Quintov.Comelec, Res., GRNo.

189698,February22,2010motionsforreconsiderationofitsDecember1, 2009decision (ONLINEDIGESTOF2009DECISION)

Facts: December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, an act authorizing the COMELECto usean automatedelectionsystemintheMay1998nationalorlocalelections. Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23,2007by enactingR.A. No. 9369.Section 13oftheamendatorylawmodifiedSection11ofR.A.No.8436 Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections4and5 of ResolutionNo.8678provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Anyperson holdingapublicappointiveofficeorpositionincluding active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacyforthesameoranyotherelectiveofficeorposition. SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November20to30,2009,duringofficehours,exceptonthelastday,whichshallbeuntilmidnight. Alarmed that they will be deemedipso facto resigned from theirofficesthemomentthey file theirCoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positionsin thegovernmentandwho intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the aforequotedSection4(a)ofResolutionNo.8678asnullandvoid. Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailedResolution.They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely forthepurposeofearlyprintingof the official ballotsinorder tocope withtimelimitations.Suchadvance filingdoesnotautomatically makethe person whofiledtheCoCacandidateatthemomentoffiling. Respondent argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit. Petitioners have not yetfiled their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial determination. Petitioners have admitted that they are merelyplanningtofiletheirCoCsforthecoming2010elections

Issue: WONpetitionershavelegalstanding.WONtheCOMELECresolutionandtheRA8678arenullandvoid. Held: To put things intheir properperspective, itisimperativethatwetrace thebriefhistoryoftheassailed provision. Section4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.No. 9369,whichforreadyreferenceisquotedasfollows: For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for

registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed hiscertificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,Thatanypersonholdingapublicappointiveofficeorposition,includingactivemembersof the armed forces, and officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. TheCourt,nevertheless,finds that,whilepetitionersarenotyet candidates,theyhave thestanding to raise theconstitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measurebecauseofitsimpactonvotingrights. Here, petitioners interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time fortheCourttostrike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law undulydiscriminatesagainstthefirstclass.Thefact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positionsandthoseoccupying electiveposts, doesnotjustifysuchdifferentialtreatment. There isthus novalidjustificationtotreatappointiveofficialsdifferently from theelectiveones. Theclassificationsimply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of thelaw. Themeasureencapsulated inthesecondprovisoof thethirdparagraphofSection13ofR.A.No.9369andinSection66oftheOECviolatestheequalprotectionclause. Thepetitionisgranted.

2010Digest Facts: This isa motion for reconsideration filed bytheComelecfortheearlierdecisionmadebythe Supreme Court ontheconstitutionalityofthesecondprovisointhe thirdparagraph of Sec. 13ofR.A.9369,Sec.66ofthe Omnibus Election Code, and Sec. 4(a) of COMELECResolutionNo.8678.Inthe 2009decision, theSupreme Court struck down the said provision as being unconstitutional for violating the equal protectionclauseofthe Constitution. A brief look at the resolutionstatesthat,anypersonholdinga publicappointive officeorposition including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other officers and employees in the governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon thefilingofhiscertificateofcandidacy.ThisisthesameprovisionseeninSec.13ofR.A.9369.

Issue:Whetherthesectionscitedareunconstitutional. Held: NO. DECISION REVERSED. PROVISIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. To start with, the equal protection clausedoes not requiretheuniversalapplicationofthe laws to all personsorthingswithoutdistinctions. What

it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developedbyjurisprudencehereisthatofreasonableness,whichhasfourrequisites: 1. 2. 3. 4. theclassificationrestsonsubstantialdistinctions itisgermanetothepurposeofthelaw itisnotlimitedtoexistingconditionsonly itappliesequallytoallmembersofthesameclass.

Theassailed decision readily acknowledges that these deemedresignedprovisionssatisfythe first,3rd,and 4th requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers that the dubious conclusion that the differential treatmentofappointiveofficialsvisaviselectedofficialsisnotgermanetothe purposeofthe law,becausethe evils sought to be prevented by the measure stillremain.Here,theSupremeCourtwantedtoavoid agraspof powerofthedominatingpoliticalpartythroughtheinfluenceofthepositionstheyheld. Thedichotomizedtreatmentofappointiveandelectiveofficials isthereforegermane to thepurposes of thelaw. For the law was made not merely to reserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with thecompeting, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. Pleasenote also that theSC discussed here that the barangay level officials are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule,which willapplytosuchlevel.

AtongPaglaumvetalvs.Comelec,G.R.No.203766,April2,2013

Facts:

Afewweeksbeforetheelections,theSupremeCourtinAtongPaglaumInc. vs.CommissiononElections

reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani and BarangayAssociationforNationalAdvancementandTransparencyv.CommissiononElections(BANAT). In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations which were disqualified by the

Commission on Election from participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections because they allegedlydo notrepresent the marginalized andunderrepresentedsector of society,themajorityis of theviewthattheparty listsystemincludesnotonlysectoralpartiesbutalsononsectoralparties. Hence, contrary to the Ang Bagong Bayani, the partylist system is not the exclusive domain of sectoral

representatives belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors but may be participated in by nonsectoralpartiesaswellwhodonotneedtorepresentmarginalizedandunderrepresentedsector. Issues: (1) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners from

participatingintheMay2013electionsand (2) Whether the criteria for participating in the partylist system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani v.

COMELEC (ABB) and BANAT v. COMELEC (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming May 2013elections.

Held: In aDecision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, throughCarpiosponencia,ruled infavorofthe54 petitions andremandedthesepetitionstotheComelec.Thepartylistgroupsandorganizationscoveredbythe 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunctionorders from thehighcourt stillstandachance to makeittothe 2013 partylist race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are qualified to register under the partylist system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections under the new parameterssetforthintheDecision.Therest,meaning,the13otherpetitions,wereremandedtothe pollbody merely for purposes of determining whether they may be grantedaccreditationunderthe new parametersbut maynotparticipateintheMay2013elections. TheDecision, however,clarifiedthatthepollbodymaynotbefaultedforactingon thebasisofprevious rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the partylist system. These earlier rulings enumeratedguidelinesonwhomayparticipateinthepartylistsystem. New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May 2013 partylist race and subsequentpartylistelections The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations,(2)regionalpartiesororganizations,and(3)sectoralpartiesororganizations. On thepartofnationalpartiesororganizationsandregionalpartiesororganizationswhichintend toparticipate in the partylist race, the new guidelines state that these parties do notneedtoorganizealongsectorallines anddonotneedtorepresentanymarginalizedorunderrepresentedsector. As for political parties, they may participate in the partylist race by registering under thepartylistsystemand no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional candidates,however,are not barred from participating in the partylist elections what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or partyunder thepartylistsystem.Thissectoralwingshallbeconsideredanindependentsectoralpartylinked toapoliticalpartythroughacoalition. Thequestionis:wheredoesrepresentationofmarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectorscomein? Theanswer:onthesectoralpartiesororganizationsthatintendtoparticipateinthepartylistsystem. The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking welldefined political constituencies. Thehighcourt went on to enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack welldefinedpoliticalconstituenciesincludeprofessionals,theelderly,women,andtheyouth. Theruleon nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to representalsoappliesonlytothe sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that itisenoughthat[a]majorityofthemembersofthe sectoral parties or organizations must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.Thesameistrueforthosewholackwelldefinedpoliticalconstituencies. As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that theymust eitherbemembersofthesectororhaveatrackrecordofadvocacyfortheirsector. Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be

disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at least one nomineewhoremainsqualified. Thepartylistsystem,accordingtotheDecision Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the partylist system, the high court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out nonsectoral parties in the partylist system and exclusively limititto sectoralgroups. Theframers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not theentirety,ofthe partylistsystemIn fact,theframersvoteddown,1922,aproposaltoreservethepartylistsystemexclusivelytosectoralparties. Therecanbenodoubtwhatsoeverthattheframersofthe1987 Constitutionexpressly rejectedtheproposalto make the partylist system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the partylist systemtoincludebothsectoralandnonsectoralparties,theDecisionread. Toamplifyitsposition,thehighcourtpointedoutSec.5(1),Art.VIofthe1987Constitution,whichstates: Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,whoshallbeelectedfromlegislativedistrictsapportionedamongthe provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as providedbylaw,shallbe electedthroughapartylistsystemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations. TheDecision also pointed out pertinent provisions ofRepublicAct (RA)No.7941,alsoknown asthePartylist SystemAct,specificallyfromSec.3(DefinitionofTerms): (b)Apartymeanseitherapoliticalpartyorasectoralpartyoracoalitionofparties (c) A political partyrefers to an organized group of citizens advocatingan ideologyorplatform, principlesand policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,regularlynominatesandsupportscertainofitsleadersandmembersascandidatesforpublicoffice (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section5hereofwhoseprincipaladvocacypertainstothespecialinterestandconcernsoftheirsector Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that theyarenotoneandthesame. PreviousrulingsreversedbyAtongPaglaum As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the partylist system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. ComelecandBANATv.Comelec In Ang Bagong Bayanis parametersforthepartylistsystem,guideline2statesthatwhileevenmajorpolitical parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 andtheConstitutiontoparticipatein thepartylist system,they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresentedsectorstobeelectedtotheHouseofRepresentatives. However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major political parties should represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified

thesemajorpartiesfromthepartylistsystem. As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court saidthattheguidelinesinthisrulingmerely formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited major political parties from participating in the partylist electionsevenifthroughtheiralliedsectoralorganizations.

Penerav.ComelecMotionforReconsideration,599SCRA60925November2009

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May2007elections.The formerfiled her certificateofcandidacy ontheday before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her partymates. Thereafter, theyhad amotorcade which wasconsist oftwo trucksand ten motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidatesoftheirpoliticalparty.

Due to this, private respondent filed apetition against her alleging premature campaigning asprovidedin the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activityexcept during the campaign period.Sheargued thatsheis not guiltysince she was not yet acandidate at that timeandthecampaignperiodhasnotyetstartedwhenthemotorcadewasconducted. While the petition waspendingin the COMELEC,shewas votedas mayorand tookherofficethereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It held that the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code which says: [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.] Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate the position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.

ISSUE: Ispetitionerguiltyofprematurecampaigning?

RULING: No,sheisnot. Section 80oftheOmnibusElection code has 3 elements:(1)apersonengages in an electioncampaign or partisan political activity (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate/s(3)theactisdoneoutsidethecampaignperiod.

A candidate is defined as any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, whohas filed her certificate of candidacy (section 79oftheOmnibusElection Code) however, from the deliberations ofthe Bicameral Conference Committee, one is deemed only a candidate for ballot purposes, RA 9369, Section 13 states that a person can only be considered a candidateat the startofthecampaign period forwhichhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy.

Any actis lawful unlessexpresslydeclaredunlawful by law. It isenough thatCongress statedthatany unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is lawful if done before the start ofthecampaign period.This plainlanguage ofthelawneednotbeconstruedfurther.

Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/sheis not yet considered asa candidate for purposes otherthanthe printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidatetotalkabout.Whatshedidwasanexerciseofherfreedomofexpression. WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decisionofthis CourtinG.R.No.181613 promulgated on11 September 2009, as wellas the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPANo. 07224. RosalindaA. Penera shallcontinue asMayorof Sta.Monica,SurigaodelNorte.

DISSENTINGOPINIONS: ChicoNazario,J: It is obvious that the motorcade was planned togain more votes from their constituents. Evenif she was not yet a candidate at that time, she can he held guilty of premature campaigning as an ordinarycitizencommittingtheprohibitedact. Abad,J:

But the fact that Penera was not yet a candidate before she actually handed in her certificate of candidacy to the designated COMELEC official does not exempt her from the prohibition against engaging in premature election campaign. Section 80 which imposes the ban ensnares any person, evenanoncandidate.

Jalosjosvs.Comelec(GR205033,2013)
PROCEDURAL DOCTRINE: The COMELEC is not required to decide in division first if it is in the exercise of Administrative Functions CASE DOCTRINE: Sec. 40(a) disqualifying persons previously convicted of crimes of moral turpitude within 2 years of serving their sentence does not allow persons who are penalized with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification to run foroffice afterthetwoyearperiod. FACTS: Petitioner Jalosjos was previouslyconvictedof2counts ofStatutoryRapeand4 countsofActs of Lasciviousness.

He was sentenced to a principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for the respective crimes, which carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. His prison term was commuted by then PresidentGMA,andafterservingthecommutedterm,wasreleasedandwasissuedaCertificateofDischargefromPrison In2012,Petitionerappliedasa voteinZamboanga butwasdeniedbytheElection RegistrationBoard (ERB) based on

his prior conviction. This prompted petitioner to file a Petition for Inclusion in the permanent list of voters. Pending the resolution of his Petition for inclusion, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Mayor of ZamboangaCity.Inthe CoC, it statedthatPetitionerisaregisteredvoterandiseligiblefortheoffice Petitioners petitioner for inclusion was denied by the Municipal Trial Court of Citites and later affirmed by the RTC

whichwasfinalandexecutoryundertheOmnibusElectionCode.Thus,Petitionerhadnorighttovoteinanyelection Afterwards, petitions for cancellation of the CoC applied for by Petitioner were filed, which were grantedbythe

COMELECenbancandmotupropriocancelledanddeniedtheCoC Petitioner filed for certiorari alleging that he was denied due process and that the Local Government Code has

removedhisAbsolutePerpetualDisqualification ISSUES: (1) (2) W/NPETITIONERWASDENIEDDUEPROCESS W/NPETITIONERSPERPETUALABSOLUTEDISQUALIFICATIONHASBEENREMOVEDBYTHELGC

FirstIssue HELD:NO Petitioners contention that under Sec. 3 of Art. IXC of the Constitution,thatAllsuchelectioncasesshall beheard

anddecidedindivision,providedthatmotionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc Based on this provision, Petitioner argues that the motu proprioresolutionoftheCOMELECenbancdeniedhim due

processsinceitshouldhavebeendecidedbyadivisionfirst However, theConstitutional provision appliesonly totheexerciseofCOMELECs quasijudicialpowers, whichincluded

decidingelectioncase.Quasijudicialfunctionsincludeinvestigationof facts,hold hearings,anddrawconclusions from them beforemakinganofficialaction. The provision does not require the COMELEC, intheexerciseofitsadministrativefunctions,todecideadministrative

issues in division first. Administrative issues include management and directing the execution or application or conduct of personsorthings. The cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy is an administrative functionwhichthe COMELEChas thediscretionto

decideenbanc.CancellationofCoCsbeinganAdministrativeFunction,Petitionerwasnotdenieddueprocess. SecondIssue: HELD:NO Petitioner argues that Sec. 40(a) of the LGC has amended Article 30 of the RPC (defining Perpetual or Temporary

AbsoluteDisqualification. Sec. 40(a) states: The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those

sentenced by final judgmentfor anoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeorforanoffensepunishablebyone(1) yearormoreof imprisonment,withintwo(2)yearsafterservingsentence Petitioner argues,byvirtueofthisprovision,heisallowed torun for officesince 2 years havealready elapsedsince

hehasservedhissentence Petitioner is incorrect inhisargumentthatSec.40(a)has amendedtheintendedmeaningofArt.30 oftheRPC.Abasic

rule of statutory construction isthatstatutesmust beconstruedinharmony witheachother.Sec.40(a)can beconstruedin harmonyofArt.30,andshouldbeconstruedassuch.ItdefeatsPetitionersargumentforimpliedamendment Those persons who fall under Sec. 40(a) may have been only penalized with temporary absolute disqualification

which ends after the prison term. Unlike Perpetual Absolute Disqualification, a person is disqualified to run for office perpetually Thus, petitionerwasnoteligiblefortheposition.COMELEC was,therefore,correcttocancelanddenyPetitionersCoC

byvirtueofthePerpetualAbsoluteDisqualificationthatwasanaccessorypenaltyofhisconvictionofhiscrimes

Reyesvs.Comelec(GR207264,2013) NATURE: Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes assailing the Resolutions dated March 2013 and May 2013 issued by COMELEC. Said resolutions ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner for the positionofRepresentativeoflonedistrictofMarinduque. FACTS: On Oct. 31,2012, respondent Socorro, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,

Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the COC of petitionontheff.grounds:

o ThatsheissinglewhensheisactuallymarriedtoCong.MandanasofBatangas o That she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas (residence of her husband) and also aresident of Quezon CityasadmittedintheDirectory ofCongressionalSpousesoftheHoR. o That her date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other documents show that her bday is either July 8, 1959orJuly3,1960. o ThatsheisapermanentresidentoranimmigrantoftheUSAand o ThatsheisaFilipinocitizenwhensheisinfactanAmericancitizen Petitionercountered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio. Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not dutybound to live with Congressman Mandanas, thenhis residence cannot be attributed to her. As to her dateofbirth, theCertificateofLiveBirthissued bytheNational Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanentresidentand/oracitizenoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaisnotsupportedbyevidence. RespondentfiledaManifestationwithMotiontoAdmitNewlyDiscovered EvidenceandAmendedListof

Exhibits11consistingof,amongothers: o Anarticlepublishedon theinterneton 8January2013 entitledSeekingandFindingtheTruthabout Regina Reyes with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitionerisanAmericancitizenandaholderofaU.S.passport o A Certification of Travel Records of petitioner,issuedby SimeonSanchez,ActingChief,Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passportinhervarioustravelsabroad. On 27 March2013, the COMELEC First Division issued Resolution cancelling petitioners COC. The

COMELEC FirstDivisionfound that, contrary to the declarations that she made in herCOC,petitionerisnot a citizen ofthePhilippinesbecauseofherfailuretocomplywith therequirementsofRepublicAct(R.A.) No.9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have theoneyearresidencyrequirementunderSection6,Article VIofthe 1987Constitution.Thus, sheisineligibletorunforthepositionofRepresentativeforthelonedistrictofMarinduque. Petitionerfiled aMotionforReconsiderationon8April2013claimingthatsheisa naturalbornFilipino

citizen and thatshehasnotlostsuchstatusbysimplyobtainingandusing anAmerican passport.Additionally, petitioner surmisedthattheCOMELECFirstDivisionreliedonthefactofhermarriagetoanAmericancitizenin concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resultedinto dual citizenship, thus there is noneedforhertofulfillthetwinrequirementsunderR.A.No.9225.

Still,petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before aNotary Publicon 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the oneyear residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that,assheneverbecameanaturalizedcitizen, sheneverlost herdomicileoforigin, whichisBoac,Marinduque. On May14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for

Reconsiderationforlackofmerit. Fourdaysthereafteroron18May2013,petitionerwasproclaimedwinnerofthe13May2013Elections. On 5June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013

Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twentyone (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. On same day, petitioner took her oath of office. Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially startsatnoonof30June2013. Petitionerfiledthepresentpetition.

ISSUE: 1. W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already

takenoathofofficeforapositionofMemberoftheHoR? 2.WhenisacandidateconsideredaMemberoftheHoR?

RULING: 1. YES.Accordingtopetitioner,theCOMELECwasoustedofitsjurisdiction whenshe wasdulyproclaimed

because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, theHREThastheexclusivejurisdictionto be the sole judge of all contests relating totheelection,returnsandqualifications of theMembersoftheHoR. Contrarytopetitionersclaim,however,theCOMELEretainsjurisdictionfortheff.reasons: a. TheHRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issueofpetitionersqualifications,as wellasoverthe

assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred thatshehasfiledsuchaction. b. Thejurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of

Representatives,asstatedinSection17,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitution.

