Professional Documents
Culture Documents
T ab L e of C o N te N ts
Introduction
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Contact Information
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Copyright 2011 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University and Heidrick & Struggles. All rights reserved
E X eC U T I V e S U M M A RY: K e Y Res U L T s A N D Re C O M M e N D A T I O N s
the board and one who will actively contribute real work as a director, says Mr. Miles. CEOs of companies that have experienced public ethical lapses are seen as far more tainted by the scandal than their boards are. While only 37% of directors believe that an ex-CEO of a company that experienced substantial accounting or ethical problems can be a good board member, 67% believe a director of a similarly-plagued company can, says Professor Larcker. Some directors do see value in having a CEO who has experienced and hopefully learned from mistakes in judgment. But far more are concerned about the stigma and perception issues in bringing aboard a CEO like this. Boards are struggling to evaluate whether prospective board members will be a good t for the company. Fifty-one percent of directors see it as moderately difcult and 20% see it as extremely or very difcult to gauge whether a prospect will be a good addition to the board, says Mr. Miles. Boards are clearly nding it a challenge to determine someones t. A single person can ruin a great board, so boards need to spend considerable time evaluating this very subjective quality. More than half of directors think that board turnover is too low. The challenge of getting rid of board members is that there is a widespread assumption of board tenure, says Professor Larcker. You may want to bring them on for three to ve years, but they end up staying for ten. While egregious problems might be taken care of more quickly, it is much more difcult to get rid of an underperforming or irrelevant director who just happens to stay on too long. Forty-six percent of companies do not engage in succession planning for their board of directors. Just as we found in our study last year that companies are seriously lagging in CEO succession planning, boards arent doing a great job of planning for board succession either, said Mr. Miles. Sixtysix percent of directors do believe that board succession planning is an important best practice, but only 54% actually do it.
Despite the fact that sitting CEOs are highly sought-after for board seats, 79% of directors said that, in practice, active CEOs are no better than non-CEO board members. Companies need to differentiate between a CEO who brings cach to
Nearly 20% of lead directors are chosen by the CEO or chairman. For obvious reasons, CEOs should not choose the lead director, says Mr. Miles. The CEO should be asked for input, but the ultimate choice needs to be made by the board. Forty-seven percent of respondents said that their lead director was elected by the independent directors, but this number should be much higher. More than 80% of board members are somewhat skeptical of the value of professional directors. Even though there has been a call among some for increased use of professional directors those who make it a full-time job to sit on boards most directors dont think that professional directors are any better than traditional board members, says Professor Larcker. While some respondents believe that this groups diversity of experience is an asset to a board, many are concerned that professional board members are too busy with other directorships to be effective.
3. Tread carefully when evaluating professional directors as board candidates. Its important to remember that boards must have a good, working relationship with their CEO in order to build value, says Mr. Miles. Ideally, a professional director comes from a background of multiple leadership positions where he or she has a deep understanding for what the CEO is going through. For these reasons, retired CEOs have the potential to make great professional directors. They can have a constructive dialogue with the CEO and can really contribute strategically and operationally. 4. Take the lead director position much more seriously. You should conduct a succession process for your lead director just as you would for a CEO or board seat, says Mr. Miles. The lead director should be the most respected member on the board a rst among equals. The nominating/ governance committee needs to run this process and make sure that the best director is in the position. It should never be rotational as not every director is suited for this leadership role. 5. Evaluate and refresh your board. Of course most board members think they are above average, says Professor Larcker. Its human nature. However, the evaluation process should be structured so that companies get a clear understanding of who is adding real value and who is not. It is time to move beyond check-the-box board reviews and start to seriously evaluate the boards effectiveness and its individual directors. Once you have this information, the chairman or lead director has to be ready to have the difcult conversation about how a director can improve, or whether it is better for them to step down.
As companies think about who to bring onto the board that can deliver the greatest value, Professor Larcker and Mr. Miles offer the following suggestions: 1. Re-think appointing the name CEO to the board. Yes, a company gets great publicity when it recruits a big name onto the board, says Professor Larcker, but you really need to think about what this person will actually deliver in value. If they are too busy or if they dont t the culture or have the right chemistry, it might not be worth it. 2. Weigh failure when evaluating a prospective board member. Obviously, personal ethical lapses should preclude someone from being chosen as a director, but there might be value in someone coming from a company that failed, says Professor Larcker. Boards need to understand what this persons contribution was to the failure. Did they learn important lessons, or are they likely to repeat past mistakes?
