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THE BHAMAT1
CATUSSUTRl

S. S.

SURYANARAYANA SASTRI
AND
C.

KUNHAN RAJA

23-4-4-69

5,000.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No.

Q H

Accession No.

'

A K Author
Title

V//&

This book should be returned on or before the date

last

marked below.

THE BHIMATI:

CATDBSfJTRl

FOREWORD
IT
is

a pleasure to
first

know

that Vacaspati's Bhftmatl

on

the

four Satras will

now be

available to

students of Indian Philosophy in an edition brought

out in the orthodox style, with a critical introduction,

Sanskrit
text,

English

translation

and

notes.

All

those interested in Indian Philosophy will be deeply

grateful
Dr. C,
to

Mr,

S.

S.

Suryanarayana

Sastri

and

Kunhan Raja

of the Philosophy

and the Sanskrit

for

Departments of the Madras University

out this very useful work.
is fairly

bringing

While S^nkara's Bhftsya

students of Indian Thought,

well

known among

the later thinkers are practically neglected.

presents one great section
his

Vacaspati

of

Advaita Vedanta and

BhamatI

is

second in importance only to S'ankara's

The Introduction,
of the work and
its

besides dealing with

the date

place in the Advaita tradition,

gives a clear and careful account of the central ideas

of the

Bhamati

the authoritativeness of scripture and

VI

its

compatibility with reason, the nature of

seat, release

Avidya and

its

ultimate and relative

others.

and Brahman

and

Is'vara,

among

There are side reflections

on similar views in Western Thought which are always

interesting.

The
its

work

will

not

only

add

to

the

reputation of

authors but also help to popularise

Vacaspati's views on Advaita Vedanta.

Andhra

University,

Waltair

S. R,

5th May, 1933

CONTENTS

Foreword
Introduction

.....
. . .

PAGE
v
ix
liii

.$*
.

Detailed Table of Contents

Text and Translation

Superimposition
Desire to
Definition

Know
.

....
.

.63

Scripture-source

Harmony
Notes

Additional Notes

......
. . .

.119 .137 .145

247

List of Abbreviations

Corrections

.297 .313 .315

INTRODUCTION
I.

DATE AND DOMICILE OF VACASPATT

ON
it

the strength of a reference in the Ny&yasuclnibandha,

is

now

generally admitted that Acarya Vacaspati

Mis'ra belongs to the period round about A,D. 841-842

(898

Vikrama

Era).
2

The

last

verse of the Bhdmatl

it is

refers to a
this

king Nrga,

While

held by some that

:!

king has not yet been identified, others

to

believe

him

have been a king of Mithila, a predecessor of

i.e.,

Nanyadeva, who reigned about 1019 Vikrama Era,

A.D, 962
;

it

is

said that this predecessor

is

named

in

some

inscriptions as Kiratadhipati,
to be those

and Kiratas are well

vehicles.
It is in

known

who had human

any case certain that there should have been a good

interval

between him and Udayana

(A.D.

984)

who

wrote the Nyftyavftrtikatfttparyatlkftpariguddhi, as a sub-

commentary on Vacaspati's NydyavftrtikaMparyatlkd.

1

See Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy

II, 107.

Nares'varS yaccaritH-'nuk&ram icchanti kartum na ca pSrayanti tasmin mahipe mahanlya-kirtau s'rimannrge 'k&ri may nibandhal?. See also p. 481, under II, i, 33.
*

"See Mm. Dr. Ganganath Jha, Sanskrit Introduction to his " " " edition of the Snnkhyatattvakaunwdl, means one who Nfga has a human vehicle," and kiratas are well known to be such. The

same writer gives many reasons, some Vacaspati was a native of Mithila.

fanciful, for holding that

That our author belonged to somewhere in Behar

or Bengal would appear to be evident from the repeated

reference to mustard

oil.

It

has also been said that in

is

what corresponds
called
It

to

ancient Mithila there

a city

Bhama

(BhamatI) and a tank of the same name.

may

be interesting to note a story current in

paijcjit-tradition

about the

name

"

Bhamati

".

In those
it

days

(as

even today in parts of Upper India),

to

would

appear

have

been

customary

to

hold learned

discussions

on such occasions as marriages.

to

Vacaspati,

who
his

listened

such a discussion on the occasion of

own

marriage, was so struck by the vagaries of

dialecticians that he resolved straightaway to devote

himself

to

the

task of setting forth

authoritative
zeal,

expositions of all the dars'anas.

so

So great was his

mighty the task and such the patient and tireless

devotion of his wife that the couple had grown old

before Vacaspati could write finis to his labours.

Then

alone did Vacaspati realise the magnitude both of his

neglect of his wife and of his wife's self-sacrifice
as a tardy measure of reparation, he gave her
;

and
to

name

the last and greatest of his works, so that she could

live

on perpetually in the BMmati, though not in the

bodies of children born of her.

The story

is

so pic*

turesque, so typical of the scholar's neglect

and the true

scholarly recompense, that

it

deserves to be true.

II.

WORKS
are enumerated in the

The works

of Vacaspati

concluding verses of the BhSmati.

They are as follows

XI

the Nyayakaqika

(a

commentary on Maijdana's Vidhi-

viveka), the Brahmatattvasamiksd, (a commentary on

Havana's

Brahmasiddhi), the Tattvabindu (a discussion

its

of language in

relation
(a

to

meaning), the NyQya-

v&rtikatatparyatikci

commentary

on Udyotakara's

Ny&yav&rtika), the Nyclyasuclnibandha (perhaps written

as a supplement to the Tatparyatlkft), the S&tikhyatatt-

vakaumudi

(a

commentary on
and
the

Is'vara Krija's Sftnkhya-

karika), the Tattvavaisaradi (a

commentary on Vyasa's
(a
1

Yogabhctsya)

Bh&mati

commentary on

S'ankara's S'arlrakamlmaipsabhasya).

The

Bfitimati

has

itself

been commented on by
is

several other works.

The most notable of these

the

Vedantakalpataru by Amalananda (13th Century

This work in turn formed the subject of two
taries, the

A.D.),

commen-

Parimala of Appayya Dlksita (16th Century

of Laksmlnrsirjiha (17th

A,D.)

and Abhoga
is

Century

A.D.).

The Abhoga

written in the light of the Parimala

criticises
it.

and sometimes

Other commentaries on the

BMmatl
kftstika
2

are

(1)

the Bhamatlvyftkhya or the Rjupra-

by S'rlraiiganatha otherwise known as Akharidand the the Bhftmatitilaka* ananda (3) (2)
;

Bhamativitisa.

All the works have been published with the exception of the Brahmatattvasanrtkffi, not even a manuscript of which has been
1

found so
*

far.

This has been published in part at Calcutta by Mahamahopadhyaya N. S, Anantak^a S astrl.

3

Manuscripts

of

this

work

are found

in

the Government

Oriental Library, Madras.

4

Mentioned

by Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy,

II, 108.

Xll

ill.

RELATIONS TO OTHER WRITERS

identified with one

The name of the Bhftmatl

of

is

two

main

streams

of

S'ankara interpretation.
is

Vftcaspati
in

owes the major part of what

distinctive

his

teaching to Mandana's Brahmasiddhi.

But as
as the

the views starting with

tenets
started
of

Padmapada

are

known

the

Vivarana-prasthana, the views that

with Mandana passed current as the tenets of

Vacaspati draws largely on

the Bhamatl-prasthana.
the Brahmasiddhi,

and sometimes on the Pancapcidika,

or
possible,

wherever

necessary

Striking

verbal

resemblances to the former work are indicated in the

notes
;

a few of the resemblances

:

to the Paficapcidikd are

;

noted here bhasyam prasannagambhiram (ahankara as)

idam-anidam-rupam
s'arlram

mithya-s'abdo 'pahnava-vacanati
s'arirake

eva

s'arlrakam

bhavalj

s'arlrako
;

jlvab

bhik^u-bhayan na sthalya anadhis'rayanam so

santi-karmani
vetalo 'dayafr
;

'yam

anvaya

possible

even without reference to asti-kriya as in

The references are to pages 1, 18, 4, 40, 63, 91, and 97 of the PancapUdikn (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series). The statements on pp. 63 and 91 of the PancapUdikfi are well-known proverbial
1

expressions ; what is striking is the use of them by both writers in the same context. The interested student will easily find the corresponding pages of the BhUmatl. Some of the criticism in the

would seem to be expressly directed against the doctrines of the PaftcapBdf&B; see the Kalpataru on I, iii, 17 26 (p, 264). We owe this reference to ii, 298) and on I, (p. Mr. T. R. Chintamani (Journal of Oriental Research, Madras,

Bhamatl

Vol. Ill,

p. 45),

Xlll

IV. SfoUTi AS

PRAMANA
adherents of any orthodox
(S'ruti)

For Vacaspati, as

for all

school of Indian Philosophy, Revealed Scripture

is

the final authority in matters of the Spirit.

(or

The

Spirit
Self,
it

Intelligence,
is

Consciousness,

the Universal
is

Brahman)
itself

that whereby knowledge

It cannot,

possible

is

knowledge.

without losing

its

self-hood,

become an object of knowledge.

It is manifest,

since but for its manifestation the whole world

would

be blind.

But

it

is

not manifested by another, since

that would lead only to an infinite series of the blind

leading the blind.

It is self-luminous

and self-manifest.

Perception, which would have no value but for the manifestation of the self-luminous intelligence in
it,

and through

could not have that intelligence

less

itself for its object.

Much

can inference make that

its

sphere, since

it is

dependent

on

concomitances between the perceived.

intuition

Brahman can be known only through

and

that only by gifted and disciplined souls, whose minds

have been purified by Scripture-ordained duties and

concentrated

on

the
first

Scripture-taught reality.

Such
one
all

minds
without

will

by

hearing of the only

it

real,

a second, reflecting on
to

and refuting
the

objections

the
for

doctrine,

contemplating

real

uninterruptedly

a long time and with faith, realise

is

Brahman.
it

The supreme pramana

Scripture, though

may and

indeed has to be helped by reasoning, as

in

an

auxiliary,

order

to

remove the doubts that

is strictly

assail the

mind.

Such reasoning, however,

XIV

subordinated

to the explication

and substantiation of

Scriptural truth

and can

in

no sense be independent.
arise

Several
(1)

questions

naturally
of

out

of

this:

Is

such

an

advocacy

Scripture

and

sub-

ordination of reason consistent with a truly philosophical attitude?

(2)

How
the

can Scripture maintain nontruth

difference

to

be

where

it

conflicts

with

perception
difference
?

which cognises a world of plurality and

When
is

there

is

a conflict between the two,

?

should not perception prevail over the other

(3)

In

any

case,

not Scripture cutting at

to

its

own

basis in

denying

authoritativeness

perception, since there

if

would be no Scriptural knowledge,

senses

words and their

is

were not

first

perceived

(4)

What

the nature
?

of perception,
1.

if it

does not cognise a world of diversity

is

Authority
as such,

claimed by Vacaspati not for

all
1

Scripture

but only for purportful Scripture.

there are

For, in Scripture itself

many

restatements

and explanatory and

eulogistic passages,

which cannot

claim to be authoritative, except perhaps in dependence

on other passages which lay down something new and The marks determinative of purport are purportful.
well

known; they

are:

the

harmony

of

the initial
(e,e.,

and concluding passages,

being otherwise
eulogistic

repetition, novelty

not

made

out), fruitfulness, glorification

passages

or

by condemnation by deprecatory

passages and intelligibility in the light of reasoning.

It is clear
1

from an application of these

tests that the

tatparyavati hi tfrutUi pratyaksid balavati, na s''ruti-m5tram

;

'

ananya-labyah s abd&rtha\i.

XV
entire

Scripture

has

non-duality
for

for

purport

The

Chftndogya

teaching,

instance, begins with pre-

mising the secondless unity of reality and goes on to

identify this reality with the self of the pupil instructed, " " That Thou art ; the same teaching is in the words

repeated nine-fold to show that

that
it

it

is is

important and
this identity

is

the primary

purport

nor

something established in ordinary experience, like the

heat of
fire,

in

which case the Scriptural declaration

;

would be a mere re-statement

novel and hence
is

it is

a statement of the
since the
;

purportful

it

is fruitful,

knowledge of

it

helps one to pass beyond transmigration

it is

the knowledge of
is

praised suitably

and

its

opposite

condemned

and the identity of the

is

self

with the
1

absolute

reality

also

found to stand to reason.

Though the application the marks of purport, it

There

of reason figures but as one of

will be seen

on closer examina-

tion that reason really plays a

part.

much more important

as to

are

disputes even

which

is

the

introductory passage and which the conclusion.

vast body of knowledge called Scripture
to
it is

In the
possible

choose a beginning anywhere and call that the

;

introductory passage

such a choice

may

be found to

favour a dualist rather than a non-dualist interpretation.

As
all

against this the non-dualist has to

make out

that

such

beginnings

are

intermediate

or secondary

(a van tar a), that

1

the real beginning (paramo-'pakrama)

On advaita

on I, iii, 33 (especially, mention of creation etc.

II,
i,

as the purport of all Scripture, see the Bh&maft 343, Anantakr.sna S'&strfs edition); p. is not part of the primary intention ; see

34

(p. 482).

XVI

is

elsewhere,
of

and
the

that

this

favours

non-dualism.

Similarly

conclusion.

The interpretation of

these in harmony, again, calls for the exercise of reason.

And

the

need of reason will be similarly found in

is

determining what
not, in

purportful repetition

and what

is

distinguishing and assigning the fruit, in the

ascertainment of the really novel, and in finding out

what

is

glorified

and by which passage.

is

So that the

authoritarianism of the advaitin

unphilosophical only

on the face of

it,

involving as

it

does the abundant

exercise of reason.

True, he says reason finds a place

it

only in so far as

does not conflict with Scripture

itself

but in the end, reason

conflicts
2,

has to judge when

it

it

with Scripture and when

does not.
perception

But

how can

Scripture over-ride

which
here
of
is

cognises difference as real?

The assumption
not be rejected.
but
it is
is

that perception
;

is

our
is

first

and basic instrument

knowledge

and what
replies

basic

may

The advaitin

that no doubt

it is first,

not basic and unsublatable.

sublation,
it is

Indeed, where there

is

the earlier that

sublated.

The

initial

statement or cognition has no doubt greater value,

because of
this rule.
its

position,

But there are exceptions to

Where

a subsequent cognition arises validly,

and

it

cannot arise except as sublating what goes

before, the earlier cognition should necessarily be taken

to

be sublated; for example, the cognition of nacre

not arise,
;

could

if

the original

cognition as silver
is

persisted

hence, the nacre-cognition

admitted to

sublate the earlier silver-cognition.

Thus, the priority

xvii

of perception

would of
the

itself

be an argument for

its

sublation

by

subsequently

resulting Scriptural

knowledge, especially

when

the latter arises without

depending
case,

on the validity of the former.

shall

In any

as

we
is

see presently,

it

is

not true that

difference
3.

perceived.
is

But surely Scripture

very existence
1

dependent on perception

for

its

Scriptural

knowledge would

not be possible except for the prior perception of words

and their senses.

required
is

The reply

to this is that all that is

the existence, the empirical reality, of words

and

their senses,

not their absolute reality.

Even

in

ordinary experience we derive what we treat as valid knowledge from what is not real but is superimposed.

Naga means an
the difference in

elephant,

while naga means a tree

*

the length of the vowel

* '

'

is

property not of

itself,
it

but of the audible sound

;

(dhvani) which manifests

and yet the knowledge

is

which

results

from

this

superimposed difference

not

delusive.

Sounds and their senses are but manifesters

is

of

knowledge which

eternal.

The former need not

latter
;

and indeed cannot be co-eternal with the

so

long as they exist and manifest knowledge, their function is fulfilled

is
;

an insistence on

their absolute reality

vain and unreasonable.

4.

Does not perception cognise difference? The

is

answer

in

the

negative.

What

we know
to

as

determinate perception does appear no doubt

difference.

cognise

But

this

is

preceded

by indeterminate

perception.

All distinctions are introduced later into

xvni
the single positive undifferentiated continuum presented

by indeterminate perception. Such perception

able to

is

compar-

the state of feeling

is

mentioned by Bradley,

wherein there

a harmony of the that and the what,

;

existence and content

it
1

is

broken up because of the

very finitude of feeling.

For

the

dialectic

on difference, Vacaspati

is

indebted to Mandana, most of whose arguments are

found

briefly

summarised

in

the

Bhamati?

The

principal argument, which will bear repetition here,

is

that

difference cannot be

real,

since

it

can be

neither of the nature of things nor an attribute of them,

If difference

were of the very nature of things, there

to

would be no things

be different

for,

whatever you

may
its

say

is

one thing will immediately break up,

is

because difference
parts
is
;

of its nature
rest

similarly of each of
;

you cannot

even in the primal atom

there

nothing which can be treated as a unit and

in

It

is

also comparable to
:

what

is

described in the following

lines of

Tennyson

to earth and sky time his tender palm is prost Against the circle of"the breast Has never thought that This is i ", But as he grows he gathers much " " " " And learns the use of I and me " finds I am not what I see And And other than the things I touch ". So rounds he to a separate mind

The baby new

What

From whence clear memory may begin As through the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

On

I,

i,

4 (pp. 174-179).

The notes

in that connection

may

also

be consulted.

XIX

the absence of any unit there can be no difference

either.
is this

If,

then, difference be said to be

an

attribute,
it is

attribute different from its substrate ? If not,

of

its

very

nature, and
If

we have

really the former

is

alternative alone.

the attribute

different, then

we have
difference

three units on our hands, the substrate, the

which

is

its

attribute

and the difference

of

the attribute from the substrate.

And

the

moment we

start inquiring into the relation of this difference to the

substrate on
other,

the one hand and

the attribute on the

infinite

we are launched on an
is

regress.

The
it

notion of difference then

unintelligible,
least of a

and since
unit

pre-supposes the
different,
it

identity

at

that

is is

is

reasonable to hold

that difference

superimposed on a basis of identity.

May
we
ence
?

not both identity and difference be real

Do

not indeed find this synthesis abundantly in experi-

We

do no doubt find their apparent synthesis in

is

experience, but that

no

justification for the uncritical

acceptance of both.

To say that both identity and

difference are manifest cannot compel us to say that

they are both real, unless

all

attempt at systematic

thinking
it

is

to be abandoned.

crown and a

bracelet,

is

said,

are different and yet non-different, different

as products, but non-different in respect of their cause,

gold.

But

if

they are really non-different, he

satisfied

who
;

wants a crown must be

with the bracelet

if

you say that there

bracelet, then there

is

difference too

between crown and

must be difference between bracelet

and gold

also, since

crown and gold are

non-different.

XX

And

if,

because of the difference between the crown and

bracelet,

he who wants the

first

does not

want the
it

second,

why

should

it

not be that he wants

?

too,

because of their non-difference

is

Such in bare outline

the criticism of the view of difference

(bheda-'bheda).
1

cum nonbe found

difference

Identity

may
taken

only with difference, but philosophy cannot stop with

juxtaposing them
;

either should

be

to be

more

fundamental than the other, and

the

advaitin has

shown

sufficient

cause for not treating difference as

fundamental.

What,

then,

is

the goal of knowledge

Is

it

the

pre-rational stage of cognition, analogous to feeling in

Bradley's system?
pre-rational
distinctions

Obviously,

it

cannot be,

for,

on the
its

supervenes the rational, introducing

and doubts.

The goal

of

knowledge cannot

be

any such unstable harmony.

there
is

For him who has

attained that,
to

perfect peace, no

more return

the relational
final

world of diversity and distraction.

The

cognition, though characterised as perceptual

and indeterminate, cannot then be of the same nature

as

the indeterminate cognition of the child and the

deaf-mute.

Between

the

two,

there

are only

two

characteristics in

common,

the immediacy of cognition

All determinate cogis

and

its

non-attributive nature.
is

nition

attributive

the subject

known

to possess

a name, a class or a quality.

1

In the indeterminate

The criticism of bheda-'bheda occurs under I, i, 4 (pp. 175178). AmalSnanda takes it to apply to Bh&skara, The argument? are in substance identical with Mariana's in the Brahmasiddhi
pp, 63*70
;

and Man<Jana

is criticising

KumSrila.

XXI
cognition of the child, there

is

no distinction of subject

and predicate at
beyond

all.

In the final perception,

we

pass

the distinction of subject and predicate, to

understand the identity underlying both, not the mere

attribution
of one with respect to the other.
is

A typical
"

cognition of this character

the recognition

This

is

that Devadatta
sion

".

What

is

asserted is not the possessubject, but the identity of

of

an attribute by a

Devadatta seen at a different time and place with the

Devadatta
essentially

seen

here

and

now,

The judgment

is

an identity judgment not an attributive one.

it

And

yet

is

not bare identity that

is

affirmed, but

identity
place.

as qualified
If

by

the differences of time and

the

differences

were really attributes of

Devadatta, forming part of his essential nature, the

identity

would be impossible.
of time

It is therefore said that

the

differences

and place are upalaksanas,

qualifications per
is

accidens,

and the identity asserted

this

so qualified.

The difference between

and the

bare identity

of the pre-rational cognition consists in

the stability, certitude and freedom from doubt of the

former.

For

it

has been mediated

is

it

has passed

through doubt and difference and

significance,

rich

with their

though they themselves

real,

persist

no longer,

not being ultimately

of determinate

The

attributive judgments

cognition have fulfilled their purpose

by

extending,

harmonising
of knowledge.

and

consolidating

the

original
final

datum
is

What happens

at the

stage

the realisation of the unity and identity

liable

of the

empery of knowledge, a unity no longer

XX11

to

disruption

from within or without, as at the preThis

is

rational level

the realisation of akhan(lartha,

is

the impartite sense, which

non-relational in nature
it is

(sarnsarga-'navagahi-jMnam), not because

relational, but because
relations.
it

infra-

has taken up and transcended

feel

Nor

need

one

that

difference

and

relations

have not come

in for fair play since they are

;

treated merely as qualifications per accidens

matters, the signification,
of
is

for,

what

conserved even in the case

of Devadatta's

an upalaksana.

The crow on the top

house serves to identify the house for him who seeks

it
;

the identification

is

the significance
fly
is

that

is

never

lost,

though the crow

1

may

away and the attribution

only a qualification per
into the error of holding

of

the crow sitting there

It
is

accidens.
1

easy to

fall

There is little discussion of the doctrine of akhandartha in the Bhnmatl itself. But it is adverted to in the Kalpataru, even and the doctrine is of such in the course of the first four sutras vital importance to advaita that at least this passing mention has
;

to be made.

The view that the

final cognition is characterised

it is

by

freedom from doubt and delusion and that

qualified per accidens by the differences is elaborated at great length in the Advaitasiddhi. VScaspati's failure to discuss akhandSrtha is susceptible of one of

following explanations. For him, as for Mandana, verbal is not of itself the cause of immediate knowledge. The cognition resulting from such testimony has to be contemplated with faith, unintermittently and for a long time before the final intuition results, From the sentence there results but a mediate cognition which starts the indispensable process of prasankhyana ; it would therefore seem unnecessary to insist on the sentence too conveying a sense that is impartite. Another possible reason is that, unlike Man<Jana, Vacaspati does not hold to the sphota-vada, the doctrine that meaning is one and integral and that it is but
the

testimony

revealed gradually in the spoken letters and words. He would seem and the Behaviourist to have more sympathy with the Associatipnist explanations of the acquirement of meaning than with an explanaThe juxtaposition of tion like that of the Gestalt psychologist. such a doctrine alongside that of akharxjartha would have appeared, to say the least, incongruous. It is worth noting that the doctrine

XX111

that the indeterminate cognition

is

the pre-rational

and the pre-relational, that

bare
subject
its

it is

but knowledge of the

without

its

attributes,

the bare stem

without
attributes

modifications.

The

relations

and

the

and the modification

though
they

all

count

in the final

cognition,

cannot
real.

count

as such, as

independently and absolutely

The
is

logical

theory

of

Bradley and Bosanquet

the
predicative
to

generally

identified

with

view

of

judgment.

Judgment,
content
the
that

according
to

the
in

former,
reality.

relates

an

ideal
of

subject

The
and
the

aspects

and the what, existence

in
feeling,

content,

exist

harmoniously

but

harmony is imperfect because of the finitude of Each aspect tends to outrun or exceed the feeling.
Thought
tries

other.

to
It

cure

the

defect

by

homeopathic method.

accentuates

the separation
in order

between the that and the what, sunders them

to bring

them together more

effectively.

The

that thus
is

sundered becomes the logical subject, while the what

the logical predicate.
reality itself
is

But, elsewhere, he holds that

the logical subject of every judgment.

is

Now,
it is

obviously, reality as a whole

not a mere that

the perfect

harmony

of the that

and the what. Nor

of akhan<Jartha is primarily intended to show that statements made in Scripture, despite their prepositional form involving subjects, predicates and relations, make known the one and the suprarelational, not the many in relation. question of some importance

is

how words

in a proposition can
;

be non-synonymous it advaita writers and is argument is not set out here for fear of prolixity.

have an identical import and yet is discussed at some length by most briefly referred to by Man<}ana; the

XXIV
is

the predicate, logically considered, a

content.

mere what, a

bare

All

this

mention of sundering and

homeopathic treatment seems then wide of the mark, a

defect which Bradley himself recognised in the Essays

on

Truth
is

and

Reality}

What

is

characteristic

of

judgment

the presence of an ideal element. If reality

alone were present in the judgment, there could be no

judgment, since the latter

is

is

relational while the former

supra-relational.

Such relations as are affirmed must

But no judgment establishing such
to absolute truth, since the

be within reality.
relations alone

can claim

predication in every case

of

would be not

of reality, but

what

is

in

reality.

In order to approximate to

finality,

then, the judgment should seek to identify the

;

ideal with the real

the identity appears, as

it

were, in

a relational form, that of predication.

the judgment
is

The predicate of

neither something other than the real,

nor a single aspect of the real taken in abstraction from

existence
;

it

is

something

less

than the

real, in that it

comprises inadequately harmonised aspects of existence

and
1

content.

That judgment

is

most

true

which

^Reference may be made in particular to pp. 316 and 333 of the Essays on Truth and Reality. It is not claimed that the view here explained is expressly adopted by Bradley but it would appear to be in consonance with his metaphysical principles, and favoured by a great part of what he says in his later writings. Of particular
;

interest
' *

in this connection are

and of the view that the subject is a mere that ". For the Bradleian view of error explained in the next paragraph, see and Reality, 2nd edition, pp, 193, 194, particularly the Appearance " We have crossed the threads of the connection between following our whats and our thats,' and have thus caused a collision, a collision which disappears when things are taken as a whole,"
floating ideas
:

"

his rejection of the doctrine of

"

'

'

Bradley's anyathakhySti, like that provisionally accepted by the advaitin, is of a variety consistent with absolutism, not pluralism.

XXV
identifies

with reality, as the logical subject, a predicate

least

which requires the

supplementation.

amount

of readjustment or

In essence, the function of the judgnot the predication of an

ment

is

true

identification,

attribute.

Such a view seems more in accord with the

fundamental position of Bradley as well as his own

expressed
dissatisfaction

with the theory of judgment

formulated by him earlier.

And

the approximation
is

it

makes

to the doctrine of

akhandartha

not without

interest.

One may note

in

passing the Bradleian theory of

error as a crossed reference

and

its

similarity to the

view

of error as anyathakhyati (apprehension as otherwise).

It

may
".

be

remembered that one of the examples

is

Bradley gives of error

green

the judgment

"

Roses are

The

error

is

possible because of a confusion

leaf
;

between the flower and the

while the flowers are red

the leaves are green,

but the greenness of the

to

former

is

erroneously

referred

the flowers;

when

our knowledge extends so as to cover both leaf and

flower and becomes more precise, so that each colour
is

referred to its appropriate substrate, the error vanishes.

The

anyathakhyati

view, though attributed to the

Logicians, has some popularity with Advaitins too ip

the explanation of sopadhika-bhrama, delusion caused

by the presence of an external adjunct.

the white crystal seen as red
is

For example,

so seen because the

it is

redness of the flower in proximity to

referred to
it.

erroneously

And

the white shell

is

seen to be yellow,

because in the jaundiced person, bile goes forth with

XXVI
the rays of light from the eyes the bile
is

and the yellowness of

erroneously referred to the object apprehend-

ed by those rays of light.

fore
in

This view

is

so

much

to the

Vacaspati's account of super-imposition that he

to

seems

be

supporter of anyathakhyati.
to

And

Amalananda has

rescue

him from

this

charge by

pointing to the explanation of the mirage, where at least

we have not a
which
is

crossed reference, but a pure creation

1

not determinable as either real or unreal.

V.

PRIMAL NESCIENCE
be-

The stream of indeterminable superimpositions

ginningless, so that
of each
it is

is

reasonable to look for the cause

2

superimposition in an earlier superimposition.

vice,

But there must be a fundamental

an original

sin,

which
diverse

is

responsible

for

the superimpositions of the

and the

relational

on the one and the supra-

relational.

Granted relationing, we can understand the

;

dependence of one relation on another

culars,

granted parti-

we can understand
is

their

causal dependence.
;

Back

of the relations there

is

a relationing

back of the

particulars there
is

a particularising.

This original sin

is

primal

nescience, the ignorance that or

the cause

(mQla-'vidya
1

karana-'vidya).

Dependent

on this

svarOpefla

maricyambho mtsa vScaspater raatam

* *

anyathSkhyStir isiS sye

ty anyatha, jagrfmr jan&h.

Kalpataru, p. 24. "In this Vacaspati differs from PadraapSda, who would go straightaway to primal nescience as the cause of all superimpositions,

xxvn
are
derivative
;

ignorances
individual
delusions

(tala-'vidyas

or

'vidy&s)
these.

and

delusions are

products

of

These

are

sublatable

by

other
;

appearances of the same grade of reality as themselves

the cognition
of a stick

may

take the place of the

is

cognition
stick

of

a snake, where in truth there

neither

nor snake.
of

Derivative ignorances are sublatable

by

cognition

the objects to which

is

they relate;

ignorance about nacre

removable by knowledge of

nacre

primal nescience

is

removable by knowledge of
;

the supreme reality alone

realisation of

hence

it

persists

up

to the

Brahman.

Particularising

ceases only

with true knowledge, the knowledge of the universal,

which

is,

not outside of, but above particulars.

difficulties at

Two
ception

least

may

be raised to the condialectic

of

mula-'vidya.

The

brilliant

of

advaitins like

Gaudapada and S'ankara has shown the

of

unintelligibility

the

causal

concept.

It

is

not

ultimately real.
of appearance.

It obtains, if at all,

only in the world

In the phenomenal world of particulars,

be excused for looking to one particular

then, one

may

as the cause or effect of another.

of asking for a cause of the

But what

is

the sense

phenomenal world and

postulating primal

nescience as that cause? Are

we

not committing the same

fallacy as Kant, who, after

confining the applicability of the causal concept to

phenomena,

proceeded

solemnly to affirm things-in?

themselves as the causes of phenomena

so presented appears serious enough.

The

difficulty

But

this at least
;

should make

us pause before

we condemn

the doctrine

XXV111

the cause suggested

itself
is

is

not trans-phenomenal, but

is

phenomenal.

It is
its

not suggested that nescience

noumenal, while

consequences and products are

phenomenal, though degrees of unreality are recognised between the cause and the products, these degrees being
distinguished, as stated earlier, according to the nature

of the

means required

for sublation.

In setting up the

alleged causal relation, then,

we

are dealing with terms,

both of which are phenomenal and therefore susceptible

of the said relation.

Further; the causal relationship as

its

between tala-'vidya and

products

is

not of the same

kind as that suggested between mula-'vidya and the

tala-'vidyas.
It
is

not suggested that mflla-'vidya

is

cause in time, so

much

as the logical ground of the tula-

Vidyas, for the latter too are said to be beginningless

(anadi).

Such a relationship

is

not inconsistent even

with the possession of a higher grade of reality by

primal nescience;
of the entire
for,
is

not

Brahman
is

the substrate

world -appearance? and

not
is

Brahman
the world
;

the absolute real? The relational world

of appearance.
It

has as

its

ground the non-relational

its

but

it

may

also

be said to have relating as

more

proximate ground.

The advaitin believes and rightly

believes in progressive development of knowledge.

He
pre-

would

concede

the doctrine that

the

effect

is

existent in the cause, in order to lead the pupil on to

deny the separate existence of the

effect

from the cause.

He would

concede the doctrine of the concrete universal

itself into

transforming

the particulars, in order to lead

the pupil to conceive this transformation as nothing but

XXIX

an

illusory

manifestation,

He would

concede the

causing of delusions by a primal nescience in order to

lead the pupil to reject finally the concept of cause.

The
is

distinction

between causal and effected nescience

but relative and there are not sufficient reasons to

it

disagree with

or reject

it.

Another and a more serious objection

is

based on

the popular conception of ignorance as mere absence of

knowledge.
or ignorance

For
is

the

traditional

advaitin," nescience

a positive entity, not a mere negation.

And
error,

this

would well accord with the positive nature of

consists not in the

which

mere absence of know-

ledge, but

in the positive assertion of something else as

It

knowledge.

may

be thought that

it

should be a non-

dualist's business to reduce

the number of entities to

one
one
of

but this

is

a misconception.

Reality for him

is

but

its

unity does not conflict with the plurality

;

phenomenal existents

and

it

has never been conis

tended that nescience, though primal,

anything but

phenomenal.
is

Nor may

it

be said that in any case there

no

justification for
is

ascribing a positive character to

what

primarily,

if

not wholly, negative.

it

For,

if

ignorance were wholly negative,

could not even be

known
since

to exist.
is

Perception would not apply thereto,

what

perceived should be in sense-contact, and

a mere negation cannot be in contact with the senses

or with anything else.

Nor can absence of knowledge

vivarta-vSdasya hi pBrva-bhOmir vedanta-vade pariijama-vadah, (Sank$epas'3riraka

II, 61.)

<J

Pace Y. Subba Rao Mnla-vidyZ-nirnsa.

:

XXX
be perceived as an attribute of the
self,

since an attri-

bute can be perceived only in the case of a substrate

that
is

in the

sphere of perception

but the self

if it

is

not

in the sphere of perception.

Inference, even

could

apply, would give only mediate knowledge, whereas

our experience of ignorance

"
I

is

immediate, in the form

I

did not
is

know nacre

but

now

know

"

and

so

on

there

the further difficulty that, being based on

is

perceived concomitance, inference

perception
to the
is

not possible, where

is

wholly ruled out.

Nor

recourse possible
;

pram&ia
the

called non-cognition (anupalabdhi)

for,
;

non-cognition again can give only mediate knowledge

further,
self

being incapable of perception,

its

attribute too cannot be perceived, while non-cognition

applies only

to that of
is

which perception
;

(or

some other
no cogni-

means

of cognition)

possible

truly, there is

tion of non-existence,

except

where the substrate of

But we do
its

non-existence

is

capable of being perceived.

have experience both of ignorance and of

by knowledge.
1

removal
both

Hence, ignorance

(or nescience) is

positive,

and indeterminable, even

like nacre-silver.

VI.

PLURALITY AND LOCATION OF NESCIENCE

distinctive

A
1

feature

of

Vacaspati's advaita
If

is

the recognition of a plurality of nesciences.

the

Vacaspati's recognition of the two avidySs is apparent from the very first line of his invocatory verse. There is no specific defence of the conception of mnlS-VidyS. Some of the arguments here mentioned are based on the I$tasiddhi, copies of the proofs of which were very kindly supplied by the editor, Mr. M. Hiriyanna
(see particularly pp. 65, 66).

XXXI

world be admitted to be a product of nescience, when

nescience
is

destroyed on the release of a single jlva

the world should be destroyed for all other jlvas as

well
;

and there should be no

distinction

between the

bound and the released.

would be
other

One way

out of the difficulty

to affirm the existence of

one jlva alone,

all

jlvas,

the

differences of teacher
all
;

and taught,

bound and released, being

alike comparable to the

dreams
released

of the single jlva

;

this jlva has not yet

been

when he

is

released, the world too

would of
is

course cease to exist.

But such radical

solipsism

unacceptable to the majority of advaitins,

that

who

hold

the

distinction

between

the

bound and the

released

may

not be ignored, since Scripture declares

that certain souls have been released and disbelief in

Scripture in such
necessarily
such.

a vital matter as

release

would

lead to the discrediting of Scripture as

plurality of jlvas

must

be conceded.
is

Our

experience

even

of

our finite self -hood

selves.

through

contact and conflict with other

These are no

doubt looked upon by the sophisticated mind as mere

not-self or
inert

matter
is

but primarily
selves.

the

conflict
is

and the contrast

the

with other
in

That
the

why

Bhagavatpada,

speaking
"

of

reciprocal

superimposition of the self

and the

not-self, refers to

the latter as the concept

Thou," though one would

as

have expected the author

"

to refer to it

"It"

or

That

".

Vacaspati's

own non-dualism
to

will be found

to approximate very closely to Berkeleyan

idealism,
parallel

though, perhaps, not

solipsism

and the

XXX11

will

be found to be

all

the closer in that both the

writers insist on the existence of

of spirits,
conflict

God and

of a plurality
to

however much that may

seem

be in
in so

with the idealism they

profess.

And

far as

he

insists

on the reality of other

spirits,

and of

our duties and obligations in relation to them up to

the stage of final realisation, Vacaspati's doctrine (as
also that of

Mandana from whom

as
realistic

it is

derived) should
1

be characterised

rather than
in
its

idealistic.

The

stream

that
2

culminates

the solipsism of
source in
is

Prak&s'ananda
or Vacaspati
;

does not have

Mandana

its

more

likely

source

the view that

Brahman
which
through
is

is

both the locus and the content of nescience,

it is

but single, and that

Brahman who

its
its

through
3

own nescience seems bound as it were and own knowledge seems to be released as it

were.
In a sense, all advaita is idealistic, in that the material world cannot have absolute and independent reality, on any variety of advaita. If such a world existed, its very existence could not be known. In the last resort, knowledge is possible only because the self is self-luminous and the self is knowledge. If things are known, it must be because they are not really other than the self, being super-imposed thereon ; see the samvid-bhnmatt, pp. 34-38 also the Brahmasiddhi, p. 7 ekatva ev&'yam drastr. -drs'ya-bhavo cidatmanal\ tatha" tattia viparintaSd 'vakalpate, drastur eva nanatve tu vivikta-svabhavayor asarnsr.sta-parasvivartanad va
1

para-svarUpayor asarabaddhayoli
*

kidr.s'o

drastr-dts'ya-bhSvah

The

author

of

the

Vednntasiddhftntamukt&valr the outt>

standing representative of VedSnta Solipsism or Dr.stisrsti-va'da, the view that perception of things is either the creation of them or is simultaneous with their creation the latter view seems to have been favoured by PrakSs'ananda.
;

3 Such a view is more in accord with the teaching of Sures'vara, wrongly identified with Mandana. Sures'vara was an immediate

disciple of S'ankara.

XXX111

Of the nesciences that

should then be as
particular
jlva

constitute the world there

many

as there are jivas.

When

a
is

attains knowledge, his

for

nescience
to be.

destroyed and

him the world ceases

to exist

Other

nesciences, however, continue

souls yet unreleased.
It

and

to bind the

may
single

be possible to explain

the

distinction

on the basis of different capacities

(s'aktis)

possessed

by a

nescience.

Nescience
it

binds every jlva because in respect of each jlva

has

a different capacity to bind

jlva
is

and when a particular

is lost,

released, that particular capacity

itself

though

nescience

persists for
is

other jivas.

Though such
is

an explanation
needless

plausible, the unity of avidya

It
is

complication.

said
is

for

instance that,

though the pain in the foot

the hand reaches forth to
foot,

not a pain in the hand,

pluck the fliorn from the

because both hand and foot are members of a

single organism

and thus there

is

community

of feeling.

There

is

no such community of feeling between different

individuals since there

they are members.

common organism of which That is why Caitra does not feel

is

no

Maitra's pain as his own.

If the different experiences of

Caitra and Maitra were, however, products of a single

avidya, this
;

may
it

discharge the functions of a

difficult to

common
own.
1

organism and

would be

explain

why Caitra

does not recall Maitra's pain as

1

if it

were

his

a development of the advaitin's explanation of non(ananusandhSna). It must be confessed that that explanation does not appear to be thorough-going, as it apparently ignores the fact of individuals being members of social and other organisms and thereby sharing each other's joys and sorrows.
This
is

recollection

XXXIV

The
in

ignorances

thus

assumed must be located

is

the jlvas.

Brahman who

pure and perfect cannot

avidya, the

obviously

be the locus of defect; and

is itself

material cause of all defects,

the greatest defect.

is

Apart from
strives

this,

it

is

the jlva that

instructed, that

and acquires the knowledge which destroys But there can be no relation of destroyer nescience.

and destroyed except as between what occupy the same The poison drunk by Caitra will not remove locus.
the
life

of

Maitra.
the
it

Hence, nescience must have the

same

locus as

knowledge which destroys

it, i.e.,

the jlva,

But

may

be objected that the finitude,

of

transmigration
constitute
his
;

and

suffering
in

the

jlva,

all

that

jlva-hood

short, are the products of

nescience

there would be no jlva except as the product

;

of nescience

how

then can nescience

itself reside in

the jlva

The attempted charge

of reciprocal depend-

ence will not stand, for the interaction of ignorance and

jlva-hood
is

beginningless,

We

do not say at any time

that ignorance was and the jlva

jlva

was

not, or that the

was and ignorance was

is in

not.

If it

be

still

urged

that such dependence

the last resort unintelligible,

"
"

we

counter

it

with the question,

why
It
is

expect inof the very

telligibility

in the case of nescience ?

to

essence of nescience
'

be unintelligible in the last

resort

tad eva
IS'

vidyanam avidyatvam.

VII,

V AHA AND THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

being
is

There

a plurality of nesciences, granted

the material cause of the world /there

that nescience

XXXV
are bound
to

be a plurality of worlds,

In conserving
to

the authoritativeness of Scripture,

we seem
The
all

have

sacrificed the claims of empirical usage,

which demands
latter
is

a single world
is,

common

to all souls.

demand
is

however, not imperative, since

that

needed

no more than the measure of agreement that exists

among
of

the different spectators of an illusion.

is

When

the rope
people,

seen to be a snake, as
the agreement

it

were, by a number

among them

does not prove

the existence of a single objective snake.

exist
in

What
all of

does

without happens to be interpreted by

them
it

the

same manner

if

the snake existed objectively

it

should not be possible for some people to mistake

a
garland.

for

The

objectivity

of the

world, then,

is

no

more than the consilience

of illusions.

What
Each

happens, then, to the view accepted by the

is

Vedanta that God

jlva

the Creator of the Universe?

to be the creator of his world,
;

would appear

through and out of the nescience abiding in him

the

world

is

sustained

by his nescience, and

is

destroyed

with

its

destruction.

The true
to

creator, sustainer

and

destroyer
If

would thus appear

be the jlva himself.

the world

be considered to be created by a God,

that could be no more than an illusion, on a par with

the
world-illusion
itself.

The

Creator

and

His

Creatorship would both be figments of the creature's

imagination.

The

jiva

is

enthroned on high and

God

apparently reduced to nothing. But such a conclusion

can hardly be consistent with the true trend of advaita.

It
is

true

that

for

this

system even Is'vara

is

not

XXXVI
ultimate;

endow Him

as

we may
still falls

with the utmost

short of perfection,
;

knowledge and power,

since the Perfect
significant
is

He

beyond

all attributes

greatness

is

only in relation to smallness, while the

is

Absolute
relative

neither

great
All

nor small and

this,

is

above
very

predications,

however,
is

is

different from

the position that Is'vara

a figment of
Vacaspati

the

jlva's

nescience.
to

On

the face of

it,

would seem

be more idealistic than Berkeley,

who

conserved the independent reality of

that of other souls.
to

God along with

And

this

is all

the more difficult

comprehend

in the case of Vacaspati,

who

begins

his work with due invocation to Bhava, Kartikeya and

Ganapati, and throughout his work betrays

of the atheism that
is

little

trace

is his

apparent conclusion.
possibility of

There

no doubt, however, that the

an

atheistic

conclusion must have struck

the author of the

many
is

of his critics, as
to

Kalpataru

anxious

make

out

repeatedly that
that they

Vacaspati does recognise Is'vara and

are fools

who say
is

there

is

no place

for

Is'vara in his system.

to

The truth

of the matter seems

It
;

be

this.

Ignorance
it

bi-polar.

is

located
it

somewhere,
content.
Is'vara.

i.e.,

belongs to some one

jlva
is

and

has a
is

Though the

the locus, the content

When
'mine'

ordinarily
1

we

use

the
in

possessive

pronoun

or

'his,

we imply
referred to. "

the person
in the
"

capacity to control
case of ignorance
;

what
I

is

Not so

mean by

my

ignorance
I

the

ignorance that
control.

is

in

me, not the ignorance that

can

The

control of avidya belongs not to

me

with

xxxvu

my
said
is

limited powers of

knowing and

acting, but to the

omniscient and omnipotent Being.

to

Is'vara too
if

may

be

be the aa'raya of ignorance,

its

by as'raya

meant the content, but not

it
it

locus (adhara).

When,

therefore,

is

said

that

my

ignorance creates the

;

universe,

does not follow that I create the universe

it

rather does

mean

that Ts'vara, the content of

is

my
out
the

ignorance, uses the ignorance that

of

in

me and
world
is
;

that

as

material

cause, evolves

the

ignorance in me, the maya, the prakrti

material
the

the primal

cause

he

who

wields

it

for

fashioning
l

world,

the mayin, the arch-juggler,

is

Ts'vara.

At no time then do we have

jlvas

Is'vara without the

or the jlvas without Ts'vara."

Ignorance

is

the
is

condition of the existence of both.

And when
it

there

ignorance,

it

must exist somewhere and

this polarity of

must have
is

a content.

When
itself is

ignorance

resolved,

ignorance
realised.

transcended and Brahmanhood fully

exists,
it

But

when ignorance
is

Ts'vara

is

the

image which
nesciences.

reflected, as

were, in the various

The

reflections are the jlvas.

Vacaspati

does not hold that the jlvas are literally reflections,

1

We

are indebted to

Mah5mah6padhy&ya

Prof. S,

Kuppuswami

S'astriar,

M.A.,

I.E.S.,

for considerable help in understanding this

part of the doctrine. See further on the same topic, MahSmahopadhyaya N. S. Anantakr^na S'Sstri's commentary on the VedftntaparibhZn> first edition, Calcutta, pp. 2-3. Reference may be made
to the Kalpataru, particularly p. 404.

*Cp. "The personal God of India, Is'vara, issues from the Brahman simultaneously with the Stman, the soul, and both appear
together as simultaneous and mutually determined occurrences. It the same in Eckhart's teaching. Only with and for the soul, with and for the creature, is God, God as person, as subject, and as conscious of objects." E. OTTO, Mysticism East and West, p. 14,
is

XXXV111

since

there
in

can be reflection only of what

is

is visible

and

what

visible

and neither Brahman nor

But he has

avidya can be said to possess visible form.

no objection to
sively.

using the analogy of reflection extenof jivas

The

diversities

are compared to the

diversities of

the reflections of one face in different

Vacaspati's

media, such as a gem, a sword, a mirror.

own
is

conception of the relation of the jlva to

Brahman
is

that of fmitisation of the infinite.

;

Ether

infinite

and all-pervasive
as
it

but

it

seems to be confined in a pot

is

were

and when the pot

In the same

moved, though the

pot alone

is it

moved, there seems to be a motion of the

as well.

ether in

way
is

Universal Spirit
the jlva
is
;

defined by the internal organ

etc.,

when
The

the defining adjuncts are got rid of, there

no longer

any

difference
is

between the jiva and Brahman.

;

finitising

bi-polar

at one pole stands Is'vara

It
is

and at
is first

the other the jlva.

reflected as Is'vara

not that

Brahman

and that the jlvas are

or

reflections

of

this

reflection,

that Is'vara
jlvas

is

a reflection in
in

one

medium
1

and

the

reflections

another

medium.
1

an

VScaspati's position in this question of whether the jlva is or a pratibimba is discussed fully by Appayya Diksita in the Parimala, at the close of I, i, 4, where he shows

avaccheda

that Vixaspati favours the avaccheda-vada. Some adyaitins hold that mSyS is different from avidy&s, that the former is collective and single while the latter are diverse, or that in the former the sattva constituent is pure, while in the latter it is impure and they say that Is'vara is the reflection of Brahman in m&y5, while the jlvas are the reflections of Brahman in avidyS. Such a view makes Is'vara very remote and leaves Him little in common with the jivas. For the various views, see the SiddhUntales'asangrafia^ 1st pariccheda, pp, 66-104 (Kurabakonam edition),
;

XXXIX
VIII.

RITUAL AND RELEASE

woes being due to nescience,

Transmigration and
the

its

one way to get

rid of

them

is

knowledge, which

destroys nescience.
all.

But knowledge does not come to The ground must be prepared, the mind cleared
for the reception of the truth.

and the heart made pure

Herein
lies

the use of ritual, the due performance of

which
to

purifies the intellect

and brings about the

is

desire

know.

The

fruit

of action

non-eternal

hence

release can never be attained through ritual.

desire to
in ritual

But the

know can
and

be brought about through engaging

this in

due course
It
is

fulfils itself
little

through

knowledge and

release.

then as

true that
it

karma has nothing

to do

with release as that

It is

can

of itself bring about release.

a remote auxiliary
be duly

(aradupakaraka)

and
1

as

such

requires to

observed in season.

IX.

THE FINAL INTUITION

know has been awakened, one
all

When

the desire to

hears the highest truths from the Vedanta, reflects on

them, reasons about them, refutes

and,

objections to them,

being

finally

satisfied

about

them, begins to
that they teach.

contemplate

the supreme

Brahman

By
for

uninterrupted meditation practised with devotion

a long time, the seeker of Brahman attains Brahman

1

VivaraijakSra holds that rituals are contributory to itself and not merely to the desire to know. See the Siddhantales'asahgraha, 3rd pariccheda, pp. 350-356.

The

knowledge

xl

he obtains, that

is

to

say,
is

an

intuition of the one

all

Supreme Intelligence, that

misery.

beyond

duality and

With
products

that intuition are destroyed nescience

;

and

its

and

spirit stands forth

its

having attained

the release that

was

own

essential nature
it

and only

seemed

to

be non-existent, as

were, like the chain

round one's
looking
cognition
for.
;

own
The

neck,

which one forgets and keeps

is

intuition

an act of immediate
is

for,

ignorance

that

experienced

as

immediate can be removed only by knowledge which

is

also

immediate; otherwise,

it

would be

like

the

case of the fever patient

bitter,

who

continues to find sugar

though
it

told

it

is

not so and

though himself

knowing

is

not

so.

Immediate cognition requires

the functioning of a sense-organ, here the mind, the

organ of internal sense.

is

And

this

mental perception

made

possible only

by long-continued contemplation

(prasankhyana) as in the lover's perception of the longlost

damsel,
is,

whom

he constantly comtemplates.
a delusion
delusive,
is
;

The

latter

of course,

but the intuition of

Brahman cannot be
by Scripture,
mislead
it
;

for

Brahman

is

taught

which

free
is
it

from defect and cannot

ex hypothesi
is

further,

Brahman
;

all

that

is

cannot but exist

and

identical with the jlva

;

whose existence cannot be doubted

possibility of delusion ?
l

whence then the

lt is held by some that immediate cognition may result even from verbal testimony without the functioning of a senseorgan, internal or external, and that the mind in any case is not a sense-organ. This view is mentioned in the notes, together with Amalananda's criticism thereof. The view that verbal

xli

The

final

intuition
;

is

of the conditioned

Brahman,

not of the Absolute

of subject

for
It

there
is

is still

the distinction

and

object.

analogous to the absolute

is

truth

of
it

Bradley,
is

which, he says,

absolute, only

because

intellectually
it is

incorrigible.

Of the
is

final

intuition too

true that nothing further

needed

to

correct

it.

It

destroys

the entire world of duality

it.

and destroys
clearing nut

itself
is

with

When

the powder of the

to precipitate

mixed with muddy water

the mud,

that powder itself does not require another

precipitant.

X,

JIVANMUKTI
stands

When
this

nescience

is

destroyed by knowledge,
is

it

to reason that release

attained straightaway.

And

would seem
that,

to
for

have the approval

of Scripture,

which says
(in

him who has

;

seen, all

karmas

the plural, not in the dual) cease

prftrabdha karma,

that which

has begun to fructify already, does not

seem

to

be exempted from destruction.

When

a person
too.

attains knowledge, he should

become disembodied
so

But the position

For
one
thing,

is

by no means
are

simple as that.
texts

there

Scriptural

which

definitely

prescribe

physical death as the limit after

testimony
of

is not of itself the cause of immediate cognition is part VScaspati's heritage from Man<}ana. For the other view, see the fyasiddhi, p. 122, the VedUntaparibhn$n, pp. 39-41, and the

Siddhantaletfasangraha,
quential discussion as to

how

3rd pariccheda, pp. 396-398 the conseverbal testimony can cause immediate
;

cognition goes on from p. 399 to p. 414.

xlii

which alone there

release

is

release,

or

speak of the final

already been
then, continue

on

death of those
1

who have

released in effect.

Embodiment may,

even after the onset of knowledge.

is

Prarabdha karma
flight
; ;

like

a missile that has begun to take

its

it

will

drop only when

force

is

fully

spent

when

that

happens, the body, which

is

constituted for the enjoyis final

ment

of that

karma, perishes as well, and there

is

release.

But there

no diminution in the knowledge

that has been realised.

And

there

is

this

advantage

in such persons continuing to be embodied, in that they

serve as preceptors.

None who

is

yet short of perfect

;

knowledge can be a preceptor of non-dualism

and

if

he who has attained such knowledge should be

dis-

embodied at the same time, there would be no preceptors at all. The texts which speak of release immediately

on

the

onset

of

knowledge
if

signify

but

the

close

proximity of final release,

release

by such release
its

we mean
the

from prarabdha karma and

product,

present body.

But

it

is

possible

to be released

even

while in the state of embodiment, in the sense that

for such

a person there
;

is

no more knowledge to be

acquired

much

less is

there anything to be done by

him.
of

Such a knower
experience

may

indeed say on the strength

his

that

he

is

released,

though he

continues to appear in the body.

As S'ankara says:

tasya tSvad eva ciram y&van na vimoksye atha sampatsye.

vimuttaa' ca vimucyate.
tasya

'bhidhySn&d

yojanSt

tattva-bh&vSt

bhDyas' c'nte-

xliii

"It

should
is

not be disputed

whether the Brahmanis

knower

embodied

for

time or

not embodied,

How

can one's own intimate experience of Brahmanexisting

J

knowledge

together

with

embodiment be

denied by another?

The
from
is

position
logical

is

attractive
of

but
If

hardly
really
of

clear

the

point
of

view.
or

there

the

persistence

a
the

part

trace
of

avidya,

(and

that

is

what

continuance

prarabdha

karma means), what

of

is

the justification for speaking

that

state

as

one of release? Where nescience

there

continues,

how
to

can
"one's
the

be perfect knowledge?

To
only

appeal
to

own
test

intimate experience*'

is

abandon

of reason, so vigorously

insisted on so long, side by side with the appeal to

Scripture.
fore

The doctrine
itself

of

Jlvan-mukti does not there-

commend
2

to

a logical mind like that of

position
is

Mandana.
i

But

his

own

not very clear.

On

Bhasya on IV,

i,

15.

See the Brahmasiddhi, pp. 129-133. It is possible to make out that Mandaim holds to one consistent view on this question, that there is final release only on the dissolution of the body, that though knowledge is attained and avidya destroyed at an earlier stage we have still an adept alone, not a perfected being, that, in short, there Such an attempt has the merit of simplifying is no Jivan-mukti. Man<Jana's position, while being on the whole faithful to it but it
-'

does not free him from the inconsistency of holding that though Mariana argues that avidya is destroyed its samskSra "persists. " " because of the use of the plural karmani (in kslyante cS 'sya karraSni ") even prarabdha karma should be taken to be destroyed with the onset of knowledge. If that too is destroyed, how can the body persist ? If it be said to persist because of samskara , while satnskira is admitted to be akiftcitkara and to have no power to bind, why then should it be said that the stbita-prajna is only a sadhaka, not a siddha? Either avidya persists, in which case the so-called Ji van-mukta is only a sgdhaka, or it does not persist, in

xliv

the one hand, he would

make

out that release comes

only with physical death, and that the descriptions in

Scripture and traditional lore of those

who have

passed

beyond the gunas or are well established in wisdom

refer to the seeker not the sage,

the devotee not the

perfected one,
to

On

the other hand, however, he seems

of the body continuing for a

admit the

possibility

time even after release, not because of a part of avidya,

but because of the impression (samskara) of avidya,
i.e.,

what

is

left

over of

its

original

momentum.
its

Avidya,

he says, has the power to bind, not so

sion.

bare impres-

He, who knows that the image

in the mirror is

a bare reflection characterised by the defects of the

mirror,

no

longer worries about the defects in the

reflection,

though by the strength of impression he

continues to see the face in that way.

To the question
to

whether the released one continues

be embodied,

Mandana
answers

would
one
it,

thus seem to give two inconsistent

negativing

embodiment

and

another

permitting

but as caused by the impression of nesci-

ence, not by nescience itself.

And
is

to

either position

grave objections

may

be raised.
well established in

The description of him who

]

knowledge
adept
;

(sthitaprajfia)

cannot

apply

to

a mere

for,

the latter

is

still

proceeding from stage to

which case he is a siddha. Mandana seeks to avoid both positions, and the result seems to be neither happy nor consistent but Prof. 8. Kuppuswami Sastriar, the learned editor of the Brahmasiddhi, seems to be of a different opinion.
;

ir

The reference

is

to the description

in the

Bhagavad-Gltft,

II,55-6J,

xlv

stage of contemplation gaining increased

firmness at

every stage

he whose knowledge can thus be surpassed

by himself cannot be said to be well established.

on the other hand,

And

no one in such a state of growth can be a preceptor

of non-dualism,
If,
it

be said that

the preceptor

is

the

man

of perfect knowledge,

who

yet

continues to be embodied, the difference

between us

extends only to the cause of such embodiment and your

explanation
itself
is

no better than mine.

What
is

is

samskara

but a trace of avidya? There

;

no impression

except as produced by some cause

notion of cause and
illusory,
If

and when the whole

effect

has been realised to be

?

how can

there be the persistence of an effect

is

you say the impression

such that

it

cannot bind,

we say
sistence

the same of the trace of nescience whose per-

we

recognise.

We

say that

when

there

is

perfect knowledge, prarabdha karma can only work itself out and not avail to create any fresh karma or

other bondage.

One would seem compelled,

this

therefore, to rest with

unsolved

contradiction

of

the

co-existence

of

bondage and
the
position

release in the Jivan-mukta.

of

And

this is

most

advaitins.

It

is

permissible,

however,

to speculate

on a possible solution of the

is

contradiction.

The

preceptor

he

whom

the pupil

may

legitimately regard as qualified to be such, not

necessarily he

who

proclaims himself to be such.

it

When
be that

such a person attains perfect knowledge,

he, as

may

an individual,
is

is

at that very time released.

For

him

there

neither a trace of ignorance nor the

rivi

impression of ignorance.
ration,

The psycho-physical configuhis body,

however, which was spoken of as

may
still

continue to exist and function for a while, shorter or

longer, according to the extent of the
left in
it.

momentum

The sarpskara

of avidya does exist, but for

It is this configu;

the body, not for the released spirit.

ration which
is

spoken of as alive
;

it is

that which

is

looked up to as the preceptor

of that that
jiva. It

it is

on the dissolution
release

one speaks of the

final

of that

may,

however, be asked

legitimately

how

the

inert

psycho-physical

organism

can

function

in the absence of intelligent guidance. If there is such

guidance,
is

is

it

not provided by the soul whose release

If
it

under

discussion ?

does provide such guid-

ance,

how

can we claim to be out of our original

difficulty as to the co-existence of

bondage and release

The answer we suggest

guidance
;

is

that there
is

may

be intelligent

but the guidance

;

not by the particular

soul, as particular

it

is

by Is'vara with
Is'vara can

whom
for

the

released soul has

become one.

and does
show-

express Himself through all

manner

of

media

ing

His Grace

to

suffering

humanity.

What more
this

natural

than

that

He

should employ

psycho-

physical organism which by due discipline and austerities

has been perfected as far as

it

may
is

be

But with

this

we pass on
If

to the further question as

to the nature of release.

the jiva

a finitisation of

Brahman, with the cessation

of the adjuncts

and of the

process of finitisation, one should

expect the jiva to

become

identical

with Brahman*

And

this

indeed

xhii
seems to be what the Scriptures teach when they say
that he

who knows Brahman becomes Brahman

it

itself.

But

if

is

true that the finitisation

is

is

bi-polar, that

Is'vara at

one pole

related to the jlvas at the other,

as
is

if

they were reflections of Himself, that the reflection

the different nesciences each of which
it

in

is

located

in

a different jlva,
identical
is

seems

difficult

for the jlva to

become
adjunct

with Brahman, when a particular

removed.

When

a face

is

reflected in a

number

of

mirrors, on the removal of a particular

mirror, the reflection therein becomes identical with the

face-as-reflected not with the face-in-itself,

The

latter

identity can come about only when

all

mirrors are
reflec-

removed, when
tion.

there

is

no further possibility of

Similarly the attainment of

Brahmanhood may
is

result only

when
all

all

nesciences are removed, that

to

say,

when

jlvas are released.

Up

to

that time,
1

release can consist only in identification with Is'vara.

Hence

it

is

not impossible that on the release of any

particular jlva, Is'vara with

identical

whom

that jlva has become

may

actuate for a time the psycho-physical

organism which persists for a while because of the

The notion of release as attainment of identity with Is'vara is dealt with at great length by Appayya Diksita in the concluding pages of the Siddhftnt ales' asahgr aha, as well as in the S'iv&dvaitanirnaya, sections, 3*2351 to 3'2355. The attainment of identity with pure Brahman can he only on the final release of all. The notion of sarvamukti (release of all) is not elaborated anywhere by Vacaspati, but he does refer to it in the commentary, on II, iii, 40 It is legitimate to infer that the whole superstructure (p. 617).
1

by Appayya is not untrue to the foundations in VScaspati's That S'ankara himself countenanced such a view is \very plausibly made out by Appayya.
raised

own

teaching.

xlviii

strength of

its

initial

momentum.

But ifavidyahas

ceased to exist for the released soul,

Is'vara ?

how can

it

exist for
is

The reply

is

that our conception of Is'vara

of a pure being standing over

against nescience, not

it,

bound by
controlling

it, it.

but certainly limited by

This nescience
is

while yet

in truth neither real

nor unreal, being indeterminable.

the Lord,

But as we conceive

He

is

certainly limited by nescience, though

when we become
experienced as

the Lord, on release,

it

will not be
ideal thus

a limitation.

The advaitin's
;

conceived cannot breed self-sufficiency

is

for,
is

salvation
attained,

possible for all,

and

till

that consummation
in

the

world-process consisting
of of

the elaboration and

;

manifestation
final

nescience will not cease

all,

till

the

release

therefore,

release
for
all

can at best
his omnisci-

be identity ence and

with

God,

who,
is

omnipotence,

yol limited.

Nor

is

the

identification with Is'vara the same as the attainment

of lordly powers said to be possible by the contemplation

of

Brahman

in

one or other of the saguna forms.

The

latter leads not to absolute lordship but only to the

ability

to

create
in

what

is

required for one's

is

own

enjoyment
nescience,

heaven.

There

no destruction of
lordly

and

consequently

the

powers so

acquired
to

may

be exhausted by exercise, so that a return

the original unlordly condition becomes possible.

He who
fully

has realised non-duality, however,

identical with Is'vara.

becomes
has not

and wholly

He

only the power to create but also the responsibility to

rule

and the duty

to

destroy.

For him there

is

no

xlix

more Nescience; hence the declaration

to saipsftra.

of non-return

The thoughtful student of Vacaspati may, perhaps,

find little that is original in him.

For the distinctive

aspects of his teaching, he

said,

owes much, as has been

differs

to

Maij4ana.
to

Where he
have

from

Havana,

he

elects
1

follow
there

S'ankara, not, perhaps always

wisely.

But

been

very few to excel

or rival

Vacaspati in the versatility and the extent

vigour of style and clarity of

of his scholarship, his

presentation.

able
little

to

The thoughts that so far we have been trace to Maijdana would have remained
for Vacaspati's linking

known and barren but

advaita doctrines,

them up with S'ankara's teaching.

About Maijdana's

own
in

there has been as

much unand

certainty

and

speculation as about his personality,

spite of scraps of information vouchsafed here

in

there
If

the course of commentaries on othar works.

publication
of

the

the Brahmasiddhi makes us

realise Vacaspati's indebtedness to

Maij4ana,

it

makes

no

less

clear our

own

indebtedness to Vacaspati for

popularising

and

keeping alive such a unique line

of non-dualist doctrine.

For example, in the criticism of sphota-vada. On this iubject " on Vtospati's criticism of the sphota-vada," Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, VI, p. 311.
1

Bee article

For the study of the Bhamati in the one of the editors

first

instance

Mr.

S.

S.

Suryanarayana Sastri
the

had the able guidance of Vedanta Vis'arada Pan4it

K. A.

Lakshmana
;

Sastri

of

Sanskrit

College,

Mylapore

the same scholar

was

of considerable help
;

in going through the

and the
full

editors'

Kalpataru and the Rjuprakatfika grateful thanks are due to him in

measure,

For the book as a whole both the editors

;

are

responsible

but the
first

translation

of the

Bk&sya
Raja,

was done
1

in the

instance by Dr,

Kunhan

while the rest was primarily the work of the other

editor.

Both

in manuscript

and

in

proof the book

has had the advantage of suggestions and criticisms

from several scholars, particularly, Mahamahopadhyaya

Vidyavacaspati
Dars'anakalanidhi
of

Kulapati
;

S.

the Presidency College puswami Sastri we owe a great debt for the kind permission the

Kupto him
to

use

Brahmwddhi
to free
;

in

proof and

for

the

trouble

he

took
as

the translation

from inaccuracies as far

also

possible

our thanks are

due to Professor

K. A. Nilakanta Sastri of the University of Madras,

and Professors
the
to
to

P.

Narasimham and

P. P. S. Sastri of

Presidency College, Madras.

Sir
S.

To these as well as
so

Radhakrishnan, who has been contribute a Foreword, we take this

expressing
is

good as

opportunity

of

our

deep

sense

of

gratitude.
;

The

Bhdmatl
tion for

admittedly a
first

difficult

work

and a transla-

the

time

is

almost necessarily tentative

For the, text, the Vani Vilas edition of the Catussatri Bhamati has been followed for the most part.
1

H
and
imperfect;
despite reasonable

care in

the

first

instance,

we have had

to introduce several alterations

and additional explanatory

tion
is

notes.

The

readers' atten-

requested to these in

making use

of the text

and

translation.

We

are

thankful
for

to the

Theosophical

Publishing House, Adyar,

tion,

undertaking the publica-

and

to

the Vasanta Press for finishing the

work

so

well

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS

[N.B. The
rest to the

summary
;

in italics relates to the Bhtyya,

and the

Bhnmatt the

arabic numerals in brackets give the pages,].

A. SUPERIMPOSITION
Existence of Superimposition
(2)
;

I.

(1).
:

Invocation
already
of the
first

Objections to the study

;

content

known
first

(3)

unfruitfulness

(4)

interpretation
;

section of the
:

Bhasya

(5)
is

reply to the

objection

true nature of the self

not

known

(7)

scriptural declarations of the true nature of the self are

purportful,

not secondary or figurative

to

(8)

it is

valid

though opposed
of the latter
is

perception, since empirical validity

(8)
;

not annulled
for

priority of perception

not a ground
(9)
;

nonsublation

the apaccheda-nyaya
is

empirical cognition
"
self

of the self

untrue

(9)
;

the

word

"
is

used not secondarily of the body

;

conto

ditions

of secondary usage (10)

self -identity

known
; '

the inquirer, not to the

is

man

in the street (11)

;

the self
illusory

not finite like the body (11)

the concept
;

'

even

for the vijftana-vadin (12)

it is

due to reciprocal
;

super-imposition of substrates and of attributes (13)

illusory
fruit

cognition
;

is

its

cause and empirical usage

as

its

(13)

non-discrimination
(14);

the cause of illusory

there

cognition
realities
;

objection

that

are not two

"

reply

^ coupling

the true with the untrue

liv

(14)

beginninglessness of super-imposition (15)

if

objecif not,

tion

bodies

etc.,

are manifest they are real

;

there can be no coupling (15)

II.

reply

(16).

Definition of Superimposition (16).

;

Explanation of the definition (17)

neither too wide (17)
;

the definition
;

is

nor too narrow(18)

explanation

of the superimpositions of yellow shell, the reflected face

(18)
;

manifestation alone does not constitute reality (19)

(19)
;

even of the unreal there can be manifestation

the
of

Mlm&nsaka view
existence

of

non-existence as another
of the Buddhist

mode

and the

criticism

view that
;

cognitions cause' the appearance of the unreal (20)

cognition can neither be determined by nor invariably

linked
(21, 22)

with the unreal

;

(21)

reply to the
like

Mtmamsakas

the superimposed
;

is

what was formerly

;

seen (22)
purity

but really

it

is

indeterminable (23)
self

the
;

etc.,

and reality of the intelligent

:

(23)

different views of superimposition criticism

atmakhyati
;

(23, 24)

of

above by akhyativadin (25)

is

his criticism
;

of the

view that the superimposed

all

created (25, 26)

;

his view that

is

cognitions are valid (26)

that delusion

but non-apprehension of the distinction between the

directly apprehended

and the remembered

his

(26, 27)

the

anyathakhyativadin
30)
;

criticism

of akhyati (28, 29,

;

his

view of super-imposition (30 f 31, 32)

indeter-

minability recognised in all the definitions (32).

III.

Possibility

of Superimposition on the inner

ad/ (S3). The saipvid-bhamatt (34-37);

manifestation of the self (34)
;

difficulties

in

the

view that consciousness

Iv

is

self-manifest,
;

the

self

being

merely

its
;

locus

(34, 35)

refutations of the above (35, 36, 37)

light is

one, determinate, identical with the self

and objects are

superimposed thereon (37, 38)

tion on the self

difficulty of superimposi-

which
not

is

a non-object
(39)
etc.

(38, 39)
;

reply

non-objectness

invariable

appearance of
to

agency,

enjoyership, objectness
;

due

defining

adjuncts (40)

ananda, nityatva
(40)
;

etc.,

not really different

from

caitanya
;

Jlvatva as

idam-anidam-rapa
;

(40, 41)

immediacy
of

of realisation of the inner self (42)

possibility

superimposition

even on what

is

not

manifest
IV.

a praudhi-vada (42, 43).

Nature of Superimposition
(43)
it
;

(43, 44).
all evil (44)
;

Called Nescience

the cause of
;

means

of

removing
(46.)

(45)

impossibility

of

its

recurrence

V.

Means of

valid knowledge
(47).

have reference to

one characterised by Nescience

Means
there
(48);
is

of

valid
of

knowledge function only when

self

conceit

in

the

body,
there

senses

etc.

without

their

functioning
(48, 49);
;

would

be

no

empirical

usage
(49)

they cannot function

is

without

control

control

not possible

except
is

by

body

on
;

which
the
is

the

nature of the self

superimposed (49)

unattached

self, in the absence

;

of supeiunposition,

not a knower (50)

where there

is

no knowership, the means of valid knowledge do not

function (50).

VI.
etc.

Resemblance

of

learned

persons

to

beasts

(51, 52).

hi
VII.

Sacred teaching (other than the Ved&nta) relates

to one characterised by Nescience (53, 54).-

Activity
the
self's

prescribed

in

sacred teaching requires

its

relation to

another world, not

cycle
(54)
;

freedom

from

the

migratory

these

teachings

function before the realisation of the self as taught in the

Vedanta (55) the karma-kanda and the Vedanta

;

relate to

different spheres

analogy of the s'yena

sacrifice (55).
(56, 57).

VIII.

Nature of Superimposition repeated

of
attributes

Superimposition

exemplified
(58).

(57)

Huperimposition of substrate exemplified

IX.
is the

Removal of

this

beginningless

cause of evil

purport of the entire Vedanta

(59, 60).
;

Etymology

of s'arlraka-mlmamsa (61)
(61, 62)
;

summary
view

of

prima facie view

summary

of final

(62).

B.

DESIRE TO

KNOW
"

I,
11

First

aphorism
"

stated
"

(63);

atha" means
"

ftnantarya" not
"

adhikclra

(64),

nor

auspicious-

ness

(65)

what

is it that

goes before? (65).

free

Brahman-knowledge,
supreme benefit
Nescience
(63)
;
;

from doubt,

is

the one

(63)

seems to be unattained because of

of

illustration

necklace round one's neck

;

doubt implied as cause of the inquiry (64)

;

primacy
"

of the aphorism justified (64)

s'astra

etymology
of the

of mlmaipsa,

and sutra

"

(64)

primacy

desire to

know

(65, 66);

"jijfiasa" distinguished

from "mlmaipsa"
"

(66)

auspiciousness effected
;

by
"

atha

"

only
to

when

used in another sense (68)

reference

what has

Ivii

gone before
"

"

does not differ in effect from

:

"

immediate

succession

(68, 69)

correct

view

there

is
is

dependence
a statement

on what goes before, only where there

of alternative views (69).
II.

Succession not to knowledge of ritual

(70)

no sequence intended nor a relationship of Sesa and

S'esin or of Adhikrtfl, 'dhikclra (71).

