SOCIOECONOMIC SEGREGATION WITH (WITHOUT) COMPETITIVE EDUCATION POLICIES.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE

Mariano Narodowski* & Milagros Nores** Documento 53 Agosto de 2001

**

Centro de Polticas Educativas - Fundacin Gobierno y Sociedad & Universidad de Quilmes. Centro de Polticas Educativas - Fundacin Gobierno y Sociedad.

Socioeconomic segregation with (without) competitive education policies. A comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile.
The last decades can be largely characterized by the amount and content of the education policies developed world-wide. Originated in the north North America and Europe- a tidal wave of thinking about the downfall of the Welfare State swept over Latin America in the 1980s, and consequently, some education policies were dramatically altered to reflect changed economic policies (Arnove, 1997) . In an intent of improving administrative efficiency, school quality, and school equity in education the current trend has meant an important transformation of the national states role in education in favor of an increased role of lower government levels. This has not necessarily meant increased at the microlevels, that is, at the schools.

However, while as an international trend, education decentralization has been widely recognized, its uncritical acceptance as a concept in itself can fail to appreciate its variety within the different educational systems (Bullock & Thomas, 1997). As Whitty, Power & Halpin (1998: 23) describe in their study of redistribution of powers in England and Wales, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia and the USA, the complexity of the reforms in these countries derives from the many meanings behind the concepts of devolution and choice. In their belief, this is related to Lauglos description of the diverse implications brought about by different forms of decentralization (1996, as cited in Whitty et al.).

More specifically, Welsh & McGinn (1998) define decentralization as being about shifts in the location of those who govern, about transfers of authority from those in one location or level vis-a-vis educational organizations, to those in another level. Additionally, they recognize three major positions in the conflict about who should govern education: political legitimacy, professional expertise and market efficiency. The authors state that the fundamental difference between these three is in terms of the justification for holding authority. Political legitimacy is about governance of education being legitimated by individuals who have been selected through a political process; professional expertise in governance refers to authority being assigned primarily to those with technical expertise in the matter; and finally, the market efficiency position brings into play a differentiation

between governance of production and governance of consumption of education. Welsh and McGinn do not view these three as mutually exclusive.

Chile has been in Latin America a regional reference in terms of educational decentralization reforms (although it has been so not only in education). As such it has been widely studied (Aedo & Larraaga, 1994; Bullock & Thomas, 1997; Carnoy, 1997 & 1998; Carnoy & McEwan, 1998 & 2000; Gauri, 1999; McEwan, 2000a & 2000b; Belfield, 2001; Bravo, Contreras & Sanhueza, 1999; Contreras, 2001; Mizala and Romaguera, 1998 & 2000; Parry, 1997a & 1997b; Patrinos & Ariasingman, 1998; Rodriguez, 1988; Viola Espinola, 1992 & Undated; Welsh & McGinn, 1998; West, 1996; within others) because of the decentralization and market reforms introduced during the 1980s. Presently, the model of education provision and administration in place in Chile is one of a quasi-market, being the general characteristics of such market a public finance of education with supply competition in the production of it, and involving public and private suppliers1.

On the other hand, Argentina represents a model of public provision of schooling inherited from a strong welfare state that faced a series of national state reduction reforms during the 1990s over the basis of issues of efficiency and federal legitimacy. This system, which we categorize as a quasi-monopoly one, has an exit2 option to a portion of its school population to the private sector, and it even promotes such exit through a state subsidization of private schools. By Quasi-Monopoly we draw upon the work of Narodowski & Nores (2001) who develop a taxonomy of models of education provision and differentiate pure monopolies from quasi-monopolies, that is, models of state provision that have imbedded exit options but that do not contemplate supply competition, in contrast to quasi-markets, which do so.

Therefore, a comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile implies a comparison of two countries that although from a national perspective have faced very different decentralization reforms that have meant a shift in the locus of governance, and that has taken place over within two very different sets of regulatory frameworks, have presently
1

For further definition of quasi-markets refer to Cullis & Jones (1998). They differentiate such markets in their recognition that they are the result of a world trend for lower levels of public provision and higher market levels. 2 We make reference to the concept of Exit as developed by A. Hirschman (1969).

arrived to similar states of their education system in terms of their enrollments socioeconomic segregation. That is, different models of schooling provision, different types of education markets and regulations, however, apparently similar results.

In both cases, in the strategy adopted towards private education, an imperative need for solving supply problems at the middle level has predominated, as well as financial restraints to the system as a whole. Consequently, the decentralization reform to the municipal level in Chile, as well as the decentralization reform to the provincial levels in Argentina, have answered to the corresponding national governments efficiency needs for the provision of education.

Within the differentiated forms of education provision, this paper intends to inquire into the causality governing the relation between the use of vouchers in education and an increased enrollment segmentation or student sorting. The interest in this matter is born from an in depth knowledge of the Argentine education system, where we have observed that not withstanding the non-existence of vouchers, or any similar form of competitive model of education provision, some of the most important objections to such policies are, however, especially valid. Theoretical approach It is a fairly predominant statement in the literature against competition, voucher and charter school initiatives, that such reforms increase student sorting across individual characteristics such as race, class, etc. Several authors have argued that because school choice policies induce families to exit public schools, they heavily promote enrollment segmentation (McEwan, 2000b; Doerr, Menendez & Swomley, 1996; Smith & Meier, 1995; Graubard & Rothstein, 1998; Carnoy, 1997; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Hassel, 1997; within others). Mostly, such approaches to the problem of socioeconomic segregation have to do with thinking the relationship between vouchers and this kind of segmentations as a positive causality were the implementation of vouchers in and education system produces increased segmentation (see I). However, such same results can be found in centralized education systems that have explicitly avoided the introduction of vouchers (see II). Therefore, this work intends to brake the assumption that vouchers are a necessary condition for socioeconomic segmentation and even question it as a sufficient condition. 4

I - Chile:

[ [

Competitive Educ. Policies (vouchers) No Competitive Educ. Policies

Privatization

] ]

