The Dvaitin as Deconstructionist: Viudscrya on "Tat tvam asi": Part 1 Author(s): Edwin Gerow Source: Journal of the American

Oriental Society, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1987), pp. 561579 Published by: American Oriental Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/603301 . Accessed: 07/04/2011 05:54
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THE DVAITIN AS DECONSTRUCTIONIST: VISNUDASACARYA ON "TAT TVAM ASI": PART 1

EDWIN GEROW REED COLLEGE Dasgupta's detailed account of the "controversy between the dualists and the monists" needs to be completed by examining a topic he probably regarded as having little "philosophical" import: the dispute over the proper interpretation of gruti passages [vedavakyani]. Starting with Visnudasa and Vyasaraya, this issue dominates the Dvaita attack on Advaita. B. N. K. Sharma's work has emphasized the novel contribution of these Dvaita thinkers to the interpretive question. I propose in this paper to discuss the standards utilized by Visnudasa in examining crucial Vedic passages, particularly "tat tvam asi," and assess their adequacy. I will speculate on the origins of this critique vis-a-vis the standard Advaita interpretations. In a sequel I will examine the reply to these criticisms made by Appaya DMksita and Madhusildana SarasvatT.The ongoing debate over scriptural readings testifies to the vitality and the generality of "literary criticism" as a mode of Indian intellectualism.

S. N. DASGUPTA DEVOTES TWO CHAPTERS [vol. 4:xxxix, xxx] and over one hundred pages of his History of Indian Philosophy to the "controversy between the Dualists and the Monists"-viz., the Vedantic schools venerating Madhva and Samkara respectively. The philosophical contributions of Madhvacarya [1238-1317 A.D.]' and his followers to the general development of the Vedanta, if noted at all by modern intellectual historians, often focus on this controversy, for it is indeed a unique contribution of realistic thought to Indian thought generally.2 Still, even Dasgupta does not touch upon, much less discuss one of the most interesting aspects of the controversy: the questions which arise over the proper interpretation of certain authoritative, mostly Vedic, texts [vedavakyani]. His account is focused on properly philosophical issues: the nature of reality, the status of knowledge, the goal of philosophy.3 Dasgupta doubtless regarded disputes over the interpretation of gruti
' See B. N. K. Sharma, A History of Dvaita School of Veddnta and its Literature, Bombay, 1960 [henceforth: BNKS]; vol. 1, p. 102. 2 See, inter alia, K. Narain: A Critique of Madhva Refutation of 9dnnkara School of Vedinta, Allahabad, 1964; Suzanne Siauve: La Doctrine de Madhva, Pondichfty, 1968. 3 Narain too focuses on philosophical issues and is silent on the interpretive question. Siauve, who develops her themes dialectically in opposition to Advaita [as does Madhva himself], mentions interpretation only tangentially: see her remarks on Vedic laksani [pp. 278-79] She does not refer to Madhva's mot famous interpretation: see next. 561

passages as having little "philosophical" import. Indeed, Madhva's most famous "contribution" to the discussion of the vedavakydni, his reparsing of "tat tvam asi,"4 does not lend much credibility to the Dvaitin as text interpreter. Still, a lively tradition of text interpretation, itself an important intellectual problem, is evidenced in this dimension of the controversy.5 In this paper, I will examine one of the earliest Dvaitin controversialists, Visnudasacarya, whose work has recently been rediscovered, and many of whose most original contributions to the controversy were previously attributed to the great Vyasaraya.6 I will reexamine the controversy itself in the light of Visnudasa's contributions, and try, in this way, to complete Dasgupta's account of the polemic: what kinds of questions are therein raised, what standards of argument are used, what principles are
4 As: sa &tm& atat tvam asi. See Chandogya Upanisad I 6.8.7, and below. Several scholars have discussed Sarnkara's and the early Advaitins' methods of interpreting sentences such as "tat tvam asi." See P. Hacker, Die Schuler Sankaras, Wiesbaden, 1951, pp. 75ff., and W. Halbfass, Studies in Kumdrila and gathkara, Reinbek, 1983, pp. 54ff. J. A. B. van Buitenen, Rdmdnuja's Veddrthasamgraha, Poona, 1956, pp. 62-64, discusses Ramanuja's view in relation to Sarnkara's. The Madhva critiques lie outside the chronological focus of these works. 6 See BNKS 2:1-23, and VadaratnavalT by Visnuddsdcdrya, ed. Bannajije Govindacarya [hereinafter:BG], Udipi, n.d., with Introduction [pp. iii-xxxii] by B. N. K. Sharma.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 107.4 (1987) and the Advaita theses, is, even in its positive parts, drafted in the style of his opponents and makes ample use of their tools of dialectical argumentation. For instance, syllogisms are offered which prove the Advaita theses of mithydtva [p. 69], svaprakdaatva [p. 21] and anirvacanlyatd [p. 98]. At this juncture the first Madhva dialectics appear. Madhva himself, in the Anuvyakhyana especially, undertakes refutations of various Advaita theses: nirgunabrahman, aikyam, etc., in the context of positively establishing the Dvaita interpretation of the stitras. JayatTrtha [fl. 1365-88]12 develops many of these same themes in various commentaries, notably the Visnutattvanirnayat-ika and the famous Nyayasudha. He quotes extensively from Citsukha, and evidently considers him an authoritative exponent of Advaita. Jayatirtha's work testifies to the growing spirit of controversy by its determined defense of Madhva's grammatical lapses'3 in the face of what must have been rather scornful Advaita condemnation of them. JayatTrtha as well is the first Madhva to compose an independent work having no goal other than Advaitic refutation: the VadavalL.'4In this terse prose work of approximately 530 "theses," Jayatirtha examines and dismantles the various syllogisms advanced by previous Advaitins, notably Citsukha, in support of their conclusion that the world is illusory [mdyavada]. He resurrects not only the style but the standpoint of the earlier Nyaya logicians, and in effect domesticates their dialectics within Vedanta. Still, the Vaddva1i has an entirely negative character. Even though its ultimate goal is positive: the reestablishment of the universe! it limits itself, somewhat ironically, to the criticism of Citsukha's positive attempts to prove insubstantiality. Its subject matter, which is strictly limited to logical issues, and its methodology place it squarely within the tradition of Sriharsa and Citsukha; it is the Dvaita response to these masters of dialectic. Until the time of Visnuddsa [ca. 1390-1440]," these various dialectics, in both their eristic and synthetic aspects, had been conceived, it seems, almost exclusively in terms of Nyaya methodology.'6 Visnuddsa's text was unknown to Dasgupta at the time he wrote his History. Even in his account of the controversial
12

presumed and what sources claimed? I hope thereby to establish what philosophical import, if any, Vedic interpretation has for those who engage in it. It is very likely the case that the purely interpretive aspect of the controversy is, once controversy gets lodged within the Vedanta, both a crux of disagreement and a genuinely original aspect of it. For it is also true that as long as the controversy merely opposed Vedantins and those outside Vedanta, questions of scriptural interpretation were less likely to occur and were certainly less decisive when they did. Indian philosophical controversy was not developed within the context of Vedanta; the topics, and the methods of disputation were already largely givens, and a distinct style of controversial writing was taken for granted, when, in the thirteenth century, the first Dvaitins took up the cudgels. The origins of controversy, as a genre, are perhaps to be seen a milennium earlier in the dialectic logic of the Buddhists, developed as a way to demolish the more positivistic tenets of orthodox Brahmanism. Impressed by the strength of such argumentation, Mimarmsa, then Nyaya developed logics to respond in kind: Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka.' The devices of a negative dialectic soon became standard armaments of scholasticism, and were taken up after the demise of Buddhism by its intellectual successors, the Advaitin followers of Samkara, to confront the very same vestiges of positivism.8 Sriharsa's twelfth-century attack on Nydya pluralism, the Khandanakhandakhadyaj is still the archetype of the genre. Much early Advaita reflects the imprint of this controversial style, which remains prevailingly negative, or refutational. Citsukha [ca. 1220], also a commentator on Srfharsa, was the first Advaitin to attempt, in the context of the controversial style, to complete the dialectic with a more positive defence of the central concepts of Advaita: his Citsukh1, or TattvapradTpikd.'0 The Citsukhi, though directed against the Nydya, and those Naiydyikas who, like Gafige'a [ca. 1175-1200]", criticize Sriharsa
Latter half of the eleventh century: K. H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, 2:523 [henceforth, EIP]. 8 Samkara himself devotes much attention to the Samkhya pradhdna: B. S. Bhdsya, 11.5ff.
...

in which he attempts to refute all definitions

of the

Nyaya system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and tries to show that the world and all worldexperiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them." Dasgupta, op. cit., 2:126. 10 Ibid. 2:147-48. The defence of svaprakdsatd is the centerpiece of his argument: pp. 2ff. [Saddargana ed., Kd9T,1974]. S. C. Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, p. 406.

BNKS 1:322.

3See BNKS 1:318-19, 332-33.

Ed. and tr. P. Nagaraja Rao, Adyar, 1943 [A.L.S. #40]. Is BNKS 2:3. 16 And even Nydya metaphysics is to some extent assumedthough one might argue, in the spirit of the Buddhist founders of this Logic, that, for the Advaitin participants at
14

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literature, he shows little familiarity with the methodological innovations of Visnuddsa that Vydsardya adopted wholesale into his work. We may say, quoting B. N. K. Sharma, that Visnuddsa "was the first Dvaitin writer to initiate the practice of harnessing the rules and principles of the Vyakarana and Purvamimamsa Sastras, systematically and on a large scale, in reinforcement of the Siddhanta position, and for refuting the views and interpretations of the other schools."' Although we have emphasized the Naiydyika context of the early controversial literature, it should not be supposed that our writers were unfamiliar with other modes of sastraic reasoning. It is a commonplace of Veddnta thought that MImarmsd rules of interpretation are to be made use of whenever appropriateand this means in dealing with the vya-vaha-rika world. Samkara himself argues for a "metaphorical" interpretation of key Vedanta texts using the Mimdmsa exegetical technique of gauni laksand-[B.S.1.1.12ff.], and indeed Samkara's defence of the centrality of the Veddnta texts themselves over and against the karma injunctive portions of the Veda depends on Mimarnsa rules used to justify the sense of sacred texts in general." Visnudasa's contribution to the dialectic of scholarly discussion derives chiefly from his insistence that the Veddnta be understood as consistent with the critical traditions of Indian scholarly thought in their broadest sense. Correspondingly he examines the Advaita theses from an eclectic set of viewpoints, the tone of which examination is that the Vedanta, to be successful, must be formulated as an integral part of that scholarly tradition. The Advaitin, he implies, seeks both to argue, and by arguing, to place itself above the argument, and thus is permanently caught in the vise of the dharmigra-hakanya-ya: he bites the hand that feeds him.'9

