The Structure of Adult Friendship Choices*

LOIS M. VERBRUGGE,

University of Michigan

ABSTRACT This paper examines bias toward status-similarity in adult friendships in Detroit and a West German city. Principles of meeting and "mating," by which strangers are converted to acquaintances and acquaintances to friends, are stated. One of these, the proximity principle, claims that the more similar people are, the more likely they will meet and become friends. This principle is tested in matrices of friendship choice for twelve social characteristics. Two statistical measures of bias are used (odds ratio and marginal ratio) and their properties discussed. Compared to a random-choice model, adult friendships show strong bias toward status similarity for all social characteristics. Bias is strongest for "edge" categories of ranked statuses and for "best" friends. The less similar two people are in social characteristics, the less likely they are to be close friends. Demographic characteristics tend to show more bias toward homogeneous choices than other characteristics. These findings are explained and further analyses of adult friendship structure and dynamics are discussed.

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Urban research has shown that friendship ties among adults are pervasive and active, particularly when compared to neighbor and coworker ties (Axelrod; Bell and Boat; Bell and Force; Jitodai; Tomeh, a, b). These friendships are sources of social contact, intimacy, and assistance. They are considered primary ties, because of their emphasis on face-to-face contact and positive affect (Cooley; K. Davis; Parsons and Shils). Despite friendship's prevalence and assumed importance, little is known about the social structure of adult friendships. Who is chosen? What goods and services are exchanged? How large and heterogeneous are friendship networks? In this paper, one feature of these primary ties is examined: the structure of friendship choice. Most studies of friendship choice involve children or young adults, often college students (Lindzey and Byrne). There are relatively few reports of friendship choice by adults (Barnes; Berkun and Meeland; Curtis; Ellis; Gans, a, b; Greer; Kahl and Davis; Laumann, a, b; Lazarsfeld and
*I thank E. O. Laumann and F. U. Pappi for use of the Detroit and Altneustadt data sets. Laumann was principal investigator of the Detroit study; Laumann and Pappi, of the Altneustadt study.

576

Adult Friendships / 577

Merton; Lipset et al.; Loomis; Lundberg and Steele; Michelson; Richardson; Riley and Foner; Rosow; Suttles; Williams; Zander and Havelin). Without exception, they find that adult friendships are highly homogeneous in social and demographic statuses, attitudes, interests, intelligence, and personality traits, and that observed homogeneity is higher than expected, on the basis of a random-choice model. Most of these studies examine homogeneity for only one social characteristic. Exceptions are Laumann, Lazarsfeld and Merton, and Loomis. These results are based on tables which cross-classify respondents (egos) by their friends (alters), for categories of a social characteristic. The data in the matrix are the outcome of processes of friendship formation, which have converted some strangers to acquaintances and some acquaintances to friends. Many factors affect chances that strangers meet and that acquaintances develop a friendship. In this paper, we review factors involved in meeting and "mating," state hypotheses about adult friendship choice based on them, construct a model of expected choices to compare with observed ones, and test the hypotheses on two data sets.
Meeting and Mating

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Social roles, life styles, attitudes, and personality traits channel individuals' spatial movements and interpersonal preferences. Consequently, pairs of strangers have varying probabilities of ever meeting each other, and varying probabilities of developing a close friendship if they do meet.I The sociologist's task is to measure the real-world probabilities for meeting and for mating (conditional upon meeting) and to identify the social principles behind them. What plausible principles are involved in adult friendship formation? We must rely on a speculative literature to identify them, since there are no empirical studies on the meeting and mating processes themselves (i.e., how acquaintanceships formed in a population of adult strangers, or how acquaintanceships were transformed into friendships). Meeting. The most plausible principles for meeting are status-homogeneity and spatial proximity. Strangers with similar social roles and beliefs are more likely to be in the same place at the same time, than those with different roles and beliefs. Also, people whose daily rounds intersect are more likely to become acquaintances than others. Mating. While meeting depends on opportunities, mating depends on both attraction and opportunities. How readily an acquaintance is converted to close friendship depends on how attractive two people find each other and how easily they can get together. What factors influence attraction between two acquaintances? Ad-

578 I Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1 977

ams argues that people value consensus in their friendships above all else. Since consensus is more likely among status-similars than status-dissimilars, this principle should result in high status-homogeneity in friendship dyads. Social psychologists have proposed other personality, cognitive, social learning, and social exchange factors to explain attraction (Marlowe and Gergen). Among them are need-complementarity (Winch); balance theory (Heider; Newcomb); congruence (Secord and Backman); feelings of gain or loss in esteem (Aronson and Linder); valuation of rewards and costs, or social exchange theory (Homans; Thibault and Kelly). The relative importance of these factors for adult friendships is not known, nor how they are reflected in a dyad's social characteristics. Opportunities for acquaintances to become friends are enhanced by spatial proximity. Close residence and daily rounds which intersect give acquaintances more chance to become intimate (Festinger et al.; Newcomb). In summary, the literature repeatedly points to one sociological principle for meeting and mating: similarity in social status or spatial location. We call this the principle of proximity and state it as follows: the more similar in social positions two people are, the stronger their chances of meeting and becoming friends (cf. Brown). When referring to social statuses, the notion of proximity is identical to that of social distance. First proposed by Simmel, the concept of social distance has been used often to explain subjective choices (e.g., Bogardus, a, b; Laumann, a), but seldom for objective (real) choices. How important is the proximity principle in meeting, and in mating after meeting? To answer these questions, we need three types of data: characteristics of a pool of strangers, of acquaintance dyads (both members), and of friendship dyads (both members). For large populations, the acquaintance data are necessarily unknown. Information about all acquaintances is too vast to seek, even from a sample. Nevertheless, with the data on strangers and friendship choices, we can answer a more general question: How strong (overall) is the principle of proximity in adult friendship choice? (We simply cannot measure the relatiave importance of proximity for meeting and mating.) This analysis focuses on the outcomes of opportunity and attraction factors, not the processes themselves. We measure the importance of proximity in friendship choice as reflected in social positions. We shall suggest the opportunity and attraction factors underlying the results but do not measure them directly.
Data Source

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Two cross-sectional sample surveys of adult populations are used: the 1966 Detroit Area Study and a 1971 survey in a West German city (population