SES segmentation SES segmentation

II - Argentina

Privatization

While opponents of school choice policies usually argument that vouchers induce enrollment privatization and hence, enrollment segmentation, the evidence form Chile and Argentina shows that enrollment segmentation is not necessarily a consequence of the introduction of vouchers. While for Chile that argument might be valid, it is not so for Argentina. Therefore, vouchers are an intervening variable in the determinants of a countrys socioeconomic segmentation, but definitely not an independent variable. The school choice decisions brought about by the introduction of vouchers are endogenous to a series of factors that determine such choice, which also play an important role in the determination of socioeconomic enrollment segmentations in non voucher systems. Consequently, this papers questions the validity of empirical analyses which have consider student socioeconomic characteristics and school choice decisions as independent determinant variables of student results, which predominates in the analysis of competition policies. Chile: twenty years of a quasi-market system of education. Historical Perspective Before the 1980s and since at least the second half of the nineteenth century, the predominant state model in Latin America was that of a liberal state that tightly controlled the of public education system. Such control meant a thorough regulation of the inputs of the schooling process by the national states in their intent of establishing the foundations of the nation and the citizenship (Weinberg, 1984; Torres and Puiggrs, 1997). As Torres and Puiggrs state, the implementation of a welfare-oriented public policy has been a central element of the Latin American state, that is, a Welfare State with an intense interventionist role that included the protection of minimum standards on income, nutrition, health, housing and education. Such state was preceded by state authoritarianism (eighties) and an aftermath return to liberal-democratic governments. Within this framework the history of education in Argentina and Chile did not differ significantly until the 1980s, when Chile made a significant shift that sent its education system through a completely different path. 5

Basically, in Chile, during the first half of the 20th century the systems trend was towards increased centralization and an accelerated involvement of the state which resulted in the concept of the Teaching State (Matte & Sancho, 1991).Therefore, up until the eighties, the education system provided schooling through its simultaneous provision and finance on one hand, and by additionally subsidizing private schools. The traditional private subsidized supply consisted mainly of urban primary schools serving middle and lowincome families, half of which were catholic and with an average subsidy of around 60 to 65% of school expenses (Viola Espinola, 1992), which in reality taking into account the forms and amounts of payments- meant a funding of 25% of the per student cost at official schools (Panadeiros, Susmel & Nores, 1998).

Almost all responsibilities for primary and secondary education laid at the center, which administrated the system through a strong regulatory framework, that included a sharp control over private schools. Even the administration of human resources was centralized, with a national salary scale and centralized decision-making on school appointments. In terms of funding, this centralized system meant that resources were assigned to schools on the basis of historical budgets (Panadeiros, et. al, 1998).

With the education systems reform implemented during the 1980s, the predominating concept was of public funding of education, clearly defined as a separate action from the production of education in itself. The scheme put into place implied an equal per student funding of all children attending both public schools with now its administration being decentralized to the municipal level- and private schools incorporated to the subsidy regime. This centralized financial scheme within a decentralized administrative system was extended for pre-school, primary and secondary education (although the Constitution of 1980 only guarantees free primary education), with the level of per student funding varying correspondingly (Matte & Sancho, 1991).

The underlying principles embodied in the model of education that was developed during these years answered to a clear recognition of the need to provide basic education for all (based on the existence of externalities of it), and an intention to promote equality of opportunities, as reflected by the capitation funding mechanism (Panadeiros, et. al, 1998). 6

Such principles were to be fulfilled at the lowest efficiency costs, that is, through the participation of the private sector. Additionally, this strategy also answered to an demand excess that had to be satisfied.

Specifically, Panadeiros, et. al (1998) describe three main components of the reform: (a) a transference of public education establishments from the central government to the municipal level; (b) a transference of middle technical-professional schools to non-profit business organizations; and (c) the replacement of the existing supply-based funding mechanism to a demand-side funding scheme to which private non-profit schools could apply for. The transference in itself was not complete until 1986, partly as a consequence of the economic crisis the country went through in the early eighties as well as because of the introduction of a series of market distortions during those years3.

In the 1990s, the Chilean transition-to-democracy government puts into the educational policy agenda the issues of education quality and equity intertwined. Therefore, pro-active policies and initiatives of positive discrimination, as well as initiatives intended to strengthen the educational systems institutional capacities were dominant from the central governments perspective. All these were developed within the existing decentralized and pro-competitive education system.

Consequently, the per student finance system for public and private subsidized schools was preserved, with an increase in education spending so as to revert the tendency of the eighties of decreasing resources in the sector (only in 1994 is the per student spending of 1982 surpassed). Additionally, within a tax reform of 1993, private subsidized primary and secondary schools and municipal secondary schools were allowed to opt for a mix funding scheme4. By 1997, 25% of the enrollment was subscribed to it (Cox, 1997). Such a reform clearly promotes a greater enrollment segmentation by income levels, as those who can not
3

The transference to the municipal level was temporarily suspended during 1983. In addition to this, the economic crisis changed the rules of the game during these years since per student funding was initially indexed and this was modified, which brought municipal schools into a deficit that brought about the Central Governments intervention to cover these. Furthermore, so as not to reduce demand for municipal schooling a modification was introduced which limited private-subsidized school entry to the market. These market distortions basically disappeared in 1986 (Panadeiros, et al., 1998). 4 The discount on resources to the schools is proportional to tuition increases. For a tuition charged to parents of half the per student subsidy, their is no discount on government funding; for tuition levels between and

pay the tuition imposed face limited school choices. Additionally, compensatory policies have apparently been insufficient to compensate for the costs imposed by this initiative on the lowest incomes groups (Viola Espnola, undated).

Furthermore, during the initial democratic years a teacher statute was enacted (and four years later reformed)5. This norm was highly regulatory, and even considered a step back on the existing decentralized system. The rigidity it brought to schools in terms of teachers mobility meant a limitation on the schools administrative capacities, but apparently was of utmost importance in increasing feasibility for subsequent education programs (Cox, 1997). However, such rigidity was significantly reduced by the 1995 Law of Teacher Statute Reform. Two programs were the consequence of this reform, PADEM (a development program for municipal education) and SNED (a system intended to asses the performance of the schools teacher teams). As a consequence of the reforms and increased funding, teacher salaries increased 80% between 1990 and 1997 (Cox, 1997).

