How do Dominant Definitions of ‘Terrorism’ Reflect Elite Interests and

Legitimise Violence in Defence Thereof? A Critical Study of the ‘War on

Terrorism’ in Colombia

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the ways in which dominant constructions of

what constitutes ‘terrorism’ serve to legitimise violence in the
defence of elite interests whilst delegitimising counter-
hegemonic and non-violent approaches in the context of the ‘war
on terrorism’ in Colombia. Employing an ‘immanent critique’
methodology, inconsistencies within the United States’ and
Colombian governmental definitions of terrorism, which
preclude designation of acts of the Colombian armed forces as
‘terrorist’ are explored. The governments’ representations of
what constitutes ‘terrorism’ and whom constitutes a ‘terrorist’ are
seen to legitimise the continuation of conflict in the defence of
elite interests and the demonisation of progressive elements of
civil society.

I. Introduction

This paper will explore the ways in which constructions of ‘legitimate’ and

‘illegitimate’ political violence through the designation of certain acts and groups as

‘terrorist’ serves very particular functions useful to dominant societal groups, through

an exploration of the case of Colombia.

Particularly since 2001, the forty-year-long conflict in Colombia has come to be

framed by both the Colombian and United States governments as a part of the larger

‘war against terrorism’. This paper will employ a methodology of ‘immanent

critique’, as used by scholars of the ‘Welsh School’ of Critical Security Studies and

Critical Terrorism Studies (Jackson, 2008; McDonald, 2009; Booth, 2007) which

seeks to expose inconsistencies in dominant and mainstream accounts of (of

‘terrorism’, in this case) with a view to revealing the political functions which these

inconsistent representations serve and locating solidarist, non-violent and inclusive

approaches which are silenced or marginalised. I hope to show that through

monopolising the mainstream position of who defines ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorists’, and the
appropriate response to the ‘terrorist threat’ in a manner which precludes the

possibility of state terrorism, the US and Colombian governments legitimise the

continuance of a brutal armed campaign not only against guerrilla insurgencies, but

also against progressive elements of civil society whom oppose human rights abuses

and neoliberal economic reform. The subjugation of alternative approaches to the

conflict, which aim to expose state terrorism and espouse non-violent solutions, is

vital for the continuation of the conflict in defence of elite interests.

After introducing the present-day situation in Colombia and the literary context and

details of the theoretical approach of the paper, I will analyse the definitions of

terrorism upon which the U.S and Colombian governments base their framing of the

conflict, before subjecting these definitions to a first-order and second-order

immanent critique.

II. Conflict and Human Rights in Colombia

Colombia has been torn apart by conflict since the late 1940s. What began as a war

between rival liberal and conservative elites evolved, in the 1950s, into class conflict

between those same elites on the one hand and peasant colonisers who would go on to

form the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC – Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia). Joined by fellow Marxists of the Ejercito de Liberación

Nacional (ELN – National Liberation Army), the FARC would engage in what

became an archetypal Cold-War conflict against the Colombian armed forces, aided

by right-wing paramilitary groups, and with the training, equipment and tuition of the

United States1. During the 1980s all sides, particularly the paramilitaries2, deepened

their involvement in Colombia’s booming narcotrafficking trade, a fact which has

made more difficult the resolution of the conflict.

1
Stokes, 2005:71-79
2
ibid p102
The support of the United States to the Colombian military effort against the FARC

and ELN has been nothing short of integral; it was US counter-insurgency doctrine

which guided the army and paramilitaries in their fight against ‘communists’ during

the cold war, and which has continued since under the auspices of a ‘war on drugs’

and, in recent years’ a ‘war on terrorism’; Colombia remains one of the biggest

recipients of US military and police aid in the world.

After decades of armed conflict, the situation in Colombia today is particularly grave.