Before we turn to Visnuddsa's most characteristic interpretive enterprise: his twenty realistic readings of "tattvamasi," we will offer two examples of his application of complex grammatical and Mimamsaka rules of intepretation to the solution of sophisticated textual problems. neha na-na-sti kimcana "here there is nothing variable" The Advaitin has taken this text20 as support for his thesis denying the reality of difference. He understands "here" to refer to Brahman, and the text to deny multiplicity or variability in the supreme principle and therefore absolutely.21 We Dvaitins however claim that this text denies not variability absolutely, but only that variability which, if attributed to Brahman, would denigrate His perfection: Brahman is never anything other than the sum of His perfections-and cannot therefore be said to be less than Himself. This text therefore denies neither multiplicity in the world, or even in Brahman, where a plenitude of virtues is admitted. In support of this interpretation we ask the Advaitin: But if (it is rather your claim that) this sentence [neha ndndsti... ] negates everything apart from Brahman, then (we reply) well! then you must also grant that the meaning of the sentence exists apart from Brahman-because it has the form of a negation! Now is (this sentence, as you interpret it) true or not? If false, then your hoped for conclusion is vitiated,22 and as well (you have accepted that) a revealed text may inculcate something not true. Further (we would also accept that such a sentence would be untrue, and hence) it is our hoped for conclusion that you have in fact proven. If (on the other hand, the sentence is) true, then it does not contradict (the view) that something, apart from Brahman, is true! And (this result is further confirmed by) the (interpretive metarule mentioned in Mahabhasya, namely, "No rule whose application is conditioned may itself be alleged as a condition for the application of another rule which, if applied, would destroy the first rule's condition of

least, no metaphysics is implied, that this argumentation has a purely didactic function. 17 VddaratndvalT, Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv. 18 Madhva had not made much use of Mimamsa: BNKS 2:48. His interpretations of "tattvamasi" stress context rather than form [ibid. 1:233-40]-apart that is from his rereading: sa -tm atat tvam asi [SarvaMu-la 1:441-42 (SrTcchandopanisadbhdsya ad 6.3.7 { = 6.8.7}etc.); and S. M. 5:22-24
(Visnutattvanirnaya); (ed. Bannafije Govindacarya, Banga-

lore, 1969ff.)]. See also below, note 127. 19 Or: upaqjvvopaqjvakavirodha; one of the standard formulae of realism, borrowed from the Mimamsa, which upholds the authority, for example, of perception, against those inferences-themselves ultimately grounded on perceptionthat would annul its reality. Cf. note 27, infra.

Kathopanisat 2.1.1 1. Samkara ad loc.: dpte ca [brahmani] ndndtvapratyupasthdpikdyd avidydyd nivrttatvad iha brahmani ndnd ndsti kimcandnumdtram api [Anandadrama S.S. #7, p. 89]. 22 For there exists, ipso facto, something true [viz. real] apart from Brahman.
21

20

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application."23The form "nikucita-"serves as an illustration. Now this form [past participle in -ta, of the root kujic, with ni- preverb: ni-kuc-i-ta], whose nasal has been deleted,24 and therefore has for its penultimate a -u-, may not as such be taken as condition for the application of the further rule: "the past participial suffix preceded by the -i(t)- augment may optionally be considered to lose its (k) indicatory adjunct after roots in penultimate -u-,"25 which rule (if it were to be applied) would give opportunity to a further guna substitution rule (and result in the wrong form *ni-koc-i-ta).26In the same way the revealed text [neha . .. ], whose meaning (as a true statement) can itself be grasped thanks to the principle that a truth other than Brahman exists, may not in turn negate (that principle of) a truth other than Brahman, to which it owes its own opportunity. If it could negate (that principle) then it would (in effect) negate itself. And that is an (evident) self-contradiction.27And (if it is false that no truth other than Brahman exists, then) a truth other than Brahman would (ipso facto) exist. Therefore, (we conclude that) the intention of the

revealedtext [neha ... ] is to negate variability(in

Brahman) only.28

sannipdtalaksano vidhir animittam tadvighatasya: cf. Paribhasendu~ekhara85, etc. 24 By the rule "delete the penultimate nasal of consonantfinal roots not (quoted in the Dhatupdtha) with an (i) indicatory adjunct, whenever a suffix follows which itself has a (k) or (fi) indicatory adjunct" (such as the past participle, (k)ta-): P. 6.4.24. 25 P. 1.2.21 26 The problem, though apparentlyintricate, is quite straightforward: by the first rule, the -fi- of kufic is deleted when followed by a (k)- initial suffix (such as the past participle, (k)ta-; the root is now "-u-penultimate;"this is now proposed as condition for applying the second rule, which would, if applied, delete the (k) from the suffix; the point of deleting the (k) is to give opportunity to still a third rule, a gunation rule, which is relevant here only in that it produces the wrong form, and thus shows graphically why the restriction on the application of the second rule must be adopted. The (k) indeed should not be deleted, and the second rule not invoked, because so doing would itself alter (cancel) the conditions in which the first rule has effect, and make its application questionable. Such indeterminacy (or circularity) of rule application must be avoided, and it is avoided by this paribhdsd (which nevertheless is not obligatory; see Nagega, ad loc.). 27 Another application of the "dharmigrdhakanyaya," according to which no dependent entity or term (upajivaka) may logically take precedence (i.e., supersede) that entity or term on which it depends for its own authority (upajivya). See note 19, supra.

23

By this argument Visnudasa shows not only a sophisticated grasp of Sanskrit grammar, but an appreciation of the implications of grammatical method for sastraic formulation generally, abstracting from the Mahabhasya rule its logical force and applying it to a novel circumstance, much as the original Mimamsa rules of interpretation were abstracted and later applied to the solution of worldly conflicts and form the framework of Dharmasastra. Now the Advaitin, in response, and somewhat inconsistentlythat is the point!-is forced to appeal to the same principles of interpretation in an effort to vindicate his thesis. The sastraic universe of discourse imposes its own form on the controversy, and it is to Visnudasa's credit that he has seen the advantages of this procedure for the realist position. Controversy, argument itself, presupposes multiplicity; if he chooses to enter the controversy, the Advaitin not only risks giving his opponent all the trumps, but opens himself to repeated charges of violating trivial truisms: is this text proclaiming (as you say) that nothing apart from Brahman exists true or false? If true, then it would appear to exist; if false, then why assert it? As in a Socratic argument, the exact mode of the refutation is unimportant; what is at issue is the proper form of argument itself. That the Advaitin responds at all to this persiflage is a tribute to the tenacity of the polemic. Many positions are attributed to the Advaitin in puirvapaksa which probably were never expressed as arguments. It may be this misrepresentation that drew the Advaitin into controversy-although as we have mentioned above, the tradition of controversy itself was probably well enough engrained to account for any sectarian response. The Dvaitin, however, by situating himself squarely in the midst of discourse itself as his commonplace, obliges the Advaitin to adopt his (the Dvaitin's) own method. We see this operating in the following excerpt, which also illustrates Visnudasa's imaginative use of a Mlmamsa nydya, or rule of interpretation:
If (our opponent should now argue that this revealed text [neha nandsti. . . ] may be interepreted as) a negation of both (the qualification and the term

28

Vadaratnavall,

pp. 5-7. From my unpublished

transla-

tion of the Govindacarya edition.

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qualified,29 our reply would be that, if so) an uneconomical complication [gaurava-] (would have been introduced into the argument). (An illustration of this may be found) in the Syena sacrifice (where) it is heard: "Let there be clarified butter made from fresh butter in a leather bag."30 (Here, the following preliminary argument [puirvapaksa] is made:) Now, because the clarified butter has not been previously mentioned, it is not possible that (this sentence) enjoins (only) "fresh butter in a leather bag" (as a qualification) of that previously attested (term). Rather, by this sentence is enjoined (both the term) qualified (and its qualification [viz., both the "clarified butter" and its qualifying determination: "made from fresh butter . . ."]). In reply to this tentative (argument, Parthasarathimi~ra)explains, in (commenting on) the eighth section of the third lesson (of the Mimamsa stitra): "By assuming (that the sentence) enjoins (both the term) qualified (and its qualification), an uneconomical complication (has been introduced into the argument). An uneconomical complication is a defect. Since (the term qualified: 'clarified butter') may be considered here to have been previously mentioned by resorting to an analogical extension [atide~a], it follows (that it is preferable to regard this sentence as) enjoining (only) 'fresh butter in a leather bag,' (as a qualification) of that previously attested (term)."3'
29 I.e., as negating both "difference" [ndndtva-]and that which has been "differentiated" [ndndbhuitavastu-],viz., the qualities of the Lord [BG]; thus one would not have to worry about the problem of which of the terms is in fact negated. This paksa is not actually adopted by the Advaita; it is introduced here only for completion of the argument

Therefore (in our case as well) it is the intention of the revealed text to (declare only) that the properties etc. (of the Lord) are not separate (from each other or from Him-and not to negate both qualification and the thing having that qualification).32

We turn now to the premier case of "interpretation" in Visnudasa: his twenty versions of "tat tvam asi" consistent with the doctrine of difference. It is at least poetically appropriate that the defenders of plurality should advance so many readings of this key text. The quantity is intended to show not so much that any one of them is correct, but that the very ground of the Advaitin interpretation, namely that the text has no ordinary meaning and if it is to make any sense at all, must be taken in a rashly figurative way, is an unnecessary presumption. Visnudasa's approach to this problem is strikingly novel. The quantity of readings aside, what distinguishes his treatment is its semantic and grammatical sophistication. The theories of the word and the sentence that had animated generations of grammarians and MImamsakas are here applied in their full
of them as doubly injunctive. Only in rare cases, and faute de mieux, is a visstavidhi accepted: the standard case is "somena yajeta," where the word "soma-" introduces into sacrifical discourse both the material of the sacrifice, and its name, #12ff. [p. 43ff. simultaneously. {See Mimarmsanyayaprakada Edgerton ed.].} The "uneconomical complication" in such an interpretation consists in the fact that we are forced, in order to get both things enjoined, to read the sentence twice, in two different ways, because a "material" may be enjoined only if the sacrifice which it serves is known; and the sacrifice itself must be declared before any material is relevant [vdkvabheda-]. In the present case (says Parthasarathi) the "clarified butter" need not be taken as enjoined in the Syena sacrifice-an ektype of the Jyotistoma-because another material (Soma) can readily be inferred, by analogy, from its use in the prototype. Better than taking "clarified butter" as a special exception to the Soma, in which case both the "butter" and the fact that it is to come from a "leather bag" will have to be taken as enjoined [visistavidhi-], we take "clarified butter" here as a passing reference only [anuvdda-] cited for the purpose of further enjoining its qualification [vigesana-: viz., the fact that it is to come from a leather bag]. By this intricate consideration, since the "clarified butter" cannot be used in the Syena itself, we conclude that it must be understood as being used in the subsidiary rites thereto only. ["atideso ndma pu-rvaprakaranasyaatra anuvrttih:" BG].
32