Finally, the 1990s in Chile are marked by a the introduction of compensatory policies. Such policies are the reflection of the prevalent concept of positive discrimination that is, as Reimers (2000: 94) states, relatively recent in education policy discourse in Latin America. Such policies in Chile took the form of interventions at different need levels6. During the early 1990s a program known as P900 was set in place, which targeted the lowest 10% basic education schools (lowest en terms of education results) with direct and technical aids such as infrastructure, textbooks, didactic teaching material, class libraries, and innovation with monitors for childrens schooling reinforcement (Cox, 1997). Additionally, the MECE-Bsica program is a systemic intervention on basic education that included material, technical and pedagogical components; and, the MECE-Media (1995) was developed for middle education with innovation and investment components7. In addition to these three, some other policies were developed as are: the extension of the school day, the networking of outstanding schools and the strengthening of teacher training programs.

a complete subsidy their is a 10% discount; for tuition levels between one and two per student subsidies their is a 20% discount, and so on (Cox, 1997). 5 Law 19.070 and Law 19.410. 6 For further characterization of the reforms introduced in Chile during the 1990s refer to Cox (1997). 7 World Bank financed (Latorre, 1997).

The model The present education trend promoting the introduction of competitive markets can be grouped into two lines of thought. That is, competitive forces in education can be introduced for two alternative reasons: as instruments for systemic change or as mechanisms for integral change. Lane (1999) introduces the concepts of integral reform vs. systemic reform. Under the argument for an integral reform of the education system Lane considers charter schools as an additional component of national and state efforts to modify and change traditional public schools, in opposition to being an instrument for systemic reform intending to completely restructure the system. In short, as an alternative within, and not to, public education. Lanes categorization into these two theoretical perspectives of what charter schools can generate in the existing educational systems can be generalized for school choice policies in general.

Chiles reform has been described as a voucher model by an important number of authors analyzing it (Parry, 1997a and 1997b; Carnoy and McEwan, 1998 and 2000; Bullock & Thomas, 1997; West, 1996; Carnoy, 1997; within others). On the other hand, Welsh & McGinn (1998) have described it as a charter school model of education provision. Actually, the main difference between vouchers and charter schools (these being both alternatives of school choice models) lays in how the subsidy reaches the school, being the voucher much more liquid for parents and students than the transfer of funds to the schools on the basis of their student enrollment. Notwithstanding this difference, in its form, the Chilean education reform falls into what Lane (1999) denominated as charter being instruments for systemic reform. The model integrated into a single market traditional public schools together with private subsidized schools with an explicit intention of making all public schooling subject to market rules.

Chiles school choice reform answered mostly to immediate needs as were greater efficiency, higher educational quality, higher equity, and the need to solve the existing access problems of the secondary education level. It can be categorized as a quasi-market model of educational provision, since it complies with the general characteristics of such a market, that is, public funding of the service with its provision being in a competitive market where public and/or private organizations take part. In education, Levacic (1995) as cited in Gordon & Whitty (1997) describes the salient characteristic of this market as being 9

the separation between the provider and the producer of schooling, with the simultaneous introduction of consumer choice elements into the relation between supply and demand. As Vandenberghe (1999: 273) states, quasi-markets form a subtle combination of the principle of public funding with the corresponding bureaucratic controls, and the market-oriented, competition-driven approach of education.

Basically, school choice proposals are based on a series of perceptions about the structure, the behavior, and the output of the dynamics of competitive markets. In the market logic, consumers play a central role because they reveal information about their preferences through their interaction with the supply side. On the basis of these sets of preferences, the supply adjusts its decisions about what, how much and at what price to offer. This supply and demand interaction brings the production of the good/service closer to the consumers interests; that is, consumer sovereignty guides the market to its best outcome (Aoki & Feiner, 1996). In education, this process implies that education supply is brought about to behave similar to the private sector, with a multiplicity of suppliers (public and private) competing for students.

The real effect, size, and implications of a school market when introduced, depends on its particularities. As Levin (1992) states, different specifics can eventually lead to extremely different results in practice, being the models financial, regulation, and information provision components of particular importance. It is evident that differences in the particularities of the model implemented answer to very different ideals and goals in terms of education equity and quality. Similarly, Arons (1971) defines the voucher scheme as malleable in its basic design, and such design as being deterministic of its results. With this in mind, the school choice model in Chile can be described on the basis of the mentioned three components, which determine the form the model will take in practice (which applies only for included schools). That is, it defines the rules of the game under which schools compete for students.

10

Table I. The Chilean Model of School Choice. Component

Specified
    *      **     

Participation
Municipal schools Private schools

Regulation
Curriculum specification Teacher certification Teacher salaries Minimum infrastructure Student admission standards Marketing Textbooks

Finance
Parental additional funding Compensatory funding Transportation provision Textbook provision Information Assessment Public provision of information

* The teacher statute of 1990 had several implication on teachers minimum working conditions. ** The funding mechanism was modified by law on 1993 to allow for mixed funding between state and parents through tuition fees. Source: elaborated on the basis of Levin (1992).

As can be seen in Table 1, the Chilean model allows for access to public resources to both, public and private schools. Additionally, it includes the regulatory components of curriculum specification and minimum infrastructure requirements, a finance component allowing for additional parental funding over public resources, and an information component that includes assessment of students results. Apparently, the model puts emphasis on controlling output and content of schooling, but eliminates regulation over inputs, except for requiring compliance with minimum requirements on infrastructure and teacher salaries (the teacher statute establishes minimum working conditions). Additionally, the 1993 amendment that allows for schools to opt for mixed funding (only private-subsidized schools at the basic level, and all schools at the middle level) has important equity implications8, as so does the fact that student admission mechanisms are not regulated and although municipal schools have to admit every student at their door, this is not true for private subsidized schools.

Law N 19.247 of 1993 established two alternatives to facilitate private resources in public education. These are: private donations (with tax benefits) and mixed funding. Municipal schools who opted for mixed funding should still receive students that are not able to pay (Latorre, 1997).

11

Enrollment Privatization and its socioeconomic segmentation After the implementation of the per student subsidy for public and subscribed private schools, private subsidized enrollment grew enormously in Chile (Figure 1). Between 1981 and 1991, private subsidized enrollment increase 57%, that is, it went from approximately 430 thousand children to 950 thousand (which implies an average annual growth rate of 12%). And in the last decade it did so even more, having increased up to 1.2 million by 1999. In short, it experienced an 180% variation in two decades. The growth in private non-subsidized enrollment was much smaller, with an increase of 20% in the first decade (2% on average, per year), and adding up to a variation of 57% by 1999. Quite contrary, public school enrollments decreased 21% between 1981 and 1991, and from there on it grew steadily. However, in 1999, enrollments in the public sector where still below what they used to be in 1981. Such an enrollment privatization has been mostly a consequence of the incentive for privately administered schools to enter the market, established by the per student subsidy allocated (which in fact was initially higher than the preexisting mean per student expenditure).

