[A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994.

] JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, Respondent. JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent. Enrique S. Chua for complainants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complainant dated June 8, 1992, docketed as Adm. Case No. RTJ- 863, charging respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his sala entitled "People v. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bench, gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest partiality, oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice "which may result or has resulted in falsification of public documents or in the commission of falsehood."
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In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied the charges against him. He averred that Atty. Chua had an axe to grind against him because of a prior incident between them. Judge Abastillas pointed out that on September 28, 1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he made statements which were highly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence, according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on March 2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and recommended for suspension from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas issued an order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this Court that Atty. Chua be suspended from the practice of law. This order of March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled "Judge Renato Abastillas v. Enrique S. Chua."
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The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Alfredo J. Lagamon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6, 1993. After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report recommending the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique 5. Chua in Adm. Case No. 3815. Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563. Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their charges of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas, through the affidavits and testimonies of Johnny K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua. The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as down payment of the consideration for the dismissal of the criminal cases against his clients, is summarized in the report of Justice Lagamon, to wit:
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"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their principal witness declared in his Affidavit that when criminal cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presided by the respondent, he was heartened because the respondent was among the few judges he was comfortable with. Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in his chambers and apprised him of the background of the cases and requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyance because of the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That the respondent accordingly instructed the docket clerk not to release the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent

allegedly said, Ike, dont worry toe much, anyway, that is not your personal problem. They are just cases of your clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorneys fees. Why, how much is your fee there? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a share there and I will take care of everything (Affidavit of Atty. Chua; Exh.H).
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Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him not to worry but at the same time informed him that the judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give P50,000.00 to the respondent because of their sad experience with the Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the objections of Atty. Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turn give to respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua deposited the check in his account. Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the respondent informed Atty. Chua that the bail bond for his clients was increased from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon ax paste motion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua for not giving the money yet to the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of the respondent where accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for the reduction of the bail and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it shall be in cash. The motion was filed and the respondent granted it the following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chua that the bail bond should be in cash to facilitate the collection of his attorneys fees so that both of them can receive their respective compensation for their efforts (Exh.H, par. 9). Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon he delivered P20,000.00 to the respondent and before he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly said where will they celebrate that evening. Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson Lee and Atty. Chua appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council and briefly related the delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent where he was rebuked by Dean Palma for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palma asked Atty. Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par. 16). During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first meeting with the respondent was between April 10 to 15, 1991 in his chambers when the criminal docket clerk was instructed not to release the warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it was also at that time when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, why, how much is your fees there? P50,000.00? You double it. (p. 54, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua discussed the reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but most probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993), and the third meeting was when he delivered the P20,000.00 which he said was on May 2, 1991 but which he rectified during cross examination that he withdrew the amount on May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was on May 3, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993).
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"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the following facts which were either admitted or undisputed and which he believes established the misconduct and the impropriety of the respondent as follows:
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a) Respondent Judges admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness Johnny Uy, whom he tagged as the financier of the herein complainants on May 29, 1991; while he met Uy only on October 7, 1991 (p. 11, Comment dated September 28, 1992 of respondent). b) Respondent Judges admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and complainant Lee saw each other at the Quezon City Sports Center, during the meeting of the Philippine Judges Association (p. 11, Comment, supra). c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that it is true that respondent met with Johnny N.H. Uy on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Quezon City . . . (p. 7, Comment, supra). Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused who were charged with two (2) criminal cases before his sala will render him liable for gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."
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Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, the latter told him that the accused (in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see the Judge at the forthcoming convention of Philippine Judges Association to be held at the Quezon City Sports Center. Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, narrated on the witness stand that he received a long distance call from Atty. Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges Association was to hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. Alter introducing himself to Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function room where they had a private conversation for about twenty minutes. During the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge Abastillas if he had received what they sent to Atty. Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but added, "I cannot give you what you are asking. It will take a little time to study." Johnson Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied, "Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against you."
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On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas why he approved three exparte motions of the private prosecutor in the criminal cases, one, for issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused and, another, for increase of their bail bond, without giving the accused an opportunity to oppose the same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing to worry "because that is my style. I will just give them a little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."
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Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy, a brother of Ban Hun Flores, who had a hand in the filing of the criminal cases, wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You just give him my telephone number and call me." Judge Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling card bearing his telephone number 7222968. The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center became the basis for the charges of "gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."
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Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending before Judge Abastillas where the accused were charged with embezzlement of the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation. According to Uy, he was interested in the outcome of the cases, more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for the reason that the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the operation of the corporation, 75% of which stocks had been assigned to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his residence in St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about 11:30 in the morning. Before going to Judge Abastillas house, Uy called him by telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction of his place. During that visit, where the background and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge Abastillas told Uy to ask Johnson Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with 5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Lee about the matter and would inform Judge Abastillas by telephone of the result. On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas told Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual friend of Uy and Judge Abastillas. The telephone conversation was taped by Uy (Exh. "B"). Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that sometime in the middle of June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan called his office and left a note that they would have dinner with Judge Abastillas at six oclock in the evening at Manila Hotel. Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, Judge Abastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice: "Johnson, dont worry," Huwag kang magalala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso nyo sa akin.
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After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused a runaround, not having done anything relative to the criminal proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of the bargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 to oppose Judge Abastillas application for transfer to Manila as RTC Judge on the ground of his lack of good moral character. Johnson Lee saw Justice Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judge allegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 and accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come back together with Johnny Uy and bring with them the tape containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January 29, 1991 Johnson Lee, together with Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBCs office where the tape was replayed before then JBC member Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained an English translation of the taped conversation