To speak with David Larcker or Stephen Miles about this research survey, please contact Helen Chang, Stanford Graduate School of Business, (650) 7233358 or chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu; or Jennifer Nelson, Heidrick & Struggles, (404) 682-7373 or jnelson@heidrick.com.
A. BAcKGROUND 1. What is your present position? (Please check all that apply.)
Percent Chief Executive Ofcer Retired Chief Executive Ofcer Chairman of the Board Retired Chairman of the Board Lead Director Executive Ofcer Retired Executive Ofcer Outside Board Member 15 15 17 5 10 13 7 66
2. What is the revenue for the company that you are most closely identied with?
Percent <$500 million $500 million to $1 billion $1 billion to $5 billion $5 billion to $10 billion $10 billion to $20 billion >$20 billion Total Percentage 31 14 25 14 7 9 100
<$500 million $500 million to $1 billion $1 billion to $5 billion $5 billion to $10 billion $10 billion to $20 billion >$20 billion
Other 9
Chief Executive Officer Retired Chief Executive Officer Chairman of the Board Retired Chairman of the Board Lead Director Executive Officer Retired Executive Officer Outside Board Member Other
10
15
20
25
30
35
Percent
10
20
30
40 Percent
50
60
70
80
3. What is the industrial sector for the company that you are most closely identied with?
Percent Natural Resources Non-durables Regulated Utility Wholesale/Retail 5 12 2 7
5. Age
Percent < 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 61 to 70 > 70 Total Percentage 0 2 12 37 40 9 100
Durables 21
14 100
0 26 1 40 2 16 3 13 4 4 5 1
0 1
4. Gender
Percent Female 26 Male 74 Total Percentage 100
2 3 4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 Percent 30 35 40
Percent
6.d. Total number of boards - this is computed from the above three questions Percent
0 5 1 13 2 19 3 22 4 13 5 10 >5 18
0
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 >5
0 10 20 30 Percent 40 50 0 5 10 15 Percent 20 25
>5
0 35 1 30 2 22 3 4 4 6 5 2 >5 1
7. Are you a professional board member or director (a director whose primary job is to serve on boards)?
Percent Yes 29 No 71 Total Percentage 100
0 1 2 3 4 5 >5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
Percent
B. PLANNING FOR NEw BOARD MEmbERS 8. Who in your company is responsible for identifying new candidates to serve on the board of directors (Please check all that apply):
Percent CEO Lead Director Other Directors Nominating & Governance Committee Full Board of Directors External Consultants Other (please specify 18 6 8 28 15 6 1 Chairman 16
CEO Chairman Lead Director Nominating & Governance Committee Full Board of Directors External Consultants Other
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Percent
CEO Chairman
10. When does your company typically begin the process of identifying candidates to serve on the board: (please check only one) ?
Percent
Lead Director Other Directors Nominating & Governance Committee Full Board of Directors External Consultants Other
After an outgoing director has stepped down While an outgoing director is in the process of stepping down Before an outgoing director announces plans to step down Other Total Percentage
6 26 49 19 100
10
15 Percent
20
25
30
9. Who in your company has primary responsibility for identifying candidates to serve on the board (please check only one):
Percent CEO 11 Chairman 14 Lead Director Nominating & Governance Committee Full Board of Directors External Consultants Other Total Percentage 1 62 7 2 3 100
Selected other responses: Need new skills When a need for a particular skill set is identied or required (new expertise sought OR replacement) When someone that would add value to the board is identied Ongoing with assumed 1-2 year lead; ongoing review of potential candidates We are constantly looking to expand the Board When board assessments reveal the need for certain capabilities/ skills/insights that are not currently represented on the Board When modications to the strategy are made Approaching mandatory retirement Well in advance of mandatory retirement dates When a director is approaching mandatory retirement or term limits Acquisition Acquisitions bring directors
11. Does your company develop a formal written document that outlines the skills, competencies, and experiences required for the next board member (skills and experience prole)? (please check only one)
Percent
13. How difcult is it to evaluate whether a prospective board member will be a good choice (in terms of chemistry, experience, and knowledge) for the company? (please check only one)
Percent Extremely difcult Very difcult Moderately difcult Slightly difcult Not at all difcult Total Percentage 3 17 51 22 7 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Extremely difficult Very difficult Moderately difficult Slightly difficult Not at all difficult
0 10 20 30 Percent 40 50 60
Percent