[BG]. 30 Cf. Katydyana Srauta Stitra 22.3.37: tato [viz., dArter: Comm.] navanltam 4/jyam.Our text may be a conflation of 35 and 37. The entire sentence is cited from Sabara ad P.M.S. 3.8.36. The argument which follows is however Parthasarathimi~ra's, and seems to differ from Sabara's in some respects. 31 Sastradipika ad P.M.S. 3.8.36. The text as cited differs somewhat from the published [N.S.P. ed.] text [cf. MK 2116]. This argument reflects the Mlmamsaka reluctance to accept as an injunction any sentence which appears simultaneously to enjoin more than one term, such as both the thing and its qualification. The architectonic of the sacrifice is compromised unless there is a clear correspondence between injunctive sentence and result-the so-called doctrine of the "single sentence" [ekavdkvatd]. In general, any technique which permits sentences to be construed in one to one correspondence with results, is preferred to an interpretation

Vadaratnavali,

p. 7.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 107.4 (1987) to the principle of consciousness evidenced in Svetaketu.' Thus, the Advaitin has resorted to laksand not once, but twice in the same sentence. Not surprisingly, this kind of double metonymy is strenuously objected to by the Advaitin's critics. But Visnudasa's argument consists in showing, in good Mimarmsaka style, that resort to double laksan-dinvolves gaurava: waste of explanatory power.36 One never resorts to laksand if a more direct reading is available. Any one of twenty other interpretations is more economical, and therefore intellectually more elegant. Of course it is not to our detriment that all twenty support the
realistic reading!37

power to a Vedic exegetical problem. For many years, until the VddaratnavalT was rediscovered, it was thought that the great Vyasaraya [1478-1539]33 had been the first to formulate this panoply of interpretations. Now it is clear that he modelled his account on that of Visnuddsa, extending it very little, at best systematizing it somewhat. The Advaitin, as indicated, has had to resort to the notion of laksand, in order to make sense of the assertion tat tvam asi 'that art thou.' The technique, metonymy, in the broadest sense, is one of the oldest devices of interpretation used by the Mimarmsain order to rationalize metaphorical or non-literal Vedic passages, such as "the trees sit at the sacrificial session," and catalogued extensively in the Nyayasuitras of Gautama.34 As with any metonymy, we start from the realization that at the literal level the assertion is meaningless or nonsensical: Svetaketu is not Brahman; the grandstands do not cheer; the trees cannot sit at the sacrificial session. From and because of this failure to communicate, we reimpose a meaning on the sentence by laksand: for no sentence, even a Vedic sentence, may be left incommunicando. That is, by metonymy, we take one of the terms in the sentence in a sense that can be successfully construed with the rest: "grandstands" means 'men in the grandstands;' "trees" means 'all animate creatures.' Metonymy is possible because a relation is understood between the literal term and the imposed meaning: containerthen is contained; hyperbolic irony, etc. The laksanad obvious for the "tvam:" it is to be taken not as referring to the individual Svetaketu, but to his indwelling soul: a-tman. Here we encounter the real problem for the Advaitin. For although the soul of Svetaketu is in some sense identical to Brahman, the cosmic soul, the sentence still is defective in meaning, for "tat" [ = 'Brahman'] still conveys the notion of "Brahman" as we ordinarily understand it: replete with qualities such as omniscience, omnipotence, etc. These qualities, which are part of Brahman's primary meaning, are clearly not present in Svetaketu's soul, and also must be set aside if "tat tvam asi" is to convey an acceptable meaning: 'the principle of pure consciousness evidenced in the world Soul is identical

No explanation of the twenty readings of "tat tvam asi" could greatly improve on Visnudasa's own. I again offer from my unpublished translation the section of the second chapter in which he propounds and defends the twenty.38
tattvamasisruter bhedaparatvam "the revealed text 'that thou art' has difference as its import" (There are) twenty interpretations of the sentence "that thou art" which support only the (thesis) of

The resort to double laksand may have been forced on the Advaitirl by his critics; early discussions of Vedic metonymy [see Siauve, op. cit., pp. 273ff.] appear to have been much less technical, with the Advaitin taking a position more akin to that of the Dhvanydloka: the crucial meaning of the text is prath'amana only. Oddly, the only case to figure prominently in this early discussion is our second, below: laksand- by proximity. "Le Veda nous guide par pedagogie negative, comme le fait celui qui, voulant montrer l'Ptoile arundhatT, trop petite pour etre aisement reperee, nous fait trouver une &toile voisine en disant que 'c'est arundhatUl'avant de nous faire voir la veritable arundhatTl" [p. 278]. 36 The circularita of double laksand is noted only in passing. To us, this seems the stronger argument, in that to take one term metonymically the other would appear to have to be taken literally, for it provides the context defining the relation that empowers the metonymy itself. If both were metonymical, they would be defining each other's context! 37The Advaitin, in responding to such criticism, has again adopted the standpoint of his critic: new kinds of laksand-are defined [see "jahadajahal-laksand," below] in an effort to salvage the double laksand objected to.
3

3 Dasgupta takes Vyasaraya as the point of departure of the "Controversy between the Dualists and the Monists." We see now that the polemics began before that. 34 N.S. 2.2.62. Also termed "gauna," "upacdra," etc. See P.M.S. 1.1.32, 1.2.10 [Sabara], 1.4.22 [KumdrilaJ;Also K. K. Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Ch. 6.

Vadaratnavali,

pp. 59-67.

Numbers in brackets refer to

the pages of the Sanskrit text.

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The Dvaitin as Deconstructionist

567

difference"-as khandana40

has been said in (my) Khandana-

Twenty senses of the Chandogas4' revealed text Will be (here) narrated; may the learned now Acknowledge the true distinction Between the embodied soul and the Lord. The purport [bhdva-] (of this passage is as follows): the partisans of non-difference have resorted to metonymy42(to interpret) both words (of the sentence) "that art thou." That is not right. For the correct meaning may be realized by resorting to figurative interpretation of one word only.43 [A] Thus, metonymy has (rightly) been resorted to by the Mimarmsakas,to (get the sense) 'husked grain', when interpreting the phrase "thou art the whole grain, satisfy the gods!"44 (There) the word "whole grain" (may be taken) in the sense 'husked grain' (since) the origin (of the latter) is dependent on (there having existed previously) whole grain.45 Similarly, regarding the sentence "that thou art," let there be metonymy (affecting) one word only; the meaning is thus obtained: 'thy origin is dependent on that'.46

39The difference at issue of course is that between the Lord and the jTva-the embodied soul; an understanding of that difference is had by correctly interpreting the terms, and their syntax, designating the Lord and the soul: "that" and "thou." 40 An earlier work of Visnudasa, now lost [BG]. Doubtless, a refutation of SaCharsa's Khandanakhandakhadya. 41I.e., the Samavedins': the Chdndogya belongs to the Samaveda. 42 Viz., laksand: supra, note 34, et seq. 43 I.e., we need not resort to the more onerous double metonymy in order to derive a satisfactory meaning. Of the twenty realistic interpretations that follow, 1-3, 5-10 and 12 involve metonymy of one word; the rest do not involve metonymy at all, but derive a sense by purely grammatical devices. 44 The illustration is taken from Sabara's Bhasya on P.M.S. 9.1.38-39 (the so-called "dhdnyddhikarana").The injunction mentions the word "dhdnya" 'whole, or unhusked rice' although the context makes it clear that the rice has already been husked [tandula-]. The question to be decided is then whether the already husked rice must be discarded and new unhusked be brought; but rather than that, laksanad is resorted to, based on a relationship of dependence. 45 That is, the husked rice could not have come to be without previously there having been some unhusked rice. 46 tadadhinotpattiko 'Si.

[B] Or, in accordance with the maxim of the "moon and the branch," our sentence may be taken to say: 'that one is (the one near) you'. Just as the moon, situated in (visible) proximity to a branch, may be indicated by saying: "that's the moon, there!-(the one near) the branch,"47just so, by saying "that thou art," may be indicated the (Brahman) who, having become the inner-controller of an embodied soul, is in close proximity to the embodied soul, but who is no larger than a thumb-span (as seen in meditation). The advantage here too is (that we have resorted to) metonymy of one word only.48[59] [C] Or, let this (sentence be taken as implying) an analogy.49 "That thou art" will then mean: 'like that (thou) art'. Even without (the explicit marker of analogy, namely) the "-vat" suffix [viz., 'like'], analogy is (possible). As the Mahabhasya says (in commenting on P. 1.1.23: "the forms 'bahu-', 'gana-', '-vat(u)', and '(d)ati' receive the technical designation "samkhv-d" ['number']"), "(what this means is:) the forms 'bahu-', gana-', '-vat(u)', and '(d)ati' are like numbers [samkhy-dvat].Then why not mention explicitly (the suffix) '-vat' (in the sUtra)? It is not (necessary). How then can something not expressed be understood? Even without (its marker,) the '-vat' suffix, analogy is (possible). Though not Brahmadatta, he may be called 'Brahmadatta'. From this we understand that he is

47 sakhaiva candrah: this is difficult to convey in English. The illustration suggests that the identity here is one of proximity only. We are to presume that this is a father's answer to a child's innocent question: "which one of these lights in the sky is the moon?" The father adopts the stragtegy of identifying the moon by means of something obvious and close to it: the tree-branch against which the moon is now visible. He says: "see the tree branch: it's that one!" So here, noticing Svetaketu's puzzlement as to what this "Brahman" might be, Uddalaka says: "look within; it's the (one close to your)self." (I.e., look within the j-va: the manifest self-the Brahman is ever close to it: ]ivasamTpagata). This reading, which asserts a metonymy of "tvam", and takes "tat" as subject, creates a grammatical problem, inasmuch as the verb is in the second person. This nyaya is of questionable authority outside Advaita, where it has been taken to illustrate how a real result [viz., satyabodha] may derive from an illusory process [devopdsana]. The answer is: "sdmfpyamdtrat" [BG]. See Siauve's parallel illustration, above: note 35. 48 But now on "tvam," rather than "tat": tvatsamfpe brahma;just as, sdkhdsamfpe candrah. See below, note 143. 49 Or, more explicitly: "analogical extension": atideso 'yam. In grammar, an atidesa rule extends the force of another rule to a context in which that rule did not at first apply.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 107.4 (1987)