Figure 1. Evolution of School Enrollments in Chile, 1981-1999 (thousands).

2500

Public
2000

1500 thousands

Private subsidized
1000

500

Private non-subsidized

0 1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Source: Ministry of Public Education of Chile.

12

The main criticisms to the model have concentrated on two issues. On one hand, on the socioeconomic segmentation it has produced on its student population as evidenced by the socioeconomic characteristics of each child, and on the other, on a lack of clear evidence of private school effectiveness under such a school choice scheme.

A descriptive-statistics approach of analysis of the effects of the reform done by Viola Espnola (1992) describes the mentioned enrollment segmentation. Summarizing, while the higher income groups urban and rural- have chosen the private system, the lower income households have stayed in the municipal system. However, the author found that although the gap between higher and lower income groups tended to be stable on private subsidized schools, it widened under the municipal schooling system, apparently evidencing a higher compensatory ability of the first. A series of studies done by the Chilean Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (1999a, 1999b, and 1999c) also evidence the segmentation of the different income levels by school dependency.

The 1998 distribution of school enrollment by income level for each type of education is described in Table II. Evidently, what Viola Espnola described for 1990 is still evident on the 1998 data. The highest quintile mostly attends private non-subsidized schools, the fourth and third quintile attends municipal and private subsidized schools in similar proportions, and the lower quintiles are highly concentrated in municipal schools. Such segmentation is observed for basic as well as middle education levels. While a 75% of the lowest quintile attend municipal basic education, only a 19% of the fifth quintile does so. At this same education level, although private subsidized school do not serve predominantly the highest quintile, it is still biased towards serving the fourth quintile (48%) more than the municipal sector does (40%).

13

Table II. Population aged 0-24 enrolled by Income Level, Type of education and Dependency, 1998. Education type Dependency National Quintile Total I II III IV V Basic Municipal 75.3 63.7 54.5 40.4 18.9 57.5 Private Subsidized 24.2 35.1 42.3 48.3 28.0 33.8 Private Non-Subsidized 0.5 1.1 3.1 11.3 53.2 8.4 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Middle Science and Municipal 78.6 66.8 59.0 45.0 22.3 53.8 Humanities Private Subsidized 18.3 28.4 33.8 38.9 25.8 29.2 Private Non-Subsidized 2.6 3.9 6.9 15.2 51.7 16.5 Corporation 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Middle Technical and Municipal 50.6 47.1 47.1 42.3 25 46.4 Professional Private Subsidized 36.3 37.8 39.5 43.9 51.1 39.3 Private Non-Subsidized 1.3 Corporation 12.4 14.0 13.1 12.5 13.8 13.1 Total 99.3 98.9 99.7 98.7 89.9 100.1
Source: Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (1999b).

A large set of studies about the Chilean education system have used an econometric approach to analyze private and municipal school effectiveness (and efficiency). Most of these are summarized in Table III. Basically, all these studies agree on the fact that the rough gap in student achievement test scores the predominant measure of school quality these studies use - between public and private subsidized schools is highly determined by differences in students socioeconomic background. Parry (1997) reached the conclusion that each type of school specializes: public schools targeting socioeconomically disadvantaged students and private schools producing higher scores with high quality students. Similarly, Mizala & Romaguera (1998 & 2000) recognize the existence of significant differences on the supplys geographical distribution for each type of schools, and of the income levels of the children attending these, which in turn has a strong correlation with the type of school. And, Bravo et al. (1999) trace a greater concentration of lower quintile students in public schools and a similar concentration of higher quintile students on private schools (whether subsidized or not).

Mostly, these studies try to identify private vs. public schools differences searching to understand the implications of nation-wide school choice experiences. All studies having used data for years previous to 1990 (included) found a higher test score achievement of private subsidized schools after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics (measured by family income and/or parental education) and other geographic and school-quality related

14

variables (i.e. class size, teacher experience, non-teaching assistants, and failure rates, within others).

Furthermore, the study by Bravo et al., which covers all assessed years (by the national assessment systems9) between 1982 and 1997, found that public and private subsidized schools have equally distributed educational results (and this has remained stable) and that private subsidized superiority over municipal schools, having controlled for school socioeconomic variables, has decreased during the nineties. This result is similar to the what the authors analyzing post 1990 data sets, that is as Carnoy & McEwan (1998 and 2000), McEwan (2000), Mizala and Romaguera (1998) have arrived to. However, altogether, studies on the effectiveness of private schools in the Chilean educational system have found a set of mixed results for post 1990 data sets. If a private subsidized superiority has been found, such superiority in terms of test scores is small, having controlled for available data on socioeconomic characteristics.

The establishment of an assessment system was a fundamental component of the reform. An assessment system worked between 1982 and 1984 denominated PER (Prueba de Evaluacin del Rendimiento Escolar) which was suspended on that last year. However, in 1988 the assessment reform component is retaken and the SIMCE (Sistema de Medicin de la Calidad de la Educacin) was put into place, and has been operating since.

15

Table III. Econometric Studies on the Chilean Model of School Choice.

Study

Data

Content

School type differentiation

Method
Cross-Section estimations; OLS

Results
The performance gap favorable to private schools in comparison to public ones decreases when controlling by socioeconomic, geographic and school quality-related factors; and only in the nineties is this gap non-significant, even turning negative the last years. Public schools produce higher achievement than private subsidized schools, after controlling for other factors (such as SES), but private-subsidized schools appear to make better use of student and school inputs. Findings also implicate school specialization: municipal schools achieve higher performance with disadvantaged children and private-subsidized schools produce higher scores enrolling high-quality students. Competition between schools does raise achievement, but the impact is small. Achievement test results do not differ significantly between public and private subsidized schools. Public schools principals surpass their private counterparts in terms of leadership ability. Public schools are also more likely to provide innovative courses. The evidence suggest that the long-run equilibrium is never reached-there will always be some poor quality schools because of information asymmetry. Attending a private subsidized school does increase standardized test scores, but the impact is relatively small. However, when TSLS models are estimated to control for school choice, the impact of private subsidized school increases significantly. Parental characteristics operate on the selection of school, and such impact is overestimated by the OLS model. The Chilean voucher system succeeds as an instrument of social mobility. The educational gap between school dependencies is statistically significant at approximately 7 to 8 points in favor of private schools, after controlling for average parental education at the school level, teacher experience, female teacher percentage, and number of non-teaching assistants. Private subsidized schools obtain higher test scores than public schools after controlling after for class size, teacher/student ratio, mother' s average years of education, family income and failure rates.

