pla es at the same time %Ai .less 2007, ?:(# And it is not in !a t true that the same pa .et o! rays shines on the separate pla es bathed by the light o! day; rather, di!!erent pa .ets o! rays shine on di!!erent pla es %Panagiotou 1D:7, 1:(# 'oreover, it ma.es little sense to suppose that Plato $ould introdu e a $ay out o! the dilemma he himsel! has onstru ted $ithout e=pli itly alerting his readers to that !a t# To suppose other$ise $ould be to de!end a parti ularly esoteri reading o! Plato"s intentions# Caving assimilated )o rates" day analogy to the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel, Parmenides turns to a riti ism o! this se ond version o! the Pie 'odel# )uppose, then, the same three sensible F thingsIA, 0, and 1Iin separate pla es at the same time# A ording to 1ausality, A, 0, and 1 are F by virtue o! parta.ing o! the F, and hen e A, 0, and 1 parta.e o! the F# Biven the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel, there is a part o! the F in ea h o! A, 0, and 1# 5! the same absurdity generated !rom the -hole Pie 'odel is to be avoided, $e must suppose that the part o! the F that is in A is numeri ally distin t !rom the part o! the F that is in 0 and !rom the part o! the F that is in 1, and also that the part o! the F that is in 0 must be numeri ally distin t !rom the part o! the F that is in 1# %4ther$ise $e $ould have the same part o! the F e=isting, as a

$hole, in separate pla es at the same time; and hen e $e $ould have something that is separate !rom itsel!#( Thus the F must have numeri ally distin t parts, and must there!ore be divided %or, at least, divisible(# Parmenides on ludes !rom this that the F annot be one, a on lusion that learly ontradi ts 4neness# Although many ommentators ta.e it !or granted that Parmenides" on lusion !ollo$s !rom the prin iple that divided %or divisible( things automati ally lose their unity, this supposition ma.es little sense in the $a.e o! )o rates" spee h# There )o rates insisted that he himsel! is one %in being one among many( even though he has many parts %!ront and ba ., upper and lo$er, and so on(# )o )o rates does not suppose that it is true in general that a thing $ith parts annot be one# The hypothesis that ma.es most sense o! )o rates" admission at the end o! Parmenides" riti ism o! the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel that the F annot be one is that )o rates is ante edently ommitted to Purity>F# For anything that has many parts is ipso !a to many %2ust as )o rates" having many parts is su!!i ient !or his being many(, and yet, by Purity>F, no !orm an have ontrary properties# Biven that the property o! being one and the property o! being many are ontraries, it !ollo$s !rom Purity>F and the laim that the F is many that the F annot be one %Ai .less 2007, ?D980(# The upshot o! the -hole>Part /ilemma is that absurdity or in onsisten y !ollo$s !rom the theory o! !orms on either o! the t$o possible versions o! the Pie 'odel on eption o! parta.ing# 5! E"s parta.ing o! F amounts to the $hole o! F being in E %the -hole Pie model(, then 1ausality on2oined $ith the e=isten e o! sensible things in separate pla es at the same time entails the absurd on lusion that !orms are separate !rom themselves; but i! E"s parta.ing o! F amounts to a part o! F being in E %the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel(, then 1ausality and Purity>F %along $ith the laim that having many parts is su!!i ient !or being many and the laim that being one and being many are ontrary properties( are in onsistent $ith 4neness# At the on lusion o! the -hole>Part /ilemma, Parmenides e=tra ts !our more absurdities !rom the result o! ombining 1ausality $ith the Pie e>o!>Pie model6
1#0y 1ausality, every F thing %other than the F( is F by parta.ing o!

the F# 0ut, by the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel, !or E to parta.e o! F is

!or E to get a part o! F# Thus, every F thing %other than the F( is F by getting a part o! the F# 3o$ let F be the property o! being large# 5n that ase, every large thing %other than the large( is large by getting a part o! the large# 0ut, Parmenides assumes, i! E is a part o! F, then E is smaller than F %and F is larger than E(, and hen e E is %in some $ay( small# )o every large thing %other than the large( is large by getting something small# 0ut this is absurd6 as )o rates himsel! emphasi*es at Phaedo 101b, it $ould be monstrous to say that something is made larger by something small# This is an instan e o! a general laim $e might all +3o 1ausation by 1ontraries,6 %3o 1ausation by 1ontraries( For any property F, nothing that is F ould ma.e something possess a property that is ontrary to the property o! being F#
2#The result o! ombining 1ausality $ith the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel

entails that equal things %other than the equal( are equal by getting a part o! the equal# Biven that any part o! E must be smaller than E %see above(, it !ollo$s that equal things %other than the equal( are equal by getting something that is smaller than the equal# 0ut, Parmenides assumes, i! E is smaller than F, then E is unequal to F, and hen e E is %in some $ay( unequal# )o every equal thing %other than the equal( is equal by getting something unequal# 0ut, again by 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries, this result is absurd6 nothing that is unequal ould ma.e something be equal#
;#The result o! ombining 1ausality $ith the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel

entails that small things %other than the small( are small by getting a part o! the small# This result entails that i! there are any small things %as indeed there are(, then the small must have parts# 0ut i! E is a part o! F, then F is larger than E %see above(, and hen e F is %in some $ay( large# 1onsequently, the small must be large# 0ut, by )el!>Predi ation, the small is small# )o the small is both large and small# 0ut this result ontradi ts Purity>F, a ording to $hi h the small annot have ontrary properties, and hen e annot be both large and small#
<#As

be!ore, the result o!

ombining 1ausality $ith the

Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel entails that small things %other than the small( are small by getting a part o! the small# 0ut, Parmenides assumes, !or E to get F is 2ust !or F to be added to E# 5t !ollo$s that small things %other than the small( are small by having a part o! the small added to them# 0ut this is absurd6 it is impossible to ma.e something small by adding something to it# These !our qui . arguments sho$ that the result o! ombining 1ausality $ith the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel does not sit $ell $ith other aspe ts o! the theory o! !orms, in parti ular 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries %1 and 2(, and the on2un tion o! Purity>F and )el!>Predi ation %;(#
).% The Third /an !rgument 1%2a#*

Plato never re!ers to any argument as the +Third 'an,# The moni.er derives !rom Aristotle, $ho in various pla es %e#g#, 'etaphysi s DD0b17 J 107Da1;, 10;Da2;)ophisti al Ae!utations 17:b;8 !!#( dis usses %something a.in to( the argument at Parmenides 1;2a9b in these terms# Parmenides sets up the argument by pointing out that, a ording to the theory o! !orms, 4neness is supposed to !ollo$ !rom 4ne>over>'any# %)ome, e#g#, Fine %1DD;, 20<(, laim that Plato means the senten e +ea h !orm is one, to e=press Hniqueness, not 4neness# 0ut this is ertainly not $hat a relevantly similar senten e e=presses at Aepubli <78a298 and ?2<b7911Isee above#( From the e=isten e o! a plurality o! F things and the !a t that, !or any su h plurality P, there is a !orm o! F>ness by virtue o! parta.ing o! $hi h ea h member o! P is F, it !ollo$s that there is one !orm +over, the many members o! P %in the sense o! being that by virtue o! parta.ing o! $hi h ea h member o! P is F(# And given that anything that is one +over, many is %in some sense( one, it !ollo$s that any !orm that has parti ipants is one# There is a vast literature on the Third 'an argument, initiated by the groundbrea.ing analysis o! the reasoning in Klastos %1D?<(# %)ee, among others, )ellars %1D??(, Klastos %1D??(, Bea h %1D?8(, Klastos %1D?8(, 1herniss %1D?7(, Pe . %1D82(, 'orav si. %1D8;(, )trang %1D8;(, Klastos %1D8D(, 1ohen %1D71(, Teloh and @ou*e .y %1D72(, Peterson %1D7;(, Boldstein and 'anni . %1D7:(, 'ann %1D7D(, 'ates %1D7D(, Pi .ering %1D:1(, Teloh %1D:1, 1?:9187(, -aterlo$ %1D:2(, Prior %1D:?, 8<97?(, 1urd %1D:8(, )harvy %1D:8(, Penner %1D:7, 2?192DD(, ) altsas %1D:D(,

'al olm %1DD1, <79?;(, 'ein$ald %1DD2(, ) altsas %1DD2(, Fine %1DD;, 20;92<1(, ' 1abe %1DD<, :<9:7(, ) h$ei*er %1DD<(, Fran es %1DD8(, Allen %1DD7, 1?29187(, Cunt %1DD7(, Ai .less %1DD:(, Pelletier and 7alta %2000(, and Ai .less %2007, 8<97?(#( 'ost ommentators agree that the reasoning relies on at least three prin iples6 4ne>over>'any, )el!>Predi ation, and 3on>5dentity %about $hi h more anon(# %Allen %1DD7, 18;( a epts that the reasoning relies on the laim that the large is largeIan instan e o! )el!>Predi ation, but denies that the argument, $hen generali*ed to !orms other than the large, relies on )el!>Predi ation#( They also agree that the reasoning generates an in!inite regress o! !orms o! largeness, and that the argument ould be generali*ed to generate an in!inite regress o! !orms orresponding to any predi ate# 0ut ommentators di!!er over $hy Plato ta.es the regress to be vi ious or problemati , and $hat Plato $ould have re ommended as a $ay o! avoiding the absurdity generated by the reasoning# Parmenides generates the in!inite regress as !ollo$s# 1onsider a plurality o! large things, A, 0, and 1# 0y 4ne>over>'any, there is a !orm o! largeness % all it +@1,( by virtue o! parta.ing o! $hi h A, 0, and 1 are large# 0y )el!>Predi ation, @1 is large# )o there is no$ a ne$ plurality o! large things, A, 0, 1, and @1# Thus, by 4ne>over>'any, there is a !orm o! largeness % all it +@2,( by virtue o! parta.ing o! $hi h A, 0, 1, and @1 are large# Cen e @1 parta.es o! @2# At this point, Parmenides assumes something li.e the !ollo$ing 3on>5dentity assumption6 %3on>5dentity( 3o !orm is identi al to anything that parta.es o! it# %3oti e that 3on>5dentity !ollo$s dire tly !rom )eparation#( From the !a t that @1 parta.es o! @2, 3on>5dentity entails that @2 is numeri ally distin t !rom @1# Thus, there must be at least t$o !orms o! largeness, @1 and @2# 0ut this is not all# 0y )el!>Predi ation, @2 is large# )o there is no$ a ne$ plurality o! large things, A, 0, 1,@1, and @2# Thus, by 4ne>over>'any, there is a !orm o! largeness % all it +@;,( by virtue o! parta.ing o! $hi h A, 0, 1, @1, and @2 are large# Cen e @1 and @2 both parta.e o! @;# 0ut then, by 3on>5dentity, @; is numeri ally distin t !rom both @1 and @2# Thus, there must be at least three !orms o! largeness, @1, @2, and @;# Aepetition o! this reasoning, based on 4ne>over>'any, )el!>Predi ation, and 3on>5dentity, then generates an