Adult Friendships / 579

20,000), called Altneustadt (a pseudonym). The Detroit data contain 1,013 cases of white males, aged 21-64. Details of sampling procedures used are in Schuman. The Altneustadt data contain 820 cases of males and females, ages 18 and above. The study used a single-stage, systematic probability sample of the municipality's eligible voters in 1971. Further details of the two cities and the samples appear in Verbrugge (53-56). In both studies, the respondent was asked to name his or her three closest (dearest) friends outside the household. 2 In the all-male Detroit sample, only nominations of male friends were allowed. In Altneustadt, respondents could name male or female friends. (For males, the percent of same-sex nominations varies from 87 to 90% for the three friends. For females, the percent of same-sex nominations is 62-68%.) Detroit respondents were more likely to name exactly three friends. Their average number is 2.9, compared to 2.7 in Altneustadt. In this analysis, Altneustadt men and women are pooled. This assumes that patterns of friendship choice are similar for the sexes (i.e., there are no interaction effects by sex). All tabulations were done separately by sex, and the assumption was supported. The two data sets are used for replication, not for cross-national comparison. If our hypotheses are general, they should be supported in (at least) two sites. This proves true in the analysis. Exceptions are noted when they occur.
Variables (or Social Positions)

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Respondents were asked about several social positions of their friends. In Detroit, these are friend's occupation, employment status (self-employed or not), educational attainment, political preference, religious preference, nationality, and age. In Altneustadt, they are friend's occupation, employment status, political preference, religious preference, age, marital status, sex, and length of residence in the city. The same items were obtained for respondents. All variables are coded in categorical form for this analysis. Choosing categories is a serious task (cf. Blau and Duncan, 24). Categories should represent real social groupings, people who share a distinctive attribute. Category members are assumed or known to behave more like each other than like other categories' members. Here, we gave careful thought to finding categories that are more than simply conventional in social research, but whose members have differential social behavior. Social statuses were divided into categories as follows: Current or most recent occupation is coded according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (International Labor Office). The five-digit codes were collapsed to the six major groups of the classification. Cate-

58o I Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1977

gories for housewife (Altneustadt) and student (both sites) were added to the six groups. The detailed occupation titles are also assigned international prestige scores according to Treiman's scheme. Prestige scores are viewed here as attributes of individuals, rather than of the jobs they hold. The continuum is split into six categories. Education is coded as years of completed schooling. The categories chosen reflect important boundaries in educational attainment, whether a diploma or degree is achieved or not. Nationality for Detroit is coded from questions on origin country and origin language. The categories are regions which have well-documented cultural differences and different periods of immigration into the United States. Residence length for Altneustadt is based on two features: migrant status (a dichotomy) and years of residence in the city. The latter is split into two categories to provide a reasonable boundary between recent and long-term residents. Residence length is asked only if ego's friend lives in the municipality. Age is split into ten-year groups, assuming they roughly differentiate stages of life cycle and associated activities. One exception occurs: ages 20-29 are split into two five-year categories. The early twenties usually entail fewer job and family responsibilities than the late twenties, and these differences may be reflected in friendship choices. Political preference, religious preference, sex, and marital status have standard categories in the two sites. A variable combining sex and marital status is also used, to determine if friendship choice is even more discriminating for sexmarital status than for either variable alone. Most of these categories are real social divisions with documented behavioral consequences. People perceive the categories named and, we assume, respond to them in choosing friends. Caution must be exercised for three variables in which categories have been imposed on continuous variables: occupational prestige, age, and residence length. Although we believe that behavior within these categories is more homogeneous than between categories, the boundaries named are not necessarily socially recognized ones. The survey questions and further coding details are in Verbrugge (62-78, Appendix II).
Methodology: Choosing a Model and Measuring Bias

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

For each social position, a cross-tabulation of ego categories versus alter categories is prepared. A separate matrix is made for each Friend (1,2,3). Altogether, 54 matrices are used in this analysis. To measure how strong the proximity principle is, we need to construct a model matrix for comparison with the actual one. The model matrix shows an expected distribution of friendship choices, which emerge

Adult Friendships 1581

from the initial pool of strangers. The difference of observed choices from expected ones is called "bias." There are two ways to build the expectations matrix. First, if a theory or prior empirical data provide numerical probabilities of choice (of friends from strangers), these can be used to construct a set of expectations. The closer the observed matrix fits the model one, the more valid the theoretical model which provides the probabilities. Second, if strong theory or prior data are lacking, a conservative approach is recommended. One assumes that friendships are formed by random pairings of strangers and constructs a matrix to reflect that. Then, one determines whether observed choices deviate significantly from it and whether the pattern of deviations fits hypotheses. There is no prior research or theory which justifies a set of numerical probabilities for adult friendship choice. This analysis is exploratory and uses a simple random-choice model. It is an exceedingly naive model of social choice. Few social behaviors fit such a model, or should be expected to fit one! Nevertheless, it is often a first step in finding patterns in data, from which nonrandom models are built. 3 The measure of bias one chooses determines how the random choice model is constructed. Here, we use two measures of bias: an odds ratio and a marginal ratio. The odds ratio compares the odds that egos in category i choose same-status friends to the odds that other egos (not i) choose friends in category i. For a 2 < 2 table, the odds ratio is (FiiF22 / F 12 F21 ) ( Mosteller). An n x n table can be collapsed to 2 x 2 tables in numerous ways to test different hypotheses. For example, to examine the tendency to choose same-status friends, this odds ratio is computed: [F21 (F.. F,. F. i + FL1 )/ (F,. F F, F12 )]. For each matrix, a total of I such odds ratios are computed. The odds ratio has a desirable feature: it is invariant with row or column multiplications (i.e., not sensitive to its margins). Observed odds ratios can be compared with expected ones to measure bias. Constructing a random-choice model is straightforward. For that model, the expected value for the odds ratio is 1.00 in all cases. This means independence of the two stubs. Observed odds ratios are tested for statistical significance (difference from 1.00) by the procedure outlined in Goodman (4-13). The marginal ratio states how much more egos in category i choose same-status friends than category i friends appear in the population of eligibles (strangers). For the marginal ratio, we first compute the percentage distribution of choices within rows. The ratio of observed percent to an expected percent measures bias. 4 The marginal ratio is identical to the social distance mobility ratio found in analyses of occupational mobility. It is affected by row and column marginal distributions (Blau and Duncan; Tyree). This feature hinders comparison of matrices with different marginal
11
) (

