Cybernetics And Human Knowing. Vol. 15, no. 2, pp.

9-31

Niklas Luhmann as an Empirical Sociologist

Methodological Implications of the System Theory of Society
Cristina Besio1 and Andrea Pronzini2

Although its theoretical fruitfulness is widely recognized, Niklas Luhmanns system theory is still considered unable to guide empirical research. We think that this criticism underestimates the potential of system theory. Starting from the discernment that in the works of Luhmann not only epistemological considerations and methodological suggestions, but also the practical application of methodological procedures, are present we highlight the empirical side of Luhmanns system theory. Research inspired by system theory can be empirical as long as the following prerequisite is fullled: the research should embrace epistemological premises which overcome the presumption of a direct access to the world as it is. The latter should be replaced by the acknowledgment of the existence of different perspectives and of the contingency of every observation (including empirical ones). At the methodological level this has the consequence that questions of what it is and the correlated aim to collect additional data in order to uncover additional facts are no longer central. On the contrary, what becomes crucial is the observation of how the world is being observed through the contingent criteria of the observed social systems, while relying on the contingent criteria of the observing social system.

Introduction Although the system theory of society developed by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann has been very fruitful in describing typical modern phenomena like science, the market economy, politics and so on, it risks facing a sad destiny: admired and discussed by academics interested in the history of sociology on the one side, ignored by empirical researchers on the other side. Undoubtedly one reason for this is the same one that caused Parsons sociological theory to be scarcely used in research: Such abstract theoretical approaches are considered unable to steer empirical investigations. Indeed, the methodological aspects are at the core of the confrontation with Luhmanns theory. In fact, frequently critique of this theory stresses its distance from an empirical approach. On the other hand, starting from the recognition of the validity of the theoretical construct, many attempts to make system theory usable in empirical social research have ourished (see Bora, 1994; Nassehi, 1998; Nassehi & Saake, 2002; Sutter, 1997; Castrignano, 1992; Schneider, 2000). Our paper contributes to the discussion on the relationship between system theory and research methods. We ask: Which characteristics should methods have in order to
1. Cristina Besio, Institute of Sociology, Technische Universitt Berlin, Franklinstr. 28/29, 10587 Berlin, Germany. cristina.besio@tu-berlin.de 2. Andrea Pronzini, Faculty of Humanities, University of Luzern, Kasernenplatz 3, 6000 Luzern, Switzerland. andrea.pronzini@unilu.ch

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be suitable for system theory? The epistemological innovations introduced by this theory make it necessary to identify methodological rules that suit its theoretical architecture. In order to be able to reect on the features of methods we have to primarily stress the specicity of the epistemological premises of system theory. In other words, the central nerve of the methodological problem does not consist in the methodology itself, but is deeply rooted in knowledge theory (Luhmann, 1987, p. 36). Within system theory, theory, methods and empirical reference each have a specic and not the usual meaning. Our rst task is to stress this through some reections on observation (part 1). In a second step we track down the main tenets of systemic methodology (part 2). By doing this, we systematize suggestions that can already be found in Luhmanns texts. As a matter of fact, in the works of Luhmann, in addition to clear methodological indications, there is a continuous application of an empirical method that suits the theory (Besio & Pronzini, 1999; Nassehi, 2000). We will also point out that if the specic methodological assumptions of system theory are taken into account, empirical procedures which stem from other research traditions can be used in combination with system theory. 1. The epistemological roots of sociological empirical research 1.1 An alternative to the distinction between subject and object In order to understand what part methods can play in a research programme guided by system theory it is crucial to discuss how the relation between observation and reality is understood in this context. Relying on the work of George Spencer Brown, Luhmann argues that an observation is possible only because an observer uses a specic distinction in order to indicate one side of that distinction (this and not that, cold and not warm, true and not false). The very important consequence is that a direct observation of objects is impossible. There is no objective and universally valid observation; any observation depends on the distinction made by an observer: There exists in reality no where for the there to be. Nor is there any when. All these are constructions of imagination, inventions of apparently stable formations for the apparent appearances (SpencerBrown, 1994, pp. vii-viii). The use of one distinction is actually the condition of the observation itself (Luhmann, 1990a). Consequently, the results of observation will vary on the basis of the distinctions the observer refers to. Every observation relies on a distinction and system theory is no exception. System theory is based on a contingent difference: the distinction system/ environment. This distinction replaces the distinction subject/object which characterizes classical epistemology. This substitution has far-reaching epistemological consequences. As long as observations are based on the distinction subject/object the world is considered an object which is separated from the subject and which acts as the ultimate reality. It is assumed that reality exists independently from observers and that every observer who does not make mistakes should produce the same description of the world (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 78). Ones perspective is

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completely different when the leading distinction is system/environment: The choice of this distinction shatters the idea of an objective world and of a subject with essential qualities. In system theory there is no transcendental subject and the world loses its status of an object of observation whose essence could be disclosed by a constant increase in scientic knowledge. Observations are always observer-dependent; a particular construction is made by the observer (a system) that differentiates itself from the environment. This is the reason why system theory argues that the world always remains unobservable. Stating that the world remains unobservable means that the knowing system always has to use a distinction in order to observe. For these distinctions there is no direct correlation in the world. The system cannot reach the world directly because it cannot escape from the boundary set by its own operations. The world cannot be known, but a system can construct its own reality on it (Luhmann, 1990b, p. 230). Every kind of knowledge production including the scienticoriginates from a system that differentiates itself from an environment that can be known only by internal constructions of an observing system. These reections have far reaching consequences also for empirical research which can no longer be considered to have a privileged access to reality. Empirical research has trouble giving up the distinction subject/object (Luhmann, 1992, p. 71). This can be clearly seen by the idea of research as a test of previously dened hypotheses which characterizes empirical research based on quantitative methods (Kromrey, 2006, pp. 24-70; Lamnek, 2005, pp. 242-273; Schnell et al., 2005, pp. 53-84). One is aware that the hypotheses are a construction of the scientic observer, but their truth or falsity is treated as empirically provable: Right results must match with reality. Research based on quantitative methods breaks down reality into variables whose values can be measured. The goal is to check the presence/ absence of some variables, to quantify them and to observe their correlations. Even though the naive assumptions of the rst positivism are left behind by recognizing that every perception is pre-structured and mediated by the observer, empirical observations are still considered at least good approximations to real phenomena. This also pertains to qualitative methods despite their differences in comparison to the quantitative approach (Wenturis et al., 1992, pp. 265-313; Lamnek, 2005, pp. 218243). Interpretative approaches such as symbolic interactionism, eldwork ethnography, discourse analysis and others maintain that social reality is symbolically constructed. Their idea is that the world is pre-structured by competent observers. Methodologically, the qualitative approach calls for the reconstruction of the point of view of the observed actors. The qualitative researcher interprets the world from the perspective of the subjects of his interpretation (Lamnek, 2005, pp. 252-254). The researcher has to understand the observed milieu from within (Geertz, 1983, pp. 289-309). This means that sociological interpretations have to be consistent with lay interpretations. The specic observation of the researcher is not allowed to take the place of the observation of the observed actor. The persistence of the assumption that reality is reachable can be tracked down in different qualitative methods, for example, in hermeneutics (Esposito, 1996).