in!inite hierar hy o! !orms o! largeness, $ith ea h !orm parta.ing o! every !orm that lies above it in the hierar hy# %That is, !or every m and n su h that mLn, @m parta.es o! @n#( 5n $hat $ay does the e=isten e o! an in!inite regress o! !orms represent a problem !or the theory o! !ormsM 4ne ans$er to this question %see Klastos %1D?<, ;2:, !n# 12; 1D??(, Boldstein and 'anni . %1D7:(, Penner %1D:7, 27D92:2(, and Fine %1DD;, 20<(( is that the nature o! the problem is !undamentally epistemi # 4n this vie$, the theory o! !orms in ludes the thesis that, !or any property F, the primary !un tion o! the F is to e=plain the F>ness o! F things, and hen e to ma.e it possible !or humans to apprehend and .no$ things as F# 0ut, so the story goes, Plato assumes that an in!inite regress o! !orms o! F>ness, ea h o! $hi h e=plains the F>ness o! the !orms o! F>ness belo$ it in the hierar hy, annot e=plain the F>ness o! the original plurality o! F things6 e=planation must ome to an end some$here# Although this interpretation ma.es sense o! the epistemi language that Plato sprin.les throughout the Third 'an passage, it does not ma.e sense o! the !a t that Parmenides sets up the argument by pointing out that the oneness o! the large !ollo$s !rom its being one +over, many large things %see above(# )o it is unli.ely that the epistemi reading o! the Third 'an is $hat Plato had in mind# 4ther s holars laim, quite orre tly, that the e=isten e o! in!initely many !orms %indeed, the e=isten e o! so mu h as t$o !orms( orresponding to any predi ate is in onsistent $ith Hniqueness# And, indeed, this result appears to be at least part o! $hat the Third 'an argument is designed to un over# 0ut Plato seems to be loo.ing to establish more than this# For in the last senten e o! the relevant passage, Parmenides announ es that the argument sho$s that ea h !orm is no longer one, but in!initely many# Although most ommentators gloss this omment as the laim that there is no longer one !orm per predi ate, but rather in!initely many, this is not $hat the senten e a tually says# -hat the senten e suggests is that the e=isten e o! in!initely many !orms o! largeness on!li ts $ith 4neness# 4ne $ay to ma.e sense o! this laim is by $ay o! the !ollo$ing hain o! reasoning# As $e"ve seen, 4ne>over>'any, )el!>Predi ation, and 3on>5dentity together generate an in!inite hierar hy o! !orms o! largeness, ea h o! $hi h parta.es o! the !orms above it in the hierar hy# Thus, @1 parta.es o! in!initely many !orms, @2parta.es o! in!initely

many !orms, @; parta.es o! in!initely many !orms, and so on# 3o$ there are passages in $hi h Plato appears to assume that !orms are as many as the predi ates that an be truly applied to them %see Philebus 1< :9d;, and Ai .less %2007, 71((# And i! $e assume that Parmenides is still $or.ing $ith the Pie e>o!>Pie model o! parta.ing, then the !a t that a !orm parta.es o! in!initely many !orms entails that it has in!initely many parts, and hen e is itsel! in!initely many# )o !rom the e=isten e o! an in!inite regress o! !orms and !rom $hat appear to be diale ti ally appropriate assumptions, it is possible to argue that ea h !orm in the hierar hy is in!initely many# Biven that the property o! being one and the property o! being many are ontraries, it then !ollo$s dire tly !rom Purity>F that ea h !orm in the hierar hy is not one# This interpretation e=plains $hy Parmenides announ es at the end o! the argument that ea h !orm is no longer one, but in!initely many %see Ai .less %2007, 8<97?((# 'any ommentators thin. that the !undamental in onsisten y revealed by the Third 'an argument rests $ith the ombination o! 4ne>over>'any, )el!>Predi ation, and 3on>5dentity# For them, the Third 'an requires that Plato give up at least one o! these prin iples# 0ut on the interpretation that best e=plains the set>up and !inal senten e o! the passage, Plato need not give up any o! these prin iples in order to avoid in onsisten y6 he an simply abandon Purity>F %and perhaps also Hniqueness(#
).) 'orms as Thoughts 1%2*#c

At the on lusion o! the Third 'an argument, )o rates suggests that it might be possible to avoid all previous in onsisten ies at the heart o! the theory o! !orms by supposing that !orms are thoughts that reside only in minds# 5n $hat appears to be a severely trun ated argument, Parmenides provides t$o sets o! reasons !or thin.ing that this suggestion $ill not avoid absurdity either# %Allen %1DD7, 17<( argues that Parmenides only provides a single argument here, one that most $ould identi!y as the se ond o! t$o#( Parmenides" !irst argument appears to have the !ollo$ing stru ture# First, all thoughts have intentional ob2e ts6 every thought is o! something rather than nothing# )e ond, the ob2e t o! any thought T is something that T thin.s to be one over all the instan es# 0ut anything that is thought

to be one over all the instan es is a !orm# Parmenides on ludes that the intentional ob2e t o! every thought is a !orm, and hen e i! every !orm is a thought then every !orm is a thought o! a !orm# Although Parmenides does not ma.e this e=pli it, it is plain that i! every !orm is numeri ally distin t !rom the !orm o! $hi h it is the intentional ob2e t, then %than.s to )el!>Predi ation and 3on>5dentity( an in!inite regress o! !orms be .ons %see Ai .less %2007, 7?97D(, and also Bill %1DD8, <0( and )ayre %1DD8, :<((# Again, there is nothing to suggest that Plato !inds the e=isten e o! an in!inite regress problemati in itsel!# Aather, the e=isten e o! a regress threatens Hniqueness, and, $hen ombined in the appropriate $ay $ith Purity>F, threatens 4neness# The reasoning that leads to on!li t $ith 4neness is parallel to the relevantly similar portion o! the Third 'an argument %see se tion <#; above, and Ai .less %2007, 7D9:0( !or details(# As i! this $eren"t bad enough, Parmenides goes on to derive a !urther absurdity !rom the result o! ombining the proposal that !orms are thoughts $ith the Pie 'odel on eption o! parta.ing# Assuming that thoughts do not have parts, the only $ay !or an ob2e t to parta.e o! a thought in a ordan e $ith the Pie 'odel is !or the ob2e t to get the thought as a $hole# )o i! !orms are thoughts, then a ording to the Pie 'odel everything is omposed o! thoughts, and hen e all things thin.# 0ut, Parmenides assumes, this panpsy hist thesis is absurd# Parmenides onsiders a $ay o! avoiding this absurdity that depends on assuming that something"s having a thought as a part does not entail that it is a thin.ing thing# 0ut, argues Parmenides, the only $ay to ma.e sense o! this proposal is to assume that thoughts are unthin.ing, an assumption that is also absurd in itsel!#
).0 The 1i2eness 3egress 1%2c#1%%a

At the on lusion o! Parmenides" riti ism o! )o rates" suggestion that !orms might be thoughts, )o rates tries a ompletely di!!erent ta .6 he suggests that !orms are patterns set in nature %paradeigmata( and that parta.ing o! a !orm amounts to being li.e it % all the ombination o! these laims +Paradigmatism,(# Paradigmatism is in ompatible both $ith the proposal that !orms are thoughts and $ith the Pie 'odel on eption o! parta.ing# The idea that !orms are patterns that serve as models !or their parti ipants is not ne$, !or it appears in various pla es in the

dialogues o! Plato"s middle period %see Aepubli <72b79 7, ?10a !!#, ?D7a<9?, ?D8b89:Iand alsoTimaeus 2D 192, <:e?9<Da1, ?0 <98(# 'ost ommentators agree that Parmenides" riti ism o! )o rates" Paradigmatism depends %at least in part( on the onstru tion o! an in!inite regress# 0ut s holars are divided over the identity and stru ture o! the regress6 $hereas some see the reasoning as basi ally indistinguishable !rom the Third 'an argument %e#g#, 4$en %1D?;(, Klastos %1D?<(, 1herniss %1D?7(, Catha$ay %1D7;(, @ee %1D7;(, Teloh %1D:1, 188(, )pellman %1D:;(, Prior %1D:?, 7197?(, and Fine %1DD;, 211921?((, others see the reasoning as generating a regress o! !orms o! li.eness %e#g#, ' 1abe %1DD<, :79:D(, ) ho!ield %1DD8(, Allen %1DD7, 17D91:8(, and Ai .less %2007, :09:?((# %The main te=tual and themati reasons !or pre!erring the latter reading to the !ormer are learly des ribed in ) ho!ield %1DD8(Isee also Bill %1DD8, <<9<?(# For a re2oinder to ) ho!ield, see ) olni ov %200;, 8798:(#( 4n the !irst vie$, the regress arises as !ollo$s# 1onsider a plurality o! F things, A, 0, and 1# 0y 4ne>over>'any, ea h o! A, 0, 1 is F by virtue o! parta.ing o! a !orm o! F>ness %say, F1(# 0y )el!>Predi ation, F1 is F# Cen e A, 0, 1 and F1 are all F, and ea h is li.e the others in being F# 3o$ onsider the ne$ plurality o! F things,A, 0, 1, and F1# 0y 4ne>over>'any, ea h o! A, 0, 1, and F1 is F by virtue o! parta.ing o! a !orm o! F>ness %say, F2(# 0y 3on>5dentity, F2 is numeri ally distin t !rom F1# 0y )el!>Predi ation, F2 is F# Cen e A, 0, 1, F1, and F2 are all F, and ea h is li.e the others in being F# 3o$ onsider the ne$ plurality o! F things, A, 0,1, F1, and F2# 0y 4ne>over>'any, ea h o! A, 0, 1, F1, and F2 is F by virtue o! parta.ing o! a !orm o! F>ness %say, F;(# 0y 3on>5dentity, F; is numeri ally distin t !rom both F1 and F2# -e there!ore have three distin t !orms o! F>ness# Aepetition o! the same pattern o! reasoning then establishes the e=isten e o! an in!inite regress o! !orms o! F>ness# This reasoning is homologous to the Third 'an argument inasmu h as both arguments rely in the very same $ay on 4ne>over>'any, )el!>Predi ation, and 3on>5dentity# 4n the se ond vie$, the regress arises di!!erently# 5n parti ular, the reasoning relies e=pli itly on Paradigmatism and on an assumption that Parmenides emphasi*es as he is setting up his riti ism, namely that the

