The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine

Between 1936 and 1939, the Palestinian revolutionary movement suffered a severe setback at the hands of three separate enemies that were to constitute together the principal threat to the nationalist movement in Palestine in all subsequent stages of its struggle the local reactionary leadership! the regimes in the "rab states surrounding Palestine! and the imperialist#$ionist enemy% &he present study will concentrate on the respective structures of these separate forces and the dialectical relations that e'isted among them% &he intensity of the Palestinian nationalist e'perience, which emerged since 191(, and was accompanied in one way or another with armed struggle, could not reflect itself on the upper structure of the Palestinian national movement which remained virtually under the control of semi#feudal and semi#religious leadership% &his was due primarily to two related factors 1% &he e'istence and effectiveness of the $ionist movement, which gave the national challenge relative predominance over the social contradictions% &he impact of this challenge was being systematically felt by the masses of Palestinian "rabs, who were the primary victims of the $ionist invasion supported by British imperialism% )% &he e'istence of a significant conflict of interests between the local feudal# religious leadership and British imperialism *t was consistently in the interest of the ruling class to promote and support a certain degree of revolutionary struggle, instead of being more or less completely allied with the imperialist power as would otherwise be the case% &he British imperialists had found in the $ionists +a more suitable ally%+ &he above factors gave the struggle of Palestinian people particular features that did not apply to the "rab nationalist struggle outside Palestine% &he traditional leadership, as a result, participated in, or at least tolerated, a most advanced form of political action ,armed struggle-! it raised progressive slogans, and had ultimately, despite its reactionary nature, provided positive leadership during a critical phase of the Palestinian nationalist struggle% *t is relevant to e'plain, however, how the feudal#religious leadership succeeded in staying at the head of the nationalist movement for so long ,until 19.(-% &he transformation of the economic and social structure of Palestine, which occurred rather rapidly, had affected primarily the /ewish sector, and had taken place at the e'pense of the Palestinian middle and petty bourgeoisie, as well as the "rab working class% &he change from a semi#feudal society to a capitalist society was accompanied by an increased concentration of economic power in the hands of the $ionist machine and consequently, within the /ewish society in Palestine% *t is significant that Palestinian "rab advocates of conciliation, who became outspoken during the thirties, were not landlords or rich peasants, but rather elements of the urban upper bourgeoisie whose interests gradually coincided with the e'panding interests of the /ewish bourgeoisie% &he latter, by controlling the process of industriali0ation, was creating its own agents% *n the meantime, the "rab countries surrounding Palestine were playing two conflicting roles% 1n the one hand, the Pan#"rab mass movement was serving as a catalyst for the revolutionary spirit of the Palestinian masses, since a dialectical relation between the Palestinian and overall "rab struggles e'isted, on the other hand, the established regimes in these "rab countries were doing everything in their power to help curb and undermine the Palestinian mass movement% &he sharpening conflict in Palestine threatened to contribute to the development of the struggle in these countries in the direction of greater violence, creating a

revolutionary potential that their respective ruling classes could not afford to overlook% &he "rab ruling classes were forced to support British imperialism against their counterpart in Palestine, which was in effect leading the Palestinian nationalist movement% 2eanwhile, the $ionist#*mperialist alliance continued to grow! the period between 1936 and 1939 witnessed not only the crystalli0ation of the militaristic and aggressive character of the colonial society that $ionism had firmly implanted in Palestine but also the relative containment and defeat of the Palestinian working class! this was subsequently to have a radical effect on the course of the struggle% 3uring that period, $ionism, in collaboration with the mandatory power, successfully undermined the development of a progressive /ewish labor movement and of /ewish#"rab Proletarian brotherhood% &he Palestine 4ommunist Party was effectively isolated among both "rab and /ewish workers, and the reactionary 5istadrut completely dominated the /ewish labour movement% &he influence of "rab progressive forces within "rab labour federations in 5aifa and /affa diminished, leaving the ground open for their control by reactionary leaderships that monopoli0ed political action%

Background: The Workers

&he issue of /ewish immigration to Palestine was not merely a moral or national issue! it had direct implication on the economic status of the "rab people of Palestine, affecting primarily the small and middle#income farmers, workers and certain sectors of the petty and middle bourgeoisies% &he national and religious character of /ewish immigration further aggravated the economic repercussions% Between 1933 and 1936, 167,777 /ews immigrated to Palestine, bringing the country8s /ewish population to ..3,777 # or )9%69 of the total # from 19)6 to 193) the average number of immigrants per year was :,)71% 1 *t rose to .),9(6 between 1933 and 1936, as direct result of ;a0i persecution in <ermany% *n 193), 9,777 <erman /ews entered Palestine, 37,777 in 1933, .7,777 in 193. and 61,777 in 1936,2 nearly three quarters of the new immigrants settling in cities% *f ;a0ism was responsible for terrori0ing the /ews and forcing them out of <ermany! it was +democratic+ capitalism, in collaboration with the $ionist movement, that was responsible for directing comparatively large numbers of /ewish migrants to Palestine, as illustrated by the following of ),66),777 /ews that fled ;a0i persecution, the =%>%"% accepted only 1:7,777 ,6%69-, Britain 67,777 ,1%99-, while Palestine received (%69 and 1,937,777 ,:6%)9- found refuge in the =%>%>%?%3 &he severe economic impact of the immigration into Palestine can be reali0ed when it is considered that a comparatively large percentage of /ewish settlers were basically capitalists *n 1933, 3,)67 of the latter ,119- were considered as capitalists, in 193., 6,1). or 1)9, and in 1936, 6,379 or 179%4 "ccording to official statistics, of the /ewish immigrants who entered Palestine between 193) and 1936, 1,3:7 ,with 1:,119 dependents- possessed P@ 1,777 or more and 137,777 were officially registered as seeking employment, or dependents of previous immigrants% 5 *n other words, the immigration was not only designed to ensure a concentration of Auropean /ewish capital in Palestine, that was to dominate the process of industriali0ation, but also to provide this effort with a /ewish proletariat &he policy that raised the slogan of +/ewish labor only+ was to have grave consequences, as it led to the rapid emergence of fascist patterns in the society of /ewish settlers%

"nother result was the development of a competitive struggle between the Palestinian "rab and /ewish proletariats and between Palestinian "rab peasants, farmers and agricultural laborers and their /ewish counterparts% &his conflict also e'tended to higher classes, in as much as the Palestinian "rab small landowners and urban middle bourgeoisie reali0ed that their interests were being threatened by growing /ewish capital% *n 1936, for e'ample, /ews controlled (:) of a total of 1,)1) industrial firms in Palestine, employing 13,6:( workers, while the rest were Palestinian "rab# controlled and employed about .,777 workers /ewish investment totaled P@ .,391,777 compared to P@ :7.,777 Palestinian "rab industrial investment! /ewish production reached P@ 6,777,777 compared to P@ 1,6.6,777 by Palestnian "rab firms *n addition, /ewish capital controlled 979 of the concessions granted by the British mandatory government, which accounted for a total investment of P@ 6,:(9,777 and provided labor for ),619 workers%6 "n official census in 193: indicated that an average /ewish worker received 1.69 more in wages than his Palestinian "rab counterpart ,"s high as .339 more in te'tile factories employing /ewish and "rab women, and )339 in tobacco factories -% +By /uly 193:, the real wages of the average Palestinian "rab worker decreased 179 while those of a /ewish worker rose 179%+! &he situation resulted in an almost total collapse of the "rab economy in Palestine, primarily affecting Palestinian "rab workers% *n his report to the Peel ?oyal 4ommission, <eorge 2ansour, the >ecretary of the Bederation of Palestinian "rab Corkers in /affa, indicated that 9(9 of Palestinian "rab workers had a +well below average+ standard of living% Based on a census covering 1,777 workers in /affa in 1936, the Bederation had found that the income of 6:9 of "rab workers was less than P@ )%:67 ,the average minimum income required to support a family being P@ 11-! 1)9 less than P@ .%)67, 1)9 less than P@ 6, .9 less than P@ 17, 1%69 less than P@ 1) and 7%69 less than P@ 16%9 Chen the 2andatory <overnment refused to allow nearly 1,777 unemployed /affa workers to hold a demonstration on /une 6, 1936, the Bederation of Corkers issued a statement warning the <overnment that unless their problems were solved, +the government would soon have to give the workers either bread or bullets%+ 1" Cith the conditions of workers continuing to deteriorate, an uprising seemed imminent% <eorge 2ansour ,who had been previously a 4ommunist Party member- came out with striking illustrations in his report to the Peel 4ommission by the end of 1936, ),):7 men and women workers were unemployed in the city of /affa alone, with a population of :1,777%11 2ansour pointed out five reasons for the high unemployment rate, four of which were directly connected with /ewish immigration 1- the settling of new immigrants! )- urban migration 3- dismissal of "rab workers from their Dobs! .- the deteriorating economic situation! 6- the discriminatory policy of the 2andatory <overnment in favor of /ewish workers% 12 *n a period of nine months, the number of 5istadrut workers increased by .1,777% "ccording to an "rticle published in the issue ;o% 3.67 of the newspaper 3avar, 5istadrut workers numbered 116,777 at the end of /uly 1936! the official 1936 government report ,p% 11:- had showed their number at the end of 1936 to be :.,777%13 &he policy of dismissal of Palestinian "rab workers from firms and proDects controlled by /ewish capital initiated violent clashes% *n the four /ewish settlements of 2albis, 3airan, Cadi 5unain and Ehadira, there were 6,)1. Palestinian "rab

workers in Bebruary 1936% "fter si' months, this figure went down to ),):6, and in a year8s time, went down to 61: Palestinian "rab workers only% 14 "ttacks against Palestinian "rab workers also took place% 1n one occasion, for instance, the /ewish community forced a Palestinian "rab contractor and his workers to leave their work in the Brodski building in 5aifa% "mong those who were systematically losing their Dobs were workers in orchards, cigarette factories, mason8s yards, construction, etc% % %15 Between 1937 and 1936, Palestinian "rab pearl industry e'ports fell from P@ 11,63) to P@ 3,::: a year% &he number of Palestinian "rab soap factories in 5aifa alone fell from 1) in 19)9 to . in 1936% &heir e'port value fell from P@ )76,669 in 1937 to P@ :9,311 in 1936%16 *t was clear that the "rab proletariat had fallen +victim to British colonialism and /ewish capital, the former bearing the primary responsibility%+ 1 Fehuda Bauer wrote 1! +1n the eve of the 1936 disturbances, Palestine was possibly the only country in the world, apart from the =%>%>%?%, that had not been affected by the world economic crisis! in fact, it enDoyed real prosperity as a result of a massive import of capital ,over 37,777,777 in capital had entered Palestine-% &he imported capital had even fallen short of the necessary funds needed for all the investment programmes%+ &his prosperity, however, was based on rather shakey foundations, which collapsed once the influ' of private capital came to an end because of fears of the outbreak of war in the 2editerranean% +&he loan system collapsed! there were indications of serious unemployment and construction activity greatly diminished% Palestinian "rab workers were being dismissed by both "rab and /ewish employers, a number of them returning to their original villages! national consciousness was rising due to the aggravating economic crisis%+ 19 Bauer, however, omits the primary factor continued /ewish immigration% >ir /ohn 5ope >impson stated in his report that, +*t was a bad, and perhaps a dangerous policy, to allow large sums of money to be invested in unprofitable industries in Palestine to Dustify increased immigration%+ *n effect, Bauer8s statement was basically unfounded% since the influ' of /ewish capital continued during the years he referred to and, in fact, reached its clima' in 1936! the number of immigrants also increased during these years% ,4apital invested in /ewish industries and commerce firms increased from P@ 6,3:1,777 in 1933 to P@ 11,63:,377 in 1936! op% cit% p% 3)3-% 2oreover, the dismissal of "rab workers by /ewish employers had begun long before that time%2" *n the meantime, large masses of Palestinian "rab peasants were being evicted and uprooted from their lands as a result of /ewish coloni0ation of rural areas%21 &hey immigrated to cities and towns only to face increasing unemployment% &he $ionist machine took full advantage of the rivalry between Palestinian "rab workers and their fellow /ewish workers% +*sraeli+ leftists later observed that not once, in a period of fifty years, were /ewish workers mobili0ed and rallied around material issues or the struggle of @abor Bederation, to challenge the +*sraeli+ regime itself% +&he /ewish proletariat could not be mobili0ed around its own cause%+22 &he fact is that the situation was fully the result of efficient $ionist planning, to recall 5er0l8s words +Private land in areas allocated to us must be sei0ed #from its owners% Poor inhabitants are to be quickly evacuated across the border after having secured for them Dobs in the countries of their destination% &hey are to be denied employment in our country! as for large property#owners, they will ultimately Doin us%+23 &he 5istadrut summed up its policy by declaring that +to allow "rabs to penetrate the /ewish labor market meant that the influ' of /ewish capital would be employed to service "rab development, which is contrary to $ionist obDectives%

Burthermore, the employment of "rabs in /ewish industries would lead to a class division in Palestine along racial lines capitalist /ews employing "rab workers! should this be permitted, we would have introduced into Palestine the conditions that had led to the emergence of anti#semitism%+ 24 &hus the ideology and practices that underlined the process of coloni0ation, with the escalation of the conflict with the "rab society in Palestine, were developing fascist characteristics in $ionist organi0ations! fascist $ionism was using the same tools as the mounting fascism in Aurope% &he "rab worker was at the bottom of a comple' social pyramid and his condition grew worse as a result of the confusion within the "rab labor movement% 3uring the period between the early twenties and early thirties, the progressive labor movement # "rab as well as /ewish # suffered crushing blows, which, together with the impact of purely subDective weaknesses, resulted in its virtual paralysis% 1n the one hand, the $ionist movement which was rapidly becoming fascist in character and resorting to armed terrorism sought to isolate and destroy the 4ommunist Party, most of whose leaders were /ews, and that resisted being contained by $ionist labor organi0ations% 1n the other hand, the Palestinian feudal religious leadership could not tolerate the rise of an "rab labor movement that was independent of its control% &he movement was thus terrori0ed by the "rab leadership% *n the early thirties, the 2ufti8s group assassinated 2ichel 2itri, President of the Bederation of "rab Corkers in /affa% Fears later, >ami &aha, a trade unionist and President of the Bederation of "rab Corkers in 5aifa was also assassinated% *n the absence of a economically and politically strong national bourgeoisie, the workers were directly confronted and oppressed by the traditional feudal leadership! the conflict occasionally led to violent confrontations which were reduced whenever the traditional leadership managed to asssume direct control over trade union activities% "s a result, labor activity lost its essential role in the struggle% 2oreover, with the sharpening of the national struggle, a relative identity of interests united the workers with the traditional "rab leadership% 2eanwhile, the 4ommunist Party occasionally succeeded in organi0ing political action% 1n one occasion on 2ay 1st, 19)7, a group of demonstrating communists clashed with a $ionist demonstration in in &el#"viv and were forced to flee the city and take refuge in the "rab quarter of 2anshiya in /affa! later a confrontation took place with a British security force that was sent to arrest the Bolsheviks% 25 *n a statement distributed on the same day, the A'ecutive 4ommittee of the Party declared +&he /ewish workers are here to live with you! they have not come to persecute you, but to live with you% &hey are ready to fight on your side against the capitalist enemy, be it /ew, "rab or British% *f the capitalists incite you against the /ewish worker, it is in order to protect themselves from you% 3o not fall into the trap! the /ewish worker, who is a soldier of the revolution, has come to offer you his hand as a comrade in resisting British, /ewish and "rab capitalists% % %Ce call on you to fight against the rich who are selling their land and their country to foreigners% 3own with British and Brench bayonets! down with "rab and foreign capitalists%+ 26 &he remarkable thing in this long statement was, not only the idealist portrait of the struggle, but also the fact that nowhere did it mention the word +$ionist+! yet $ionism represented to the Palestinian "rab peasants and workers a daily threat, as well as to the /ewish communists, fifty#five of whom were attacked by $ionists in &el#"viv and e'pelled to /affa% &he Palestine 4ommunist Party remained isolated from the political reality until the end of 1937, which was the year its >eventh 4ongress was held% *n the resolutions passed by the 4ongress, the Party admitted that it had +essentially adopted an erroneous attitude towards the issue of Palestinian nationalism, and the status of the /ewish national minority in Palestine and its role vis#a#vis the "rab masses% &he Party had failed to become active among the Palestinian "rab masses and remained isolated by working e'clusively among /ewish workers% *ts isolation was illustrated by the Party8s negative attitude during the Palestinian "rab uprising of 19)9%+2

"lthough in practice the Party systematically attacked the Palestinian bourgeoisie # which at the time was in a difficult position # and although it never adopted the policy of popular fronts and alliances with the revolutionary classes, the records of the >eventh 4ongress held in 1937#1931 provide a most valuable political analysis% "s shown in these records! the Party considered solving the Palestinian "rab national question as one of the primary tasks of revolutionary struggle *t viewed its isolation from the Palestinian "rab mass movement as the result of a +$ionist# influenced deviation that prevented the "rabi0ation of the Party%+ &he documents mention +opportunist efforts to block the "rabi0ation of the Party%+ &he 4ongress adopted the view that it was the duty of the Party to e'pand the cadres of the revolutionary forces capable of directing the activity of the peasants ,that is, cadres of revolutionary Palestinian "rab workers%- &he +"rabi0ation+ of the Party, its transformation into a real party of the toiling Palestinian "rab masses was the first condition of the success of its activity in the rural areas%2! &he Party, however, proved incapable of carrying out the task of mobili0ing Palestinian "rabs, and the revolutionary slogans adopted by the 4ongress were never translated into action +;ot a single dunum to the *mperialist and $ionist usurpers,+ +the revolutionary e'propriation of land belonging to the government, to rich /ewish developers, $ionist factions and big "rab landowners and farmers,+ +;o recognition of agreements on the sale of land,+ +the struggle against $ionist usurpers%+29 &he 4ongress had also decided that +it is possible to solve all the burning issues and end oppression only through armed revolution under the leadership of the working class%+ 3" &he Palestine 4ommunist Party was thus never +"rabi0ed%+ &he field was open for the domination of the Palestinian "rab mass movement by the feudal and religious leaderships% Perhaps one reason behind the line and practices of the Party at that time was the uncompromising revolutionary attitude for which the 4omintern was famous between 19)( and 193.% But despite their small number, their relative isolation and their failure to reach the Palestinian "rab masses, particularly in the rural areas, the communists threw all their weight into the 1936 revolt% &hey showed great courage, cooperated with some of the local leaders, and supported the 2ufti! many of them were killed and arrested% But they did not succeed in becoming an influential force% "pparently the slogan of +"rabi0ation+ got lost somewhere later on! nearly ten years later, on /anuary )), 19.6, *0vestia dared to compare the +struggle of the /ews+ in Palestine with the Bolshevik struggle before 191:% *n any case, the resolutions of the >eventh 4ongress of the Palestine 4ommunist Party have only been revealed recently! the process of "rabi0ation did not take place, and despite the educational role played by the Party and the contributions it made to the struggle in this field, it did not play the role proDected for it by its >eventh 4ongress in the Palestinian national movement at that time% 3uring the 1936 revolt the Party split% &here was also another fundamental split in 19.(, and another in 1966, for reasons connected with "rabi0ation! the dissidents advocated a +constructive+ attitude towards $ionism% &his failure of the 4ommunist Party, the weakness of the rising "rab bourgeoisie and the disunity of the "rab labor movement meant that the feudal#religious leaderships were cast to play a fundamental role as the situation escalated to the point of e'plosion in 1936%

Background: The Peasants

>uch was the situation concerning the workers at the outbreak of the 1936 revolt% 5owever, what we have considered so far dealt only with one domain in which the

conflict raged between the /ewish and "rab societies in Palestine and later inside each of these societies% &he other domain is the rural areas, where the conflict assumed its primarily nationalist form because of /ewish capital pouring into Palestine% 3espite the fact that a large share of /ewish capital was allocated to rural areas, and despite the presence of British imperialist military forces and the immense pressure e'erted by the administrative machine in favor of the $ionists, the latter achieved only minimal result ,a total of 6,:6) new coloni0ing settlers- in comparison to $ionist plans to establish a /ewish state% &hey nevertheless seriously damaged the status of the Palestinian "rab rural population% 1wnership by /ewish groups of urban and rural land rose from 377,777 dunums in 19)9 to 1,)67,777 dunums in 1937% &he purchased land was insignificant from the point of view of mass coloni0ation and of the solution of the +/ewish problem%+ But the e'propriation of nearly one million dunums # almost one#third of the agricultural land # led to a severe impoverishment of "rab peasants and Bedouins% By 1931, )7,777 peasant families had been evicted by the $ionists% Burthermore, agricultural life in the underdeveloped world, and the "rab world in particular, is not merely a mode of production, but equally a way of social, religious and ritual life% &hus, in addition to the loss of land, the Palestinian "rab rural society was being destroyed by the process of coloni0ation% =ntil 1931, only 161 per thousand /ews depended on agriculture for a living, compared to 63: per thousand "rabs% 1f nearly 119,777 peasants, about 11,777 were /ews%31 Chereas, in 1931, 19%19 of the /ewish population worked in agriculture, 699 of the Palestinian "rabs lived off the land% &he economic basis for this clash is very dangerous of course but to comprehend it fully we should see its national face% *n 19.1, 379 of the Palestinian "rab peasants owned no land, while nearly 679 of the rest owned plots that were too small to meet their living requirements% Chile )67 feudal landlords owned . million dunums, )6,777 peasant families were landless, and .6,777 owned an average of 177 dunums% 16,777 hired agricultural laborers worked for landlords% "ccording to survey of 3)) Palestinian "rab villages conducted in 1936, .:9 of the peasants owned less than : dunums and 669 less than )7 dunums ,the minimum required to feed an average family was 137 dunums%- 32 "lthough they lived under the triple pressure of $ionist invasion, "rab feudal ownership of the land and the heavy ta'es imposed by the British 2andatory <overnment, the Palestinian rural masses were primarily conscious of the national challenge% 3uring the uprisings of 19)9 and 1933, many small Palestinian "rab peasants sold their lands to big landlords in order to buy arms to resist the $ionist invasion and the British mandate% *t was this invasion which, by threatening a way of life in which religion, tradition and honor played an important role, enabled the feudal#clerical leaderships to remain in a position of leadership despite the crimes they had committed% *n many cases, it was feudal elements who bought the land to sell it to /ewish capital% Between 1933 and 1936, 6)%:9 of all the land purchased by $ionists belonged to landowners residing in Palestine, 1.%99 to absentee landlords and ))%69 to small peasants% Chile between 19)7 and 19)), the figures were )7%(9 from resident landlords, :6%.9 from absentee landlords and 3%(9 from small peasants% 33&he laws passed by the 2andatory <overnment were designed to serve the obDectives of /ewish settlement! although they were framed in such a way as to suggest that peasants were protected against being evicted or forced to sell% *n reality they provided no such protection% &his was illustrated in the cases of Cadi al#5awarith,

an area of .7,777 dunums, the village of >hatta with its 16,777 dunums and many other villages where the land was sei0ed by $ionists after having evicted its inhabitants% "s a result, the 67,777 /ews who lived in agricultural settlements owned 1,)77,777 dunums # an average of ). per inhabitant # while 677,777 "rabs owned less than 6,777,777, an average of 1) dunums per inhabitant% 34 &he case of the (,:37 peasants evicted from 2arD *bn "mer ,).7,777 dunums-, where the land was sold to $ionists by the Beirut feudal family of >ursock, remained suspended until the end of the 2andate in 19.(% 35 +Avery plot of land bought by /ews was made foreign to "rabs as if it had been amputated from the body of Palestine and removed to another country%+ 36 &hese words were those of a big Palestinian feudal leader% 5e added +"ccording to the /ews, 179 of the land was purchased from peasants, and the rest from big landlords%%%But in fact )69 of the land belonged to peasants%+ 3 &his apologetic attitude on the part of the feudalist does not change the fact that ,as reported by /ewish sources- of the total land acquired by three large /ewish companies by 1936 ,which accounted for half the land purchased by /ewish capital up to that date-, 6)%69 belonged to absentee landlords, ).%69 to residing landlords, 13%.9 from the government, churches, and foreign companies, and 9%.9 from individual peasants%3! &his transfer of land ownership created an e'panding class of dispossessed peasants who turned to seasonal salaried labor% &he maDority eventually made their way to the cities and sought unskilled labor% +Bor a peasant who was evicted from his land, it was impossible to secure other land, and the compensation was usually very small e'cept in cases where the 2ukhtar ,2ayor- or other village notables were involved%+39 &he maDority of dispossessed peasants thus moved to cities and towns% +*n /affa, most of the street cleaners were e'#villagers! the "rab 4igarette and &obacco 4ompany in ;a0areth reported that most of its workers were also of village origin%+4" &he following illustrates the fate of migrating peasants +Ce asked the 4ompany how many workers it employed and the answer was )17% &he total weekly wages paid to the workers were P@6), amounting to an average of )9%6 piastres per worker per week%+41 "t that time, the average weekly wages of a /ewish woman worker in tobacco factories ranged from between 1:7 and )37 piastres a week%42 Aven in government employment, an average /ewish worker earned over 1779 more than his "rab counterpart% 43 *n 1937, the /ohnson#4rosby commission estimated the average annual income of a peasant at P@31%3:, before ta' deductions% &he report further indicated that average ta' deductions amounted to P@ 3%(:% *f we further deducted the P@( that the average peasant paid as interest on his loans, the net income would amount to P@19%6 annually% "ccording to the same report, the average sum required to cover the e'penses of a peasant family was P@)6% +&he peasants, in fact%%%were the most heavily ta'ed group in Palestine%%%the policy pursued by the government clearly aimed at placing the peasant in an economic situation that would ensure the establishment of a /ewish national home%+44 4learly then, /ewish immigration and the transformation of the Palestinian economy from an essentially "rab agricultural economy to an industrial economy dominated by /ewish capital, affected primarily the small Palestinian "rab peasants% &a' e'emptions were granted meanwhile to /ewish immigrants, as well as e'emptions covering the imports related to /ewish industries, such as certain raw materials, unfinished products, coal%%%etc% 4ustoms duty on imported consumer goods rose% &he average import ta' rose from 119 at the beginning of the 2andate to more than )69 by 1936! 1179 on sugar, 1.99 on tobacco, )7(9 on petrol, .776 on matches and )69 on coffee%45