Ritual

not subsidiary
sentence (71)
reflection
;

to

apprehension

of

the

sense of the

Brahman -intuition
and
contemplation

results (72)
;

from

hearing,
etc.

sacrifices

are of service to that

impurities

contemplation
beatitude or

by

destroying

opposed

to

by purifying the person or because of the discharge

of

the

three

obligations
too

(73)

the

rites

may
view
:

subserve
(74)
;

contemplation
of
is

by

samyoga-prthaktva

refutation

the

above prima facie

Brahman-intuition
or

not a product or a modification

(75,

an
;

attainment

76)
is

or

something purified

(76, 77)
is

Brahman-intuition

not itself Brahman, nor

free

from adjuncts

itself
;

the last adjunct on the

brink of destruction (78)

idea, because of the

not invalid like an imagined

immediate experience of the jlva

intuition
effected

from

the

first

(79);

by

the

antalikarana

aided

by

the

impression consequent
;

on the repetition of the Vedanta Texts between contemplation and ritual (79).

no co-presence

Objection: in spite of knowledge, impressions of

Nescience

persist;
;

example
ritual

of

the

bilious

person

spitting out sugar

needed to root out these

task,

impressions

they

may

succeed in the

though

Iviii

themselves

part

of

Nescience; example of certain

(80).

poisons, the clearing nut etc.

Reply: impressions

of

Nescience

may

continue,
;

but the enlightened one has no faith in ritual

he

who
;

has no faith
ritual

is

not eligible to

engage

in ritual (81)

performed by ineligible persons has no fruit

for

(81),

and not required

contemplation
too

(82).

Objection: prohibitions

would not apply

to

the vidvan, and there would be transgressions of the

moral law

(82).
:

Reply
Nescience,
faith
(82)
;

Even the jivanmukta has

though
he has no faith
for

slight traces of
in

rituals

but

is

required only

doing, not

for

refraining
;

there can be no transgression of prohibitions (83)

ritual

not required even in the origination of con;

templation (83)

rites

are remote auxiliaries (83),

as

generating the desire to

know
;

(84).

Tapas explained

as eating in moderation (84)

obligatory rites purify

(84).

by

destroying sin already incurred

unjustifiable,

Samyoga(85).

prthaktva

because

of

prolixity

Stages in the functioning of ritual towards the desire

to

know

(85).

Ritual unnecessary
resulted (86).

where non-attachtext does

ment has already

The Jabala

not intend to declare the presence of a rule of succession

Both Scripture and codes intend but an emphasis on non-attachment (88). Nor is sequence established
(87).

by patha, sthana, mukhya

is

or

pravrtti, because there

(88)
;

no relationship of subsidiary and principal

nor

is

there the eligibility of a person already eligible for

else (89).

something

lix

III.

Difference between the >two

"

Desires to know

"

in respect

of content and fruit

(90), in

the dependence

or non-dependence of the content on observances (90), in

the
the

existence
related

or non-existence of their contents (91), in

texts

prompting

to

activity

or

merely

instructing (91).

Etymology
apparent
directing
it

of

visaya
"

(92)

in

spite

of
is

the

injunction
to

atma
in

jftatavyalj,"

there

no

activity

respect
;

of

Brahman,

since

cannot be produced (93)

nor in respect of contem-

plation or knowledge from verbal testimony, since neither

is

aprapta so as to call for a scriptural injunction

IV.

(93).

The Preliminaries stated

(94).

Discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, not

of the nature of certitude (95), nor of the nature of doubt,

but the apprehension of difference between substrates in

general, as also between their attributes, as eternal

and

non-eternal
(96)
;

(95); absolute

denial of truth impossible

non-attachment and
etc.

how

it

arises (96)

s'ama,

dama

explained

(97).

V.
all

"

"

Explanation of
that

therefore

perishability of
hereafter,

enjoyment, even

acquired for the

while Brahman-knowledge bears permanent fruit (98).

Possibility

of

non-attachment

questioned; pain
;

should be remedied, not pleasure avoided (99)

scriptural

declaration of the imperishability of heavenly pleasures

sublates

inference of perishability

(99)

reply

pain

cannot be remedied because of the defects of dependence on external means and diminution persisting in
all

produced happiness (100)

diminution

etc.

evidenced by

k
Scripture too
in

addition to inference

hence texts
;

to

the contrary have a secondary sense (100)

Brahman-

knowledge the supreme human goal

(100).

VI
mean

"

compound with the sense of object

caste etc. (101).

Brahma-jijftfisd," explained as a sixth caseBrahman does not

;

Refutation of the fourth case compound (101, 102)

Brahman

is

that which
"

will be

defined
"

later (102)

refutation of

the residuary sense

of the sixth case

(102, 103), because

knowledge requires an object and

Brahman
VII.
(104),

is

that object (103).

refutation

Further

of the residuary sense

The
views

objection

and

the

reply

imply concealed

(104).

VIII.

Farther
:

defence

of the residuary sense

involves
it

refutation

acceptance

of

the principal

the
;

acceptance
Scriptural

of

everything

dependent

on

(105)

support for Brahman

of

being the object (106)

;

explanation

"jijMscl" (106)
is

Brahman-knowledge

exterminates Nescience and

hence the

human goal

(106).

Both objector and respondent come out with their

real views (105)
is
;

knowledge culminating
;

in realisation
is

the object of desire (107)

Brahman-realisation

the

human

goal,

though

it is

incapable of generation,
(107,
is

modification,

purification, or attainment
is

108);

hence

its

knowledge

sought (108) and this

possible

only with the help of the inquiry into Brahman (109).

IX.
whether

Objection: impossibility

of desire to know,
or

Brahman

be

known

unknown

(109),

hi
Reply
:

Brahman

does exist and

is

well

known as

the

self (110).

Existence of a general understanding of

Brahman
attributes
;

even
of

prior

to

the

enquiry

(111);

the

Brahman
fails

(111, 112);
to

etymology of Brahman (112)

his

no one
self is

cognise
(113),
:

own

self

(113)

and the

Brahman

X.

Objection

being
;

known. Brahman need not be

:

inquired into (114)

distinctive

reply

conflicting

views about

its
;

nature

several such views stated (114, 115)

necessity for inquiry into

Vedanta aided by reasoning

not inconsistent therewith (115),

Conflicting views must

have a common
"

basis (115)

such views about the denotation of the "thou" (116)

similar
(116) (117)
;

views about the denotation of

directly stated (117)
;

that

"

indicated

and

the basis of such views

need for inquiry (118)

place of reasoning (118).

C.

DEFINITION

I,

Definition

of

Brahman
"

stated (119)

explana;

tion

and

"

tion of
the

justification of janm&di" (120, 121) explana" " " in this for this (121, 122) complement
;

of

aphorism

(122).
:

Objection

No definition is possible since no pramana

;

applies (119, 120)

possible

reply

tatastha-lak?ana stated as
for

(120)

justification

treating

Brahman
;

as

the cause, not the pradhana

intelligence
(123).
(122),

etc.

(121, 122)

need for

and omniscience and omnipotence

Ixii

II.

Justification for

considering only the three]

viz.,

origination, sustentation and destruction (124). " " Other modifications of being mentioned (124), and
to

shown

be included in the three (125)

the mention

of these three alone brings to

about creation

etc. (125)

else

mind the appropriate S'ruti would be brought to mind

first

the Nirukta which does not teach the

III.

cause (125).
ruled out

Pradh&na, primal atoms, chance

etc.

etc.

(126)

origination

used by some as grounds for

inferring the

Lord

(126).

IV.

Present aphorism not intended to set forth an

inference (127), the purpose of these aphorisms being

to

inquire

into

and

string

together

Ved&nta texts
by

(127),

Brahman-realisation

being

possible

such

inquiry alone (128), inference serving only to confirm

the sense of the texts (128). " " manana Explanation of

and

"

"

yukti

(128).

V.
etc.

Scripture not the sole authority, but experience

too,

where

applicable

(129),

since

Brahman-

knowledge
to

culminates in experience (129), and relates

(130)
in
;

an

existent

not a kcirya which allows of

option' (130),

and

respect

of which
"
;

prescriptions

and prohibitions are purportful (130) a

on the human

thing" admits
it

of no options (131); hence knowledge of

intellect

depends not
itself

(131),

but

on the thing

for validity (131).

Reconciliation
prescriptions
etc.

where
(132);

there

is

conflict

between
do
not

doubt

and

error

introduce option into things, not being dependent on

their nature (133).

Ixiii

VI,
ledge

The existent
the

is

open to other means of know*

besides

Ved&nta; contingent non-authorita(134); reply:

tiveness of the latter

Brahman

not a

content of the senses (134); the aphorism

tion etc.

of origina-

intended not to
exhibit

suggest an inference (135),

;

but

to

Vedanta texts (135)

the definitive text

among

these

(136).

Objection:
inferential
of

Vedantas
(134)
;

would be restatements of
the inner self not an object

knowledge
;

the senses (135)

(135)
;

applicable

sam^nyato drsta inference not Brahman's vivarto-'padanatva ex-

plained (136).

D.

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE

I.

Source of Scripture necessarily an omniscient

;

being (137) author necessarily

knows more than the content

omniscient (138),
(138)
all
;

of the work, and Scripture

itself is

How Rgveda
are like
expressible

etc.,

are S'astras
;

how

they
is

the omniscient one (139)

not
;

knowledge
effortlessness

"

"

though

possessed

(140)

applied to creation signifies slightness, not absence, of

effort

(140)

words and sentences non-eternal (140,

is

141)

hence creation of these by the Lord

has no absolute liberty (141, 142)

possible

though He

essential
;

nature of the Vedas identical in every creation (142)

single authorship

not inconsistent with faith in the

work

(142).

II.

Alternative

interpretation
(143).

Scripture

is

the

pramana

for

Brahman

Possible

doubt

that

Ixiv

inference is suggested by the second aphorism is removed

by the present aphorism (144),

E.

HARMONY
evidenced
;

I.

Brahman
is

not

by

Scripture whose
or

purport
subsidiary

ritual
to

(145)

Brahman-texts futile

injunction
etc.

of rituals or injunction of
;

contemplation

(146, 148)

the

existent

is

in the
relation

sphere of other pramftnas

to
it

and hence Sruti in

(147)
;

is

non-authoritative
in

arthav&da

passages

find

purport
;

syntactical

unity

with injunctions

(14?)

statement of the final view (148),

Contingent non-authoritativeness for the Vedantas,

because of failure of non-dependence (145)
be
neither
;

they can
(146)
;

non-authoritative

nor

unfruitful

they teach the agent, deity contemplation

of
etc.

etc. of ritual or prescribe

(146)

no injunction

possible,

even

an originative nature, in the case of the existent

;

(147)

content of the injunction

procedure,
the
eligibility

is

a becoming (147)
etc.,

application,

are

present

even

in

originative

injunction,
"

though
"

un-

intended (148).
"

II.

Explanation of
;

but

and

"

harmony

in the

aphorism (149, 150)

agent, deity,
etc.

purport of the texts not to teach

;

(150)

Brahman, though
etc.

existent,

is

not

the

content

of perception
the
self to

(150)

oneness of
8d,stra

Brahman
alone (154)

and
;

be

known through

Sastra not futile because of the absence of

what

is

to be rejected or accepted (154); even

from

the

Ixv
realisation

of Brahman results the attainment of the

;

human

goal (154)

teaching of
;

Brahman
all

not subsidiary
is

to contemplation (155)

for then

duality

quashed

(155)

and

there can be

no resurrection thereof

(155).

Upakrama and upasamhara as determinative

the sense of texts
(150)
;

of

illustration

from the texts

about

the

upairis'u

sacrifice

(150)

Brahman

thus
;

settled to be the purport of the

Vedantas (150, 151)

non-authoritativeness cannot be as referring to existent

things (152)
(152)
;

or as dependent on

the

human
not
;

intellect

objection: a

human
what

origin

may

be inferred for the

if

Vedas, as referring to existents

refer exclusively
to
is

(152),

they
if

to

be done (152)

reply:

by karya the implied apOrva is meant, apauru^eyatva would result even for injunctions to worship a
Buddhist Caitya (153)
seen, it
;

if

for the latter

human

origin
;

is

may

be inferred for the Vedantas (153)

is

from

Brahman-realisation there

direct attainment of the

human

goal (155)

two
:

varieties of the attained

it

and

the abandoned (155)

the attained, as
(156).
to

were and the

abandoned, as
Ill,

it

were

Veda

relating

the

self is

authoritative
is

independently
itself fruitful

of injunctions, since self-knowledge

(158)
;

of

authoritativeness

not

established

through inference (159).

Difference of Vedantas from arthavadas like
"

he

howled" (158);
dependent
on

authoritativeness

of

the

Vedanta

generating

indubitable knowledge of
(159)
;

what

is

not already
is

known

it is

intrinsic (159)

hence no example

necessary (160).

Ixvi

IV.
object
fire

Objection:

Brahman intimated
;

only as the

of contemplation (160)
(163)
;
;

analogy of the Qhavanlya

the
fruit

etc.

pravrtti or nivrtti

of the
;

Rftstra (163)

authority to support this position (164)

knowledge of Brahman enjoined for him who desires

immortality (165),

Brahman
thereto
is

not the purport as the relation of words

not

known

(160)

it is

neither to be rejected

nor accepted and hence cannot be declared by a prudent

man
(161)

(160)

words have

for purport

what

is to

be done

and not an existent (161); that a word has a

certain sense has to be

known by

inferring the cognition

of that sense in another

his

who

hears the word, through

;

pravrtti

or nivrtti as probans (161)

pravrtti
;

and

nivrtti characteristic of sacred teaching (161)

transmiof

gration
"

does not cease with

"

knowing the sense

That thou art

(162)

from hearing, one does not

attain the

human

goal, as reflection and contemplation

;

are also prescribed (162)

of the self, as subsidiary to of existence

(163)
;

contemplation, there

is

certitude

contemplation cannot be of the superimposed, as

it

would not be of the

contemplation of

self (163)
is

the person eligible for

ratri-

Brahman

understood on the

satra-nyaya (165).
V.
Objection (contd.)
:

though the objects of the two

enquiries are different, only as occasioned by an injunction of contemplation is there the quest of Brahman (166)
futility of texts not relating to
;
;

an injunction (167) no
9

resemblance

to

"this
etc.\

is

rope> not a

snake,'

as

happiness, misery

continue even for him

who has

Ixvii

heard

(168)

reflection

and contemplation

are

also

enjoined (168).

The
object

intuition (daitfana) of the self cannot be the

of

an injunction

(166,

167)

dra^avyak

etc.

are not real injunctions (167).

VI.

Reply

ritual

and Brahman

differ in respect
;

of their knowledge and fruit (169, 170)

gradations of
;

happiness consequent on performance of ritual (170, 171)

;

gradations of misery (172) final release not the fruit of

religious duty (173), being natural and eternal (173).

Fruit of Religious Duty surpassable and destructible (169)

;

oneness of jlva and

Brahman
which

is

eternal and

unproduced (170); removal of Nescience occurs even

with
the
rise

of knowledge,

results natural-

ly for the

mind aided by the impressions

(170);
of

of reflection

and

contemplation

no apflrva needed (170);

musical notes (171); no
as the latter
;

analogy of apprehension

injunction needed for contemplation,

is

even otherwise known to result in intuition (171)

niyama-'purva, as in pounding the paddy (171)
texts
;

nor a

hence

about

contemplation

etc,

are only apparent

injunctions (172).

VII.

Two

kinds of eternality (174)

non-embodi-

ment
kftrya,

is

immutably eternal (174);

if subsidiary to a

Brahman

would

be non-eternal,

as also final

release (175).

Evolving eternality not absolute (174); view of

whole and part as different yet non-different (175, 176)

non -difference
effect-aspect
in

the causal aspect, difference in the

(176,

(176); criticism

177,

178); either

Ixviii

difference or non-difference should be assumptive (179)

grounds for holding difference to be assumptive (179).

VIII.
diately

Sruti shows final release to follow imme(180),

on Brahman-knowledge

and excludes any;

thing else to be done in between (181)

support from the

Preceptor Aksapftda (182).

Knowledge instrumental
two-fold

to release only as removing

Nescience (180); definition of acarya (181);

explanation of the
IX,
self not

Nyaya aphorism
of the unity

(182).

Knowledge

of Brahman and the

an imagined
is

identification,

nor a superimposition,

nor what

due
;

to association with a distinctive

mode of

activity (184)

nor a purification (186)

etc.

objections to its

being sampat

(186)

Brahman-knowledge dependent

on the

object, not on the activity of the

man

(187)

no

room for

activity to enter, not even through

Brahman

being the object of the

knowing or contemplating activity

;

(187); Scripture cited (187, 188)

purport of

S'tistra to

remove difference posited by Nescience (188), not to give

demonstrative knowledge of

Brahman
etc.

(188)

removal of

differences of cogniser, cognised

(189); no fear of

non-eternality of release (189).

Sampat and adhyasa explained and distinguished (183, 184); association with a distinctive mode of activity explained (184, 185)
;

in all three, self

is

subsidiary

and contemplation

is

the principal (185); purification

explained (185); refutation of the above possibilities:

texts

about the self are

anarabhya-'dhlta (186); no
rites,

non-inconstant connection with

as for the ladle

made

of parna

wood

(187);

Brahman not

the object of

Ixix

the cognising activity (187)

strative

words cannot give demonless of

knowledge even of worldly things, much

the transcendent (188),

X,

Non-eternality of release, if

it

be a product

or a modification (190).

XL
already

If

of

the

nature of oneself,
if

Brahman

is

attained:

even

not

so,

the

all-pervasive

Brahman
activity

cannot be

attained:

hence

no

room for

(191).

XII.
excellence

Brahman

being eternally perfect and pure, no

it

may

be added to

or defect removed there"

purified

from; hence
activity (192),

release is not the

and needs no

XIII.

Eelease is not manifested through purifica;

tory acts, as the self cannot be the locus of an act (193)

otherwise

its

non-eternality would result (194).

;

Nescience located in the jiva

hence Brahman

is it

certainly eternally pure (194); assuming impurity,

cannot be purified by an act inherent in another, while

no act can inhere in

it
:

(194).

XIV.
the

Objection

acts inhering in the body purify

self (195);

reply:

what

is

purified is the self as

associated with the body (195, 196, 197); purification is

of thai alone which

valid

is

made

the content of empirically

pramaqa (196). XV. No other channel for

means
(198).
:

activity (198)

knowledge

the one

XVI.

Objection

knowledge

is

an act of the mind

(198); reply: no; nature of act explained (198, 199);

and distinguished from

that of knowledge

(200,

201).

Ixx

Acts like contemplation not established prior to an

injunction

(200); but

knowledge

of

Brahman

results
;

from texts for those

who can
it

understand them (200)

injunction not purportful, as

effected

cannot be effected or not

or

effected

in

different
in

way

(200,

201);

contemplation

and

culmination

experience

not

enjoined as they are well

known even

in the absence of

the injunction (201).

XVII.

Imperatives found in Scripture about the

;

self have not the enjoined for content (202)

but they turn

one away from the objects of natural activity (202, 203).

XVIII.

With Brahman-realisation
;

there is destruc-

tion of all obligations (205)

Brahman

not subsidiary to

an injunction of contemplation (205). XIX. The self is understood from

the

Upanisads

alone, does not transmigrate, is of the nature of Brahman

and occurs in a topic of

non-existent nor

his

own ;

this self is neither

unknown

((206).

Purportfulness and s'astratva

established

for the
;

Vedanta, even as teaching the existent (206)

are apprehended
(207)
;

words

in experience

in relation to existents
is

because usage with such purport

seen and

it is

possible

to infer cognition of the existent in

;

him who
;

understands the word (207)

description of Sumeru (207)

an onlooker ignorant

of

the

language, but knowing

the cause of the father's happiness infers in the father

the cognition of his son's birth as produced by the

messenger's words (208)
;

usage of words in relation to

because of fruitfulness (208)
;

the existent

is intelligible

inference as to the Vedantas having the existent for

Ixxi

content (209)

etymology of Upani$ad (209) grounds for

;

the self not being subsidiary to

what

is

to be

done (209,

210)

how Brahman can be

signified by the Vedanta,

;

through elimination of defining conditions (210)

possibility of

im-

removing that which gets so defined

self is

(211).

XX.

The

the witness of the denotation of

the

"/"

(211):

not

known through
;

vidhi-kaqda or

through reasoning (211)

it

impossibility of refuting or of
:

an injunction (212) imperishability, subordinating eternal purity, intelligence and freedom of the self(%lZ )
to
it

is

what

is

principally

revealed

in

the

Upanisads

(212).

All others except the self, being indeterminable

and

unstable perish
all these (214)
;

but not the

self,

the material cause of

(215).

it is

immutably eternal

XXI.

Purport is declared to be ritual only in the

;

case of prescriptions and prohibitions (215)

the existent
;

taught by Scripture cannot be other than existent (215)

even what
is

for the sake of an act is not itself an act,

;

but a thing (216)

(216)
;

the self

may

be taught in the

same way

such teaching purposeful as leading to cessation

of transmigration (216).
Purport
of

words
;

is

not only karya or what

is it

subserves karya (217)

nor

the sense of each word

independently (217);
evitable

teaching of

word-sense an inis

intermediary to sentence-sense, which

(218);

the

purport

conjunction
is to

with

other
;

word-senses

needed, not with what

be done (218) even state-

ments related

to the activity of being signify not that

activity but only a relation (219).

Ixxii

XXII.

Prohibitions relate to desisting

from an

act

and

that is not

an

act (224)

the negation does not signify

anything other than indifference consisting in desisting

from what

is

established by one's

own nature

(224)

in-

difference is caused by non-existence

negative particle,
fire

and

it

subsides of its

made known by the own accord, like

what

without fuel (225).

Prohibitions do not have for purport
is to

he

done (220)
tion,

for

karya depends on the existence of

voli-

and

volition on its determinant,

;

and the determi-

nant must be a doing (220)

related
to

substance and quality are

the

karya

only

through
fall

doing (221);

when
tion,

substance and

quality

within the injuncthe

they do so as complements to

doing (221)

connection of material and deity is not the content " of prescription in there is that cigneya etc.," (222)
;

even

in
is

"make

pot,"
is

the substantive

is

only

what
tions

desired, not what

enjoined (222)

if

prohibito be

had karya

for purport, exclusion

would have

understood in

all

cases, as in the Prajapati-vrata,

and

the other function of negation would have to be aban-

doned (223)
nor
is

cessation

is

not itself

what is

to

done (224)
;

voluntary effort to desist prescribed (226) what

is

is

prohibited
is is

cognised as instrumental to
its

evil,

and

this

the cognition of

non-existence (226)

this cognition
;

the cause of the perpetuation of indifference (227)

the imperative suffix restates

what
its

is

established even

otherwise by passion and shows

evil

instrumentality to

(228)

and

this cognition dies out of itself like fire

;

whose

fuel

has been consumed (229)

the

Mlmaipsaka

Ixxiii

declaration of futility applies only to such narratives

etc.,

as do not subserve the

human

goal (230).

XXIII.
table

Statements about the existent are profitransmigratoriness does not exist as before
;

(230)

for him who has realised Brahman (230, 231)

tion

illustra-

from

the wealthy

man and
is

the

man

with ear-rings

(231, 232); embodiment

due

to illusory knowledge,
;

while non-embodiment is eternal (233)

embodiment not

caused

by

merit
;

dependence (233)

and demerit, because of reciprocal because the self is not an agent, not
etc. (234).

even indirectly like kings

Brahman-intuition

compared

to

the intuition of

musical notes by the mind purified through the hearing

and practice of music

of the entire universe

(232)

it

removes the presentation

therewith (232).

and

itself

XXI\r

Conceit of self in the body is illusory, not

secondary (235); for secondary usage depends on the

prior apprehension of difference (236); the concept"
is

I"

applied

to

the body

etc.

non- figuratively, through

non-discrimination, even
illusory (237)
;

by learned

men

(237)

hence

consequently when this illusion is removed

is

by true knowledge there

jlvanmukti (238)
;

support

from Sruti and Smrti (238)

before for

no transmigratoriness as

him who has

realised (238).

Some unseen cause needed to explain superimposition since valid perception or doubt

would be appropriate

otherwise (237),

XXV.
of reflection
the

Brahman

is

not subsidiary to injunctions

these too are for
is the

and contemplation, since

;

sake of realisation (239)

Scripture

pram&'qa

Ixxiv
the texts, not because far Brahman, because of harmony of

of Brahman being the content of an injunction (240)

hence the commencement of a new Sftstra
but not if its purport were
(241 ); all "
is justified (240)

means
(242)

to contemplate " of valid knowledge terminate in I am

an injunction

Brahman
tative

they are contentless

and non-authori;

on the realisation of the non-dual Brahman (242)

support from the verses of a Brahman-knower (242).

No
their

prescription of
in

manana and nididhyasana,

intuition
is

since

culmination

established
;

by cothey are
rites,

presence and co-absence in experience (239)

not principal rites (239); nor are they subsidiary

like purification, since the self is neither used nor to be

used anywhere (240), and, as propounded in the Upani^ads,

is

opposed to the observance of rites (240)

one-

ness of the self and

Brahman

not merely different from

but opposed to Religious Duty (241); non-authoritativeness follows at that stage for
all

pramftnas (242)

expla-

nation of the verses of the Brahman-knower (242);

explanation of the secondary and illusory selves (243)

dependence of loka-yatrti and even enlightenment on

these conceits (243); knowership
to self-realisation
etc., possible

only prior
is

(243)

the self to be realised

;

not

other than the knower (244)

rise

the non-valid yet gives

to absolutely

real
;

experience,

up

to the ascertainis
is

ment
real
is

of the self ($44)

the intuition which

;

absolutely

unproduced (244)

short of that there

Nescience

and
is

in its producing or destroying other Nescience there

unintelligibility
v

no

(2l5); Is'avasya Upani?ad cited

in support (245).

3?-

BRAHMASUTRABHASYA
OF S'ASKABACARYA
"
"

OP

the spheres of the two concepts of

Thou

and

"
I,"

the object and the subject, with their natures opposed

to

each other like darkness

and

light,

when

it

is

established that one cannot intelligibly be of the nature

of

the other, the more

is

it

unintelligible for their

;

attributes too to be one (in the substrate of) the other

on this account, the superimposition of the object, the

sphere of the concept of
"

Thou," and of
self,

its attributes,

on the

subject,

the intelligent

the sphere of the

error in

concept of

"
I,"

and (conversely) through an

respect of that, the superimposition of the subject

its

and

attributes

on the object, can properly be only an

illusion.

Yet, after superimposing on each the nature

attributes of the other through non-discrimina-

and the

tion of each

from the other in the case of attributes

absolutely
substrates

distinct

(among
"

themselves)
there
is

as
this

also

of

(similarly

distinct),
I

natural

empirical usage like,

am

this,"

and

"
this is mine,"
its

coupling the true with the untrue, with

illusory cognition,

cause in

THE BHAMATI
1.

We

render obeisance to that immortal Brahman,

the immeasurable bliss and knowledge, from

l

whom

as Lord

with

the

two
there

kinds

of

indeterminable Nescience as

ministers,
air,
fire,

are the illusory manifestations of ether,

water and the earth

and from

whom came

forth

this universe,
2.

movable and immovable, high and low.

are

The Vedas
the

His breath, His glance the

five

elements,

(universe)
is

movable and immovable

is

His

smile,* His sleep

3.

the final deluge.

to

To the Vedas and

Bhava, which are eternal

and associated with six angas as also with manifold imperishable properties (or indeciinables)
4.

we render

11

obeisance.

We

render
to

obeisance to Marta^da, to Tilakaof universal

svamin/ and

Mahaga^apati, who are worthy

adoration and are the dispensers of all fulfilment.

5.

Obeisance to Vyftsa, the secondary Creator. the

of

author

the

Brahma-sRtras,

the

incarnation of the

cognitive energy of the

6.

Lord Hari.
to S'aftkara, of

Having rendered obeisance

wisdom

pure, of grace the ocean,

<J

we

(proceed to) analyse the clear

(yet)

deep
7.

commentary written by him.

As the waters

of a

highway

are purified by falling

into the current of the Ganges, even so are the lowly words
of those like us, by^their conjunction

with the work of the

Master.

*-*

II

II

I^T

II

II

II

II

37^

5JF

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rRT

SUPERIMP08ITION

Now,
which
is

that

of

which

there

is

no doubt or that

profitless

cannot be the sphere of a desire to know

as,

on the part of a prudent inquirer,

for instance, a pot

present in bright light and coming into contact with the sense (of sight) along with the mind
;

or the teeth of a

crow.

So too,
is

is

this

Brahman

hence the knowledge of

7

what

opposed
?'.$.,

to (the presence of) the pervader

profit).
it is

(of

the
is

inquiry,
called

doubt and

It is

thus

the self alone

Brahman, because

great or

it

causes to grow.

This

(self) is

known through

immediate experience of the nature of

indubitable, non-erroneous and " I," as distinct

intellect, their

from the body, the organs, the mind, the

objects,
(in

short)
this
"
;

from whatever
(this

may

be designated by
all

"

the

term

experience exists) in
the

living
;

beings from the

worm and
"
Is

moth

to gods

and sages
"

hence the

self

cannot be the object

this
I

of a desire to
?

know.

No
to "
I

one indeed doubts

" this
is

or not- 1

or

makes

the mistake

not

I at

all ".

Nor
"
I

is it

admissible

say that,
11

since

judgements

like

am

lean, stout,"

go,

etc,,

are seen to be used

8

in

apposition with

qualities

of

the body,
If

the body

is

the substrate of the

word "I".
"
I,

that were the substrate, the recognition

of)

who
"

while young enjoyed (the company

I

now, when
children
verily,

am

old,

enjoy (the company

of)

my parents, my grandis

would

not

come

into

being.

There

not,

as

between the bodies of youth and old age the

slightest trace of recognition?

whereby identity could be

is

determinedis

Hence, that which

that
is

constant in whatever
the latter, as a string

variable,

different from

from the flowers (strung thereon).

u
is

So too, the factor which

is

designated by the word

of the

"

and

constant even in the

is

variations

bodies

of youth, etc.,

different

from

4
these,

3UPERIMP08ITION
Further, the very person,

who

in

dreams possessed

of a divine

body enjoys pleasures suitable thereto, seeing

to be

himself

when awake
"
I

endowed with a human body

and saying

am

not divine, but human," experiences the

substrate of I-ness,

which

is

distinct

from the body and

unsublated, though sublated in respect of the divine body.

Further, he,

who becomes

a tiger by his yoga, experiences

;

the self as non-different in spite of differences of the body

hence, the body
is

not the substrate of I-ness.

its

Hence

too,

even the organs are not

the senses
*'

substrate, since even

is

where

are different there

I

the recognition of the

substrate of I-ness, in

myself that saw

now touch

it ".

The
The

distinction of that
intellect

(self)

from objects
4<

is

but too patent.

and the mind, being but instruments, cannot

I,"

properly be substrates of a cognition of

which

reflects

the
lean,
is

agent (not the instrument).

I

Statements like "I

am

am
see

blind," etc,,

which are made even though there

self), are,

no non-difference (between the body and the

to hold, suitably understood as in some way " the galleries shout (meaning figurative, like the statement

as

we

fit

that the people in the galleries shout)

established

".

Therefore,

it is

that

the

self,

which
of

is

understood from the

exceedingly patent

experience

the "I," distinct from

9 the body, the organs, the mind, the intellect, the objects,

(in
is,

short) from whatever

is

designated by the term "this,"

because of the absence of doubt, not the object of a

desire to

know,
is

(This
inquiry).

so)
is

also because there

is

no

profit (from

the

It

thus:

salvation which consists

is

in the

cessation of transmigration
set
forth.

the profit here desired to be

for
its
self,

Transmigration
of the true

has

cause the non-

experience

nature of the

and

is

to be got

8TJPERIMP08IT10N
rid of

by knowledge of the true nature of the

is

self,

If that

(transmigration) which

beginningless persists alongside

self,

the beginningless knowledge of the true nature of the

how can

there be the riddance of the former, there being

?

no opposition (between the two)

"

And how can

?

there be

non-experience of the true nature of the self

the experience of
the true nature of the
I,"

Other than

there

is

indeed no knowledge of
this self,
is

self,

Nor can
etc,,

which

is

other

than the body, the organ

and which
"
"

established by
to all

the very patent experience of

negatived

common

men, be

even
to

by

thousand

Upanisads, that being

verily,

opposed

experience,

A
we

thousand Scriptures,

cannot convert a pot into a cloth.

opposition to experience,
see
fit

Therefore, because of
to hold that the TJpani*

sads have but a figurative sense,

Raising a doubt, with

:

these ideas in mind, (the commentator) answers it (thus) " Of the spheres of the two concepts/' etc. " " " Of the spheres etc., up to can Here, (the text) from
"

properly be only illusion

is

the statement
"

of the doubt,

"

(The text beginning) from

answer.
"

Yet

is

the statement of the

(of

As against the expression "Yet"

the next

sentence), the word

though" has

statement of the doubt.

'

Where
'

to be supplied in the " the words of the spheres

'

'

of the

two concepts
"

this

and
(in

"

should have been used,

"
this ") to indicate

the word

thou

"
is

used

the place of

the absolute difference (between the contrasted aspects of

"

experience).
*'

The counter-correlate
1

'

of the " "

word

"
I
is

not
is

the word

this,
'

so

much

as the

word

thou/' since there

seen extensive

usage of expressions like

We

are this,

we

8UPBBIMPOBITION
",

are that

The

self of the

nature of intelligence

is

the sub-

ject (oisayin), the non-intelligent intellect, organs,

body and

objects, are the objects of cognition (viqayas).

For, these

bind the intelligent

self,

that
11

is

to say,

make

it

determinabie

through their
ence,

own
is

form.

As an example

of absolute differ-

which

the ground of the impossibility of reciprocal

(there
is

super-imposition
light".

mentioned) "like darkness and

Never indeed, can one understand such utterly

and darkness each to be of the nature
"
:

different things as light

of the other.

This

is

stated thus

when

it is

established that

one cannot

intelligibly

be of the nature of the other."

The one

being the other means the one having the nature of the
other, that
is

to say, the identity of the

"
1

one with the other

this is unintelligible.

Be

this so.

Let there be no reciprocal identity between

(i,e,,

different substrates

the self and the not-self)

there

may

occur yet the reciprocal super-imposition of their attributes,

such as inertness and intelligence, eternality and non-eternality

etc.

Even where

substrates are distinguished, there

is

indeed seen to occur super-imposition of their attributes,

e,g. t

in thecrystai though apprehended as different from the flower,

yet because of

its

absolute transparency, there arises the

'

illu-

sion of redness, in the experience

red crystal

",

generated by
"

the reflection of the hibiscus flower.

their

To

this

it is

said

for

attributes too."

The existence
i.e.,

of the

attributes
;

of
is

one

substrate in the other,

their
:

mutual transfer

this

unintelligible.

This

is

the idea

it is

indeed a substance with

colour, which, on account of its absolute transparency takes

on the reflection of another substance with colour, though

diTt^

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8UPBBIMP08ITION
apprehended as different from
ever, is
itself

the intelligent

self,

how-

the colourless subject and cannot take on the

"

reflec-

tion of the object,

smell, taste
etc,,

As they

(the Bhattas) say

Of sound,

in

what way can there be

reflection

?"

lj

Hence

it

follows by elimination that mutual transfer of the

constantly
subject
is

associated

attributes

of

the

object

and the

possible only on the basis of the reciprocal connecIf

tion of these two.

these two substrates being apprehend-

ed as absolutely distinct are unrelated, their attributes are

even more clearly unrelated, they being further removed

from each other by the interposition of their respective sub" strates.

"

This

is

stated thus
"

the more," etc.

Through an

error in respect of that

means through an

error in respect of

the

object.
is

The
is

word "illusion"
said
:

signifies
is

concealment.

This

what

super-imposition

pervaded by
i.e.,

non-apprehension of difference; the opposite thereof,

the apprehension of difference,
rid
is

present here, which, getting

of that

non-apprehension

of difference, gets rid also of "

the

super-imposition

pervaded thereby.
"
:

Though they

can properly be only

This
is

illusion, yet

this is the construction.

(All) this

the underlying idea,

"

might be

so, if

the true nature of the self were manifest in the experi-

ence of the

I ".

This, however,
is

is

not so.

It is

thus

the

true nature of the self

declared in Scripture, traditional

codes
as

(smfti),

epics

(itihutas),

and mythologies (purfyas)

of the

undefined

by any limiting conditions, as

one

consistency of endless bliss and intelligence, as indifferent,

as one and without a second.

Nor can

those (statements)
self as

which have the purport

nature,

of

teaching the

of this

through

their

introductory,

intermediate

and

8UPERIMPOSITION

concluding passages, and through purportful repetition, be

made
the

figurative even by Indra.

For, from repetition results

as
in

eminence
!

of

the

object,
;

"Lo, beautiful,
"

lo,

beautiful

",

not

its littleness

nor even figurativeness (that

of the
I," exhibit-

being) remote indeed,

The experience

ing

as

it

does the self as finite and as confounded by a

multitude of griefs and sorrows,

how can
?
it

it

have the true

it

nature

of

the

self

for

its

sphere

Or how can
be said
is

be

undeluded (experience)?
Scripture
is

Nor can

that since

opposed to perception, which

l4

the

elder

means

of

valid

knowledge (pramftna),

the former alone

or

as dependent on the latter should be declared invalid

figurative
;

for,

since that (Scripture)

is

not of
of

human

origin

and
since

is

free

from even the suspicion

any

defect,

and

its

validity is self-revealed by the very fact of its

it is

conveying knowledge,
of
If

independent

(of
i.e.,

any other means

valid knowledge.

knowledge) in respect of its effect,

it

be said that though independent in respect of the

(it

knowledge
perception

generates),

yet since
its

it

is

dependent on
is

in

respect of

origin,

and since there

opposition to that (perception), there will be the non-validity

of Scriptural teaching, consisting in its non-production,

no

(we reply);
(by

for,

there

is

no opposition

to its origination

perception).

Scriptural

knowledge does not indeed

it

annul the empirical validity of perception, whereby

itself

would
its

cease to be,
rather
(does
is

because of the non-existence of

it

'cause;

annul)

the absolute (validity

of

perception).

Nor

its

cause the absolutely true (percepis

tion), since true knowledge

seen to arise from means of

knowledge which are empirically though not absolutely

*f

SIF3T:

?WT

8UPERIMP08ITION
valid.

Thus, the qualities of short and long, though foreign

to

letters (belonging as

they do to sound

dhcani), being

super-imposed thereon, are causes of true apprehension;

those

who

in

the world

understand by

naga and naga

verily,

different objects such as elephant and tree are not,

deluded people.

Nor may
purport that
sense.
in
It

it

be said of a word not having any other

is

it

used figuratively in respect of

"
:

its

own
word
its

has indeed been said

The meaning

of a

an

injunctive
lj

statement cannot be other (than

primary
is

one)."

The
its

priority of

what

is

not depended on
its

a ground for

being sublated, not for

sublating

(another means

of

knowledge),
is

for,

it

is

seen that the

earlier cognition of silver

sublated by the later cognition

of nacre.

If

the former were not sublated, the origination

of the latter (cognition)

whose essence
intelligible.

is

the sublation (of

it

the former)

would not be

And

has been
is

shown that the absolute

depended on.
(Jaimini):
later,

validity

(of

perception)
of

not

So

too the

aphorism

the great sage

"Where
earlier
rite

there
is

is

the relationship of earlier and

as
in

the

weaker,
"'

the

case

of

the

archetypal
"

(prakrti)"

And
of the

to the

same

effect (is the

verse)

The

superiority

later over the

earlier is

cognised where their cognitions arise not as reciprocally

1
'

dependent/'
Further,

those
I-ness,

who acknowledge
even by

the

self

as

the

substrate

of

them the

truth

of that "
I

(cognition) cannot be admitted, since in the

judgement

am

in this very abode, (but) cognising," the omnipresent self

is

apprehended as

finite,

in the

same way as

to the

man

10

8UPERIMP08ITION

on the ground, big trees on the top of a high peak appear as

blades of grass,

Nor

is it

admissible that the experienced

finiteness is of the body,

not of the

self.

For then the

11

"

experience would not be of the form

"

I (am),
if

etc.

nor
"

"

would

it

be of the form
used)
it

cognising,"

(the

word

be

taken to be
Further,

in

a secondary sense

(of

the body).

when

is

agreed as between the speaker and

the

understanding listener that a certain word has the

of

connotation
follows
in

another,

then the use

is

secondary;
It

it
is,

the

wake

of

awareness of difference.

indeed, thus:

when

the word agnihotra, which (ordinarily)

rite

denotes the obligatory

of that

name,

is

used in the
1

statement

"he

'

offers

the

mQsa-agnihotra

oblation

in

another context ascertained to be

in

(of a) different (nature),

connection with an act related to the kuntfapfiyinam

the
of
;

ayana,

use

(of
is

the

word agnihotra) based on the

accomplished
(in

similarity
is

what
ls

to be

both cases)

secondary
of

so too the use of the word "lion" in the

case

a pupil

who
lion,

is

known from
(Here,
" I
is

experience to be
the

different

from

however)

primary

"

denotation of the word

determinately
in

not indeed experienced as

etc.,

and specifically other than the body

which case alone that word would have the secondary

sense of body etc.

Nor may

it

be understood that, where

is

by long usage a term has a secondary sense, there

recognition of the sense being secondary, as
is

no

the case
oil;

with
for,

tail a

(lit.

sesamum
only

oil)

as

applied to mustard
is

here

too,

where difference

established,

in

respect of viscidity,

being extracted from

oil

sesamum

etc.,

there

is

the conceit of mustard

etc.

being primarily

f|

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:

ffcl

n^MiR

SUPERIMPOSITION
designated by the word
ed that there
It
is

11

taila.

It is

not however, determinoil.

identity between taila and mustard

follows then that

secondary usage

is

pervaded by the

cognition of the difference between the primary and the

secondary by those

who know

both.

Here, the pervader,

w., cognition

of difference eliminating (itself) also elimi-

nates the secondary usage.

Nor may

it

be said that though the bodies of youth

different,

and old age are

yet,

from the recognition of an

"
I

identical self in the judgement

am

he

", it

follows that

there

is

an experience

of the self as different

is,

from the

body

etc.

Such a judgement

verily, that of the critic,

critics

not of the

man

in the street.

Even

do not surpass
life.

the generality of

men

in respect of practical

Indeed,
;

the revered commentator says this presently in the words

"And
Even
the

because
outsiders

there

is

no
is,

distinction

from beasts

etc,"

"

say
that

It

verily, those

who

reflect

on
1

teaching

make

this

distinction,
fit

not learners/
that finitude

Hence by elimination we
understood
14

see

to hold

is

of the self
this

by the

man

in the street

who

says

1
is

am
Nor

in

very abode

etc.," in

the same

way

as ether

cognised as limited by pot, ewer, basin etc.

is
it

meet

to say, in order to conserve the validity

11

of (the use of) the

word "l,"

that the self too, like the

its

body
of

etc.,

is

finite.

In that case,
of

size should be that

an atom or that

the body.
"
I

If that

of

an atom,

there would not be the usage

if

am

stout, or (I

am)

"
tall
;

that of the body, then, as

made up

of parts, there

would

result non-eternality, as in the case of the body.

Further, on

12

8UPERIMPOSITION
view,
it

this

must
or

be

either

the aggregate

of parts

that
of

intelligises

each

part

by

itself.

On

the view

each part intelligising by

itself,

in the

absence of a

consensus

among

the

many

independent intelligences,

either the body would be distracted or non-action would

result,

as

the consequence of simultaneous activity in

If intelligence

opposed directions,
aggregate, then
self too

be associated with the

injured, the intelligent

when one

part

is

being injured in part would not intelligise.

Nor

is

there

seen any fixed relationship of co-existence

parts.

among

the

many

When any
intelligise

one part
in

is

damaged, the
of

aggregate
part.

cannot

the

absence

that

Even
illusoriness
for,

if

cognition
the

(vijnana)

be

the

substrate,

the

of

concept

"l"

continues the

same,
"

that

(concept) manifests a

permanent substance, while

I

cognitions are fleeting,

fat,

In this way, expressions like

" etc.

am

am

blind,

go
"

are explained as due to super-

imposition.

The concept
be

"
I

of

having been in this way shown to

(worthless as) a rotten gourd, the revered Scripture

may

proceed unhindered to remove from the

"

self notions conse-

quent on the experience of

I,"

such as agency, enjoyership

happiness, misery, grief etc,

Hence, in the words*'

"

after

superimposing on each/'

etc.,

there are elaborated the nature,

I,"

cause and result of the concept

whose

illusoriness

is

well-known

from

all

trustworthy Scripture, traditional

codes, epics and purnyas.

of

Superimposing the nature of one

two substrates

the body and the

selfon

the other,

ffrf

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wtwwjwi

'

8UPBRIMPOBITION
'*

13

0,0.,
41

I
"

am

"

this

body

etc,

The
"

(identification

wit!
^

this

(is)

a matter of fact, not a matter of knowledge,

"

Empirical usage (lokaoyaoahUrdk)

means the usage

"
I

of the

world

that
iti

is

designation of the form

am
are

this

",

By the
the

word

(in

aham

idam
etc.

iti)

there

indicated

acceptance, rejection
of valid

of

what are known by means

knowledge to be beneficial or injurious to the

body

etc,

There

is

also the super-imposition of the attributes of

e.g.,

one substrate on the other,

imposing the bodily

etc,,

attri-

butes of birth, death, old age, disease

i.e.)

on the substrate,

the self

on

whom

bodies

etc,,

have been super-imposed,

self

and similarly the attributes of the

etc.,

such as intelligence

on the body
;

etc.,

on which self-ness has been superi.e.,

imposed
the

there
of

is

consequently the empirical usage,

mode

speech

"Mine
By
to
iti

is

this

old age, death, son,

iti) is

cow, ownership etc."

activity
etc,

(in

mame'dam
above
(there

indicated

suitable

the

experience.
is)

The

statement
"

"after

superimposing
21

the empirical
is

usage

is

intelligible,

since the agent that

inferred for
is

the acts of super-imposition and empirical usage

but one
for

and the same.

superimposition,

By
it is

indicating priority

in

time

the

made

clear that
"
:

it is

the cause of the

its

empirical usage, in the

word

empirical usage with

etc.

cause
1

in
is

the

illusory

cognition"
2"

"illusory

cogni-

tion*

superimposition;
the
existence
or

having that as the cause;

non-existence
of empirical

that

is,

usage follows on the existence or non-existence of that

(superimposition).

14

8UPERIMP08ITION
Having thus stated the nature
of superimposition
its

and

its

fruit,

viz.,

empirical usage, he states

cause in the

"

words
i.e. t

through non-discrimination of each from the other/'

(their) distinctness.
is

through non-apprehension of
should
thus,
it

Now,
all ?

why And

not be that there

"
this

no difference at

(if

there were none), there would be no super-

imposition.
substrate

To
which

he says

of

the attribute

and the

are

absolutely

distinct,"

Distinctness

from
case

the absolute standpoint means non-identity in the

of

substrates,

and

non-confusion in the case of

attributes.

Be

this so.

The delusion

as to identity conditioned by

non-apprehension of the difference between two real entities

is

intelligible,

like the

delusion of the identity with silver

in the case
difference.

of nacre, because of

non-apprehension of their
is

Here,
other

however, there

no

real
self,

entity like

the

body,

than

the

intelligent

which

is

the absolute reality.

of

Whence then the non-apprehension

of
?

the distinctness

the

intelligent

self?
"
:

Whence

the

delusion of identity

To

this

he replies

by coupling the
is
:

true with the untrue."

The construction
non-apprehension
etc.)

after super-

imposing

because

of

of
is

distinctness

(through coupling the true

self
etc.
;

The

true

the intelligent

the untrue

are

the

intellect,

the organs, the body

;

coupling

these

two

substrates

coupling means
real

yoking.

Because there cannot be any

coupling of
is

the phenomenal with the absolutely real, there

evi suffix

used the
signifies

(mithunl- instead of mithunamit

),

which
This
is

what
said
:

is

not that becoming that as

were.

what

is

the

imposition

of

what does not appear being

is

impossible,

what

is

required

the cognition of what

is

imposed, not

its real existence.

twiwwi
iihl

^T,

idlMrl:

8UPBRIMPOSITION

15

Be

this

so.

When
is

there

is

cognition of what

is

superimposed, there

the superimposition of what was

itself is

formerly seen, while that cognition

conditioned by

superimposition

thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence

to

seems

difficult

avoid.
is

To

this

he says: "natural".

This empirical usage

the beginninglessness

natural, beginningless,

Through
98

of

the

usage, there

is

declared the

beginninglessness
of

of its

cause

superimposition.

Hence,

the intellect, organs, body

is

etc., appearing in every prior

illusory cognition, there

of

use in every subsequent instance

(process)

superimposition.
(the

This
of)
;

being beginningless,
is

like

succession

the seed and the sprout, there

this is the
it is

no reciprocal dependence

meaning.

Be
that

this so.

Certainly,

only the prior appearance

counts in imposition, not

the

absolute
is

reality

of

what appears.

But even appearance

unintelligible in

the case of the body, the organs

etc.,

which are wholly

unreal, and are comparable to the lotus-pond in the sky.

The

reality even of the intelligent self is but manifestation,

that,
like

and nothing other than

the inherence of the

class-Being (sotta-stimanya-samavaya) or practical efficiency

(artha-kriyfL-karita),
4

as

(the

admission

of)

these would

lead to duality."

Further, with the postulation of another

(to

Being and another practical efficiency

reality)

determine the

of this

Being and
infinite

this

practically efficient,

we

shall

have

an

regress.

Hence,

manifestation

alone has to be admitted as constituting reality.

Thus,

the body

etc,,

since

they are manifest, are not unreal,

or
else,
if

being

like

the intelligent self;

;

unreal,

they

cannot be manifest

how then can

there be the coupling of

16
It

8UPKRIMP08ITION

may
?

be asked

what
is
:

is this

thing called super-

imposition

The

reply

the appearance elsewhere,

with a nature like to that of recollection, of what was

seen before,

Some speak

of

it

as superimposition else;

where of the
that,

attributes of another

but some others say

when
it

there
is

is

the superimposition of one on

conditioned by the non;

another,

a delusion

apprehension of their distinctness

that,

others, however, say

when

there
is

is

the superimposition of one on

in

another,

there

an assumption
But
in

the latter of an
it

opposite attribute.

any

case,

does not depart

from the property

of one

appearing as having the

this
if
is

attributes of another.

And

our experience in
;

the world

nacre appears as
if

silver

the

moon though

one appears as

having a second.

the true with the untrue

In the absence of this (coupling)

is

whose difference

is

it

that

not apprehended

and from

what
the

That (non-apprehension

of difference) failing,

whence
objector

superimposition? With

this

in mind, the

says:

"What

is

this

thing called superimposition?"

The The

(pronoun) "what*'

has the sense of an objection,

respondent meets the objection by simply giving the define

tion
of
is

superimposition well-known to the world:

"The

reply

the appearance elsewhere* with a nature like to that

of recollection, of

what was seen

is

before."

Avabhnsa

is

that

appearance which
tion

terminated or depreciated.
is

Termina-

or depreciation
it

sublation by

another cognition;

by

this,

(avabhftsa) is said to be

an

illusory cognition,

f> I *q

33

=n

ci

ffrl
j

BUPEBIMP08ITION
This
"
is

17

the

further
"

commentary on that

(definition)

what was seen before

etc,

Pnrva.drtffi,-'vabhasafy

means

the appearance of what was seen before.

The

illusory

appearance cannot come about without the coupling of the

imposed element with that on which

it is

imposed

hence

what

is

untrue and superimposed

before".

is

understood by the words

is

"what was seen

indicate that
it

The word "seen"

used to

(the superimposed element) counts only as

phenomenal not as absolutely real

seen
is

Even
;

thus,

what

is

now

not capable of being imposed

before
1

hence the use

of the
its

"

word

',

What was

seen before, though real in

own

nature,

is

yet, as superimposed, indeterminable

and

hence unreal.

The locus

of

imposition,

which

is

real, is

stated in: "elsewhere." are absolutely real. true with the untrue. "

Elsewhere, in nacre
is

etc,,

which

Thus

declared the coupling of the

Be

this

so.

The appearance elsewhere

is

of

what was
There "

seen before "-this

is,

no

definition, being too wide. "

verily, in the

cow, Kalaksl,

the appearance of cowness

seen before in the cow, Svastimatl.

There

is

also the

appearance elsewhere, at Mahismati,

seen at Pataliputra.
"
"

of

Devadatta formerly

(Both these appearances are) valid.

is

The word

appearance (avabhftsa]

indeed well-known
"

the appearance of valid experience, as in " " To this he says : of etc. blue, the appearance of yellow
as applied to

a nature

like to that of recollection."

Its

nature

is

like the
is

nature of recollection. The non-presence of the object

essence of recollection
of a present object.
;

of the

while recognition, which

is)

is

valid, is

Hence, (the definition

not too wide,

18

8UPEBIMP08ITION

Nor
is

is

it

too narrow

for,

even dream-cognition which

is

of the

same nature

as delusive recollection

of this

nature (given in the definition),

of

There

too, verily,

because
etc.

the

non-presence of the recollected parents

not

being reflected upon, on account of the defect of

is

sleep, there

here

and there the superimposition

of

the time and

place

when they were formerly

present and seen.

Thus,

the
like)

same

definition is to be applied also to (experiences " "the shell is yellow," sugar is bitter", It is thus:
is

the yellow, which resides in the biie that

in contact

with
is
is

the exceedingly

pure rays going forth from the eye,"

bile
;

experienced in dissociation from the

the shell too

experienced (bat) with the whiteness concealed by a defect

(in

the sense-organ) the shell

of
is

the non-relation of the yellow colour

;

to

not experienced

because of similarity in
non-relationship,

respect

non-apprehension

of

the

appositional relation previously seen in (experiences) like 41 "

yellow mass of gold, yellow bilna fruit

is

imposed on
"

yellow-ness and shell-ness and one speaks of the yellow shell.

In this
is

way

too

may

be explained the apprehension

of

sugar

bitter 'V*

Similarly, rays
in

light from the organ of

sight come

contact with the pure mirror or sheet of

water facing the cogniser, but they are reflected therefrom

by the stronger rays of the Sun's

contact with
a
defect,
it

light,

and coming into

;

the face, apprehend the face

because of

however, they do not apprehend the face as

really
is,
i.e.,

where

not facing oneself, but impose on

it

the property of facing oneself that belongs to the formerly

7

seen

mirror

or

sheet

of

water/

Thus, the definition

rf^T

' t

ro
rCT

'

ffrf

rfcl^tcf:

sjf^T:

8UPERIMP08ITION
applies
to

19

the delusion
to

of

reflection too,

In the same
the

way

are

be

explained

suitably

delusions like

perception of two moons, loss of the sense of direction,

the fiery circle, the fata morgana (gandharva-nagara)?* the
9

snake seen in the bamboo/

This
is

what

is

said
in

it is

not that manifestation alone

case, bodies, organs etc.,

constitutes

reality,

which

by
not

the very
as
if

fact

of manifestation,

would be

real.
etc., or

It is

ropes
as

etc,,

do not appear as snakes

crystals

etc.,

endowed with red colour and so on;

nor, as thus

appearing, do they really

become those
were
so,

objects or

endowed

with those attributes.

in the case of a

If that
?0

one would conclude

mirage

that

it is

the MandakinI which

has come down close by, with her garlands of constantly

agitated waves high and low, and proceeding (thereto) should

be able to quench one's thirst by drinking of that water,

Hence, of what
absolute
reality

is

superimposed, even though manifest,

this

cannot be admitted, even though

"

(conclusion) be not desired.

Nor
water
is

is

it

admissible to ask thus

in the mirage, the

(as

unreal, but in its

;

own nature

mirage)

it is

absolutely real

whereas, the body, organs

etc.,

are unreal

even in their own nature, and as such cannot be the

sphere of any experience;
"

how

then can they be super-

imposed

For,

if

what

is

unreal cannot be the object of

etc.,

any experience, how then do the mirage

unreal,

which are
water
etc, ?
etc.)

become the sphere

real in their
real as

of experience

as

Though

own
water

nature, they
etc,, as well.

(the

mirage

cannot become

20

8UPERIMPOSITION
It

may
as

be said
distinct

there

is

nothing called non-existence

(abhttva)

from existence (bhnva).

An

existent

considered as of the nature of another existent becomes

non-existence

but in

its

own nature
is

it

is

but existence.

"

As

is

said

Non-existence

but another existent con!l

sidered in relation to something else/'

Hence,
of

this,

which

may

be

explained

as

another mode

existence,

may
is

well be in

the sphere of experience.

unreal, devoid
of
it

The world, which

of

absolutely
(true)

any capacity, devoid

be

any

essence,

how can
it

an object

of experience ?

How,
self?

again,

can
is
it

be

superimposed

on the intelligent
the
objects (of
(to appear),

Nor

admissible that, though

experience)

are wholly devoid of

any capacity

the respective cognitions, through the capacity

in

residing

them

as

cognitions,

of

themselves give rise to the

appearance of the unreal, as a product of a unique nature,

and that this capacity

real

(of

the cognitions) to
is

make

the un-

appear
it

is

Nescience.

What

this faculty of cognition

whereby
it

makes the unreal appear?

If
it

What

is

it

that

is

capable of?

is

the unreal,
be

is it

effected or only

made known by
is

it?

It

cannot

effected,

since
is it

that

unintelligible in the case of the unreal,

Nor

what

is

made known,

since there

is

no other cognition known

further, (what
its

(other than that which

is

makes manifest);

thus manifested being unreal and requiring

the

relation

to

new cognition
If

to

be explained), infinite regress

it is

would

result.

now,

it

be said that

the very essence

is

of cognition

to manifest the unreal,

?

what
If
it

this relation

between the real and the unreal

be said that the

^ ft

8UPERIMP08ITION
relation
of

21

cognition,

which
is

is

real,

to

that

which

is

unreal

is

that the former

made determinate under the

1

control of

what

is

unreal, lo

how

very fortunate

is

this

poor cognition that attains to determination even through

the unreal.

Nor does cognition do anything

(of
is

thereto, since

being the support

the case of what
tion
is

any such thing)

If it

is

inappropriate in

unreal.

be said that the cogniit

is

not controlled by the unreal, but that

of cognition not to
is

of the

very nature
unreal,
lol

appear apart from the

this partiality for the

unfortunate indeed
is

unreal,

whereby cognition

invariably linked to the unreal,

of the

though neither originating therefrom nor

as that."

same nature

Hence, body, organs

(true)

etc.,

which are wholly unreal

of

and

have no

essence,

cannot become objects

experience,

To

this

we

reply

if

what has no

(true) essence be

not

within the sphere of experience,

water, in of

are these rays real as

such wise that they

may come

within the sphere

experience?

(The pHrvapaksin says):

They have no

(true)

essence (in the nature of water), since the rays are

not of the nature of water,

The essence

of things

is

of

two kinds,
"
is

real or unreal, the former in respect of themselves,

the latter in respect of things other than themselves.

said
:

As

The essence
other

of things

is

grasped by some at some

or as unreal in respect
33

time
of

or

either

as

real

(those

things)
Is

themselves
the

or

in respect of others."
of

(We

reply):

cognition

water

in the
it

rays

in the sphere of the true ? Then, being valid,

would not

22

8UPERIMP08ITION
nor would
it

be delusive
rejoins)
:

it

be sublated,

(The pHrvapaksin
if it

certainly,

would not be sublated,

apprehended

the rays, which truly are not of the nature of water, as

not of the nature of water,

When
how can

apprehended as of the
it

nature

of water,
?

however,
1

be non-delusive or

non-sublated

Lo

then (we reply)

of

the rays

whose
is

nature

is

non-waterness, their nature as waterness

they, being non-different

not

real, since

from non-waterness,
;

cannot
unreal
;

intelligibly
for,
is
it

be of the nature of waterness

nor
"

is it

is

recognised by you, in the words

Nonelse,

existence

existence in another form, not anything

'

since no (such thing)

is

proved,"

that the unreality of one

thing
thing
in

is

but another thing.

if
it

Nor

is

the imposed form another

were,

it

should be either the rays or the water

the
first

the

Ganges.
of

On

alternative, the cognition

would be
on the

the form "rays," not of the form

it

"water"
"

latter (alternative), "

would be
",

of the

form
if

water

in the Ganges," not

(water) here
it

(Further)

the parti*
the form)

cular place be not recollected,

11

should be

(of

"

"

water
this
is

(merely), not

here

".

Nor

is it

admissible that

something wholly unreal, a mere falsehood devoid

of all existence, since that cannot intelligibly be within the

sphere of experience

this

has been said

earlier,

Hence, the
to

water superimposed on the rays has to be recognised

be

indeterminable, being neither real nor unreal nor yet real and
unreal, this (last) being self-contradictory. Thus, in this way,

the superimposed water

that reason
is

is

like absolutely real water,

;

and

for

like

what was formerly seen but

really that is

^rRf^g

'ifpPlf
ffit
i

SUPERIMPOSITION
not water, nor what was formerly seen
indeterminable,

23

but

it is

untrue,

In the same way, even the universe of

is

bodies, organs etc,

indeterminable

though novel, yet they

i.e.,

are superimposed on something other,

self,

the intelligent
in prior

in

the

same way
cognitions.

as

what was presented

is

erroneous
definition

This

intelligible,

since

the
of

of

superimposition

applies.

The sublation

the universe of bodies, organs etc. will be explained later.

As

for the

intelligent self,

it is

in the sphere of Scripture,

traditional

codes,
basfed

epics

and

purftnas\

as

ascertained

by reasoning
it is

on and not in conflict with these,

of purity,

of
is

the nature

intelligence
real.

and freedom,
self-

and

determinable
is

as
;

certainly

Unsublated
very

luminosity

its

reality

that

is

of

the

nature of
this),

the intelligent
as

self,

not something other (than

such

inherence

of
is

the

class-Being, or practical efficiency,

Thus, everything

clear.

Superimposition,

which
is

is

indeterminable

and has

been defined as above,

there
reason,
are
in

admitted

by
of

all

inquirers, but

considerable

differences
its

detail.

For this

order to establish

indeterminability firmly,

"

he says

Some speak

"
of
it

etc.

"Of

the

attribute of

another,"
;

i.e.,

of the

attribute

of the cognition, here, of silver

of the cognition.

that

is

to say, of the

form
i.e.,

"

The superimposition
to

is

elsewhere,"

outside.
is

According
;

the

SautrEntika

teaching, there
is

external reality

the imposition thereon of what

(is

of

the form of cognition

superimposition).

Even according

24

8UPERIMPOSITTON
though there

to the Vijfianavadins,

is

no external

reality,

yet there
of

is

an external falsehood created by the impressions

Nescience,
is

beginningless

and

on

this

there

is

the
this

imposition of what
is is

of the form of cognition,

is

And

the justification

there

the general rule that whatever

experienced in a particular form should be accepted in

its

that form, since

being other than that results (only)

it.

from a cognition of greater force which sublates

"

When

the sublating cognition

"

this

is

not silver

is

intelligible
is

even as sublating the Mis-element alone,

to

it

not meet
if

take

it

to

extend to the stor-element.

For,

the

substrate

"silver" were sublated, then, both

"
"

the

silver
;

and

its

attribute

of

this-ness
it

would be sublated
"

it

would be better
alone
is

to take

"

that the attribute

*

this-ness

sublated,

not the substrate

"
silver

as

well,

Hence

it

follows that silver

is

which

is

sublated in respect of

externality
us.

by presumption confined to knowledge within

of

Thus follows the imposition outside

what

is

of the

form of cognition.
44

But some others,"

with the doctrine " say thai when
another,
of
their
it

i,e. t

those

who

are not satisfied

of imposition as of the

form of cognition,

there

is

the

superimposition of one on

is

a delusion conditioned by tta non-apprehension

distinctness",

They
silver

state the
etc,

reason for their

of

dissatisfaction.

That
be

are

the

form of
experience

cognition

should
or

established
inference,

either

by

(perception)

by

Inference in this
it

regard

will be refuted later,

As

for experience,

must be either

SIT

fl
' '

f|

wiiK*ii

fl

f%

Cffi

^1
In

8UPERIMP08ITION
the cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates
It
is

25

it.

not
to

the

experience

of

silver

(that
;

intimates

its

nature

be

the form of cognition)

for,

that
"

makes
11

known
what
is

silver as

having
for,

for its

substrate, the

this,

not

within;

in

that case, because of the nonit

difference of the cogniser from the cognition, "

tion)

(the cogni-

would be

(of

the form)
say)
:

(am

silver) ".

(The atrnaits

khyativadin

may
word

delusive
;

cognition determines
its

own form

to

be external and thus,

" I

sphere

is

not the sub-

strate of the
is

"
;

its

being of the

form of cognition
If this be

to be

known from
:

the sublating cognition.

let

said,

(we reply)

lo

the long-lived one reflect on this

silver the
its

sublating cognition.

Does that distinguish from

object present before us, or also

is

show

of

it

that

nature

of the

form of cognition
1'

The

intelligence of that person

beloved of the gods,

who

says of the sublating cognition

that

it

has the function of making

known
is

(the prior experi1

ence to have) the form of cognition,

If
it

indeed to be praised

be said

that

(its

being)

of the

form of cognition

follows by presumption from the negation of the presence

(of

silver)

before

us,

no (we reply)

for,

from the denial

it

of the

non-apprehension

of non-proximity,
;

would become

non-proximate (to the cogniser)

whence then the extreme

it is

proximity to the oogniser such that

of his

own nature
the

And

this

(sublating cognition) denies

neither

silver

nor the this-ness, but the empirical usage of silver occasioned

by the non-apprehension of distinctness,

of

Nor by

the

cognition
for,

silver

is

silver

itself

occasioned in

nacre;
as
its

the presentation of silver cannot have naore

basis, that

being opposed to experience.

Nor

is it

26

SUPERIMP08ITION

the basis as existent alone (not as known), since that would

be too wide (a basis)
things,
it
;

for, existentiality

being

common

to all
basis.

would follow that any of them could be the

the
basis) as

Nor
for,

(is

nacre

the cause (of the cognition),

the

senses too are

"

causes.

Hence, the meaning

of
is

the word

"

basis

is

but manifestation.

And

since nacre
it

not manifest in the cognition of silver,

basis
?

how can

be the
there

Or

if

manifestation be admitted,
?

how can

be no opposition to experience
etc,,

Further, since the senses

are seen to have the capacity to generate valid

know-

ledge,
If
it

how can
be
said

illusory

cognition

result

from

them?
they

that

in

conjunction with

defects

acquire the capacity to (generate) illusory cognition, no (we

reply),

since

defects

can cause only the counter-action

;

of the generative capacity (of a cause)

else

even from the

parched

kufaja

seed
shoot.

there

would result the springing

if

up

of a

banyan

Further,

cognitions

fail

to be

constant to their (proper) spheres, there would result loss of

confidence in everything. It should, therefore, be recognised
that
all

cognition
are
is

is

valid,

Thus, the cognitions

"silver"

and
here,
(of

"this"
"

of

two kinds, memory and experience;

this
;

"

the apprehension of a mere object in front

"

us)

because of a defect, the class-nature of nacreity,

there, is not apprehended
;

which
has the
(of

is

the bare

that,"

which

been

apprehended,
of
silver,

calls

up, because of similarity,

memory

through reviving the impressions

the former experience of silver).

That (memory) though,

of the

nature of an apprehension of what has been appreas bare apprehension, the element of (the
lost

hended, stands
content)

having been apprehended being

through a

<ii*fiI*iRi

'BT

srfq
:
I

SUmiMPOSITION
defect.

27

Thus, there

is

non- apprehension of the difference

between the memory

of the silver and the apprehension of the

bare object before us, whether in their

tions)

own

nature (as cognihence, because

silver,

or

in

respect
to

of

their contents;

of
is

resemblance
actually
in
"

the

cognition
contact,

of

where

it

(sense-)
silver

the

two cognitions
(in

"this"

and

"though

different

nature)

as

perception and

memory, bring about empirical usage as

In some cases,

non-different and appositional designation.

again,

there
is

are

but two perceptions

"

whose reciprocal
is

difference

not apprehended as in

the shell

yellow

".

In that case, as (for instance) in the case of a pure crystal,

there
is

apprehended as present in the rays of light going

forth from the eyes the yellowness of the bile, but the bile
itself
is

not apprehended.
is

The

shell too,

because of some

defect,
of

apprehended as barely existent, but as devoid

of

the quality
of

whiteness.

Because
of

of

similarity

in

respect

the

non-apprehension

the
there

non-relation
is

between the quality and the

usage
as

qualified,

empirical

non-different

and appositional designation, in

exactly the
of

same way

as in the cognition of the yellow

is

mass
is

gold.

(When

there

sublation)

what

is

sublated

the

empirical

usage as non-different occasioned by the

;

non-apprehension of difference
sublating nature
"

hence

is

intelligible

the

of the cognition of distinctness

;

in
is

the
also

form

not this

"

and this being

is

intelligible, there

established

what

established in the

worldthe
all

delusive-

ness of the prior cognition,

ful or delusive,
30

Therefore,
of)

cognitions doubtis

about (the nature

which there

dispute,

are true,

a pot

efcc.

because they are cognitions, like the cognition of " when This is the view explained in the words
:

there i& the eu$tf imposition

erf

one on another.

"

When

OH

28
nacre
there
is

8UPBRIMPOSITION
etc.,

what

is

well-known to the world as the

by the

superimposition
cognition as

of silver etc., that is not conditioned

else,

something
by
the

but

it

is

rather a delusion

conditioned

non-apprehension
silver

of the distinctness
it

between (on the one hand)

by the loss
of

and the memory of

which

the element of (the content) having been

as

apprehended

stands

bare

apprehension,
is

and (on the

other hand) the bare object which

present before us as

"this"
consists

and
in

the

cognition

thereof.

And
of

delusiveness

the

appositional designation
to

memory and

apprehension with reference

empirical usage as silver etc.

each other, and in the

"Others, however,"
this,

who
there

are not
is

satisfied

even with

"say

that
is

when

superimposition of one on
in the latter of
:

another,

there

an assumption
is

an opposite

attribute".

This
all
is

the underlying idea

it is

(knowledge)
is

common
silver/*

to

that
for

because of the cognition ''this

there

him who seeks

silver activity

and

appositional designation in respect of the substance in front

(of him).

That cannot come about from the bare

failure to

apprehend the reciprocal difference between

apprehension or their respective spheres
the activity and speech of an
are conditioned
;

memory and for, how could

being,

intelligent
result
it

which

by apprehension,
it

from bare nonresults not

apprehension

Now,

has been said that

from

bare non-apprehension, but from

memory and
of

apprehension,

where

their
is

difference

in

respect
;

their

nature and

contents

not apprehended

because of the similarity

to the valid
to

cognition of silver before us, they give rise

empirical

usage
(To

as

non>different

and
of

appositional

designation.
replies
:)

this,

the supporter

anyathakhyati

Now,

the similarity of this to the valid cognition

ft

'^^'

ffc!

ffcf

^H

:,

371ft

f|

8UPBBIMP08ITION

29

may
Even

be the cause of empirical usage either by being appreits

hended, or by
if
it

bare existence, without being apprehended.

be apprehended, the apprehension must be of

'

"

the form
is
14

Of the cognitions
to

'

'

this

and
or
is

'

silver
of

there

resemblance

valid

cognition,"
difference

the form

Between those very two no

1

apprehended in

respect of their nature or contents ".

'

Of these, the cognition

this

is

like

valid

cognition

cannot lead to empirical

usage
41

in the
is

same way
like a

Gavaya

cow

as valid cognitionThe cognition " does not, verily, induce activity

in respect of a
"

gavaya in him

who

seeks a cow,

As

for

the cognition

non-apprehension of the difference between

is

those very two," that

"
"

self-contradictory
it

where there

is

non-apprehension of difference,

cannot be of the form

is

between the two between

the

"
;

nor,

when

there

the apprehension

two,"
it

can there be non-apprehension of

difference.

Hence,
of

must be
not

said

that the non-appre-

hension
the

difference,

being

itself

apprehended,
fact
of

is

cause

of
Is

empirical usage
it,

by the bare
of

its

existence.

then,

the

cause
or

empirical usage
of
itself

through

creating

an
?

imposition

without
it
:

creating an imposition

This

is

how we

look at

since

the

empirical

usage

of

an
on

intelligent

being
(it

cannot
be

intelligibly
effective)
(it

be

consequent
as

ignorance,

must

only

creating an imposed cognition.

it

Now
of

may

be

objected)

is

true

that

the

activity

an

intelligent

being

is

consequent not on ignorance, but

is

on apprehension and memory whose distinctness

not

known.

Not so (we

reply)

truly,

it

is

not the

memory

"

of the bare root-meaning of the

word

silver" that causes

activity

for,

it

is

undisputed that the activity of one

"

who
".

seeks silver

is

directed to the substrate of

this-ness

30

8UPERIMP08ITION
can one be active in respect
"

How
*

of the substrate of

this-ness
to

unless one desires

it ?

It is self-contradictory

say

that
else.

he

desires

one

thing

and
it is

works
silver

for

something
is

And, not knowing that

"

which

the substrate

of

the
it ?

this-ness,"
If

how can one who

is)

seeks silver desire

(the substrate

one says (that desire

due to

"

of the

this-ness ") not being apprehended

(silver),

as

not of the nature of that

:

that (one)

is

to be

answered thus
nature of that

since
(silver),

it

is

not apprehended to be of the

is

why

not one indifferent to

it ?

Thus, this intelligent being pulled in opposite directions by

acceptance
settled of

and indifference
the
attitude
of

is

unsettled,
"

and
"
;

is

finally

in

acceptance by the imposition

"

silver

on the substrate of
of difference
is

this-ness

thus,

the

non-apprehension
of

the cause of the activity

an
It

intelligent
is

being,

through creating superimposiof

is

tion.

thus

because

the non-apprehension of

difference the quality of silver " " the fact that of this-ness
;

imposed on the substrate

to that class

what belongs
next

(silver)

is

advantageous
is

is

brought

to

mind

that (advantageousness)
silver

next inferred in respect of the

of

(imposed)

on the substrate
;

".this-ness,"

as

it

belongs to that class

then, he

who

seeks silver engages in

;

activity in respect of that (imposed silver)

thus

is

the

sequence

established.