Bravo, D., Contreras, D., & Sanhueza, C. (1999) PER: 1982-1984, Educational Achievement, Inequalities and SIMCE: 1988Private/Public Gap: Chile 1982-1997. 1997 Universidad de Chile. Parry, T. (1997). Theory meets reality in the SIMCE: 1988education voucher debate: some evidence from 1990. Chile. Education Economics, (5)3.

School level data for Public; Private; and Spanish and Math, Private Subsidized and 4th and 8th grade. School level data for Public; and Private Spanish and Math, Subsidized 4th grade.

OLS

Parry, T. (1997). How will schools respond to incentives of privatisation? Evidence from Chile and Implications for the United States. American Review of Public Administration, (27)3.

SIMCE: 1991; and School level data for Public; and Private data from a Spanish and Math, Subsidized random sample of 8th grade. 50 schools in the santiago area

OLS

Contreras, D. (2001) Evaluating a Voucher PAA: Academic system in Chile. Individual, Family and School Aptitude Test, Characteristics. Working Paper N 175, 1998. Economics Department, Universidad de Chile.

Individual level data; 142,382 observations.

Public; Private; and Private Subsidized

OLS and TSLS

Rodriguez, J. (1988) School Achievement and PER: 1988 Decentralization Policy: the Chilean Case. Draft. ILADES.

Sample of 281 schools in Santiago, 4th grade.

OLS

Aedo, C. and Larraaga, O. (1994) Sistemas de Entrega de los Servicios Sociales: La Experiencia Chilena. En Aedo, C. and Larraaga, O. Sistemas de Entrega de los Servicios Sociales: Una Agenda para la Reforma. Washington, D.C.: Interamerican Development Bank.

SIMCE: 1990 and 500 schools 1991; and CASEN: 1990 for socioeconomic information.

OLS

16

Carnoy, M. and McEwan, P. (1998) Is SIMCE: 1998Privatization More Effective and Cost-Effective 1996, bi-anual. the Public? The Case of Chile. Draft. Stanford University. Carnoy, M. and McEwan, P. (2000) The Effectivenes and Efficiency of Private Schools in Chile's Voucher System. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, (22)3. SIMCE: 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996; and JUNAEB for background information on children.

Public; and Private Subsidized

OLS

After controlling for different variables and using a fixed effect approach they conclude that competition reduced school performance. On average, non-religious and profit maximizing voucher schools are marginally less effective than public schools in producing Spanish and Math achievements (or at best, similarly effective). However, they cost about 13%-17% less than public schools after controlling for achievement and student background. In contrast, Catholic schools are more effective than public schools at producing achievement for similar students. The results therefore, deliver a mixed message. The results are decidedly mixed. Catholic schools are somewhat more effective than public schools un producing student outcomes. There are few differences in outcomes between public and non-religious subsidized schools. In short, private schools vary widely in the outcomes they produce. The authors control for socioeconomic level, a vulnerability index of the school, and a series of institutional characteristics of the school (a geographical index, teacher experience, number of teachers -size-, and preschool education). The initial difference on average scores between dependencies -favoring private subsidized schools over municipal ones- disappears after introducing controls to the model, and the sign is even reverted. Additionally, it's significance is reduced. At the school level data there is a significant correlation between school dependency and its students socioeconomic level. On average, municipal schools have lower that the expected results in comparison to the other two types of schools. At the student level, school dependency is a significant variable. Students at municipal schools have lower SIMCE results than students at private subsidized schools, which in turn has lower results than private non-subsidized.

School level data for Public corporation, Spanish and Math, Catholic voucher, 4th grade. Protestant voucher, nonreligious voucher, and non-voucher private schools relative to Municipal schools. School level data for Spanish and Math, 8th grade (n=160,283) Catholic subsidized, nonreligious subsidized, and non-subsidized private schools, relative to public schools.

OLS

McEwan, P. (2000) Private and Public SIMCE:1997 schooling in the Southern Cone: A comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile. Occasional Paper No. 11, NCSPE, Teachers College, Columbia University. Mizala, A. and Romaguera, P. (1998) SIMCE:1996; and Desempeo escolar y eleccion de colegios: la JUNAEB for experiencia chilena. Center of applied children's health Economics, Universidad de Chile. status.

OLS

Over 5,000 schools; Municipal; and Private average score non-subsidized and between the math private subsidized and spanish tests for 4th grade.

OLS

Mizala, A. and Romaguera, P. (2000) Determinacin de factores explicativos de los resultados escolares en educacin media en Chile. Center of applied Economics, Universidad de Chile.

SIMCE: 1998; JUNAEB data for vulnerability and MINEDUC data.

Individual and Municipal; Nonschool level data for subsidized Private and Spanish and Math, private subsidized 8th grade

OLS

17

It is worth noting that the study done by Contreras (2001) is the only one of the hereby included studies which uses a different data source, that is, individual student data. With two-stage least squares estimations to control for school choice, the author shows that the impact of private subsidized schools is larger than what the estimation by ordinary least squares results in, and therefore concludes that the Chilean model actually succeeds as an instrument of social mobility.

These results have to be put into context with what has happened in the legislative and political arena during this decade. As a matter of fact, although the value of the per student subsidy initially decreased because of an economic crisis that affected all public funding, and with the exception of the interruption of the assessment system, there were no important changes in the direction of the policy in place or in the commitment with the reform through the 1980s.

On the other hand, the 1990s have been characterized by an important set of changes in the policy rules that determined the institutional characteristics of the market game. On the one hand, as occurred in most Latin American countries, an important set of compensatory policies were put into place, some of which directly affected the budget of public schools. Additionally, as has been already mentioned, the funding scheme of the previous decade was changed to allow for the existence of complementary sources of school funding by the private sector, either from parents themselves, or through tax-deductible donations.

Drawing from these studies results, it is plausible to hypothesis that the decrease/disappearance of the difference in subsidized private school effectiveness as measured versus municipal schools-, as Bravo et al. (1999) observe, may be interpreted either as a problem of private subsidized schools, or, more interestingly, as a model success. That is, that the competitive pressures introduced by it have brought about a municipal school quality increase. Even Carnoy & McEwan (2000: 228) recognize such plausibility.