and gave it to Justice Relova and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. Both extensively interrogated Johnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua for having allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua that by delivering himself the advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the judge. As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas, complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ92-863 averred and sought to prove the following:
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1.) When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, Judge Abastillas, instead of acting on the same, issued an order for their arrest and confiscation of their bailbonds in view of their failure to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day; 2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas still insisted that they be present at their arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave preferential treatment to some cases, particularly Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847, entitled "People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts and for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and the accused acquitted in just five (5) months, and in which the accused were not required to be present at the hearing of the Motion to Quash the Information; whereas in connection with complainants Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information, their presence was required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion was denied in open court in a "trifling manner. 3.) Complainants Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment, Pre-trial and Continuous Trial dated June 2, 1991 was arbitrarily denied, their bonds were declared forfeited and the bondsmen were asked to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds. In addition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants arrest and fixed an excessive bond of P50,000.00 each for their provisional liberty. 4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste requiring the delivery to court of the illegally possessed firearm and ammunition, which order was not necessary because the items should have been forfeited in favor of the Government and deposited in Camp Crame. 5.) Two of complainants motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period. In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of October 22, 1993, as well as in his testimony in his own behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua or having received P20,000.00 from him as initial payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan (Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, Alma M. Ronato, Wilma B. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter), Amando N. Eso (Deputy Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2) and Edwin O. Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during the incumbency of Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua enter the judges chambers.
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While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas either on May 2 or May 3 of 1991, on cross-examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when pressed to give the exact date that:
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"Q Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the next day, you delivered P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas? "A Yes. Correct. "Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3? "A Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then with me my old bank passbook. I traced the deposit and withdrawal in that passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 of the sum of P20,000.00. So most probably, its either on that very same day or immediately the next day that I delivered the money. "A I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the next day is either a nonworking day or a Saturday and I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. when I placed the P20,000.00 in my

