Surveillance Implications of 9/11

Dr. Steven R. Bussolari

MIT Lincoln Laboratory
2 May 2002

<bussolari@ll.mit.edu>
This work is sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration under Air

50
Force Contract #F19628-00-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclusions,
and recommendations are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed
by the U.S. Government.

years
'MIT
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 Outline

• New operational needs

- Resulting from 9/11/01
- DoD operational concerns
- Implications of operational needs

• Existing surveillance capabilities

• Looking ahead

• Summary

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 FAA Air Traffic Operational Needs
Post September 11, 2001

Surveillance
- Continuous primary radar track while cooperative
surveillance is lost
- All available surveillance for a given airspace volume
made available to controller responsible for airspace

Automatic alerting of controller

- Loss of transponder capability
- Unexplained deviations from planned route of flight
- Unexplained deviation from assigned altitude

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 DoD Operational Concerns
Civil Aviation Threat Spectrum

Small Jet Aircraft

Remotely
Piloted Aircraft Commercial Airliner

Ultralight Single Engine Propeller

Helicopter

Sailplane

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I ft I
 NORAD Radar Network (CONUS)
9/11/01

ltmV. CiEOtNI) LEVESl

SWtt «

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 NORAD Radar Network
With Additional 51 Interior ATC Radars
130"

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 Proposed National Integration Infrastructure
Source: National Cruise Missile Defense 2000 Study
Crisis and Consequence National & DoD
Management Agencies Intelligence CIA
FEMA FBI NSA NRO Drug and Law
NCA/NMCC SECARMY (DOMS) DIA State Enforcement Agencies
State Emergency Ops Centers
w
K Cheyenne Mountain
DBA FBI
uses
N-SP/CC CIW
Operations Center
Government of Canada/NDOC National Integrated N-SP
Combined Intelligence
1 Few Connections Exist Coordination & Warning Center Center (CIC)
• Robust Com required for National (NIC&WC)
Collaborative Environment Air Fusion Maritime Fusion
• Need console based data exchange
NCE Other Organizations
Existing Data Single Integrated Air/Maritime Picture JIATF-W JIATF-E
Existing Voice AMICC JSSROC

Region Air
Ops Centers Current Maritime Ops Centers Adjacent CINCs
I MARPAC MARLANT PACOMJFCOM
Sector Air USCG-PAC USCG-LANT SOUTHCOM
Ops Centers
Maritime Interdiction
Maritime Tracking Agencies
Air Interdiction Sensors Systems
Sensors ONI MACE CST
Systems
C2 Coordination/Support ISR USCG Intell Coord Ctr

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 Implications of FAA Operational Needs
Immediately Post 9/11

Aircraft tracking
- Track continuity in case of loss of cooperative surveillance

Surveillance data distribution

- Must not continue to scale as (# sensors) x (# users)

Surveillance data integration

- Need seamless integration of data from multiple sensors

Conformance monitoring
- Requires significant reduction in false alarms

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 Outline

Existing surveillance capabilities

- FAA
- DoD / Law Enforcement

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 FAA Surveillance System

Two types of radar data

- Primary (skin paint)
- Secondary (beacon)

Terminal RAdar Approach Control (TRACON)

- 155 facilities in US
- Uses surveillance data from Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR)

Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)

- 21 facilities in US
- Uses data from Air Route Surveillance Radar (ARSR) and
selected ASR (as gap filler)

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 FAA Airport Surveillance Radars (ASR)
Location Number of Sites Range Update Period Height Finding Status

Airports To be replaced
30 5-60 nmi 4.8 sec
by ASR-11

ASR-7

To be replaced
Airports 5-60 nmi 4,8 sec by ASR-11

Principal Service Life

134 0.25-60 nmi 4.8 sec No
Airports Extension Program
Underway

ASR-9

Airports 104 0.25-60 nmi 4.8 sec No FAA t USAF

new acquisition

ASR-11

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

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 FAA Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSR)
Update Portal Height

Internal
45 200 nmi
CONUS 10 sec No Near end of
service life
ARSR-1/2

Internal
CONUS 13 5-200 nmi 12 sec No Near end of
service life

Perimeter
42 5-200 nmi FAA / DoD
CONUS 12 sec Yes Dual use radar

ARSR.4

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

 Enhanced Traffic Management System
(ETMS)