2.TheSClistedcitedvariousjurisprudentialdoctrinesnamely: Marcos v. COMELEC: As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress beginsonlyafteracandidatehasbecome amemberoftheHouse of Representatives. PetitionernotbeingamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,itis obviousthatthe HRETatthispointhasno jurisdictionoverthequestion.

VinzonsChato v. COMELEC: The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and theHRETsownjurisdictionbegins.

Gonzalezv.COMELEC:Afterproclamation,takingofoathandassumptionofofficeby Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returnsweretransferredtotheHRETas theconstitutionalbodycreatedtopass upon thesame.

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, itsjurisdiction overcontests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. In the caseat bar,petitionercannotbeconsideredaMemberoftheHoRbecauseprimarily,shehasnotyetassumedoffice.

The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to complywiththesecondrequirement,petitionerattachedapurported Oath OfOffice takenbeforeHon.Feliciano Belmonte Jr.on5June2013.However,thisisnottheoathofoffice whichconfers membership to theHouseof Representatives. Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a validorofficialtakingofthe oathitmustbemade(1)beforethe Speakerofthe House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclearwhethertherequiredoathofofficewasindeedcompliedwith.

Moreover, the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013,theCOMELECEnBanchadalready finallydisposed of theissue of petitioners lack ofFilipinocitizenshipandresidency viaitsResolution dated 14May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was no longer any pending case on petitioners qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative before the COMELEC. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmedadecisionoftheCOMELECFirstDivision.

Theassailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the

assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and executoryon19May2013basedonSection3,Rule37oftheCOMELECRulesofProcedure.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by filing Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5day period, but she failed to do so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondentCOMELEC rightlyissuedaCertificateofFinality.

OTHERISSUES: 1.W/NCOMELECcommittedgraveabusedofdiscretioninitsResolution?

COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the Houseof Representatives. COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere tothetechnicalrulesofprocedurein the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.Inviewofthefactthattheproceedingsin apetitionto deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidencewasproperlyadmittedbyrespondentCOMELEC.

Furthermore, there wasnodenialofdueprocessinthecaseatbaraspetitionerwas givenevery opportunityto argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tans petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence.Unfortunately,shedidnotavailherselfoftheopportunitygivenher.

2.W/NpetitionerfailedtoproveherFilipinocitizenship,aswellasheroneyearresidencyinMarinduque?

YES. According to the disposition of the CA: For respondent (herein petitioner) to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the followingacts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before theConsulGeneralof the Philippine Consulate in the USA and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Respondent (petitioner) falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is anaturalborn Filipino citizen. Unless and until shecanestablish that shehadavailedofthe privileges of RA9225 by becoming a dual FilipinoAmerican citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, sheremainstobeanAmericancitizenandis,therefore,ineligibletorunforandhold anyelectivepublicofficeinthePhilippines.

To coverupher apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No.9225,petitionercontendsthat, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a naturalborn Filipino citizen. Again, the Court sustained CAs ruling in this wise: In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant toRA9225soas to conclude that shehasregainedherdomicile in the Philippines. There beingnoproofthat[petitioner]hadrenounced herAmerican citizenship,itfollowsthat she has notabandonedherdomicileofchoiceinthe USA. Theonlyproof presentedby [petitioner]toshowthat she has met the oneyear residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of originin Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her oneyear Resolution 14 G.R. No. 207264 residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an Americancitizen. No amount of her stay in thesaidlocalitycansubstitutethefactthatshe hasnot abandoned herdomicileofchoiceintheUSA.

3.

W/N act of the COMELEC in enforcing theprovisionsofRANo.9225addsqualificationsofMembersof

theHoRotherthanthoseenumeratedintheConstitution? NO. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House ofRepresentatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed bySection6,Article VIof the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and must have oneyear residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A.No.9225 to determineifshereacquired herstatusasanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.Itsimplyappliedtheconstitutionalprovisionandnothingmore.

Betitovs.BenipayoG.R.No.147179,March26,2001355SCRA313

NicolasLewis,etalvs.Comelec,G.R.No.162759August4,2006,497SCRA649,
Doctrine:Filipinoswhohaveretained/reacquiredhis/hercitizenshipunderR.A.9225(CitizenshipRetentionand ReAcquisitionActof2003)mayvoteasanabsenteevoterunderR.A.9189(OverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003)even withoutsatisfyingtheresidencyrequirementofSection1,ArticleVofthe1987Constitution(residencyinthePhilippinesfor atleast1yearintheplacewheretheyproposetovoteforatleast6monthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection). Facts: LoidaNicolasLewisetal.aresuccessfulapplicantsforrecognitionofPhilippinecitizenshipunderR.A.9225(Citizenship RetentionandReAcquisitionActof2003)whichaccordstosuchapplicantstherightofsuffrage,amongothers. BeforetheMay2004nationalandlocalelections,NicolasLewisetal.soughtregistrationandcertificationas"overseas absenteevoter"onlytobeadvisedbythePhilippineEmbassyintheUnitedStatesthattheyhaveyetnorighttovoteinsuch

electionsbecauseoftheirlackoftheoneyearresidencerequirementprescribedunderSection1ofArticleVofthe1987 Constitution. ItistheCOMELECSpositionthatthosewhohaveavailedofthelaw(R.A.9225)cannotexercisetherightofsuffragegiven underR.A.9189(OverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003)becauseFilipinoswhohavemerelyreacquiredtheircitizenship on18September2003attheearliestareconsideredregularvoterswhohavetomeettherequirementsofresidency, amongothersunderSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitution. LoidaNicolasLewisfiledapetitionforcertiorariandmandamusdirectlytotheSupremeCourt. Issue:WhetherFilipinoswhohaveretained/reacquiredhis/hercitizenshipunderR.A.9225(CitizenshipRetentionand ReAcquisitionActof2003)mayvoteasanabsenteevoterunderR.A.9189(OverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003)even withoutsatisfyingtheresidencyrequirementofSection1,ArticleVofthe1987Constitution(residencyinthePhilippinesfor atleast1yearintheplacewheretheyproposetovoteforatleast6monthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection). Held:Yes Section2ofR.A.9225providesthat: SEC2.DeclarationofPolicy.ItisherebydeclaredthepolicyoftheStatethatallPhilippinecitizenswhobecome citizensofanothercountryshallbedeemednottohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipunderthe conditionsofthisAct. Moreover,Section5ofR.A.9225provides: SEC.5.CivilandPoliticalRightsandLiabilities.ThosewhoretainorreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipunderthisAct shallenjoyfullcivilandpoliticalrightsandbesubjecttoallattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexisting lawsofthePhilippinesandthefollowingconditions: (1)ThoseintendingtoexercisetheirrightofsuffragemustmeettherequirementsunderSection1,ArticleVofthe Constitution,RepublicActNo.9189,otherwiseknownas"TheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003"andother existinglawsxxx ThereisnoprovisioninthedualcitizenshiplawR.A.9225requiring"duals"toactuallyestablishresidenceandphysically stayinthePhilippinesfirstbeforetheycanexercisetheirrighttovote. Onthecontrary,R.A.9225,inimplicitacknowledgmentthat"duals"aremostlikelynonresidents,grantsunderitsSection 5(1)thesamerightofsuffrageasthatgrantedanabsenteevoterunderR.A.9189. ItcannotbeoveremphasizedthatR.A.9189aims,inessence,toenfranchiseasmuchaspossiblealloverseasFilipinos who,savefortheresidencyrequirementsexactedofanordinaryvoterunderordinaryconditions,arequalifiedtovote. Bythedoctrineofnecessaryimplicationinstatutoryconstruction,thestrategiclocationofSection2ofArticleVofthe1987 ConstitutionindicatesthattheConstitutionalCommissionprovidedforanexceptiontotheactualresidency requirementofSection1ofthesameArticlewithrespecttoqualifiedFilipinosabroad. Moreover,residencyinSection1,ArticleVofthe1987Constitutionhavebeeninterpretedasdomicility(intenttoreturnto oneshome). ItwouldbelegallyandconstitutionallyimpossibletogivefranchisetooverseasFilipinoswhodonotphysicallyliveinthe countrytosatisfytheresidencyrequirementprescribedbySection1,ArticleVofthe1987Constitution.

USvsSancuya13PhilReports729
Facts:Defendants,inspectors of election, refusedto permitRufinoIsturistoregisteras anelector.Isturisclaimedthe rightby virtueofhisownershipofrealpropertyworthP500,asprescribedinsubsection(b),section13,ofActNo.1582.

Issue:Whetherornottheinspectorsofelectioncanrefuseregistrationofanunqualifiedvoter. Held: When an elector claims the right to vote by virtue of the above provision of law the inspectors are authorized to exercise aquasijudicial power indecidingthe questioninvolved, andunless they knowingly,willfully, andmaliciouslyrefuse toregisteraqualifiedvotertheyarenotcriminallyliable. Evidenceinsufficienttosustainconviction.Judgmentreversedanddefendantsacquitted.

Dimaporovs.Comelec,G.R.No.81151,Jan.7,1988, FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and private respondent Vicente Belmonte were both candidates for Representativeofthe1stCongressionalDistrictofLanaodelNorteduringtheMay14,2007elections.

Sometime in the evening of May 19, 2007, the ballot boxes containing theCOCsofKauswagan,Bacolodand Maigo were allegedly forcibly opened, their padlocks destroyed and the envelopes containing theCOCs and theStatementofVotes(SOV)openedandviolated.

When the PBOC was about to resume the canvassing at around 9:00 a.m. the succeeding day, the forced openingoftheballotboxeswasdiscoveredpromptingthePBOCtosuspendthecanvass.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8073 adopting in part the recommendation of Atty. Ausan directing the PBOC of Lanao del Norte to "immediately reconvene solely for the purpose of retrieving the three envelopes supposedly containing the COCs fromthemunicipalitiesofKauswagan, BacolodandMaigo"andto"openthe same in the presence of all watchers, counsels, and representatives of all contending parties and the accredited Citizens Arm of the Commission and right there and then to direct the representatives of the dominant majority and minority parties to present their respectivecopiesoftheCOCs for comparison withthe COCsintendedfortheCOMELECandwiththeCOCsinsidetheenvelopejustopened."

TheCOMELEC further resolved that when discrepancies showsignsoftampering and falsifying, thePBOCis to "immediately turnover to the NBI the copies of the COCs of said three (3) municipalities intended for the Commission and the Election Officer for purposes of comparison with those retrieved from the questioned ballotboxes."

The new Special Provincial Board of Canvassers (SPBOC) convened and opened the ballot boxes for the towns of Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod. As the SPBOC proceeded with the canvass, private respondent Belmonte objected to the inclusion of the COCs of the concerned municipalities. The SPBOC denied Belmontesobjectionsduetolackofjurisdiction.

Belmonte filed his verified notice of appeal beforethe SPBOC.Inthe assailed ResolutionofJuly 10,2007,the Second Division of the COMELEC granted Belmontes petition. While conceding that it has no jurisdictionto hear and decide preproclamation cases against members of the house, it tookcognizance of thepetitionas one for the correction of manifest errors, hence, withinitsjurisdictionasperthe lastsentenceofSection15of RepublicAct(R.A.)No.7166.Thelawprovides: Sec. 15. Preproclamation Cases in ElectionsforPresident,VicePresident, Senator,andMemberof

the House of Representatives. For purpose of the elections for president, vicepresident, senator, and member of the house of representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in Sec. 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing bodymotuproprio oruponwrittencomplaint of aninterested personto correctmanifesterrorsinthecertificateofcanvassorelectionreturnsbeforeit.

Dimaporo filed petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuanceofatemporary restraining order and/or writof preliminaryinjunctionquestioningthejurisdictionoftheCOMELECoverthecase.

Dimaporo claims that the subject matter involved does not pertain to manifest errors but to the "preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation" of certificates of canvass, a matter outside the realm of the COMELECsjurisdictionwhenacongressionalseatisinvolved.

Dimaporowasalsograntedastatusquoanteorder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in proclaiming Belmonte winner even though a Status Quo Ante Orderwasgranted?

HELD: Petition dismissed, Comelec has duly proclaimed BELEMONTE, thusifDIMAPOROwantstopursuea case,hemustfilewiththeHRET.

RATIO: private respondent Belmonte filedhiscommentevenbefore theissuance of thestatusquoante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of RepresentativesoftheFirstCongressionalDistrictofLanaodelNorte

HehadtakenhisoathbeforeSpeakeroftheHouseJosedeVenecia,Jr.andassumedhisdutiesaccordingly.

IN LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, JURISDICTION OVER THISCASEHASALREADYBEENTRANSFERRED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET). WHEN THERE HAS BEEN A PROCLAMATION AND A DEFEATED CANDIDATE CLAIMS TO BE THE WINNER, IT IS THE ELECTORAL

TRIBUNALTHATALREADYHASJURISDICTIONOVERTHECASE.

The COMELEC was not amiss in quickly deciding Belmontes petition to correct manifest errors then proclaiminghimthewinner

HADJI RASUL BATADOR BASHER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONONELECTIONS and ABULKAIR AMPATUA, respondents.

Doctrine: An election must be held at the place, date and time prescribed by law. Likewise, its suspension or postponementmustcomplyrequirements.Otherwise,itisirregularandvoid.

Facts: Petitioner Basher and respondent Ampatua were both candidates for the position of PunongBaranggayin Lanao del Sur. The voting started only at around 9:00 pm because of the prevailing tension that the activity might trigger bloodshed. The mayor went hysterical, and his escorts pointed guns at the comelec officials. Their military escorts likewiserespondedinthelikemannertowardsthemayor. Aftertheywerepacifiedbythe PNP, thecomelec officers proceeded with theelectionuntilearlyin themorning of thefollowingday. Thetally sheet reflected the following results: Ampatua 250 votes Basher 15 votes Razul 10 votes. Ampatua wasproclaimedwinner.

Bashan filed a petition for declaration of failure of election. According to him, to avoid bloodshed, it was ultimately agreed that no election would be conducted that day. The ballot box containing election

paraphernalia were turned over to the PNP for safekeeping. They were surprised to learn that the election tellers filleduptheelectionreturnsandcertificateofcanvassonthatnightattheresidenceofthe mayor. There wasnoannouncementthattheelectionwouldbeheldatmayorshouse.

Issue: Whether the election held on the date, atthe time, and inthe placeother thanthosedesignatedbylaw andbytheComelecwasvalid.

Held:NO,therewasafailureofelection.

ElectionSitus was Illegal. The placewherethevotingwasconductedwasillegal. Theomnibuselection code provides that the chairman of the boardofelectiontellersshalldesignatethe publicschool orany otherpublic building within the barangay to be used as a polling place. It was alleged that the election was held at the residence of the mayor. And while it was later on repudiated by the board of elector tribunal, they failed to disclosewhereexactlythevotingwasconducted.

Voting Time was Irregular. The law provides that the voting shall start at 7:00 am and shall end at 3:00 pm except whentherearevoterspresentwithin30metersinfrontof thepollingplace who have notyetcastedtheir votes. Having the election from 9:00pmuntilintheweehours of thefollowingdaywas notin accordance with the comelec rules. Such nocturnal election practice discourages the peoples exercise of their fundamental rightofsuffrage,byexposingthemtodangersconcomitanttothedeadofnight.

Election date was invalid. The comelec scheduled the special election on August 30, 1997. Suspension or postponement of election is governed by the code which states that when for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia,andotheranalogous cases which would make holding of an election impossible, the Comelec shall suspend or postponed the election there in close to the electiondatebutnotlaterthan 30daysafterthecessation of thecause,andinall cases 90 days from the date of original election. The herein election extended until the wee housein the followingday,whichisAugust31,1997.

Election Postponement was Invalid. The official did not follow the procedure laid down by law for election postponement or suspension or declaration of a failure of election. The comelec official did not conductany proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether any of the legal grounds for suspension or postponementactuallyexist.

Notice was Irregular. The electorate were not given ample notice of the exact schedule and venue of the election. The announcement was made onlyminutesbeforethesupposedvoting. Ifonedaynoticewasheld insufficient in the previous jurisprudence, the much shorter notice in the present caseshould all themore be declaredwanting.Itinfactshouldbeequatedwithnonotice.

Disposition: The petition granted, assailed resolution set aside. Proclamation of respondent Ampatua is hereby declare void.ComelecisorderedtoconductaspecialelectionforpunongbarangayinLanaodelSur.

DissentingOpinion: De Leon: The Comelec, in rendering their resolution, did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The announcement was made in themosqueafewhoursbeforethe voting actuallycommenced. The records are bereft of any evidence that the said announcement or notice made in the mosque of Barangay whose populace is predominantly muslim , resulted in disenfranchisement of substantial number of votes. In the petition, there was no indication of the total number of registered voters and the number of voters who were allegedlyunabletoexercisetheirrightofsuffrage.Petitiondenied.

Hassanvs.Comelec,264SCRA125

FACTS:

Petitioner, Hadji Nor L. Hassan, and private respondent, Mangondaya P. Hassan Buatan were candidates for the Office of the ViceMayor while the other private respondents were candidates for councilors in Madalum, Lanaodel Sur in thelastregular local elections of May8,1995. However, dueto threats of violence and terrorism in the area there was failure of elections in 6 out of 24 precincts in Madalum. The ballot boxes were burned and there were threats by unidentified persons. In 5 other precincts, elections did not take place because the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) failed to report to their respective polling places. The COMELEC, headed by Virgilio O. Garcillano recommended to hold specialelections in said precincts onMay 27, 1995 however, the members of the BEI again failed to report for duty in their respective polling places. The COMELEC Teamrescheduled the elections in these precincts for May 29, 1995 atLiangan Elementary(Arabic) School,which was 15 kilometers away from the respective polling places but still, the members of the Board did not again report for duty which caused the COMELEC to appointthepolice/military personnelto actas substitute memberstopushthroughwiththeelections. Respondent Magondaya Hassan ranked highest garnering 1098 votes, followed by Petitioner Nor Hassan with 879votes. Petitioner Nor Hassan filed a petition withtheCOMELECassailing thevalidity of the May 29 rescheduled special. The COMELEC en bancdeniedthepetitionfora declarationof failure of elections and ordered the Board of Canvassers to declare Private respondent as the winning candidate.

ISSUE: Whetherornottherewasafailureinelections.