12. (If Yes to q11) How different is the skills and experiences prole for your next board member from the skills and experiences prole of the outgoing director (please check only one):
Percent Extremely different Very different Moderately different Slightly different Not at all different Total Percentage 4 21 46 20 9 100
14. Is the present turnover of board members on U.S. Corporate Boards (please check only one)
Percent Much too low About right Much too high Total Percentage 8 44 0 100 Low 47
Extremely different Very different Moderately different Slightly different Not at all different
0 10 20 30 Percent 40 50 60
High 1
Much too low Low About right High Much too high
0 10 20 30 Percent 40 50 60
C. BOARD SUccESSION PLANNING 15. Does your company engage in succession planning for the board of directors? (please check only one)
Percent Yes 54 No 46 Total Percentage 100
17. (If Yes to q15) How often is board succession planning discussed in formal board or committee meetings (please check only one):
Percent One meeting per year Two meetings per year More than two meetings per year Every few years Total Percentage 24 36 33 6 100
Never 1
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
One meeting per year Two meetings per year More than two meetings per year Every few years Never
Percent
16. (If Yes to q15) Where is board succession planning primarily discussed (please check only one):
Percent Meetings of the full board Meetings of the nominating and governance committee Informally among directors Other (please specify) Total Percentage
Meetings of the full board Meetings of the nominating and governance committee Informally among directors Other (please specify)
0 10 20 30 40 Percent 50 60 70 80
21 71 4 4 100
10
15
20 Percent
25
30
35
40
18. Which of the following statements best summarizes your opinion of board succession planning (please check only one):
Percent It is an important best practice It is useful only when the board has critical directors whose loss would be very bad for the company It is not useful at all Total Percentage 66 26 8 100
19. Does your company have board members with an expertise in CEO succession planning (i.e., they have led or have participated in three or more succession processes in the past as a CEO or director):
Percent Yes 66 No 34 Total Percentage 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
20. (If Yes to q19) Which of the following directors have expertise in succession planning (please check all that apply):
Number Chairman 79 Lead Director Director(s) other than these 48 93 Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee 69
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
Chairman Lead Director Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee Director(s) other than these
0 20 40 60 Percent 80 100
23. What traits of active CEOs make them attractive board candidates (please check all that apply):
Percent Strategic expertise Risk management expertise Operational expertise Experience responding to a crisis or failure Leadership qualities Extensive personal and/or professional networks Other (please specify) 77 45 74 43 67 46 13
21. When recruiting for an open board seat, does your company consider whether a candidate has previous experience in CEO succession planning?
Percent Yes 24 No 76 Total Percentage 100
Strategic expertise Risk management expertise Operational expertise Experience responding Leadership qualities
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
D. CEOs AS BOARD MEmbERS 22. Are directors who are active CEOs better than non-CEO board members?
Percent Yes 21 No 79 Total Percentage 100
Current Knowledge Current industry knowledge Current issues, current issues experience External global market dynamics perspective Ability to identify with the CEO in terms of issues They are currently in the ow of business issues They are currently experiencing some of the same problems as our CEO Retired CEOs bring considerable perspective but not the immediacy of serving CEOs
10
24. What traits of active CEOs make them unattractive board candidates (please check all that apply):
Percent Too busy with their company to be effective directors 87 Too interested in networking/promoting their own company to be effective directors Too bossy/used to having their way Not good collaborators Other (please specify) 21 33 28 5
26. Are directors who are retired CEOs better than average board members?
Percent Yes 46 No 54 Total Percentage 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Too busy Too interested Too bossy Not good collaborators Never
0 20 40 60 Percent 80 100
Percent
27. How many years before the experiences of a retired CEO become outdated and are no longer valuable to current board service?
Percent Less than 3 years More than 3 but less than 5 years More than 5 but less than 10 years More than 10 years CEO experience never becomes outdated Total Percentage 10 16 20 16 38 100
Selected other responses: Big ego Not good listeners Too generous with compensation