attache case, I remember my kid commenting that Papa, you have so much money in your attache case. So the money stayed overnight with me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, Sept. 15, 1993.) Seizing upon Atty. Chuns above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the money "most probably was on May 3,1991, Judge Abastillas argued that he could not have received the money in the afternoon of May 3 as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that day by ferry boat for Iloilo City and then proceeded by car to Roxas City where he stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in honor of Justice Bellosillo who was appointed as Court Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an affidavit of Judge Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Bacolod City) certifying that he and his wife were with Judge Abastillas in their journey to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, Ramon B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the effect that Judge Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991 where he stayed up to the following day.
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Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the Quezon City Sports Center during the convention of the Philippine Judges Association. But he denied having asked Johnson for a meeting there or having talked to him privately regarding the criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTC Judge Joselito de la Rosa of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge de la Rosa, a friend of Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card to Judge de la Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This was the same calling card that was introduced as evidence by the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863. Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the Manila Hotel in the evening of June 7, 1991 but that the latter was never invited by him to be there on that occasion. This is the account of Judge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of the meeting:
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"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my cousin and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on that occasion. what happened was this: My cousin and I agreed to a foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. When my wife and I were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called me up and said he wanted to see me. I told him that I was going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeing me; and I had an inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I told him, I was willing to see him, as long as he did not bring along either or both Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made this condition because I did not want to meet Lee and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I was willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of mine, and he was counsel for one of my brothers-in law (bilas-husband of my wifes sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed that he would not take with him either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was at the Manila Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when I saw Atty. Simbulan, I asked him: Bakit ba nandito iyan? (Why is that person here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka na; Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya (I dont know. Please be patient; dont get angry. Let him join us). I contained my irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos, are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, we tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by Johnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed during the Judges Convention. Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon, the Investigating Justice in this proceeding. "24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial to Lee, I showed my displeasure by not addressing him. It is not true that I told him I will take care of the two criminal cases." (At pp. 13 and 14.) Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, went to his residence at Quezon City on October 7, 1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas, was not at his own initiative and the amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is his version of the meeting:
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"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from Johnny Uy. He did come to my residence on that date, but that was not on my initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting word from our maid and from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had been calling up asking for me, but refused to leave any message. And then on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a luncheon meeting, our maid informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phone Johnny Uy introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house; he said he wanted to talk

to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where his sister Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that he was going to discuss the Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if he had, I would have refused to see him, because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with the pushiness and aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to establish a close relationship with me. Uy was very insistent that I see him, so just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he came to my house on said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about the S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never asked him for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money, Philippine or American currency, on that occasion, or over the phone. Uy was lying when he testified that when he came to see me at home, I asked for $5,000.00 from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a telephone conversation with me on October 16, 1991, said $5,000.00 was discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed $5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him, or with anybody else." (Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.)
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Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815 The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the March 11, 1993 contempt order were contained in the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated February 21, 1992 he filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, to wit:
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1.And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to say that in denying the six (6) incidents in the manner above-described, the Court acted no better than a pre-school kid who murmurs a favorite nursery rime (sic) (Page 3, par. 5 of the Motion). 2.To put it bluntly, Accused have the feeling that these cases are being railroaded against them (Page 5, 2nd par. of the Motion). 3.Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable erroneous actuations of the Court, which have gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt extraordinary remedies or corrective disciplinary sanctions urgently required, so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations created by the series of plainly and outrageously, if not maliciously, erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highly prejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the administration of justice and in effect, constitute a desecration of our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the President Judge RENATO E. ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the Bench, a copy of this Motion is made under oath and furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R. Narvasa; Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the impending formal administrative complaint the accused will in due time institute with the Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of the Motion)."
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In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas expanded his charges against Atty. Chua to include the following:
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A.) Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of the Bar and he violated his oath of office for the reason that:
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1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, he committed the crime of bribery which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code; 2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in People of the Philippines versus Enrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City; 3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425, entitled "J. Bautista Rabago v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua;" 4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by testifying in the proceedings under oath that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991, when he knew that he never gave any bribe money to Judge Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made other false statements in the proceedings to harass Judge Abastillas. B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
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1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money to

Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991; 2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings and memoranda against Undersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice; 3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in declaring that be gave P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false evidence in the form of a taped conversation, indicating lack of candor, fairness and good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chua violate his duties not to do any falsehood to mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice; and 4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client the two (2) accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 not to attend the scheduled arraignment. Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings before Justice Lagamon that he gave P20,000.00 as bribe to Judge Abastillas. Thus:
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"Q In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge Abastillas, what was your advise to your clients? "A I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically meritorious. So I do not see any reason giving money or bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the habit doing that. "Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe? "A That is what I told them. "Q What did your clients tell you? "A They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me. Because their reason is the sad experience they had undergone with the Dept. of Justice. And according to Mr. Uy he told me, he said you just cannot underestimate my sister Banua and perhaps you do not know her. And he said giving of money is not in reality a bribe because we are in effect buying justice. And he told me I have to be practical about the whole thing. "Q So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a bribe but you were only buying justice? "Q I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way of life approach such practice but I really do not know why I gave in to their constant persistent pleadings. "Q Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to your clients? "A Partly maybe. "Q So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas was allegedly asking from you? "A That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to him." (TSN., Oct. 27, 1993, pp. 7-8.) Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in view of Atty. Chuas uncertainty as to the date he delivered the money. His final estimate of the date on cross-examination May 3, 1993 had afforded Judge Abastillas a credible defense of alibi. However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had willingly and knowingly discussed with interested parties with whom he met at least three (3) times, the possible dismissal of the criminal cases for a certain consideration. Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 on May 29, 1991 at the Philippine Judges convention at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 and at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that he accepted as visitor in his house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 Johnny K.H. Uy, a party interested in the outcome of the criminal cases. This meeting was followed by a telephone call made

by Uy to Judge Abastillas on October 16, 1991 wherein the former informed the latter that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US$5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee would be cleared first, to which Judge Abastillas suggested to Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both. Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he talked to Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991, except to say, "It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we even discussed $5,000.00, (p. 16, Sworn Statement, Em. "27"). Judge Abastillas also declared on cross-examination that "it is possible (that Johnny Uy talked to him over the phone on October 16) but I cannot remember exactly the caller, maybe one of the callers might be a certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his voice." (TSN, p. 25, November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified comment dated September 28, 1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillas declared he had telephone conversation with Johnny Uy just before Uy went to his house on October 7, 1991. Thus:
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"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed me that Mr. Johnny Uy wanted to talk to me. When respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and asked that he be allowed to see respondent in his house. Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry because he had a 2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very insistent, so, just to get rid of him, respondent agreed to see Uy for a few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latters house. After introducing himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants herein. "What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel of Lee and Moreno to do all that need to be done in the case." (pp. 6-7.) Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uys voice on the phone and in fact they had a face-to-face conversation on October 7, 1991 in the Judges house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas could not say definitely whether he had a talk with Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame and shallow stance only serves to emphasize the obvious. There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone conversation as recorded in the tape by Johnny Uy on October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped conversation was replayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified and recognized the voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas. In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas response was to advise Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited US$5,000.00. However, the taped conversation as the evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would show, was just a sequel of a series of interlinked events that had earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by Judge Abastillas of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment, followed by the meeting between Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, and the meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latters house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City where the judge asked for US $5,000.00. All the interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusion that Judge Abastillas knew that the "5T" meant $5,000.00 he tried to solicit. Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all about the "5T" mentioned by Johnny Uy, he should have expressed surprise and inquired from Uy what he meant by it. He did not, which goes to show he filly understood what the "5T" stood for.
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It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge Abastillas, the latters reply did not appear to be responsive because he mentioned something like Take up the matter with Al Simbulan." The theory is advanced that it would be illogical for a person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party and a lawyer at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty. Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge Abastillas and Johnny Uy. He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding the direct personal involvement of the taker in the payoff. In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the taped conversation (Exh. 13) as evidence. He offered no objection to its replay at the hearing before Justice Lagamon. We do not believe that Judge Abastillas meeting with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center was not