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

582 / Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1977

frequencies and even comparison of cells within a matrix.s For the marginal ratio, we use the bottom marginal of the matrix for the random-choice expectations. This is the distribution of friends for a social position. The model therefore claims that egos of each category choose their friends from the friend population at random, i.e., that the percentage distribution in each row is identical to the bottom marginal. No test of statistical significance for the ratio is available. Both the odds ratio and the marginal ratio are acceptable measures of bias, compared to a random-choice model. As conceived here, they both use the friendship matrix itself to identify the population of strangers eligible for friendship. 6 We prefer the odds ratio because of its desirable statistical properties. In this analysis, when both the odds ratio and marginal ratio were computed, we report only the former.
Hypotheses

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

The Detroit and Altneustadt data permit examination of friendship choice in three dimensions: (a) for different social positions, (b) for categories of social positions, and (c) across friends by their nomination order.
HOMOGENEITY BIAS

Same-status people are very likely to choose each other as friends, more so than if friendship choice were random (Hypothesis 1). This is the only hypothesis to be stated which has prior theoretical and empirical attention. 7 Similarity in social positions is probably valued because viewpoints and experiences associated with them are similar. The more uniformly and comprehensively a position reflects such features, and the more salient they are, the more likely it is a strong basis for friendship choice (cf. Byrne; Newcomb).
HOMOGENEITY BIAS WITHIN SOCIAL POSITIONS

If homogeneity bias is truly pervasive as a principle of friendship choice, it should appear for every category of social positions (Hypothesis 2a). It is likely that some social groupings have greater bias toward samestatus friends than others. We hypothesize that, when categories can be ranked (e.g., age), homogeneity bias is greatest for "edge" categories (Hypothesis 2b). Edges are the highest and lowest categories. This has been found true in research on occupational mobility (Blau and Duncan), friendship choice (Laumann, a, b), and age homogamy of brides and grooms (McFarland). The edge effect may be substantive (i.e., sociologically interesting)

Adult Friendships 1 5 8 3

or artifactual. There are two substantive reasons for it: first, edge categories are often small and edge members uncommon. As rare people, they may be particularly envied, disdained, or respected in society. This recognized specialness may encourage self-consciousness and solidarity among edge members, and it may enhance preference for each other as intimates. Chances of meeting each other may also be increased if they have more similar roles and leisure activitiesdue to discrimination or choicethan other categories. Second, edge people can choose same-status friends or different-status friends, but the latter exist in only one direction. If the proximity principle is a strong one, edge people have limited options for friendship choice. They bump against constraints in one direction. They may compensate by choosing more same-status friends, which inflates their homogeneity bias. But the edge effect can be artifactual when simple ratios of two numbers are used to measure bias (e.g., the marginal ratio). Small numerators and denominators easily produce very large, or very small, ratios. Edge categories are often small, and high bias may simply reflect that feature. A second artifact can actually deflate bias for the edges. When edge categories are open-ended, they often contain a greater span of codes than middle categories. In our data, this is true for age (the upper edge for both egos and alters, the lower edge for alters only), education (17+ years), length of residence (10+ years), and occupational prestige (70+). The wider a category's span, the less biased toward homogeneity its choices will appear. There is no obvious way to correct for these artifacts: if we assign every category the same width, the cell sizes for edges become very small and incur the size artifact. If Hypothesis 2b is supported, we must determine which of the above reasons accounts for it. Hypothesis 2b refers to ranked statuses. But the rareness concept can be generalized to accommodate non-ranked statuses as well: small, selfconscious groupings will show greater bias toward homogeneous friendships than other groupings (Hypothesis 2c). Minorities may develop a sense of collective solidarity due to discrimination, rare skills, or distinct cultural traditions. This will encourage greater homogeneity bias in their friendships than we find in other categories. Despite the simplicity of this hypothesis, there is no prior example of it in literature on friendship choice. Clearly, a simple ratio measure is likely to produce artifactual results for this hypothesis (due to the category size problem).
HOMOGENEITY BIAS ACROSS FRIENDS

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

In Detroit and Altneustadt, first-named friends tend to be best friends. The average degree of affect felt by ego toward a nominated friend decreases sharply from Friend 1 to Friend 3 (Verbrugge). If having similar attitudes

5 84 I Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1977 and concerns is highly valued in friendship, then people will strive to find status-similars for their very best friends. For weaker friendships, they will be less concerned about a close match (cf. Levinger and Snoek). Homogeneity bias should decrease across friends by nomination order (Hypothesis 3), or any other indicator of primariness. If the principle is very strong, this differential bias should appear even in data on one's three closest friends.
PROXIMITY BIAS WITHIN SOCIAL POSITIONS

Hypotheses 1 and 2a-2c focus solely on the diagonal cells of a friendship matrix. The proximity principle also allows deductions about off-diagonal cells. Hypothesis 4 refers to ranked social positions: the less similar two people are in their daily rounds, skills, attitudes, domestic commitments, and social esteem, the less likely they will meet or form a close friendship. Bias should be greatest in the diagonal cell and diminish as one moves farther from it (i.e. as the friend's status is less similar to ego's). Results
HOMOGENEITY BIAS

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Table 1 shows the overall percent of same-status choices and degree of bias for each social position. From a descriptive viewpoint, homogeneity in adult friendship is common. In Altneustadt, about 75 percent of adults choose friends whose sex or marital status is the same as their own. In Detroit, about half of all friendships are age-homogeneous. For all social
Table 1. HOMOGENEITY AND HOMOGENEITY BIAS (COMPARED TO A RANDOM-CHOICE MODEL) IN FRIENDSHIPS, FOR ALL SOCIAL POSITIONS, DETROIT 1966 AND ALTNEUSTADT 1971 Percent of Friends in Same Category as Ego's Social Position and Site Occupation Detroit N Altneustadt N Employment status Detroit N Altneustadt N ^FI,/F.. x 100 Friend 1 Friend 2 Friend 3 Degree of Bias (Marginal Ratio) Observed Cases Expected Cases Friend 1 Friend 2 Friend 3