25. Are directors who are retired CEOs better board members than active CEOs?
Percent Yes 55 No 45 Total Percentage 100
More than 3 but less than 5 years More than 5 but less than 10 years More than 10 years CEO experience never outdated
0 5 10 15 20 Percent 25 30 35 40
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
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28. Can an ex-CEO of a company that experienced substantial accounting and ethical problems be a good board member at another company? (please check only one)
Percent Yes 37 No 63 Total Percentage 100
Not a good t as ability to assess risk may be decient Assuming the problems occurred during his/her tenure, there is a reputational risk that may affect his/her ability to perform well If the issues arose on the CEOs watch they should have had the processes in place to see the risks and correct before they became problems for the company, the employees and shareholders Earnings experience may be a good teacher A good CEO learns why he missed the aws, and does not drop the ball twice, though be careful of awed characters. As long as the CEO was not involved (aware of or acting in) in personal egregious behavior and the CEO is able to openly speak to lessons learned so that Board can learn from his/her experience. However, there may always be a question mark around that person I would say yes depending on the situation if the CEO has learned from the mistake, he/she could be very valuable They may be a productive board member in a private company depending on their expertise in the segment or growth initiatives that do not track culture If the CEO recognized the deciencies and tried to be transformational, then yes. But if the CEO accepted status quo, then no There either is or is not a culture of ethical behavior and compliance or not. The CEO sets the tone. HOWEVER, there are CEOs who have inherited problems they did not create and they should not be blanketed with the above statement These problems may have strengthened the CEOs ability to respond effectively and plan proactively
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
30. Can a board member (not the CEO) at a company that experienced substantial accounting and ethical problems be a good board member at another company? (please check only one)
Percent Yes 67 No 33 Total Percentage 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
12
E. SEPARATING ThE ChAIRmAN AND CEO POSITIONS 32. Does your company separate the Chairman and CEO roles? (please check only one)
Percent Yes 68 No 32 Total Percentage 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
33. (If Yes to q32) How many years ago were the positions separated?
Percent 1 6 2 8 3 11 4 8 5 16 6 to 10 24 >10 8 Always 19 Total Percentage 100
1 2 3 4 5 6 to 10 > 10 Always
10 Percent
15
20
25
13
34. (If Yes to q32) What event or events caused the separation of CEO/Chairman positions? (please check all that apply)
Percent Pressure from large shareholders Legislative action Board members view this as a best practice It has always been the case for our company 4 2 38 25 Proxy advisor (ISS or Glass-Lewis) recommendation 4
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Other 20
Pressure from large shareholders Proxy advisor (ISS or Glass-Lewis) recommendation Legislative action Board members view this as a best practice It has always been the case Other
Percent
F. LEAD INDEPENDENT DIREcTOR 37. Does your company have a lead independent director?
Percent Yes 50 No 50
0 5 10 15 20 Percent 25 30 35 40
Total Percentage
100
Selected other responses: Concern over leadership qualities of promoted CEO Part of implementation of succession plan. Needed transition period Retirement of the previous CEO and hiring of a new rst time CEO who the board felt needed mentoring
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
35. (If Yes to q32) Is the separation due to a CEO succession event?
Percent
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
14
40. (If Rotated to q38) How frequently is the lead director position rotated?
Percent Every year Every 2 years 21 47 7 7 100
Every year Every 2 years Every 3 years No set schedule
0 10 20 30 Percent 40 50 60
18
20 60 0 20 100
41. (If Yes to q37) Is the lead independent director at your company the senior-most outside (nonexecutive) director?
Percent Yes 40 No 60 Total Percentage
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
39. (If Elected to q38) How frequently does the lead director election occur?
Percent Every year Every 2 years Every 3 years No set schedule Total Percentage 43 12 12 33 100
100
Percent
42. (If Yes to q37) Is the lead independent director at your company the most highly respected nonexecutive director?
Percent Yes 39 No 61 Total Percentage
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
100
Percent
15
43. (If Yes to q37) Does the lead independent director have personality attributes (such as the ability to build consensus) that specially equip this person to be effective in this position?
Percent Yes 86 No 14 Total Percentage 100
G. PROFESSIONAL BOARD MEmbERS In the following questions, we refer to a professional board member as a director whose primary job is to serve on boards (i.e., these individuals have prior executive experience, but currently they have no other full-time job than to sit on boards). Traditional board members are individuals that either have a full-time job or other professional interests. Most of their annual income is not derived from compensation for board positions. 46. Do you have any professional directors on your board?
Percent
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
44. (If Yes to q38) Does the lead independent director have prior board experience that is more extensive than the average director?