like Brahmadatta."50 In the same way, the sense of "that thou art" is better realized as 'like that thou art'. Otherwise, the sentence "that thou art" would not convey (any meaning). As the Mahdbhdsya says: "He who calls a cow a horse never conveys a satisfactory meaning [saMpratyaya].""5And Kaiyata adds: "Only a superimposition of the horse's properties is understood, but not the actual essence of a horse. "52 [D] Or, as in (the assertion) "food is Brahman,"" we may understand the nominative case of "tat" in the sense of the locative case.54(Our authority is) the aphorism: "(The following irregular endings are substituted in the Veda for the various case endings:) . . the luk-deletion of the case endings . . ."5 [60] Here, the primary meaning alone (is resorted to):56'you rest on Him, like the bird (tied) to its perch.'57 And MImdmsakas as well accept (taking) the nominative case in the sense of the locative: (they have understood) "tat" 'that' and "yat" 'which' (to mean 'tatra' and 'yatra' ["there" and "where"]), when interpreting the phrase: "Standing where they have pressed, there they should recite the Samidheni."'58They have concluded thus that the injunction means: 'Standing where they have pressed (the Soma, viz., near the Soma-vehicle), there they should recite the Sdmidhen! (mantras)'. [E] Or, "it may be called by that on account of accompaniment."59As is well-known, the Veda (avers that) the embodied soul is accompanied by Brahman. Therefore this is what is taught (by the phrase) "that art thou": 'thou art accompanied by that (Brahman)'. Alluding to the example: "'Vernal' is called (that student) who studies (during) the spring," which has been offered for the aphorism: "The suffix 'tha(k)' is enjoined in the sense of 'he who studies. . .' or 'he who knows . . .', after the stems 'vasanta-' ["spring"], etc.,"60the Mahdbhhsya says: "This usage [nirdega-] is illegitimate. We find here (the mention) 'he who studies . . .' Now there is no (object of) study called 'spring'. (On the contrary) there is no fault (with this usage). 'It may be called by that on account of accompaniment.' 'Spring study' shall be the study (of that object) which is accompanied by the spring.",61
5 The reference is to Chdndogya 6.8.2: "Just as a bird tied by a string, after flying in various directions without finding a resting-place elsewhere settles down (at last) at the place where it is bound . . ." [Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, p. 456]. P.M.S. 3.7.15-16. This of course would be gibberish in English, which does not usually permit the relative (or the demonstrative) pronoun and adverb to be interchanged. We would explain the Sanskrit somewhat differently:the "nominative" here that the Indians see being taken as a locative, is rather an instance of adverbial use of the stem form. But Pdnini, for reasons of economy, enjoins a case ending even on "adverbs" and other indeclinables. Visnuddsa's use here of Sabara is incidentally somewhat free: Sabara does take "yat"as a locative adverb, but the issue is not grammaticalit is whether the cart located thereby is enjoined as a location only or as an accessory to the sacrifice. sdhacaryat tdcchabdyam: the phrase is Patafijali's; see below. The examples suggest that the ingenious ""Occhabdyam" means 'designating (this thing) by that (alien term)', i.e., metonymy. 60 P. 4.2.63. The example given is the standard one [see Kdgikdad loc.], but is not actually mentioned in the Bhdsya. 61 Mbh. ad loc. [N.S.P. ed., vol. 4, p. 176]. The problem here is that such taddhita derivatives ["vernal (student)"]

Sthdnivadbhdva [P. 1.1.56] is an example. In Mmma-msa, the extension of an act from one sacrifice to another is termed "atidega"[P.M.S. 7 passim]. "Atidesa" is spoken of generally as the taking of one thing for another based on a relevant similarity between the two: it is thus the logical ground for the dlamkdrika's "upamd": "candravat tava mukham" 'thy face is like the moon (in charm, grace, etc.)'. This laksand here differs from the first two in being based on similarity, whereas they were based on (real) contiguity. The issues are very general: cf. the discussion of "gauni" and "guddhd" laksand [Raja, op. cit., p. 257], and my article on the Indian analogues to Peirce's "icon" and "index": "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." Philosophy East and West, 1984, pp. 245-60.] 5() Mbh. ad loc. [N.S.P.ed., vol. 1, pp. 306-7 (with minor variations)]. Cf. "simho mdnavakah" 'the boy is a lion!'meaning like a lion, brave as a lion, etc. 51 Mbh. ad P. 1.2.64 [N.S.P. ed., vol. 2, p. 88]. 52 Pradipa, ibidem. 7.9.2, Taittiriya 2.2, 3.2. That is, just as the first expression means 'Brahman is in food' so the second means 'thou art in Brahman'-located in Him as your basis. This fourth interpretation involves no laksand at all. The first four thus define the genera of possible legitimate interpretations: laksand (a) of real contiguity affecting the word "tat";(b) of real contiguity affecting the word "tvam"; (c) of similarity; and (d) abhidhd [mukhydrthah]. The remaining sixteen differ only in species. 5 P. 7.1.39 [after Vasu, AstddhydyT, vol. 2, p. 1332]; in other words, a nominal case ending may, in the Vedic language, be deleted without affecting the sense. This sitra covers, among other Vedic anomalies, the "endingless locatives," inherited from Indo-European. See below, cases [P]
53Chdndogya
54

through [S].
56 Deleting the case ending is not an interpretive device, but a grammatical procedure: the sense of the locative is directly expressed (by the deletion).

GEROW: The Dvaitin as Deconstructionist Kaiyata adds: "(The object studied) is entitled to be called by the term (spring), because it is accompanied by (the spring)-(either because) the spring is described in it, (or because) it is studied during the spring."62 Therefore taking one word only in a figurative sense is (here too) legitimate (-and preferable to
taking two).

569

[F] Or, (we have observed that) it is illegitimate for the opposing view to adopt metonymy in two words of the phrase "that art thou"; (in contrast, our) explanation is perfectly sound, which adopts a metaphorical [gaunatd-] interpretation of one word only:

"that," as in (the expression) "thou art a lion!" In fact, even though (the soul and the Lord) are other
[anyatve
pi],

(both of them) have forms in common,

such as (being) selves; therefore mundane and Vedic usage both (justify) the expression: "thou art indeed that."63The varttika "On account of the similarity of form,"64 (mentioned) in the day-lesson on abbrevia65 tions (supports the same conclusion). (Commenting thereon) the Mahdbhasya says: "(The usage) 'this is indeed that' occurs because of similarity of form, even when ('that' is something) other (than 'this')."66 And also in the Veda, there are usages (justified by) the maxim "because of a common form,"67 such as: "the sacrificial pole is the sun."68[61] [G] Or, "because it is dependent on that, it becomes the designation of that." For example, the usage: "the King became (for all his people) the kingdom.",69 In

the Nayaviveka (of Bhavanatha) it is said: "The express audition of the number 'ten' in (the sentence) 'At the morning extraction, the Adhvaryu holds these ten (cups)'70 must be understood as the audition of a collectivity (of cups). Because the quantity ten is based on the collectivity of cups, it becomes the designation of that (group of objects)-because it is dependent on that.7' (Here) the effect is designated by a word for the cause."72 Similarly (because thou art dependent on Him), it is correct to designate Him (by the word) "thou." [H] Or, (considering the three kinds of entity of which the universe is composed, namely, the Lord, the souls, and inanimate matter, we observe that) the difference between the Lord and inanimate matter is great indeed. The (difference, however, between) the Lord and the souls is not so (great),73 but is (by comparison) small. Thus even though a difference exists, there may well be a wish not to express it4 Mutatis mutandis, even though the absence of difference does not exist, there may well be a wish to express it.75 The Mahabhasya, commenting on (the aphorism) "The genitive case (is enjoined) in the remaining (senses),"76 says: "By 'remaining . . .' is meant 'the absence of any wish to express (one of the already mentioned case meanings) such as '(direct) object."' But how can there be the absence of a wish to express [avivaksd-] what (already) exists? There may indeed be the absence of a wish to express an
70 Sabara ad P.M.S. 2.2.17. The version translated by Jha contains the mention "grahdn"'cups' [G.O.S. #66, p. 244]. 7 The abstraction ten [like kingdom above] is based on the concrete matter in which it inheres; thus it may also designate that matter. This synecdoche involves a relation different from, but the same principle as, [A]. The Mimamsakas take this not as a laksand, but as a second meaning of the number: dasasaMkhydvi.istatvam iti [BG]. 72 I.e., because there are "ten," we grasp the cups [=effect]. Visnuddsa's text does not exactly agree with Nayaviveka ad P.M.S. 2.2.17, as published [Rdstriya Samskrta Samsthdna ed., p. 404]. Bhavandtha may have been conflated with Prabhdkara or with Varadardja'scommentary [ibidem]. 73... because they have more in common than either does with inanimate matter [BG]. 74 I.e., in order to minimize it, in comparison to the difference between the Lord and matter. 75 I.e., in order to maximize the far greater difference between the Lord and matter. 76 sashT Sese: P. 2.3.50; the other cases have been enjoined to express specific relations: object, instrument, location, etc. The genitive is used when a relation other than those mentioned is to be expressed.

presume the standard syntax of the verb "studies" ['he who studies something']-in other words, that the term in the accusative case express the object of study, and nothing else. But, as the objector points out, there is no object of study called the "spring." Therefore the basis in usage of the taddhita is absent. Patafijali's answer is to imply the object of study, via metonymy: he who studies (any object of study) during the spring, is entitled to be called a "vernal student." 62 PradTpa,ad loc. Therefore, the derivation "vasantika-" is legitimate! 63 tad evdsi: "eva" is here the sign of the ruipaka,by which this case differs from [C] above, an explicit simile [upamd]. 64 ruipasdmdnyddvd: vdrttika 8 to the Sivastitra "a i u(1)" [N.S.P. ed., vol. 1, p. 100]. 65 The pratydhardhnika is the second of the nine making up the navdhnika on the firstpdda of the first adhydya. 66 Mbh., ibidem. 67 sarupyat: P.M.S. 1.4.25. 68 idityo yfipah: Taittiriya Brdhmana 2.1.5.2. Discussed at P.M.S. 1.4.25. 69 I.e., the word "kingdom" is used of the king: because the kingdom is based on the king-according to classical Indian notions, at least.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 107.4 (1987)

existing (thing), as (for example:) 'The sheep has no wool' or 'The maiden has no waist'."7(And indeed it is also possible) to wish to express the non-existent, as (for example:) 'The pond is an ocean!'."7 And the same (may be said) here of "that thou art." Therefore, the metonymy of one word only is proper. [I] Or, (it may be that) father Udddlaka, observing (the pride of his son Svetaketu), who was thinking (to himself:) "I am the only self-evident, independent, pure intelligence in my body; there is no other Lord (than myself), no (other) friend," (and wishing to chastise his son) thought upon (the meaning of) the revealed text Two well-winged (friends cling Close-yoked upon a common tree: One eats sweetly the pippala fruit, The other eats nought, but looks on)79 and responded to Svetaketu's question (by affirming:) "that thou art." What he meant was: 'thou art related to Him, impelled by Him, His friend'. This conclusion is justified) also by the (following argument). Now when we say: "that"-namely, Brahman, the cause of creation, etc.-"art thou" (referring to Svetaketu), there is no (semantic) compatibility80 (in the literal predication of such contraries). Since a figurative meaning8 is well (justified) by literate usage82(in cases) such as "the grandstands are shouting," (it follows that) the meaning of the word "thou" is (properly) predicated here of the word "that," which has been taken figuratively, in the sense 'related to that.'83 Similarly, (let us consider) the (sastraic) example: "any formation from words must be competent."84 In this interpretive rule what is meant by "formation" [vidhi-] is: 'that form which is achieved by application of a grammatical rule [vidhfyate]'; by "compound" [samdsa-] is meant: [62] 'the result (of such an application) which starts from words [padakdrya-]'85 Since