The memory

of silver

in general

cannot

help
"

one to infer the advantageousness of the

this-ness/' as the probans, silver-ness,

substrate of

would

not be

known

to reside in the subject. Perception (of subject

is,

and probans) in the same place

verily,

the cause of

inference, not perception in different places.

As

is

said

"(Inference

follows)

from

perception

(of

probans and
relation

subject) in the

same place by one who knows the

q^I:

"

ftfcl,

ft

'

f|

SUPERIMPOSITION
This perception
superimposition,
in the

31

same place occurs

(the

in

Hence

is

established
i.e.,

following in-

ference): the subject of dispute,

etc,,

the cognition of silver

its

has

the

object before
silver
etc.,

one for
it

content, since in

him who seeks

in

invariably induces activity

;

respect of that

(object in front)

that cognition which

a

invariably

induces

activity
its

in

him who seeks

thing

has that thing for

silver admitted

content, as in the valid cognition of

;

by both of us
is

this (cognition)

is

also so

therefore, that

so

(i.e.,

the cognition of silver has the

for
its

substrate

of

"this-ness"

content).

As

for

what
not
:

was said about nacre not being the

basis, since

it is

presented, you being questioned will have to explain this

of

what

is

it

that you
"
?

say
Is

it

is

not the basis of the

cognition

this is silver

it

of the nacreity or merely of

?

the white bright substance in front

If not

being the basis

belongs to the nacreity, certainly, (we agree).

latter not being the basis,

As
it

for the

you alone
he,

who

assert

contradict
" this

experience.
is

It

is

thus

who

has the experience

silver," does,

while so

experiencing, indicate the subetc.

stance in front with his finger

It

is

also seen that

where causes are obstructed by a defect in the production of

their normal effects they acquire the capacity to produce

other effects
forest-fire

e.g.,

the seeds of the cane parched by the

;

produce plantain-stems
is

the digestive

fire

of

him

whose stomach
quantity

affected by bhasmaka

can digest a large

of food.

The inference
of

of the truth of delusions

which

are

deprived
is

their

contents

by

sublating

perceptions
hot.

fallacious, like the inference that fire is not

As

for

what was

said about the loss of confidence in all

32

8UPERIMP08ITION
of

means
to

valid

knowledge
(to

if

illusory cognitions be said

is

be

inconstant

their contents), that

met

in the

Nyttyakanikft by us
ia

who

declare that (for cognition) there

of)
its

self-validity

through (the very fact

its

conveying
content)
;

knowledge and not through

hence
it

constancy

(to its

is

not dilated on here/*

The

criticism of the

doctrine of the loss (of the memory-ness) of

memory has
"others

been stated here only in

brief

it

is

to be learnt in detail
it is

from the BrahmatattoasamlkqU.

Hence
is

said

however
on

say

that
there

when
is

there

superimposition of one
latter

another

an assumption in the

of

an
is

opposite

attribute."

When
etc,,

on
there

nacre
is

etc.,

there

imposition of silver
properties

the attribution of the

to that very

of silver etc,,
:

which are opposed

nacre

etc.

this is the construction.

let

Now,
what
says:
of

there be these differences

in

among
?

inquirers
this of

that
in

the

present
etc.

context

To

he
the
is

"But
of

any case,"

The assumption

attributes

one thing in the case of another, that

untruth (anrtatn)\ we have explained above that that

indeterminability,

is

From

that

(it

would follow that) in the

systems

of

all

inquirers this indeterminable assumption of

the attributes of one thing in another has necessarily to

find

a place

hence this indeterminability

this
is

is

an accepted

doctrine in all systems;

is

the meaning.

The

idea

that this must be admitted, though unwillingly, by those

who maintain
between

the view of non-apprehension (of difference

as

memory and apprehension) inasmuch

they

favour the invariability of appositional designation and

activity.

ffcf

SUPIBIMPOHTION

33

Again, how can there be the superimposition of

the
object
is

and

its

attributes

on

the

inner

self,

which
an

a non-object?

For,

everyone
is

superimposes
present before

object

on another object that

him;

and

you

say

that the

inner
is

self,

which

is

outside the concept of "Thou,"

a non-object.

The

reply

is:
it

now,
is

this

is

not

invariably a non-object,
of

because

the

object

the concept "I," and

because of the immediacy of the realisation of the

inner
self.

And

there

is

no rule that an object can

another
object

be

superimposed
before

only
one.

on
For,

that

is

present

upon

ether,

though

not

perceptible,

the

unthinking

superimpose
is

surface,

impurity

etc.

Similarly there

no contradiction in

the superimposition of the non-self even on the inner

self.

This untruth

is

established in the case not only of

inquirers, but also of the

man

in the street

hence he says
"
;

"And
as
is

thus

is

our experience in the world

1

nacre appear*
this

"

(if it

were)

silver.'

This,

again,

is

not silver

the complement (to the above sentence),

Be
of

this so.
is

The delusion that one thing

established in experience
;

is

of the nature
is

another

but there

not

seen the delusion of difference in the case of

what

is

one

and
for

non-different;

whence
are

the

delusion

of

difference

the jivas

who

not different from the intelligent

34

SUPERIMPOSITIOtf
"

self ?
if

To

this he says

the moon, though one, appears as

having a second."
In the words "Again, how/'
etc.,

the superimposition
to.

on the intelligent self

is

again objected

This

is

the
be

meaning

is

this

intelligent self manifest or not ? If

it

not manifest,
objects

how can

there

be the
?

superimposition of

and their attributes thereon

of silver or its

There

is

not, verily,

the superimposition

attributes
us).

on a nonself
is

manifest
manifest,

substance
it

in

front

(of

If

this

does not stand to reason that

in

it is

inert,

and
I0

manifested

dependence on another, like a pot

is

etc.

(The

self

that

manifest should be either self-manifest or

;

manifested by another
be

it

is

not the latter

nor

can

it

the

former.)

Verily, the

same thing cannot be both

agent and object, because

indeed, that

of contradiction,

The

object

is,

which can bear the

fruit of activity
is

inherent in

another; the
(than the
of ?
self)

knowing
;

activity

not inherent in another

(self)

how, then, can that

be the object there-

Nor can the same be both

But

selfif

and other- (dependent),

because of contradiction.

inherence (of the knowing

activity) in another self be admitted, the

known

self

would

become

not-self (not

being the subject of that activity).

Further, for that (another knowing self would be required,

and) for that (another), so that there

is infinite
is

regress.

(He

who

holds

that

consciousness
;)

self-manifest,
self,

but not the

inert,

self,

may

say

be this so.

The

though

though manifest in the cognitions

of all things, is

agent alone, not object, being, like Caitra, not characterised

by

bearing

the

fruit

of

activity inherent

in

another.

In Caitra's reaching a city through activity inherent in

ffrl

3?Wi:

SIT

*f

?!

^FT
f|

^S,

*T

^f

^i* Ksni3*wti*wni<*ifi

1%

ftHWW

8UPBBIMP08ITION

35

himself, though the product inheres in both Caitra and the

city,

the object-ness belongs to the city alone, since to

the

that belongs

property of bearing the fruit of activity

inherent

in

another,

and not to Caitra, though he too

is

bears the fruit of activity, as the act of going

in Caitra (alone).

inherent

This

is

not (sound), because of opposition to Scripture,

"
:

Scripture, indeed, says

Truth, knowledge,

infinitude is

Brahman."
This
is is

intelligible too,

It

is

thus

that fruit,
in
is

which

the

manifestation of the object, that

which the
that
inert

object

and the
?

self
If

manifest

themselves,

or self-manifest

that were inert, both the object and

;

the self would be inert

in

which, then, would be manifest

which,

there being no distinction

(among the three)?

whole universe,

Thus would

result non-manifestation for the

(Nor can the reciprocal dependence

"

of these three be of

any
on

avail)

and thus the proverb

As the

blind holding
it

to the blind falls at every step."

Nor may
(yet)

be said

that cognition,

being

itself

hidden,

makes known
etc,

both the object and the

(which,
for,

self,

like the sense of sight

themselves

unperceived,
is

yet

cause perception);
the

to

make known
is

to

produce cognition, and

cognition that

produced, being inert, would not surmount

defect
(of

the

above-mentioned

the

blind

leading

the

blind).

Thus, the subsequent cognitions too being

inert,

there would be infinite regress.

Therefore, consciousness be

should

be

acknowledged

to

manifested

without

dependence on another.

Even
the
the
self,

thus,

what

is

gained (by you) for the object and

inert by

which (you hold) are both

(you

nature? This

is

gain,

may

say),

that

the

consciousness

of

36

8UPERIMP08ITION
is

them
object

not

inert.

(But
the

it

does

not
of

follow

that

the
are

and

the
in

self,

causes

consciousness,
is

not

inert);

that

case,

because the son

?

scholar,

should the father be a scholar too

It is of

the very nature

of the self-luminous consciousness to be related to the object

and the
nature

self:

if

this

be said, alas

then,

it is

equally the

of

the

scholarly son to be related to his father.

(You may define the relation thus): the manifestation of

consciousness
is

along with the manifestation of the object never

;

and

the

self,

without
this
is its

the

manifestation of the
If this

object and the self

nature,

be said,

is

consciousness,

then,
(on

different

from the manifestation

of

consciousness
of the

the

one hand),
self (on

and the manifestation

?

object

and the

the other)

If

that were so,

then, consciousness would no longer be self-manifest, nor

would consciousness be the manifestation of the object

and the
of
self.

Then, (you

may
of

say), the

two manifestations,
and
self,

consciousness

and

the
;

object

are

not

different

from consciousness

these two are but consciousis

ness.

If this

be said, then, what

said in "consciousness
self,'*

(goes) along with the

is

object and the

that (alone)

what

is

said in

(the manifestation of) consciousness

(goes) along with the manifestation of the object and the

self"

(so

that

there
is

is

r.o

advance in your position)."

be

(Hence), what
self,

desired

to

stated by you (that the

itself inert, is

the locus of the self-manifest conscious-

ness) does

not result.
is

Nor
the

there
that
for

concomitance

with

the

object

in

case

of

consciousness which
its

has objects past

and
has
there

future

sphere
in

(though

such concomitance
so
far).

been
is

assumed

the

argument

Since

generated the

cognition of rejection,

acceptance

ffcf

lo

8UPERIMPOBITION
or indifference relating to that

37

as content, there is con-

comitance with the object:

if

this be said,
etc., like

no (we reply);

because the cognition of rejection

of the

the consciousness

object

itself,

cannot intelligibly have that (past or

future object) as content.

jection
etc,,

Because of giving

rise to re-

the

cognition of rejection etc, too have the

;

object as content

and because of giving

etc,,

rise to the cogni-

tion

of rejection

which have the

object as content,

the consciousness

of

the

object too has that (object) as

content

if

this be said, since the conjunction of the

body

with the
ting

self that puts forth effort is the

cause of the set-

up and cessation of bodily activity in respect of an

is

object,

that (conjunction) too (we ask) a manifestation

its

of the

object ? Because of

inertness, (you
is

may

say), the

conjunction of the body and the self

of the object.

not a manifestation
is

Now, though

this

(consciousness)
its

self-

manifest (unlike the afore-said conjunction),

like

luminosity,
;

that

of a

glow-worm,
however,

is
it

only in respect of itself

is

in

respect of

objects,

inert

this has

been ex-

plained (by the analogy of the scholarly son's father),

Nor are

objects of the very nature of light

;

(i.e.,

of con-

sciousness, as the Vijfianavadins say)

as
finite,

they are experienced

itself as

as

long or gross, while light manifests

internal,

short nor long. neither gross nor subtle,^neither

Therefore,

we

see

fit

to

hold
is

that the object,

certainly

which

is

other than the self-manifest,

like

indeterminable,

the second

moon

experienced along with the moon.

is

And no
such
the

natural differentiation

experienced in this light as

its

(so
self,

that

there
is

is

no obstacle to

identity with

which

one).

Nor can

differences

among

objects,

38

8UPERIMPOBITION
differences into light,
4'

which are indeterminable, introduce

which
is

determinate,

as

that would prove too much.

It will also be

shown

later that reciprocal difference does not

of

come

in

the line
is

valid

knowledge,

Therefore,

this
eter-

very light, which

nal,

self-luminous, one, immutable,

is

without

parts,

the

inner

self,

i.e.,

the self that

knows the
organs
etc,,

determinate

self

to be other than the body,

which are indeterminable.

not being other-dependent for
its

That
tion,

self,

manifesta(of

and being without parts, cannot be an object

cog-

nition),

How,
"

then, can there be the superimposition thereof objects,

i.e.,

on of the attributes

of bodies,
is

organs etc,?

The word
objection,

how"

(in the commentary)

in the sense of

an
;

This superimposition does not stand to reason

does it not stand to reason ? To this is the objection. " For, every one superimposes an object upon this he says
:

Why

another object that

is

is

present before one.

is

11

This

is

what

said:

that,

whose manifestation

other-dependent and
it is,

which has
hended in
fic

parts, appears other

its

than what

being appreits speci-

general nature, but not apprehended in

nature, because of defect in the organs

self,

(of cognition).
its

The

inner

however, not being other-dependent for

mani-

festation, does not require for the

knowledge
itself
it

of itself

any

organs, by defects in

which

it

would
case,

become

defective.

Nor has
in

it

any

parts, in

which

could be apprehended

some

part, but

not in othersis

It cannot, verily,

happen
itself

that the

same

(thing)

at the

same time and by

;

both apprehended and not apprehended

of

hence on the view

the self-luminosity (of the

self)

there can be no super-

imposition,

(And) even

if

it

be never manifest, there can

lllcf

f|

rl^f

ft<5ic*fi

aa iy^Ji

8UPKRIMP08TTION
be
is

39

no superimposition,
not immediately

since

it

is

not before us,

Silver
is
",

i.e.,

experienced.
"
this
is

not, verily,

superimposed in the form

is

silver
it

when

nacre

not present before us,

Hence

follows

that there
is

can be no superimposition both when there

apprehension and when there
is

complete

total non-apprehension.

Be

this

so.

If the intelligent self

were not an

object,
;

then indeed, there could be no superimposition thereon

but
it is

the

object of the concept

"l",

Why
For,

then

can
"

there
is

be

no

superimposition?
'

To

this

he says;
if

which

ever outside the concept of

Thou V

the

intelligent self

were the

object, the subject (viqayin)

would be
himself

other than that.

And

thus, he

who

is

the subject

is

the intelligent self; the object, however, should be admitted

to
of
is

be other than that, and in the sphere of the concept

"
"
*

Thou

".

Hence,
for

being outside the concept of

of

Thou

'

"

(stated)

the purpose

remedying the possibility

infinite regress
;

of non-selfhood (for the self)

it

and of

hence

is

that

not

being an object has to be predicated of

is

the self; and thus, there

no superimposition: this

is

the

meaning,

He
object

answers

this:

"The

reply

isnow,
u

this
it

is is

not
the

invariably a non-object/'
of the concept 'I
1
.

Why
11

(not)?
is
is

Because

This

the meaning: true,

the inner self being self-manifest

is

not an object and

without parts
the
j'U a,
;

but yet, having attained to the state

really defined

of

though not

by the particular

defining conditions
less

posited by indeterminable beginningas

Nescience, such

the

intellect,

the mind, bodies

if

subtle and gross, and the organs, he appears as

defined

though not

different, he appears as

if

different; though

40
not

8TJPERIMP08ITION
an
agent,

he

appears

as

agent; though not an

enjoyer, he appears as enjoyer;

ject,

and

though not an ob" "

I
;

he appears

as the

object

of the concept

just

as

the ether because of differences defined by adjuncts

pot,

such as

ewer,

basin

etc,,

appears as different and

possessing

diverse

attributes,
of

Of the

self that
is

is

but of
verily,

the

one

essence

intelligence,

there

not,

anything unapprehended, when

is

the element of intelligence

apprehended,
indeed,

Bliss,

eternality,

pervasiveness

etc. are

not,

different

from
not

its

nature as intelligence,

such

that

they
of

are

apprehended along with the

apprehension

that

element.

While being certainly

apprehended, yet, because of posited difference, they appear

as
if

not discriminated, and hence not apprehended.

Nor

is

the difference of the self from the intellect etc. real, so that
that (difference) too
self is
is

apprehended, when the intelligent

the intellect
the
is

apprehended

for,

etc.,

being indeteris

minable, their difference (from

self)

too

indeter-

minable (and unreal).

itself,

Thus,

it

for the intelligent self

is

which

is

self-manifest

and undefined, that there

the condition of the jlva,

the
difference

through non-apprehension of
intellect
etc.,

from

the defined
of

and the

(consequent)

superimposition
the

these.

Of

this,

which

partakes

of

nature
"

of

the
"

the intelligent

self)

and the

being the object of the concept

this (the inert object), " "

I
is intelligible.

"not-this (non-object: "

It is

"

thus
as

the intelligent self appears, in the concept

"
I, is

agent

and
there

enjoyer,

And

for that

(self)

which

indifferent

cannot occur the capacity either to act or

for that aggregate of the effect (the body)
*'.*.,

to enjoy.

And

and

the organs,

the intellect

etc.,

to

which belong the

ffrf

"

"

8UPEBIMPOBITION
capacities to act and enjoy, there
it is

41

is

no

intelligence,

Hence,

the intelligent self that, linked to the aggregate of the

effect (the

body) and the organs, gains the capacity to act

;

and enjoy

though self-manifest, yet by intermixture with

objects like the intellect etc., it somehow becomes the object " " M " of the concept the substrate of and is I-ness, I, (variously)
of the field

designated
(ksetrajila).

jlva,

creature

(jantu),
is

or

knower

The
self,

jlva indeed For,

not different
Scripture:

from

the
its

intelligent

thus
flva"

runs
etc."

"in

own

nature,

as

that

Thus, the

jiva though

self-manifest,
self,

because of being non-different

"
is

from the intelligent

fit

yet

made by

"
I

the concept

for
is

empirical

usage

as

agent and

enjoyer; hence
"
I ".

it

said to be the basis

(to

of the concept
is

Nor

is it

admissible
in

say)

that there

reciprocal dependence
if

that

(the jlva)

becomes an object
is

there
(he)

is

super-

imposition, and there

object;
for,
of)

superimposition
is

if

becomes an

the (process)

beginningless, like the (depenis

dence

seed and sprout, and there

no inconsistency in
its

every subsequent superimposition having for

object that

which has been made the content

"

of

each earlier superbeen said in the

imposition and
text
of the
it

its

impressions

this

has

commentary; "this natural empirical usage/'

:

Hence

has been well-said

"now,
not

this is not invariably

non-object."

The

jlva

though

an object, as (nonself-manifest,
is

different from)

the intelligent self and as

is

yet

an object

in his conditioned

form

this

the idea,

42

8UPEBIMP08ITION

Be

this so.

We

do not deny superimposition on the

is

ground that the jloa

not an object, his manifestation

;

not being other-dependent

we maintain

rather that the

inner self does not shine either of itself or with the help
of

another,
self,

and

is

hence not an
is

object,

Hence on the
there be

inner

which
?

never manifest,
"
this

how can
"

superimposition

To

he says

and because of the

self,

immediacy

of the realisation of the inner

self,

Prathn

is

the realisation of the inner

thereof.

because of the immediacy

is

Though,

in the inner self, realisation

not some-

thing other than that, yet the difference (implied in the words
"realisation
telligence
intelligent

of the

self")

is

figurative,
is

as

in
is

"the
said:
to

in-

of

the

self",

This

what
be

the

self

should

necessarily

admitted

be

immediately perceived, since from the non-manifestation

thereof would follow the non-manifestation of everything

and the blindness of the universe

this has
;

been already

said.
all

"

And

there

is

Scripture to this effect

That shining,
<s

else shines after it;

by

its light all this

shines."

Having given
vHdin^
another
self:

this real answer,

he states as a prau$ha-

answer,

assuming the mediacy of the

is

intelligent

"And

there

no rule"
i.e.,

etc.

"Only on
is

another object present before one/'

only on what

immediate

(directly perceived).

Why

is

there no such rule

To
etc.

" this he says: "For, upon ether, though not perceptible

The

(particle)

hi
is

means for

the reason that

Ether,

though a substance,

yet devoid

of

form and touch;

:,

ft

8UPERIMP08ITION

43

This aforementioned superimposition of this character,

wise

men

hold to be Nescience, and as distinct

from that, the determination of the nature of the thing,

they call knowledge, Here, such being the case,

when

hence

it

cannot be cognised by an external sense,

Nor

can

it

be cognised by the mind, since the unaided mind

external ; hence it is not " of this, children/ ?,#., those
is
1

does not act in respect of what

perceived,

Now,

in

respect

who
what

possess no discriminative
is

knowledge, those

who

see

shown them by

others,

superimpose sometimes

blueness,

the colour of the earth, sometimes whiteness,

fire,

the property of

and determine

it

to be blue like the

petals of the nllotpda (blue lily) or white like a

row

of raja-

hamsas (swans),
tion,

Here

too, there is, in the

form of recollec-

the appearance of the property of the formerly seen

"

brightness or darkness,
'

Thus, even thereon, they

it

superof

impose surface,
indranlla gems,

likening

to a

huge inverted bowl made

;

He

concludes thus

"Similarly,"
all

i.e.,

in the

manner
"

set forth
is

above, through answering

objections,

there
self/'

no contradiction in the superimposition of the notof

t.*,,

the intellect

etc.,

"even on the inner self ".

;

Now, there
should
this

are thousands of superimpositions

why

particular

one

be expounded through the

?

statement of objection and answer

Why

not the general

?

nature alone of superimposition (be expounded)

To

this

he

says:

"This

afore-mentioned

superimposition

of

this

44

8UPERIMP08ITION
the superimposition
of

there
latter

is is

one on another, the

not affected, even to the extent, of an atom,

by the good or bad features produced by the former,

It
is

in

the

wake

of

this

aforementioned reciprocal
is

superimposition of the self and the not-self, which

designated Nescience, that there proceed

all

empirical

usages of the world relating to valid knowledge and the

means

thereof,

and

all

the sacred teachings relating

to prescription, prohibition

and

release,

character, wise

men

hold to be Nescience,"
epics,
it

It is

well-known
etc,,

from Scripture, traditional codes,

Nescience
is

puranas

that

the seed

of all evil;

will be said later

that the Vedftnta sets out to remove that Nescience,

The
alone

superimposition of the not-self on the inner self

the cause of
that
all

is

evil,

not the delusion of silver

;

etc,

hence
of

alone

is

Nescience
nature,
it

since?

in

the absence

the
is

knowledge of

its

cannot be removed, that alone

expounded, not superimposition in general

By

the words

"of
evil,
evil,

this character" there is declared its

being the cause of

It is

because of
because
it

its

being of that form.

the cause of
self suffer

makes the non-suffering inner

etc.,

by imposing
with appetite

the adverse internal organ

etc,,

associated
etc.

on the inner

self free

from appetite

Nor
too,

is

superimposition considered to be such by others

in

which

case,
it is

there would
"

be no need

for

the

exposition,

Hence

said

wise

men hold"

etc,

srft^ftr

^^5%

STfrlT

3^ ^ " ^4^ft^^m. "

ffrl

f^TT
:
I

SUPERIMP08ITION

45

Now,

this

Nescience

associated

with

impressions,

which are beginningless, deep-rooted and dense, cannot be

removed,
thinks
so,

there

being no means

therefor;
it

to

him who
:

the

means

for

removing

is

declared thus
i.e,,

"and, as distinct from that, the determination,''

know-

of the thing, they," ledge not subject to doubt "of the nature
i.e.,

wise

men
is

"call knowledge",

It

is

verily in the inner

etc,,

self,

which

wholly distinct from the intellect

that,

because of the non-apprehension of the difference from

the intellect
etc,,

there

is

superimposition of the nature

and attributes of the

of difference

intellect, etc,

The non-apprehension

being removed by the cognition of difference

(e,<?,,

through hearing
that
of

study of the VedSnta), reflection

?;fe,,

etc.,

which

sublates Nescience,
i:

the ascertainment
is

the

nature

of

things,
self,

knowledge, which
stands forth in
its

of

the
;

nature of the intelligent

this is the

own

nature

meaning.
so,

Be
and

this

Nescience associated with deep-rooted

sublated
its

dense

impressions, though

by knowledge,
impressions, and

will come up again, because of

own

bring

about results suitable to

etc,

itself,
4<

such as (further)
Here, such being the

impressions
case,"
i.e,,

To

this

he says

there being this kind of ascertainment of the

"
of things,

true nature

when
is

there
not,

is

the superimposition of

one on another, the latter

even to the extent of an

atom, affected by the good or bad features produced by the

46
1

SUPBR1MP08ITION

former'
of the

the intelligent self

is

not affected by the defects

internal organ etc,, such as appetite etc,, nor are

the

internal

organ

etc.

affected

by the good features of

etc,

the intelligent selfintelligence, bliss

is

This

is

what

said

it

is

of the very nature of the repetition of the

it

ascertainment of truth that

removes illusory cognition,

though beginningless and having deep-rooted and dense

impressions,
It
is,

indeed,

of the nature of the intellect

to be partial to truth,

As even

outsiders say:

''Of the

essential nature of things unaffected

by

error, there is

no

sublation

for,

the intellect, even though

it,"

making no

effort,
is

has a partiality for

"

More

particularly (there

the

question);
internal

Whence can

there be sublation of the wholly

of
self,

(intimate)

knowledge

the

truth,

which

is

of
is

the nature of the intelligent

"

by Nescience, which

indeterminable

"

In the statement
there
is,

coupling the true with the untrue,

through non-discrimination of each from the other,

the empirical usage 'I

am

this/

'this is

mine/" empirical
is

usage

in

the nature of verbal designation

expressly

mentioned,

Ordinary
is

word
the

Hi

shown

empirical usage, " in the words;

indicated
It is in

by the

the
of

wake of
the
telf

afore-mentioned
not-self,

mutual

superimposition

and the

designated Nescience" etc,;

this is self-

explanatory*

"

?r

5fT

8UPERIMP08ITION

47

How,
of valid
to

again,

is it

that perception and other means

knowledge and sacred teachings have reference

?

one characterised by Nescience

The reply

is

when

one devoid of the conceit of "I" and "mine" in one's

body,
the
is

senses

etc.,

cannot intelligibly be a knower,

the

functioning
unintelligible.
etc,
is

of

means

of

valid

knowledge

Indeed, empirical usage relating to

perception
of

not possible without the employment

is

the senses;

and the functioning of the senses

;

not possible without control

is

nor by a body on which

not superimposed the nature of the self can anything

be operated.

And when none

of these

is

present, the

unattached

self

cannot intelligibly be a knower.

And

without a knower, there can be no functioning of the

means

of

valid

knowledge.
of valid

Therefore,

perception

and other means

teachings
Nescience.

knowledge and the sacred

to

have

reference

one

characterised

by

An
tion

"

objection

is

raised

How,
"

again,

is it

that percep-

and other means

of valid

knowledge have reference to

Valid knowledge or oidu&
;

one characterised by Nescience ?

is,

verily,

determination of the truth

how can

the means of

valid

knowledge which are instruments thereto have for

their locus
valid

what

is

characterised by Nescience
find a locus in
effect, viz.,

Means

of

knowledge cannot

what

is

characterised
is

by Nescience, since their

knowledge,

opposed

48
to Nescience
as

BUPERIMPOSITION
this
is

the idea,

Or

let

perception etc, be

you say empirically

is

(valid); but sacred teachings,

is

whose

purport

to teach

what

beneficial to

man, being opposed

is

to Nescience, cannot

have
"

reference to "

what

characterised

by Nescience; hence he says:

"

and sacred teachings/'

He

answers
1

The
'

reply

is/'

When

one devoid of the conceit of

'

1'

and

mine

in the body, senses etc,/' devoid of the super-

"
of the imposition of the nature and attributes
intelligibly
self,

cannot

be a knower, the functioning of the means of valid

is unintelligible/'
is

knowledge
a knower
that
is

This

is

the

meaning:

to
;

be

to

be an agent in respect of knowledge and

(in

indepeadence
consists

respect
inciting

of the
all

cognitive

act).

Independence
other than

in

causal conditions

the

knower, without being incited by them.

By him,
of valid

therefore, is to bo incited the pramfirw, the

means
incited

knowledge.

Nor can an instrument be

without acivity on one's part,

eternal,

Nor can the immutable,

is

intelligent

self,

which

incapable of transfor-

mation, be active

of itself.

Hence, being active by the

etc,,

superimposition of the nature of the intellect

are
active, it

which
;

can control the means of valid knowledge

therefore, the
i,e n

means

of valid

knowledge have reference

to,

are located in the person characterised by Nescience.

Now,

let

it

be that the

means

of valid

knowledge do
"
:

not function

what do we

lose ?

To

this

he says
is

Indeed,

empirical usage relating to

perception

etc,

not possible,

without the employment of the senses etc."

empirical usage, means
fruit,

Vyavaharah
is

because there

usage on

account of that

the fruit of the

means

of valid knowledge,

rare:

18

fft

^11

8UPERIMP08ITION
"

49

like perception

etc.,

is

here meant.

The senses

"

should

be

taken to denote the senses, the probans

(in inference)

etc., like the " in there go

word "dantfin (man with the

staff),"

(which)
possess

men with
;

"

staves
is

(denotes those

who

no staves as well)
ts

thus

intelligible the expression (" etc,,"

in)

perception

etc."
;

The

verb

in

"empirical usage"
"

implies the agent

hence a

common

"

subject (for

usage
is:

and "without the employment").

The construction

the empirical usage (which results) without the employment.

Why
1

should the knower employ the means of valid

knowledge?
"

Why
this
of

should

they

not

function

of

them-

selves?
senses,"

To
i.e.,

he says:

"and
of

the functioning of the

the means
".

valid

knowledge

*'is

not

possible without control

in

Never do instruments function

without being controlled by

respect

of

their

objects

agents, lest cloth

should

originate

from the shuttle

etc.,

without (being controlled by) a weaver.

not the body
itself

Why,
this

then, should

be the controller

Superimposition of
"

the self would, then, be superfluous.

To

he says

nor
self,

by a body, on which
can
anything
result

is

not superimposed the nature of the

for,

be

operated";
in

otherwise,

functioning
this
is

would
idea.

even

(dreamless)

sleep;

the

Be
of

this so,

Just as a weaver

is

an agent in the case

nature on the
so

the cloth, without superimposing his

etc.,

shuttle

but by

operating them,

even

superimposing his nature on the body, orgar

by operating them, he who knows them

etc.)

(th*

may become
i.e.,

a knower.

To

this he sr

none of these/'
"

reciprocal superimpos

attributes

is

present, the unattached

50

SUPERIMP08ITION
at all times, from all attributes

ways and
"cannot
etc.

and substrates,

intelligibly

be a knower".
etc.,

It is

the active weaver

that control the shuttle

and operate them, whereas

for

the

self,

whose self-hood has not been superimposed

etc,,
:

on the body

there can be no activity, because of

this is the

its

being unattached
fore, the

meaning,

Necessarily, therein superim-

means

of valid

knowledge are located

"
:

position.

Thus he says

And

without knowership, there

can be no activity of the means of valid knowledge."

verily,

He,

becomes a knower, who

fruit,

is

independent in respect
Valid

of

the

valid

knowledge,

knowledge

is

variety of the modification of the internal organ, directed

towards the object known, and

intelligence

is

of the nature of the

residing

in

the

agent.

And how

could

modification of the inert internal organ be of the nature

of intelligence,
if

the intelligent self were not superimposed

thereon
as

How,
if

again, could this have the intelligent self

agent,

the

functioning internal organ were not

superimposed on the intelligent self? Hence, from reciprocal

superimposition, there results the fruit called valid knowledge,

which

resides in the intelligent self as agent

when
same

that results,
valid

there

results

knowership.

With

this

knowledge as content, there ensues the activity of the

"

means

of valid knowledge.
is

By the

use of the word

49

knower-

ship," valid knowledge

also implied.

If the fruit, valid

Vim-

1 -

^e, were non-existent, the means of valid knowledge

^e active
to
;

and thus the means of valid knowledge

be

such

this

is

the

meaning.

He

refore, perception

and other means of valid

ference only to

what

is

characterised by

STffrl:

5PRT
T

srfrf

srft

SUPfiRIMPOSmON

51

And
etc, etc,

because there

is

no distinction from beasts

Indeed, as beasts
are
is

etc,,

when

their sense of hearing

brought

into

relation

with sound
etc,,

etc.,
is

if

there

produced a cognition of sound

that

un-

favourable, recede from them, and

if it is

favourable,

approach them; and as they, seeing a

man

approach

with a stick held aloft in his hand, begin to run

"
thinking,
his in

away

he desires

to beat

me

",

but seeing

him with
;

hand
the

filled

with green grass, proceed towards him

too,

same way, men

though of cultivated minds,

seeing strong

men

of fierce

mien shouting, sword held

aloft in the hand, recede

from them, but approach them

to

of

an opposite character the empirical usage relating

;

means and
is

objects of valid

knowledge

in the case of
it is

men
well

similar to that of beasts,

And for beasts etc,,

Be
ignorant

this so.

Let this be the

case in respect of the

ones,

Even

for

those persons, however,

who

have understood the true nature of the inner

self prois

pounded
seen
the

by

Scripture

and reasoning (thereon), there

relating

empirical

usage

to

means

of valid

knowledge and objects known thereby; how, then, can

means

of

valid

knowledge have reference only to one

"

characterised

by
is

Nescience

To

this

he says

And

because there

no distinction from beasts etc."

Scripture
different

It

may

be

that,

through

and reasoning, they know

the inner self as

from the body, organs etc,;

52

8UPERIMP08ITION
that empirical usage relating to perception etc,

known

always comes in the wake of non-discrimination,

since

And

we

see a similarity to them,

it is

concluded that
relat-

even in the case of learned men, empirical usage

ing to the perception
etc, is, for

the time being, similar.

in respect,

however, of the empirical usage relating to

means

of valid

knowledge and the objects known, they do

not rise above the characteristic of beings that merely bear

life.

The

activity even of these learned ones

is

seen to be

of

the same nature as

is

the

activity

of beasts and birds,

whose stupidity

undisputed,

Because of this similarity,

is

characterisation by Nescience
(learned
particle
ones),

inferred

even for those

at

the time of the sense

of

empirical usage,

The

"and" has

linking up (this with

is:

the reason already given).

The meaning

the afore-

mentioned reasoning together with the above-stated answer

to

the objection

establishes

in

the case

of

the means

of valid

knowledge that they have reference to persons

by
Nescience,
"

characterised
"

This

itself

is

analysed:
"

Indeed, as beasts

etc.

Here, by the words

when

their

sense of hearing
etc,,"

etc.

are brought into relation with sound

as

there

is

shown perception
fruit
is

the means of valid

knowledge.
cognition
of

Its

mentioned in the words: "the

"If
It
is
it

sound

etc/'

be unfavourable"

states

the

fruit

of inference

thus: after cognising the

nature of the sound, and remembering the unfavourable

nature of that class of sound, unfavourableness
is

inferred

ft*!

fIrf

3?5{

ffrl |frl
I

rWT f|

ffrl

f|

8UPERIMP08ITION

S3

But

in the case

of empirical usage relating to'the

sacred teaching, although no person with forethought,

unless he

knows the

relation

of the self to the other

it,

world,

will

consider himself eligible for

still,

the

true self that can be

known only from

etc.,
etc.,
;

the Vedantas,

as transcending hunger
like

divested of differentiations

brahmin, katriya

not required for eligibility

and non-transmigrating, is for, it (the true self) is of no

of

what
"

is
:

perceived to
"

belong to that

class.

This

is

exemplified
aloft
etc.

and, as they, seeing a

man

with a stick held

The sense
so.

of the rest is not obscure,

it

Be
reference

this

Let

be that perception

etc.

have

to

one

characterised

by

Nescience.

The

sacred teaching,
desires

however, which teaches that one who

should
sacrifice

Heaven
on,
of

with

the

jyotistoma
the superverily,
fit

and

so

cannot induce activity

the body
is

through
Here,
is

imposition
eligible

on the
to be

self.

the

person
"

known

one who

to

enjoy

fruit

in
:

another world.

Hence the aphorism

(what
is

of the great

sage

The
is

fruit

of

enjoined in) the sacred

since
it

teaching
nature

for

the person directed,

it

is

of that

(i.e.,

since

is

an injunction understood through

*

verbal testimony,

in the

form

He who
')
;

desires

Heaven

is

to sacrifice with the jyotistoma

self

hence, one should oneetc..

engage

(in the act enjoined).'*

fit

Bodies

which become
;

ashes, are not

for (enjoyment) of fruit in another world

hence the sacred teaching postulates by implication some

eligible

person other than the body

(vidyft),

etc.

the understanding

of

it

being knowledge

how can
But

the sacred teaching

?

have reference to one characterised by Nescience

"

Rais-

ing this objection,

he says

in the case of empirical

54
service

8UPERIMP08ITION

and

is

opposed to

eligibility.

And any

sacred

teaching that functions before the realisation of the self

as of such a nature does not go

beyond the reference

It
is

to

one characterised by Nescience.

thus: texts like,

"A

brahmin shall sacrifice" function, as based on the

self of differentiations like caste,

superim position on the

orders of
life,

age
to

etc.

usage
cle

relating

the sacred teaching"

etc

The

parti-

but" distinguishes from empirical usage like peretc.,

ception
Indeed,

that
in

which

relates

to the sacred teaching.

of

since,
for

the absence

a relation to another

world

the person

who

desires

Heaven, the sacred

it

teaching relating to eligibility cannot carry on,

to

has

postulate

that

much

alone by implication, not his

freedom from the migratory cycle

too;

for,

this

is

of

no service in respect of
in

eligibility

the person propounded

is,

the

TJpanisads,

being neither agent nor enjoyer,

It is

rather, opposed to eligibility.

the person that engages

in action and

is,

verily, the

enjoyer of the enjoyments that

is

are the

fruit

produced by the acts, that

the person

eligible to

perform the act, the lord (thereof).

a non-agent be one

who engages
?

in activity

How can How can a

non-enjoyer be the enjoyer of the enjoyments that are

the fruit produced by the acts
relating
to

Hence, the sacred teaching

prohibitions
sets

prescriptions

and
being,

out in
of

respect

of

that

human

who

has

a conceit

agency, enjoyership, brahminhood etc., acquired through

beginningless Nescience.

Thus, the Vedantas too have refe;

rence only to the person characterised by Nescience

there
is

for,

not the understanding of their sense, in the absence

of the distinction of the

knower

etc.

They, instructing the

rWT

'

d'-

f|

JteH 4 1*^*1 II :

ri:

'

^fcf

8UPERIMP08ITION
person
the

SS
establish
all

characterised

by

Nescience,

him

in

form

taught

by

them,
;

from which
is

Nescience
(from

has
the
final

been

wiped
of

out

this

their distinction

teaching

injunctions,

which
it

brings

about no

establishment).

Hence,

is

established that the

sacred teachings have reference only to persons characterised

by Nescience.
this
so.

Be

Though,

because

of

opposition

and
is

non-utility, the person propounded in the

Upanisads
as

not needed in respect of eligibility, yet

the

learnt from

Upanisads

(in

the course

of the
is

normally prescribed
of

study
in

adhyayana),

that (person)

capable

standing

the

way
of the

of eligibility.

Thus, because of the sense of

of

each

(part)

being destructive

that

of the

other, the

whole
of

Veda would To
"

lose
this

its

authority
"

as a

means
sacred
of

valid

knowledge.

he says:
the

And any

teaching which
self as of

functions

before
etc.

realisation

the

such

a nature

True, the understanding

of

the

person propounded
;

in

the Upanisads
that,

is

opposed

to of

eligibility

but

prior

to

the

prescriptions

acts

bring about suitable empirical usage, and they

cannot
has

be

counteracted by
yet

Brahman-knowledge, which

not

been generated.
a

Nor

is

there

reciprocal

annulment,
spheres)
is

since

differentiation

(of

their respective

intelligible,
(to

on the basis of the difference in

they
relate)

the

persons

whom
of

as
:

characterised by

knowledge or Nescience.
of the element "

For example
is

though, in respect
"

what

to be accomplished, there is the

prohibition

Injure
sets

not
forth

any living being,

"

the sacred
kill his

teaching which
(by

He who would
1
'

enemy
this?

an

evil

spell)

should sacrifice with the ?y*na"isnot

contradicted

by

"injure not

etc.;

wherefore

is

56

SUPEKIMP08ITION

We
not that,

have already said that what

is

is

called super-

imposition

the cognition as something of

is

what

is

This

how when

the son, wife etc.

are

unsound or sound, one superimposes on oneself the

butes of external things, as

attri-

"I am myself sound

unsound

"
;

similarly the attributes of the body in

51

or "
I

Because of the difference in the persons (addressed).

persons
eligible

The

who
in

have

conquered
of

the

enemy

angerare
however,
(are
etc.

respect

the prohibition;
of

those,

who

are

under

the power

the

enemy

anger

eligible)

in respect of the

teaching about the s'yena

it

What was

said (about the sacred teaching that)

"

does

not go beyond the reference to the person characterised

by Nescience, that
Superimposition
of

itself is

made
"

"
It
is,

clear in

thus.

caste
"

The

king

is

to
of

sacrifice

with
life
:

the
"

rajasttya

etc.

superimposition
a

orders

of

The house-holder should obtain

etc.;
is

wife of equal
hair

status"
is

superimposition
tend the fires"
is

of

age:

"He whose
is

black
"
:

to

etc.;

superimposition of
to give

state
life

He whose malady

incurable
etc."

up

his

by plunging into the water

and so on.

The

expression "et cetera" serves to include sins, major and minor, causing intermixture, unworthiness or defilement,

and other such superimpositions.

Having
answer
and the
the

thus

expounded

through

objection
of

and
self

reciprocal

superimposition
it

the

not-self,

and strengthened

by

the discourse

on

the

means
us
of

and
its

objects

of

valid

knowledge, he
nature,
in

reminds
to

already
its

declared

order
:

expound

elaborately

being
is

the

cause of evil

"We

have already said that what

called superimposition

ffrl

15

'

ffrf;

ffcf

ffcl

BUPEBIMPOBITION

57
M

am
"
I

fat;

"I am lean; "I am

"
;

fair,"

stand," "I go,"

"
I

jump

similarly the attributes of the senses in

"
;

am

dumb, one-eyed, impotent, deaf, blind

similarly

the attributes of the internal organ, like desire, resolve,

doubt, determination,

In this
"

way
" I

after superimposing
self

the denotation of the concept

is

on the inner

that

the witness of

its

entire activities,

by the reverse of

that, one superimposes that inner self, the witness of all,

on the internal organ

etc,

"
is

the cognition as something of

what

is

not thai

This

is

summary way

of stating

what was

said earlier, that

it is

"the appearance elsewhere, with a nature

recollection, of
is

like to that

of

what was seen

before".

Here,

I,"

which

the superimposition of the nature of the substrate alone,

"
of evil

cannot be the cause

the

without generating the

attributes;
of

mine,"
superis

superimposition

of

hence
*

the
"

imposition of attributes, the notion

mine,
of

alone

the

direct

cause
is

of

the

entire

evil

the migratory
is

cycle; this

elaborately explained in: "It

thus:

when

the son, wife" etc,

Superimposing identity with the body

on the
of

self,

and superimposing thereon the bodily attribute

etc.,

the ownership of son, wife

"
etc,,

in the

same way

as
"

leanness

one says

am

myself unsound or sound,

The sense

of ownership being complete,

when there

is

full-

ness of wealth, the owner {in this case) becomes complete,

58

8UPKR1MPQ8ITIOI
from the lack of wealth, ownership too

perfect

similarly,

becoming incomplete, the owner becomes incomplete, imperfect

The external
to

attributes, like

unsoundness which

attach

the body through

the channel of ownership,

self:

these one superimposes on the

this is the meaning.

When

this

is

the case in respect of bodily attributes, like

ownership, dependent on external adjuncts, what need be

said

about bodily attributes, like leanness

?

etc.,

which do
:

not depend on external adjuncts

"

In this view, he says

" etc.

Similarly, the attributes of the body

He

superimposes

on the

self

the attributes of deafness

etc.,

which are the

attributes

of

the senses, which are more intimate than

the body, and on which the nature of the self has been

superimposed; (he also superimposes on the

resolve
etc.,

self)

desire,

which are

attributes

of the

internal organ,

which

is

even more intimate, and on which the nature of

is

the self has been superimposed: this

the construction.

Having
attributes,
"

in this exposition stated the superimposition of

its

he states

basis,

the superimposition of the

substrate:

In this way, after superimposing the denotation

of the concept " n

T"

etc.

That in which the psychosis, the

i.e.,

concept

It

occurs,

the internal organ, that

is

the
is

denotation of the concept

"l" (ahampr aiyayin)

self,

that

superimposed on the inner

intelligence

which, on account of
is

its

and

indifference,

the

witness

of

the

processes of the internal organ.

Thus are explained agency

"
is

and enjoyership.

Intelligence

explained

by the reverse

SRWTRRR

cR: ^cft ^trE

BUPERIMP08ITION

59

Thus, this beginningless and endless natural superimposition, of the nature of illusory cognition, which

causes

agency,

enjoyership

etc.,

is

directly

experi-

enced by the entire world.

this cause of evil, for the

It

is

for the

removal of

attainment of the knowledge

of that," by

the reverse of the internal organ

etc,

etc,,

the
is

internal

organ by
u

are

inert,

the

reverse

of

that
is

intelligence;
to imply
self,
is

that;

the

instrumental

case

used

in this

wise
all,

"-"one

superimposes that inner

etc/'

the witness of

on the internal organ

inner
self

This

what

is

said hereby: the

defined

by the

internal organ etc,, the intelligent being compounded of " " " the this and the not-this," is the jlva, the agent, the enjoyer, the support of the

two kinds of Nescience

"

the result

and the cause,

the substrate of

I-ness," the transmigrates

the vessel of the entire host of woes, the material cause

of

reciprocal
is

superimposition

the

material

cause

of

that again
less,
of)

superimposition

hence, this being beginningis

like the

seed and the sprout, there

not (the defect

reciprocal dependence,

Superimposition,
discourse on the

which has been confirmed by the

objects of valid knowledge,
is

means and

yet further confirmed for the benefit of the pupil, through a

declaration of
"
its

nature, this being perceived by the whole

"

world

Thus, this beginningless, endless

in the

etc.

(" Endless

"

means) not being destructible

ledge.
is

absence of true know-

The cause

stated: "natural,"

of the beginning] essness and endlessness " " Of the nature of illusory cognition ;

60
of

8UPERIMP08ITIOK
the

oneness of the

self,

that
is

all

the Vedantas
purport of the
this

are

commenced.
Vedanta,

How
we

this

the
in

entire

shall

show

S'arlraka-

mlmarpsa.

the

nature

of

illusory
it

cognitions
is

is

indeterminability
;

that to which
indeterminable.

belongs

stated here

that

means

it is

"

He

concludes the topic

"
etc.

It is

for

the removal of

this cause of evil

Whence
?

the removal of this, in

the absence of an opposed concept

To

this

he says: "for the

attainment
Pratipattik

of
is

the knowledge of the oreness of the self."

attainment

for that purpose, not merely for

rites.

purposes of incantation

nor for engaging in

The

oneness of the self

is

entire dissociation from the universe,

while existing in the form of bliss.

indubitably bring about that

The Vedantas, which

attainment, destroy super-

imposition
if

from
"

its

very root.

This
is

is

what
self,

is

said:
valid,

the eoncept

I,"

whose content

the

were

there would be no desire to

of
its

know Brahman, on the ground

being

known and

(the inquiry) being unprofitable.

In the absence of that (desire

to

know), the Vedanta

would

not

be

studied for the knowledge of Brahman,

but would only serve the unintended purpose of incantation.

Then,
indeed,

the

Upanisadio

oonoept

of

the self would not,

this invalid (concept),

enjoy validity.

Nor would

though

oft repeated, avail

etc.,

to remove the real agency,

It
is,

enjoye/ship

of the

self.

indeed, an imposed
real

form

that

is

removed by true knowledge, not the

57

f|

8UP1BIMPOBITIOH
by untrue knowledge*

61

The rope-nature

of the rope cannot

be negated even by a thousand continuous apprehensions

of a

snake.

The form occasioned by

illusory cognition)

however,

can

be negated by true knowledge, and the

impression of illusory cognition,

impression produced
ledge
practised

though strong, by the

through the repetition of true know-

with close application, unintermittently

and

for a long time,

Be
etc.

this so.

The meditations on the

(to

vital air (prctya)

are also largely seen

all

be taught) in the Vedanta,

Then, how can

of "

the Ved&nta texts have the one object

teaching the oneness of the self?

this
is

To

this
"

he says:
etc.

That

the purport of the entire Vedanta

The

body
is

(s'arlra) is itself called

sfirZrafca, i,e^

varlraka
.

what

resides therein
is

the

the jlw-self
is

That inquiry

mentioned
by the

here
"

whose purpose
"

to

show

of that self denoted

"
(in

thou

That thou

art "), that his nature is that of "

the supreme self denoted by the

that
is

".

This
(1)

is

the

summary

of

what

meant here

though

by the injunction to study one's

it

own

section of the

Veda, which makes

follow that the entire

of the

Veda denoted
is

by the term "one's own section

Veda"
it is

directed

to the fruitful understanding of the sense,

follow

also

made

to

that the Vedantas too, like the prescriptions and

of

prohibitions

acts

denoted by the term "one's

own

section of the Veda," are directed to the fruitful under-

standing of the sense,

(2)

though, in accordance with the

is

maxim" But the sense of a

of ordinary

text

not distinguished (from that

usage

")/*

the significant nature of the Ved&nta*

62

SUPERIMP08ITION
as in the case of the

is

universal,

hymns

(mantras),

(3)

though from the Vedantas there comes the understanding of

the one inner self unconnected with the universe,

who

is

mass

of intelligence

and

bliss,

and

is

free

from agency and

into
conflict

enjoyership,

yet

these

Vedantas,

coming
free

with

the concept "I,"

which

is

from doubt and

sublation,

and comprehends the

self as characterised

by

agency, enjoyership, misery, grief and delusion,

and slipping
a
figurative

away

from

their

meaning,

either

have

significance

or serve only in incantations, and thus

have

a sense other than the one desired to be declared.

the
four-chaptered

Hence,
to

Sarlraka-mlmamsa,
is

directed

the

inquiry into their sense,

not to be commenced,
is

Nor

is

the

self,

which
"

patent to

all

men

in the

"

jBXperience
case,

of the

either doubtful or fruitful, in

it,

which
result.

from the desire to know

is

an inquiry would

This

the prima facie view,

final

The

view

is

this

this

would be

so, if

the concept
it
is

"I" were

valid.

Since,

in the

manner

stated above,
its

cannot sublate Scriptural texts

not
all

etc.,

and since

validity

accepted

by Scripture
it is

etc,

and by the systems of

the preceptors,

but superimposed.
is

Hence the
the one

Vedantas have a sense which

not other than

is

desired to be declared or figurative, but

of the character
53

mentioned.

The inner

self alone is their principal sense.

is,

Since in respect of that there

in the

manner
is

to be stated,

both doubt and

In
this

profit, the desire to

know

appropriate.

view, the aphorist expresses the desire to

:

know

in

aphoristic form

Then

therefore the desire to

kntw Brahman.

j,

ft 3

TO
f|

SI^JWH,

In the sacred teaching of the VedSnta Enquiry,

which

is

proposed to be explained, this

:

is

the

first

aphorism

THEN THEREFORE THE DESIRE

TO

KNOW BRAHMAN

By

the desire to
profit,

know he

indicates (the existence of)

is

both doubt and

explicitly
(i.*.,

Here, Brahman-knowledge
it
is

the

declared profit, since

directly pervaded by

is

the object

of)

desire,

Nor,

as

in the

case of

observances succeeding to the knowledge of

ritual, is there

anything succeeding to Brahman-knowledge, in view of

which,
that (knowledge) would
benefit,

be

secondary

benefit.

The supreme
free

rather,
this

is

Brahman-knowledge alone,

from
of

all' doubt,

(knowledge),
all

which
is

is

of the

nature

the cessation of
bliss,

misery and

of the one

essence of

being conveyed by the Ved&ntas, whose

the

content
called

is

known through

mode

of

argumentation

5raAma-mIffl8wwi7,

It is

in the endeavour towards

that

end that,

verily,

the skilled
(end),

inquirers

would more

certainly set

out*

That

though already attained,

if

yet becomes an object of desire, as

oi

unattained, because

beginningless Nescience
the

just as

one,

who

erroneously
to
it,

imagines

necklace

round

one's

own neck
attains

be
as

non-existent, being

shown that by another,

64

DESIRE TO

KNOW
is

In this the word then (atha)

the sense of
44

accepted as having

"

immediate succession," not the sense of

desire to

what

is

begun" (adhikara); because the

cannot
be

know

Brahman

what

is

begun.

And

if

it

had not been attained

(before).

The

desire to
its

know,

being the result of doubt, indicates doubt as

cause.

The
worth

doubt
while.

makes

the

commencement

of the

inquiry

Thus, as indicating the doubt and the benefit that

are the causes of the skilled inquirer setting out on this

sacred teaching,

it is

meet that the aphorism should be at the

commencement

of the sacred teaching; hence, the revered

commentator says: "In the sacred teaching of the Vedania " this is the inquiry, which is proposed to be explained ", by us
first

aphorism/'

The word

mlmflrtisa signifies

an inquiry that

commands
it

respect.

The inquiry commands

respect, because

bears the

fruit, viz.,

the ascertainment of that extremely

subtle sense,
goal.

which

is

the cause of the supreme

human

Mlmamsa-s'Ustra means the sacred teaching relating

to that inquiry,

and

s'ftstra is so-called,

because

it

(the in-

quiry)

is

taught or truthfully explained by that to the pupils

thereof.

An
As
of

aphorism
is

is

such, because

it

indicates

much

meaning.

said: "Concise, indicative of (the) senses,

letters

composed
are

few

and words, replete with sense, such

what

the wise ones call aphorisms."

Having thus explained the purport of the aphorism, " " then "In this, the word he explains the first word of it
f

'then*

is

accepted

as

having

the

sense of 'immediate

succession'."

The

word

"then,"

occurring
of

among

the

words

of
;

the

aphorism,

has

the sense

immediate

succession

this is the construction.

MxjJtf'M I

^f

n-

AiitiMu

'T:

II

ffcl

qTi

c^

THE DESIRE TO ENOW

"
auspiciousness
"

65

has no syntactical relation with the

sentence.
in

meaning
only

of the

Indeed, the word

atha,'

when used

another sense, can bring about

it.

auspiciousness by the mere sound of

to

And

reference

what has gone before does not

succession.

in effect differ from

immediate

And when
just

the

meaning

is

"immediate

succession,"

as

the desire to

know

Religious Duty

relates invariably

to the study of the

Vedas that has gone

before, similarly, there

must be

stated something which has gone before, to which the

desire
to

know Brahman

too invariably relates.

Imis,

mediate succession to the study of one's own Veda

however, common.
" "
is

Now, the word

what
is

then
"

also seen in the sense of

(i.e.,

begun, as in
in the Veda,

Then
and
in

there
(ie.,

is

begun) this
is

jyotitoma"

"Then
(i,0.,

there
is

begun)

the treatise on afebda" or

treatise

"Then

there

begun) the
is it

on yoga" in worldly usage;

"
*

why then
is

not
this

here understood in the sense of what

begun ?

To

he says
"

not the sense of

what
"

is

begun

V Why

(not) f
is

Because the desire to know Brahman cannot be what

In this aphorism, the

begun."

from the wording to be more

11

desire to know*' appears " " important than Brahman or

it

knowledge thereof ",

Nor may
"

be said that, just as

is

the meaning of the word "baton"

what

is

intended,

though subordinate in tho words

The bearer
54

of the

baton

chants the permission and the reply,"

here, in the case of
for,

it

may

be so even

Brahman and

the knowledge thereof;

the

"desire

to

know

1*

is

alone intended here, as

indicating the doubt and the benefit, which are subsidiary

66

THI DB8IBI TO KNOW

to engaging in the sacred teaching relating to the inquiry into

Brahman.

If

that were not intended, those (sub;

sidiaries)

would not be indicated

hence, prudent inquirers

would not set out on the inquiry into Brahman any more
than on the examination of the teeth
verily,

of a crow.

Then,

Brahman and the knowledge

benefit;
is

thereof could not be

the

theme and the

for,

being opposed to the

concept "I," which

in

not (known to be) superimposed,

object, the validity of the

respect of

such an

Ved&ntas

would be unintelligible;

as for senses other than the one

desired to be declared, such as figurative senses that

may

serve one's engaging in

rites, or

serve in incantations in the

etc.,

same way

as

(the syllable)

hum

these are possible

of apprehension, even in dependence

on the injunction to

study one's own section of the Veda. Hence, the primacy " desire to know," which indicates both doubt and of the
benefit,
is

here intended both by the words and by the

(as

sentence
signify

a
is

whole).

Nor can that (word

"

jijftasa)
is is

what

begun, so that the word

then," which

in proximity thereto,

may

also be taken to
is

mark what

begun

for, it is

not that which

treated (in every section).

Brahman-knowledge, which qualifies the desire to know, may^ however, be what is begun* And that too does not connect
"

with the word

that

then/' because there

is

no primacy for

(Brahman-knowledge).
the same
as
it

Nor

is

the desire to

know
like

(jijWaa)

inquiry (mimBwsS), so that,

the treatise on yoga,

may

be what

is

begun the word

;

mlmRmati,- being derived with the termination sem, but

not in the sense of desire, according to the (aphorism)

mtin-badha
etc.,

55

either from the root

rofln,

to measure, with

the addition of an
signifies

"n"

or from the root mfln, to reverence,

an

inquiry

that

commands

respect;

whiU

*T

T^

1%
I

II

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

"

67

the word
to

"
jijfiasa

"
signifies

desire to

know ",

"

Desire

know"

is

indeed

what

starts

one on the "inquiry",

Nor can that which

is

starts be

identical with that

which

started, that relationship (of starter and started) being

unintelligible

where they are one,

(for

Nor

is

it

proper to

assume some other sense

is
it

a word)

when

its

own sense
Hence

intelligible, as that will

is

be an undue extension,

well said: "because the desire to

is

know

... cannot be

what

begun."
of

Now, why may not the word atha have the sense
auspiciousness
the desire
to
?

Thus, the aphorism comes to

is

mean

that

know Brahman

to be undertaken every

day

as

causing auspiciousness.

To

this

he says:'* and

'auspiciousness' has no syntactical relation with the meaning

of the sentence,"
It
is

the meaning of a word that, verily,

;

has syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence

and that (former)

is

either expressed or implied,

is

In this

case, auspiciousness
of the

not the sense expressed or implied

word

atha, but something effected on the mere hearing

of that word, as

on hearing the sound of the drum (mrdanga)

or the conch,

And

in the use of

words

it is

not seen that

what

is

effected or recalled (by a word) has

any syntactical
is

relation with the

ing.

meaning
:

of the sentence

this

the mean-

(Objection)

is

not the word atha used here and there

?

to signify auspiciousness

And

there would also be conflict

"
:

with the text of the traditional Code, which says

The two

words
of
this

Om

and atha burst out of yore from

are

the throat
(Reply): to
in

Brahman; hence both

"

auspicious."

he says

Indeed, the

word 'atha/ only when used

68

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

another sense, can bring about auspiciousness by the (mere)

sound of

it"

The

word
etc.,

atha,

used

in

the sense of

immediate

succession

produces auspiciousness, like

etc.,

the sound of the

flute,
it,

the lyre

by the sound,

i.e.,

by

the mere hearing of

and thus helps to bring about auspi-

ciousness, like the sight of the pitcher of

water brought for

with the text

a different purpose.

Thus, there

is

no

conflict

of the traditional Code.

Therefore, the sense of immediate

succession being there, the sense of auspiciousness too

(is

secured) by the mere hearing

this

is

the meaning.

Be

this

so.

The

word

atha

may depend on an
"

antecedent factor, even without having the sense of

imbe

mediate succession
raised

",

This

is

how
'

a question

may

with reference to this very word atha

in

"is this
'

word atha (used

or
(atha)

the sense
is

of)
1
'

immediate succession
Here,

'what

begun'?

the word atha

occurring in the interrogative states an alternative view

after

stating

preliminary view,
earlier.

with reference to the

"

atha
diate

occurring

Of that (second) word,

it is

imme-

succession
earlier

"
is

not the sense, since

separated

from the

occurring word by the statement of the

preliminary

view.

Nor
if

is

there

non-dependence on the

foregoing (word), for

there were no dependence on that,

that (word) would not be the content of this (interrogative),

and consequently the disjunction, not referring to the same

content, would be unintelligible.

Never does
or
is

it

happen
"

(that

one asks): eternal?"

"Is the

self

eternal

the intellect non-

Hence, even without the sense of

immediate

succession,"

why

should

it

not be that the word atha

18

ft 3

fe^lcftfcl

?fti

=IT

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

"

69

depends on what goes before

To

this he says

and

refe-

rence to what has gone before does not, in effect, differ from

immediate succession."
"

This

is

the meaning:
"

we

prefer

the sense of

immediate succession

not because of eagerfactor,

ness, but rather in order to secure

some antecedent

which

will

serve

as

the

cause of the desire to

know

Brahman. Since that

the

(sense) results even on the

view that

word atha
of

is

dependent on what goes before, any

to
"
fix

eagerness
"

ours

the

sense of that word as

immediate succession
expressed by the

would be in vain.
in
effect."
is

That

is

here
it is

words:"

But, in reality,

in stating another view, that there

dependence on what
is

goes
of

before

and

since,

here,

there

no statement

an

alternative
"

view,
is

by
as

elimination,

"immediate
;

succession
correct view.

alone

left

the

sense

this

is

the

Let
of
*

"immediate

succession"

be

the sense;
the

what
is

it?

To

this

he says:
'

"And when

meaning
is

immediate succession
be
declared

"
etc.

Immediate succession
something
or
other,

to

here

not

to

since

that results

even without any statement.

necessarily
after

person does
else.

something,

doing something
or

Nor
im-

do

we

see

any

benefitseen

unseen

from

mediate succession alone.

4

Hence, there

must

be* declared

immediate succession to that, without which the desire

to

know
which

Brahman would
it

not be, and in the presence

is

of

would certainly be generated. That

the

here

mentioned

in

words:

"something

which

has gone

before to which the desire to

relates,"

know Brahman

too invariably

70

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Now,
sion
to a

here,

what

is

distinctive

is

immediate succes;

knowledge
to
so.

of ritual.

No

for,

even prior to

desire

know

Religious

Duty, desire to

know

Be
desire

this

Of the desire to know Brahman, as of the

Religious Duty
to the

to

know

(dharma),

there

may

be

immediate succession
the

study of one's

own

section of
like

Veda because
Duty,

of
is

compatibility, since

Brahman,

Religious
Scripture.
arise

known
being

on

the

sole

authority of

That

not
its

known,
(i.e.,

there

does

not

cognition of

own content
the

Religious
of
it

Duty

and

Brahman); and

apprehension

(Scripture) "
:

follows necessarily even from the rule as to study

one

should study one's

own

section of the Veda," Hence, imis

mediate succession to the study of the Veda alone

the

meaning

of the

word atha, even in the case of the desire to

"

know Brahman,
the study
of

To

this

he says
is,

Immediate succession to

one's

own Veda
Duty

however,

common

"

to the

desire to

know

Religious
here,

as well as to the desire to

know

Brahman,

And

by the words "one's own Veda"

is

referring to the content, the content thereof, viz., study,

implied.

And
"

this (succession) being understood

even from
Religious
all
;

the aphorism
)0

Then, therefore, the desire to

know

Duty,"

the present aphorism need not be begun at

for,

the word dharma (used in the above sUtra) implies the

entire

sense of the Vedas, and Brahman, like Religious

Duty, being equally the sense of the Vedas, the teaching

about

immediate

succession to the study of the Veda

:

applies equally (to both)

this is the
is

meaning.

Now, the objection

distinctive"
of the

raised: to

"Now,

here,

what

is

desire

know Brahman

in relation

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

71

Brahman

is

intelligible in respect of

one who has studied

the Vedanta.
cession
in

And

there

is

the rule of immediate sucetc.,

;

respect of the

cutting of the heart

because, there, the sequence is intended to be declared

but here no similar sequence

for

is

intended to be declared

there

is

no authority

for the relationship of subeligibility

sidiary

and principal or of

of

the person

(already) eligible as between the desire to

know

Reli-

gious Duty and Brahman.

to

the

desire

to

know

Religious
".

Duty "is
This
is its

immediate

succession to a knowledge of ritual

meaning

through the express statement

44

of

the instrumental case

etc.,

They
are

desire

to

know

by

sacrifice"
of
is

sacrifice

etc.

applied

to the

knowledge

Brahman
primary
as

as

its

sub-

sidiaries;
of desire,

for,

knowledge alone

the object

and other things which are not primary have

to be related to

what

is

primary.

Even

here, sacrifice etc.

are not subsidiary to the production of the knowledge of

the meaning of the sentence, since the latter

is

produced

by the sentence

itself,

Nor does

it

stand to reason that the

;

sentence requires ritual as an auxiliary

for, in

him who

knows the connection

of

words and their senses, com-

prehends the true nature of the principles regulating the

use
of sounds,

who

keeps in mind the relationships of

subsidiary and principal, earlier and later,

among

things,

and

the

requirements
is

of

expectancy,

proximity

and

compatibility, there

seen the unhindered production of

of the sentence, even

the knowledge

of the

meaning
rites.

though

he has not performed any

Or,

if it

did not arise, there

of prescriptive

would be no knowledge of the meaning

72

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

texts,

and prohibitory

and there would

result the failure of

the observances and avoidances, which are the sense of

those (texts).

If

from the knowledge

of

them arose

their

observance and avoidance, there would be reciprocal dependence,

in

that

that (knowledge) being existent, there

is

observance and avoidance of their sense, while from them

(the

observance and avoidance) there

is

the

knowledge
texts

thereof.

Nor

is

it

admissible

that

the

Vedanta

alone depend on ritual for the comprehension of their sense,

and not other sentences

for,

there

is

no special cause.

Now,

those whose intellects are impure to start with

first

cannot from the

asserted
jlva

understand the validity of the identity

by

the

text

"That thou

art"

between the
is

denoted

by the "thou," whose nature

self

that

of

agent and enjoyer, and the supreme

41

denoted by the
intelligent
is

that,"

whose nature

is

eternally

pure,

and

indifferent, because

of the

certainty that there

lack of

compatibility

(between the denotations of the two terms).

But those

of pure intellect,

whose internal impurities have

of sacrifices, gifts, austerities

undergone attrition by means

and

fasting,

and who
the

are

endowed with
(of

faith,

having

understood
will

compatibility

'that"

and "thou"),

understand their identity.

If this be urged, then, of the

is

ascertainment* of compatibility, which

valid knowledge, do
ritual,

the cause of the

it

you resolve to say that

not a means
is

comes from
knowledge

which

is

itself

of valid

(pramnna), or that ritual too

in

a means of valid knowledge,

?

addition to
is

perception etc.
effected

If the

ascertainment of

compatibility

by reasoning unopposed to the

it,

Vedanta

and basod on

there

is

no need

for

ritual.

Hence, having apprehended the jlccfs nature to be that of

the supreme
self,

through knowledge of the nature of

'
j
i

*rai:

'
:
I

sj\iWil*

icwwi:

'

ffcf

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

"

73

hearing texts like

That thou

art,"

and confirmed

it

by

reasoning based thereon, there results intuition of

Brahman

through the contemplation

of

otherwise
for

known

as bhavann
;

that (truth), practised

etc,

long and unintermittently

sacrifice

serve in this (contemplation).

As

is

said

"But

that (discipline of mental functioning) practised for

long, unintermittently and with satkaras is the sure means " 57 (of realising the truth) Continence, austerity, faith, sacrifice

etc,

are the satkaras.

Hence

it is

the Scripture says

"

Knowing
aided

that

alone,

the wise M

brahmin should perform

testi-

contemplation (frajwS)."

Having known through

is

mony
to

by argumentation, one

to betake

oneself

contemplation.
is

Here, some say that

for sacrifice etc.,

there
are

utility

through their destroying impurities that

of

the

foes

beatitude.

Others
are

say

it

is

through
It
is

purifying

the

person (that they

sacrifice etc,,

useful).

the

person purified by
templation
of

who, verily, by the conwith

devotion

Brahman

practised

and

unintermittently for a long time, plucks out

the impressions
of beginningless

by the root all

thence, the
it is

Nescience;

inner self becomes clear,

pure and bright.

"
:

Hence

that

the traditional Code says

attain

One

creates the capacity to

"

Brahman

through the mahayajnas (brahma-yajna,

and through
sacrifices,"

deva-yajfia, pitr-yajna etc.)

and

He,

for

whom

there have been these forty and eight purificatory

its

ceremonies". Yet others say of ritual that

service to

Brahman-knowledge
obligations. "
effect
:

is
is,

through the discharge of the three

indeed, the traditional

There

Code

to this
is

Having discharged the three

mind on
1

obligations, one

to

'9

set

one's

release.'

Others, however, say that

the various rites, though enjoined with reference to their " That the respective results, yet, because of texts like

74

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

brahmins seek to know through the study of the Vedas,

through sacrifice
of
etc,," are

subsidiary to the contemplation

relation
of

Brahman, through the

samyoga-prthaktva
(ebony) wood, while

(two-in-oneness), just

as the

khttdira

serving the purpose of the sacrifice (in the capacity of

sacrificial

stake),

serves
;

also

to

bring
is

about

virility

(to

the

sacrificed

for

the

principle
is)

"when one

subserves
"

two ends,

(the relation

samyoga-pfthaktva"?
sage (Badarayana):
etc.,

Hence too the aphorism

Because
there
as
is

of the great

of

the
all

Scriptural
(in

text

about sacrifice
"

need of
the

the contemplation of Brahman),

()1

in

case

of

horse."
etc,

(The word)
;

"
all

means
these

sacrifice,

gifts,

austerities

there

is

need of
is

for

the

contemplation of Brahman;

this

the

meaning.
etc,,

Hence,

whichever be the authority, Scripture

it is

or the

aphorism of the great sage, in any case,

of

contemplation

Brahman

as united to sacrifice etc., and

possessed of the three properties (devotion, length of time

and

non-intermission),

that

is

efficient

to

bring

about

intuition of

Brahman, otherwise known as

release,
its

through
impres-

the destruction of beginningless Nescience and

sions
;

for

this

purpose, rites ought to be observed.

Nor

can these be observed, in the absence of the knowledge of

the

many

different

forms

of

rites

in

respect

of

their

consequences seen and unseen, of things in relation to them

as

inherent or as

remote causes, of the elements which

are taught directly or obtained

subsidiaries
different

by transfer, of the host of

2

ending with sequence (krama), as also of the

eligible

persons

for

the

respective rites/

Nor

does that knowledge result without a critical study of the

inquiry into Religious Duty.
'

Hence

it

has been well said

to

what

is distinctive

is

immediate succession

a knowledge

frf :

7:

$i|ft$TT ?

ft5

^p

EH
?
*f

dNHCM:

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

11

75

of ritual.

It

is,

verily,

by the knowledge of ritual that

contemplation
of

there

results

for

the

Brahman

the

GO- operation of ritual.

This
prior"
to

he refutes;
the
is

"No."
of

Why
ritual,

(not)?

"For, even
to

knowledge

"the desire

know

Brahman
Vedanta
".

intelligible in respect of

one

who has

studied the

This

is

the underlying idea:

it

is

said

that rites are

needed for the purpose of Brahman-contemplation, otherwise

rites

known

as bhavanu.
Is
it

We

"

ask here

in

what way

are

needed?"

for the

(production of the)
(rites)

effect,

just as

for the (igneya

(a

and other
in

there

is

need of the
final

samit

subsidiary

rite)

order to produce the

unseen

result

(paramn-'pfirva),
?

which

is

favourable to

long-delayed fruit
like

Or,

is it

in respect of its

own

existence,

the requirement
two,

of the material

the puro^as'a cut

for the effect,
as

into

and the deity

Agnii

Not
It is

that

cannot stand examination.

thus

it

has to be
it

admitted of the contemplation of

intuition
of

Brahman that

effects

the

nature

of

Brahman.
is

That may be a
it

product, as the ball (of flour)

produced by mixing
;

into

a paste
purified,

a modification, as rice from pounding

like

something

the mortar etc. by sprinkling

61
;

something

attained, as

milk by milking.

Firstly,

it is

not a product.

The

intuition of

Brahman produced by Brahman-contemsame way

as perception

plation does not, verily, result in the

of the pot etc.,

which

are produced by the senses etc,, differ-

ent from the pot

etc,, inert

by nature

for,

Brahman, not

be-

ing illumined in dependence on another, the intuition thereof

is of its

own

nature, eternal, and production

is

not intelligible

in that case.

Any

intuition different

therefrom, brought

76

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

is

about by contemplation,

infected

with doubt, like an

;

imagined idea, and hence cannot be valid

for, it is

seen of

that kind (of idea), even with that (contemplation) as accessory,

that

it

is

often inconstant.
fire

The (apparently)

direct

experience of a

with

huge flames, as the

fire,

result of the

contemplation of a (wrongly) inferred

by one whose
cold, does not,

body
verily,

is

extremely benumbed with intense

accord with other valid knowledge, this non-accord

being seen extensively.

Hence, since there

is

is

not the effect

characteristic of valid intuition, ritual

not needed in the

generation

(of

any
is

result)

by

contemplation.
eternal

And

for

Brahman,

who

immutably
or

and all-pervasive,
cannot
result

modification,

purification

attainment

through contemplation,

Be
in

this

so.

