Provisional Remedies Preliminary Attachment (Mangila vs CA) Preliminary attachment has 3 stages: first, the court issues the

order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. owever, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have ac!uired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the "ourt will not bind the defendant. (Chuidian vs Sandiganbayan) #upervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule. $hen the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant%s cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with #ection &' of the same rule (Du vs Stronghold Insurance) A levy on e(ecution duly registered ta)es preference over a prior unregistered sale; and that even if the prior sale is subse!uently registered before the sale in e(ecution but after the levy was duly made, the validity of the e(ecution sale should be maintained, because it retroacts to the date of the levy; otherwise, the preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory. (Wenceslao vs Readycon Trading) *f the applicant for a preliminary attachment is found by the court to be entitled as such, then no damages may be recovered by adverse party resulting from such attachment. +he attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. ,oreover, the filing of a counter-bond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by the attaching party creditor instead of the other way, which in most instances li)e in the present case, would re!uire presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot easily be settled in a pending incident of the case. Preliminary *njunction (Idolor vs CA) *njunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. .efore an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following re!uisites be present: &/ there must be a right in esse or the e(istence of a right to be protected; '/ the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. ence the e(istence of a right violated, is a prere!uisite to the granting of an injunction. *njunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the e(istence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the e(istence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. +he controlling reason for the e(istence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. *t is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious conse!uences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. *t is always a ground for denying injunction that the party see)ing it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought 0filed beyond redemption period/. +he possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual e(isting right is not aground for an injunction. ( ustilo vs Real) $e do not see how the complainant%s e(ercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order 1to maintain the status !uo.1 $e see no reason to disagree with the finding of the 2"A that the evident purpose of the second +32 was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the 4iga ng mga .arangay. (!WWA vs Chave") +he status !uo should be that e(isting at the time of the filing of the case. +he status !uo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. +he status !uo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is e(isting at the time of the filing of the case. *ndubitably, the trial court must not ma)e use of its injunctive power to alter such status. $hat is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ can not be effectuated to establish new relations between the parties. (#imitless Potential vs CA)

,alice or lac) of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. +his must be so, because to re!uire malice as a prere!uisite would ma)e the filing of a bond a useless formality. +he dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues. +hus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioner5s main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the bond. +he injunction bond is answerable for all damages suffered by reason only of the issuance of the writ 3eceivership (Sy $ong %u vs CA) 3eceivership, which is admittedly a harsh remedy, should be granted with e(treme caution. #ound bases therefor must appear on record, and there should be a clear showing of its necessity. +he need for a receivership in the case under consideration can be gleaned from the aforecited dis!uisition by the "ourt of Appeals finding that the properties of the partnership were in danger of being damaged or lost on account of certain acts of the appointed manager in li!uidation. (#arrobis vs Phil &eterans 'an() $hen a ban) is prohibited from continuing to do business by the "entral .an) and a receiver is appointed for such ban), that ban) would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept new deposits. owever, the receiver of the ban) is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the ban), which debts form part of the assets of the ban). +he receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation of the ban) under receivership, and ta)e steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the receiver of the ban) is obliged to collect pre-e(isting debts due to the ban), and in connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing such debts. ence, Prescription will still run against the ban) under receivership. A ban) is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver. owever, the ban) may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect the assets of such ban) and to safeguard its assets. (Aguilar vs Manila 'an(ing) .esides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners5 position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their obligation when respondent was placed under receivership. $hen a ban) is placed under receivership, it would only not be able to do new business, that is, to grant new loans or to accept new deposits. owever, the receiver of the ban) is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the ban), which debts form part of the assets of the ban). +hus, petitioners5 obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent was placed under receivership. +he respondents5 receivership is an e(traneous circumstance and has no effect on petitioners5 obligation. 3eplevin (!rosa vs CA) *f recovery of personal property is not possible, the applicant may recover its e!uivalent in money. ($ang vs &alde") +he provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who see)s immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. *t suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words of #ection ', 3ule 67, 1entitled to the possession thereof.1 ence, after defendant had been duly represented by counsel even at the inception of the service of summons and a copy of the order of replevin on 8anuary 9, &:;<, defendant +homas =ang had already been duly served, especially so, when counsel manifested in their comment to the opposition filed by plaintiffs that ,anuel =ap has been duly authori>ed to represent +homas =ang. From then on defendant should have been on guard as to the provision of #ection 6, 3ule 67 of the 3ules of "ourt: the five 0</ days period within which to file the counter-replevin for the approval of the court, counted from the actual ta)ing of the property by the officer or the sheriff on 8anuary 9, &:;<. (Su)erlines Trans)ortation vs P*C) Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was towed by respondents on the re!uest of 4opera. *t was thus not distrained or ta)en for a ta( assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or sei>ed under a writ of e(ecution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis. *t is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. .ut the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, sei>ed in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and sei>ures or its accepted e(ceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. As the "ourt said in +amisin v. 2dejar, 1A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial e(ecutive officer in pursuance of his e(ecution of a legal writ.1 2nly when property is lawfully ta)en by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.