relation o! li.eness is symmetri al6 i! E is li.e F, then F is li.e E %Parmenides 1;2d?97(# 1onsider t$o things, A and 0, that both have the property o! being F# Biven that there is a property that A and 0 both share, it !ollo$s that A is li.e 0 and that 0 is li.e A# Thus, A is li.e something %and hen e, in some $ay, li.e( and 0 is li.e something %and hen e, in some $ay, li.e(# 0ut, by 4ne>over>'any, A and 0 are both li.e by virtue o! parta.ing o! a !orm o! li.eness %say, @1(# 3o$ assume !or redu tio that something is li.e @1 or @1 is li.e something# 1learly i! @1 is li.e something, then @1 is %in some $ay( li.e# And i! something is li.e @1, then, by symmetry o! li.eness, @1 is li.e it, and hen e again @1 is %in some $ay( li.e# )o, $hether something is li.e @1 or @1 is li.e something,@1 is li.e# 3o$, by 4ne>over>'any, @1 is li.e by virtue o! parta.ing o! a !orm o! li.eness %say, @2(, and hen e @1 parta.es o! @2# 0y 3on>5dentity, @2 is numeri ally distin t !rom @1# 0ut also, by Paradigmatism, @1 is li.e @2, and hen e, by symmetry o! li.eness, @2 is li.e @1# )o @2 is %in some $ay( li.e# 0y 4ne>over>'any, then,@1 and @2 are li.e by virtue o! parta.ing o! a !orm o! li.eness %say, @;(, and hen e @1 and @2 both parta.e o! @;# 0y 3on>5dentity, @; is numeri ally distin t !rom both @1 and @2# This gives us three distin t !orms o! li.eness# Aepetition o! the same pattern o! reasoning then establishes the e=isten e o! an in!inite regress o! !orms o! li.eness# Ta.ing !or granted that the e=isten e o! su h a regress is in some $ay absurd or problemati , Parmenides in!ers that the assumption !or redu tio is !alse, i#e#, that nothing is li.e @1 and @1 is li.e nothing# 0ut this result is itsel! una eptable# For $e already have it that A and 0 are li.e by virtue o! parta.ing o! @1, and hen e that A and 0 parta.e o! @1# 0y Paradigmatism, A and 0 are li.e @1, and hen e something is li.e @1# 'oreover, by symmetry o! li.eness, @1 is li.e A and 0, and hen e @1 is li.e something# Thus the assumption !or redu tio is true# 1ontradi tion# 3oti e that, on the se ond vie$, the reasoning leading to the relevant regress is not homologous to the Third 'an argument6 instead o! deriving the laim that ea h !orm o! li.eness is li.e !rom )el!>Predi ation, Parmenides in!ers it !rom the on2un tion o! Paradigmatism and the symmetry o! li.eness# 4n either interpretation o! the identity and stru ture o! the relevant regress, it is as yet un lear $hy Parmenides !inds the regress problemati # 5t is reasonable to assume that Parmenides" reason !or !inding the li.eness

regress problemati is the same as his reason !or !inding the largeness regress problemati in the Third 'an argument# The same three options anvassed in se tion <#; are available# )ome ontend that the regress is epistemi and vi ious by its very nature, others that the regress on!li ts $ith Hniqueness, and yet others that the regress leads to the laim that ea h !orm in the relevant in!inite hierar hy is many, and hen e, by 4neness and Purity>F, both one and not one#
)." The 4reatest Difficulty 1%%a#1%)e

At the on lusion o! the @i.eness Aegress, Parmenides raises $hat he hara teri*es as the greatest di!!i ulty !or the theory o! !orms# This di!!i ulty ta.es the !orm o! t$o arguments, the !irst designed to sho$ that, i! the !orms are as )o rates has des ribed them, they annot be .no$n by human beings, the se ond designed to sho$ that, i! the !orms are as )o rates has des ribed them, then the gods annot .no$ human a!!airs# 0oth o! these on lusions, i! true, $ould be devastating to the theory o! !orms# For, !irst, in the middle dialogues, Plato ta.es !or granted that humans an .no$ at least some !orms %see 'eno 78a897 and Phaedo 7<b29;( and s.et hes a method %i#e#, diale ti ( that is designed to provide humans $ith .no$ledge o! the !orms %Aepubli ?;<b;9 ?(; and, se ond, as )o rates himsel! a epts, it $ould be +sho .ing, %1;< <( and +astonishing, %1;<d:( to be told that the gods annot .no$ human a!!airs# 1ommentators di!!er over the proper $ay to re onstru t and evaluate the t$o arguments# -ith respe t to the !irst argument, some s holars %su h as @e$is %1D7D(( laim that the argument is invalid, some %su h as Peterson %1D:1(( that there are t$o di!!erent valid $ays o! re onstru ting it, others %su h as Fi and 0ae %1DD:(, and Ai .less %2007, :89D0(( that there is a single $ay to re onstru t the argument, one on $hi h it omes out valid# The se ond argument is usually thought to be largely homologous to the !irst# The !irst argument begins $ith the assumption % all it P1( that nothing that is itsel! by itsel! is in %or among( humans %Parmenides 1;; ;98(# This assumption re!le ts a parti ular understanding o! $hat )eparation requires, a on eption that is emphasi*ed in the dialogues o! the middle period %see )ymposium 211a:9b1 and Timaeus?2a19;I!or dis ussion,

see Ai .less %2007, 1D920((# Parmenides then adds, and provides instan es o!, t$o !urther premises, P2 and P;6 %P2( 5! E is a !orm and E is $hat it is in relation to F, then F is a !orm# %P;( 5! E is in humans and E is $hat it is in relation to F, then F is in humans# For many ommentators, P2 states that !orms are related to other !orms, but not to sensible things, and P; states that sensible things are related to other sensible things, but not to !orms %see, e#g#, Ayle %1D;D(, 1herniss %1D<<, 2:2 !!#(, 1hen %1D<<(, Aun iman %1D?D(, ) hipper %1D8?, 1?(, 'atthe$s %1D72(, -eingartner %1D7;, 1:?91:7(, Fu2isa$a %1D7<, ;0 !!#(, )hiner %1D7<, 2< and ;1(, ' 1abe %1DD<, D09D<(, Bill %1DD8, <?9<:(, )ayre %1DD8, ::9D1(, and Allen %1DD7, 1D;920;((# 0ut there are good reasons !or thin.ing that this interpretation is in orre t %see Forrester %1D7<(, @e$is %1D7D(, Peterson %1D:1(, Fi and 0ae %1DD:(, and Ai .less %2007, ::((# Plato"s !ormulation o! P2 and P; presupposes a distin tion bet$een t$o $ays o! being6 relative being and absolute being# )omething has relative being i! it is impossible to des ribe its nature $ithout mentioning something else to $hi h it is related# )omething has absolute being i! it does not have relative being# The point o! P2 is that it is in relation to another !orm that any !orm $ith merely relative being is de!ined# The point o! P; is that it is in relation to another sensible thing that any sensible thing $ith merely relative being is de!ined# This reading is on!irmed by Parmenides" illustrations o! P2 and P;# 'astery itsel!, he says, is $hat it is in relation to slavery itsel!, but it is not the ase that mastery itsel! is $hat it is in relation to a human slave# )imilarly, slavery itsel! is $hat it is in relation to mastery itsel!, but it is not the ase that slavery itsel! is $hat it is in relation to a human master# 'oreover, a human master is $hat he is in relation to a human slave, but it is not the ase that a human master is $hat he is in relation to slavery itsel!# )imilarly, a human slave is $hat he is in relation to a human master, but it is not the ase that a human slave is $hat he is in relation to mastery itsel!# Parmenides then instantiates P; using the e=ample o! .no$ledge6 %P;N( 5! E is .no$ledge in humans and E is $hat it is in relation to F, then F is in humans#

And !inally, Parmenides assumes that .no$ledge has merely relative being6 %P<( Nno$ledge is $hat it is in relation to $hat it is .no$ledge o!# The reasoning to the !irst on lusion is straight!or$ard# 0y P<, .no$ledge is $hat it is in relation to $hat it is .no$ledge o!# 1onsequently, by P;N, i! E is .no$ledge in humans, then the ob2e t o! E %i#e#, $hat E is .no$ledge o!( is in humans# 3o$, a ording to )eparation, every !orm is itsel! by itsel!# 0ut, by P1, nothing that is itsel! by itsel! is in humans# 1onsequently, $hatever is in humans is not a !orm# )o i! E is .no$ledge in humans, then the ob2e t o! E is not a !orm# That is to say, no .no$ledge in humans %i#e#, no .no$ledge that humans have( has any !orm as its ob2e t# Thus, !rom )eparation, P1, P;N, and P<, it !ollo$s that humans do not .no$ any !orms# The se ond argument begins $ith t$o assumptions6 %i( that any .no$ledge that is a !orm is more pre ise than any .no$ledge that is in humans, and %ii( that the gods have any .no$ledge that is more pre ise than any .no$ledge that is in humans# From these t$o assumptions, $hat !ollo$s is6 %P?( 5! E is a .no$ledge and E is a !orm, then the gods have E# Parmenides then reasons as !ollo$s# 0y P2, i! E is a !orm and E is $hat it is in relation to F, then F is a !orm# 0y P<, .no$ledge is $hat it is in relation to $hat it is .no$ledge o!# )o P2 and P< together entail P86 %P8( 5! E is a !orm and E is a .no$ledge o! F, then F is a !orm# 3o$, by P1, anything that is itsel! by itsel! is not in humans, and, by )eparation, every !orm is itsel! by itsel!# Cen e P1 and )eparation entail that no !orm is in humans, i#e#, that i! F is a !orm, then F is not in humans# This result, ta.en together $ith P8, entails P76 %P7( 5! E is a !orm and E is a .no$ledge o! F, then F is not in humans#