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Although its main concern is no longer the reconstruction of the motives and perspectives of individuals, hermeneutics still sticks to the following basic assumption: the uniqueness of the sense of the text and the possibility of reaching a consensus on its interpretation. Even though it allows for different interpretations, the text has a univocal sense that steers the multiplicity of interpretations (Esposito, 1996, p. 605). The sense of the text is treated as positive data which guides the search for a rational agreement in the research process (Luhmann, 1997, p. 36). But this search for an agreement means not acknowledging the incommensurability of observations. Different points of view are levelled, as if different researchers were a unique subject (Luhmann, 1990b, p. 229). But why must different observations which focus on the same object, in our case a text, nd convergence? This is necessary only if one thinks that there is a world which exists independently from an observer. 1.2 The non-arbitrariness of observations When empirical observations are understood as operations of an observer that constructs its own world, as in system theory, the whole question about objectivity is couched in a very different manner: if we cannot refer to a given world, how can scientic observations control their own production of knowledge? When one abandons the idea of an objective world and of inter-subjective consensus, how can one then distinguish between a true and false scientic statement? According to Luhmanns theory it is not even possible to appeal to a higher state of theory in respect to empirical observations: indeed, not even theory has a privileged access to reality.3 The answer is much more difcult and can only be found by seriously and consequently walking the path of operative constructivism to the very end. In order to fully grasp the methodological implications of the epistemological premises of Luhmanns system theory we need to present some pillars of its operative constructivism. In this framework the process of knowledge creation is based on observations (as described above). However, it has to be stressed that an observation is always an operation of a system (Esposito, 1992a). This is possibly one of the most important tenets of operative constructivism and also what differentiates it from other constructivist approaches. The distinction between operation and observation is at the heart of Luhmanns knowledge theory. With operation Luhmann describes the basic elements of systems which reproduce themselves by autopoiesis. Observations are a particular form of autopoietic operation. There are systems that are made of operations that cannot observe (like biological systems). There are other systems (like psychic and social systems) that are made of observing operations. Operative constructivism means that every observation is at the same time also an operation of a system. That means that every observation (itself an operation) has to connect to other operations of the system. There is no observation without autopoiesis. Every observation has an

3. The idea of higher status of theory was a central assumption of Adornos approach. For a brief critique of the Frankfurter Schule see Luhmann (1990b).

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operational level, but its functioning cannot be explained by reducing it to the operation: The process of distinguishing and indicating should also be considered. One added value of this distinction is that the observing system is not seen as something totally separate from the observed phenomena. The subject is replaced by the observer, which is not an entity detached from the observed objects. Because every observation made by the observer is at the same time an operation of a system, the observer is in the world (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 68 ff.; Esposito, 1992a, p. 68 ff.). Every observation is always a specic operation of a system. Classical knowledge theories which came after Kants metaphysics, by recognizing that all knowledge depends on a subject, ask the question of how knowledge is possible in spite of the dependence of reality on cognition structures, whereas systemic constructivism takes another path: knowledge is possible exactly because there is no direct access to reality (Luhmann, 1988). Only because systems reproduce themselves by operations that rely on specic distinctions are they able to observe the world. Having no access to reality does not mean that the differences are not real. On the contrary: The only one ultimate reality is the reality of the operations of the system. Indeed the distinction between observation and operation marks the paradoxical foundation of system theory. In Luhmanns system theory at rst glance everything seems to depend on observation: How things are is nothing but the result of an observation (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 140). Also the distinction between knowledge and things is a distinction made by an observer. However, in order to observe, a system has to operate: Assumptions about being presuppose an observer who has to be in order to observe. (Thyssen, 2004, p. 11). In other terms, whenever we are observing in the framework of system theory we observe operating systems which are in the world. Luhmann maintains the empirical Faktizitt (actuality) of the observing systems. This is an implication of considering observation as an indication of one side of a distinction. When a system observes it uses a distinction in order to indicate one side (this and not that) but the distinction itself is unobservable. This means that the condition of observing (the distinction itself) is unobservable. As a consequence, it is precisely the paradox which allows for observing: The world is observable because it is unobservable (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 46). In addition, second-order observations are always also rst-order observations (Brier, 2007, p. 42). A distinction implies that further operations are necessary in order to observe observations, that is, to indicate their leading distinction as one side of a new distinction. A distinction may seem nave or dogmatic, but it is a beginning: It is an indication that severs the unobservable world. What has been excluded is not observed, but by drawing a distinction the system has started to operate. This has consequences: A domain of cognition of an operating system comes into being, whereupon the initial distinction can be observed in this domain. The paradoxical foundation can also be expressed as follows: in order to observe a system has to operate (an observation is always an operation of a system), but only an observer can describe operations. This paradoxical construction deserves a very close attention. In fact, it has been argued that a major problem of Luhmanns epistemology