#upport (De Asis vs CA) +he right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. +he agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent%s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. *t violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. (Peo)le vs Manahan) 2n the matter of ac)nowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a !uo is in order. Article 3?< of +he 3evised Penal "ode provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to 1ac)nowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so,1 and 1in every case to support the offspring.1 *n the case before us, compulsory ac)nowledgment of the child ,elanie +ibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this "ourt in People v. @uerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recogni>e the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.1 "onse!uently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. *n any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law. (#o)e" vs CA) An passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioner is not without remedy. For as what he see)s to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide, he can file a motion with the trial court for its modification since a judgment granting support never becomes final. S)ecial Civil Action *nterpleader (+ternal ardens vs IAC) Bnder the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner%s objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having as)ed for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only re!uired by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the 4and Cevelopment Program. As correctly observed by the "ourt of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and e!uity: Dthat the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the e(pense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.E (Wac(,-ac( ol. / Country vs #ee Won) +he remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and ha>ard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with )nowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to ta)e the chances for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the conse!uences of defeat. +o permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he as)s may be ta)en from his own. (Mesina vs IAC) "onsidering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent ban) merely too) the necessary precaution not to ma)e a mista)e as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. *t has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by respondent ban) because petitioner and 8ose @o were both laying their claims on the chec), petitioner as)ing payment thereon and 8ose @o as the purchaser or owner. .an) filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because petitioner is laying claim to the same chec) that @o is claiming. 2n the very day that the ban) instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated .an) vs. 8ose @o and 8ohn Coe, but later on changed to ,arcelo A. ,esina for 8ohn Coe when his name became )nown to respondent ban). Ceclaratory 3elief (&elarde vs S0S) +he essential re!uisites: 0&/ there is a justiciable controversy; 0'/ the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; 03/ the party see)ing the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and 0?/ the issue is ripe for judicial determination. *n special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. +he reason for this e(ception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Fevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened. (Tambunting vs Sumabat)

$here the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. *n other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Bnder such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to e(plain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. ence prescription would still run (Almeda vs 'athala M(tg) 3e!uisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: &/ the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, e(ecutive order or regulation, or ordinance; '/ the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and re!uire judicial construction; 3/ there must have been no breach of the documents in !uestion; ?/ there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the Dripening seedsE of one between persons whose interests are adverse; </ the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6/ ade!uate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. (1a-asa(i Port Services vs Amores) *t is easy to see in the instant case, that what is sought is a declaration not only that private respondent is a corporation for there is no dispute on that matter but also that it is separate and distinct from ".F. #harp Gabushi)i Gaisha and therefore, not liable for the latter%s indebtedness. *t is evident that monetary obligations does not, in any way, refer to status, lights and obligations. 2bligations are more or less temporary, but status is relatively permanent. .ut more importantly, as cited in the case of 0Cy Poco v. "ommissioner of *mmigration, et al., &6 #"3A 6&; H&:66I/, the prevailing rule is that 1where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status and other relations, commonly e(pressed in written instrument, the case is not one for declaratory judgment.1 +hus, considering the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason to adhere to the principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where judgment would have to be made, only after a judicial investigation of disputed issues. *n fact, private respondent itself perceives that petitioners may even see) to pierce the veil of corporate identity. (Dy Poco vs Commissioner o. immigration) $here a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly e(pressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment.E And, here, the material issues are the citi>enship of the mother and the illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and status of the latter which are sought to be declared are dependent upon those disputed issues. A declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would have to be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed facts. (Adla-an vs IAC) +his action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invo)ed by them. "onse!uently, in such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an e(ecutory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. owever, the "ourt has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are sufficient to ma)e out a case for specific performance or recovery of property with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the evidence. +his decisional rule applies to the case at bar. "ertiorari (#lam"on vs #ogronio) $hile the general rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must have filed a motion for reconsideration of the act or order complained of, the "ourt has dispensed with this re!uirement in several instances. +hus, a previous motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is necessary unless: 0i/ the issue raised is one purely of law; 0ii/ public interest is involved; 0iii/ there is urgency; 0iv/ a !uestion of jurisdiction is s!uarely raised before and decided by the lower court; and 0v/ the order is a patent nullity. (Insular #i.e vs Serrano) +he courts do not interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the specificity and ade!uacy of the averments in a criminal complaint. +he determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an e(ecutive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the #ecretary of 8ustice. +he duty of the "ourt in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the e(ecutive determination was done without or in e(cess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 3esolutions of the #ecretary of 8ustice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse. At any rate, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.