7 The question, which seems odd to us, probably derives from the Indian presumption that the relation between a word and its meaning is fixed, necessary: cf. the first vdrttika to Astddhydyl: "siddhe sabddrthasarhbandhe"[MBh., vol. 1, p. 59 (N.S.P. ed.)]. The hyperbole implies of course that the wool is not worth cutting, that the girl's waist is unusually small, etc. 7 I.e., is inexhaustible, etc. [BG]. What "does not exist" here is the identity of pond and ocean. Nevertheless it is legitimate to "mean" that identity, in order to minimize the (real) difference. Mundaka 3. 1. 1. Also Svetadvatara 4.6. The Dvaita readings of "tat tvam asi" concentrate on the context of the utterance-and here on the pride of Svetaketu, who returned from his course of traditional Brahminical study thinking himself quite wise [Chdndogya 6.1.2]. 8( yogyatd: the semanticists consider three factors essential in order that a sentence be successfully interpreted: dkdtiksd [the words must be syntactically interrelated according to the canons of the grammar], yogyatd [the words must express meanings that in this world of ours are interrelatable], and samnidhi [the words must be uttered in close enough sequential proximity to be linked together by the hearer]. Failure of any one of these conditions would in principle provoke laksand, if the sense of the utterance is to be saved.

upacara: a less precise term for non-literal usage; laksand is included within it, and is meant here-but the term can cover other phenomena, such as dhvani, etc. 82 vyutpatti: in general, the process of arriving at an acceptable meaning; the term is applied both to the grammatical techniques of derivation and to the contextual methods of education. What Visnudasa implies here is that the exegetical techniques used by the Advaitin to derive his interpretation cannot stand the test of educated usage generally. Ours however are well supported. 83 What Visnuddsa means is that the word "that"-because of a failure of yogyatd at the literal level-has been reinterpreted figuratively to mean 'related to that' [tatsarmbandhin-]: the standard strategy of laksand, whereby "grandstands" is taken to mean 'related to the grandstands'. As now reinterpreted, the word is understood as a adjective, modifying "thou," and hence, in accordance with the Indian theory of "collocality" [sdmdnddhikaranya], points to or expresses the same underlying object as "thou"-much as "blue" and "pot" have the same local reference, and therefore agree. 84 samarthah padavidhih: P. 2.1.1. This paribhdsd satra conditions all compounding rules, and is taken generally to mean: 'only those phrasal units [pada-] that have syntactic interrelatedness will be deemed competent [samartha-] to form [vidhi-] compounds'. That is, since Pdnini derives compounds from preexisting well-formed sentences, what this paribhdsd does is to exclude as bases for derivation, word strings that are not syntactically interrelated: "idam rdjiaht| purusa dgacchatu" will not qualify because the genitive "rd]jhah"is not predicated on the noun "purusah". "ayam rdjiah purusah," however, is fine, because the genitive does depend on "purusa~h."
85

Visnuddsa

is developing a standard grammatical problem:

in the sitra, "'padavidhi"'formation from words' can refer only to the finished compound. But of course at that derivational stage, the question of competence is moot. It is

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The Dvaitin as Deconstructionist

571

the (compound) is already well-formed when (we have reached) the stage "king's-man" [rdjapurusah], the mention "competent" (at that stage) is pointless [anarthaka-]. Therefore, the term "formation from words" [viz., compound], which has been taken figuratively, because (a compound is) related to words that are competent, is here (properly) predicated of the word "competent."86And Kaiyata has said: "The term 'formation from words', because it has been taken figuratively, as related to words that are competent, is here (properly) predicated of the word 'competent'."87 And in the Padamafijari, Haradatta says: "The word 'competent' occasions a figurative usage, . .. "because it presumes that (only) words are competent'."88 Therefore (in our case too), by a metonymy of one word (only), the meaning is realized: 'thou art presumptive of that (Brahman)'.89 [J] Or, (let us consider Udddlaka's query:) "Indeed (Svetaketu!) have you not asked for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard?..."90 Now Svetaketu (quite proud of his new learning, might have) asked (his father in reply:) "Is it not proven by experience that I am the agent, prompted by (my) body and senses? What other agent than this is there?"9' His father (then, having in mind) the aphorism "(The soul) is an agent, on account of scripture having a purport (thereby),"92(and meaning to say:) "Truly indeed, and by His grace, do you experience something akin to His power [tdcchdlva-], which is to act and to know, (in your own limited ability to act and to know)," did in fact say: "that thou art." (He)

meant: 'thou hast something akin to His power'

[tacchllo 'si].

The Mahdbhdsya, commenting on the aphorism: "'Contraction' is (the replacement of) y, v, r, or 1, by i, u, r, or 1,respectively"93says: "From a crow is born a crow; from a hawk a hawk-and from 'contraction' is born 'contraction'."94And Kaiyata thereon: "'From a crow is born a crow': as well here from (the process) 'contraction,' that which is born of it (namely), the (replacement) phoneme, obtains, figuratively, its power."95 And so our meaning (is also) realized, by (resort to) metonymy of one word (only).9' [K] Or, (we will not read "tat tvarn asi" as a single
sentence, but as two:) "that . . . is the impeller"; "thou art . . . the one impelled." The (phrase) employed is

(thus the combination of two) partial sentences [x'akvaikale.sapravogah].97Just as (the author of the aphorisms), when he should have said: "Inquiry is to be undertaken," said instead: "Now, therefore, the
inquiry into Brahman. . . .9' And the Mahdbhhsya

says: "We observe men (from time to time) in their utterances using parts of sentences, as 'Enter ...
candy . . .',99 and (even parts of words, as when we

not the compound that is competent, but its component words. Therefore it will be necessary to interpret the form "paclavidlhi"figuratively, so that it in fact does refer to the words: 'padavidhisambandhin'. 86 I.e., "competent" properly modifies and agrees with "padavidhi"--now interpreted to mean '(words) connected with a paavidhi' [viz., compound]. 87 Pradipa ad loc. [vdrttika 20: "siddham tu samarthdnamn iti vacandt": N.S.P. ed., vol. 2, p. 340]. Kaiyata's comment is merely paraphrased by Visnuddsa's preceding line. x Padamafijari ad Ksika ad loc. [Prdcya Bhdrat! ed., vol.
2, p. 6]. "Sarnarthapaddcrai'atvdt" is cited from Ksika. It

appears that Haradatta is saying that the word "competent" is being used figuratively;but this cannot be the case. Rather, it is the provoking cause of the figuration [upacaritavrtli-]. 89 taddaritastvam asi: i.e., 'without that, thou canst not be'. in the form of a statement. We have translated it as a rhetorical question. 92 B.S. 2.3.33 [Thibaut, vol. 2, p. 49].
9( Chdndogya 6.1.2-3. 91 Svetaketu's "question" is

1.1.45. Mbh. ad loc. [N.S.P. ed., vol. 1, p. 393]. Patafijali's lighthearted comment responds to the problem: how can "contraction"- which is a process of replacement-give its name also to the result of that process, viz., the four phonemes listed in the satra? Pradipa ad loc. [ibid., p. 394]. "Kdkdj jatah kdkah" is quoted from Patafijali. Our edition has the reading: "tdcchahd'atn lahhate" [cf. E, supra] instead of "tdcchflam . this, of course, is Visnuddsa's meaning: by manifesting its power figuratively the product gets the right to be designated by the cause's name. 96 By metonymy, we may use the name of the power [viz., the cause] instead of the product [viz., the effect]: "thou art (the product of) that (power)." This technique, based on the principle of "adhvdhdra"or 'implicit expansion' of the sentence, recalls the way the MImdmsakasconstrue larger, complete, ritual assertions from partial, but mutually implicatory, sentences. Note that no resort to metonymy is made. AxB.S. 1.1. 1. That is, our authority is Bddardyana himself, who has left the first sentence of his aphorisms unfinished. 99 pravisa ... pindfm.... the point comes across a bit more clearly in the Sanskrit, which marks the imperative of the transitive verb and the accusative of the noun. The verb requires an object; the object requires a verb-but not the object and the verb with which they occur. Thus another ob ect and another verb must be supplied.

9 ig lzanahsampr)asdranam: P.

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call) 'Satyabhdmd' 'Satyd'. "'00Kaiyata explains: "The verb 'entering', because 'entering' cannot be construed with 'candy', suggests (another object, such as 'house'; similarly, 'candy' [acc.sg.] suggests the verb 'eating,' with which it may be construed as an object; thus: 'enter ... the house; eat . . . the candy'."'0' So also here the meaning of the (complete) sentence is realized: "that . . ."-namely, Brahman-". . . is the impeller"; "thou art . .. the one impelled."[63] [L] Moreover, in this section (of the Chandogya upanisad), the (unconditional) difference between the Lord-the supreme Brahman-and everything that has the nature of an embodied soul, is set forth [niripyate], preceded by a demonstration [tattvanirupana-] of the essence of the embodied soul. (Uddalaka) assert, "that thou art" in order to convey (to Svetaketu) that the Lord is different from the embodied soul, for even in final liberation, the embodied soul is dependent on Him, similar to Him, absorbed in Him, accompanied by Him, impelled by Him. The syntactic connection "He is this . . ." is illustrated In the Mahabhasya in terms of the reasons: Dependence, similarity, absorption, accompaniment.'02 For these reasons (then), usages such as "that thou art," (involving) syntactic agreements' between (the terms) "embodied soul" and "Brahman,"are justified. Nor (should it be alleged that) the reasons (given are not attested (as valid in relevant revealed texts). Indeed, the "dependence" (of the soul and Brahman) is attested by: "All these creatures . .. have (the supreme) being as their abode, as their support."104 And "similarity" is attested by: "Then he . . . becomes equal with the Lord (in flawlessness)."'05 And "absorption" is attested by: "(He enjoys all that is desirable,) along with Brahman the omniscient."106 And "accompaniment" is attested by revealed texts such as: "By means of this bridge only he enjoys, he rejoices" and "He experiences all (his) desires through this Self."'07 Likewise all these reasons (remain) valid even in final liberation (as we learn from): "In His vicinity, he enjoys...."108 Thus the explanation (of "that thou art"-as a predication involving) syntactic agreement-is entirely justified. And the advantage (of this explanation) is the metonymy of one word only. In the Mahabhasya too (we find these reasons utilized). After proposing the examples: "the wife of 'gopa' is 'gopT';the wife of 'prastha' is 'prasthV'," for the aphorism: "(The feminine affix -(O)Tl() is enjoined,) when (the wife is so) designated from association with the male,"'09 an objection is raised: "How can the word 'prastha', expressing masculine (gender), accept a feminine (suffix)?"'10 (The difficulty is) avoided (by arguing): "Perhaps the aphorism 'It [viz., 'she'] belongs to him"" (governs also this case); if so, 12 Well then a suffix -a(n) (would have obtained)."

satyabhdma... satyd.... names of Krsna's wife. Mbh. ad P. 1.1.45 [N.S.P. ed., vol. 1, p. 394]. The printed text reads: vdkyaikade~sn [pl.]. Visnuddsa suppresses "padesu padaikadeidn" but cites its example! '1' Pradipa ad loc. The printed text varies slightly but the meaning is the same. 102 tdtsthya: lit. standing on that; taddharmya; sayujya; sdhacarya. The 9loka is the author's own [BG]. What is peculiar in this interpretation is the argument itselfborrowed from Patafijali. The individual "reasons" have been dealt with separately elsewhere. 03 sdmdnddhikaranya:supra, note 83. 104 Chdndogya 6.8.4. 105 Mundakopanisat 3.1.3.