The FARC and ELN continue to be responsible for grievous human rights abuses;

right-wing paramilitaries, despite supposedly being opposed by the government, carry

out regular and brutal attacks against progressive elements of civil society such as

indigenous organisations, journalists, and human rights groups, and have made

Colombia the most dangerous country in the world for trade unionists. These same

organisations are also subject to a constant barrage of attacks from government

officials, whom reject their criticisms of the conduct of the conflict or the continued

imposition of neoliberal reform and accuse them of working in the service of the

‘terrorists’.

The real price for the decades of conflict is paid by the civilian population, whom are

subject to constant violence and the threat thereof by all sides. Colombia now enjoys

the second-highest rate of internal displacement in the world3.

III. Literary Context and Theoretical Approach

Analyses of the conflict in Colombia in the aftermath of the Cold War have, by and

large, remained innocent of post-positivist analysis, much less so the literature which

could be seen as belonging to the field of ‘terrorism studies’ or ‘security studies’.

Since 2001, the issue of ‘terrorism’ in Colombia has received comparatively little

attention by contrast to that which has been lavished upon ‘terrorist’ groups which are
3
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2008
more religious in their ideological orientation or disposed towards suicide attacks in

their strategies. Nonetheless, there does exist a literature which for the most part could

be described as pertaining to an ‘orthodox’ or problem-solving approach to ‘terrorism

studies’ which tend to adhere to what Stokes4 calls a ‘discontinuity thesis’, which

claims that US policy in Colombia has shifted from a focus on communism during the

cold war to drugs in the 1990s and now ‘terrorism’. Such approaches thus typically

focus on the dynamics of the supposed ‘crime-terror nexus’5 or ‘narco-terrorist’

phenomenon6, often with the intention of drawing policy-relevant conclusions in

terms of the greater ‘war on terrorism’7.

A notable exception – at least in the English-language literature – to the dominant

‘problem-solving’ approach is represented by the work of Doug Stokes8 who has

launched a series of vitriolic attacks upon the predominant discourses offered by

various United States administrations to justify their policies in Colombia.

Recent years have seen the emergence of something of a bifurcation within the field

of ‘terrorism studies’ generally, a field which had not previously been known for its

heterogeneity of theoretical approaches, and which had witnessed significant growth

in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 attacks in the United States as a result of

‘terrorism’ coming to dominate the foreign and internal policy agendas of the U.S and

several other states. Until recently, much of the scholarly work on ‘terrorism’

conformed to the characteristics of what Richard Jackson9 and others refer to as

‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’10. A sub-field of Policy Studies with its roots in Security

Studies, this dominant ‘orthodox’ literature has tended to take a positivist, rational,
4
Stokes, 2005, 1-18
5
see for example Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007
6
see for Example Bjornehed, 2004
7
ibid; Vaicius and Isacson, 2003
8
Stokes, 2005, 2006
9
see Jackson, 2007
10
‘Orthodox’ literature is, however, not quite as homogenous as the label may imply: see Horgan and
Boyle (2008)
and ‘problem-solving’ orientation towards the issue of ‘terrorism’ and tends to be

designed to be policy-relevant. It is in reaction to the nature of this ‘orthodox’

literature that, in the last few years, the new research agenda of ‘Critical Terrorism

Studies’ (CTS) emerged, initially focusing upon heavily criticising the

epistemological and methodological foundations and institutional contexts of the

predominant ‘orthodox’ approach. Some of the strongest criticisms stem from the fact

that ‘Orthodox’ Terrorism Studies was an academic field “not dominated

institutionally by universities so much as by think tanks, policy institutes, intelligence

agencies, militaries, media organisations, and the ideological activity of political

parties and ministers”11; links between governments, research institutes and think

tanks – such as those which have existed between the RAND Corporation and

successive US governments – has resulted in ‘embedded expertise’12, which is

charged with cementing the state-centric bias of research, and this state-centrism has

led to a ‘problem-solving’ literature which, according to Ruth Blakely “considers the

problem of terrorism within the context of…existing institutions and power

dynamics”13; what’s more, research associated with this “embedded expertise”, such

as the propagation of the ‘new terrorism’ concept, is charged with serving specific

functions advantageous to certain elite groups14.