Arroneous inferences of fact or conclusions of law are correctable by certiorari only if they are of such a degree as to amount to a clear case of abuse of discretion of the grave and malevolent )ind. (Tua"on vs Register o. Deeds o. Caloocan) +hese acts may thus be properly struc) down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in e(cess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. #ince ,r. ,arcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone )nows, being vested in the #upreme "ourt and such inferior courts as may be established by law, the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. +he acts were completely alien to his office as chief e(ecutive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. (Torres vs Aguinaldo) .y grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical e(ercise of judgment as is e!uivalent to lac) of jurisdiction. +he abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is e(ercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. ,andamus (#icaros vs Sandiganbayan) ,andamus is a proper recourse for citi>ens who see) to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the "onstitution. +o reiterate, the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed under the fundamental law. "orrelatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the "onstitution, to speedily dispose of the case before it. +hus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by the "onstitution, e(peditious action from all officials who are tas)ed with the administration of justice. *deally, a petition for mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial but not of a discretionary duty. ,ore specifically, persons or public officials may be directed to act with or to e(ercise discretion, but not as to how that discretion should be e(ercised. owever, our jurisprudence is replete with e(ceptions in this matter. +hus, it has been held that in a case where there is 1gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable e(cess of authority,1 the writ may be issued to control precisely the e(ercise of such discretion. (2P 'oard o. Regents vs #igot,Telan) ,andamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being re!uired. *t is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty re!uires the e(ercise of discretion or judgment. (#acson vs Pere") $hen there are surfeit of other remedies which can be availed of, prohibition and mandamus are improper. *t is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. ,andamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award Juo $arranto (Calle3a vs Panday) #ection &0a/ of 3ule 66 of the present 3ules no longer contains the phrase 1or an office in a corporation created by authority of law1 which was found in the old 3ules. "learly, the present 3ule 66 only applies to actions of !uo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of 3.A. Fo. ;9::. *t is, therefore, +he *nterim 3ules of Procedure @overning *ntra"orporate "ontroversies Bnder 3.A. Fo. ;9:: 0hereinafter the *nterim 3ules/ which applies to the petition for !uo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being !uestioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of #t. 8ohn ospital, *ncorporated. (Mendo"a vs Allas) 2rdinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. +his rule, however, is not applicable in !uo warranto cases. A judgment in !uo warranto does not bind the respondent%s successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. +his follows from the nature of the writ of !uo warranto itself. *t is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authori>ed to perform any act in, or e(ercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. *n the case at bar, the petition for !uo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. $hat was threshed out before the trial court was the !ualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent 3ay

Allas, not against @odofredo 2lores. +he "ourt of Appeals did not err in denying e(ecution of the trial court%s decision. A(propriation (City o. Manila vs Serrano) +hus, a writ of possession may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for e(propriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount e!uivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to e(propriation. Bpon compliance with these re!uirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. *n this case, these re!uirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession. (*AP!C!R vs CA) 2rdinarily, the dismissal of the e(propriation case restores possession of the e(propriated land to the landowner. owever, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. +he Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to FP". Pobre has completely lost the Property as if FP" had physically ta)en over the entire 6;,:6: s!uaremeter Property. +his case ceased to be an action for e(propriation when FP" dismissed its complaint for e(propriation. #ince this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the 3ules of "ourt on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable. $e have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural re!uirements. FP"%s ta)ing of Pobre%s property without filing the appropriate e(propriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. (Re)ublic vs Phil,&ille Dev4) +o stress, payment of just compensation is not a condition sine !ua non to the issuance of an order of e(propriation. *n e(propriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land e(propriated that must wait until the indemnity is actually paid. (Re)ublic vs Andaya) 1+a)ing,1 in the e(ercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. Foreclosure of 3eal Astate ,ortgage (Dayot vs Shell Chemical) +he obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an e(tra-judicial foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property ceases to be ministerial once it is shown that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor and that such third party is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the e(-parte writ of possession was applied for. (Service-ide S)ecialist vs CA) +he mortgagor must be impleaded in a replevin suit for recovery of mortgaged property and not just the possessor. ,ortgagee must establish a clear right first before he may be entitled to possession of property and this is only possible when mortgagor is impleaded. ence, the mortgagor is an indispensable party. (2nion'an( vs CA) *t is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. "onsolidation too) place as a matter of right since there was no redemption of the foreclosed property. Fotice to the mortgagors, and with more reason, to private respondents who are not even parties to the mortgage contract nor to the e(tra judicial sale, is not necessary. (Ardiente vs Provincial Sheri..) *t is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in e(tra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. ('PI vs &eloso) .ona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption period fi(ed by law can easily be circumvented. *n order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the redemption price composed of the following: 0&/ the price which the purchaser paid for the property; 0'/ interest of &K per month on the purchase price; 03/ the amount of any assessments or ta(es which the purchaser may have paid on the property after the purchase; and 0?/ interest of &K per month on such assessments and ta(es.

3edemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a !uestion of payment or valid tender of the full redemption price within said period. Partition (%eirs o. Teves vs CA) Avery act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an e(change, a compromise, or any other transaction. Forcible Antry and Bnlawful Cetainer (C R Cor) vs Treyes) An independent action may be filed for actions for damages arising from incidents occurring after dispossession (#arano vs Calendacion) *n unlawful detainer, ' re!uisites must be present: 0a/ there must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the "ontract to #ell; and 0b/ there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in #ection ' of 3ule 97. (Raymundo vs 'andong) 2nly possession is the issue in an ejectment suit (Re.ugia vs CA) An ejectment suit is limited only to the issue of possession, even when appealed to the 3+" (0avelosa vs CA) +he issue of ownership is different from the issue of possession, hence, the filing of a case before the 3+" !uestioning ownership does not preclude the filing before the ,+" of an ejectment suit !uestioning possession. "ontempt (0udge +s)anol vs 5ormoso) A person accused of indirect contempt may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel (Montenegro vs Montenegro) $hen the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time, the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioner5s absence. (Sison vs Caoibes 0r4) "ontempt is improper if issued against a person that has no interest or relation to a case, especially if such person is not a party to the case. ($asay vs Recto) "ontempt parta)es of the nature of a criminal offense. +he e(oneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an ac!uittal from which an appeal would not lie. S)ecial Proceedings #ettlement of Astates (De #eon vs CA) A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon !uestions of title provisionally. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. *f there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (&alarao vs Pascual) $hether the probate court e(ercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion as to how to appoint an administrator. As to possession, the law e(plicitly authori>es him to ta)e possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. "learly, the special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the primary and independent discretion of )eeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration. Partisan possession e(ercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator under the 3ules of "ourt. (2nion 'an( vs Santibane")

+hus, in e(ecuting any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an e(tra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. +he money claim must be filed against the decedent5s estate in the probate court. +he rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. +he law strictly re!uires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent%s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Admund as co-ma)er of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Admund may have as against the petitioner. (0amero vs *elicor) +he appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the 3+" and nonappealable. owever, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the 3+" committed grave abuse of discretion or lac) of or in e(cess of jurisdiction. (#ee vs RTC o. 6C) +he sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. (+state o. Rui" vs CA) @randchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent%s estate. +he law clearly limits the allowance to 1widow and children1 and does not e(tend it to the deceased%s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. (San #uis vs San #uis) +he word 1resides1 should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. *t signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. *n this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 3esidence simply re!uires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile re!uires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to ma)e it one5s domicile. Fo particular length of time of residence is re!uired though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. , there is a distinction between 1residence1 for purposes of election laws and 1residence1 for purposes of fi(ing the venue of actions. (Pila)il vs %eirs o. Ma7imino 'riones) *t should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the e(istence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. Ascheats (Alvarico vs Sola) Aven assuming that respondent Amelita #ola ac!uired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the #tate can institute reversion proceedings under #ec. &7& of the Public 4and Act. *n other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. (Caro vs Sucaldito) 3eversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land bac) to the government under the 3egalian doctrine. "onsidering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. *n this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance. @uardianship (Cani"a vs CA) $hile it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Astradas. +hat action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have ta)en her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar. ( oyena vs #edesma, ustilo) *n the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. Adoption (Cang vs CA)