Designed as a strategic traffic

flow management tool

Receives flight plan and aircraft

position data from FAA
TRACON and ARTCC facilities
- Update period ~ 1 min

Operated by DoT VNTSC

- Data assembled in Cambridge,
MA
- Data disseminated to FAA,
airlines, and other users

MIT Lincoln Laboratory

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 Military Ground-Based Surveillance Radars
Selected Examples
NUMBER OF UPDATE ALTITUDE
LOCATION RANGE MISCELLANEOUS
SITiS PERIOD CAPABILITY

North Warning
IFF included,
System, 10-12 sees Yes,
-100 250 nmi fixed site or
Alaska, (360°) -1100 ft @ 100 nmi
transportable
Foreign Countries

AN/FPS-117

5, 10 sees Yes, IFF Included,

-15 300 nmi
(360°) -1000 ft @ IOO nmi transportable

Aftrrps-59

IFF included,
Mobile system >100 2 sees Yes,
20 nmi mobile,
(U.S. Army) (as of 1998) (360°) -200 ft @ 10 nmi
gap filler

AN/MPQ-64
Sentinel

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 AWACS E-3 Sentry
The E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
provides Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and C2 in support
of air defense
- 34 E-3s in U.S. inventory, additional AWACS are deployed
with NATO and with foreign nations
- Air surveillance of small civil aircraft to radar horizon
360° coverage
10 sec update period
IFF capability included
- Maritime surveillance capability also available

Target altitude: 100 m

A W A C S E-3 Radar Line-of-Sight Coverage

^^—^— MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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 Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)

• TARS provides air s u r v e i l l a n c e

c o v e r a g e along the s o u t h e r n
border of the U.S. and Puerto Rico
— Primary mission: detection of drug
smuggling aircraft

- Established by U.S C u s t o m s
Service, currently operated by DoD
- 10 CONUS sites from A r i z o n a to
Florida
Target altitude: 100 m
Aerostat altitude: 12,000ft
Smooth earth

- Operating altitude: 10-15 kft

- Radar horizon: 250-300 km

Radar Line-of-Sight Coverage

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 Outline

Looking ahead
- Surveillance Data Network
- Sensor enhancements

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 Motivation for Surveillance Data Network

Existing MAS surveillance data distribution

- Costly to build and maintain
- Not robust in the presence of sensor failures

Existing surveillance data formats (e.g., CD-2)

- Do not support the gains in surveillance accuracy achieved over
past 40 years
- As a consequence, the MAS cannot exploit the existing and
future capability of its surveillance sensors

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 Proposed Surveillance Data Network (SON)

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> >
 Sensor Enhancement Example
Height Finding Capability of Existing ATC Primary Radars
LOCATION RANGi ELEVATION ANTENNA ACCURACY (ELEVATION) STATUS

Perimeter 5-200 nmi M u l t i p l e Stacked ±150Q ft @ 1?5 nmi (2m2) o tjona|

CONUS Beam

ARSR-4

internal
CONUS 5-200 nmi High/Low Beams TBO TBD

Principal ±2000 ft @ 40 nmi (2m2) Concept

0.25-60 nmi High/Low Beams
Airports (estimated) Demonstrated

ASR-9

Airports 0.25-60 nmi High/Low Beams TBD TBD

ASH-11

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 Potential Height Finding Accuracy
with Existing ATC Radars

40,000

Vertical
Resolution: ,17*

0
r i i I i 11 i T ~ i i i i ]
50 W ISO 200 250
RANGE (nautical miles)

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 Near Term Actions

Provide DoD with FAA radar data to cover interior CONUS

- Already underway with numerous FAA sensors
Develop integrated national air picture
- Integrate surveillance data from multiple sensors in CONUS
with flight data from FAA to form a seamless and common air
picture
Develop anomalous event reporting system
- Provide automated or semi-automated means for ATC to send
anomaly information to DoD and Law Enforcement

Improve quality of integrated national air picture

- Increase sensor and automated tracking performance

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 Summary

Many sensors, no common integrated air picture

- FAA, DoD, Law Enforcement operate separate sensor networks
- Wide spectrum of sensor capabilities
- Very little integration of sensor data

Recommended first step is to create common air picture with

existing sensors
- Connectivity, integration, and data dissemination
- Architecture should permit addition of sensors as well as
increase in sensor capability as required

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