48.4 (1005) 48.3 (760) 85.4 (996) 86.0 (401)

50.5 (997) 45.9 (737) 84.9 (989) 83.3 (377)

50.1 (954) 42.4 (691) 82.2 (946) 83.1 (356)

1.72 2.43

1.85 2.25

1.78 2.14

1.09 1.07

1.09 1.04

1.05 1.03

Adult Friendships 1 5 85
Table 1, continued
Percent of Friends in Same Category as Ego's Social Position and Site

Degree of Bias (Marginal Ratio)

Observed Cases Expected Cases

EF;,IF,. x 100
Friend 1

Friend 2

Friend 3

Friend 1

Friend 2

Friend 3

Education Detroit N Age Detroit N Altneustadt N Marital status Altneustadt N Sex Altneustadt N Sex-Marital status Altneustadt N Nationality Detroit
N

39.0 (1005) 51.4 (1003) 45.3 (755) 77.2 (760) 78.2 (760) 61.1 (760) 42.4 (889) 60.6 (891) 45.9 (760) 69.4 (975) 74.4 (739) 54.0 (498) 39.4 (995) 41.9 (413)

38.5 (997) 49.4 (995) 41.0 (743) 75.6 (737) 74.1 (737) 56.9 (737) 43.4 (865) 62.1 (870) 42.1 (737) 64.6 (966) 70.8 (723) 51.7 (439) 42.9 (987) 44.1 (388)

36.7 (954) 45.8 (951) 44.1 (689) 74.7 (691) 75.1 (691) 57.5 (691) 40.2 (810) 56.0 (837) 39.4 (691) 63.9 (920) 72.1 (666) 49.9 (379) 41.1 (936) 41.1 (370)

1.87

1.77

1.67

2.45 2.71

2.36 2.37

2.20 2.52

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

1.24

1.15

1.17

1.58

1.50

1.52

1.98

1.75

1.81

1.58

1.67

1.53

Political preference Detroit

N

1.53 1.68

1.54 1.56

1.39 1.55

Altneustadt
N

Religious preference Detroit N Altneustadt

N

1.56 1.28

1.47 1.23

1.45 1.25

Residential mobility Altneustadt

N

1.59

1.49

1.46

Occupational prestige Detroit N Altneustadt

N

1.55 1.74

1.60 1.77

1.54 1.72

586 / Social Forces / vol. 56:2, december 1977

positions in the two sites, at least 35 percent of all friendships are homogeneous. No odds ratio is appropriate for Hypothesis 1, so we must rely on the marginal ratio. Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. The observed number of pairs in diagonal cells is compared to the expected number computed from the alter marginal. In all 54 matrices, the marginal ratio exceeds 1.00. Apparently, all of the social positions are salient for friendship choice. Whether because of high chances of meeting people with the same social or demographic characteristics, or strong attraction to similar acquaintances, adults are much more likely to have same-status friends than if they were to choose friends at random.
HOMOGENEITY BIAS WITHIN SOCIAL POSITIONS

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Table 2 shows the percent of same-status choices and degree of bias for each category of the social positions. The degree of homogeneity is remarkable for several categories. Over 60 percent of friendships are statushomogeneous among production workers (Detroit), students, workers who are not self-employed, young adults, single and married people, males and females, married males, Republicans and Democrats, people with no political preference (Altneustadt), Catholics, Jews, and Protestants (Detroit).
Table 2. HOMOGENEITY AND HOMOGENEITY BIAS IN FRIENDSHIPS, BY CATEGORIES OF SOCIAL POSITIONS, DETROIT 1966 AND ALTNEUSTADT 1971.

Friend 1*
Percent Social Position and Site Occupation Detroit Professional Administrator Clerical Sales Service Production Student Altneustadt Professional Administrator Clerical Sales Service Production Housewife Student 48 33 (9)t 28 31 63 (100) 63 (28) 35 (9) (11) 50 52 70 5.87 3.00 [1.67]t 5.23 16.73 4.83
Homogeneous Odds

Friend 1'
Social Position and Site Sex Marital status Altneustadt Single male Married male Prev. married male Single female Married female Prev. married female Nationality Detroit North American British West/North East European South European Other Political preference Detroit Percent Homogeneous Odds Ratio Choices

Choices

Ratio

57 85 (5) (24) 53 33

20.53 15.55 [5.82] 5.02 12.49 8.15

12.26 11.22 3.64 [2.28] [6.50] 6.49 7.81 74.29

(18) 47 42 46 29 (41)

5.11 2.25 2.19 5.26 7.00 27.04

Adult Friendships 1 587

Table 2, continued Frie n d 1*

Social Position and Site Employment status Detroit Self-employed Not self-employed Altneustadt Self-employed Not self-employed Education Detroit 0-8 years 9-11 12 13-15 16 17 or more Age Detroit Under 25 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 or above Altneustadt Under 25 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70 or above Marital status Altneustadt Single Married Previously married Sex Altneustadt Male Female Percent Homogeneous Odds Choices Ratio Social Position and Site Republican Independent Democrat Altneustadt Christian Democrat Liberal (Free Democrat) Social Democrat No pref./Don't know Religious preference Detroit Catholic Protestant Jewish None/Other Altneustadt Catholic Protestant None/Other Residential mobility Altneustadt In Alt. since birth 10+ years in Alt, Less than 10 years Occupational prestige Detroit 1-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Altneustadt 1-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Friend 1 Percent

Homogeneous Odds
Choices 56 35 75 45 (17) 43 72 Ratio 5.48 5.68 4.75 5.88 72.20 4.59 3.40

44 90 44 91

7.64 7.64 7.31 7.31

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

27 29 54 31 39 49

5.02 3.47 2.23 4.03 5.98 14.22

68 74 83 (12) 86 52 (17)

6.28 7.57 643.9 6.36 6.83 6.79 14.10

72 46 51 58 45 21
71

81.81 18.32 6.44 4.98 6.82 4.58 53.22 6.79 7.28 3.18 4.21 6.25 15.15

54 53 55

2.87 2.51 12.56

36 56 38 34 35 38

19 48 33 40 30 43 34 (15) 57 37 36 38

2.78 2.26 2.55 2.51 8.01 26.94 7.20 [2.65] 3.11 2.55 4.55 16.55

72 84 29

25.58 6.89 5.60

90 68

19.18 19.181

*Detailed data are shown for Friend 1. Data for Friends 2 and 3 are available on request. t( ) means n < 10.