Let not the intuition

generation
etc,,

of

Brahman

result,

the

way

of

from

contemplation.

Purification,
of the

however, may come about through the removal

indeterminable Nescience, as the
is

veil of the two-fold

danseuse concealed by

the curtain

manifested through

the raising of the curtain by the stage-hand. the use of ritual,

Herein

lies
:

But there

is

this

much

of difference

on the raising
object
of

of

the curtain, the danseuse becomes the

perception to the audience.
of

immediate

Here,
is

however, the bare removal

the veil of Nescience

else, since

what

is

generated, and nothing

"

intuition

of

Brahman cannot
being eternal.

be generated, the nature of

Brahman
Brahmanis

Here,
Is

we ask
it

What

is

this

contemplation?"

succession
?

of

whatever

apprehended through verbal testimony

or a succession of

indubitable cognitions gained through (valid) verbal testi-

mony t

If

it

be a succession

of

whatever

is

cognised

*TT

^
30

^T

f:

f|

ffcl

ro

THfi DESIftE

TO

KNOW
if

77

through verbal testimony, then, even

it

practised repeatedly

cannot remove Nescience.

It

is

the ascertainment of

truth and the repetition thereof

its

that root out erfo* with

of
is

impressions,
of
"

not

the

repetition
of

doubt,

nor the

repetition

the
or

cognition "

what
a
tall

general
"

The
even
if

"

cognition

post

man

or

big object,

repeated a hundred timefe, cannot lead to the certitude that

it is

but a man, unless there

is

specific Cognition.
trtie

Now,
the

it

has been said that the jfwi's

self

nature ad
throtigh

supreme
of
of

having

been

apprehended
it

cognition
(cognition)

the

nature of hearing,
nature
of

is

confirmed by

the

reasoning.

Hence,

con-

templation

of

the nature

of a succession

of indubitable
is,

cognitions based on (valid) Verbal testimony

as assisted

by

ritual,

the

cause of the destruction of the two-fold

this achieve that destruction Without
is

Nescience.

Nor can

bringing about experience of Brahman. Error, which

of the

nature of immediate experience^ can be removed only by true

knowledge

of the nature of
;

immediate experience, not by a

seen that irhmediate presentafire,

mediate presentation

for, it is

tions like confusion of direction, the circle of

trees
4

the moving

(as

seen

when one
ai*e

is

oneself moving), and the Water

in the
in

mirage

removed only by immediate presentations

true

the nature

of

cognitions
etc.

of

the directions

etc,

Confusion of direction
ascertainment
of

are not, verily, removed by the

etc.

the

directions

obtained
is

through

verbal testimony, infefendd etc.

is

Hence, what
"

to be desired

the intuition

of the denotation of the "

thou

"

as of the

nature of the denotation of the

that

".

Only thus and not

78

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

otherwise can there be cessation of the intuition of the

denotation of the

"thou"

as subject to suffering, grief etc,

This intuition does not, verily, result from verbal testimony,

even though accompanied by inquiry, but from perception,

that (intuition) being the invariable result of that (perception)
alone, as otherwise
it

would follow that a banyan shoot could

(>J

grow even from a

fe?^aja-seed.

Hence,

it

stands to reason

that the internal organ perfected by the contemplation of

the

meaning

of sentences of indubitable import, manifests,

'

bf the immediately experienced denotation of the

its

thou/'

nature as the denotation of the "that," through negating

various conditioned forms
itself of

the

of the former,

Nor

is

this
it

experience
could not
(vftti)

the nature of Brahman, in which case

;

be generated

rather,

it

is

a particular psychosis
its

of the

internal organ
this does
is

itself,

having Brahman for

content,

Nor with

Brahman become

other-illu-

mined, Because
it

Brahman

illumined by verbal testimony,

Indeed, that

does not, verily, become non-self-illumined,

is

which

free

from

ail

adjuncts
is

is

declared to be self-efful1

'"

gence, not that which

conditioned too,
"
:

As the revered
a

commentator,
non-object"
the
intuition

verily, says

now,

this is not invariably

all

Nor
of

is

there

freedom from

adjuncts in
of

Brahman,
it

though a psychosis
is

the

internal organ, for,

(the intuition)

known

to be an

adjunct
being
if
it

opposed

both

to

itself

and to other adjuncts,

Otherwise
(i.e.,

itself

on the brink of destruction,

to

were not united

intelligence

as an adjunct), of

the psychosis of the internal organ, itself non-intelligent,

self-illumination would be unintelligible, in the absence of

'Ma i*i Pi+i

i I

-f

*T

ff f|

T58 DE9IRB TO KNOW

the reflection of intelligence, and hence
it

79

could not intuite,

Nor

is

this

invalid

as

an imagined

idea, like the intuition

fire, for,
is

of the (erroneously) inferred

and contemplated

there

the nature of

fire

is

mediate, whereas here, there

of the jlra,

even

from
nature

the
is

first,

immediate experience

whose

that of

Brahman made impure by

adjuncts,

The

attributes

of purity, intelligence etc.

(i.e.,

do not in truth go
that),
is

beyond that
jli;a

are

not different from

free
is

It is

the

himself that,

when

from adjuncts,

said to be

Brahman, whose nature

freedom

purity, intelligence etc,

Nor

is

from

the

respective

adjuncts

something other

than thai
aided

Therefore, just as through the sense of hearing,

repeti-

by the impressions brought about by the

tion of the knowledge gained from the science of music,

one experiences directly the different notes, tafya

etc,, in

their different cadences, even so the jiva through the inter-

nal

organ,

aided by the impressions brought about by the

repetition of the
its

meaning

of the

Ved&nta

texts, experiences

own
If

nature as Brahman,
it

be

fi^id

that there

is

need of ritual for contempla-

tion in respect of the generation of the psychosis of the

internal organ,
for,
is
,<*.,

intuition of
ritual
is

Brahman, no (we

reply),

cooperation with

unintelligible, since there

no

co-presence of contemplation and the observance

"

of ritual.
''

Nor, verily, can he,

who from

texts like
self,

That
other

thou

art

indubitably understands
is

the one

than the body, whose nature

indifference,
is

purity,

intelligence
etc,,

and

who

is

endowed with non-agency

etc,,

who

devoid of caste*distinctions like brahmin

understand

80

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

(for

eligibility

himself)

in

respect

of

ritual.

He who

is

not

fit

(to

understand such a

eligibility),

how can he

be

an agent
It

or (even)

an

eligible person ?

may

be

said

that though the truth

is

ascertained,

activity

conditioned
it is

by
is

error

is

seen to continue; for

certain
that sugar
is

example, though
sweet,
taste

known

for

yet
for

there

the continued
is

experience of bitter

him whose sense

it

affected

by

bile,
it.

for

he

tastes sugar, spits

out and thus abandons

Hence,

there
of

is

the observance of ritual because of the continuance

the

impressions

of

Nescience;
is

and

its

destruction

by that to which knowledge

intelligible.

the auxiliary will therefore be

"
:

Nor may

it

be asked

How

can

ritual, itself
?

of the

nature of Nescience, destroy Nescience

And

of its

destroyer, ritual,

whence the destruction?

seen
of

1 '

For, instances

are

extensively

entities

which destroy themas themselves

;

selves

and others
(goat's)

of the

same
digests

class
itself

for

example,
poison

milk

and
as

other milk,

cures

other

poison

as well

itself,

the dust

of the clearing-nut mixed with muddy water precipitates

both
so,

itself

and the mud and makes the water clear

even

ritual,

though

of the nature of Nescience, drives

itself departs.
:

away

other Nescience and

To
texts

this

it

is

said

true

through frequently repeated

alone,
this

beginning

with

"Existence

was

in

the beginning, dear one"

art/'

and ending with "That thou

there
of
is

as
of

aided
true
different

by

Brahman-inquiry,

the
inner

dawn
self,

indubitable

knowledge
bodies
etc.,

the
the

as

from

the

material

ffrl

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

cause of which
there
is

81

is

beginningless Nescience

in spite of this,

the continuance of notions of transmigrations and

consequent empirical usage, because of the continuance of the

impressions of Nescience
;

yet, the

wise one,

who

holds

these empirical usages and notions to be fictitious, does not

have faith
bile

in

them, just as he whose sense

is

affected

by

does not have faith in the bitterness of sugar, though

spits
it

he

out and abandons

it.

And

thus, one

who has
modus

ascertained

that tho totality of act, agent, means,

is

operandi and fruit

not real,

how can
(to

he be eligible to
is

act?

He

who knows
Else, of

them
it

be real), he, verily,

difficult to
etc.

the eligible one,

eligibility

would be
tfndras

avoid the

even
of
is

beasts,

In the section
varieties
of
act,

treating

ritual,

he

who knows

the

agent
it

etc-

considered to be the

man who

knows.

Hence

is

that

the revered commentator describes the sacred

as

teaching
Nescience,

having

reference

to

one characterised by

Therefore, just as in respect of the rujQ,sftya

to be performed

by those who have the conceit of belongis

ing to the caste of kings, there

no

eligibility for

those

who have
vais'ya

the

conceit

of

belonging to the brahmin or

caste,

even so in respect of ritual to be performed

by those who have the conceit of distinctions like double

birth, agent, act,

means

etc.,

there

is
is

no

eligibility for

those

who have no such

conceit.

Nor

the Vaidic ritual, per-

formed by one, ineligible though

skilled,

capable of bearing

fruit, any more than the vais'yastoma performed by brahmins

or ksatriyas.
visible
result,

Therefore, in respect of rites which have a

he who has capacity and engages therein

82

THE DB8IBB TO KNOW

obtain the fruit, that being seen.
result,

may

In respect of rites

with an invisible

however, the

fruit

which

is

known
is

only from the sacred teaching cannot go to

not eligible
;

him who

hence, ritual

is

not required

in the perfor-

mance
Be
the

of contemplation.
this
so.

Just

as,

in

respect

of

prescribed
of

acts

eligibility

for
is

which includes the conceit

no
so,

being
of

human,
that

there

eligibility

for
of

one

devoid

conceit,

even

in

respect

prohibitions,

on

the ground that those

who

are eligible are (those that

have

the

conceit

of

being)

human, there would be no

*

eligibility

for those devoid of that conceit, as in the case

of beasts etc.

Hence, such a person observing what

is

prohi;

bited would not incur sin,

any more than the lower animals

thus would result the transgression of the law/"

objection

(To this
attains

we

reply)

not

so.

This
life)
is

one

(who

realisation even in the present

of

not wholly devoid

rather

the

conceit

that

he

is

human

does

that

conceit continue in him in slight traces, through the con68

tinuance of the impressions of Nescience.

that, considering

It

has been said

what continues

to be illusory,

he has no
be so
?

faith in

it

(as real).

What

follows therefrom

if this

This follows therefrom.

is eligible,

He who

has faith in prescriptions

not he

who

has no faith.

Hence, he
etc., is

who has no

faith

in

the conceit of being

human

not eligible in

respect of the sacred teaching of prescriptions. Hence too the " The oblation or gift offered without traditional Code says " w The sacred teaching of prohibitions, however, etc. faith

does not stand in need of faith

it

functions, rather, only in

W;

1*1:

ri

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

respect of a
act.

83

human

being

who

directs himself to a forbidden

Hence, even he,

faith,

who has apprehended

as

the truth about

is

Brahman with

much

as

he who

bound in the

migratory cycle, incurs sin by acting in transgression of

prohibitions;
therefore,

there

is

not the acceptance

of

a doctrine involving the transgression of the law,

Hence,
of
its

contemplation
effect,

does

not require ritual in

respect

Hence too

(it

is)

not (required) even in respect of the

(for),
it

origination of contemplation;

has been said that

the generation of

there

is

no

eligibility

for ritual after

indubitable

knowledge through verbal testimony,

Thus

too Scripture says:

"Not by

ritual

nor by off-spring nor

alone

by

wealth,

but
'"

by

renunciation

do they enjoy

immortality/*

Are these

rites

then entirely without any use here?

"

Then would
be
fice

texts like

They seek
(we
reply),
It

to

know by
rites

"
sacrifice
sacriself,

contradicted,
are

No

for,
is

like

remote
of

auxiliaries.
i.e.,

thus:

that

by study

the Veda,

by constant study of one's

i.e.,

own Veda,
to

the brahmins seek to know,

they desire

know, not that they do know,

is

Though

in fact

know-

ledge
yet,

primary (as compared with the desire therefor),

it
is

since in the word,

the
is

meaning

of the

stem

(as

compared with the

suffix),

it

subsidiary, while desire,

being the meaning of the

relates

suffix, is

primary

and activity
"

to

what

is

primary,

When

one says

Bring the

king's man,"

one does not, verily, bring the king, who,

84

THE DB8IBB TO ENOW

in fact,
is

though primary

yet subsidiary in the word, as

is

the qualification of
the word,
i.e.,

"man," but that which

primary in

the

man

himself,
is

Thus, of sacrifice, as of
prescription as the

the study of the Veda, there

to desire.

means

So too

of the

austerity,

which consists in not

is

eating.

Not eating

as and
eats

how
is

one desires, that alone

austerity,
tion,

He who

what
is

good and pure in moderato

in

him indeed, there

desire

know Brahman,
Nor

not in one

who never

eats, as the latter will but die.

does austerity consist in the observance of fasts like the

Gaadr&yafla since, for that kind of person, disturbance of

the equilibrtorii of humours will result.
i

The
sins

obligatory

rites

purify the person by destroying

(already)
is

incurred.

Thus too Scripture says: "He,

verily,

the atmayajin (one

this
is

who
"

pleases the self)

who
"

knows 'by
this is

purified this
1

part (body) of mine, by

1

"

my

body made to grow,'

sacrifice
"
etc.

The words
The

by this
traditional

refer to the

of the context.

Code too says:

He

for

whom

there have been these forty

(sacrifice being included

and eight purificatory ceremonies

among
the

them),''
of

The following

Athamna

text too

shows

rise

knowledge, only in that ignorant person of

purified intellect in

whom

the desire to

know has

arisen

through the attrition of impurities by the observance of

"
rites,

obligatory

and

occasioned

Being
"

of

purified

intellect, he, then, sees the partless

7"

(Brahman) through con:

templation."
arises
in

The

traditional

Code too says

Knowledge

persons from the consumption of sin through

c
22

'
:

ffcl

cn!:j

3=Rf:

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

rites*'
etc*
It
is

85

settled

that

obligatory

rites

destroy

incurred sin and

thereby purify

the

person; when

the

subsidiariness of obligatory rites to the generation of

knowout

ledge
direct

is

thus

intelligible,

it

is

not proper to
of

make

subsidiariness

by the principle

two-in-oneness,
It
is is

as

that

would lead to prolixity of assumptions,

of
;

thus:

from the observance

;

obligatory

rites

merit

generated

thence sin ceases

sattva,
i-e.,

it is

that

(sin)

which makes

impure the

the intellect, through errors of the

etc,,

nature of the cognition of eternity, purity, pleasure

in the migratory cycle,

which by nature

is

transient,

impure

and miserable;
of

hence, on the cessation of sin, the door

perception

and

reasoning being opened, one knows

unhindered the impermanence, impurity and misery of the

migratory cycle, through perception and inference
arises renunciation consisting in
;

thence

non-attachment thereto;
it
;

thence grows the desire to remove

the means to remove
true
it;
is

thence one seeks

hearing that knowledge of the

the

nature of the self

to

means
in

to

be sought, one

desires

know

that;

thence,
it,

the order of hearing

it

(study)

etc,,

one knows

Thus,

stands

to

reason

that
tion
ie.j

rites

are remote auxiliaries in respect of the genera-

of

knowledge,
intellect,

through
This

the

purification

of

sattva,

the

same
the

sense

is

repeated

in

the

Bhagavadglta
yoga,

"For
is

silent

one

who wants
for

to

achieve

ritual

said to be the cause;

him

who
cause

has achieved yoga,

"'

equanimity

is

said

to

be the

",

86

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

This being
so,

he,

who, though not performing

rites,

is

yet of purified intellect, because of rites performed in a

prior existence, and has non-attachment generated in

him

through the realisation of the essential worthlessness of

the

migratory cycle, for him there

is

no need for the

observance of ritual which serves to bring about non-attachment, that having resulted even through the observance of
ritual

in

a prior existence,

It

is

with reference to such

if

foremost among
wise, let n
life,"

men

that Scripture sets out: "Or,

other-

him renounce even from the

"

student's order of
"

That

is

here
to

aid

even prior

to the knowledge
is

of

ritual

"desire

know

Brahman

intelligible
"

in

respect of one

who has

studied the Vedanta.

life,

Hence

it is,

that for one in the student's order of

obligations
to
11

there are no

for the

discharge of which rites would have

In conformity with this, the statement
"
is

be

performed,
is

He who
should
be

born a brahmin
explained
as

born with three obligations

those
"

relating to

who become
if

house-holders.

Otherwise the Scripture

Or,

otherwise,

from the student's order of life" would be contradicted.

The discharge
is

of

obligations,

even by the house-holder,

only for the purification of the intellect,

The statements
dies
of
old
final

about

what

is

prescribed

when one

age,
rite

about being reduced to ashes

75

and about the

(antyetfi)

relate to those ignorant ones

ritual,

who are

inertly fixed

in the

observance of
the
true
self.

not to those learned ones

the

who

know

Hence,

word

atha connotes
of

immediate succession to that, in the absence

which

^fc!

wcf ^

P^Pcl ^

f3: ?

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

there

87

would be no desire to know Brahman, and in the

presence of which that (desiro) certainly becomes existent.

Nor

is

knowledge

of ritual of this nature.

It is, therefore,

clear that the

word atha does not here signify immediate

succession to the knowledge of ritual.

Be

this so.

Let

it

not be that any sequence

is

settled

by the sense (artha), as in the performance of the agmhotra

and
there

the
is

preparation of

the barley-gruel (therefor)

;

but

a sequence settled by direct statement (sruti

"
suffix)
;

here,

the -ktva

the

following
is

Jabftla

text

having
;

become a house-holder, one

having
verily,

to

become a forest-dweller
one
is

become
indicates

forest-dweller,

to

renounce,"
etc.,

the
u

observance of sacrifice

by the

term "house-holder".
(to this
rule,
effect)
:

There

is

also the traditional Code

Having

studied the Vedas according to

in the

having procreated sons

manner

laid

down by
release."

Religious
of

Duty, having performed sacrifices to the best

ability,

one's

one

is

to

set

one's
:

mind on
"

There are also words

of

censure like

The twice-born

one who, without having studied the Vedas, procreated

progeny and offered up

below."

sacrifices, desires release goes "

down
is

(To
"

this

the commentator) says:

And

there

the rule of immediate succession in respect of the cutting of

the heart "
etc.

Whence

(is

this rule) ?
first,
is

(The text reads)

One

should cut the heart

then the tongue, then the

to

sides."

Here, the sequence

first

intended

be
is

declared

by the words

and

then.

No such

sequence

intended

to be declared in the present case, for, the absence of a

rule
(of

succession)
"
:

is

shown
if

later,

even by the same

Scriptural text

Or,

otherwise, order
of

one
life

is

to renounce
or

even

from

the

student's

from
all

the
this,

householder's or from the

forest-dweller's."

By

88

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

is

nonattachment
Scripture says
:

indicated (as essential).

Hence

it is

that

"

The day on which there

is

is

non-attachment,
of censure
of

that very day one

to renounce."

The words
intellect.

have in view the person of impure

He

impure

intellect desiring release but not setting

about the means

fails

thereto,

because

of

laziness,

verily,

to

observe

oven

the

obligatory and
life,

occasioned rites

characteristic

of the

house-holder's

and goes on the downward path

;

with his (load

sense.

of) sin increasing every instant

this

is

the

Be
by

this so.

Let

it

be that there
;

is

no sequence either
should there not

direct

statement or by sense

why

be a sequence authorised by the text (pDfAo), the position

(sthnna)

the principal (mukhya) or procedure (pravrtti)

?'"

To
ship
like

this

of

he says: "for, there subsidiary and principal."

is

no authority for the

relation-

Between

subsidiaries,
like

the

samit

.sacrifice,

and

principal rites,

the

Ugneja, which are known to contribute towards a single result," which are defined by a single result, which are

comprehended by a single procedural

be

text,"

which are

to

performed
to the
of

by

single

eligible
full

person,

and which are

related
results

same period

or

new moon, sequence

necessity, because of the impossibility of their

it-

simultaneous performance; and since

is

necessary to
text, (position)

determine the particular kind of sequence,

etc,

are

capable
is

of

fixing

the variety

thereof.

Where,

however, there

no relationship of subsidiary and principal,

by a single
eligible

nor
the

even
case

definition
of the

person,

as

in

saurya, aryamaya, prajftpatya and other

is

such
and,

rites,

there
text

no need
etc.

for

any particular sequence

hence,

are

of

no authority as fixing a
sentience)
is

narticular seauence. thoucrh

some Particular

37-

f|

sift

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

89

unavoidably understood (because of the impossibility of

pronouncing
authority

all

three at the
as
direct

same

time).

Nor
or the

is

there any
for

such
of

statement

like

relationship
desire to

subsidiary
Religious

and principal, as between the

know

Duty and the

desire to

know

Brahman.

Now,
is

there

is

seen a rule of sequence, even where there

in the case
8

no relationship of subsidiary and principal, as

of the in

milk-pail (godohana), which secures a human

to

goal,'

relation

the
in

subsidiaries

of

the dars'apfiryamtlsa

sacrifice, or

as

the case

of the darvapttrnamtisa
"

and

the soma sacrifice

mentioned in

Having performed the

and

dar&apUrnamdsat one should perform the soma sacrifice/*

which do not stand

principal.

in the relationship of subsidiary

:

To
the

this

he says

since there

is

no authority
the
It

even

for

relationship
this
is

''of eligibility of

person
is

(already) eligible'*:

the construction.
is

for

the

person

who, as desiring heaven,

eligible
is

for the

dars'apttryamasa, that, as desiring cattle, there

for
ling,

eligibility

the

milk-pail

in

connection with the water-sprinkrite.

a subsidiary of the dars'apttrnamnsa

is

The milk-

pail

not,

indeed,

capable of producing cattle directly

without operating in some way.

Nor

is

there Scriptural

mention of
case
it

its

entering into any other operation, in which

fall

would

outside the order of subsidiaries of that

It does,

(daryapftrnamftsa).

however, appear as dependent

on the
thereto

water-sprinkling
"

rite,

because of
is

its

contiguity
;

in

With a cup one

to sprinkle water

with

the milk-pail, one

suitability

who

desires cattle," and because of the

of

that for the sprinkling of water.

Hence,

because of the dependence of the milk-pail on the watersprinkling,

which

is

a subsidiary to the sacrifice,

it

is

90

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

There
is

also difference in the fruit

and the object

of the desire to

know.

Prosperity
it

is

the fruit of the

knowledge of Religious Duty, and

vance
as
its
;

depends on obser-

but the knowledge of

fruit;

Brahman has beatitude

on any other

and

it

does not depend

concluded that, though contributory (only) to a

it

human

goal,

belongs

to

sequence,

through the sequence of that

as
exists

(subsidiary).
(sacrifice)

Such sequence

between the soma

and the i$i (dars'apUriTtamasa) should be known

(in
its

to

have been refuted

Implication to the present

80 case), even by the refutation of direct statement.

Even
pal or

if

the

relationship
of

of subsidiary
eligible

and princibe
absent,

the

eligibility

the person

sequence
result,

may
by

be intended,

when

defined

by the same
all
if

as

among

the six sacrificial rites

end, attainment
of

tigneya etc.,

defined

the one

heaven;

or,

Religious Duty be a part of the

Brahman
is

desired to be

known,

then,

just
of the

as

sequence

intended
of

among
which

the

four chapters
of

Brahma- sUtras, each

treats

some aspect

of the

Brahman taught

in all the four,

of that

which are mutually

related

by the non-difference

which

is

desired

to

be known, even so, hero too, sequence

may

be intended as between the desires to

know

Religious

Duty and Brahman, because

desire to

of being objects of a single

is

know.
thus

And

neither of these (conditions)

here

present;
fruit

he says:

There
"

is

also difference

in the

and the object of the desire

:

to

know/'
is

He

analyses

the difference in the fruit

Prosperity

the fruit of the

knowledge of Religious Duty,"

is

Since the desire to

(as its

know

in

fact dependent

on knowledge

content), the

___
I

ff 3

fir!

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

observance.
to

91

Religious Duty, the object of the desire

to

know, has

come

into existence,

and does not

it is

exist at the

time of knowing, because

dependent

on the activity of the person.

the desire to

But here the object of

know

is

the existent Brahman, which,

being eternally existent, does not depend on

activity.

human

There
text,

is

also

difference

in

the operation
Religious

of

the

That
a

text,

which

defines

Duty,
in

instructs
activity.

person
text

only by

engaging

him

an

The

dealing with Brahman,

;

however, merely
ledge
is

instructs the person

since the

knowis

to be produced

from the text, the person

not
in

directed (to activity) in respect of knowledge.

As

the case of the

knowledge

of

an object produced from

(is

the contact of the sense-organ with the object, so

it

here).

words "fruit of knowledge" mean "fruit of the desire to

know":

that

is

the idea.
;

Nor
is

is

the difference of fruit

one of nature alone

there

hence he says: and it in which they are brought about depends on observance," The knowledge of Brahman does
;

difference even in the "

way

not need any other observance, except the continued repetition of knowledge from

verbal testimony, for, the co-pre-

sence of

rites,
is

obligatory or occasioned, has already been

refuted: this

the idea.

He

states

the wholesale difference in the objects deto

sired to be

known: "Religious Duty... has

is

come

into

existence" etc. Bhavyafy

"what has

to

come

into existence";
81

the krtya termination signifies the agent (of the action).

92

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

into existence has to be brought about
is

What comes

by the
hence

operation of an operator,

dependent on that, and

i.e.,

is

non-existent prior to that,

exists
is

when

it is

known

What
;

true

it is

invariably real, not unreal at any time

this

is

the meaning.

The

difference

between the objects

desired to be

known

is

not merely because of their nature, but

also because of differences in the operation of the respective

means which convey knowledge

''There
is

of them.

Thus, he says

also a difference in the operation of the text."

signifies Scriptural text (not

The term codana here

an injunctive
text),

merely

the general being secondarily implied by

what denotes the

operation thus
etc.
:

particular.
"

He
of

analyses the difference in

"

That

text
is

which defines Religious Duty

In Scripture, which
for

non-human

origin, there is

no room

commands

etc.,

which are expressions

of diffe-

rent forms of the

human
it

will; "

hence codana here means

of

teaching,

Hence
is

is

said
8J

The means

knowing that

(dharma)
bhUvanfi,
itself,

teaching."

And

that (teaching) relates to

i.e.,

human

operations

that

are
i,e,,

taught by
;

and also
etc.

to the content

thereof,

sacrifice etc.

sacrifice

are the content of bhftoana, since the operaeffort

is

tion consisting in

determined in dependence on
is

that (sacrifice

etc.),

and since the word vi$aya (content)

&ifl,

derived from

the root
is

to bind (so that the content is

to).

what the
Religious

effort

bound

(Scripture)

makes known

Duty such

as sacrifice etc., only as directing a

his desires, through

person to

them as means subserving

making
not

known

that

operations

and,

through
is

their
;

channel, sacrifices are instrumental to what

desired

otherwise

(does

Scripture function).

The teaching

about Brahman, however, merely instructs the person, but

does not instruct

him

as directing

him

to activity.

Why

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Because
is

93

knowledge

free

from the direction to

activity

produced by the teaching.

Now,
Vedanta

it

may

be said
"

a person
self is

is

taught Brahman by
M

texts

like

The

to be

known,"

which

purport to be

injunctive,

only by directing him to the

knowing activity, because of syntactical unity with that

(apparently injunctive text)
;

hence, there

is

similarity of

the

teaching of

Brahman
he

to

the teaching of Religious

is

Duty.

To

this

says: "the person

not directed

(to

activity) in respect of the knowledge/'

This
(to
for,

is

what
in

is

intended
respect

a person

is

not to be directed
of
is

activity)

of

tho

intuition

Brahman,

that, being of the

nature of Brahman,

eternal and

not
for,

to

be

produced
being

nor in respect of contemplation,

that

established,

through

observation

of

co-presence and co-absence, to be the causo of excellence

in

knowledge,

cannot

be the

object

of

an injunction;

nor in respect of knowledge through verbal testimony, since

that too arises

unhindered in him who has studied the

Vedas, knows the words and their senses, and understands

the true principles governing knowledge gained
verbal testimony.
"

through
:

As an example

of this

same he says

as in the case of the knowledge of an object produced from

the contact of the sense organ with the object."

"

He

links

up what
in

is

illustrated, in the words:

so

(is

it

here)." Further,
is

those

Vedanta
of

texts,
self,

wliose

purport

to

enjoin

knowledge

the

the ascertainment of the true

nature of the self cannot be knowledge gained from verbal

testimony
nature
thereof.

for,

their purport
self,

would then be not the true

to

of

the

but
is

injunctions

the knowledge
that,
verily,
is

That

which

their purport,

94

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Therefore, something has to be stated, in immediate

succession

to

which the desire

is

to

know Brahman

is

taught,

This

the

statement:
;

discrimination of

things eternal and non-eternal

non-attachment to the
possession
in

enjoyment of

fruit

here or hereafter;

abundance

of calmness, equanimity and other such

desire
to
too,

means
exist,

and

for release.

Where, indeed, these

even prior
after

a desire to
it

know

Religious Duty,

and

that

is

possible

to desire to

know

Brahman

and

also

to

know; not
"

in

their absence.
"

Therefore, by the word

then

"
is

taught

immediate

succession" to possession in abundance of the means

stated before,

their

significance.

Nor does ascertainment

taught
result

of

the true

nature of
of

what
is

is

even from that, the purport

which

something
is

else,

on the ground that knowledge

stands in need of
it
;

depends
for,

on what

known and
is

this

(dependence)
(t.i.,

intelligible

even through supernot be of the true

is

imposition

the knowledge need

is

nature

of

what

known).

Henoe

it

settled that the

Vedftnta has not for purport an injunction to knowledge.

"

The present

topic

is

concluded thus
etc,

Therefore, some-

"

thing has to be stated

That

in the absence of

which

there

would be no desire to know Brahman, that in the

"

presence of which, however, that (desire) becomes certainly

existent
:

this

is

the sense.

He

states

it

thus

This

is

the
"

statement : discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal

etc.

The

eternal,

i.e.,

the inner self

If

the non-eternal,

i.e>,

the

body,

organs, objects etc.

discrimination relating to these

3^T<T

^3

ff 'FRg, STfRfN

II

c^T

flfc!

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

be of the nature of certitude, the desire to
let it

95

Brahman being already known, know Brahman would be superfluous. Then,

is

be that discrimination
it

bare knowledge, not certitude

is

that being so,

(truth and) error

might be doubt, which

other than
;

that cannot bring about non-attachment

and not bringing that about, how can that be the cause
of

the

desire
:

to

know Brahman? Hence

residing in things

it

should be non-

explained thus
"

as

eternal and
"

eternal,

things
"
;

eternal

and non-eternal
of

means their
and non-

attributes " eternal

discrimination

things

eternal

means the discrimination

of the substrates

which

are

eternal
is

and non-eternal, as also of their attributes,

is

This
tive

what

said: there need not be specific discriminaof

different " this

knowledge

substrates,
is

non-eternal, in the

form
"
;

and eternal " this is true, eternal/'

untrue,

non-eternal

one does determine certainly the

in general, as also

difference between substrates

between
eternal
eternal,

their attributes, as eternal and non-eternal.

is

To be
is

to
;

be true; that

in
is

which
in

this

is,

that
of

true

and

thus,
is

it

the

sphere
;

desire.

To
this

be
is,

non-eternal

to

be

untrue
untrue
;

that

in

which
it

that

is

non-eternal,
of desire.

and

thus,

is

not

in the sphere

Of these* which are experienced

"

and constitute the spheres of the concepts " I," the object and the subject, that which
to be true, of

Thou

"

and

is

established

eternal and pleasant, that

that,

comes

in the sphere

desire

however, which

becomes

non-eternal,
is

untrue,

encompassed by the three-fold misery, that

;

to be

abandoned
eternal

this discrimination of things eternal

and non-

comes

to

him whose

intellect

has been purified by

the rites performed whether in a prior existence or in this

one,

as

shown by experience and reasoning.

Nor may

96
it

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

be said that there
of
that,
is

no such thing as truth

for, in

the

absence

even untruth which has that (truth)

be unintelligible
itself
is real.
;

as substrate would
Nihilists, the

further,

even for the

Void

Having thus considered

and reasoning of the fore-

wisely in the light of the experience

most among men, having looked at himself, who with the

rest

of the

animate world goes about migrating, constantly

being born and dying," in the worlds from Satyaloka

to Avici,
is

down
is

encompassed by the three kinds of misery and

tossed about helplessly on the waves of the migratory cycle

through

(all

divisions of time frojn) the instant, the

muhurta

(about an hour), the

yama

(three hours), the day, the night,

the fortnight, the month,

the

season (two months), the

half-year, the year, the yuga, the period of four yugas, the

period of a

Manu, the deluge and the great deluge (when

even the primal elements are destroyed) up to the period

of a principal creation and the intermediate creation, there
arises
(for

him) a

contemplation of the impermanence,

this migratory world.

impurity and miserable nature of

From the contemplation

crimination of
"

arising from this kind of disfor

things eternal and non-eternal, there results

fruit

him
after
".

non-attachment to the enjoyment of

here or hereis

Artha

(literally, thing)

means that which

is

sought,

that

is

to say, fruit.

Non-attachment thereto
it

indifference

due to the realisation of

"

as not

worthy of enjoyment.

Thence

the possession in abundance of calmness, equanimity

It
is,

and other such means."

verily, the

mind, which

is

intoxicated with the wine of passion and other impurities,

that directs the organs to their respective objects, high and

low, brings about various activities and their fruit in the

nature of merit and demerit, and offers up the self as an

oblation in the fearful
fire

of migration,

which

is

* mass

^FcT

THE DKBIRE TO KNOW

of in

97

the flames of manifold miseries,

That mind, however,

etc.,

which the intoxication due

to

the wine of passion

has been put an end to by the perfecting of non-attachment

gained by the repetition of the contemplation (mentioned

above),
self.
is

subjugated,

i.e.,

is

brought under control by the

occasioned by non-

This subjugation of the mind

is

attachment

called

calmness
is

(s

ama) or ras'lktira-samjfia,
fit

And the subjugated mind

respect of truth
its
(i.e.,

made

for application in

to the investigation of truth); this

it is

capacity

is

(dama) equanimity, just as

is

understood
a plough,

that the calm young bull

made

fit

to

draw

a cart

etc.

In the "etcetera" (of the commentary) are

included desire to abandon (titiksa) objects, turning

(uparati)

away
truth.

from them, and faith (sraddha)

"
is

in

the

Hence

it

that Scripture says

Hence, having become

(from

possessed

of

calmness,

equanimity, turning away

objects), the desire to

abandon (them), and

faith, one, seeing

h>

the

self

in the self

alone, sees everything in the

is

self.'*

Sama-damtidi-sadhana-sampat

the possession of these

in

means, calmness, equanimity

etc,,

an abundant degree.
release

Thence

arises

the desire in

him

for

from the

bondage to the migratory cycle; hence he says:

desire for release/'

"and

For

this

one,

who has

heard that the

free

knowledge
is

of the eternally pure, intelligent

and

Brahman

the cause of release, there comes

the desire to

know know
is

that even before, and (sometimes) after, the desire to

Religious

Duty; hence, the immediate succession

not
to

to

them
Duty;

alone,

the

desire

to

know

Religious

thus,

he

says:

"when

indeed,

these" etc,

Not

98

THE DE8IRB TO KNOW The word

"

therefore

in

the

Veda

itself,

signifies the reason, Because " Therefore as here the texts, like

"

enjoyment acquired by an act

after,

perishes,

even

so,

here-

the
1

enjoyment acquired through Religious Duty

perishes,'

show that agnihotra

etc,,

which are means

fruit
;

to prosperity,
it

have an impermanent

and because
results
''

is

shown

that the supreme goal of

of

man
"

from

the

knowledge

Brahman, by

texts like
;

One who

knows Brahman

attains

the supreme
possession
in

therefore, in

immediate succession

to the

abundance of

the means stated above, there should be the desire to

know Brahman,

merely the desire to know, he says, but knowledge

results
14

itself

therefrom:
etc.

"and

also to know,"

He

concludes:

Therefore"

"

The word
plained

''

atah

which comes

noxfc

in

order

is

ex1

thus: "The word 'therefore'

signifies the reason.'

"

This same sense of the reason connoted by

"

therefore"
itself"
etc.

he

explains
it

thus:

Because
true,

in

the

Veda

Here,

is

askad:
after

there

comes the desire

in
is

to
of

know
the since

Brahman
means

the

possession
this
itself

abundance

declared.

But

unintelligible,
fruit

non-attachment to the enjoyment of

is

here or

hereafter
object

unintelligible,
is

Fruit, being characterised as the

is

of desire,

what

known

to be advantageous.
to that

There cannot be for him non-attachment

(itself)

which
is

causes

attachment.

If

it

be said that

there

THE DESIRE TO ENOW

non-attachment evon to pleasure, because of
with
pain,
its

99

association

why,

alas,

should
its

there

not be

attachment

even to pain, because of

association with pleasure?

Hence, one should, in accepting pleasure, endeavour to

remedy pain
it

even

if

pain should come in unavoidably,

should
is

be

remedied

and the pleasure alone

desires
fish

enjoyed.
fish

This

how: he who

brings
is

up the

along with mosses and thorns,

takes what

to be taken

and abandons the rest;

or,

he

who

desires grain brings

is

the grain with the straw, takes

what

to be

taken and

abandons the

rest,

Hence,

it is

not proper to abandon the

is

pleasure here or hereafter which

known

to be advan-

tageous, because

of

the fear of pain,

Verily,

one does

not
field

refrain

from sowing because there are beasts of the

or from putting the pot on to cook because there are

beggars.

Further,

oven though the very timid

may

give

up
or

visible pleasure,

because the pleasure from sandal-paste

its

women

is

tainted with pain consisting in

decrease

(by consumption), that cannot apply to pleasures hereafter

such as (enjoyment
able,

in)

heaven
"
:

etc.,

these being imperish-

Scripture indeed says

We

have drunk *oma, we

of

have become immortal"; also "The merit

sacrifices

him who

with the

cftturmfisija

cannot, verily, diminish",

as to destructibility on
its

Nor can there be an inference here

the ground
of
(its)

being produced, since

content

is

sublated by revelation, like the inference about the purity

100

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

of the

human

skull (by analogy

with conches

etc,)

Hence, the

possession of the above-mentioned means being non-existent,

it

follows that there cannot be the desire to

this
"

know Brahman,

To meet
"

result,

the revered

aphorist uses the word

therefore

and

its

meaning
in the

is

explained by the
"
itself

commen-

"

tator thus

Because

Veda

etc,

This

is

what

is

intended: true, beasts, beggars

;

etc,

can

be set at nought by agriculturists, cooks etc.

ever,

pain,

how-

which

is

manifold, produced by various causes, cannot

for,

be remedied

in

the long run, the miseries of being

dependent on means (external to oneself) and of diminution

are constantly and inseparably attendant on
all

produced

happiness,

Wot even the best

alone

of

craftsmen can remove

is

the poison

from food which

in

mixed with honey

and poison, and eat (the food)

conjunction with the

honey alone.
nution,

In conjunction with the inference as to dimi"

the texts

like

Therefore, as here the enjoyment

acquired by an act

"
etc,/'

which declare diminution, bring

4<

about a secondary sense for texts like

We
is

have drunk

owa"

etc,,

because the primary sense

impossible,

As

the Paurftijikas say:

"Permanence

till

the dissolution of

the primal elements

is

called immortality,"

And

here,

by the word brahma the valid means of

s/

knowledge thereof,

?,e,,

the Veda,

is

brought to mind,
u

And,

because of suitability, such texts as

Therefore, as here the

enjoyment acquired by an act

"
etc, are referred to

by the

26

f* *i3utii

T
i

'
:
I

ni<?

"W*ira

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Brahma-jijfwsd
is

101
in respect of

desire
is

to

know

Brahman,
be stated

And Brahman
as

that whose definition will

for

"That whence
For
this

this

what

begins

with origination".
"

very reason, for the word

"
"
is

Brahman

"

there

cannot be the doubt of any other

meaning

like that of caste etc.

Of Brahman

in the

sixth case in the sense of object, not in the residuary

sense

because

what

is

desired to be

known

is

needed

for the desire to

know, and because

else as desired to

of the non-designa-

tion of

anything

be known.

"

pronoun
fifth

therefore,"

and indicated as the reason by the

atali).

case termination (the tas suffix in

Be

this so.

Just as misery
etc.,
:

is

attendant on produced
it

happiness like heaven

of

even so
"

may

be in the case

Brahman.

To

this
of
is

he says

And

because

it is

shown that

the

supreme goal
This

man
what

results
is

from the knowledge of

therefore,
of

Brahman."
because
of

meant thereby:

revelation,
in)

which declares the diminution

etc.,

(enjoyment

heaven

and the knowledge of Brahman

results

as the supreme
of the
it is

human

goal, there

the possession
;

above-mentioned means in abundance

and thence

settled there is the desire to

know (Brahman).
i

14

The (compound-) word brahma-jijnasa is thus explained Desire to know in respect of Brahman." By showing the
(to

compound

be) of the sixth case, the refutation

of the explanation
of this

is

to

be understood

by

earlier

com-

mentators as a fourth case compound

brahmaye

jijfiasft*

For, by the dictum of Katyayana "in the dative compound,

both

the

basic

object

and

the modification should be

102
apprehended,"
it

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

is

a rule that there are dative compounds

its

only in respect of a basic object and

in

modifications, as
;

the case of

wood

and the sacrificial stake

where the

compounded elements are not

modification, that (dative)

related as basic object

is

and

compound
is

ruled out

further

the possessive
"
of

compound
etc.,

clearly

laid "

down

in the case
etc.

horse-fodder"
sixth

in the
s

words

Horse-fodder
in

are

case

compounds

",

Even

the possessive
(as

compound, the primacy in fact of

with
the verbal primacy
of

Brahman

compared
is

"the desire
"

to

know")

intelligible.

Be
pect
of

this

so.

When
this

it

is

said

desire to
is

know
in
is

in res-

"

Brahman," since
there
to
is

Brahman"

used

many
there

senses,
this

doubt: of which

Brahman
is

desire

know? The word "Brahman"

used of

the brahmin caste, as in brahmahatti (brahminicide), of the

Veda,

as

in

brahmojjham (forgetting
of the

the
''

Veda

once

studied),

and
"

supreme

self,

as

in

He who knows
doubt

Brahman
removes
:

becomes

Brahman
is

itself".

This

he

And Brahman
Since
after

that whose definition will be

stated" etc.

premising the desire to

self,

know

Brahman, he
to mind,

defines the

supreme

in order to bring that

we understand

that the desire to

know mentioned

here

is

the desire to
etc.
;

know

the supreme self alone, not the

brahmin caste

this is the sense,

Even accepting the compound

it

to be of the sixth case,

is

the sixth case not in the sense of object, but in a resi;

duary sense

since the residuary sense signifies relationship

in general, not " desire to said

merely that of being the object, when

it is

know

in respect of

Brahman,"
is

it

amounts

to

saying "desire to

know

(all)

that

connected with

'

atwtaia.

|fcl

^1

ffcf

ffrf

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Brahman
means
.

103
to

Thus,

the things that serve the desire

as the nature of

know Brahman, such

of

Brahman, the

valid

knowing
fruit,
all

it,

reasoning, the means (of attainment)

and the

signified

by the name "desire to know

under the name
are
related
to
"

Brahman,"

are comprehended

desire to

know

Brahman,''

since

they

Brahman

directly
of

or indirectly.

In the sixth case with the sense

object,

however,
is

what

is

signified

by

"Brahman"
;

is

the object; that

only the nature (of

etc,

Brahman)

and the
;

means

of

knowledge
of

would not be comprehended

hence, in respect
quiry

the

means

of

knowledge

etc,,

the in-

would be into what was not premised,

think thus, he says: "'Of Brahman'
in
is in

To those
the sixth

who
case
"

the

sense
is

of

object"

He
is

states

the reason:
t;ie

because what

desired to be
is

known

needed for

desire

to

know."

Knowledge
;

bound up with the attainment

of the desire

and

for knowledge,
is

what

is

to be

known

is

Brahman.

Knowledge
is

not,

verily,

determined

in the

absence of what

to be
;

known, nor the desire to

know

in

the absence of knowledge

hence, because of being bound up

with the attainment

(of

it),

the desire to
is

know

primarily

needs an object alone, not what

for,

related

in general;
is

even in the absence

of

this

(latter),

that (desire)
is

determined,

when

the object exists.

Verily, there

not,

after seeing the sun or the moon, a search for what is " " Of what is this ? There is, however, related, in the form
"

when one says knowledge ", " What is its object the form
primarily needed,
as

the search for the object, in " Hence, because of being

related as object alone, not

Brahman

is

what

is

related in general, this (sense) being secondary.

And

thus, (the
;

compound
this is the

is

in)

the sixth case with the

sense of object

meaning.

104

THE DE8IBB TO KNOW

Now, even on the acceptance

of the sixth case in

the residuary sense, Brahman's being the object of the

desire to

know
one

is

not contradicted

for relationship in

general
thus,

is

based on some particular relationship.

Even
object-

for

who,

discarding

the

direct

ness of

Brahman, assumes indirect objectness through

is

the channel of general relationship, the effort

vain.

in

Now,

it

is

true

that

tha desire to
is

know

is

not
;

determined in the absence of what

desired to be

known
To

may Brahman may be

"

but there

be some other object for this desire, while

related
to
it

as a residuary.

this

he says

and because

of the non-designation of anything

else as desired to be

known."
"
:

With some unrevealed view one asks

the
etc.
;

Now, even on

acceptance of the sixth case in the residuary sense"

since
relationship
in

general

is

not opposed to a

particular relationship, and since the determination of the

desire

to

know

is

intelligible
:

without
is
:

contradicting

(Brahman's) being the object

with an unrevealed view, he

this

the sense.
"

Himself

criticises

even thus, for one

who
Well

discarding the direct

objectness

of

Brahman"
principles

etc.

indeed

have

you

followed

the

true

of

interpretation in abandoning the relationship of expressed

objectness,

which

is

primarily
fit

needed

by the desire to
primarily,

know,

and

which

is

to

be related

and

(adopting) the relationship of

what

is

related in general,

which

is

needed somehow at a later stage, (thus making)

the secondary primary

and the primary secondary

"
"

The

designation

(of

the relationship) as

direct" and

indirect"

fa* win

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

105

Now,

it

is

not in vain, since

it

would have the

purpose of premising inquiry into everything, without

residue, that
;

is

dependent on Brahman

if

this be said,

no because on the acceptance of the principal, whatever

is

dependent

on

it

will

be presumptively implied.
is

Brahman, indeed, being what

attained by knowledge,
one, which
is
is

most desired to be

the principal,

That principal

the object of the desire to know, being

accepted, those things, without a desire to

there
will

know which
will

not be the desire to

know Brahman,
;

certainly be presumptively implied

to

hence they are not

Just as
is

be
it

separately stated
"
is

in

the aphorism.

when
is

said,

Here goes the king," what

stated
is it

the going of the king along with his retinue, so

here.

And

it

is

so,

also because of conformity with

Scripture.

The

Scriptural

passages

beginning

with

(in

the commentary)
9'

is

in the sense
"
*

of

"primary" and
".
it

"

"

non-primary,

manifest

and

non-manifest
%l
:

The

objector

now

reveals his view

not in vain, since

would have the purpose

without residue, that
is

of premising inquiry into everything,

dependent on Brahman/'

This has

been explained above.

The respondent too

reveals his
"

own
etc.

view: "no; because on the acceptance of the principal

The
it
is

principal position belongs, in fact, to

Brahman (though
of the rest (of
is

not so in the sentence).

The sense

the commentary) along with the illustration

not obscure

the support of Scripture too

is

not obscure in sense.

106
"

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

in the passage,
is

That whence these beings originate,"

that;
that
is

"Desire the knowledge of

quite explicitly
desire to
if

Brahman/'

show that Brahman

the object of the

know.
"

And
is

that will conform to the aphorism,

the sixth case

accepted in the sense of object,

"
is

Therefore,

Of Brahman

in the sixth case in the

sense of object,
Jyfiasfl
is

desire

to
is

know.

The knowledge

culminating in realisation
expressed

the object of the desire

by
of

the

san-suffix;

because

fruit
is

is

the

content

desire.

Indeed,

Brahman

the object

desired to be realised through valid knowledge.

realisation

The
goal,

of

Brahman

is,

indeed,
evils,

the

human
etc.,

because
seeds
of

it

exterminates
all

Nescience

the

transmigration
is

whatsoever.

Therefore

Brahman

is

what

to be desired to be

known.

Having

thus

established the

compound

(as

of the of the
so.

character) acceptable to him, he states the

meaning

word

jijtiaM:
is

"jijnasa

is

desire to

know."

Be

this

Knowledge

not the content of desire.

or the
or,

The attainment
is,

of happiness

remedying

of misery

verily,

the

sphere

of desire,

through these, the means therefor.

is

Knowledge of Brahman

not such.

It

is

not, indeed,
is

experienced a? advantageous or as the cessation of what

disadvantageous.

Nor
exists,

is

it

a means to those two

is

for,

even when that

no special happiness

seen, while

the misery that continues does not cease.

Hence, merely

'

rfj^l

ffrf sreJSc

f fir

ff

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

107

because of the aphorist's words, being the object of desire does

"

not result for knowledge,

To
"

this
etc.

he says

The know-

ledge culminating in realisation

is

Not bare knowledge

desired

rather,

it

is

the knowledge, which as bringing

about realisation

or

intuition

culminates in realisation,

that is the object of the desire expressed

"

by the saw-suffix.
has
is

Why?

Because

fruit is the content of desire"; desire

the means for

its

sphere

till

the fruit

is

attained

this

the complement (to be understood).

Now,
does
of
it

let it

be that knowledge culminates in realisation

even then become a desired object? Knowledge

is

what

not required
in
realisation.

is

not, verily, desired,

even
"

if it

culminate

To

this

he says:

Indeed,

Brahman

is

the object desired to be realised through valid

knowledge."
content
is

Let

it

be

that

there

is

realisation

whose
?

Brahman
"
:

even thus, how

realisation of
it

is it

what

is

desired

To
the

this

he says

The
Is

Brahman
No;
it

is,

indeed,
rather,

human goal"
which
is

prosperity?

is,

beatitude,

of the nature of

Brahman, the mass of

all

supreme
hence

bliss

whence has been expelled

taint of misery

it is

the unexcelled

human

goal.

Be

this so.

The

realisation of
is

Brahman
what
is

is

not the

human goal

For the human goal

;

pervaded by
is

human

activity

and to this

(realisation),

which

of the

nature of Brahman, generation, modification, purification or

attainment cannot happen,

case,
it

as,

being non-eternal in that

be
of

could

not

intelligibly

that

nature
there

(of
is

Brahman).

And when

generation
activity.

etc, are absent,

no pervasion by (human)

Hence,

realisation of
this

Brahman

is

not

the

human

goal.

To

he says:

108
"

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

it

because
all

exterminates

evils,

Nescience
True,

etc.,

the seeds of

transmigration whatsoever,"

in

the realisation
of

of

Brahman,
etc.

which

is

of

the

nature

Brahman,

generation
of

do not occur;

yet,

under the influence

Nescience,
the

the

indeterminable

beginningless

nature of Brahman, though not illumined by another and

though shining, appears as

if

not shining and as

if illu-

mined by another! though

etc.,
it

different

from the body, organs

;

appears
the

as

if

not different from them

evils,

hence,
etc,,

prior

to

extermination of the
it

Nescience
it

the seeds of transmigration,

is

unattained, as

were,

and when that (extermination)

as
it

exists, it

becomes attained,
it is

were

consequently, being thus sought by men,

appropriately the

human

goal. "
"

The word "etcetera"

the impressions thereof,

after

Nescience

comprehends

The cessation
to

of Nescience etc.,
effect

however,

should

be

known

come from the

is

of

contemplation, w*., intuition, which

chosis of the internal organ.

a variety

of psy-

He

concludes: "Therefore,

Brahman

is

what

is to

be desired to be

known

"

by the person

who

is

of

the character stated above and desires release.

is

Not, verily, without that knowledge

its

Nescience, which with

impressions

is

the primal cause of manifold miseries,

its

destroyed.
festation
of

Nor without
the

destruction

is

there the mani-

intuition

of

the jloa as of the nature of

Brahman, the mass

taint of misery.

of bliss

whence has been

expelled

all

Hence, by those who desire

bliss,

(to realise)

the nature of Brahman, the mass of

to,

the means there-

i.&,

knowledge, should

be desired.

And

that results

from the Vedftnta texts not of themselves, but as aided by the

31 R r4 1

95*

f^IT

28

5i

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

109

That Brahman, again, should be either known or

unknown.
if

If

known,
it

it is

not to be desired to be
all

known

not known,

cannot at

be desired to be known*

inquiry into
is

Brahman

consequently, through desire, one

directed to the inquiry into

Brahman, not

to the

VedBnta

or to the intention to declare their sense, For, this " Then? there(latter) is already attained by (the aphorism)
texts
fore,

the

inquiry into Religious Duty,"

which aphoristione's

cally
this

expresses
(study)

the injunction to study

own Veda,

signifying

the fruitful understanding of the

of

sense;

and the apprehension

Religious Duty, since

it

implies the (entire) sense of the Veda, secondarily implies

Brahman
Religious

too,

in

the

same way

as

(it

implies)

what

is

not

Duty (adharma).

Though,

like the inquiry into

Religious Duty, the inquiry into

Brahman too may be implied

yet, that is not set

by the inquiry into the sen^e of the Veda,

forth
in the
earlier inquiry (into

dharma).

Nor does the

inquiry into
of the

Brahman

follow immediately on the mere study

Veda,

Hence, in order to start the inquiry into

also to

Brahman and

show that

it

follows immediately on the

etc*, this

discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal

aphorism has to be stated

thus, there
it

is

no

repetition.

Be

this so.

By

this aphorism,

has been said, instruis

mentality to the knowledge of

Brahman

taught of inquiry
"

that does not stand to reason, since

"

it

cannot bear examietc,

nation

thus, one asks

That Brahman, again

From

110

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

is
:

The reply
eternally

There does exist Brahman

intelligent
all

who is by

nature

pure,

and

free,

omniscient and
analyses the

endowed with

powers.

By him who

meaning
meanings

of the

word Brahman, there are cognised the

,

eternal, pure etc

"

because of conformity with

A.nd because of being the

the sense of the root

self of all,

BrV'*

the existence of

Brahman

is

well-known.
of himself;

Everyone, verily, cognises

the

existence
".

he does not cognise

"
I

do not exist

If

indeed the

existence of the self were not well-known, the entire

world would cognise

"
I

do not exist

".

And

the self

is

Brahman,

the Ved&nta texts, which as not of

evidently
valid,
If
it

human

origin are self-

(Brahman) should
be known,
it

be either

known

or

not known.
of

has been made the content

out
of

ascertained
;

knowledge
it

arising

the Vedanta

texts

therefore,

is

not to be desired to be
its

known
(yet)

for,

the means which, having produced

fruit,

makes

no
of

distinction

to

its

object,

transgresses

the definition the Vcd&ntas,

means.

Or

else, if it

be not

known from
it, it

then, since the Ved&ntas do not teach

would ever be
Desire

unknown and
arises for

could not be desired to be known.

what has been experienced and

liked, not for

if it

what
were

has never been experienced before.

liked,

Nor, even

could

it

be known, there being no means of valid

respect thereof).

knowledge

(in

Verbal testimony should

ftnrrer

'

fRr snihn^

ffcl

^K

:,

fiff

4$<a

srWb

smft

THE DEBIBE TO KNOW

be said to be the
"

111

means

of

knowing

it

as will be said
If that

Because of the sacred-teaching-source."

give

does not
sTistra's)

knowledge

of in

it,

whence

then

its

(the

authoritativeness

that respect?

Nor does any other

of

means

of valid

knowledge apply in respect

is

Brahman.
it

Hence, since in the case of what

be known, there
is

known, though

can

no desire to know, and in the case of

it is

what
be
to

is

not known,

not the object of desire and cannot

of the desire
it;

known, Brahman cannot be the object

know;

this

is

the objection,

He

remedies
is

"The

reply is: there does exist

pure, intelligent

Brahman, who
This
is

by nature eternally
:

and

free."

the sense

even prior to

the inquiry into Brahman,

for him,

who

has studied the

Veda,

who has by
etc.,

a study of Etymology (nirukta),

Grammar
and

(vyftkarana)
their

understood the relation of words

is

import, there

even without the inquiry a general

understanding of the nature of Brahman endowed with

eternality
11

etc,

from the string of texts beginning with

"

Existence alone this was in the beginning, dear one

and

ending
14

with
"

"That
etc.

thou

art",

Here,

by

the words

Brahman

(in the
is

commentary) signifying the object

of knowledge, there

indicated secondarily the knowledge

of that
is

whose content
(Brahman)
doubt.
is

is

Brahman, since the existence

not settled prior to inquiry,

when

there

By

the word "eternal,"

is

misery characterised by

diminution
to

excluded,

By the word "pure," misejy due

etc.,
is

adjuncts

like

the

body

excluded.

The word

112

THE DESIRE TO ENOW

exhibits
it

"intelligent"

as blissful and not illumined by

another, since bliss and effulgence are non-different.

Be
these,

this
its

so,

It release existed,
;

then would shine forth

(qualities) purity etc.

but, prior to that, there is

conjunction with misery through the bodily attributes of

birth, old

age,
etc.
it

death

etc.,

due

to non-difference

from
free,

the

body

To

this

he says: "free",
(i.e.,

Always

always pure,
body
etc.),

yet appears so

non-different from the

because of delusion due to the influence ef

beginningless Nescience.
less

Having thus shown the adjunctdeclares

its

form

of

Brahman, he
1J
:

form as with the

all

adjunct of Nescience
powers/'

omniscient and endowed with

its

By

thin is

shown

being the cause of the

the cause
of
is

universe, since being or not being

depen-

dent on the
ledge.
this

presence

or

absence

power and know-

Whence, again, the

realisation of

Brahman

as of the

nature? To this
of the

he says: "By him who analyses

etc,

meaning

word 'Brahman'

The

realisation of

Brahman

as of this nature comes not merely from considera" " Existence alone etc,, taken together tion of texts like " with what goes before and after, but the word Brahman"

itself

gives us this very sense through

"
:

its

etymology.

He

give* the derivation

'

because of conformity with the sense of

"

the foot

brh

'."

The

root

bjh,"

meaning growth,
permits

signifies

excellence.

This

undefined

excellence

of

it

(Brahman) (the attribution

etc.,

of) eternality, purity, intelligence

:

conveyed through other words

this

is

the sense,

ff

ffcl

fffrl-

f 3:

H=ff ff

ffcl

3R

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Having thus declared that purity
"
etc, are

113

well-known

of

the denotation of the word

that," he says also of the

"

denotation of the word "thou":

the
self

And, because
is

of being
1 '

of all,

the existence of
of

Brahman

well-known,
to

The existence
the
it

Brahman

is

well-known to ail even

;

ploughman with
himself,

his dust-covered feet

itself is

whence

Because
"

"
is

This

explained

Every one, verily

etc.

He
of

confirms

this

cognition

itself,

by

the

refuta-

tion
to

non-cognition:

"not not"
certainly

etc,;

does
(so)

not

fail

cognise
is

"I

exist,"

but

does

cognise;
exht," but
"

"

this

the construction,

Now, one may know

"

may

not

know

the

self.

To

this

he says

If,

indeed
If

etc.

He would

not have the cognition 'I exist".

is

he did not
"

cognise the jlya-self, which

the substrate of
"
I
;

I-ness,"

he would not have

the cognition of

this

is

the sense,
self,

Now,

let it

be that
"

all

men have
;

the cognition of the

it

the

"
I-ness

substrate of
"

what

of

for

Brahman

To

this

he

says:

And

the self

is

Brahman "; because

to

of the apposi-

tional relation of intelligence

etc.

"that"
of the

"thou".

Hence, the purity,

5

denotation of the

"that*

being

well-known from Scripture, and thejiiw denoted by the

"thou" being well-known from

perception, and since the

cognition of the word-significance precedes the cognition

of

the

sentence-significance,
of

it

is

intelligible

that the
as of the

realisation

the

denotation of the "thou

results

"

nature
"

of this

Brahman
is

from

the

text

"That thou

art

the idea,

114

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

then, in the world,
in

If,

Brahman
it

is

well-known as
it

the

self,

that case, since

that
it

is

already known,
to

follows

again

is

not to be desired

be

known.
to
its

No;

because there are conflicting views as

nature.

particular

The ordinary man and the

Lokftyatikas conceive of the self as the mere body

qualified

by intelligence,

Others hold that the self

is

only the intelligent sense-organs,

it
is

Yet others say that

it is

the mind.

Some say

that
it is

mere momentary
Still

cognition,

Others say that

is

the void.

others

say that there

migrates,

a being different from the body,

who
that

who

is

agent and enjoyer,

Some say

The objector declares the

alternatives;
"If, then,
in

defect in the
"

first of

these
11

the world

etc.

The 'world
If

means the succession

text
self

of teacher

and taught,

from the

"That thou

art,"

Brahman
"

be well-known to be the
self (be

where one ought

to say

The

understood) as
is

Brahman," the statement "Brahman

understood
(as

as

the self"

to be

made) in view
(it

of the

intention to declare

non-difference
it

would again follow that being known

cannot be the object of the desire to know).

"No,'
its

He

answers

this:

Why

not? "Because there are

1 '

conflicting

views as to

particular nature.

Such

conflicting views

are said to be the seeds of doubt, in the absence of any

of valid

means
of

knowledge to confirm or confute,

And because

ffc!

ffrf

rf

3R?

^TT

f^T

f|

!:

^
'

f|

'srfe^n

jte

ft?i

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

he
is

115

enjoyer alone, not agent.

There

is,

as different

from that, the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, say

some.

The

self

he

is

of the enjoyer, say others,

Thus

many
Of
fall

people hold different views, basing themselves

texts

upon reasoning and

these,

(both sound and) fallacious,

he,

who without

inquiry accepts any, will

to
evil.

from

beatitude

and attain
statement
is

Therefore
desire
to

beginning

with

a
there

of

the

know Brahman,
the

begun a

respectful inquiry into

is

Vedanta

texts,

whose

auxiliary

reasoning
is

not

inconsistent

therewith,

and

whose purpose

beatitude.

that doubt the desire to

know
is

is intelligible

this

is

the idea.

The

substrate, which

the basis of dispute, should be

all

admitted to be established by the conclusions of

else,

systems;

there would be no conflicting views, these having either

"

no basis or different bases,

conflicting views
;

"
Vipratipattis
are, verily,

and views cannot have no

basis, as

then

they would have nothing to rest on.

conflict

Nor do those (views)

which
is

have

different

bases.

The

views
is

that

the intellect

non-eternal and that the soul

eternal

are not, truly, conflicting views.

Hence,

it

is

the con-

clusion of
tion of the

all

systems that the purity etc. of the denotaVedSnfcas, while

"that" are known from the

"

the jiva denoted by the

thou

"
is

established by experience.

The
or

conflicting views relate merely to their manifestation

non-manifestation and to the

since,
in

various

modes thereof.

Therefore,
in

respect

of

the

substrate

known

a general

way, there are conflicting views as to the

116
(of
is

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

its

particulars

nature),

doubt

in

respect

of

these

particulars

reasonable,
first

Of these, he shows
the denotation of
"

the conflicting views about

in

the

"thou,"
"

the

word^ beginning
IS

with

The ordinary man

and ending with

enjoyer alone,

not agent".

Here, on the views of intelligence as body, sense,

cognition,
"

mind
"

or

momentary
"

the

eternaiity

etc,

of the

denotation of the
the

that

cannot relate to the denotation of

thou," because of lack of compatibility,

too,

On

the nihilist
of

view

how
arid

can
is

that
a

which

is

incapable
be

being
(of

spoken

of

not

word-sense

the sphere

denotation)

of

the

"that"

and

"thou"?
is

Of

the

forms of agent and enjoyer too, there

certainly lack of

consonance
" of

with

the

eternaiity
of

etc.

of 'the

denotation
the

the

that,"
self)

because

mutability.
is

On

view

that (the
is

though not an agent

with

an enjoyer, there
etc.,

lack

of

consonance

eternaiity

because of

mutability.
are

On

the view that selves though not enjoyers

of

many, there continues the same lack

"

consonance

with the denotation

of

the word

that,''

bocause of the

non-eternaiity etc. resulting from

definition as a plurality

and because
"

of the

abandonment

of non-duality.

Through

the conflicting views in respect of the denotation of the

word
of the

thou,"

there are

shown

similar views in
is

respect
to say,

denotation of the

word '"that"; that

the
are

Lokayatikas and others who contend that the Vedas

unauthoritative,
of
verily,

hold
to

the

cognition of the

denotation

the

"that"
Vedas
of the

be

illusory,

while those
hold

who

maintain

the

to

be
"

authoritative,
is

that the denotation

"that

either figurative

or not (primarily) intended (as the object of the teaching),

Rl^

w-

fl

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Thus, having,

117

through the conflicting views about tho

denotation of the "thou," indicated the conflicting views

about

the

denotation

of

the

"that,"

he

states

the

conflicting views directly relating to the denotation of the

"that":
omniscient

'There

is,

as

different

from

that,

the
'

Lord,
relates

and omnipotent,

say some,'

That

to the /i.'a-selves,
etc.,

He

is

different not

merely from the body

is

but also from the jtVa-selves,

And he

also the ruler of

the whole universe,

His two natural attributes of omni-

science and omnipotence are mentioned to establish rulership,

Even

this

(ruler),

being different

from the Jim-selves,

cannot have an appositional relation with the denotation

of
"

the

"thou"; hence, he
he
is

states

his

own view

thus;

The

self,

of the enjoyer, say others."

Of the enjoyer
the

,&,

of

the jwa-self conditioned

the

by

Nescience, he,
is

Lord,

denotation

of

the "that,"
is

the self; hence,

non-different from the Lord

etc.

the ^Va-self, as the pot-ether

is

from the ether at large

In finishing

this

the sense,

with the conflicting views, he states the

cause

of

these

views: "Thus,
reasoning,
or

many"
or

etc,

They base
and
is

themselves
texts,

on

sound

fallacious,
this

on
the

soundly

unsoundly
let

interpreted;

construction,

Now>

there be conflicting views, and let

so,
?

doubt be their cause; even

into
he,

why
this

should the inquiry

u

Brahman be commenced

To

he says

Of

these,

who without
of

inquiry'
truth,

etc,

Beatitude can come from

of untruth.

knowledge

the

not

Further,

if

118

THE DESIRE TO KNOW

is
f
'

because of untrue knowledge there

"

loss
etc.

of faith, evil

too follows, he says

and attain

to evil

He

concludes
etc.

the

purport
into

of

the

aphorism:
is

"Therefore"
;

The

inquiry
ing,

the Vedantas

but reasoning

other reasonis

which does not

the

conflict therewith,

such as

mentioned
in

in

Pttrva-mlmumsa

and

in

the

Nifitja-sfttras,

discussing the authoritativeness of the Vedas, of perception

etc.
;

that of which these are auxiliaries

it

is

thus mentioned.

Hence,

is

established that the inquiry into Brahman,

of

which brings about the knowledge

to

Brahman, the means

supreme beatitude, should be

commenced.

TO

II

II

f|

Brahman,
known.

it

has been said,

is

to be desired to be

What

is

the definition, then, of this

Brahman

To

this the venerable aphorist says

THAT,

WHENCE FOR

THIS

WHAT

BEGINS

WITH ORIGINATION

Having thus

justified

in

the

first

aphorism the cominto

mencement

of the inquiry, he

commences the inquiry

Brahman

That, whence for this what begins with origination'

of

The commentator says by way

"

introduction to

this

aphorism
known,
Here,
of

Brahman,
is

it

has been

said, is to
of

be desired to be

What
though,

the definition, then,

this

Brahman?"
knowledge
its

from

the

premising
as

of

the

the nature of

Brahman
the

the
of

principal,

subetc,

sidiaries

such

as

means
since
its

valid

knowledge
is

are
pal,

also

premised, yet
alone
is

nature

the

princi-

that

first

established

by

objection

(and

answer),

Whatever

is

experienced in any
;

way

is

limited,

impure, non-intelligent and destructible

of
is

by the knowledge

these cannot be defined the nature of Brahman, which

opposed to them, being of the nature of eternal purity

and intelligence,
is

No one
it

ever defines the eternal by

what

produced,

Nor can

be defined by

its

own

attributes

120

DEFINITION

What
it is

begins with janma^

i.e..

origination
its

thus

an adjectival compound indicating

is
:

own

attribute.

The meaning of the compound

tion

origination, sustenta-

and destruction.
on
both

And

of origination the primacy

of

depends

statements
It is

Scripture and the

"
;

nature of things,

thus stated in Scripture

That

whence these beings

originate."

In this passage the

such as eternality, since these are not already known.

is

What

well-known

is,

indeed, a definition, not

what

is

absolutely

unknown,
here, since

And

similarly, not

even verbal testimony obtains

Brahman being

absolutely

unknown

is

not the

meaning
sentence.

of a
89

word and hence cannot be the meaning of a

in the

Hence,

absence of a definition,
;

Brahman

cannot be desired to be known

objector.

this

is

the view of the

This

objection
etc.

the revered

aphorist answers: "That,

whence"
definition

Let not this

experienced universe be the

as
its

of

Brahman, either
it;

attribute or through

identity

with
by

but

it

may

well be (the definition) as as

originated

the
is

latter,

just

the

attainment of
;

different localities

(a definition) of the

motion of the sun

this is

the purport.

He
of

analyses

the
i.e.,

parts

of

the
"

aphorism: "what

begins with janma,

origination

etc.

For

the

sake

parsimony, the
the

aphorist

uses
to

the neuter janmZdi\

justify
this,

and
the

commentator, in
(in

order

gives

samHh&ra*di)andva
(origination,

the

neuter):

janmcrsthitr
90

bkangam

sustentation

and

destruction).

'

DEFINITION

121

sequence

is

shown among

origination, sustentation

and

dissolution.

And
and

the nature of
dissolution

things

is

such that

sustentation

occur in respect of a

substrate that has

become existent through origination,

u

"
for this,"

"

In

the expression

by

this

is

designated
etc.

the substrate cognised

through perception
it

The

sixth case has the sense of relating

' ' 1

to origination etc,

Whence'
Of
this

is

the

designation of the cause.

universe, differentiated by

name and

form,

containing

many agents and

enjoyers, the abode of

what

are definitely regulated in respect of place, time, cause,

action

and

fruit,

the nature of whose design cannot even

The

passage beginning

with

"And
of

of

origination"
is

and
self-

ending

with

"the

designation

the cause"

explanatory.

Be

this

so.

When

there are so

many

(likely causes

of the universe) floating about,

such as primal nature, time,

the activity of planetary deities or guardian deities (like

Indra,
things),

guarding

the directions), chance, the nature (of

and non-existence,

why

postulate an omniscient

and omnipotent Brahman as the cause of the origination

"
etc,,

of the universe ?

To

this

he says

Of

this universe

differentiated

by

name and form"

etc.,

etc.

Here,

by the

qualification
telligent being

"differentiated"
is

causation by
is

an

in-

postulated,
entities

whereby
like the

ruled out causation

by non-intelligent

prodhnna or by what

U2
be

DEFINITION
the
that
is

conceived

by

mind,

omniscient and
the origination,
is

omnipotent
sustentation
is

cause

whence there

and

destruction" that
of

Brahman
(in

"

the

complement

the

sentence

the

aphorism).

is

non-existent,

That, verily, which

like

is

differentiated

by

name and
intelligent
is

form,
being,

pot etc,

is

seen to be caused by an

The

universe,

which
;

is

under dispute,
causation

differentiated

by name and form

is

hence,

by an intelligent being
verily,

postulated.

The

intelligent one,

having

considered

the

name and form name

it

intellect,

creates the external pot, with the

of a

in his " pot/'

is

and the form

the

narrow neck
into

etc.

Hence
only
if

that

pot

to

be

brought
is

being,

it

exists

already in resolve,
"

the object-causal-condition, in the

"
".

form

He makes

a pot

As they say
is

But what

is

present in the intellect, that

thus,
it

not

non-existent/*

And

cannot be postulated that a non- intelligent entity

creates

what

it

cannot consider in the intellect

this

is

the idea.

