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Cultural Realism
By Alistar I Johnston Presented by Yavor Kostadinov 802330315

Contents
Chapter 5 - A Return to Theory
Strategy of Symbols and Symbolic Strategy Effects of Symbolic Strategy on Choice Hypotheses about Ming Strategic DM

Chapter 6 The Ming Security Problematique

Add your text in here Bingshu in the Ming Dynasty Add your text in here Ming Security Problems in the North Add your text in here The Parabellum Paradigm and Alternatives

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Chapter 5
A Return to Theory

Strategy of Symbols and Symbolic Strategy

Symbols for decision makers

Internal use directed at the self, at the elite. Symbols for the purpose of autocommunication. This is what you should look like

Symbols as a source of authority

Outwards use directed at the group, non-elites. Symbols for official language that excludes alternative strategies, undermines challenges to the authority and legitimacy, and reinforces hegemony in the DM

Symbols as a distance creators

Outwards use directed at the relationship between groups. Symbols for the creation of us vs. the others to rationalise group behaviours otherwise inconsistent with the self-professed preferences of the group. Done by renaming objectionable behaviours with culturally accceptable symbolic terms

Effects of Symbolic Strategy on Choice

Restriction on Strategic choice
1. 2. org. or political interest of strategic elites military own agenda acceptance of limited debate -echo ex. if one country falls to communism others will follow, recent ex. Koreas FP towards Japan unintended result of the deliberate manipulation of strategic symbols by decision elites ex. constraints by public opinion

3.

No apriori reasons for restrictions

- Johnston argues that in contrast autocommunication implies that 1. inertia, SOPs, rational choices lift a priori reasons 2. strategic discourse accentures us-them differences lifting restrictions

Disjuncture between SCs in China

- autocommunication hypothesis applied to decision makers seeking to affirm their own competence over DM process. Hard to defend this hypothesis for writers of the Seven Military classics -official language hypothesis the Confucian-Mencian discourse would have been used to validate the authority of the strategist - cognitive dissonance hypothesis - from ideal to real or the support for war clothed as righteous punishment

Hypotheses about Ming Strategic DM

No expectation of relationship between the idealized grand strategic preference ranking and Ming strategic choice Independent variable attitude Dependent variable behaviour Relationship of Ming Chinas strategic culture and strategic choice

Given the parabellum axioms in the operational strategic culture, expected is a positive relationship between changes in the relative capacity of the Ming to act offensively against the Mongols and offensive strategic choice

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Chapter 6
The Ming Security Problematique

Bingshu in the Ming Dynasty

Bingshu texts on strategy and statecraft

Zhen JI
1 2 3 4
References to Sun Zi, Wu Zi, Wei Liao Zi No ConfucianMencian variablesum view Similar to parabellum axioms of 7 Mil. Classics Preemptive application of force Emphasis on caution

Cao Lu Jing Lue

1 2 3 4
Reference to Wu Zi and 7 Mil. Classics Some of the Confucian-Mencian strategic discourse In general force is necessary to deal with external threat The use of deterrent capabilities Emphazis on harmony, flexibility

Tou Bi Fu Tan
1 2 3 4
Builds on Sun Zis Art of War Absence of Confucian-Mencian language In general,stratagem to create opportunities for attack defeat the enemy without the use of actual violence Active defence

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6

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Principle of absolute flexibility

Si Ma Fas axiom of reckless pursuit

Content of quan bien

Ming Security Problems in the North

United Mongols under Esen Counteroffensive by Ming forces and defeat at Tu Mu - captured emperor by the Mongols Decline in wars due to Mongol weakness from internal problems

1368 1423

1449

14701540

1580

Hong Wu Push of the Mongols out of North China Yong Le Extended offensive campaigns

flaring of debates on offensive strategy Decline of Mings capacity to mobilize facing other external threats

The Parabellum Paradigm and Alternatives

Common among memorials were the clear causal paths from military preparations to the defeat or submission of the enemy and then to the security of the state

Alternatives
Primary strategic goal of the Mongols was to get access to Chinas material wealth, if not through plundering then through trade. Economic goals

Parabellum Paradigm
Conflict and war constant characteristics of human affairs Zero-sum view

vs.

Variable-sum
Analysis of both absolute and relative gains

Military preparations and application of violence for resolve

Quan bian as a key decision-making axiom

Critique and Conclusion

Although Johnston has flaws, his contribution to the field of strategic studies from cognitive meta-theoretical orientation is significant

Case Bias
Johnston provides no convincing explanation for choosing to study Ming China

Chinesenes s have If other countries

similarly offensive strategies during times of external threat, then the unique Chineseness of the parabellum culture is gone

Culture/behaviour
Claims that behaviour is culturally determined are unrealistic, given that leaders are open to many different cultural influences, and that behavior might be culturally informed but not determined by culture alone

Predetermines outcome

Overarching problem

Overarching problem

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