A major problem – not just confined to ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’, but perhaps to

the entire ‘terrorism’ discourse, both governmental and scholarly – is the lack of a

widely accepted definition of terrorism. Research which tends to look at the ‘problem’

of the ‘terrorist-other’ from within state-centric paradigms, then, would tend naturally

to focus upon non-state actors acting against the state; the net result of this is a severe

11
Burke, 2008:37
12
Burnett and Whyte, 2005
13
Blakely 2007:229
14
Burnett and Whyte, 2005:13-15
lack of research into the issue of state terrorism which as Ruth Blakely points out, has

become something of an ‘elephant in the room’15.

More generally, the very category of ‘terrorist’ now presents itself as something which

needs to be dealt with; it is accepted by scholars on both sides of the orthodox/critical

divide that the labelling of an individual, group, or action as ‘terrorist’ is an inherently

delegitimising act16. Eric Herring, in looking at CTS from an activist-scholar

perspective, asserts that the ‘terrorism’ category is something which needs to be

moved beyond as part of a general strategy of rights-based opposition to all forms of

political violence; the political act of labelling a particular group as ‘terrorist’ is a

barrier to understanding (understood as comprehension and empathy) and a – perhaps

deliberate – barrier to dialogue and conflict resolution, and thus an obstruction to

emancipation17. Indeed, in exploring an emancipatory approach to CTS, Matt

McDonald points out the importance of inquiring as to which voices are privileged

over others in defining what is ‘terrorism’, who are ‘terrorists’, and what the best

response to the ‘terrorist threat’ is, with a view to locating the functions this serves

and the voices espousing potentially emancipatory non-violent solutions which are

actively marginalised18. It is primarily with these questions, in the Colombian

contexts, which this paper will concern itself, through employing a methodology of

‘immanent critique’ as expanded below.

Theoretical Approach

This paper will hope to explore the ways in which the definition of what constitutes

‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ groups and activities affects the legitimacy of the

aforementioned groups and activities, as well as responses to them, with a view to

15
see Blakely 2008; see also Jackson 2008
16
Herring, 2008:206
17
ibid p207
18
McDonald, 2009:114-116
identifying the ways in which some voices are amplified over others in this process,

and thus the ways in which it reflects the interests of particular groups. The approach

will broadly follow the ‘immanent critique’ method popular within the ‘Welsh school’

of Critical Security Studies and recommended by McDonald19 as a strong

methodology for developing an emancipatory approach to CTS. ‘Immanent critique’

is a method of inquiry which “engages with the core commitments of particular

discourses, ideologies, or institutional arrangements on their own terms, in the process

of locating possibilities for radical change within a particular existing order”20

Following from this, our task in this paper is to explore whose voices are privileged

(and what perspectives are silenced?) in determining what constitutes ‘terrorism’; who

are ‘terrorists’; and what are the appropriate actions to be taken against them. Thus, in

this case, the texts to be analysed will be the legal definitions of ‘terrorism’ and what

constitutes a ‘terrorist organisation’ employed by the Governments of the United

States and Colombia which consequently lay the legal foundations for various forms

of action against them.

The given discourse, ideology or institutional arrangement is then subjected to two

phases of critique ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’. A first-order critique focuses on

“internal contradictions, mistakes, misconceptions and omissions” of the discourse

(etc) in question “in order to criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and

perspectives that…[it] fails to acknowledge or address”21. This paper will therefore

seek to denaturalise the governments’ definitions of terrorism through exploring the

possibility of state terrorism in Colombia.

A second-order critique, then, steps back from the discourse itself in order to reflect

upon the “broader political and ethical consequences” of the naturalisation of one
19
ibid
20
ibid p113
21
Jackson, 2008:379
particular representation and the silencing of others; in particular, the ways in which it

is used by elites to “structure the primary subject positions, accepted knowledge,

commonsense and legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being

described; exclude and de-legitimise alternative knowledge and practice; naturalise a

particular political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic regime of

truth”22 .

Through engagement with this technique I will argue that the choice of a particular

representation of what constitutes ‘terrorism’ by both governments is a deliberate

choice with significant political consequences in the Colombian context.

IV. State Definitions of ‘Terrorism’ in the United States and Colombia

Successive Colombian and United States’ administrations have reiterated that the

conflict in Colombia is one between a government and ‘terrorists’ with strong

connections to the narcotrafficking industry; the power of the word ‘terrorism’ being

what it is, this is a strategy which deliberately and with great ease places the conflict

in terms of a ‘good’ state and ‘bad’ terrorists. With the extent of U.S hegemony

nowadays, such presentations of the conflict can become so easily naturalised that we

may lose track of the fact that this is the viewpoint presented not by neutral observers

but by belligerents in a conflict, despite the substantial efforts of both governments to

present ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ as an objective category with criteria which must be

met. This section will outline these criteria with a view to denaturalising them through

first- and second-order immanent critiques at a later point.

The U.S. State Department’s ‘Terrorism’ Criteria

The two main left-wing armed insurgent groups in Colombia - the FARC and ELN -

have been on the United States’ Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) since 1997,

22
ibid
whilst the right-wing umbrella group for paramilitaries, the Autodefensas Unidas de

Colombia (AUC – Unided Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) was added in 2001.

Three criteria must be fulfilled before an organisation may be placed on the FTO list:

firstly, it must be a foreign organisation. Secondly, it must engage in terrorist activity

as defined in Section 213 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (INA) or

terrorism as defined by section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,

Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, or “retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist

activity or terrorism”23. The INA gives an extensive list of actions which qualify as

terrorist activity:

“[A]ny activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is

committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful

under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any

of the following:

(I) The highjacking [sic] or sabotage of any conveyance (including an

aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to

detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a

governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an

explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or

detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined

in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of

such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any--

23
US State Department, 2009
 (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or

(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other

than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or

indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial

damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.”24

To engage in terrorist activity, then, is defined as to carry out, prepare or plan, solicit

any individual for involvement in, knowingly afford material support for, or gather

information for potential targets of the above actions. The Foreign Relations

Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 defines terrorism as:

[P]remeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against

noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.25

The third and final criterion is that “[t]he organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism

must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense,

foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States”26.

‘Terrorism’ in Colombian Penal Law

Colombian anti-terrorist legislation (upon which, presumably, subsequent statutes and

rhetoric are built) refers to ‘terrorism’ and ‘acts of terrorism’ as defined in Articles

144 and 343 of the Colombian Penal Code (legislación penal). Article 144 states:

“Acts of terrorism. (S)He whom, in the course of armed conflict,

carries out or orders to be carried out indiscriminate or excessive

attacks or makes the civil population the object of attacks, reprisals,

24
US State Department Archive: Immigration and Nationality Act
25
US State Department Archive: Foreign Relations Authorization Act 1988 and 1989
26
US State Department, 2009
 acts or threats of violence whose final purpose is to terrorise [the civil

population] 27

Article 343 states:

“Terrorism. He who provokes or maintains in a state of anxiety or terror

the population or a sector thereof, through acts which endanger the life,

physical integrity, or the freedom of people or buildings or means of

communication, transport, processing or transport of fluids or prime

movers using means capable of causing havoc…”28

The two United States’ definitions can be seen to vary greatly in both content and

orientation: the first focuses entirely on methods and means and makes practically no

mention of the agency or intent, whereas the second explicitly states that the groups

are non-state actors, perpetrating politically motivated ‘violence against non-

combatant targets’. Whilst the first does not explicitly state that the actors involved

are non-state, it is implied somewhat by the criteria that the action be considered

illegal in the state in which it takes place. The Colombian definitions, by virtue of

being official state documents, can be assumed to exclude official actions of the State.

Both States, based upon these definitions, have designated the FARC, ELN and AUC

as terrorist organisations. Since it is the States that dominate the agenda in defining

what and whom constitutes ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’, they also clearly dominate the

agenda in defining the appropriate response; accordingly, they espouse a military

solution combined with destruction of illicit crops in order to drain revenue, and the

deepening of neoliberal economic reform29.

V. First-Order Critique

27
Congress of Colombia: Colombian Penal Code, available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/penal.html [in Spanish; this and all translations by the
author]
28
ibid
29
Stokes, 2005, 105-122
A first-order critique will engage with these definitions on their own terms in order to

expose inconsistencies, practical problems and hypocrisies. First of all, the implicit

(and in the case of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, explicit) notion present in

the States’ definitions that terrorism can only be carried out by sub-national groups

(ergo not the state itself) is, as Richard Jackson states, absurd 30. As we shall explore

below, despite governmental denials and claims to the contrary, actions taken by

representatives of the Colombian state, even in recent years, easily satisfy the criteria

necessary, as outlined above, to be classified as ‘acts of terrorism’.

We shall begin by looking at the actions of the Colombian security forces themselves.

With the partial demobilisation of paramilitary groups in recent years, the number of

extrajudicial killings carried out by the Colombian armed forces has increased

substantially. According to Amnesty International31, in 2007 alone over 330 people

were reportedly subjected to extrajudicial killings by the security forces; victims, who

are often campesinos or community organisers, are “typically taken from their home

or place of work in front of witnesses and taken to another location to be killed. The

body is presented wearing army fatigues by the security forces…[and] often show

signs of torture”32; the victims are generally later alleged by the security forces to be

“guerrillas killed in combat”.

Acts by civilians as simple as an explicit statement of non-involvement in the conflict

are apparently sufficient justification for suspicion and attacks. A particularly

pertinent example of this is provided by the killing of five members of the

Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó (Peace Community of San José de

Apartadó), - a ‘humanitarian zone’ wherein the community has pledged not to be

drawn into either side of the conflict – in 2005. The security forces, who still claim
30
Jackson, 2008:383
31
Amnesty 2008:25
32
ibid
that the community is subversive, have been implicated in the killings 33. Communities

such as these, particularly in the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó River Basins, are under

constant threat of attack from all sides, who are competing for control of palm oil

reservations in the area.

Aside from their own activities, and despite supposed efforts by the government to

prosecute such behaviour, there remains strong evidence of significant linkages

between elements of the armed forces and right-wing paramilitaries, who remain

responsible for the majority of human rights abuses in Colombia. A UN report from

2005 noted a character of military operations whereby areas are taken by regular

Colombian military personnel, and paramilitaries subsequently arrive to control the

captured territory with at least the acquiescence of the armed forces34. Furthermore,

according to Amnesty, members of the security forces have occasionally made explicit

threats to civilian populations that, once they had moved on, they would be replaced

by paramilitaries35. The full extent of collusion between state and military officials has

been evidenced, at least in part, by the ‘para-politics’ scandal of recent years, wherein

it was revealed that some 60 parliamentarians – most of whom were part of Uribe’s

governing coalition – and over 100 other public officials had alleged links to

paramilitary activity36. Despite Uribe’s ostensibly anti-paramilitary stance, the facts on

the ground tell an alarmingly different story, as perhaps best summed up by the

declaration of an AUC regional commander in 2003: “Uribe is like heaven compared

to [former President] Pastrana”37.