"n illustration of government policy is provided by the following story told by "rchbishop <regorius 5aDDar to the Peel 4ommission +* was once in the village of ?oma in the "cre district, where the inhabitants live off the production of olive oil% Bor a long time, they had been complaining to the 5igh 4ommissioner about the 1il 4ompany% &he 4ompany received help from the government in the form of ta' e'emption on its imports of ground nuts from which it e'tracted oil and mi'ed it with olive oil and sold it at lower prices% &he people in the village asked that their product be protected against the 4ompany8s product, and the government formed a committee to hear the villagers8 complaints% Chen the committee went to ?oma the villagers were furious to find out that its chairman was none other than the director of the 4ompany%+46 1n the other hand, the ta' system was clearly discriminatory in favor of the rich% 1n a yearly income of P@))%3: the ta' rate was )69 while salaries and earnings that e'ceeded P@1,777 per year were subDect to 1)9 in ta'es%4 &he small and middle peasants were not only impoverished as a result of losing their land, but were also the victims of $ionist practices that were based on the slogans of +/ewish labor only+ and +/ewish products only%+ /ewish industrialists employed only /ewish workers, paid them higher wages and sold their products at higher prices% +/ews were encouraged to give preference to /ewish products although at higher prices than those of "rab competitors%+4! ?aw materials were e'empted from custom duty, while high ta'es were imposed on imported goods, particularly if similar goods were locally produced by /ewish factories% 1n the other hand, the class that was known as the +effendi class+ and lived in the town, derived their income from agricultural land rented to peasants and from interests on loans to peasants% ,&he Affendis did not begin to invest in industry until the forties%- &his form of e'ploitation was by far more ruinous to the peasants than $ionist coloni0ation% "nother rural group was the +Bedouins,+ who counted 66,663 in 1931 ,in 19)) there were 173,777 Bedouin in Palestine-% &hey were to play a principal role in the 1936 revolt, as they did during the "ugust 19)9 uprising% *t drew the attention of the Palestine 4ommunist Party in the congress referred to previously% &he Bedouins, who made up nearly 369 of the population, constituted a potential revolutionary force% +&urned desperate because of severe impoverishment and constant hunger, they were always on the verge of armed uprisings% &heir participation in the "ugust uprising showed that they could play a leading role in a mass revolt, and at the same time it appears clearly that the leaders of these tribes could be spoilt by money% &hey were constantly providing the army of landless peasants and semi#proletarians with new hands and mouths%+49 *n the meantime, the fragmented "rab urban petty#bourgeoisie was in a state of confusion, indecision and fragmentation the speed at which society was being transformed into a /ewish industrial society gave neither the growing bourgeoisie nor the feudalists the chance to take part in or to profit from the process% *t was, therefore, by no means surprising that most of the Palestinian leaders who testified before the Peel 4ommission in 193:, and before the previous commissions, had eulogi0ed 1ttoman imperialism and praised the way it had treated them as compared with British imperialism% &hey had been the instrument of the Porte, the bulwark of the >ultan and an integral part of the system of domination, oppression and e'ploitation, whereas British imperialism had dismissed them from the post of

chief agent, because it had found a better qualified, more firmly established and more highly organi0ed agent in the $ionist movement% *n this way, the main outlines of the fundamental role that the feudal#clerical leadership was to play were established # it was to be a +struggle+ for a better position in the colonialist regime% But they could not engage in this +struggle+ without rallying around their support, the classes that were eager to free themselves from the yoke of coloni0ation% Cith this end in view, they drew up a programme that was clearly progressive, adopted mass slogans, which they were neither willing nor able to push to their logical conclusions, and followed a pattern of struggle which was quite out of character% 1f course these leaderships did not have absolute freedom of action, as many people like to suggest! on the contrary, they were e'posed to all the pressures that were shaping the course of events, to the increasing intensity of the conflicts and to all the influences we have already discussed% &his e'plains why there developed from time to time partial contradictions between their interests and those of the ruling classes of the "rab countries surrounding Palestine, although they upheld the same class interests% *t also e'plains their widescale alliances within the class structure of Palestine%

Background: The #ntellectuals

*n 1937, after thirteen years of British occupation of Palestine, the 3irector of Aducation admitted in his report that +>ince the beginning of the occupation, the government has never undertaken to provide sufficient funds for the building of a single school in the country,+ and in 1936, the government turned down .19 of the applications by Palestinian "rabs for places in schools% *n the (77 villages in Palestine there were only fifteen schools for girls and )69 for boys and only fifteen village girls got as far as the seventh elementary grade% &here were 61: Palestinian "rab villages which had neither boys8 nor girls8 schools and there was not one secondary school in the villages% 2oreover, the government +censored books and obDected to all cultural links with the "rab world, and did nothing to raise the educational level of the peasants%%%+ 5" &hus in 1931 among Palestinian 2uslims )61 per thousand males and 33 per thousand females had attended school, and among the Palestinian 4hristians :16 per thousand males and ..1 per thousand females ,for /ews the figures were 9.3 per thousand males and :(: per thousand females%- 51 &hese figures give an idea of the educational situation in the rural areas, but not of that in Palestine as a whole, which had played a pioneering role in education since the start of the "rab resurgence at the beginning of the )7th century% *n fact, a large number of printing presses had been established in Palestine before the British occupation, about fifty "rabic newspapers appeared between 197. and 19)), while at least ten more with a wide circulation made their appearance before the 1936 revolt% " number of factors, which it is not possible to deal with at length here, had made Palestine an important center of "rab culture, and the persistent efforts of intellectuals migrating into and out of Palestine were a basic factor in establishing the cultural role of Palestine and in the establishment of literary associations and clubs which began to appear in the early twenties%

&his cultural development, which was constantly fed by a flow of "rab graduates from Beirut and 4airo, was accompanied by an e'tensive activity in the field of translation from Brench and Anglish% &he foreign missions that were primarily attracted to Palestine for historical and religious considerations, placed a prominent role in disseminating an atmosphere of education in the cities% 5owever, it is not the general cultural climate in Palestine during that period that is of concern to us, but rather, in particular, the influence of the aggravating economic and political crisis on the literary movement% &he development of a certain +popular culture+ was very significant% *t represented a certain awareness that e'isted in rural areas despite the widespread illiteracy, an awareness that was spurred by the rapidly developing economic and political reality% Popular poetry in particular reflected a growing concern on the part of the rural masses over the course of events% &his spontaneous awareness led to a spirit of mobili0ation in the villages% &he maDority of urban intellectuals, for their part, were of a feudal or commercial petty#bourgeois class affiliation% "lthough they basically advocated a type of bourgeois revolution, the obDective conditions were by no means favorable to the development of the class that would logically lead such a struggle% "s political activists, they thus remained under the control of the traditional leadership% &heir work nevertheless reflected a degree of awareness that, in general, was not shared by their counterparts in other "rab countries% &he struggle between advocates of revolution and reactionaries in the rural areas, and between revolutionary militants and defeatist elements in the cities was developing in favor of the revolution% Ce do not know of a single Palestinian writer or intellectual in that period who did not participate in the call for resistance against the colonial enemy% &here is no doubt that the intellectuals, even though they were not, in general, mobili0ed by a revolutionary party, played an important role in the national struggle% &he position of Palestinian intellectuals was unique% 5aving completed their studies and returned to their towns, they became aware of the incapacity of the class they belonged to of leading the national struggle% But at the same time they suffered from their own inability to participate and benefit from the process of industrial development that was essentially controlled by an alien and hostile community% 1n the other hand, in the rural areas of Palestine, the peasants, who for centuries had been subDect to class and national oppression, lived in a most archaic society where local feudal and religious leaders e'ercised absolute authority% Popular poetry often reflected the submissiveness of peasants $, which the Palestinian intellectuals, and in particular the poets, could not combat easily% 4ertain intellectuals attempted to overcome the submissive mood of the rural masses and played a prominent role in disseminating progressive awareness% Cadi al#Bustani, a poet of @ebanese origin who graduated from the "merican =niversity of Beirut and settled in Palestine, played an important role as a progressive intellectual% 5e was the first to warn against the Balfour 3eclaration and its challenges, the very month it was issued% 5is period ,as Palestine was on the verge of armed revolt- produced a powerful vanguard of revolutionary poets whose works became part of the cultural heritage of the masses% $$ 1n /anuary )9, 19)7, the British 2andatory <overnment sent a letter to the editor of the cultural maga0ine Karmel, which was then published in 5aifa, requesting the publication of a poem by the celebrated *raqi poet 2a8ruf "l#?isafi that was dedicated to the British 5igh 4ommissioner and that praised and eulogi0ed him along with a /ewish speaker called /ehuda% &he editor agreed to publish it along with a reply to it% "l# Bustani wrote the reply in the form of a poem which said the following

+/uda8s+ speechG 1r acts of witchcraftG "nd ?asafi8s sayingG 1r lies of poetry Four poetry is of the choicest words, you are well#acquainted with the Dewels of sea verse But this sea is one of politics, if Dustice spreads high its low tide begins FesH 5e who has crossed the /ordan ?iver is our cousin but he who comes from across the sea is suspicious%53 &his long poem, which became very famous at the time, was in fact a unique political document! it not only made "l#?isafi look a fool, but also asserted, even at that early date, political facts of great importance% *t not only mentioned /ewish immigration and the danger it constituted, but also the role played by Britain in fragmenting the Palestinian "rabs, the Balfour 3eclaration, and its implications, etc% " short time before this, on 2arch )(th 19)7, "l#Bustani had himself led a demonstration, which chanted a song that he had composed himself% 5e was summoned to an inquiry, and the following appears in the records of the inquiry conducted by the Public Prosecutor

Public Prosecutor: >tatements have been made that you were carried shoulder#high, and that you said to the people who were following behind you +1h 4hristians, 1h 2uslims+% The Accused: Fes% Public Prosecutor: "nd you also said +&o whom have you left the countryG+ The Accused: Fes% Public Prosecutor: &hen you said +Eill the /ews and unbelievers%+ The Accused: ;o% &hat violates the meter and the rhyme% * could not have said that% Chat * said was both rhyming and metrical% *t is called poetry%54 *n the subsequent periods poetry played an increasingly important role in e'pressing, on all sorts of occasions, feelings of the helpless masses% &hus, when Balfour came from @ondon to attend the opening ceremony of the 5ebrew =niversity in 19):, the ceremony was also attended by "hmad @utfi al#>aid, as the delegate of the Agyptian government, and the poet *skandar al#Ehuri wrote the following lines addressed to Balfour

+?unning, from @ondon you came to stir the fire of this battle 1h @ord * cannot blame you for you are not the source of our misery% Bor Agypt is to be blamed as it only e'tends to us empty hands%+ $$$ *brahim &uqan, "bu >alma ,"bd al#Earim al#Earmi- and "bd al#?ahim 2ahmud were, since the beginning of the thirties, the culmination of the wave of nationalist poets who inflamed the whole of Palestine with revolutionary awareness and agitation% "s8af al#;ashashibi, Ehalil al#>akakini, *brahim al#3abbagh, 2uhammed 5asan "la al#3in, Burhan al#"bbushi, 2uhammed Ehurshid, Iayasar al#Ehuri, the priest <eorge Bitar, Bulos >hihada, 2utlaq "bd al#Ehaliq and others% &he work of these three, &uqan, al#Earmi and 2ahmud, displays an e'traordinary power of appreciation of what was going on, which can only be e'plained as a profound grasp of what was boiling in mass circles% Chat appears to be ine'plicable prophecy and a power of prediction in their poems is, in fact, only their ability to

e'press this dialectical relationship that linked their artistic work with the movement that was at work in society% &he fact that we have concentrated on the role played by poetry and popular poetry does not mean that other manifestations of cultural activity in Palestine did not play any role, or that their role was insignificant% @iterary newspapers and articles, stories and the translation movement all played a significant pioneering role% Bor e'ample, in an editorial published by Fusuf al#*sa in "l#;afa8is in 19)7, we read +Palestine is "rab # its 2uslims are "rab # its 4hristians are "rab # and its /ewish citi0ens are "rab too% Palestine will never be quiet if it is separated from >yria and made a national home for $ionism% % %+ *t was e'pressions of this kind at the beginning of the twenties that fashioned the revolutionary cultural tide in the thirties, which was to play an important role in promoting awareness and sparking off the revolt # writers such as "rif al#"rif, Ehalil al#>akakini ,a mocking writer of fiery prose, and son of a master carpenter-, "s8af al#;ashashibi ,a member of the upper bourgeoisie who was influenced by al# >akakini and adopted many of his views-, "rif al#"00uni, 2ahmud >aif al#3in al# *rani and ;aDati >idqi ,one of the early leftist writers who, in 1936, e'tolled the materialism of *bn Ehaldun and deplored idealism%- 5e was probably the first chronicler which the "rab nationalist movement had from the beginning of the renaissance who used a materialist analysis of events% 5e published his researches in "l#&ali8a in 193: and 193( "bdullah 2ukhlis ,who in the middle thirties started calling for the view that colonialism is a class phenomenon, and maintaining that artistic production must be militant-, ?aDa al#5urani, "bdullah al#Bandak, Ehalil al# Badiri, 2uhammad *00at 3arwa0a and *sa al#>ifri ,whose eulogy of the death of al# Iassam had a profoundly revolutionary significance%&his effervescence in the Palestinian cultural atmosphere which reached its clima' in the thirties, was e'pressed in a variety of forms, but for many reasons related to the history of "rabic literature, the greatest influence was always e'ercised by poetry and popular poetry% &his alone e'plains the role which poetry took upon itself in this period, which was almost direct political preaching% *brahim &uqan, for e'ample, commenting on the establishment, in 193), of the +national fund+ to save land in Palestine from being sold to the $ionists ,this was the fund established by the feudal#clerical leadership on the prete't of preventing the land of poor peasants from falling into the hands of the $ionists- says +Aight of those responsible for the fund proDect were land brokers for the $ionists%+ "s early as 19)9, *brahim &uqan disclosed the role that the big landowners were playing in connection with the land problem +&hey have sold the country to its enemies because of their greed for money! but it is their homes they have sold% &hey could have been forgiven if they had been forced to do so by hunger, but <od knows that they have never felt hunger or thirst%+ +*f only one of our leaders would fast like <andhi # perhaps his fast would do some good% &here is no need to abstain from food # in Palestine a leader would die without food% @et him abstain from selling land and keep a plot in which to lay his bones%+55

*n the same year, &uqan had written his epic on the death sentences passed by the 2andatory <overnment on the three martyrs, Buad 5iDa0i, of >afad, and 2uhammad /umDum and "ta al#$ir of "cre% &his poem became e'tremely famous, and came to be regarded as part of the revolutionary heritage, like the poem of "bd al#?ahim 2ahmud written on "ugust 1., 1936 in hich he addressed the "mir >aud who was visiting Palestine +5ave you come to visit the "qsa 2osque, or to say farewell to it before it is destroyedG+ &his poet was to lay down his life in the battle of "l#>haDara in Palestine in 19.(, but before that he was to play a prominent role, along with "bu >alma and &uqan% *n laying the foundations of Palestinian resistance poetry which later, under *sraeli occupation, was to become one of the most conspicuous manifestations of the endurance of the Palestinian masses% Poetry and popular poetry accompanied the mass movement frm the early thirties, e'pressing the developments that preceded the outbreak of the revolt% &he poem of "bu >alma, in which he chronicled the 1936 revolt, courageously describes the bitter disappointment caused by the way the "rab regimes abandoned it +Fou who cherish the homeland revolt against the outright oppression @iberate the homeland from the kings liberate it from the puppets% % % * thought we have kings that can lead the men behind them >hame to such kings if kings are so low By god, their crowns are not fit to be shoesoles Ce are the ones who will protect the homeland and heal its wounds%+ 2ention must also be made of the popular poet +"wad+ who, the night before his e'ecution in 193:, wrote on the walls of his cell in "cre a splendid poem ending with the lines +&he bridegroom belongs to us! woe to him whom we are fighting against # we8ll cut off his moustache with a sword% >hake the lance with the beautiful shaft! where are you from, you brave men% Ce are men of Palestine # welcome with honor% +Bather of the bridegroom, do not worry, we are drinkers of blood% *n Bal8a and Cadi al#&uffah there has been an attack and a clash of arms% % % 1h ye beautiful women sing and chant% 1n the day of the battle of Beit "mrin you hear the sound of gun#shooting, look upon us from the balcony%+56 &he anger felt against all three members of the enemy trinity # the $ionist invasion, the British mandate and "rab reaction, both local and otherwise, grew constantly as the situation grew more critical% "t that time the countryside, with the escalation of the conflicts and the outbreaks of armed uprisings, was developing its new awareness through the contacts of its +cultural+ elements, with the towns and the multiplication of factors inducing such awareness +<ood people, what is this hatredG " $ionist with a CesternerG+ 5 and +the gun appeared, the lion did not! the mu00le of the gun is wet with dew,+ or +5is rifle,

with the salesman * say my heart will never rest till * buy it 5is rifle got rusty from lack of use but still longing for its fighter%+ *ndeed, the inflammatory call to revolt went to such e'traordinary lengths that, after all the inherited proverbs which counseled submissiveness, and constituted a lead with the infallible authority of traditions, popular poetry suddenly became capable of saying +"rab, son of weak and poor woman, sell your mother and buy a gun! a gun will be better than your mother when the revolt relieves your cares%+ 5! "s the conflict became more and more acute, the +gun+ was to become the instrument which destroyed the age#old walls of the call to submissiveness and suddenly became able to pierce the heart of the matter, and the revolt became the promise for the future # better than the warmest things in the past, the mother and the family% But over all this effervescence the patriarchal feudalism was ossified with its impotent leadership, its authority and its reliance on the past% *n the midst of these complicated and heated conflicts, which were both e'panding and growing more profound, and which mainly affected the "rab peasants and workers, although they also pressed heavily on the petty and middle bourgeoisie and the middle peasants in the country, the situation was becoming ever more critical, e'pressing itself in armed outbreaks from time to time ,19)9#1933-% 1n the other hand, the Palestinian feudal#clerical leaders felt that their own interests too were threatened by the growing economic force # /ewish capitalism allied with the British 2andate% But their interests were also threatened from the opposite quarter # by the poor "rab masses who no longer knew where to turn% Bor the "rab urban bourgeoisie was weak and incapable of leadership in this stage of economic transformation which was taking place with unparalleled rapidity and a small section of this bourgeoisie became parasitic and remained on the fringe of /ewish industrial development% *n addition both their subDective and obDective conditions were undergoing changes contradictory to the general direction "rab society was pursuing% &he young intellectuals, sons of the rich rural families, played a prominent role in inciting people to revolt% &hey had returned from their universities to a society in which they reDected the formula of the old relationships, which had become outdated, and in which they were reDected by the new formulas which had started to take shape within the framework of the $ionist#colonialist alliance% &hus the class struggle became mi'ed, with e'traordinary thoroughness, with the national interest and religious feelings, and this mi'ture broke out within the framework of the obDective and subDective crisis which "rab society in Palestine was e'periencing% 3ue to the above, Palestinian "rab society remained a prisoner of the feudal#clerical leaderships% *n view of the social and economic oppression which was the lot of the poor Palestinian "rabs in the towns and villages, it was inevitable that the nationalist movement should assume advanced forms of struggle, adopt class slogans and follow a course of action basd on class concepts% >imilarly, faced with the firm and daily e'pressed alliance between the invading society built by the /ewish settlers in Palestine and British colonialism, it was impossible to forget the primarily nationalist character of that struggle% "nd in view of the terrible religious fervor on which the $ionist invasion of Palestine was based, and which was inseparable from all of its manifestations, it was impossible that the underdeveloped Palestinian countryside should not practice religious fundamentalism as a manifestation of hostility to the $ionist colonialist incursion%

4ommenting on the emergence of the Black Panther movement in +*srael,+ the leftist 5ebrew#language maga0ine Matzpen ,;o% 6, "pril 19:1- says +4lass conflicts in *srael sometimes tend to take the form of confessional conflicts% 4lass conflicts, even when translated into the language of confessionalism, have from the start lain at the heart of $ionism%+ 1f course this statement applies to an even greater e'tent to the role played by religion against the $ionist incursion, as being a form of both national and class persecution% Bor e'ample +1ne of the results of $ionism was that celebrations of the Prophet8s Birthday were turned into nationalist rallies under the direction of the 2ufti of 5aifa and the poet Cadi8 al#Bustani and were attended by all the 4hristian leaders and notables, not a single /ew being invited% *n this way, saints8 days, both 2uslim and 4hristian, became popular festivals with a nationalist tinge in the towns of Palestine%+ &he feudal#clerical leaderships proceeded to impose themselves at the head of the movement of the masses% &o do this they took advantage of the meagerness of the "rab urban bourgeoisie, and of the conflict which was, to a certain e'tent, boiling up between them and British colonialism, which had established its influence through its alliance with the $ionist movement! of their religious attributes, of the small si0e of the "rab proletariat and the meagerness of its 4ommunist Party, which was not only under the control of /ewish leaders, but its "rab elements had been subDected to oppression and intimidation by the feudal leadership ever since the early twenties% *t was against this complicated background, in which the interlocked and e'tremely complicated conflicts were flaring up, that the 1936 revolt came to the forefront in the history of Palestine% %&T'( JA'amples of such proverbs 5e who eats from the >ultan8s bread, strikes by his sword! @et no grass grow after mine! &oday8s egg is better than tomorrow8s hen ," bird in the hand is worth two in the bush-!Chen we started selling coffins people started dying! &he most severe of pains is the present one! 5e runs after the loaf of bread and the loaf of bread runs before him! @ife goes well with the well to do% 52 $$)ccording to Tau*i+ ,i-ad. a resistance /oet in occu/ied Palestine 0%a1areth2: 3&ur revolutionar- /oetr- 04ah5ud 6ar7ish. (a5ih al-8asi5 and 5-sel*2 is an e9tension o* the revolutionar- /oetr- o* #:rahi5 Tu+an. ):d al-Rahi5 4ah5ud. 4utla+ ):d al-;hali+ and others<<<:ecause our :attle is an e9tension o* theirs<3 0On Popular Poetry. 6ar al-Tha7ra. /<152 JJJ&aufiq $iyad described this poem in the following words +* have not known a poetry work equivalent in the strength, sacrifice and bravery in this great poem%+ ,from Literature and Popular Literature, 3ar al#"wda, p% 37-%