*t would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. +here should be a holistic approach to the matter, ta)ing into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. +hat a husband is not e(actly an upright man is not, strictly spea)ing, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. +he discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but li)ewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. (In the matter o. ado)tion o. Ste)hanie *athy Astorga arcia) *t is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. +he interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. ence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, li)e #tephanie, to use, as middle name her mother5s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. (Re)ublic vs CA / Caranto) As to the correction of name, the trial court erred in upholding the same for failure to abide the procedure provided under 3ule &7;, 3ules of "ourt. $hile there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with 3ule ::, sec. ?. *n that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Fothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. +he local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, conse!uently, of the opportunity to be heard. 0+his rule has now been abandoned/ (Re)ublic vs %ernande") +he creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee%s registered "hristian or first name. +he automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Feither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. 0+his rule has now been abandoned/ (&da de 0acob vs CA) +he burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. +his 3espondent Pilapil failed to do. ,oreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham. abeas "orpus 0*llusorio vs .ildner/ abeas "orpus is not available to the wife to secure the custody of her husband, who voluntary chose not to cohabit with her. 0#erapio vs #andiganbayan/ A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one%s right to bail. *t cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even e(ercised said discretion. +he proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed. +he issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the #andiganbayan%s resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. +he recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail. 04acson vs Pere>/ +he issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. 0Pulido vs Abu/ owever, for filing a Petition for abeas "orpus despite the pendency of the Petition for "ertiorari that !uestioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for abeas "orpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. As lucidly e(plained by the "ourt of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of @on>ales and ,esa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for abeas "orpus because the relief he is see)ing therein is the same relief he is as)ing for in the certiorari case. ,oreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether @on>ales and ,esa should be released on bail. .ecause of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the sameLsimilar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case 1petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping. 0#angca vs "ity Prosecutor of "ebu "ity/ $hen the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a $rit of effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. abeas "orpus was filed is

$rit if Amparo and abeas Cata 0"anlas vs FAP*"2 omeowners/ +heir claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and e(ecutory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. +here is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. .esides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners5 claim to the land in !uestion is not alleged in the petition at all. +he "ourt can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. Fo writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. 0+apu> vs del 3osario/ +he writ is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an e(traordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing 3ules, or as a remedy supplemental to these 3ules. $hat it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Feither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. "hange of Fame 0Aleosida vs 4ocal "ivil 3egistrar of J"/ *f the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. *f the rectification affects the civil status, citi>enship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Aven substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under 3ule &7; provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party%s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 03epublic vs Gho/ $hile the jurisdictional re!uirements of 3ule &73 0which governs petitions for change of name/ were not complied with, observance of the provisions of 3ule &7; suffices to effect the correction sought for. +he mista)e is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding. 0Gilosbayan Foundation vs Armita/ Fo substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citi>enship status is a substantial change. #ubstantial corrections to the nationality or citi>enship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under 3ule &7; of the 3ules of "ourt, not under 3A :7?;. 03epublic vs "apote/ A proceeding is adversarial where the party see)ing relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. +he fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it ma)e the proceeding less adversarial in nature. (Petition .or change o. name o. 0ulian lim Carulason Wang) *n the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. owever, how such change of name would ma)e his integration into #ingaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. +hat the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. *n addition, petitioner is only a minor. "onsidering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. (Ceruilla vs Delantar) All matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under 3ule &7; of the 3ules of "ourt which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the "ivil 3egistry. +hus, the petition filed by the "eruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to #ection 30c/, 3ule & and 3ule &7; of the 3ules of "ourt. #ummons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the re!uirements of fair play and due process. +vidence Preliminary "onsiderations (Peo)le vs 5etalino) +he evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be limited to the statements made in open court; rather, it should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. *n every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties.

10

(!ng Chia vs Re)ublic) +he rule on formal offer of evidence 03ule &3', sec. 3?/ now being invo)ed by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturali>ation. +he only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is 1practicable and convenient.1 ence the acceptance of additional evidence by the appellate court does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. (Peo)le vs &alde") *t is a matter of judicial e(perience that an affidavit, being ta)en e(-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. +o be sure, a sworn statement ta)en e( parte is generally considered to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross e(amination. (8ulueta vs CA) +he constitutional injunction declaring 1the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable1 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife 0who thin)s herself aggrieved by her husband%s infidelity/ who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. +he only e(ception to the prohibition in the "onstitution is if there is a 1lawful order Hfrom aI court or when public safety or order re!uires otherwise, as prescribed by law.1 2ne thing is freedom of communication; !uite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one )nows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. (Peo)le vs $atar) Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Bnder Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its e(istence or non-e(istence. Applying the above test to the case at bar, the CFA evidence obtained through P"3 testing and utili>ing #+3 analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a !uo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. (Peo)le vs Sartagoda) $hat need not be proved (Re)ublic vs CA) A court will ta)e judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. *n addition judicial notice will be ta)en of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. 8udicial notice will also be ta)en of court personnel. (Peo)le vs 1ulais) +rue, as a general rule, courts should not ta)e judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. +his is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-e(amine the witnesses against him. (#aureano vs CA) As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine "ourts do not ta)e judicial notice of the laws of #ingapore. +he defendant that claims the applicability of the #ingapore 4aws to this case has the burden of proof. +he defendant has failed to do so. +herefore, the Philippine law should be applied. (Processual Presumption) (#'P vs 'anal) $ell-settled is the rule that courts are not authori>ed to ta)e judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. +hey may only do so 1in the absence of objection1 and 1with the )nowledge of the opposing party,1 which are not obtaining here. (Re)ublic lass Cor) vs 6ua) A party may ma)e judicial admissions in 0a/ the pleadings filed by the parties, 0b/ during the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or 0c/ in other stages of the judicial proceeding. +o constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. *f made in another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight. (%abagat rill vs DMC,2rban Pro)erty) *ndeed, municipal courts may ta)e judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit. #uch notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. +he location of abagat @rill cannot be resolved by merely ta)ing judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation Fo. '7; such location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case.