In spite of governmental rhetoric, then, there remains apparently systematic and

widespread use of extrajudicial killings and close collusion with right-wing

33
Indymedia, 2005; Amnesty, 2009
34
Stokes, 2005:113
35
Amnesty 2008:35-36
36
ibid p19
37
Stokes, 2005:112
paramilitaries within the Colombian military, with quite obvious political motives,

which easily satisfy the criteria for ‘terrorism’ as set out by the US State Department

and Colombian Penal Laws – if, that is, they did not preclude the classification of

government actions as ‘terrorist’. Nonetheless, both governments present the conflict

as one between a ‘legitimate’ state and the ‘illegitimate’ FARC, ELN and the very

paramilitaries which appear not only to be closely related to state and government

officials at all levels, but appear to some large extent to act in their interests.

The purpose of a first-order critique, as Jackson states, is to destabilise dominant

understandings of accepted knowledge, expose biases and imbalances, and suggest

that other ways of ‘knowing’ are possible38. In this case, I have attempted to

destabilise the dominant understanding of the ‘terrorist problem’ in Colombia as

portrayed by the US and Colombian governments through demonstrating that,

although their definitions of ‘terrorist acts’ preclude state involvement, actions of

Colombian state representatives clearly qualify as acts of ‘terrorism’.

VI. Second-Order Critique

By means of a second-order critique, I will now attempt to explore the ethical,

ideological and political functions of the particular representation of ‘terrorism’ and

‘terrorists’ in the Colombian context espoused by the governments of Colombia and

the United States. It is my contention that this particular representation serves specific

political and ideological purposes beneficial to both the Colombian ruling elites and

the economic interests of the United States.

Since 2001 the U.S has shifted its rhetoric regarding its involvement in Colombia

from one of ‘counter-narcotics’ to one of ‘counter-terrorism’, thus bringing the

38
Jackson, 2008:386
conflict under the umbrella of the ‘Global War on Terrorism’. FARC – despite being

responsible for less human rights atrocities than the AUC and other paramilitaries –

was designated the ‘most dangerous terrorist group in the Western Hemisphere’ by

Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Senator John McCain asserted that the U.S had

‘dispensed with the illusion’ that a qualitative difference existed between drug

traffickers and ‘domestic terrorists’39. Former Assistant Secretary of State, Rand

Beers, even went so far as to allege that FARC members had received training in ‘Al

Qaeda terrorist camps’, a statement which he later withdrew40. Through situating the

Colombian conflict and narckotrafficking problem in terms of the greater ‘War on

Terrorism’, the US has been able to greatly increase police and military assistance

under the Andean Regional Assistance in the years 2003-2008 to between $597

million and $632 million, compared to around $398 million in 2002, compared to

economic and social aid ranging from around $132 million to $139 million in the

same period41.

Framing the conflict in terms of ‘terrorism’, complete with recognition thereof by the

United States, has been an indispensable political tool for the Uribe governments, and

has been utilised extensively to demonise sections of civil society whom question

government policies or oppose continued neoliberal reform of the economy.

The policy of the Uribe administrations has been to consistently deny – despite the

last 40 years of conflict - that what exists in Colombia is an internal armed conflict;

according to the President, “in Colombia there is no war. War contains elements of

legitimacy between contenders. In Colombia there are not legitimate contenders, there

is a democratic State within which lives a population mistreated by terrorism”42; such

39
Stokes, 2006:378
40
Stokes, 2005:106
41
Center for International Policy, 2008
42
Uribe, as quoted by the Colombian Ministry of Defence (2004)
a sentiment has been echoed by other government officials43. Defining the conflict in

these terms has significant consequences: it implies a rejection of the principle of

distinction between civilians and combatants, forces the civilian population to be at

the service of the military, and negates the need to respect the norms of Humanitarian

Law which would otherwise apply to an internal armed conflict. Uribe’s primary

policy regarding terrorism, the Politica de Seguridad Democrática, or ‘Democratic

Security Policy’, which has been promoted since 2002, takes as its objective “to

reinforce and ensure the rule of law in the entire territory, through the strengthening of

democratic authority: the free exercise of the authority of the institutions, of the rule

of law and of the active participation of citizens in matters of common interest”44.