Parmenides then in!ers the !ollo$ing on lusion !rom the on2un tion o! P? and P76 %1( 5! E is a .no$ledge o! F and the gods have E, then F is not in humans# 5! this in!eren e $ere valid, then Parmenides $ould have sho$n that the ob2e t o! any .no$ledge the gods have is not in humans, i#e#, that the gods do not .no$ human a!!airs# Co$ever, 1 does not !ollo$ validly !rom the on2un tion o! P7 and P?# Aather 1 !ollo$s validly !rom the on2un tion o! P7 and P?O %!or details, see Ai .less %2007, D2((6 %P?O( 5! E is a .no$ledge and the gods have E, then E is a !orm# There are three main possibilities here6 %i( Plato simply missed the !a t that the se ond argument is invalid; %ii( Plato intended his readers to re ogni*e the argument as invalid; and %ii( Plato unintentionally misstated P?O as P?# %5n any event, it is interesting to note that, $hereas P; but not P2 !un tions as a premise in the !irst argument, P2 but not P; !un tions as a premise in the se ond argument#( 0. 5ow to Save the 'orms: The Plan of the Deductions 1%)e#1%6c A!ter having arti ulated potentially devastating riti isms o! the theory o! !orms, one might e=pe t Parmenides to on lude that the theory is a lost ause and should be abandoned# 0ut, surprisingly, Parmenides does e=a tly the opposite# Ce laims, rather, that one $ho does not +allo$ that !or ea h thing there is a hara ter that is al$ays the same, %a lear re!eren e to 4ne>over>'any( $ill +destroy the po$er o! diale ti entirely, %1;?b:9 2(# Cere Parmenides means one o! t$o things, depending on $hether +diale ti , is ta.en in a te hni al sense %as meaning the pro ess by $hi h a philosopher is supposed to a quire .no$ledge o! the !ormsIseeAepubli ?;<b;9 ?( or in a non>te hni al sense %as meaning the ability to onverse or ommuni ate(# 5n any event, Parmenides ma.es it lear that the po$er o! diale ti %ho$ever this is understood( annot be saved unless the !orms themselves are saved# As a means o! saving the !orms, Parmenides re ommends a pro ess o! training that !o uses on !orms and ta.es note o!

the !a t that !orms $ander %in the sense o! having ontrary properties, su h as being li.e and unli.e6 1;?e197(# 5n parti ular, Parmenides suggests that the training pro ess ta.e the !ollo$ing shape# First, on erning some !orm, it must involve e=tra ting onsequen es !rom the hypothesis that that !orm is; se ond, on erning the very same !orm, it must involve e=tra ting onsequen es !rom the hypothesis that that !orm is not %1;?e:91;8a2(# Parmenides goes on to say that it is also important to onsider di!!erent sorts o! onsequen es6 !irst, onsequen es !or the !orm that is hypothesi*ed to be %or to not be(, and se ond, onsequen es !or things other than the !orm that is hypothesi*ed to be %or not to be(# Parmenides also says that the training pro ess should involve e=tra ting onsequen es !or the relevant !orm in relation to itsel! and in relation to the others, and onsequen es !or things other than the relevant !orm in relation to themselves and in relation to the relevant !orm# As most ommentators agree, the arguments that o upy the se ond part o! the dialogue may be grouped into eight distin t stret hes o! reasoning or /edu tions %$ith an additional Appendi= to the !irst t$o /edu tions6 1??e<91?7b?(# There is some ontroversy over the prin iples o! division that Plato uses to generate the groupings# )ome, notably 'ein$ald %1DD1(, Peterson %1DD8; 2000; 200;(, and )ayre %1DD8(, argue that the division into eight /edu tions should be e=plained by the three prin iples o! division announ ed by Parmenides in his des ription o! the method o! training# 4n this %non>standard( pi ture, the /edu tions should be understood as aiming at the !ollo$ing on lusions6
%/1( 5! the G is, then the G is not F and not on>F in relation to itsel!# %/2( 5! the G is, then the G is F and on>F in relation to the others# %/;( 5! the G is, then the others are F and on>F in relation to the G# %/<( 5! the G is, then the others are not F and not on>F in relation to themselves# %/?( 5! the G is not, then the G is F and on>F in relation to the others# %/8( 5! the G is not, then the G is not F and not on>F in relation to itsel!# %/7( 5! the G is not, then the others are F and on>F in relation to the G#

%/:( 5! the G is not, then the others are not F and not on>F in relation to themselves#

4thers, in luding 'iller %1D:8(, Bill %1DD8(, Allen %1DD7(, and Ai .less %2007(, do not agree $ith this $ay o! representing the proper $ay o! generating eight /edu tions# 5n parti ular, these s holars ta.e issue $ith the laim that the third prin iple o! division on erns $hether the onsequen es !or the relevant !orm %or !or things other than the !orm( are relative to itsel! or relative to things other than it# As they see it, the third prin iple o! division on erns $hether the onsequen es !or the relevant !orm %or !or things other than the !orm( are positive or negative# A ording to this standard pi ture, the /edu tions should be understood as aiming at the !ollo$ing on lusions6
%/1( 5! the G is, then the G is not F and not on>F %in relation to itsel! and in relation to the others(# %/2( 5! the G is, then the G is F and on>F %in relation to itsel! and in relation to the others(# %/;( 5! the G is, then the others are F and on>F %in relation to themselves and in relation to the G(# %/<( 5! the G is, then the others are not F and not on>F %in relation to themselves and in relation to the G(# %/?( 5! the G is not, then the G is F and on>F %in relation to itsel! and in relation to the others(# %/8( 5! the G is not, then the G is not F and not on>F %in relation to itsel! and in relation to the others(# %/7( 5! the G is not, then the others are F and on>F %in relation to themselves and in relation to the G(# %/:( 5! the G is not, then the others are not F and not on>F %in relation to themselves and in relation to the G(#

%/7 represents something o! an anomaly here, be ause many o! the on lusions a tually derived in that /edu tion are o! the !orm6 5! the B is not, then the othersappear to be F and on>F# )ee se tion 8#: belo$#( Parmenides then o!!ers to engage in the training e=er ise himsel!, ta.ing +one, as the relevant instan e o! +B,, and onsidering a range o! properties as instan es o! +F, %being many, being a $hole, being limited, having shape, being in onesel!, being in another, being in motion, being the same as onesel!, being the same as another, being li.e onesel!, being li.e another, tou hing onesel!, tou hing another, being equal to onesel!, being equal to another, being %or oming to be( older than onesel!, being

%or oming to be( older than another, being in time, being, being named or spo.en o!, and being the ob2e t o! an a ount, opinion, .no$ledge, or per eption(# 4ne o! the primary motivations !or adopting the non>standard pi ture is that the standard pi ture ma.es it di!!i ult to understand the se ond part o! the dialogue as anything other than in oherent# The problem is this# 4n the standard pi ture, /1 and /2 together appear to entail that i! the one is, then the one is F and is not F %and the one is on>F and is not on>F(, and hen e that it is not the ase that the one is# )imilarly, /; and /< together appear to entail that i! the one is, then the others areF and not F %and the others are on>F and not on>F(, and hen e again that it is not the ase that the one is# 4n the other hand, a ording to the same pi ture, /? and /8 together appear to entail that i! the one is not, then the one is F and is not F %and the one is on>F and is not on>F(, and hen e that it is not the ase that the one is not# And similarly, /7 and /: appear to entail that i! the one is not, then the others are %or at least appear to be( F and not F %and the others are, or at least appear to be, on>F and not on>F(, and hen e again that it is not the ase that the one is not# Putting all eight /edu tions together, the overall result on the standard pi ture is a straight!or$ard ontradi tion# 4ne advantage o! the non>standard interpretation, then, is that it avoids reading the /edu tions as an e=tended argument !or a ne essary !alsehood# Co$ever, there are also good te=tual reasons to thin. that the standard pi ture is superior to the non>standard proposal# For e=ample, in /2, Parmenides argues that i! the one is, then the one is both di!!erent and the same in relation to itsel! %1<7b79:(, both li.e and unli.e in relation to itsel! %1<:d;9<(, and both older and younger in relation to itsel! %1?2e29;(# 0ut a ording to the non>standard pi ture Parmenides should not be using /2 to argue !or onsequen es about the one in relation to itsel!; rather, Parmenides should be using /2 to argue !or onsequen es about the one in relation to the others# %5n reply to this sort o! riti ism, 'ein$ald %1DD1, <897?( and )ayre %1DD8, 11<( argue, though in di!!erent $ays, that Plato uses the in>relation>to quali!i ations in a te hni al, rather than ordinary, sense# For riti isms o! 'ein$ald"s in!luential proposal, see Bill %1DD8, ?8, !n# D0(, )ayre %1DD8, 110911;(, and Ai .less %2007, 1029108(#(