$[ ] means the odds ratio is not significantly different from 1.00 at p w .05. The criterion values for
significance are in Goodman (Table 3). Cannot be computed because of a zero cell in the 2 x 2 table. IA table which is originally 2 x 2 produces only one odds ratio.

588 I Social Forces / vol. 56:2, december 1977

Hypothesis 2a is strongly supported. Bias toward homogeneity is pervasive, appearing in virtually all social categories. All 240 odds ratios examined exceed 1.00, and all but 15 of them are significantly different from 1.00. 8 We infer that virtually all the categories are good cues of people's daily rounds (which affect chances of meeting) and of concerns and attitudes which people want to have in common with friends. Where is this bias strongest? Odds ratios are routinely above 10.0 for students and professionals; highly educated people (17+ years); young adults (under 25 and 25-29) and adults 50-59 (Detroit); males and females; married men and married women; Catholics, Jews, and Protestants (Detroit). This means that the chances a respondent in category i chooses a same-status friend are over ten times the chances that other respondents choose friends in category i. The excess choices occur because of unusually high opportunities for these categories to meet status-similars and/or very strong preferences to have friends of the same status. For example, students often live in dormitories or in common residential areas, and they have common concerns and leisure interests. These enhance chances that students will meet other students and want them for friends. Reasonable explanations can be advanced for most of the other categories with high homogeneity bias. But the data require more systematic attention. Do edge categories show stronger bias than middle ones? Do small categories show stronger bias than large ones? If Hypotheses 2b and 2c are confirmed, can we believe these are sociologically interesting results? The edge hypothesis (2b) is tested for education, age, and occupational prestige by asking if the two edge categories have the highest bias measures in a table. Of 15 tests for the odds ratio, the hypothesis is confirmed 7 times. But the failures show an interesting uniformity: the category adjacent to the highest-bias edge ranks second; the opposite edge ranks third. In summary, the highest bias for same-status friends appears for people of highest education, youngest age, and highest prestige. Sometimes, the people with almost-highest education (16 years), almost-youngest age (25-29), and almost-highest prestige (60-69) rank next to bias for same-status friends; the opposite edge ranks third. 9 Otherwise, the opposite edge ranks second. Why do these particular categories have highest bias? If we can show generally that when people choose a friend different in education or prestige, they bias choices toward better-educated and higher-prestige people than themselves, the answer is clear. The highest-status people bump against constraints (there are few people higher than themselves) and they compensate by additional choices of same-status friends. Similarly, if people prefer younger friends (when they choose an age-dissimilar one), the fact that bias is greatest for the age group under 25 is explained.

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Adult Friendships 1589

To test this, we use all middle categories, since they provide cells to both left and right. For each category, above-diagonal and below-diagonal cells are pooled. This odds ratio is computed: the numerator is the odds that egos in category i choose a higher-status (including older) friend instead of a lower-status (including younger) one. The denominator is the comparable odds from the marginal, reflecting the relative eligibility of upper- (> i) and lower- (< i) status friends. Odds ratios above 1.00 mean that egos of category i are biased toward choosing upper-status friends. Altogether, there are 63 tests. Bias for more-educated, higher-prestige, and older friends appears in 64 percent of the tests. But the results are complex: The odds ratios tend to be below 1.00 for low-status egos (i.e., a bias toward lower-status friends) but increase monotonically and exceed 1.00 above a threshold category. Egos with education 11+ years, with occupational prestige scores 50+, and aged 40+ all show preference for higher-status friends. Thus, bias for upper-status friends is not pervasive. It appears among middle-status egos and becomes stronger as ego's status increases. In fact, low-status egos who have a dissimilar friend tend to choose a lowerstatus person than themselves. This is especially true for age. The number of choices made to right and left of the diagonal depends partly on the span of codes available, i.e., on the social distance of eligible friends. A fairer test of upward versus downward bias is to compare choices in the cells adjacent to the diagonal. This controls for social distance if we assume the adjacent categories have equal social distance from category i. When the test is performed for adjacent cells, results are similar to those above. Fifty-six percent of the tests show the expected bias, and the pattern is the same. Thus, bias for dissimilar friends tends to be upward (toward older, more educated, more esteemed people) when ego's own status is middle or high. Bias for dissimilar friends tends to be downward for low-status egos. These results are true even for adjacent cells (the two closest social groupings to ego's own). The strong patterns of social choice are intriguing, especially for education and prestige: Do low-status people feel more comfortable with their education (or prestige) inferiors? Are the motivations of high-status people different, so they hope to enhance their own status by associating with higher-status friends? Although interesting in their own right, these patterns do not explain the initial question (which edge category shows strongest homogeneity bias). Either edge can have highest bias and be consistent with the patterns of choice just found for dissimilar friends. In summary, the edge effects seem to have a sociological basis (edge people experience constraints in friendship choice). The results are not simple, but they are so consistent in both sites that one must count them as real and seek further explanations. There is no way to test the second sociological explanation, that edge members have stronger preference for

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

59 0 / Social Forces / vol. 56:2, december 1 977

status-similar friends than middle-category members do. Could the results be artifactual? Probably not. Odds ratios are based on four numbers and are less sensitive to small category sizes than the marginal ratio. Second, the category-width artifact tends to deflate odds ratios. Assuming it is present, the homogeneity bias of edge categories is actually less than if the artifact were removed. To test the small-category Hypothesis (2c), we posit a negative association between category size and homogeneity bias. Kendall's tau-a (-r a ) is the test statistic. When T,, is computed for the ranks of odds ratios, with category size, the hypothesis is not supported. Of 45 tests, 47 percent produce negative T Q , 7 percent a T a = . 00 (no relationship), and 46 percent a positive T,,. We conclude that small social groupings are not more likely to have high homogeneity bias. The tau is a very demanding test for Hypothesis 2c. A more lenient test involves just the polar categories: Do the smallest categories have highest bias, and the largest categories, lowest bias? Of 45 tests for the odds ratio, only 40 percent support the first statement, and 27 percent the second. In summary, there is little evidence that category size and homogeneity bias are associated. (Even if an association were found, we would have to demonstrate further that small groupings are more segregated or solidary, which would enhance their chances of meeting and mating with each other.)
HOMOGENEITY BIAS ACROSS FRIENDS