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(Clarion Printing vs *#RC) A court will ta)e judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. *n addition judicial notice will be ta)en of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. 8udicial notice will also be ta)en of court personnel. Rules o. Admissibility 2bject Avidence (Peo)le vs Rulle)a) A person%s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court, as provided in #ection &, 3ule &37. (Peo)le vs 2l"oron) #uch pieces of object evidence indeed are more elo!uent than a hundred witnesses. +he fact of carnal )nowledge is not disputed. *t was positively established through the offended party%s own testimony and corroborated by that of her e(amining physician (Macarrubo vs Macarrubo) +he saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer in those submitted in evidence by complainant, which show a typical happy family with respondent essaying out his role as a husband to complainant and a father to their two )ids. Cocumentary Avidence (De &era vs Aguilar) All originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. +his, petitioners failed to do. 3ecords show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies. (Citi'an( Mastercard vs Teodoro) .efore a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: 0&/ the e(istence or due e(ecution of the original; 0'/ the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and 03/ on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. +he correct order of proof is as follows: e(istence, e(ecution, loss, and contents. (Sison vs Peo)le) +he rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. +he value of this )ind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. +he photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has ta)en. +he correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. +his court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants objected to their admissibility for lac) of proper identification. owever, when the accused presented their evidence, the same photographs were presented to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. +he photographs were adopted by appellants as part of the defense e(hibits. ( arvida vs Sales) Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the "2,A4A" 3ules of Procedure, much less by the 3ules of "ourt. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. *t is, at best, an e(act copy preserving all the mar)s of an original. $ithout the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. *t may, in fact, be a sham pleading. (Cuevas vs Muno") +hus, it is an accepted practice for the re!uesting state to rush its re!uest in the form of a tele( or diplomatic cable, the practically of the use of which in conceded. Aven our own A(tradition 4aw 0P.C. Fo. &76:/ allows the transmission of a re!uest for provisional arrest via telegraph. +here is no re!uirement for the authentication of a re!uest for provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. +he process of preparing a formal re!uest for e(tradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also lea)age-prone. (%eirs o. Saban)an vs Comor)osa) +he facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in @arvida. +he one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but

12

recogni>ed as valid in ban)ing, financial, and business transactions. *f the "ertification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his 2rder. (!rtanes vs CA) when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. "onsidering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. (#a)u,la)u 5oundation vs CA) $hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Avidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. $hile parol evidence is admissible to e(plain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mista)e. ('orillo vs CA) (Cru" vs CA) (Peo)le vs olimlim) *t is now universally accepted that intellectual wea)ness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. (Peo)le vs Castaneda) $hen an offense directly attac)s, or directly and vitally impairs the "onjugal 3elation, it comes within the e(ception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other e(cept in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other. $ith more reason must the e(ception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. +a)en collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tran!uility which may be disturbed. ('ordalba vs CA) +he dead man5s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his )nowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. (Ra"on vs CA) +he case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late 8uan "huidian to recover shares of stoc) in A. 3a>on, *nc. allegedly owned by the late 8uan +. "huidian. *t is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the dead man statute. +he case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder "huidian. (Sunga,Chan vs Chua) .ut before this rule can be successfully invo)ed to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: &. +he witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted; '. +he action is against an e(ecutor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. +he subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; ?. is testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.1 +wo reasons forestall the application of the 1Cead ,an%s #tatute1 to this case. First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the 1Cead ,an%s #tatute1. #econd, the testimony of 8osephine is not covered by the 1Cead ,an%s #tatute1 for the simple reason that she is not 1a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.1 (Peo)le vs Sandiganbayan) *f the client see)s his lawyer%s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be bro)en by the attorney without the client%s consent. +he same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he see)s the lawyer%s advice. . *t is well settled that in order that a communication