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is that it avoids a philosophical solution to the problem of the paradox (Thyssen, 2004). Instead, Luhmann focuses on observing how systems operate in the presence of the paradox; how they unfold (but do not solve!) the paradox. There is no solution to the paradox offered by Luhmann, but it can be handled in time (Thyssen, 2006, p. 8). If one does not accept it and looks for a philosophical solution, the paradoxical foundation of system theory can be interpreted in terms of an open ontology (see Brier, 2007). We choose, on the contrary, to follow the path of Luhmanns operative constructivism and to show what consequences it has for sociological research. Instead of speaking of open ontology, we prefer to speak of operative, contingent ontology. Ontology comes into being only thanks to the operations of a specic system that construct its own world by severing the world in two (system/ environment) by connecting operations to operations. Choosing operative constructivism means renouncing the search for an ultimate philosophical foundation. Indeed operative constructivism means accepting the paradoxical foundation of knowledge without trying or even feeling the need to solve the paradox. Observed systems and the observer exist only because they mutually and paradoxically presuppose each other. Luhmanns solution is a third way between realism and constructivism, indeed it is a sociological way.4 Starting with the above mentioned considerations we maintain that the absence of absolute principles does not mean that the theory is open to every observation. On the contrary, (a) there are constraints which depend on the internal dynamics of a system, and (b) constraints which depend on the structural coupling of a system with other systems in its environment; moreover, (c) there are differences between distinctions. (a) Because every observation made by a system is an operation which has to connect to other operations of the system, specic limits are set to the range of possible observations. As the foundation of every observation is not a structure or a principle but a paradox, all the attempts to make it work are contingent and depend on the conditions of acceptability of a system (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 47). The internal setting of boundaries is the rst mechanism of control over the observations. A system that has started to operate in an environment (otherwise there would be no system) comes into being, and, in the case of communication systems, develops the capability of self-observation. It also develops structures which make some connections more probable and others less probable. For science this means the internal construction of connected concepts, procedures, rational criteria, rules for inferences, methods, disciplines and so on. In other words, scientic observations strengthen or weaken each other in a recursive process. System theory is therefore nothing but communication that participates in the reproduction of the system of science and therefore has to connect to scientic communications. (b) A description of reality works until the observing system (e.g., science) can operate with it. Does it mean that the environment has no relevance at all? Luhmann
4. If one then wants to indicate an operative way of dealing with the paradox (and dealing with it does not mean to resolve it) one has to address the concept of time. This last plays a central role in the work of Spencer Brown who also renounced a philosophical foundation for his calculus, replacing this with the paradox itself.

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insists that the environment counts (Thyssen, 2004, pp. 9-11). According to Luhmann, the fact that a system keeps on operating means that the system is tolerated by its environment. It keeps on operating in an environment. To explain this we refer to the concept of structural coupling (Luhmann, 1997, pp. 92 ff. & 779 ff.). The concept pertains to different aspects of the environment and explains, for example, the fact that society can operate in only a very limited range of temperatures or can only operate as long as the participating persons are not too ill.5 The concept allows the explanation of the relationship between a system and other systems in its environment. Whenever systems are structurally coupled an operation of one system provokes self-irritation in the other system which then begins to process information. The structures of the two systems are connected in a way which canalizes specic irritations in a highly selective manner. For example, language is a structure which connects psychic and social systems and enables both to self-irritate on the basis of linguistic events which happen in the other system. In the long run, structurally coupled systems evolve in a way which suits the autopoiesis of both systems (otherwise they stop operating, ending their existence). So the human mind evolved in a way which is compatible with modern society. As a consequence, structural coupling limits the possible structures of a system. This is also true for scientic observations. The environment tolerates a limited range of structures (theory, methods, descriptions, etc. ). This is the way in which the world, although it is not directly accessible for the observing systems, sets constraints on the system. The world is not a direct source of information for a system. The world does not kick back as an objective world that tells the observer if the representations she or he made are true or false. The world kicks back only in the sense that it tolerates some constructions and does not tolerate others. The observing system can keep on observing only as long as the distinctions used do not hinder its operations (its autopoiesis) in its environment. To clarify this for the case of scientic observation: Every communication, even scientic, has no direct contact to the world. Communication can refer to natural phenomena, for example, as a theme, but in order to communicate about them social systems rely on the perception of individuals. Communication can be irritated only by what has been seen, heard and so on from psychic systems (which are in the environment) and not directly from nature. Social systems are structurally coupled with psychic systems: this means that social systems can internally construct information that goes back to irritation caused by psychic systems. Of course, not every perception is relevant for science. Science has to discriminate between everyday and methodologically guided perceptions. However, perceptions of the latter can unleash effects on scientic communication. In the long run, this leads science to select communicative representations which are also tolerable for perception (that is for psychic systems). The effects are never direct, but mediated through the structures
5. The description in terms of temperatures or illness is a construction of an observing system, which has to operate as system in an environment in order to observe. In other words: the idea of structural coupling is only another formulation for the paradox of the operative constructivism.

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of science (such as theories or concepts). In other words, science cannot import human perception. But even if this would be possible, science would still not be able to gain access to the world because perception is also the result of an autopoietic network of operations of an operating system, in this case consciousness. Moreover, psychic systems are also structurally coupled with other systems, in particular with the neurophysiological processes of the brain which limit the development of psychic structures. As a consequence, the observation of nature is far from unconstrained: not every hypothesis is accepted from the scientic community, not every perception can be formulated in words, not every world state can be perceived with human senses, and so on. (c) There are no unquestionable distinctions, but it matters which distinctions are used. Indeed, there are great differences, in particular between distinctions that can be applied to themselves, that allow the observer to observe itself, and distinctions that do not. The classical distinction subject/object generates an unbridgeable distance between the observing subject and the observed object. In contrast, the distinction system/environment maintains that the observer is also a system; as such it is not different from the systems it sees in its own environment. The distinction system/ environment can re-enter itself and therefore allows for self-observation. (a), (b) and (c) show that knowledge is not arbitrary. A theory of knowledge based on the anything goes approach is not plausible. Only some forms of knowledge are able to connect with the operations of science (Luhmann, 1997, p. 52). Furthermore only some specic forms of knowledge are compatible with the structural coupling of a system. On the one hand, system theory can dene and describe the contingent nature of knowledge; on the other hand, it stresses that scientic knowledge can never be arbitrary. Non-arbitrariness stems from the operational constraints of a system that differentiates itself from an environment. Obviously, even system theory can only see what it can see, but the partiality of observation is not treated as a limit, but as a chance. As a consequence, research guided by system theory produces knowledge while seeking to increase both the awareness of contingency and the non-arbitrariness of combinations at the same time. 1.3 Theory /empirical approach vs. theory/methods As methods seem to guarantee proximity to reality, in sociology the production and analysis of data is preferred by far to theoretical analysis. An undesirable consequence is the widespread practice of ignoring theory when describing data. In fact, methods often act as a substitute for theory. Data are collected, and then an investigation on the possible and signicant statistical combinations is carried out (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 369 f.). Instead of a theoretical description supported by data one nds descriptions consisting almost exclusively of data aggregations. System theory forces to the refutation of this asymmetry in favouring methods against theories. Indeed, considering both theory and method as structures of a system the degree of empiricism ... of a theoretical selection does not seem to be different or smaller than the one of a statistical or empirical research In neither of these cases