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

The hypothesis that homogeneity bias decreases as friendships become less close is tested for each social position and for their categories. Using Table 1, consider the marginal ratio for the three friends. Bias decreases across them for only 8 of 18 tests. (In addition, four tests almost match the hypothesis.) But for 12 tests, bias is greatest for Friend 1. And for no social position is bias greatest for Friend 3. Applying the hypothesis to categories, there are 76 tests for the odds ratio. 10 Only 17 percent of the tests show the hypothesized decrease. But 57 percent of tests do show that Friend 1 has highest bias. (Friend 2 has highest bias in 36% of the tests.) The results imply that status-similar acquaintances are more likely to be elevated to the ranks of best friends than dissimilar acquaintances. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not confirmed, but the results do show that stronger efforts are made to find a similar person for one's very best friend (here, Friend 1) than for other close friends. The social positions which show best friend bias most persistently are age, sex, marital status, political preference (Altneustadt), religious preference, and residence length. Apparently, it is more important to find

Adult Friendships 1591

a best friend whose life cycle status and political/religious commitments are similar, than one whose social status and ethnic background are similar. Differential opportunities to meet may also account for these differences. This is a very intriguing result; the relative importance of these social positions in adult friendship choice merits more research.
PROXIMITY BIAS WITHIN SOCIAL POSITIONS

To test Hypothesis 4, we scan odds ratios for each category of ranked positions. (These are education, age, and occupational prestige.) Taking each row, do the ratios decrease to the left and right of the diagonal cell? The hypothesis is considered supported only if the ratios monotonically decrease as we move from the marginal. Of 52 tests, 43 (83%) fit the hypothesis (data not shown). For each social position, the percent supporting it are: 91 percent for education, 75 percent and 77 percent for age, 100 percent and 83 percent for occupational prestige.'' (Detroit is reported first, Altneustadt second.) In summary, Hypothesis 4 receives ample support. The less similar a pair of adults are, the less likely they are to become close friends. In addition, the pairs with very low bias indicate the relatively low chances of meeting and/or attraction for each other that people of very different social roles, attitudes, and demographic status experience.
Discussion

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Let us summarize the principal results. Adults choose friends of similar social status much more than a random-choice model predicts. This homogeneity bias appears for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, ethnic background, and political/religious preferences (Hypothesis 1). It appears for virtually all social groupings, especially for edge categories (or next-to-edge categories) (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Examination of offdiagonal choices suggests that edge-category egos experience constraints when choosing dissimilar friends: high-status egos would like higher-status friends, but the diminishing number of eligibles forces more same-status choices. Similarly, low-status egos seem to prefer lower-status friends, but they end up choosing more same-status friends because of size constraints. Besides such constraints on choice, edge members may be very strongly attracted to each other or have high chances of meeting. There is no way to test this second effect in the data sets. We have demonstrated that at least one of the two hypothesized social effects occurs. And there is no evidence the result is artifactual. Hypothesis 2c is not supported: there is no convincing evidence that small social groupings strongly prefer same-status friends. For the social

59 2 I Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1977

statuses in the Detroit and Altneustadt data, minorities do not have greater homogeneity bias than other groups. Homogeneity bias is strongest for first-named (usually "best") friends, compared to other close friends. This strengthens the evidence that similar status is highly valued in friendships. The result differs slightly from Hypothesis 3. Finally, the principle of proximity is strongly supported (Hypothesis 4). The more similar two adults are in social status, the more likely they will be close friends, compared to a random model. As social distance increases, bias measures drop under 1.00 and tend to decrease monotonically. The main contribution of this analysis is evidence that social and spatial proximity are strong and pervasive factors in adult friendship choice. The choices are nonrandom and are patterned to fit the proximity principle. The social roles and preferences measured are crude indicators of concerns, attitudes, pleasures, and dreams. Consensus on these matters is probably the valued aspect of friendship, not the similarity in social positions themselves. The positions are also crude indicators of daily rounds and thus of chances of meeting. Despite their indirectness, social positions manage to confirm the proximity principle. More direct measures of spatial location, daily movements, and life concerns for egos and their friends would probably demonstrate it more strongly. The data leave no doubt that adult friendships are strongly stratified with respect to social statuses, attitudes, and demographic characteristics. Particularly striking is the strong bias for age, sex, and marital status (see results for Hypotheses 2a, 3, 4). As expected, sexmarital status tends to show higher homogeneity bias than either of its components, indicating that adults take the combination explicitly into account when choosing friends. Apparently, demographic characteristics are good indicators of important past experiences, perspectives, and interests (Booth), and personal concerns. More formally: the experiences encoded by age, sex, and marital status are salient and clearly reflected there, relative to other social positions. This accounts for high attraction toward demographically similar friends (a mating effect). What about meeting? Do daily rounds of people similar in age, sex, and marital status intersect more than people of similar SES? We simply do not know. Whatever the specific reasons for high bias toward demographically similar friends, the data for age and sex confirm Mayhew's claim that ascriptive characteristics remain important in modern societies. This analysis complements Laumanri s (a, b) work on adult friendships. 12 In CambridgeBelmont and Detroit, Laumann finds substantial differences among occupational and ethnoreligious groups in how they choose friends. Here, we examine the chances that people become friends,

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Adult Friendships 1 593

for various social positions, and test one principle which accounts for differential chances. The analyses are distinctly different: Laumann studies how similarly two categories spread their friendship choices among eligibles; we study how often people of two categories become friends, compared to a model of social choice. We demonstrate persistently that the proximity principle accounts for frequencies of pairs. The social structure of the data emerges clearly with a simple methodology. Second, Laumann (a) finds the edge effect for occupation data in CambridgeBelmont. The Detroit data produce a similar result (Laumann, b). In this analysis, the edge effect is found for occupational prestige scores (a clearly ranked position) and all other ranked statuses available. Most important, its interpretation as a social effect, rather than an artifact, is buttressed.
Conclusions

