G.R. No. L-58289July 24, 1982VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, , vs.

THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; respondents. Petition filed by the Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, praying that this Court declare Presidential Decree 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes" unconstitutional. In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML. ISSUE: the validity of the exercise of standby emergency powers invoked in Amendment No. 6 HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. SC declared it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the President (Prime Minister) are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof and (2) whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. The power is to issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land. As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.The SC also noted that Amendment No. 6 is a measure seen by the president to avoiddeclaring another martial law. There are also other options that the president can recourse to;they are:(a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan;(b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks(c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and(d) martial law [being the last] , it is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. President must first exercise emergency powers as may be provided by the legislature. When it fails, it cannot be adequate when lawless violence becomes generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces. And when such situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the preventive incarceration or detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution, without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure that carries with it repressive and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of the country, it is but natural to think of it only as a very last resort. Again, this is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by the military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to

accompany the exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the armed forces and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than disguised martial law. the Constitution is not merely a literal document to be always read according to the plain and ordinary signification of its words. the ultimate thrust of Our discussion is to establish as a legal proposition that behind and beneath the words of the amendment, the literal reference to "the President (Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 was the intention to make such reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested the totality of the executive power under the system of government established thereby. For as a matter of general principle in constitutional law, belonging as he does to the political department of the government, it is only with such official that, the high prerogative of policy determination can be shared. And in this connection, it is very important to note that the amendment does not speak of the "incumbent President" only, as in the other amendments, like Nos. 1, 3 and 5, but of the President, meaning to include all future presidents. More, Amendment No. 6 makes mention not only of the interim Batasan but also of the regular one. All these unmistakably imply that the power conferred upon the President thereby was not for President Marcos alone but for whoever might be President of the Philippines in the future. Anent petitioner's claim that the President may not constitutionally grant the amnesty provided for in P.D. 1840, to Our mind, the following well taken brief answer of the Solicitor General, with whom We fully agree, is more than sufficient to dispose of the same adversely to petitioner's stance: Again, we beg to disagree. Article VII, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, Presidential Decree 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution. All the above premises taken into account. Our considered conclusion and judgment is that Amendment No. 6 of October 1976 of the Constitution of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or modified, much less repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981.WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed [G.R. No. 124873. July 14, 1999.]UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BF HOMES, INC., respondent. Petitioner United BF Homeowners' Association, Inc. (UBFHAI) is the umbrella organization and sole representative of all homeowners in the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, a seven hundred sixty five (765) hectare subdivision located in the south of Manila. Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) is the owner-developer of the said subdivision, which first opened in 1968. 3 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) under receivership to undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program due to its financial difficulties. Petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1989, and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space in 1989 and 1993, respectively. In 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's eleven (11) members of the board of directors was appointed. Petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for

mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver. Without filing an answer to the petition with HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition and also ordered HIGC's hearing officer to refrain from hearing and to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner UBFHAI raises two issues: (1) whether or not the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the HIGC, specifically Section 1(b), Rule II of the "Rules of Procedure in the Settlement of Homeowners' Disputes" is valid; (2) whether or not the acts committed by the respondent constitute an attack on petitioner's corporate existence. 19 Corollary to these, petitioner questions the appellate court's jurisdiction over the subject case The Supreme Court held that Rule II, Section 1 (b) of HIGC's "Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners' Disputes" is void, without ruling on the validity of the rest of the rules. Neither can HIGC claim original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus under the two other types of disputes enumerated in PD 902-A and its revised rules. The dispute is not one involving the members of the homeowners association nor is it one between any and/or all of the members and the association of which they are members. The parties are the homeowners' association and the owner-developer, acting at the same time as the corporation's committee of receivers. The Court decision and resolution appealed from were affirmed. SYLLABUS 1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC); POWERS AND FUNCTIONS THEREOF; LIMITATIONS. Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners' associations was vested by law with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant to Executive Order 535, this function was delegated to the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). Section 2 of Executive Order 535 provides: "2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers; (a) To require submission of and register articles of incorporation of homeowners associations and issue certificates of incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the registering associations with the duly promulgated rules and regulations thereon; maintain a registry thereof; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;" By virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners' associations, but also the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: "(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity." On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners' disputes. Section 1(b), Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include: "Section 1. Types of Disputes The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or committee duly designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following: . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among members of the association, between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the

association and the state/general public or other entity." Therefore, in relation to Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the HIGC's jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes is limited to controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between any or all of them and the association of which they are members or associates; and (3) between such association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. 2. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT; AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CANNOT AMEND AN ACT OF CONGRESS; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. As early as 1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators (PVA), 33 SCRA 585, 588 [1970], we ruled that the power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed for an administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute." (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 404, 407 [1996]). If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. (Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. National Wages and Productivity Commission, 289 SCRA 667, 681 [1981]). In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the law, insofar as the association's franchise or corporate existence is involved, it is only the State, not the "general public or other entity" that could question this. The appellate court correctly held that: "The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do . . . ." The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution." It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid.

[G.R. No. L-16704. March 17, 1962.] VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee. SYLLABUS 1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF LAW; NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. 2. ID.; ID.; BINDING EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ON COURTS; REQUISITES. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., pp. 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. 3. ID.; ID.; CIRCULAR NO. 22 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION MERELY AN ADVISORY OPINION AND NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT. Circular No. 22 of the Social Security Commission purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. Such circular, therefore, did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. 4. ID.; INTERPRETATION OF TERMS OR WORDS; RULE WHEN A TERM OR WORD IS SPECIFICALLY DEFINED IN A STATUTE. While the rule is that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. DECISION BARRERA, J p: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor. "Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 21/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month." petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term `compensation' for the purposes of" such computation,

their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal. The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act." There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit. p. 194.) A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit. pp. 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8(f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: "(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so." Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: "(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month." It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the

amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Chapter 2ORDINANCE POWER ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987BOOK III OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Title I Chapter 2 Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.chanrobles virtual law library 1987 constitution Art 2Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. NCC Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. Rpc Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; chan robles virtual law library 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.chanrobles virtual law library