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can one pretend that there is a direct reference to reality (Corsi, 1989, p. 577). Therefore it makes no sense to keep distinguishing between theory and empirical approach in this respect and to pretend that the latter has an exclusive access to reality. Theory and methods both talk about an external reality, but this reference is in both cases nothing more than a product of the operations of a system. To take this into consideration properly, we argue that the distinction theory/ empirical approach has to be replaced by the distinction theory/methods (Besio & Pronzini, 1999). Methods are programs (structures) of an autopoietic system, science, that allow for distinguishing between true or false statements. They are rules and procedures which allow a judgement if a statement is true or false, excluding the attribution of both values and of a third value. It is important to stress that assigning true value to a statement does not mean that a correspondence to reality has been discovered. Truth is not the agreement between assertions and reality, but is a communication form. A methodologically controlled operation needs a selfobservation of science which estimates which procedures are suitable to attribute a value (true or false) to propositions. An observation based on methods relies on procedures (e.g., experimental settings, rules for sampling, instruments, etc.) which have been dened as correct by science. Assigning truth values to statements by the means of methods is a genuine scientic operation which does not take place in other contexts. Theories, which also are programs of science, are instead descriptions of the world whose function is the comparison between facts in more and more improbable terms (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 408). Theory can help to gain a new understanding of reality by elaborating surprising comparisons. Understanding by using a theory means the application of distinctions that goes beyond common sense. Theories and methods are scientic structures with different functions and must always be used together (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 403). Theories and methods set for each other specic limits, excluding, once again, arbitrariness. Methods do not allow for proof if the theory corresponds to the real world; methods establish the rules that have to be followed in order to apply the code true/false to propositions. This is why theories can be replaced by considering the results that come from the use of methods. Theory allows us to choose which data can be considered, allows for building up expectations of where data can be found and also to ask questions concerning specic texts. The specicity of a theory calls for a specic method (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 403). 1.4 The function of theory: an example The above allows us to point outagainst the widespread idea that system theory lacks methodologythat, starting from an understanding of method as a tool for applying truth values, within system theory methods has a crucial role. As system theory strives to produce scientic knowledge, in the terms of the theory itself, it cannot neglect either theory or methods. In his observations of social systems Luhmann never works without theory and, we argue, without methods. As a matter of fact, the texts of Luhmann are lled with

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methodological suggestions and also with concrete applications of methods. On the basis of theory-guided comparisons, Luhmann observes social semantics and structures.6 He analyzes which communicative forms have been preserved in written texts, which distinctions are at the basis of communication processes, which descriptions have more plausibility, and then he connects the whole to hypotheses on the structural evolution of society. In the next section we will focus on methods. But rst we show how theory can inspire empirical observation. We do this by referring to the example of temporal semantics (Luhmann, 1980, pp. 235-300). The task of Luhmanns analysis is not to test a hypothesis by controlling of a representative sample as to whether it conrms theoretical expectations; but rather to explore texts in search of tendencies that theory sees as relevant and which it can meaningfully interpret. System theory steers the reading of historical materials and allows for complex comparisons between semantics and the structures of older society and modern society. We highlight only few points: 1. The following hypothesis guides the analysis of the development of temporal semantics in modernity: the increasing complexity of society at the operational level implies an increase of the temporalization of society. This has far-reaching consequences for semantics. With temporalization of society Luhmann points out the fact that it is impossible to connect all the communications that take place in society at the same time. Operative temporalization of complexity means, for example, that with functional differentiation the different contexts of society (politics, economy, science, etc.) operate within time-frames that cannot be coordinated with each other or with the time-frame of everyday life. As a consequence, society has to connect communications according to different time frames. That is to say, modern society has to temporalize its operative connections. Under these conditions, time semantics must change, too, in order to not lose coordination with the social structures. Time can no longer be considered as a circle that is the same for all observers. With the differentiation of modern society in functional systems, the steadiness of the essence of things, to which the idea of circular time is related, loses its plausibility. Semantics develop from a spatial concept of the present, understood as presence and therefore related to something that lasts, to a momentary, almost vanishing present. 2. In his analysis Luhmann also identies which problems arise when semantics vary. For example, when the present is conceived as a momentary event with no relations, the problem of explaining the relations between things and different events is raised. If the present has no duration, how can one explain that things show a sense of continuity? It is the idea of creatio continua which gives an initial answer. Later on comes the idea of historicized time and of the temporal horizons of past and future, which will allow for explaining connections between events and considering the vast amount of possible combinations of different elements in time.
6. The idea that empirical observation is always theory-guided implies that in the framework of system theory one has to be explicit about this hypotheses, its theoretical assumptions and ones own role as an observer (Brier, 2007, p. 25). This premise is also used by Bourdieu in his empirical analyses. It makes the work of Bourdieu particularly interesting for empirical research inspired by system theory.