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between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. (#im vs CA) (Almonte vs &as9ue") $here the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the "onstitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. Admissions (Ching vs CA) Bnder the 3ules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. $hile they may nonetheless be utili>ed against the pleader as e(trajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. *f not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered. (Peo)le vs audia) A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal )nowledge or perception. +he offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant5s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia. owever, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. (Doldol vs Peo)le) #uch partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. #aid payment is of no moment and could not have legally brought ac!uittal for the appellant. 2n the contrary, as guided by #ection '9, 3ule &37 of the 3ules on Avidence, $e hold that said payment, particularly when ta)en in conjunction with appellant5s commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellant5s guilt that he embe>>led or converted the missing funds to his personal use. (Peo)le vs Cui) For this admission of a co-conspirator to be appreciated, the following re!uisites must be satisfied: a. that the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; b. that the admission relates to the common objects; and c. that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. +he general rule is that e(tra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator made before the formation of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment of its object are inadmissible in evidence as against the other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross-e(amine them. (Peo)le vs arcia) .eing ta)en e(-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and in!uiries. *t has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often e(ecuted when an affiant%s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford her a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to her. "onfessions (#adiana vs Peo)le) Avidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial investigation. +here is no !uestion that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his "ounter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. *t is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not e(acted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. (Peo)le vs 5lores) $here several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. +he e(trajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the testimony given by a co-accused during trial. +he first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against his co-accused who had the right and opportunity to cross-e(amine the declarant. (Peo)le vs Sayaboc) 8urisprudence provides that e(trajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. +he condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional re!uirements safeguarding an accused5s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially

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when the e(trajudicial confession has been denounced. +he rationale for this re!uirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. +herefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible. (Peo)le vs 2lit) Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. +he e(clusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. "onduct and "haracter (Peo)le vs Santos) $e consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the @uerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving )nowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant )new that the particular corner of two 0'/ particular streets in ,anila was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. (Peo)le vs *ardo) Avidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or )nowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the li)e. $hile lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by 4orielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconse!uential. +hey are not as serious as charging one%s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. (Re)ublic vs %eirs o. Ale3aga) A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latter5s )nowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the former5s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. earsay Avidence 3ule (Peo)le vs Montane") +he statement is highly reliable, having been made in e(tremity when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to spea) the truth. (Peo)le vs 'ernal) A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following re!uisites, to wit: 10&/ that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 0'/ that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; 03/ that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and 0?/ that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.1 (Tison vs CA) +he general rule is that where the party claiming see)s recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant%s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. +here must be some independent proof of this fact. As an e(ception, the re!uirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. (0ison vs CA) $e hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly )nown as 1family possessions,1 or those articles which represent, in effect, a family%s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. +hese have been described as objects 1openly e(hibited and well )nown to the family,1 or those 1which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.1 (Peo)le vs Mendo"a) +he test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated with congency by justice 3icardo 8. Francisco thus: whether the act, declaration or e(clamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event which it characteri>es as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. +ested by

15

this standard, the e(tra-judicial admission of accused-appellant was clearly part of the res gestae and therefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against the accused-appellant. (Peo)le vs &illarama) +o be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or subse!uent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. (Peo)le vs Palmones) *n order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. +he following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: 0&/ the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the ma)ing of the statement; 0'/ the place where the statement was made; 03/ the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; 0?/ the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and 0</ the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. +ested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements fail to !ualify as part of the res gestae. (Peo)le vs #obrigas) A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an e(ception to the hearsay rule when the following re!uisites concur: 0&/ the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 0'/ the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 03/ the statements must concern the occurrence in !uestion and its immediately attending circumstances. (PA# vs Ramos) A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection. +he hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, !ualify or characteri>e the act, are admissible as a part of the res gestae. (#ao vs Standard Insurance) +he police blotter was admitted under 3ule &37, #ection ?? of the 3ules of "ourt. Bnder the said rule, the following are the re!uisites for its admissibility: 0a/ that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; 0b/ that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; 0c/ that the public officer or other person had sufficient )nowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been ac!uired by him personally or through official information. (M+RA#C! vs 6uisumbing) (Peo)le vs !rti",Miya(o) Bnder these rules, the adoption by the ,a)ati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the ParaMa!ue trial court does not fall under the e(ception to the right of confrontation as the e(ception contemplated by law covers only the utili>ation of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utili>ation of previous decisions or judgments. 2pinion 3ule (Peo)le vs Abriol) +here is no definite standard of determining the degree of s)ill or )nowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an e(pert. *t is sufficient that the following factors be present: 0&/ training and education; 0'/ particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and 03/ presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. +he !uestion of whether a witness is properly !ualified to give an e(pert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court. ('autista vs CA) +he opinion of a handwriting e(pert on the genuineness of a !uestioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal )nowledge thereof, the testimony of an e(pert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. (Peo)le vs Duranan) *t is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in !uestion. @enerally, it is re!uired that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. "haracter Avidence