Be

this so,

The

intelligent planetary deities or the

guardian deities
sidered

may

create

the universe, having

;

conof

names and forms

"

in their intellects
is

Brahman
To
this

the nature mentioned above

says
:

unnecessary.

he
are

containing
like

many

agents and enjoyers."

priests
(ftviks]

Some
etc,,

agents

cooks,

sacrificial

not

DBP1NITION

123

enjoyers,

Some

others, however, are enjoyers, as the fathers

in the svQddhas,
10

and the sons in the Vaiyvnnare$i,~ not

of both,

agents;

Hence the mention

The compound
it

place-time-cause-act-fruit --is an itaretara*>dvandva\ and

has

to

be

split

up into: place

etc,,

these
is

being defined
the universe
;

with respect to each,

The abode
etc.).

of these

of this (universe, the cause

Some, indeed, are created

in definite places, &</,, black antelopes etc,

Some
cuckoo

are created
etc.

at definite times, e.g., the warbling of the

Some

are occasioned by definite causes,

of storks occasioned
(of

e.g.,

the impregnation

by the thunder-clap of the early clouds

the rainy season),

Some perform

definite acts,

e.g.>

such

acts as

the performance of sacrifices (for others) belong to

Similarly,

brahmins alone, not to others,

fruit,
e.j/,,

some enjoy

definite

some
are

are happy,

some

are miserable, likewise

those

who

happy are themselves at other times miserable,

not
fit

All this does

is

in

with creation by yadrcchu, which

or by the nature (of things),

another

name
by one

for chance,

or (even)

who

is

not omniscient and omnipotent,

since the planetary and guardian deities,

whose knowledge

and

capacity

are
112

limited,
is

cannot
:

know and produce

"the nature of whose
"

(the universe),

That

thus said

design cannot even be conceived by the mind.

of the design even
of

The nature

a single body cannot be conceived

;

by the mind at any time

of

remote indeed

is

(the possibility
;

conceiving)

the

design of the

universe

how

then to

124

DEFINITION

Of

all

other

modifications
;

of

being,

there

is

inclusion even in the three

hence are mentioned here

destruction,

origination, sustentation

and

But

if

what

are
"

enumerated
etc,,

by

Yaska,

namely,

"originates,"
in

exists"

were taken, since they occur

world's
sustentation,
of

the

period

of

the

the origination,

sustenlation

and

destruction

the world

from

its

primal cause would

not be apprehended;
so,

this

doubt

may

arise

lest

one should doubt

that origination

from Brahman, the cause, and sustentation and dissolution even in that, these alone are apprehended*

create

This
*

is

the sense,
is

fle

completes the text of the

is

aphorism:
"

'that

Brahman'

the

complement

of the

sentence.

Be

this so,

Why

should origination, sustentation and

1'

destruction alone bo understood here by

"what

begins with,

not growth, transformation and decrease as well ? To this he " " Of all other modifications of being says t.e,, of growth
:

etc,,

"there
of

is

inclusion even in the three",

Growth

is

the

increase
parts,
e.g.,

parts,

Thereby, from that which has few

from two threads, there arises another being, the

hence, growth
of
is

big cloth

but origination,
as
defined

Transformation,

which

is

three

kinds

by

'

fft

Tl:,

?ft

DEFINITION

125

fa

and laksaija^
gold,

is

but

origination,

For,

of the

substrate,

the

dharmo^laksaya
etc.,
is

transformation
of
is

into

bracelet,

crown

the

origination
bracelet etc,

these,

So

too,

the presentness etc, of the

that too
is

lakqaqa

transformation;

origination.

AvasthQ, trans-

formation
(even
in

lies

in the distinction of newness, oldness etc,

is

what
is

present

etc.)

that (too)
is

is

origination,

Decrease

the decrease of parts and

but destruction,

Thus, being included under various appropriate heads, in

origination
this
is

etc,,

growth

etc, are
if

not mentioned separately

the sense,
etc,,

Now, even

these were not included in

origination

then too origination, sustentation and de-

struction alone should be mentioned, For, in that case, verily,

"

the Scriptural text teaching these, yw,,

v
94

That whence these

beings originate

etc,,

is

brought to mind, and Brahman

as the primal cause of the universe

becomes

defined.

Else,
etc,,

by the comprehension of origination, existence, growth

there would

come
0ii
;

to

mind the

text of the Nifukta

which

teaches these

and that

(text) does not intend to

teach the

primal cause, since

origination,

the modifications

of being,

such as

taught by that

text, are intelligible

even in the

period of sustentation subsequent to the primal creation.

In order to remove this objection, there

origination,

is

understood the

sustentation and destruction declared in the

Veda;

thus

he says:

''But

if

what

are enumerated by

Yaska"etc.

126

DEFINITION

Of the universe with the above-mentioned

qualities,

origination etc, cannot be postulated from the non-senti-

ent Pradhana, primal atoms, non-existence, a transmi-

grating being, or

(in fact)

from anything other than a

qualities,

Lord with the above-mentioned

Nor can

it

be

by

its

own nature because

;

here

we have

to accept parti-

cular places, times

and

causes, This very inference, those,

who uphold
for

the causality of the Lord, regard as a proof

etc,

the

existence

of

the Lord, distinct from a

transmigrating being,

Now, even
therefrom
destruction,

thus,

let

origination

alone be indicated

are

inevitably
this "

understood

sustentation
origination
is

and

To

he says:

"that

from

Brahman, the cause

its

etc,

By the
bare

three, there

indicated

material

causality

origination,

being

common
indicate

to

the

efficient

cause

as
is

well,

cannot

material
etc,

causality,

That

thus said: "even in that"

The purpose served by the

mentioned
with
(part

special causes and effects

above

is

now

declared:
qualities,

"Of
"

the

universe

the
of

above-mentioned
writing,

etc,

By

this

the)

the postulation has

been declared

of the content premised, the nature of of definition

(thereof),

Brahman, by way
knowledge thereof

The means

of

W^T^fT^RTFT

ff

DEFINITION

127

Now, here
in

too that
"

same thing has been premised

the aphorism,
".

That, whence for this

what begins

with origination

No

because the aphorisms have

the purpose of stringing together the Vedanta texts like

flowers,

For,

it is

the Vedanta texts that are cited and

considered

by

the

aphorisms.

Brahman-realisation,

"

has to be declared,

As the Naiyftyikas say

That subject
premise can
is

which has been postulated

be established
tradicted

(as possible) in the

by means

of a

probans
it

that which

con-

even at the moment

of

arises

cannot be saved

by means
1

probanit,

e.g.,

'the barren

woman

is

"

mother

and so on,

Thus, origination

etc, are the

grounds

for postulation,
blish
Ttfvara

Others, like the Vaitfesikas, desire to estaThis,

by inference from these very grounds,

he mentions, in order to strengthen them as grounds for

postulation:

"This very
"
:

"

inference
"

etc,
etc.

He

questions

Now, here too

The subject-matter

of the section (adhikaraya) being

concluded even with this,

he answers the question, in the capacity of a friend, with

reference to the subject-matter of the succeeding section
:

"No; because
very

the aphorisms have the purpose

of
is

''

etc,

This

purpose

stringing
"
:

together the flowers of the

it is

Vedanta texts

shown

For,
is

the

Vedanta

"

texts

etc.

The end

of the inquiry

the destruction of the twofold

Nescience along with the impressions.

Thence, verily, the

accomplishment,

i.e.

manifestation of Brahman, realisation,

128

DEFINITION
accomplished at the end of the inquiry into
is

indeed,

is

the meaning of the texts, and

not accomplished by

other means of valid knowledge like inference.

While,

however, there are the Vedanta texts which declare the

cause of the origination of the universe,
confirm
too,

in order to

the

apprehension of their meaning, inference

as
is

such

not opposed

to

the

Vedanta

texts,
it is

becomes a means of valid knowledge, and as such

not avoided
;

because argumentation
It is

is

accepted as an
:

auxiliary even by Scripture,

"
texts,
5),

thus

the Scriptural
"

It is to be heard, to

be reflected on

(5/4,

II, iv,

and

"

learned and intelligent

;

man

reaches the

Gandhara country
"

even so here, a

man knows when

2),

he has a teacher
that
it is

(Chand., VI, xiv,

show

of the self

helped by the

human

intellect,

In

respect
to

of

that

Brahman,
other
?

is

no

means

of

know?

ledge

be

followed

than

verbal

testimony

Then, whence reflection

is

And whence
?

the experience

thereof

To
texts

this
"

the intuition which " he says While,

;

however, there are the

be

Vedanta
be

etc.

Inference should

understood

to

of that

variety
also

which

is

not in

conflict

with

the

Vedanta and

dependent

on

it.

Discrimination by reasoning, not in conflict with verbal

testimony,

and dependent
is

thereon,

is

called

reflection,

Reasoning

either presumption or inference,

frTT

ft

rT^T T%
'

'

f
'

%^C

ffrT

f ^t

^?ffi[

srm-

ffrf

DEFINITION

129

Nor

is

it

that, as in the desire to

etc,

know

Religious

Duty, Scripture

alone are the authority, in the

case of the desire to

know Brahman

on the contrary,
etc.

here Scripture
of

etc.,

as also experience

are

means
since

valid

knowledge, as and

when

applicable,
in

the

knowledge of Brahman culminates

experience

Be

this so.

As the human
Duty,
also ?

intellect is of

no aid in the

knowledge

of Religious

why

should

it

not be likewise
"
:

in respect of

Brahman

To

this

he says

Nor

is

itthat,

as in the
etc.":

desire to

know

Religious

Duty"

etc.

"Scripture

Scripture, epics, pvrft$as and traditional Codes are

the means of valid knowledge,

Experience
viz.,

is

a particular
of
is

psychosis

of
;

the

internal

organ,

the intuition

Brahman

the fruit of that

means

of valid

knowledge

the manifestation of the nature of

Brahman through

its

removal of Nescience.
fruit,

It
it

is

to be understood to be the

as

it

were (since

is

not like other fruit created,

in

purified

etc.).

Though
is

even

the

desire

to

know

Religious Duty there

of

the functioning of the accessories

etc.,

experience,

like

perception
desire
to

yet

it

is

not

there

directly.

In

the
(i.e.,

know
etc.

Brahman,

however,

experience
desire
to

intuition)

occur directly; and the

;

thus,

know Brahman has experience for its object he says "since the knowledge of Brahman culminates
:

inexperience"
intuition
of

etc.

The experience
is

of

Brahman,

i.e.,

the

Brahman,

the supreme
bliss

human

goal, being

of the nature of supreme

all

whence has been wiped out

misery.

130

DEFINITION
for

and has an existent object

respect
of

content,

Indeed, in

what
to

is

to he

done, authoritativeness can

etc,,

belong

only

Scripture

since

there
is

is

no
be

dependence on experience, and since what

done derives
its

to

existence in dependence on a person,

or
scriptural,

An

action,

worldly

may
;

be

done,

or

not done, or done in a different

way

for

example, one

goes on horse-back, or on
u

foot, or otherwise or does not

go at

all.

Similarly,
" "

In the Atirfttra one should use the

sixteenth cup,

In the Atirfttra ono should not use the

sixteenth cup";
" "
rise,

"One
to

is

to

offer

oblation after sun-

One

is

offer oblation before sun-rise."

And
in

prescriptions

and prohibitions would be purportful

these cases, as options or as general rules and exceptions,

Now,
experience
itself
is

let

it

be

that

the desire
its

to

know has
that

the

of

Brahman

for

object;

experience

not possible, since

Brahman cannot
i;

be the object
of

thereof.

To

this

he says

and (since the knowledge

"

Brahman) has an

existent object for content.

is

The

relation-

ship of object and subject

of

an illusory form of the intuition

(the form
in
this

indicated by) the absence (of the universe).

Not

way

does the knowledge of Religious

Duty
is

culminate in experience, since the experience of that

in itself a

not

human

goal, the

human

goal being realised by the

observance of that (duty), and observance being established

by mere verbal testimony, even in the absence of experience

this
to be

he

says

in:

"Indeed, since,

in

respect

of

what

is

done,'*

etc.

Nor

is

it

capable of being the content

3T%T
WT,
57

3T5T

ffir

ft

rrf

^f'

ffif

<

't

^^i^"

1*113

ffc!

<$lfVt

DEFINITION

131
"

But
not

thing does not admit of options like,

"
exists, does

thus,

thus,"

not exist

",

Options, however,

are dependent on the

of

human
of

intellect.

The knowledge
not dependent
It

the the

true

nature

thing

is

on

human

intellect.

What then?

depends

on the thing

itself,

Indeed, in respect of one and the

same
* 4

post,

true cognition does not arise in the form,

else,

It is

a post, or something

man ",

In this case,
;

"
11

or something else, a
It is certainly

man
is

"
is

an

illusory cognition

a post,"
thing.

the true cognition, because

it

depends on

the

Thus, authoritativeness of

what have
thing,

existent

things as content depends on the

of intuition, since
it

it

is

non-existent in time present, and

;

is

non-existent in time present, not being settled

:

thus,

he says
in

"and

since

what
a

is

to

be done derives
1

its

existence

dependence
of

on

person

(who

acts).'

This

very

dependence
he states
the
:

acts,

worldly and Vaidic, on a person,

etc.

many

be done or not done

nature
etc.

He
u

exemplifies

unsettled

of

worldly

acts:
a

e,g,,

one goes
illustra-

on

horse-back"

He combines

Scriptural

tion with
atiratra

the one from

should
is

experience:

''Similarly 'in the

'

"
etc.

one

use the sixteenth cup

This

illustration

cited to

show that

it

is

possible to do or

not to door another;

He
"

gives an illustration
is

of doing in one
"
etc,

way

One

to offer oblation after sunrise

132

DEFINITION

Be

this so.

Because

of

man's freedom in respect of

what

is

to be done, there results the futility of (these) pres-

criptions

and prohibitions, since a person's engaging in and

from activity are not dependent thereon,

desisting
this

To

he says:

"And

prescriptions
"

and prohibitions would

''One should use"
is

be purportful in these cases

prescription;

etc,

is

the

"one should not use"

is

the

prohibition,

The

offering of oblation

injunctive both

when mentioned
is

before

dawn and

after

dawn.

Similarly, there
as

prohibition

about touching

human

bones,
of

also

prescription to
a brahmin,

wear them

in respect

one

who has
of this

killed

Prescriptions and prohibitions

kind are purportful'

How ?

"

To
"

this he says

as options or as genera! rules and

exceptions.

The

en (at the end of the sentence, in the com-

mentary)

signifies a

reason,

Combination being impossible

in the case of using

and not-using, or of offering before and

of their contradiction,

after

dawn, because

and the relation

of sublafcer

and sublated being impossible between alternais

tives

which are equally strong, option

inevitable.

The

prohibited contact of

human bones and

the wearing of
;

them

are opposed to each other, but are not equally strong

there
is

hence,

no option; but
there
is

of

the

general

rule

prohibiting

contact,
of

sublation by the special rule, the content

to

the

prescription

wear.

This

is

what

is

said:

by

prescriptions and prohibitions alone

is

that unreali^ed-but-

to-be-created thing brought

about, whereby there results

human freedom even

in respect of

engaging in and desisting

1
'

from activity dependent on prescriptions and prohibitions,

flfcl

1%

Wftfcl

DEFINITION
But
says
this

133

is

not so in the case of existent things

'

thus be

"
:

But a thing does not admit

of options like

thus/ 'not

thus'/'
being),
of the

By

this

is

refuted

option as

to
(lit,

the

mode
"

(of

Option as to the substance itself

"
*

the possessor
'.

'

mode)
this

is

refuted

exists/

does not exist

Be
seen,
it

so,

Even among
post
or

existent things, option

is

as

in

"a

man."

How,

then,
?

can
this

be said that a thing does not admit of option

1

To

he says
is

"Options, however'

etc.
i.e.,

The "human
doubt and

intellect"

the internal organ; options,

error, are de-

pendent thereon, Either they originate from the mind alone

with
its

impressions, as in dreams

or,

they originate from

the mind

and the senses together with their impressions,

as in the doubt about the post

whether it is a post or a man,

or

in the erroneous cognition of it as certainly a man ; " " or, something else, a words "something else (in

by the

man")

there

is

denoted a man,
(doubt and

who

is

in fact other

than a post,

And they

error)

do not depend on the real

they arise in dependence
substrates
etc.)

man

or

the real

post,

since
of

merely

on

the

perception

with

common

attributes,

Hence, options (doubt, error

which are not

of things as they are,

do not introduce option into things or

this
is

change their nature

of the truth, that
is

the sense.

As

for the

knowledge

dependent not on the intellect, but on the

is

thing;
of

hence,

it

appropriate to ascertain the nature

things
u
:

therewith,

not
of

through doubt etc,;

the
true

thus,

h
ii

says

The knowledge

nature of a thing

not"

etc,

184

DEFINITION
this

Then,

being the

case,

the

knowledge of
because
its

Brahman
content
is

too

depends on the thing

thing.

itself,

an existent

Now,
is

if

the content be an

existent thing, then

Brahman

certainly the object of

other

means

of

valid

knowledge;

and

hence a

consideration of the Vedanta texts would certainly be purposeless,

No, because, not being a content of the senses,

is

the relation

not apprehended.

By

nature, the senses

have objects as their content, and do not have Brahman

as their content.

Indeed,

if

Brahman were a content

of

the senses, there would be the apprehension that this

effect is related to

Brahman.

When

the effect alone

is

Having made
knowledge
things,

clear in this fashion that the validity of

in respect of existent things is

dependent on the

he declares the objectivity of the knowledge of

"
"
:

Brahman
"Now,

Then, this being the case

the

etc.

Here, he asks
"
etc,

if

content be an existent thing

That

statement which relates to existent things

to be

is,

verily, seen
is

re-statement, having an object which

within
"

the sphere of other means of valid knowledge,

are fruit

e.g.,

there

on the banks
texts.

of

the

river".

So too are the

is

VedSnta

Hence, these would but re-state what

other means
of

known through

valid

knowledge, since
It

they (the texts) refer to existent objects.

said that in respect of
etc*

has been

Brahman, inference with origination

is

of the

universe as probans,

another means of valid

'flrfn

?
I

fife

DEFINITION

1SB

apprehended,
to

it

cannot be ascertained whether it

related to something else.

is

related

Brahman
"

or
u

Therefore,

the aphorism,
origination
ference.

That, whence for this

not
for

what begins with

is

the purpose of suggesting inthe purpose of showing the

that
this

What
texts,

then ?

It is for

Vedanta
is

What

then

is

Vedanta

text,

which
Bhygu,

desired to be

marked out by

aphorism?

the son of Varuna, approached his father Varupa, saying

4

Teach me Brahman, Venerable One

"
is

"
;

beginning thus,

it

said,

That whence these beings originate, that by

live,
is

which, being originated, they

return
:

that to which they

desire to

know

that

that

Brahman ,"

And

of

knowledge,
is

Therefore, that (means of knowledge) which

basic

is

alone to be investigated, not the Vedanta texts,

as dependent thereon
;

which are true

aphorisms

how, then, can the

together the

have

the

object

of
is

stringing

Vedanta
"

texts like flowers ? This

the sense,
"

He answers
etc.

No, because, not being a content of the senses

is

Again,

why

oays:

the inner self not a content of the senses ? To this he ' " By nature etc. Hence it is that Scripture says :
1

"The

Creator

forced
is

the

senses

outwards; therefore,
98

they see what

"

without,
if

not the self within,"

By
"

the words,
etc,,

Indeed,
is

Brahman were a content

of the senses

there

explained the inner self not being an object of

the senses,

We shall

explain quite clearly later,

100

" how even

sHmti,nyato-dr$a inference

does not apply to Brahman,

13ft

DEFINITION

this,

this is

the definitive

text,

"From

Bliss alone,

verily, these beings originate

being originated, by Bliss

return,'*

do they live

unto Bliss do they

There are to be
is

cited other texts too of this class,

whose content

by
a

nature eternally pure, intelligent and free, and

cause omniscient in character,

is

And

it

has been explained by us extensively in the Nyfiya-

kayikft.

We

M
shall also explain later

how

the texts are not

restatements merely
Therefore, everything
u

because of having existent contents,

is

clear,

And Scripture

exhibits origi-

nation in

That whence"

etc,, life

or sustentation in "that
1
'

by which, being originated, they

"

live,
"

and absorption there"

in in

that to which they return

etc,

And

of this, this

is

the definitive text ":

(of the text)
41

there being a doubt as to the content

etc,,

being the pradhana

11

the definitive text

is

is

From

Bliss

alone

etc,

102

This

what

is

said:
for

it is

established

that just

as

the

stream,

which has

its

material cause the rope in conjunction with the ignorance

of

the rope, exists

itself,

if

the rope exists, and

is

absorbed in
its

the rope

even so the universe, which has for

material cause
exists in

Brahman

in conjunction
is

with Nescience,

Brahman

alone and

absorbed even in that,

35

II

II

5T-

Through the exposition of causality

universe
scient.
it

in respect of the
is

has been indicated that Brahman

this itself,
it is

omni-

To strengthen

said

BECAUSE OF THE SACRED-TEACHING-SOURCE

Of the great body

the flgvada
etc,,

of sacred teaching comprising

disci-

supplemented by innumerable

plines, illuminating all

things like a torch, resembling

i.e n

the omniscient, the source,

the cause,

is

Brahman,

Indeed, of such sacred teaching, comprising the

etc,,

Rgveda

endowed

with the quality of omniscience, the

origin

can be from nothing but an omniscient being,

a
sacred

When

teaching

with an extensive theme

originates

from a particular person, for example, the

sacred

teaching of

Grammar

etc,

from Panini

etc,,

In order to introduce the next aphorism, he states the

u

relationship with the preceding aphorism

Through the
"

exposition of causality in respect of tho universe

etc,

The

omniscience

of

the

Lord follows not merely from His

is

being the cause of the universe, but

also
(here,

to be understood

from

His being the source of the sacred teaching

Scripture),

He shows how

being the source of

198

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE
its

although

content be only a part of what

possesses

is

to he

known, he

more extensive knowledge than

in

thatthis
being,
effort,

is

well

known
from

experience.

That great
even without

the source

whom

there

is,

on the analogy of sport, like human breath, the

of that,
is

origination

which

is

differentiated into various

branches, which

the cause of such distinctions as gods,

life,

lower animals, men, castes, and orders of

the ocean of all knowledge called the

which
etc,,

is

Rgveda

because of scriptural
this is the breath,

texts like
is

"Of

that great being

which

the Rgveda

"is
is

it

necessary

to say that for that

(great being) there

?

unsurpassed

omniscience and omnipotence

"

Scripture

establishes

omniscience:

Of the great body

1
'

of

sacred teaching comprising the Rg-veda

etc,

IJg-veda etc.

are vustras (sacred teachings) inasmuch as they teach disciples the procedure in regard to all obligatory, occasioned

and

optional rites belonging to the four castes and four orders,

from impregnation to cremation,

(all

acts) to be performed

from the hours of dawn to those of the evening, as also the

truth about

Brahman

hence

too, since
is

they relate to great

themes, they are great.

Nor

their greatness due merely

to the greatness of the themes, but also to their

having many
he
says:

angas
"

and

upnhgas
by
%

as

subsidiaries;

hence

supplemented
reasoning
disciplines
;

innumerable
inquiry

disciplines."
etc.

Purtina,

(nyfya)

(mlm&nstt)

are

the ten

supplemented by them in their respective ways.

IfTT-

ffcl

JB

80BIPTURB-SOURCE
removed even the doubt as
its

139

Thereby

is

to its (Scripture's)
all

authoritativeness, because of

being recognised by
verily,

worthy men (wsfas).

sages,

Worthy men,
of

are the great

the

authors

the purtyas etc.;

by them

who

elaborated the Vedas through their respective (teachings)

and
(the

practised

with

devotion the sense taught therein,

of)

authoritativeness
this
fail

the
or

Veda
instruct

is

accepted.

Nor

does
in

to

instruct

but

not clearly,
;

which
he

case

its

authoritativeness would be suspect

all

thus

says:
all

'illuminating

things

like

a torch."

Illuminating

things

in

all

ways, they are neither

:

non-instructive nor not-clearly-instructive

this

is

the sense.

Hence
one,

it is

they are sarvajtia-kalpa,

of the

i.e.,

like the omniscient

all

The knowledge
;

omniscient one extends to

things
to
all

the
things

subject-matter of the sacred teaching extends

;

hence the likeness,

(of

Having thus
he
states

stated
their

the

co-presence
"

cause

and

effect)

co-absence:
attribute
of

Indeed, of such sacred teaching" etc.

The
all
all

the

omniscient

one

is

knowledge of
since
"
:

themes;
themes

that

attribute

pertains

to Scripture,

belong to that too,

He

proves the said sense

When

a sacred teaching with an extensive theme originates from

1

"

a particular person, he/

that particular person,

"

possesses
:

more extensive knowledge than that

is

sacred teaching

this

the construction.

Even

to-day,

when

those like us declare

a body of sacred teaching which contains valid sense, there

is

knowledge

of

more themes

in us, the speakers,

than in

140

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE

our expressions,
cannot,
difference

The
be

distinctive attributes of various things

indeed,

declared,

though experienced,

The

in the sweetness of sugar-cane, milk

and jaggery

cannot, verily, be given expression to even by Sarasvatl.

The use

of the

word "extensive"

is

to indicate that
its

though
content
it.

the sense of a statement

is

may

be extensive, yet

not equal to that of the knowledge of

declares
"
:

him who makes

the

He

the
Is it

conclusion

along with
" etc.

application

(upanat/a)

necessary to say
is

That great being,

from which source there

fche'origination of the Veda,

what

need be said of the unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence

of

that
t

great

being,
is

Brahman? That

is

the

construction.

Of that which
the
"

differentiated into various

is

branches":
differentiated

application
'

(upanaya)
"
;

from "Of that

the conclusions begins " with "of him, that great being" and ends with omnipo-

up to

origination

'

"

tence".

Even without
"
:

effort

i,<?,,

with very slight

is saltless."

effort,

as

when one says

The barley porridge

What

divine sages

too cannot compass even with great effort,

effort,

He

effects

that with very slight

as

if

in sport

thus

are declared His unsurpassed omniscience and omnipotence,

For His creation of the Vedas without

" "

effort there is cited

Scripture

Of

this great being

etc.'"

Even by those

who recognise the

eternality of letters (the

Mlmamsakas), the

non-eternality of words and sentences should be admitted,

word

is,

indeed,

composed
is

of letters of

differentiated by

sequence.

sentence

composed

words differentiated

3T*q

Rf^ ^rRq

'

ffrJ

q^i

Tii?i'ie

i eid II<HH

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE
by sequence. Sequence, which
is

141

is

a property of manifestation, since

for letters,

not a property

of letters,

which are

eternal and all-pervasive, there can be no relationship of

before and after, in respect of time or space,

Manifestation

being non-eternal,

how can word-ness

?

be eternal, though the

manifested letters be eternal

By

the non-eternality of words,

is

the non-eternality of sentences etc,

the repetition of words etc,
of
is

also explained,

Hence

like the (imitative) repetition

dancing,

Just

as

the

danseuse,

who

is

instructed,

performs movements and gestures like to those performed

by the dancing instructor, and does not exhibit the very

same

gestures, even so the pupil follows the

same sequence
as that adopted

among

the letters, words etc.

of the

Veda

by the instructor, but does not pronounce the very same

(sequence)
;

for,

the manifestations (the sounds) of the pupil

are different from the manifestations (sounds) of the teacher,

Thus, there
eternality
of

is

no dispute between those who uphold the

of letters

or

non-eternality
sentences,
of

as

to the creation
;

words
is

and

whether ordinary or Scriptural

there

difference

view only with reference to the

in respect of Scriptural sentences,

(absolute) liberty of "

man

As

they say

With
of

effort

should

we

refute (only) the

(absolute) liberty

man."

The Jaiminlyas, who do not

believe in a creation or destruction, teach a beginningless

and uninterrupted study

of the Veda,

through a succession of

teachers and pupils like ourselves,

But those who follow

the teaching of Vy&sa say that, though, according to the

doctrine
of

creation

and

destruction

established

in

142

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE
supreme

Scripture, the traditional Code, epics etc,, the

aelf,

who

because
is

of

His

association

with
is

beffinningless

Nescience

omnipotent and omniscient,

the creator of

the eternal Vedas,

He

is

not entirely free in respect of

them, since

He

creates their sequence in such

;

manner

as to

conform to the earlier ones

sacrifice

(this is) in the

same way

as

and brahminicide, which, though

illusory effects of

Brahman, do not change their nature

in

in a fresh creation,

respect of their leading respectively to good and evil.

is

Not in any creation

brahminioide the cause of good nor

evil,

the horse-sacrifice the cause of

any more than

fire

can

wet or water burn.

the

Just as, in this creation, the study of

is

Veda

in the settled sequence

the cause of prosperity

is

and beatitude, and (studied) otherwise

even as a verbal thunder-bolt,
;

the cause of evil

it

104

even so does

happen

in

another creation hence, the creator, who, though omniscient

and omnipotent, creates the Vedas in accordance with what

they

were

in

earlier

creations,

has not a free hand.

"

The Jaiminlyas
of

too prefer to understand

"

by

not being

human

origin (apauru$eyatva)

the absence of entire

freedom for the person (who creates).

us too, with a different purpose.

That

is

common

to

Nor

is it

proper (to urge) that,

if

revealed by one person,

there would be no faith (in Scripture).

What

is

revealed

even by many persons,

ignorant or wise, yet affected by

some
tion,

defect

is,

indeed,

not worthy of faith

that revela-

however,

is

worthy

of faith

which

is

made by him, who

possesses knowledge of the truth and from

whom

all

defects

*PTT

%frl

fln

3T^

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE

143

Or
etc.,

else, the

sacred teaching comprising the ftgveda

is

as described above,

the source,

i.&, the

cause or

the authority for understanding correctly the nature of

this

Brahman,

It

is

only from the sacred teaching as

is

authority that

Brahman

understood to be the cause

:

of the origination etc. of the universe

this is the idea.

In the previous aphorism has been cited the sacred

teaching beginning with "That whence these beings
originate".

Then

for

what purpose

is

this

aphorism,

inasmuch
of

as in

the previous aphorism itself the source

to

Brahman was shown

be

the sacred

teaching,
?

through the citation of sacred teachings of this class

The reply

is

there, the

sacred teaching has not been

have been banished, even though he

case of those

is

but one.

In the

who

existed at the

first

creation, like Prajftpati

and the divine sages,

who

possess in abundance virtue,

wisdom, non-attachment and lordly power, the ascertain-

ment

of

His nature

is

intelligible;
;

through their faith

follows the faith of later ones

hence, Brahman's being the

as also the

sacred-teaching-source

is intelligible,

non-human
is

origin and validity of the sacred teaching,

This

the

first

explanation (of the aphorism).

"

He

begins

another

explanation

Or

else

etc.

In

the previous

section, the impossibility of a definition of

possibility of a definiis

Brahman's nature was refuted and the

tion stated.

Of that same definition the doubt

removed,

144
explicitly stated

SCRIPTURE-SOURCE
in

the words of the aphorism

"

so

it

may
for

be doubted that in the aphorism

That, whence

this

what begins with

;

"

origination

mere inference
this

was suggested
sets out

to

remove such a doubt,

aphorism

Because of the Sacred-Teaching-Source."

that by this

may

be inferred {the existence of Brahman,

e.g.,

on the analogy of products within our experience which

require a creator), and
it is

said that in respect of

is

Brahman
of valid

taught by revelation Scripture

the (only)

means

knowledge.
is

The meaning

of the text (of the

commentary)

not obscure.

'

'

5TT^ftf^fT?^

ffrf

ft

?frl

How,

again, can

Brahman be said to have

the sacred

teaching as authority, inasmuch as sacred teachings

are
for

shown

to refer to

rituals in
is

"Since Scripture
futility for
is

is

the purpose of ritual, there

"
?

whatever

has not that purpose

Therefore, there

futility for

That
knowledge
(in

the

sacred

teaching

is

the

means

of

valid

in respect of

Brahman has been but premised

;

the second explanation of the last aphorism)

;

that

is

to

be taught by the present aphorism

hence, the commentator

prefaces the aphorism with a statement of the prima facie

view: "How, again"

etc.

"How"

signifies

an objection:
the VedSntas,
(as

because there would result non-utility for

which teach what

is

not the

human goal, declaring

they

do) the existent Brahman, which, being pure, intelligent and

indifferent

by nature, should be treated with indifference

and because there would result non-authoritativeness for

them

(the

Vedantas) since,

having existent objects for

their content,
etc.,

they have the same content as perception

like worldly

and are consequently but re-statements,

statements,

Worldly statements, which teach the same

other

content
verily,

as
of

means

of valid

knowledge, are not,

similarly
of

themselves

authoritative;

the

VedSntas too;
in

hence, their

authoritativeness consisting

their

non-dependence (on any other means of valid

knowledge) would be destroyed,

should become unauthoritative,

Nor

is it

meet that they

it is

Nor

unfruitful, for,

146
the Vedantas since
ritual
;

HARMONY
they are not for the purpose of
be subsidiaries to the injunction of

or they

may

rituals

with the purpose of

etc.,

making known the agent,

the purpose of pres-

the deity

or they

may have

cribing other

acts like contemplation etc. Indeed, there

cannot possibly be the teaching of the nature of already

existent things, because a thing already existent
is

the

content of perception

etc.

and

in the teaching thereof,

settled

that

they have the fruit brought about by the

prescription to study one's

acts,
etc.,

own Veda.

Hence, they subserve

their only purport being the teaching of agent, deity

required

by the respective prescribed

purport
be

rites.

If,

how-

ever,

that

not accepted,

because of nonis

proximity,
reference

then
to

of

the

Vedantas,

there
etc.,
its

at

least

acts

like

contemplation

which are
is

proximate.

Thus, indeed, as having for

etc.,

sphere what

not understood by perception

and hence as not depenutility result (for

dent on those (pramayas), validity and

the

Vedantas)

this

is

the sense

intended

(by

the ob-

jector).

The
is

citation of

the aphorism of the great sage

(Jaimini)

for strengthening the

prima
it,

facie

view (and

making clear the necessity to refute

faith in
it

not for creating

as the final view).

"Futility"

means

non-utility

and non-generation of

valid knowledge, being dependent (on other pramQrias), be" cause of being re-statements. Prom therefore" up to "or,

they

may have
"
etc.,

the purpose of prescribing other acts like con*

is

temptation

the compendious statement (of this view).

this begins

The

analytical

commentary on
"

with "Indeed,

there cannot" and ends with

or

is intelligible ",

SKTf

^F
n
i

-.

ATf

*TT

HARMONY

147

there being nothing to be rejected or accepted, there

is

no human goal.
futility

For

this

very reason,

lest
etc.,

there be

in

the case of

"He howled"

they are

stated to be purposeful as being praises, (in the aphorism),

11

But by syntactical unity with an injunction, they

",

have the purpose of praising the injunction

Mantras
to ritual,

may And

"
like

Thee

"

for food

etc.

are said to be related

mentioning as they do rituals or the instru(Therefore),

ments therefor,

nowhere has the purpose-

fulness of the Vedic sentences without association with

an injunction been seen or

of the nature of

is intelligible,

And

in respect

a thing already existent there can be

no

injunction,

because

an injunction has

ritual

as

Be
have

this so.

Though not subserving

acts, the

Vedantas

for

purport an injunction in respect

that
is

of

Brahman's

nature;
final

favoured

by the aphorism stating the

"
:

view

(for the

Mlmftmsakas)
10*

But by syntactical unity

is

with an injunction"

etc,

Verily, not that alone

an

injunction which induces activity where there was none

before
;

for,

the originative injunction has the purpose of

making known
which make
nature,

what was unknown; and the Vedantas,

this

known the unknown Brahman, have

this

To

he says
"

"And

in respect of the nature of

a thing already existent

to

etc.

All injunctions are admitted

is

have

for

content only a becoming which

is

not yet

existent and
of

to be

originated

for,

the various forms the

fruit),

injunction

the

qualificatory

(stating

the

applicatory (showing the subsidUriness of the rite to tbt

US
content,

HARMONY
Therefore,
the

Vedantas

are

subsidiary to

injunctions of rituals, illuminating as they do the nature

of the agent, the deity etc. required

by
is

ritual,

If

now

because of the fear that the context

different (from

that of ritual), this be not accepted, even then they

have
their

for

purport the act of contemplation present in

sentences,

own

Therefore for
the source,

Brahman

the sacred

teaching
the reply

cannot
is
:

be

When

this results,

BUT THAT, BECAUSE OF THE

HARMONY

fruit),

the procedural, and the originative (showing the

i.e.,

form,

the material

and the deity

for the rite)

are

inseparable one from another, and they do not occur in

respect of the existent,

But they

differ in respect of

the

purport

of

the

respective
is

statements.

For example, the

is

statement "he

to

perform the agnihotra,"

in
significance,
is

a statement

which

is

only

originative

since by
sacrifice

the

statement

he who desires heaven

to

with

theaffw'Aotrci" there are obtained the eligible person, the

application, and the procedure,

Nor
(in

is it

that the applicais

tion

etc.

are

not

present there
1

"he

to sacrifice

with the dffwiAofra'

);

though present, they are merely

Hence, an injunccontent,

unintended, being otherwise obtained.

tion,

which

has

a
of

volition

for

its

cannot
:

result

in the case

an existent

object.

He

concludes

"Therefore "etc,

rf-

f|

ftrt:

88

Sffrl

^Rlf

ff-HH'^l^

HARMONY
The word
"

149

but

"
is

to exclude the

prima facie view.

That Brahman, omniscient and omnipotent, the cause of

the creation, sustentation and dissolution of the universe,
is

understood from the sacred teaching, the Vedanta

(alone).

How ?

Because of the harmony. Indeed, in

all

the Vedftntas, the sentence?, run together as having for

Stating

the cause of dissatisfaction

''If,

with that, he
This being the

ends with another view:

now"

etc.

case* since verbal testimony

has no purport in respect of

Brahman

of the

nature declared, that form thereof which

has been established by other means of valid knowledge

cannot

be

contradicted

by

verbal

testimony;

for,

that

(verbal testimony) relates to contemplation,

and contempla-

tion

is

compatible

even
"

with

superimposition.

He
etc.

concludes the present topic:

Therefore, for
is,"

Brahman"

Beginning with "The reply

view through the aphorism.
"

he states the
"
etc.

final

'

'

He
tat
(in

explains this

The word but

The word
this
of

the aphorism)
'
k

premises

the final view;

he
the

analyses:

That Brahman"
view, whose mind
*>.,

etc.
is

The upholder

prima facie
asks:

hard (and impenetrable),

"How?"

"in what way?''

The upholder

of

the final view states the ground of his

is

own

view, which

the

particular

way

(demanded
Right
the
(full)

by the
relation

opponent):
is

"

Because of the harmony/'

\

harmony

(samanvaya)
established). "

thereby

(is

reference

to

Brahman
all

This
etc.

itself

he analyses:

"Indeed, in

the

Vedantas
declare

He

cites

many

texts,

in the desire to
to

that

the

Vedantas

refer

solely

Brahman:

150

HARMONY
"
:

purport the teaching of this sense

Existence alone,
ii,

dear one, this was in the beginning

"

"

(Chand., VI,

1)

One alone without a second

"
;

"

The

Self, verily, exis-

ted in the beginning as one alone"

11

U# M II,i,

(i)

Such

this

Brahman without an

earlier

and a

later,
;

without an inside and an outside"

(Brh., II, v, 19)

"This Self
II,
ii,

is

Brahman, the experiencer of all" (Mund t}

"

11)

Brahman

alone, the immortal in front"

'

"Existence

alone

etc.

As

for the
etc.,

text

"That,

verily,

whence these beings originate"

and
refers

that was cited earlier

to the cause of the origination, sustentation

and destruction of the universe;

recalled
here,
it is

since

it

will

be thus

not mentioned (again).

Indeed, that

with
it

which
that

statement
alone
is

begins and that with which

ends,

considered

to

be the meaning
the nature of

of the statement,

by those

who understand
from
the
verbal
text

the

knowledge
in
it

resulting
of

testimony.

For

example,
sacrifice,

respect
is

about the upams'u

of that novel

acknowledged to be injunctive

upUmsfU
with

sacrifice,

on the strength of the syntactical unity

of

the

injunction

the uptims'u

sacrifice,

preceded

by the statement of the defect of apathy (occasioned by)

the

continuous
concluding
100

(oblation
(part
so,

of)

jwotfSs'a,

as

also

with

the

stating)

the

remedying of that
of

(defect).;
14

even

here

too,

because
"
etc.,

the text

Existence alone, dear one, this was

"

commencing
"

with Brahman, and the text

That thou

art

concluding

with Brahman as the

self of

the jlva, the (whole) text

has that alone for purport.

In the same

way

it is

to be

'

',

SIT

f|
ffrl

^n^T:

HABMONY
and
the
so on,

151

Nor,

when

for
is

the words in these texts

ascertained

harmony

understood to have
is it

for

content the nature of Brahman,

proper to assume

any

other content
of
of

for there

would result the abandonstated

ment
tion

what

is
is

directly

and the assump-

what

not directly stated.

is

Nor may one

conclude that their purport

the agent, the deity etc.
texts like,
"
;

to

teach the nature of

because there are scriptural

Then by what and

whom

could one see

"
?

(Brh., II, iv, 13)

which refute action, causal condition

and

result.

Nor

is

Brahman,

though

of

the nature of an
etc,
;

already existent thing, the content of perception

because, that

Brahman

is

the

self,
7),

as stated in

"

That

thou art

"

(Chttnd., VI,

viii,

cannot be understood

understood, through the consideration of

what goes before

and

after,

that

other

texts
is

too
the
is

have

Brahman
of

for

purport,

Nor,
in

when

there

possibility
it

seen

purport

reference

thereto,

proper

to

posit

an

unseen purport in reference to something

else,

that being

an undue extension,
is
'

Their purport in reference to agents

but also unintelligible; thus

not merely unseen,

"
:

he

says

Nor may

one

etc.

Recalling the cause

of
to

the prima facie view about

unauthoritativeness
"

due

dependence, he condemns

it

Nor
"

is

Brahman, though
etc,

of the nature of
is

an already existent
it
is,

thing

This
of

is

what

intended:

indeed, on

the

analogy

human

statements, that,

as referring to

existent things, the dependence of the Vedantas (on other

pramci,$as) is suspected.

Here, you being questioned will

152

HARMONY
to

have

explain

this:

is

the

dependence of

human

statements because of their reference to existent things

or

because
to

of

their being

human?
then

If

because of the
result

reference

existent

things,

would

non-

authoritativeness

even for perception

etc,, as reciprocally

dependent
If

for,

they too certainly refer to existent things.

are dependent as due to the

now human statements

intellect,

human
though

then,
to

of

the Vedantas not due to that,

things,

referring

existent

there

is

no non-

authoritativeness, as for perception etc,, (which are valid)

as

generated
etc.

by

constant causes like

the senses, the

probins
It

may
result

be said:

if,

indeed,

non-human

origin

were

established, then, for the

Vedantas as non-dependent, validity

is

would

but that itself

not established, because of

;

the reference to existent things

for,

since of an existent

thing a person can have knowledge, without depending on

verbal

testimony, through other

(of
is

means

of knowledge, the

making
intellect

a statement about such a thing) as due to the

intelligible
;

and the inference as

arise
of)

to the

human
probans

origin

of

the

Vedas can

unhindered,

the

being (thoir being

artificial
is

composed

sentences etc. (which are

etc.).

combinations of letters

Hence, dependence
origin, but not

unavoidable, on the ground of

human
what

on

the ground of referring to an existent thing.

In the case,

however,

of that
to

which
is

refers to

is

to be done, since

what

is

be done

novel and not the sphere of any

other means of knowledge, and since what has never been

experienced before cannot enter the

in
its

human

intellect, either

own

nature or as superimposed, for the Vedantas

signifying this, there can be no creation, and consequently

no human

origin

hence results

(for

them) authoritativeness

rffi:

f|

mi

ft

liW4lf:

HARMONY
without dependence
tiveness,
;

153

therefore, in order to secure authoritaof

purport

is

we recognise even what is to be done.

we say
is
:

the Vedantas that their

To
this
If
it

this

what, again,

long-lived one

1,

is

which

to be done,

which cannot be known by man

be said to be the unseen potentiality (apUrva), how,

it

alas, does

come

to

be the significance of the imperative

suffix (tin) etc. ? For, that (apUroa) being trans-experiential,

there

is

no knowledge of the relation

(of the

word) to that

in conformity with ordinary language,

from the imperative

within experience,
"

suffix etc. there are understood only acts

as

what
(It

is

to be done.

may

be said that) from the statement

is is

He who
one

desires heaven

to sacrifice," the one,

who

is

qualified by

heaven which
directed
;

to be attained, is understood to be the to be

and he understands that alone has

is

done
are
of
it

which
acts,

beneficial

in

securing

heaven.

Nor
capable

which

are

destroyed
hereafter;

momentarily,
hence,

securing
is

heaven
from
of

by
is

elimination,

only

the

Veda that there

suffix
is

understood the
to

relation

the

imperative
is)

etc.

the

unseen
be

potentiality,
said,
it

(which

what

to be done.

If this

would

follow,
in

alas,

that
(a

even
Buddhist

in

texts

enjoining
there
is,

obeisance

caitya
to

shrine),

because

of relation

such words as desire for

is)

heaven

etc.,

the unseen potentiality (which

to be

done

and thus, creation

even of these being impossible, non(for

human
their

origin

would result
origin
is

them
seen,

too).

Or,

if

because

human

clearly

their signifying

an

unseen potentiality be denied, then, since human origin

may
of)

be inferred of the Vedantas too, (their being composed

sentences etc. being the probans, (for them too) there

154

HARMONY
As
is to
is

except by sacred teaching.

that, being devoid of

for

what has been

said

what

be rejected or accepted,
;

the teaching

is futile,

there

not this defect

for,

even
is

from the realisation of the

devoid of what
results,
is

self as

Brahman, which

to

be rejected or accepted, there

all

through the destruction of

hindrances, the

attainment of the
teaches the deity

human
there

goal.
is

But of that which

to its
text.

etc,,

no opposition even
its

subserving the contemplation mentioned in

own

cannot be the signification of an unseen potentiality.

the inference from (being composed
of)

If

sentences

etc. is

shown
ground
origin)
fied
is

to

be

fallacious

on

some

other ground,

(that

itself will

do, and) the justification (of non-human

on the ground of an unseen potentiality being signisuperfluous.

And non-human
Nyftyakanikci't
107

origin has been exhere,

pounded by us in the

however,

it is

not set forth for fear of prolixity.

Non-human

origin being thus established, there

is

not

for the Vedantas,

though

referring to existent things,

any

detriment to their authoritativeness on the ground of de-

pendence (on other means of knowledge).

there
is

Nor

is it

that

not the understanding of what has not been under-

stood, in

which

case, there

would be no authoritativeness
is

for, the jtvas being

Brahman
is

not otherwise understood.

of the nature

That
of

is

thus said: "Nor

1 '

Brahman, though

an existent thing

etc.

he condemns

Recalling the second cause of the prima facie view, " As for what has been said that, being it
:

devoid of what

is to

he rejected or accepted

"
etc.

From

the

understanding

of the sense of injunctions the

attainment

5?

<r*n

Tf

HARMONY
It

155

does not, however, happen thus in the case of

it

Brahman
;

that

is

subsidiary to the injunction of contemplation

because, being one and devoid of

or accepted,
it is

what

is

to be rejected

intelligible that all cognition of duality

etc, is

such as action, causal condition

for

quashed.

And
know-

the cognition of duality once crushed by the

ledge of the oneness of Brahman, there cannot be a resurrection, in

which case there

may

be taught for

Brahman

subsidiariness to the injunction of contemplation.

of

the

human

goal

is,

verily,

indirect,

Here,

however,

from the understanding of texts like "That thou art"

culminating
in
of

realisation,

there

is,

without dependence
direct attain"

on the

effort

any external observance, the

goal, as from the

ment

of the

human

knowledge

This

is

not a snake, but a rope",

This

is its

superiority to the

knowledge
This
indeed, of
others,

of the sense of injunctions.

is

what

is

said:

what

is

desired by
e.g.,

man

is,

two kinds
which,

some unattained,
though

a village

etc,

again,

attained,

yet under the

e.g.>

influence of delusion are understood to be unattained,

the

necklace
be

round

one's
is

own

neck.

Similarly,

what

would

abandoned

also

two-foldsome which not

rid
of, e.g.,

already got rid of are desired to be got

the

snake encircling one's

been already got
rid

feet

others, again,
to

which having
of, e.g.,

of are desired

be got rid

the snake superimposed on the anklet adorning the

feet.

Here,

since

the

attainment of the unattained and the

156

HARMONY
of

abandonment

the

unabandoned
is,

result

from

the

observance of extrinsic means, there

true

subsequent to the

knowledge

of

these

means,

the

need

for their

observance.

Never does knowledge alone remove a thing.

indeed, alter the

Even a thousand rope-cognitions cannot,

character
of

the

really

present

snake.

In

the case,

however, of those, which being superimposed are desired to

be
as
either
it

attained

or abandoned,
it

it

is

possible to attain

were or abandon as

were, by the mere intuition of

the truth, without dependence on any extrinsic observances.

For,

they

exist

by

the

superimposition

alone;

and

intuition
root

of the

truth plucks out the superimposed by the

it,

and

destroys

Thus, here too, in the

the

bliss

of

Brahman,

which

through

superimposition
jlva,

due to
is

Nescience has attained the state of the

reality devoid of grief, misery
etc.,

which

in

this state conditioned

by superimposition
the sense
realisation.

is

removed by the true knowledge of

of the

text

"That thou art" culminating

in

On

the removal of that, the blissful nature,

though
attained

(eternally) attained,

becomes attained, as
etc,,
if

if

not

(already); grief,

misery

though

(eternally)

abandoned, become abandoned, as

This
self
is

unabandoned

(already).
of the

said

thus:

"for, even

from the realisation

as Brahman",
all

though the removal in an eminent

i.e.,

degree of

the hindrances of the jiva,

that,
"

of error together
;

with
it

its

impressions,

verily, hinders beings

is

hence

is

the hindrance

there

the attainment of the

human
the

goal" characterised by the removal of misery and

attainment of happiness.

f|

40

511-

HARMONY
As
for

157

what has been

said about the Vedantas having

contemplation for purport, because of the teaching of the

"

deity

etc,, in

such texts about contemplation as

1

Contemplate
the true

"

as the self alone,'

108

contemplate the
he condemns
i,e, t

self alone, as

enjoyment"

etc.,

it:

"But

of that

which

teaches the deity etc.,"

is

of the
its

word "self" alone, "there

no opposition even
in
its

to

subserving the contemplation

If

mentioned
it

own
the

text".

there

is

no

conflict, let

be,

then,

that

Vedantas have only injunctions to

through the channel
"
:

contemplation for purport,

the deity.

of teaching

To

this he says

It
11

does not, however, happen

thus in the case of

Brahman

etc.

Contemplation, which

depends on the establishment of differences of the contemplated, the contemplator, the contemplation
etc.,

cannot
of
all

occur in the case of Brahman, which

kinds of difference and
is

is

devoid

to be

known

only through the

Vedanta;

hence, the Vedantas

cannot be subsidiary to
being opposed thereto;

the injunctions
this is the sense.

to contemplation,

Be

this

so.

If

there

be

authoritativeness

for

the

Vedantas, though not of the nature of injunctions, alas,

"
1
'

then,
of

even for texts like

he howled
of

1"9

etc,,

which

refer

themselves

(independently

linking up

with any
indifferent,

injunction) to things to
let

which one should be

;

there be authoritativeness
or accept
is

for,

the determination to

reject

not alone the fruit of valid knowledge,

is

since the determination to be indifferent

to be the fruit

also admitted

thereof,

by those who know the means of

(texts) to

valid

knowledge;

hence the reference of these

158

HARMONY
Though
in other places

Vedic statements are not seen

with an injunc-

to be authoritative except in association

tion, yet, since the
fruit,

knowledge of the self culminates in the

the authoritative nature of the sacred teaching

that as

with

content cannot be denied.

And

not

prohibitions

like "silver

is is

not to be given (as daksiyti)

superfluous.

in the barhis (sacrifice)

"

To

this he says
etc.

"Though,

in

other places,

Vedic statements"

It

is,

indeed, understood that the entire

Veda

is

means

to the

human

goal,

because of

its

being apprehended

in

con-

sequence of the injunction to study one's own Veda.

a single
goal;
letter

Not

of

it

may

fail to contribute to the

human

howled

what, then, of "

etc. ?

such a combination
goal
is

of

words as "he

And no human

seen to follow from

the very comprehension of their sense, as from the (com-

prehension of the) Vedantas,

of words,

Hence, such combinations

desiring to generate a
(of

human

goal, are certainly

expectant

something
"
silver
"
is

else

to

complete them).

The

prohibition too

not to be given (as Aak^ina] in

the barhis (sacrifice)

is

is

expectant of the censure of what

not otherwise
is it

prohibited

by

itself

for,

possible to
if

turn
(text

away an

intelligent being therefrom.

Hence,

no

conveying) censure be available, even at a distance

itself),

(from

the prohibition itself would create for itself

a two-fold capacity, in respect of the prohibition of silver

and in respect of the censure, like (the injunction

11 "

of)

the

darvi-homa.
"

Thus,
" "

of

the two combinations

of

words

he howled

and

silver is

not to be given (as daksiyfi)

^ift

ffrf

i|

HARMONY
through
inference
is

159

understood

the

authoritative

nature of the sacred teaching, in which case there would

be the need for an example seen elsewhere.

it

Therefore
is

is

established that the authority for

Brahman

the

sacred teaching,

in

the barhis (sacrifice)," which are on

fire

as

it

were

(to

be

completed each by the other), there

is,

through the chan-

nel of the censure implied secondarily, mutual syntactical

relation,

as

between

the

horseless
burnt.

(chariot)

and (the

horse)
is

whose chariot has been

dependence on the

Not

thus, however,

there

human

goal in the Vedantas,

since,

from the very comprehension

(on
;

of their sense,

without
goal

dependence
is

any thing
has been

else),

the supreme

human

attained

this

said.
is

Now, since authoritativeness

part
of

not seen for any other

the Veda, which

is

not related to an injunction,

how

could this (authoritativeness) occur for the Vedantas,

which are not related thereto?

not through inference
ritativeness
of
is

To
"

this
etc.

he says

"And

understood

For, the authoin

the means of valid

knowledge consists
is

their

generating

knowledge

which

unsublated,
it

not

already understood, and indubitable; and that,

explained,
e.g.,
is

has been
else,

intrinsic

(not

made known by anything

inference based on practical efficiency),

Though

the

generation of this kind of

knowledge

is

known by presump-

tive implication from the nature of the effect, yet, in the

generation of that knowledge, they do not depend on any

other means of valid knowledge, not even this presumptive
implication,
result
;

as
it

(otherwise)
is

reciprocal dependence would

hence

said to be intrinsic.

The generation

of

160

HARMONY
Here some others confront us: even though the

authority

for
is

Brahman

is

the sacred

teaching, yet

Brahman

intimated by the sacred teaching only as

;

the content of the injunction of contemplation

just as

this

kind

of

knowledge, like that of injunctions

is

in res-

pect of

what

to be done, exists for the Vedantas too in

;

respect of
in

Brahman
of

hence results their authoritativeness

of

respect

Brahman, without the need

it

an example.
manifested

Otherwise, since

is

not seen that colour

is

by any other sense,

sight

(it

would follow that) the sense of

too could
"
:

not manifest colour.

"

He

concludes

the

present topic

Therefore
of

etc.

He
ment
is

sets

up the view
"

some
It

"

some others confront us

of

of the preceptors "

is

Here

etc.

thus

The

ascertainis

Brahman
done,
not

is

from that whose purport

of

what
is

to

be

because

the

relation
its

(to

what

signified)

being known, because of

its

being sacred

teaching, because of
reflection
etc.
1

being purposeful, and because of

being cognised (as enjoined in connection

Verily, the

therewith).'

Vedantas cannot have the existent

Brahman
fied)

for purport,

their relation thereto (as the signi-

not

being known.

That with reference

to

which

words are not used by a worldly wise person, the relation of

them thereto

is

not apprehended.

Nor does the prudent

alone,
is

inquirer desire to declare

to

some form

which

is

neither

be

rejected

nor accepted, as that

not desired to be

cognised.
of

In conveying knowledge of that, the cognition

is

which

not desired, there would be detriment to his

this
is

prudence.

Hence,

worldly wise person, desiring to

declare that which

desired to be

known, would declare

mi

f|

f|

HARMONY
that thing alone which
is

161

the

oause of engaging in or
is

desisting from activity, and, since what

to be

done when

known

is

the cause thereof, would teach that alone.

And

thus, from the usage of elderly persons one understands of

words that they have for purport what

these,

is

to be done.
is

Of

some are

directly expressive of

what

to be done,

while some, however, express their

to

own

sense as subsidiary

what

is

to be

done

but (in any case) words do not have

Further,
it
it

for purport

an existent thing.

has to be ascerof

tained in the case of a word that

conveys knowledge

a content, by inferring the cognition of the sense in another

man who knows

the

meaning

(of the word),

and by under-

standing the concomitance of that (cognition) with the

existence or non-existence of the word.

And

there

is

not

any probans

in respect of a cognition existing in another

man

and relating to the bare form of an existent thing.

however, of
in

In

the case,
existing

the cognition of

what

is

to be done,
viz.,

another

man

there are probans,

;

the

engaging in or the cessation from activity

of the

hence, because

relation

(to the signified)

not being known, the

Ved&ntas

do not have the form of Brahman for purport.

it is

Further, of the Vedantas, as part of the Veda,

well

known

that they constitute sacred teaching.

And

the

character of sacred teaching belongs to such com-

binations of words as have the engaging in or cessation

from activity for their purport.

in or cessation

As

is

said:

"Engaging

from activity in respect of the obligatory

or the occasioned, that by

is

which these are taught

to

men

called

a sacred teaching,"
the
(bare)

Therefore, their having for

is

purport

nature (of Brahman)

annulled by

thair well-known character

of being sacred teaching,

162

HARMONY
Further,

we do not
is

see any purposefulness for these,

whose purport

the teaching of the nature of Brahman.

Nor, just as, from the ascertainment,

somehow through
of the sentence

secondary
this
fear,
is

implication,

of the true sense

rope, not a snake/'

etc,,
is

there

is

the cessation of

trembling

there, similarly, from the under"

standing of the sense of the text

cessation
there
is

That thou

art,"

the
for,

of

the

attributes
as

of

transmigration;
of

continuance
the person

before

those (attributes)
the

even
text,

for

who has heard

sense of the

Further,

if

for

him who has heard

of

Brahman

there

occurs

the cessation of the attributes of transmigration,

it,

why

is

then, that on top of the hearing, reflection etc,

?

are found declared

Hence, because of
futility,

this too, that there

would

result

their

the

Vedantas have not the

have for purport what

nature of
is

Brahman

for purport, but

is

to be done,

whose content
which
is

the contemplation of the

self.

And
is

this

to

be

done as enjoining him

is

who

enjoined in respect of itself

and,
it

called

an injunction

(niyoga),

as
is

not seen through any

called the

other means of

knowledge,
that

unseen (ap&rva).

And
its

since

cannot result without the practice of

for

content

(contemplation),

the sake
be

of

its

own

establishment,
of

that

very

thing
of

to

dono

implies
is

the practice
its

contemplation
instrument.
be

the

self,

which

content and
it

Just as the thing to be done, since

in

has to
is

determined

dependence

on

its

own

content,

determined by that content

contemplation, even
its

so, since

contemplation cannot be determined without

the self, for the

content

sake of

its

determination, this very thing

f%

fMtn

^IT

'Hl

ffif

HARMOMY
the sacrificial post, the fthavanlya
fire etc.,

16S

even though

they are supra-mundane, are intimated by the sacred

teaching (only) as subsidiary to an injunction.
is

^Whence

this ?

Because the sacred teaching has for purport the

in

fruit of

engaging
is

an activity or desisting therefrom. So

indeed

the quotation from those

who know

the purport

to be done implies that kind

that,
of

of self.

As

is

said:

"But

which

is

accepted,

i.e.,

implied for the establishment

is

that
is

(other,

which
of

is

enjoined), that too

enjoined

this

the

usage

the

tantra

(the

Pftrva-mlmGmsll-

vftstra)"
tion,

And

for knowledge, the content of the injuncit,

injunctiveness consists in the practice of

of

in the

sense

contemplation;

for

the

self,

however, as the

content of that (contemplation),

in)

(injunctiveness consists

the certitude of
(Objection
:

its

own

existence.

it

has been said that contemplation

;

may

be of what

is

superimposed

how then can

is

there be the
?)

certitude of the existence of

what

contemplated

(Reply): that on which the nature of that

(self)

has

been superimposed would be the determinant of another

(knowledge);

hence that (knowledge of the

self)

would

not be determined thereby.

Hence, through the Vedantas

contemplation
"
etc.

which have
of

for purport the injunction of the

self,

that kind of
self,

there

is

the ascertainment of that

kind of

All this he says in "even though

In the

matter of the ascertainment of the true nature of a thing,

even from those which have an injunction for purport, an

example

is

given:

"jus* as the sacrificial post "etc,

In

164
of the sacred teaching,

HABMONT
Its purport is indeed seen to be " is called the teaching of ritual (S'a.-Bh., I, i, 1) ;

what

"An
action

injunction
"

is

a
i,

statement which prompts

"
;

to

(fita.-jBA,, I,

2)

Of this the knowledge comes

"
i,

"

from an injunction

(PA/,, I,

5)

Of (words) denoting
whose
is

those (existent things), there

is

relation with that

"

purport

is

ritual" (PJ/.

I, i, 25.)

Since Scripture

for

the purpose of ritual, there

that purpose." (PAT.,

is futility for

whatever has not

is

I, ii, 1.)

Hence the sacred teaching

to a particular object

purposeful as prompting a

man

and

respect
tie

of the stake enjoined for the tying

up

in

"he

is

to

up the beast
is

to the stake," since

it is

out'of the ordinary,

there

the question
"
?
;

'what
"

is

this stake (in substance

and shape)
stake,"

from the texts

fashions
etc,,

khadira (ebony) becomes the

"he

the stake,"

"he

is

to

make

the

stake

octagonal"
of acts

though

having for purport the

it is

injunction
particular

of

carpentry,

understood that a
fashioned
in

kind

of
is

wood

purified

and

particular shape

the stake,

Similarly are to be underof sacred teaching

stood the akavanlija etc.

The character
is

belongs

to that

whose purport

engaging in or cessation
is

from activity, not to that whose purport

the nature (of

is

an existent); the relation

(of

a significant word)
;

only to

what

is

to be done,

not to the nature

these two grounds

"
etc.,

are explained by the words of the commentary beginning

"

with

Because the sacred teaching has for purport

and

ending with

"And

because of similarity

thereto, for the

Vedantas

too, there can be purposefulness only in the

same

fc

?ST ft
'

5fW' ffrf;

'
:

',

SlffrT-

HARMONY
as withholding

165

him from a

particular object. Others are

useful as subsidiary thereto.

thereto, for the

And

because of similarity

Vedantas

too, there

can be purposefulness

only in the same way,

respect of

And

there being purport in

an injunction,
etc.

just as for him,

who
the

desires

heaven,

agnihotra

are

enjoined

as

means,

similarly for him,

who
is

desires immortality, the

:

know-

ledge of

Brahman

enjoined

this stands to reason.

way",
of

And

since
is

what

is

to be done

is

not independent

him who

enjoined, the eligible person

who

is

to prac:

tise,

he states the particular class of the person enjoined

'

"

And

there being purport in respect of an injunction

is

etc,

Be-

coming Brahman
eulogistic

present as already established in the

passage
itself";

"He who knows Brahman becomes

yet,

Brahman

because of the expectancy of the

particular class of person enjoined for this (becoming) there

results,

on the analogy of the ratrmtra^ the particular

person enjoined,
For,
if,
<

class

of

iz,,

he

who

desires to

become

Brahman.

on the analogy of the piyfapitr-yajfla"*

the person enjoined be assumed to be he

who desires heaven,

that would be the signification

of the absolutely remote,

as being a sense not related to the eulogistic passage.

And

since to

become Brahman

is

to be immortal,
desires
its

it is

said (in

the

commentary)
immortality,

"For him who

even because of

immortality".

And

being immortality,

cannot be inferred to be non-eternal on the ground of being

effected,

because

of

conflict with

Scripture (otherwise);

this

is

the idea.

166

HARMONY
Now, here the
distinctness of

what

is

desired to

be

known has been

which
be

stated
is

in

the ritual section Reliinto being,

is

gious Duty,
desired
existent,
to

to
;

come

what

is
is

known
is

but here Brahman, which

fulfilled,
is

which

eternally

what

is

desired to be

known.

Of

these, the fruit of the

know-

ledge of

Brahman should be

distinct from the fruit of

the knowledge of Religious

Duty, which requires an

observance.
It

cannot possibly be thus; because Brahman

is

taught only as occasioned by an injunction about something to be done, ''The self verily
"
is

to be

seen" (Brh.,
.

IV,

iv, 5)
is

That

self

whose
is

sins are destroyed

to be desired to be

he

to be sought for, he
"
vii, 1)
;

known
alone

"
"

(Chand,, VIII,
(Bfh.
}

Contemplate as the
self

self

"
I,

iv, 7)

Contemplate the
*'

alone as the true

"

enjoyment

(Brh.>

I, iv,

15)
"

He who knows Brahman

ii,

becomes Brahman
such injunctions,
is

itself

(If wjd., Ill,

is

9)

there being
"

when

there
is

a desire to know,

Who

this self?",

"What

that

Brahman

? ",

the entire

Through the aforementioned

tween the
desires to

difference in nature be-

know
"

Religious Duty and Brahman,

latter)

he raises the question of (the

"
of

injunctions

Now, here

etc,

not being the content " It cannot He answers

;

possibly be thus" etc.

is

And

here, the intuition of the self

not what

is

enjoined.

For, that, because of the verb

"see,"

signifying cognition, should

be of the nature of

?FT
'

' ;

rTTT'Fft?T

3TT-

?frl

frf

cf5[

HARMONY
Vedftnta
is
is

167

useful

in

intimating

its

nature

that

Brahman

eternal, omniscient, all-pervasive, eternally

contented, eternally pure, intelligent and free by nature,

knowledge,

bliss

and

so on.

And

from the contemplation

thereof there will result the invisible fruit, final release,

as seen

from the sacred teaching.

If,

however, they

do not enter into an injunction of something to be done,

and

if

they be the mere statements of

fact, since there

can

be neither rejection nor acceptance, there would only be futility for the Vedanta texts, as for the statements,
"

The earth has seven

"

islands,"

Here goes the king

".

hearing or of perception.
"

And

perception too should be

either the concept

I,"

found in ordinary experience, or that

attains excellence.

which

is

produced

when contemplation

Of these, hearing cannot be the object of an injunction, since

that,
like hearing in respect

of rites,

is

established even

by the injunction to study one's own Veda.

Nor

(can)

perception found in ordinary experience (be the object of

the injunction), since that

is

natural

Nor may the

object of
its

the injunction be that clarity brought by contemplation to

content,

the self propounded in the Upanisads, since that

(clarity) follows as a

by-product even from the injunction of

113

contemplation, like whey.

of the self

Therefore, the contemplation

propounded

in the

Upaniads

is

prescribed in res-

pect of
joined.

him who

As

desires immortality, who is the person en" " is to be seen for the texts etc., they are what
of injunctions, not (real) injunctions,
"
etc.

have the appearance

"

This

is

thus said

And from the contemplation thereof

168

HARMONY
Now, even
in the case of a
is

mere statement of
"
etc,,

fact,

as in

"

This
is

is

a rope, this

not a snake

purpose-

fulness

seen through the removal of fear generated

Similarly,
fact

by

delusion,

here

too

by

the

state-

ment
grator,

of

the
there
of

of

the self not being

purposefulness
of
his

a transmithe

may
the

be

through

removal
grator.

delusion

being a transmi-

This would be

so,

if

the delusion of his being a

transmigrator

could be removed

by

merely hearing

about the nature of Brahman, like the delusion of snake

by merely hearing about the nature of the

it

rope.

But

is

not so removed
of

because even for

are found

him who has

the attributes

heard
of

Brahman

there

transmigrator, like

happiness and
is

misery, as

before,

and because there

found the injunction of

reflection
in

and
is

contemplation subsequent to hearing,

be heard about, to be reflected on,
Therefore,

"He
be

to

to

contemplated,"
to

Brahman

should
as
of

be

acknowledged
only
as

have

sacred

teaching
injunction

authority
realisation.

the

content of an

"Because
reflection etc.

of

its

being purposeful, and because of

being cognised": the elaboration of this in

is

the rest (of the commentary)

self-explanatory.

' t

ffn

-Ml

^T: ?

HARMONY
To
in
this it
is

169

replied

no, because of the difference

nature between ritual

their

and Brahman,
fruit.

in

respect

of

knowledge
body,

and
or

Ritual
is

performed
is

by

the

speech

mind

what

called
tradiis

Religious Duty, as
tional

established
desire "

by Scripture and
to

Codes, and the

know

this object

declared in the aphorism

Then therefore the

desire to

know

Religious Duty

".

Vices too like killing are to be

desired to be

known

for rejection,

being defined by prohi-

bitory injunctions.

The

fruit of this injunction-defined

This

view

of

some

he

condemns:

"To

this

it

is

replied; no," the view of some (is not sound) ; why not T u Because of the difference in nature between ritual and

Brahman
fruits

in

respect

of

their

knowledge and

fruit.'

The

of

action, meritorious or sinful, are (respectively)

happiness

and misery.
in

Of these, there are gradations of

happiness, rising
of

degrees of superiority, from the world

men up

to that of

Brahma,

Similarly, there are degrees

of misery, from the world of

men down

to the hell

known

as Avici*

And

all

that

is

both produced and destructible.

self,

The fruit of the knowledge of the

however,

is final,

unembodied, unsurpassable, and, being naturally established,

it

is

eternal and unproduced.

it is

That, verily,

is fruit,

as

it

were, because
of Nescience.

manifested even with the bare removal

is

This
of
is

what

is

said

by you
the
is

too,

who admit

the

injunction

contemplation as
recognised

purport of the

Vedantas,

there

what

understood from

the Vedanta,
of

viz.,

the jloa naturally being of the nature

intelligent etc.
is

Brahman, eternally pure,

of

And

that

is

not

the fruit

an injunction whose content

contemplation,

170

HARMONY
evil,

good and
ble

religiousi

duty and

vice,

are percepti-

happiness

and

misery,

which

are

experienced

through the body, speech and the mind, generated by

the association
of

sense-organs with objects, and are

well-known
objects,

from

Brahma down

to

the immovable

In all corporeal beings starting from

to

man and
is

rising

Brahma,
declared.
of

the

gradation

of

happiness
is

scripturally

And

therefrom
viz.,

understood

the

gradation

its

cause,

merit.

From

the

gradation of merit follows the gradation of the eligible

persons.

And

the gradation
for

of

the

eligible

persons

brought about by desire

etc.
is

fruit,

capacity, learning

well-known.

Thus,

only

those

who perform
the fruit of

since

it

is

eternal and

unproduced.
of

Nor
veil

(is

the
less
its

injunction)

the

removal

the

of

beginning-

Nescience, since that happens even with the rise of

11 *

opposite,

viz.,

knowledge.

Nor

is

the rise of know-

ledge (the

fruit),

since that too results for the

mind even

from

its

being aided by the impressions produced by con-

templation preceded by hearing and reflection.

impression
of the

Like the

contemplation, the unseen result of the

is

contemplation too
seen
in

an auxiliary

to the
is

mind
fruit

it is,

verily,

that of

what

is

enjoined there

even here (not

hereafter alone), for example, the fruitfulness even

to the CitrS

here of the injunctions

and Kariri

sacrifices,

whose
(in

fruits

are

respectively
if

undefined

and

defined
;

respect of time);"'
(the

this

be said, no (we reply)

for,

like

capacity) of the impressions of the contemplation

of the science of

of

the

meaning

music to produce the

intuition of the notes

sa$a

etc.,

without the need for an

HABMONY
sacrifices
etc.,

171

can go by the northern path on account

of the excellence of

knowledge and meditation through

;

the instrumentality afforded by mere offerings, works of

public
utility

and alms-giving, there

is

passage along
etc.

the

southern

path in the order of smoke

of

Here

too

the

gradation

happiness

and

the

gradation of

means thereto are understood from

"

this sacred teaching

is

After

living
it

there

till

there

consumption".

Similarly
is

is

understood that the smallest happiness

beings starting from

possible

for

man down

to the

inanimate beings only from Religious Duty defined by

injunctions,

and that

it

exists in gradations.

In the

unseen potentiality, there

is,

for

the impressions of the

contemplation of the meaning of the VedSnta, the capacity

to produce the intuition of the jlva being of the nature of

Brahman, even without the need

(of

an unseen

potentiality).

And

thus, since, for the

unseen potentiality of the contemin respect of immortality,

it

plation, there is

no causality

is

not meet that he who desires immortality should learn that

(apftrva)
(yet)

as

what

is

to be done.
this
is,

Desiring one thing, he

indeed, a contradiction.

works
is
it

for another;

Nor

admissible to say that he

who

desires that will

is

understand the act (of contemplation) itself as what

be done, not
its

to

unseen potentiality;

for,

since the inis

strumentality of that (contemplation) thereto

cognised

even through other means

of

knowledge, the injunction

would be
to

futile.

Nor
paddy)

is

there parallelism to the injunction

since
fche

pound

(the

etc.,

even here the unseen

is

potentiality consequent on

restriction

not underis

stood

from

any

other

(text).

And

there

not any

172

HARMONY
for corporeal beings, starting either
is

same way,
or

upwards

downwards, since there

there
viz.,
is

found a gradation of

misery,
its

understood a gradation in respect of

vice,

cause,

as defined by prohibitory injuncrespect

of
of

tions,

and
Thus

also
in

in

those
those

who

practise

them.

the

case
etc.,

who have

the

defect of Nescience

gradations of happiness

and
of

misery, which are brought about by the gradations

merit and demerit, which are generated

of

in the

wake

embodiment, and which are non-eternal and of the

nature of transmigration, are well-known from Scripture,

traditional Codes

and reasoning. And thus the Scripture,

immortality taught by an eulogistic passage, other than

the becoming Brahman, whereby he be eligible for contemplation,

who

desires

it

would

In assuming, however, on
fruit),

the analogy of the ui&'vajit sacrifice,"' heaven (as the

becaune
will

of its surpassability

and

liability to decrease, there

of

be

no

permanent

fruit

contemplation.

