Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rajesh De
Ernest May
Matt Levitt
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TEAM #1
Item 1: Key Questions
I. Lines of Inquiry and Key Questons
A. We propose to organize our initial research around three over-arching questions,
which will be used as principal lines of inquiry:
1. What is the history of al Qaeda and its linkages to other terrorist entities prior
to the 9/11 attacks?
2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of all evidence
now available—synthesizing the information available earlier with that
obtained post-9/11—regarding the planning, preparation, financing, and
execution of the 9/11 attacks?
3. What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and its affiliated
entities and what threat do they now pose?
Each of these lines of inquiry is a building block that encompasses many specific
component questions. We can identify some of these component questions at the outset
of the research, and they are listed below as a means of focusing the initiation of our
research. However, new component questions will emerge from our discoveries as our
research progresses. Thus, one of the aims of the initial research is to identify additional
key component questions for our research. One of the crosscutting issues to which we
will pay close attention is al Qaeda's collaborative relationships and connections with
various other entities because these factors will be critical in assessing al Qaeda's means
and capabilities for future attacks.
B. The following is a list of some of the key component questions that will be the focus of
our initial research:
1. What is the history of al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack?
a. What are al Qaeda's origins, ideological roots, doctrines, and
worldview, and how have they evolved over time? Who have been its
key functionaries? How has it recruited personnel?
b. What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al Qaeda, either
operating alone or in collaboration with other terrorist groups? How
were they carried out?
c. With what other terrorist groups has al Qaeda been affiliated, either
in collaborative operations or through funding and logistical support?
d. How has al Qaeda functioned organizationally and financially?
e. What have been its relationships with governments or government
components acting outside the purview of their own political
leadership, including, but not limited to those governments or
factions that provided al Qaeda with support and sanctuary?
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We will start our research on the first line of inquiry—in effect, the construction of
"base building block"—in the 1989-1990 time frame, when Usama bin Laden's "base"
ror "al Qaeda" was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, and bin Laden himself returned to Saudi
Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in
1990, bin Laden began his tirades against the "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world
and called for the expulsion of the American "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites"
of Islam. In 1991 bin Laden moved his base to Sudan. Some context:
During this time frame several major terrorist operations took place in which bin
Laden is known to have been involved, as well as additional attacks for which there
is evidence of, at least, bin Laden's support. These attacks include the 1992
bombing of a hotel in Yemen where American troops on their way to Somalia were
staying; the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC I); the "Day
of Terror" plot, targeted at New York City landmarks, a plot that was broken up by
law enforcement in June 1993; the 1995 "Bojinka Plot" in Manila, which included
plans to blow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean, assassinate the Pope and the
U.S. president, and fly an airplane laden with explosives into the CIA's
headquarters; and the 1995 bombing of the Saudi National Guard building in
Riyadh that killed five U.S. soldiers. In addition, although the attacks on the
American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did not take place until August 1998,
the planning was already well underway while bin Laden was residing in Sudan and
he reportedly reviewed the plans for the attacks and the reconnaissance photos
used for those plans.
The multiple connections between these operations offer insights into the evolving
structure of al Qaeda. For example, Wadih el-Hage served as bin Laden's personal
secretary while the al Qaeda leader was based in Sudan. Prior to that, from 1991
to 1992 El-Hage headed a so-called charitable organization in New York City that
ostensibly raised funds for veterans of the Afghan jihad; the organization had
previously raised funds to support those fighters during the jihad. While in New
York City El-Hage also had contact with at least one of the participants in WTC I
and he was later convicted for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings. Similarly,
Ramzi Yousef, who managed WTC I, escaped after the attack and ended up in
Manila, where he worked with future 9/11 commander Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
on the 1995 Bojinka Plot.
Our research will then follow bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of 1996 and the
establishment of his infrastructure there. We will focus on one of the key developmental lines
during this period, the further expansion of al Qaeda's global reach through recruitment,
indoctrination, training and the dispersal of its cells, at least some of which played critical roles
in the later 9/11 attacks. Some context:
Al Qaeda's base and operational infrastructure expanded by a significant order of
magnitude after bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in 1996, entrenching its "army"
infrastructure of bases for training in weapons, tactics, and production of explosive
devices. This infrastructure also provided centers for ideological indoctrination and
for screening the ranks to spot and vet individuals for the inner cadre of terrorist
cells. This was the source of a large portion of the individuals dispatched to form
cells in cities around the globea process vividly demonstrated in what we now
know about many of the 9/11 hijackers.
The home base in Afghanistan also facilitated sequestered gatherings for strategic
and operational planning, and for collaboration sessions with leaders of other
terrorist groups. We now understand that a significant expansion of consortium
arrangements with other terrorists took place from the Afghan bases. For example,
there is evidence that al Qaeda collaborated with two Asian terrorist groups in
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attacks carried out in Manila and Jakarta in December 2000. This same connection
was used to set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur,
including individuals who would later be involved in the attack on the USS Cole in
October 2000, the 9/11 attacks, and in the October 2002 Bali bombing.
Similarly, a report released by the Singapore police reveals that the Southeast
Asian terrorist organization Jema'ah Islamiyya planned to provide the foot soldiers
for the aborted suicide strikes planned for Manila and Jakarta in early 2002; al
Qaeda leaders made the strategic planning decisions at meetings in Afghanistan
and provided the financing ana much of the target reconnaissance.
Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing the
planning, preparation, financing and execution of the 9/11 attacks in rigorous detail from its
origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging newly developed
intelligence (including findings emerging from the research on al Qaeda's origins and
development) with information from existing sources. Our specific objectives include the
identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities, including possible links with state
sponsors. These links could be a major part of the threat al Qaeda poses in the future. Some
context:
Evidence now available indicates that the concept of using aircraft as weapons-
crashing them into major sites—was raised with top al Qaeda leaders as far back
as the mid-1990's, at the same time the Manila-based Boiinka Plot was underway.
Some have also theorized that the concept of employing hijackers with pilot
training evolved from the failed attempt of Algerian hijackers to force pilots to
steer a hijacked aircraft into the Eiffel Tower in 1995. The process of selecting
individuals for piloting the aircraft, bringing together the operational teams,
moving the financial support for the training and maintenance of the teams, and,
most notably, coordinating the actions of the diverse components of the attack-
entering the United States from both sides of the continent, and coordinating the
implementation of the plot with flights from three major airports—are prima facie
indications of the linchpin role of the "central staff" of al Qaeda's inner circle.
The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing specific areas of focus and
identifying sources for pursuing the third line of inquiry: What has happened to al Qaeda in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the intensified worldwide coalition in a war against terrorism,
and, of even greater importance, what this reveals about al Qaeda's present composition and
its threat to the United States.
The research on al Qaeda's earlier developments will naturally feed into the understanding of
al Qaeda's current situation. However, we plan to step back at various intervals to examine
what specific component questions and branches of inquiry have emerged from our research
into al Qaeda's evolution and use these questions to sharpen our focus on the current threat.
TEAM #1
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L JFBI Headquarters)
Michael Rolince (FBI Headquarters)
Pasquale J. D'Am.uro (Deputy Executive Assistant Director, FBI)
JFBI New York)
Scholars and Outside Experts
Bruce Hoffman (RAND Corporation)
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Daniel-Benjamin (CSIS)
Zachary Abouza
Bernard Lewis
Richard Clarke (former Chair, CSG, NSC) \a Bodine (former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
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