Another $ay out o! the problem posed by the seeming in oheren e o! the /edu tions is to suppose that the sub2e t o! one /edu tion is numeri ally distin t !rom the sub2e t o! some o! the other /edu tions# 'ultisub2e tist interpretations o! this .ind have been de!ended by the 3eoplatonists %in luding Plotinus and Pro lus(, 1orn!ord %1D;D(, 'iller %1D:8(, and )ayre %1DD8(# 4ne o! the ma2or problems !a ing multisub2e tism is the !a t that Parmenides is quite e=pli it about the !a t that the sub2e t !orm o! ea h /edu tion is identi al to the sub2e t !orm o! ea h o! the other /edu tions# %For !urther riti isms o! multisub2e tism, see 'ein$ald %1DD1, 2<928(# For parti ular riti isms o! the 3eoplatonist version o! multisub2e tism, see Allen %1DD7, 211921? and 21:922<(#( The standard vie$ %i! there is one( is that the /edu tions have an aporeti purpose6 their aim is to perple=, to set problems that must be solved, either by re2e ting some o! the premises that lead to the master ontradi tion or by !inding !ault $ith the relevant reasoning# Aporeti interpretations o! this sort have been de!ended by Bill %1DD8( and Allen %1DD7(, $ith additional support provided by Patterson %1DDD(# 4n this .ind o! vie$, Plato does not ommit to any parti ular $ay o! solving the problems6 the se ond part o! the dialogue is simply meant to serve as a hallenge to the reader# Fet another alternative is that detailed logi al analysis o! the /edu tions reveals arguments su!!i ient to establish both that the one is and, importantly, that prin iples su h as Purity>F and Hniqueness are !alse# As Ai .less %2007, 1;891;7 and 211( argues, Purity>F is a ba .ground premise o! both /1 and /<# Ta.en together, then, /1 and /2 are su!!i ient to establish that a ontradi tion !ollo$s !rom the hypothesis that the one is, on the assumption that Purity>F is true# That is, /1 and /2 together entail that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse# 0ut /? and /8 together entail that the one is# 5t then !ollo$s dire tly that Purity>F must be !alse# 'oreover, /2 ontains an argument !or the laim that i! the one is, then there are in!initely many !orms o! oneness# Biven that the one is %than.s to /? and /8(, it !ollo$s dire tly that there must be more than one !orm orresponding to the property o! being one, and hen e that Hniqueness is !alse# %Ai .less %2007, 2;:92;D( also argues that the se ond part o! the dialogue provides su!!i ient reason to re2e t 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries#(

". The Deductions 1%6c#1""c &a h /edu tion onsists o! separate stret hes o! reasoning % all them +Arguments,( leading to a number o! logi ally inter onne ted results % all them +1on lusions,(# The summary to !ollo$ is governed by the !ollo$ing notational onventions# &a h /edu tion re eives a number %+/1, !or the !irst /edu tion, +/2, !or the se ond /edu tion, and so on( and ea h Argument $ithin ea h /edu tion re eives a number %+A1, !or the !irst Argument, +A2, !or the se ond Argument, and so on(# %The Appendi= to the !irst t$o /edu tions $ill be alled +App,#( 5! an Argument has e=a tly one 1on lusion, the single 1on lusion $ill be re!erred to as +1,# 5! an Argument has more than one 1on lusion, the 1on lusions $ill be numbered %+11, !or the !irst 1on lusion, +12, !or the se ond 1on lusion, and so on(#
".1 The 'irst Deduction 1%6c#1)2a

The aim o! /1 is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that i! the one is, then the one is neither F nor on>F# -ithin /1, there are eighteen separate Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is, then the one is not many %/1A11(, the one has no parts %/1A211(, the one is not a $hole %/1A212(, the one has no beginning, middle, or end %/1A;1(, the one is unlimited %/1A<1(, the one has no shape %/1A?1(, the one is not in another %/1A811(, the one is not in itsel! %/1A812(, the one is no$here %/1A81;(, the one is not in motion %/1A71(, the one is not at rest %/1A:1(, the one is not di!!erent !rom itsel! %/1AD11(, the one is not the same as another %/1AD12(, the one is not di!!erent !rom another %/1A101(, the one is not the same as itsel! %/1A111(, the one is not li.e another or itsel! %/1A121(, the one is not unli.e itsel! or another %/1A1;1(, the one is not equal to itsel! or another %/1A1<11(, the one is not unequal to itsel! or another %/1A1<12(, the one is not the same age as itsel! or another %/1A1?11(, the one is neither younger nor older than itsel! or another %/1A1?12(, the one is not in time %/1A181(, the one neither omes to be nor eases to be %/1A1711(, the one does not parta.e o! being %/1A1712(, the one is not %/1A171;(, the one is not one %/1A171<(, the one is not named or spo.en o!, nor is it the ob2e t o! an a ount, .no$ledge, per eption, or opinion %/1A1:1(#

'ost o! the individual Arguments in /1 are logi ally inter onne ted# The e= eptions are /1A11, /1AD11, /1AD12, /1A101, and /1A111, $hi h do not depend on any previously established 1on lusions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 11291;7(#( The Arguments o! /1 also rest on a large number o! independent premises, among $hi h $e !ind the !ollo$ing6 %i( the property o! being one and the property o! being many are ontraries; %ii( anything that has parts is many; %iii( a $hole is a thing $ith parts !rom $hi h no part is missing; %iv( the beginning, middle, and end o!E are parts o! E; %v( the beginning and end o! E are the limits o! E; %vi( to be round is to have e=tremities that are equidistant in every dire tion !rom the middle; %vii( to be straight is to have a middle that stands in the $ay o! the t$o e=tremities; %viii( anything that has shape must be either round or straight; %i=( i! E is in F, then E is ontained all around by F and E tou hes F in many pla es $ith many parts; %=( i! E is ontained all around by F and E tou hes F in many pla es $ith many parts, thenE is round; %=i( i! E tou hes F in many pla es $ith many parts, then E has parts; %=ii( i! E both ontains itsel! and is ontained by itsel!, then E is t$o; %=iii( i! E is t$o, then E is many; %=iv( $hatever is neither in itsel! nor in another is no$here; %=v( i! E is in motion, then E alters !rom itsel! or moves spatially; %=vi( i! E moves spatially, then E either spins in a ir le in the same lo ation or hanges !rom one pla e to another# 5t appears that every Argument o! /1 other than /1AD is logi ally valid# %Co$ever, see Bill %1DD8, :1, n# 1;<(, $ho ontends that /1A12 and /1A1; are !alla ious#(( /1AD seems to ommit the !alla y o! equivo ation %see Ai .less %2007, 121912;(# 5t also appears that almost all the independent premises o! /1 are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or sel!>evident# There are three e= eptions to this laim# /1A10 depends on the questionable premise that i! Eis not di!!erent by itsel!, then E itsel! is not di!!erent in any $ay %see Ai .less %2007, 12;912<((, and /1A11 depends on the questionable premise that i! the nature o! the F is not identi al to the nature o! the B, then i! E is B relative to itsel!, E is not F relative to itsel! %see Ai .less %2007, 12<9128((# 0ut the most interesting e= eption is /1A1# 5n /1A1, Parmenides argues

!or /1A116 that i! the one is, then the one is not many# The reasoning is simple# From 4neness or )el!>Predi ation, it !ollo$s that the one is one# 1onsequently, i! the one is, then the one is one# 0ut the property o! being one and the property o! being many are ontraries, and, by Purity>F, no !orm an have ontrary properties# Biven that the one is a !orm, it !ollo$s that i! the one is, then the one is not many# The non>obvious premises here are 4neness %or )el!>Predi ation( and Purity>F# -hereas some might argue that /1A1 is unsound be ause 4neness %or )el!>Predi ation( is !alse, others might argue that the very point o! /1A1 is to sho$ that i! the one is and is many, then Purity>F is !alse#
".2 The Second Deduction 1)2*#100e

The aim o! /2 is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that i! the one is, then the one is both F and on>F# -ithin /2 there are thirty>three separate Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is, then the one parta.es o! being %/2A111(, the one is not the same as being %/2A112(, the one is a $hole %/2A211(, being and the one are parts o! the one %/2A212(, the one is in!initely many %/2A;1 and /2A?1(, the di!!erent is not the same as the one %/2A<11(, the di!!erent is not the same as being %/2A<12(, the one has parts %/2A811(, the one is a $hole %/2A812(, the one is limited %/2A81;(, the one is unlimited %/2A81<(, the one has a beginning, a middle, and an end %/2A711(, the one has shape %/2A712(, the one is in itsel! %/2A:11(, the one is not no$here %/2A:12(, the one is in another %/2A:1;(, the one is at rest %/2AD11(, the one is in motion %/2AD12(, the one is the same as itsel! %/2A1011(, the one is di!!erent !rom itsel! %/2A1012(, the one is di!!erent !rom the others %/2A111(, the one is the same as the others %/2A121(, the one is li.e the others %/2A1;1 and /2A1?11(, the one is unli.e the others %/2A1<1 and /2A1?12(, the one is li.e itsel! %/2A1811(, the one is unli.e itsel! %/2A1812(, the one tou hes itsel! %/2A1711(, the one tou hes the others %/2A1712(, the one does not tou h itsel! %/2A1:1(, the one does not tou h the others %/2A1D1(, the one is equal to itsel! %/2A2011(, the one is equal to the others %/2A2012(, the one is both greater than and less than itsel! %/2A2111(, the one is unequal to itsel! %/2A2112(, the one is both greater than and less than the others %/2A2211(, the one is unequal to the others %/2A2212(, the one is more than, less than, and equal to itsel! in number

%/2A2;11(, the one is more than, less than, and equal to the others in number %/2A2;12(, the one parta.es o! time %/2A2<1(, the one omes to be older than itsel! %/2A2?11(, the one omes to be younger than itsel! %/2A2?12(, the one al$ays is older than itsel! %/2A2811(, the one al$ays is younger than itsel! %/2A2812(, the one is the same age as itsel! %/2A2711(, the one is neither older nor younger than itsel! %/2A2712(, the one neither omes to be older nor omes to be younger than itsel! %/2A271;(, the one is older than the others %/2A2:1(, the one is younger than the others %/2A2D1(, the one is the same age as the others %/2A;011(, the one is neither older nor younger than the others %/2A;012(, the one neither omes to be older nor omes to be younger than the others %/2A;11(, the one omes to be younger than the others %/2A;211(, the one omes to be older than the others %/2A;212(, the one parta.es o! time past, !uture, and present %/2A;;11(, the one is and omes to be, $as and $as oming to be, and $ill be and $ill be oming to be %/2A;;12(, and the one ould be named and spo.en o!, as $ell as be the ob2e t o! an a ount, .no$ledge, per eption, and opinion %/2A;;1;(# 'ost o! the individual Arguments in /2 are logi ally inter onne ted# The e= eptions are /2A111, /2A112, /2A:12, /2A1011, /2A121, /2A1:1, /2A1D1, /2A2011, /2A2012, and /2A2<1, $hi h do not depend on any previously established on lusions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 1;:91:7(#( 5t appears that every Argument o! /2 is logi ally valid# %Co$ever, see Bill %1DD8, 8<, n# 107(, $ho ontends that /2A: and /2AD are !alla ious, and Patterson %1DDD, D:9100(, $ho argues that /2A: is !alla ious#(( @i.e the Arguments o! /1, the Arguments o! /2 rest on a large number o! independent premises, in luding many o! the independent premises o! /1# Again, most o! these premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or sel!>evident# %Bill %1DD8, :;9:<( ob2e ts to one o! the premises o! /2A1< and Patterson ob2e ts to one o! the premises o! /2A2:, but Ai .less %2007, 180 and 17?( laims that it is un lear $hether Plato himsel! $ould have !ound these premises problemati #( There are three e= eptions to this laim6 /2A<, /2A12, and /2A1<# /2A< depends on 1ausality and 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries, /2A12 depends on 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries,

and /2A1<1 depends on /2A121# 0ut there are reasons !or thin.ing that 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries is !alse# -hen ombined $ith 1ausality, 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries entails that, !or any property F, the F annot be on>F# 0ut,assuming that the one is, this ontradi ts /2A;1, namely that i! the one is, then the one is %in!initely( many# )o, i! 1ausality is true and the one is, then 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries must be !alse# This result is important, !or the !alsity o! 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries $ould enable Plato to dispat h at least some o! Parmenides" earlier riti isms o! the theory o! !orms, notably the !irst t$o riti isms o! the result o! ombining the theory o! !orms $ith the Pie e>o!>Pie 'odel on eption o! parta.ingIsee the end o! se tion <#2 above# 3oti e that /1 and /2 together entail that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse# To see $hy, onsider the !ollo$ing# /1 establishes that i! Purity>F is true, then i! the one is, then the one is neither F nor on>F; and /2 establishes that i! the one is, then the one is both F and on>F# )o i! both /1 and /2 are valid and based on a eptable premises %other than Purity>F(, then /1 and /2 together establish that i! Purity>F is true and the one is, then the one has ontradi tory properties# Biven that it is impossible !or something to have ontradi tory properties, it is a dire t onsequen e o! the on2un tion o! /1 and /2 that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse#
".% The !&&endi, to the 'irst Two Deductions 100e#106*

The !un tion o! the Appendi= is to sho$ that the 1on lusions o! /1 and /2 together entail that, !or a range o! properties F, i! the one is, then there is a moment outside o! time %the so> alled +instant,( at $hi h the one hanges !rom being F to being on>F# -ithin the Appendi=, there are !ive Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is, then there are times T1 and T2 su h that T1 is distin t !rom T2 and the one parta.es o! being at T1 and the one does not parta.e o! being atT2 %AppA11(, there is a de!inite time at $hi h the one omes to be %AppA211(, there is a de!inite time at $hi h the one eases to be %AppA212(, there is a time at $hi h the one eases to be many %AppA;11(, there is a time at $hi h the one eases to be one %AppA;12(, there is a time at $hi h the one is ombined %AppA;1;(, there is a time at $hi h the one is separated %AppA;1<(, there is a time at $hi h the one is made li.e %AppA;1?(,

there is a time at $hi h the one is made unli.e %AppA;18(, there is a time at $hi h the one is in reased %AppA;17(, there is a time at $hi h the one is de reased %AppA;1:(, there is a time at $hi h the one is made equal %AppA;1D(, there is something % all it +the instant,( %i( that is in no time at all and %ii( at $hi h the one hanges both !rom being in motion to being at rest and !rom being at rest to being in motion and %iii( at $hi h the one is neither at rest nor in motion %AppA<1(, there is something % all it +the instant,( %i( that is in no time at all and %ii( at $hi h the one hanges both !rom not>being to being and !rom being to not>being and %iii( at $hi h the one neither is nor is not %AppA?11(, there is something % all it +the instant,( %i( that is in no time at all and %ii( at $hi h the one hanges both !rom being one to being many and !rom being many to being one and %iii( at $hi h the one is neither one nor many %AppA?12(, there is something % all it +the instant,( %i( that is in no time at all and %ii( at $hi h the one hanges both !rom being li.e to being unli.e and !rom being unli.e to being li.e and %iii( at $hi h the one is neither li.e nor unli.e %AppA?1;(, and there is something % all it +the instant,( %i( that is in no time at all and %ii( at $hi h the one hanges both !rom being small to being large and !rom being large to being small and %iii( at $hi h the one is neither large nor small %AppA?1<(# All o! the individual Arguments $ithin the Appendi= are logi ally inter onne ted# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 1:D91D:(#( 5t appears that every Argument o! the Appendi= is logi ally valid# @i.e the Arguments o! /1 and /2, the Arguments o! the Appendi= rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! /1 and /2# Again, most o! the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or sel!>evident# %Bill %1DD8, :8( ob2e ts to one o! the premises o! AppA?# For a re2oinder, see Ai .less %2007, 1D?, n# 2(#( There is one ma2or e= eption to this laim, ho$ever# All o! the Arguments o! the Appendi= other than AppA1 depend !or their soundness on the soundness o! AppA1# 0ut AppA1 depends !or its soundness on the soundness o! /1A17, $hi h itsel! depends !or its soundness on the truth o! Purity>F# )o i! Purity>F $ere !alse, then all the Arguments o! the Appendi= $ould be unsound#

".) The Third Deduction 106*#107*

The aim o! /; is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that i! the one is, then the others are both F and on>F# -ithin /;, there are seven Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is, then the others are not the one %/;A11(, the others have parts %/;A211(, the others are a $hole %/;A212 and /;A;12(, the others are one %/;A21; and /;A;11(, the $hole and the part o! the others are many %/;A<1(, the $hole and the part o! the others are unlimited in multitude %/;A?11(, the $hole and the part o! the others are unlimited %/;A?12(, the $hole and the part o! the others are limited %/;A81(, ea h o! the others is li.e itsel! %/;A711(, ea h o! the others is li.e ea h o! the others other than itsel! %/;A712(, ea h o! the others is unli.e itsel! %/;A71;(, and ea h o! the others is unli.e ea h o! the others other than itsel! %/;A71<(# There is also the promise o! a number o! Arguments establishing results o! the !orm6 5! the one is, then the others are both F and on>F# 'ost o! the individual Arguments in /; are logi ally inter onne ted, and onne ted to Arguments $ithin previous /edu tions# The only e= eption is /;A211, $hi h does not depend on any previously established 1on lusions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 1D:9208(#( 5t appears that every argument o! /; is logi ally valid# @i.e the Arguments o! /1 and /2, the Arguments o! /; rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! /1 and /2# Again, it appears that the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or sel!>evident# Thus it appears that, !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, /; establishes, $ithout relian e on Purity>F or any other potentially problemati assumption, that i! the one is, then the others have a host o! ontrary properties#
".0 The 'ourth Deduction 107*#1"(*

The aim o! /< is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that i! the one is, then the others are neither F nor on>F# -ithin /<, there are !our Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is, then the others are not one %/<A11(, the others are not many %/<A211(, the others are not a $hole %/<A212(, the others do not have parts %/<A21;(, the others are not li.e %/<A;11(, the others are not unli.e

%/<A;12(, the others are not both li.e and unli.e %/<A;1;(, the others are not the same %/<A<11(, the others are not di!!erent %/<A<12(, the others are not in motion %/<A<1;(, the others are not at rest %/<A<1<(, the others are not oming to be %/<A<1?(, the others are not easing to be %/<A<18(, the others are not greater %/<A<17(, the others are not equal %/<A<1:(, and the others are not less %/<A<1D(# All o! the individual Arguments in /< are logi ally inter onne ted, and onne ted to Arguments $ithin previous /edu tions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 2079211(#( 5t appears that all o! the Arguments in /< are valid# @i.e the Arguments o! the !irst three /edu tions, the Arguments o! /< rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! /1 and /2 %but not /;(# Again, it appears that most o! the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or sel!>evident# There is one ma2or e= eption to this laim, ho$ever# All o! the Arguments o! /< depend !or their soundness on the soundness o! /1A2# 0ut /1A2 depends !or its soundness on the soundness o! /1A1, $hi h itsel! depends !or its soundness on the truth o! Purity>F# )o $e an redes ribe the 1on lusion o! /< as !ollo$s6 5! Purity>F is true, then i! the one is, then the others do not have a host o! ontrary properties# This means that /; and /< together entail that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse# For, by /;, i! the one is, then the others are both F and on>F# 0ut, by /<, i! Purity>F is true and the one is, then the others are neither F nor on>F# )o, i! Purity>F is true and the one is, then the others have a host o! ontradi tory properties# Biven that it is impossible !or anything to have ontradi tory properties, it !ollo$s dire tly that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse#
"." The 'ifth Deduction 1"(*#1"%*