HELD:YES Yestherewasafailureinelections. TheCourthasruledthatthepreconditionsfordeclaringafailureofelectionare: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure,violence or terrorism, (2)thatthevotesnotcastthereinsufficetoaffecttheresultsoftheelections. Theconcurrenceofthesetwo(2)circumstancesarerequiredtojustifythecallingofaspecialelection. It is true that as a rule, terrorism may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of elections and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds of only a relative few. Otherwise elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and terrorism. However, the COMELEC cannot turn a blind

eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area. Elections had to be set for the third time because no members of the BEI reported for duty due to impending threats ofviolenceinthearea. This in fact promptedCOMELEC to deploy military mentoact assubstitute membersjustso electionscould be held and to thwart these threats of violence, the COMELECteam, moreover,decided to transfer the polling places to Liangan Elementary School which was 15 kilometersaway from the pollingplace. The peculiar situation of this case cannot be overstated. The notice given ontheafternoonofthedaybefore the scheduled special elections and transferring the venue of theelections 15kilometersaway from the farthest barangay/school was too short resulting to the disenfranchisement of voters. Out of the 1,546registered voters in the five (5) precincts, only 328 actually voted. It was quite sweeping and illogical for the COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would not have inanywayaffectedthe results of the elections. While the difference between the two candidates is only 219 out of the votes actually cast, the COMELEC totally ignored the fact thatthere weremore than athousand registered voters who failedtovote. DISPOSITIVEPORTION: WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED. (1) The COMELEC is hereby enjoined from proclaiming the winners for the Office of ViceMayor and Councilorsrespectivelyand (2) The COMELEC is ORDERED to conduct special elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as soon as possible.

SangcadS.Bao(BAO)v.COMELEC,GRno.149666,December19,2003, FACTS: PetitionerSangcadS.BaosoughtreelectionasmayorofButig,LanaodelSur. He filed before the COMELEC a Very Urgent Petition for Suspension of Counting of Votes by the BOE Inspectors, Canvass of Election Returns and Proclamation of Winners, and Declaration of Failure of Elections. Thepetitionallegedthat:

1. he requested ActingElection Officer Casidar toadopttheProjectofPrecinctswithsixclusteredvoting centerswhichhe recommended > Military COMELEC Deputy Col.FelixCastro,Jr.disregardedtheplan withoutconsultingbothpartiesandthevotersconcerned

2.PNPpersonnelbearinghighpoweredfirearmswereseenescortingpersonswhoarenotvoters

3.Ballotboxesweremissingduringtheperiodofcastingofvotes

4. Wife ofvicemayoraltycandidatePundaracabAnderforciblytookpossessionoftheBookofVotersand actedasBoardofElectionInspectorsandconductedthevotingbyherself

5. Casting of voteswas stopped early because nonregistrants and flying voters insisted on voting, thus causingfightingandshootingamongvoters

6. All the registered voters werenotabletocasttheirvotesbecausetheballotboxeswerebroughttothe secondflooroftheschoolbuilding.Whentheboxeswerebroughtdown,theballotsandtheBookofVoters werealreadyfilledupandthumbmarkedbynonvoters

7.Votingwasclosedat3:30p.m.,butwasillegallyreopenedand

8.Officialballotsissuedtovoterswereforciblyfilledupbyoneperson.

The COMELEC EnBanc, without giving duecourse to the petitionand thepetitioninintervention,resolved thecase. ItdismissedthepetitionandLangcospetitioninintervention. Petitioner contendsthatbeinga contentious case, theCOMELECactsasaquasijudicialtribunalandthus falls underthetermcourtthatthequestionedresolutionfailedtoexpressclearlyanddistinctlythefacts and thelawonwhichitisbasedincontraventionofArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution.Hefurthercontends that even ifthere was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect and that the COMELEC violatedtheOmnibusElectionCodeanditsownrules.

ISSUE:WhethertheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninnotdeclaringafailureofelection?

HELD:No Inthepresent case, the allegationsbases of both thepetitionandLangcospetitionininterventionbefore theCOMELECaremostlygroundsforanelectioncontest,notforadeclarationoffailureofelection. While there are allegations which may be grounds for failure of election, they are supported by mere affidavitsandthenarrativereportoftheelectionofficer. That petitionerandpetitionerintervenorwereNOTABLEtopresentsubstantialevidenceinsupportoftheir allegations. COMELEC should not be blamed for during the June 28, 2001 hearing, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras, collaborating counsel for petitioner, on being informed thatrespondent Pansar had not yet received the summons to necessitate the resetting of the hearing, made a request, which was granted, that said respondent shouldjustfileananswerormemorandumtoabbreviatetheproceedings,anddidnotobject to the COMELECs pronouncement to consider the petitionsubmitted for resolution after the filingof the answerormemorandum.

Petitioner and petitionerintervenor are deemed to have waived their right to present further evidence to substantiatetheirpetition.

Sarmientovs.COMELEC212SCRA307

Case13:Sarmientov.Comelec Facts:ThecaseisaconsolidatedcasebythepetitionerscontestingResolutionsofrespondentCommission onElections(COMELEC)inthefollowingSpecialCases(SPC): 1)G.R.No.105628SPCNo.92266grantingtheappealfromtherulingoftheMunicipalBoardof CanvassersofVirac,Catanduaneswhichorderedtheexclusionfromthecanvassofone(1)electionreturn 2)G.R.No.105725SPCNo.92323reversingtherulingoftheCityBoardofCanvassersofIrigaCitywhich orderedtheexclusionfromthecanvassofsix(6)electionreturnsandinUNDNo.92243orderingthesaid BoardofCanvasserstoincludeinthecanvasstheelectionreturnsinvolvedtherein 3)G.R.No.105727SPCNo.92288dismissingtheappealofpetitionerfromtherulingoftheProvincial BoardofCanvassersofCatanduaneswhichorderedtheinclusioninthecanvassthecertificateofcanvassfor themunicipalityofVirac,excludingthereturnsfrom48precincts 4)G.R.No.105730SPCNo.92315affirmingtherulingoftheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersofJose Panganiban,CamarinesNortewhichdismissedpetitioner'soppositiontothecompositionofthesaid MunicipalBoardofCanvassers 5)G.R.No.105771SPCNo.92271affirmingtherulingoftheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersofCabusao, CamarinesSurwhich,amongothers,rejectedpetitioner'sobjectiontocertainelectionreturns 6)G.R.No.105778SPCNo.92039dismissingsaidcasefornoncompliancewithSection20ofR.A.No. 7166 7)G.R.No.105797SPCNo.92153affirmingtherulingsoftheProvincialBoardofCanvassersofDavao Orientalwhichrejectedpetitioner'sobjectionstothecanvassofsomecertificatesofcanvass 8)G.R.No.105919SPCNo.92293dismissingpetitioner'sappealfromtherulingoftheMunicipalBoardof CanvassersofUpiNuro,Maguindanao 9)G.R.No.105977SPCNo.92087denyingtheamendedpreproclamationpetition,whichisanappeal fromtherulingsoftheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersofTernate,Cavite,anddenyingasubsequentmotionto resolvetheissuesraisedinsaidamendedpetition. Petitionersimpugnthechallengedresolutionsabovespecifiedashavingbeenissuedwithgraveabuseof discretioninthat,interalia,theCommission,sittingenbanc,tookcognizanceofanddecidedtheappeals withoutfirstreferringthemtoanyofitsDivisions. Section3,subdivisionC,ArticleIXofthe1987Constitutionexpresslyprovides: Sec.3.TheCommissiononElectionsmaysitenbancorintwodivisions,andshall promulgateitsrulesofprocedureinordertoexpeditedispositionofelectioncases,including preproclamationcontroversies.Allsuchelectioncasesshallbeheardanddecidedin division,providedthatmotionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbythe Commissionenbanc. Issue/s:W/NtheCOMELECiscorrectinhearingtheappealsenbanc. Held:NO.Electioncasesincludepreproclamationcontroversies,andallsuchcasesmustfirstbeheardby anddecidedbyaDivisionoftheCommission.TheCommission,sittingenbanc,doesnothavetheauthorityto hearanddecidethesameatfirstinstance.IntheCOMELECRulesofProcedure,preproclamationcasesare classifiedasSpecialCasesand,incompliancewiththeConstitution,the2DivisionsoftheCommissionare

vestedwiththeauthoritytohearanddecidetheseSpecialCases. Indisputably,then,theCOMELECenbancactedwithoutjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,whenit resolvedtheappealsofpetitionersintheSpecialCaseswithoutfirstreferringthemtoanyofitsDivisions.Said resolutionsare,therefore,nullandvoidandmustbesetaside.However,Section16ofRA7166providesthat allpreproclamationcasespendingbeforeitshallbedeemedterminatedatthebeginningofthetermofthe officeinvolved.SincethetermsofofficeinvolvedintheSpecialCasessubjectofthepetitionshavealready commenced,thesecaseshavebeenrenderedmootandacademic,andmustbedismissedwithoutprejudice tothefilingofpetitionersofregularelectionprotests.

ZaratevsCOMELEC,318SCRA608

FACTS: Petition for certiorari against Comelec in annulling MTCdecision and declaringJulianLallaveJr. asdulyelectedSKChairmanofBarangayIcan,Malasiqui,Pangasinan. In1996SKelections,LallavewonoverZaratebyaSINGLEVOTE(4645). BarangayBoardofCanvassersproclaimedLallaveasdulyelectedSKChairman May16,1996ZaratefiledelectionprotestbeforetheMTC,alleging: During tallying, members of the Board of Election Tellers counted 3 votes, which read JLinfavorofLallave That the votes JL are stray votes and should be null and void no candidate has a nicknameornameJL Sept.9,1996,MTCinfavorofZarate,votescountbecame: Zarate44 Lallave38

LallaveappealedtoCOMELECclaimingthatJLvotesarevalid. ComelecinfavorofLallave
After a careful and thoroughreview oftheassailed decision,wefind theballotsmarked asExhibits A, B, C, D, and E containing JL initials valid for the petitioner. Section 211, par. 14 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that Any vote containing initials only or which is illegible or which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended shall beconsideredasstrayvotebutshallnot invalidate the whole ballot. Obviously, while JL initials appeared in the aforesaid exhibits, it should be noted that petitioner Julian Lallave, Jr., is the only candidate who possesses the JL initials and in our view, ballots containing such initials SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY petitioner as the candidate intended to be votedforSKChairman.

Zaratefiledpresentpetition Eventhoughnotincludedinthepetition,SCtackledtheissueofjurisdiction

ISSUE:istheactofLallave,infilingdirectlytoComelecEnBanc,wasproper?NO

HELD: SC granted Zarates petition ordered Comelec to assign the case to a division to resolve the case RATIO: Appeal madebyLallavetoComelec from the MTC decisionDID NOTgo through a divisionofthe Commissionfirst.Instead,itwentstraightEnBanc,whichdecidedinfavorofLallave Section3,SubdivisionCofArticleIXoftheConstitutionwhichexpresslyprovides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decidedbytheCommissionenbanc. Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, nulland void and mustbe setaside. Consequently, the appeals aredeemedpending beforethe Commission forproperreferraltoaDivision.

Ramirezvs.COMELEC,270SCRA590

FACTS: Petitioner JoseC.Ramirez and private respondent AlfredoI.Gowerecandidatesforvicemayorof Giporlos,EasternSamar in the election of May8,1995.PetitionerwasproclaimedwinnerbytheMunicipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) showing that he obtained 1,367 votes against private respondents 1,235 votes. Private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition for the correction of claimed manifest error in the Statement of Votes. Healleged that, based ontheentriesintheStatementofVotes,heobtained1,515 votes as against petitioners 1,367 votes but that because of error in addition, he was only credited with 1,235 votes. In his counterprotest, petitioner stated that it was actually the votes for him which were erroneouslyreflected in the Statement of Votes. The addition ofthenumberofvotesfromotherprecincts confirms the MBCs certificate that the total number of votes cast was actually 1,367 for petitioner and 1,235forprivaterespondent. On August 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its first questioned resolution, directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute thevotesintheStatementofVotesandproclaimthewinningcandidateforvice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar accordingly. On September 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its second questioned resolution,reiteratingitsearlierruling.ItrejectedtheMBCsrecommendationtoresort to election returns: The MunicipalBoard ofCanvassers is reminded that pursuant to Section 231 of the Omnibus ElectionCode, it is the Statement ofVotes x x x which supports and form (sic) the basis ofthe

CertificateofCanvassandProclamationofwinningcandidates. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the annulment of the two resolutions of the COMELECandthereinstatementinsteadofpetitionerJoseC.Ramirezasthedulyelectedvicemayor. ISSUES: 1. WON the COMELEC actedwithout jurisdiction over the Statement ofVotesbecausetheyresolvedthe

casewithoutitsdivisionsactinguponitprimarily 2. WON the MBCalreadymadeacorrectionofthemanifesterrorsintheStatementofVotesanditwasa

grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to order a recomputation of the votes based on the allegedly uncorrectedStatementofVotes. HELD: With respect to the first ground of the petition, Art. IX, 3 of the Constitution provides: The Commission onElections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shallpromulgateitsrulesofprocedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. On the other hand, Rule 27, 5 of the 1993Rulesof the COMELEC expressly provides thatpreproclamationcontroversiesinvolving,interalia,manifesterrors inthetabulationortallyingoftheresultsmaybefileddirectlywiththeCOMELECenbanc. Inany event, petitioneris estopped fromraisingtheissueofjurisdictionoftheCOMELECenbanc.Notonly did he participate in the proceedings below but he also sought affirmative relief from the COMELEC en bancbyfilingaCounterProtest. As tothesecondissue. The corrections should be made eitherbyinsertingcorrectionsintheStatement of Votes which was originally prepared and submitted by the MBC, or by preparing an entirely new Statement of Votes incorporating therein the corrections. The certification issued by the MBC is thusnot the proper way to correct manifest errors in the Statement of Votes. More importantly, the corrections should be basedontheelectionreturnsbutherethecorrectionsappeartohavebeenmadebytheMBCon the bases of the Certificates of Votes issued. Certificates of Votes are issued by Boards of Election Inspectors(BEI)towatchers,pursuantto215oftheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC). Thereisnoreasonfor their useinthiscasesincetheintegrityoftheelectionreturnsisnotinquestion.TheStatementofVotesis a vital component of the electoral process. It supports the Certificate of Canvass and is the basis for proclamation.Butin thiscase the Statement of Votes was not even prepareduntilaftertheproclamation ofthewinningcandidate.ThisiscontrarytotheOmnibusElectionCode,231. Decision: WHEREFORE, the petitionispartially GRANTED by annullingtheresolutionsdatedAugust1,1995 andSeptember26,1995oftheCommissiononElections. TheCOMELECisinsteadDIRECTEDtoreconvene the Municipal Board of Canvassers or, if this is not feasible, to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers in Giporlos, Eastern Samar and to order it to revise with deliberate speed the Statement of Voteson the basis of the election returns from all precincts of the MunicipalityofGiporlosandthereafter proclaimthewinningcandidateonthebasisthereof.SOORDERED.

Faelnarvs.COMELEC,331SCRA429

DOCTRINE: if

the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is

conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report uponwhichthe Commissions Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which determines the existence of probable cause. Consequently, an appeal totheCommissionis unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original resolution,in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appealor motuproprio,may review the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal. procedural kasi kayaganito. NATURE: petition for certiorari due to RTCs denial of petitioners motion to quash the informationsfiledagainsthim. FACTS: On April 8, 1997, Eugenio Faelner filed a certificate for candidacy for thepositionof BarangayChariman. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JINGJING FAELNARSCUP,"openedattheGuadalupeSportsComplexandlasteduptoApril30,1997. This led to the filingof complaint for electioneering against petitioner and Cecilio Gilamacby AntionioLuy. The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign period which officially started onMay1,1997,inviolationofthe Omnibus Election Code. Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioners name was placed on the facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex (2) petitioners name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone during the games (3) the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper and (4) a raffle sponsored by CecilioGillamacwasheldwithhomeappliancesgivenawayasprizes. Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting event for the benefitoftheyouth. Electionofficerwhoinvestigatedthecaserecommendedthedismissalofthecomplaint. However, the law department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of a complaint againsthim. Later, COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case, however on the motion of antiono luy, the comelec reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary informationsagainstpetitionerandGillamac. Then,petitionerandgilamacwerechargedintheRTCofCEBUundertwoinformations. Petitioner now moved for the quashal of the information. RTC denied hismotionhence this recourse. ISSUE/S: WON the resolution oftheCOMELECenbancrecommendingthedismissalofthe

informationagainsthimisfinalandexecutory. Is the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the electionlawsimmediatelyfinalandexecutory,aspetitionercontends? HELD: on the 1st issue, petitioner actually wants to declare theresolutionof the COMELEC null and void. This petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the COMELEC. Resolution No. 982914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en banc on October 29, 1998. Petitioners remedy was to seek its annulment by way of a special civil action of certiorari underRule65oftheRulesofCourt.Rule64,2provides: SEC. 2. Mode of Review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the SupremeCourtoncertiorariunderRule65,exceptashereinafterprovided. Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shallbe filedwithin30daysfromnoticeofthe resolution sought tobe reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The presentpetitiontoset aside the orders of thetrial court denying its motion to quashandmotionforreconsideration was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after Resolution No. 982194 was promulgated on October29,1998.Consequently,theresolutionisnowfinalandbindingupon theparties. Onthe2ndissue:petitionerrelieshiscontentionfromthe1988COMELECrulesofprocedure, however it is now amended. The 1993 Rules of procedure now provides that in election offense cases, motion for reconsideration is allowed in an en banc decision of the COMELEC. Petitioner likewise invokes Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides SEC. 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal. Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution ofinvestigating officers maybemadeonlytotheCommission within ten (10) daysfromreceiptoftheresolutionofsaidofficials,provided,howeverthatthis shallnotdivesttheCommissionofitspowertomotuproprioreview,revise,modifyorreverse the resolution of the chief stateprosecutorand/orprovincial/cityprosecutors.Thedecisionof theCommissiononsaidappealsshallbeimmediatelyexecutoryandfinal. Even a cursory readingoftheaboverule,however,willshowthatitgovernsappealsfromthe action of the State Prosecutor or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers. The present case does not involve such an appeal but resolutionof theCOMELECitselfintheexerciseofitsexclusivepowertoconductpreliminary investigationofelectionoffensecases.Suchdistinctioncanbeeasilyexplained. In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated

power to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating officer submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve the issue of probable cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the Commission of itsreviewpowerswould,atthispoint,alreadyconstituteasecondlookonthe issue of probable cause, the COMELECs ruling on the appeal would be immediately final andexecutory. On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report uponwhichthe Commissions Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc which determines the existence of probable cause. Consequently, an appeal totheCommissionis unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original resolution,in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appealor motuproprio,may reviewtheresolutionoftheStateProsecutor,orProvincialorCityFiscal. Reliance by petitioner upon Rule 34, 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is thus withoutanybasis. WHEREFORE,thepetitionforcertiorariisDENIED. SOORDERED.

Gallardovs.Tabamo,218SCRA253

Topic: COMELEC powers and functions Doctrine The COMELEC has the constitutional power and function to enforce and administer laws relative to conduct of elections. The regular courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a petition to enjoin the construction of public works projects within 45 days before an election. Facts Private respondent, Pedro Romulado, filed a petition with the RTC against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing and prosecution certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) because although they were initiated a few days before March 27 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project. Petitioners allegedly violated paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. Private respondent alleged that the illegal prosecution of these public work projects requiring massive outlay of public funds during this election period has been and is being done maliciously and intentionally for the purpose of corrupting the voters and inducing them to support the candidacy of petitioner Gallardo and his candidates in the coming May 11, 1992 election. Respondent judge Tabamo issued the TRO in question. Petitioners argue that this case involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the COMELEC.

