Methods of LOGIC REVISED EDITION Willard Van Orman Quine HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON [New You « Chicago «San Frcs » TorontoCopyright © 1950, 1959 by Hol, Rinehart and Winston nc. Libcary of Congress Catalog Card Number 99124 ebay, 1966 2729.0219 Prined in the United States of Amenca To MARJORIEForeword tothe Revised Editon In 28 thee are wo convenient deductive rule that cannot be directly justified, for the good reason that they serve to deduce conclusions from premisss insuficent «0 imply them. In past printings of §28 there rules have been intety justified y proving that deductions in which they are wed will till rura out allright in the end, a long at certain arbitrary looking restrictions are re spected, In thi new edition, §28 i ewrtten, The rule and resti tions are now explained and justified ina way that dispels the old air of artical. Pp, 190f, and 244-248 treated of theorems of Church and Gide, to the efzet that there can be no decison procedure fr quant fiaton theory and ao complete proof procedure fr number theory. is material has been rewritten, and alo extended (by compresing the adjacent text, with a view to providing a somewhat fll understanding. ‘An appendix is aed proving Gide’ cheorem of the complete ress of quantification theory and a related theorem of Liwenbcim, ‘This i the Appendix that was enclosed asa pampbet with part of the thd printing. ‘On suggestions of Me. Donald P. Quimby and Profesor Wiliam “TParey, Ihave revised pp 31,52, and [BL inthe direction of moce freedom of classroom procedure, Laser emendatons, many of therm prompted by Mr. Quimby, have been made in pp. 2,97, 135, ME, 170,189, 200, 202,242, and the Bibliography and ladex ‘Thiry small typographical or clerical errs discovered in the fie printing were corrected inthe second, 1952. Also various more suletantal emendations were there made, acting pages 44, 53, 67,100,116, 19, 73, 176, 181, and 192. For ealling my attention to the need of thse corrections I remain indebted to many rede, ‘specaly ProfesotsG.B. Butch, Alonzo Church, and AP, Ushenko and Mess, M. W. Dick, 8. Pais, and S.J. Tees. Cambridge, August 2, 1956 WV.Q Preface Logic isan old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one “There i oom in it for many books. But if each of five lagi books is concerned, at leas in its erly portions, with the clement ofthe subject, and allare from the sume hand, then space mut be found in ‘the fith for an apology. Such isthe purpose for which the present page andthe next have ben set aide. “This book undertakes both to convey a precise understanding of ‘the formal concepts of rodern logic and to develop conveaient tech igues of formal reaaiag. Logic books exit which are strong in ‘theory and rigorous and elegant in the matter of proof but the reader who would dicover further prof of his wa has had pin filly to develop his own method of discovery. a this book, though rigor harbeca preserved, the objective ofinelcting technical ity fas bern allowed to prevail aver that of elegance. ‘The logic of truth functions and the logic of one place predates, ‘or monaie quantification theory, are provided here with mechanical texts ofvaity. Various such tents are knowa, but new ones are bere presented which seem on the whole to terminate more quickly when ‘ppied to examples, For the broader loge of predicates, or general quantification theory, comprehensive tests of validity ae known to be imposible Here one must resort to proof athe than mere tests; and the dis ‘covery of proof commonly depends on ingenuity. Here, cherefre, cflcacy is served by s0 faming the rules of proof as to make the dscovery of proofs as easy om the average as we can. This objective, ‘ather than tht of concisenessof rules, hs prompted thesytematiz- tion of general quantification theory contained inthis bok. ‘This moch makes the book » new mansal of lgial method. But ‘theory alo comes in fora size. The lst five sections of the book eal with set theory andthe foundations of mathematics, others dealvith singular terms and descriptions others grad the old ontological the, These pages too turned out new in more than manner of ex presion. ‘Sal this sone more book which develops modern logic from the round wp. Unavoidably there have been patches where points ex Plhined in my easier wetags needed o be explained again ia exen Tally the ame old way. At thee pints I have adapted examples and expository pasages ftom Mathematical Logi, Elementary Lope and O Sendo ds Nova Lépict, preferring not to obscure genuine points of contact by ad hoe shifts of example or of phrasing. But the Prints are few. BL draws in parton §6 of O Sendo, and §3 dram in parton §2 of Mathematica Logic. Ta $84, 8, 12, and 31, examples ‘ce borrowed from Ebmenary Lape but are handled dierenty. ‘About a sith ofthe book is being printed smal, ax optional ead ing: the tet is intended as a text for a semester college course in ‘deductive lpi. The course in which I shall we i snot Feesnan “Thought, but it ea course for the general student and it doesnot presuppose Freshman ‘Thought or other special training. Besides bing intended forthe general staden, the course docs double duty as prerequisite for specialized coures in logic; and it is hoped ‘correspondingly that this book may be wieful as «foundation for further building Finally, despite the presence of exerci, the book ‘would fil of much of its purpose if it were not also taken up as 2 treatise by ceaders who have no comiitments toa colege logic core. ‘Acknowledgments For help criticams of catliee drafis Iam grateil to Profenors George D. W. Berry and George Burch, Dr. Joseph L. Cobite Profesor Nelon Goodman, Dr. Olive Stes and James W. Olver, and the publisher reader. Each of thew seven has afected the book forthe beter the last ewo were especially influential. To Mr. Robert F- McNaughton, Js 1am indebted fora ertcalsruinyof the book in its inal sages, a well at for making the index and helping the proofeadng” I thank the Harvard Univenity Pres for pesmi sion to borrow portions of §2 of my Mathematical Logi, and T thank Ging and Company for permision to adap sundey examples from my Flementery Logic. The principal ackoowledgment of alli due my wile for her uairing efforts, both secretarial and evtcal, But for her the book would have ben slower to appear and slower and dresrice orcad. Combride, March 8, 1930 W.V.Q.Introduction Logie, ke any seience, ha as ts busines the purr of truth, What fare true ate certain statements; and the pursuit of truth i the en ‘deavr to sort out the true statements fom the others, which are fase. ‘Truths areas plentifil as falehoods, since each fsehood admits of a neption which is tru, But scientific activity i not the insti tate amacsing of truths cence selective and secks the truths that count for most, either in point of intrinsic interest o¢ a instruments for coping with the world. FFortuth ordinarily attaches o statement by virtue ofthe natre of the word. Ie isa commonplace, inaccurate but not unfounded, that a statement is true when it corresponds to reality, when ie rirzors the wodd. A fundamental way of deciding whether axa reat is eve is by comping it, in some sense oF other, with the ‘worldor, whichis the nearest we can come, by comparing it with fur experience ofthe word, ‘Strictly speaking, what admit of truth and falsity are not state- ments as repeatable patterns of utteance, but individual events of ratement utterance. For, utterances tht sound alike an vary in ‘meaning wth the orcson of the utterance, This is dve not ony t0| careless ambiguities, but systematic ambiguities which ae sential to the mature of language. The pronoun ‘changes its erence with every change of speaker ‘hee’ changes its reference with every sig: rifieage movement though space; and ‘now’ changes its reference every time itis utered. So the crucial point of eantact between description and rat in tbe sought in the utterance ofa statement on the occasion of an experience which that statement utterance directly reports. The secing ofa green patch, and the simultaneous uterance ‘Green patch ‘ow’, constitute the soe of composite event which ints rare occur ‘rencs, gladens the heart ofthe epistemologis. Such events, fundamental though they are epistemological, arepre Because of thesia au of lngoge. Langage ftaon serving. win ising the sol end f an tmnt i sao tobe rode hat te objec of ob fe ted commonest uttcace ae cal shared pyc object ther then pte experines Phys bet ty id oot exit sen ota Vol epget hve Int be iva ‘Theyateindpenntless th pic common denominators of pve Doc traces abou pyalojes arent vial or fatale by dct compatson wh cxpesence Tey ppt odes, nt ‘spares bu the exer world. They cn be cpr with he Cher wd onl hough the mem f our experece of hat orl butte comet between cur epee and the word Trey loves ep of hypothe o inrence which pees iy dice an cochisvecofotaon ofthe tence ith ‘xbjce mt, There many ap ete objectve cap and be inte ip So satenents apart man ocular tem fo pte vlogs cote ely devmay with exgernce The tse ene ponuncment abt poston td the ae tha reisiney hand ae cpl scents dt py oer ad Fy object kaon tonya prof tent nee el smctre wc taken av ole pings at edge upon Capctznce As bras kaneedge sconce a ee cia bec tor our wl bolo eiatons canta isd cone escape fr rating esesoce to experiences, Th ee whol b unerdeemined by epesenr, bt imply given loam cere hat cetan ob sd be ortcoming, When sic prediction of expert tr ot wrong th sytem aso Be ‘lange onciow- at we ein a wide te of che to what Scena then orev sd what neo ei 20 ‘nny verses wil te afer oun the prea ig Gon whch brought the sem to geet, Ow statement abot cv ety ete boa of ewe expec ot indy batas a cnporte ty But achchace of win to evi abet ta ge cheme of pronto, Some tetsu pyar cy pena my hand, "The mercury is at 80 ar in some sense cost to posible ‘experience than othees and such statements must be guarded pretty jealously once the appropriate experiences have appeared. Should revision ofthe system become necesary, other statements than thee are to suifer Tes only by such an allocation of peorty that we can ope to claim any empirical content of objective reference forthe symem ara whole, "There i alo, however, another and somewat opposite priority: the mote fundamental a lw ie to our conceptual seme, the lest Hkely we are to choos ic for revision. When some revision of our system of statements iscalled for, we pefer, other things bring equal, 4 revision which dscrbs the system leat. Actually, despite the apy putent opposition between ths priority and the’ one previously noted, the one involves the other. For, the connection between 2 statement such as My pen is in my hand’ and the experiences which are sid to verify it is itl» matter of general peincipes central to the system, ‘Where the two priorities come into confit, ithe i capable of prevailing. Statements close to experience and seemingly veried by the appropriate experiences may occasionally be given up, even by pleading hllucination, in the exteme case where their retention would enti