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3. Theory can also show how different concepts are connected to each other and how the development of specic concepts (e.g., concepts of time) can favour the development of other concepts (e.g., concerning the right behavior). For example, if the present is reduced to a vanishing event, everything is perceived as constantly changing and the future is seen as highly uncertain, attitudes like prudentia, which rely on a calculable temporal horizon, do not function any more. Theory tells the researcher what she or he can expect from structural developments of society. Theory explains data. In this case, in texts (letters, novels etc.) one nds examples that support the hypothesis of a variation of time semantics. 2. The method of system theory On the basis of the epistemological premises described above we stress some methodological implications for system theory concerning: the typology of empirical materials to be used (2.1, 2.2), the unities of analysis (2.3), which kind of questions can be asked (2.4), the typology of comparisons (2.5), the interplay between theory and methods (2.6) and some examples of how empirical methods stemming from other research traditions can be used (2.7). 2.1 Explanation of trivialities Perhaps the suspicion that the systemic approach neglects empirical research depends on the frequent statement made by Luhmann that one has to refer to so-called trivialities and that in many cases it can be advisable to make use of observations already made by others instead of collecting data ex novo. As a matter of fact, Luhmann, though he does not exclude making data collections, considers analysis of existing data particularly worthwhile. A question arises: which data are suited to be reinterpreted through the lens of system theory? Which are the trivialities? Instead of making data collections that aim to take an increasingly complete picture of a given social world, one can refer to socially uncontested facts, namely trivialities, and make them revealing in the light of theory. Trivialities are characteristics of society that are immediately observable and that often, as treated as obvious, no one has the need to explain. One can better understand the importance of trivialities when taking into account the question of complexity. Empirical research, although very scrupulous in collecting data, usually works with a limited set of variables on the basis of ceteris paribus clauses, that is to say always with a limited portion of society. This is very problematic from the point of view of system theory. Because system theory aims to describe society as a system, it has to include more than just a limited portion of society. In order to face complexity, system theory needs other tools: these are mainly theoretical concepts and so-called trivialities. Trivialities allow the theory to observe in more sociologically informative ways.7 The examples of triviality in Luhmanns texts are manifold. Often he starts with a triviality, for example in the article Die Knappheit der Zeit und die Vordringlichkeit des Befristeten: Zeitdruck ist eine verbreitete Erscheinung(time-pressure is a

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common phenomenon) (Luhmann, 1968, p. 3). He reminds us how the quick glance at the watch or organizer are routines gestures, folders with the sign urgent or very urgent populate every ofce-desk, deadlines determine the rhythm of the our work. Luhmann stresses Das alles bedarf vor den Lesern dieser Zeitschrift keines Nachweis (Translation: this certainly does not require any further elucidation for the readers of this journal). Starting from this point Luhmann explains how this orientation to time began, in which systems it is found and which functions it has. Theory sheds a new light on trivialities. For example, the well known fact that children in schools do not only or primarily learn the lesson content but develop their own culture is considered by pedagogical approaches to be a serious problem in the educational process. Youth cultures supposedly have to be understood and changed in order to better educate children. For Luhmann this specic kind of learning cannot be avoided. He describes the development of subcultures in schools as a normal socialization process. Moreover, this kind of learning has great relevance when, for example, children learn to deal with organizations, competition, evaluation and so on. This interpretation is possible because system theory sees education as a specic form of (self)socialization. Socialization is a continuously ongoing process based on the structural coupling between communication and consciousness (Luhmann, 2002, p. 48 ff). Yet, education is a specic communication form which has to be organized (e.g. in schools) and has to take place in specic interactions (classrooms). This is the reason why classes which aim to educate always have the collateral consequence that they socialize in an uncontrolled manner (Luhmann, 2002, p. 79). System theory refers to trivialities in order to make its uncommon interpretations plausible. For example, to strengthen the theoretically deducted assertion that minor events in a social system can have unforeseen consequences in others, Luhmann (1990c, pp. 222) gives examples which sound very enlightened such as the following: a small payment to a politician, which is a minor event in the economic system (when compared with the enormous transactions which take place every day), can become a scandal in politics. The majority of sociological research does not feel the need to explain trivialities because its main goal is the knowledge of the real world. For system theory the contrary holds true. For the majority of sociological research, if something is trivial, it is not interesting, because there is already an agreement on it. Since trivialities are socially accepted facts, sociology does not think that they need to be further explained. Trivialities do not need to be questioned and are considered only in order to gain more exact measurements. For example, the increasing disaffection of the electorate with political parties can nowadays be considered as a triviality. Correspondingly, sociological research aims to precisely quantify the disaffection or to show differences between or in a nation and to connect the disaffection to the socio7. One has to keep in mind that reference to trivialities is not exclusive to system theory and is also specic to classics such as George H. Mead and Herbert Blumer. As far as trivialities are concerned, Blumer once stated that: The premises of symbolic interactionism are simple. I think they can be readily tested and validated merely observing what goes on in social life right under ones nose (Baugh, 1990, p. 34).

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demographic characteristics of the electorate. These kinds of analyses mainly add a variety of quantications to the description of the topic. System theory takes a completely different approach to trivialities. If one observes a social accepted phenomenon from the point of view of a theory of society, new comparisons are possible: One can assume that the political disaffection is part of a broader disaffection of modern society with its formal organization (see e.g., Luhmann, 1993b). Starting from this, one could therefore investigate the peculiar connection between formal organizations, function system, and society and then concentrate on the more specic case of political parties. 2.2 Secondary analysis The analysis of trivialities sometimes turns out to be a secondary analysis. Often, trivialities consist, namely, of facts that are already taken for granted by the research community. The latter can comprehend knowledge of milieu participants (Luhmann, 1997, p. 37), quantitative data, data collected by means of different techniques such as participant observation or text analysis, and so forth. Luhmann, for example, refers to some intuitive knowledge that has been conrmed in studies on attribution processes. It is known that nowadays people are normally more open to accept risks that result from their own earlier decisions (e.g., smoking or driving fast), while, on the other hand, they hardly accept risks imposed by third parties (e.g., construction of new polluting industries near their own home). Luhmann interprets this well-known fact by the means of the theoretically developed distinction risk/danger (Luhmann, 1991). One further example: In order to describe how mass media select information, Luhmann (1996b, pp. 53-81) refers to empirical studies on news values. Typically, these studies are based on content-analysis and unravel so-called news values. These are criteria used by the media to distinguish between information and non-information (e.g., immediacy or drama). Luhmann himself offers a list of such factors referring to numerous nice or current examples from the press or media-studies. Sometimes examples are limit cases or counterfactual. A typical problem of secondary analysis is that if the data have not been collected by considering a specic hypothesis, the researcher may not be able to nd the information he is looking for (Boudon, 1996, p. 37). Indeed, if one has theoretical hypotheses and wants to verify these with the help of data, one has to ask questions that are reality specic. If, on the contrary, one treats data constructed by empirical research as material that needs a theoretical explanation, things are different. Reference to this material is not reductive because the same data can be observed from new points of view that are very different from the one for which they had been collected. In other words: system theory uses data produced by observing with other distinctions as material for its second-order observations.