Issue WON the trial court has jurisdiction. Held No. The COMELEC has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

TelecommunicationandBroadcastAttorneysofthePhilippinesvs.COMELEC,289SCRA33 Montejovs.COMELEC,242SCRA415

Montejo vs. COMELEC 242 SCRA 415 March 16, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting(transferring of a municipality from one district to another) certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties.On December 29, 1994, it promulgated the of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether

the unprecedented a

exercise

by

the COMELEC of from one district to

the legislative power of another district) and

redistricting(transferring

municipality

reapportionment (divide and shareout) is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, which transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Constitutonal Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the

Metropolitan Manila Area." Said ordinance states that:

Section 2 of the ordinance: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.

Section 3 of the ordinance : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. In the latter case, they can include that municipality in the district where it ought to belong. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

To emphasize, the COMELEC cannot transfer one municipality inone district to another district. Such is a substantial amendment. Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . . ."

Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district. It is likewise denied.

Sandovalvs.Comelec,G.R.No.133842.January26,2000,323SCRA403

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the MalabonNavotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassersproclaimed petitionerthedulyelectedcongressman.Thepetitionertookhisoathof officeonthe same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, whichsoughtthe annulmentofpetitioner'sproclamation.He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman tosuspendthe canvassandproclamationof thewinning candidate, but the district board of canvassersproceededwith thecanvassand proclamation despitethesaid verbal order. He also alleged that there was noninclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issuedan ordersetting asidetheproclamationofpetitioner andruled theproclamationasvoid.Hence,thispetitionforcertiorariseekingtheannulmentandreversaloftheComelecorder. ISSUES: 1.whethertheCOMELEChasthepowertotakecognizanceofSPCNo.98143andSPCNo.98206

SPC No. 98143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and NavotaswithPrayerfortheNullificationoftheProclamationofFedericoS.SandovalasCongressman." SPCNo.98206.Thepetitionsoughttheannulmentofpetitioner'sproclamationascongressman.

2.whethertheCOMELEC'sordertosetasidepetitioner'sproclamationwasvalid.

RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all preproclamation controversies.As anexception,however, tothegeneralrule, Section 15 of Republic Act(RA) 7166prohibits candidates inthe presidential,vicepresidential,senatorialand congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Preproclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, VicePresident, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, VicePresident, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authorityoftheappropriatecanvassing bodymotupropioor uponwritten complaint ofaninterestedpersontocorrectmanifesterrorsin thecertificateofcanvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of thewinnerintheelection,whichdelay might result in a vacuumin these sensitiveposts. The law,nonetheless, providesanexception to theexception.Thesecond sentence of Section 15 allows the filingof petitionsforcorrection ofmanifesterrorsin thecertificateofcanvass orelection returns even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of theHouseofRepresentativesfor thesimplereason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassingnordelaythe proclamation ofthewinner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under theConstitutionto"enforce and administer all laws and regulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendumand recall" and itspowerto"decide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote,allquestionsaffectingelections."

We now go tothesecondissue. AlthoughtheCOMELECis clothedwithjurisdiction overthesubjectmatterandissue of SPC No. 98143 and SPC No. 98206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner isinvalidforhavingbeenrenderedwithoutdueprocess oflaw.Procedural dueprocess demands prior notice and hearing.The factsshow thatCOMELECsetasidethe proclamation ofpetitionerwithoutthebenefit ofpriornoticeandhearinganditrenderedthequestionedorderbasedsolelyonprivaterespondent'sallegations.

Public respondent submits thatproceduraldue processneed notbeobservedinthiscasebecauseitwasmerelyexercising itsadministrativepowertoreview,reviseandreversetheactionsoftheboardofcanvassers.

Wecannotacceptpublicrespondent'sargument.

Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conductregistration ofvoters,deputizelaw enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of theCommission,prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of orimpositionof anyotherdisciplinary actionupon anyofficeroremployee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, orderordecision.In addition,the Commissionalsohasdirectcontrol and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to actasanarbiter.It behoovesthe Commissiontohearboth parties todeterminetheveracityoftheir allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by theCOMELECof its quasijudicialpower.Ithasbeensaid thatwhereapowerrestsinjudgment ordiscretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasijudicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasijudicial tribunal, cannotignoretherequirementsofproceduraldueprocessinresolvingthepetitionsfiledbyprivaterespondent.

TheCOMELECorderdatedJune2,1998inSPCNo.98143andSPCNo.98206isANNULLED.

Nature:

Aratucvs.Comelec88SCRA251

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the respondent COMELEC resolving their appeal from the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers for Region XII regarding the canvass of the results of the electioninsaidregionforrepresentativestotheI.B.P.heldonApril7,1978. Facts:

Theseare consolidated petitions for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction toreview decisionsbytheCOMELEC.

Tomatic Aratuc etal. are independent candidates for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa who banded together under the banner of the Kunsensiyang Bayan an unegisterd political party, sought the suspensionofthecanvassthenbeingundertakenbyrespondentBoardinCotabatocity.Asupervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon Venancio S. Duque,hadconductedofthecomplaintsof the petitionersthereinofallegedirregularitiesintheelectionrecordsinthevotingcenters,petitionershad asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed resumption of the canvass but issuedguidelinestobefollowedbutthereaftermodified.

On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting. The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the COMELEC. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which, the case was declared submitted for decision. In order to enable the Commission to decidetheappealproperly:

a. It willhave to go deeper into the examination of the votingrecords and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commissiontodecidetoopentheballotboxesand

b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well asthoseofthemilitaryauthoritiesin theareasaffected.

On January 13, 1979, the COMELEC rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the finalresultofthecanvass.

Hencethecase

Issue: WhetherthereisgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictiononthepartofCOMELEC.

Held: No,

UnderSection 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)shallhavedirect control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section175 of the same Code

provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies." The fact of the matter is that the authority oftheCommissionin reviewingactuationsofboardofcanvassersdoesnotspringfrom any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the ElectionCode,butfromtheplenaryprerogativeofdirectcontrolandsupervisionendowed to it by the abovequoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and controlover another may dodirectly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. Wecannot fault respondent COMELEC for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass. On the contrary, it must be stated that COMELEC correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties visvis the preservation of the purity of electionsandelectoralprocessesandindoingwhatpetitioneritshouldnothavedone.

Dispositive:PetitionDismissed

FilipinaEngineeringandMachineShopvs.Ferrer,135SCRA25

FACTS: In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, COMELEC issued an INVITATION TO BID on September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths Among the 17 bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said INVITATION were the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company, (Acme for short). Respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum on the proceedings taken pursuant to the said Invitation to Bid which stated that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy 51 kilos in weight. The Committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made." After an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the COMELEC Commissioners, and after the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to Acme, subject to the condition, among others, that "(Acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant" COMELEC issued Purchase Order No. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the 11,000 Units of voting booths in favor of Acme. Acme accepted the terms of the purchase. On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee,

and private respondent Acme. In the meantime, since no restraining order had been issued against the holding of the national elections scheduled on November 11, 1969, Acme complied with its contract with the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid HELD: YES. Section 5 of the Revised Election Code provided that, any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court. Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, provides that, "final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections ..." fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence it has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws. We are however, far from convince that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Ambil v. Comelec G.R. No. 143398 , October 25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358

Doctrine: Only final orders, rulings, and decisions of the Commission EN BANC may be subject to judicial review by way of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of Rule of Court. Interlocutory orders do not come within the purview of judicial review. Facts: The controversy of the case revolves around a resolution issued by a division of the COMELEC over an election protest. Ramirez and Ambil were both candidates for the position of Governor in Eastern Samar for the May 11, 1998 elections. The COMELEC proclaimed Ambil the winner thus prompting the former to file an electoral protest over 201 precincts. On January 2000, Commissioner Guiani drafted and signed a proposed resolution which was not promulgated even after his retirement. The resolution was a decision proclaiming Ramirez as the winner of the election. On Feb. 24, 2000, Ambit received a resolution stating the same. However, COMELEC responded to the purported resolution and claimed that it is a useless scrap of paper because it was not promulgated during the time Commissioner Guiani was still in position. On March 31, 2000, the Comelec 1st Division issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution of the protest case. Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, Ambil filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court under certiorari, with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether or not the unpromulgated resolution by the Comelec First Division may be set aside by the Supreme Court. Held: NO. The power of the Supreme Court to review cases filed by certiorari is provided for in the Constitution. In interpreting Sec 7 thereof, the SC said, "We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolutionof the Comelec en banc,not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

Romualdez vs. RTC,226 SCRA 406

CASENO.24ROMUALDEZvs.RTC FACTS: PhilipRomualdezisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.Sometimeintheearlypartof1980,in consonancewithhisdecisiontoestablishhislegalresidenceatBarangayMalbog,Tolosa,Leyte.causedthe constructionofhisresidentialhousetherein. GiventheatmospherebroughtaboutbytheEDSAPeoplePowerRevolutionof1986,Romualdez,together withhisimmediatefamily,leftthePhilippinesandsought"asylum"intheUnitedStateswhichtheUnitedStates governmentgranted. In1987,heattemptedtocomebacktothePhilippinestorunforCongress.However,hisflightwasaborted. ItwastheletterconcerninghispossibledeportationwhichmadehimcomebacktothePhilippines,arriving herewithoutanygovernmenttraveldocument. Uponarrival,heimmediatelywentbacktohisresidenceinMalbog,Tolosa,Leyte. DuringtheregistrationofvotersconductedbytheCOMELECforthe11May1992elections,petitioner registeredhimselfanewasavoteratPrecinctNo.9ofMalbog,Tolosa,Leyte.ThechairmanoftheBoardof ElectionInspectorsallowedhimtoberegistered. DonatoAdvinculafiledapetitionintheMTC,prayingthatRomualdeznamebeexcludedinthelistofvoters

sincehesaresidentofMassachusetts,USA.(HedidnotfulfiltherequirementsunderArt.V,Sec.1ofthe Consti) Asananswer,RomualdezcontendsthathehasbeenaresidentofTolosa,Leyte,sincetheearly1980's, andthathehasnotabandonedhissaidresidencebyhisphysicalabsencetherefromduringtheperiodfrom 1986uptothethirdweekofDecember1991. MTCfindstherespondenttobearesidentofBrgy.Malbog,Tolosa,Leyteandqualifiedtoregisterasavoter thereat Advinculaappealed. RTCfindsrespondentPhilipRomualdezdisqualifiedtoregisterasavoterforthe1992electionsand reversedthedecisionofthelowercourtintoto. Hence,petitionerfiledthispresentcase. SCissuedaTROdirectingrespondentRTCJudgePedroEspinotoceaseanddesistfromenforcing questioneddecision. ISSUES: 1.PROCEDURAL:WhetherornottheMTCandRTCacquiredjurisdictionovertheabovecases,thepetition havingbeenfiledbyonewhodidnotallegetobehimselfaregisteredvoterofthemunicipalityconcerned 2.SUBSTANTIAL:WhetherornottheRTCerredinfindingthepetitionertohavevoluntarilyleftthecountryand abandonedhisresidenceinMalbog,Tolosa,Leyte(Technically,theCourtquestionsWONpetitioneris consideredasaresidentofMalbog,Tolosa,Leyte)

HELD: 1.TheCourtreiteratesthat"whilelackofjurisdictionmaybeassailedatanystage,aparty'sactive participationintheproceedingsbeforeacourtwithoutjurisdictionwillestopsuchpartyfromassailingsuchlack ofjurisdiction."Undoubtedly,thepetitionerisnowestoppedfromquestioningthejurisdictionoftherespondent notonlybyhisactiveparticipationintheproceedingsthereatbut,moreimportantly,inhavingsoughtan affirmativereliefhimselfwhentheappealwasmadetothelattercourtwhosejurisdictionhe,ineffect,invoked. 2.PetitionerRomualdezdidnotabandonhisresidence. o Inelectioncases,theCourttreatsdomicileandresidenceassynonymousterms,thus:"(t)heterm "residence"asusedintheelectionlawissynonymouswith"domicile",whichimportsnotonlyanintentionto resideinafixedplacebutalsopersonalpresenceinthatplace,coupledwithconductindicativeofsuch intention." o "Domicile"denotesafixedpermanentresidencetowhichwhenabsentforbusinessorpleasure,orforlike reasons,oneintendstoreturn. o Thatresidence,inthecaseofthepetitioner,wasestablishedduringtheearly1980'stobeatBarangay Malbog,Tolosa,Leyte. o Residencethusacquired,however,maybelostbyadoptinganotherchoiceofdomicile.Inorder,inturn,to acquireanewdomicilebychoice,theremustconcur(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality,(2)an intentiontoremainthere,and(3)anintentiontoabandontheolddomicile. o Givenhisidentityandthecircumstancesduringthetime,petitionerssuddendeparturefromthecountry cannotbedescribedas"voluntary,"oras"abandonmentofresidence"atleastinthecontextthattheseterms areusedinapplyingtheconceptof"domicilebychoice. o Afterexaminationofrecords,theCourtfindsnotthatmuchtoconvinceusthatthepetitionerhad,infact, abandonedhisresidenceinthePhilippinesandestablishedhisdomicileelsewhere.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE,findingmeritonthepetitionthesameisherebyGRANTEDDUECOURSEoftheDecisionofthe respondentRegionalTrialCourtdated03April1992isherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE,andtheDecisionof theMunicipalTrialCourtdated28February1992isherebyREINSTATEDandtheTemporaryRestrainingOrder issuedbytheCourtinthiscaseiscorrespondinglymadePERMANENT.Nopronouncementastocosts.

Kabataan Party-List vs. Comelec G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009,

CASENO.25 KABATAANPARTYLISTREPRESENTATIVERAYMONDV.PALATINO,etal.v.COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS PreservingthesanctityoftherightofsuffrageensuresthattheStatederivesitspowerfromthe consentofthegoverned. FACTS: OnFebruary12,2009theCOMELECissuedResolutionNo.8585adjustingthedeadlineofvoter registrationfortheMay10,2010NationalandLocalElectionstoOctober31,2009,insteadofDecember 15,2009asfixedbytheirpriorResolutionNo.8514pursuanttoR.A.8189ortheVotersRegistrationAct of1996.ThepublicclamoredforanextensionbuttheCOMELECarguedthattheyneedmoretimeto preparefortheautomatedelections.ItcontendsthattheOmnibusElectionCodeconferuponitthepower topromulgaterulesadregulationsinordertoensurefree,orderlyandhonestelections.Italsocitedthe caseofAkbayanYouthv.CommissiononElectionswherethecourtdeniedasimilarprayerforan extensionofthedeadlineofvoterregistrationfortheMay14,2001elections. RaymondV.Palatino,representativeofKabataanPartylistassailedthevalidityofCOMELECResolution No.8585andseeksdeclarationofitsnullity.Palatinocontendsthatthiswouldbeconsideredan encroachmentofthelegislativepowerofCongressasitamendsthesystemofcontinuingvoter registrationunderSection8ofTheVotersRegistrationActof1996.ItwasprayedthatResolutionNo. 8585bedeclarednullandvoidandtoextendtheregistrationuntilJanuary9,2010. ISSUE:WONR.A.8585,adjustingthedeadlineofvoterregistrationtoOctober31,2009insteadof December15,2009,isnullandvoid?YES. HELD:PreservingthesanctityoftherightofsuffrageensuresthattheStatederivesitspowerfromthe consentofthegoverned.TheparamountimportanceofthisrightisalsoafunctionoftheStatepolicyof peopleempowermentarticulatedintheconstitutionaldeclarationthatsovereigntyresidesinthepeople andallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem,bolsteredbytherecognitionofthevitalroleofthe youthinnationbuildinganddirectivetotheStatetoencouragetheirinvolvementinpublicandcivicaffairs. Thecleartextofthelawthusdecreesthatvotersbeallowedtoregisterdailyduringregularofficeshours, exceptduringtheperiodstarting120daysbeforearegularelectionand90daysbeforeaspecialelection. Inthepresentcase,theCourtfindsnogroundtoholdthatthemandateofcontinuingvoterregistration cannotbereasonablyheldwithintheperiodprovidedbyR.A.8189,Sec.8dailyduringofficehours, exceptduringtheperiodstarting120daysbeforetheMay10,2010regularelections.Thereisthusno occasionfortheCOMELECtoexerciseitspowertofixotherdatesordeadlinestherefor.

COMELECResolutionNo.8585isdeclarednullandvoidinsofarasitsetthedeadlineofvoterregistration fortheMay10,2010electionsonOctober31,2009.TheCOMELECisdirectedtoproceedwithdispatch inreopeningtheregistrationofvotersandholdingthesameuntilJanuary9,2010.

Baytan vs Comelec GR. No. 153945, 396 SCRA 703, 716

DOCTRINE: Double Registration is committed as long as the person does not cancel their previous application prior to applying for a new one. FACTS: Petitioners Baytan (Reynato, Reynaldo, and Adrian) were on their way to register, and were led by Brgy. Captain Ignacio to the Precinct of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered and returned home The day after, curious as to why the registrants in Barangay 18 were unfamiliar to them, they reviewed the precinct map of Brgy. 18 and found out their residence was actually in Brgy. 28. Petitioners then went to the precinct of Brgy. 28 and registered again. Afterwards, petitioners sent a letter to the then COMELEC Assistant asking for advice on how to cancel their initial registration which they made in mistake, and informing him that they have already registered a second time and wanted to redress their error The Election Officer of Cavite forwarded copies of Petitioners Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor (Ravanzo) who recommended that a case be filed against Petitioners for double registration (since it was recommendation to file an information only, this was merely in the preliminary investigation stage) The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of Ravanzo to file an information Petitioners filed for Certiorari ISSUE: W/N PETITIONERS WERE IN VIOLATION OF DOUBLE REGISTRATION HELD: YES Sec. 261 of the Election Code lists the Prohibited Acts, subsection (y)(5) state: Any person who, being a registered voter, registers without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration It is clear that Petitioners did not cancel their previous registration prior to registering again in Brgy. 28 That fact alone is enough to give COMELEC to find probable cause In addition, double registration being malum prohibitum, the argument of petitioners that they did not

intend to violate the law is immaterial. Thus, Petitioner is incorrect in arguing COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when they approved the recommendation of Ravanza to file an information based on probable cause Note: Issue of due process was also discussed, but it was because COMELEC decided the preliminary investigation en banc so petitioners argue denial of due process. Deciding of cases of registration is an administrative function and thus, not covered by Sec. 3 of Art. IX-C of the Constitution

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1136781, October 6, 2000

NATURE: 3 consolidated petitions FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of 123 parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed 13 party-list representatives from 12 parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to the petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the COMELEC en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative. One of the candidates, Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Govt Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement (PAG-ASA) filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the HOR, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Nine other party-list orgs fled their respective Motions for Intervention seeking the same relief as sought by PAG-ASA. On Oct 15m 1998, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition.

a. It ordered the proclamation of 38 party-list group in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. b. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives."

c. In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative. There were 12 parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, which objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11. The COMELEC en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold? The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives. Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold. Several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system On January 12, 1999, the SC issued a Status Quo Order directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on January 13, 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the October/January Resolutions.