pre-arranged. Neither do we accept his explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judges party at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the discussion in complainants memorandum in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote:
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"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first met complainant Lee by way of his justification in meeting the said Complainant, should he taken with a grain of salt, so to speak. Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being instrumental in paving the way for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two judges was presented by him to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of Judge Ponferrada (Annex 4 of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact that on May 3, 1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from Judge Ponferrada to bolster the circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."
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Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under mutually conducive and cordial circumstances which subsequently led to the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very probable. 3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that meeting of May 29, 1991 with complainant Lee at the Judges convention, he did not give him the opportunity to see respondent again and that he took all steps necessary so that he could not have to talk again to Lee, is a pure lie, and thus cannot be believed, because when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation, was confronted with a calling card (EXH.D) of his own cousin Mr. Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant Lee, in the presence of respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991 or barely a weck after respondent Judge, realizing that he could no longer pretend to be that resolute in avoiding complainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext that complaint (sic) Lee was a gatecrasher on that occasion. This, by itself is extremely difficult to believe. Even respondent Judges explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at that Manila Hotel dinner is silly, if not childish and ridiculous. According to respondent Judge, he already had an inkling on what was in Arty. Simbulans mind when the latter insisted in seeing him at the time he and his wife were already on their way to the Manila Hotel for a foursome dinner. That inkling according to respondent Judge, are the two criminal cases where complainant Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless willingly allowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding the fact that, in his own words, prior to this, he (Atty. Simbulan) informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda. Thus if indeed respondent Judge is so determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoiding at all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the Investigating Justice, then, he could have easily set up an alibi to mislead Atty. Simbulan.
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Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee again after their meeting at the Judges convention. Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to prove that complainant Lee was really a gatecrasher or request Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his version that Lee was the most unwanted guest during that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Lees having his calling card (EXH.C), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him up by telephone prior to their seeing each other on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent Judge."
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The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a stake in the outcome of Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 100~I and the recorded telephone conversation where said cases were discussed manifested Judge Abastillas willingness, nay, propensity to ester into deals with motivations incongruous to the merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed serious misconduct no less. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01). It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesars wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against the high standard of moral ethics required of judges.
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We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 against Judge Abastillas without merit. We quote with approval the pertinent portions of Justice Lagamons report relative to said accusations:
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The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of Arrest when the accused Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno failed to appear during the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. Atty. manifested that he instructed his clients not to appear in Court because a day before the date set for arraignment he allegedly filed a consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the same be heard on Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified of the arraignment. They should have displayed their respect for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of the arraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court from orally denying the motion to quash and proceeding with the arraignment. It appears that the motion which was filed only one day before the scheduled date of hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into account that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court in the presence of Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26. The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People v. Espinos (Crim. Cases 8846 and 8847) where the respondent ordered that the firearms involved in the case be delivered to the custody of the Court for proper disposition. The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored manner just because counsel for the accused Atty. Roger Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly, a full-blown trial type hearing was conducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the case was dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the complainants the accused were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991 arraignment notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is our observation that the two cases cannot be equated because in the first place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court notwithstanding notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, the Order of the Court directing the delivery of the firearms in the custody of the police is properly and in order. We are fully aware of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of the firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order for the delivery of the firearms for proper disposal. In fact, Atty. Chua is guilty of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court changing the phrase to this Court to to him, thereby creating an implication that the respondent entertained personal interest in the firearms. The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in question be delivered to the court and after an Order of Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh.15, p. 143, records).
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The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim v. Lim) within 90 days cannot be given much consideration taking into account the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the branch to the effect that the case was partially tried by the respondent and that the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the same. There is. therefore, a need for the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses. The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 as well as the motion for reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court only on February 5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua. Respondent lost track of what motions are due for resolution until he was reminded on January 20, 1992 through a supplemental motion filed by Arty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motions were all resolved."
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Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815 Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
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However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed his genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I considered that particular moment of my life as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist,"

he added (TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12). Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice.
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Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his willingness to come forward, at the risk of being administratively penalized himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the very ones tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, is hereby found GUILTY of serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92863 for having met with persons involved and/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and Sonny Moreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of discussing or soliciting bribe in connection said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government owned or controlled corporations. This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas. Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., no part. Close relation to family of party. Bellosillo, J., no part. My name is mentioned a number of times in the case. Quiason, J., no part, Judge R.E. Abastillas being a client of my former law office. Mendoza, J., no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997 PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.: Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct. 1 After an answer 2 and a reply 3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following recommendation: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly appreciated: Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada. Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years. Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation

respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996. Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A"). On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1"). Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"); Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1"). Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4"). After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and dignity. 4 He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of

Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites. 5 On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which we quote with approval: That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a). That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with. The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage. Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and respondent void. Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled. But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the

immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis. In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege. From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7 However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure. WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., J.J., concur. Narvasa, C.J., took no part. Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. 1856 October 28, 1983 SALVACION E. MARCAYDA, complainant, vs. JUSTINIANO P. NAZ, respondent. R. G. Tansinsin for complainant. Justiniano P. Naz in his own behalf.

AQUINO, J.: This is a revival of the immorality charge against respondent Justiniano P. Naz. Salvacion E. Marcayda in a handwritten letter filed in this Court on April 19, 1977 asked that Naz's oath-taking as a member of the bar (after having flunked twice) be withheld pending negotiations for the support of his alleged child begotten with Salvacion. Naz in his answer of April 27, 1977 denied the paternity of the child. He alleged that the complaint was pure harassment and blackmail. He said that Salvacion could have filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Education and Culture since he was employed in the Legaspi branch of that Office but she never filed any such complaint. Accompanying his answer was an affidavit wherein Naz requested that, because clearance could not be given him to take the oath on April 29, 1977 due to Salvacion's complaint, he be allowed to take the oath but his signing of the Roll of attorneys be deferred pending resolution of Salvacion's complaint. On the following day, April 28, 1977, Naz and Salvacion, both 47, natives of Camalig Albay, executed in Manila a notarized agreement before lawyer Braulio R. G. Tansinsin wherein Naz admitted that he had an affair with Salvacion in 1964 as a result of which a boy named Rey E. Marcayda was born on January 8, 1965, (should beMarch 8, 1965, as shown in Exhibit 2). Naz was a married man. Salvacion was married to Primo Marcayda who died of tuberculosis on July 5, 1965 (Exh. 1). Naz in that agreement bound himself to pay Salvacion for Rey's support (1) back support of P2,000 on or before December 25, 1977 and another P2,000 on or before December 25, 1978 and (2) P100 or its dollar equivalent in advance within the first five days of every month, starting May, 1977 until Rey reached the age of twenty-one. Because of that public instrument admitting paternity and the promise to support the adulterous child, Salvacion on that same date, April 28, 1977, withdrew her complaint filed in this Court to withhold the oath-taking of Naz on the ground of immorality.