100

106 TaittirTlya 2.1. I.e., "immersedin Brahman, he enjoys . . . The laukika example given in Mahabhasya, below, implies nothing more than necessary association [tdtsamlpya-]. 107 Sources unknown. The examples seem to illustrate "means" rather than "accompaniment." But a "bridge" is a means by being crossed, and "through this Self" could be understood associatively: 'along with this Self'. 108 Paramagruti [one of many Srutis cited in Dvaita texts that have not survived: BG]. The full 9loka is given as: visnum sarvagunaih piirnam j]itvd samsdravarjitah I nirduhkhdnandabhun nityam tatsamTpe sa modate | 109 P. 4.1.48. The printed text of the Bhasya mentions only "prasthT" [N.S.P. ed., vol. 4, p. 64]. The force of this siltra is to assign the suffix -I when the woman is so called by association with her husband only-an exception to the -d suffix which would be used when the woman might be so called in her own right. 11O Mbh. ad loc. [ibidem]. The problem is that the feminine suffix in this case would be affixed to an already masculine base-rather than to a semantically neutral stem [prdtipddika-]. The feminine form would be realized differently were we to start from the basic semantic conditions of the utterance. A 'lady who departs' [pratisthati] would be "prasthd."But here the underlying stem is already masculine, and as such is not a suitable recipient of a feminine suffix. "' P.4.3.120. 112 By P. 4.1.83: prdg divyato In, because 4.3.120 falls within its scope, and 4.1.48 does not. Further, by 7.2.11, a vrddhi would have been provoked, and then only could the

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then, let a syntactic connection... (be made): '(s)he is this . . .' But [64] (replies the objector): how can 'this' be (used to designate something) not this? In four ways may 'this' designate 'not this': in terms of dependence, similarity, accompaniment, contiguity. (For instance) because of dependence (we say): the 'cot is laughing'; because of similarity: '(he calls) the wandering ascetic "Brahmadatta"'; because of contiguity: 'the village on the Ganges'; because of accompaniment: 'let the swords enter'.""4 Thus our explanation (of "that art thou'), making use of the rules enunciated in the Mahabhasya, is far better. (We have already) said that a metonymy which purports both to abandon and not to abandon (the primary meaning) is not proper. And finally a metonymy (attributed to) both words (simultaneously) is a flaw. (Thus our position alone remains cogent.) Enough prolixity! [M] Or, as we have said above, resort to metonymy is licit when the literal meaning (of a sentence) is impossible. When the literal meaning is possible, (it is not licit) because the powers (of words) that are posterior' (to the literal meaning) have no proper (opportunity). But here the literal meaning is possible: "that thou art." Let "that" (refer anaphorically) to "aitaddtmyam"'one who has the Supreme Self as his inner controller'."7 Let in that way the literal meaning prevail."' This done, (we derive) the advantage that the neuter gender of the pronoun "tat" 'that' now

construes with an (appropriate) referent in proximity [samnihitaparimarsopapatti-]."9 (The form is derived as follows:) of whom this is the Self, viz., the innercontroller, that (one) is "this-selved."120 The (taddhita) suffix (s)ya(fi) is enjoined without change of meaning [svdrthe], inasmuch as (the stem to which it is enjoined) may be taken as a member of the gana "brdhmanddi."'2'The meaning (then) is: 'thou art one whose inner-controller is that (Brahman)'. [N] Or (let us derive "aitaddtmyam" differently, though keeping the anaphoric reference. The underlying form will now be a karmadhdraya, rather than a bahuvrThi):"this" (Brahman) is "that Self" [esa casav dtmd ca];122 then (by applying the general rule of nominal derivation) "tasyedam,"'23(we obtain): "ait119

feminine suffix have been invoked: prdsthi. The printed text of the Bhasya does not include this line. 113 abhisambandha: see above. 114 Mbh. ad loc. [ibid., p. 67]. The four familiar metonymies designate a) the child on the cot, b) an ascetic similar to Brahmadatta, c) a village on the bank of the Ganges, d) soldiers having swords. 115 See Raja, op. cit., p. 249ff., and below, note 164. 116 jaghanyavrtteh: laksandis posterior to abhidhd both in depending on it, and in presuming its failure. The relation is not reciprocal. 117 See the full text of Chandogya 6.8.7, etc. This curious term is variously interpreted, but its meaning here is not at issue. The point is that "tat" may be taken in its anaphoric sense, as referring back to "aitadatmyam." 118 The last eight interpretations all involve "mukhydrtha." See [D] and [K] above. It might be alleged that the previous two instances did involve some minor tampering with the text: deletion of a case ending, or dividing the sentence in two. The present case is "hard"in the sense that no principle is involved apart from the anaphoric [viz., literal] meaning of the pronoun.

The neuters "tat" and "aitaddtmyam" have long puzzled interpreters of the Upanisad. Though "tat" [neut.] is usually understood anaphorically, it is commonly taken to refer to Brahman [neut.], even though in context it is not "Brahman" but the "Self" [itman, masc.] that serves as referent. "Aitaddtmyam" is itself a puzzle. The various explanations offered here take it as a bahuvrihi: 'one who has as his self [viz., inner-controller), this (Brahman)'. As such, the (s)ya(fi) suffix would appear otiose, and the neuter unnecessary: "tvam etaddtmakah" would serve as well. In context, "aitaddtmyam" seems rather predicated of "idam sarvam": this whole (world) 'has as its self. . . , etc.' But the otiose suffix, whose connotation is usually 'abstraction', points to another possibility-the abstract noun formed from the bahuvrihi above: 'state of being, such that (in it) one's self is taken to be this (Brahman)'-i.e., the world properly understood [See P. 5.1.124]. But this interpretation does not help the syntax of the upanisad: the "yah" [sa ya eso nimd] may be picked up by the later "tat" [tat satyam sa dtmd], but the intervening "aitaddtmyam idam sarvam" then appears parenthetical at best. It is unusual for both "etad" and "tat" to pick up the same antecedent. 120 esa atma- antarydm-iyasya tad aitaddtmyam: as above, taking aitaddtmyam as a bahuvrihi, but finessing its gender. 121 Cf. P. 5.1.124: gunavacanabrdhmanddibhyah karmani ca. The argument appears only in the broadest sense to be Paninean: (s)ya(ni) is not enjoined svdrthe, and "etaddtman-" is not included in the gana "brdhmanaddi." 122 Of course, underlying the bahuvrihi was a karmadharaya also. The difference however is that the "self" is understood here as the predicate of an ordinary demonstrative assertion: 'this is that (Brahman)'; in the other case, the "self" was the subject of a retrospective identification: '(of whom) that (Brahman) is this'. 123 P. 4.3.120: 'it belongs to him'. I.e., in this general sense of 'x belongs to y' a number of derivational suffixes are

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addtmyam" ' . . . which belongs to (the) that-self.' The meaning (of "that thou art") is thus: 'thou art a something [= a 'that'] belonging to (viz., related to, dependent on) the self that is this (Brahman).' [0] Or, let there (be understood) a compound word. The meaning would then be: 'thou art of that'.'24 The relation (here) has the meaning of the genitive, defined as that (relation) obtaining between possessor and possessed [svasvdmibhdva-].'25 [P] Now, from the fact that the instruction ("that thou art") occurs several times (in the course of the upanisadic passage126 we are considering, it follows that) many meanings are thereby implied. 127 Now many more literal interpretations (are possible) when we keep in mind (the Paninean aphorism): "The lukdeletion of the case-endings (is permissible) . .. (in the Vedic language)." 128 In the Navaparakarani, Uddalaka, in order to set forth the difference in nature of Brahman and the embodied soul, (making use of nine) examples, has explained that difference in many ways, through a variety of relations, such as that of 'dependent to sustainer'.'29 The same (range of) meanings is intended to apply to the terms so illustrated (by these nine illustrations).'30 And indeed (one such) meaning is conveyed [kathyate] (when Uddalaka) says: "that thou art," that is: 'thou, the embodied soul, persist [tisthasi] thanks to that, the Supreme Self, (who is) the cause impelling thee (to act)'."'3 And it is this meaning that is represented [vyutpadita-] in the illustration: [65] "(. . . this mighty tree) ... being pervaded by the supreme Self, stands firm, drinking and rejoicing.""'32 [Q] Or, (our text means) 'thou art born from Him' (when) it says "that art thou." Everyone recognizes (here) either deletion (of the case ending) or a substitution of the nominative singular (ending for that of the ablative), in accordance with the aphorism: "The luk-deletion of the case-endings (is permissible) ... (in the Vedic language).""' And it is this
meaning that is made clear in the illustration: " . . all

enjoined, including (s)ya(fi) [P. 5.1.124]-which is now not otiose. 124 All the preceding interpretations have taken "tat tvam asi" as three words; given though that neither Sanskrit mss. nor the viva voce tradition take any special account of word boundaries, it is always possible to suggest other word divisions, grammar permitting. In our present case, "tat," when taken as an independent word would be a nominative singular neuter of the pronoun, and the predicate of the assertion-but the same form could also be understood as the stem of that pronoun, properly compounded with the following nominal, which happens here to be "tvam." We get the somewhat anomalous "compound": "that-thou", understood like the more usual "tatpurusa"'his servant' to imply a genitive relation: 'its thou'. We confront here the outer limits of Sanskrit grammar, as well as of exegetical dexterity. 25 P. 2.2.8 and 2.3.50. Viz., the Navaprakarani, Chandogya 6.8 through 16. See next. 127 A leitmotif of the Madhva interpretations is the insistence that attention be paid to the nine concrete illustrations offered by Uddalaka: the banyan, the salt in the water, etc. Cf. Visnutattvanirnaya [S.M., vol. 5, p. 22ff.] 128 supam suluk.... P. 7.1.39; supra [D]. This notion was introduced initially to make the general point that our passage might be interpreted literally. Here it is developed concretely, both in terms of the case endings that may be deleted, and in terms of the implications of various illustrations. In the cases before us, the stitra will allow an apparent nominative to be taken in the sense of any case inflection. "Luk" indicates that the zero morpheme resulting from a deletion may not be presumed still to be there for purposes of subsequent rule application. Unlike "lopa" deletion, the substituend really has been zeroed.
126

these creatures, even though they have come forth from Being do not know.... [R] (Or, the text intends) the meaning 'thou art of Him' (when) it says "that art thou," viz., 'thou art His dependent, a servant of Him'. As in the example "the King's man" the relation (expressed here) has the meaning of the genitive case, defined as that (relation) obtaining between possessor and possessed [svasvdmibhava-].'35 And it is this meaning that is made clear

that which "lives on (another)" upaqivyopaqj-vakatva: [upaj-vaka-] and that on which it lives [upaqjvya-]. Supra, notes 19 and 27. 130 ddrstdntike pi: in other words, the difference between theiY-vaand Brahman may be conceived in as many different ways as there are illustrations of it offered. 131 prayojakahetu: the distinction between Brahman and the individual soul is here modelled on the grammatical distinction between the hetu [P. 1.4.55] and the kartr [1.4.54]. In causative verb constructions, the second, or causative, agent manifests agency only in provoking [tatprayojakah] the underlying agent itself to act. 132 Chandogya 6.11.1 Otherwise Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 461. 133 See above. Here the ablative [fifth] case is presumed to have been deleted, rather than the instrumental [third]. 134 Chandogya 6.10.2. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 460. 135 Supra, [0].
129