ISSUES: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time? 2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

RULING: 1. NO. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. A simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. The same declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides: (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. The Court is not tasked to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.

2. YES, the two percent threshold and three-seat limit are consistent with the intent of the framers of constitution and law.

a.

The two-percent threshold:

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation. b. The three-seat-per-party limit:

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, the Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House. 3. As to the method of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The formula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no. of votes of concerned party divided by no. of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. (5% = 2 seats ) It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system. First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters. a. Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party. b. Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. c. Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. EPILOGUE: In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation. In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review. The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature. Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits. Court denied petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.

Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698

Political parties and party lists: (Sorry for the length nilagay ko yung mga provisions ) The case:

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus ResolutionNo.37851issuedbytheCommissiononElections(Comelec)onMarch26,2001. This Resolution approved the participation of154organizationsandparties,includingthose herein impleaded, in the 2001 partylist elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the partylist system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalizedoroverrepresented.
Facts:

In the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the earlyreleaseoftheOmnibusResolutionsoftheDivisionswhich werepromulgatedonlyon10February2001. Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respectiveManifestations,statingtheirintentiontoparticipateinthepartylistelections. The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several othersinitsassailedMarch26,2001

OmnibusResolutionNo.3785,whichwequote: "We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multipartisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoralwindow. "It will be noted that as defined, the 'partylist system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizationsorcoalitionsthereofregisteredwith theCommissiononElections. "However, in the course ofourreviewofthemattersatbar,wemustrecognizethefactthat there is a need to keepthenumberofsectoralparties,organizationsandcoalitions,downto a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the MotionsforReconsiderationsorOppositions." On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of some of herein respondents be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List SystemfortheMay14,2001Elections'andthatsaidcertifiedlistbeaccordinglyamended. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan MunaYouth also filed a Petition for CancellationofRegistrationandNominationagainstsomeofhereinrespondents.5 The Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May3,2001.Duringthehearing,however,CommissionerRalphC. Lantionmerelydirectedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda. Disstisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Petitioners OFW and Bayan muna filed separate cases before the Supreme Court both challenging the challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. These case are consolidated , directed the hearing of oralarguments while at the same timeallowedtheCOMELECtoproceedwiththe countingandcanvassing butbarredproclamationofwinnersuntilfurtherordersfromthecourt. Issue:WhetherMajorpoliticalpartiesmayparticipateinthepartylistsystem WhethertheOmnibusresolutionisconstitutional

Held: ThePetitionsarepartlymeritorious.ThesecasesshouldberemandedtotheComelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitutionandRA7941,asspecifiedinthisDecision. . Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the partylist elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations."
First Issue: Yes,

Furthermore,underSections7and8,Article IX(C) oftheConstitution, politicalpartiesmay beregisteredunderthepartylistsystem. "Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, exceptforthoseregisteredunderthepartylistsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution. "Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the partylist system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similarbodies.However,theyshallbeentitledto appointpollwatchersinaccordancewithlaw. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations orcoalitionsthereof,xxx." Section 3 expresslystatesthata"party"is"either a politicalpartyorasectoralpartyoracoalition ofparties. " More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominatesandsupportscertainofitsleadersandmembersascandidatesforpublicoffice." Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political partiesinthepartylistsystem.Wequotethepertinentprovisionbelow: "xxx "For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth CongressofthePhilippinesshallnotbeentitledtoparticipateinthepartylistsystem.

xxx" Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the partylistelections.
Limitation:

Thatpoliticalpartiesmayparticipateinthepartylistelections doesnotmean,however,that anypoliticalpartyoranyorganizationorgroupforthatmattermaydoso The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the partylist system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, ArticleVIoftheConstitution,providesasfollows: "(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislativedistricts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist systemofregisterednational,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizations. (2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be providedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector."(Emphasissupplied.)
Second Issue: Validity of the omnibus resolution

The foregoing provision on the partylist system is not selfexecutory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law" it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of theConstitution. Hence,RA7941wasenacted.
Yes it is valid,

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The partylist system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to

comeoutoftheirlimboandseizetheopportunity. Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that thepartylistsystemis,withoutanyqualification,opentoall.Suchposition does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the partylist system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would furtherweakenthemandaggravatetheirmarginalization. In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the partylist provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers ofRA 7941. Dispositive: this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the partylist participantsinthelightoftheguidelinesenunciatedinthisDecision.
*Note the guidelines the SC created on whos eligible:

First,thepoliticalparty,sector,organizationorcoalitionmustrepresentthemarginalized andunderrepresentedgroupsidentifiedinSection5ofRA7941. Second,whileevenmajorpoliticalpartiesareexpresslyallowedbyRA7941andthe Constitutiontoparticipateinthepartylistsystem,theymustcomplywiththedeclared statutorypolicyofenabling"Filipinocitizensbelongingtomarginalizedand underrepresentedsectorsxxxtobeelectedtotheHouseofRepresentatives.Thoughnot disqualified,theymustshowthattheyarerepresentingtheinterestofthemarginalized. Third,inviewoftheobjections53directedagainsttheregistrationofAngBuhayHayaang Yumabong,whichisallegedlyareligiousgroup,theCourtnotestheexpressconstitutional provisionthatthereligioussectormaynotberepresentedinthepartylistsystem.Theterm "EXCEPTRELIGIOUSGROUPSpertainstothereligiousdenominationsitself,notthe individual(i.ePriests) Fourth,apartyoranorganizationmustnotbedisqualifiedunderSection6ofRA7941, whichenumeratesthegroundsfordisqualificationasfollows: "(1)Itisareligioussectordenomination,organizationorassociationorganizedforreligious purposes

(2)Itadvocatesviolenceorunlawfulmeanstoseekitsgoal (3)Itisaforeignpartyororganization (4)Itisreceivingsupportfromanyforeigngovernment,foreignpoliticalparty,foundation, organization,whetherdirectlyorthroughanyofitsofficersormembersorindirectlythrough thirdpartiesforpartisanelectionpurposes (5)Itviolatesorfailstocomplywithlaws,rulesorregulationsrelatingtoelections (6)Itdeclaresuntruthfulstatementsinitspetition (7)Ithasceasedtoexistforatleastone(1)yearor (8)Itfailstoparticipateinthelasttwo(2)precedingelectionsorfailstoobtainatleasttwo percentum(2%)ofthevotescastunderthepartylistsysteminthetwo(2)preceding electionsfortheconstituencyinwhichithasregistered."59 Fifth,thepartyororganizationmustnotbeanadjunctof,oraprojectorganizedoranentity fundedorassistedby,thegovernment. Fifth,thepartyororganizationmustnotbeanadjunctof,oraprojectorganizedoranentity fundedorassistedby,thegovernment. Sixth,thepartymustnotonlycomplywiththerequirementsofthelawitsnomineesmust likewisedoso.Section9ofRA7941: "SEC.9.QualificationsofPartyListNominees.Nopersonshallbenominatedas partylistrepresentativeunlessheisanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,aregistered voter,aresidentofthePhilippinesforaperiodofnotlessthanone(1)yearimmediately precedingthedayoftheelection,abletoreadandwrite,abonafidememberofthepartyor organizationwhichheseekstorepresentforatleastninety(90)daysprecedingthedayof theelection,andisatleasttwentyfive(25)yearsofageonthedayoftheelection. Incaseofanomineeoftheyouthsector,hemustatleastbetwentyfive(25)butnotmore thanthirty(30)yearsofageonthedayoftheelection.Anyyouthsectoralrepresentative whoattainstheageofthirty(30)duringhistermshallbeallowedtocontinueinofficeuntil theexpirationofhisterm." Seventh,notonlythecandidatepartyororganizationmustrepresentmarginalizedand underrepresentedsectorssoalsomustitsnominees.

Eighth,aspreviouslydiscussed,whilelackingawelldefinedpoliticalconstituency,the nomineemustlikewisebeabletocontributetotheformulationandenactmentof appropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawhole

PGBI vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 190529, 619 SCRA 585 CaseNo.29
PhilippineGuardiansBrotherhood,Inc.(PGBI)vs.COMELEC Doctrine: A partylist may be disqualified if it failstoparticipateinthe lasttwo(2)preceding electionsorfails toqualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. (Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941, as amended/interpreted by the SC in light of the BANAT v.COMELEC ruling)A delistingbasedonamixtureorfusionof these twodifferentandseparategroundsfordelistingisthereforeastrainedapplicationofthelaw. Facts: ThePhilippineGuardiansBrotherhood,Inc.(PGBI)registeredasapartylistinthe2010elections. However, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several partylist groups or organizationsfromthelistofregisterednational,regionalorsectoralparties,organizationsorcoalitionsincludingPGBI. Itwasdelistedbecauseitfailedtoget2%ofthevotescastin2004anditdidnotparticipateinthe2007elections. PGBIfileditsverifiedoppositiontothesaidresolutionbuttheCOMELECdeniedPGBIsmotion/oppositionforlackofmerit. The COMELECappliedMinero v.Commission onElections (G.R. 177548)whichisverysimilar tothecaseat barMINEROfailed toget2%ofthevotesin2001anddidnotparticipateatallinthe2004elections. PGBIfiledforapetitionforcertioraridirectlytotheSupremeCourt. Initially,theSCdismissedthepetitioninlightoftherulingofMinerov.COMELEC. However, it was subsequently reconsidered because PGBI asserted that Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941 (PartyListSystem Act) does not apply since it only failed to participate in one preceding election (not two) and failed to secure the required percentage in one (not two) preceding election. [PGBI asserted that to be disqualified under Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941, a partylist should fail to participate in two precedingelectionsORfailtosecurethe requiredpercentage(2%)in twopreceding electionsnotamixtureofthetwogrounds.] Issue:WhetherPGBIshouldbedelistedfromtherosterofregisteredpartylistsinthe2010Elections. Held:NoTheSupremeCourtabandonedtheMinerovs.COMELECruling. Section6(8)ofRepublicActNo.7941(RA7941),otherwiseknownasthePartyListSystemAct,provides: Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation ofRegistration.TheCOMELEC maymotu proprioor uponverified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,theregistration ofany national,regionalor sectoralparty,organizationorcoalitiononanyofthefollowinggrounds: xxxx (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) precedingelectionsorfailstoobtainatleast two per centum (2%)ofthe votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Theword"or"isadisjunctivetermsignifyingdisassociationandindependenceofonethingfromtheotherthingsenumerated Theplain,clearandunmistakablelanguageofthelawprovidesfortwo(2)separatereasons/groundsfordelisting. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is aninterpretationnot within thecontemplation of theframersofthe lawand henceisagravelyabusiveinterpretationofthelaw. The Supreme Court also interpretedSection6(8) ofR.A.7941 inlightof theBANAT v.COMELECrulingthat partylistgroupsor organizationsgarneringlessthan2%ofthepartylistvotesmayyetqualifyforaseatintheallocationofadditionalseats. The disqualification should nownecessarilybereadtoapply to partylistgroupsor organizationsthatdidnotqualifyforaseat inthetwoprecedingelectionsfortheconstituencyinwhichitregistered.

OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698

Facts:

BANAT vs. Comelec 586 SCRA 211.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc. BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula. Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling 2) Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

3) Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is constitutional 4) How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? RULING: 1) The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. 2) Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. However, the second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." 3) In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seateach. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. 4) Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties would participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Atong Paglaum et al. vs. Comelec, April 2, 2013

Liberal Party vs. Comelec, 620 SCRA 393

LIBERALPARTYvs.COMELEC DOCTRINE: Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to register separately in accordance with established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legalpersonalityfromthat of the coalition they may wish to establish with other registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own inthe exerciseoftheir and theirmembersdemocraticfreedomofchoice,buttheycannotreceiveofficialrecognitionfortheircoalition.

FACTS: OnJuly14,2009,theCOMELECpromulgatedResolutionsettingAugust17,2009 asthelast dayfor the filing of petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution providing, for the rules for the filing ofpetitionsforaccreditationforthe determinationofthedominant majority party, the dominant minorityparty,tenmajornationalparties,andtwomajorlocal parties for theMay10, 2010 elections and which also set the deadline for filing of petitionsforaccreditationon February 12,2010and requiredthataccreditationapplicantsberegisteredpoliticalparties,organizationsorcoalitions. On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petitionforaccreditationasdominantminority party and on the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a petition forregistrationasacoalition(NPNPC)andaskedthatitberecognized and accreditedas thedominant minority partyforpurposes of the May 10, 2010 elections. On February 23, 2010,theLP filed its Oppositionto theNPNPCspetition TheCOMELEC issued an Order and a Notice of Hearing on February 17, 2010setting for hearing thepetitions for accreditationtodeterminethedominantmajorityparty,dominantminorityparty,10majornationalpartiesand 2majorlocalpartiesinconnectionwiththeMay10,2010elections. Among thepetitionssetforhearingwerethe LPs and the NPNPCs petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority party. The LP presented Rep. Lualhati as its witness and testified that the NPC National Convention did not authorize its National Central Committee to enter into a coalition with the NP and that neither the National Convention nor the general membershipwaseverconsultedaboutthemergerwiththeNP. On April 12, 2010, the COMELEC in its resolution granted the NPNPCs petition for registration asa coalition that the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers That no rule existssetting a deadline for the registration of coalitions andopinedthattheregistrationofacoalitionissimply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality That both the NP and the NPC have validly agreed to join

forcesforpoliticalorelectionpurposes. TheLPnowassailstheApril12,2010COMELECResolutionforhaving beenissuedwithgraveabuseof discretion. ISSUES: 1.WONtheCOMELECenbancconstitutedgraveabuseofdiscretion.YES. 2.WONthepresentpetitionispremature.NO 3.WONtheNPNPCpetitionbeforetheCOMELECviewedasapetitionforregistration,timebarred?YES

HELD: 1.YES Themostobviousgroundcitedinthepetitionthat,ifproperlyestablished,would constitutegraveabuse of discretion is the alleged unwarranted action of the en bancin acting onthe registrationoftheNPNPCwhen theCOMELECsown Rules ofProcedureprovidesthatregistrationisunderthe jurisdictionoftheDivisionatthe first instance. This alleged error is more than an error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the en banc acted without legal authority and therebycommittedajurisdictionaltransgression[31]itsaction,being ultravires, wouldbeanullity. Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate resolution, ordered that August 17, 2009 be the cutoff date for the registration of parties, and yet approved the registration of NPNPC longafter this cutoff date had passed without any valid justification or reason for suspendingthe rule. Forthe en banc to so act was not a mere error of law. The grant of registration was an act outside mandatory legal parametersandwasthereforedonewhentheCOMELECnolongerhadtheauthoritytoactonit. In thissense,it isaproperallegationofgraveabuseofdiscretionunderRule64oftheRulesofCourt. In our view, these jurisdictional challenges to the en banc Resolution, if established, constitute ultra viresactsthatwouldrendertheResolutionvoid.

2.NO The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the actthatbestowsjuridicalpersonality for purposes of our election laws accreditation, on the other hand,relatestotheprivilegedparticipationthatour electionlawsgranttoqualifiedregisteredparties. The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NPNPC the petition expressly and frontally sought the issuance of awritofprohibitionandrestrainingorderto prevent the COMELEC from accreditingacoalitionthatisnotregistered asaparty.The combinationofapetition for certiorariand for prohibition under the circumstances ofthepresentcaseisfullyjustified,asthe registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact sequentially follow one another.

Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition stated otherwise,a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carriedout,accreditationisthenextnaturalsteptofollow. Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in thepetition,thefilingofapetitionforprohibitionwithaprayerfora preliminaryinjunctioncanonlybe expectedas alogicalremedial move otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the pointofviewof prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event the accreditation that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involvedasthe nullificationofa pastand accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives,the OSGobjectionbasedonprematurityis showntobecompletelygroundless.

3.YES Yes, the NPNPCs petition for registration as a coalition is timebarred. Thus, the en banc was wrong in orderingtheoutoftimeregistrationoftheNPNPCcoalition. Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the [L]ast day for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without mentioning organizations and coalitions in the way that the three entities are separately mentioned under Section 2(5), Article IXC of the Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1of theCOMELEC Rules. Resolution No. 8646, however, issimplyalistingofelectoral activities and deadlinesfor theMay 10, 2010 elections it is not in any way a resolution aimed atestablishing distinctionsamong political parties, organizations, and coalitions. In the absence of anynote, explanationor reasonwhy thedeadlineonly mentions political parties, the term political parties should be understood in its generic sense that covers politicalorganizationsandpoliticalcoalitionsaswell. The en bancs failure to follow its own rules on deadlines may, be a negligible error that does not affect its jurisdiction. An examination of Resolution No. 8646, however, shows that the deadline for registration cannot butbeafirmandmandatorydeadlinethattheCOMELEChasset. Given themandatorynatureofthedeadline,subjectonlytoasystemic changethe enbancactedinexcessofits jurisdictionwhen it granted the registration of NPNPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELECitself had set the authority to register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, themandatorydeadlineisajurisdictionalmatterthatshouldhavebeensatisfiedandwasnot. Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures,ifthey aretobe recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carrya different legal personality from that ofthecoalitionthey maywishtoestablish withothersimilarly registered parties. Iftheywanttocoalescewithoneanotherwithoutthe formalregistrationoftheir coalition,they candosoontheirownintheexerciseoftheirandtheirmembersdemocraticfreedomofchoice,but theycannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominantmajorityorminorityparty.Therearenoifsandbutsabouttheseconstitutionalterms. Theen banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling onthe registrationof the NPNPC as a coalition. The matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The

COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and proceduresthe Constitutionandourlawsimpose.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premisesconsidered, weherebyGRANTthepetitionand,accordingly,NULLIFYandSET ASIDE the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the Nacionalista PartyNationalist Peoples Coalition as a political coalition, docketed as SPP10(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NPNPC CoalitionintheMay10,2010electionsforlackoftherequisite registrationas apoliticalcoalition. ThisDecision isdeclaredimmediatelyexecutory.Nocosts.

FACTS:

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245

* Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. * He assumed office in due time. * October 27, 1988 - the League of Municipalities (League), represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. * May 22, 1988 - Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. Also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section. * Commission on Elections decided to set the case for hearing on the merits. * Frivaldo went to the SC in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, SC issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents. * Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. - No

HELD: - Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times". - Specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. - Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. - SC sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence, he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. - He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. - SC will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. - The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does NOT excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. - Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. - If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 Case35:RomualdezMarcosvsCOMELEC FACTS:Imelda,alittleover8yearsold,inorabout1938,established herdomicileinTacloban,Leytewhereshe studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during1952 to workwithher cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered thereas a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she

registeredasavoter. In1965,whenMarcoswonpresidency,theylived inMalacanangPalaceandregisteredas avoter inSan Miguel Manila. SheservedasmemberoftheBatasang PambansaandGovernorofMetro Manila during1978. Imelda RomualdezMarcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition forCancellation and Disqualification" withthe Commission on Electionsalleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Thepetitioner,inan honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residencyduetothefactthatshebecamearesidentoftheMunicipalityofTolosainsaidmonths. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her owndeclarationof7monthsresidencyinthedistrictforthefollowingreasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law whenherfatherbroughtthemtoLeyte 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing anewone, and acts whichcorrespondwith thepurpose. In theabsenceandconcurrenceofallthese,domicileoforiginshouldbedeemedtocontinue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in CivilLawdoes not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicileoforiginandmerelygainedanewhomeandnotdomiciliumnecessarium. 4. AssumingthatImeldagainedanewdomicileafterhermarriageandacquiredright to chooseanewoneonly after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, whichsupportsthedomiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences inTacloban,celebratingher birthdaysandotherimportantmilestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses thenecessaryresidencequalifications to runfora seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directedto order the ProvincialBoardofCanvasserstoproclaimpetitioner asthedulyelected Representativeof theFirstDistrictofLeyte.

Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. On April 24, 1995, Mateo Bedon ( Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the grounds that he lacked the residence qualification under Sec 6, Art 7 of the 1987 Consti.

Issue:

Hearings were conducted by the COMELEC and dismissed Bedons petition to disqualify. On April 25, 1995, Aquino filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days. On May 6, 1995, Comelec 2nd division declared Aquino ELIGIBLE to run. On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc. On May 10, 1995, Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of Aquino. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of Aquino. On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending Aquinos proclamation until completion of the canvassing. On June 1, 1995, Aquino filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Resolving Aquino's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof reading: Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more reflection and judiciousness. Same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows: Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence. Hence, the petition for certiorari

Did Comelec err in deciding that Aquino did not meet the constitutional requirement of residency? NO Ratio: Petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted: The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. It indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for, public office. He must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done. The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative. In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And. as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership In the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.

Grego vs. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481

GREGOvs.COMELEC Facts:Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff bytheSCupona findingofserious misconduct in anadministrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for CouncilorintheSecondDistrictoftheCityofManila.Hewonand,accordingly,assumed office. Afterhisterm, Basco sought reelection. Again, he was elected as one of the (6) City Councilors. Despite challenges to his position, Basco remained undaunted and ran again. Once again, he won. Petitioner Grego, claiming to bea registered voter, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos disqualification, for thesuspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilorof Manilas Second District. On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copyofthepetition. Theothermembersofthe BOC learned about thispetition only twodays later. The Manila BOC proclaimedBascoasadulyelectedcouncilorforthe 2nd DistrictofManila. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable BithaoCamarista, Presiding Judge, MTC Manila.

In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made by the Manila City BOC. He reiterated Bascos disqualificationandprayedanewthatcandidateRomualdoS.Marananbedeclaredthewinner. Issue: WON Bascoshould be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been removed from officeas a result of an administrativecasepursuanttoSection40(b)ofRepublic ActNo. 7160, otherwise knownas the Local Government Code (Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160appliesretroactivelyto
thoseremovedfromofficebeforeittookeffectonJanuary1,1992)

Held: Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is alreadyasettledissueand there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does notqualify the date of a candidatesremovalfromofficeandthatitiscouchedin thepasttenseshouldnotdeter usfromthe applying the law prospectively. the issue ofwhether ornotBascostripleelectiontoofficecuredhis alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point becausetheargument proceedsontheassumptionthathewas in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the LocalGovernment Code which, aswesaidearlier,appliesonlytothose removedfromofficeonorafterJanuary 1, 1992. Anent Bascos alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as governmentowned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioners contention is baseless. Neitherdoes petitioners argument that thetermanypositionisbroadenoughtocover without distinctionboth appointiveandlocalpositionsmeritanyconsideration. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. xxx AND WITHPREJUDICETOREINSTATEMENTTOANYPOSITIONINTHENATIONALORLOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENTOWNED OR CONTROLLEDCORPORATIONS. SEC.24.PersonnelActions.(d) Reinstatement. Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct,been separatedtherefrom, maybereinstatedtoapositioninthesamelevelforwhichheisqualified.

In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Bascois likewise barredfromrunning for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas isreinstatementto anappointiveposition In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as nothaving beenattendedby graveabuseof discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondents continuance in office as City CouncilorfortheSecondDistrictofManila.

Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

CASENO.38 MercadovsManzano
DOCTRINE: To beginwith, dualcitizenshipisdifferentfromdualallegiance.Theformerarises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two ormore states, a personissimultaneouslyconsideredanationalbythesaidstates. Personswithdualallegianceareprohibitedfromrunningforanyelectiveposition. Facts: Petitioner Ernesto S. MercadoandprivaterespondentEduardoB.Manzano werecandidates forvicemayoroftheCityofMakatiintheMay11,1998elections. Eduardo B. Manzano won with a total of103,853overErnestoS. Mercadowith only100,894 votes. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who allegedthatprivaterespondentwasnot acitizenofthePhilippinesbutoftheUnitedStates. COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Local Government Code,persons withdual citizenship are disqualified fromrunningforanyelective position. The petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of ViceMayorofMakatiCitywasfiledbeforeMay11,1998elections. under 40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode,personswithdualcitizenshiparedisqualified fromrunningforanyelectiveposition Respondent admitted that he is registered as aforeignerwiththeBureauofImmigrationand alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and

Filipinomother. He was born intheUnitedStates andisconsideredanAmericancitizenunderUS Laws.But notwithstandinghisregistrationasanAmericancitizen,hedidnotlosehisFilipinocitizenship. USfollowsjussolis.WhilePhilippinesfollowsjussanguinis. Issue: Whether under our laws, heis disqualified from thepositionfor whichhefiledhiscertificateof candidacy.Isheeligiblefortheofficeheseekstobeelected? Held: To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.The former ariseswhen,asa result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneouslyconsideredanationalbythesaidstates. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classesofcitizensofthePhilippinestopossessdualcitizenship: (1) Those born ofFilipino fathersand/ormothersinforeigncountrieswhichfollowtheprinciple ofjussoli (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fatherscountrysuchchildrenarecitizensofthatcountry (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may beothersituationsinwhichacitizenofthePhilippinesmay,withoutperformingany act, be also a citizen of another state but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyaltytotwoormore states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectivelyremovinganydisqualificationhemighthaveasadualcitizen. To recapitulate,bydeclaringinhiscertificateofcandidacythatheisaFilipinocitizenthatheis not a permanent resident orimmigrant of another country that he will defendandsupportthe Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have saidbeforeasadualcitizen. On the other hand,privaterespondents oathofallegiancetothePhilippines,whenconsidered with the fact that he hasspent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country,leaves nodoubtofhis

electionofPhilippinecitizenship.

Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013

CASENO.39ABUNDOv.COMELEC Topic:Candidateandcertificateofcandidacytermlimit
Doctrine The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Facts Abundo ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in the years 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. He was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and 2007 elections. In the 2004 election, however, Jose Torres was proclaimed the winner of the electoral race and Mayor of Viga, performing the functions of the office. Abundo protested Torres election and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. He assumed office from May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007. In 2010, Torres initiated a case for the disqualification of Abundo based on the three-term limit rule before the COMELEC but before it resolved the issue, private respondent Vega commenced this quo warranto action before the RTC. RTC disqualified Abundo. COMELEC affirmed ruling of RTC. Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Issue WON Abundo is barred by the constitutional 3-term limit rule. Held No. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. What the constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term; there has to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. The purpose of the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the monopolization of political power and prevent elected officials from breeding propriety interest in their position but also to enhance the peoples freedom of choice. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms; (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served a little over one year and one month only. Thus, the two-year period which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos case from

the ambit of the three-term limit rule. Abundo is declared eligible for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 election and is immediately reinstated to said position. ***NOTE: Summary of jurisprudence affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption: Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position through succession, his service for the unexpired portion of the term cannot be treated as one full term. Montebon v. Commission on Elections supplemented this by saying that if the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption. On the issue of recall elections, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v. Commission on Elections held that an elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials service for he had become in the interim a private citizen. Latasa v. Commission on Elections ruled that the abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service. As mentioned above, Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections states that preventive suspension is not a term interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of the office during this period. Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections and Dizon v. Commission on Elections continued on to rule that when a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office. An interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of service. Lastly, Ong v. Alegre and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections declared when an official is defeated in an election protest and decision becomes final only after the official had served the full term for the office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term.

Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157

Gador vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 431

Gador v. COMELEC

Facts: Amado Gador filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court to compel the COMELEC to include his name in the list of candidates for mayor in Ozamiz City. He alleged that he is a candidate for the office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as independent for the January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980. On January 8, 1980, Gador wired the Chairman of the Commission on Elections informing him of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and at the same time, requesting him to release the approval of his COC. Two days later, Gador caused the Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to wire the Chairman, Commission on Elections, reiterating the information that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy on January 7 as he was already busy for his campaign and wants to know about the status of his candidacy and also considering the fact that the President announced that the COMELEC resolution for the extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied and there is a strong probability that the petitioner's name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list of candidates.

Issue: Whether the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid

Held: No. Section 7, Batas Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by Gador that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy. The Supreme Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of Gador is void.


Facts:

Sinaca vs. Mula, 315 SCRA 266

In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.) Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: a)Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and b)it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member. Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte. Ratio Decidendi: NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy

for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.

Torayno vs.COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574

Disqualification of candidates; grounds, procedure and effects of

Facts: During the 1995 elections, herein respondent Vicente Y. Emano was declared for his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, hisresidencewasdeclaredtobe inTagoloan,MisamisOriental. On June14,1997,whilestillthegovernorofMisamisOriental,Emanoexecuteda VoterRegistration Record inCagayan deOroCity(geographicallylocatedinthe Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 yearsofresidence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. EmanowasdeclaredbytheCOMELECasthedulyelectedMayor. Among those who ran for the mayorshipof the cityin1998,along with Emano, wasErasmoB.Damasing,counselofhereinpetitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and JacquelineM. Serio,all residentsofCagayandeOroCity,filedaPetitionbefore the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98298, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the oneyear residence requirement, the declaration of respondents win came before the resolutionofthecase,resultingtopetitioners filingthistimeofaquowarrantobeforetheCOMELEC.Inheretheyseek:

theannulmentoftheelectionofprivaterespondent the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highestnumberofvotes,asthedulyelectedmayorofthecity TheComelecFirstDivisiondeniedthePetitionforDisqualification. TheCOMELECEnBancupheldthedecisionofthefirstdivisionrulingthat: "There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or registeringasa voterinahighlyurbanizedcitywhoseresidents are not given the right to vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirementsprescribedbylawinthecaseofaqualifiedvoter. "Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence showing that the respondent was a registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the argument that the respondent is not a resident [or a] registered voter inCagayan de OroCitysinceregistrationinsaidPrecinct does notprecludetherespondentfromregisteringanewinanotherplace." Hencethecase Issue: Whether respondentEmano'sresidenceinthecityqualifieshimtorunfor andbeelectedasmayor Whether Held: Yes,petitionhasnomerit. Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, MisamisOriental,notinCagayandeOroCitysince: (1)hehad runand won as governor oftheprovinceofMisamisOrientalfor threeconsecutivetermsimmediatelyprecedingthe1998elections (2)in the pleadingshe filed inconnectionwithanelection protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan,MisamisOriental

 (3)hehad fullyexercisedthepowersandprerogativesofgovernoruntilhe filedhisCertificateofCandidacyformayoronMarch25,1998. Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a resident of the province. They averthat residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have changed his residence to CagayandeOroCitywhilehewasstillgovernorofMisamisOriental. In the caseat bar, the Comelecfound thatprivaterespondentandhisfamilyhad actuallybeen residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa,CagayandeOroCity,in ahouse hehad bought in1973., Duringthethreeterms(19881998)thathewas governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where theseatof the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voterofthesamecity. Cagayande OroCity was oncean integral part of MisamisOriental andremains a geographical partoftheprovince. Notonly isitatthecenterof the province more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein much less, gettingacquainted with itsconcerns andinterests. Insection39ofthelocalgovernmentcode: "SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippinesaregistered voter inthebarangay,municipality,city,orprovincexx x where he intends to be elected a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately precedingtheday oftheelectionandabletoreadandwriteFilipino oranyotherlocallanguageordialect." In requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seekto beelected, the Constitution orthelawintendstopreventthe possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of acommunityandnotidentifiedwiththelatterfrom[seeking]anelective officetoservethatcommunity In the contentionthatthefactthatCagayandeOroCityisahighlyurbanizedcity whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections, such political

subdivisions and voting restrictions, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized orindependent component city, for thatmatter, does notcompletelyisolate itsresidents,politics,commerce and other businesses from the entire province and vice versa especially whenthecityislocatedattheveryheartoftheprovinceitself,asinthiscase. The actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship.
Not to mention that respondent won in a landslide, thus, the court find it apt to reiterate the

principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must begivenfullesteffect. In caseofdoubt,political lawsmust beinterpreted to give lifeandspirittothepopularmandate."itwouldbefar bettertoerrinfavor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Issue of the effect of disqualification of winner to second placer no longer delvedwith Dispositive:Petitiondismissed

Villaber vs. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126

CASE NO. 44 VILLABER vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (disqualification of candidates; grounds, procedure and effects of) FACTS: Pablo C. Villaber, seeks the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy Both petitioner Villaber and private respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections

(COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the RTC for violation of BP 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, Villaber is disqualified to run for any public office. Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek to be elected " - which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In his answers to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas' petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from holding any elective public office" and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda and applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: "Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. ISSUE: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. HELD: YES. As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty , or good morals." We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that "not every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine." We further pronounced therein that: "...in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as

malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only.In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute." (Emphasis ours) In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone The elements of the offense under the above provision are: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.19 The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda20 we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person." Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer. This argument is erroneous. In Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member. We cannot go along with petitioner's contention that this Court's ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines,26 which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.27 In these two latter cases, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was imposed. Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence, the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement.

Adiongvs.COMELEC,244SCRA272

Doctrine: Under the Constitution, the COMELEC, during the election period is given regulatory powers to regulate theconductandmannerofelections.However,such limitationsmustshowa clear and present danger in order for the such limitations to be valid. The restriction on posting of decals and stickers in mobile places violatesthefreedomofspeechofapersonanddeprivationofhisrightsofownershipofproperty. Facts: Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,

television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." Issue: Whether the prohibition is violative of Sec. 82 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: YES. The following points were raised by the Supreme Court in support of their decision: First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

NationalPressClubvs.COMELEC,207SCRA1

CASENO.46NATIONALPRESSCLUBVS.COMELEC Facts: Petitionersinthesecasesconsistofrepresentativesofthemassmedia whichare preventedfromsellingor donating space and time for political advertisements two (2) individuals who are candidates for office(onefor national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections and taxpayers and voters who claimthattheirrighttobeinformedofelectionIssueandofcredentialsofthecandidatesisbeingcurtailed. It isprincipally argued bypetitionersthatSection11(b)ofRepublicAct No.66461 invadesandviolates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that theprohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, mediabased election or political propagandaduringtheelectionperiodof1992. It isassertedthat the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate

channelsofpublicinformationandpublicopinionrelevanttoelectionIssue. Further, petitioners contend thatSection11(b)abridges thefreedomofspeechofcandidates,andthatthe suppression of mediabased campaign or political propaganda except those appearingintheComelecspace of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailingandlimitingtherightofvoterstoinformationandopinion. Issue:WhetherorNotSection11(b)ofRepublicActNo.6646constitutional.

Held: Yes. Itseems a modest proposition that the provision of theBill of Rights which enshrinesfreedomofspeech, freedom of expression and freedom of the presshastobetakenin conjunctionwith ArticleIX(C)(4) whichmay be seen to be a special provision applicable duringaspecificlimited periodi.e.,"duringthe electionperiod." In ourownsociety,equalityofopportunitytoprofferoneselfforpublic office, without regardtothelevel of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies givenconstitutionalrankbyArticleII,Section26oftheConstitution istheegalitariandemand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for publicserviceandprohibitpoliticaldynastiesas maybe definedby law." The essential questioniswhether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speechandfreedomofthepress.TheCourtconsidersthat Section 11(b) hasnot goneoutsidethepermissible boundsofsupervisionorregulationofmediaoperationsduringelectionperiods. Section 11 (b) is limitedinthedurationofitsapplicabilityandenforceability.ByvirtueoftheoperationofArticleIX (C)(4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to electionperiods. Section 11(b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists inrespect of candidates, their qualifications, and programsand so forth, so long at leastassuchcomments,opinionsandbeliefs arenot infactadvertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11(b)asdesignedtocoveronlypaidpoliticaladvertisementsofparticularcandidates. Thelimiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressiveorunreasonable.

PilarV.COMELEC245SCRA759

CASENO.47 JUANITOC.PILARv.COMELEC FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94040. Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of memberoftheSangguniang PanlalawiganoftheProvince of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. TheCOMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fineofP10,000.00 for failuretofile hisstatement ofcontributions and expenditurespursuant to COMELEC ResolutionNo.2348,inturnimplementingR.A.No.7166whichprovidesthat: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expendituresinconnectionwiththeelection. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a noncandidate, havingwithdrawn hiscertificatesofcandidacy threedays after its filing. Petitioner posits that it is clear from the law that candidatemusthaveentered the political contest, and should haveeither won orlost. COMELECdeniedthemotionfor reconsiderationofpetitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94040), which deniedthepetition.Hence,thispetitionforcertiorari. ISSUE: DidPetitionerswithdrawalofhiscandidacyextinguishhisliabilityfortheadministrativefine?NO. HELD: No. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that, every candidate has the obligation to filehis statementof contributions and expenditures. Wellrecognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, asthelaw makesno distinctionor qualification asto whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section14 ofthe law usesthe word shall Asa general rule,theuseof theword shall in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the generalrule. Also, Section 13 of ResolutionNo. 2348 categorically refersto all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacyhasaccepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the shortspan of hiscampaign.The evil sought to bepreventedby the lawisnotalltooremote. Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that The filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilitieswhicha candidate mayhaveincurred. DISSENTINGOPINION: MELO,J. He was no longer considered a candidate within the ambit of RA 7166, since hewithdrew hiscertificate. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days fromthefiling to the withdrawalof thecertificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, or utilizing his aborted

candidacy for purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.Ithereforevotetograntpetition.

Peraltavs.COMELEC82SCRA30

Note: This is 6 consolidated cases. Each case is regarding the constitutionality of a specific provisionof the 1978 Election Code. Due to the length of the case, this digest is focused on the topic this case is underintheoutlinewhichis:campaignelectionpropagandacontributionsandexpenditures FACTS: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than fortyfive days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day beforeandthedayoftheelection. Petitionersquestionedtheconstitutionalityofthe45daycampaignperiodbecause: o (a) it was decreed by the President and notby the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 ofArticleXIICand o (b)theperiodshouldcoveratleastninetydays(90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XIIC of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commenceninetydaysbeforethedayofelectionandshallendthirtydaysthereafter. ISSUES:W/NTHE45DAYPERIODISUNCONSTITUTIONAL HELD: The45daycampaignperiodisconstitutional. Section 6, Article XIIC provides: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. While Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides: The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XIIC oftheConstitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty five days immediately preceding theelection,excluding thedaybeforeandthedayoftheelection Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XIIC of the Constitution,thesamedoesnotviolatetheConstitution.