a cataclysmic revision of fundamental laws. But to. over rule a multiplicity of such statements, if they eeinfore one another and are sustained by diferent observers, would invite criticism, ‘The priority on lw, considered now apart from any competition with the priority on statements veried by experience, admits of smany gradations, onjectureso history and economics willbe revised more willingly than laws of physics and these more willingly than laws of mathematics and logic. Our system of statements has sch a thick ewhion of indeterminacy, in relation to experience, that vast donaias of lw can easly be eld immune to revision om principle. We can always turn to other quarters ofthe sytem when revisions axe called for by unexpected expeiences, Mathematice and logic, central as they are tothe conceptual scheme, tend to be accorded such immunity, in view of our conservative preference for revisions hich disturb the sytem least; and herein, perhaps, les the "aeces- sity" which thelr of mathemati and lgi are fle t enjoy.Inthe end ic is peshaps the same to sy, a one often does, that the laws of mathematics and logic are true simply by virtue of our eon- eptual scheme. For itis eertily by virtue of tht scheme that those laws are central tit; and i is by virtue of bring thus central that the laws ae preserved frm revision atthe expense of statements lesestrateyclly sitote. Teisali often sid thatthe ls of mathematics and logic are tue by vitueof the meanings ofthe words", "=, Py ‘and ete, which they contain, This alan T can accept, for I expect ic ders only in ‘roring from saying tat the avs ate tre by virtue ofour concept scheme, ‘But it must now be remarked that ou conservative preference for those revisions which disturb che syste least is opposed by a signif ant contrary force afore for implifeaton. Far reaching revision of the fundamental laws of physie war elected in tecent decades, by considerations of simplicity, in preference to the welter of ad Boe Sulbidlary laws which would otherwite have been needed to accom tmodate the wayward experiences of Michelson and Morley and other Cxperimenters, Continued experiment “confirmed” the fundamental revisions in te sense of increasing the simplicity diferent ‘Mathematical and logial laws chemseves are not immune to revision ifs found that excndal implications of our whole con ‘eptal scheme will amoe. There have been suggestion, simulated Inrely by quindares of modern physics that we revise the true fake dichotomy of earent logic in favor of some sort of tr- oF ‘chrom. Logical laws are the most central and crucial statements fof our conceptual seeme, and for this reaon the most proveeted from revision by the force of conserva; but, becuse again of their crucial poston, they are the laws an apt revision of which ‘night offer the move sweeping simplification of our whole system of Knowledge “Thus the lvsof mathematics nd logic may, despteall “necesity" ‘beabrogated But this ienot to deay that such awsare true by virtue ofthe conceptual scheme, or by virtue of meanings. Because these laws reso centr any revision of them is fel tobe the adoption of few conceptual scheme, the imposition of aew meanings on old fronds No such Zevolution, by the way i envisged inthis books ‘here will be novels ofappreach and technique fn thew pages, but at boctom logic wil remain unchanged. Tr the most part, ashas been sree inthe foregoing paragraphs, fur suatemeats relate only remotely to experience. The system of statements sa whole has its experiential implications; but the ind vidual statements apart from the peripheral few which dieetly Adrcrbe experience as such ate relevant twexperence ony indirectly ‘through thie participation ia the system, Ie is oly by way ofthe selations of one statement 9 another that the statements in the interior ofthe system ca igure at alin he prediction of experience, tnd can be found deserving of revision when prediction fil. Now of these relations of statements to statement, one of conspicuous importance is the relation of logical implication: the relation of any statement to any that fellows logialy from it fone statement ito bbe held attr, each statement implied by it must alo be held as ‘tre; and thus cis chat statements internal to the system have thee lAfects on statements atthe periphery. Bu for implication, our system of statements would forthe most fare be meaningless: nothing but the periphery would make sease Yer implication is not realy an aed fctor; for, to say that one statement logically implies a second isthe sume assaying that a tied statement of the system, an Ethen’ compound formed from the ‘other to, logically tre or “valid.” Logical trths are statements ‘ona par withthe rest, but very centrally situated; they are state iments of uch forms as x = 2 "por not p\'Ifp then pp and g sheng, "everything is thus and so thea something i thus and and others more complex and ls quickly recognizable. Their charac ‘erntieis that they ao aly are tue butstay truceven when we make substitutions upon their component words and phrases as we please, provided merely thatthe so-called “logical” words ‘=’, ‘or, ‘nt’ “then ‘everyting’, “omething’ ete, stay undisturbed, We may rite any statements in the 'pand ‘postions and any terms in the ‘thus and 0" positions, in the forms cited above, without fear of falsity. All that counts, when a statement i logialy tre, sit struc ture in terms of logical words. Thus tis that logical truth are com ‘monly sid to be ve by virtue merely of che meanings of the logical swords.