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Finding structure in empirical data is a prior step to constructing models of social choice. In this first analysis, we have looked for structure with several modest hypotheses to guide the examination. Overall, the proximity principle is strongly confirmed. An appropriate next step is to use the empirical and theoretical results to make a nonrandom model. For example, using Table 2, we might state that same-category pairs will be twice as frequent as a random model predicts (i.e., the expected marginal ratio is 2.00) or has twice the odds of a dissimilar pair. A pattern of choice for offdiagonal cells can also be incorporated. 13 The model of expectations is then compared to observed data and goodness-of-fit computed. Alternatively, real friendship dynamics can be observed and a pattern of probabilities derived from them can be tested on these matrices. In addition to such analysis of friendship structure, important questions about processes and consequences of adult friendships remain: first, is their structure principally the outcome of restricted opportunities for meeting, or of preferences and contact opportunities with acquaintances? In other words, what is the relative importance of meeting versus mating? To answer this, a matrix of acquaintanceships is required from cross-sectional or longitudinal data. Second, a mating model claims that people filter acquaintances, preferring some for close friendship. Little is known about those preferences among adults. Specifically, what do adults value and seek in their friendships? How good are social positions as cues of those desired features? Third, what are the expressive and instrumental consequences of homogeneous friendships? Speculation about expressive benefits abounds (Adams; Brown), but evidence of any consequences is scant. The notion that homogeneous ties have instrumental disadvantages (Verbrugge) remains to be tested.

594 I Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1 977 Research on these topics will add to child and young adult studies, making possible a life cycle approach to friendship formation. Moreover, it will demonstrate that adult friendships are not sociologically mundane, but have detailed structure, complex dynamics, and numerous consequences.
Notes
1. Sociologists have rarely recognized that two conceptually distinct processes (meeting and mating) underlie friendship choices. An exception is Lazarsfeld and Merton. In their studies of marital-mate selection, Romney discusses the need for two models and Eckland hints at it. A fine conceptual treatment of friendship dynamics, which includes meeting and mating processes, is provided by social psychologists Levinger and Snoek. 2. Respondents were actually asked to name three people "who are your closest friends and whom you see most often." This taps two dimensions (degree of affect and contact frequency). For this analysis, we would like the friends to be ordered by degree of affect. Examining the data, we find that most respondents do name friends in order from most to least affect, and it is a more uniform criterion underlying nomination order than contact frequency is (Verbrugge). 3. Nonrandom models can be constructed in three ways. First, one can build a hypothetical matrix of choices, based on a theory about social choice. Romney's marriage analysis is of this type. Second, one can choose a normative matrix of choices, a set of observed choices from some other time or place. After standardization of marginals, the researcher's data are compared to this normative matrix. McFarland's marriage analysis is of this type. Third, loglinear models for contingency tables allow the researcher to specify effects for marginals and combinations of them in a model (J. Davis). Complex models involving main effects, correlations, and interactions can be tested. 4. To avoid rounding errors, it is best to compute the ratio of observed frequencies (F^) to expected ones (ti). Computations were performed both ways for this analysis. 5. The marginals problem is called a "group size problem" in the social networks literature (Bonacich; McFarland and Brown). Tyree proposes another measure of bias: Yule's Q. Q is a considerable improvement over the marginal ratio. But it is not totally free of marginal effects and it has a clumsy interpretation. 6. The expected distribution should refer to the population of strangers who are eligible for friendship. The stranger population is impossible to define precisely, since friendship choices are not restricted to those within the same population egos come from. (In fact, 12-19% of the nominated friends live outside the urban areas of Detroit and Altneustadt.) In addition, some strangers are very active socially and very attractive, and they have higher chances of being met and liked by all types of egos than other strangers do. In other words, some strangers are truly more eligible than others to become friends of any ego. Lacking independent data on the strangers who are eligible for ego's friendship, we accept the friend marginal distribution as a good guess. The friend marginal is assumed to reflect the structure of opportunities for friendship, taking into account the unequal chances strangers have of being met and liked by others and their wider boundaries than the ego population itself. We take the friend marginal as given. Bias in friendship choice is then assessed. We do not intend to explain the differences between the ego and alter marginals, only the patterns within the table. (Differences between the ego and friend marginals are discussed in Verbrugge, 64-66. Besides the two factors named above, response error may cause the two marginals to differ. Egos may systematically inflate their friends' social status when describing them in the interview.) 7. Hypotheses were also formed to compare the strength of homogeneity bias for different social positions (age, occupation, etc.). However, the hypotheses are untestable due to a feature of the matrices: a matrix's order influences measures of choice and bias. The fewer categories, the more homogeneous choices appear to be and the less biased when compared to any model. The remedy is to force all matrices to be the same order. (In our case, this would be 2 x 2, the smallest matrix order.) The cost of condensing tables is great, since much

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Adult Friendships / 595

information in the original table is thereby lost. 8. There are 84 categories to consider, i.e., 252 odds ratios for the three friends. Notes (d) and (e) of Table 2 explain why only 240 are examined. 9. One exception: in Detroit, the odds ratio shows this ranking for Friend 1's age: 25, 25-29, 40-49, 60+, etc. 10.Only categories with two or three statistically significant odds ratios are used. 11.Only statistically significant odds ratios are used, and only rows with three or more such ratios are examined. All nonsignificant odds ratios are ignored. Here, p < .15 is used for the significance level. The test values for determining significance were computed, following Goodman's (10) procedure when one knows how many ratios are of interest. For each table, n 2 - n ratios were computed for off-diagonal cells. Actually, only (n - 1) 2 of them are nonredundant. 12.The 1973 reference used the same Detroit data set as this analysis. 13.These global probabilities would be limited by the marginals: no more choices can be expected than are found in the minimum marginal cell, F or F.
.j