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2.3 Only communication can communicate8 Several sociological approaches analyze communication as composed of actions of individuals that have specic motives and intentions. Individuals are considered the primary source in order to study the social level. System theory starts with another assumption: the distinction system/environment. Systems differentiate themselves from the environment reproducing a specic operation. Psychic and social systems are based respectively on thinking and communication and are found in each others environment. Sociological analysis concentrates on social systems. According to system theory, social phenomena cannot be explained by the analysis and combination of actions and intentions. This is the reason why, in this framework, units of observation are no longer individuals, but communications. At this point an explication is needed. Social systems are not able to directly observe communication, but communication can only be inferred (Luhmann, 1984, 226; Brier, 2007, p. 41). Social systems are forced to observe themselves in a more simple form: that is as a sequence of actions. But does this also apply to system theory? Is system theory also forced to reduce communication to the category of action? The answer is no: Theoretically, the theory asserts that communication (and not action) is the basic element of social systems. But, methodologically, how can communication be observed? Our answer is that one can observe chains of communication. This is our methodological solution to the fact that we cannot observe communication directly. Communication is described as the synthesis of three distinctions: utterance, information and understanding of the distinction between utterance and information. Communication takes place when someone understands that someone else has intentionally uttered something. Communication can exist only if the distinction between action and information is understood. It is not enough that someone writes or says something. Understanding is highly relevant here, as it allows for the self-referential processing of communication. Understanding is crucial for communication, but it is not visible. However, following utterances can nd a connection only starting from understanding. As a consequence, understanding can be analyzed through its consequences for utterances. Observing the connection we can empirically infer from communication. In other words: A social system features a sequence of self-referring communications. At the level of methods, the researcher has to observe how communication sequences develop and process meaning. The connection (Anschluss) between communications is at the core of the analysis of social events, processes and structures. Communication can be reconstructed as a sequential chain of operations (Schneider, 2000, 131) in which communicative structures such as programs, semantics and roles are used. Empirical observation which focuses on communication does not try to detect the motives of individuals. This is considered impossible: In order to know the motives of individuals, because of their intransparency, the researcher has to revert to communication. However, radically distinguishing between psychic and social
8. Luhmann (1996a, p. 261).

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systems one maintains that what is communicated by individuals never coincides with their thoughts: Once thoughts are uttered and understood they become part of communication and therefore underlie communicative rules. Interviews are also communicative situations where what can be observed is only communication. Moreover, even if one could know the motives of individuals, one still would not be able to explain how society works. While a focus on motives overemphasizes their causal role, focusing on communication stresses that no individual has the power to steer communication. Starting from the assumption that social systems are an emergent order of reality which cannot be reduced to participating individuals, one sets different research priorities. The researcher can focus on specic communication processes, semantics and structures. Motives themselves can be studied as forms of communication that refer to psychological conditions. It becomes interesting to observe how motives function in communication. One can notice that, for example, whereas persons remain quite stable, motives change due to circumstances and in different contexts the motives ascribed to a person can vary. This way the person/motive distinction provides the social systems with the capacity for both continuity and discontinuity (Luhmann, 1996c, p. 344).9 2.4 Observing the observer If the conditions of the production of knowledge are not universal, but there are only operating systems which observe, it is meaningful to observe these concrete observers. System theory stresses that the observation of observers relies on specic distinctions. It is the choice of a specic distinction which regulates what has to be included or excluded by the observation. This applies to both observing systems: the observing observer and the observed observer. In other words, when the observer wants to observe something as a system, at the same time he assumes that he observes how the observed system sets its own delimitation and in this way differentiates itself from its environment (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 4). An observation based on the subject/object distinction treats the observed system as something objective. So the social world is observed at the rst order, namely as if the observations made by communication were objects (Esposito, 1992b, p. 259). While a rst-order observation means observing things as facts, a second-order observation means to observe observations and to highlight their selectivity and contingency. From the point of view of Luhmanns theory, communication is always the contingent result of complex systems. Communications cannot be treated as fact; on the contrary, it is always the realization of something that could also be different.

9. While the analysis of the real intentions of individuals is not necessary to understand social phenomena, the individuals do not become insignicant. They are in the environment of social systems and are an essential precondition for their development. By means of the concept of structural coupling the relationship between social and psychic systems can be studied. One can, on one side, analyze how psychic systems affect communication and on the other side, analyze which consequences communication has for them (Luhmann, 1990c, p. 65)

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Second-order observation means that the distinction used cannot be treated as an object and has to be modalized (Esposito, 1992b, p. 268). This allows for the observation of the contingency of the observed observers (Nassehi & Saake, 2002). Attention is focused on the utilization of a specic distinction instead of other possible distinctions. This kind of approach underlies, for example, the well-known analysis of ecological communication (Luhmann, 1990c).10 What matters is not the objectivity of the data, but how a specic observation is constructed, how the system limits itself, and the fact that some information is processed instead of other information. The classics of sociology had another relationship with empirical research. They tried to interpret the facts on the basis of what there is behind (for example, Marxs theory) (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 123). In order to do this, one had to assume that the sociologist always knows more than the text he interprets. According to system theory, societys latency, (what there is behind) is the distinction used by every different observer (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 139). The researcher observing at the second order does not ask what questions (what it is) but how questions (how the world is being observed). This way one gains the possibility of observing what observers see and what they do not see (Luhmann, 1997, p. 375). This means that the observation of the distinctions allows us to observe not only what has been told or written, not only realized operations, but also what is left unexpressed. 2.5 The functional method Causal analysis is at the heart of quantitative empirical research. This, in a rst step, identies and isolates variables, and then analyses their connections on the basis of the cause/effect scheme. But the impossibility of taking into account all variables which are relevant to explain social facts implies a choice (Blalock, 1984, p. 16ff.). The result is that in spite of the pretension of knowing facts, only a highly selective and contingent combination of the innumerable relevant causes and effects is realized. The choice of highlighting specic causal relations has no correspondence to the environment (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 109). This selection does not trouble system theory. Instead, the main problem of causal analysis is seen in its inability to take the unrealized possibilities of social systems into consideration and the related impossibility of observing the contingency of the actualized ones. In fact, the most interesting aspect for system theory is asking why possible interactions do not take place (Luhmann, 1997, p. 39). In the framework of system theory functional analysis can be considered an adequate methodology in order to answer this question (Luhmann, 1970; Castrignano, 1992, p. 138). Causal analysis and systemic functional analysis have an opposed approach to contingency. Functional analysis is interested in

10. In the book Ecological Communication, instead of observing the destructive consequences of human behavior on the environment and how people are incapable to react adequately to ecological menaces, Luhmann observes how different systems observe ecological problems. By the means of this analysis one becomes aware that different observations are based on very specic structures and e.g. for economy only prices and the possibility to gain or to lose money in respect to ecological questions are relevant criteria. As a consequence one can, for example, better understand why the moral semantic of social movement can hardly inuence this system.