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(Peo)le vs Deo)ita) .urden of Proofs and Presumptions (Ibaan Rural 'an( vs CA) Astoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to spea) out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to e(ist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the e(istence of such facts. (Alcara" vs Tangga,an) $henever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; After recogni>ing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Nirgilio ac!uired title over the lot. (Peo)le vs Padrigone) Bnder 3ule &3&, #ection 30e/ of the 3ules of "ourt, the rule that 1evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced1 does not apply if 0a/ the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; 0b/ the suppression was not willful; 0c/ it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and 0d/ the suppression is an e(ercise of a privilege. (Metro 'an( vs CA) *t is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. Fo rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it e(ists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be ta)en as conclusive that the fact does not e(ist. (Peo)le vs !ng) +o determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were underta)en in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to ma)e sure that the details of the operation are clearly and ade!uately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. +his presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. (Peo)le vs allego)

(Peo)le vs +dualino) +he "ourt cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. Presentation of Avidence (Peo)le vs 5abre) *n any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate li)ewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. (Peo)le vs uamos) +he right of every party to cross-e(amine a witness 1with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.1 *t is also the duty of the witness to answer !uestions put to him or her, subject to certain e(ceptions. (Peo)le vs Pere") As a rule, leading !uestions are not allowed. owever, the rules provide for e(ceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. 4eading !uestions are necessary to coa( the truth out of their reluctant lips. (Peo)le vs Castillano) .efore the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-e(aminer must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-e(amined. +he witness must be given a chance to recollect and to e(plain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.

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0People vs Plasencia/ +he use of memory aids during an e(amination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. *n this case, the e(ercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has e(plained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and li)e details. (Can9ue vs CA) .e that as it may, considered as a memorandum, A(h. G does not itself constitute evidence. Bnder 3ule &3', sec. &7, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. (Dy vs CA) *n proving their due e(ecution and genuineness, it is not sufficient that the witness state in a general manner that the person whose signature appears thereon was the one who e(ecuted the document. +he testimony of an eye witness authenticating a private document must be positive, categorically stating that the document was actually witnessed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto. (%eirs o. #acsa vs CA) For a private ancient document to be e(empt from proof of due e(ecution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than 37 years old; it is also necessary that the following re!uirements are fulfilled; 0&/ that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 0'/ that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. (Peo)le vs Canonigo) +he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Fevertheless, despite the fact that the baptismal certificate which reflected accused-appellant5s date of birth has not been formally offered in evidence, the court may ta)e note of the said date of birth as reflected in the baptismal certificate. Fot only was it the subject of the testimony of accused-appellant5s own witness, ,s. ,acaria Astacio, but during the course of the trial, repeated references have been made by the counsel for accused-appellant to the latter5s date of birth as appearing in the said baptismal certificate. +he absence of any formal presentation of certain e(hibits does not render their consideration thereof a reversible error, if repeated references thereto in the course of trial by counsel for accused and of the court convincingly show that the documents were part of prosecution5s evidence. (!ng vs CA) +he mere fact that a particular document is identified and mar)ed as an e(hibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. +he party may decide to offer it if it believes this will advance the cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. A document or an article is valueless unless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given an opportunity to object to it and to cross-e(amine any witness called to present or identify it. Avidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties their right to rebut them. $eight and #ufficiency of Avidence (Peo)le vs Suare") *t is doctrinal that the re!uirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to e(clude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. 2nly moral certainty is re!uired or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (Peo)le vs 'ulan) *ndeed, the testimony of a lone witness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmar)s of truth and sincerity. $hile the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessarily with the greatest number. "onviction of the accused may still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. *t must be stressed that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in itself, such that common e(perience and observation of man)ind lead to the inference its probability under the circumstances. (D+CS vs del Rosario) *n civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 1Preponderance of evidence1 means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. *n other words, preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of the evidence - or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse party. (Cervantes vs Cardeno) ,ere substantial evidence suffices in administrative cases. (Reyes vs Mangino)

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*nasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent 8udge connotes misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the !uantum of proof re!uired should be more than substantial. +he 3ules of "ourt re!uires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct )nowledge. +he judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. .efore any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. +hus, the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. +he general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. ('enares vs Pancho) *t is well to note at this point that in !uasi-judicial proceedings, the !uantum of evidence re!uired to support the findings of the F43" is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade!uate to justify a conclusion. (PA# vs CA) *t is well entrenched that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by !uasi-judicial and administrative bodies are generally accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. #ubstantial evidence, which is the !uantum of evidence re!uired to establish a fact in cases before administrative or !uasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade!uate to justify a conclusion. (#agon vs CA) #ettled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notari>ed document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its e(ecution and delivery. (Domingo vs Domingo) .eing a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein e(pressed. *t has the presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.

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