 Under Amendment 1,the manner ofelectionof membersoftheinterimBatasangPambansashall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No.5, shall continue to exerciselegislativepoweruntilmartiallawshallhavebeenlifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the countrywithinwhich an electoralcampaign maybeadequatelyconductedinallregionsofthenation. However, even assuming that it should be the Commissionon Elections thatshould fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with bythefactthat the Commission has adopted and isenforcingtheperiodfixedinSection4,Article1,ofthe1978ElectionCode. In addition, there isadistinctionbetweenelectionperiod, which iswhat was mentionedin Section 6, Article XIIC of the 1978 Constitution, and campaign period. The Campaign Period in the 1978 Election Code was fixed at not more than 45 days preceding the election. It shows that the Campaign Period (which is held prior to the election) is different from the Election Period which extends even after the election. Thus,Sec.4ofthe1978ElectionCodeisnotviolativeofSec.6,Art.XIIC Note: All questioned provisions were held to be constitutional. Dissenting opinions were focused on the provision on allowing block voting and were mostly because it was the President (Marcos) who promulgatedsuchandnottheCOMELEC

Penerav.COMELEC,G.R.18161311September2009,

Penerav.COMELEC(September2009) FACTS: Peneraand private respondent Edgar Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.Monica duringthe14 May2007elections. On2April2007,AndanarfiledbeforetheOfficeoftheRegionalElectionDirector(ORED),CaragaRegion (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for ViceMayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party,[5]forunlawfully engaginginelectioncampaigningand partisanpoliticalactivitypriortothecommencementofthecampaignperiod. Andanarclaimedthaton29March2007adaybeforethestartoftheauthorizedcampaignperiodon30 March 2007 Penera and her partymates went around the differentbarangaysinSta. Monica, announcingtheir candidaciesandrequestingthepeopletovoteforthemonthedayoftheelections. AlthoughPeneraadmittedthatamotorcadedidtakeplace,she explainedthatitwassimplyin accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. Infact,Penera claimed,in themotorcade held by her political party, no person made any speech, notevenany of thecandidates.Instead, there wasonly marching music in the background andagrand standingforthe purposeofraisingthehands

of thecandidates in the motorcade. Finally, Penera cited Barroso v. Ampig inher defense, wherein the Court supposedly ruled that a motorcade held by candidates during thefilingoftheirCOCswasnota form of political campaigning. WhilethecasewaspendingbeforetheCOMELECSecondDivision,the14May2007 electionstook place and, as a result thereof, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor ofSta. Monica. Penerasoonassumed officeon2July2002. On 24 July2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution in SPA No. 07224, penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Ferrer), which disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the OmnibusElectionCode. CommissionerFlorentino A. Tuason, Jr. (Tuason) wrote a Separate Opinion[12] on the 24 July 2007 Resolution. Although Commissioner Tuason concurred with theponente, he stressed that, indeed, Penera should be made accountable for her actions after the filing of her COC on 29 March 2007. Prior thereto, there wasnocandidateyetwhosecandidacywouldhavebeenenhancedbytheprematurecampaigning. CommissionerSarmiento believed that thepiecesofevidencesubmitted byAndanar did notsufficiently establish probable cause that Penera engaged inpremature campaigning,inviolationofSections80and68of the Omnibus Election Code. The two photocopied pictures, purporting to be those of Penera, did not clearly reveal what was actually happening in the truck or who were the passengers thereof. Likewise, the Affidavits seemedto have been prepared and executed byoneandthe sameperson becausetheyhadsimilarsentence constructionandform,andtheyweresworntobeforethesameattestingofficer. Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration[14] of the 24 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, maintaining that she did not make anyadmissiononthefactual mattersstatedintheappealedresolution.Thiswas,however,deniedbytheCOMELECenbanc. Stillundeterred,PenerafiledtheinstantPetitionbefore theSCprayingthattheResolutions dated24July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and en banc, respectively, be declared nulland voidforhavingbeenissuedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaignperiod?YES 2. Whether or not [the COMELEC] committed grave abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackoforinexcess of jurisdiction in finding that the act of [Penera] in conducting a motorcade before the filing of her certificate of candidacyconstitutesprematurecampaigning?NO 3. Whether or not [the COMELEC] committed grave abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackoforinexcess of jurisdiction when it resolved to disqualify [Penera] despite the failure of [Andanar] to present competent, admissible and substantial evidence to prove [the] violation of Section 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code?

RULING: TheSC held that there was no grave abuse of discretion amountingtolack orexcess of jurisdictionon thepart of the COMELEC Second Division in disqualifying Penera as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica in the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 and also on the part of the COMELEC en banc in denying Peneras Motionfor Reconsideration on the Resolution dated 30 January 2008. Said Resolutions are sufficiently supported by substantial evidence, meaning, such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequatetosupporta conclusion. TheprohibitedactofprematurecampaigningisdefinedunderSection80oftheOmnibusElectionCode,towit: SECTION 80. Electioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivityoutsidecampaign period.It shallbeunlawful for anyperson, whether or nota voter orcandidate,orforanyparty,orassociationofpersons,toengageinan election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties mayhold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates withinthirtydays before thecommencementofthecampaignperiodandfortyfivedaysforPresidentialandVicePresidentialelection.

If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is duly proven, the consequence of the violationisclearlyspelledoutinSection68ofthesaidCode,whichreads: SECTION.68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who,inanactionorprotest inwhich heis apartyis declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having xxx (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing asa candidate,orif he has beenelected,fromholdingtheoffice.Anypersonwhoisapermanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordancewiththeresidencerequirementprovidedforintheelectionlaws.

In thecase at bar, it had been sufficiently established, notjustby Andanars evidence,but also thoseofPenera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March 2007, participated inamotorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candiestotheonlookers.

More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purposeofsolicitingvotesand/or undertaking anycampaignorpropagandafororagainstacandidate[.]Amotorcade isaprocessionorparadeof automobiles or other motor vehicles. The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates andtheir supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcadesistointroducethe candidates and thepositions,towhich theyseektobe elected, to the voting public or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollectionof their names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no otherpurposethantopromotetheelectionofaparticularcandidateorcandidates.

In the case at bar, Penera never denied that she took part in the conduct of the motorcade aftershe filed her COCon the day before the startofthecampaignperiod. Shemerelyclaimedthatthesamewas notundertaken for campaign purposes. Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneysand ten motorcycles, were festooned with multicolored balloons the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta. Monica and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. With vehicles,balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can hardly persuade the Court that the motorcadewas spontaneousandunplanned. For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activityoutsidethecampaignperiod,PeneramustbedisqualifiedfromholdingtheofficeofMayorofSta.Monica. ANOTHERISSUE: Thedissenting opinion, however, raises the legal issue that Section 15ofRepublic ActNo. 8436, asamended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term candidate, as a result of which, premature campaigningmaynolongerbecommitted. Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an electivepublic office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through anaccreditedpoliticalparty, aggroupment,orcoalitionofparties. RepublicAct No. 8436, enacted on 22December1997, authorized theCOMELEC to useanautomatedelection system for theprocess ofvoting,countingofvotes,andcanvassing/consolidatingthe resultsofthe nationaland localelections. The statute also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated countingmachines, computer equipment, devices and materials and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. In particular, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 provided for the specifications of the official ballots to be used in the automated election system and the guidelines for the printing thereof, the relevant portions of which state:xxx For thispurpose, the deadline for the filingof certificateofcandidacy/petitionforregistration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vicepresident, shall be deemedresigned only upon the start of the campaign period correspondingtothe positionforwhich he/she isrunning:Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of theMay11,1998 elections,thedeadlinefor filingofthecertificateofcandidacyforthepositionsofPresident,VicePresident,Senatorsandcandidatesunder the PartyList System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the PartyList SystemshallbeonFebruary9,1998whilethedeadline for thefilingofcertificateofcandidacyforother positions shallbeonMarch27,1998. On 10 February 2007, Republic ActNo.9369tookeffect.Section13 of RepublicAct No.9369amendedSection 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 and renumbered the same as the new Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436. The pertinent portions of Section15ofRepublicActNo.8436, asamendedbyRepublic ActNo. 9369, nowread:xxx Anypersonwhofileshis certificate of candidacy within this periodshallonlybeconsideredasacandidate at the startof the campaign periodforwhichhefiled his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.. In view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the Dissenting Opinion arguesthat Section80oftheOmnibusElectionCodecan notbe appliedtothepresentcasesince,astheCourt

held in Lanot v. Commission on Elections,[34] the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited premature campaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a person may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be considereda candidate until thestart of thecampaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activitydesigned to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate to public office becausethereisno candidatetospeakof. According to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Peneras acts before the start of the campaign period constitute election campaigning or partisan political activities, these are not punishable underSection80 of theOmnibus ElectionCodegiventhatshewasnotyetacandidateatthattime.Ontheotherhand,Peneras acts,ifcommitted withinthe campaign period, when she was already a candidate, are likewise notcovered bySection80asthis provisionpunishesonlyactsoutsidethecampaignperiod. However, the Supreme Court disagrees with the aforesaid opinion and held that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic ActNo.8436,wouldreadilyreveal that that it did not contain an express repeal of Section80 of theOmnibusElectionCode.An expressrepealis onewhereinastatutedeclares,usuallyinitsrepealingclause, that aparticular and specific law,identifiedbyits numberortitle,isrepealed.Absentthisspecificrequirement,anexpressrepealmaynotbepresumed. There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.The followingpointsareexplanatory: First,Section80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on prematurecampaigning,explicitlyprovides that it shallbe unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period. Very simply, prematurecampaigningmaybecommittedevenbyapersonwhoisnotacandidate. For thisreason, the plain declaration in LanotthatwhatSection80 of theOmnibusElectionCode prohibitsis an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the campaign period, is clearly erroneous. Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or partisan political activity in thefollowing manner:(b)Theterm"electioncampaign" or"partisanpolitical activity"referstoanactdesigned to promote theelectionordefeatofaparticularcandidateorcandidatestoa publicoffice whichshallinclude:(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,committeesorothergroups of personsforthepurposeofsoliciting votesand/or undertaking any campaign for or againstacandidate(2)Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate (3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries,or holding interviews for or against the election of anycandidateforpublic office (4)Publishing ordistributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose theelection of anycandidateor (5)Directlyorindirectlysolicitingvotes,pledgesorsupportfororagainstacandidate.

True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COCbut before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a

person, upon the filing of his/herCOC,alreadyexplicitlydeclareshis/herintentiontorunasacandidateinthe comingelections. The commission by such a person of any of the actsenumeratedunder Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches,etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonablyconstruedasforthepurposeofpromotinghis/herintendedcandidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds withhis/hercandidacy, his/herintent turninginto actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filingofhis/herCOCandpriortothe campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/shemaybedisqualified.

Third,inconnectionwiththeprecedingdiscussion,theline inSection15ofRepublicActNo.8436,as amended, which provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of thecampaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry outthesamewith impunity. As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/herbecomingacandidate(thus,priortothe start of thecampaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaignperiod,whenthepersonofficiallybecomesa candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shallaccrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate whohadpreviouslyengaged inpremature campaigning alreadyenjoysan unfairheadstartinpromotinghis/hercandidacy. The questions of fact raised by Penera and questions of law raised by the Dissenting Opinion must all be resolved against Penera. Penera should be disqualified from holding office as Mayor of Sta. Monicaforhaving committed premature campaigning when, right after she filed her COC, but still a day before the start of the campaignperiod,shetookpartinamotorcade,whichconsistedoftwo jeepneys and tenmotorcyclesladenwith multicoloredballoonsthatwentaroundseveralbarangaysofSta.Monica,andgaveawaycandiestothecrowd. PetitionforCertiorariDISMISSED.

Penerav.ComelecMotionforReconsideration25November2009,599SCRA609

Macalintalvs.Comelec,405SCRA614

CaseNo.51

Macalintalvs.COMELEC Doctrine:Absenteevoterscanbeconsideredasaqualifiedvoternotwithstandingthefailuretosatisfytheresidency requirementofSection1,ArticleVofthe1987ConstitutionPROVIDEDhe/sheexecutesanaffidavitpreparedforthe purposebytheCommissiondeclaringthathe/sheshallresumeactualphysicalpermanentresidenceinthePhilippinesnot laterthanthree(3)yearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistrationunderthisActANDalsostatingthathe/shehasnotappliedfor citizenshipinanothercountry. Facts:(Note:1stIssuewouldbethemoresubstantialissueinthiscase) (RemovedtheProceduralaspectofthecaselocusstandi[taxpayersuit]+proprietyofthepetitiondirectlytotheSC) Atty.RomuloMacalintalfiledapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionseekingthedeclarationofSection5(d),18.5,17.1,19and 25ofRepublicActNo.9189(TheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003)asunconstitutional. MacalintalpositsthatSection5(d)isunconstitutionalbecauseitviolatesSection1,ArticleVofthe1987Constitutionwhich requiresthatthevotermustbearesidentinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereheproposestovote foratleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedinganelection. MacalintalfurtherarguesthatSection1,ArticleVoftheConstitutiondoesnotallowprovisionalregistrationorapromisebya votertoperformaconditiontobequalifiedtovoteinapoliticalexercisethatthelegislatureshouldnotbeallowedto circumventtherequirementoftheConstitutionontherightofsuffragebyprovidingaconditionthereonwhichineffectamends oralterstheaforesaidresidencerequirementtoqualifyaFilipinoabroadtovote. Macalintalclaimsthattherightofsuffrageshouldnotbegrantedtoanyonewho,onthedateoftheelection,doesnotpossess thequalificationsprovidedforbySection1,ArticleVoftheConstitution. Issue/s: 1. DoesSection5(d)ofRep.ActNo.9189allowingtheregistrationofvoterswhoareimmigrantsorpermanent residentsinothercountriesbytheirmereactofexecutinganaffidavitexpressingtheirintentiontoreturntothePhilippines, violatetheresidencyrequirementinSection1ofArticleVoftheConstitution? 2. DoesSection18.5ofthesamelawempoweringtheCOMELECtoproclaimthewinningcandidatesfornational officesandpartylistrepresentativesincludingthePresidentandtheVicePresidentviolatetheconstitutionalmandateunder Section4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionthatthewinningcandidatesforPresidentandtheVicePresidentshallbeproclaimed aswinnersbyCongress? 3. MayCongress,throughtheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteecreatedinSection25ofRep.ActNo.9189, exercisethepowertoreview,revise,amend,andapprovetheImplementingRulesandRegulationsthattheCommissionon ElectionsshallpromulgatewithoutviolatingtheindependenceoftheCOMELECunderSection1,ArticleIXAofthe Constitution? Held: 1.No Section1,ArticleVoftheConstitutionspecificallyprovidesthatsuffragemaybeexercisedby(1)allcitizensofthe Philippines,(2)nototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,(3)atleasteighteenyearsofage,(4)whoareresidentsinthePhilippines foratleastoneyearandintheplacewheretheyproposetovoteforatleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection. UnderSection5(d)ofR.A.No.9189,oneofthosedisqualifiedfromvotingisanimmigrantorpermanentresidentwhois recognizedassuchinthehostcountryunlesshe/sheexecutesanaffidavitdeclaringthathe/sheshallresumeactualphysical permanentresidenceinthePhilippinesnotlaterthanthreeyearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistrationundersaidAct. Ordinarily,anabsenteeisnotaresidentandviceversaapersoncannotbeatthesametime,botharesidentandan

absentee. However,underourelectionlawsandthecountlesspronouncementsoftheCourtpertainingtoelections,anabsentee remainsattachedtohisresidenceinthePhilippinesasresidenceisconsideredsynonymouswithdomicile(intenttoreturnto oneshome). Residenceisnotdomicile,butdomicileisresidencecoupledwiththeintentiontoremainforanunlimitedtime. ItisclearfromthediscussionsofthemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionthattheyintendedtoenfranchiseasmuchas possibleallFilipinocitizensabroadwhohavenotabandonedtheirdomicileoforigin. Accordingly,Section4ofR.A.No.9189providesforthecoverageoftheabsenteevotingprocess,towit: SEC.4.Coverage.AllcitizensofthePhilippinesabroad,whoarenototherwisedisqualifiedbylaw,atleast eighteen(18)yearsofageonthedayofelections,mayvoteforpresident,vicepresident,senatorsandpartylist representatives. ThesaidprovisiondoesnotrequirephysicalresidencyinthePhilippines. ContrarytotheclaimofMacalintal,theexecutionoftheaffidavititselfisnottheenablingorenfranchisingact.Theaffidavit requiredinSection5(d)isnotonlyproofoftheintentionoftheimmigrantorpermanentresidenttogobackandresume residencyinthePhilippines,butmoresignificantly,itservesasanexplicitexpressionthathehadnotinfactabandonedhis domicileoforigin. Theaffidavitisrequiredofimmigrantsandpermanentresidentsabroadbecausebytheirstatusintheirhostcountries,they arepresumedtohaverelinquishedtheirintenttoreturntothiscountrythus,withouttheaffidavit,thepresumptionof abandonmentofPhilippinedomicileshallremain. ItmustbeemphasizedthatSection5(d)doesnotonlyrequireanaffidavitorapromiseto"resumeactualphysicalpermanent residenceinthePhilippinesnotlaterthanthreeyearsfromapprovalofhis/herregistration,"theFilipinosabroadmustalso declarethattheyhavenotappliedforcitizenshipinanothercountry.Thus,theymustreturntothePhilippinesotherwise, theirfailuretoreturn"shallbecausefortheremoval"oftheirnames"fromtheNationalRegistryofAbsenteeVotersand his/herpermanentdisqualificationtovoteinabsentia." However,thevotescastedbyqualifiedFilipinosabroadwhofailedtoreturnwithinthreeyearsshallnotbeinvalidated becausetheywerequalifiedtovoteonthedateoftheelections,buttheirfailuretoreturnshallbecausefortheremovalofthe namesoftheimmigrantsorpermanentresidentsfromtheNationalRegistryofAbsenteeVotersandtheirpermanent disqualificationtovoteinabsentia. 2.YesbuttheconstitutionalityofSection18.5ofR.A.No.9189isUPHELDwithrespectonlytotheauthoritygivento theCOMELECtoproclaimthewinningcandidatesfortheSenatorsandpartylistrepresentativesbutnotasto thepowertocanvassthevotesandproclaimthewinningcandidatesforPresidentandVicePresidentwhichislodgedwith CongressunderSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution. 3.NoCOMELECshouldbeanINDEPENDENTConstitutionalCommission. Byvestingitselfwiththepowerstoapprove,review,amend,andrevisetheIRRforTheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof 2003,Congresswentbeyondthescopeofitsconstitutionalauthority.Congresstrampledupontheconstitutionalmandateof independenceoftheCOMELEC.