Thus, a clear bifurcation in terms of legitimacy is created and reinforced through the

implication that citizens must become involved in the fight against ‘terrorism’:

essentially, you are either with the government, or with the ‘terrorists’. In practice,

this policy has been utilised to crack down on internal dissent and systematically

demonise citizens or organisations who voice concerns as regarding government

policies, particularly human rights organisations, trade unions, and media outlets. As

early as 2002 the policy was invoked in order to temporarily suspend public rallies

due to a state of ‘internal commotion’. Civil society organisations – particularly those

involved in Human Rights, Trade Unions, or indigenous organisations – have been

subjected to vitriolic attacks and claims that they are supporters or accomplices of the

‘terrorists’,45 as part of a clear campaign to stigmatise their work. Perhaps

unsurprisingly, precisely the same accusations are made by the paramilitaries, whom

continue to regularly attack the same trade unionists, media outlets, human rights

activists, community organisers, and so forth which the government claims work in
43
International Commission of Jurists, 2006:4
44
República De Colombia, 2003:12
45
see for example Amnesty, 2008b
favour of the ‘terrorists’. Whilst the government supposedly opposes paramilitaries, in

practice, little is done to protect progressive elements of civil society. ‘Good citizens’,

by contrast, are those who join the fight against the terrorists by joining one of the

local part-time army brigades, or the paid informant network set up under the

Democratic Security Policy.

The maintenance of the dominant neoliberal order through state terrorism and

paramilitary attacks against progressive elements of Colombian civil society has been

of significant benefit to the United States. Successive administrations have explicitly

tied the need for the deepening of neoliberal market reform with the fight against

narcotraffickers and ‘terrorism’; indeed, economic considerations can be observed to

be central to US policy in the region. As a former chief of the US Southern Command

asserted, “maintenance of a stability geared towards the preservation of capitalist

socioeconomic relations and the continued and unhindered access to Latin American

markets by US transnationals in the post-cold war period” are vital to US interests46.

Indeed, U.S access to oil in the region has become vital in recent years, as perhaps

evidenced by the $98 million included in the ARI in 2003 dedicated to the formation

and training of a military unit which would be dedicated solely to defend the Caño

Limón oil pipeline, owned by American company Occidental, which perhaps speaks

volumes about U.S interests in the region47.

We can see, then, that the representation of the conflict by the U.S and Colombian

governments as one between a ‘legitimate’ state and ‘illegitimate’ ‘terrorists’ and their

supporters in the human rights, trade union, anti-war and other organisations serves

very specific ends; the alternative representations of, and non-violent solutions to the

conflict espoused by groups such as the Movement of Victims of State Crimes

46
Stokes, 2006:379
47
ibid p378
(MOVICE)48, or the Peace Community of San José must, along with traditional

groups, such as trade unions, whom oppose the continued imposition of a disciplinary

form of neoliberalism, be silenced in order to legitimise continued conflict in the

name of these interests.

VII. Conclusions

This paper has examined the ways in which the definitions of terrorism used by the

United States and Colombia, which preclude designation of the Colombian military or

its actions as ‘terrorist’, serve to frame the Colombian conflict in a particular way

which is advantageous to both the Colombian ruling elite and the United States as it

facilitates the silencing of internal dissent and the continuation of conflict in defence

of economic interests. This comes at a cost to elements of civil society who espouse a

non-violent solution to the conflict and those whom oppose neoliberal economic

reforms alike. It is my contention that if an emancipatory solution to the conflict is to

be achieved, the voices of the moderate majority in Colombia must be amplified,

above those for whom the conflict has become profitable. Furthermore, the ‘terrorist’

designation must be moved beyond as it is integral to the justification espoused by

both governments for the continuation of said conflict. Perhaps a comprehensive

discourse-analytic approach, however, would have been somewhat more enlightening

in demonstrating more completely the ways in which the ‘terrorism/counter-terrorism’

dichotomy functions to legitimise elite interests and delegitimise counter-hegemonic

and non-violent discourses.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amnesty International (2009a) “Colombia: Thousands of Civilians Punished for Not