The aim o! /? is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that i! the one is not, then the one is both F and on>F# -ithin /?, there are t$elve Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is not, then the one is di!!erent !rom the others %/?A111(, $e have .no$ledge o! the one %/?A112(, the one is di!!erent in .ind !rom the others %/?A21(, the one parta.es o! something, that, and this %/?A;1(, the one is unli.e the others %/?A<11(, the others are unli.e the one %/?A<12(, the one

parta.es o! the unli.e %i#e#, has unli.eness( in relation to the others %/?A<1;(, the one parta.es o! the li.e in relation to itsel! %/?A?11(, the one is li.e itsel! %/?A?12(, the one is unequal to the others %/?A811(, the others are unequal to the one %/?A812(, the one parta.es o! the unequal in relation to the others %/?A81;(, the one parta.es o! the large %/?A711(, the one parta.es o! the small %/?A712(, the one parta.es o! the equal %/?A71;(, the one parta.es o! being %/?A:11(, the one parta.es o! not>being %/?A:12(, the one is in motion %/?AD1(, the one is not in motion %/?A1011(, the one is at rest %/?A1012(, the one is altered %/?A1111(, the one is not altered %/?A1112(, the one omes to be %/?A1211(, the one eases to be %/?A1212(, the one does not ome to be %/?A121;(, and the one does not ease to be %/?A121<(# 'ost o! the individual Arguments in /? are logi ally inter onne ted, and onne ted to Arguments $ithin previous /edu tions# The e= eptions are /?A111, /?A112, /?A;1, /?A?11, /?A:11, /?A:12, and /?A1011, $hi h do not depend on any previously established 1on lusions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 212922;(#( 5t appears that all o! the Arguments in /? are valid# @i.e the Arguments o! the !irst !our /edu tions, the Arguments o! /? rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! /1, /2, and the Appendi= %but not /; or /<(# Again, it appears that most o! the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or sel!>evident# Thus it appears that, !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, /? establishes, $ithout relian e on Purity>F or any other potentially problemati assumption, that i! the one is not, then the one has a host o! ontrary properties# 5n other $ords, as Plato sees it, /? establishes that i! the one is not, then Purity>F is !alse# -hen ombined $ith the results o! /1 and /2 %or, alternatively, $ith the results o! /; and /<(, this result entails that Purity>F is in !a t !alse# To see this, re all that /1 and /2 %as $ell as /; and /<( together entail that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse# 3o$, by /?, i! the one is not, then Purity>F is !alse# )o, $hether the one is or is not, Purity>F is !alse# )o Purity>F is !alse#
".6 The Si,th Deduction 1"%*#1")*

The aim o! /8 is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that

i! the one is not, then the one is neither F nor on>F# -ithin /8, there are !our Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is not, then the one in no $ay is %/8A111(, the one in no $ay parta.es o! being %/8A112(, the one in no $ay omes to be %/8A211(, the one in no $ay eases to be %/8A212(, the one is not altered in any $ay %/8A21;(, the one is not in motion %/8A21<(, the one is not at rest %/8A21?(, the one does not parta.e o! the small %/8A;11(, the one does not parta.e o! the large %/8A;12(, the one does not parta.e o! the equal %/8A;1;(, the one does not parta.e o! the li.e %/8A;1<(, the one does not parta.e o! the di!!erent %/8A;1?(, the others are not li.e the one %/8A<11(, the others are not unli.e the one %/8A<12(, the others are not the same as the one %/8A<1;(, the others are not di!!erent !rom the one %/8A<1<(, none o! the !ollo$ing %namely, o! that, to that, something, this, o! this, o! another, to another, time past, time !uture, time present, .no$ledge, per eption, opinion, a ount, and name( is appli able to the one %/8A<1?(, and the one is in no state at all %/8A<18(# 'ost o! the individual Arguments in /8 are logi ally inter onne ted, and onne ted to Arguments $ithin previous /edu tions# The e= eptions are /8A111 and /8A<1?, $hi h do not depend on any previously established 1on lusions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 22;922:(#( 5t appears that all o! the Arguments in /8 are valid# @i.e the Arguments o! the !irst !ive /edu tions, the Arguments o! /8 rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! /? %but not /1, /2, /;, /<, or the Appendi=(# Again, it appears that most o! the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or 2ust plain obvious# Thus it appears that, !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, /8 establishes, $ithout relian e on Purity>F or any other potentially problemati assumption, that i! the one is not, then the one has neither o! a host o! ontrary properties# -hen ombined $ith the results o! /?, this result entails that the one is# To see this, onsider the !ollo$ing# /? establishes that i! the one is not, then the one is both Fand on>F; and /8 establishes that i! the one is not, then the one is neither F nor on>F# )o i! both /? and /8 are valid and based on a eptable premises, then /? and /8 together establish that i! the one is not, then the one has ontradi tory properties# Biven that it is impossible !or something to have ontradi tory properties, it is a dire t

onsequen e o! the on2un tion o! /? and /8 that it is not the ase that the one is not# That is to say, /? and /8 together entail that the one is# This is a signi!i ant result, !or t$o reasons# First, it rein!or es the earlier result obtained !rom the on2un tion o! /1, /2, and /? %and !rom the on2un tion o! /;, /<, and /?(, namely that Purity>F is !alse# For /1 and /2 %as $ell as /; and /<( together entail that i! the one is, then Purity>F is !alse# 0ut /8 establishes that the one is# 5t then !ollo$s dire tly by modus ponens that Purity>F is !alse# )e ond, the result that the one is an be generali*ed to establish the being o! any !orm $hatever# The reason is that none o! the reasoning in the /edu tions up to this point depends on the one"s having been hosen as the main sub2e t o! the /edu tions# &very Argument o! /19/8 $ould go through i! some other !orm $ere substituted !or the one as the main topi o! dis ussion# &arlier, Parmenides had said that +only a very gi!ted man an ome to .no$ that !or ea h thing there is some .ind, a being itsel! by itsel!, %1;?a9b(# )o he has no$ revealed himsel! to be the +very gi!ted man, o! $hom he had spo.en#
".$ The Seventh Deduction 1")*#1"0e

The aim o! /7 is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that i! the one is not, then the others are both F and on>F# -ithin /7, there are si= Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is not, then the others are %/7A111(, the others are other %/7A112(, the others are di!!erent %/7A11;(, the others are other than ea h other %/7A11<(, the others are in!initely many %/7A21(, ea h o! the others appears to be one %/7A;11(, ea h o! the others is not one %/7A;12(, the others appear to be in!initely many %/7A;1;(, some o! the others appear to be even, others odd %/7A;1<(, none o! the others is either even or odd %/7A;1?(, among the others there appears to be a smallest %/7A<11(, ea h o! the others %even the other that appears smallest( appears large in relation to its parts %/7A<12(, ea h o! the others appears to ome to the equal %/7A<1;(, ea h o! the others appears to have no beginning, middle, or end in relation to itsel! %/7A?11(, ea h o! the others appears unlimited in relation to itsel! %/7A?12(, ea h o! the others appears limited in relation to another %/7A?1;(, ea h o! the others appears to be li.e itsel! and ea h o! the others %/7A811(, and ea h o! the others

appears to be unli.e itsel! and ea h o! the others %/7A812(# 'ost o! the individual Arguments in /7 are logi ally inter onne ted, and onne ted to Arguments $ithin previous /edu tions# The e= eptions are /7A111 and /7A;1?, $hi h do not depend on any previously established 1on lusions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 22:92;8(#( 5t appears that all o! the Arguments in /7 are valid# @i.e the Arguments o! the !irst si= /edu tions, the Arguments o! /7 rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! every /edu tion other than /< and the Appendi=# Again, it appears that most o! the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or 2ust plain obvious# Thus it appears that, !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, /7 establishes, $ithout relian e on Purity>F or any other potentially problemati assumption, that i! the one is not, then the others appear to have a host o! ontrary properties# %Thus /7 does not on!orm e=a tly to Parmenides" earlier des ription o! the method o! the /edu tions# -hat $e $ould e=pe t !rom that des ription is not that /7 $ould establish that i! the one is not then the others appear to have ontrary properties, but rather that /7 $ould establish that i! the one is not then the others a tually have ontrary properties# This dis repan y remains something o! a mystery#( )till, it is possible to e=tra t an interesting result !rom /7, $hen ombined $ith a result !rom /;# /7A1 establishes that i! the one is not, then the others are %/7A111(# 0ut /; establishes %!or many F"s( that i! the one is, then the others are F# 0ut to be F is to be in some $ay or other# )o i! the others are F, then the others are# )o /; establishes %!or many F"s( that i! the one is, then the others are# Thus, /; and /7A111 together entail that, $hether the one is or is not, the others are# Cen e /; and /7 together entail that the others are# Assuming that the others are %or, at least, in lude( all the !orms other than the one, it !ollo$s, in on2un tion $ith the previously established result that the one is %see se tion 8#7 above(, that every !orm is# This rein!or es the previous laim %see se tion 8#7 again( that the result that the one is an be generali*ed to all the !orms#
".7 The +ighth Deduction 1"0e#1""c

The aim o! /: is to establish, !or a variety o! di!!erent properties F, that

i! the one is not, then the others are neither F nor on>F# -ithin /:, there are t$o Arguments $ith the !ollo$ing 1on lusions6 5! the one is not, then none o! the others is one %/:A111(, the others are not many %/:A112(, the others annot be on eived to be either one or many %/:A21(# 'ost o! the individual Arguments in /: are logi ally inter onne ted, and onne ted to Arguments $ithin previous /edu tions# The lone e= eption is /:A21, $hi h depends on none o! the 1on lusions established in previous /edu tions# %For details, see Ai .less %2007, 2;892;:(#( 5t appears that all o! the Arguments in /: are valid# @i.e the Arguments o! the !irst seven /edu tions, the Arguments o! /: rest on a number o! independent premises, in luding premises o! /1# Again, it appears that most o! the premises are, at least !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, either de!initionally true or 2ust plain obvious# Thus it appears that, !rom Plato"s point o! vie$, /: establishes, $ithout relian e on Purity>F or any other potentially problemati assumption, that i! the one is not, then the others are, at the very least, neither one nor many# Ta.en together, /7 and /: establish that the one is# For /7A2 sho$s that i! the one is not, then the others are many# 0ut /:A1 sho$s that i! the one is not, then the others are not many# Thus /7 and /: sho$ that i! the one is not, then the others have ontradi tory properties# Biven that nothing an have ontradi tory properties, it !ollo$s dire tly that the one is# This rein!or es the result previously established in se tion 8#7# 6. 8onclusion ) holars are deeply divided about the entral interpretive questions relating to a proper understanding o! Plato"s Parmenides# -hat is the point o! Parmenides" riti isms o! )o rates" theory o! !orms, ta.en both individually and olle tively, in the !irst part o! the dialogueM -hat is the point o! Parmenides" instantiation o! his o$n re ommended method o! training in the se ond part o! the dialogueM And ho$, in parti ular, is the se ond part o! the dialogue supposed to bear on the !irstM For some, Parmenides" riti isms are no more than a +re ord o! honest perple=ity, %see Klastos %1D?<, ;<;(; Bill %1DD8(; Allen %1DD7((# 4n this vie$, Plato"s intention $as simply to put !or$ard di!!i ulties !or the theory o! !orms that he himsel! did not, at least at the time he $rote the

