Name: Jabe Tecson Gica TITLE: LEAGUE OF CITIES VS. COMELEC CITATION: G.R. NO.

176951
FACTS:

July 24, 2013 Wednesday

DATE: NOVEMBER 18, 2008

The Congress enacted into law R.A. 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code during the 12th Congress, by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million in order to restrain "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

A total of 57 municipalities had city hood bills pending in Congress prior to its enactment but 24 of them were not converted during the 11th Congress. The House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 to exempt the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress but it was adjourned without the Senate's approval. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009.- The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of 1987 Constitution? Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause?

THE COURTS RULING: The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and 10, Article X of 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause, and are thus unconstitutional. The constitution provides: Section 10, Article X of 1987 Constitution. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

In that case, the cityhood bills violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other laws. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. The Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they preclude the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

The Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which is unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.

Furthermore, R.A. 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law. It took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Hence, the retroactive application is inadmissible.

WHEREFORE, the Court granted the petitions and declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

TITLE: SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC CITATION: 270 SCRA 106 G.R. NO. 127325
FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. ISSUES: Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision? Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative? Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution?

DATE: MARCH 19, 1997

THE COURTS RULING: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petitio n is a revision or amendment has become academic.

TITLE: KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. GARCIA JR. CITATION: 239 SCRA 386 G.R. NO. 115381
FACTS: Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range." Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.

DATE: DECEMBER 23, 1994

ISSUE: Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal?

THE COURTS RULING: Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the transport sector, we find that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications between administrative officers. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition was GRANTED and the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 was MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid. There was no pronouncement as to costs.

TITLE: DEMETRIA VS. ALBA CITATION: 148 SCRA 208 G.R. NO. L-71977
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations. The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

DATE: FEBRUARY 27, 1987

ISSUES: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional? Whether or not the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act?

THE COURTS RULING: Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. Petition was granted. And Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 was declared null and void.

TITLE: GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE CITATION: 196 SCRA 221 G.R. NO. 94571
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D. No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

DATE: APRIL 22, 1991

The petitioner seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution? Whether Or Not PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 and PD No. 1967 still operative under our constitution?

THE COURTS RULING: There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.

The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. The Court, therefore, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same. There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition was DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

TITLE: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) VS. COCOFED, ET AL. and BALLARES, ET AL. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR. and the SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) CITATION: G.R. NO. 147063
FACTS: Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Orders 1, 5 2 6 and 14. On the explicit premise that vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created by Executive Order 1 to assist the President in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth thus accumulated whether located in the Philippines or abroad. Executive Order 2 stated that the ill-gotten assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world. Executive Order 14, on the other hand, empowered the PCGG, with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, inter alia, to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under EOs 1 and 2. Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal.

DATE: DECEMBER 14, 2001

Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged one million coconut farmers, the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of the said UCPB shares, the PCGG, on 31 July 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages (Case 0033) in the Sandiganbayan. On 15 November 1990, upon Motion of COCOFED, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares on the ground that COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies had not been impleaded by the PCGG as parties-defendants in its 31 July 1987 Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the Writ of Sequestration issued by the Commission was automatically lifted for PCGGs failure to commence the corresponding judicial action within the six-month period ending on 2 August 1987 provided under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The anti-graft court noted that though these entities were listed in an annex appended to the Complaint, they had not been named as parties-respondents.

The Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari (GR 96073) in the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to proceed with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered shares to be voted by their registered owners. The victory of the registered shareholders was fleeting because the Court, acting on the solicitor generals Motion for Clarification/Manifestation, issued a Resolution on 16 February 1993, declaring that the right of COCOFED, et. al. to vote stock in their names at the meetings of the UCPB cannot be conceded at this time. That right still has to be established by them before the Sandiganbayan. Until that is done, they cannot be deemed legitimate owners of UCPB stock and cannot be accorded the right to vote them. On 23 January 1995, the Court rendered its final Decision in GR 96073, nullifying and setting aside the 15 November 1990 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which lifted the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares.