The Revolt
5istorians are at odds with each other with regard to the different incidents that took place in various places as the reason for the outbreak of the 1936 revolt% "ccording to Fehuda Bauer, +the incident that is commonly regarded as the start of the 1936 disturbances+ occurred on 19th "pril 1936, when Palestinian "rab crowds in /affa attacked /ewish passers#by%59 *n the view of *sa al#>ifri 6", >alih 2as8ud Buwaysir61 and >ubhi Fasin62, the first spark was lit when an unknown group of Palestinian "rabs ,>ubhi Fasin describes it as a Iassamist group including Barhan al#>a8udi and 2ahmud 3airawi- ambushed fifteen cars on the road from "nabta and the ;ur >hams prison, robbed their /ewish

and "rab passengers alike of their money, while one of the three members of the group made a short speech to the Palestinian "rabs, who formed the maDority of the passengers, in which, according to al#>ifri, he said +Ce are taking your money so that we can fight the enemy and defend you%+63 3r% "bd al#Cahhab al#Eayyali thinks that the first spark was lit before that # in Bebruary 1936, when an armed band of Palestinian "rabs surrounded a school which /ewish contractors were building in 5aifa, employing /ewish#only labor% 64 But all sources rightly believe that the Iassamist rising, sparked off by >heikh *00 al#3in al#Iassam was the real start of the 1936 revolt% 5owever, the report of the ?oyal 4ommission ,@ord Peel- which Fehuda Bauer regards as one of the more authoritative sources written about the Palestine problem, sidesteps ,ignores- these immediate causes for the outbreak of the revolt, and attributes the outbreak to two main causes the "rabs8 desire to win national independence and their aversion to, and fear of, the establishment of the +/ewish national home+ in Palestine% *t is not difficult to see that these two causes are really only one, and the words in which they are couched are inflated and convey no precise meaning% 5owever, @ord Peel mentions what he calls +secondary factors+ which contributed to the outbreak of the +disturbances%+ &hese are 1% )% 3% .% &he spread of the "rab nationalist spirit outside Palestine% *ncreasing /ewish immigration since 1933% &he fact that the /ews were able to influence public opinion in Britain% &he lack of Palestinian "rab confidence in the good intentions of the British government% 6% &he Palestinian "rabs8 fear of continued land purchases by /ews% 6. &he fact that the ultimate obDectives of the 2andatory government were not clear%65 &he way the then#leadership of the Palestinian national movement understood the causes can be deduced from the three slogans with which it adorned all its demands% &hese were 1% "n immediate stop to /ewish immigration% )% Prohibition of the transfer of the ownership of Palestinian "rab lands to /ewish settlers% 3. &he establishment of a democratic government in which Palestinian "rabs would have the largest share in conformity with their numerical superiority%66 But these slogans, in the bombastic versions in which they were repeated, were quite incapable of e'pressing the real situation, and in fact to a great e'tent all they did was to perpetuate the control of the feudal leadership over the nationalist movement% *n fact the real cause of the revolt was the fact that the acute conflicts involved in the transformation of Palestinian society from an "rab agricultural#feudal#clerical one into a $ionist ,Cestern- industrial bourgeois one, had reached their clima', as we have already seen%

&he process of establishing the roots of colonialism and transforming it from a British mandate into $ionist settler colonialism, as we have seen, reached its clima' in the mid#thirties, and in fact the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement was obliged to adopt a certain form of armed struggle because it was no longer capable of e'ercising its leadership at a time when the conflict had reached decisive proportions% " variety of conflicting factors played a role in inducing the Palestinian then# leadership to adopt the form of armed struggle Birstly the *00 al#3in al#Iassam movement% >econdly &he series of failures sustained by this leadership at a time when they were at the helm of the mass movement, even with regard to the minor and partial demands that the colonialists did not usually hesitate to yield to, in the hope of absorbing resentment% ,&he British took a long time to see the value of this manoeuvre! however, their interests were safeguarded through the e'istence of competent $ionist agents%&hirdly $ionist violence ,the armed bands, the slogan of +/ewish labor only,+ etc% in addition to colonialist violence ,the manner in which the 19)9 rising had been suppressed%*n any discussion of the 1936#1939 revolt, a special place must be reserved for >heikh *00 al#3in al#Iassam% *n spite of all that has been written about him, it is not too much to say that this unique personality is still really unknown, and will probably remain so% 2ost of what has been written about him has dealt with him only from the outside and because of this superficiality in the study of personality several /ewish historians have not hesitated to regard him as a +fanatical dervish,+ while many Cestern historians have ignored him altogether% *n fact it is clear that it is the failure to grasp the dialectical connection between religion and nationalist tendencies that is responsible for the belittling of the importance of the Iassamist movement% 5owever, whatever view is held of al#Iassam, there is no doubt that his movement ,1)th#19th ;ovember 1936- represented a turning point in the nationalist struggle and played an important role in the adoption of a more advanced form of struggle in confrontation with the traditional leadership which had become divided and splintered in the face of the mounting struggle% Probably the personality of al#Iassam in itself constituted the symbolic point of encounter of that great mass of interconnected factors which, for the purposes of simplification, has come to be known as the +Palestine problem%+ &he fact that he was +>yrian+ ,born in /abala on the periphery of @atakia- e'emplified the "rab nationalist factor in the struggle% &he fact that he was an "0harist ,he studied at "l# "0har- e'emplifies the religious#nationalist factor represented by "l#"0har at the beginning of the century% &he fact that he had a record of engaging in nationalist struggle ,took part in the >yrian revolt against the Brench at /abal 5oran in 1919# 19)7 and was condemned to death- e'emplified the unity of "rab struggle% "l#Iassam came to 5aifa in 19)1 with the Agyptian >heikh 2uammad al#5anafi and >heikh "li al#5aDD "bid and immediately started to form secret groups% Chat is remarkable in al#Iassam8s activities is his advanced organi0ational intelligence and his steel#strong patience% *n 19)9, he refused to be rushed into announcing that he was under arms and, in spite of the fact that this refusal led to a split in the organi0ation, it did succeed in holding together and remaining secret%

"ccording to a well#known Iassamist 6 , al#Iassam programmed his revolt in three stages, psychological preparation and the dissemination of a revolutionary spirit, the formation of secret groups, the formation of committees to collect contributions and others to purchase arms, committees for training, for security, espionage, propaganda and information and for political contacts # and then armed revolt% 2ost of those who knew al#Iassam say that when he went out to the Fa8bad hills with )6 of his men on the night of 1)th ;ovember 1936, his obDect was not to declare the armed revolt but to spread the call for the revolt, but that an accidental encounter led to his presence there being disclosed, and in spite of the heroic resistance of al#Iassem and his men, a British force easily destroyed them% *t appears that when he reali0ed that he could no longer e'pand the revolt with his comrades, >heikh al#Iassam adopted his famous slogan +3ie as 2artyrs%+ *t is due to al#Iassam that we should understand this slogan in a +<uevarist+ sense, if we may use the e'pression, but at the ordinary nationalist level, the little evidence we possess of al#Iassam8s conduct shows that he was aware of the importance of his role as the initiator of an advanced revolutionary focus% &his slogan was to bear fruit immediately% &he masses followed their martyr8s body 17 kilometres on foot to the village of FaDur% But the most important thing that happened was the e'posing of the traditional leaders in the face of the challenge constituted by >heikh al#Iassam% &hese leaders were as conscious of the challenge as was the British 2andate% "ccording to one Iassamist, a few months before al#Iassam went into the hills he sent to 5aDD al#"min al#5ussaini, through >heikh 2usa al#"0rawi, to ask him to coordinate declarations of revolt throughout the country% 5ussaini refused, however, on the ground that conditions were not yet ripe% 6! Chen "l#Iassam was killed his funeral was attended only by poor people% &he leaders adopted an indifferent attitude, which they soon reali0ed was a mistake% Bor the killing of al#Iassam was an occurrence of outstanding significance which they could not afford to ignore% Proof of this is to be found in the fact that representatives of the five Palestinian parties visited the British 5igh 4ommissioner only si' days after the killing of al#Iassam, and submitted to him an e'traordinarily impudent memorandum in which they admitted that +if they did not receive an answer to this memorandum which could be regarded as generally satisfactory, they would lose all their influence over their followers, e'tremist and irresponsible views would prevail and the situation would deteriorate%+ 69 &hey obviously wanted to e'ploit the phenomenon of al#Iassam to enable them to take a step backwards% 5owever, by his choice of the form of struggle al#Iassam had made it impossible for them to retreat, and this in fact is what e'plains the difference between the attitude of the Palestinian leaders to the killing of >heikh al#Iassam immediately after it happened, and the attitude they adopted at the ceremony held on the fortieth day after his death% 3uring these forty days they discovered that if they did not try to mount the great wave that had been set in motion by al#Iassam, it would engulf them% &hey therefore cast off the indifference they had displayed at his funeral and took part in the rallies and speeches at the fortieth day ceremony% 4learly 5aDD "min al#5ussaini was to remain aware of this loophole in later times% Aven more than twenty years later the maga0ine Filastine, the mouthpiece of the "rab 5igher 4ommittee, tried to give the impression that the Iassamist movement

was nothing but a part of the movement led by the 2ufti, and that the latter and al# Iassam had been +personal friends%+ " "s for the British, they told the story of al#Iassam in the report on the incidents of 1936 that they submitted to <eneva as follows +&here were widespread rumors that a terrorist gang had been formed at the inspiration of political and religious factors, and on ;ovember :, 1936, a police sergeant and a constable were following up a theft in the hills of the ;a0areth 3istrict, when two unknown persons fired on them, killing the sergeant% % % &his incident soon led to the discovery of a gang operating in the neighborhood under the leadership of *00 al#3in al#Iassam, a political refugee from >yria who enDoyed considerable prestige as a religious leader% 5e had been the obDect of strong suspicion some years before, and he was said to have had a hand in terrorist activities%+ +>heikh al#Iassam8s funeral in 5aifa was attended by very large crowds, and in spite of the efforts made by influential 2uslims to keep order, there were demonstrations and stones were thrown% &he death of al#Iassam aroused a wave of powerful feelings in political and other circles in the country and the "rabic newspapers agreed in calling him a martyr in the articles they wrote about him%+ 1 &he British, too, were aware of the challenge represented by the killing of al# Iassam, and they too tried to put the clock back, as is shown by the view e'pressed by the 5igh 4ommissioner in a letter he wrote to the 2inister for the 4olonies% *n this letter he said that if the demands of the "rab leaders were not granted, +they would lose all their influence and all possibility of pacification, by the moderate means he proposed, would vanish+% 2 But it was impossible to put the clock back, for the Iassamist movement was, in fact, an e'pression of the natural pattern that was capable of coping with the escalation of the conflict and settling it% *t was not long before this was reflected in a number of committees and groupings, so that the traditional leadership was obliged to choose between confronting this escalating will to fight among the masses or to quell their will and to put them under their control% "lthough the British took rapid action, and proposed the idea of a legislative assembly and mooted the idea of stopping land sales, it was too late &he $ionist movement, whose will began to crystallise very firmly at that time, played its part in diminishing the effectiveness of the British offer% "ll the same, the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement had not yet decided its attitude, but was e'traordinarily vacillating, and up to "pril )nd, 1936 the representatives of the Palestinian parties were prepared to form a delegation to go to @ondon to tell the British government their point of view% 5owever, things blew up before the leadership of the nationalist movement intended, and when the first flames were ignited in /affa in Bebruary 1936, the leaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement believed that they could still obtain partial concessions from Britain through negotiations% But they were surprised by the following events% "ll who were closely associated with the events of "pril 1936 admit that the outbreak of violence and civil disobedience was spontaneous and that, with the e'ception of the acts instigated by the surviving Iassamists, everything that happened was a spontaneous e'pression of the critical level that the conflict had reached%

Aven when the general strike was declared on 19th "pril 1936 the leadership of the nationalist movement lagged behind% 5owever, they soon got on the bandwagon before it left them behind, and succeeded, for the reasons already mentioned in our analysis of the social#political situation in Palestine, in dominating the nationalist movement% Brom the organisational point of view the Palestinian nationalist movement was represented by a number of parties, most of which were the vestiges of the anti# 1ttoman movements that had arisen at the beginning of the century% &his meant both that they had not engaged in a struggle for independence ,as was the case in Agypt, for e'ample- and that they were no more than general frameworks, without definite principles, controlled by groups of notables and dependent on loyalties rooted in and derived from the influence they enDoyed as religious or feudal leaders or prominent members of society! they were not parties with organised bases% "part from al#Iassam himself ,and the 4ommunists, naturally- not one of the leaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement at this time possessed any organising ability! even 5aDD "min al#5ussaini, who had unusual administrative abilities, had no conception of organisation as applied to struggle% 1rganisational responsibilities were most often based on individual talents in the subcommittees and among the middle cadre% 5owever, they were usually incapable of transforming their abilities into policy% 1n the eve of the revolt the situation of the representatives of the nationalist movement in Palestine was as follows with the dissolution of the "rab A'ecutive 4ommittee in "ugust 193. si' groups emerged 1% &he "rab Palestine Party, in 2ay 1936, headed by /amal al#5ussaini! it more or less embodied the policy of the 2ufti and represented the feudalists and big city merchants% )% &he ;ational 3efence Party, headed by ?aghib al#;ashashibi! founded in 3ecember 193. it represented the new urban bourgeoisie and the senior officials% 3% &he *ndependence Party, which had been founded in 193), with "uni "bd al# 5adl at its head% *t included the intellectuals, the middle bourgeoisie and some sectors of the petty#bourgeoisie! this contributed to its left wing playing a special role% .% &he ?eform Party which, founded by 3r 5usain al#Ehalidi in "ugust 1936, represented a number of intellectuals% 6% &he ;ational Bloc Party, headed by "bd al#@atif >alah% 6% &he Palestine Fouth Party, headed by Fa8qub al#<husain% &his multiplicity was purely superficial! it was not a clear and definite e'pression of the class configuration in the country% &he overwhelming maDority of the masses were not represented ,according to ;evill Barbour 979 of the revolutionaries were peasants who regarded themselves as volunteers-% " glance at the class structure in Palestine in 1931 shows that 699 of the Palestinian "rabs were peasants ,19%19 of the /ews-, 1)%99 of the "rabs worked in construction industry and mining ,37%69 of the /ews-% 69 of the Palestinian "rabs worked in communications, (%.9 in commerce, 1%39 in the administration, etc% 3 &his means that the overwhelming maDority of the, population was not represented in these parties which, although they represented the feudal and religious leaders,

the urban compradors and certain sectors of the intellectuals! they were always subDect to the leadership of the 2ufti and his class, which represented the feudal# clerical leaders, and was more nationalist than the leadership which represented the urban bourgeoisie% &he latter was represented by the effendis at a time when they were starting to invest their money in industry ,this trend became more pronounced after the defeat of the 1936#1939 revolt-% &he petty#bourgeoisie in general ,small traders, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants and craftsmen- had no leadership% "s a class they had had no influence and no importance under the &urkish regime, which depended on the effendi class, to which the &urks gave the right of local government, due to the fact that it had grown in conDunction with the feudal aristocracy% &he labour movement was newly established and weak and was, as a result, e'posed to oppression by the authorities, crushing competition from the /ewish proletariat and bourgeoisie, and persecution by the leadership, of the "rab nationalist movement% Before the "rab 5igher 4ommittee was8 formed, with, 5aDD "min al#5ussaini at its head, on )6 "pril 1936, /amal al#5ussaini, the leader of the "rab Party, had been dissatisfied by people8s growing belief that the Anglish were the real enemy, and the ;ational 3efence Party which represented, first and foremost, the growing urban comprador class, was not really disposed for an open clash with the British% 1nly two days earlier, on )3 "pril 1936, Cei0mann, the leader of the $ionist movement, had made a speech in &el#"viv in which he described the "rab#$ionist struggle, which was beginning to break out, as a struggle between destructive and constructive elements, thereby putting the $ionist forces in their place as the instrument of colonialism on the eve of the armed clash% &his was the position on both sides of the field on the eve of the revoltH *n the countryside the revolt assumed the form of civil disobedience and armed insurrection% 5undreds of armed men flocked to Doin the bands that had begun to fan out in the mountains, ;on#payment of ta'es was decided on at the conference held in the ?audat al#2a8aref al#Cataniya college in /erusalem on 2ay :, 1936 and was attended by about 167 delegates representing the "rabs of Palestine% " review of the names of the delegates made by *sa al#>afri 4 shows that it was at this conference that the leadership of the mass movement committed itself to an unsubstantial alliance between the feudal#religious leaderships, the urban commercial bourgeoisie and a limited number of the intellectuals% &he resolution adopted by this conference was brief, but it was a clear illustration of the e'tent to which a leadership of this kind was capable of reaching% +&he conference decided unanimously to announce that no ta'es will be paid as from 2ay 16th, 1936 if the British government does not make a radical change in its policy by stopping /ewish immigration%+ &he British response to civil disobedience and armed insurrection was to strike at two key points the first was the organi0ational cadre which was, for the most part, more revolutionary than the leadership, and the second the impoverished masses who had taken part in the revolt and who in fact had nothing but their own arms to protect them% &his goes a long way towards e'plaining why the only two people who were comparatively proficient at organisation # "uni "bed el#5adi and 2ohammad "0at 3arwa0eh # were arrested, while the rest were subDected either to arrest or to

harassment to the e'tent that they were totally paralysed% &his is shown by the fact that 61 "rabs responsible for organising the strike ,the middle cadre- were arrested on 2ay )3rd% 5owever, these arrests did not prevent Britain from giving permits to four of the leaders of the revolt, /amal al#5ussaini, >hibli al#/amal, "bd al#@atif >alah and 3r *00at &annus to travel to @ondon and meet the 2inister for the 4olonies, which took place on /une 1)th% &here was nothing unusual about this incident, which was to be constantly repeated throughout the subsequent months and years% &he British 5igh 4ommissioner had observed with great satisfaction that +the Briday sermons were much more moderate than K* had e'pected, at a time when feelings are so strong% &his was mainly due to the 2ufti+% 5 Brom the outset the situation had been that the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement regarded the revolt of the masses as merely intended to e'ert pressure on British colonialism with the obDect of improving the conditions of the masses as a class% &he British were profoundly aware of this fact, and acted accordingly% &hey did not, however, take the trouble to grant this class the concessions it desired! @ondon persisted in meeting its commitments as regards handing over the colonialist heritage in Palestine to the $ionist movement and, moreover, it was during the years of the revolt # 1936#1939 # that British colonialism threw all its weight into performing the task of supporting the $ionist presence and setting it on its feet, as we shall see later% &he British succeeded in achieving this in two ways by striking at the poor peasant revolutionaries with unprecedented violence, and by employing their e'tensive influence with the "rab regimes, which played a maDor role in liquidating the revolt% Firstly: &he British Amergency ?egulations played an effective role% "*#>ifri cites a group of sentences passed at the time to show how unDust these regulations were +si' years8 imprisonment for possessing a revolver# 1) years far possessing a bomb # five years with hard labour for possessing 1) bullets# eight months on a charge of misdirecting a detachment of soldiers% nine years on a charge of possessing e'plosives# five years for trying to buy ammunition from soldiers# two weeks8 imprisonment for possessing a stick % % % etc%+ 6 "ccording to a British estimate submitted to the @eague of ;ations, the number of Palestinian "rabs killed in the 1936 revolt was about one thousand, apart from wounded, missing and interned% &he British employed the policy of blowing up houses on a wide scale% *n addition to blowing up and destroying part of the city of /affa ,/une 1(th, 1936- where the number of houses blown up was estimated at ))7 and the number of persons rendered homeless at 6,777% *n addition one hundred huts were demolished in /abalia, 377 in "bu Eabir, 367 in >heikh 2urad and :6 in "rab al#3audi% *t is clear that the inhabitants of the quarters that were destroyed *n /affa and of the huts that were destroyed in the outskirts were poor peasants who had left the country for the town% *n the villages, according to al# >ifri8s estimate% 1.3 houses were blown up for reasons directly connected with the revolt% &hese houses belonged to poor peasants, some medium peasants and a very small number of feudal families% Secondly: "mir "bdullah of &ransDordan$ and ;uri >aid started to take action to mediate with the "rab 5igher 4ommittee% 5owever, their mediation was unsuccessful, despite the readiness of the leadership to accept their good offices% But the movement of the masses was not yet ready to be domesticated in 1936 although these contacts did have a negative effect on the revolt, and left a feeling that the conflict then in progress was amenable to settlement, "nd in fact this initiative which started with failure was to be completely successful in 1ctober of the same year, only about seven weeks later%