dialogue, see a $ay to resolve# The main problem !or this interpretation is that, a!ter having laid out his riti isms o! the theory, Parmenides says that it should be possible !or a +very gi!ted man, to de!end the e=isten e o! the !orms, and thereby e=plain the possibility o! diale ti , through a method o! training that Parmenides himsel! goes on to instantiate in the se ond part o! the dialogue# For others, Parmenides" riti isms are !alla ies that someone $ho !ollo$s Parmenides" re ommended method o! training $ill thereby be in a position to diagnose# 4n this vie$, the theory o! !orms emerges relatively inta t at the end o! the dialogue# The most in!luential version o! this vie$ belongs to 'ein$ald %1DD1; 1DD2( and Peterson %1DD8; 2000; 200;(# A ording to 'ein$ald, Plato meant us to re ogni*e the invalidity o! Parmenides" riti isms o! the theory o! !orms by having us !o us on the in>relation>to quali!i ations that are supposed to serve as one o! the prin iples o! division that e=plain the !a t that the se ond part ta.es the shape o! eight separate /edu tions# These quali!i ations, properly understood, reveal that sub2e t>predi ate senten es %o! the !orm +E is F,( are ambiguous6 to say that E is F is to say either that E is F in relation to itsel! %i#e#, pros heauto( or that E is F in relation to the others %i#e#, pros ta alla(, $here to say that E is F pros heauto is to say that the F is de!initionally true o! E, and to say that E is F pros ta alla is to say that E displays the !eature o! being F# As 'ein$ald argues, i! Plato meant us to re ogni*e the e=isten e o! su h an ambiguity, then he probably meant us to re ogni*e that sel!>predi ational senten es %o! the !orm +The F is F,( are also ambiguous, and that the ambiguity o! su h senten es reveals that the Third 'an argument and the Breatest /i!!i ulty ommit the !alla y o! equivo ation# The main problem $ith this parti ular interpretive strategy is that it is provably !alse that all versions o! the Third 'an argument %or Breatest /i!!i ulty( ome out !alla ious i! sel!>predi ational senten es are ambiguous as bet$een pros heauto and pros ta alla readings# %For details, see Fran es %1DD8(#( There are other interpretations that are similar to the one de!ended by 'ein$ald and Peterson# 'iller %1D:8(, !or e=ample, argues that a dis erning reader $ho is able to loo. beneath the sur!a e o! the te=t is in a position to re ogni*e that Parmenides" riti isms are e!!e tive only on

the $rong>headed supposition that !orms are !undamentally similar to the sensible, material things that parta.e o! them# The point o! the dialogue, on this vie$, is to help the dis erning reader see the !orms !or $hat they really are, trans endent beings that should be a essed by reason rather than $ith the help o! ategories dra$n !rom sense e=perien e# 4ne o! the problems $ith su h an interpretation is a problem that is ommon to esoteri readings in general6 on e one has le!t the sur!a e o! the te=t, there are no interpretive onstraints on $hat one might !ind beneath the sur!a e# Kirtually any interpretation $ill turn out to be 2usti!ied by the te=t# Another problem $ith this approa h is that it pays insu!!i ient attention to the logi al inter onne tions among individual riti isms o! the theory o! !orms, and bet$een the riti isms as a $hole and the /edu tions# There is another $ay o! ans$ering the three entral interpretive questions, one on $hi h Parmenides" riti isms as $ell as the /edu tions ome out as serious and valid %This is the interpretation de!ended in Ai .less %2007(#( -hat Parmenides" riti isms reveal is that, $hether ombined $ith the Pie 'odel on eption o! parta.ing or $ith Paradigmatism, Plato"s middle period theory o! !orms is internally in onsistent# 5t turns out that there are three prin iples the abandonment o! $hi h $ould eliminate all in onsisten ies apart !rom the Breatest /i!!i ulty6 Purity>F, Hniqueness, and 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries# 1are!ul logi al analysis o! the se ond part o! the dialogue then reveals that the /edu tions establish not only that the !orms posited by the middle period theory e=ist, but also that Purity>F, Hniqueness, and 3o 1ausation by 1ontraries are all !alse# 5t is then reasonable to suppose that Plato meant the reader to re ogni*e that the proper $ay to save the !orms is by abandoning these three basi assumptions# And, importantly, this an be done $ithout abandoning the most important prin iples at the heart o! the middle period theory, namely 4ne>over>'any and )eparation# The aptly>named Breatest /i!!i ulty is then le!t as a hallenge !or !uture $or.# 9i*liogra&hy
Allen, A# &#, 1DD7, Plato"s Parmenides, revised edition# 3e$ Caven6

Fale Hniversity Press#

0ailey, /# T# J#, 200D, PThe Third 'an ArgumentQ, Philosophy 1ompass,

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Catha$ay, A# F#, 1D7;, PThe )e ond +Third 'an,Q, in 'orav si. 1D7;6 7:9100# Cavli e., A#, and Nar!i., F#, 200?, Plato"s Parmenides6 Pro eedings o! the Fourth )ymposium Platoni um Pragense, Prague6 45N4F'&3C Publishers# Cermann, A#, and 1hrysa.opoulou, )#, 2010, Plato"s Parmenides6 Te=t, Translation, and 5ntrodu tory &ssay, @as Kegas6 Parmenides Publishing# Cunt, /#, 1DD7, PCo$ %not( to &=empt Platoni Forms !rom Parmenides"s Third 'anQ, Phronesis, <26 1920# Nraut, A# %ed#(, 1DD2, The 1ambridge 1ompanion to Plato, 1ambridge6 1ambridge Hniversity Press# @ee, &# 3#, 1D7;, PThe )e ond +Third 'an,6 An 5nterpretationQ, in 'orav si. 1D7;6 1019122# @e$is, F#, 1D7D, PParmenides on )eparation and the Nno$ability o! the Forms6 Plato"s Parmenides 1;;A !!#Q, Philosophi al )tudies, ;?6 10?9127# 'al olm, J#, 1DD1, Plato on the )el!>Predi ation o! Forms6 &arly and 'iddle /ialogues, 4=!ord6 1larendon Press# 'ann, -# &#, 1D7D, PThe Third 'anJThe 'an -ho 3ever -asQ, Ameri an Philosophi al Ruarterly, 186 1879178# 'ates, 0#, 1D7D, P5dentity and Predi ation in PlatoQ, Phronesis, 2<6 211922D# 'atthe$s, B#, 1D72, Plato"s &pistemology and Aelated @ogi al Problems, @ondon6 Faber# ' 1abe, '# '#, 1DD<, Plato"s 5ndividuals, Prin eton6 Prin eton Hniversity Press# 'ein$ald, 1# 1#, 1DD1, Plato"s Parmenides, 3e$ For.6 4=!ord Hniversity Press# 'ein$ald, 1# 1#, 1DD2, PBood>bye to the Third 'anQ, in Nraut 1DD26 ;8?9;D8# 'iller, '# C# Jr#, 1D:8, Plato"s Parmenides6 The 1onversion o! the )oul, Prin eton6 Prin eton Hniversity Press# 'orav si., J# '# &#, 1D8;, PThe +Third 'an, Argument and Plato"s Theory o! FormsQ, Phronesis, :6 ?0982# 'orav si., J# '# &# %ed#(, 1D7;, Patterns in Plato"s Thought, /ordre ht6 Aeidel# 4$en, B# &# @#, 1D?;, PThe Pla e o! the Timaeus in Plato"s /ialoguesQ, 1lassi al Ruarterly, 3#)# ;, 7D9D?#

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Plato"s Parmenides, )outh 0end6 Hniversity o! 3otre /ame Press# ) altsas, T#, 1D:D, PThe @ogi o! the /ilemma o! Parti ipation and o! the Third 'an ArgumentQ, Apeiron, 226 879D0# ) altsas, T#, 1DD2, PA 3e essary Falsehood in the Third 'an ArgumentQ, Phronesis, ;76 21892;2# ) hipper, &# -#, 1D8?, Forms in Plato"s @ater /ialogues, The Cague6 'artinus 3i2ho!!# ) ho!ield, '#, 1DD8, P@i.eness and @i.enesses in the ParmenidesQ, in Bill and ' 1abe 1DD86 <D977# ) h$ei*er, P#, 1DD<, P)el!>Predi ation and the Third 'anQ, &r.enntnis, <06 219<2# ) olni ov, )#, 200;, Plato"s Parmenides, 0er.eley6 Hniversity o! 1ali!ornia Press# )ellars, -#, 1D??, PKlastos and +The Third 'an,Q, Philosophi al Aevie$, 8<6 <0?9<;7# )harvy, A#, 1D:8, PPlato"s 1ausal @ogi and the Third 'an ArgumentQ, 3oSs, 206 ?079?;0# )hiner, A#, 1D7<, Nno$ledge and Aeality in Plato"s Philebus, Assen6 van Bor um# )pellman, @#, 1D:;, PPatterns and 1opies6 The )e ond Kersion o! the Third 'anQ, Pa i!i Philosophi al Ruarterly, 8<6 18?917?# )prague, A# N#, 1D87, PParmenides" )ail and /ionysodorus" 4=Q, Phronesis, 126 D19D:# )trang, 1#, 1D8;, PPlato and the Third 'anQ, Pro eedings o! the Aristotelian )o iety %)upplementary Kolume(, ;76 1<7918<# Teloh, C#, 1D:1, The /evelopment o! Plato"s 'etaphysi s, Hniversity Par.6 Pennsylvania )tate Hniversity Press# Teloh, C#, and @ou*e .y, /# J#, 1D72, PPlato"s Third 'an ArgumentQ, Phronesis, 176 :09D<# Klastos, B#, 1D?<, PThe Third 'an Argument in the ParmenidesQ, Philosophi al Aevie$, 8<6 ;1D9;<D# 999, 1D??, PAddenda to the Third 'an Argument6 A Aeply to Pro!essor )ellarsQ, Philosophi al Aevie$, 8<6 <;:9<<:# 999, 1D?8, PPosts ript to the Third 'an6 A Aeply to 'r# Bea hQ, Philosophi al Aevie$, 8?6 :;9D<# 999, 1D8D, PPlato"s +Third 'an, Argument %Parm, 1;2a1>b2(6 Te=t and

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