The withdrawal document was also executed before Notary Tansinsin. It is document No. 628 of his notarial book while the document of acknowledgment and support is No. 629. The result of these last minute maneuvers was this Court's resolution of April 28, 1977 allowing Naz to take his oath by reason of Salvacion's withdrawal of her complaint (SBC-582). He took his oath on April 29, 1977 But Naz did not live up to his promise to give support. In a verified complaint dated December 23, 1977 Salvacion asked for the reopening of the administrative case. She alleged that she withdrew the complaint so that Naz would have a higher salary and would be in a better position to support Rey. He is now an incumbent legal officer of Region V of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Legaspi City, with an annual salary of P17,724. She testified that after Rey's birth Naz gave her forty pesos a month for six months. After she withdrew her complaint, Naz gave her one hundred pesos for May, 1977. As already stated, he did not comply with his commitment in the notarial agreement of support which was the basis of the withdrawal of the immorality complaint against him. Naz in his comment on the complaint and in his testimony in the Solicitor General's office declared that Rey was not his son. Rey's 1965 birth certificate shows that he was born in wedlock to Salvacion and her husband, Primo (Exh. 21). He alleged that he was "coerced" to sign the agreement of support. The complaint was like "an Armalite trained on the head of the respondent". We hold that, as noted by the Solicitor General, Naz is not guilty of gross immorality. He should not be disbarred because he had admitted the paternity of Rey in a public document and agreed to support him. This circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and scandalous. (Arciga vs. Maniwang, Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,1981, 106 SCRA 591). The agreement of support was the basis of the withdrawal of the 1917 complaint against him. The eleventh-hour withdrawal paved the way for his oath-taking. He cannot be allowed to repudiate that public document of the ground of supposed coercion. Respondent Naz's stand of not giving any value to that public document shows a certain unscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble profession. It is tantamount to self stultification. His attitude is highly censurable. He wants to make a mockery of the proceedings in this Court by making it appear that he lied brazenly about the filiation of Rey Marcayda just to facilitate his admission to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood. The remedy of complainant Marcayda is a civil action for support on the basis of the agreement of support which isirrevocably binding on Naz. She could also file an administrative complaint against him with the Ministry of Education and Culture which could require him to give support to the child, Rey (See Sec. 36, Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807). WHEREFORE, respondent Naz is severely reprimanded for his attempt to nullify the notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation he had admitted. A copy of this resolution should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office. SO ORDERED. Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur. De Castro, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein he committed adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married.

Separate Opinions MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein he committed adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 507 February 24, 1975 JOSE MONTAA, JULIANA M. MONTAA and MARTINA MONTAA, petitioners, vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO M. RUADO, respondent. RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.: It has been remarked that affairs of the heart may at the start be characterized by sweetness and light only to turn sour at the end. It is not unlikely either that there will be moments of warmth resulting in a love-child, not exactly unwanted, but apt to cause complications. So it did turn out exactly in this administrative case, the male participant, respondent Edmundo M. Ruado, being a member of the bar and, at the time of the complaint, an assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon. His conduct in courting complainant Martina Montaa, 1 leading her to believe in the sincerity of his intentions, both of them being single at the time, and to submit to his importunities to have sexual relations resulting in her pregnancy and subsequent delivery, but thereafter marrying another

woman, was stigmatized as lacking in that "degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of, and must be possessed by, members of the bar. 2 Respondent was required to answer. He did so: He denied the fact that he and complainant, Martina Montaa, were sweethearts and further disclaimed any promise being given by him to marry her. Such being the circumstances, he was rather insistent that he did not violate any trust or confidence and that he was not guilty of any deceitful inducements. There was no denial, however, of the sexual intimacies that marked the relationship as well as of complainant thereafter, as a consequence thereof, becoming pregnant. It was at that stage that the administrative case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The matter was investigated and the report of this investigation was duly forthcoming. According to the findings: "Complainant Martina Montaa's declarations in the investigation tend to show that she and respondent were sweethearts. This started when they met at the Governor's office in Romblon. Complainant then was employed as filing clerk while respondent [was the] public defender. Because they were often seen together, people who knew them began to talk about them, as lovers. The frequency of their association continued unabated until respondent revealed to complainant that his parents were against her for she had created a bad impression on respondent's father. Complainant resented this. She left Romblon and sought employment in Manila, eventually landing a job in the Bureau of Public Highways. Respondent, however, stayed in Romblon and continued discharging his duties as Assistant Provincial Fiscal, a position he was appointed to later. This episode momentarily broke the relationship between the two." 3 Then come this portion: "Respondent, however, came to Manila on several occasions during which he visited complainant. Eventually, the two made up. During these visits, complainant was led to believe by respondent that he would marry her and the only drawback was his financial instability and his moral obligation to support the education of his brothers and sisters. Thus, whenever the subject of marriage was introduced in their conversations, respondent simply begged deferment." 4 Further: "It was on these visits that respondent and complainant had intimate affairs. There was an instance when respondent fetched complainant in her office. Thereafter, the two proceeded to Long Beach Hotel in Pasay City. It was alleged by complainant that she did not know at first that they were to proceed to the hotel. Complainant not knowing the place where their taxi stopped reminded respondent that they were supposed to eat but respondent confided to her that the place also served food at the same time leading her inside and since she felt she would create a scene if she desisted, she went along with respondent and in one of the rooms they had sexual intercourse. Other similar incidents followed. Such was what happened in March, 1960 when respondent attended the convention of the government prosecutors league in Manila and having fetched complainant in her office the two proceeded first to a movie house at Rizal Avenue. They wound up later at the Long Beach Hotel and once more indulged in sexual intercourse." 5 So: "As a consequence, complainant became pregnant. Alarmed by her condition she immediately wrote a letter to respondent and urged him to come to Manila. Respondent, in reply explained that he was quite busy with his work. When respondent finally came he accompanied complainant to a doctor who confirmed her pregnancy." 6 The deterioration of the relationship was set forth thus: "Respondent seldom came to Manila after he learned of complainant's pregnancy. Obviously in despair, complainant threatened to bring the matter to court and respondent's reaction was of belligerence. The matter eventually reached the attention of the Department of Justice and administrative investigations were conducted to determine respondent's fitness to hold on to his job as Assistant Provincial Fiscal. Shortly thereafter, the instant case was filed seeking the disbarment of herein respondent." 7 The Solicitor General, in his report, was duly mindful of circumstances that place the conduct of respondent Ruado in not too harsh a light. As he pointed out, he did take note that marriage must have entered "into the plans of complainant and respondent, 8 He could not believe, however, that the various occasions in which the parties engaged in sexual relations were prompted solely by the expectancy on her part that ere long the marital knot would be tied. They were both mature, no longer in the first flush of youth, impelled to act thus because of the strong physical attraction that