Since,

therefore,

becoming Brahman
of

is

manifested even with the

removal of the veil

Nescience, since the removal of

Nescience occurs even with the knowledge of the sense of

the

Ved&nta

culminating in realisation, and since the

causing of an impression by contemplation and the impression being an auxiliary to the mind in producing an
intuition are established by other means of knowledge, the " " is not an injunction ; text contemplate but as the self

bat

it

is

only

what has the appearance

"

of

an injunction

just as, for

example, texts like

"

Visnu

is

to be sacrificed to

with the upnms'u

are

what have the appearance

;

of injunc-

tions, but are not injunctions

this

is

the sense intended.

ffrl

3jft

ffrf
'

f 5f

fa

?'H'WT

HARMONY
11

173

Not verily

for

him who

exists as
is

embodied can there

11

be the destruction of what

restates

pleasing and non-pleasing,

the
"

nature
verily

of

transmigration as described
is

above.

Him
and
;

who

non-embodied,

what

is

pleasing

not

pleasing do
is

not. touch" (Chftnd.,

the denial of the touch
it is

VIII,
of

xii, 1)
is

since here there

what

pleasing and

not pleasing,

understood
is

that for the non-embodiment called final release, there

denied

its

being the fruit of Religious Duty defined by

Indeed,
if
it

injunctions.

were the

fruit
is

of Religious

Duty, the denial of the touch of what

not pleasing would be unintelligible.

pleasing and

If it

be said that

non-embodiment
no, because
like
it

itself is

the fruit of Religious Duty,

is

natural, as understood from Scriptures

**The intelligent one, knowing the self as nonin

embodied
as

the body, as permanent in the transient,

all-pervasive, does not "
;

great

and
"

come

"

to grief

(Katha., II, 22)

Indeed he
II,
i,

is

without breath, without

"

mind, pure
attached."

(Muqd.,
(Brit.,

2)

Indeed

this self is

non-

IV,

Hi, 15.)

Hence

it is

that the nondistinct

embodiment
the fruit

called final release,

which
is

is

from

of ritual to be observed,

established to be

eternal

"
It

has been said

well
11

known from
Of these, he

Scripture, tradicites Scripture:

tional

Codes and reasoning.

thus the Scripture" etc.
it

"And

He
that
;

states the reasoning:

"Hence

is"

etc.

Verily,

which
is

is

natural
;

is

eternal, for example, intelligence

fore, it is

and this

natural

there-

eternal.

174

HARMONY
Of
these,

some may be eternal

"

in

evolution, in

which though subject

11

to transformation, the cognition

is

This
earth

is

but that
for those for

not destroyed

for

example,

etc,,

who uphold

the universe to be
(guqas),

eternal,
for

or,

example,

the constituents
is

the Safikhyas,
eternal,

This, however,
like

absolute,
ether,

immudevoid

tably
of
all

all-pervasive

the

modifications,

eternally

contented,

without

parts,

self-luminous

by

nature,
their
is

which

merit

and

demerit

together

with
This

fruit

do not approach,

nor the three times.

final release,

the non-embodiment called

"
like,

because of Scriptures

Other than

Others,

indeed,

mention two kinds

of eternality

the

immutable eternality and the evolving eternality.

(immortality)
is

When
some
thus
"

said to be eternal, lest

:

it

be taken to be
these,
It is

"

eternality of the evolving kind, he says

etc.

Of

For,
it

evolving eternality

is

not absolute,

does

evolve as a whole or in part?

If it evolve as a
its
it

whole,
If
it

how can

there be no destruction of
is

nature?
or non-

evolve in part,
If
it

that part different from

different?

be different,
?

how can
Indeed,
is

the transformation

be of that (eternal entity)

when one thing

is

transformed,
as

different

thing

not also

transformed,
Or,
if it

that

would

be

an

undue

extension.

be

non*different,

how can

the transformation be not of the

whole

T^

ffrr

HABMONY
virtue, other

175

than

vice,

other than this that

is

done
in

and not done, other than what has been and what
"

to

be

(Ratha,,

II,

14 ,) Therefore such
is

is

Brahman,
If that

the desire to

know which

here the context,

be taught as subsidiary to something to be done,

if

and

final release be

acknowledged
is

to be

something to be
then
it

accomplished by that which

be certainly non-eternal
the
result

to be done,

would

Then, this being the case,

final

would be that

release

is

only

an

excellent stage
of
ritual

among

the

graded non-eternal

fruits
is

described
to

above,
eternal

And
by

final
all

release

acknowledged

be

who uphold

doctrine of final release,

Therefore

the teaching of

Brahman

as subsidiary to

what

is

to be

done does not

stand to reason.

It
it

may
thus
:

be

said

to

be
in

different
its

and non-different
is

is

that
is

itself,

causal aspect
the

nonlike

different,

and
etc.,

different

in

effect-aspect,

bracelets

which are non-different

gold,

in respect of their

nature

as

and
etc.

different

in
it

respect

of

their

nature

as
of

bracelets

Nor

is

meet

to

say that,
and
nonin one.
?

because

the

opposition

of

difference
of the

difference, there

cannot be the inherence

two

Where

is it

that
is

we have

the right cognition of opposition

11 '

(In that)

which

opposed to the means of valid knowledge,

176

HABMOHY
that

But

which

is

understood

through

the

means
In

of valid knowledge, for that that nature alone

(is true).

the appositional
difference

cognition

"This ear-ring

is

gold," both
it is

and non-difference are clearly manifest;

thus:

if

non-difference were absolute, there would result

the appearance of one twice (as subject and as predicate);

and
tion,

if

difference were absolute, there would be no apposi;

any more than between cow and horse

where there
or of having
is

there

is

no

apposition,

a relationship of support and

supported
(said

the

same
;

locus

the pot

is

never

to be) the cherry (therein)

nor
"

is it

said of Caitra
is

and Maitra present on one seat that and

it is

Caitra

Maitra";

this unsublated, indubitable, universal appositional

cognition

that

establishes

difference

and non-difference

between the
effects

effect

and

the

cause;

and thus, since the

are

of

the nature of the cause, and since of the

is

cause, whose nature

existence, there

is

persistence every-

where, there
the
effect,

is

in the aspect of existence non-difference of

;

the universe (from the cause)

is

in the effect-aspect

as cow, pot etc., there

effect-aspect,

difference.

As

is

said:

"in the
in

there
for
in

is

difference;
in

non-difference

the
is

causal

aspect;

example,
the

the gold-aspect there

of

non-difference,
difference/'

aspect

ear-ring

etc,,

there

is

To

this the reply

is

what, then,

is

this

which

is

called

difference,

which should
If
it

exist along with non-difference in

one place?

be said to be reciprocal non-existence,

does this exist or not between effect and cause, bracelet

sfc

13

5"

HARMONY
and gold
If it
?

177

If not,

there
is

is

oneness alone, not difference.

does exist, there

is

difference alone, not non-difference,

Nor

there no

opposition between
is

existence and nonOr,

if it

existence, as their co-existence

impossible,

were

possible, there would result non-difference as such between

the

bracelet

and the vardhamtina"* difference not being

Further, the bracelet being nonas,

opposed to non-difference*
different

from gold, just

ear-rings
etc.

in the gold-aspect, bracelets,

crowns,

are

not different, so even in the

bracelet-aspect they should not differ, because of the nondifference

is

of

the bracelet from gold.

etc.,

And

thus, gold alone

is

real, not the bracelet

since of the difference there

no manifestation.

Now,

(it

may

be said)

only as gold

is

there

non-

difference, not as bracelet; as that (bracelet),

is

however, there

but difference from ear-ring

etc.
is

(We ask
gold,
etc.?

in
it

reply)

if

the bracelet

non-different from

how
And

is
if

that this (former) does not recur in ear-ring

it

does not recur,

?

how

is

the bracelet non-

different

from gold
is

For, those, which are variable

when

something
as

recurrent, are certainly different from that,

flowers

the

different
is

from the string.

And though

goldness

recurrent, ear-ring etc. are not recurrent; hence,

If,

they too are certainly different from gold.

the
recurrence
of

because of

existentiality,

all

things

were non-

" this is here, different, there would be no distinctions like " " this is now, not this is from this, not that," not that,"

that,"

"this

is

so,

not that"

etc.,

because of the non-

existence of any ground for discrimination of anything, in

178

HARMONY
place,
at

any

any time, in any manner.

it

Further,
its

when

from a distance
ties,

is

understood to be gold,

particulari-

as

ear-ring etc,, would not

of

be desired to be known,

because

their

non-difference from gold, and because of

the latter being known.

Now,

since

there

is

difference
is

too

of

ear-ring

etc.

from gold, even when gold

known, they are unknown.

Now,

since there

is

non-difference too,

why
is

are they not

known?

On
;

the contrary, knowledge alone

for,

appropriate

in their case

the absence of the effect (knowledge), in

is

the
rule
;

absence of the cause (non-difference),

the general

and that

is

set
in

aside (here) by the existence of the

cause,

And since

non-difference there
is

is

the existence
are certainly

of the cause,

when

gold

known, ear-ring

etc.

known; hence the

of

desire to
futile.

know them and

the cognitions

them would be
of

Therefore, that which on the

is

apprehension
different
is

another
(other)
ass,

not

(itself)

apprehended

is

from that

for example,

when the camel

apprehended,
is

apprehended,

the

which

is

not
gold

(differs)

from
a

the camel.
distance,
;

And when

apprehendetc,,

ed

from
not

its

particularities,

ear-ring

are
gold.

apprehended

therefore

they

are different from

"

"

How,
If

then,

is

there the apposition

it

ear-ring

(is)
is

gold

this

be

asked,

has been said that there

is

no appo-

sition,

where

there

relationship

of

support and

supported
explain)

or of having the same locus.

of recurrence
etc.,

Then,

how

(to

the distinction

and variability, and

is

the desire to

know

ear-ring

even when gold

known ?

ffif ct

fasWRrF^=n^R3, ft^RRFlf

ffe

MK*il(W, ^

ffcl

fttsi4r4dl*i

HARMONY
It
if

179

has been said that these two,

verily, are not intelligible,

(i.e.,

there be non-difference, absolute or non-absolute

cum
and

difference),

Therefore,

one
to

of

the

two, difference
it

non-difference, having
of non-difference that
it

be abandoned,
is

is

on the basis
;

there

the positing of difference

is

does not stand to reason that non- difference

For, difference
is

posited

on a basis of difference.

dependent on

what

is

differentiated;
;

those which are differentiated are

each one

if

there were not one, there could be no difference

;

because there would be no locus

and

of unity there

is

no

dependence on difference
in

the apprehension of difference,

this,"

the form "not

this,

(but)

has need of the ap-

prehension of the counter-correlate, while the apprehension

of unity
it

has no need of anything else: for these reasons

is

admissible that only

"

on a basis of non-difference
difference."

is

there the

positing of indeterminable
:

80 too

Scripture

only as clay
is

is

this true."

Hence, immutable
this
is

eternity alone
established.

absolute,

not evolving eternity;

The
doctrine

illustration
of
is

"like the ether"

since
in

is

according to the

others,

our system that too, being

here,

produced,

non-eternal.

And
its

by the words "im-

mutably eternal," he refutes

"

being an object of achieve1

ment

by the words
;

all-pervasive/
"

its

being an object of
modifications/'
its

attainment

by the words

devoid of

all

being an object of change; by the words "without parts,"

its

being an object of purification.

is

Just as, verily, for the

rice-grains there
called

generated, by the sprinkling, an element

purification,

not

thus

is

there any

element in
it

Brahman,

produced by (ritualistic) action, since

is

has no

members (arayavas)\ that

to say, since

it

has no parts.

180

HARMONY
Further, there

are scriptural texts which, showing

final release to follow

immediately on the knowledge of

:

Brahman, exclude anything else to be done in between

u

He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself " " And his actions perish when he, the (Mm<L, III, ii, 9);
higher and the lower,
is

seen

"

"

(Mund.,

II,

ii,

8)

He

who knows the

where
"

bliss of

Brahman has no
"

fear from any-

(Taitt^ 11,9);
"

"Verily thou hast, oh Janaka,

;

reached fearlessness

(Brh., IV, ii,4)

4

Therefore, one
' ;

knew only
that
all

the self in the form,

"

am Brahman

from

this

sprang

(Vnjwaneyibrahmaqopanisad,

He
By

states its being the

human

goal:

"eternally contented/'

contentment

is

implied happiness devoid of

is

misery.

Contentment,
cessation
of

indeed,

happiness conjoined with the

the misery of appetite,

And happiness,
;

if

not cognised,
"

cannot
*'

be

human

goal

to this

he says

self-luminous.

Having thus shown through Scripture

fruit called release, in his

etc,,

that the

own
the

view,

is

eternal,

he elaborates

the
"
If

that be taught

non-eternality "

of
etc.

release
is

achieved by action:

Nor

there sublation by Scripture,

in the
texts,

since

there

is

intelligibility

of Scripture,

manner
which

mentioned.
stand in the

Further,

there

are

numerous

way

of the

view that release, as generated by

is

the unseen potentiality born of knowledge,

consequent

on

an

injunction;
etc.

thus,

he

says:

"Further, there are

of

Scriptural texts"
in

The instrumentality

knowledge

respect of release consists only in the removal of the

itself,

hindrance of the two kinds of Nescience, not in

nor

srfir

ffrf
:
I

PillRhl

46

'

'

ffif

iftr

',

f:

fqm

HARMONY
I,

181

iv,

10);
is

"Then,
there,
"
?

what

delusion

is

there,

what

sorrow
this

for

one who has uniformly seen

7)
etc.

oneness

(Itfa,,

Similarly the following

may

be cited in order to exclude anything else which

has to be done in between the sight of Brahman and

"

becoming the

self of all
'

Verily, the sage

Vamadeva,
'

seeing him, realised,

(Brh.,
I,

became Manu and the sun

"
1

"

iv,

10)

just as in

standing, he sings/ one

understands that between standing and singing there

is

nothing else for him to do.

thou
"

"

Thou indeed

art our

father,

who
VI,

carriest

us to the other shore of

"
(Pr.,
8)
;

ignorance
like

have indeed heard from those

self
;

Your Reverence that one who knows the

sorrow
;

crosses
this

Your Reverence,
"

am

one in grief

me,

may Your Reverence

i,

take

across

sorrow"

(Chttnd., VII,

3)

To him whose

sins are squeezed out,

in the production of
"

an unseen potentiality

for this too,

"
120

he cites Scriptures

Thou indeed

art our father

etc,

To

this effect, there are not merely Scripture etc,, but also

the aphorism of the preceptor, Akgapada, based on reason" " thus he says etc. Similarly, there is the aphorism ing
; :

And

the preceptor
"
:

is

he

who has been

thus defined in the

purana

Because he explains the meaning of the sacred

confirms
(his

teaching,

pupils)

in

the

observances, and

himself

conforms

to

those
a

observances,

he

is

called
this

preceptor."

By

such

one has been formulated

182 the

HARMONY
revered

Sanatkumara

shows

the other side of

these
of

darkness"

(Ctand,, VII, xxvi, 2);

and other

scriptural passages

show the

fruit

the knowledge

of

Brahman

to be

merely the cessation of the obstacles

to final release,

Similarly

there

is

the aphorism

preceptor
birth,

and supported

written by the U 0f misery, by reasoning

activity,

defect and illusory knowledge, by the

is

destruction of each subsequent one, there

tion of each earlier one,

the destruc-

and consequently

final release ",

And

the destruction of illusory knowledge results from

the cognition of the oneness of

Brahman and

the

self,

aphorism:
knowledge,
there
ly
is

"Of

misery, birth, activity, defect and illusory

of

by the destruction

each subsequent one,

the destruction of each earlier one, and consequentW1

final release."

In the order of mention, the cause

is

the subsequent, the effect the earlier; on the destruction of

the cause there
is

the destruction of the

the fever generated

effect, as

when
is

phlegm

is

destroyed,

by phlegm
is

destroyed.
truction
of

On

the destruction of birth, there

the des-

misery;
of
of

on the destruction of activity, the

on the destruction of defect, the on the destruction of illusory

destruction
destruction

birth;

activity;

knowledge, the destruction of defect.

ledge,

And

illusory

know-

which

is

Nescience,

is

the primal cause of transmiof generating desire etc.

gration, even in the visible

manner

TO
<1T5|3JM

:;

HARMONY
And
that
is

18S

removed only by

its

opposite,

viz.,

knowledge of

the truth, the cognition of the unity of

self,

Brahman and the

is

culminating in realisation.

Hence, release

the maniof

festation of the nature of

Brahman, through the removal

(i.e.,

Nescience
plation)

but

it

is

not the effect of vidyd

of

contem-

or the
this

effect
is

an unseen potentiality generated

thereby;

the

meaning
is

of

the

aphorism.

The

citation of the aphorism

only to this extent

is

that from

knowledge

of the truth
;

there

the destruction of illusory

is

knowledge
as
i.e.,

that,

however, which

acceptable to Aksapada

knowledge
by

of the truth, is not here acceptable.

Hereby

the accord

of

another preceptor, this sense

is

confirmed.

Be

this so,

The cognition
it

of unity does not

have

for

content a thing as
illusory knowledge,
itself

exists, in
i.e n

which

case,

it

would remove

the presentation of difference, and

;

not be the content of an injunction

etc,

but

it is

of the

nature of an imagined identification

And

thus, being

non-established prior to an injunction, and to be accomplished through the desire of the person,
it

would become

the sphere of an injunction

for example, because of the

its

likeness of the mind, through the infinity of

tions,

modifica-

to the All-gods, the latter are

is

imagined in the mind,

if

the mind which

the support

is

ignored as

not cognised,

and the imagined All-gods alone are principally contemplated, infinite worlds

being

attained thereby; similarly,

because of likeness in the nature of intelligence, the nature

of

Brahman

is

imagined in the

jlva, the jloa

which

is

the

184

HARMONY
Nor
is

this cognition of the

oneness of

Brahman

and the

self of the

nature of an imagined identification,

as in the case of
are infinite
;

"

Mind

verily

is infinite,

the All-gods
".

therefore he conquers an infinite world

Nor
of
is

is it

of the nature of superimposition as in the case

"Contemplate the mind as Brahman," "The sun

Brahman

this is the teaching/

where there

is

super-

imposition of the contemplation of

Brahman

in the

mind,

the sun etc.

distinctive
air is
It is

Nor

is

it

caused by association with a

"

of activity, as in the case of The " The vital air is the devourer ", the devourer,"

mode

not also of the nature of purification subsidiary

If the cognition

to a ritual like the glance at the ghee.

support

is

ignored

as

if

not cognised, and

Brahman

is

contemplated principally, the fruit of immortality being

attained thereby.

In superimposition, however, the support

122

being the principal,

there

is

contemplation of that as
"

having the nature superimposed for example,

*,

Contemplate
this
is
is

"

the mind as Brahman," "

The sun

is

Brahman,

the

teaching

similarly,

in respect

of the jlva,
".

who

not

"

Brahman,
Or

Contemplate but as Brahman

(the meditation

may

be)

from the association with a

"

distinctive
is

mode

of activity; for

example
verily,

The
is

air, verily,
\

samuarga"
external

"The
air-deity
fire

vital
is,

air,

samvarga"

the

indeed,
at

the

samvarga\ that,

indeed,

devours

etc.; for,

the time of the final

'

ft Mi

HARMONY
deluge,
it

185

devours

fire

etc,,

destroys

them and

establishes

them

in itself. or
air

destruction
itself,

As the^DravidacSrya says; "Because by by devouring it makes (all things) into

is

the

samvarga"
that,

And

the

internal

vital
etc.
;

air
for,

is

samvarga

indeed, devours
it is

all,

speech

at the time of death,

that alone, which goes forth

itself,

collecting together all the

organs in

Just as the

meditation on the air or the vital air as samvarga reveals

the universe in
of the jlva as
all

ten directions, even so, the meditation

of the (former's) act of

Brahman, because
is

causing to grow,
immortality,

capable of (producing) the fruit of

these three views, contemplation etc,
self,

On

all

in respect of the

intuition of the

are principal acts,

like

since

they have an unseen potentiality for content,

the

stutis

and

s'astras
act-

but
Or,

the

self

is

substance

subsidiary
as

to the

intuition

may

be prescribed

a purification of the
the
"

self.

For example, in the topic

the
glance,

concerning

dars'apurnamasa,
is

which
at

is

mentioned in

Ghee

that

which has been glanced

is

by the

(sacrificed) wife", and

which

required by the subject of

the topic as a purification of the material, ghee, an accessory

of the upamsru sacrifice,
is

prescribed as a subsidiary rite

even

so, in respect of

the
is

self,

which as agent

is

an accessory
rite, in

to the rite, intuition

enjoined as a subsidiary
to be seen,"

the

words

"The
1

self,

verily, is

because of the
substance

'4

principle
is

"Those

by

which
in

the

principal
of

desired to be purified,
is

respect

that (substance),

subsidiariness "

cognised for them".

Hence, he says:

Nor
"

is this

cognition of the oneness of the "

Brahman and

the

self

etc.

Why

not

If

the cognition of the oneness of

186
of the oneness of

HARMONY
Brahman and
the self were to be

admitted to be of the form of an imagined identification

etc.,

then in the case of statements like

"

"

That thou
"

art", "I am Brahman,

and "This
to the
is

self is

Brahman

violence
of

would be done

syntactical

relation
fact

words

whose purport
of

to

declare the
self.

of

the

oneness

Brahman and the

of
is

There would

be

contradiction
of

scriptural
cut,
all

passages like

"The

knot

the heart
II,
ii,

doubts are resolved"

fruit, viz.,

(Mu'Qd.,

8),

which declare the

If
it

the

cessation

of Nescience.

were of the nature of

statements of one

an imagined
becoming
becomes

identification etc., the

in
"
itself

Brahman

"He who knows Brahman

(Mund.,
Ill,
ii,

Brahman

9)

would not

be satisfactorily intelligible,
the oneness of
of

Therefore the cognition of

the self
is

Brahman and

not of the nature

an imagined

identification etc.

Brahman and
imagined

the self were admitted to be of the form of an

identification etc."

and so on.

Indeed,

of the

glance at the ghee mentioned in the topic of the dars'apftrriamflsa,

it is

meet that

it

should be a purification of the ghee,

which

is

an accessory thereto.
"

And

" texts like

The

self,

verily, is

topic.
etc.,
is

to be seen are not mentioned in any particular " " The text He, for whom the ladle is of

par^a-wood

not mentioned in the course

"

of

any particular
by the

topic

yet the word

ladle

"
recalls the sacrifice

sentence, through the channel of the ladle, which has a

non-inconstant connection with the sacrifice, (and thus)

^Tt^T^TJ'

ffrf

fife

rrff ?

i^^:,

HABMONY
For
this

187

reason,

the knowledge of
activity.

Brahman
then

is

not dependent on
It is

human

What

is it ?

dependent on the thing alone, like the know-

ledge of things which are the content of valid cognitions

like

perception etc.

And, of Brahman of
it is

this

nature and of the cognition thereof,

not possible
field of)
act-

by any reasoning to assume entrance into (the

what

is

to

be done.
does

Nor as the
enter

object of the
into

of

cognition

Brahman
there
is

what
its

is

to

be

done

because
of

the

denial of
in
"

being the

object

the

act of

knowing

It is different

from

the known,

also

from the unknown" (Kena.,

I, 3)

and

brings

about

subsidiariness

to
is

the sacrifice for being-

made-of-parpo-wood.
stant

There

not similarly a non-inconsacrifice,

connection of the self with the

intuition
thereof,

whereby

the

being

subsidiary to the sacrifice,

sacrifice.

would purify the

fore,

self for the

sake of the

There-

though

this be

an injunction, yet because

as
in

of the failure

of

the

application,

"Bright gold

is

to be worn,"
its

and because of having unseen potentiality as

this
is

content,

only

a principal
etc,);

rite,

not a subsidiary rite (like

purification

this

criticism

being too

patent

is

not stated, only the criticism

common
is

to all the positions

it

being

stated.

Since

its

sense

not obscure,

is

not

commented

on.
its

Further,

being
is

an

injunction with

the

act

of

cognition as content
texts;

opposed to numerous Scriptural

as the object of the act of

thus

he says:

"Nor

188
"

HARMONY
all this,

By whom one knows

how can one know him

is

"
?

(Brh,, II, iv, 14).

Similarly, there

also the denial of its

being the object of the act of contemplation: after

premising
the

non-objectness of

Brahman

in

"That
is

which

is

not expressed by speech, by which speech

"

expressed," (Scripture says),

Know

then that alone to

be Brahman, not this which

I, 4).

is

contemplated."

(Kena^

If it be said that if

Brahman be not an

object, the

sacred
of,

teaching cannot intelligibly be the source there;

no

for

the sacred teaching has

for

purport the

cessation of the difference posited

by Nescience, Indeed,
its

the

sacred

teaching does not intend to declare

"

content,

Brahman, as
to

this

".

What

then

? It

declares
self,

Brahman
"

be a non-object, as being the inner

"

cognition
etc.

etc.

He
it

objects

If

Brahman be
if

not an object

"

And thence

would be as

an

evil spirit arose in

;

the midst of a ceremony to appease (evil spirits)

the
the
idea,

this "

is

He

refutes

this:

"No."

Why
all

not?

Since

sacred

teaching has for purport the cessation of the

posited by Nescience."

difference

Indeed,

sentences are
things as

not capable of making

"
this " "

known

differences

among

or

this ".

For, the differences of sweetness

among

sugar-cane, milk and jaggery cannot be expressed in words.

It
if,

must be seen

to be similar in all other cases too.

Hence,

even in respect of worldly things established by other

of valid

means

knowledge, this be the fate of words, what

self,

then need be said in respect of the inner

which
in

is

transcendent?

As

for

the predication,

somehow,

ff

*T

f^T: ?
I

w-

48

m-

SRRfT

HARMONY
and
removes
differences
like

189

the

known, knower,

and knowledge posited by Nescience.

"

And

thus the

sacred
it
is

teaching:

Conceived of by him by
;

whom
of,

not conceived of

he,

by

whom
to

it is

conceived

does not

know

it

not

known

them who

(say they)

know

known
II,
3)
;

to "

them who (say they) do not know/'

(Kena.,

Thou canst not

see the seer of sight,

canst the

not

hear the hearer of hearing, canst not think

of

thinker

the

thought,
11

canst not
f

know
and

the

knower

of the

knowledge

(5rA M III,iv

2)

so on.

Therefore through the cessation of migratoriness posited

by Nescience, there
self eternally

is

the restoration of the nature of the

free

hence

for final release there is

not

the defect of non-eternality.

manner not too remote, that

denotation
of

holds equally here,

That the

the

"thou," the cogniser, through valid

of valid knowledge,
is

knowledge dependent on the means

pervades the object of knowledge, the pot etc,- this

manifestation of Nescience,
inner
self,

Being in apposition with the

"

the denotation of the

is

that,"

which

is

not an

object and
it;

indifferent,

there cannot be cognisership for

of

hence,

on

the

cessation

that,

there cease the

threefold distinctions of the

Verily,

means

of valid

knowledge

etc.

unreal, the object, the result and the * It is, indeed, thus that process of cooking cannot be real. " there is a verse occurring elsewhere When, of the word

when

the cook

is

190

HARMONY
But, for

him

to

whom

release
v

is

something
is

to

be

produced,

it

stands to reason

there

the need for

something
too,
if it

to be done, mental, verbal or physical,

So

be a

modification,
is

For these two views the

In the world,

non-eternality of release

a certainty,
etc,,

neither modifications like curd

like

nor things produced

a jar

etc,

are found to be eternal,

that/ cured of

its

external reference, there

*

is

identity of
*

significance with the word

too, getting the

thou/ then, the word

*

'

thou

same

significance as
all

that/

i.e.,

the pure

intelligent self,

abandons

the impurities, such as agency,

that affect the true substance,"

"

To the same
:

effect
'

he cites

by him
fore,

Scriptures "
1

And

thus the sacred teaching

Conceived of
:

etc,

He

concludes the present topic

"There-

through the cessation of the migratoriness posited by

"

Nescience

etc,

He

deduces
:

the
"

non-eternality

of
"

release
etc.

on the
is

opponent's view

But, for

him

to

whom

What

to

be done,

i,e,,

the unseen potentiality,

etc,
;

is

generated by the

operation in respect of sacrifice

for its

that, release needs

;, e ,
}

origination,
of

"For

those two views/'

for the

two (views)

achievement and modification.

is

That the

momentary cognition
thus, since the
release
is

the

self,

say the Bauddhas,

is

And

origination of a pure cognition

is

release,

what

achieved,

For others, however, the

wr

II

ffcl

rWT

HARMONY
Nor even as what
is

191

to be attained is there the

;

need for something to be done

of one's
if

for if it be of the nature

is

own

self, it is

not

what

to be attained

even
not

different
is

from one's own nature, Brahman

;

is

what

to be attained
is

because, being all-pervasive,

all, like

Brahman by nature
the ether.

eternally attained by

self's

attainment of the state of isolation, after getting

;

rid
is

of the state of transmigration, is release

hence, release

a modification

for example,

for milk, the

attainment of
is

anothor state by the abandonment of the former state,

the modification, curd.

On

these two views, there

(its)

is

no

eternality for release, because of

being produced, like

curd, pot etc.

"

From

tho scriptural text

"
etc,,

Then, the light which shines

beyond the heavens

differences of place,

there arc understood of

it is

Brahman
it is

where
the

modified and where

to

unmodified

hence,

reaching

that place
is

where

Brahman

is

unmodified might become what

;

to be

done by
is

the injunction of contemplation etc.

and thus, there

for

Brahman
"

says

Nor even as what

object-ness in respect of attainment, " is to be attained etc.

To

this he

By means

different
is

from oneself, one abandons the place where there

modification
for

and reaches that where there

is

none.

Thus,

example,

the sailor in his boat (leaving behind

him) the shores of the sea, which are subject to modification,

being characterised by groups of foam produced by the

192

HARMONY
Nor
is final

release the purified, in

for

which case there

would be the need

purification

an

activity,

Indeed what is called

may

be either by the addition of merits to

what

is
it

to be purified, or

by the removal

of defects,

Now,

cannot be by the addition of merits, since final re-

lease is of the nature of

Brahman,

to

which no excellence

can be added
release
is

nor by the removal of defects, since final

of the nature of

Brahman

eternally pure,

dashing

of

countless waves, reaches the central portion,

is

which, untroubled by any waves,

consequently unmodified.

calm, pure, steady and

is

Since, however, the jiva

but
For,

Brahman, what
attainment
If, is

is

to be attained and
;

by what means
is

based on difference

this

the meaning,

now, the jlva be different from Brahman, even then,

is

Brahman

not attained, since Brahman, because of his

"
is

pervasiveness,
if

eternally attained
"

thus he says

even

different

from one's own nature

etc.
:

He
"Nor
is

refutes the object-ness in respect of purification

final

release the purified"

:

etc,

Purifiedness

is,

indeed, of

two kinds

(i)

either by the addition of merits

for example, the colouring of the citron flower with the

juice of the lac;

rise

the flower being purified thereby gives

to

fruit

of

the same colour as lac;

;

(ii)

or by the

removal of defects

for example, the

impure surface of a

mirror becomes purified and bright through being rubbed

with
be

powdered

brick,

Of

these
to

(ways),

there

cannot
is

any

addition

of merits

Brahman,

For,

this

WT

49

fecfM
I

Sflcl

-T

HARMONY
"
If
it

193

be said,

Final release, being of one's

own

nature, yet having been obscured, becomes manifest on

the purification of the self through acts, as, for example,

when a mirror
attribute
of

is

purified through the act of rubbing, its

lustre

(becomes manifest)," no

because of

the unintelligibly of the self being the locus of an act,

That which
ing
it,

is

the locus of an act, not without modify-

does

that act

get

its

being,

If the self

were

merit of the nature of

its

Brahman

or different

If it

be of
?
If,

nature,

how can
they
there

it

be added, that being eternal

then,

however,
produced,

be

different,

because

of for

being
release,

would result non-eternality

Nor can there be the

between
differents,

relation of attribute and substrate

like

cow and
been

horse,
as

And

difference

cum

non-difference
of

has

refuted
it

contradictory,

Because
ease
i

these considerations,

is

said:

"since final

is

of the nature of

Brahman

to

which no excellence
alternative:

added."

He

refutes the second

"

"Nor

^noval
k

of defects

etc,

Impurity, being present in

is

removed

but not being present in Brahman,

:

removed, being eternally removed (therefrom)

the se&e,

^5 final
Rels^e, which
is

release, being of one's

own

"

nature

of the very nature of

Brahman, being
is

yeginningless impurity, Nescience,

fested

mani-

when

WL self

is

purified

by acts

of

contemplation

194

HARMONY
be transformed through any
locus,

to

act having

that as
result.

the

non-eternality
"

of

the self

would

"

Statements like

This

is

spoken of as non-transformable
that
is

would be sublated,

And

unacceptable.

There-

fore for the self, there

cannot be an act having that

the self
locus,
is

as the
of

locus.

And

since

not the object

is

an act having some other

it

not purified

thereby,

etc,;

but
is

it is

not produced.
established

This
of

is

what

is

said: eternal
self,

purity

not

the (individual)

that

being defiled by Nescience in the state of transmigration,

He

refutes

the

objection:

"no,"

Why

not? "Because
1

of the unintelligibility of the self being the locus of

an act/
jiuti
;

Nescience
but
that
is

is

located

not in

Brahman, but

in

the

has

been said to be indeterminable;

hence,

Brahman

certainly eternally pure,

of)

Admitting impurity,
its

however, he condemns (the view

being purified by

an

act,

Indeed,

an act may purify Brahman either as

in)

inherent in Brahman, just as the rubbing (consisting

the extensive conjunction and disjunction of brick powder

is

always inherent in the surface of the mirror;

in

or,

as
of

inherent

another.

The

act

is

not an attribute

Brahman,
in
its

since, that (act) being the cause of modification

locus,

there
for

would be destruction

of

Brahman's

eternality,

As
be

what
to

is

inherent in

another,

how
there

can

that

of

service

something

else, since

'
I

'

fin

f cf:
5

ft

R^frl

5T

^fH

HARMONY
Now, by

195

acts having the body as their locus, such as

etc,,

bathing, sipping, wearing of the sacred thread

the

embodied
is

is

seen to be purified,

No

because what

purified is only that self

etc.,
it is

which

is

associated with the

body

which

is

caught hold of by Nescience,

Indeed,
etc.
is

a matter of perception that bathing, sipping

It

inhere in the body.

stands to reason that

its

what
is
is

purified

by the act having the body as

is

locus

something which

associated with that (body), and

self

apprehended as the

through Nescience.

Just as

through the equilibrium of the humours brought about

by treatment having the body as the locus, there

fruit

is

the

of

health

for

that which

is

associated with that

of

body, and has the conceit (in

itself)
'*

that (body),
free

where

there

arises

the cognition

am

from

would be undue extension?

the
that

When
seen

the mirror
to

is

rubbed,

gem
is

is

not,

indeed,

be

purified.

"And
to

unacceptable": by

the

"that" he

refers

the

sublation,
"

He

raises the question of

an inconstancy here
" etc.

Now,

by acts having the body as their locus

M

He answers
Brahman by

No,"

It

is

only the conditioning of

is

beginningless indeterminable Nescience that

called the jlva or the

knower

of the field (ksetrajna).

And that

196

HARMONY
similarly,

disease,"

that

wherein

through bathing,
etc,,

sipping,

wearing of the sacred thread

there arises
is

the cognition
purified,

"I am
that
is

clean,

purified,"

that (alone)

And
is

certainly

associated

with the
"
I,"

body.

It
is

only by him

who has

the conceit

who

the object of the

all

concept "I,"

who

is

the

knower, that
fruit

the

actions are fulfilled.

is

And

their

he alone enjoys, because there

u

the

Mantra

passage,

One

of

them
"

eats the sweet fruit, the other,

1,

not eating, looks on

(Rv.>

164,

20~fci,, III,

i,

1),

is

associated with bodies, subtle and gross, with organs etc,

is

it

placed

in

the midst
it

of
is

their

aggregate;

through
of the

non-difference therewith,

made the content

concept "I";

therefore, the purification of the body etc,,

of the

though the attribute

self,

body

etc,?

may

apply to the

because of the determination of non-difference there;

from

just as the fragrance of the cosmetics

is

predicated
is

of the damsel.

Therefore, here too, the purification

is

of

that alone which

made the content

of empirically valid
;

means
is

of

knowledge, not of anything else

In truth,

hence there
is

no inconstancy.

however, there

neither

act nor purification,

Since the rest (of the commentary)

along with the illustration has been explained even in

(explaining) the

commentary on superimposition,
"

it is

not

"

explained here.

One

of

them eats the sweet

fruit

one

ffrT

'3TT-

00

'

*tt

ffn

WI^T

ffrf

HARMONY
"
also

197

(The

self)

as associated with the body, the organs,

call the

and the mind, the wise men

"
I, iii, 4),

enjoyer

",

(Katha^

Similary,
all,

The one God, concealed

all beings,

in all beings,

pervading

the inner self of

the watcher of

acts, living in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, alone

and

free
all,

from attributes" (S'vet, VI,

11),

"He
free

per-

vaded

he who

is

effulgent,

non -embodied,

from
"

misery, indestructible,
(Is a.,
8):

pure

and non-afflicted by

sin

these

two

Mantras show that Brahman

to it

cannot have any excellence added

is

and that
is

it

eternally

pure,

And becoming Brahman

final

final

release,
purified.

Therefore,

release

is

not

also

the

"
is

the jzw-self;

fruit'*

is

the fruit of karma,

self.

"The
of
is

other not eating" etc,;

the supreme

The words

the

hymn

(mantra) declare

enjoyership only of what

associated (with the body etc,):

"The

self,

as associated

with

the

organs,

the

mind"
of

etc.

He

cites

two hymns

which

have

the

object

showing

the unassociated
etc.

Brahman
means

of pure nature;

"The one god"

means
is

Sukram
misery;

effulgent;

avrayam

free

from

asfl&viram

means undissolved, that

"
"
:

to say, indestructible,

He

concludes

Therefore

etc,

198

HARMONY
Other than these, no one can point out any channel

through

which

an act

may

enter into final release,

Therefore, apart from the one (means) knowledge, there

cannot intelligibly be any entrance here even for the

shadow

of

an

act.
is

Now, what

called

knowledge
Indeed that

is

a mental

act.

No
an

because of difference.
act,

is

what

is

called

wherein there

is

an injunction even without

regard to the nature of the thing, and in dependence

Now,

let

there not be one of the four forms of object;

ness like being achieved etc.

there

may be some

fifth

way

in

which the object-ness

"
this

of release "

may
etc,

be explained.

To

he says;
is

Other than these

Other than these

in to

modes, there

no mode, whereby action may come

This
is

(secure) release.

what

is

said

being the
;

fruit of

action

is

pervaded by one

among

the four forms

and
of

this

(pervasion),

being excluded from release because being

seen,

the
of)

pervader

not

excludes

(the

possibility

release being the fruit of action.

Is there, then, in release

all

no action at all? In that case,

that purpose and
all

sacred teaching for

engaging in activity for that purpose

this

would be
"

futile.

To

he says by

way

of conclusion
"

Therefore! apart from the one (means), knowledge

etc.

fferT

ff

TT*T

HT,

ffrl

=^rfrl
f?T:
?

^5 ^T^ficl

nR$<(d

5f

flH^ft

ff THT

*TT |ft

KTf

iff

HARMONY
on the mental activity of a person,
cases like
"

199

For example, in

That deity

for

whom

there should be taken

up the oblation, that one should contemplate in mind,

uttering the word,
'

'

vasat

"

"

(Ait Brah.,

Ill, viii, 1),

The
and

Evening
so on,
this
it
is

(deity),

one should contemplate in mind

i.e.,

"

Contemplation,
mental,
still

thinking about, even though

it is

since

dependent on a person,

may

be effected, or not effected, or effected in a dif-

ferent

way, by the person,

Knowledge, however,

is

Now,
mental
act,

how can
is

it

be that

knowledge, which
?

is

not the sphere of an injunction

its fruit, release, is

And how
"

can

it

be that

not one of those achieved

is

"
etc. ?
etc.

Thus he asks

Now, what

He

"

answers
This
is

No,"

Why
true,

not

called knowledge " Because of differis

ence,"

the sense:

knowledge

a mental
of)

act;

but this cannot generate fruit in (the nature

since,

Brahman,

being

self-luminous,

that

(Brahman)

cannot intelligibly be in the relation of an object to an act

of

cognition;
is

this

has

been said before.

"

Even when
:

there
"

this difference,
is

he mentions another difference

called

Indeed, that

what

is

an
is

"
etc,

act

Wherein/

"

in respect of a content,

there

an injunction even without

for

regard

to the

nature of the thing"

example,

while
is

taking up the oblation intended for the deity

receive
it,

who

to

there

is

no regard for the true nature of the

it
;

deity in the act of contemplating

of fire in (relation to)
real
fire

or, in
is

the meditation

woman,
is

there
is

no regard for the

is

"indeed that

what

called an act"; this

200

HARMONY
a means of valid knowledge.

generated by

And a

means
as
it

of valid
exists.

knowledge has

for its content the thing

Therefore, knowledge cannot be effected

or
effected
in
;

or not

effected

a different
it is

way

it

is

dependent purely on the thing

not dependent on

an injunction, nor
fore,

is it

dependent on a person.
there
is

Theregreat
"

for

knowledge, though mental,

difference in nature (from

verily
is

an
"

act).

In cases like
verily

Man

fire,

Gautama ",
vii,

The woman
viii, 1).

is fire

Gautama
cognition,

"

(Chand., V,

and

there arises the

which

is

mental, of

fire

in respect of

man

the construction.
verily,

The meditation on the

"

deity

is

not,

established prior to the injunction

is

To whichever
that,

deity the offering

made,
'"'

let

him meditate on

when

he

is

about to say

?;a,sa(.".

But, for

him who has

studied

the Vedanta,

who knows

words, their sense and the relation

(between the two),

and understands the true principles

relating to verbal testimony, there does result a knowledge

of "

Brahman

Existence
art,"

as the self, from the discourse beginning with " "

alone

etc.,

and

ending with

That thou

because of the capacity of testimony to convey valid

knowledge, just as from the capacity of the contact between

sense and object, there
is

for the

man

of attentive

mind
This,

the

experience
is

of

the jar present in bright light.

its

which

generated by the capacity of

verily,

own

(causal)

aggregate, cannot,

be effected in a different

way

or not effected, at the will of man, like the meditation

on

the

deity,

in

which case an injunction would be

srat

^TR

me

f-TT

IT

HARMONY
and woman,
on
This, however, is only
it is

201

an

act,

dependent

a person, because

generated
fire

solely

by an
of

injunction.

But the
fire,
is it

cognition of

in

respect

the

well-known
nor

that

is

not

dependent on an

injunction,

dependent on a person.
only

What

then?
is

Being

dependent

on
it

the
is

thing which

the content of perception,

;

certainly

knowthe

ledge

it

is

not an act.

One should understand

same
all

in respect of things

which are the contents of

means

of valid knowledge.

purportful here,

Nor

is

contemplation nor

its

culmination

in experience the sphere of the injunction, since intuition

or the removal of beginningless

Nescience

is

established

through

the

capacity

of

these two

(contemplation and

culmination in

experience)

as ascertained by co-presence
tire

and

co-absence,

even in

absence of an injunction

and consequently they cannot be effected in a different

way

or

not
of

effected,

at

the

will

of

man,

Hence, the

knowledge
sphere
of

Brahman, though a mental

injunction.

act, is not the

an

Of

acts

dependent

on the

functioning of the mind of man, the non-regard for the

nature of things,

is

sometimes not opposed

(to that nature),

;

as in the case of the meditation

not,

on the deity
to

there

is

indeed,
;

any opposition here

it is

the nature of the

thing

sometimes

opposed to the nature of the thing,

in

like the meditation

of this

of fire

man and woman.

Because

much

of difference,

there are cited the

two pairs

202

HARMONY
This being the case, even the knowledge, whose

content
is

is

Brahman and
on

the self as they really are,

not

dependent

an injunction.

Although, in

respect of that content, imperatives etc. are found used,

yet

as

having

for

content that which cannot be

like the
;

enjoined, they
etc,

become blunt

edge of a razor
is

applied to a stone etc.

because the content

thing which cannot be rejected or accepted,

purpose then are there such passages like,
5

For what
"

The

self

verily, should be seen,

heard about,*
?

etc,,

which are

shadows of injunctions
purpose of turning one

We

say that they are for the

the objects of natural

away from

"
of illustrations,

By

the word "only

in "this is only an

"
act

he denies dependence on the thing,

Now, there

are declared injunctions like

5
.

Contemplate
*,

but as the self'

They

are 'not deluded declarations

is

for,

whatever

is

handed down by successive tradition

;

alike

(in authority)

hence, they must be injunctive.

in

To

this

he

"

says

Although
on.

respect of that content imperatives

;

etc.'

and so

True, imperatives etc. are used

they are not,

however,
]

those
'"

whose

content

is

the

enjoined (vidhi-

visayft1i\

as,

if

they referred to those, there would result

non-authoritativeness.

An injunction is,

indeed, that

whose
that

content
alone
is

is

what
is

is

to be rejected or accepted.

And

what

to be rejected or accepted,

which a person

can
it

effect

or not effect or effect in a different way,

is

And

is

he,

who

capable in respect of that, that becomes

fsnaftft

firf^ft^T:,
:
I

^ f|

'

f3

'

',

HARMONY
activity,

203

That extrovert, the person who engages

rt

in

activity saying,

Let

me have

pleasant things, let

me

have no unpleasant things," and does not attain therewith the

final

human
"

goal, him,

who

desires the final

goal, passages like

The

self verily is to

be seen," turn

away from

the objects of natural activity,

(&'.&,

namely the
and sense-

assemblage of effect and cause

organs) and

objects

make him

active along the current of the

in the activity

inner

self,

And

for

him who engages

is

of the quest of the self, there

taught by the following

self,

passages the true nature of the

"

as

what cannot be
"
is

rejected or accepted "

All

this,

which

that self
self,

(Bfk,

II, iv, 6),

But when

all of this is

only the

then by what and

whom

shall

one see ... by what

and

whom
"

shall

one know ? ... The knower, by what

(Brh.,

shall

one know?"

IV, v,

15),

"This

self

is

Brahman

(Brh., II, v, 19) etc.

the agent, the eligible person, the person enjoined.

And

since the hearing, reflection, contemplation and intuition

of the self are not of this
of

nature, there

is

non-existence

the content and the person

who

observes,

which are
is

the

pervaders

of

an
the

injunction;
injunction;

hence, there

the

non-existence
suffix
etc,,

of

hence, the

imperative

though used, are not capable of impelling to

activity,

and become non-authoritative, as the edge of a

204

HARMONY
"

razor (applied) to a stone becomes blunt,

M

As having

for
is

content that which cannot be enjoined

he, indeed,

who

capable,

is

the

agent,

the
is

eligible

person,
is

the person

enjoined

but where there

is

no capacity, there

no agency

hence, he
enjoined
If,
;

not eligible, and consequently not the person

this is the sense,

because
are

of

the

non-existence of an injunction,
for

these
then,

not

injunctive statements,

what purpose,
of

are these statements,

which are the shadows

injunctions?
etc.

Thus he asks: "For what

it

purpose, then"
futile, as their

Nor

is

meet that they should be

purport being apprehended in consequence of the injunction

to study this
is

one's

own Veda would,

The
reply
is;

then, be unintelligible;

the idea.

"We say"
hearing

etc.

It

is,

indeed,

the

otherwise
texts
is
it,

established

etc.,

that

are

re-stated by
tions.

which have the appearance

though a re-statement,
of

of injunc-

Nor

fruitless, since it
:

produces
heart
is
is

excellence

activity.

It

is

thus

he,

whose

distracted by the desire to obtain or avoid

what

pleasant or unpleasant, and

fix

who

is

(thus) an extrovert,
self,

cannot

his

mind calmly on the inner

Damming

up the current of the mind towards objects by the texts

about hearing of the
of injunctions,
self
etc,,

which have the appearance

he opens up the current towards the inner

is

self; hence, for re-statements there

the production of

excellence

of activity;

they being consequently fruitful

in
is

their being apprehended

to study one's

consequence of the injunction

own Veda

certainly intelligible.

'FT:

SCWTfT

HARMONY
Again, as
the
self,

205

for the

statement that the knowledge of

is

not relating primarily to what

for

to be done,
is

serves

neither

acceptance

nor rejection, this

is

acknowledged
to us, that,

to be

even
there

so,
is

This

indeed an ornament

when

the realisation of
obligations
is

Brahman,
and the

there

is

the

destruction of all

accomplishment of everything that

So too says Scripture
*

to be accomplished,

"
;

If a person should

know the self as

am

that,' desiring

what, for the sake of what, should

he suffer in sympathy with the body (that suffers)?"

(Brh., IV, iv, 12),
11

And

there

is

the traditional Code:

Knowing

that,

one can become the knower and one

all

who has accomplished

Bharata," (Gtta,

that

is

to be accomplished,

Oh

XV,

20.) Therefore,
is

not as subsidiary to
there the intimation

the injunction of contemplation

of

Brahman,

As
self,

for

what was

objected that the knowledge of the

is

not being subsidiary to an observance,

not a

human
a

goal, that does

not stand to reason

its

its

being a

human

goal being established in

to

own right, its not being subsidiary

;

an injunction

is

a merit, not a defect

thus he says

"Again, as for"

etc. Anusafljvaret, will

suffer in

sympathy

with the body that

suffers,

The
"
:

rest

is

easily understood,

He

concludes the present topic

Therefore, not as subsidiary

"
etc,

to the injunction of contemplation

206

HARMONY
That too which some say,
"

There

is

no portion of the

Veda, which deals with bare things, other than injunctions for

engaging in and desisting from activity and

subsidiary thereto," that
is
is

what
self

is

not so; for the

propounded in the Upani^ads

else.

not subsidiary to any-

thing

Of that

self,

understood from the Upa-

ni?ads alone,

who

does not transmigrate,

who

is

of the

nature of Brahman,

who

is

distinct

from the four kinds

a topic

of substances, i.&, the produced etc.,

of his

who occurs in
it

own, who

is

not subsidiary to any other,

cannot
is

be said that such a one does not exist or that he

not
self
it is

known
is

because there

is

the word

"
self

"

"

in

That

not

this,

not that," CBfA,, III

;

ix, 26),
for,

and because

not possible to deny the self

even he

who

denies,

even

for

him

there

is

self-hood.

In order to establish the subject of the topic

authoritativeness
existent),
of

(i.e.,

the
is

the

Vedtata

in

respect

of

what

he restates the view of some to condemn

it;

"That
is

too

which some say"

This
is

etc,

He condemns
"

it

;" that

not so,"

the underlying idea:

Just as activity
is

is

the probans in the knowledge of what

so are
;

to be done,

even

pleasure etc, in the knowledge of

is

what
there

is is

existent

thus

purportfulness (for the Vedanta)

it

the character of sacred teaching since

beneficial." If the capacity of

teaches what

is

words in respect of the expres-

sion of

what

is

to be done or the expression of their

own

%ST fe

l|

3P1

?7f :,

rfcf

":

HARMONY
subsidiary to that (which
rule in the
is

207

to be done)

were settled as a

usage of elderly persons, then, the Upanigads

would

not
is

have

for
is

purport

Brahman

as

the
;

self,

which

not what
is

to be rejected or accepted of
is

for

such

capacity

not

known

words in experience, and the

preceded by that
If,

cognition of Vaidic sense

(t.e,,the

cogni-

tion of their sense in experience),

however, there can

be in experience the apprehension of the relation of words

even to existent things, then, in the case of the Upanisads,

it

will not be possible to conceal their

having for purport

that (existent)

as

understood from the consideration of

after,

what goes before and

to be
is

and assume for purport what

is

done

for,

thence would result the abandonment of what

directly

declared and the

assumption of what

is

not

so declared.

First, then, there would be no apprehension of

is

a relationship in respect of a sense which

(only)
if

not to be done,

there

were not seen in experience any usage with

if it

that purport, and

were not possible to infer the cogni-

tion of that in the case of

189

him who knows

(the

meaning

of

words).
port
is

It is

not the case that the usage with that as puris

not seen in experience, since there

extensively

seen in experience the usage of combinations of words, which

have the purpose

etc.,

of (creating) joy or the cessation of fear

is

but have not for purport what

:

to be done.
is

This

is

how

the king of mountains, Sumeru,

the abode of the

host of guardians of the world, beginning with Indra, to-

gether with the retinue of siddhas, vidyadharas, gandharvas

and apsaras,
torrent

is

composed

of rocks of gold

washed by the

of

waters of the Mand&kinl falling

is

down from

Brahmaloka, and
birds

attractive with the notes of crystalline

;

playing in the pleasure gardens like Nandana

;

(or)

this is not a snake, this is a rope

and so

on,

Nor is

it

that

208

HARMONY
in the person

there cannot be inferred

who knows

(the

meaning

of words) the cognition of an existent thing, since

etc.,

there do occur joy

the grounds of inference.

It is

thus

a Dravidian ignorant of the

meaning

of the

Aryan
the

language, and intent on going to the

city, is seated in
;

house of Devadatta, near the highway

of a son

he knows the birth

;

which

is

a cause of delight to the father

;

he goes with

the herald to Devadatta in the city

"

he hears the herald say

is

May
cloth

thy prosperity increase, Devadatta, a son

after

born
(a

to thee,"

making the

offering of the pafavftsa

dipped

in saffron water in
;

which the

infant's feet

have been washed)

he sees at once the hairs

(of

Devadatta)

stand on end, the eyes and the face bloom like the fully

blown lotus

he infers the joy generated in Devadatta and

also (infers) of the joy,

arises

which was non-existent

earlier but
it

immediately after hearing these words, that

;

is

caused thereby

he understands that a sense has been stated

is

which

is

the cause of joy, since this (statement)

not
is

capable of creating joy

the cause of joy
>

without teaching a sense which

is

and since no other cause of joy

is

cognised,

while the birth of a son as a cause thereof

understood,

he determines that that alone was declared by the herald.

Similarly are to be exemplified fear, grief etc,

And thus

because

of

its

being fruitful, the usage of that which

is

expresses the existent thing even by the prudent inquirer

intelligible.

This being
is

so,

because the knowledge of the

nature of

Brahman

the cause of the supreme

human

goal,

and because, though not teaching a person's engaging in

or desisting from activity, the Vedantas do teach
beneficial to
is

what

is

man, the character of being sacred teaching

established (for them).

Thereby
is

is

this established
for content

the

texts

about which there

dispute have

what

53

rffT

5IfT

I:

HARMONY
is

209

existent,

because of their generating valid knowledge

;

about existent things

ledge
for

that which generates valid

(object)
etc.,

know-

about an object has that

for its content,

etc.

example, the sense of sight

;

having colour

for content

Therefore,
self

it

so too are these (texts) ; hence they are so. " that is not so, since the has been well said
:

propounded
else,"

in

the

Upanisads
"

is

not
"
is

subsidiary

to
sat,

anything

The word

Upanisad

derived from

with uva and ni as prefixes meaning destruction and a kvip

suffix
;

it

declares the knowledge of

Brahman,
it

since, taking

the

non-dual

Brahman near
its

(one),
;

destroys Nescience

together with

impressions

because of being the cause

;

thereof, the VedSntas too are Upanisads

he

who

is

known

therefrom

is

the person propounded in the Upanisads.

"

This

itself

he analyses
"

of that self, understood

from the

Upanisads alone
of the

etc.

He

distinguishes

it

from the content

concept

"l": "who
kinds

does not transmigrate."

is

For

that very reason,

being devoid of activity, he

of

distinct

from

the

four

substances

(the

generated, the
is

modified

etc.).

And

therefore, that
is

which

distinct

from

the four kinds of substances

else.

not subsidiary to anything

is

For,

it

is

the existent substance that

subsidiary
be

to another, which, being desired to be done,

may

what
for

can be attained
"

(i.e.,

accomplished) by generation
"

etc.,

example,
is

He

fashions the stake

is of

etc.

That, again, which

not subsidiary to another,

the nature of the existent,

and devoid of use, for example,

"
is

"Gold
"
18

is

to

be worn,"
that there
etc.

He

is

to offer flour (as

(i.e.,

an oblation)

etc., for

no attainment

accomplishment) by generation
(again),
is it

For what other reason,

to "

not a subsidiary

another? To this he says:

For the reason that he

occurs in a topic of his

own ". Qf the Upanisads which occur

210
not
in

HARMONY
the course of any particular topic (other than
(it

their own),

being seen) through the consideration of what

is

goes before and after that the purport

person, this topic
is

propounding the

principally that of the person alone.

is

And

it

has been explained that there

not for the person,

as in the case of the ladle, a non-inconstant relation with

sacrifice.

Therefore,

it

is

not possible to say of this one,

who

occurs in his
etc.),

own

topic,
is

who

is

of that nature (non-

transmigrating

who
;

cognised through Upanisads,

that he does not exist

this is the sense.

of other
is

Be

this of

so,

Of Brahman, as not the sphere

the
relation
(to

means

knowledge,
;

words)
;

not

apprehended
it

hence

it is

not the meaning of a word

hence,
;

cannot

intelligibly
it

be the meaning of a sentence

how,
?

then,
this

can

be the significance of the Upanisad

To
is

"

he says

because there

is

the

word

'

'

'

self

in
is

that self

not this, not that'."

Though

for the self there

not, as for

cow
yet,

etc.,

being the sphere of other means of knowledge,

as
it

being,
it

is,

the luminous

self,

it

is

possible to

indicate

as the significance of the sentence, through the

destruction of the respective

as
etc.

adjuncts,

in the

same way

gold
It

through
is

the

destruction of bracelets, ear-rings

not, verily, that the

;

luminous self-consciousness

does not shine

nor

is

it

that even the aggregate of body

defining

and

organs

which

is

the

condition (does not

of the respective

shine).

Hence, through the destruction

of the text

adjuncts, because

"that

self is
its

not this, not

that," this self-luminous

one, because of

greatness and

pervasiveness, can be indicated by the sentence as

Brahman

and the

self

(Atma)

this is the sense.

Now,

like the refutation of the adjunct,

why

is

there not
?

also refuted the existence of the self that gets conditioned

3T?f:

'

gft:

HARMONY
Now,
"
I

211

since

the self

is

the content of the concept

"
it

is

unintelligible that he can be understood from

the

Upani^ads

alone.

No, because, as the witness

Indeed, as distinct from

thereof, this has been refuted,

the agent

who

is

the content of the concept "I," the

is

witness thereof, that self which

one, immutably eternal, which

present in

all,

equal,

is

the self of

all,

has not

been understood by anyone either through the liturgical

portion

(of

the Veda) or through ratiocination.

"

To

this

he says:

and because
is,

it is

not possible to deny the

all,

self,"

Luminosity

indeed,

the self of
substrate,
is

since the

world-delusion
be a delusion

has that for

its

Nor can there

;

when
is

the substrate
is

non-existent

never

when
as

the rope

non-existent
it

there seen the delusion

to the

rope that

is

a snake or a stream.
is

Further,

by the light of the self s luminosity

"

there light for the

all else

world.

And thus says Scripture

it
;

That shining,
shines.'*
is

shines after

by
of

its

light all this

is

Nor when

the luminosity
of

the self

denied,

the manifestation

the

world
of

appropriate.

Therefore,
self,

because
results

of

the

impossibility

denying the

there
of

from the

Vedantas the realisation of the nature

is

Brahman, which
knowledge

not
is

the sphere
all

of

other means of valid

;

and

devoid of

adjuncts

this

is

the sense.
it

He who
is

cannot put up with the restriction that

"
:

understood from the Upanisads alone objects

self" etc.

Now,

since the

The

self is, indeed, the

content of the

212

HARMONY
him
it is

Therefore,
to link

not possible for anyone to refute, nor

to

up as subsidiary

an injunction,
all,

And even
is

because of being the self of

rejected or accepted,

he

is

not what

to be

The
the

entire

host of perishable

modifications,
self,

up

to

self,

does indeed perish.

The

indeed, because of the non-existence of a cause for

is

perishing,

imperishable

and because of the non-

existence of
eternal
;

any cause
this

for modification, it is
it is

immutably
"

for

very reason,
;

by nature eternally
There
is

pure, intelligent, free

is

therefore in (texts like)

self,

nothing higher than the

",

that

is

the limit, that

"

the highest goal

(Kafka,

I, iii,

11),
"

But

ask about

that self propounded in the Upanisads

"

(B?h., Ill, ix, 26),

"
is

the qualification
telligible (only)

propounded in the Upanisads

the self
is

in-

when

what

is

revealed princi-

pally in there
is

the Upaniads,

Therefore, the statement that

no part of the Veda which deals with existent

things

is

mere rashness.

"

"
I

concept

common
;

to
it

all
is

people

it

is

agent, enjoyer
(sense)

and transmigrate
"

for,

only in this

that

the word

"

self

is

used both by the

man

in the street

and by inquirers.
the

The words which

are used in experience,

same

are used in the

;

Veda

too,

and the meanings are

"
"
self

the same (in both cases)

hence, the word

in
it
;

in the

Upanisads
in

too should

apply

that
this
is

(sense)

alone,

not

any other sense opposed to

the sense.

ff

^TT

qTT ifrf:

',

^T

ffit

^TTf^T-

If^T:,

64

f cf:

WT

ft 3?

flfej i|

HARMONY
He
answers:

213

"No";

the

Person of the Upanisads

"

is

"
I ".

not the content of the concept

as the witness thereof
41

Why

not

Because

"he who
is

is

the content of the concept

1,"

the

agent,

he who

conditioned by the aggregate

as the witness of this, the

of

body and organs, the j^a-self,

self's

supreme
"
I ",

"this,"

being the content of the concept

is

has been refuted, This

"

what

is

said

though

in the

words of the text

Having entered

in its true nature as the

jiva, the self" etc., the identity of the flva

and the supreme

is

selves

is

absolute,

yet

its

conditioned form
;

thej^a;

but the pure form

is its

witness
of

and

this,

not being underis

stood through other

of

means

knowledge,
he elaborates

the sphere
"

the Upanisad.
"

This

itself
is

Indeed, as

distinct
*

from the agent who

"

the content of the concept

etc,

It

is

not possible
".

to link

(it)

up as subsidiary

to

an

"

injunction

Why
for

not
is

Even

because of being the self,"

all

The

self,

indeed,

not for the sake of another, but

others

are

the

sake of the
not
for

self,

And
of

thus

says
is

"

Scripture:

Verily,

the love

everything
is

everything dear, but for the love of the self

dear,"
all,

everything

Further, for that very reason of being the self of

is

it

not what

is

to be rejected or accepted.

Indeed,
;

of

the entire universe,

is

Brahman
is is

alone

is

the true self

it

nor

one's
;

nature what

to be rejected, since

cannot

be rejected
attained,

nor

is it

what

to be accepted, being already

Hence,

prescriptions

and prohibitions, whose

contents are

what

are

to

be rejected or accepted, do not

self,

have the true nature of the

which

is

opposed to that,

214
as their content
self alone is

HARMONY
consequently, of the entire universe, the " The entire host the truth. This he explains
; :

of perishable modifications

up

to the self does, indeed, perish."

is

This

is

the sense

the

self,

indeed,

absolutely real, being

established by Scripture,

traditional

Code,
;

epics, purftQas

and reasoning not opposed to these

the world, however,

which

is

exhibited

by beginningless
that which
is

Nescience,

is
is

not
the

absolutely real.

And

absolutely real
is

material cause of this, as the real rope

viz.,

of the modification,
it is

the delusion of the

snake,

Hence

that there
is

is

the perishing of
stable nature.

this, which, as
self,

indeterminable,
is

of un;

The

however,

absolutely real

nor

can this be made unreal even by a thousand causes,

Not

even a thousand craftsmen can make a cloth of a pot; this

has been said.
Therefore, there
is

the

perishing of

all
is

modifications stopping the imperishable

self, just

as there

the perishing of the silver and the snake stopping at the real

nacre and rope,

entire host
self
is

The

self,

indeed,

is

the sole truth of the

of modifications

in the universe,

Nor

for the

there perishability, for the reason that

it is infinite,

To him who says that there may be destruction, he says " The self, indeed, because of the non-existence of a cause for
;

perishing" etc,

Indeed, even a

thousand causes are not

capable of turning one thing into another; this has been

said.

Now,

let

not the self in

;

its

own

nature be what

is

to

be rejected or accepted

but some attribute thereof

;

may

be rejected,
41

And

to this he says : because of the non-existence of any cause for modifica-

and some may be accepted

tion,

it is

immutably

eternal/'

It

has been said that not one

t^iw

m=iftfo

folftil

3Tif

iium ft

M-

HARMONY
That quotation too from those
"
of the sacred teaching,
Its
"

215

who know
is

the purport

purport

indeed seen to
to be

be the teaching of rituals

and so on, that has

understood to refer to sacred teachings of prescriptions

and

prohibitions, since the content is the desire to

know
"

Religious Duty.

Further,
"

for

those

who

accept in-

variably the text,

etc.,

Since the purpose of the Scripture

there would result the futility of the teaching

existents,
If,

about

besides
it

the

engaging

in

and

desisting
for

from activity,
sake of what
is

teaches existent things, as

into being,

the

to
it

come

what

is

the

cause for saying that

eternal
existent
?

does not teach the immutably

is

Indeed the existent that

If
it

taught

does not turn out to be an act.

be said that

of the three

kinds of modification
exists

consisting

of

dharma,

lakqaqa, and avasthft

here.

Further,
is

since of the

absolutely real self the attribute too

alteration
effected

absolutely real, the

self,

of that, as in the

case of the

cannot be

by any cause.

Nor

is

there any modification other

than the alteration of the attribute.

"

Hence, this

is

said

because of the non-existence of any cause for modification,"

rest is easily understood.

The

That statement, again,

teaching, which was
position),
cited

of those

who know

the sacred

by some

as evidence (of their

that he

explains

otherwise: "That quotation

too from those

who know
to

the purport of the sacred teaching," said

Where
seen
to

it

ought
be

be

"its purport
of

is,

indeed,

the

fruitful

teaching

the sense," since

216

HARMONY
though not an
act,

since,

the existent

is

instrumental
is

to
for

an act, the
the

teaching about an existent

of

only
;

sake

an

act,

this

is

not a

difficulty
is

even though

for

the sake of an act, there

to

certainly

taught the thing which has the capacity

accomplish
its

an act

that
;

it is

for the

sake of an act
alone,
If it

is,

however,

purpose

with

this

much

the thing

does not

turn out to be untaught.

be said to be taught,
?

what

(good)

will

that be to you

The reply

is

the

teaching about the unknown self-substance too certainly

deserves to be of that kind,

By

the knowledge thereof

there results the profit, the cessation of illusory knowledge

which

is

the cause of transmigration

hence there

is

no
in-

difference,

from the teaching of objects that are

strumental to an act, in respect of purposefulness,

the desire to

know

Religious
is

Duty constitutes the

topic,

and since Religious Duty

"

of the nature of rites,

it

it is

said

the teaching of rites

".

But
of

(the statement cited) does

of teaching the

not stand in the

existent

way

the function

Brahman.

Indeed,

when Soma Sarman

constitutes

the topic, the expression of his good qualities does not exclude Vis^u Seaman's possession of good qualities,

The

sacred teaching of prescription has for content the rites

prescribed,

and

the sacred teaching

;

of

prohibition has

for content the rites prohibited

thus, both
is

have

for pur-

port the teaching of rites,

Further, there

the statement
"

of the author of the sacred teaching (Jaimini) that

Since

Rifo^lfei

'

SET

HARMONY
1 '

217
if

Scripture
"

signifies

rites

etc.

Here,

the use of the

is

word

"

signification

(artha)

expressed what

denoted,

thence would result for substance, quality and action (the

defect of) meaninglessness consisting in not being denoted
for,
;

they do not signify

"
:

what

is

to be done.

To

this

he
"

says
etc.
is

Further, for those

who

accept invariably the text

It

may

be said
is

to be significant in relation to
is

what

to be done

not to denote what

to be done, but to be
;

of service to that

which

is

to be

done

and words relating

to substances
qualities

and qualities denote existent substances and

as

only

subsidiary to

what

is

to be done, not as

abiding in themselves.

So those who know the sacred

statement
can,

teaching

say:

"An

injunctive

indeed,

make known
which
This
is

the already

existent, that

which

exists, that

will

come
is

into being

and others
:

of this class.

"

ln

what

said

(thereby)

an injunctive statement,
is

while making

known
"

the thing that

to be done,

makes

known
etc.

for the
this

sake of that even objects already existent

:

To

he says
it

ing from activity,

besides the engaging in and desist" teaches existent things etc. This is
If,

what

is

intended

it

has
of

been taught by those

who

have shown the meaning

words even with reference to

existent things that the apprehension of relation (of word to

sense)

is

not in respect of that sense alone of

is

its

own which

subserves what

to be done,
of

and not in any other sense.

UJ

Nor

is

the

purport

words only in respect of their own

If that

sense (unrelated to that of other words).

were

so, there would be no cognition of the sense of a sentence.

For, syntactical unity

is

not seen

among

those which are

each independently primary and are devoid of the relation

of
is

primary and secondary (among themselves). Hence, there

syntactical unity for words,

which express

their

own

218
sense, through their

HARMONY
having for purport a

common

fruitful

word-significance.

And

thus becomes intelligible the cogni-

tion of the single sentence-significance,

which

is

qualified

by

each

respective

significance

(of

the words).
"

As

is

said

by those who know the sacred teaching:

letters

Though the
word-signifi;

directly

effect

the teaching of the

cance,

yet they do not terminate there fruitlessly

valid

in their

activity towards

knowledge

of

the sentence-signifiis

cance, the teaching of the word-significance

(intermediary), like

an inevitable

the

flame of the fuel in cooking."

And

thus, the cognition of the sentence-significance being

intelligible

even with words having for purport the conis

junction with other significances, there

no rule as to their
is

having for purport the conjunction with what

to be done*
in

And

this

being the case, there

is

no defect even

having

for purport the nature of the

immutably eternal Brahman.

into being)
is
is

Bhavyam (what
be done.
of

is

to

come

what

is to

Now, that
is

existent
into

which

taught for the sake

is

what

to

come

being,
is

that

not an existent,
is to

since, in the

form of what
is

conjoined to what
to

come

into being, that

"

also

what

is

come
is

he

says

Indeed, the existent that

;

To this into being. " etc. Contaught

rather, a relation

junction does not consist in identity

it is,

with what
about (the
process
of

is

to be done, in the form of

what

is

brought

fruit)

and that which brings

it

about.

With the

becoming, however, which has that (relation) for

is

content, (the relation) of existent things

(that between) activity

of the

form

of

and causal agent

hence, for existent

things there

He
is

not the nature of activity ; this is the sense. " " though not an act etc. And thus there objects :
is

the unintelligibility of the teaching of Brahman, which

is

does not subserve activity and

immutably eternal

this

i<nfw rwit*iPrf

j^fro

II

f|
I

11^:

^fcl

"
"
'Of:

"
^fcl
I

"

^1

f|
;

f%

HARMONY
is

219
is

the

idea.

He answers:
an act
"

"this
etc.

not a difficulty

even

though for the sake of

Indeed,

the

existent,

taught as for the sake of activity, does not become other

than existent

rather

is this,

which

is

capable of achieving
thus, words,

the activity, certainly existent.

And

which

have been determined to signify existent things, which are

seen in some cases to have for content the existent abiding
in
itself
(i.e.,

without

syntactical relation

to

an

act),

cannot properly be tortured to signify somehow relation to

activity.

Verily,

though the conditioned be seen a hundred

seen somewhere does not become
thus
is

times, the unconditioned

unseen (as

it

were).

And

are

extensively

seen in

experience statements of what

the
activity
(only) of

existent, conditioned

by

being,

though not subservient to

etc.

activity,

such as descriptions of forests

Thus, even

those which are related to activity terminate with (signifying) a relation alone
is

this

man

" for example, to the question Whose " ?" the reply is The king's." Similarly, there
;

are

those which
;

are

related

to

the

significance "
114

of

the

stem alone
these

for example, to the question

Of what kind are

Indeed,
is

trees ?"

the reply

is

Fruit-bearing".

the existence or non-existence of the

not desired
to be

man

or the trees

known by

the questioner;

rather

is it

the particular master of the

of the trees.

man and

the particular kind

is

And he who knows what

desired by the

questioner replies only as to the particular master or the

particular kind, not as to existence, that not being desired
to be

known by
there
is

him.

And

it

has been explained that for

words

significance

even in respect of fruitful

"

existent things.

be said to be the existent " " taught, what good "will that be to you whether teacher or

He

"

"

questions

If

it

220
listener? Therefore,

HARMONY
only that existent which
is fruitless
;

is

fruitful

should be taught, not that which

is

and Brahman
as devoid of

fruitless,

since to that

which

is indifferent,
;

all

activity, no serviceability can belong

"
:

this is the idea.

He answers
substance

The

reply

is

the teaching of the

"

unknown self1

too

certainly deserves to be of that kind/

i.e.,

certainly fruitful. " This too (api) ".

indifferent,

The word
is

and
is

"
(ca)
:

has the sense of

is

what

said

though Brahman

yet knowledge from verbal testimony relating

to

that content, such knowledge culminating in realisation,

cuts

away

its

opposite,
is

Nescience, the primal cause of

;

transmigration, and
Further,
of
it

thus fruitful

this is the sense.

even by those who recognise in the case

is

all
is

words that their purport

"

what
"

is

to be done,

not possible to recognise in the case of (statements

like)

brahmin
etc.,

is

not to be

killed,''

Liquor

is

not to be
is

drunk
done.

"

that they
is

have

for

purport what
its

to be

That which
is

to be done, having
volition,

limits defined

by volition,
cessation
tree-ness.

pervaded by
like

and ceases on the

on the cessation of
effort
;

of

that,

s'wmzpa-ness
is

Volition,

indeed,

human

and that
its

is

determined in dependence on the content.

being
of

And

content,

the

nature of something to be
of

accomplished,

must be a process
a
be)
later,

becoming, which has an earlier and

and helps

to bring about

something

else

(it

can

neither a substance nor a quality.

