Introduction

the EAR staff was well-received when they arrived at the incident site within 3
hours of the attack. During the incident response and in followup sessions
weeks afterward, the EAR proved invaluable to first responders, their families,
and the entire county support network. This is a valuable resource that must be
incorporated in response plans.
5. Training, Exercises, and Shared Experiences: The ACFD has long
recognized the possibility of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist
attack in the Washington Metropolitan Area and has pursued an aggressive
preparedness program for such an event, including its pioneering work
associated with the MMRS. In preparation for anticipated problems associated
with the arrival of Y2K, Arlington County government thoroughly exercised the
CEMP. In 1998, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) established a fire liaison
position to work specifically with area fire departments. Washington
Metropolitan Area public safety organizations routinely work together on events
of national prominence and shared jurisdictional interests, such as presidential
inaugural celebrations, Heads of State visits, international conferences such as
the periodic International Monetary Fund (IMF) conference, and others. They
also regularly participate in frequent training exercises including those hosted by
the Pentagon and MOW. All this and more contributed to the successful
Pentagon response.
Challenges that Must Be Met
1. Self-Dispatching: Organizations, response units, and individuals
proceeding on their own initiative directly to an incident site, without the
knowledge and permission of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander,
complicate the exercise of command, increase the risks faced by bonafide
responders, and exacerbate the challenge of accountability. WMD terrorist event
response plans should designate preselected and well-marked staging areas.
Dispatch instructions should be clear. Law enforcement agencies should be
familiar with deployment plans and quickly establish incident site access controls.
When identified, self-dispatched resources should be immediately released from
the scene, unless incorporated into the Incident Commander's response plan.
2. Fixed and Mobile Command and Control Facilities: Arlington County
does not have a facility specifically designed and equipped to support the
emergency management functions specified in the CEMP. The conference room
currently used as the EOC does not have adequate space and is not configured
or properly equipped for that role. The notification and recall capabilities of the
Emergency Communications Center are constrained by equipment limitations and
there are no protected telephone lines for outside calls when the 9-1-1 lines are
saturated. The ACFD does not have a mobile command vehicle and relied on the
use of vehicles belonging to other organizations and jurisdictions. The ACPD
mobile command unit needs to be replaced or extensively modernized.
3. Communications: Almost all aspects of communications continue to be
problematic, from initial notification to tactical operations. Cellular telephones
were of little value in the first few hours and cellular priority access service
(CPAS) is not provided to emergency responders. Radio channels were initially

Arlington County Introduction

After-Action Report Page 12