Percent
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
45. Which of the following statements best summarizes your opinion of the lead independent director position in your company (please check only one):
Percent It is an effective position that is a best practice It is something that is done to simply satisfy exchange listing requirements It is something that is simply window dressing for our shareholders Total Percentage 81 7 12 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
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48. What traits about professional board members make them attractive board candidates (please check all that apply):
Percent Experience with multiple companies Diversity of background Experience with successful companies Experience with failed companies Experience managing a crisis Extensive professional networks
Experience with multiple companies Diversity of background Experience with successful companies Experience with failed companies Experience managing a crisis Extensive professional networks 0 20 40 Percent 60 80 100
Too busy with directorships Too interested in networking/ promoting Lack independence No experience Doing this for the money Too old Other
0 10 20 30 Percent 40 50 60
86 62 58 36 50 40
H. BOARD ObSERVERS In the following questions, we refer to a board observer as an individual who attends board meetings or committee meetings, but is neither a full-time board member nor a paid consultant. 50. Does your company have board observers?
Percent Yes 17 No 83 Total Percentage 100
49. What traits of professional board members make them unattractive board candidates (please check all that apply):
Percent Too busy with other directorships to be effective Too interested in networking/promoting their own career to be effective Lack independence (because they rely on director fees as primary income) No current experience in executive position They are simply doing this for the money Too old Other 56 27 24 31 26 16 10
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
17
51. (If Yes to q50) How many board observers are present in a typical meeting?
Percent 1 32 2 5 3 0 4 26 >4 37 Total Percentage 100
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
54. If Yes to q53 Do these positions rotate among internal managers of the company (e.g., a new person(s) every year or every other year)?
Percent
1 2 3 4 >4
0 5 10 15 20 Percent 25 30 35 40
Yes No 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent
52. (If Yes to q50) How are board observers compensated for their services? (please check all that apply)
Percent Cash Options or stock They are not compensated Total Percentage 12 4 84 100
55. (If Yes to q50) Are board observers ever (please check all that apply)
Percent Investors 21 Customers 1 Suppliers 0 Employee representatives Other 18 25
53. (If Yes to q50) Do any of your board observers include internal management employees that have high potential to become senior executives within the company?
Percent Yes 52 No 48 Total Percentage 100
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56. (If Yes to q50) How are board observers identied and sourced? (please check all that apply):
Percent Management recommendation Director recommendation Recommendation by an investor Recommendation by a consultant Recommendation by an outside third party Other 46 18 1 4 0 18
Deeper company knowledge Deeper industry knowledge Deeper functional knowledge Scientific Knowledge Regulatory Knowledge Business Relationships Governmental Relationships Other
Management recommendation Director recommendation Recommendation by an investor Recommendation by a consultant Recommendation by an outside third party Other
10
20
30
40 Percent
50
60
70
80
58. (If Yes to q50) Which of the following are most likely to have a board observer (please check all that apply):
Percent
0 10 20 Percent 30 40 50
Meeting of the full board Meeting of the audit committee Meeting of the compensation committee
79 39 21
57. (If Yes to q50) What value do board observers add to the company? (please check all that apply):
Percent Deeper company knowledge Deeper industry knowledge Deeper functional knowledge Scientic Knowledge Regulatory Knowledge Business Relationships Governmental Relationships Other 61 29 29 4 21 25 4 11
Meeting of the nominating and governance committee 11 Meeting of a specialized committee (such as nance, risk, technology, etc.) 14
Meeting of the full board Meeting of the audit committee Compensation committee Nominating and governance committee Specialized committee
0 10 20 30 40 Percent 50 60 70 80
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59. (If Yes to q50) Does the presence of a board observer inuence the discussion or level of candor in the formal boardroom?
Percent Yes 17 No 83 Total Percentage 100
60. (If Yes to q50) Has a board observer ever been added to the board as a full voting member?