18

Theoretically, competitive forces bring a market to equilibrium. In the present model, such competitive pressures means a competition on the sphere of quality, since subsidized schools can not compete on prices their price is fixed at the per student subsidy-, they do so on the quality sphere (cost of zero does not imply equal access for all students; this is determined by the location of the school, and admission policies). In Chile, it is plausible to hypothesize that once the subsidy was established and the market opened, schools entered the market taking advantage of the public funding of education. However, as the threat this meant to municipal schools became visible, this worked as an incentive for such schools to improve, in order to retain there already weakened demand capture. This meant quality improvements that narrowed down the difference between the private subsidized sector and municipal schools in terms of results (once having corrected for the population they served), although both sectors where improving in terms of achievement results. Argentina: over fifty years of a quasi-monopoly in education. Historical perspective As was mentioned before, up until the 1980s, the Argentine education systems progress does not differ much from what took place in its neighbor country. While Chile broke up with the liberal states strong regulation of education, Argentina has not done so in such a stark way, and to the same degree. Quite contrary, Argentinas education reforms are concentrated on the early 1990s together with the introduction of compensatory policiesand still on going, and although these have brought about an important amount of changes in the system, they have not implied a strong deviation from previous policy.

Argentinas present education system is mainly based on the organization and discipline of all preexistent schooling experiences, which were diverse and mainly of denominational origin. By the end of the 19th century, the Schools Directorate10 of each province, together with the National Education Council11 founded the institutional basis over which rules on school finance, administration and organization were established, and all schools started to depend upon one of these. As stated on a previous work (Narodowski, 2000), in Argentina the governments managed a statalization of schools which is reflected on the monopolistic provision of education which was agreed on and that has subsisted to the

10 11

Direccin de Escuelas. Consejo Nacional de Educacin.

19

present based on an underlying consensus on education. A reflection of this underlying consensus is the fact that Argentina lacked a organic education law up to the enactment of the Federal Education Law of 1993 (Ley Federal de Educacin). The work emphasizes that the States education policies, their firmness and their effectiveness, all through the twentieth century were founded on very few parliamentary regulations.

After the twentieth centurys 1950s, the educational system faced a strong legitimacy loss related to the fact that the system was not able to fulfill its promise of social mobility. Additionally, the legal equalization that the State gave to private education institutions such as the elimination of private school students to take equivalency examinations at public schools so as to receive their certification- (Narodowski y Andrada, 2002). Also, private-school subsidies were regularized by the end of the 1940s12, but the governmentchurch conflict of the 1950s13 left subsidies during that decade to be mainly defined with a high degree of institutional discretional power (Morduchowicz, et al., 1999). However, only in 1964 were objective parameters and criteria established for private subsidy allocation14, however still today, the amounts allocated per school lack any clear consistency (Morduchowicz, et al., 1999) and frequently answer to client-oriented and prebendary criteria (Narodowski, 2000).

From these years on, the Argentine educational system has preserved its main characteristics, and built on them. That is, although the main principles have not changed much, and at the Macro level the system remained mainly the same, at the micro level it has constantly grown in normative terms-, which has led to a hyper-regulation of public schools (Narodowski, 1999). In contrast, in the private sector this has not happened, and therefore there has been a relative de-regulation of this sector. Most substantial reforms during the 1970s took place in the teacher-training field (Narodowski, 2000), when the military regime eliminated the traditional Normal Schools and teacher training starts to be provided by tertiary non-university institutions.

12

Law 13.047 of September 22, 1947, known as Teacher Statute for Private Schooling Institutions (Estatuto para el personal docente de los establecimientos de enseanza privada). 13 Between 1953 and 1958 the conflict between the Catholic Church and the government of Pern reflected itself in the education sector through a series of norms that took power away from the Church, the main private sector schooling provider (Morduchowicz et al., 1999). 14 Decree 15/1964.

20

Furthermore, the decentralization reforms of 1978 (transference of primary national schools to the provincial governments) and 1992 (transference of middle schools to the provincial level) dismantled the Federal governments structure of schooling provision on the basis of financial and economic needs. However, such decentralization initiatives has meant a lost Federal government control in favor of the provincial levels, but has not mean increased school autonomy. Finally, the 1993 Federal Education Law15 brought about a formal and long needed organization of the education system, extending compulsory education and restructuring its levels. As ascertained on a former study (Narodowski, 2000), no mayor novelties surfaced in terms of strategic State prevalence and control in education policy, except for its curricular component. These last reforms had little implications for school autonomy and everyday schooling activities. Although the last series of reforms implied a discourse shift from input-based control of education to outputbased provision of education, in reality they only implied an additional normative layer. The last 30 years in education policy have generated a hyper-regulated impoverished state system coexistent with a highly autonomous and expanded private sector. The model Argentinas model of public provision of education has the particularity of mixing a strong welfare state inherited from the post World War II era with a series of reforms over the basis of issues of efficiency and federal legitimacy that have construed over, instead of replacing, the former. Such a model of education provision can be categorized as a quasimonopoly one.

The quasi-Monopoly definition hereby considered is based on the work done by Narodowski & Nores (2001). As mentioned before, they elaborate a taxonomy of education provision models. Their main contribution is the differentiation of pure monopolies from quasi-monopolies, that is, models of state provision that have imbedded exit options but that do not contemplate the promotion of supply competition or marketoriented provision as quasi-markets do. Explicitly, if a monopoly and a market model could be thought as linear opposites and the distance between these two a continuum, a quasi-monopoly of education provision would be somewhere between a pure monopoly and a quasi-market.

15

Law N 24.195 of 1993: Ley Federal de Educacin.

21

Argentina fits into this category, predominantly because it evolved into a system where the main form of education provision is that of public education, supplied by a centralized State (presently provincial states), with an effective and state promoted exit option. This exit alternative is the private sector, which the state furthers through an institutionalized subsidy assistance. Therefore, although the decentralized system does no establish a competitive setting for all schools, it does finance a segment of the supply that draws students from the total enrollment pool, and allows such segment to be part of a competitive market (together with non subsidized private schools) while not introducing any competitive incentives, and/or deregulating the traditional public school system that has increasingly lost legitimacy.