For, the content

of volition is

that which

is

directly pervaded

by volition

and
is

of

substance and quality, which are existent, there

volition.

no pervasion by

Therefore
"
:

it

is

that the

author of the sacred teaching says

sense
of
""

Verbs have the

is

becoming;

through
for

them

activity

to

be

known/'

Though

words signifying substance and

ffrf
:
I

HARMONY
quality there
is

221
to

relation

to

what

is

be done in the
there
is

stage

when they
of

are occasioned,

yet, since
is

for

becoming,

itself,

the relation to what

to be done,
is

while for words signifying substance and quality that

only

through

their
of

conjunction
novel
(rite

with
etc.)
is

becoming,

the

understanding

the

only through

words signifying becoming, not through words signifying

substance
the
"

or

quality.
of

Nor
is

is

it

that curds

etc.

are

contents
is

what

to

be done in (statements like)

M "

He

to

offer

oblation with curds,

for,

He
to

is to

sprinkle

continuously";
for
its

even there, what

is

be done has
the offering

content only the process of becoming

or the sprinkling.

of oblation
that,

Nor with

this does it follow

because of the prescription of the oblation as qualified

by

curds
"

and the sprinkling as qualified by continuity,

is

as in "

He

to sacrifice with

soma

(-juice)/'

the statements
is

He

"
is

to offer the agnihotra oblation,"

"

He

to sprinkle

with
here

ghee
too

become
is

re-statements

thereof.

Though

what

to

be done has certainly for content

the process of becoming, yet substance and quality, even

though not

contents, are prescribed as

complementary

to

the process of becoming.

Indeed, the process of becoming,

uncharacterised
condition
particular

as

being the
is

bare

operation
(i.e.,

of a causal

(karaka),

characterised

defined)

by
;

causal

conditions,
etc.

such

as

substance

etc.

hence, substance
thus,
itself

are
of

complementary to that.

And

when
is

the process

becoming
its

is

prescribed, that
;

prescribed together with

complements

hence,

substance and quality, though not contents, get prescribed

as

complements
to

thereto.

And

thus,

the prescription

attaches
of

substance and quality through the channel

of

the

process

becoming

and because of the fear of

222
its

HARMONY
own
content being
thereof

prolixity,

otherwise established,
it

through

re-statement
etc.,
all

comes to have

for

purport substance
consequently,
in

which are complements thereto;

cases, prescription has for content the

"

process of becoming alone.

Hereby
(rite)

is

refuted

the

view that in
"
etc,,

That dgneya
the prescription
its

which
for

is

on eight potsherds
the

has

content

connection

(of the rite with

material

and

deity).

Now,

the

object
;

of
if

prescription

cannot be

the process of becoming

is

for,

the agent of
its

the becoming

existent, then, that

which has
in

existence

accomplished

cannot

be

an

agent

respect of the
;

becoming
agent
laid
is)

verily,

the sky does not become

since

nor,

if

(the

non-existent,
is

an

injunction cannot be
;

on what
object

non-existent, like a sky-flower

therefore

the

of

the prescription

is

the

operation of the

productive agent, that which brings about, this (operation)

being implied by the becoming, the operation of what

is

brought about;

and this
effort
;

operation
of this,
if

is

productive

force

(bhflvana), volition,

contentless, there can

be
it

no cognition
is

hence, because of the need for a content,

only the connection with material and deity brought

is its

to

mind by the word agneya that

effort

content.

Now,

how can human

have
for
its
?

which has an operation

"

for content

sphere

connection not of the nature of an

operation

Indeed, even in
its

Make

a pot,"
is

human

effort

has not for

sphere the pot which

;

the direct signifi-

cance of the noun

rather does

it

operate the staff etc.

through the hand

only that volition
is

etc.

Therefore, that (sentence) declares

for content the operation

which has

and

for the

sake of the

pot, but not that

is

which has

directly

the pot as content.

The pot

there (in the volition) as

"

"
I

HN^Icl

HARMONY
what
is

223

intended,

but
only

not as
the
"

the content.

As content,
etc.

however,

there
is

is

operation of the hand

*'

Hence
joined

it
is

that even in

That Ugneya

etc.,

what

is

en-

only the thing to be done, mz., the sacrifice implied

by the connection with material and deity,

is

What is
" etc. ?

it

that
is

One should bring about (what is desired) through the agneya sacrifice ". Hence it is that the statements
said
is)

said in "

"That agneya which

is

offered

(What

"
"

He who, knowing thus, performs the full moon sacrifice," " He who, knowing thus, performs the new moon sacrifice
of the

become re-statements

six

sacrifices

prescribed in

"That agneya" etc. Hence it is that only for this restatement of what is enjoined is there the connection with
"

the fruit in

He who
full
is

desires

heaven

is

to sacrifice with the

new moon and

Hence
it

moon

sacrifices ".

invariable

that

in

every
"

case

the

injunction has for content the operation alone, through

the
"

channel
not
"

of

volition.
if

And

thus

in

Kill

not,"

Drink

etc,,
its

there be

admitted something to

be done, then,
admitted,
(volition)

pervader,

volition,

would have to be

as
as

also

the

becoming

which pervades that

on the analogy
would,
as
of the

content.
l:5f>

And

thus,

Prajapati-vrata,

the

injunction

signifying

exclusion
kill

through the implication of the resolve not to

or not to drink,
it

have that

(resolve) as content.
final

And

thus

would follow that the

obsequies have been

performed for (that function of negation which consists in)

the denial of that for

which there
(of

is

an occasion.

Nor
is

when

there

is

a possibility

direct

significance)

implication proper.
rising

In the case, however, of "See not the

sun
is

"
etc.,

since they

commence with

"

His vow,"

there

not the possibility of the denial of that for which

224

HARMONY
Further by statements like
"
is

A brahmin
taught.

is

not to

be killed," desisting from activity

Nor is that

an

act,

nor even a means to an act.

for the

If the teaching of

those
less,

which are not

there

sake of an act be purposeu

would

result

the futility of teachings of

desisting from activity like

killed
".

brahmin

is

not to be
possible

And

that

is

not acceptable.

Nor

is it

to

assume

for the negative particle

the signification

of a non-established act, as distinct from the indifference

consisting in desisting from the act of killing, because

of the

connection with the sense of killing that

is

established through one's

own

nature.

And

this is the

there

is

an occasion; hence,
'

it

is

proper,

through the

signification of exclusion, to
1

imply the resolve not to see.

etc.,

Therefore, in "Kill not,

denials
of
is

"Drink not"

which are

of

what there
is

is

an occasion

for, since the process

becoming

non-existent,

volition pervaded

thereby
is

non-existent

and

that
is

being non-existent, there

non-existence
is

of
;

what

pervaded
is

thereby,

viz.,

what
state-

to

be done

hence there
purport

no rule that
is

all
;

ments
1

have
"

for

what
like

to

be

done
is

thus

he says:
killed

"by statements

'A brahmin

not to be

etc.

Now, why does

is

not cessation

itself

become what

to

be

done, or the

means

to

that

(cessation) ?

To
11

this

he says:

"Nor

is

that an act"

The word "act

expresses what is to be done. This itself he analyses " If the teaching of those which are not for the sake of an
11

act

etc,

T ^ HT

3TIf

rT
T:

^
I

HT ft^H

fft

67

HARMONY
nature of the negative particle, that
non-existence of that to which
cognition of non-existence
is

225
it

makes known the

related.

it is

And

the

the cause of indifference.

And
fuel

that subsides of

its

own

accord like the

it

fire

whose

has been consumed.

Therefore,

is

but the in-

difference consisting in

the desisting from activity for

which there

is

occasion,

which we consider
"

to be the

meaning
"

of the prohibition,
etc.,

brahmin

is

not to be

killed
etc.

in

all cases

other than the Prajapati-vow

is

Therefore, the declaration of futility

to be under-

stood to have for content such praises of the existent, in

the form of narratives

goal.

etc,,

as do not serve the

human

Be

this

so,
is

Because

of

the

injunctive suffix being

is

heard, there

cognised here what

to be
;

done

and that

cannot be without a process of becoming

of

nor in the case

him who

because of passion engages in killing, drinking

etc., is

indifference intelligible by chance, without voluntary

effort

therefore,

that

voluntary

effort

of

the
is
;

mind,
the act

speech and body intent on engaging in activity

which
there
act

is
is

the sphere of the prohibitory injunction

"

hence,

no statement whatsover which does not have an

purport.
for the

for

(To this) he says

Nor

is it

possible to

assume

negative particle the signification of a nonas distinct from the indifference consisting
1

established act,
in
it

desisting

from the act

of killing/

For what reason

"because

is

not

possible?
"

To

this

he

says:
"

of the

connection

of the negative particle

with the sense of killing

nature
".

that is established through one's

own

This

is

the

sense:

indeed,

the

injunctive

suffix

cognised

as having

226
for

HARMONY
purport
killing

and drinking prescribes them alone

this is

the general rule.

And

these cannot be prescribed,

since

they
the

result

(even)

from passion.

Nor

is

there

enjoined
for

denial,
is

by

the negative particle, of that

since
of

which there
is

occasion,

that too,

whose

nature
existent

indifference,

there

is

establishment as already

(in

the form of antecedent non-existence, prtigis

abhava).
since
to

Nor

voluntary

effort

(what

is

to be enjoined),

that, not being

expressly mentioned, would

is

have

be implied, since where there

implication
is

a possibility (of direct

signification)
(effort)

not proper,

and since that

cannot be the content of the injunction, because

injunctive
" suffix

of

the

being

re-statement
Therefore,

of

the
is

activity

that results
"

from passion.

what

restated as

one might drink or

that
is

kill,"
",

and

is

prohibited in
(i.e.,

the form
unprofitable
of

not (to be done)

is

its

non-existence
;

nature)

brought
is

to

mind

but the sense

the

negative
is

particle

not prescribed.

And
is

since

non-existence
to
itself,

determined by the existent that

takes

opposed
it

and
if

on the colour of the existent,

appears as
if

existent in the case of the existent, and as

in the

to

be

accomplished
;

case of what

is

to be

accomplished

hence, the sense of the negative particle,

is

whose content
if

what

is

to be accomplished, appears as
;

itself to be accomplished

hence the delusion that the

is

sense

of

the negative particle

"
:

something to be done.

This he says thus

"

And

this is the nature of the negative

particle

etc.
let

Now,
existence

the negative particle

make known the non;

of

what

is

related to itself (as counter-correlate)

but, for the

mind, speech and the body intent on activity,

?

how can

there be the desisting therefrom by chance

^
fei

flffifif

ffil

^R:

<w

HARMONY
To
this
"

227

he says

cause

the cognition of non-existence is the " of indifference ". This is the of the perpetuation
:

"

And

idea: on hearing the words "Diet yourself

"

when

there

is

fever,"

Offer not your finger to the serpent," the elderly

person
if

so

addressed starts to put himself on diet,

or,

intent
;

on offering his finger to the serpent, desists therei.e.,

from

the infant,

the

learner,

on seeing

this, infers

for the elderly person addressed the causes of engaging in

and desisting from activity,

is

viz.,

desire and aversion.

It

thus

the

elderly

person's

engaging in and desisting

from activity have desire and aversion for cause, since

they are independent acts of engaging in and desisting

from activity, like

my own

independent acts of engaging in

and desisting from activity.

are preceded
to

And

his desire

and aversion

by the understanding of the instrumentality

desired
or

what

is

not desired inherent in the same

thing as the obligation, since they are desire and aversion

which

are

causes

of

engaging

in

and desisting from

activity,

like

the desire

and aversion which are causes

of

my own

engaging in and desisting from activity.

Never

do desire and aversion result for me as preceded (only)

by the cognitions
of the
of

of the word, its operation, the intention

person (who speaks), and

the unseen potentiality

;

an injunction, as undefined by the three times

rather do

they appear on repeated

introspection as preceded

by the

above-mentioned causes alone. Therefore, the elderly person's

independent engaging in and desisting from activity, as also
his desire and aversion, are pervaded by the understanding
of

the instrumentality to what

is

desired or not desired,

;

inherent in the same thing as the obligation

because of
;

this sequence, the relation of cause and effect is established

hence,

it

is

established that the elderly person's engaging

228

HARMONY

in and desisting from activity are from the understanding of the

instrumentality to what

is

desired or not desired.

earlier

And
and

this
is

understanding,

which was non-existent

generated

immediately after the hearing of the

its

word, has the

in

hearing of the word for

"

cause

hence
to

statements like
it

He

1 '

is

to sacrifice,

which prompt

activity,

is

the
is

word
to

itself,

which, making known the

that
its
is

operation
to
to

that
is

be done and

instrumental

what what
are

desired,

also

makes known

instrumentality
it
;

is

desired and the

obligation to do

for,
is

these

two

not

otherwise
is

obtained,

and
of

what

not

otherwise obtained

the

sense
is

the word.

Where,
other-

however,
wise, as

the
in

obligatoriness " Kill not,"

obtained

even
"
etc,,

"

Drink

not

since

engaging in killing

and drinking are obtained even from

etc.,

passion, there, the imperative suffix

associated with

the

negative

particle,

re-state

this

and make known

only the causality

(causality)
is

of the

two

in respect of evil,

which
their

not
to

otherwise

established.
desired,
is

Indeed,

instrumentality
as

what
could

is

directly
of

known,

otherwise

they

not
"

be

Therefore,

statements
purport
to
evil,

like

Kill

desire. objects " Drink not", not,"

have

for

the

making

known

of

the

instru-

mentality
ness

through

re-stating
etc.,

the

obligatori-

established

by
for

passion

but
it

they

do

not

have obligatoriness
said
It
is

purport; hence

has been well

is

that prohibitions are not related to

what

to be done.

the

cognition

of

the instrumentality to evil in the

is

case of

what are prohibited that

what

the cognition of the

non-existence of
intelligent

are prohibited,

Thus, indeed, this

is

being,

though
considers

seeing
the

what
future,

superficially

attractive,

yet

cognises

the

fd

HARMONY
non-existence of activity, which
is

229
desisting from activity,

and desists

that

is

to

say, he establishes himself in

an

attitude of indifference.

Be
of

this so.

If cognition of

non-existence be the cause

should persist so

establishment
is

in

indifference, that

long as there
for,

indifference; but that does not persist;

indifferent,
is

he

who,
to

though

has a mind strongly

attached

other objects,
;

not one

who

cognises their

non-existence
establishes,
not, verily,
is

nor,

in

the absence of the cause which

;

there seen the establishment of the effect

when

the pillar has fallen does the top floor

:

stand.
accord,

Therefore he says
like
is

"And
fuel

that subsides of

its

own
This

the fire

whose

has been consumed."

being

intent on activity only so long as he does not

its

understand
of its
root,

instrumentality to
to
evil

evil.

The understanding

instrumentality

plucks out activity by the

fire
:

and

itself

subsides like the

is

whose

fuel

has been

consumed.
existence
is

This

what

is

said

the cognition of non-

the cause of the establishment in indifference

not in the

same way

as
;

the pillar
is it

(is

the cause) of the

stability of the top floor

rather

the cause of establish-

ment, as protecting from adventitious causes of destruction,

just

as

the armour impenetrable

as tortoise-shell
life
it is

is

the

cause of the stability of the warrior's

by protecting
not that there
is

him from the attack of missiles.

is

And

loss of the

warrior's

life,

when
of

the armour

removed

and
"

there

is
it is

no

attack

missiles.

He

concludes:

Therefore,
activity for

but indifference consisting in the desisting from

is

which there

occasion
of

"
etc*

Since indifference
(of

exists

even in the absence

it
is

knowledge
the

instrumentality

to

evil),

distinguished by

upalaksa^a,

vfe.,

230

HARMONY
As
for that too

which has been

said, that the bare

thing mentioned without entry into an injunction of

what

is

to

be done would be

futile, like
etc,,

the statement

"The Earth has seven

refuted
;

islands"
is
is

that has been

because profit
"

seen even in the statement

a rope, this
is

about a bare object

This

not a snake

".

Now,

it

has been said that since, even for him

to)

who

has

heard (the texts relating

is

Brahman, transmigratoriness

seen as before, there

is

not purposefulness as in the case

of the statement about the nature of the rope.

To

this the

reply

is:

not in the case of

is it

him who has

realised

Brahman

as the self

possible to

show transmigratoriness

desisting from
Is

an activity

for

which there

is

occasion.

the view then of the Jaiminiyas

wholly absurd, (the

view) which suspects

to

futility because of non-subsidiariness

what

is

to

be done

and makes out (the existence

to be

of)

subsidiariness to
tion),

what
it

is

done

(Raising this ques"

he answers

by way
is to

of conclusion:
"

Therefore, the
etc.

declaration
facie

of futility
final

be understood

The prima
and

and

views based on non-subsidiariness

subsidiariness

to

what

is

to

be done have for content

;

which do not serve the human goal but they do not have the Upanisads for content, since the
narratives
etc.,

Upanisads lead up to the realisation of Brahman, which

of itself the human goal ; this is the sense. " " As for that too which has been said by those

is

who

think

the knowledge not to be the

of

the self propounded

goal,
(in

in the
"

Upanisads

human

the words)

the bare thing

is

mentioned without entry into an injunction of what

to be

TO

f%

flfti^is

ri

ft

ff
JUst

HARMONY
as before; because
of)
it

231

is

opposed to (the knowledge

Brahman-as-the-self generated by the

of valid knowledge.

Veda

as the

means
of a

Indeed, because in respect

of self in his

man, who has the conceit

is

body

etc.,

there

found possession by misery, fear

etc,, it is

not

possible to
in

assume

that, in respect of the

same man, when,

self

consequence of the realisation of Brahman as

produced by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge,

there the
is

the cessation of such a conceit, there continues

possession

same

by misery, fear

etc,,

caused by

illusory

knowledge.

Verily, because for the rich houseof wealth, there is

holder,

having the conceit

found fear

caused by the (possible) theft of the wealth, there does

not continue for the same man,

when he renounces and

becomes freed from the conceit of wealth, the same fear

caused

by the

(possible)

theft

of the

wealth,

Nor,

done"

etc.,

here, with a concealed

"

view,

he recalls the
1

answer mentioned

earlier

that has been refuted/

Here,
u
:

the objector recalls the sense mentioned by himself

it

Now,
(the

has been said that since even for him

who has heard

texts relating to)

Brahman
"

"
etc.

The respondent
:

reveals the

concealed view

To

this the reply is

not in the case of

"

him

who has

understood

Brahman

as the self
is

etc.

True, not the

knowledge alone

of

Brahman

the cause of the cessation

of the attributes of transmigration, but rather its culmina-

tion

in intuition,

And

the intuition of

Brahman

is

232

HARMONY

because for a
in

man having ear-rings there is seen happiness

is

the conceit of having ear-rings,

there for the

is

same

man, when he gives up the ear-rings and

"
ear-rings.

freed from

the conceit of having ear-rings, happiness in having

This

is

declared by Scripture,

Him,

verily,

who

is

non-embodied, pleasure and

VIII,
xii, 1),

pain do not touch,"

(Cftflwd.,
is

If it be said that

when

the body

destroyed, there

may

be non-embodiment, not

when

particular psychosis of the internal organ, generated in the

mind

as

aided
etc,,

by the impressions produced by hearing,

like

reflection
satfja etc.,

the
is

intuition

of

the different notes,

whose source

the mind purified by the hearing

of

and practice of the science

rooting

music,

And

this,

while

out

the
of

perception of the stupendous

the
entire

magical
out as

presentation

universe,

roots itself

well, not being distinct

from that universe; this has been

it is

explained above,
similarity to

Hence,

established that there

of

is

but

the declaration

the

true

nature of the

rope (as rope, not snake).

And

here, being based on the

it is

Veda

as

the

means

of valid knowledge,

spoken

of as
",

"generated by the Veda as the means of valid knowledge

In this very matter, he mentions two examples, divided

into

the

non-origination

of

happiness and

of

misery:

"Verily, because for the rich house-holder"

"

etc.

Recites
"
etc.

Scripture to this effect

This

is

declared by Scripture
is

He
answers:

asks:
a

"when
;

the body

destroyed"
"
is

etc, etc,

He
If

no

because being embodied

caused

ffrT

Mci

69

ft ft TK| l^

crflff^t

HARMONY
alive,

233
is

no

because being embodied

caused by illusory
self,
it
is

knowledge.
possible to

Indeed, in respect of the

not

assume

its

being embodied in any other

way
the

than

through

illusory

knowledge, consisting

in

conceit of self in the body,

Non-embodiment
:

is

eternal,
said.

because
If it

it

is

not caused by an act

is

so

we have

be said that being embodied

that,

caused by the merit

and demerit acquired by

(of

no;

because relation
because
it is

that)

to

a body

is

not

established,

not established that merit and demerit are acquired by

the
self,

and because there would

result

reciprocal

dependence between the relation

acquisition of merit and demerit
tion of beginninglessness in this

to a

body and the

by

that.

The assumpa chain of the

is (like)

being embodied were

it is,

real,

that would not cease during

;

life

however, caused by illusory knowledge

life

and that can

knowledge.
it

be removed even during

by the
is

rise of true

As

for

non-embodiment, since that

as
of
etc.

of his nature,

cannot

be removed,

by destruction of nature there would result

existence
;

destruction
"
is

thus he says

"
:

Non-embodiment

eternal

Be

this so.

Being embodied

is

not caused by illusory

;

knowledge, but caused by merit and demerit

cease except with the cessation of
its

and

it

cannot

causes, merit and

is

demerit

and on the cessation of these, there

but death

234

HARMONY

blind.

And

because there
is

is

no inherence of activity in
If it
for

the self, agency

unintelligible.
is

be said that by

mere proximity there

agency
is

kings and others,

no; because their agency

intelligible

through the

relationship to servants procured through

payment

of

money

etc.

Not

for

the

self,

however,

is it

possible to
etc. as

assume anything like the payment of money

the

cause of the relationship of master and servant with

reference to the body etc.
Illusory conceit, however,
is

the perceived cause of the relation.

the self being the sacrificer.

By

this is explained

hence there
"
objects
:

is
it

no non-embodiment during
be said that being embodied
"
etc,
is

life

thus he

If

caused by the
"

merit and demerit acquired by that

"

That

relates to
"

the
etc.
for,

self.

He

"

refutes this

no,

because relation to a body

Not

directly

can the

self acquire merit

and demerit,

those two, which arise from the exertion of speech, the

intellect

and the body, do not occur when there

to

is

no

relation

body

he

who

desires

(to

establish) being

embodied
defect
''

(as

resulting) from them lands clearly in the

of

reciprocal
"

dependence

that

is

thus said

because there would result reciprocal dependence between

"
etc,
It
it

the relation to a body

may
is

be said

True, there

is

reciprocal dependence, but

not a defect, because of

1
'

beginninglessness, as between seed and sprout.

"

To

this

he says

The assumption

of beginninglessness in this is (like)

f;

nfi^fcl

*f |fcf

3^1

HARMONY
Here they say
from the body
etc,,
is
:

235

in respect of the self that is distinct

etc.,

the conceit of" I

;

"

in its

own body
;

secondary, not illusory

if this

be said, no

for,

secondariness and primariness are well-known to him to

whom

the difference between the things

to

is

well-known.
is

For him

whom

the difference between the things

"

a chain of the blind/

ninglessness
is

One may think thus

This begin;

not like a chain of the blind

when from

particular merit

and demerit, there

it is

is

a particular relation

between a

self

and a body,

not, indeed, from that

same

relation to a

body that there result that particular merit

rather do these (merit and demerit) result from
of

and demerit

a prior relation
rise

the self to the body, which had

;

its

from earlier merit and demerit

"

while this relation of

"
;

the self to the body results from another merit and demerit
to
this
1

one he says
etc,
etc.

because there

is

no inherence of

activity'

He
He

proximity"
one's
"
self
:

objects: "If it be said that by mere " " " no." answers Procuring is making
is

own.

That

not the case,

he says, with the

Not for the

for those
is

self,

however

"
etc.

As

who

think that the conceit of the self in

is

the body etc.

not illusory, but

"

secondary, like the

conceit of the lion in the pupil

etc.,

he introduces their
"
etc.

view and condemns

to
is

it

Here they say

That person

whom
thus

differences between things are

well-known, he
vasty,-

mentioned

(in

the

words

prasiddha

bhedali).

And

since this has been explained by us under

it

the
here.

commentary on superimposition,

is

not explained

In the twilight, in respect of a thing not apprehended

236

HARMONY
for

well-known

example,

if

a certain thing possessing a

is

mane

etc,,

and

having a particular configuration

"

established through co-presence

principal signification of the

and co-absence as the

lion/'

word and concept

and another, a man, established as possessing

courage
etc.,

cruelty,

which are the ordinary

for that- one, the

word and

qualities of a lion " " concept lion have secon-

dary signification in respect of that man, not for him to

whom
known.

the difference between the things

is

not wellof)

For

this (latter) one,

however, (the use

one

word and concept

in the place of another

;

can be caused

only delusively, not secondarily

of that

for

example, in respect

whose particularity has not been apprehended

" This is a post," the word and in twilight, in the form " " man have the post as content or for concept of
;

example, in the nacre, the word and concept which for

some
"

unknown
is

reason

are determined

in

the

form

This

silver ".

In the same way,

how can

the word

as distinct from a

man

" in of

the form
a

this

is

a post," the

word and the concept

post for content
;

man due

to doubt

have the

there,

indeed,
is

the attribute

of being a

man, though not certain,

but superimposed.

Having

thus illustrated the superiinposition of the uncertain in

cases of doubt, he illustrates (the superimposition of) the
"

certain in cases of erroneous cognition

the nacre" etc.
in
front,
is

or, for

example, in

When
is

for the white

shining

substance
while

there

similarity

to

nacre

and
is

silver,

there

the ascertainment of silver,

why

there not the

:;

rKT2TTi:

fin

^fcl

HARMONY
and concept of
"
I,"

237

which
etc.,

arise in respect of the assem-

blage of the body

non-figuratively through the

non-discrimination of the self and the not-self, be said

to be

secondary

Even by the learned men who have

discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self,

the word and the concept fail to be discriminated, just as

by shepherds and goatherds.

maintain that there
the concept of
"
I
is

Therefore for those

who
etc,,

a self distinct from the body

"

in respect of the

body

is

but illusory,

ascertainment of nacre itself?

Or there may be doubt,

;

which
strate
of

is

appropriate in

two ways

for,

there

is

seen a subis

with

common

attributes, while
(i.e.,

there

absence
of valid

cognition

or non-cognition

of

any means
also

knowledge,
there
is

favourable
of

or

unfavourable);
particulars,

because

memory

both

since similarity,

which
is

arouses
to

the
both.

impressions, being located in both,

common

Therefore

it

is

said:
is

"for some

unknown
there
is

reason."

Though

the seen cause

common,
and since
its

hereby mentioned an unseen cause

that has to be inferred from the perception of

it

effect,

is

not

by the
self

Even common (to both) this is the idea. learned men who have discriminative knowledge of the
:

"

and the

"
not-self
;

for

those

who

are learned, merely

in respect of their proficiency in hearing

is

and reflection

that

to say. for those in

whom
1

the intuition of the truth has

"
:

not risen.
distinction

That has been said

from beasts'
etc.

And

because there
of

is

no
is

The sense

the rest

not obscure*

238

HARMONY
secondary.

not

Hence,

since

"being embodied"
it is

is

caused by illusory knowledge,

established that for

is

the wise one, even while alive, there

non-embodiment.
is

And

thus

there
:

is

Scripture

whose content

the

Brahman-knower
lies

"

Therefore, as the slough of a snake

off

dead and cast

on the

ant-hill,

in the very

same

way
"

lies

this

body; then that non-embodied,

"

immortal
iv,

life, is

Brahman alone,

light alone

(B?h., IV,
it

7)

Having eyes but

without eyes as
it

were,

having ears but without ears as

but without speech as
it

were, having speech

were, having mind but without

mind as
it

it

were, having breath, but without breath as

were."

There

is

the traditional Code also,

"

What

is

the language of him

etc,,

who

is

firm in knowledge?" (Qita, II)

which, while declaring the distinctive marks of one

is

firm in knowledge, shows that for the wise one there

relation with

no

engaging

in

any

activity,

Therefore, not as the

self,

in the case of
is

him who has

realised

Brahman

there

transmigratoriness

as

before;

he,

however,

who has
Brahman

transmigratoriness as before, has not realised

as the self
;

this is faultless.

And
the
"

in the matter of

non-embodiment during

life for

wise
thus

one, he cites Scripture and traditional

Code

And

"
etc.
:

This
"

is

easily understood.

He

concludes

the present topic

realised

Therefore, not in the case of

"
etc.

him who has

Brahman

as the self

5rrTt

srffa

H^RRT

w:

ffcl

HARMONY

239

Again, as for the statement that since reflection

and

contemplation
is

are seen subsequent

to

to

hearing,

Brahman
stop
like

subsidiary

an injunction and does not

that
is

with

its

own

existence,

not so

because,

hearing, reflection and

If

contemplation are for the

purpose of realisation.

the realised

Brahman were

employed elsewhere, then there would be subsidiariness

to

an injunction

but

it

is

not so

because reflection

and contemplation too

are, like hearing, for the purpose

"

Now,

it

has been said

If

the jlva's realisation of

Brahman

as the self were alone the cause of the cessation

of the attribute of transmigration, there

futility

would
etc,

be, alas
;

the

of the prescription
for

of

reflection

hence, the

Vedantas have purport the injunction of contempla" " Again, as for the tion restating this, he condemns it
;
:

statement
is

"
etc,

Even

of reflection

and contemplation there

no prescription, since of these two which are established

fruit of intui-

by co'presence and co-absence to have the

tion, there
is

(but)

re-statement by sentences which have

;

the appearance of injunctions

that

is

thus said

"because

they are for the purpose of realisation." Intuition of

is

Brahman

realisation

the subsidiariness thereto of reflection and

is

contemplation

established by co-presence and co-absence

this is the sense.

Why,
of

then, should

it

not be an injunction

alone
"

in

respect

reflection
"
etc,

etc, ?

To

this

he says

If the realised

Brahman

That

reflection

and con-

templation are not principal rites with an unseen content,

viz.,

the fruit

of immortality,

has been stated above.

240

HARMONY
Brahman does not come
to

of realisation, Therefore

have

the sacred teachings as the means of valid knowledge

in

virtue of being
;

the content of an injunction of

for this reason
it is

contemplation

and

established that

Brahman even independently has

sacred teaching as

the means of valid knowledge, because of the harmony

of the

VedSnta
of

texts,

And

this

being the case, the com-

mencement
that,

a distinct sacred teaching dealing with

"

in

the form
1

Then therefore the

If
it

desire to
for

know

Brahman,'

is

intelligible.

had

purport an

Therefore, there remains for

them the character

etc.
;

of subsiis

diary

rites,

like

pounding, sprinkling

that too

unsuitable, since to the self does not belong (the attribute of)

having been used or being about to be used elsewhere

(the self
is

for

propounded

in)

the Upanisad, in particular, there

rifces
:

opposition to the observance of

"

this
"

is

the sense.

He

concludes the present topic

Therefore

etc.

And
existent

thus,

the

Upanisads

having

for

purport the
of the sacred

Brahman, since Brahman, the object

is

teaching,
difference

other

than Religious Duty, and since through

there
is

of

content

difference

in

the sacred
"

teaching,

the commencement
to

therefore, the desire

"

know Brahman
"

of the sacred teaching "

is

Then,
;

intelligible
If,

thus he says
it

And

this being the case

etc.

however,

were otherwise,

it

would be but the desire to know

;

Religious Duty, not another sacred teaching

"

consequently,

there would not be the commencement of another sacred

teaching

thus he says

it

had

for purport

an injunction

3Tn<?t

s?TO5

61

'Flfif

HARMONY
injunction

241

of contemplation, a distinct sacred teaching

would not be commenced, that (study) having been com-

menced even with

Religious Duty
".

"

Then therefore the

if it

desire to

know
would

And
:

had

to be begun, it

have been begun thus

Then

therefore the desire to

know

the rest of the Religious

Duty," like

"Then

therefore the desire to

of the sacrifice and

know what

subserves the purpose

",

what subserves the goal of man

realisation
is

(PM, IV,

i,

1.)

The

of

the unity
(in

of

Brahman and
teaching)
;

the self
it

not premised

that sacred
(another)

hence
is

stands to reason

that

sacred teaching
14

begun
"
:

for that purpose in the

form

Then therefore the

"
I

desire to

know Brahman

",

There-

fore,

am Brahman

in this alone terminate all

'

of contemplation

etc,

Not merely because

is

of being of the

nature of an existent
self other

the

oneness of

Brahman and
"

the

than Religious Duty, but also because of opposi;

tion thereto
'

thus he says by
*
:

way
"

of conclusion
etc.

There"
this

fore,

am Brahman

in this alone

By

the word

"

he refers to the knowledge.

Injunctions,

indeed, are the

means

of valid

knowledge

in

respect
(i.e.,

of Religious

Duty.

And

these,

which are based on

of end,

have as content)

differences
rise

means, and modus operand^ and give

it),

to Religious
is

Duty (through teaching

self,

cannot,

when

there

oneness of Brahman and the

be based on those

(differences),
is

because

of opposition

this is the sense.

This
is

the fate not alone of the sacred teaching that

the

242

HARMONY
and
all

injunctions

other
is

means

of valid knowledge. Not,

indeed,
self,

when
is

there

the realisation of the non-dual

which

to be neither rejected nor accepted,

can

those

which are contentless and are devoid of a knower

to be

be

fit

means

of valid knowledge.
:

Further, they say

illusory

When

the secondary and the

selves are non-existent, then, because of the of son,

sublation

body

etc.,

how can

the

thing to be

done, the enlightenment that I

am

of the nature of

the real Brahman, come about? Prior to the cognition

of the self that
for the
self,
is

to be sought, there is
is

knowership
the knower

What
from

to

be

sought

is

alone,

as free

sin,

defect etc.
is

As the cognition
to

of the self in the body

assumed

be valid know-

ledge,

even

so

is

this

empirically

valid knowledge
self.

(assumed to be valid) up to the ascertainment of the

means
but of
all

of valid
all

knowledge
of valid

in

respect
;

means

knowledge
"

Religious Duty, " and thus he says ;

"

of

other

means
is

of valid knowledge/'
etc.

Why ?

Not, indeed,

when
there

there
is

the realisation

In non-duality, indeed,
object
;

not the relationship

is

of

and subject

nor

agency, since there

nothing to be done

nor instrumental-

for the same reason. That is thus stated ity, " " " and which are devoid of a knower ". in and

by the

To
knower
:

this
138

very effect he cites the verses of a Brahman"

"

Further, they say

is

etc.

The conceit
feels

of the self

in son, wife etc,,

secondary,

As one

miserable by

cl: 1

ff

w
:

ft

HARMONY
one's

243

own

misery, and happy by one's

own

happiness, so too
;

does one

(feel)

by what

is
is

present in the son etc.

hence

it is

secondary.
difference
is

But there

not the conceit of oneness, since

established in experience,
"

Hence,
(the

it is

seconof of

dary (figurative) as in
a country of that name)

The Vahlka
is

inhabitant

an ox
etc., is

".

But the conceit

the self in the body, organs

not secondary, because

(from them)
;

of the experience of non-difference

it

is

an

illusion, rather, like the cognition of silver in nacre.

it

Thus,

is

this

twofold conceit of the self that sustains the

world,
If that,

march

of the

however, were non-existent,

there would be no

march

of the world, nor

even the experibecause of the

ence of the oneness of

Brahman and the

"

self,

non-existence of the means thereto,

etc.

m.,

hearing, reflection

That

is

thus said

because of the sublation of son, body

self is non-existent, there is subis

etc."

When the secondary

;

lation of son, wife etc, "

that

to say, the non-existence of

is

the sense of
there
is

mine

",

When

the illusory self

non-existent,

the sublation

of body,

organ

etc,,

as

also

the

sublation of hearing etc,

And

the destruction of the march

thence, there is not alone " the enlightenof the world ;

of the

ment that
this

am

of

the
1'

nature
is

real

Brahman,
of

thing

to be

done
is

which

of

the

nature

an

awakening, that
"

that too,
bility ?

how
this

to say, the intuition of non-duality, " can (it) come about ? Whence its impossi-

"

To
to

he says

Prior to the cognition of the self

is

that

is

be

sought, there
is

knowership for the

the

self/'

This

(knowership)

synecdoche;

distinction

244

HARMONY
valid

of

knowledge,

object
is

of

valid

knowledge

and
This

means
is

of valid
is

knowledge
:

also to be understood.
is

what

said
of

this distinction, indeed,

the cause of

the intuition
it
;

non-duality,
is

since

it

invariably precedes

therefore,

when that
is

non-existent,

the effect

is

not

produced,

Nor
self
;

the self to be sought other than the

"
:

knowing
knower
tion

thus he says
as free from

What

is

to be

sought

is

the

alone,

sin,

defect etc."

The

illustra-

of the

necklet round

one's

neck has, indeed, been

stated.

Be

this

so.

From what

is

non-valid,

how can

there

be the origination of the absolutely real experience of nonduality?

self in

To

this
is

he

says;

"As
to

the

cognition

of the

the body

assumed

be valid knowledge, even

1

so

is this

empirically valid knowledge (assumed to be valid),'

of this he states
:

The terminus
"

"up

to the ascertainment

of the self
this
is

up to the intuition
This
is

of the nature of
is

Brahman

the sense.

what

said

even by those
it

who maintain

the absolute reality of the world,

must be

said that the conceit of the self in the body etc.

is illusory,
it

since

it is

sublated by valid knowledge.

it is

And

of this

should

be admitted that
that
it

the cause of

all

valid knowledge,

and

sustains the real

march

of the world.

This

is

the

mode
Nor

for us
is

too in respect of the intuition of non-duality,

this

intuition of non-duality, a particular psychosis of

139

the internal organ, absolutely and invariably real

that intuition which
since
it

As

for

is real,

that

is

not something to be done*

is

of

the nature of Brahman.

As

for Nescience,

f|

62

qqfri:

HARMONY
whether
no
"
it

245

destroy or generate (other) Nescience, there

is

unintelligibility

whatever,

So

too

says

Scripture:

Knowledge and Nescience, he, who knows both together,

byond
death by Nescience, enjoys immortality
14

passing

through Knowledge,"

Therefore, everything

is clear,

HEBE ENDS THE CATUH-SOTRI-BHAMATI

NOTES
PAGE
2

1.

Vacaspati, like

Padmapada, the author

of

of

the

PancapadikU, recognises two kinds

are
is

Nescience.

These

the kara^a-'vidya and the karya-Vidyas,

beginningless
;

The former

the latter too are beginningless, but in

the same sense as a continuous stream.

Kara^a-'vidya

is

one, on the view of some, but not according to Vacaspati.

Another name

for

it is

mdla-'vidya.

As contrasted with

it,

the others are called tula-'vidyas or avastha-'jfianas, modal

ignorances.
2.

See further, Introduction, section V.

to be

The world, movable and immovable, has

created through Hira^yagarbha, and thus requires greater

effort

than the elements

hence their comparison to the

effort

smile,

which requires greater

than a mere glance

so says the Kalpataru.

3.

This

is

a joint salutation to the Vedas and to

Paramaslva,
with
of

whom
see

Vacaspati would appear to identify

the

Saguria-Brahman, possibly following the lead

;

Saftkara

the Sivadvaitanirr^aya, para

3.

233,

and

the paras immediately preceding.

The

six angas

of the

Veda

are

phonetics,

prosody,

etymology,

grammar,

astrology

and

ritual;

the

avyayas (indeclinables) like

the
six

particle ca

(meaning 'and') are innumerable.

Paramastiva

The

aftgas

of

(Bhava)

are

omniscience,

248

NOTES

[Pp. 2-3, N. 4-7

illimi-

contentment, eternal wisdom, independence, eternal

table

resources,

and unimaginable power; the avyayas

are

(imperishable

properties)

ten:

knowledge,

non-

attachment, lordly power, austerity, truth, mercy, firmness,

creatorship,

self-knowledge and

controllership

thus

the

Kalpataru.
4.

Amalananda takes
of

this

expression to refer to a

deity

fond

sesamum.

From

a verse quoted in the

refer

Kalpataru
to

the

word "Martaijda" would seem to

Tilakasvamin
(see
is

the Sun.

Das Gupta says

Skanda

another
;

name

for Karttikeya or

HIP,

II,

107)

in this

identification, he
5.

has also the support of the Rjuprakas'iktt.

Creator
(apara-vedhas),

Secondary
be so,

Vyasa

is

said

to

because of

a boon granted to him, in

common with Daksa and are known as Prajapatis

justifies

others, in virtue of
(creators).

which they

The
to

RjuprakUs'ikd,

the

attribution

of

creatorship

Vyasa on the

ground of bis being an incarnation of

energy,
as stated
in the

Visi;u's cognitive

Pura^as

the second line of the

verse would thus be a justification of the second half of

the

first line.
6.

The
;

bhasya

of

Sankara

is

clear

to

outward

appearance

but the depth of thought revealed on analysis

shows

its

might and majesty.

PAGE

7.

/,e,,

condition or cause

fire is

the pervader and

smoke

the

pervaded

(vyapya).
is

That
the

which

is

more

extensive

(adhika-detfa-vftti)

pervader,

and that

which

is

less extensive (nyflna-detfa-vftti) is the pervaded.

They

are, of course, co-extensive,

where the
present

relation
is

is

reciprocal

The

pervader

in

the

case

the

Pp. 4-8, N, 8-14]

NOTES
inquiry,
i.e.,

249
lack
of

condition

of

the

knowledge plus

the existence of profit from the knowledge,

8.

That

is

to say, the

body whereon the attributes

of the self

have been superimposed.

PAGE

4
9.

The

intellect
it,

is

the

determinative

faculty

certitude

belongs to
It
is

while doubt belongs to the mind

to

(manas).

essential

remember that

all

these

psychical factors are in their

own nature

unconscious.

PAGE

10.

The usage
;

"

You

very

rare
6

hence the word

are myself" does exist, but it is u " extensive is used advisedly.

PAGE

11.

That

is

to say, present
:

it

(avabhasayanti) as of

the same nature as themselves

12.

Pjuprakas'ika.
is

What
of

is

here meant

the cognition of the one

being

the nature of the other (itaretaratva-pratttih),

not the actual identity of the one with the other.

latter
is

The

never doubted and

its

non-existence needs no proof.

PAGE

13.

For the superimposition

of

of attributes there

must

be either superimposition
relationship
other.

their substrates

or such a
reflect

between the

latter that

one

may
of

the

Neither of these being possible as between subject

object,

and

whence the superimposition

is

attributes ?
(p.

The quotation

from the Slokavarttika, V, 39

280).

PAGE

14.

Knowledge through perception necessarily comes

knowledge
through

before

any

other means, such

as

250
inference

NOTES
etc.,

[Pp, 9-10, N. 15-18

and certainly long before knowledge through

Herein consists the priority (jyesfatva)

verbal testimony.
of perception.

Further, words can convey knowledge only

when they
this

are perceived.

For
is

his

arguments in meeting

contention, Vacaspati

indebted to

Ma$dana MisTa

see the Brahmasiddhi, pp. 39-41, esp. p. 41.

The example
is

given for the origination of valid knowledge from what

empirically, but not absolutely, real
difference
of

may

be paralleled by the

significance

brought

about by

emphasis.
;

Emphasis does not belong

to the nature of the words

but

when imposed on
the

different
;

words in a sentence, the sense of

is

sentence

differs

the difference in sense

is

validly

apprehended, though resulting from what

superimposed.

PAGE

15.

This
is

is

statement

of

ffabarasvamin.

The

"other"
16.

the implied sense (laksyartha).

VI, v, 54.

PM,

The archetypal

rite is that all of

whose subsidiaries have been

ture.

explicitly laid

down by

Scrip-

There are other

vikytis
;

rites

modelled on these; they are

are as a rule taken over

called

their subsidiaries

from the injunctions as to the prakfti rite.

a particular subsidiary has been laid

Where, however,
for the vikfti,

down

the corresponding subsidiary from the prakfti will not be

taken over the subsequent prescription in the vikfti sublates

;

the earlier injunction in the prakfti,

tion of kutfa grass as

Thus, the prescrip-

an auxiliary

in the prakfti is sublated

of stera in the vik^ti.

when

there

is

an express prescription
p.

17.

TantravQrttika,

819.

PAGE

10
"

18.
rite,

The word

"

agnihotra
rite.

is
is

the

name

of a particular
rite called

an obligatory

There

another

the

Pp. 11-13, N. 19-22]

"
"

NOTES
which
is

251
not obligatory, though
"

kuijcjapayinam ayana

the injunction in that regard uses the word

agnihotra

".

The

object of using this

word

is

to indicate not the identity

of the rites,

but the need for transferring from the obliga-

tory rite all such subsidiaries as are not expressly laid

for the

down

other.
iii,

On

the whole topic see

PM,

I,

iv, 4

II, iii,

24

and VII,
11

1-4.

PAGE

19.

That

"
is,

in the cognition

am

in this very abode,

but cognising

".

PAGE

13
"

20.

There

is

no cognition of the form

"
"

am

the

body"; but the cognition

is

none the

less

due to the
;

erroneous identification of the self with the non-self

is

that

why
21.

it

is

said that the identification

u

is

a fact, though

not present in cognition.

The Sanskrit

"

adhyasya vyavahSrah
u

involves
"

the use of the participial suffix (-ktva) in

(superimposing).

adhyasya
is

This
for

is

justifiable

only where there

common agent
22.

both activities.
is

See Pariini: 3.4,21.

Vacaspati says there

this justification.
identifies

While

Vacaspati

mithyajfiana

with

adhyasa, treating prior superimpositions as the causes of

subsequent ones, Padmapada sees here a reference to the

primal
into

cosmic

ignorance.

He

splits

up the compound
diffi-

mithya

and

ajfiana,

There are undoubtedly

Nescience as a cause
of the Vivararia, a
;

culties in treating Primal

see the

Introduction.

The author

commentary

on

the

Pancap&dikn,

justifies

Padmapada's explanation

on the ground that to allege superimposition as the cause

252
of superimposition

NOTES
would be
to

[Pp,

1548, N. 23-25
fallacy
of

commit the

self-dependence (Etmas'raya).
pati
just

But as

Havana

and Vacas-

are

never tired of pointing out,

full intelligibility is

what one may not expect

in the case of

Nescience

non-intelligibility is constitutive of its very nature.

PAGE

15

23.

The

bhasya
is

says

that

the

empirical usage

(vyavaharah)

natural and beginningless

But

if

that

were

so, it could not

have a cause

Hence, the beginningviz.

lessness

should be taken really to qualify the cause,

superimposition,
superimpositions.

But

this

is

itself

an

effect

of

prior

How, then, can that be said to have

reply
is

no beginning
is

The

that

what

is

here intended

not the absence of any beginning, but the absence of any

beginning that

may

be said to be the first; in other words,

like that of a perennial
is

we have
stream.

a continuous process

Such beginninglessness
as

called karya-'naditva or

pravaha-'naditva,

contrasted

with

svarHpa-'naditva,

such as belongs to the

jlva, Is'vara,

Pure Intelligence, the

difference between the jlva and Is'vara, Nescience,

relation to Intelligence,
24.

and

its

According to Vacaspati, satta

self-luminosity,

(reality)

consists
e.g.

in unsublated

The other views,

the

inherence of reality as a genus, and practical efficiency,

are maintained by the Naiyayikas

and cannot appeal to

viz.

the advaitin for the reasons mentioned,

the introduc-

tion of duality and the infinite regress involved.

PAGE

18

25.

This
in
for

view

(or

something very much like

at

it)

eomes

criticism

the

hands

of

Kavitarkika

P. 18,

N. 26-27]

HOTE8
of

253

Cakravarfci

Nfshpha Bhattopadhyaya,

whom we know
views in the

nothing beyond the

first

summary given

of his

chapter

of

the

Siddhantale&asangraha.
:

The point

of the criticism is this

does the yellow, which goes forth

?

with the rays of light, pervade the object

there
then,
shell
is

If it
;

does not,
if it

no

possibility of its superimposition

does,

even others who are near by should perceive the

to

be
is

yellow,

as

if is

it

were gilded.
"
"

What

the

Cakravarti
in

criticising

the notion of two psychoses

this

an

illusion,

one cognising the

and the other

the "yellow" or the "silver"; neither the existence nor the

functioning
to

of

two such psychoses

It
is

is

intelligible,

according

him.

not clear from the

Bh&matl

whether
his

Vacaspati

recognises

two

psychoses,
;

though

language

suggests
briefly

such recognition
refers

but

Appayya
to

Dlksita

who

in

the
it

Parimala

the

Cakravartin's criticism, makes out that

Tarkikas,
26.

applies only to the

An
"
is

interesting

question

in

relation

to

this

experience
for

whence the previous experience

of bitterness
bitter,

an infant, who has not yet tasted anything

turns

but

away from the mother's

biliousness

milk, because of the

it

delusion caused by

that

is

bitter?" One

explanation
the

is

that
of

the

bitterness
life.

is

imported from
9

experiences

a prior

Of. SLS,

pp.

204-205

(Kumbakonam
27.

edition).

There has been more than one theory of reflection

philosophy.

in

advaita

Vacaspati

seems

to

hold

in

common with

Padmapada and the Vivaragacarya

is

that

the image which appears to be apprehended

original
face.

but the

There
original

is

a difference of opinion as to
is

whether

the

itself

apprehended

but in a

254
different
or

NOTES
place

tP. 18, N.

27

the original that

is

present in

its

own

proper place.
that

Padmapada

holds the former view and says

those

who
view
of

maintain

the

latter

are

patently
p. 23).

contradicted

by experience (see the Pancapadikci,

is

The

latter

that

maintained by Vacaspati, and

from another, possibly
not have

must be part

his

inheritance
it

Havana,
criticism
is

as

otherwise

could

come

in

for

even in Padmapada's days.

rays go back
it,

The Bhamatl view

image
In
the

that the reflected

it

to the original

where
support
original

is

and apprehend
the view
itself,

but not as where

is

it is.

of

that

what
"

apprehended

is

image

the Vivara^acarya points to the

form of the sublating cognition

'*

The face

is

not there

"

not

The

face

is

not

".

As
*

regards Vacaspati's
rightly

own
the

exposition,

Appayya

DJksita

remarks

in

Parimala that the element of

location of the original
"
is

non-apprehension of the
all reflection,

not essential to

since

it

is

absent from the cognition of the reflection of

a tree, for instance,

of

which may co-exist with the cognition

it

the

tree

where

is

really

located.

The doctrine

that the rays from the sense of sight are turned back

by the stronger rays of the sun does not seem to be

shared by the Vivara^acarya,

who

says they are turned

etc.

back by the reflecting medium, the mirror

version
of

Neither

the

theory,

of

course,
of

corresponds to the

modern
which

physicist's

notion
of

reflection,

according

to

the

rays

the

sun

or

other illuminant are

reflected, not rays from the sense of sight.

The most

powerful criticism of the theory that the reflected image

is

identical with

the

original

comes from the AdvaitaDlksita,

is

vidyacarya
father)

(probably

Rafigaraja

Appayya's
a fictitious

who

holds

that the reflected image

P. 19, N. 28-30] of

NOTES
like

255

creation

Nescience,

the water of the mirage.

(i)

These are some of the points urged by him.

true that there
is

It is

not

no notion of an independent face in

other unsophisticated persons

the mirror.

Children and

take

the reflection to be

an independent

entity,

(ii)

The

reflection

does

not have the properties

of

of tho

original.

The

reflection

the sun does

not burn, nor does the

reflection

of the

moon
we

cool,

(iii)

When we

look

at

calm sheet
our
faces,

of water,

see not merely the reflections of

bed.

but also the sandy

is

The only

possible

explanation
pass

that some
the

rays from the sense of sight

through

reflecting
this

medium while

others

are

turned back.
the rays
?

Whence

difference in the strength of

Again, the rays which are admittedly weaker

than water and are consequently turned back therefrom,

are
of

yet said to be stronger than the

much

stronger rays

the sun, so that they go up to the solar orb and enable

its

us to see
pp, 268-280

reflection in the water! See further

edition).

SL,

(Kumbakonam

PAGE

19
"

"

28.

gandharva-nagara
etc.,

is

delusion

of

cities,

buildings
29' (a bilious

seen in the clouds.

said

It

is

that the eye treated with the vasa

sees

substance) from a frog,

bamboo as a

snake and the colour of a snake in the colour of the

bamboo.

See the relevant portion of the Kalpataru and

"

the Parimala thereon.

30.

"maruu
rays
of
11
.

marlcika-nicayam

is

literally

a body

of

son's

(shining) over a desert (and giving the

appearance
"

water);

it

is

therefore

rendered

here

as

mirage

The

ftjuprakas'ikft

takes

"uccBvacam"

256

NOTES

(Pp. 20-21, N. 31-33

(understood in our translation to

qualifying ''waves") along with

mean
"

"

high and low" as

marlcika-nicayam," the

whole

compound

meaning

"the

unspeakably
"
;

intense

commentary
"

rays of the sun shining over a desert " * "

according to this
"

uccavacam

means

vacam agocaram

or

atyadhikam

".

PAGE

20
"

31.

bhava-'ntaram
"

abhavo

hi.*'

This part of the

line occurs in the Slokavarttika, p. 566, where,

is

however,
"

it

followed by
".

"

purastat pratipaditah

not by

kayacit

tu vyapeksaya

The whole

line as here

quoted occurs in
v,

the

Vibhramaviveka of Magcjana Mitfra (see

edition).
is

129, p. 14,

Madras

It is

not unlikely that Vacaspati's

own

quotation

from Mandana,

PAGE

21

32.

Cp.

karya-kara^a-bhavad

va

svabhavad

va

niyamakat
avinabhava-niyamo 'dars'anan na na
33.

dars'anat.
p.

The

verse

is

from the SlokavUrttika,

476,

This view of Kumarila, which treats existence and nonexistence as co-existent aspects
of

everything,

is

to be

distinguished from

the view of Prabhakara, which denies

to

any

kind

of

reality

non-existence, since the nonis

existence

of anything) say a pot,

a,0,,

nothing more than

the bare locus,

the ground

itself.

The

line

"bhavaseems to
it

'ntaram

abhavo
to

'nyo na

kas'cid

"
anirflpa$at

some extent
not

be reminiscent of this view; and

is

infrequently
;

mistaken

for

an

expression

of

the

Prabhakara view

see, for instance, D.

M. Datta, The Six

Ways

o/ Knowing, p.

160 and the foot-note.

The

ascription,

Pp. 22-32, N. 34-39]

NOTES
is

257
Kum&rila's descripp.

however,

is

erroneous, since that line

tion of his
also the

own

position.
v.

See the Slokavarttika,

127, p, 14,

245

Vibhramaviveka,

where

this line

is

cited in the exposition of the Varttika-kara's

own

position.

PAGE

22

34.

See Note 33.

PAGE

25
"

35.

Expressions like
"

long-lived one

"

"

and

beloved

of the

Gods

are applied to the opponent,

more particularly

to the Buddhist, sarcastically, to indicate his folly.

PAGE

27
"
"

36.

True," that

is,

literally,

correspond to their

objects."

Correspondence

for the

Naiyayikas and for the

Prabhakaras (whose view

is

seems to have meant nothing more than

ency
".

set forth in the present passage) " practical effici-

It is difficult to
it

determine whether the Naiyayikas

could be

ever understood

to

mean "resemblance" and

characterised as representationists.

PAGE

30

37.

For the criticism

of

akhyati-vada Cp. the Brahma-

siddhi, pp. 136-147, esp. p. 137.

PAGE

31

38.

Bhasmaka, morbid appetite due to over-digestion

seems

to

have been known as YQnaittl in Tamil; Op. Mayi-

mekalai, patikam, line 66.

PAGE

32

39.

The Nynyakavika
Vidkiviveka.

is

Vacaspati's

Commentary on

Amalananda

in the relevant part

258
of the Kalpataru gives a
in the Nyftyakayiktl.
is

NOTES

[Pp. 34-36, N, 40-41

summary of Vacaspati's arguments The main argument is this, Truth

of the cogni-

self-evident, not

made known by constancy

need

tion to its object.

If cognition does require constancy, for

it
it

what purpose does

the

for the presentation of the

?

object cognised or for successful practical activity

first,

Not

since cognition does not arise

;

first

and then present

an

the object
object.

rather does

it

arise as the presentation of

Nor the second

practical
Is this

for, in order to apprehend con-

stancy,

efficiency
effected

etc,

should be

first
?

appre-

hended.

by another cognition

Then the

constancy of that cognition comes in question and we have

an

infinite

regress.

If

another cognition be not needed

for the

second cognition, validity would be ascertained

first
if

neither for that cognition nor for the

cognition, de-

pendent thereon for

its

validity,

And

the validity of
not that of the

the second cognition be self-evident,

first

why

as well ?

The Brahmatattvasamlkfin
later
is

referred

to three lines

Vacaspati's commentary on the Brahmasiddhi of

Mandana,

PAGE

34

40.

The

Rjnpraktis'ika
"

reads

"atma 'jado" taking

stands

the two words "self" and "non-inert" in apposition, so

that the sentence

means

If it is manifest,
is

it

to reason that the self,

etc,,

which

non-inert,

is

not, like pot

manifested in dependence on another."

36

PAGE

41.

That

is

to say,

we

are left only with the fact of

the relatedness of consciousness to objects and the self;

Pp. 38-45, N. 4247]

NOTES
as. the
still

259

and with this we got no further forward,

of the

analogy
applies.

ignorant father and the scholarly son

PAGE

38
For, then, the plurality of reflections of the sun
It is to

42.

would introduce difference into the sun.

that this demonstration of self-luminosity
objector,

be noted

is offered

by the
of

with

view

to

show

the impossibility

superimposition.

PAGE

41
Chund., VI,
iii, 2.

43.

44.

There

is

a continuous streau of superimposition,

wherein

jlva-hood and

object-ness

(visayatva)

alternate,

without the defect of reciprocal dependence.

of

The content

an

earlier superimposition

may

be jlva-hood; and this

jlva

may become
42

the object of the next superimposition.

PAGE

45.
46.

Svet.,Vl,U.
"
"

"
is

Praudhi-vada
".

sometimes rendered as
in

an

extravagant argument

It is

the nature of a supple-

mentary argument, which proceeds by conceding the opponent's

assumptions
its

though
It

really

untenable as sug-

gested by

synonym.

has no

strict relevance to the

main
in the "

thesis as its establishment.

Thus the denial

of

God

S&thkhya Sfttras
".

is

said

by Vijfiana Bhiksfu to be

praudhi-vada
45

PAGE

47.
is

That the inner

from

self,

which
this

is

pure intelligence,

different
64,

intellect

etc.,

is

what

is

to be

260

NOTES
;

[P. 49,

N. 48

apprehended
tion,

this

apprehension constitutes the

final cogniis
it

which

is

of the
it

same
is

class of reality as

what

removed
requires

thereby, though

of a higher degree in that

nothing else for

its

own removal,

The

rise of this cognition

is of itself the removal of Nescience, since nothing else remains to be acquired or done for this removal. But even

the final cognition

the self ing
the
;

is

other than the knowledge which

is

it

only helps to reveal the latter,

"

through remov"

obscuration caused by

Nescience; hence that

cognition

may

be spoken of as

knowledge

only deri-

vatively or secondarily.

PAGE

49

48. "

The reading
pravartante

"

in all printed texts

"

is

pravartate,"
for.

though

seems obviously to be called

As the

text stands, the

meaning would seem

"

to be

why
it

should he (the knower) not function of himself"? But

is

evident

both from
it is

what follows and from the com-

mentaries that
"

the functioning of the senses and of the

pramaijas generally which

"

pravartante

is here in question. The reading has been adopted in the present text on
:

the strength of two MSS. in the Adyar Library

30

22

(Grantha script) and 40

19 (Malayalam script).

It is

interesting to note that the Kalpataru takes the second

question to relate to a different objector and not to be merely

explanatory of the
"
"

first

question.

The

"
first
'
'

question

is

why
own
is

should the knower utilise the pramapas

in

The atmanepada
is

upadatte

implies that the utilisation

for his

benefit.

The
should

obvious

complement
"

of that

question

why

not the prama^as function for his benefit

?

without being utilised by him

This would be the question

of a follower of the Safekhya, according to which, primal

Pp, 50-53, N. 49-50]

NOTES

261

nature functions
benefit of Spirit,

of itself in the presence of Spirit, for the

But there
evolutes

is

another possibility
function, not for

that
one's

prakjti and
benefit,

its

may
it

any

but just because

is

is

their nature.

The second

question

based on this possibility.

"
"

This interpretation,

says the author of the Abhoga,

"

is justified,

nay demanded,
"
etc.

by the force of

eva

in

svayam eva kasmat

Bhasya) means
"

One

may

also

note in this
(in the

connection that, while for

controller
it

"

Vacaspati adhiqihUnam

Padmapada,

Anandagiri
".

and

Govindananda take
in the

to

mean
mean
:

"

locus
"

The sentence

Bhasya would thus

and without the locus

is

of the senses (that is to say,

the body) there

no functioning,*'

PAGE 50
49.

The
"
etc,

words

of

the
"

Bhasya

"And

without a
".

knower

imply also
a

and without valid knowledge

The need
has

for

knower who can control the pramaijas

explained,

been
it.

already

and there
is

is

no need to

repeat

What
because

is

shown

here

the need for superim?;i:.,

position,

of

the nature of valid knowledge,

the combination of intelligence and non-intelligence (cidacid-rapa-garbhini).

PAGE

53

50.
sacrificer

PM,

III,

vii,

18.

The question
personally
including
all

is

whether the

(yajamSna) should
sacrificial
it

engage in each
subsidiaries
or

act

of

ritual,
if

whether

will

suffice

he makes the dedication of

prirna facie

the sacrificial material the

since
sacrificer

The
himself

view
all

is

that
rites,

should
is

engage in
to

the
;

the

fruit

declared

go

to

him

and the

262
to

NOTES
necessarily goes

[Pp. 56-62, N, 51-53

fruit

that

agent
rites.

who

is

implied by
final

the activity of engaging in the

that the services
of the

The

view

is

officiating priests

tftviks)

have

been formally purchased by the yajamana and that this

purchase would be
all

futile

if

the yajamana had to perform

the

rites

himself.

The

aphorism cited here

;

is

the

statement of the prima facie view

fruit is
its

but in both views, the

in activity for

understood to go to him
;

who engages

sake

and this

is all

that

is

intended to be illustrated here.

PAGE 56
51.

Cp. Brahmasiddhi,p 43.

t

There are three expect:

ancies for every operation prompted by an injunction

is

what

to

be accomplished

wherewith

and how

In the
it

case of the sfyena or

injures

hawk
as

sacrifice (so called

because

the
out

enemy even
the

quickly

as

hawk would
the enemy
is

pluck

enemy's

eyes)

injury to
this

what

is

to

be accomplished,

But

cannot be in the
it

last resort a Scripture-ordained end, since

conflicts
is

with

the prohibition of injury to

Scripture-permitted end.
fore,
is

ail

beings,

It

at best a

One

of the expectancies, there-

not
this,

fulfilled

from an absolute point of view*

of

Despite
observed

the

injunction

the

hawk
it,

sacrifice

is

by those

who

are eligible for

i.e.

those

who

have not conquered anger.

PAGE

61

52.

PM,

I, ii,

40.

PAGE

62
"

53.

The inner

self

alone

is

their principal sense.

"

The word

mukhyft-'rthafy

would ordinarily mean "primary"

P, 65,, N. 54]

NOTES
"

263

or

"expressed"
".

as opposed to
self,

secondary" or "implied
is

sense

The inner

however,
"

expressed sense of the words

That

"

and

not the primary or " " "

thou

in

That

thou

art".

Hence, the word

"
"

mukhya here means nothing

see the Rjuprakfis'ika.

more than

non-figurative

PAGE

65
"

"
daridl

54.

presan anvaha."
ca

Scripture says
"

maitra-

varuriah actually

presati
offers

'nvaha ca.
oblations,

While the adhvaryu

the

the maitra-varuria has the

task of preparing them

and the

hott priests

have the
as soon as

function of calling on the deities to

the
offerings

come up

are

ready.

On

the adhvaryu satisfying

offerings

himself
ready,

from
the

the maitra-varu^a that the

are

latter,

with

the

former's

consent,
"

gives

permission to the hoty priests, in the formula

to
call

as'ravaya,"

the deities.
is

When

the invitation has been made,

to "

that

fact

communicated

the

adhvaryu
".

by the

maitra-varuija in the formula

of

astu sTausat

The

first

these formulae

is

called

the praisa and the second the

of

anuvacana.
to

That the uttering

results

both of these belongs

the
said

the

maitra-varuria

from
it

text
later

already
"daijdl

mentioned.

When,

therefore,

is

presan

anvaha

(the priest

with the baton chants the

should be taken to be

permission and the reply)/' this

a restatement in respect of the chanter and the chanting, being injunctive

only in respect of the qualification of
If

having a baton.
the

the emphasis were not on the baton,

be

statement

would
is

wholly

futile.

Hence

the

importance of what

not primary in the sentence.

ll

But

this is not so in the case of

brahma-jijfiasa

".

264

NOTES
66
"
55.

[Pp. 66-74, N. 55-60

PAGE

man-badha

"
etc.
;

see Pa$ini, III,

viz..

i,

6.

This

aphorism says that the stems mentioned,

etc,,

man, badha

undergo a duplication and a lengthening of the initial

Thus,

consonant.

from

mnn
rule,

we

get

maman
;

this,

in

accordance with another

becomes mlrnUn

and

this
11

with saw-suffix, which, however, does not mean "desire

in the present case,

becomes mlmfimsti.

PAGE

70

56.

PJf.1,1,1.

PAGE

73
75,,
1,

57.

14.
iv, 21.

58.
59.
(l)

Brh., IV,

Manusmrti, VI,
the

35.

The three

obligations are
(2)

to

Gods,

(discharged by sacrifices),

to

the

fathers,
(3) to

(discharged

by

the

creation of progeny), and

the sages, (discharged by

of

study of the Veda and

observance

brahmacharya).

The two
Manu,
II,

srnjiis

cited

few

lines earlier are respectively

22.

28 and Gautama,

VIII,

On

the whole subject of the relation of karma

to jiiana Cp. Brahmasiddhi, pp. 27-37.

PAGE
.

74
"
"

60.

samyoga-pjthaktva
relation.

is

literally

a two-foldness

(i.e.,

a difference) of

The subsidiary happens

rite

to be in

two

relations,

one with the

of

which

it is

a necessary part, and the other with the fruit specifically

"

enjoined.

E.g.,
is

there
to
tie

are

two

texts

khadire pas'um
1

badhnati (he

the beast to the ebony stake)'

and

"khadiram

vlryakamasya

yflpam

karoti

(he

who

P. 75, N. 61-63]
desires
to

NOTES
is

265
of ebony)
".

virility

make

the stake

As

subserving the sacrifice, ebony would be a constant factor

thereof;
but,

as

subserving

the

desire
is

for

virility,

it

would be a variable factor.

in the

There

no inconsistency

same subsidiary having

this twofold relation (sam-

yoga-pythaktva).
61.

Ved. 8a., Ill,

iv,

32,

It

is

worth

noting that
is

Havana's
hold

interpretation

of the

horse-analogy

both

distinctive and interesting.

He who wants

to go quickly

gets

of a

horse,

though he can otherwise foot the

distance.

The use
;

of ritual is analogous to the service

rendered by a horse
62.

see Brahmasiddhi, pp. 36-37.

Proximate and remote contributories

"

are

the

results of

two

varieties of auxiliaries,

which are distinguish-

ed as they subserve the rite and indirectly the fruit, or

the fruit alone directly, not the rite

in time,

the fruit being distant

is

what subserves that alone

;

said to be a remote
rite directly,

auxiliary (aradupakaraka)
e.g.,

what subserves the

is

the material used or to be used,

(sannipatyaof

a proximate contri-

butory
the

or

samavayika-upakaraka).
rite

Where

subsidiaries

are

expressly mentioned by

Scripture, they are said to be obtained

(upades'a)
;

by direct teaching

where, however, they have to be derived from

another

rite

which

is

its

model,

they are said

to

be

obtained by transfer

(afcides'a).

For a

full list of subsidiaries

:

(aftgani) see Mlm&'ipsu-nyaya-prakas'a, (Edgerton)

sections

182-191.

See

list of

corrections.

PAGE

75

63.

The agneya and two other

i

rites constitute the

still

dars'e^i

similarly

the agneya

with

two other

rites

constitutes

the paurijamase^i.

The two groups

of three

266
bring
this

NOTES
about
fruit

[P. 78,

N. 64-65

heaven
after

as

the

ultimate

fruit,

But since

comes
as

much

delay, while the rites perish

as

soon

they
to
in

are

performed,
;

an unseen potency
is

(apGrva)
rites

has
it

be assumed

this

produced by the

and

turn produces
;

heaven.

But each

rite

does not produce heaven

it

is

only the six rites together

that result;

with
of

their

subsidiaries

that produce

each

these

perishable

rites,

however, should produce an

is

apurva, while the ultimate result, heaven,

of
all

the result

an apQrva which

is

final

(parama-'purva) and to which

the other apQrvas (known as utpatty-apUrvas) contri-

bute.
rites

Now,

the
to
it

samit

is

the

name
rites

of

one

of

the

subsidiary
;

the three

main
its

of the dars'a or
is

paurjjamases^i

produces
the

own apurva which

generated

contributory

to
is

parama-'purva

by
etc.

the

agneya

etc. It

only in order that the agneya

may

produce their fruit, that the due performance of the samit

etc.

and

the

generation

of

their

appropriate apQrvas

are necessary.
etc.

But

it

is

possible to perform the

agneya
In the

even

without

performing

the

samit

etc.

case of the purodas'a, the sacrificial cake

made

of rice flour,

we have

a different relationship

in the absence of purodas'a,

;

the agneya etc. could not be performed

these depend on

the purodas'a for their very existence, not merely for their
fruitfulness.
64.
sacrificial

The

mortar

in

which the
is

rice-grains

for

the

cake are

pounded

purified

by sprinkling.

PAGE

78

65.

For

the
is

school

of

verbal testimony
ledge.

not of itself a

Mamjana and Vacaspati, means of immediate knowis

The

internal organ (which, according to them,

P. 78, N, 65]

NOTES

267

sense-organ) intuites the real, as aided by knowledge gained

through

testimony,

reasoning thereon

and so on.

As

against this, the

Vivararia

school holds that knowledge

of itself be immediate.

through verbal testimony

may

An

"

example given of
tenth
"

this

is

the statement

Thou

art the

addressed to the proverbial party of ten fools who,

river,

on crossing a

reckoned up their
himself

total

number

as nine,

each

enumerator leaving
the enumerator
"
is

out of the counting.

When

pointed to by an outsider witk.v

"

the words

Thou

art the tenth

there arises the

full

and

immediate certitude of

his being the tenth

man and
The

of the

whole

party

being safe.

Verbal testimony would thus

follow-

seem

to be a cause of immediate knowledge.

ing free rendering of a passage from the Kalpataru will

be of interest in this connection: "This

is

the idea,
is

Of

Brahman, though

of itself

immediate, mediacy

apprehend-

ed because of delusion,

Hence, the intuition thereof can

be only through a means of valid immediate cognition.

And
self

since the internal organ generates in the conditioned

1

the

immediate
to

psychosis

of

1/

that (organ)

is

established
self.

be the cause of

immediate cognition in the

That (organ), however,

as aided by the succession

self,

of cognitions of the unity of

In the

Brahman and the

*

intuites

case of the jlva

is

its

being of the nature of Brahman,

That,' in the

which

secondarily implied by the word

as

same way
prior

the
is

sense of sight aided by the retenta of

the cause of the recognition of the

experience

oneness

implied by 'tbat-ness'
;

and 'this-ness*
').

(in

the

recognition
is

This

is

that Devadatta

But verbal testimony

not settled to be the cause of valid immediate cognition.

If cognition

were intuitive because of the object cognised

is

being capable of immediacy (as

05

maintained by some

268
advaitins,

NOTES
e.g.,

IP, 78,

N. 66

the author of the Itfasiddhi), that (immediacy)

for the inference

would result even

difference
*

whose content

is

the

between the body and the

self.

Even

in the case

of

Thou

art the tenth,' the intuition results only

from the

sense-organ

as

aided

by that

(statement),

Further, the

immediate

cognition generated by contemplation of the

knowledge resulting from the Vedantas cannot be delusive,

because of the strength of the basic means of knowledge
(t.e,,

Scripture).
for,

Nor does

it

follow that validity

is

extrinis

sic

confirmation by the basic means of knowledge

sought (only) to
*

remove the suspicion

of invalidity.

This

has to be admitted because of such texts supported by reasoning as

Cognition

But
from

it

is

seen by the concentrated intellect'.

verbal
is

testimony
directly
'

arises

only

in

the

form
'

'that

which
is

immediate/

not in the

form

Brahman

mediate

yet, the cognition

remains

mediate, because of the nature of the instrument (verbal

testimony), and
is

not delusive

thus, everything
is

is

clear."

Op. Brahmasiddhi, p. 134.

One

tempted
is

to think that

between the two rival views, there

without
held

but a distinction
is

difference.

Even

where verbal testimony

object,
it is

to cause

immediate cognition, the

or

said,

should

be

proximate

immediate.

May
i.e.,

not

this

proximity
66.

mean proximity
According
is

to a sense-organ,

the mind ?
veiled

to

Vacaspati,

what
;

is

by

Nescience
tioned
is is

the conditioned
;

Brahman

for,

the uncondi-

flawless

it

can be neither veiled nor revealed.

intuition must, therefore,

What
also

revealed by the final

the

be

conditioned
is

Brahman.

In veiling and in

manifestation there

the relation of content and container,

and

what

enters

into at

any relation cannot be the unstage

of

conditioned.