;ot that these contacts were the only form assumed by the dialectic of the relations between Palestine and the neighbouring "rab countries% &his dialectic was more complicated and reflected the comple'ity of the conflicts, Ce have already seen what al#Iassam represented in this field! and in fact the Iassamist phenomenon in this sense continued to e'ist% @arge numbers of "rab freedom fighters poured into Palestine! among them were >a8id al#"s, who was killed in 1ctober 1936, >heikh 2uhammad al#"shmar and many others% &his influ' also comprised a number of adventurist nationalist officers, the most prominent of whom was Bau0i al#IawuqDi who shortly after entry into Palestine at the head of a small band in "ugust 1936 declared himself commander in chief of the revolt% "lthough these men improved and e'panded the tactics of the rebels, the greater part of the burden of revolutionary violence in the country and of commando action in the towns, continued to be borne by the dispossessed peasants% *n fact it was the +officers+ who emerged from the ranks of the peasants themselves who continued to play the maDor role, but most of them were subDect to the leadership of al#2ufti% &hey also represented legendary heroism for the masses of the revolution% "lthough the British officials in Palestine did not completely agree with @ondon8s policy of reckless support for the $ionist movement, and thought that there was room for an "rab class leadership whose interests were not linked with the revolt, to cooperate with colonialism% Britain finally accepted, so it seems, on /une 19th, 1936, the +importance of the organic link between the safety of British interests and the success of $ionism in Palestine+% ! Britain decided to strengthen its forces in Palestine and to increase repressive measures% Brightened by this decision, the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement vacillated and lost its nerve% 5aDD "min al#5ussaini, ?aghib ;ashashibi and "uni "bd al#5adi hastened to meet the British 5igh 4ommissioner, and it is clear from reports he sent to his government at the time they confirmed that they were prepared to end the revolt if the "rab kings asked them to do so% &hey did not, however, dare to admit to the masses that they were the originators! of this tortuous scheme, and repeatedly denied it% "fter this large numbers of British troops, estimated at twenty thousand, poured into Palestine, and on 37th >eptember 1936, when they had all arrived, a decree was issued enforcing martial law% &he mandatory authorities stepped up their policy of relentless repression, and >eptember and 1ctober witnessed battles of the greatest violence # the last battles, in fact, to cover nearly the whole of Palestine% 1n 11th 1ctober 1936, the "rab 5igher 4ommittee distributed a statement calling for an end to the strike, and thereby the revolt +*nasmuch as submission to the will of their 2aDesties and 5ighnesses, the "rab kings and to comply with their wishes is one of our hereditary "rab traditions, and inasmuch as the "rab 5igher 4ommittee firmly believes that their 2aDesties and 5ighnesses would only give orders that are in conformity with the interests of their sons and with the obDect of protecting their rights! the "rab 5igher 4ommittee, in obedience to tire wishes of their 2aDesties and 5ighnesses, the Eings and amirs, and from its belief ill the great benefit that will result from their mediation and cooperation, calls on the noble "rab people to end the strike and the disturbances, in obedience to these orders, whose only obDect is the interests of the "rabs%+ 9 A'actly a month later ,on 11th ;ovember 1936- the +<eneral 4ommand of the "rab ?evolt in >outhern >yria#Palestine+ announced that it +calls for all acts of violence to be stopped completely, and that there should be no provocation towards

anything liable to disturb the atmosphere of the negotiations, which the "rab nation hopes will succeed and obtain the full rights of the country%+ !" &en days later the same command issued another statement in which it declared that it had +left the field, from its confidence in the guarantee of the "rab kings and amirs, and to protect the safety of the negotiations+% !1 "s /amil al#>huqairi says +>o, in obedience to the orders of the kings and amirs, the strike was called off, and the activities of the revolt came to an end within two hours of the call being published+%!2 "lthough at that time Britain was challenging the Palestinian leaderships on precisely the point over which they had deceived the masses # the question of /ewish immigration to Palestine # and although these leaders decided to boycott the ?oyal 4ommission ,the Peel 4ommission-, the "rab kings and amirs obliged these leaderships to obey them for the second time in less than three months% Eing "bdul "0i0 "l >a8ud and Eing <ha0i wrote letters to 5aDD "min al#5ussaini saying +*n view of our confidence in the good intentions of the British government to do Dustice to the "rabs, it is our opinion that your interest requires that you should meet the ?oyal 4ommission+% *n fact this incident, which appears trivial, shattered the alliance in the leadership of the nationalist movement, as the forces to the right of 5aDD "min al#5ussaini, led by the 3efence Party, immediately opposed the decision to boycott the Peel 4ommission, and gave numerous indications of their desire to accept the settlement that Britain was to propose% &he leaders of this party, which represented mainly the urban effendis, relied on the discontent felt by the big merchants in the towns and on the dislocation of the interests of the urban bourgeoisie, which depended on close economic relations embodied in the agencies they held from British, and sometimes /ewish, industrial firms% &he "rab regimes, especially that of &ransDordan, strongly supported the attitude of this right wing, and 5aDD "min al 5ussaini and what he represented had no inclination to turn to the leftist front which, in fact, he had started to liquidate% &hus his attitude began to be increasingly vacillating and hesitant, and it was clear that he had got into a position where he could not take a single step forward with the revolt, and where, equally, retreat could no longer do him any good% 5owever, when the British thought that they could now achieve the political liquidation of the 2ufti in the period of quiet that followed the end of the strike, they found that this was not true, and that the 2ufti8s right wing was still much too weak to control the situation% &he British 5igh 4ommissioner maliciously continued to realise how great a role the 2ufti could play while he was restricted to that position between the 3efence Party on his right and the8 *ndependence Party ,its left wing- and the young intellectuals8 movements on his left% &his 5igh 4ommissioner realised Britain8s ability to take advantage of the wide margin between +the infle'ibility ,obstinacy- of the villagers who resisted for si' months, receiving little pay but not indulging in plunder+ and the weakness or non#e'istence of great qualities of leadership in the members of the ,"rab 5igher- 4ommittee%+ !3 &he correctness of the 5igh 4ommissioner8s view of the limited role that the 2ufti8s right#wing could play was shown when the 3efence Party failed to take an unambiguous stand against the report of the Peel 4ommission, which, published on :th /uly 193:, recommended partition and the establishment of a /ewish state% "t the same time, it became clear that the 5igh 4ommissioner8s fear that pressure from the 2ufti8s left#wing might lead hum to abandon his moderate attitude was not groundless% &his pressure, however, was not e'erted by the quarter from which the 5igh 4ommissioner had e'pected it, but by the middle cadre which was still represented on the national committees, and which was daily represented by

groups of dispossessed peasants and unemployed workers in the cities and the countryside% &hus the only course left to the 2ufti was to flee% 5e avoided arrest by taking refuge in the 5aram al#>harif, but events forced him into a position which he had not been able to take up a year earlier% *n >eptember 193: "ndrews, the 3istrict 4ommissioner of the <alilee district, was shot dead by four armed commandos outside the "nglican church in ;a0areth% "ndrews was +the only official who administered the 2andate as $ionists consider it right %%% he never succeeded in winning the confidence of the Bellahin LPalestinian peasantsM%+ &he "rabs regarded him as a friend of the $ionists and believed that his task was to facilitate the transfer of <alilee to the $ionist state that had been demarcated by the partition proposal% &he "rab peasants disliked him,, and accused him of facilitating the sale of the 5uleh lands, and the commandos who killed him are believed to have belonged to one of the secret cells of the Iassamites% !4 "lthough the "rab 5igher 4ommittee condemned this incident on the same night, the situation, e'actly as had happened when al#Iassam was killed, had got out of the control of the 2ufti and his group, so that, if they wanted to remain at the head of the national movement, they had to hang onto it and mount the rising wave, as had happened in "pril 1936% &his time, however, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses was more violent, not only because of the e'perience they had acquired during the past year, but also because the conflict that was taking place before their eyes had become increasingly clear% *t is certain that this stage of the revolt was directed substantially, if not entirely, against the British rather than the $ionists% &he growth of the conflict had led to the crystallisation of more clear#cut positions! the peasants were in almost complete control of the revolt, the role of the urban bourgeoisie had retreated somewhat, and the wealthy people in the country and the big middle peasants were hesitant to support the rebels, while the $ionist forces had effectively gone on the offensive% &here are two important questions to be considered as regards this stage of the revolt

1. +&he "rabs contacted the $ionists, proposing that they reach some kind of
an agreement on the basis of a complete severance of relations with Britain% But the $ionists immediately reDected this, because they regarded their relations with Britain as fundamental+%!5 &his was accompanied by a rise in the number of $ionists serving in the police in Palestine! from 366 in 1936 to 6() in 1936% and at the end of that year the government announced the recruitment of 1).7 $ionists as additional policemen armed with army rifles% " month later the figure rose to )(63!6 and British officers played a prominent role in leading $ionist groups in attacks on Palestinian "rab villages% &he fact that the leadership of the revolt was outside Palestine ,in 3amascus- made the role of the local leadership, most of which were of poor peasant origin, more important than it had been in the previous period% &hese were closely linked with the peasants% &his does much to e'plain to what e'tent the revolt was able to go% *n this period, for e'ample, "bd al# ?ahim al#5aDD emerged as a local commander, and the 4ommunists say that they were in contact with him and supplied him with information% ! &his development might have constituted a historic turning point in the revolt had it not been for the weakness of the +left+ in both the relative and the true sense, and had not these local commands been obliged to maintain

2.

their organisational link, to a certain e'tent, with the +4entral 4ommittee for >truggle+ ,/ihad- in 3amascus, not only because of their traditional loyalty to it, but also because they depended on it to some e'tent for financing% *n the whole history of the Palestinian struggle the armed popular revolt was never closer to victory than in the months between the end of 193: and the beginning of 1939% *n this period the British forces8 control of Palestine weakened, the prestige of colonialism was at its lowest, and the reputation and influence of the revolt became the principal force in the country% 5owever, at this time, Britain became more convinced that it would have to rely on $ionists who had provided them with a unique situation that they had never found in any of their colonies # they had at their disposal a local force which had common cause with British colonialism and was highly mobilised against the local population% "t this time Britain began to be alarmed at the necessity of diverting part of its military forces to confront the ever more critical situation in Aurope% &herefore Britain viewed with increasing favour +the rapid organisation of a /ewish volunteer defense force of 6,677 men already in e'istence%+ !! *t had already gone some way in pursuing a policy of relying on the local $ionist force and handing over to it many of the tasks of repression, which were increasing% 5owever, it did not destroy the bridge which it had always maintained with the class led by the 2ufti, and it was in this field and at this time in particular that the British played a maDor role in maintaining the 2ufti as the undisputed representative of the Palestinian "rabs% &heir reserves of the leadership on the right of the 2ufti were practically e'hausted so that if the 2ufti were no longer regarded as the sole leader, this would +leave no#one who can represent the "rabs e'cept the leaders of the revolt in the mountains+, as the British 5igh 4ommissioner for Palestine said% !9 &here can be no doubt that this, among other reasons, contributed to keeping the 2ufti at the head of the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement in spite, of the fact that he had left his place of refuge in the "qsa 2osque in a hasty manner, and had been in 3amascus since the end of /anuary 193:% British oppression, which had escalated to an une'pected level, and the escalation of police raids, mass arrests and e'ecutions throughout 193: and 193( weakened the revolt but did not end it% &he British had come to realise that both in essence and substance, and as regards its local leadership, it was a peasant revolt% "s a result of this, the revolutionary spirit that prevailed throughout the whole of Palestine led to everyone in the towns wearing the peasant headdress ,keffiya and agal- so that the countryman coming into the town should not be subDected to oppression by the authorities% @ater, all were forbidden to carry their identity cards, so that the authorities should not be able to distinguish a townsman from a countryman% &his situation indicates very clearly the nature of the revolt and its influence at that time% &he countryside in general was the cradle of the revolt, and the temporary occupation of towns in 193( was achieved after attacks by peasants 9" from outside% &his meant that it was the peasants and villagers in general who were paying the highest price% *n 193( a number of peasants were e'ecuted merely for being in possession of arms% " rapid glance at the list of the names of those who were sent to prison or to the gallows shows us that the overwhelming maDority were poor peasants% Bor e'ample, +all the inhabitants of the village of "in Earem, three thousand in number, were sentenced to go ten kilometres every day to report to the police station%+91 3uring that period Britain sentenced about ),777 Palestinian "rabs to

long terms of imprisonment, demolished more than 6,777 houses and e'ecuted by hanging 1.( persons in "cre prison, and there were more than 6,777 in prison for varying terms%92 Britain, which in ;ovember 193( had abandoned the partition proposal recommended by the Peel ?eport, now started trying to gain time% &he ?ound &able 4onference held in @ondon in Bebruary 1939 was a typical illustration of the dubious transaction that was going on silently all the time between the command of the Palestinian revolt and the British, who knew for certain that the command was prepared to bargain at any moment% 1f course /amal al#5ussaini did not go to the ?ound &able 4onference in @ondon alone! he was accompanied by representatives of the +independent+ "rab countries% &hus the "rab regimes which were subDect to colonialism were destined for the second time in less than two years to impose their will on the "rabs of Palestine through the identity ,latent and potential- of interests of all those who sat around the ?ound &able in @ondon% &he speeches made by /amal al#5ussaini, "mir Baisal ,>audi "rabia-, "mir 5ussein ,the Femen-, "ll 2ahir ,Agypt- and ;uri al#>a8id ,*raq-, who declared that he was speaking as a close friend of Britain and who did not want to say a single word that might hurt the feelings of any Briton, because he was their friend from the bottom of his heart,93 only confirmed the success of the policy which Britain had for so long been carefully pursuing vis#a#vis the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement! it did not abandon it, and kept it constantly at the end of an open bridge% "nd the British were confident that *raq and >audi "rabia +were prepared to use their influence with the Palestinian leaders to put an end to the revolt and ensure the success of the 4onference%+ 5owever, the revolt in Palestine had not subsided ,according to official figures, in Bebruary 1939, 117 were killed and 11) wounded in 1) engagements with the British, 39 villages were searched, curfews were imposed in three towns three times, about )77 villagers were arrested, there were fires in five government departments, ten "rabs were e'ecuted on charges of carrying arms, there were attacks on ten $ionist settlements, the oil pipeline was blown up! a train between 5aifa and @ydda was mined, and a search post was set up in the "qsa 2osque-% &he British figures presented by the 4olonial >ecretary show that +between )7th 3ecember and )9th Bebruary, there were 3.( incidents of assassination, 1.7 acts of sabotage, 19 kidnappings, )3 thefts, nine mine and 3) bomb e'plosions, while the "rmy lost 1( dead and 39 wounded, and the Palestinians lost (3 dead and 1). wounded! these figures do not include casualties to the rebels% % %+94 &hings continued in this way until >eptember 1939, the month in which the >econd Corld Car broke out% *n the meantime the Palestinian "rabs suffered irreplaceable losses! the leadership quite apart from the spirit of compromise that was afoot, was outside the country! the newly constituted local commands were falling one after the other on the various fields of battle, British oppression had reached its clima', and $ionist violence had been constantly escalating since the middle of 193:% &here can be no doubt that the British concentrated presence and the persistence that accompanied it in the Palestinian theatre had e'hausted the rebels, who, with their leadership, no longer really knew who they were fighting against or why% "t one moment the leadership would talk of traditional friendship and common interests with Britain, at another went so far as to agree to the granting of autonomy to the /ews in the areas where they were settled% &here can be no doubt that the vacillation of the leadership, and its inability to determine a clear obDective to fight for, played its part in weakening the revolt%

But this must not lead us to neglect the obDective factor the British used two divisions of troops, several squadrons of planes, the police, and the &ransDordan Brontier Borce, in addition to the si' thousand strong quasi#$ionist force! all this was thrown in to gain control of the situation% ,&he Peel 4ommission admitted that security e'penditure in Palestine had risen from P@()6,777 in 1936 to P@),))3,777 in 1936-% &his campaign of terrorism and the efforts that were made to cut the rebels8 links with the villages, e'hausted the revolt% &he killing of "bd al#?ahim al#5aDD 2uhammad in 2arch 1939 came as a crushing blow to the revolt, depriving it of one of the bravest, wisest and most honest of the popular revolutionary leaders% "fter that the local commands started to collapse and leave the field% 2oreover, the Branco#British rapprochement on the eve of the >econd Corld Car certainly made it easier to surround the rebels! "rif "bd al#?a00aq, worn out by hunger and pursuit, was handed over to the Brench, along with some of his followers! /ordanian forces arrested Fusuf "bu 3aur and handed him over to the British, who e'ecuted him% "lso British and $ionist terrorism in the villages had made people afraid to support the rebels and supply them with ammunition and food, and doubtless the lack of even a minimum of organisation made it impossible to surmount these obstacles% "t the time the Palestinian 4ommunist Party attributed the failure of the revolt to five principal causes 1% )% 3% .% &he &he &he &he &he absence of the revolutionary leadership! individualism and opportunism of the leaders of the revolt% lack of a central command for the forces of the revolt, weakness of the Palestinian 4ommunist Party% inauspicious world situation%95

5.

1n the whole, this is correct, but to these causes must be added the fact that the 4ommunist Party was close to the leadership of 5aDD "min al#5ussaini, whom they viewed as +belonging to the most e'tremely anti#imperialist wing of the nationalist movement+, while it regarded his enemies as +feudalist+ traitors% 96 "nd this in spite of the fact that the 2ufti8s group had absolutely no hesitation in liquidating leftist elements who tried to penetrate labour circles% &he 4ommunist left, in addition to being weak, was incapable of reaching the countryside! it was concentrated in certain towns% *t had failed to "rabise the Party, as the >eventh 4omintern 4ongress had recommended, and was still a victim of its restricted view of "rab unity, and of relations, as far as the struggle was concerned, with the rest of the "rab homeland, which had organisational repercussions, *t is clear that the shortcoming that was mainly responsible for this defeat was the great gap caused by the rapid movement of society in Palestine which, as we have seen, was undergoing an e'tremely violent transformation from an "rab agricultural society into a /ewish industrial one% &his was the real reason why the "rab nationalist bourgeoisie and petty#bourgeoisie did not play their historical role in the Palestinian nationalist movement at the time, and allowed the feudal religious leaders to lead this movement for a long period without rivals% 3r% "bd al#Cahhab al#Eayyali adds other important causes% +Ceariness with fighting,+ he says, +constant military pressure, and the hope that some aspects of the Chite Paper would be applied, in addition to the lack of arms and ammunition, all played their part in making it difficult to continue the revolt% 2oreover, in view of the fact that the world was on the brink of the >econd Corld Car, Brance suppressed the rebels8 headquarters in 3amascus%+9

&o all this we can add two important interconnected factors which can be discussed together, as they played a prominent role in frustrating the revolt% &hey are the attitude of &ransDordan as embodied in the attitude of the subservient regime led by the "mir "bdullah, and the activity carried on by agents of the counter# revolution in the interior who were on the periphery of the terrorist activities of the British and $ionist forces% &he 3efence Party, led by ?aghib ;ashashibi, played the role of legal representative of the subservient &ransDordan regime in the Palestinian nationalist movement% &his link was probably a kind of camouflage because of the Party8s inability to reveal the links of subservience which connected it with British colonialism in the midst of a battle in which the principal enemy was that same colonialism% &herefore the link with the regime in &ransDordan was a sort of camouflage accepted by both sides% &he 3efence Party consisted of a small group of urban effendis who chiefly represented the interests of the rising comprador bourgeoisie and had begun to discover that its e'istence and growth depended on its being linked not only with British colonialism but also with the $ionist movement which controlled the industrial transformation of the Palestinian economy% Because of this class situation it is possible to sum up their history by saying that they +cooperated with the occupation authorities in the administrative field and with $ionism in the commercial field, sold land to the /ews, acted as brokers, disseminated misgivings, impeded nationalist activity, strengthened the link between "bdullah and 5ussain and the $ionists in 19)3#19). supported immigration and the 2andate in the twenties and partition in the thirties, advocated the establishment of a /ewish national home in part of Palestine and the surrender of the other part to &ransDordan %%% etc%+9! Chile the "mir "bdullah of &ransDordan was suppressing the &ransDordanian mass movement which, on its own initiative, had decided at the popular conference held with 2ithqal al#Bai0 in the chair in the village of =mm al#"md, to support the Palestinian revolt with men and material, the British decided to consider &ransDordan as part of the field of action against the activities of the Palestinian rebels% &he role played by the subservient &ransDordan regime was not restricted to this! it closed the roads to *raq to prevent any support arriving, and restricted the movements of the Palestinian leaders who, after the construction of the barbed wire entanglement along the northern frontier of Palestine, had been obliged to increase their activities from &ransDordan% &he regime8s activities culminated in the arrest in 1939 of two Palestinian leaders% 1ne of them, Fusuf "bu 3urrar, was handed over to the British whereupon he was e'ecuted% "t the time, the forces of the &ransDordan regime were engaged side by side with the British troops and the $ionist gangs in hunting down the rebels% &here can be no doubt that this role played by the &ransDordan regime encouraged elements of the internal counter#revolution to step up their activities% " number of the 3efence Party leaders took part in the establishment of what they called +peace detachments,+ small mercenary forces which were formed in cooperation with the Anglish, and helped to hunt down the rebels, took part in engagements with them and evicted them from some of the positions they controlled% Bakhri al#;ashashibi was a leader of one of these divisions, in arming them and directing their activities %%% this led to his being killed a few months after the end of the revolt%99 Before that, the savage British campaign to disarm the whole of Palestine had depended on +encouraging elements hostile to the 2ufti to supply them ,the British- with information and to identify rebels%+ 1"" &he attitudes of *raq and >audi "rabia at that time were not much better than that of the /ordanian regime% "t the @ondon 4onference they had e'pressed their readiness +to use their influence with

the Palestinian leaders to put an end to the revolt%+ 1"1 But all this could not make the leaders of the counter#revolution ,the agents of the British- a force that had any weight with the masses% 1n the contrary, it strengthened the 2ufti and his leadership, whereas the encouragement of counter#revolutionary elements was intended, among other things, to curb the 2ufti and confine him within a field that could eventually be controlled% &hroughout, the British acted in accordance with their conviction that al#;ashashibi could never be a substitute for the 2ufti% &he small marginal degree of manoeuvreability of the 2ufti8s command, which was the result of the minor disputes their in progress between Brench colonialism in >yria and @ebanon and British colonialism, was not capable of leading to a radical change in the balance of power, and it soon contracted to the point where it hardly e'isted at all on the eve of the Car% &hese facts as a whole show that the Palestinian revolt was attacked and received blows in its three most vital points 1% &he subDective point # meaning the incapacity, vacillation, weakness, subDectivity and anarchy of its various leaders% )% &he "rab point # meaning the collusion of the "rab regimes to frustrate it at a time when the weak popular "rab nationalist movement was only interacting with the Palestinian revolt in a selective, subDective and marginal way% 3% &he international point%# meaning the immense disequilibrium in the obDective balance of power which resulted from the alliance of all the members of the colonialist camp with each other and also with the $ionist movement, which was henceforward to have at its disposal a considerable striking force on the eve of the >econd Corld Car% &he best estimate of "rab human losses in the 1936#39 revolt is that which states that losses in the four years totaled 19,:9) killed and wounded! this includes the casualties sustained by the Palestinian "rabs at the hands of the $ionist gangs in the same period% &his estimate is based on the first conservative admissions contained in official British reports, checked against other documents% 1"2 &hese calculations establish that 1)77 "rabs were killed in 1936% 1)7 in 193:, 1)77 in 193( and 1)77 in 1939% *n addition 11) "rabs were e'ecuted and 1)77 killed in various terrorist operations% &his makes the total of "rabs killed in the 1936#39 revolt, 6,73), while 1.,:67 were wounded in the same period% 3etainees numbered about (16 in 193:, ),.63 in 193(, and appro'imately 6,6:9 in 1939% &he real significance of these figures can be shown by comparisons% *n relation to numbers of inhabitants, Palestinian losses in 1936#39 are equivalent to losses by Britain of )77,777 killed, 677,777 wounded and 1,)).,777 arrested% *n the case of "merica the losses would be one million killed, 3 million wounded and 6,1)7,777 arrestedH But the real and most serious losses lay in the rapid growth of both the military and economic sectors which laid the foundations of the $ionist settler entity in Palestine% *t is no e'aggeration to say that this economic and military presence of the 0ionists, whose links with *mperialism grew stronger, established its principal foundations in this period ,between 1936 and 1939- and one *sraeli historian goes so far as to say

that +the conditions for the $ionist victory had in 19.( been created in the period of the "rab revolt%+1"3 &he general policy followed by the $ionists during this period can be seen in their profound determination to avoid any conflict between themselves and the mandatory authorities, even at a time when the latter, hard#pressed by the "rab rebels, were obliged to refuse some of the vigorous demands of the $ionist movement% &he $ionists clearly knew that if they gave the British # who at the time had the strongest and most aggressive colonial army in the world # the chance to crush the "rab revolt in Palestine, this army would be doing a greater service to their schemes than they ever could have dreamed of% &hus the main $ionist plans ran along two parallel lines the closest possible alliance with Britain # to the e'tent that the )7th $ionist 4ongress held in the summer of 193:, e'pressed its readiness to accept partition in its determination to conciliate Britain and avoid any clash with it% >uch a policy was pursued so as to allow the colonialist empire to crush the "rab revolt that had broken out again that summer% &he other line of their policy consisted of the continuous internal mobili0ation of $ionist settler society, under the slogan adopted by Ben <urion at the time of +no alternative,+ which emphasi0ed the necessity of laying the foundations of a military society and of its military and economic instruments% &he question of the greatest possible conciliation with the British, in spite of the fact that they had, for e'ample, taken steps to reduce /ewish immigration, was a pivotal point in the history of $ionist policy during that period, and in spite of the fact that there were in the movement certain elements that reDected what was called +self# control,+ the voice of this minority had no effect% &he law that led the policies of the $ionists during that period was that summari0ed by Cei0man who said +&here is a complete similarity of interests between the $ionists and the British in Palestine%+ 3uring this period, cooperation and interaction between the two lines of policy ,1alliance with the British mandate to the greatest possible e'tent, and ,)- the mobili0ation of the /ewish settler society! had e'tremely important consequences% &he /ewish bourgeoisie took advantage of the spread of the "rab revolt to implement many of the proDects that they would not have been able to implement under different circumstances% >uddenly freed from the competition of cheap$$ Palestinian "rab agricultural produce, this bourgeoisie proceeded to take action to promote its economic e'istence% ;aturally it was not possible to do this without the blessing of the British% 3uring the revolt the $ionists and the mandatory authorities succeeded in building a network of roads between the principal $ionist colonies and the towns which were later to constitute a basic part of the infrastructure of the $ionist economy% &hen the main road from 5aifa to &el#"viv was paved, and the 5aifa harbor was e'panded and deepened, and a harbor was constructed at &el#"viv which was later to kill the port of /affa% *n addition the $ionists monopoli0ed contracts for supplying the British troops who had started to flood into Palestine% Bifty $ionist colonies were established between 1936 and 1939, and in between 1936 and 193(, /ews invested P@1,)6(,777 in building works in five /ewish towns, as against only P@1)7,777 invested by "rabs in 16 "rab villages in the same period%

/ews also engaged e'tensively in the British security proDects undertaken to absorb and employ large numbers of unemployed /ewish workers, who were constantly increasing in numbers on the frontiers of Palestine, for which +the British employed /ewish labor at a cost of P@177,777 to build+1"4 as well as do0ens of other proDects% Bigures published later give us a more accurate idea the value of e'ports of locally manufactured goods rose from P@.:(,(7: in 1936 to nearly double that figure ,P@(96,(:6- in 193:, in spite of the revolt% 1"5 &his can only be e'plained by the greatly increased activity of the /ewish economy% &he scope of this mobili0ation e'panded from the economic field, in alliance with the 2andate, to the military field, in collusion with it% &he British reali0ed that their $ionist ally was qualified to play a role that no one else could play so well% *n fact, Ben#<urion is only telling part of the truth when he admits that the number of /ewish recruits in the quasi#police force armed with rifles rose to ),(63 in >eptember 1936, for this was only a part of the /ewish force # there were 1),777 men in the 5aganah in 193:, in addition to a further 3,777 in /abotinski8s ;ational 2ilitary 1rgani0ation% 1"6 &he alliance of these, as the real representatives of the $ionist movement, with British colonialism, led to the idea of a +Iuasi#Police Borce+ in the spring of 1936% &he idea served as a cover for the armed $ionist presence which enDoyed the blessing and encouragement of the British% &his force served as a transition period for some months, during which the 5aganah prepared to move, at the beginning of 193:, to a new stage% ;ot only were the British aware of this, they actually helped it to take shape% &his stage consisted of forays by patrols and limited operations against the Palestinian "rabs, the main obDect of which was to distract and confuse them% *t would have been quite impossible to advance to this stage and at the same time to maintain the +truce+ ,the alliance- with the 2andatory authorities had this not been the result of a Doint plan% Ben <urion affirms that the additional $ionist police farce made an ideal +framework+ for the training of the 5aganah%1" *n the summer of 193: this force was given the name +3efense of the /ewish 4olonies+, which was later changed to +4olony Police+% *t was organised under the supervision of the British 2andate throughout the length and breadth of the country, and the British undertook to train its members% *n 193: it was strengthened with 3,777 new members, all of whom played a direct role in repressive operations against the Palestinian rebels, especially in the ;orth% *n /une 193( the British decided that offensive operations must be undertaken against the rebels% &hey therefore held instruction courses on this subDect which provided training to large numbers of 5aganah cadres, who later became cadres of the K*sraeli8 army%1"! "t the beginning of 1939, the British army organi0ed ten groups of 4olony Police into well armed groups, which were given 5ebrew names% 2embers of this force were allowed to abandon the Ialbaq, the official headgear, for the "ustralian bush hat, to make them even more distinctive% &hese groups totalled 1.,.11 men, each being commanded by a British officer, who was assisted by a second in command appointed by the /ewish "gency% By the spring of 1939 the $ionists also had 6) mechanised units of eight to ten men each% *n the spring of 193( the British command decided to entrust to these $ionist elements the defense of railways between 5aifa and @udd that were blown up frequently by Palestinian commandos, and sent .3. members to e'ecute this mission% 5owever, only si' months later the /ewish "gency had succeeded in raising their numbers to (77% &his development was not only of service in the

building up of $ionist military strength, but also helped to absorb and employ large numbers of unemployed /ewish workers, who were constantly increasing in numbers in the towns% *n this way the /ewish proletariat was directed to work in repressive organi0ations, not only in British security proDects directed against the revolt, but also in the $ionist military force% &he foundations of the $ionist military apparatus were laid under British supervision% &he $ionist force which had been88 entrusted with the defence of the 5aifa#@ydda railway was later given the defence of the oil pipeline in the Bashan plain% &his pipeline, which had been recently constructed ,193.- to bring oil from Eirkuk to 5aifa, had several times been blown up by the Palestinian rebels% &his was of great symbolic value, &he "rab rebels, who were aware of the value of the oil to the British e'ploiters, blew up the pipeline for the first time near *rbid on 16 /uly 1936% *t was later blown up several times near the villages of Eaukab, 5awa% 2ihna *srail, *ksal, and between at#=fula and Bashan, and at &ell "das, Bira, "rd al#2arD, &amra, Eafr 2isr, /isr al#2aDami, /inDar, Bashan and "in 3aur% &he British were unable to defend this vital pipeline, and admitted as much, that the +pipe+ as the Palestinian "rab peasants called it, was enshrined in the folklore which glorified acts of popular heroism% "t any rate, the British secured minimum protection for the pipeline in two ways% *nside Palestine it was defended by $ionist groups while in /ordanian territory the task of guarding it was given to +>haikh &urki ibn $ain, chief of the $ain subdivision of the Bani >akhr tribe, whom the company authori0ed to patrol the desert by any means necessary%+1"9 Ben <urion almost reveals this fact directly when talking about British efforts to establish a $ionist "ir Borce, whose task was to be to safeguard these interests% &he British in an early stage were able to see the strategy called by the "mericans 37 years later +Nietnami0ation+% &his was e'tremely important, because it was this incident that strengthened Britain8s conviction that the formation of a $ionist striking force would solve many problems connected with the defence of *mperialist interests accompanied by efforts to form a $ionist armed force to protect these interests% *n this field the British officer 4harles 1rde Cingate played a prominent role in translating the British#$ionist alliance into practical action% $ionist historians try to give the impression that Cingate8s efforts were the consequence of personal temperament and +idealistic+ devotion% But it is clear that this intelligent officer, who was sent to 5aifa by his chiefs in the autumn of 193:, had been entrusted with a specific task # the formation of the nuclei of striking forces for the $ionist armed force which had been in e'istence for at least si' months, but which needed crystallisation and preparation% &his British officer, whom +*sraeli+ soldiers regard as the real founder of the +*sraeli+ army, made the pipe#line problems his special task, 5owever, this task led on to a series of operations involving terrorism and killing, and it was Cingate who took upon himself the task of teaching his pupils at "in 3aur # among whom was 3ayan # to become an e'pert in such operations% &here can be no doubt that, in addition to his qualifications as an e'perienced imperialist officer, Cingate was equipped with an unlimited racialist hatred for the "rabs% *t is clear from the biographies written by those who knew him that he enDoyed killing or torturing "rab% peasants, or humiliating them in any way% 11"

&hrough imperialists like Cingate, and through reactionary leaders of the type of the "mir "bdullah the British were making it possible for the $ionist movement to become at both military and economic levels, a beach#head to guard their interests% "ll this happened from the conviction of all concerned that the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement was not sufficiently revolutionary to enable it to stand up to these closely united enemies% *n the midst of all this, the Palestinian nationalist movement, which had been paralysed by the subDective factors we have mentioned and the violent attacks launched both by the British and the $ionists, was in a difficult situation on the eve of the >econd Corld Car% &he claims of some historians that the "rabs +stopped+ their revolt to allow the British to wage its world war against ;a0ism, are naive, and refuted not only by the facts, but also by the fact that 5aDD "min al#5ussaini took refuge in ;a0i <ermany throughout the war% &his picture as a whole represents the political and social map that prevailed through the years 1936#1939% *t is this situation, with the dialectical relations involved in it, that e'plains the stagnation of the Palestinian nationalist situation throughout the war% Chen the war ended, the British found that the Palestinian nationalist movement had been pretty well tamed its head was broken and scattered, its base had been weakened and its social fabric worn out and disintegrated as a result of the violent change that was taking place in society and of the failure of its leaderships and parties to organise and mobilise it and also as a result of the weakness and confusion of the left and the instability of the nationalist movement in the neighbouring "rab countries% &hus the $ionist movement entered the forties to find the field practically clear for it, with the international climate e'tremely favourable following the psychological and political atmosphere caused by 5itler8s massacres of the /ews% Chile the "rab regimes in the neighbouring "rab countries were bourgeois regimes in the historical predicament without any real power% ;or was there in /ewish society in Palestine at that time any leftist movement to e'ert pressure in the opposite direction # practically the whole of this society was devoted to settlement through invasion% &he Palestinian left had, with the >econd Corld Car, begun to lose the initiative with which it had started in the middle thirties, as a result of the change in 4omintern policy, accompanied by the failure to "rabi0e the Party% Chat is more, the communist left was becoming more and more subDect to repression by the defeated "rab leadership% ,Bor e'ample, the 2ufti8s men assassinated the trade unionist leader >ami &aha in 5aifa on 1) >eptember 19.: and before that, the assassination in /affa of the unionist 2ichel 2itri, who had played an important role in mobili0ing "rab workers before the outbreak of the troubles in 1936-% "ll this enabled the $ionist movement in the middle forties to step up its previously only partial conflict with British colonialism in Palestine, after long years of alliance% &hus in 19.: circumstances were favourable, for it to pluck the fruits of the defeat of the 1936 revolt which the outbreak of the war had prevented it from doing sooner% &hus the period taken to complete the second chapter of the Palestinian defeat # from the end of 19.: to the middle of 19.( # was ama0ingly short, because it was only the conclusion of a long and bloody chapter which had lasted from "pril 1936 to >eptember 1939% %&T'( J&ransDordan is the Aast Bank of the ?iver /ordan, while the west Bank is part of Palestine ,Aditor-%

JJ@et us take as an e'ample, wages paid by the growers of citrus fruits# the most important agricultural produce in Palestine% *n 1936 the <eneral "gricultural 4ouncil fi'ed the wages of /ewish workers at P@1) per dunum per year, and of "rab workers at P@(%

=ootnotes
1% 5imadeh,>aid ,ed%- Aconomic 1rgani0ation of Palestine% "merican =niversity of Beirut% Beirut 1939, p%3)% )% 2enuhin, 2oshe% &he 3ecadence of /udaism in our &ime% *nstitute of Palestine >tudies, Beirut, 1969% 3% Ceinstock% ;athan% @e >ionisme # 4ontra *srael% 2aspero% Paris, 1969% .% *bid% 6% 5imadeh, op% cit%, p%)6,):% 6% Ceinstock, 1p% cit% :% 5imadeb, 1p,cft%, P,3:3% (% *bid% p%3:6% 9% 4ollection of "rab testimonies in Palestine before the British ?oyal 4ommission% al#*tidal Press 3amascus, 193(, p%6.% 17% *bid%% p%66% 11% 5imadeh% 1p% cit% ,the number of the unemployed increased to .777 in /affa alone after 1936% see footnote 6,p%66-% 1)% 4ollection% 1p% cit, P%66% 13% *bid% p%66% 1.% 3avar ;o% 3.6) ,see ft% note 13% p%661%16% 4ollection% 1p% 4it%, P%16% 16% *bid%, p%66% 1:% *bid%, p%69% 1(% Fehuda Bauer% +&he "rab ?evolt of 1936+ ;ew 1utlook% Nol%9 ;o% 6 ,(1-% &el# "viv, 1966% p% 67% 19% *bid%, p%61% )7% *n 1937% the number of "rab construction workers in /erusalem dropped from 1677 to 677 while that of /ews went up from 667 to 1677%

)1% =p to 1931% the $ionists e'pelled )7,777 Palestinian "rab peasants after they bought the land on which the latter used to work% ))% 5aim 5anagbi, 2oshe 2achover, "kiva 1rr% +&he 4lass ;ature of *srael+ ;ew @eft ?eview ,66-, /an#Beb 19:1, p%6% )3% &heodor 5er0l, >elected Corks, ;ewman Ad%% Nol%:, Book 1% &el "viv, p%(6% ).% A'co Boundation for Palestine% *nc%, Palestine% " >tudy of /ewish, "rab and British Policies% Nol% 1% Fale =niversity Press%19.:% p% 661% )6% Eayyali%, "bdulwahhab% 2odern 5istory of Palestine% "rab *nstitute of >tudies and Publication% Beirut% 19:7% p% 1:.% )6% 3ocuments of the Palestine "rab ?esistance ,191(#1939-% Beirut, pp% ))% )3% )., )6% ):% "ction among the peasants and the struggle against $ionism, &he Palestine 4ommunist Party &heses for 1931% 4ommunist *nternationalism and the "rab ?evolution, 3ar a1#5aqiqa, Beirut, p% 6.% )(% *bid%, pp% 1)), 1)1% )9% *bid%, pp% 1).% 37% *bid%, p% 16)% 31% 5imadeh! *bid%, p% 39% 3)% 4ommunist *nternationalism, pp% 136#1.6% 33% Ceinstock% *bid% 3.% 4ollection% p%3.% 36% &he >ublime Porte had granted this land to the >ursuk family of @ebanon *n return for services% >ee also 5adawi, Palestine =nder the 2andate% 19)7#19.7, Palestine >tudues, Euwaiti "lumni "ssociation%, pp%3., 36% *n 193., the $ionists% 36% 4ollection% P%3.% 3:% *bid%, P%39% 3(% 5adawi%, 1p% cit%, P%)9% 39% 4ollection% p%)6% .7% *bid%% p%66% .1% *bid%, p%6(% .)% 5imadeh% 1p% cit%, p%3:6% .3% 4ollection, P%67%

..% *bid%, pp%6)#63% .6% *bid%, p%%6)% .6% *bid%, p%..% .:% *bid%, p%63% .(% ?ony A% <ubbay, " Political >tudy of the "rab#/ewish 4onflict, @ibrairie de 3ro0% <eneve, 1969% p%)9% 179% >ifrl, 1p% cit%, pp%131#13)% .9% 4ommunist *nternationalism% PP%1.3#1..% 67% 4ollection, p%6)% 61% 5imadeh, 1p% cit%, p%.6% 6)% +"rab >ociety+ by 3r% "li "hmed *ssa, quoted in Fusra "rnita, Bolkloric "rts in Palestine% Beirut, Palestine ?esearch 4enter, P%@%1% p%1(:% 63% Faghi, 3r% "bdul ?ahman% 2odern Palestinian @iterature% Beirut, p%)3)% 6.% *bid%, p%)3:% 66% *bid%, P%)(3% 66% 1ur Popular >ongs% by ;imr >irhan% /ordan, 2inistry of 4ulture and and *nformation, P%16:% 6:% *bid%, pp%)99#377% 6(% *bid%, p%371% 69% Fehuda Bauer, 1p% cit% P%.9 67% >ifri% *ssa% "rab Palestine =nder the 2andate O $ionism% the ;ew Palestine Bookshop% /affa, 193:% Nol% ** p% 17 61% Palestinian >truggle over half a century, by >aleh Bouyissir% al#Batah 5ouse, Beirut, p% 1(7% 6)% &he <reat "rab ?evolution in Palestine% al#5ana 5ouse, 3amascus% >ubhir Fasine, p%37 63% Bouyissir, 1p% cit%, P%1(1% 6.% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, P%37)% 66% 4ollection% p,96% 66% 5adawi% 1p% cit%, p%3(% 6:% Fasin, >ubhi% 1p% cit%, pp%))#)3

6(% *bid% p%))% 69% Eayyali, 1p% cit% p%)96% :7% Palestine% ;o%9.% /an 1,1969% "rab 5igher 4ommittee% Beirut% :1% *bid%, ;o% 9.% p%19% :)% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, p%)96% :3% Palestine8s Aconomic Buture% Percy, @und 5% @ondon, 19.6% p% 61% :.% >ifri, 1p% cit%, pp,39,.7% :6% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, P%311% :6% >ifri, 1p% cit%, p%67% ::% *bid%% P%93% :(% Eayyali, 1p% cit% p%319% :9% 3ocuments, p%.6.% (7% *bid%, P%.6:% (1% *bid%, p%.6(% ()% 4ollection% P%(% (3% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, p%3)6% (.% ;eville Barbour, ;isi 3ominus, @ondon, pp% 1(3#193% (6% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, P%33(% (6% /ewish 1bserver, >ept% )7, 1963% @ondon, pp% 13#1.% (:% "bdul Iadir Fasin% al Eatib, ;o% 1)1% "pril 19:1 p% 11. ((% Eayyali% 1p% cit%, P%3.6% (9% *bid%, p%3.6% 97% *n 2ay 193(% the rebels occupied 5ebron after they had already occupied the old port of /erusalem% 1n >ept% 9, they occupied Beersheba and released prisoners% 1n 1ct% 6, they occupied &iberias! in early "ugust parts of ;ablus, etc% 91% Bouyissir% 1p% cit%, p%).:% 9)% *bid%, p%).:% 93% *bid%, p%)6(%

9.% al#"hram, 2arch 1% 1939, 4airo% 96% Fasin% 1p% cit% p%116% 96% *bid%, p%11.% 9:% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, p%369% 9(% >ayegh, "nis% &he 5ashemite O the Palestine Iuestion% Beirut, 1966% p% 167% 99% *bid% >ee also al#&alia8a, ;o%. "pril :, 19:1% 4airo, p% 9(% 177% Eayyali, 1p% cit%, p%3.(% 171% " letter from Baghdad to the British Boreign 2inister% 31 1ct% 1937% Iuoted in Eayyali, *bid% p% 3.9 17)% Calid Ehalidi ed, Brom 5aven to 4onquest% *P>, Beirut, 19:1% pp% (36#(.9% 173% Bouyissir, 1p% cit%, P%)1% 17.% Barbour% 1p% cit% p%193% 176% 5imadeh, 1p% cit%, P%3)3% 176% Bouyissir, 1p% cit%, p%3)3% 17:% Ben <urion% 1p% cit%, p%3:)% 17(% *bid%, p%3:3% 179% >ifri, op%cit% pp%131#13)% 117% Ehalidi% 1p% cit%, p%3:6#3:(%

Arab Revolt (in Palestine) - The Arab revolt in Palestine should be distinguished from the Arab revolt of WW I that was led by Lawrence of Arabia and Sherif Hussein. It was also called The !eoraot - by the "ews# and the Praot - riots# and the $reat u%rising by the Arabs. The Arab revolt in Palestine# or The $reat &%rising too' %lace between ()*+-, and ()*). It consisted of a stri'e including withholding of ta-es# of acts of sabotage against .ritish forces# assassination of .ritish officials# murder of "ewish civilians and murder of other Arabs. The revolt was triggered by Arab dissatisfaction and alarm at the relatively large number of "ewish immigrants arriving in the early ()*/s# worsening economic conditions due to the world de%ression and other factors# and disaffection stirred u% by the Husseini clan.

The revolt was a %ivotal event in the history of 0ionism and of Palestine1
It

signaled the real beginning of active involvement of the Arab states in the Palestinian cause. It established an ethos of Arab violence and of "ewish re%risals against Arab civilians. It destroyed the leadershi% of the Palestinian Arab community. This occurred mostly because Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini4s Al 5utuwwa 6officially designated 7a8i Scouts 9(:; li<uidated most of the Palestinian o%%osition# es%ecially the 7ashashibi and 7usseibeh families. It %reci%itated a final brea' between the 0ionist movement and the .ritish when the .ritish ended "ewish immigration with the White Pa%er of ()*). This embittered the 0ionist movement# es%ecially when it turned out that nearly all the "ews tra%%ed in 3uro%e were murdered in the Holocaust. It hel%ed to create the Haganah as an effective fighting force and at the same time generated the Irgun as a dissident grou%. It gave birth to the idea of Palestine %artition - the Peel =ommission >e%ort# generated as a result of the revolt# floated the idea of %artition of Palestine. The events of the revolt thus set the stage for the further events of ()?,-()?@ including %artition of Palestine# Israel inde%endence and the clash of the Arabs and "ews of Palestine in the war of ()?@. These however# were %ost%oned because of the intervention of World War II. All of the issues of the Arab-0ionist struggle in Palestinian had matured and had been framed by the time of the u%rising. 3ach side was right from their %oint of view. The real issue was the threat of a "ewish ma2ority in Palestine# which would ma'e Palestinian Arabs lose any ho%e of %olitical control of Palestine. The reality of the threat was brought home by the increase in "ewish %o%ulation from (AB to CAB of Palestinian %o%ulation in five years. In ()*+# the last big immigration year# over ,,#/// "ews had arrived in Palestine# mostly from $ermany where conditions had become intolerable with the rise of 7a8ism. The Arab %erce%tion of the threat was made <uite clear from the start. .y ()()# re%resentatives of the "affa !uslim=hristian council were saying1 We will %ush the 0ionists into the sea or they will %ush us into the desert 9C:

This animosity and desire for domination was legitimate from the narrow stand%oint of nationalist interests# though it is to be noted that the Arabs of Palestine had never had %olitical control of Palestine in all history. It was originally a %rovince of the Arab =ali%hate and later a %rovince of the !amelu'e and Dttoman Tur'ish em%ires. Euring the time of the =rusader 'ingdom they were ruled by =hristian 3uro%eans. The Palestinians wished to %resent their cause in a different light. Therefore# the issue was carefully disguised as a fear of economic dis%lacement for the %ur%oses of convincing .ritish commissions regarding the %light of the Arabs of Palestine. However# there were no real data to bac' u% the claims of economic de%rivation. The Arabs of Palestine en2oyed an un%recedented economic advance during most of the %eriod of the .ritish mandate 6see0ionism and Its Im%act ;# though the %eriod in <uestion coincided with a world de%ression and with a local drought that had forced many Palestinians off the land. To bolster their claims however# the Arabs of Palestine could %oint out the announced %olicy of the 0ionist movement of encouraging the hiring of "ewish# rather than Arab wor'ers in "ewish industries. They could also %oint out that they were denied democratic re%resentation according to their numbers in the government of Palestine. 5rom their %oint of view# the 0ionist movement had invested large sums of money in Palestine# as well as considerable efforts in hel%ing to secure a .ritish !andate for Palestine. All this was done to obtain a national home# and the further investment and coo%eration with the mandate was on the basis of the %romise# secured in the !andate of the League of 7ations# that Palestine would be a national home for the "ewish %eo%le. !oreover# the "ews of 3uro%e were rightly %erceived to be in mortal %eril. It seemed a natural right and duty for the "ews of Palestine to e-tend every aid and shelter to their brothers. If Arabs had faced a similar danger# would not the Arabs of Palestine have rallied to their aidF The revolt can be viewed as having the following stages and ma2or events associated with it. Prologue - The economic and %olitical setting and events %rior to the revolt. Revolt of Izzedin el-Qassam and his death at the hands of the .ritish in 7ovember ()*+.

Cooptation by the Mufti and he !eneral "tri#e - The revolt was coo%ted by $rand !ufti Ha22 Amin el Husseini. 3stablishment of the Arab higher committee and the general stri'e and s%oradic violence in the s%ring of ()*,. Euring this %eriod# the 0ionist 3-ecutive and the Haganah counseled Havlaga - self control# and dissident 3t8el 6Irgun; li'ewise followed this %olicy. he interlude of the Peel Commission - The general stri'e was called off and violence was sto%%ed beginning in Dctober of ()*,# in order to give the Peel commission time to wor'. Resumption of the Revolt - After the efforts of the Peel commission ended in failure# the revolt resumed. In Se%tember or Dctober of ()*A# the $rand !ufti Ha22 Amin el Husseini and much of the Arab Higher =ommittee were forced to flee after the murder of Lewis Andrews# the .ritish High =ommissioner for the $alilee. - The revolt did not end with the flight of Husseini and the higher committee# but rather increased in intensity# to the %oint where the .ritish lost control entirely in "erusalem and .eersheba for while. 7umerous greater or lesser attac's on "ews li'e the Giryat Haroshet !assacre of ()*@ caused the 3t8el to move to re%risal attac's# and the Haganah also began more %in%oint re%risals. "t $ames Conferen%e - The .ritish called a round table conference in London in 5ebruary ()*) in an attem%t to get some agreement regarding the future of Palestine. The conference was a failure. &urther suppression of the revolt - The revolt s%uttered on until Se%tember of ()*) des%ite the issuance of the .ritish White Pa%er in !ay of ()*) and des%ite brutal attem%ts at su%%ression. The final dissolution of the revolt did not come until the outbrea' of World War II. >emar'ably# until that time# the 5rench had allowed the leadershi% of the revolt to continue its o%erations in Eamascus unhindered. When war bro'e out# the 5rench su%%ressed the Eamascus leadershi% and the revolt came to an end. The events of the revolt are sur%risingly %oorly documented in histories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. !ilitarily the Arabs suffered the most. About +// "ews and ?#+//- +#/// Arabs died in total. A large number of Arabs were 'illed by Husseini4s faction# which a%%arently 'illed more Arabs than "ews# and most of the rest were 'illed by brutal .ritish re%risals. There was at least one

massacre of "ews in Tiberias. In "erusalem and Hebron# the Arabs wrested control from the .ritish and the "ewish communities had to be evacuated. The remnant of the Hebron community# which had been wea'ened by the massacre of ()C) after living there for hundreds of years# did not return after ()*,. The "ewish community in the old city of "erusalem was greatly de%o%ulated. Additionally# there were numerous se%arate incidents of terror# directed against "ewish civilians# against infrastructure and against .ritish officials and soldiers. 0ionist sources do not dwell on Arab massacres and violence very much# because at the time the im%ortance of Arab violence was minimi8ed so as not to discourage immigration to Palestine. Ei%lomatically# there is no doubt that the Arabs won their ob2ective with the %ublication of the .ritish White Pa%er of ()*)# which ended "ewish immigration for all %ractical %ur%oses. In any event# immigration had been curtailed during the years of the revolt. An as%ect of the revolt that is es%ecially %oorly documented is the chain of leadershi% and financing. The revolt was coo%ted in its later stages by the $rand !ufti Ha22 Amin al Husseini and his family# but it was ignited by I88edin el Hassam# a Syrian immigrant to Palestine# and the military leadershi% and su%%ly bases remained in Syria# which was controlled by the 5rench. As noted# no ste%s were ta'en against this leadershi% until the outbrea' of World War II. Prologue The violence and agitation that had come to the fore in the riots of ()C) never really sto%%ed. There were continual incidents# meetings and initiatives by Palestinians against "ewish settlement in Palestine. According to $hassan Ganafani 9*: the following %arties had been formed by ()*+ with the dissolution of the Arab 3-ecutive =ommittee1 (. The Arab Palestine Party# in !ay ()*+# headed by "amal alHussainiI it more or less embodied the %olicy of the !ufti and re%resented the feudalists and big city merchants. C. The 7ational Eefense Party# headed by >aghib al-7ashashibiI founded in Eecember ()*?# re%resented the new urban bourgeoisie and the senior officials. *. The Inde%endence Party# which had been founded in ()*C# with Auni Abd al-Hadl at its head. It included the intellectuals# the middle bourgeoisie and some sectors of the %etty-bourgeoisieI this contributed to its left wing %laying a s%ecial role. ?. The >eform Party which# founded by Er Husain al-Ghalidi in August ()*+# re%resented a number of intellectuals.

+. The 7ational .loc Party# headed by Abd al-Latif Salah. ,. The Palestine Jouth Party# headed by Ja4<ub al-$husain. The !ufti4s Arab Palestine %arty and the 7ational Eefence %arty were %robably the most im%ortant# re%resenting the Husseini clan and the 7ashashibi clan res%ectively. The 7ashashibi clan controlled the mayoralty of "erusalem. This gave it a %olitical base as well contact and coo%eration with "ews who were em%loyed by the "erusalem munici%ality. The %arty re%resented a relatively moderate line in Palestinian %olitics. An allied but se%arate moderate influence was the reform %arty# which was established by the Ghalidi and .udeiri families 9?:. Palestinian %olitics was thus a reflection of Palestinian clan structure and re%resented the ruling clans of Palestine. As Ganafani %oints out# most of the Palestinian wor'ers and %easants were not re%resented in these %arties. The %arty that was to lead the revolt# the Husseini %arty# re%resented the feudal landowners as Ganafani %oints out# and the Imams and religious establishment# organi8ed in the Su%reme !uslim =ouncil run by the !ufti. Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini had been a%%ointed $rand !ufti of "erusalem by the .ritish. His Su%reme !uslim =ouncil controlled considerable funds that were ta'en from the Palestine budget# as well as donations that Husseini raised for the %ur%ose of renovating the mos<ues in "erusalem. At least some of these moneys were diverted for %ro%aganda. Husseini used his %ost as !ufti to build his base with Arab traditionalists as well as to stay close to the .ritish mandatory officials. At the same time# he tried to enlist the hel% of the A-is %owers. He a%%roached the $erman consul and according to Italian sources# was funded for a long time by the Italian fascist government. His ne%hew# "amal Husseini# formed the Arab Palestine 6or Palestine Arab %arty; to meet the challenge %osts by the 7ashashibis. The Husseini faction %robably did not %artici%ate directly in any of the violence that %receded the revolt# but certainly contributed incitement# rhetoric and ideological leadershi%. The ob2ective bases for Palestinian Arab dissatisfaction and fright over "ewish immigration and land %urchases are difficult to 2udge and were certainly greatly e-aggerated by the !ufti and his followers. "ewish immigration to Palestine had certainly increased in the ()*/s# owing to relatively good economic conditions in Palestine and the rise of anti-Semitism first in Poland and then in $ermany# followed by the $erman Anschluss 6anne-ation of Austria; and invasion of =8echoslova'ia. The following table summari8es "ewish immigration in the relevant years. In the last year before the revolt#

about ,A#/// "ews had arrived in Palestine. About (+/#/// in all had arrived since ()**.
Table (1 "ewish immigration to Palestine Jear ()*( ()*C ()** ()*? ()*+ ()*, ()*A ()*@ ()*) ()?/ ()?( Immigrants ?#/A+ (C#+** *A#**A ?+#C,A ,,#?AC C)#+)+ (/#,C) (?#,A+ *(#()+ (/#,?* ?#+)C

In ()*(# "ews constituted less than (AB of the %o%ulation. .y ()*+# CAB of the %o%ulation of Palestine was "ewish. The .ritish blue boo' estimates showed *++#/// "ews in Palestine 6see Po%ulation of Palestine;. Ganafani wrote1 .etween ()** and ()*+# (+/#/// "ews immigrated to Palestine# bringing the country4s "ewish %o%ulation to ??*#/// - or C).,B This is untrue according to .ritish statistics. "ewish %o%ulation did not reach ??*#/// until about ()*) 6seePo%ulation of Palestine; . 5or racists who are worried about demogra%hy# such an increase in itself is surely alarming. According to Ganafani and other Palestinian sources# the immigration and land %urchases resulted in massive dis%lacement of Palestinian wor'ers and dis%ossession of Palestinian tenant farmers from their land. Db2ective data do not seem to bear out these claims. There were local %oc'ets of unem%loyment. In "affa# Ganafani writes# by the end of ()*+# C#CA/ men and women wor'ers were unem%loyed# with a %o%ulation of A(#///. This might re%resent unem%loyment of (/B or (+B of the wor' force 6%erha%s (+#///-C/#/// in a %o%ulation of A(#///; in a city that was chosen to dramati8e the %light of Palestinian wor'ers. =onsidering that unem%loyment rates of C+B or more were not uncommon in 3uro%e in those de%ression years# it is not a reason for armed revolt in itself. Dverall# Palestinian Arab wor'ers and %easants

had a consistently higher standard of living than their counter%arts in surrounding Arab countries# and these gains increased over time as we have shown elsewhere 6see 0ionism and Its Im%act ;. The fact is# that the area of land under cultivation by Arabs increased dramatically during the mandate years. in ()CC# there were CC#/// dunams of Arab land %roducing citrus cro%s. In ()?/# there were (?/#/// dunams of Arab citrus land# mostly %roducing cro% for e-%ort in Palestine. In ()*( Arabs had **C#/// dunams of olive groves and a%%le orchards. .y ()?C they had @*C#/// dunams under cultivation. 9+:. Palestinian Arab agriculture and industry en2oyed an un%recedented growth during the %eriod of the !andate. Db2ectively and sub2ectively# these gains were obscured by several factors1 (- Euring the %articular %eriod in <uestion there was a severe world economic recession as well as a local drought. C-Some traditional Palestinian Arab industries could not com%ete in the world mar'et or became un%rofitable due to rising wages in other industries. Huoting Ganafani1 .etween ()*/ and ()*+# Palestinian Arab %earl industry e-%orts fell from PL ((#+*C to PL *#AAA a year. The number of Palestinian Arab soa% factories in Haifa alone fell from (C in ()C) to ? in ()*+. Their e-%ort value fell from PL C/,#,+) in ()*/ to PL A)#*(( in ()*+. This failure could hardly be blamed on "ews or 0ionists. 7o "ews had invested or were em%loyed in these industries# and "ewish industries did not com%ete with them. 7onetheless# Ganafani writes1 It was clear that the Arab %roletariat had fallen victim to .ritish colonialism and "ewish ca%ital# the former bearing the %rimary res%onsibility. Why was it clearF To whomF How could the "ews be res%onsible for the failure of the Arab Palestinian %earl industry or the soa% industryF *- >elative to "ewish wor'ers and "ewish farmers# the wages of Arab Palestinians continued to lag# and in the %eriod in <uestion# a%%arently fell absolutely. Ganafani writes1

An official census in ()*A indicated that an average "ewish wor'er received (?+B more in wages than his Palestinian Arab counter%art1 6As high as ?**B more in te-tile factories em%loying "ewish and Arab women# and C**B in tobacco factories ;. .y "uly ()*A# the real wages of the average Palestinian Arab wor'er decreased (/B while those of a "ewish wor'er rose (/B. In %art# the wage differential re%resented discrimination on the %art of "ewish em%loyers. This was a %olicy of the 0ionist organi8ation. The 2ustification given for it was that Arab wor'ers usually lived with their e-tended family and did not %ay rent# whereas "ews lived in the city and had to %ay rent as well as higher %rices for food and services. In %art# it re%resented the fact that Arab em%loyers %aid less for the same wor'. That was hardly the fault of the 0ionists. In %art# it re%resented different %ay for different s'ills. .y "uly ()*A of course# the u%rising had been going on for well over a year. Arabs had underta'en a general stri'e and were involved in violence. Arabs were undesirable and sus%ect em%loyees for "ews. Arabs found em%loyment in Arab industries and agriculture# which %aid less. This is %robably reflected in the fall in real wages as well as in dismissals of Arabs from wor' in the "ewish sector. =ertainly# the fall in wages in ()*A did not cause the u%rising of I88edin el Hassam in ()*+. ?- Selective hiring of "ews by 0ionists. Ganafani documents1 The %olicy of dismissal of Palestinian Arab wor'ers from firms and %ro2ects controlled by "ewish ca%ital initiated violent clashes. In the four "ewish settlements of !albis# Eairan# Wadi Hunain and Ghadira# there were ,#C(? Palestinian Arab wor'ers in 5ebruary ()*+. After si- months# this figure went down to C#CA,# and in a year4s time# went down to ,(A Palestinian Arab wor'ers only. The last settlement is Hedera. It is not clear what the others were. Hedera at least# was on land %urchased by the "ewish agency. .efore it was develo%ed by the 0ionists# there was no em%loyment there for anyone. "ewish Labor did not dis%lace Arab labor. At most# we could say that "ews were now em%loying less Arabs than %reviously. 7ote that the time %eriod cited coincides with the beginning of the disturbances. It is not clear to what e-tent it was due to "ews only hiring %ractices ado%ted for ideological reasons and to what e-tent it was due to firing of Arabs when the disturbances and stri'es began# for security reasons or because they did not show u% for wor'. If this %rocess had been an actual cause of the unrest# then it would have been ta'ing %lace before the unrest began# and not simultaneously with it.

However# there was certainly a %olicy of discriminatory hiring. it was felt that 0ionist funding should be used to %rovide 2obs for "ewish immigrants. Dn the other hand# it was felt that hiring of Arabs would establish an unhealthy relationshi% in which "ews were ca%italists and Arabs wor'ers# and that would lead to anti-Semitism. .en $urion e-%lained1 9,: KWe do not want to create a situation li'e that which e-ists in South Africa# where the whites are the owners and rulers# and the blac's are the wor'ers. If we do not do all 'inds of wor'# easy and hard# s'illed and uns'illed# if we become merely landlords# then this will not be our homelandL .uilt in to the Arab com%laint against Avoda Ivrit 6"ewish labor; was the assum%tion that the 0ionists owed em%loyment to the Arabs of Palestine. This might have been a valid com%laint if Arab industries and agriculture were o%en to "ews# but they were not. As it is# 0ionist investment could not fail to benefit the Arabs of Palestine and it did benefit them ob2ectively# though their relative %osition declined. +- !assive ca%ital investment and industriali8ation by 0ionists com%ared to %oor investment and lac' of industriali8ation by Arabs in Palestine. It was ho%eless to try to su%%ort the burgeoning Arab and "ewish %o%ulations of Palestine from traditional agriculture and from handicraft industries# %earl fishing# soa% factories using (@th century technology and the li'e. Industriali8ation re<uired massive investment# but the Arabs did not su%%ly the ca%ital to their sector. Ganafani wrote1 In ()*+# for e-am%le# "ews controlled @AC of a total of (#C(C industrial firms in Palestine# em%loying (*#,A@ wor'ers# while the rest were Palestinian Arab-controlled and em%loyed about ?#/// wor'ers1 "ewish investment totaled PL ?#*)(#/// com%ared to PL A/?#/// Palestinian Arab industrial investmentI "ewish %roduction reached PL ,#///#/// com%ared to PL (#+?+#/// by Palestinian Arab firms.. The dis%arity re%resented by the above figures is almost incredible# yet it a%%ears to be a fact. It is an indictment of Arab Palestinian society and not of 0ionists or 0ionism. 7o 0ionists %revented Palestinian Arabs from raising ca%ital abroad. As the Arabs did not invest in 0ionist industries# it is hardly to be e-%ected that 0ionists would invest in Arab industries. The numbers are all the more

stri'ing when we consider that in ()*+# according to .ritish statistics# there were about )?/#/// Arabs and only *++#/// "ews in Palestine. 6. Arab ruling classes within Palestinian society prevented the rise of an effective labor movement that could equalize the rights of Palestinian workers; their resentment was deflected to the ew and to the national struggle.As Ganafani writes 6em%hasis added;1 Dn the other hand# the Palestinian feudal religious leadershi% could not tolerate the rise of an Arab labor movement that was inde%endent of its control. The movement was thus terrori8ed by the Arab leadershi%. In the early thirties# the !ufti4s grou% assassinated !ichel !itri# President of the 5ederation of Arab Wor'ers in "affa. Jears later# Sami Taha# a trade unionist and President of the 5ederation of Arab Wor'ers in Haifa was also assassinated. In the absence of a economically and %olitically strong national bourgeoisie# the wor'ers were directly confronted and o%%ressed by the traditional feudal leadershi%I the conflict occasionally led to violent confrontations which were reduced whenever the traditional leadershi% managed to assume direct control over trade union activities. As a result# labor activity lost its essential role in the struggle. Moreover, with the sharpening of the national struggle, a relative identity of interests united the workers with the traditional Arab leadership. The last observation by Ganafani could %erha%s have been ta'en directly from an analysis of the economic basis of anti-Semitism and national factors in the class struggle by the !ar-ist 0ionist# .er .orochov. 6See for e-am%le#The 7ational Huestion and the =lass Struggle; !. "ndustrialization brought about the usual displacement of agricultural population# and rising wages caused handicrafts industries to fail. This %roblem was e-acerbated by the world de%ression# and the affected %o%ulation was the Arab felahin and handicraft wor'ers of Palestine. The %roblem became one of "ews versus Arabs because the Arabs of Palestine failed to reinvest their ca%ital in industrial develo%ment. Ganafani writes1 The transformation of the economic and social structure of Palestine# which occurred rather ra%idly# had affected %rimarily the "ewish sector# and had ta'en %lace at the e-%ense of the Palestinian middle and %etty bourgeoisie# as well as the Arab wor'ing class. The change from a semi-feudal society to a

ca%italist society was accom%anied by an increased concentration of economic %ower in the hands of the 0ionist machine The concentration of economic %ower in the hands of the 0ionist machine as we have seen# was due sim%ly to 0ionist investment. @- A %rolonged drought and an economic crisis in ()*+ %reci%itated unrest. A drought between ()*( and ()*? was a ma2or cause of Arab migration to the cities. Smallholder tenant farmers were wi%ed out. &nder the im%etus of 0ionist investment# Palestine had %ros%ered until ()*+. In ()*+ the League of 7ations im%osed sanctions on Italy# which had invaded Abyssinia# causing a ban' %anic and failure of some firms. To limit the im%act on "ewish em%loyment# the Histadruth ste%%ed u% its cam%aign for "ewish labor. 9A:. $ % &isplacement of Arab tenant farmers who were bought out by 'ionists - Ganafani and other Palestinian sources cite huge numbers of Arab %easants who were su%%osedly dis%laced by "ewish land %urchases in the */s# but ob2ective .ritish government surveys could not find a thousand such families. The movement to the cities undoubtedly occurred. This must ha%%en when a country is industriali8ed. There is only so much land# and the %o%ulation increases. If agriculture doesn4t become more efficient# some must leave the land. The difference is made u% by industrial em%loyment. All over the world# societies moved from being over )/B rural to being over )/B urban in the s%ace of a century. Dnly a few thousand Palestinians in all were directly affected by 0ionist land %urchases since the (@@/s 9@:. However# the Palestinians blamed the entire dis%lacement of rural %o%ulation# an inevitable conse<uence of industriali8ation# on the 0ionists. This was not an accident# as it was directly encouraged by the Arab Palestinian ruling classes. Since the ()C/s# Arab feudal interests had re%resented the %roblem using two or three assum%tions that were ado%ted not only by the Arabs of Palestine but by the .ritish themselves# and are evident in the Ho%e Sim%son >e%ort as well as the White Pa%er of ()*)1 a% (he land has a fi)ed capacity to absorb immigration. "f ewish immigrants come in# Arabs will have to leave.This assum%tion was %roven false re%eatedly as "ews continued to arrive and the standard of living of Arabs im%roved overall and Arab %o%ulation increased# but it was never abandoned by the .ritish or the Arabs.

b % ews have no right to settle in Palestine; the selective racist prohibition of ewish immigration and land sales to ews is perfectly natural and correct and prevents *colonization.* - This assum%tion was tacitly acce%ted by the .ritish too# even though they had been given a mandate to create a national home in Palestine and on that basis "ews had settled and invested in Palestine. c % 'ionists owe the Arabs of Palestine a living - Arab land owners and ca%italists sim%ly reassigned all of their social obligations to the 0ionists# and all the ills of Arab Palestinian society became faults of the 0ionists in Arab Palestinian rhetoric. Lac' of em%loyment for Palestinian Arabs and lac' of education for Palestinian Arabs were somehow turned into faults of the "ews. The Arab claims of dis%ossession and im%overishment by invading 0ionists were fictional. They can be dis%roved by a few illustrative facts. It is true that the "ews had %urchased over a million dunams of land by the ()*/s. It is not true# as Ganfani asserts that this constituted a third of the arable land in Palestine. Ganfani claims1 Dwnershi% by "ewish grou%s of urban and rural land rose from *//#/// dunums in ()C) to (#C+/#/// dunums in ()*/. The %urchased land was insignificant from the %oint of view of mass coloni8ation and of the solution of the "ewish %roblem. .ut the e-%ro%riation of nearly one million dunums - almost one-third of the agricultural land - led to a severe im%overishment of Arab %easants and .edouins. .y ()*(# C/#/// %easant families had been evicted by the 0ionists. Actually# by ()*, the "ews had %urchased only (#C*(#/// dunams. 9(/: The total land ownershi% by "ews in all of Palestine thus amounted to about ?B of the land area of Palestine. Since the total arable land area of Palestine was estimated at the time as ,#??/#/// dunams 6that is the low estimateI the high estimate was over (C#///#/// dunams;# (#C*(#/// dunams could hardly have been a third of the arable land. !oreover# with im%roved irrigation and water sources# more land became arable. In ()*,# a commission of in<uiry found that a total of ,+? Palestinian families had lost their lands as the result of 0ionist %urchases# out of a total of ,(#?/@ Arab families that owned or tenanted land. In other words# less than (B. These families lost ?,#,** dunams of land# which is less than (B of the arable area. 9): Li'ewise# the Avoda Ivrit %olicy of e-cluding Arab wor'ers from the "ewish economy could not %ossibly have had a serious effect on

Arab labor# sim%ly because the "ewish economy was too small. In ()*,# the "ewish economy em%loyed a total of @C#/// wor'ers. Df these# (?.,B or about (C#/// were Arabs. 9((: That is not to say that the Arabs had no real grievances or that there was no ob2ective basis for the revolt. The classic 0ionist-socialist analysis of the roots of the u%rising# ado%ted by non-socialists as well# is that the feudalists and Imams felt threatened by the changes introduced by 0ionism in the economy and %olitics of Palestine. Literacy and modernism challenged traditional society# and industriali8ation would u%set the feudal %ower base of the landowning families# creating urban middle class and %rofessional o%%osition. To some e-tent these ideas are borne out by the %arty structure outlined above# and the bitter rivalries that ensued between the Husseini clan and the other factions. In turn# the 0ionists# at least in %ublic# tended to ignore or minimi8e the very real grievances of the Arabs of Palestine and their genuine national and ethnic feelings. In theory# 0ionist Socialists believed they would develo% the land to the benefit of both "ews and Arabs# and advance the class struggle of the Arab wor'er. .er .orochov had announced in >ussia1 !any %oint out the obstacles which we encounter in our coloni8ation wor'. Some say that the Tur'ish law hinders our wor'# others contend that Palestine is insignificantly small# and still others charge us with the odious crime of wishing to o%%ress and e-%el the Arabs from Palestine... When the waste lands are %re%ared for coloni8ation# when modern techni<ue is introduced# and when the other obstacles are removed# there will be sufficient land to accommodate both the "ews and the Arabs. 7ormal relations between the "ews and Arabs will and must %revail +.er .orochov - 3ret8 Jisrael in our %rogram and tactics - ()(A, .orochov had made an insightful analysis of the role of nationalism in the class struggle 6The 7ational Huestion and the =lass Struggle;. He should have understood that "ewish wor'ers would be no more welcome among the Arab %roletariat than they were among >ussian wor'ers. As he %redicted the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism fueled by the lower middle class as $ermany develo%ed# he could have %redicted the same develo%ments in Palestine. In %ractice# instead of normal relations# two wholly se%arate communities develo%ed in Palestine. "ews and Arabs had se%arate

schools# se%arate medical facilities# se%arate %olitical %arties and se%arate labor unions. TheHistadrut was a "ewish labor union# officially called the Histadrut Hapoalim Ha-ivriim .e-eretz /israel the Drgani8ation of Hebrew Wor'ers in the Land of Israel. The instinct to se%aration was to a large e-tent mutual. The Arabs did not want to learn Hebrew in 0ionist schools# and the "ews had no interest in learning Arabic. In the cities# mi-ed Arab-"ewish neighborhoods as in "affa# were rare# and were a focal %oint for riots and %roblems. The two communities met as munici%al em%loyees in some towns such as "erusalem and Haifa# and chiefly# in the mar'et %lace and labor mar'et. .eyond that# they were growing increasingly invisible to each other# by conscious effort. The "ewish community was richer. The Arabs increasingly saw themselves outside# loo'ing in# in their own country. 5rom their %ers%ective# the %ros%erity of the "ews was being achieved at their e-%ense# and this could not fail to generate resentment. .oth the !ufti and the .ritish ascribed the unrest to landlessness of Palestinian Arab 5ellahin# su%%osedly caused by 0ionist land %urchases. The causes of landlessness among rural Arabs in Palestine were e-amined in detail by Genneth Stein.9?+:Archaic land ownershi% arrangements and the ill-begotten Tan8imat reform favored large and %ros%erous classes# who had been gradually buying u% the land of smallholders. The devastation wrought by the Tur's during World War I dee%ened indebtedness of smallholders# who were being forced to sell to the rich. They were also unable to com%ete with ine-%ensive foreign agricultural %roduce. The e-tent of landlessness was also deliberately e-aggerated by Sir "ohn Ho%e Ho%e Sim%son# by erroneous inter%retation of data. 9?,: he Revolt of Izzedin 'l Qassam !ohamed I8-al-Ein al Hassam 6I88edin el Hassam# I88edin el Gassam; # who s%ar'ed the Arab riots of ()*,-*/# was not a Palestinian Arab. He was born in "ablah# near Lata'iah in Syria# in the early (@@/s. When the 5rench were to ta'e over Syria# he tried to organi8e guerilla resistance. He 2oined 5eisal in Eamascus# but then fled to .eirut and ultimately to Haifa when the 5rench came. In Haifa he taught school# but soon became imam of the Isti<lal mos<ue. He was then a%%ointed regional registrar of marriages for the Su%reme !uslim =ouncil of the !ufti Ha2 Amin el Husseini. He used this innocent %ost as a s%ringboard for organi8ing terrorist cells to stri'e at the .ritish and the "ews. His followers began to attac' "ewish civilians in the way that was to become the hallmar' of Palestinian resistance. Three members of Gibbut8 Jagur were 'illed# and a

father and son in 7ahalal. His followers also tore u% trees %lanted by the "75 and .ritish railroad trac's. In ()*+ Hassam tried to %ersuade the !ufti to 2oin him in a call for "ihad against the .ritish# but the !ufti refused. In 7ovember of ()*+# Hassam too' to the hills around "enin with a few men. It is not entirely clear what he intended to do# since he was over +/ years old at the time. Hassam and his followers were in the caves for about ten days# su%%orted by food from villagers. Two of Hassam4s men ran into a %olice %atrol searching for fruit thieves and 'illed a %oliceman. The .ritish launched a manhunt. They found Hassam in a cave near Ja4bad and he was 'illed in a gun battle on 7ovember ()# ()*+. .en $urion referred to this battle as the Arab Tel Hai - 6see .iogra%hy of "ose%h Trum%eldor ; a symbolic battle that created a symbolic hero. Hassam4s death became the focal %oint of an u%rising. 9(C: he first phase of the uprising - %ooptation by the Mufti and he !eneral "tri#e The death of I88edin 3l Hassam s%ar'ed a more general u%rising. The %olitical situation began to change too. Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini now %erceived that the time was ri%e for more active %artici%ation. He formed a %aramilitary youth grou%# al 0utuwwah. The character of this movement cannot be disguised. It was officially designated the 7a8i Scouts. At the o%ening meeting on 5ebruary ((# ()*,# he noted that Hitler had begun with , followers and now had ,/ million. Al 0utuwwah became the ma2or Palestinian underground or terrorist grou% both during the riots and in ()?@. 9(*:. Euring this %eriod there was a constant stream of terrorist incidents and disturbances. It is difficult to %in%oint which of these little murders mar'ed the beginning of the revolt. Huoting Ganafani# Er. Abd al-Wahhab al-Gayyali thin's that the first s%ar' was lit ... in 5ebruary ()*,# when an armed band of Palestinian Arabs surrounded a school which "ewish contractors were building in Haifa# em%loying "ewish-only labor. Dthers generally date the revolt to one of several incidents in A%ril of ()*,. Jehuda .auer claimed# the incident that is commonly regarded as the start of the ()*, disturbances occurred on ()th A%ril ()*,# when Palestinian Arab crowds in "affa attac'ed "ewish %assers-by. 9(?: Palestinian writers and .enny !orris cite an earlier incident that occurred east of Tul'arm# on A%ril (+. According to Ganafani# an

un'nown grou% of Palestinian Arabs# a%%arently Hassamists# ambushed fifteen cars on the road from Anabta and the 7ur Shams %rison# robbed their "ewish and Arab %assengers ali'e of their money# while one of the three members of the grou% made a short s%eech to the Palestinian Arabs# who formed the ma2ority of the %assengers. !orris adds that the Arabs then shot three of the "ews# two of whom died and one survived. In retaliation# members of the Irgun .et which had been formed in ()*/# drove u% to a shac' in Petah Ti<va and shot dead its two Arab occu%ants. 9(+:. Arab attac's ranged from sabotage of the TAP oil %i%e line# to ambushes of .ritish %atrols# to bombs hurled into trains and school buildings set afire# to murder of civilians and full scale %ogroms. The Arabs %referred to use schoolboys for many of these attac's# as they were not liable for the death %enalty. Dn Saturday# !ay (,# ()*,# three "ews were 'illed leaving the 3dison cinema in "erusalem. Dnce was a doctor# another a ba'er# a third a university student. Sabotage of the %i%eline became a trademar' of the revolt. It was sabotaged at numerous %laces in Palestine and Trans2ordan# and defended 8ealously by the Trans2ordan legion in "ordan and later in Palestine by Drde =harles Wingate and his S%ecial 7ight S<uads These murderous activities a%%arently had the wholehearted su%%ort of the Palestinian community initially. !oderate Palestinian Ghalil Sa'a'ini wrote in admiration of this slaughter of the three in "erusalem1 There is no other heroism li'e this# e-ce%t the heroism of the Shei' al-Hassam 9(,:. Sa'a'ini also wrote They throw bombs# shoot# burn fields# destroy "ewish citrus groves in "affa# blow u% bridges# cut tele%hone cables# to%%le electric %oles. 3very day they bloc' roads and every day Arabs dis%lay a heroism that the government never conceived of. 9(A: Sa'a'ini wrote further to his son# Sari# Two anonymous heroes# threw a grenade at a %assenger train full of "ewish civilians and the .ritish soldiers who were escorting them. Who would believe there are such heroes in PalestineF What a great honor it is# my Sari# to be an Arab in Palestine. 9(@:. Almost all at once# 7ational =ommittees s%rang u% in every Arab Palestinian community to coordinate the revolt and declare stri'es. Dn A%ril C+# Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini formed the Arab Higher =ommittee 6AH=; to direct the u%rising. The AH= remained the leading body of the Arab Palestinians until ()?@. A general stri'e was declared at the end of A%ril or early !ay 9():. The stri'e

included non-%ayment of ta-es and closure of Haifa %ort. It was only %artially successful# since Palestinian Arab mandatory em%loyees did not stri'e and farmers sowed their cro%s as usual. The Arabs had three demands1 (. An immediate sto% to "ewish immigration. C. Prohibition of sale of Arab lands to "ewish settlers. *. The establishment of a democratic government in which Arabs would have the largest share in conformity with their numerical su%eriority. The third demand was certainly 2ustified# but as it would have led to im%lementation of the first demand# it would violate the terms of the mandate and could not be granted. 7one of these demands were really economic in nature. The Arabs did not as' to forbid all land sales - only sale of lands to "ews# nor did they as' for a sto% to Arab immigration. They did not as' for more 2obs in the !andatory government# though this is one of the grievances that Ganafani lists# or for any other sort of economic relief. .asically# the first two demands were -eno%hobic and racist. The stri'e was accom%anied by a violent guerilla u%rising in the countryside# %rimarily centered on 7ablus but a%%arently directed in %art from Eamascus. The Arabs attac'ed .ritish %olice# officials and soldiers# the TAP oil %i%eline# railways and "ews as individuals and in grou%s. They destroyed e-tensive %ro%erty# es%ecially by u%rooting orchards# which was a traditional method of settling dis%utes and e-acting vengeance in Palestine. As the months wore on# s%oradic attac's by villagers gave way to armed bands. The Arab Higher =ommittee officially condemned such violence# but they certainly %rovided the incitement that was a bac'ground to it# and may have %rovided financing as well. According to !orris 9C/: and numerous other sources# the armed bands# and the Arab Higher =ommittee as well# were %robably funded by 5ascist Italy and %erha%s by 7a8i $ermany. A-is %ro%aganda was certainly <uite ha%%y to su%%ort the Arab cause against the .ritish. =ount $alea88o =iano# the Italian foreign minister# later claimed that millions were given to the !ufti# and Haganah intelligence found evidence of $erman funding# which was later confirmed by ca%tured Abwehr documents. 6see The Ira<
A-is =ou% ;.

As the summer was ending# 5aw8i 3l Hawu<2i 6or Gau'2i; and about C// volunteers from Ira<# Syria and Trans2ordan# entered the Samaria region. Gau'2i# born in Syria li'e I88edin 3l-Hassam# made a career of fighting the .ritish. Li'e the $rand !ufti Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini# Gau'2i had 7a8i sym%athies and was to s%end the war in $ermany# but he was always at odds with Husseini.
he $e(ish Response - 3-ce%t for the initial revenge 'illing initiated by the Irgun .et and noted above# the 0ionist res%onse was generally restraint - Havlaga. The "ewish Agency decided that the best course was to stay out of the fight# and let the anger of the .ritish be directed against the Arabs# rather than entering the fight and becoming %art of the %roblem. The latter course would have invited an even handed .ritish res%onse. The %rimary reaction of the Haganah was initially defensive. It guarded vulnerable "ewish neighborhoods and set u% factories for armor %lating and %rotecting buses and other vehicles# as shown at right.

Later# under Jit8ha' Sadeh# the Haganah organi8ed flying s<uads that attem%ted to interce%t Arab marauders before they struc'. In August of ()*,# after two nurses had been murdered in "affa# four "ews were murdered in the =armel and a child was murdered in Tel Aviv# the Haganah too' briefly to re%risals# 'illing several %eo%le in "affa# attac'ing a .edouin encam%ment and 'illing a woman in Tira.

The Irgun .et ambushed the "affa train# 'illing an Armenian %assenger and wounding five Arabs# and they 'illed two Arabs in Petah Ti<va. The Haganah reaffirmed its %olicy of Havlaga 6restraint; however# and no further re%risals too' %lace in ()*,. he end of the first phase - With the arrival of Gau'2i4s band and the increase in violence# the .ritish finally began to show some resolution in ending the violence. An entire division was brought in from 3gy%t# and .ritish began dynamiting houses in "affa and 7ablus as %unitive measures and to ma'e it easier to control dense neighborhoods. Gau'2i and his followers were eventually surrounded. They were forced to leave Palestine but were not arrested. 3conomically# the stri'e had little im%act on anyone e-ce%t the Arabs. The closing of Haifa %ort led to the develo%ment of the %ort of Tel Aviv. In the "affa area# citrus cro%s were ri%ening and had to be %ic'ed and e-%orted. In any case# the economy of Palestine was carried by the numerically smaller "ewish sector rather than by the Arabs. As Ganafani notes# the value of e-%orts of locally manufactured goods rose from PL ?A@#@/A in ()*+ to PL @),#@A+ in ()*A# des%ite of the revolt. The Arabs could not de%rive themselves of their livelihood for long. The stri'e and the first stage of violence were terminated when the .ritish announced they would send a commission to study the %roblem of Palestine. The .ritish enlisted the su%%ort of Trans2ordan4s Ging Abdullah# 7uri As-Said# Ibn Saud of Saudi Arab and others# who called for <uiet to give the commission a chance to do its wor'. In Dctober of ()*,# the Arab Higher =ommittee distributed one or more notices in secret calling u%on the armed bands to com%ly with the armistice. Dne version of these notices is given by Ganafani1 Inasmuch as submission to the will of their !a2esties and Highnesses# the Arab 'ings and to com%ly with their wishes is one of our hereditary Arab traditions# and inasmuch as the Arab Higher =ommittee firmly believes that their !a2esties and Highnesses would only give orders that are in conformity with the interests of their sons and with the ob2ect of %rotecting their rightsI the Arab Higher =ommittee# in obedience to tire wishes of their !a2esties and Highnesses# the Gings and amirs# and from its belief ill the great benefit that will result from their mediation and coo%eration# calls on the noble Arab %eo%le to end the stri'e and the disturbances# in obedience to these orders# whose only ob2ect is the interests of the Arabs.

However# a different version# <uoted by !orris 9C(: ma'es the su%%ort of the Arab Higher =ommittee for violence fairly e-%licit1 Honored .rethrenM HeroesM... Dur %oor tongues cannot e-%ress the strength of our love and admiration and the e-altation concealed in our hearts for your self-sacrifice and your devoted war for religion# fatherland and all things Arab. >est assured that your struggle is engraved in letters of flame in the chronicles of the nation. And now...we...urge you to sto% activity until needed. Save the bullets and ta'e care of them. We stand now in a %eriod of ho%e and e-%ectation. If the >oyal =ommission comes and 2udges e<uitably and gives us all our rights# well and good. If not# the field of battle lies before us...We re<uest...self-control and armistice until a new notice. he Peel Commission Report The Peel =ommission arrived in Palestine on 7ovember ((# ()*A. They heard both Palestinian Arab and 0ionist arguments# though the Arab Higher =ommittee was initially reluctant to coo%erate. The commission concluded that the sides were irreconcilable# and recommended the %artition of Palestine. About +#/// s<uare 'ilometers including a %art of the Sharon %lain and the $alilee would become a "ewish state# a small area including "erusalem and a corridor to "affa would remain a .ritish mandate and the remainder of Palestine would become %art of Trans2ordan. To ensure a "ewish ma2ority even in this small area# the commission recommended %o%ulation transfer. A large number of Arabs# about CC+#///# would be transferred out of the "ewish area and about (#C+/ "ews would be transferred out of the Arab area. This idea# since branded as racist and genocidal and anathemati8ed by the mainstream 0ionist organi8ation as well as by Arabs# was founded in international %recedent. The Peel =ommission re%ort noted1 A %recedent is afforded by the e-change effected between the $ree' and Tur'ish %o%ulations on the morrow of the $recoTur'ish War of ()CC. A convention was signed by the $ree' and Tur'ish $overnments# %roviding that# under the su%ervision of the League of 7ations# $ree' nationals of the Drthodo- religion living in Tur'ey should be com%ulsorily removed to $reece# and Tur'ish nationals of the !oslem religion living in $reece to Tur'ey. The numbers involved were high--no less than some (#*//#/// $ree's and some ?//#/// Tur's. .ut so vigorously and effectively was the tas' accom%lished that within about eighteen months from the s%ring of ()C* the whole e-change was com%leted. The courage

of the $ree' and Tur'ish statesmen concerned has been 2ustified by the result. .efore the o%eration the $ree' and Tur'ish minorities had been a constant irritant. 7ow $reco-Tur'ish relations are friendlier than they have ever been before. In fact of course# the %o%ulation e-change between $ree's and Tur's was not amicable at all. Indeed the %rocess of e-%elling %eo%le of the wrong ethnicity was accom%lished vigorously and effectively# not only by statesmen but by mobs# and it was hardly a model of humanitarianism. In any case# transfer could not be accom%lished %eaceably without the agreement of both sides# and that was not forthcoming in Palestine. The 0ionist e-ecutive acce%ted the %ro%osal# after much debate about the morality of %o%ulation transfer. !uch has been made of the fact that .en-$urion believed that the small state would be a ste%%ing stone to a larger one# but no larger state was on offer. The Arab Higher =ommittee 6AH=; re2ected the %artition offer on the insistence of the Husseini clan. The 7ashashibis were initially in favor of %artition# which was also favored by Trans2ordan# but withdrew their su%%ort in the face of strong o%%osition. An assassination attem%t on 5a'hri 7ashashibi in "uly of ()*A caused the 7ashashibis to withdraw from the Arab Higher =ommittee. The rebellion and with it the Palestinian Arab cause# then fell into the hands of the e-tremist factions e-clusively. 5a'hri 7ashashibi was eventually 'illed in Ira< by Husseini %artisans in ()?(. In the face of Arab o%%osition# the .ritish shrun' the si8e of the %ro%osed "ewish state in successive %lans until it was com%letely absurd# by sending a different commission# the Woodhead commission. 3ven this re%ort was re2ected and the government concluded that real %artition was im%ractical# voicing the %ious and em%ty sentiment that the best ho%e lay in "ewish-Arab coo%eration. Partition was deemed to be im%ractical because the Arab state would not be economically viable# no matter how small the "ewish state. Palestine contained more Arabs than ever before in its history# and they en2oyed a higher standard of living than ever before# but they could only be su%%orted as long as they were de%endent on the economic activity of the "ewish minority and the investments of the 0ionist movement. At the same time# the Arabs of Palestine insisted that this "ewish minority was dis%ossessing them and tried to rid themselves of the "ews and the 0ionist enter%rise. The Arabs would say that they had been im%overished by 0ionist dis%ossession# but in fact they en2oyed a higher standard of living and faster economic growth than their neighbors in Syria# "ordan or 3gy%t.

In setting in motion the Peel commission negotiations# the .ritish had involved the rulers of the Arab states in the Palestine conflict by as'ing them to moderate the demands of the rebels. Instead# the Arab rulers# chiefly Ging Saud of Saudi Arabia# came down s<uarely on the side of the Arabs of Palestine 6See for e-am%le Ging Saud4s Niews on Palestine and Partition ;. 7uri As Said of Ira< and Abdullah of "ordan were more moderate# but far less influential. 5or many years the !ufti Ha2 Amin 3l Husseini had tried to enlist the Arab leaders in o%%osing the .ritish and u%hold the Palestinian cause# to little avail. 7ow the .ritish had succeeded in creating an o%%osition to their own %olicyM. This involvement# whether it was essential to marshalling Arabs to the .ritish war effort that was antici%ated as some claim# or a disastrous error# as 3lie Gedourie argues# 9CC: was to change the nature of the Palestinian-"ewish struggle. he Resumption of the Revolt The violence resumed in Se%tember of ()*A. Dn Se%tember C,# Lewis Andrews# the .ritish Eistrict =ommissioner for the $alilee# was assassinated in 7a8areth by Arab gunmen. The Arab Higher =ommittee 6AH=; issued a pro%forma denunciation of the murder# and the !ufti himself# who had found sanctuary in the Haram as Sharif 6Tem%le !ount; denounced it as well. 7onetheless# on Dctober ( #()*A the .ritish issued warrants for the arrest of all AH= members including the !ufti Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini# who was dismissed as head of the Su%reme !uslim =ouncil. Dn Dctober (C# Husseini# disguised as a woman or a .edouin# esca%ed from the Haram as Sharif and fled to Lebanon by boat. 5rom there he fled to Ira< with many members of the AH= # where eventually he hel%ed to instigate a %ro-A-is cou%. When that was %ut down# he fled to 7a8i $ermany# broadcast for the 7a8is and organi8ed SS units in Jugoslavia. 6see also1 Ha2 Amin 3l Husseini - 5atwa of ()?(# $rand !ufti Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini# and The Ira< A-is =ou% ; The violence %robably %ea'ed in Dctober of ()*@. In that month the rebels too' over "erusalem for a time# forcing evacuation of "ews from the old city. They also committed a %ogrom in the "ewish %art of Tiberias# murdering () %eo%le# among them (( children. Ale- !orrison# a .ritish truc' driver sym%athetic to the Arab cause wrote# They left behind them one of the worst sights I ever saw in my life... The na'ed bodies of the women e-%osed the evidence that the 'nives had been used in the most ghastly fashion. The bodies of children# a%%arently set alight with gasoline in a nursery# were still smoldering. A short time later the rebels murdered the "ewish mayor of Tiberias. 9C*: After the !ufti and the Arab Higher =ommittee had fled# the revolt degenerated into internecine clan rivalry and brutality. 7otables who o%%osed the resum%tion of the stri'e and violence# such as Ghalil Taha# were assassinated. The !ayor of Haifa# Hassan Shu'ri# survived two attem%ts on his life in !ay of ()*, and "anurary of ()*A. In 5ebruary ()*A# the !u'htar of =aesaria was murdered# and in A%ril of ()*A Ibrahim Jusuf# a member of the 7ablus munici%al council was assassinated. D%%osition su%%orters of the 7ashashibi clan and others were beaten and tortured. The terror was

ste%%ed u% with the resum%tion of violence. Dn the !ufti4s orders from e-ile# hundreds were assassinated and thousands were terrori8ed into leaving the country. In A%ril of ()*@# the !u'htar of !a2dal and his wife we 'illed# as well 7asr al Ein 7asr# mayor of Hebron. The wife and three sons of the mu'htar of Eeir es Shei'h were 'illed in a bomb e-%losion in Se%tember ()*@.. Hassan Sid<i al Ea2ani# a member of he "erusalem munici%al council was shot dead in 7ovember of ()*@. The remaining members of the council fled the country. 9C?: Some of the o%%osition was no doubt a reaction to the intense %ressure the .ritish a%%lied to villagers# including collective %unishment and hangings for minor offences. According to Ganafani# in ()*@ a number of %easants were e-ecuted merely for being in %ossession of arms. Euring that %eriod .ritain sentenced about C#/// Palestinian Arabs to long terms of im%risonment# demolished more than +#/// houses and e-ecuted by hanging (?@ %ersons in Acre %rison# and there were more than +#/// in %rison for varying terms. .ritain and Haganah intelligence encouraged division among the Arabs and %aid informers. Dwing to clan rivalries# there were many of these to be found. H.H. Wilson# an 3nglishman who taught at .ir 0eit college wrote in the winter of ()*@ that the rebellion seemed now to be turning into a struggle between the two Arab %olitical %arties1 The !ufti4s faction... and the 7ashashibis# who ho%e to get the %ower away from them by ma'ing u% to the .ritish. In the s%ring of ()*)# >aghib 7ashashibi stated# We may e-%ect now that for fifty years the Arabs will 'ill one another to avenge what ha%%ened during the disturbances. 9C+: Privately# he told a "ewish em%loyee of the

"erusalem munici%ality that there would be %eace between the "ews and the Arabs long before there would be %eace between the Husseinis and the 7ahashibis.
In "anuary of ()*)# rebel commander 4Abd al Halim Al "aulani wrote1 =om%laints are received from the villages in the "erusalem area regarding robbery# e-ecution# torture and murder committed by several %eo%le wearing the uniform of the "ihad...How did the innocent sin so that their money is stolen# their cattle robbed# their women ra%ed and their 2ewellery e-tortedF Dur rebellion has become a rebellion against the villages and not against the government or the "ews. 9C,: >ebel leader Ahmad !ahmoud Hasan 6Abu .a'r; re%orted to the =entral =ommittee in Eamascus in !ay of ()*)1 ... The behavior of the fighters toward the villagers is e-tremely tyrannical and horrifying1 brutal robbery# e-ecution without %rior investigation. =onflicts without any reason# disorder and com%lete inaction.. 9CA:

Anwar 7usseibeh# then a 2udge# called it a bitter and selfconsuming abomination. 9C@:

$iven the rivalry as well as the re%ression by the .ritish# many of the Palestinian elite# about C/#///- */#///# thought it was wisest to leave the country. They settled in neighboring countries and most returned in the beginning of World War II. D%%osition to the revolt grew and the villagers with the hel% of the o%%osition 7ashashibi %arty and the tacit encouragement of the 0ionists and the .ritish# organi8ed %eace bands that threw the rebels out in many cases. These were strongest in the Eru8e areas and around =hristian 7a8areth# but they also o%erated around 7ablus.
he )ritish Response - The .ritish ado%ted harsh methods# including torture of both "ews and Arabs# and collective %unishment of villages. 5rom India# where he was not beloved of the local %o%ulace# they sent Sir =harles Tegart# an e-%erienced %oliceman# to coordinate the su%%ression of the rebellion. After the !unich %act seemed to give .ritain some res%ite in 3uro%e# substantial reinforcements arrived in Autumn of ()*@. 5rom the beginning of ()*@ to the end of ()*) over a hundred Arabs were e-ecuted# more than one a wee' on average. Arthur Waucho%e# who had been High =ommissioner of Palestine for many years and %resided over the many failures of the mandate# was re%laced by Harold !ac!ichael. While Waucho%e was a humanitarian# a friend of the 0ionists who also saw the Arab %oint of view# !ac!ichael can only be described as a thoroughly des%icable character. He demonstrated that he had no regard for Arab life whatever in su%%ression of the revolt by instituting brutal su%%ression and indiscriminate %unishment. Then in his cynical and draconic enforcement of the ban on "ewish immigration from 3uro%e# he demonstrated that he had no regard for "ewish lives either. Though there were immigration certificates available des%ite the tiny yearly <uota of "ewish immigrants# !ac!ichael barred the entry of "ewish immigrants from 7a8i occu%ied countries on the grounds that they were enemy aliensM This same attitude was evident in his dealings with Arabs during the revolt. The .ritish built a networ' of security roads. Tegart built a security fence along the northern border to %revent infiltration of terrorists. He ordered the construction of a string of %olice forts# 'nown as Tegart forts# that remain %art of the Israeli landsca%e to this day. These# as well as the fence# were built by the Histadruth construction com%any# Solel .oneh. $e(ish Response and $e(ish )ritish Cooperation - The "ewish Agency %olicy of Havlaga 6restraint; was frustrating# but %aid dividends to the "ewish Jishuv. 3arly in the rebellion# Drde =harles Wingate was forwarded to Palestine as a ca%tain in the intelligence service. Wingate was ultimately to organi8e the s%ecial night s<uads staffed by .ritish soldiers and the Haganah# that were %robably the first effective counter-guerilla forces in modern times. 6see biogra%hy of Drde =harles Wingate;. The .ritish hired some *#/// to ,#/// "ewish %oliceman or $haffirs who were usually also members of the Haganah. The $haffirs carried light arms legally and with .ritish sanction. The Haganah grew to a force of ,#/// to (C#/// volunteers during the %eriod of the revolt. The Haganah and the "ewish community had

built a small underground arms industry that was turning out mines# grenades# C and * inch mortars# armor %lating for vehicles and ammunition. 9C):. Together with the innovations of Jit8ha' Sadeh# service in the .ritish %olice# and the organi8ation of Haganah intelligence that soon evolved into the Sherut Jedioth 6Shai;# the "ewish res%onse to the revolt and "ewish coo%eration with the .ritish laid the foundation for the "ewish fighting force of ()?@. At the same time# the .ritish had outlawed the construction of new settlements. The "ews res%onded by building numerous Homa &migdal 6Tower and Stoc'ade; settlements that evaded .ritish regulations and allowed construction of do8ens of new settlements# about ++ in all between ()*, and ()*). 0ionist histories re%eat with %ride that a large number of settlements were created during the revolt and that no "ewish settlements were removed. Though it is true that no new 0ionist settlements were lost# the venerable "ewish community of Hebron had to be %ermanently evacuated in ()*,# and the riots also reduced by half the %o%ulation of the "ewish <uarter of the Dld =ity of "erusalem. Ees%ite .ritish restrictions on immigration# legal and illegal immigration were organi8ed at first by the revisionists and in ()*) by the "ewish Agency. According to official figures# immigration was reduced drastically and didn4t even fill the <uotas. Dn the other hand# official .ritish estimates based on those immigration numbers gave the number of "ews in Palestine in ()?+ as about ++?#///# whereas when the results the Anglo-American survey were tallied# there were about ,/@#/// "ews. The discre%ancy was %robably due to illegal immigration. 6see Po%ulation of Palestine;. The res%onse of the Haganahto Arab violence was officially moral and restrained and was %rimarily confined to defensive measures. .en-$urion e-%lained the %olicy of Havlaga 6 restraint ; after one of the early Arab attac's1

Those who today murdered our %eo%le in an ambush not only %lotted to murder some "ews but intended to %rovo'e us... The Arabs stand to gain from such a develo%ment. They want the country to be in a state of %er%etual %ogrom.... Any further bloodshed 9by the "ews: will only bring %olitical advantage to the Arabs and harm us... Dur strength is in the defense... and this strength will give us %olitical victory if 3ngland and the world will 'now that we are defending ourselves rather than attac'ing. 9*/:
However in early ()*)# on the orders of Eavid .en $urion# Jit8ha' Sadeh created three s%ecial o%erations 6Peulot 1eyuhadot# Pu*m, , units that attac'ed Arab terrorists and civilian targets and later attac'ed some .ritish military targets as well. he Irgun Response - The %olicy of coo%eration and restraint that yielded such dividends for the 0ionists was frustrating for the "ewish %o%ulation# which was under attac'. It made a natural %olitical target for the >evisionist faction# that insisted on armed action and had never wanted to coo%erate with

the .ritish. The Irgun bet had organi8ed itself into the Irgun T8vai Leumi 63t8el; by this time# though about half its members had returned to the Haganah in ()*A. They began a bombing cam%aign against Arab civilians. The first such attac' 'illed two Arabs in a bus de%ot off "affa Street in "erusalem on 7ovember ((# ()*A. Dn 7ovember (?# the Irgun carried out a number of fatal attac's throughout the country. In A%ril ()*@# the Irgun ambushed an Arab bus on the Safed->osh Pina road. The ambush resulted in no deaths# but the .ritish caught the three %er%etrators# and hanged Shlomo .en Josef# the only "ew to be hanged in the u%rising. The Irgun tried to ma'e him into a hero. .en $urion remar'ed# I am not shoc'ed that a "ew was hanged in Palestine. I am ashamed of the deed that lead to the hanging. 9*(: Dn "uly ,# ()*@# the Irgun %lanted two large mil' canisters filled with e-%losive in the Arab suq6mar'et; in Haifa# 'illing C( and wounding +C. Dn "uly (+# an Irgun bomb 'illed (/ Arabs and wounded over */ in the Dld =ity of "erusalem. Dn "uly C+# about ?/ Arabs were 'illed by a bomb in the Haifa mar'et. Dn August C,# a bomb in "affa 'illed C? and wounded *).9*C: The Irgun bombings were very %ossibly the ins%iration for the terror bombings of Palestinian Arabs that succeeded them. The official 0ionist organi8ation denounced terror des%ite the S%ecial D%erations units. In addition to considerations of coo%eration with the .ritish# it was feared# according to Tom Segev# that terror would unleash an unending Arab blood feud. A grou% of "ewish intellectuals and %oliticians issued a declaration against terror. The im%erative 6not to 'ill;# %resent at the infancy of an ancient %eo%le# a%%lies today# it stated. The signatories included the author Shmuel Josef Agnon# the %oet Shaul Tcherni'ovs'y# the %hiloso%her !artin .uber# and %oliticians .erl Gat8nelson and $olda !yerson 6 $olda !eir;. 9**: Casualties - 3stimates of the numbers of casualties and dead vary widely. According to !orris 9*?: the revolt claimed between *#/// and ,#/// Arab dead. Another Israeli historian 9*+: claimed that ?#+// Arabs were 'illed by other Arabs. According to Ganafani# citing Ghalidi19*,: The best estimate of Arab human losses in the ()*,-*) revolt is that which states that losses in the four years totaled ()#A)C 'illed and woundedI this includes the casualties sustained by the Palestinian Arabs at the hands of the 0ionist gangs in the same %eriod. This estimate is based on the first conservative admissions contained in official .ritish re%orts# chec'ed against other documents. These calculations establish that (C// Arabs were 'illed in ()*,. (C/ in ()*A# (C// in ()*@ and (C// in ()*). In addition ((C Arabs were e-ecuted and (C// 'illed in various terrorist o%erations. This ma'es the total of Arabs 'illed in the ()*,-*) revolt# +#/*C# while (?#A,/ were wounded in the same %eriod. Eetainees numbered about @(, in ()*A# C#?,* in ()*@# and a%%ro-imately +#,A) in ()*).

According to Sachar 9*A: there were C#*)? "ewish casualties# ,C/ .ritish and *#A,? Arabs by August of ()*)# when the revolt was essentially over. he "t* $ames Conferen%e - The .ritish understood that world war was looming# and that it was essential not to antagoni8e the Arabs. The !iddle 3ast subcommittee of the =ommittee of Im%erial Eefence noted in "anuary ()*)19*@: We feel it necessary to %oint out... the strong feeling... in all Arab States in connection with .ritish %olicy in Palestine...We assume that# immediately on the outbrea' of war# the necessary measures would be ta'en... in order to bring about a com%lete a%%easement of Arab o%inion in Palestine and in neighboring countries. The government of 7eville =hamberlain dutifully set out to effect com%lete a%%easement. To resolve the <uestion of Palestine# the .ritish called the St "ames conference in 5ebruary of ()*). The .ritish released interned members of the Arab Higher =ommittee so that they could attend the conference along with delegates from Arab countries. Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini was barred from attending# but his ne%hew "amal Husseini re%resented him. The Arabs would not meet with the "ews# and so conferences were conducted se%arately. .en $urion# for the "ews# was conscious of the %light of 3uro%ean "ewry# increasingly im%eriled by the advance of 7a8i $ermany and the im%ending war. A 0ionist %lea to acce%t (/#/// "ewish children had been re2ected by the .ritish in ()*@. .en-$urion of course insisted on continued immigration and ob2ected to formation of an inde%endent Arab state# which would void the obligations of the .ritish mandate. The Palestinian Arabs insisted on an end to immigration and an inde%endent Arab state. The Arab states agreed to su%%ort whatever solution the Arabs of Palestine would acce%t# but the Arabs of Palestine would acce%t no com%romise. The .ritish offered to reduce "ewish immigration to (//#/// over (/ years# and later to @/#/// to no avail. The conference ad2ourned# a failure# on !arch (A. 9*): he +hite Paper - The .ritish government a%%rehended the a%%roach of war more and more strongly with each day that %assed# and the need to a%%ease the Arabs seemed to become increasingly acute. 7eville =hamberlain remar'ed If we must offend one side# let us offend the "ews rather than the Arabs. 9?/: This %olicy is more difficult to understand than a%%ears at first. True# the .ritish could not afford an Arab rebellion in the !iddle 3ast# interference with shi%%ing via the Sue8 canal or interference with oil su%%lies during war time. However# in reality there may have been little to fear from the Arabs. In Ira<# the regime of 7uri as-Said and the Hashemites was totally de%endent on .ritish bayonets# as would be %roven shortly. Ees%ite .ritish concessions# the !ufti instigated a %ro-A-is cou% in Ira<# but it was overthrown by the .ritish and the government was restored. The Hashemite 'ing of Ira<# li'e Abdullah# the Hashemite Ging of "ordan# would necessarily have favored a %artition solution that gave control of Palestine to the Hashemites rather than to the radical Husseini and his Palestinian followers. Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia was li'ewise totally de%endent on the .ritish. In

3gy%t# the .ritish had to im%ose a sym%athetic war time government more or less by force in any event. However# in ()*)# the =hamberlain government remained fi-ated on its %olicy of meeting force with a%%easement. In !ay of ()*)# the .ritish issued the infamous White Pa%er of ()*)# which became 'nown to 0ionists sim%ly as The White Pa%er - *Hasefer Ha2avan.* It limited "ewish immigration to (+#/// %er year for five years# and %laced e-treme restrictions on %urchases of land by "ews in Palestine. In %arliament# Winston =hurchill denounced the White Pa%er as another !unich and a surrender to Arab violence. The Permanent !andates =ommission of the =ouncil of the League of 7ations re2ected the White Pa%er as violating the terms of the mandate# which was to have created a national home for the "ewish %eo%le. 9?(: The .ritish were undeterred. The League of 7ations was dying in any case. The White Pa%er s%elled doom for the "ews of 3uro%e# but it failed to satisfy the Arabs of Palestine. The moderate faction initially acce%ted it# but the Arab Higher =ommittee# led by Husseini# re2ected it. The slogan of the rebels remained The 3nglish to the sea# the "ews to their graves. 9?C: The Arabs of Palestine %ronounced their own doom. So defined# the conflict could only end with the e-%ulsion or e-termination of either Arabs or "ews. 'ffe%t on the ,ionist Movement - Since ultimately the "ews trium%hed in Palestine and obtained a state# it is too easy to agree in retros%ect with historians li'e .enny !orris 9?*:# who argue that the White Pa%er was not really a serious blow to the "ewish Jishuv and the 0ionist enter%rise. !orally# the 0ionist movement was stunned. The goal of the 0ionist movement had been to create a national home for the "ews and a shelter from %ersecution. It had now failed the "ewish %eo%le in its most critical hour. Anti-0ionist "ews# in %articular .und members# were to ma'e the most of this failure. The %olicy of the 0ionist e-ecutive which was to coo%erate with the .ritish# %roved to be a disastrous failure# and the >evisionists who o%%osed such coo%eration would use this failure to drive a wedge into the 0ionist movement that could have caused a fatal s%lit. True# by ()?( the gates of occu%ied 3uro%e had been more or less slammed shut by the 7a8is# but the .ritish had started limiting immigration in ()*,. Perha%s a (//#/// or even C//#/// "ews could have been rescued with a determined effort# if immigration had remained at the levels of ()*+# and if a determined effort had been made# with .ritish coo%eration. 3ven n the s%ring of ()*)# it was not too late to save at least some of the "ews of Poland which was yet to be invaded# and even in ()?/# "ews could have been rescued from Hungary# 5rance and other countries. The 0ionist movement faced a disaster %olitically# morally and in human terms that should not be minimi8ed in hindsight. The 0ionist movement was to recover from the disaster# but it did not learn all the lessons that should have been learned from the Arab u%rising# and it also learned some bad lessons. The %rimary failure of the 0ionist movement was to treat the Arabs of Palestine as invisible# to ignore their needs and concerns and to insist on totally se%arate develo%ment. Humanitarianism# e<uality and socialist and democratic ideals were given li% service far more often than they were im%lemented. It is %ossible that nothing the 0ionists would have done

could have avoided the s%lit# but a less drastic and bitter fight would certainly have resulted if 0ionists had made allowances for Arab labor# had hel%ed to encourage education and literacy among the Arabs of Palestine# they might have created a stratum of the %o%ulation less inimical to 0ionism and more immune to religious and %olitical e-tremism. A second error was the resort to terror re%risals against civilians. Such murders were the wea%on of the Arab Palestinians# and as long as only they used them# they were clearly in the wrong. When the 0ionist grou%s began re%lying in 'ind# they did the e-tremist Arab cause a service. it could not be morally 2ustified and it was o%%osed to the vaunted 0ionist ideals. Inasmuch as the Arabs of Palestine were in large %art unable to control the doings of the !ufti and his henchman or of the revolt leaders in Eamascus# terrori8ing civilians had no deterrent effect. It hel%ed to fan the fames of hate# to destroy the %ossibility of coe-istence# and to undermine the moral basis of 0ionism all these# after all# were goals of the !ufti and his men# and "ewish terrorism against civilians was accom%lishing them. When the "ewish Jishuv became a state# use of terror had worse im%lications. Indiscriminate murder of civilians by a state is a war crime. it indicates a breach of military disci%line - armed forces that are our of control and cannot be de%ended u%on to serve a strategic military %ur%ose. 'ffe%t on the Arab Palestinians - The Arabs had won a great victory in the White Pa%er# and des%ite the re2ection of the white %a%er by the AH=# it was %erceived as a victory. The average Arab one s%o'e to was trium%hant# regarding the White Pa%er as a concession won by Arab arms# wrote the .ritish observer# H.H. Wilson 9??:. Palestine under the .ritish would remain essentially closed to "ewish immigration# and "ews would never get a homeland in Palestine as long as the mandate continued. The 0ionists would lose the entire "ewish %o%ulation of 3uro%e# u%on which they had counted to settle Palestine. $iven the numerical su%eriority of the Arabs of Palestine and the su%%ort of surrounding states# as well their influence with the .ritish it would not have been difficult to ensure an Arab Palestine either through continuation of the mandate or by meeting any feeble 0ionist attem%t at resistance with massive re%ression. .y any ob2ective measure# the 0ionist %ro2ect in Palestine a%%eared to be ho%eless. However# the Arab Palestinians made several mista'es that would %rove fatal to their cause. The first ma2or failure was the almost total lac' of constructive effort in building u% their own institutions# investing in the Arab sector of the Palestinian economy and creating their own state in the ma'ing as the 0ionists did. 5or e-am%le# the !ufti# Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini tried to create a 7ational 5und in ()*(# for investment in Palestine and %rimarily %erha%s to %urchase land and %revent the "ewish 7ational 5und from buying it# but they did not succeed in raising very much money 9?+: The discre%ancy in 0ionist investment versus Arab Palestinian investment# documented by Ganafani and others# is glaring# and it was certainly not the fault of the 0ionists. A second failure of the Arab Palestinians was the s%lit in their ran's. The s%lit that divided the 0ionists in failure did not %rove fatal# even when the

Haganah turned against the revisionists actively. However# the s%lit that divided the Arab Palestinians in their hour of success# accom%anied by violence and re%ression# had grave conse<uences. !ost of the moderate %olitical leadershi%# resting on the urban middle class led by the Ea2anis and the 7ashashibis and their allies# the leadershi% that should have been the bac'bone of the state# was wi%ed out. This was largely the doing of the Arab Palestinian leadershi%# rather than .ritish re%ression. .ritish re%ression after all# failed utterly in its attem%ts to wi%e out Ha22 Amin 3l Husseini and his clan# who were the main internal instigators and hence the main targets of their efforts. It is unli'ely that it was res%onsible for the brea'down of Arab leadershi% as some have claimed. A third error was resort to terror against "ewish civilians as an almost e-clusive wea%on. This has bac'fired on the Palestinian cause since the ()C/s and it continues to do so. If# during their u%rising# the Arabs of Palestine had confined their violence to .ritish targets# it is unli'ely that the "ews would have been so concerned to develo% a military defense ca%ability. Arab riots in the C/s and */s hel%ed to ma'e self-defense a central %art of the ethos of 0ionism. Since then# they have gained nothing by branding themselves as terrorists by attac's on schools# hi-2ac'ing of airliners and suicide attac's. After the victory of the White Pa%er# the Palestinians made several other errors# the seeds of which were %lanted in the %eriod of the great u%rising or before. A fourth error was siding with the wrong side in World War II. The identification with the 7a8i cause was already evident in the */s. It %roved to be less im%ortant than one might thin'# since the .ritish# as well as Arab leaders# were <uite willing to deal with 7a8i war criminals li'e Husseini after World War II. A fifth error was utter infle-ibility. The great issue of the %ost war %eriod that built %ressure for a "ewish state were the C+/#/// dis%laced %ersons in 3uro%e# of whom the &S %ressured .ritain to admit (//#///. If the Arabs of Palestine had yielded on this %oint and allowed immigration# there would have been no decision to %artition Palestine in ()?A and no "ewish state. A si-th and most disastrous blunder committed by Arab and !uslim countries was %ersecution of their "ewish %o%ulations. The basis of this %ersecution was racism# which in %art was ins%ired by Palestinian rhetoric. Some of it was endemic in the societies of those countries - as for e-am%le in Jemen. In %art it was 'indled by the issue of Palestine. Persecution of "ews hel%ed to encourage the mass migration of "ews from Arab countries to Palestine and ensured a ra%id %o%ulation e-%ansion in the first years of the e-istence of the "ewish state. The 0ionist movement would use their defeat much better than the Arabs of Palestine used their victory.

Ami "sseroff )iblography

Arnon--hana. /uval. 6Hebrew; Peasants in the Arab 3evolt in the 4and of "srael 5$66% 5$6$# Pa%yrus# ()@C. )auer. /ehuda# The Arab >evolt of ()*, 7ew 8utlook. Nol.) 7o. , 6@(;.# (),,. %. +/. 0ar-"egor. Mi%hael and "troun. Mauri%e. 6Hebrew and 5rench; Israel-Palestine# The reality beyond the !yths# .6JisraelO5alastin# Hamet8iut Sheme4ever Lamitosim; - !asah# The "ewish-Arab Peace =enter# $ivat Haviva# ())A. 1anafani. !hassan# The ()*,-*) >evolt in Palestine %ublished in 3nglish by =ommittee for a Eemocratic Palestine# 7ew Jor'# ()AC and by Tricontinental Society# London# ()@/. Dn the Web at htt%1OOwww.new2erseysolidarity.orgOresourcesO'anafaniO'anafani?.htm 1edourie. 'lie. Islam in the !odern World# Holt# >inehart and Winston# ()@(. 1halidi. +alid. 0rom Haven to 9onquest: 3eadings in 'ionism and the Palestine Problem until 5$;<# The Institute for Palestine Studies# ()A(. Morris. )enny. 3ighteous =ictims : A History of the 'ionist%Arab 9onflict 5<<5%5$$$ # Gno%f# C///. Morris. )enny. (he .irth of the Palestinian 3efugee Problem 5$;!%5$;$# =ambridge# =ambridge &niversity Press# ()@A. Porath $. (he Palestinian Arab 7ational 1ovement# 5$5$%5$6$ from 3iots to 3ebellion # London# 5ran' =ass# ()AA "a%har. 0o(ard M*. A History of "srael from the 3ise of 'ionism to 8ur (ime # Alfred A. Gno%f# ())@. "egev. om. 8ne Palestine# 9omplete: ews and Arabs >nder the .ritish 1andate trans. H. ?atzman# !etro%olitan .oo's# C///. "tein. 1enneth +*# he 2and Question In Palestine. 3435-3464. &niv. of 7orth =arolina Press# ()@?. "tein. 1enneth +*# Palestine4s >ural 3conomy# ()(A - ()*)# Studies in 0ionism# Nol. @# no. ( 6()@A;. essler. Mar# A*. A History of the "sraeli%Palestinian 9onflict +"ndiana @eries in Arab and "slamic @tudies,# Indiana &niv Press# ())?. eveth. "habtai. .en%Aurion and the Palestinian Arabs: 0rom Peace to ?ar# 4ondon: 8)ford >niversity Press# ()@+#

7otes
(. !orris# C///# %. (C?. C. !orris# C///# %. )(. *. All Ganafani references are to Ganafani# $hassan# The ()*,-*) >evolt in Palestine %ublished in 3nglish by =ommittee for a Eemocratic Palestine# 7ew

?. +. ,. A. @. ). (/. ((. (C. (*. (?. (+. (,. (A. (@. (). C/. C(. CC. C*. C?. C+. C,. CA. C@. C). */. *(. *C. **. *?. *+. *,. *A. *@. *). ?/. ?(. ?C. ?*. ??. ?+.

46.

?A.

Jor'# ()AC and by Tricontinental Society# London# ()@/. Dn the Web at htt%1OOwww.new2erseysolidarity.orgOresourcesO'anafaniO'anafani?.htm !orris# C///# %. (C?. .enny !orris# ()@A# %% @-). Teveth# ()@+# %. (?/. !orris# C///# %. (CA. !orris# C///# %. (C*. Har-Segor and Stroun# ())A# %age CC+ Tessler# ())?# % (A?. Tessler# ())?# %. (@/.. Segev# C///# %% *,/-*,(. !orris# C///# %. (C?. .auer# (),, %. ?). !orris# C///# %. (C@. Segev# C///# % *,+ Segev# C///# %. *,A. Segev# C///# %. *,@. Ganafani# ()@/# !orris# C///# %. (*/. !orris# C///# %.(** !orris# C///# %. (**. Gedourie# (),/# %% )*--(A/. Segev# % ?(? Sachar# ())@# %. C(* !orris# C///# (+*. !orris# C///# %. (+C !orris# C///# %.(+C Segev# C///# %. *,) !orris# C/// % (+? Teveth# ()@+# %. (A*-(A?. Segev# C///# %. *@+ !orris# C///# %. (?A Segev# C///# %. *@?. !orris# C///# %.(+). Arnon-Dhana# %. (?/. Ganafani# ()@/# citing Ghalidi# ()A(# %%. @*,-@?). Sachar# ())@# %. CCC. !orris# C///# %. (++. !orris# C///# %. (+,. !orris# C///# %. (+@. !orris# C///# %. (+).. !orris# C///# %. (+@. !orris# C///# %. (+). Porath# ()A@# %. *?@ Porat# ()A@# %. (C) ff. Stein# Genneth W.# he 2and Question In Palestine. 3435-3464. &niv. of 7orth =arolina Press# ()@?I Stein# Genneth W.#Palestine4s >ural 3conomy# ()(A - ()*)# Studies in 0ionism# Nol. @# no. ( 6()@A;I %%. C+ - ?)I The Land Huestion in Palestine. Stein# Genneth W.# The Land Huestion In Palestine# ()(A-()*)# &niv. of 7orth =arolina Press# ()@? %. (/).