The decentralization in Argentina did not change the systems form of governance as it did its locus. Although the provincial levels are responsible for the educational service provided under their jurisdiction, it is not true that from the schools perspective this has translated itself into greater school autonomy. Such school autonomy however, has always been present in the private subsidized sector, and this has not changed with the decentralization reform. Enrollment privatization and Socioeconomic segmentation Since the legal equalization of the private sectors school supply in the sixties, the exit option has been increasingly exercised in Argentina, mainly by those who had the means to escape to the private education sector, in the search for higher quality. As can be observed in Figure 2, although total enrollments (primary and secondary) increased between 1950 and 1980 for both, the private and the public sector (121%), private sectors participation did so in 11 percentage points (from 9.6% to 20.6%). Enrollments in these schools more than tripled during this period. Additionally, between the years 1980 and 1998, (years for which the Chilean case has been described) such participation grew an additional 1.7 (increasing from a 20.6 % of total enrollments to a 22.3%). Furthermore, while private school supply increased almost 60%, public school supply fell a 5.2%.

22

Figure 2. Evolution of School Enrollments in Argentina, 1980-1998 (thousands).

7000

6000

5000

4000 Thousands

Public Sector
3000

2000

Private Sector
1000

0 1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1994

1997

Source: Morduchowicz et al. (2000).

However, looking at enrollments from a different perspective, a similar segmentation to that of Chile can be observed. Table IV presents enrollment by income level, type of education and dependency for the coexisting reformed and non-reformed systems16. Although private subsidized schools could not be traced trough the existing data for Argentina, religious private school are differentiated17. Over two thirds of the private schools fall into this category. Similarly, 75% of private schools received some percentage of subsidies in 1998 (Morduchowicz, et al., 1999). Therefore, it is not strongly mistaken to assume that a large share of the existing subsidies are assigned to religious private schools. As evidenced, the lowest quintiles have higher public education participation rates, than the fourth and fifth quintile. Although the levels of education are mixed combining reform and non-reformed schools, it is evident that this occurs at all levels of education, but much less markedly at the secondary and polimodal level. While 86% of the lowest quintile enrolled in basic general education attends public schools, only a 27% of the highest quintile does so. That is, the probability of attending a public school for a child of the highest quintile is about one third of such probability for a child of the first quintile.
16

The 1993 Federal Education Law changed the structure of the education levels from seven years of primary education (presently the non-reformed primary schools) to nine years of basic general education (reformed primary schools and the first two years of what used to constitute the secondary level), and the five years of secondary education (presently the non-reformed secondary schools) into 3 years of polimodal education. 17 The information is based on the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social, a urban household survey administered on 1997 by SIEMPRO (Sistema de Informacin, Monitoreo y Evaluacin de Programas Sociales), of the Ministry of Social Development and Environment.

23

Table IV. Population aged 0-24 enrolled by Income Level, Type of education and Dependency, 1997. Education level Dependency Income Quintile Total I II III IV V Basic General Public 86.1 76.8 59.8 50.9 27.1 70.9 Education Religious Private 8.0 14.4 28.6 31.2 44.6 18.5 Non religious Private 5.9 8.8 11.6 17.9 28.3 10.6 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Primary Public 95.3 85.8 76.4 67.9 51.4 85.4 (non reformed) Religious Private 3.8 10.4 16.1 24.8 32.2 10.6 Non religious Private 0.9 3.8 7.5 7.3 16.5 4.0 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Polimodal Public 80.4 74.9 76.9 49.7 52.7 70.7 Religious Private 16.3 11.3 9.5 44.2 13.2 17.8 Non religious Private 3.3 13.9 13.6 6.1 34.0 11.5 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Secondary Public 87.5 83.7 72.8 63.8 43.4 74.3 (non reformed) Religious Private 6.8 10.5 20.4 20.6 34.7 16.1 Non religious Private 5.7 5.8 6.8 15.7 21.9 9.5 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Elaboration on the basis of the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social, SIEMPRO, 1997.

In terms of private schooling, the higher the quintile group, the higher the percentage of children attending these types of schools. Moreover, this is much stronger for religious private enrollment. While about 6% of the lowest income children in basic general education attends a non-religious private school, and 8% a religious one, 45% of the children in the highest quintile attend the former and 28% the latter. Such pattern is the same for non reformed primary and secondary education, and not so clear for polimodal education (by 1997 this education structure had been implemented in less than half of the provinces with a lot of irregularities, and such stark difference in comparison to what happens in the rest of the levels may be consequence of this). Anyhow, the enrollment segmentation by school dependency for the different income quintiles follows a similar pattern to that of Chile that was mentioned before.

There are not many studies with a similar focus of those mentioned for Chile that approach the Argentine case through an econometric methodology. The traced ones have predominantly tried to identify public versus private sector differentials in education. The results obtained through regular OLS analysis (Table V) are definitely mixed controlling for socio-economic characteristics of the children-, with somewhat better results for private schooling at least at the primary level (Llach et al., 1999), or for catholic private schools (McEwan, 2000), or through a greater school autonomy in the private sector (Eskeland & Filmer, 2000). Additionally, Llach et al. find that the higher the socioeconomic background, the higher the probability of choosing a private school, which further evidences the enrollment segmentation mentioned before. 24

Table V. Econometric Studies on the Argentine Model of Education Provision.

Study

Data

Content
Individual level data for Spanish and Math. National sample of 7th grade. (n=28,860) Individual level data for Spanish and Math. National sample of 6th & 7th grade. Urban schools only.

School type Method differentiation

Catholic subsidized, nonreligious subsidized, and non-subsidized private schools, relative to public schools. None OLS

Results
The results are decidedly mixed. Catholic schools are somewhat more effective than public schools in producing student outcomes. More differences in outcomes between public and non-religious subsidized schools than Chile. In short, private schools vary widely in the outcomes they produce. Autonomy and participation matters.

McEwan, P. (2000) Private and Public SINEC: 1997 schooling in the Southern Cone: A comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile. Occasional Paper No. 11, NCSPE, Teachers College, Columbia University. Eskeland, G.S & D. Filmer. (2000) Does SINEC: 1994 decentralization improve learning? Autonomy and parental participation in argentine schools. Preliminary draft.

OLS

Llach, J.J., Montoya, S. & F. Roldn. SINEC: 1993 (1999). Educacin para todos. (Buenos and 1997 (not Aires, Ieral). comparable).

Individual level Private schools and Public data for Spanish schools. and Math. National sample for the 7th grade, and the 12th grade.

OLS, and HLM

For primary education -and always after controlling for socioeconomic status-, attendance to a private school is positively associated with scores most times and only 7% of the variance on test scores is explained by the school type. At the middle level, there is no significant positive association between attendance to a private school and test scores. Private school attendance is positively associated with less drop-out and repeater rates, and with promotion on time. Additionally, the HLM study showed a positive effect of private schools larger than the effect of public schools for all provinces except Buenos Aires when controlling for socioeconomic status. Lastly, selection bias is clearly important since higher SES increase the probability of choosing private schooling.