Percent Yes 17 No 83 Total Percentage 100
Percent
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A B O U T S TA N F O R D U N I V E R s I T Y s R O C K C E N T E R F O R C O R P O R AT E G O V E R N A N C E A N D H E I D R I C K & S T R U gg L E s
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DAVID F. LARcKER James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting; Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program; Senior Faculty, Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University; Codirector of the Directors Consortium Executive Program Website Phone Email http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp (650) 725-6159 larcker_david@gsb.stanford.edu
Professor Larckers research focuses on executive compensation, corporate governance, and managerial accounting. His work examines the choice of performance measures and compensation contracts in organizations. He has current research projects on the valuation implications of corporate governance, role of the business press in the debate on executive compensation, and modeling the cost of executive stock options. Professor Larcker presently holds the James Irvin Miller Professorship. He is the director of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and senior faculty of the Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. He recently co-authored the book Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences, published by FT Press-Pearson Prentice Hall in April, 2011. He has also authored numerous academic research papers, case studies, corporate governance closer look studies, and articles for the popular press including Do You Have A Plan For Finding Your Next CEO? The Corporate Board September/October 2010 with Stephen Miles of Heidrick & Struggles. Daves research has been often cited by the WSJ, BloombergBusinessWeek, FT, Forbes, NY Times, Agenda, NACD Directorship, Corporate Board Member, SHRM and Corporate Secretary Magazine among others. Professor Larcker was previously the Ernst & Young Professor of accounting at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and Professor of accounting and information systems at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University. He received his PhD in Business from the University of Kansas and his BS and MS in Engineering from the University of Missouri- Rolla. He is on the editorial boards of the Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. Professor Larcker received the Notable Contribution to Managerial Accounting Research in 2001. He is also a trustee of the Wells Fargo Advantage Funds.
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STEPhEN A. MILES Vice Chairman, Heidrick & Struggles Phone Email (404) 538-0119 smiles@heidrick.com
Stephen Miles is a vice chairman of Heidrick & Struggles. He runs Leadership Advisory Services within the Leadership Consulting Practice and oversees the rms worldwide executive assessment and succession planning activities. He is also a key member of Heidrick & Struggles Chief Executive Ofcer & Board of Directors Practice. With more than 15 years of experience in assessment, top-level succession planning, organizational effectiveness and strategy consulting, Stephen specializes in CEO succession and has partnered with numerous boards of global Fortune 500 companies to ensure that a successful leadership selection and transition occurs. He also has led many chairman successions and board effectiveness reviews, partnering with boards of directors to help them with their overall effectiveness, committee effectiveness and individual director effectiveness. Additionally, he is a recognized expert on the role of the chief operating ofcer, and has consulted numerous companies on the establishment and the effectiveness of the position and supporting the transition from COO to effective CEO. Stephen is a coach to many CEOs and COOs around the world. He has built the Practices coaching expertise by focusing on high-performance leadership competencies with a heavy emphasis on the business and cultural context. Stephen works extensively internationally, and his clients cut across all industry sectors. Stephen and his CEO advisory services were proled in the BusinessWeek article The Rising Star of CEO Consulting. Prior to joining Heidrick & Struggles, Stephen held various positions at Andersen Consulting. Stephen is author and co-editor of the best-selling business book Leaders Talk Leadership. He also co-authored Riding Shotgun: The Role of the Chief Operating Ofcer, as well as the cover article in the May 2006 issue of Harvard Business Review* on the same topic. Stephen also co-authored the feature article in the April 2007 issue of Harvard Business Review titled: The Leadership TeamComplementary Strengths or Conicting Agendas? Great top teams work to their members disparate strengthsbut those differences can cause discord, too, especially during succession. His third book, Your Career Game: How Game Theory Can Help You Achieve Your Professional Goals, was released in April 2010 (Stanford University Press) and he has also recently completed a chapter on Assessing the Leader for Linkage Inc.s Best Practices in Leadership Development Handbook 2nd edition; Wiley 2009. Stephen is the author of the Stanford Graduate School of Business case study entitled Multimillionaire Matchmaker: An Inside Look at CEO Succession Planning. Stephen has also been featured in Forbes, BusinessWeek, Boardroom Intelligence, Strategy + Business, WSJ/MIT, Consulting Magazine, MIT Sloan, Ivey Business Journal, and CEO Magazine. He is a frequent speaker on the topics of CEO succession, coaching C-level executives, talent management and complementary leadership at the top (high performance teams). Stephen is a member of the Heidrick & Struggles Management Committee. He is an independent director for Overlay.TV and DNA13, and an advisory board member at Rypple and The Pythian Group. He has lived in Kenya, South Africa, Iraq, Argentina and Canada.
* Second in Command: The Misunderstood Role of the COO was a McKinsey Award nalist for the best article in Harvard Business Review in 2006.
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C O N TA C T I N F O R M AT I O N
If you have any questions about this survey, please contact: Michelle E. Gutman Associate Director, Corporate Governance Research Programs Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance Stanford Graduate School of Business Knight Management Center 655 Knight Way, C222 Stanford, CA 94305-7298 (USA) Phone: +1.650.736.7420 Email: gutman_michelle@gsb.stanford.edu
Copyright 2011 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University and Heidrick & Struggles. All rights reserved. 10.21.2011
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