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comparisons that highlight other possibilities. It questions the effect stressing the fact that there are multiple causes which can act as a functional equivalent in producing the observed effect. A specic aspect of society can have different causes and the interest of the researcher is not the identication of the probability that a given cause produces a specic effect, but the identication of the causes that are functionally equivalent in producing this specic effect (Luhmann, 1970, p. 14). Functional analysis does not pretend to know the world as it is, but aims to show its contingency. Through functional analysis the articiality of what the observed milieu take for granted can be highlighted (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 137). Different aspects of society can be compared on the basis of a specic reference problem which they are able solve. They are functionally equivalent in the solution (in terms of cause/effect, they can all act as a cause to reach a specic effect). As an example we can take the function of producing collective binding decisions which every complex society has to full (Luhmann, 2000a, p. 84 ff.). Historically, this function has been fullled in different manners, for example through the open demonstration of strength, struggle or occupation of political ofces. These are all forms to show and use power. They allow people to recognize who has power and therefore can make binding decisions. In other words, they all are functionally equivalent in motivating the acceptance of decisions even if these do not appear rational or advantageous. However, functional equivalents cannot simply replace one another. Political ofces, for example, if compared with a pure show of strength, make opposition to political power less probable and therefore assure more stability. This way functional analysis simultaneously demonstrates the contingency of structures and the unlikelihood of the substitution of functional equivalents. It pursues the identication of contingency and of regularities as two faces of the same coin. 2.6 Zettelkasten How is the interplay between theory and methods realized? Two interrelated techniques are available: a) a specic way to read scientic texts; b) a specic way to organize collected material, the so-called Zettelkasten (card le). a) How can the reader recognize what is actually relevant in scientic texts? Luhmann (2000b, pp. 153-154) rejects two widely used techniques: On the one hand, one can hardly gain insight into the relationships between concepts and into the problems discussed in a text if one merely associates knowledge with authors or different labels such as system theory or symbolic interactionism (Luhmann 2000b, p. 154). On the other hand, neither collecting knowledge on specic sociological themes such as risk or socialization is satisfactory. This has the advantage of disclosing the state of the art of a topic, but the researcher soon notices that this knowledge has to be updated. She or he can only search for new knowledge as she or he does not activate the necessary instruments in order to exploit the existing one. According to Luhmann: The problem of reading scientic texts seems to be that one does not need a short term memory, but instead a long term one, in order to gain points of reference to distinguish the important from the unimportant, and the new from what

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has only been repeated (Luhmann, 2000b, pp. 154-155). The researcher has to read in a selective manner: she or he must be guided by her or his own problems, distinctions, already examined empirical ndings, relating what she or he is reading to what she or he already knows. The underlying epistemological assumptions of constructivism are evident. At the level of procedure this can be done by making notes which primarily do not quote or summarize the text, but reframe what has been read. As this process becomes a routine, what will be written down will be only the readers own ideas (that come to mind while reading). This way of working assures the simultaneous selfreference and external reference of the theory. System theory makes a second-order observation of scientic statements in order to grasp insights that activate its own distinctions. This means that the availability of complex distinctions and concepts is the condition which enables the theory to observe the ndings of others. As a result, this can strengthen some ideas but also lead to the rejection of others. For example, empirical studies can provoke surprise or doubts about specic theoretical statements. b) The information gained should also be properly stored. One has to build a memory that makes it possible to selectively pick up information and make new connections. This can be realized by using the le card system of Luhmann. It reects the style of reading that has been sketched out above. It is not aimed at storing information about authors, theories or sociological topics, but it catches irritations that become information when ltered through the distinctions of the theory. The mechanism is quite simple: The information retrieved is put down on paper cards to which a number is attributed. Each further card becomes progressively another number, and these numbers, and the position in the card box as well, will never be changed. When the researcher reads texts which relate to reections already written down in the past, one can continue the pre-existing cluster of cards by adding one card and sequentially numbering the new card. Or a new card can specify a concept of a specic card, so that it can be inserted among the sequential cards (e.g., between card 1/3 and card 1/4 one can put a card numbered 1/3a). An important task is keeping the position and the number attributed to cards xed. That way, as the card le grows, one is also forced to make internal references. That is, one has to build up connections between the ideas one has written down on cards. A card le without internal reference between cards would not allow for the construction of a complex memory. Obviously, one also needs another le card with alphabetically ordered concepts that refer to specic cards of the main le card. All is subsumed to the internal conceptual architecture of the theory.11 The le system allows for surprise. After a while the researcher who has constructed the le card system has no control over it. The way the le card answers; the connections it shapes are not decided by the researcher.

11. This means that something can be remembered, but a lot of information gets lost. However, to forget is a necessary step in order to develop knowledge when a society becomes complex. The card index invention mirrors a society which is learning a new way of organizing its memory whose primal function is not remembering but forgetting (Cevolini, 2004).