25

Differing governance models Consequence of the differing models of education provision of Argentina and Chile and the differing decentralization reforms that have taken place in these countries are two very different sets of regulatory frameworks and education finance and administration systems, that is, dissimilar forms of governance.

We developed a series of decision-making aspects in the areas of: policy planning, school supply, school organization, financing, personnel, curriculum and instruction, monitoring and evaluation, and student choice regulation a total of 25 decision-making categories-. From this categorization (see appendix) the decision-making level for public and private subsidized schools was traced.

As observed in Figure 3, while in Argentina 88% of these decisions for public schools either are taken or have to have the input of provincial education authorities, in Chile, municipal governments are responsible for a larger amount of such decision (46%), but with an important supervision and control responsibility remaining at the central level (59%). Furthermore, for the private subsidized schools, the locus of governance changes in both cases towards greater school level decision-making, but this occurs much more markedly in Chile. In Argentina, provincial authorities intervene in 42% of such decisionmaking categories for private-subsidized schools, and 58% of these have the Schools input. On the other hand in Chile, municipal governments intervene in only 4% and the School does so in 63%.

26

Figure 3. Governance of Public and Private-Subsidized schools, in Argentina and Chile.

PUB _A R G
P&S 8% S 8% C 4% C &P 17 %

PS _A R G
P 17 % P&S 4%

C &P 29 % P 51 % C ,P&S 4% S 50 % C 8%

PUB_C H
M &S M 25 % 8% S 8% C &S 13 % P 4%

PS _C H

S 50 %

C &M 4% C &S 8% C C &M 13 % 38 % C 29 %

Note: C = Central level; P = Provincial level; M = Municipal level; and S = School level. Source: Own elaboration.

Conclusions The worldwide intent of improving administrative efficiency, school quality, and school equity in education has meant an important transformation of the national states role in education in favor of an increased role of lower government levels. Within the different directions that such policies have taken in the country-specific settings, some countries have introduced reforms with specific competition and efficiency components, as did Chile, while others have stayed in the decentralization discourse with limited real changes having been done in this direction, as did Argentina.

Therefore, a transfer of authority from those in one location or level vis-a-vis educational organizations, to those in another level, has not necessarily changed the rules of the game for schools. On one hand, Chile introduced strong decentralization and market reforms during the 1980s. Therefore, it evolved into a quasi-market model of education provision, where education is provided in a market system but where some aspects have been kept at the centralized decision-making level. On the other hand, Argentina can be defined as a quasi-monopoly system of education provision, since its education system is highly 27

centralized at the provincial level (being a federal country) but has an explicit and statesubsidized exit option. Hence, these two countries have faced very different decentralization reforms, and which have taken place over within two very different sets of regulatory frameworks. Notwithstanding, presently they have arrived to similar states in terms of the education systems enrollments socioeconomic segmentation. In short, they represent two different models of schooling provision and regulations that have arrived in the socioeconomic aspects to similar results.

The paper questions the causality governing the relation between the use of competitive policies (vouchers) in education and an increased enrollment segmentation or student sorting. That is, it questions a predominant statement in the literature opposing competition initiatives in education, that states that such initiatives promote enrollment segmentation. About all of these approaches to the problem of socioeconomic segregation have to do with thinking the relationship between vouchers and this kind of segmentations as a positive causality were the implementation of vouchers in education results into increased segmentation. However, such same results can also be found in systems such as the Argentine education system, that which are highly centralized and have not introduced competitive reforms. Therefore, the evidence form Chile and Argentina shows that enrollment segmentation is not a consequence of the introduction of vouchers, and the causal relationship between this two variables is broken. Even more, the equilibrium apparent in the Chilean experience would indicate the models success (Bravo et al., 1999) on the basis of competitive policies in education.

In conclusion, vouchers are not an independent variable but an intervening one within the determinants of socioeconomic segmentation. The family school choice decisions brought about by the introduction of systems such as vouchers are definitely endogenous to a series of factors that determine such choice, factors that that are evidently important in the determination of socioeconomic enrollment segmentations in non voucher systems. Apparently, this questions the validity of empirical analyses which take student socioeconomic characteristics and school choice decisions as independent determinant variables of student results, highly predominant in the empirical studies of competition policies.

28

Appendix i. Educational System's Governance of Public and Subsidize-Private Schools, by administration level. Decision-making by Argentina Chile Central Provincial Municipal School Central Provincial Municipal category Governance Policy planning X X X Implementation X X X X School supply Official authorization X Xa School opening and closure P S P School organization Structure P S P Min. Requirements X X Financing Recurrent funding Xb X Capital funding P S P Compensatory funding X X X School budget administration X S P Private funding Sc Personnel Hiring and Firing P Se P In-service training X P S X P Salary determination P Sf Pg Qualification standards Xh X Curriculum & instruction Curriculum content X X S X Textbooks decision-making P S P Textbook provision X P P Didactic methods P X P Student evaluation P X P Monitoring & evaluation Monitoring/supervision Accreditation X X Promotions X Discipline X Student/Schools Assessment X X X Students Admissions P S Pj X = Public and Subsidized-Private schools; P = Public Schools, S = Subsidized-Private Schools. School

S S

X S S Sd S S Sg

Xi S S X X

X X

Sj

Categories developed by the author and based on Rideout & Ural. (1993). a) Authorization is given by the National Ministry of Education with compliance to a set of requirements. b) Subsidies to private schools are only given to cover teacher salaries. c) Schools that are granted subsidy are done so at different percentages on the basis of their organic personnel plant. d) Subsidized schools can receive donations since 1993, as well as opt for mixed funding. e) The province of Jujuy however, establishes that private schools have the possibility of receiving financial support under the condition that they comply with the provincial teacher statute in terms of job stability and labor conditions. f) As stated in the FLE, teachers in private institutions have the right to earn a minimum wage of at least as much as teachers in the public sector. g) Limits imposed by the teacher statute. h) The requirement of the Federal Law of Education on teacher certification is that it complies with each jurisdiction's requirements. i) Schools have to comply with study plans and programs either being these the general ones dictated by the central government, or their own after the National Ministry's approval. j) Municipal schools are not allowed to select students, while subsidized schools do not have such a restriction.

29

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