GEROW: The Dvaitin as Deconstructionist in the illustration: ' . . . of that subtle essence this great Nyagrodha tree is (a dependent)."136 [S] (Or, the text intends) the meaning 'thou art on Him, (namely, on) Brahman', when it says: "that thou art." (The relation expressed here) has the meaning of the locative case, viz., 'thou art based on Him, reside in Him, art near to Him, art dependent on Him'.'37 And it is the relation of "support" and "supported" that is represented in the illustra[daraydaravibhdva-] tion of the bird and (its) cord.'38 These several meanings may be intended (without recourse to metonymy) by (invoking) the denotative function alone. [T] Or, (we may construe the text to read): "that is the Self; not-that art thou."''39The meaning is (then): 'the Self is that subtle one; thou art not that', that is, 'thou art other than that.' Even though the passage "sa dtmdtattvamasi"is ambiguous, because (its) words may be divided up in two (quite different) ways, nevertheless (it is easy to) decide that what is taught thereby is not non-difference, but difference, in conformity with the (many) illustrations, all of which unambiguously have difference as their purport. For it makes no sense, after proposing one thing as thesis, to offer corroborating instances of another (thesis). The (ambiguous statement): "sound is (non) eternal"140 is, after all, decisive(ly understood) as soon as [66] the

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example of the "pot" (is offered). See further the discussion in my Khandanakhandana regarding the nature of the corroborating example. Further, we hear in the Mahopanisad: As (illustrated) by the bird and the string, By the essences of the many trees, By the rivers and the sea, by the salt In the pure water, by the thief and The stolen property, by a man and His (many) destinations-in these ways Are the embodied soul and the Lord separate, Eternally differentiated; nevertheless Because of His extreme subtlety The supreme Lord is not seen as different From the embodied soul by those of Little intellect--though He is its impeller. He who knows the difference of these two Is freed; otherwise, he is (forever) bound.'4'

Let me now sum up, in tabular form, the twenty interpretations. Those involving a metonymy are indicated by bold-faced numbers; the metonymy itself, or the sense derived by grammatical rule, is also emphasized in bold-face. On the right are given Visnudasa's examples, and a brief translation.

1. tadadhTnotpattiko'si Thou art founded on that! 2. jivasamlpagatam tat tvam asi Which art thou? The Brahma-thout 3. tadvad asi [atideso 'yam] Thou are a that! 4. tasmin adhdrabandhane sakunir iva tvam tisthasi Thou art located in that! 5. tatsahacaritas tvam asi Thou art ever near that!

dhanyam asi dhinuhi devan Thou art grain [o cooked rice]! sadkhaiva candrah Which moon? The branch-moon! abrahmadattam brahmadattam itydh& He's a (veritable) Brahmadatta! annam brahma! Brahman is food! [supdrm suluk] vasantam adhTtevisantikah He studies the summer (-lesson)

136 Chandogya 6.12.2. Radhakrishnan otherwise. The Chandogya uses an unmistakable genitive. 137 ... all predicates requiringa locative complement [-tasmin]. As above, the case is deleted by "suprm suluk... 138 Chandogya 6.8.2; supra [D]. 139 sa atmdtattvamasi: The rationale for this emendation is also grounded in the Upanisadic context. Svetaketu has returned from his years of Vedic study "conceited"-thinking falsely that his soul and the ultimate soul are one! To disabuse him of this, his father denies the identity. Ramanuja had also noted Svetaketu's pride, in arguing against the

Advaita notion of identity [Veddrthasarngraha,13-18]. 140 sabdo'nityah: which may be resolved either as "Vabdah nityah" 'sound is eternal' or "gabdah anityah"'sound is noneternal'. But as soon as an illustration is offered-"like the ether," or "like a pot," the sense of the original proposition is disambiguated. 141 Cited by Madhvacdrya in Visnutattvanirnaya [from "Paramopanisad": S.M., vol. 5, p. 27]. The "illustrations" refer to Chandogya 6.8.2, 9.1, 10.1, 13.1, 16.1, and 15.1-2. This concludes the excerpt from our translation of Vadaratnavall.

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6. tatsarupas tvam asi Thou art intelligent like that! 7. tadadhinatvdt tadvyapadesas tvam asi The thou is the "Brahman!" 8. bheddvivaksitatvad bhinnam api tat tvam asi Thou art indeed a that! 9. tatsambandhf tatpreryas tatsakhas tvam asi Thou art intimate with that! 10. tacchilo 'Si Thou art Brahmaed! 11. prerakam tat preryas tvam asi [vdkyaikadesaprayogah] Thou art ... That is ... 12.fjivas tada-sritastatsadrsas tatsahacaritas tatsdyujyavdrms tatpreryo mokse pi Thou in mok~a depend on that! 13. tad aitaddtmyam tvam asi Thou art that, viz.... 14. idem [different referent] 15. tasya tvam asi That-thou art! 16. tena prayojakahetund tvam j]vas tisthasi Thou art thence 17. tato jdtas tvam asi Thou art thither 18. tasya ddsas tvam asi Thou art that's 19. tasmin brahmani tvam tisthasi Thou art there 20. sa dtmd I atat tvam asi Svetaketo! &dityoyuipah And the pole is the sun! rjad rdstram abhavat The king is the "kingdom!" [Holkar . .. samudrah kundikd This vat is an ocean! samarthah padavidhih The word (-injunction) is competent ig yanah saMprasdranam Ik is the reduction of Yan athdto brahmajijiidsd Next, enquiry ... [is to be undertaken] prajdh saddyatan-h ... &c. sarvdth [upacdra properly speaking] All beings are truth's basis "Thou art that 'governed by it"' [anaphoric 'tat'] "Thou art that 'kind of thing"' King-man > King's man [sasthyarthah samdsah] "Thou persisteth [by] that" suluk] [supdrm "Thou art born [from] that" "Thou art the servant [of] that" "Thou art [in] that" "Thou are[n't] that, Svetaketu!

The twenty are not presented very systematically. Vyasaraya's major contribution to the discussion is in fact his attempt to systematize them.'42 Yet the two accounts are not identical. Visnudasa is aware that the twenty interpretations fall into three main subvarieties: [i] some [1-3, 5-10, 12] involve laksand, as does the Advaitin's version. Our interpretations, however, involve but a single laksand'. And of these, all but one, if I understand them rightly, involve taking "tat" [= Brahman] metonymically, in such a way that an underlying relationship between the "tat" and the "tvam" is suggested: origin, dependence, location,

possession, association, etc. Laukika and sastraic or vedic examples are given for each of these usages. The ambiguous "'akhacandranydya" alone'43 appears to involve laksand of the term "tvam," which elsewhere always designates ?vetaketu literally: the jIva, the embodied souL [ii] others [4, 11, 13-19] involve no

142

See BNKS 2:124-39.

143 Unless 12 is to be taken as involving upacara of "tvam" in the sense 1jiva'-notions of dependence etc. now being predicated on the jTva, rather than on "tat" [=Brahma]. In which case, the term "tvam" must elsewhere be taken as referringdirectly to the individual Svetaketu. This is probably a preferable interpretation in that it allows us to distinguish clearly cases 12 and 1.

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metonymy at all, but arrive at their meaning by directly grammatical devices, such as the Vedic siitra supdrm suluk... 144, or by syntactical adjustments, such as taking "tat" as the anaphora [13-14], or interpreting the whole phrase as more than one sentence [11]. Finally [iii], Madhva's textual emendation seems to consistute a class of interpretations by itself, for it involves neither [i] nor [ii] above. A problem which I have not been able to solve satisfactorily is the apparent synonymy of cases 4 and 19. Visnudasa says explicitly that both are to be suluk. . ." and we may formed by the siltra "supdqm not therefore appeal to a principle that seems to operate elsewhere: similarity of semantic result may be achieved through different technical devices, which by themselves are sufficient to define cases as separate [e.g., 8, 3; 10, 1]. That he refers to one of the nine illustrations in re 4 [viz., sakuni, the bird] would seem an insufficient motivation of the distinction, for the illustrations are everywhere appealed to as the ground of the metaphors involved. However, the point may well be that the locative sense may be justified either with [4] or without [19] reference to the context of the utterance. If this is so, then our number 4 may be taken as implying deletion of any one of the four cases [cf. 16-19], but specifically motivated by the context. Vyasaraya does not materially change this schema. He distinguishes the two subcases under [i] above, and he clearly classes our case 2 [.adkhaiva candrah under metonymies of "tvam."'45Our problematic case 12 is not apparently understood as different from 1; instead two new interpretations are offered which clearly involve laksand on "tvam." That is to say, the phrase "tat tvam asi" is now taken as referring directly to Brahma, rather than to Svetaketu: 'Brahma is the "thou" [among the Gods ... ],' etc. The different kinds of non-metonymic principles we have seen operating sub [ii] are also more explicitly distinguished. Apart from the new cases of metonymy on "tvam," which seem weaker than the others in that they do not seem to fit as well the sentential context of the following vocative [Svetaketo!], Vyasaraya's interpretations are not significantly different from Visnudasa's, are somewhat better organized, and in a few instances, seem to ignore sophisticated points made by the earlier author [cf. 12]. The sources of Visnudasa's discussion of "tat tvam asi" are not always very clear, either among Madhvas

or Advaitins. Madhva himself, apart from his notorious reedition of the of the text: sa dtmd I atat tvam asi, interprets the vakya only contextually-in the light of the nine examples offeredpassim in Chandogya 6: the salt in the water, the nyagrodha fruit, the rivers and the ocean, etc. His point is well taken, but has been largely overlooked, in the glare of the publicity given to his radical notion of samdhi. Since the examples presume difference, and express only absorption or mergence, it is, he says, in the interest of the whole text better to take tat tvam asi in the same way, for otherwise the illustrations will be pointless. 146 Neither is Jayatirtha a likely source. His Vadavali discusses two vedavdkydni only [ekam evddvitTyam, neha ndindsti] and these so briefly as not to suggest the rich possibilities Visnudasa explores. In his commentary on Tattvodyota, 4 Jayatirtha argues that our text is to be taken figuratively-as a simile, and contradicts the Advaita view that it expresses "abheda." He further notes that even if it were taken as expressing identity, patent contradiction at the mukhydrtha level would force reinterpretation as simile anyway [sa iva tvam asi]. Jayatirtha's interpretation is based on the relation of "reflection" [bimbapratibimbabhdva-]. This brief and indeed laconic interpretation, although it does itself involve laksand, is not Visnudasa's source. It is tempting to think that the sudden emergence of semantic acumen on the part of Visnudasa was in part an ingenious response to the negative reaction that Madhva's outrageous interpretation of tat tvam asi had itself occasioned. Samkara, in his unquestionably authentic writings,'48frequently refers to this vedavdkya, but accepts its meaning as self-evident, requiring no special defense: tat [brahma] tvam [atmd] asi [9vetaketo!].'49 By it the identity [aikyam] of the individual soul and the world-principle is declared. Neither is the long section on "tat tvam asi" in the verse portion of the Upadesasahasrli50 of much help in ascertaining
146 In these contextual interpretations, Madhva adopts the traditional reading: tat tvam asi. As Sharma points out, this indicates that Madhva was interested not so much in revising the Veda, as in focusing attention on the Advaitin's cavalier attitude to language generally: BNKS 1:239 and 2:138-9. 147 Cited BNKS 1.327. 148 But see below re Upadesasahasri and Vivekacudamani. 149 E.g., Srmkarabhdsya ad Chdndogya 6.8.7: atas tat (sat) tvam [viz., pratyagatma] asiti he Svetaketo! [A.S.S. #14, p. 365] 150 XVIII. [P.O.S. 8, pp. 329ff.] The attribution to Samkara though open to question, is generally accepted. See Mayeda, Samkara's Upadestasdhasri, Tokyo, 1973.