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

References Adams, B. N. 1967. "Interaction Theory and the Social Network." Sociometry 30:64-78. Aronson, E., and D. Linder. 1965. "Gain and Loss of Esteem as Determinants of Interpersonal Attractiveness." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1:156-71. Axelrod, M. 1956. "Urban Structure and Social Participation." American Sociological Review 21:13-18. Barnes, J. A. 1954. "Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish." Human Relations 7:39-58. Bell, W., and M. D. Boat. 1957. "Urban Neighborhoods and Informal Social Relations. " American Journal of Sociology 62:391-98. Bell, W., and M. T. Force. 1956. "Urban Neighborhood Types and Participation in Formal Associations." American Sociological Review 21:25-34. Berkun, M., and T. Meeland. 1958. "Sociometric Effects of Race and of Combat Performance." Sociometry 21:145-49. Blau, P. M., and O. D. Duncan. 1967. The American Occupational Structure. New York: Wiley. Bogardus, E. a:1925. "Social Distance and Its Origins." Journal of Applied Sociology 9:216-26. . b:1959. Social Distance. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press. Bonacich, P. 1967. "Associational Contiguity: A Critique." American Sociological Review 32:813-15. Booth, A. 1972. "Sex and Social Participation." American Sociological Review 37: 183-92. Brown, R. 1965. Social Psychology. New York: Free Press. Byrne, D. 1961. "Interpersonal Attraction and Attitude-Similarity." Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 62:713-15. Cooley, C. H. 1909. Social Organization. New York: Scribner's. Curtis, R. F. 1963. "Differential Association and the Stratification of the Urban Community." Social Forces 42:68-77. Davis, J. 1974. "Hierarchical Models for Significance Tests in Multivariate Contingency Tables." In H. L. Costner (ed.), Sociological Methodology 1973-1974. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Davis, K. 1949. Human Society. New York: Macmillan. Eckland, B. K. 1968. "Theories of Mate Selection." Eugenics Quarterly 15:71-84. Ellis, R. A. 1957. "Social Stratification and Social Relations: An Empirical Test of the Disjunctiveness of Social Classes." American Sociological Review 22:570-78.

59 6 I Social Forces I vol. 56:2, december 1977

Festinger, L., S. Schachter, and K. Back. 1950. Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A Study of Human Factors in Housing. New York: Harper. Gans, H. a:1962. The Urban Villagers. New York: Free Press. . b:1967. The Levittowners. New York: Pantheon. Goodman, L. A. 1969. "How to Ransack Social Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classification Tables." American Journal of Sociology 75:1-40. Greer, S. 1956. "Urbanism Reconsidered: A Comparative Study of Local Areas in a Metropolis. American Sociological Review 21:19-25. Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley. Homans, G. C. 1961. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. International Labor Office. 1969. International Standard Classification of Occupations. Rev. ed. Geneva. Jitodai, T. T. 1963. "Migration and Kinship Contact." Pacific Sociological Review 6:49-55. Kahl, J. A., and J. A. Davis. 1955. "A Comparison of Indexes of Socio-Economic Status" American Sociological Review 20:317-25. Laumann, E. O. a: 1966. Prestige and Association in an Urban Community. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. . b:1973. Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks. New York: Wiley. Lazarsfeld, P. F., and R. K. Merton. 1954. "Friendship as a Social Process: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis." In M. Berger et al. (eds.), Freedom and Control in Modern Society. New York: Van Nostrand. Levinger, G., and J. D. Snoek. 1972. "Attraction in Relationships: A New Look at Interpersonal Attraction" New York: General Learning Press. Lindzey, G., and D. Byrne. 1969. "Measurement of Social Choice and Interpersonal Attractiveness." In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. 2. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Lipset, S. M., M. A. Trow, and J. S. Coleman. 1956. Union Democracy. Glencoe: Free Press. Loomis, C. P. 1946. "Political and Occupational Cleavages in a Hanoverian Village, Germany." Sociometry 9:316-33. Lundberg, G. A., and M. Steele, 1938. "Social Attraction Patterns in a Village." Sociometry 1:375-419. McFarland, D. D. 1971. A Model of the Marriage Market, with Implications for Two-Sex Population Growth. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan. McFarland, D. D., and D. J. Brown, 1973. "Social Distance as a Metric: A Systematic Introduction to Smallest Space Analysis." In E. O. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism. New York: Wiley. Marlowe, D., and K. J. Gergen. 1968. "Personality and Social Interaction." In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. 3. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Mayhew, L. 1968. "Ascription in Modern Societies. Sociological Inquiry 38:105-20. Michelson, W. 1970. Man and His Urban Environment. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Mosteller, F. 1968. "Association and Estimation in Contingency Tables. Journal of the American Statistical Association 63:1-28. Newcomb, T. 1961. The Acquaintance Process. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Parsons, T., and E. Shils. 1951. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Richardson, H. M. 1940. "Community of Values as a Factor in Friendships of College and Adult Women. Journal of Social Psychology 11:303-12.
" " " "

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011

Adult Friendships / 597

Riley, M. W., and A. Foner. 1968. Aging and Society. Vol. 3: An Inventory of Research Findings. New York: Russell Sage. Romney, A. K. 1971. "A Model for the Analysis of Endogamy." In P. Kay (ed.), Explorations in Mathematical Anthropology. Cambridge: MIT Press. Rosow, I. 1967. Social Integration of the Aged. New York: Free Press. Schuman, H. 1973. "Sampling Design for the 1965-1966 Detroit Area Study." In E. 0. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism. New York: Wiley. Secord, P. F. and C. W. Backman. 1964. "Interpersonal Congruency, Perceived Similarity, and Friendship." Sociometry 27:115-27. Simmel, G. 1908. Soziologie, Untersuchungen uber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Suttles, G. 1968. The Social Order of the Slum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Thibault, J. W., and H. H. Kelley. 1959. The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: Wiley. Tomeh, A. K. a:1964. "Informal Group Participation and Residential Patterns." American Journal of Sociology 70:28-35. . b:1967. "Informal Participation in a Metropolitan Community." Sociological Quarterly 8:85-102. Treiman, D. J. 1975. Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Academic Press. Tyree, A. 1973. "Mobility Ratios and Association in Mobility Tables." Population Studies 27:577-88. Verbrugge, L. M. 1974. Adult Friendship Contact: Time Constraints and Status-Homogeneity Effects, Detroit and [Altneustadt], West Germany. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan. Williams, R. M. 1959. "Friendship and Social Values in a Suburban Community: An Exploratory Study." Pacific Sociological Review 2:3-10. Winch, R. F. 1958. Mate-Selection: A Study of Complementary Needs. New York: Harper & Row. Zander, A., and A. Havelin. 1960. "Social Comparison and Interpersonal Attraction." Human Relations 13:21-32.

Downloaded from http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on November 19, 2011