But

the

the final cognition

Pi 82, N. 67-68J

NOTES
is

269

the

conditioning

such

that the condition does not

itself

appear; the pure Brahman

condition
itself
is

seems to appear; the

has been said,
is

the psychosis, which, as

on the brink of destruction.

very
rule

This condition operates

by

its

existence,

constituting

an exception to the
as

general

that
to

condition

operates

such only

when
on

known
topic.

be such.

See further the Kalpataru

this

Here* again, the difference between the

Bhftmati and Vivaraya schools tends to be verbal rather

than material

for,
is

the distinction

is difficult

to

make

out

between what
and what
is

said to be the intuition of pure

Brahman

said to be the intuition of the conditioned

Brahman,

but without any awareness of the condition or

the conditioning.

PAGE 82
"
67.

The expression
of action

bhinna-karmata

"

means the peri.e.,

formance

suited to those

who

are different,

who have
in

not the conceit of being

"

human

beings

actions,

other words, which

are suitable to beasts etc. It has

been translated rather freely as

68.

transgression of the law

of release

".

Vacaspati's account
is

while

embodied

(jlvan-mukti)

not very satisfactory.

In the present

exposition

he

seems to hold to the view of

Havana

(Cp. the Brahmasiddhi, p. 130), that the so-called perfected

saint

is

not wholly perfect

he

is

only a s&dhaka, not

i,

siddha.

But

later

on,

in

commenting on IV,

15,

Vacaspati echoes Saftkara and maintains expressly that

the

jlvan-mukta

is

a siddha, not a sadhaka.

He

also

stands there for the continuance of a part of Nescience,

in

the form of prarabdha- karma, while in the present

postulates, like Mai^dana, the continuance of

context, he

270
impressions
postulate
alone.

HOTBS

[Pp. 83-84, N. 69-71

in

As

noted
of a

the
is

Introduction, to

the continuance

body

not the

same

as

to postulate continuance of the

conceit of identity with

the

body.

If
it

the

latter

be

necessary element of
be
difficult

jlvan-mukti,

would

indeed

to

avoid
is

Ramanuja's criticism that the assertion of jlvan-mukti

like

the

son's

assertion

of

his

mother's
of

barrenness.
prohibitions,

Vacaspati's

ingenious

explanation

how

though not prescriptions, hold good in the case of the

jlvan-mukta
has
obvious
is

leanings

towards

Mandana's

doctrine that jlvan-mukti

at best figurative, a predication

final release.

based on the close proximity of

usual explanation
of the
is

The more

that the psycho-physical

is

mechanism

released self

so attuned that

it

cannot possibly

go wrong.

This

is

simpler and perhaps more satisfactory.

far

That Vacaspati

is

from consistent will be apparent

"
II,
iii,

from what he says under

however,

48

(p.

626)

For him,
everything

who
of

knows

the

difference
for

from
is

beginning with the

the
conceit
in

intellect,

him who
of

devoid of
is

the enjoyership
of

karma, there
thus, there

no
not

eligibility

respect

karma.

And

is

(for

him) acting as he
is

likes, since, for

him who
is

is

devoid

of conceit, there

not even that."

This

very different

from the position that prohibitions are binding, because

they do not
call

for

an act of faith

in the

same manner

as prescriptions.
69.

Bhagavad-(Jim, XVII, 28.

PAGE

83

70.

Kaivalya Upa.,

I,

Mahnncirftyaya, XII, 28.

PAGE

84

71-

Satapatha

Brthmwa

XI,

ii,

6, 13.

Pp. 85-88, K. 72-761

72.
Ill,
8.

NOTES
i,

271

Jftf$<?.,

PAGE

85

73.

Bhagavad-Gm,Vl,S.

PAGE

86
Jftbala., 4.

74.
75.

Jara-marya-vada
age
(or illness for

etc,

When

one

is

about to die

of old

the matter of that), an expiatory

is

ceremony

(prayatfcitta)

prescribed

this

is

what

is

meant

by

the

prescription
is

about
also

jarS-mararia.
;

The
this

cremation of dead bodies

is

a prescribed rite
"

what
",

is

referred

to

in

the words

being reduced to

ashes

In the

case

of

those

who have
the son
is

performed
enjoined to

sacrifices

during their life-time,

a
final

perform

sacrifice (antyes^i).

Jara (old
well.

age)

is

synecdochic
to
is

for illness

and the like as

''

There seems

have been a

reading

jara-marya- 'rthavada," which

explained by the Rjuprakfts'ikti, to

mean
case

that which
of
(

is

enjoined

(vadhyate=vidhlyate) in the
etc.

arthe)

death due to old age

PAGE

88

76.

Sequence
sense

may
the
of

be

settled

by direct statement
in the texts
is

UrutO,
(patha),

(artha),

order of mention

the position
(sthana),

that whose sequence

to

be

settled

the sequence

adopted in the principal

first

(mukhya), or the sequence adopted in the

(pravjtti),

procedure

The

first

of

these

is,

of

course, the clearest

indication.

Direct statement
"
in

may

be by the participial
(g?hl

-ktca

suffix, as
is

Having become a householder

etc.

bhntva), he

to

become a forest-dweller"

It

has

been said in the text (of the Bhamati) that such sequence

m
is

NOTES
by
the
disregard
of

tP, 88,

H. 76
if

sublated

sequence in "Or,

otherwise, let him " life and so on.

renounce from the student's order of

The next determinant

of sequence

is

artha.

The

text about the preparation of barley gruel occurs after that

about

the

performance

of

agnihotra.

Since the latter

to be the

requires

some material, and barley gruel appears

it

material,

would

be

natural to prepare

this

before

performing the oblation.

of mention

Those who stick to the order

that the
oblation

would, however, maintain

first,

should

come

some other material being assumed

therefor and

that the preparation of the gruel should be

result.

assumed to have some other unseen

This involves

the abandonment of the visible material and the visible

result

and the assumption

Bather than incur
preferable
to

of

something invisible in both

cases.
it is

this defect of prolixity (gaurava),

recognise the sequence warranted by

first

the sense (artha) and prepare the gruel

so that

it

may

be offered in the agnihotra.

The next determinant

(pat ha).
to

is

the order of mention

of six rites, three

The dars'a-pUrnam&sa consists be performed at the full moon and

three at the

new

moon.

They are
and

(1)

the agneya, the agnlsomlya, and the

anubandhya,

(2)

the

agneya,

the aindram dadhi

and the aindram pay ah.

is

For either set of three, there

called
fore-sacrifices
:

a set of subsidiaries
are

(prayaja). "

These
yajati,

mentioned in the following order

yajati,

samido
yajati,

tanttnapfttam
yajati."

ido

yajati,

barhir

svahakaTam
order alone

Should they be performed in this

?

or

in

any other

The answer

is

that since

the names of these rites occur to the mind in the order

of

mention,

they

should

be performed in that order.

P. 88, N. 76]

NOTES
in

273

They

are

learnt

that order, in accordance with the

one's

injunction to study

Veda

and the texts serve tho

the
rites,

purpose
recalling

not only of making

known

but also of

them

to

mind

for the

sake of their observance,

rite,

Of the Jyotis^oma as archetypal

there

is

modification called the sadhyaskra, in which

all

the three

animals,

the

agnlsomlya,

the

savanlya and the anu-

bandhya

have to be

offered

up on the same day, not

on three different days, as in the archetype,

day, then, are they
all to

On which

be offered

On

the second day

the day to which the savanlya

animal belongs in the

in the

archetype
to

after collecting

the
this
its

soma

cup dedicated

the

Atfvins.
is

For,

in

way, each of the other

place

animals

moved out

of

by one day alone;

whereas in any other way, there would be a disturbance

of

two days

for one or other of the animals.

is

And on

the

second day, the savanlya animal

because
the
;

to be

approached

first,

offering

of that

animal belongs

eminently

to that day

and from the originative injunction in the

is

archetype,

it

understood to follow

immediately on

the

filling of the

cup dedicated to the As'vins.

be

The other
order

two

animals

may
them

approached

either in the

belonging to

in the archetype, or without regard for

any special sequence.

(sthEna).

Thus

is

sequence settled by position

Sequence
settled in

among
with

the
that

subsidiaries
in
is

may
the

be

conformity

the principal rite

inter-

(mukhya),
vals

When

such an order
subsidiaries

adopted,
their

between

the

and

respective

principals would be equal; otherwise, there would be a

larger interval in

some

oases,

and in others none at

all.

The

offerings in the

&gneya

etc.

have to be sprinkled with

274
the ghee
left

NOTES
over from the fore-sacrifices.

[P. 88,

N, 76

The Bgneya
;

comes
ling
of

first

and the aindram dadhi comes next

respective materials

the sprink-

the
If

should follow the same

first

order.

the latter were sprinkled

and then the former,

first,

since the Sgneya has to be offered up

between the

sprinkling of
at
all,

it

and

its

offering there would be

no interval

while there would be too long an interval in the case

of the aindram dadhi.

In the Vajapeya, seventeen animals are to be offered

up on the same day.

led, tied

These have
It is a
first.

to be approached, sprink-

up and so on.
is

matter of indifference which

series of opera-

animal

approached

But the whole

tions should not be finished in the case of one animal before

the next one

is

approached

for,

then,

it

would not consti-

tute the offering of the seventeen together.

What

interval

there

is

should be only such as

is

unavoidable.

Hence,

each stage
all

of each operation should be

gone through with

is ?

the animals.
is

Now, when the

that

first

stage (sprinkling)

over,

there any order to be observed for the next stage

facie

The prima

view

is

it is

an unnecessary tax on the

order and that the second

mind
stage
final

to

remember the

original

may
view

begin with any animal ready to hand.

is

The

that the sequence adopted in the

first

opera-

tion should be preserved throughout the series of operations.

When

simultaneity
it is

is

enjoined and succession

is

adopted

only because

inevitable, delay in

each operation should

be reduced to a

minimum

for each

animal there

may

be
;

only sixteen intervals between one operation and the next

and this can be secured only by adhering to the original

order.

This

is

sequence settled by pravytti.

understood that these determinants

It is, of course,

have been mentioned in the order of superiority and that

Pp. 89-90, N. 77-80]

NOTES
is

m
than the preceding
final

each subsequent one

one.
77*

leas conclusive

The

single

result

is

the

supreme unseen

result, the parama-'pHrva, to which the fruit of subsidiary

rites,

the utpatty-apflrvas as they are called, are contri'

butory.
78.

E.g.,
dars'a

He who

desires

heaven should
it is

sacrifice

with the
that
all

and par^amasa," wherefrom

understood

the six sacrifices comprised under dars'a and pfln?a-

masa

are contributory to heaven.

PAGE

89
I.e.,

79.

a specific
;

human

object, say, the securing of

cattle in plenty

this is distinguished to

from what
as

is

kratv-

artha,

subsidiary

the rite

itself

serving

its

due
both

accomplishment.
ends,

When

the same subsidiary

fulfils

we have

two-in-one-ness (samyoga-pythaktva).
is

As

part of the darafe-pttr$amEsa there

a water-sprinkling
is

ceremony

called

ap-praijayana

this

ceremony

by

itself

merely kratv-artha.

But he who desires cattle

;

is to sprinkle

from a godohana (milking) vessel in this case, the sprinkling

becomes purusa-'rtha.
90
It

See

PM,

IV,

i,

2.

PAGE

80.

has been shown that even where

is

explicit use

of the participial (-ktva) suffix, indicative of sequence,

no

sequence

is

intended, as

shown

for instance in the case of

the Jabala

Upaniad.
is

In the case of the desire to

know

Brahman
away.

there

not even such a suffix to be explained

Therefore, the existence of sequence as between the

sacrifice

soma

and the dartfapflnjam&sa-iti has no applica-

tion here,
ee

that being a case of the explicit use of the

2?6
"
participial suffix
"
;

NOTES

[Pp. 91-100, H. 81-87

Having performed the

dartfapflrijamasa-

iti

etc.

PAGE

91

81.
fies

Kartari kftyab.

The
"

the object of an act.

But

become

-ya suffix generally signi" is an intransitive

verb and no object thereof can be signified.

tion
it

To

this objec-

is

said that the suffix in

signifies

bhavyah
(karfcy)

is

really a kytya

suffix,

which

the agent

of

an

act,

not

its

object.

PAGE

92

82.

PM.

I,

i,5.

PAGE

93
Brh., II, iv, 5,

83.

PAGE

96
"

"

84.

Jayasva mriyasva
"

is

apparently in the impera".

tive

mood meaning
is

be born and die

Here, however, the

sua-suffix

used to signify mere repetition.

:

They

are

repeatedly born and they repeatedly die

this is the sense.

This

is

illustrated

by Appayya Dlksita through the Sanskrit

equivalent of the
"

common Tamil
"

expression
"

v^\u
'

vettenru
'

vettinBn which apparently means

'

He
in

cut saying the

cut,
'

cut,

but
(i.e.,

really

means

He

cut

cut, cut

manner

repeatedly) ".

PAGE

97
Brh.. IV,
iv,

85.

23.

PAGE

100
Chand.. VIII,
i,

86.
87.
,

6.
is

This paragraph

commenced, says the Kalpa-

as a reply to Bb&sfcaro,

who

holds that though the

Pp. 102-120, N. 88-90)

NOTES

277
be good

reason given for the desire to

know Brahman may

enough

in itself, there is yet

is

no indication in the aphorism

to the aphorist's mind.

that this
reply

what was present

The
to

makes out that the vtorA,brahma

it,

itself brings

mind the Veda, and not the whole of

of
it
(i.e.,

but those parts

the Upaniads) which

may

suitably
"

come

after
".

the preliminaries

understood by the word

then (atha)

PAGE 102
"
88.

This
is

is

in

answer to the objection that

"

horse-

fodder
horse,

"
"

a dative compound, meaning

fodder for the

though the

compounded elements are not related

The answer as basic object (prakyti) and its modification. " " is that Katyayana himself declares horse-fodder and
the like
to

be possessive compounds,

in

spite

of

their

dative sense.

PAGE

120

89.

This
in

is

the idea
or

a thing'may be defined
if

if it is

known known
of
;

experience

its

attributes

at
;

least

are

or verbal testimony
is

may

apply to

it

but in none

susceptible of being defined. ways " " " 90. The terms samahara-dvandva and itaretara" are difficult to render adequately into English. dvandva " " " " and distributive compound may Collective compound

these

Brahman

serve as a near approximation

"

that

is

to say, in the case

of the

samahara-dvandva,

"

any predication made would

"

apply to the collection as a whole, the collection being

the principal (vis'esya) in that
"

compound

in the

itaretara-

dvandva,

however, the predication would apply to each

whole, the collection here being but an

member
attribute
latter

of the

(vis'esaria) of
is

each member of the aggregate,

The

compound

well exemplified in the text, where the

278
predicate,

NOTES
"niyata,"
applies
to

[Pp. 123-125, N. 91-93

each

member

of

compound
is

time, place, fruit etc.

'

samahSra-dvandva

the "

always in the neuter.

PAGE 123
91.
for his

The son performs the annual ceremonies (sraddha)

Here, the son
is

departed ancestors.

agent alone, not

enjoyer,

while the fathers are enjoyers alone, not agents.

offered on twelve potsherds,
is

Similarly, the vais'vanara-isiji,

by the father on the birth

the son
;

of a son,

for the welfare of

;

here,
is

the son

is

not

agent, but enjoyer alone

the father

agent, but enjoyer only remotely, through the

;

welfare of his son

92.

see

PM,
is

IV,

iii,

38-39.

Planetary and guardian

deities.

The reason urged

for their non-creatorship

the fact that the world contains

It
is

many
is

agents,

enjoyers

etc.

not the plurality that

If

important here, but the diversity.

the world were

at least of a uniform nature, its creation

by those of limited
;

knowledge and power might be

their creatorship
is

intelligible

what precludes
and the

the diversity

of the world

finitude of the capacity of these deities.

Being themselves

jlvas, says the Kalpataru, they cannot create a world full

of jlvas
finitude.

like themselves

here too the essential defect

is

One may
the

also expect the cause to differ in

;

some

way from
if

effect

there would be no such difference,

these deities were the cause.

PAGE

125

93.

On

the three varieties

13.

of parinama, see
is

Yoga

Sutras, III,

Dharma-pariQ&ma

exemplified by clay

ceasing to

be

a lump and becoming a pot.

to the

Laksa$a~

parinama belongs

dharmas

e.g.,

the lump of clay

;

ceases to be present and comes to belong to the past

the

Pp, 131-132, N. 94-97]

NOfKB

2<f9

pot ceases to be of the future and comes to belong to the

present.

Avastha-pari^ama belongs to the lakagas

is

e.g.,

even the pot that

states

present attains each

moment

different

as

new

or old.
or,

characteristic

as

By laksaija is understood temporal Woods renders it, time- variation

Prof,

avastha

is

a mode.

Keith following Prof. Jacobi

suggests that the treatment of these three varieties in the

Yogabhnsya

gives

clear

indications

of indebtedness

to

Vasubandhu.

See Some Problems of Indian Philosophy,

pp.

IHQ, VIII,
lak$ai}a
94.
is

431432.

The word lak^aya

"

in

dharma",

used in the sense of rflpa,

Taittn III, 1.

consisting in

95.

Nirukta,

I,

2 (p. 29, SarUp's edition).

PAGE

131

96.

The soma
"grahas".

juice

is

collected

and kept in cups

sacrifice
is

called

In

particular

called
;

the

atiratra,"

the use of sixteen cups

is

prescribed

but

elsewhere in Scripture, there

also the prohibition of the

use of the sixteenth cup in the atirstra sacrifice.

face
of

In the
is

such contradiction,

it

is

understood that there

option for the sacrificer to use or not to use the sixteenth

cup.

PAGE

132

97.

The Srlrangam

"

edition reads

svatantryam iva

bhavati," meaning that

human

activity and non-activity,

though dependent on prescriptions and prohibitions, seem

to be free.

This discrediting of freedom

is

not required or

supported by the text.

"

The Kalpataru

too seeks not to

deny freedom, but to show and

prescriptions
etc.:
yet,

justify the dependence on

Though
because

capable of acting of his

of

own

free

will,

his

not knowing the

280

KOtES

(P. 135,

N. 98-100
beneficial

instrumentality (of particular acts) to what

is

or harmful, there is need of the prescriptions and prohibi-

tions that give that knowledge-"

PAGE

135
Kafka., IV,
1.

98.
99.

In the tarkapada

(II, ii).
is

100.

Inference sSmai?yato dpsta

the

third

of the
It
is
is

traditionally
essentially

recognised three classes of inference.

inference

by

analogy.

Thus,

the

sun

inferred

to
its

move,

on the analogy of Caitra, for the sun

changes
Caitra
is

position

and similar change of position

Its special
is

for
lies

accounted for by motion.

value

in dealing
of

with a probandum which

(atlndriya).

beyond the reach

is

the senses
of

That Brahman

not in the

sphere

the

senses

has been already stated.

it is

Now,

Vacaspati goes on to say that

of inference,
to

not even in the sphere

it

even that variety of

which

is

applicable

what
is

is

super-sensuous.

kanika

explained
of a

at

The argument of the NyHyasome length by the Kalpataru.

The inference
creator;
for,

creator

may

establish at best a

human
extrain

in

the case
of

of

some human beings

ordinary powers
Vis'vamitra
for

creation

have been observed, as

who

created a whole universe.

It is possible

one or more

human

beings, therefore, to create a world,

If

acting simultaneously or in succession.

you say that

you

argue to

a creator with

knowledge of the means

? If so,

employed, do you mean some knowledge of them

omniscience

is
If,

not established and your inference of the

Lord
your

fails.

however,

you claim omniscience

the
in

to

be

probandum,
is

again
present

inference

fails,

since the

probandum

not

any co-subject (sapakg*),

Pp. 136-142, N. 101-104]

NOTES
the
potter

281

You

knows everything in connection with the pot he makes and that, similarly, God knows everything in connection with the world he

may

say

that

makes.

But the potter knows not who

it it

will

buy

his pot

nor what uses

will

be put to
fall

and

if

God's knowledge
of

were

similar,

would

far

short

omniscience.

Further,
If

God, who

has no mind, can have no knowledge.

you say

that, because of his lordship,

he has knowledge

even without a mind, you

of
his

may

as well say that, because

lordship,

he creates the universe, though he has

no knowledge; and thus, like the moneylender

his greed for interest loses the principal,

who

in

you cut

at the

very root of the argument for

an

intelligent creator.

PAGE

136

101. 102.

Under

I, i, 4.

r i.

III, 6.

PAGE 140
103.

Brh.

II, iv, 10.

PAGE 142
104.
of the
is

Recitation of the Veda,

if

defective in respect

hymns, words or due

to be

inflection of the voice (svara)

evil,

said

productive of

even as

if

the words
of this

were
is

thunder-bolt.

The

legendary

instance

that of Tvas^ha

who performed
Indra.

a sacrifice to obtain a

son
the

who would vanquish

stress

But since he misplaced

in

the

compound

"indra-tfatruh,''

what he
of

actually said

amounted to a prayer for a son

;

whom
who

Indra would be the vanquisher

thus was born V^tra,

was

slain in due course

by Indra.

282

NOTES
147

[Pp. 147-150, N, 105-106

PAGE

105.

PM.,

I, ii, 7.

PAGE

150
In respect of the upEmafu sacrifice,
is

106. "

scripture

to perform the upSmtfu sacrifice at intervals," " and goe3 on to say Vis$u is to be sacrificed to with the " etc. Two upEmtfu, for the avoidance of jSmita (monotony)

says

He

other deities are also mentioned as to be sacrificed to with

the upamtfu.

form of the
sacrificed to

rite.

The deity and the material constitute the " The latter set of texts Vis$u is to be
etc.

"

mentions the deities

is

another text says

that where the material

not specifically mentioned, the

ghee in the darvl

texts

is

the material.

Thus, the latter set of

would seem to be

really injunctive, the first being mere;

ly a collective restatement

further, the imperative suffix

is

to be found

only in the second set.

first

Nevertheless, the final

is

view

is

that the

text

alone

injunctive.

If the

second set were

injunctive, then, for the

same purpose and

with the same material, there would be the prescription

of

three

rites

to

three

deities,

though
If
.

the unity

of
is

purpose would suggest a single

injunctive,

rite.

the

first

text

the

second

set

may

be taken to contain

restatements

thereof combined with eulogistic passages

fruit.

mentioning the
if

There can be no syntactical unity,

Further,
etc.

several
Visflu
is

rites

be taken to be enjoined.
"
etc.,
is

in

"

to

be sacrificed to

VisQu

appear

to

be the principals, while the rite

is

secondary, whereas
its

the rite

primary in the

first

text,

mention there

being

novel (apflrva).

In the
etc,

second set of texts,

we
as

have to construe Vi?$u

deities

as secondary and relate

is

them

to

the

rite

which

really

primary*

Rather

154, N. 107]

NOTES
it

283
first

than

do

this,

is

simpler to take the

text as

injunotive*

Though
it

the

verb

there

is

in

the present

indicative mood,

may

be interpreted as an imperative*
rite,

As

for the

form of the
;

even the second set

is

not

self-contained

and the co-operation of the general text

material
is

declaring
too,

the

available

for

the
of

first

text

which text has the further advantages

For such reasons, the second

parsimony
is

and novelty.
as
is

set

treated

containing restatements, having the force "so great

the up&mtfu that Visriu
principle
is

etc,

are the deities thereof

"

".

The governing

that of syntactical unity for

the whole passage beginning with jami va etad yajnasya " " kriyate up to agnisomav upams'u yatavya 'jamitvaya ".

The

same

principle "
"
etc.

is

applied

to

the

Vedanta texts

beginning with
the beginning

Existence alone, dear one, this was in

PAGE 154
107.

The following

is

the Kalpataru

summary

of the

arguments
is

of the Nyayakayikft: (1) Religious duty,

to be done,

which

what
is

is

cannot be the sphere of perception,

sense with what
is.

which
(2)

born of the contact of

of Yogins
;

Even the perception

in

can claim excellence

hence perception
(3)
is

only

respect

of sense-objects

inapplicable to dharma, the content of the Veda.

And

since
of

it

has no probans
etc.
(4)

etc.,

it

cannot be the sphere

utter intelligible
is

inference

And no person can

is

statements
about.

when he

ignorant
are

of

what he
of

to

speak

Hence the Vedas

not

human
"

should be remembered that the word

context
applies
to
all

human

It origin. " in this

beings short of the omniscient

one, and not to

men

alone.

284

NOTES

[Pp. 157-165, N. 108-111

PAGE 157
108.

The reference

is

to

Bfh-Upa.,

I,

iv,

15; the

immediately
I,

iv, 7.

The

preceding text is " "

from the same Upanisad

is

word

lokam

translated

by some as

"state"
seems
to

or "true state".

But the word "enjoyment"

with S'aftkara's understanding

accord

better

of the passage in his

bh&sya on that Upanisad.

is

109.

The reference

to

T8,

I,

v, 1.

The story

goes that the devas handed

over their wealth for safefit

keeping to Agni,

who

in a

of greed ran

away with

it

and hid himself in the waters.

the other devas, he howled and

When

he was caught by

his tears
is

became
of

silver.

The statement
value.
It
is

is

good as a fairy tale but

no practical

therefore
of

explained to be subsidiary to the

of
silver

prohibition
prohibition

the

offering

as

daksiita,

which occurs

later in the

same

S'ruti,

PAGE 158
110.

Darvihoma (PM, VIII,

it

iv,

1-9) is

the

name

of

rite
it

is

not the injunction of an accessory, in which

sacrifice

case
It
is

would mean an injunction of a

with the darvl,

not a sacrifice (yajna) but an oblation (homa).

accessories
etc.

No

special

are prescribed, the

same

accessories

spoon
rites.

being used as are prescribed for other enjoined

It

has no archetype.

Besides

the text enjoining

texts

its

performance, there are no other

it

laying

down
text

the fruit or praising

is

and so
all

on.

Hence that one

to

be taken to perform

the functions, particularly

those of praising and prescribing the homa.

PAGE

165

111.

The

text

is

"well established (long-lived) are

",

they who

meditate on the ratrl

The

fruit of long life,

P, 167, N, 112-113]

NOTES
only in an eulogistic passage,
is

285
not

being
really

mentioned
its

fruit;

that fruit

is

understood to be heaven,

on the analogy
is

of the Vis'vajit sacrifice.

is

But the

final

view

that the fruit

whatever

is

mentioned nearest, in

the order of express statement, eulogistic passage, what

is

carried

over from

another and so on,

fruit
is

In the case of

the

Ratrisattra,

no

expressly stated;
life

but the
fruit
is

eulogistic

passage mentioning long

;

as
fruit,

the

only next in authority

hence, this

is

the

not heaven,

which, even in the case of the

but
is

Vis'vajit, is not expressed,

assumed

see PAf, IV,

iii,

17-19.
offering

112.

Piflda-pitf-yajna

is

an

to the

manes,
This

to be
is

made on the afternoon

of the

new moon
rite,
is

day.

an independent, not a subsidiary,

is

since a particular
also

time

prescribed
for other

and
rites
;

that time
further,

seen to be

prohibited

it is

enumerated along
it

with other principal

to have a fruit of
its

rites.

This being the case,

fruit,

ought
;

own no
;

however,

is

mentioned

hence, on the analogy

to be
is

of the
fruit
iii,

Via'vajit,
is

its fruit is

taken

heaven.

That the

heaven, in such cases,

ascertained in

PAT, IV,
;

15-16, in connection with

the Vtevajit sacrifice

yet the analogy of the Pi^a-pityVis'vajit

yajna

is

mentioned here, since in fact the

for,
it

has
rite

another fruit;
for

is

prescribed

as

an expiatory

him who undertakes a

fails to

sattra sacrifice, performs the

sacrifice.

sankalpa, but

go through with the

PAGE 167
113.

PM,

IV,

i,

22-24.

It

is

enjoined that curds

object of the pouring

should be poured into hot milk.

is

The

the production of cream (ftmiksa),

Whey

too results,

however, as a by-product,

286

NOTES
170

[Pp. 170-179, N.

114419

PAGE

114.

The removal
;

of Nescience

is

not something over

p,

and above knowledge

eva Vidya-nivyttih.
115.
it

Cp. Brahmasiddhi,

32

vidyo-'daya

If

a sacrifice

is

enjoined,

it

does not follow that

should bear fruit either here alone or only in a hereafter.

is

Thus, the Karlri

crops

performed to secure
;

rain, so that the

may
in

be luxuriant

if

that

is

fruitful at all (and not

it

obstructed
fruit

by some unknown cause),

life,

should bring

its

this
is

almost

immediately after the

;

sacrifice.
is

The Citra
restriction

performed for obtaining cattle

there
;

no

as to

when

this

should bear fruit

man may
whether

become prosperous

as the result of that sacrifice,

in this life or the next.

PAGE

172

116,

See note 112 on Piflda-pity-yajfia.

PAGE

175
Op. Brahmasiddhi, pp. 63
ff,

117,

PAGE 177
118*

Vardhamana would appear

in the

to

have been a gold

ornament

form of a svastika.

PAGE

179
"

119.

Difference

is

dependent

"
eto.

This one sentence

seeks to summarise
rather
siddhi.
stiff

a good part of the interesting and

of the second chapter of the

dialectic

Brahma-

Interested readers should turn to that for fuller

information.

A slight

expansion of the argument of the

Bhnmati
iifference

is,

however, attempted here.

Our knowledge

of

is

necessarily bound up with that of the correlates

P. 179, N. 119]

NOTES

287
"
is

which are
different

different.

The cognition

of the form
if

is

from

"
;

and this would not be possible,

there

were no prior knowledge of

A and B

and

this cognition of

A
;

and B cannot be of them as non-different, as otherwise the

subsequent cognition of their difference could not arise
therefore,

the cognition of difference, which

we seek

to

explain,

is

based on a cognition of differents, which would

as

not

be

cognised
;

such but for a cognition of their

Further,
is

difference

thus we have reciprocal dependence.

units,
if

the cognition relates to several

different from the

each of which

others.

Now,

there were no units,

there would be no difference either.

that difference
difference
is

But your contention

For,

is

real

tends

to

abolish the unit.

it is

either

an attribute

of the units or
If
it

of their
is it

very constitution (svabhava).

identical

be an attribute,
?

with the differents or not identical

Obviously,
is

an attribute cannot be identical with that which

to possess
it
;

said

else,

it

would be
it.

of the very constitution of

that which possesses

is,

If the attribute is
is

not identical,

in

other words, different, what

?
it,

the nature of this

it

second difference
should
be
?

Is

that too an attribute, as

obviously
it

Is
?

then, different

from the elements

in the affirmative
;

differentiates

The answer must be

and

thus,

we

get an

infinite regress of differences,

finality.

each resting

on the next without any

difference
is

Let us say* then, that

of things.

of

the very

constitution
:

Two
"
diffeif

difficulties present

themselves

(1)

and

are the alleged

is

differents.
"

They

agree in

this, that

what

called

rence
things

is

of the very constitution of both. in

Now,

two

agree

some particular
u

aspect, so far forth they

"
is

are identical
of both

Because

difference

of the constitution

and B, the two are so far identical

But

this

288

NOTES

[Pp. 181-184, N. 120-122

was
if

just the reason alleged for their non-identity.

it

Thus,
itself.

difference be of the nature of things?

abolishes

(2)

We
;

must have

and

before

we can say
is

that they

are different.

But we cannot have these or any other

each alleged unit, difference
the very

units

for,

of

nature.
to

Hence, whatever

may

be set up as a unit,

down

the primal
is

atom, tends to break

down

indefinitely*

There
is

nothing which can be called one.

itself or as

single thing

not single either in

a combination of simpler

elements, since there can be no units to combine.

These

objections apply not merely to the cognition of difference,

but to
be

its

very existence.

Unity, on the other hand, cannot

shown

to be thus dependent
in

on difference

for its exis-

tence.

True,

respect

of cognition, there does

this

seem

to

be such dependence.

But

may

be explained on the

basis of a posited difference.

A phenomenon

need not be

explained by external causes in every case, since internal

defects like those of a sense-organ (jaundice, joy, fear etc.)

may

be the causes in

many

cases.

Since difference and

non-difference cannot both be real, one of

treated as posited.

them must be

For the reasons here stated and on

razor),
it

grounds

of

parsimony (Occam's

is

proper to

assume

difference to be posited

on non-difference.

PAGE

181

120.

Pr.,VI,

8.

PAGE

182
Nytiya Sutras,
I, i, 2,

121.

PAGE

184
In
the

122.

imagined
is

identification

(sampat), pri-

macy

belongs to

what

imagined, not to that on which

P. 185,

N, 123-124] imposed;
it

NOTES
is

289

it

is

aropyapradhana, not alambana or

like

adhithanapradhana,
the distinction
Paftcapndikn.
is

superimposition

(adhyasa)

stated almost in the

identification

same terms

in the

For the

of the Dravidacarya

mentioned on page 185, see

Mm.

8.

Kuppuswami

Sastri in

Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, Madras, pp. 468-473,

where a plausible case

Tirumalitfai Alvar.

is

made out

for the equation

with

PAGE 185
123.
Stuta-s'astravat.
is

The mention
;

of the deities in
is

a musical chant a musical

these
(the

a stuti
it

where the mention

a
stestra.

not in

chant,
to to

is

called

Since both of
of subsidiaries

serve
deities)

make

clear the

relation

the principal (the sacrifice), and since

they have the visible result of mentioning the nature of

the
deities,

they are but subsidiary rites;

view.

this

is

the

prima

facie

The

final

view holds that they are

"

principal rites with an unseen potentiality as their fruit,

as

otherwise

the

expressly

stated
futile.

"
stauti,
e.g.,

injunction

"tfaiiasati"

etc.

would be

Further, a stuti,
is

"this kgatriya youth has large eyes"

praise,
etc.

intended to be a

not

a description

hence, description, denotation

of the deities

may

not be said to be the visible result

of stuti etc.
self

Similarly, here too, the contemplation of the

;

may

be the principal
principals,
of

this

is

the sense.
II,
i,

On

stuti

and
the

tfastra

as

see

PM,

13-29.

For

punctuation

this

sentence,

we have

relied

on the

Kalpataru and the Nirnayasagar edition of the Bhamatl

with the RatnaprabhU.
is

The punctuation

in other editions

clearly erroneous.

See also additional notes.

124,

290

NOTES
187
"

[Pp. 187-189, H. 125-126

PAGE

125.

Bright gold

is

to be worn."

This

is

one of the

stray sayings

which occur without being

It is

related to

any

particular sacrificial rite.

contended as a prima facie

in-

view that since the material and the deity for an

dependent
rite

are not mentioned, since

it is

mentioned in

the Adhvaryava Veda presumably as something to be done

by the adhvaryu, since the wearing must be intended as a

purification of the wearer or the gold or both, and since the purification
rite,

must be intended

for the sake of

some other

the injunction to wear gold should be subsidiary to the

rites.

agnihotra and other such

The

final

view

is

that since

an independent
and since there

result is declared
is

disfiguring the

enemy,

no application (niyoga) of the wearing in

rite, it
is is

the context of any other

an independent duty.

The second

of these reasons

more important, since the

declaration of fruit

may

be discounted on the ground of the

"

absence of the usual formula

He who

desires this

is

to

do

such and such

"

".

Hence

it

is

that the Bhrimatl has the

words
cation
".

viniyoga-bhaftgena, because of failure of the appli-

Nor may

subsidiariness

be established on the
for,

analogy of the ladle

ladle,

made

of

parga wood,

unlike the

this

wearing

is

not invariably related to a sacrifice,

for purposes

gold being

worn even

other than sacrificial.

See

PM>

III, iv,

20-24.

PAGE 189
126.

The

Srlrangam

edition

reads

vaktf,

vakya,

vacaka and vacan&ni, instead

pacanani.

of pakt?, pakya,
is

paka and

What

is

intended in either case

the denial of

agency, whether as a speaker or as a cook, though the

latter
is,

perhaps,

the

more

forceful

illustration.

The

Pp. 200-209, N. 127-130]

NOTES
to

291
support the Staraftgam

Rjupraknvika
reading.

would

appear

PAGE 200
127.

Aitareya Brahmaya,

III, viii, 1.

PAGE

202

128.

The compound might mean

"
;

"

those which are the

contents of injunctions
"

in the present context, however,

is

the meaning

is

those whose content

"
;

an injunction,

i.e.

something to be done

see the

Kalpataru.

PAGE 207
129.

The process
the cow, and

of learning

assumed by the Prabha-

karas

is

rather elaborate.

They say that when

brings
it,

asks

to bring

C,

who

hears A's words

and sees B's action, infers B's understanding of the sense of

the
words, and
thus

comes

to

know

that those words

mean

that action.

But how does C know that the under-

standing of the sense of the words should have preceded

B's actions
?

The

relation of words to sense in this case he

If
it

comes

to

know

only later.

be said that he knows

of the

from prior conditioning of action by knowledge

sense, since the process of learning
is

word-

the same there too,

the question
infinite
is

is

but pushed one stage back, and

we have an

regress.

The only way

meaning
is

to get out of the difficulty

is

to hold that the

of

words

original and natural,

and that the meaning

relation to

conveyed even independently of

what

is

to be done.

PAGE 209
"

130.

He

is

to offer flour (as an oblation).

Flour,
;

here, has not been used in the rite

fore,
it

up

to this stage

thereit

has not been purified

nor after the oblation does

292
survive, since
it

NOTES
is

[P. 217,

N, 131-132
it

reduced to ashes

hence, then too,

I

cannot be treated as purified by the

be understood that what
is
is

rite

it

must therefore
this

primary

in

injunction

the

oblation,

not the
case,

flour,

and that the

latter,

though

in

the

accusative

should

be interpreted in the
there
is

instrumental
bhaftga
in
is

case

(tfaktuna
of flour,

juhoti);
in the

viniyogaas in the

the case

same way

gold that

to be worn*

PAGE

217

131.

This

is

from

SfobarasvEmin's

bhaya

on

PIT,

I, i, 2.

132,

Vacaspati follows

Kumarila in

his

view of the
the sphota

relation of language to meaning.

He

rejects

doctrine of the

grammarians and Magdana MisTa, holding

to the possibility of an ordered recollection of the audible

sounds which manifest the different letters

recollection
rise

from such a

may
are,

arise word-sense.

The word-senses which

independent.

thus

however,

not

They

are
is

fundamentally parts of a sentence-sense; this latter

their

purport.

Hence

each word, while expressing

its

own
is

sense, reaches

forward to the sentence-sense, which

all

secondarily implied (lakgita) by

the words together,

is

While thus the integrity

is

of the sentence

recognised,

it

not exalted at the

It

expense of the independence of the

that
in

words.

would
is

appear
held
to

while
the

some

form

of

associationism
different

explanation of

how

audible sounds
is

come

to

constitute a word, this

view-point

transcended in considering the relation of

to

word senses
advaitins

the

sentence-sense.

One wonders why

based as

like

Saftkara

and Vacaspati did not favour

the doctrine of pada-sphofa and vakya-sphoja,

Pp. 218-223, N. 133-136]

it

NOTES
is

293
truer and has

is

on a psychology which
advaita principles.

more
"

in

common with
I, iii,

See further the Bhfimatl,

28, Vacaspati's Tattvabindu

and an
"

article

on

Vftcas-

pati's

criticism

of the Sphota-vada,

Journal of Oriental

Research, Madras, VI, 311,

PAGE

218
Slokavnrttika, VII, vv. 342, 343
;

133.

p. 943.

PAGE 219
134.

Op. Brahmasiddhi,

p,

99

PaficapHdikQ, p. 97.

PAGE

220

135.

PAUI,

i,

1.

PAGE

223
Ordinarily,

136.

the

negative

particle

should

be

construed with the

verb-ending, to signify a prohibition.

:

There
is

are,

however, two exceptions

"

(1)

when

the sentence

introduced
"

with words relating to something positive,

etc.
;

such as

His vows are

result,

and

(2)

when otherwise
is

an option would
the

(1)
it

An
is

example of the former

said to be part of a

Prajapati-vrata, where

vow
The

not to look on the rising nor on the setting sun.

premising of a
to

vow

raises the

expectation of

something

be done

not looking at the sun must be understood

to be

to

mean something
Hence,

done, not merely something to be

avoided.

the

negative

statement

is

taken to

enjoin the formation of a resolve not to see the rising or

the setting sun.

The negative

particle

is

Detached from

the optative verb-ending and

verb, so

attached to the root of the

i.e.,

that

it

may

signify not-seeing,

the resolve not

to

see.

When

combined thus with verbal roots or with

nouns, the negative indicates not prohibition, but exclusion,

294

NOTES
non-brahmin.
sacrifice
(2) It
is

[P. 229, N. 137 "

e.g,

said in Scripture
shall

Not

in the

after
If
this

(anflyaja)

he

say ye-yajamahe".
it

be taken to be a prohibition,
of

would imply the

prior establishment
sacrifices
;

the saying of ye-yajamahe in all

for,

only

of

the contingent can there be any

futile.
;

denial,

as

otherwise negation would be

No

such
be

rule is

established as to saying ye-yajamahe

"

and

if it

assumed, option would

between
is

He

result, just as there is, for instance, " " and is to offer oblation before sun-rise

He

to offer oblation after sun-rise

"<

Nor can the negation

wholly annul the assumed

result;
for,

rule so that option

is

may

not

such wholesale annulment

possible

only

between independent statements,

but not between state;

ments one
the
this

of
is

which

is

presupposed by the other

here,

rule

presupposed by the negation.

is

Because of
related not
"

contingence of option, the negation

"
"

"

to

the word
"
is

say,

but to

after-sacrifice,

so that the
after-

meaning

He

shall

say ye-yajamahe not at the

sacrifice". pp.

See the Mlmamsfi-nyaya-praktis'a,

(Edgerton),

168174.

Students of Western Logic will note the insist-

ence on relevance to the context in both prohibition and

exclusion.

Denial can be only of that which

is

is

possible

exclusion

only of that which

discourse

is

similar and falls into the

universe

of

(nan iva

yuktam

anya-sad^-

'dhikaraije),

PAOK'229
"
;

"

.137.

Upalaka$a
".

may

be rendered AS. a ".qualifica-

tipn per- acddena as

to

It is difficult to

render into English so

vis'esaija

bring out

its

difference

from

(proprium)

on the
the

one hand and upadhi (conditioning adjunct) on

other.

The

distinction

is

well

explained

in

the

P. 242,

N. 138]
p.

NOTES
420
(under
I,

295

Kalpataru,
inheres
in

iv,

22).

That

which
it,

the product

and serves to distinguish

is

like

the blueness
inherent

of the nllotpala,

a vitfesana,

What

is

not

may
it

be either an up&dhi or an upalakai?a.

Of

these, that which lasts as long as the product and serves to

distinguish

is

an upadhi that which

;

is

occasional and

causes the cognition of difference

is

an upalak?a^a.

The

distinction between these two corresponds to that between

inseparable accidens

and separable accidens.

Redness

is

not inherent in the crystal nor the crow in the house.

But when one

is

is

asked to fetch the red crystal, the redness

crystal
till

present in the
is

it

is

brought

but

when

house

pointed to Caitra as that

which has a crow perched

till

on

it,

the crow does not necessarily remain there

;

Caitra
is

reaches the house

upalaksaija,

redness

is

an upadhi, the crow

an

PAGE 242
138.

This Brahman-knower has been identified as one

of references in

Acarya Sundara Pa$<Jya, on the strength

Atmasvarflpa's Prabodhapariyodhinl, (R. No. 3225 of the

Govt. MSS. Library, Egmore), an unpublished Commentary

on the Paficapftdika, and in Madhavamantrin

dlpikft,

Tatparya-

Commentary on
Sastri
ff.

the Stltasamhita

see

Mm.

S.

Kuppuswami
Madras,
I, p. 5

in the Journal

of Oriental Research,

The learned author of this paper suggests

the identification of Sundara Pa$<jya with (1)

Kan

Pa$<Jya,
of his

reputed to
illness

have been a learned king, who was cured

and reconverted to Saivism by the famous Saiva

Tirujnanasambandha,
or
(iii)

Saint, himself,

or

(ii)

Tirujftanasambandha
of the

some other pre-Kumahla scholar

The
first

PQrva

and

Uttara Mimaipsas.

two

of

these

296

NOTES

[P. 244,

N, 139

suggestions suffer from the difficulty of having to reconcile

the advaita taught in these verses with the fifaivism of the

reputed

author;
is

the

characterisation

of the

latter

as

S'ivadvaita

of little help, for,

between Siv&dvaita and

what we may
is

for convenience call Saftkaradvaita, there

wide enough gap to bridge.

And

while there

is

tradition that
sion,

Kun

Paridya was a Jaina before

his reconver-

there

is

no tradition that he was an advaitin, either

;

earlier

or later

and the difference between the positions

not so slight as to be glossed over.
to the second identification.

ascribed to

him

is

The

same
third

difficulty
is

applies

The

too vague to need acceptance or rejection.

Whether

the
is

ascription of the verses to

correct
is

an Acarya Sundara Paridya

itself

a question that merits further conside-

ration, since the ascription

seems to appear only in comwithin the bounds of possibility

;

paratively late works.

It is

that a quotation
thus,

is

mistaken for one's own composition

verses

quoted by a comparatively obscure and late

Sundara Pa$<Jya

may have
later

been wrongly ascribed to him

;

by Atmasvarflpa and Madhavamantrin but in the absence

of

any knowledge of a

Sundara Paijdya or about the

is

trustworthiness of AtmasvarQpa, this

nothing more than

bare

possibility.
I,
ii,

An

attempt has been made in the

Jignyasa,
S.

1-6

to traverse the
;

arguments of

Mm.

Euppuswami

Sastriar

but most of the contentions are

rather puerile and unconvincing.

PAGE 244
139.

The

advaitin cannot insist

too strongly that

is

the cognition

which destroys Nescience

possesses
;

also a psychosis

and that

it

only the same class of reality as

what

it

destroys

it

is

not absolutely

real.

Though

in a

P. 245, N.

UO]

NOTES
it is

297
based on distincdistinc-

sense the product of Nescience, (for

tions tions
of pramftty,

prama^a and prameya, which

of Nescience)
it

are products

has yet the capacity

the

to destroy its generatrix

fire

and

itself at

same

time.

The

born of the friction of bamboos in a forest does not

spare the bamboos which generated it; and,

when the
Nor
is

whole forest
it

is

consumed,
is

it

dies

out of

itself.

true

that what

not absolutaly real has no practical

unreal, causes effects

efficiency.

Even a dream, though

or

physical and psychical, besides serving as an indicator of

future
events,

auspicious

otherwise.

Indeed,

the

advaitin maintains that practical efficiency belongs only

to the

empirically valid, neither to the wholly real nor to

unreal.

the wholly
it

The

latter

cannot be

efficient,

since

itself

is

not

the former, being eternally accomplished,

efficient.

has no activity and hence cannot be

"

That

is

why Vacaspati
that
of
is

says

As

for that intuition

it is

which

is real,

not something to be done, since

"

of the nature

Brahman.

PAGE 245
140.

JW,

11.

ADDITIONAL NOTES
[The following
additional notes relate to pages 10, 20, 27, 46, and 220-223, 227-228, 237, 239.|
:

49, 71, 95, 122, 147,-:153, 162-165

PAGE
"

10
"

prakarag&.'ntara
list

is

difference
is

of context (see the

of corrections).

This

the last of the six pramanas

given by Jaimini

(PM II,

Hi, 24) for differentiating rituals.

298
It
is

ADDITIONAL NOTES
defined thus:

anupadeya-guga-sahakyta-'nupasthitih
In essence
it

prakaraga-'ntaram.
to the intellect.

consists in non-proximity
148,

The term occurs again on page

"

and
"

the

same idea

is

expressed by YEcaspati as

asannidhana

on page 146

PAGE
"

20

tadguija-samvijnano bahuvrlhih.

"

Adjectival com-

pounds are of two kinds

clusive,

the inclusive and the non-in-

In the present case the denotation of the com"

pound

"janmadi"
1

is

origination,

sustentation

and

destruction

';

this

denotation includes that of the com-

ponent
is

parts

"janma and

adi"; thus this compound

"

of the inclusive type,

"

In a compound, however, like

"

citragu

in sentences like

citragum anaya (bring the

man with
signified

spotted

cows)" the spotted cows which are

by

the

component

parts
;

are not included in

the signification of the compound

for

what

is

intended

is

the arrival of the owner of the cows, not his arrival with
the cows
;

hence

this

compound

is

of the non-inclusive type.

PAGE

27

"abheda-vyavaharah samanadhikaranya-vyapadetfatf ca"

"

has been rendered as

empirical usage as non-different

and appositional designation".

narily

Vyavahara (usage)

ordi-

vyapadetfa (verbal designation) too ; here, " " are however, they distinguished, vyavahara signifying
practical activity alone.
"

includes

Hence the denotation

"
of

empiri-

cal

usage
is

what

narrower in the present context, excluding " mentioned in appositionai designation ;" it in
is
is,

other words, equivalent to "pravftti (activity), " which

the word used by Vacaspati in the middle of p, 28.

is

ADDITIONAL NOTES

299

PAGE
11

46
"

nirupadrava-bhntartha-svarUpasya
siders

etc.

The

out-

here cited are the Bauddhas,

who

teach the doctrine

of nairatmya.
effort.

The apprehension
is

of this truth costs

some

But once there

is

the apprehension and contempla-

tion

thereof, there

increasing clarity, which, however,

effort, in

does not call for increased

increased success
before.

the

same way

as each

in

jumping

calls for a bigger effort

than

Nor
of

is

there subsequent sublation by error, the

persist
;

impressions

which too

for

knowledge has a bias

till

for truth, and disturbances due to error exist only

is

truth

attained, not
;

thereafter.

This

is

a favourite verse with

Vacaspati

see,

on verse 64.

for instance, the Sfthkhyatattvakaumudl " The word intellect" in the translation has

to be understood
list

as

synonymous with knowledge

see also

of corrections.

PAGE

49
" "

The
to

reading

pravartante

adopted

by

us seems
"

have the support of the Bhfimatltilaka and the Rjupraka-

s'ikn.

The

Parimala,

which uses the analogy

etc.,

yatha

pradhanam pravartate"
"

may

possibly prefer the read-

ing

pravartate

".

On

either reading, the subject of the

M
etc.

sentence "atha svayam eva kasmat

plied

has to be sup"

"

from without; but on the reading

to

pravartate
is

it is

possible

understand
fit

that the subject

neither the self

(which does not

"
plural),

in)

nor prama^as (which requires the

is

but

yat pravartate tat (that which

to

active) ".
it

Such usage may be taken

"

be idiomatic, and
after.
it

agrees

with what comes before and

"

But we prefer the

reading

pravartante

since

has the support of two

commentaries besides that of the MSS. mentioned in Note 48.

60

300

ADDITIONAL NOTES
71
4<

PAGE

"adhikrta-'dhikara"

is

rendered as

eligibility of

the per-

son already eligible

".

Two components

enter into adhikara

the possession of certain qualities, connate, acquired or both

(this alone is

what

is

understood by fitness or eligibility ordifruit to

narily),

and the possession of interest in the

be atin-

tained.

The former
Brahmin
is

is

more

in the foreground

when, for

stance, a
rite,
it is

said to be the adhikarin for a particular

is

In adhikyta-'dhikara, interestedness

more
is

to fore

a person, interested in a particular result, that

further

interested in another result accruing from a further subsidiary.

PAGE
"

95
"

nitya-'nitya-vastu-vivekah.
this.

Vacaspati's position

is

What
is
;

is

eternal

is

not already
as

known

as distinct from

what
inquiry

non-eternal,

then there can be no further

nor can indefinite knowledge, of the nature of doubt,

avail to generate non-attachment.

What

does exist

is

the

distinction of eternality from non-eternality, the discrimi-

nation of the attributes (which are called vastu, since they

dwell therein, vasatl
non-eternality
is

7t).

This knowledge of eternality and

linked up with the knowledge of desirability

and non-desirability.
"

And
Thou

thus he knows that

"
"

among

the

denotations of the

and the

"
I,

that which will

be established as eternal will be that which turns out to be

desirable

and the non- eternal that which turns out not

This

to be desirable.

much

of

knowledge can account for

both non-attachment and the desire to

know Brahman.

PAGE 122
"

yatha

'hul^

buddhi-siddham tu na tad

"

asat.

This
Sastriar

quotation has been traced by

to

Mm.
i,

S.

Kuppuswami

the

Nynya

Sutras

(IV,

50),

where, however, the

ADDITIONAL NOTES
"

301

reading

is

buddhi-siddham

tu

tad asat".

Vacaspati
:

himself interprets this aphorism thus in the Tntparyafika

tad asad bhavi

karyam anenai

'

va karagena janyate na
'ty

'nyene

'ty

anuraanad

buddhi-siddham eve

arthal?,

The aphorism thus interpreted fits in naturally with the And the comment of the rest of the Bhamatl context.
Kalpataru
is
:

almost a paraphrase of the words of the

Tatparyaftkn

yad

asad
sad

iti

prasiddham

tad

buddhy-

arGdhena

mperia

eva,

anyatha

turanga-stngavat

karmatva-nirdes'a-'yogat
it

In the light of this, therefore,

"

seems necessary to amend the text by leaving out the

"

na

"

and correct the translation thus

is

That, however,

which

non-existent

(i.e.,
1

to be produced), is (certainly)

existent
of

in the intellect/

In regard to this suggestion

certain difficulties have to be
at the end
:

the learned

Professor,

pointed out.

The Kalpatqru,

of the sentence

quoted above, goes on to say

iti

sat-karya-vadina ahufc.
is

The aphorism,
statement
the
of

as

it

occurs in the Nyftya Sfitras,

the

the

final

view of asat-karya-vada held by

words
of

Naiyayika,

The

the

Kalpataru would,
is

therefore, suggest that the citation here

not of a

Nyaya
by
the

aphorism, but of the aphorism of some school professing

sat-karya-vada.

The

suggestion
:

is

reinforced

Bh&matltilaka
aha.

which says

atra sat-karya-vadi-sammatim
is

Once

this

possibility

conceded,

there

is

the

further

possibility

that

the
in
it.

aphorism

here
is

cited

by

"

Vacaspati has a
bare possibility

na

"

That
u

this

more than a

seems made out by the ftjuprak&s'ikHi

of a

which implies the presence

na

na

"

in the

aphorism

by

asan nara-s^ftgadi buddhav alikhya vyakriyate;

'

buddhi-sattve

sattva-'yogac ca
*hur
iti.

tatra
of the

vfddha-sammatim
Kalpataru too do

aha

yatha

The words

302

ADDITIOKAL NOTES
tc

not rule out the reading with a

na

",

The

least that

is

necessary to support the suggested correction

is

the further

correction of the Kalpataru and the Bhamatltilaka so as " " " and asatto make them read asat-karya-vadina ahufc

karya-vadi-sammatim
a

aha

".

Such

procedure

involving

double
of

correction

may
of

seem

condemned

by

the

law

parsimony.

But there are at least two counter-

vailing

considerations

some

weight,
traced,

The

first

is

that

no

other

source
as

has

been

while
fits

the
into
is

Nyaya
the

aphorism

interpeted

by Vacaspati
is

present

context.
little

The

other

that

there

comparatively
support to

point in the advaitin appealing for

as
his

the sat-karya-vadin,
;

he himself
reliance

is

of that

persuasion

on the contrary,

even on the

asat-karya-vadin
against
in
this
it

would

be

just

and

purportful
at

As
issue

must be noted that the point

is

the Bhamatl

the possibility of creation by a non-

intelligent being.

The pQrvapaksin

in this case

is

not the

follower
creator),

of

the

Nyaya

(which

admits an

intelligent

but the follower of the Saftkhya (well

known

as

sat-karya-vada), according to
creation buddhi-siddha
for

whom

the world

is

not before

an

Itfvara,

Thus, though the

suggested source and corrections are extremely plausible,

it

is

difficult to

accept them outright at the present stage

editions
of

further,

neither the printed

either

book nor

the

M8S. that we have been

able to consult warrant the

for

correction.

The
and 20

MSS. consulted

the

Kalpataru are
;

20

14

19 of the

Adyar Library

for

the

Bhamatl, MSS. mentioned in Note 48 were consulted, and

for

the

Bh&maMilaka.
Of course,

MS. No. 39 C 14

of

the same

Library.
tion of

scribal errors leading to the perpetua-

wrong readings are not uncommon.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

303

PAGE

147

The expressions "heya" and "upadeya," which occur

very frequently in the Bh&$ya and the BhUmatl, have been
"

rendered

uniformly
".

as

to

be

"

"

rejected

and

to

be

accepted

It

should be noted, however, that, except in a

in

few

cases

(as

the present

one),

what

is

meant

is

avoidance and seeking, not mere intellectual rejection or

acceptance.

When,

for instance,

it is

being one's
it

own
it is

"
self,
is

neither

said that " "

Brahman,
"

heya

nor

upadeya,

means that
153

neither to be avoided nor sought.

PAGE
"

"

caitya-vandanadi-vakya.
"

It

would appear from the

*'

Rjuprakas'ikft that the

statement

"
is

"

caityam vandeta,
is

not

"caitye vandeta," so that the obeisance

not
in

to the

caitya,

the caitya.

Conformably

to this, caitya
fig-tree to

would mean not a shrine, but the consecrated

which Buddhists

offer worship,

PAGES

162-165 and 220-223

of

These pages contain statements

the Prabhakara

position based on the doctrine of anvitabhidhana,

Certain

terms, though
special
senses.

common

to the

Bha$a

school, are used in

in

The equivalents used

would apply

the translation the

are

such

as
of

throughout the book;

will,

peculiarities

Prabhakara usage
In
the

therefore, not be

clear

therefrom.

following

translation,

terms
;

distinctively suitable to Prabhakara's system are employed

it

may

be

used

along

with

or in

the

place

of the

translation on the above-mentioned pages.

For

this school,
is

karya, niyoga and apOrva are synonyms.

What

to be
is

done (karya)

is

that which prompts (niyoga), and this

304
the

ADDITIONAL NOTES
trans-experiential

potency
of

(apflrva)
is

which

secures

heaven.
this
fruit

The determinant
is

karya

volition (kyti), and of

the determinant

the particular act (kriys).

e.g.,

The

(bhavya or phala,

heaven)

is

emphatically not

what prompts nor the determinant.

is

The person prompted

called

the niyojya

he

is

not the person enjoined, since

injunction, as in the Bh&tt a

niyoga means apUrva, not an

school.

TRANSLATION
him who has heard

[P. 162] Further, if for

(studied)

about

Brahman

there occurs the cessation of the attributes

of transmigration,

why

is it,

then, that, on top of hearing,

reflection etc. are found declared ?

Therefore, even because

of the contingence of the futility of these, the

Vedantas do

not have for purport the nature of Brahman, but have for
purport what
is

to

be

done,

whose determinant
this,

is

the

contemplation of the self.

as prompting
itself
is

And
to

which

is

to be done,

him who

is

be prompted in respect of

called niyoga (the prompter), and as not previously

experienced

through

other

means

of

knowledge,
is

it

is

called the trans-experiential.

And

since there

not the
of
its

establishment

of

this

without

the

observance

determinant (contemplation), that

done,
of the

itself,

which
the

is

to be

implies

for

its

own establishment
self, (this

observance

contemplation of the

being) the determiis

nant
since

and instrument of that.

its

And what

to be done,

definitive

knowledge depends on (that which

[its

defines)
volition,
act,

its

own determinant

own determinant
is

is

and the determinant of that

in

the particular
is

contemplation

the present instance],

defined by

ADDITIONAL NOTES
the
determinant, contemplation
;

305

similarly, since of con-

templation too there cannot be definitive knowledge in the

absence of

its

determinant, the

self,

[P.

163] that

itself,

which

is

to be done, implies, for the sake

of the determina-

tion of that (contemplation), the self as that (determinant).

"

As they say
that too

That, however, which

is

introduced,
is

i.e.,

implied, for the establishment of that (which

falls

to be done),
;

within the scope of the injunction

the
in

this is

the

usage

of

Tantra
the

(the

Prabhakara school
of

of

Mimamsa)."

And,

case

contemplation, the
its falling

determinant of the prompter (niyoga),

within the
it

scope of the injunction consists in the observance of

as
of

an act
that

for the self, however,

which

is

the determinant

(contemplation), (falling within the scope of the

its

injunction consists in) the certitude of

own

existence.

[P. 165]

And, since what

is

is

to be

done

is

not independent

of

him who
is

prompted, the eligible (interested) person

who

to practise, he states the particular class of person

"
:

prompted

And

there being

purport in respect of an
is

"

injunction
established

etc.

Becoming Brahman
the
eulogistic

present as already

in

passage

"He who knows

Brahman becomes Brahman

statement
of

itself";

yet (because of this

of the existent being

is

changed into a statement

what

to be accomplished), there being the expectancy of person prompted, on the analogy

of the particular class of the ratrisatra,

he

who
of

desires to

become Brahman comes

For,

to
if

be understood as the particular person prompted.

on the

analogy

the pipda-pit^-yajna, the person

prompted be assumed to be he who desires heaven, that

would be the signification of the absolutely remote by the

306
eulogistic passage,

ADDITIONAL NOTES
which would then have a sense wholly
And, since to become Brahman
said
(in
is

unrelated to be immortal,

itself.
it

to

is

the commentary)
*

"For him
*

who
*

desires

*
[P.

immortality." * #

220] Further,
of
all

even by those
is

who
to
like)

recognise the

purport
not
is

words to be what
in

be done,

ifc

is

possible

the

case of
"
"

(texts
is

"A
to

brahmin
"

not

to

be

killed,
is

Liquor

not

be drunk,
For,

to recognise
is

what

to be done as purport.
its

what
is

to

be

done, having

limits

defined

by

volition,

pervaded by volition, and ceases

that,
like

with the cessation of

of

Sims'apa-ness

on
of

the cessation
a particular
effort;

tree-ness
tree].

[s'ims'apa

being the
indeed,
is

name

kind of
its

Volition,

human
its

and

definitive

knowledge depends on
nant, being
of the

determinant.
is

And

its

determi-

nature of what

to be accomplished,
after,

can be only a doing, which has a before and an

helps
to

and

bring about something else

It
is
is,

(it

can be) neither a

substance nor a quality.

indeed,

what

is

directly
;

pervaded by

volition that

the determinant of volition

and, in the case of substance and quality,

existent, there
is

which are already

Therefore
it is

no pervasion by

volition.

there

is

the statement of the author of the sacred teaching:

"Vorbs signify doing; through their instrumentality can

be
for
to

known what
what

is

to be

done

"
(kriya).
[P, 221]
is

Though
relation

words signifying substance and quality there

is

to be done, in their effect-stage

[i.e.,

in the stage

when complete sentence-sense arises, with what is to be done as the main element], yet, since relation to what is
to be done
is

direct in the case of (words signifying) doing,

while

for

words signifying

substance and quality

it

is

ADDITIONAL NOTES

307

through their conjunction with doing, the understanding

of the trans-experiential (apOrva)
signify
quality.
is

only from those which

"

doing,

not
is
it

from words signifying substance or

that in statements like
"

Nor
with
"

He

is

to offer

oblation

curds/'

He

is

to

pour diagonally and

is

continuously,
to be done
;

curds etc. are the determinants of what

for,

even there, what

is

to be

done has as

its

determinant the doing alone

the diagonal pouring.
injunction (being)
as qualified by
of the

the offering of oblation or

this score, because of the

Nor on

of the oblation

and the diagonal pouring^

curds and continuity, as in (the injunction

qualified in) "He is to sacrifice with the soraa " " do (the texts) He is to offer the agnihotra (juice), " " " He is to pour ghee diagonally become oblation,

restatements of that (injunction of the qualified),

Thougfy,

here too what

is

to

be done has for determinant doing

alone, yet, substance

and quality, as complements

of the

doing, though not determinants, fall within the scope of

the
as

injunction.

The

doing,

indeed,

being

undefined,

the

bare functioning of a kftraka (causal correlate of

is

doing),

defined
etc.
;

by

the

particular
etc.

causal

correlate

substance
thereto.

hence,

substance

are complements

And

thus,

when doing
falls
its

falls

within the scope of

the injunction, that

within the scope of the injunction

certainly together with

complements

hence, substance

and quality, though not determinants, yet as complements

thereto,

come

to be within the scope of the injunction.

And

thus, the injunction which goes over to substance and

quality through the channel of doing, because of the fear

of

prolixity

and because

its

own

content

is

otherwise

established, comes, through a restatement thereof, to

for purport substance etc., 70

have

which are complements thereto;

3Q8
[P.

ADDITIONAL NOTES
222]

hence, in

all

cases,

what

is

enjoined

(?.e.,

what

is

to be done) has doing alone for its determinant.

Hereby

is

refuted
is

the view that in

"There

is

that
"

agneya (cake) which

prepared on eight (earthen) plates

what

is

enjoined

has for determinant the connection of

the material and the deity.

"

Now,

(it

may
"

be said), the

meaning

of the root

bha

(to become),'* (in

bhavati

"

of

the text) cannot fall within the scope of an injunction;

for,
if

what becomes be already

existent, then that

which
that
if

has

its

existence (already) accomplished cannot be

becomes',
ether,

tWuch

indeed,
is

does not become; nor,

non-existent, since
is

what
a

non-existent cannot be what

therefore,
is

prompted,

like

sky-flower;

what

falls

within the scope of the injunction

belongs to

the operation which

is

him who

brings about, the producer, and which

implied by the becoming, the operation to be brought about

and, since this operation
is

activation,

volition,
;

effort, it

cannot

be

cognised

without a determinant
its

therefore,

there being the

is

need for a determinant,

determinant

only the connection of material and deity brought to

mind by the word "agneya".

say)
for

(To this the Prabhakaras

now, how can

its

human

effort,

which has an operation

determinant,
of

refer to a connection,
?

which
"

is

not of

the nature

an operation

Truly, even in

Make

a pot,"

human

effort
;

does not directly refer to the meaning of the

it

noun, pot

rather does

cause the hand

etc. to

manipulate

the staff etc.

Therefrom one understands that volition alone,

sake of the pot and has a manipulation for
is

which

is

for the

determinant, but not that (volition) whose determinant

directly the pot.
(volition) as

The pot comes within the scope

is

of that

what

desired, not as a determinant*

is

IP. 223]

As determinant, however, there

only the manipulation

ADDITIONAL NOTES
by
"

309
reason,

the

hand
is

eto.

For
"

the
etc,,

same
what

even

in

There
the

that sgneya
is

falls

within the scope

of

injunction

only the sacrificial act,

which

is

implied by the connection of material and deity, and which

is
is

the determinant of what

"

said in

There

is

to be done. What is it that " that agneya (cake) eto. f (It is said)
is is

"

One should

bring about (what

to be done)
it is

through the

sacrifice "

with agni as deity."

Hence

that the texts

sacrifice,"

"

He who, knowing thus, performs the full moon He who, knowing thus, performs the new moon
restatements
is

sacrifice

"

become
"

of the
"
eto.

six sacrifices

prescribed

in

There

that agneya
itself,
is

Hence too

for that (group of

sacrifices)

which

falls

within the scope

is

of

the

injunction and
" in
full

restated,

there
is

the relation to fruit,

He who desires heaven

moon
sacrifices ".
it

to sacrifice with the

new and

Hence
is

is

an invariable rule that in every case what

for determinant

enjoined has

doing alone, through the

"

channel of volition.
etc.,
if

And

"
Kill not,"

thus, in

Drink not

"

there be

admitted something to be done, then,

its

pervader, volition, would have to be admitted, as also the

doing which pervades that (volition) as determinant,

thus,

And
is

on

the

analogy of the Prajapati-vrata, what

as signifying

enjoined

would,

exclusion
kill

through

the

implication of the resolve

that (resolve) as that
denial
(that

not to

or not drink, have

it

determinant.

And thus

would follow
in)

function of negation which consists

the

of

what there
is

is

occasion for

is

wholly abandoned*
is

Nor when there

a possibility (of direct significance)

"

implication proper. " the rising sun etc., since they

there
is

In the case, however,

commence with

of "

See not

His vow,"

not the possibility of the denial of that for which

810
there
is

ADDITIONAL NOTE8
an occasion
;

[P.

224] hence

it is

proper through

the signification of exclusion, to imply the resolve not to

see.

Therefore, in "Kill not,"

denials
of

"Drink not"
for,
is

etc.,

which

are
is

what there

is

an occasion

since doing
;

non-existent, volition pervaded thereby

is

non-existent

and that being non-existent, there

is
is

non-existence of what

pervaded thereby,

viz.,

what

is

to be

done

hence there
is

no rule that
;

all

statements have for purport what

to

be done

thus he says ....

PAGE 165
brahma veda brahmai va bhavati
sentence as
it
'
'

"
iti

etc.

The

"

stands

may

imply that the fruit

11

brahmafor

bhavana

(becoming

Brahman)

has

need

the

particular person prompted (niyojya-vis'e?a).

This, however,

does

not

fit

in

with the Prabhakara doctrine, which

acknowledges efficiency for the apUrva alone, not for the

fruit.

Becoming Brahman, though stated

is

as siddha, has
;

to be understood as sadhya (what

to be accomplished)
is

and

for this

change (viparii?ama) there

is

an expectancy

(akaftksa),

which
class
of

satisfied

by the statement of the

particular
11

person
"

prompted.

The

genitive
of

in

brahma-bhavanasya

would be thus a case

anadare
"

gathl, this being indicated in the translation by

this construction is mentioned in the

"

yet

Bhttmatltilaka too*

See also

list of

corrections.

PAGES 227 and

The
11

228
" "

word
"

kartavyata
"

has
".

been

translated
is,

as

obligation

or as

obligatoriness

There
;

of course,

no question of moral obligation here

at best, a mechanical urge

what

is

present

is,

or impulsion consequent on a

person's natural desires and passions.

Because of these a

ADDITIONAL NOTES
person
is

3U
is

tempted to drink or

kill

it

this temptation

or impulsion

which

is

restated

by the prohibition and

negatived.

The
is

object of the negation is to

make
is

it

known

that

what

restated, the tempting act,

this context the

instrumental
is

to evil. to

Throughout
"
obligation

reader

requested

remember that no
"

ethical significance attaches to the

"

words

and

obligatoriness

".

PAGE 237
The punctuation
factory in
is

of lines

8-12 of the text

;

is

unsatis-

all

the printed editions

the
"

the present punctuation

based

on
"

explanation given in the

Kalpataru.
"

"

dvedha

in

saqitfayo
possibilities

va dvedha yuktah
"
;

"
is

means

as

between two
as,

this qualification

purportful?

in

other cases, the doubt

may

be

among more than

two

possibilities.
;

The
list of

translation
corrections.

has therefore to be

corrected

see the

PAGE
"
rites

239

That contemplation and

"
etc.

"

The

word

reflection are not principal " here is not to be principal

contrasted with "subsidiary

"
;

it

means rather that which

has an apflrva result

tfastras

even subsidiaries, like stutis and

p.

(mentioned on

185),

have apflrva
"

results,

and
;

should, therefore, be classed as

in this context, therefore, a

"
principal
is

in this sense

gu^a-karma
is

not what

is

subsidiary in general, but

what

proximately subsidiary,
;

subserving the

rite

itself,

not the apttrva generated

it is,

in other words, a sannipatyo-'pakaraka-

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Aitareya Upanisad.
Ait.BrQh.,
Brh.,

Aitareya Brahma^a.

Bjhadara^yaka Upaniad.

Chnnd.,

Chandogya Upanisad.
Bhagavad Glta.

HIP,,

History of Indian Philosophy by

8,

N. Das

Gupta (Cambridge University

IHQ.,

Press),

Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

Isftvasya Upanisad.

Jftbala.,

Jabalopanisad.

Kafka.,

Ka^hopanisad.
Kenopani?ad.

Muijdakopamad.
PM,,
Pr.,
Rv.,
ffa-BA.,
8vet,,

Purva-mlmamsa-sutras.
Pras'nopanisad.
Ilgveda,

S^abara-bhasya.
S'veta^vatara

Upaniad.

SLS.,
Taitt:,

Siddhantales'asafigraha by
Taittirlya Upani^ad,
Taittirlya Saiphita.

Appayya

Dlk?ita.

T8.

Upa.

7Aflfl,

Vedanta Sntras.

Yoga

Satras.

CORRECTIONS
LIKE
12,13
10
3

FOR

READ

11
8

18 16
8

Roo

10
4

2,

take on the
reflection of

be reflected in

14
23, 24

concealment
its

condemnation
(perception so far as
it is)

origination

(by perception)

what

originates

10

13, 14

in another con-

ascertained through
difference of context

text ascertained
71

ing

with

sequence

CORRECTIONS

317

PAGE

LINE

FOR

READ
(krama)t which are

taught

directly

or

obtained by transfer,

and

which

bring

about proximate or

remote
ries,

contributo-

seen or unseen,

25

in the conceit
is

under the conceit

will be established
will be

established

26
27

comes
becomes
indicating
its

turns out to be
of

120

the

type

which

own

attribute

signifies

(the inclu-

sion of the sense of

the parts) as compo-

nents
the

of that

(i.e.,

sense

of

the

compound),
127
7

That subject

That

131 137

19
4

many
The Sacred

may
Being-Sacred-Teach-

Teaching-Source ing-Source
150
22
24

apathy

monotony
through

156
164

though
khndira

14

what

is

made

of kha*

dim
25

nature
enjoined for this

existent
enjoined,

165

16

(becoming)

318

CORRECTIONS

PAGE
165

LINE
22

FOB
as ... passage

READ
by the eulogistic pas*
sage, since
it

has a

sense

wholly
it.

un-

to y related

193
206
209

11

they
their

that

26
20-22

own
therefore

their

own

sense as

And
. .

And

for this reason

it

to^

anything
else

that

is

not supf

sidiary
else,
it

to
is

anything
distinct

from the four kinds

of substances.

doing

Or,

doubt

may
t

be
be-

appropriate

as

tween the two

239
28
viz.,

the fruit

and with the (ultimate)

fruit

Printed by A. K. Sitaraina Sbastri, at the Vasanta Press, Adyar, Madras,