144 145

P. 7.1.39. Supra [D] and passim. BNKS vol. 2, p. 129.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 107.4 (1987) to point us away from all the false anvayas-the associations we make via the worldly ahamkkdra, towards that which is truly invariable in our "selves." If this is the case, we have here only the dimmest precursor of the problem Visnudasa later develops. No theory of the saktis is even implied, much less 158 expressed! In the VivekacUdamani, also attributed by some to Samkara,159 a treatment of "tat tvam asi" is found and along with it the kernel of the interpretation to which our Dvaitin critics object: aikyam tayor [tattvaMpadayor] laksitayor na vdcyayor nigadyate 'nyonyaviruddhadharminoh ... 160 If this work is indeed Samkara's, it would account for the modus of the subsequent discussion. To me, however, the tat tvam asi discussion and that of other grutis in Vivekaciidamani seems already to presume the beginnings of the polemic, which must have been subsequent at least to Samkara. If the Vivekaciidamani is earlier than Vadaratnavali, it may be a source for Visnudasa. It is the Vivarana school'6' of Advaita that appears to be responsible for the early interpretation of "tat tvam asi" as a double laksana, and thus most likely provides the provocation for the Dvaita reply. Padmapada's Paficapadika already contains the kernel of the later controversy, for it is the first to compare "tat tvam asi" to laukika statements like "so 'yam Devadattah.'62 In his commentary on this passage, Prakasatman'63 appears to adopt the two laksand
58 Though verse 29 comes close to adopting the terminology of the later discussion: abhdso yatra tatraiva sabddh ... laksayeyur, na sdksat tam [dtmdnam] abhidadhyuh kathamcana. 19 See Potter, EIP, 3:335 and notes. Paul Hacker accepts, Ingalls and Mayeda deny, his authorship. 160 Vs. 244 ab [ed. H. R. Bhagavat, Poona Oriental Series #8, 2nd ed., 1952]. Samkara's authentic commentary on Chandogya 6.8.7 shows no trace of this interpretation [ASS #14, p. 365-66]. 161 Citsukha, Visnuddsa's favorite Advaitin, does not discuss the vdkya. 162 9.21. This later serves as a stock example of jahadajahallaksana- [suddhddhyavasdna variety: see below]. "This is the (same) Devadatta (that you saw yesterday)" is understood as a laksand in that the temporal qualification now attaching to the visible Devadatta [Skt. ayam] has been set aside in asserting an identity with the Devadatta of yesterday [sah]. The Devadatta is the same. Similarly, that aspect of the tvam incompatible with Brahmahood is set aside; the remainder is kept-consciousness, etc. 163 10th century ["975": Potter, EIP, 1.147].

Visnudasa's sources. The main purport of the section, as has long been recognized,"' is that the correct understanding of key Vedic passages [vedavdkydni] is a, or perhaps the way to realizing Brahman. The point of view is thus very primitive, and may even be preSamkaran. Jiidna is not so much achieved here by ratiocination, as by revelation-revelation of the partially hidden import of the Vedic passage.'52 The ritualistic context is evident, and suggests perhaps a Mimamsa sect on its way to adopting a classical Advaita posture. But it is also clear that the Upadegasahasri proposes, however inchoately, a method of interpreting Vedic texts, using the ubiquitous terms anvaya and vyatireka. Van Buitenen takes these terms to imply much of the problematic of later authors such as Visnudasa. He explicitly identifies the method as that of laksand, or metonymy."' But he acknowledges that even Suresvara, who follows Upadegasahasri closely, does not dilate explicitly on this "laksana."''54 We need not go into the matter in great detail, since a copious literature has grown up around Samkara's use of the terms anvaya and vyatireka."'5Van Buitenen's interpretation seems hasty, for other passages in section 18 itself of the Upadegasahasri suggest that the author saw, in texts such as "tat tvam asi," not so much a problem resolvable by laksanad,as he saw in these texts a necessarily veiled effort to refer to the inexpressible itself that which is beyond any power of language to signify.'56 Words themselves are proof that dbhdsa is operating.'57Halbfass is doubtless right in concluding that anvaya and vyatireka here mean little more than 'avyabhicdra' and 'vyabhicdra': the adventitious can never properly be associated with Brahman. It is the force of texts such as "tat tvam asi"
E.g., Dasgupta, H.I.P., vol. 2, p. 81. See the fascinating account of Samkara's reasoning in Wilhelm Halbfass' Studies in Kumdrila and Samkara, Reinbek, 1983. The mentions of our text in Upadegasdhasri, and Samkara's way of interpreting it, are discussed pp. 5457, where also is cited the earlier literature in extenso. 1 Vedarthasamgraha, Introduction, p. 63. Even "jahadajahallaksand"! 154 Ibidem. I have not been able to consult the article by R. V. deSmet, "The logical structure of 'tat tvam asi' according to Suresvara's Naiskarmyasiddhi" [Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner, 1961], noted by Potter, EIP, 1:133. 1' Cited, Halbfass, loc. cit. 156 jdtikarmadimattvad dhi tasmini sabdds tv ahamkrti I na kascid vartate sabdas tadabhdvdt sva atmani [18.28]. 157na hy ajdtyddimdn kascid arthah sabdair niruipyate atmabhaso yathahamkrd dtmasabdais tathocyate [ 18.30/ 3 1].
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theory in explaining how both elements of "tat tvam asi" eventually mean 'brahman' [the akhanIdrtha paksa]. But the terms used are not those of the developed discussion, and indeed could be taken as " 164 It implying only the later "jahadajahallaksain. should be noted that the "double laksand" view that Visnudasa is contesting, and the "jahadajahallaksan-d" notion, are not formally identical: the first asserts that two words ["tat" and "tvam"] simultaneously may be taken metaphorically, the latter, that one word [i.e., "Brahman" or "gvetaketu"], may itself be taken both metaphorically, and not metaphorically. The result is equally onerous, for the sentence also has to be read twice. Visnudasa, furthermore, takes these two views as different.'65 By the time of Sarvajfiatman,166 a technical vocabulary has been elaborated in order to discuss these matters. He apparently is the first to use the term of the peculiar metonymy the "jahadajahallaksanad" Advaitins propose for our text. Logically, of course, the former view could be said to imply the latter, for the Advaitin clearly wishes to take both tat and tvam "mukhyalaksandbhydrm" that is, as retaining some
ayam atmd tat tvam asftyddisabdds ca mukhyalaksanadbhydam brahmany eva vartanta iti [Paficapddikdvivarana, p. 239, Vizianagram SS. #5, Benares, 1892; cf. editor's note: "jahadajahallaksanayetyarthah"]. The "so 'yam devadattah" example (taken from Padmapada's text) follows, and is explained in the same way. By this odd notion, a term may both abandon and not abandon its literal meaning in the same instance, may both be a metaphor and not a metaphor at the same time. Later writers offer illustrations involving part-whole relations: "The town is burning" [even if only part of it is on fire!]. But of course the major application is to texts like tat tvam asi, whereby the double laksand is rationalized [see below]-and the akhanddrtha of Brahman is explained. Compare "this is the (same) Devadatta (that you saw yesterday)." Jahadajahallaksand is strenuously defended by later Advaitins, such as Appaya Diksita [Vrttivdrttika, part 2], but was never accepted by the dlamkdrikas. 165 "na-pi jahadajahallaksanayeti dvitiyah pak~sah"[p. 57], "athavd padadvayasya laksanad-rayanamayuktam" [p. 58]. As we have indicated above, his twenty interpretations are directed against the latter contention only. 166 First half of the eleventh century [Potter, EIP, 1:159]. 167 Paficaprakriya, p. 10 [ed. Cintamani]. See Van Buitenen, op. cit., pp. 63-64. In Sarvajfiatman's Sarhksepasiarraka,
164

aspect of their literal references:'Brahman' and 'Svetaketu'. It is the conjunction of terms only that forces us to reevaluate both words: for the person Svetaketu is not pure intelligence, and the world-principle is not delimited by a body.'68 Thus, from the Advaitin's point of view, it is one "jahadajahallaksa~n" that provokes the other-a reciprocal of even recursive metaphor! Sarvajfiatman, apparently, also first draws attention to this parallel between 'jahadajahallaksand" and the notion of double laksanadalthough his treatment seems somewhat defensive and could itself be taken to imply prior partisan criticism. Not only does he link the two modes of laksanad, he understands that adopting one forces us to adopt the other!169 We thus conclude that Sarvajfiatmanrepresents unambiguously the thesis that Visnudasa attacks. Visnudasa's method of grammatical and ?astraic interpretation was it seems made widely known and popularized by Vyasaraya; several distinguished Advaitins, Appaya Dliksita and Madhusfidana in particular, took it upon themselves to respond to Vyasaraya and the Madhva critique. In a sequel, I will discuss Madhusfidana's replies to Vyasaraya and Visnudasa, and his defence of the Advaitin interpretations of "tat tvam asi" and other vedavdkydni. But for now I must leave you with the uncomfortable thought that identity propositions are semantically preposterous. "OWill we ever really assert who "we" are?

1.149ff., synonymous terms are employed: e.g., bhdgamjahdti na jahdti ca bhdgam anyd [ 1.154], but the notion of threefold [jahal-, ajahal-, and jahadajahal-] laksand is clearly espoused. 161 Sarnksepasariraka 1.162: yady apy evabi ndtirekdvakdaah purne tattve tattvamarthopapatteh: "Even then (if it is argued that, in order to justify the grammatical coordination of the two words, it is necessary to accept difference), still there is not even a trace of difference (between the senses signified), as the secondary senses of these two words would hold good only when they are identical." [N. Veezhinathan, tr.; M.U.P.S. #18, p. 77] 169 Ibid. 1.163: na ca vinigamandydrm kdranam kimcid astiI sphutam ubhayapadasthd laksand-samsyate 'tah: "As there is no clear basis for taking one of the two words in its figurative sense, it is proper that the two words should be taken (together) in their secondary significative function." [ibid., p. 78] 170 If true, otiose; iffalse, non-existent. Q.E.D.