Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PANEL: AL QAEDA
Designated Commissioners:
Enclosures
2 - Prepared Statements
3 - Biographies
4 - Invitation Letters
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR THE PANEL: AL QAEDA
Designated Commissioners:
General
1. What are the three or four most important things the nation needs to know about al
Qaeda?
2. How is al Qaeda different from the way it was pre-9/11? Who are the key al Qaeda
leaders today?
4. What is the status of al Qaeda's efforts to obtain chemical, biological, radioactive, and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons?
Director Tenet has said that al Qaeda is determined to attack the United States using
CBRN weapons. He noted a particularly high risk of poison, anthrax, chemical attacks
using common materials, and attacks using radiological dispersal devices.
This question is intended to give a fuller picture of al Qaeda as well as elicit information
on how successful U.S. counterterrorism efforts have been since 9/11.
2. What precautions did al Qaeda take to prevent us from learning about attacks before
they were carried out?
Infrastructure
2. How significant is the loss of the Afghan training camps? How is al Qaeda currently
conducting training?
Al Qaeda camps primarily provided military training, not terrorist training. Terrorist
operatives such as the 9/11 hijackers took specialized courses which were not available
within the standard camp structure.
3. How many people went through bin Ladin's training camps prior to 9/11? Do we know
their current status?
This question helps to understand the magnitude of the threat. Estimates range from
10,000 to 100,000. The trainees returned to their countries and could be activated to
conduct attacks against U.S. interests.
Popular Support
How much support does Bin Ladin/al Qaeda have in the Muslim world? Is his support
increasing or decreasing? What is the source of his appeal?
A survey recently cited in the Washington Post claimed that 49% of Saudi citizens have a
favorable opinion of Bin Ladin's sermons and rhetoric, although less than 5% would
support his becoming "President of the Arabian Peninsula."
Iran
1. Did Iran provide safe passage for al Qaeda operatives traveling to and from
Afghanistan?
Several sources, as well as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, have stated that
Iran has provided safe passage to al Qaeda operatives and senior officials. Documents
retrieved from possible al Qaeda safehouses refer to a "safe passage" arrangement,
although the documents also indicate the arrangement was no longer in force after 9/11.
2. Are there al Qaeda members in Iran now? If so, are there any Iranian-imposed limits
on their actions?
Press reporting indicates that Iran has a number of senior al Qaeda officials under "house
arrest," although the Iranian government has not provided the U.S. with their identities
(Newsweek has reported that Saif al-Adel, head of al Qaeda's Military Committee, and
Saad Bin Ladin are among them).
3. Other than the training in the early 90s described in the staff statement, are you aware
of any additional ties between al Qaeda and Hezbollah?
Saudi Arabia
1. Did the Saudi government or any members of the Royal Family provide al Qaeda with
operational support or direct funding?
Team 4 has found no evidence to indicate that the Saudi government or senior officials
within the Saudi government directly funded al Qaeda. Our staff statement indicates that
"some governments" may have turned a blind eye to al Qaeda fundraising, and that al
Qaeda found fertile fundraising ground in Saudi Arabia.
2. What is your sense of al Qaeda's ethnic composition prior to 9/11? Did any particular
nationalities predominate? If so, why do you think that was the case?
From its start, Saudi and Yemeni nationals seem to have found Al Qaeda's message
especially compelling. At least before 9/11, they apparently formed the bulk of its
members.
Pakistan
We have found that ISID was the main distributor of Pakistani government support to the
Taliban. Given the close ties between the Taliban and al Qaeda, ISID support to al Qaeda
is possible but so far unproven. Support by individual ISID and former ISID personnel
seems much more likely. In the wake of 9/11, the Pakistani government broke off its
support for the Taliban. This suggests that whatever ISID- al Qaeda relationship may
have existed also ended. However, there are indications that some individual ISID
personnel may have assisted al Qaeda members to flee Afghanistan.
Iraq
1. Did the Iraqi regime ever consider offering Bin Ladin safe haven?
2. Prior to 9/11, was there operational support or cooperation between Bin Ladin and
Saddam Hussein? Did this change after 9/11?
The reporting on this subject is generally unreliable, sparse, and contradictory. A number
of recent analytic documents (like the Feith memo) have argued that a relationship did
exist between the two. According to what the staff has seen, the best that can be said is
that any relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq extended no farther than "sporadic, low-
level contacts," and even that is hard to pin down.
1. Did the CIA fund Bin Ladin during the Soviet War in Afghanistan?
Conflict diamonds are mined in war zones and sold covertly to support warlords or rebel
groups. Many conflict diamonds come from Sierra Leone, Angola, or Liberia and were
used to finance the rebel causes in those countries. Several sources claim al Qaeda used
these diamonds to fund terrorist efforts, although we have found this to be
unsubstantiated.
Af
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
Ms. Deborah Mary Doran
Richard Ben-Veniste Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fred F. Fielding J. Edgar Hoover Building
Jamie S. Gorelick
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535-0001
Slade Gorton
Dear Ms. Doran:
Bob Kerrey
John F. Lehman The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States will
hold a public hearing on June 16,2004, in Washington, DC on the 9/11 Plot.
Timothy J. Roemer
You are invited to testify at these proceedings at 8:30 - 10:00 a.m. on
James R. Thompson Wednesday, June 16.
This session will be the sixth in the Commission's 2004 investigative hearing
Philip D. Zelikow
Y—'.UTIVE DIRECTOR schedule, which will collectively advance the Commission's efforts to produce
an authoritative account of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
September 11,2001 terrorist attacks. At this hearing, the Commission will
examine the nature of the enemy that carried out the 9/11 plot. We look
forward to your testimony on the following topics:
• The current status of the al Qaeda network, and the threat that it and
similar groups pose to the United States.
We ask that you submit comprehensive written testimony and provide your
statement via e-mail to Melissa Coffey at mcoffey@9-l lcommission.gov by
9:00 a.m. on June 9,2004. Your foil statement will be made part of the record
and carefully studied by the Commission.
We would also ask that you limit your oral remarks to five minutes, so that we
may highlight what we expect will be a highly fruitful interchange with you.
In addition to summarizing your written testimony, your oral statement should
highlight what you believe to be most important for the Commission and the
public to understanding about the enemy. All witnesses at this and future
Commission hearings will be asked to testify under oath.
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
The Honorable Patrick J. Fitzgerald
Richard Ben-Veniste U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
U.S. Attorney's Office
Fred F. Fielding
219 South Dearborn, Suite 500
Jamie S. Gorelick Chicago, IL 60604
• The current status of the al Qaeda network, and the threat that it and
similar groups pose to the United States.
We ask that you submit comprehensive written testimony and provide your
statement via e-mail to Melissa Coffey at mcoffey@9-l lcommission.gov by
9:00 a.m. on June 9,2004. Your full statement will be made part of the record
and carefully studied by the Commission.
We would also ask that you limit your oral remarks to five minutes, so that we
may highlight what we expect will be a highly fruitful interchange with you.
In addition to summarizing your written testimony, your oral statement should
highlight what you believe to be most important for the Commission and the
public to understanding about the enemy. All witnesses at this and future
Commission hearings will be asked to testify under oath.
A*
Thomas H. Kean Lee H. Hamilton
Chair Vice Chair
RG: 148
Box: 00017 Folder: 0049 Documents
Series: Team 1A Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 2
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 341
Withdrawn: 08-14-2008 by: