Case 74 CITY OF MANILA VS. GERARDO GARCIA, et. Al. G.R. No.

L-26053 February 21, 1967 Facts: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558 where defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. The Mayor issued a written permits, each labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions that defendants were charged nominal rentals. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School came the need for expansion. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession. Defendants appealed. Issue: Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. Held: Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. Defendants are wrong of insisting that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits. These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters: Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. 11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and

adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction". Judgment affirmed under review with costs against defendants-appellants. Case 75 FLORENTINO GALLEGO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Sand THE CA G.R. No. L-18247 August 31, 1963 Facts: In the morning of March 10, 1957, appellant and his companions were about to hold a meeting of the Jehovahs Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao, Iloilo. The chief of police, Avelino Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him whether he had a permit to hold said meeting. As appellant could not produce any, the chief of police enjoined him from so proceeding with the meeting but instead of desisting in obedience to the chief of polices intimation, appellant, in a chal lenging vein, addressed his followers, You must continue that, we will see what they can do for us. Whereupon, the chief of police warned appellant if he continued with the meeting, he was to place him under arrest. However, appellant, disregarding the warning, continued the meeting for at least 30 minutes more whereupon, he was arrested and charged accordingly. Issue: WON the holding of meeting without a permit is illegal. Held: Disobedience on appellants part is self-evident from his immediate reaction to the chief of police warning for him to discontinue the meeting his exhorting his followers to continue the meeting as they were prepared to see what can the police does for them. And these words were followed by the overt act of continuing the meeting for at least 30 minutes as sufficiently established by the evidence. And it appears that, contrary to appellants contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding on religious meeting in public places. The ordinance in this case is reasonable regulation of the use of public streets. There is no claim that it gives the authorities arbitrary power to grant or deny permit; in fact there is no claim that petitioner was arbitrarily denied a permit. Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, costs against petitioner. Case 76 JOSE TABUENA VS. CA G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991 Facts: The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. The lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON petitioner is the absolute owner of the subject lot. Held: Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows: Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in his favor and dismiss the complaint. Petition is granted and the appealed decision is reversed and set aside with costs against the private respondent.