A month thereafter, the PCGG pursuant to an Order of the Sandiganbayan subdivided Case 0033 into eight Complaints (Cases 0033-A to 0033-H). Six years later, on 13 February 2001, the Board of Directors of UCPB received from the ACCRA Law Office a letter written on behalf of the COCOFED and the alleged nameless one million coconut farmers, demanding the holding of a stockholders meeting for the purpose of, among others, electing the board of directors. In response, the board approved a Resolution calling for a stockholders meeting on 6 March 2001 at 3 p.m. On 23 February 20 01, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. filed the Class Action Omnibus Motion in Sandiganbayan Civil Cases 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F, asking the Sandiganbayan to enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more than one million coconut farmers; and to enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the names of the 14 CIIF holding companies including those registered in the name of the PCGG. On 28 February 2001, the Sandiganbayan, after hearing the parties on oral argument, issued the Order, authorizing COCOFED, et. al. and Ballares, et. al. as well as Cojuangco, as are all other registered stockholders of the United Coconut Planters Bank, until further orders from the Court, to exercise their rights to vote their shares of stock and themselves to be voted upon in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) at the scheduled Stockholders Meeting on 6 March 2001 or on any subsequent continuation or resetting thereof, and to perform such acts as will normally follow in the exercise of these rights as registered stockholders. The Republic of the Philippines represented by the PCGG filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered UCPB shares?

THE COURTS RULING: The registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these sequestered shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr. Two clear public character exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote the shares exist (1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands. The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to truth; that public property registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner should be given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of ownership. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares. Herein, the money used to purchase the sequestered UCPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the coconut levy funds. The sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies, not with alleged ill-gotten wealth. As the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, but are in fact prima facie public funds, the Court believes that the government should be allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they belong to it as the prima facie beneficial and true owner. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and effectively reversing existing jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which are prima facie public in character.

TITLE: PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS CITATION: 110 PHIL 331 G.R. NO. L-10405
FACTS: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

DATE: DECEMBER 29, 1960

ISSUE: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional?

THE COURTS RULING: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective.

The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such position in said two (2) cases the importance of the issues therein raised is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated political subdivision, and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines. Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained. Wherefore, the decision appealed from was reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta.

TITLE: CRUZ VS. PARAS CITATION: 123 SCRA 569 G.R. NO. L-42571-72
FACTS: De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the Temporary Restraining Order he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads An Act Granting Municipal Or City Boards And Councils The Power To Regulate The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Certain Places Of Amusement Within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid?

DATE: JULY 25, 1983

THE COURTS RULING: It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

Under the Local Government Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmation, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

TITLE: TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD CITATION: G.R.NO. 75697

FACTS: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." "Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

DATE: JUNE 18, 1987

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.

ISSUES: Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power? Whether or not the DECREE is constitutional?

THE COURTS RULING: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition was dismissed. No costs

TITLE: TOBIAS VS. ABALOS CITATION: G.R. NO. L- 114783

FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

DATE: DECEMBER 8, 1994

ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)? THE COURTS RULING: There are claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TITLE: TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE CITATION: 235 SCRA 630 G.R. NO. 115455
FACTS: Republic Act 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act 7716 on various grounds. Tolentino contends that Republic Act 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively. Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution?

DATE: AUGUST 25, 1994

THE COURTS RULING: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

TITLE: BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORP. VS. VALENCIA CITATION: 11 SCRA 486 G.R. NO. L-20740
FACTS: This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.

DATE: JUNE 30, 1964

Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be filed two month before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications(formerly Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to petitioners.

Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis? Whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9in favor of PBS? Whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof?

THE COURTS RULING: In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. There was no express agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.

As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to state that it having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and said intervenor on the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, no right belonging to said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to give up its present operation of Channel 9. Based on the Appropriations Act the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing commercial television stations.

This gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. The executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void.

It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

TITLE: GONZALEZ VS. MACARAIG CITATION: 191 SCRA 452 G.R. NO. 87636
FACTS: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a General Provision, were vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 (Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes) was adopted. On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales, Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina, Jr., John Osmea, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Taada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and as substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this case, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson, Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.s cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the itemveto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

DATE: NOVEMBER 19, 1990

The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case is a political question beyond the power of the Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a rider because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the Presidents veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill. ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill?

THE COURTS RULING: The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.

The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings. More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation from savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public treasury. It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.

TITLE: PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ CITATION: G.R. NO. 113105

FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled An Act Appropriating Funds For The Operation Of The Government Of The Philippines From January One To December Thirty One, Nineteen Hundred And Ninety-Four, And For Other Purposes (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows: 1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987. 2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), 3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance. 4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). 5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers

DATE: AUGUST 19, 1994

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. 7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress ISSUES: Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional? Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional? THE COURTS RULING: The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service). The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

TITLE: TAADA VS. TUVERA CITATION: 136 SCRA 27 G.R. NO. L-63915
FACTS: Invoking the Peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

DATE: APRIL 24, 1985

The respondents, trough the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuance is a question. Said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being aggrieved parties within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided.