LibananvsHRET,283SCRA520

Casimirovs.COMELEC171SCRA468,1989

Facts: In the local elections of 18 January 1988 Gabriel P. Casimiro was the UNIDO candidate for Mayor of the Municipality of Las Pinas, Metro Manila. Alfredo Juntilla and Rosalino Riguera were also candidates for the samepositionofMayor,withRiguerahavingbeenultimatelyproclaimedMayor. During the canvassing of votes acasepertinenttothepetition,was filed before publicrespondentCommission onElections(COMELEC): Petition to Suspend Canvass of Election Return transfer the Venue for the Canvass of Election Returnstothe COMELEC Main Office in Intramuros, Manila and/or Suspend the proclamation of any winning candidate for Mayor, ViceMayor and Councilors in the Municipality of Las Pinas, or to Declare the Nullity of Proclamation, if any. GabrielP.Casimiro,Petitioner. Comelec 2nd Division dismissed the petition and ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene, completethecanvassifnotyetcompletedandtoproclaimthewinningcandidates. WiththeliftingoftheRestrainingOrder,respondentRosalinoRigueraandthe otherwinning candidatesforlocal officialswereproclaimed. Issue: Whether or not the canvass proceedings in the COMELEC Central Office were illegal for having been made withoutpriornotice? Held: No.They claim that their counsel was present at the COMELEC MainOfficenot for purposesofthe canvassing on 2 February 1988 but only to accompany the transfer of the election returns and ballot boxes thatthey had asked for the postponement of the canvassing for the following day as they had no watchers, tabulators and election paraphernalia, but that postponement was precipitately denied, by reason ofwhich theyweredeprived oftheirbasicandfundamentalrighttodueprocess. Theletterhavingclearlyreferredalsototransferof"thevenueofthecanvass",petitionerscannotjustifiablyclaim that notice was lacking or that said notice was meant only for the transfer of election returns. If petitioners' representatives were absent during the canvassing it wasbecausethey had opted to leavetheproceedingsfor reasonsof their own. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC, therefore, in upholding thevalidityofthecanvassingatitsMainOffice.

CIRILO M. QUILALA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (Second Division), THE MUNICIPALBOARDOFCANVASSERSOFCURRIMAO,ILOCOSNORTE,andWILBURGO,respondents. Facts:

Petitioner Cirilo Quilala and respondent Wilbur Go were candidates for Mayor in Curimao, Ilocos Norte. On January19, 1988, after the canvas, it appears that Wilbur Go received the plurality of votes legallycastsforthe saidoffice. Quilala filed a petition anchored on the allegation that he was not represented in the canvasingoftheelection returns. The facts revealed that the petitioner was notified that the Board of Canvassers would convene to canvass the election returns on January 19, 1988, 6:00 pm at the Municipal Hall ofthetown. On thesaiddate, the Board actually convened at 6:00 pm (as the law requires) and called for representatives of the political parties, but when it appeared that no election returns were available for canvass yet, it went on recess and resumed it proceedings at 10:00 pm. There is no dispute that the petitioner was not represented in the canvass. Thepetitionerpraysforadeclarationofnullityofcanvassandthe proclamationofWilburGoandforan orderdirectingtheBoardofCanvasserstoconductapropercanvass. Issue:WhethertheBoardofCanvasserswasrequiredtoserveanothernoticeafteritrecessedat6:00pm. Held:No,therewasnonecessitytosendanothernoticetothepetitioner. The Supreme Court supported the reasoning of the Comelec saying that it was the responsibility of the petitioner or his watcher to verify when actual canvass of the returns where going to bemade. Thenoticewas not necessary because there was no subsequent meeting of the Board of Canvassers to speak of. It merely recessedafter it convened at 6:00 pm because there were no returns to canvass yet. However,itresumedits proceedingsassoonasthereturnsarrived. Thelawrequires the Board of Canvassers to meet continuously from daytodayuntilthecanvassis completed and mayadjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting the other electionreturnsfromother pollingplaceswithin its jurisdiction and as soon as the other election returns are delivered, the board shall immediately resume canvassing until all the returns have been canvassed. The Board mustcompletetheircanvasswithinthirtysix hours. The petitioner may not claim ignorance of this provision as these are matters affecting his political fortune. Consequently, with or without notice, it was the dutyofthepetitionerandallcandidatesforthatmattertoassign their watchers or representatives in the counting of votes andcanvassingelection returnsinordertoinsurethe sanctityandpurityoftheballots.Theallegeddefectinnoticeisonlyoneofform,notsubstance. Dispositive:Thepetitionisdismissed.

Carunchovs.COMELEC,315SCRA693

CARUNCHOvs.COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the

districtofPasig City attheMay11,1998synchronizedelections. At9:00oclockinthemorningofMay12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers, started to canvass the election returns. The canvass was proceeding smoothly when the Board received intelligence reports that one of the candidates for the congressional race, retired General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters, might disrupt and stop the canvassing. At exactly 6:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters stormed the Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns wasbeingconducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing those present in the canvassing venue, including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with themtheElectionReturnsthey were canvassing and tallyingaswell as the Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing. They entrusted these documents to the City Treasurers Office and the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). Election documents and paraphernalia werescatteredallovertheplacewhentheintrudersleft. Thefollowing day, the subcanvassing unitsrecoveredthe 22Election Returns and theStatementofVotesfrom theTreasurers Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of each of the 22 election returns,whichcontainedthe names of candidates for congressmen, had been detached and could not be found. An investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for thelossbutityieldednegative result. TheBoardsecured properauthorityfrom the COMELEC for the reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the other copies of the election returns, particularly the provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors. At 2:40a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that ithad finishedcanvassingthe 1,491 electionreturnsand proclaimedHenry P. Lanot as the winner in the congressionalrace. On May21,1998,petitionerCarunchofiled aMotiontoNullifyProclamationontheBasisofIncompleteReturns.

ISSUE: WONCOMELECenbancactedinwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.

HELD:NO SEC. 233. When theelectionreturnsaredelayed,lostordestroyed.Incaseitscopy of theelection returnsis missing, theboard of canvassers shall, by messengerorotherwise,obtainsuch missingelection returnsfrom the board of election inspectors concerned, or if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its representativetoinvestigatethecaseandimmediatelyreportthemattertotheCommission. Theboard of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all theelection returnshavebeen receivedbyit,may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available electionreturnsifthe missingelectionreturnswillnotaffecttheresultsoftheelection. Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twentytwo (22) election returns, still,

the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented only 4,400 votes. That number cannot affect the result of the election because Henry Lanots lead over his closestrival, hereinpetitioner,was 17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code aforequoted states,the Board of Canvassers could have totally disregarded the twentytwo(22)election returnsandlegallyproclaimed LanotasthewinnerintheelectioninPasigCityforMemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. However,this is true onlywheretheelectionreturnsmissingornotcounted willaffect theresults of theelection. Itbearsstressing that in the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically found thatthe electionreturnswhich were not counted by respondent canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will not affecttheresultoftheelectionconsideringthatLanotsleadoverpetitionerwasalready17,971votes. On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issuedthe assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998 dismissing petitioners motion to nullifytheproclamation of HenryP.LanotasMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesforthelonedistrictofPasigCity.

DISPOSITION: PetitionforCertioraridismissed.

Laudeniovs.COMELEC276SCRA705

Allardevs.COMELEC,159SCRA623 Case57Allardev.Comelec Nature:Petitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswithprayerfortheissuanceofpreliminaryinjunction and/orrestrainingorder Facts:Petitioner,acongressionalcandidateseekstosetasidetheorderoftheCOMELECdenyinghisprayerto suspendthecanvassofvotesandtheannulmentoftheresultsofthecanvassintheLasPiasMuntinlupa congressionaldistrictduetoalleged(1)massivefraudashewasnevercreditedwithanyvoteintheentire districtexceptinlessthanadozenprecinctsinLasPiasandafewprecinctsinMuntinlupawherehegotone (1)voteeachresultinginhishavingonlyafewvotessincethevotesintendedforhimwerecreditedtoother candidatesand/ordeliberatelyomitted(2)falsified,incompleteelectionreturns,orreturnscontainedmaterial defects,orappearedtobetamperedwithorarenotauthentic(3)thezerovoteshereceivedinmorethan907 precinctsinLasPiasandMuntinlupaisnotonlystatisticallyimprobablebutinherentlyimpossiblebecauseof hisstatureasajudgewhoislovedbythepeopleofthesaidmunicipalities(4)irregularitiesintheconductof canvassingand(5)massivevotebuying. Awinnerwasalreadydeclaredbythetimethepetitionwasdismissed. Issue/s:IstheCOMELECcorrectinproclaimingawinnerdespitethecasefiledbypetitioner?

Held:Itisapparentfromtherecordsofthecasethattheothergroundsrelieduponbypetitionerinseekingrelief fromtheComelec,i.e.massivefraudresultinginhishavingbeencreditedzerovoteswhenthevotesintended forhimwerecreditedtoothercandidatesand/ordeliberatelyomittedmassivevotebuying,arepropergrounds foranelectionprotestwhichfallwithintheexclusivejurisdictionoftheHouseElectoralTribunalandarenotthe properissuesthatmayberaisedinapreproclamationcontroversyunderSection243oftheOmnibusElection Code.Whileitistruethattheothergroundscitedbypetitioner,i.e.electionreturnswhichwerefalsified, incomplete,orcontainmaterialdefects,orappeartobetamperedwithorarenotauthenticcopies,areproper groundsforapreproclamationcontroversyunderSection243oftheOmnibusElectionCode,thereliefssought cannotneverthelessbegrantedconsideringthatduringthecanvassingoftheelectionreturns,petitioner admittedlydidnotraisehisobjectionsagainsttheelectionreturnsbeforetheBoardofCanvassersofLasPias MuntinlupaDistrictwhichisanessentialmandatoryprerequisiteunderSection245oftheOmnibusElection Code(Espaldonvs.Comelec,G.R.No.78987,August25,1987).Theproceduralshortcutundertakenby petitionerinelevatingtotheComelechisbelatedobjectionstotheelectionreturnsisnotsanctionedbySection 245oftheOmnibusElectionCode. Besides,asreaffirmedbytheCourtinRoblesvs.Comelec,G.R.No.79847,December17,1987,"theCourthas consistentlymaintainedthatelectionreturnsofcertainprecinctsmayonlybeexcludedandsetasideatthecost ofdisenfranchisingthevotersonlyontheclearestandcompellingshowingoftheirnullity."Petitionerfailedto establishsuchessentialrequisiteinthispetition.

Dipatuanvs.COMELEC,185SCRA86

FACTS: Dimangadap Dipatuan filed certiorari with SC to set aside Comelec En Banc decision, which affirmedits2nddivisiondecision Ordered the inclusion of electionreturns precincts of the municipality of Bacolod Grande, provinceofLanaodelsur DipatuanandAmanoddinwerecandidatesinFeb1,1988speciallocalelectionsforMayoralty Feb 21, 1988 Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod Grande finished counting but did not proclaimwinners Feb 25, 1988 a separate Board of Canvassers proclaimed Dipatuan as Mayor, excluding precincts#15,17,21 Feb29,1988AmanoddinwasproclaimedwinnerandMayorelect Comelec En Banc set aside both proclamations on the ground that the former was improperly constitutedwhilethelatterwaspremature.Hence,aSpecialBoardwascreatedtorecanvass June 21, 1988, Dipatuan objected inclusion of Precints 15 and 17, claiming both have spurious andmanufacturedvotes. Precinct 15 248 persons appears to have actually voted, 187 arrived and voted, which aremostlyilliteratesmanyvotedwithveilscoveringtheirfaces Precinct1793votersarelisted,45illiterateswereabletovote Both precincts revealed discrepancies between signatures of voters in voter affidavitsand inthevotingrecord SpecialBoarddenierDipatuansobjectionsorderedinclusionofprecincts15&17 Onappeal,Comelec2nddivisiondismissedDipatuansappeal

ComelecEnBancaffirmed2nddivision Hence,presentcertioraritoSC

ISSUE:Isthereapreproclamationcontroversy(onthequestionelectionreturnsfromtheprecincts)?NO HELD:WHEREFORE,thisPetitionforcertiorariisherebyDISMISSED.Nopronouncementastocosts. RATIO: The questioned election returns were not obviously manufactured or not authentic, which is a requirement under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code to qualify as a preproclamation controversy.Mere alphabeticaland chronological votingdoesnot constitutefraud which willjustify the exclusion of election returns. Petitioner Dipatuan does not claim that the election returns themselves were not authentic. What he arguedis thatwhere electionreturns, thoughgenuine or authentic in character, are reflective of fraudulent acts done before or carried out bytheBoardof Election Inspectors, the return should be deemed as obviously manufactured. On the other hand, private respondent Amanoddin was able to satisfactorily explainwhytheBoard of Election Inspectorsadoptedvotingbyalphabeticalorder. Comelec correctly emphasized that, under the regime of the Omnibus Election Code, preproclamation controversies are properly limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before such Board of Canvassers, and not the Board of Election Inspectors nor proceedings before such latter Board and that such challenges should relate to particular election returns to which petitioner should have made specific verbal objection subsequently confirmed in writing. In a preproclamation controversy it is axiomatic that the Comelec is not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel the Comelec to pierce the veil, so to speak, of electionreturns primafacie regular, has his properremedyin a regular election protest. By their nature, and given the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of elections, preproclamation controversies are to be resolved in summaryproceedings. Section243oftheOmnibusElectionCodeprovides,inrelevantpart: Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy. The following shallbetheproperissuesthatmayberaisedinapreproclamationcontroversy: xxxxxxxxx (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic and . . . (Emphasissupplied) In the case at bar, the Comelec Second Division held that the apparent alphabetical and chronological sequence in the voting was not necessarily proof of fraud that would justify the exclusionoftheassailedreturns. We must conclude that petitionerhasnotshown any graveabuse of discretionor any actwithout or in excess of jurisdiction on part of the Comelec in rendering the decisions dated 8 November

1988and22December1988.

DeCastrovs.COMELEC267SCRA806

DeCastrovs.COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro duringtheMay1995elections. Inthesame elections, private respondent was proclaimed ViceMayor of the same municipality. Petitioners rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed an election protest before the Regional Trial CourtofPinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died. Four days after such death or on December 19, 1995, the trial court dismissed the election protest ruling as it did that [a]s this case is personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itself. The issue or issues brought out in this protest have becomemootandacademic.Privaterespondent learnedaboutthedismissaloftheprotest and filed his Omnibus Petition/Motion (For Intervention and/or Substitution with Motion for Reconsideration). Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner on January 30, 1996. Trial court denied private respondents Omnibus Petition/Motion and stubbornly held thatanelection protestbeingpersonalto theprotestant,isipso facto terminated by the latters death. Unable to agree with the trial courts dismissal of theelection protest, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) private respondent mainly assailed the trialcourt orders ashavingbeenissuedwithgraveabuse ofdiscretion.

COMELEC granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus. It ruledthatanelectioncontestinvolvesboththe private interests of the rival candidates and the public interest in the final determination ofthe realchoiceof the electorate, and for this reason, anelectioncontestnecessarilysurvives thedeathoftheprotestantorthe protestee.

Issue: Is an election protest apersonal actionextinguisheduponthedeath ofthe realpartyininterest? Ifnot, whatisthemandatoryperiodwithinwhichtoeffectuatethesubstitutionofparties?

Held: It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death.[9] Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir ofhismaybeallowedto continue holdinghisoffice inhisplace.But whilethe rightto a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting privateaspirationsbutisimbuedwithparamountpublicinterests

It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogativesoftheofficeswithintheirgift.

The death of the protestant, as in this case, neither constitutes agroundforthedismissalofthecontestnor ousts the trial court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest. Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is amatterclothedwithpublicinterest,wherefore,publicpolicydemandsthatanelection contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. The asseveration of petitioner that private respondent is not a real party in interest entitled to be substituted in the election protest in place of thelateJamilla,isutterlywithoutlegalbasis.

To finally dispose of this case, we rule thatthefilingbyprivaterespondentofhisOmnibusPetition/Motionon January 15, 1996, well within a period of thirty days from December 19,1995 whenJamillascounselinformed thetrialcourtofJamillasdeath,wasincompliancewithSection17,Rule3oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.

Poe,Jr.vs.Arroyo,PETcaseno.0002,March29,2005,

CASENO.60 POEVSGMA2005 DOCTRINE: Only the registered candidate for President or for VicePresident of the Philippines who received the second or third highest numberofvotes maycontest theelectionofthePresidentorthe VicePresident, as the case may be, by filing a verifiedpetition withthe Clerk of thePresidential ElectoralTribunalwithinthirty(30)daysafterthe proclamationofthewinner. Facts: During the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, Arroyo was declared as the candidate who garnered the most number of votes for the presidency while FPJ followed in the second place. July 23, 2004 FPJ filed an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting the votes of Arroyo. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant diedinthecourseofhismedicaltreatmentatSt.LukesHospital. Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died duringthependencyofthelatterspresidentialprotestcase? Held: NO. according to Rule 14 of PET. Election Protest.

Only the registered candidate for President orfor VicePresident of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the VicePresident, as the case may be, byfilinga verifiedpetitionwiththeClerkofthePresidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Sinceinthiscase,norealpartiessuchasthevicepresidentialaspirants inthe2004elections,havecomeforwardtointervene,ortobe substitutedforthedeceasedprotestant,thepetitionmustbedismissed.

Tecsonvs.COMELEC424SCRA277

CASENO.61TECSONv.COMELEC Topic:electioncontests
Doctrine The primary jurisdiction of the Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held. Facts Petitioners sought for the disqualification of FPJ on the ground that he is not a natural born citizen. COMELEC took cognizance of the case and dismissed the petitioner ruling that FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners assails the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, contending that only the SC may resolve this case by invoking Section 4, Art VII, of the 1987 Constitution which reads The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Issue WON the SC (as Presidential Electoral Tribunal) has jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates. Held No. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully

holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

SungavsCOMELEC288SCRA76

DeJesusvs.People,120SCRA760

Rogelio de jesus vs People of the Philippins

Ananias Hibo defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon .She filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to the Ministry of Justice which endorsed the same to the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation. Noting that petitioner was being charged in relation to his office, Asst. fiscals in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal issued a resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978. After approval thereof by the Tanodbayan, the following informationwas filed before the Sandiganbayan: That accused registered people on election day. And that they tampered with the election reports by making it appear that 10,727 persons were the total number of registered voters instead of only 10,532 Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. Sandigan bayan denied this motion. Petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that the same being an election offense over which the power to investigate, prosecute and try is lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan's exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner. Petitioner invokes Section 2 of Article XII[c] of the 1973 Constitution which vests upon the COMELEC the

power "to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections," and its implementing legislation, Section 182 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides the following: Section 182 Prosecution. The Commission shall, thru its duly authorized legal officer, have the power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Petitioner further cites Section 184 of the same Code which invests the court of first instance with "exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this code Sandiganbayaninvokes Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, which mandated the Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices, and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Issue: who b/w tanodbayan or COMELEC can prosecute Who b/w the sandiganbayan or the CFI has jurisdiction Held: COMELEC and cfi Ratio the COMELEC has the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: [c] Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is phased in terms so broad and general that it cannot be legitimately construed to vest said entity with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. Neither can it be interpreted to impliedly repeal the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the court of first instance to hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as to the status of the accused. Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are not favored. it is noted that while Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4[c] of P.D. No, 1606 speaks generally of "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers ... in relation to their office." Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. And where a reconciliation between the statute is possible, as in the case at bar, the former should be deemed an exception to the latter. The same principle of statutory construction should be applied with respect to the powers vested upon the COMELEC and the Tanodbayan in so far as election offenses are concerned.

Disposition: comelec must prosecute and cfi has jurisdiction.