each had for the other and of the force of a deeply-rooted desire too difficult to resist. Accordingly, it is his view that there is relevance to this excerpt from an opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in Soberano v. Villanueva: 9 "Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especially in the light of the circumstances attending this case, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar." 10 The injury thus inflicted to the good name and reputation of complainant, as noted in a recent resolution, arose "from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as 'so powerful an appetite,' an imperative of life closely associated with the 'recklessness and the caprice of desire.' " 11 Not that he is entitled to exculpation. The Solicitor General explained why: "In view, however, of respondent's position as Assistant Provincial Fiscal we must insist that he ought to have conducted himself in an exemplary character. His indulging in pre-marital acts with complainant, even though made possible by mutual desire, has placed him outside of the category of exemplary individuals in the community. By committing such acts, respondent was dismissed or more accurately considered resigned from his position as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, Romblon, by the President of the Philippines who modified the recommendation of the Department of Justice in the administrative case against respondent that he be merely fined (Adm. Order No. 57). The dismissal of respondent took effect upon receipt of the decision of the President on April 9, 1963. Hence, respondent has ceased discharging his duties as Assistant Provincial Fiscal. In the light of the dismissal, it would seem harsh under the special circumstances of the case to impose upon respondent the extreme penalty of disbarment as prayed for by the complainant. In a case (Administrative Case No. 248, February 26, 1962, Viojan vs. Duran), this Court considered the suspension of a Justice of the Peace from his post as sufficient penalty for the immorality committed by him and hence dismissed the disbarment proceedings. Herein respondent was not only suspended but dismissed or considered resigned from his public office and to follow said dismissal with the penalty of disbarment would be unreasonably stiff." 12 Accordingly, it was the recommendation that while the petition for disbarment of respondent Ruado should be denied, he, nevertheless, should be reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely by this Court. It must likewise be impressed on him that he should comply with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out of wedlock, the result of his relationship with complainant Martina Montaa. This Court is inclined to accept the above recommendation with the only modification that it should be a severe reprimand. WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo M. Ruado is severely reprimanded. Let a copy of this resolution be entered on his record. Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM: In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting. The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant case. 3 On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4 In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy. The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum. On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant. Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initioand that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital. Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9 In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13 We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land. SO ORDERED.