Participating in Conflict” http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-
releases/colombia-thousands-civilians-punished-not-participating-conflict-2009022
48
see www.movimientodevictimas.org
Amnesty International (2008a) ‘Leave Us in Peace! Targeting Civilians in Colombia’s
Internal Armed Conflict’

Amnesty International (2008b) “Colombian President Should Stop False Accusations

Against Human Rights Groups”, 20 November 2008,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/colombian-president-should-stop-
false-accusations-against-human-rights-groups-20081120

Björnehed, Emma(2004)'Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the

War on Terror', Global Crime,6:3,305 — 324

Blakely, Ruth (2007) ‘Bringing the State back into Terrorism Studies’ European
Political Science 6 228-235

Blakely, Ruth (2008): ‘The Elephant in the Room: A Reply to John Horgan and
Michael J. Boyle’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 1:2 151-165

Booth, Ken (2007) Theory of World Society Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Burke, Anthony (2008) ‘The End of Terrorism Studies’ Critical Studies on Terrorism
1:1 37-49

Burnett, Johnny & Dave Whyte (2005) “Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism”
Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media 1 (4) 1-18

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Gunning, Jeroen (2007): “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Government and
Opposition Vol. 42 No. 3 pp.363-393

Herring, Eric (2008): “Critical Terrorism Studies: An Activist Scholar Perspective”

Critical Studies on Terrorism 1:2, 197-211

Horgan, John and Boyle, Michael J. (2008) ‘A case against Critical Terrorism
Studies’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 1:2 51-64

Hutchinson, Steven & O’Malley, Pat (2007) “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on

Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality” Studies in Conflict and
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Indymedia Colombia: “Ultima Version Masacre San José de Apartadó”

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Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2008) “Internally Displaced People in

Colombia” http://www.internal-displacement.org/
International Commission of Jurists ‘Eminent Jurists Panel: Terrorism, Counter-
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Jackson, Richard (2007) ‘The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies’

European Political Science 6 pp244-251

Jackson, Richard (2008) ‘The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and
Terrorism Studies’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 1:3, 377-392

McDonald, Matt (2009) ‘Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies’ in Jackson et

al (eds) Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London & New York:
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Ministry of Defence, Republic of Colombia (2004) “En Colombia no hay Guerra, hay
un Desafío Terrorista: Uribe” [“In Colombia there is no War, there is a Terrorist
Challenge: Uribe] http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/index.php?page=181&id=356

Movimiento de Victimas de Crimines del Estado (Movement of Victims of State

Crimes): www.movimientodevictimas.org

República de Colombia (2003) Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática,

(Defence and Democratic Security Policy) accessed on-line
http://mindefensa.gov.co/dayTemplates/images/seguridad_democratica.pdf

Stokes, Doug (2005) America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (Zed Books)

Stokes, Doug (2006) “Iron Fists in Iron Gloves: The Political Economy of US
Terrorocracy Promotion in Colombia” British Journal of Politics and International
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US Department of State: Foreign Terrorist Organisations Fact Sheet

http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392.htm

Vaicius, Ingrid & Isacson, Adam (2003) “The ‘War on Drugs’ meets the ‘War on
Terror’: The United Stats’ Military Involvement in Colombia Climbs to the Next
Level” Center for International Policy International Policy Report, February 2003

Legal Texts

Congress of Colombia: Colombian Penal Code, available at

http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/penal.html

US Department of State Archive: Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212

http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103399.htm

US Department of State Archive: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years

1988 and 1989: Terrorism Definition
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103401.htm