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2.7 A variety of methods: The examples of conversation analysis As we have already mentioned in the chapters on the analysis of trivialities and secondary analysis, available data, both quantitative and qualitative, can be used with selective sight of the theory. This means that available data can be used if, and only if, they are compatible with the theoretical and methodological premises of system theory. Obviously, these premises should be also taken into consideration when the researcher collects the data him/herself. In the works of Luhmann the use of available data is very important. However, data can be also collected and analyzed ex novo specically starting from system theory. In fact Luhmanns analyses of historical sources are of this type. For example, his analysis of time semantics does not refer only to secondary sources such as literature or historical studies, but also refers to or directly cites source documents. In order to show the compatibility between theoretical reections and empirical observations Belege are presented as examples.12 Starting from theoretical hypothesis, for example on specic semantics, one has to show that communication chains which have the characteristics foreseen by the hypothesis can be observed. The observation must follow methodological rules which are considered valid in a discipline. Nevertheless, the choice of the sources is guided by theory and theory can suggest that some methods are more appropriate than others. Moreover, while observing organizations Luhmann employs descriptions which are comparable to thick (qualitative) empirical observations in the framework of ethnomethodology. From the perspective of the participant observer he describes decision processes for example, in courts, administrative bodies, and universities, the setting of deadlines or the relevance of changes of personnel, the difference between internal and external descriptions of organizations etc. Also in this case, system theory stresses the importance of tightly tting concepts (Ziegert, 2006, p. 52), that is to say, the importance of concepts which t with methodologically guided observations. In other words: In order to formulate scientic sentences one has to reach a t between theoretical descriptions and data which have been constructed through empirical observation. Once the methodological pillars are identied, there are no obstacles when searching for a connection to other empirical traditions (Vogd, 2007). In order to collect and analyze data it is possible to resort to methods developed within other frameworks. Also, in this case a match with the theoretical and methodological premises of system theory is needed. Some researchers have already tried this (e.g., Bora, 1994; Nassehi & Saake, 2002; Castrignano, 1992). An interesting example is the use of techniques of conversation analysis (e.g., Baraldi, 2006; Lee, 2003; Hausendorf & Bora 2006). It has been argued that conversation analysis can be suitable for system theory because they share some important premises (Hausendorf, 1992). In particular, they share the idea that social
12. For example, showing that the semantics of the 17th century begin to consider the present as a punctual event some verses of the famous English author and poet John Donne are cited as are reections from a treatise of the theologian Francois Senault.

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structures are a result of communication processes which operate in a self-referential way. The meaning of an utterance is not determined by an actor, but is seen as the result of a meaning attributional process sequentially and retrospectively realized by the utterance(s) following next to a preceding one (Schneider, 2000, p. 124). Starting from this consideration one can analyze how social structures originate from these processes and shape them. Chains of communication are observed and not individuals. Rather than looking for latent structures (non-observable givens), those distinctions which are used in order to observe are the object of the search. These are considered as contingent products of communication processes and therefore their development has to be explained. Once established, structures reduce complexity and make autopoiesis possible. Hausendorf and Bora (2006), for example, analyze how citizenship is communicatively constructed in citizenship talks. They analyze how this construction develops, by observing, for example, how new participants are introduced or which relevance is attributed to specic groups (e.g., politicians, doctors, etc.). The authors resort to procedures of sequential analysis that allow the identication of subunits which the researcher can concentrate on. The sequence of these units is the base from which to follow the unfolding of communication over time. Instruments of semantic, pragmatic and linguistic analysis allow the researchers to analyze which kind of statements are expressed, which words, linguistic or non-verbal forms are used, for example, in order to dene membership to a specic group or category, how the use of words or the reference to categories changes over time, which arguments are used, and so forth. This ne analysis leads to reconstructing social constructions (Hausendorf and Bora, 2006, p. 88). The theoretical framework also allows investigation into the function of specic procedures or devices used by participants (e.g., clarication of category belonging through forms such as: to be a ... or to come from ...) and to investigate which functional equivalent could be used instead (e.g., accentuation of category belonging through forms such as the contrast between categories: First of all we are citizens then we are researchers). Conclusion In opposition to a widespread assumption, we argue that system theory is structurally bound to empirical research. Starting from Luhmanns denition of the role of theory and methods in science, an observation which has the pretence to be scientic cannot neglect empirical data or theory. The emphasis on theory in Luhmanns texts can be explained referring to a contingent situation of modern sociology. Luhmann felt that the discipline shows an unbalanced relationship between theory and methods and that methods are ranked much higher than theory. The consequence is that most research is conducted outside of an encompassing theoretical framework; an amount of case studies and statistical analyses are available but lack proper interpretation. An important message of Luhmann is the following: theory can help to gain relevant information from data. Theory can shed new light on well-known phenomena by

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offering improbable but conceptually justied comparisons. This statement underlies the relevance of theory, but also the necessity of data. This strong interplay of theory and methods is also what allows for testing the results of system theory research: Because the proof cannot be sought in the correspondence with an external reality, the internal consistency and mutual renement of theory and methods is what assures the scientic proof. Then it is the structural coupling that determines if the knowledge so produced will be tolerated by the environmentor whether it will not. The interplay of theory and methods is particularly important in order to accomplish the main tasks of sociology: the description of society. It is evident that this is a task which empirical research cannot accomplish alone. Collection and evaluation of data are not enough. The possibility of describing facts with the help of different concepts, of presenting data in a different manner by referring to other distinctions, is crucial. The knowledge produced by empirical research, even if remarkable in its quantity and its variability, remains merely as knowledge which refers to portions of society. While empirical methods generate a huge variety of data, observation with the help of a complex theory allows for properly connecting data and interpreting many contexts. However, without a link to data, theory would remain an abstract description lacking plausibility. As methods rule the process of dening a proposition as true or false, a theory which avoids the connection to methods would lose its connection to scientic development. The tight t between methodologically observed phenomena and the concepts which capture them is central; not the theory alone. The objective of the enterprise is ... not so much theory building as producing good science (Ziegert, 2006, p. 52). As a consequence, not only the development of theory, but also further application and renement of methods for system theory are promising research tasks for the near future. Acknowledgment We would like to thank the editor of C&HK Sren Brier and two anonymous reviewers for their comments which have helped us improve our argumentation. References
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Vogd, W. (2007). Empirie oder Theorie? Systemtheoretische Forschung jenseits einer vermeintlichen Alternative. Soziale Welt, 58 (3), 295-322. Wenturis, N. et al. (1992). Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften. Eine Einfhrung. Tbingen: Francke Verlag. Ziegert, K. A. (2006). Systems theory and qualitative socio-legal research. In R.Banakar & M.Travers (Eds.), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (pp. 49-67). Oxford: Hart Publishers.

Taylor, C. (2003). Magma, unnumbered (detail). 40 x 72, oil on canvas.

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