THE COURTS RULING: The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of the laws as a pre-requisite for their effectivity. Neither the publication of laws in the Official gazette as a pre-requisite for their effectivity. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication on the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided This pre-requisite does not apply to a law with a fixed provision as to when will it take effect, The intention of this provision is to give the general public enough awareness of the laws that will regulate their actions. Commonwealth Act No. 638 does not support the proposition that for the effectivity of laws, it must be published in the Official Gazette. The said act only provides the uniform publication and distribution of the Official Gazette, only important legislative acts and those of public in nature are required to be published in the Official Gazette.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one, it is unjust if a person will be punished with a law he had no notice, thats why laws which is public in nature shall be published in the Official gazette to protect the constitutional right of the people, to be informed on matter of public concern. For no person should be bound by law without notice. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TITLE: PVB EMPLOYEES VS. JUDGE VERA CITATION: G.R. NO. 105364
FACTS: Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (Case SP-32311). Thereafter, the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E. (PVBEU-NUBE), represented by Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP-3231. After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid. On 8 March 1991, PVBEU-NUBE Fernandez moved to disqualify the Judge Benjamin Vega, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, from hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners. On the 2nd of January 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, PVBEU-NUBE and Fernandez filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. Republic Act 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefore, And For Other Purposes", which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on 2 January 1992 and which was published in the Official Gazette on 24 February 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of 3 years from the date of the reopening of the head office.

DATE: JUNE 28, 2001

The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same. Pursuant to said RA 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated 13 March 1992 with Judge Vega praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of RA 7169. On 10 April 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution 348 which approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitation Committee.

Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen. Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen. Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank.

Moreover, PVBEU-NUBE and Fernandez learned that the Central Bank was set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while PVBEU-NUBE's and Fernandez's claims have been frozen to their prejudice.

On 3 June 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with Judge Vega. PVBEU-NUBE and Fernandez, on the other hand, filed the petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order. In a Resolution, dated 8 June 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case. On 22 June 1992, MOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court. On 3 August 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular banking operations.

ISSUE: Whether a liquidation court can continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

THE COURTS RULING: The enactment of Republic Act 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, Judge Vega has been stripped of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation. Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

TITLE: GARCIA VS. COMELEC CITATION: G.R. NO. 111230

FACTS: On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the Republic Act No. 7227. The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution. However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum. On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. ISSUE: Whether or not the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative? Whether or not the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?

DATE: SEPTEMBER 30, 1994

THE COURTS RULING: The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials. Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein. The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore.

Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and re ferendum, and the exceptions there from, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely: 1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution 2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation 3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. The petition was granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.

TITLE: SENATE VS. ERMITA CITATION: G.R. NO. 169777

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? THE COURTS RULING: The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.

DATE: APRIL 20, 2006

If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefore. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

TITLE: BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON CITATION: G.R. NO. L-89914
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin Romualdez. The complaint alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with then President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino people. Conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdez corporations were carried in various newspapers. Other newspapers declared that shortly after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Romualdez companies were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the Presidents brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firm. In the Senate, Senator Enrile delivered a speech on the alleged take over by Lopa of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies owned by Romualdez. Senator Enrile also called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law, particularly with regard to RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The matter was referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has valid legislative purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21? THE COURTS RULING: The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As provided under Art. VI, Sec. 21, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self.

DATE: NOVEMBER 20, 1991

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided in the Senate Rules of Procedure. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. This matter appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

TITLE: STANDARD CHARTER VS. SENATE CITATION: G.R. NO. 167173

FACTS: Petitioner, Standard Chartered Bank, is an institution incorporated in England with limited liability licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the country. It violated RA 8799 for selling unregistered foreign securities. Senator Enrile in his privilege speech introduced a Resolution to attend the matter. The respondent-committees chairperson Senator Angara set an initial hearing to investigate in aid of legislation thereto. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing and submit their written position paper. Petitioners, in response, submitted to respondent a letter stressing their position that there were cases already pending in court which involved the same issues that the respondent is subjecting to legislative inquiry. The petitioner thereby poses a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to continue the inquiries since there are cases of a similar subject filed in court of which are still pending. Respondent still commenced the investigation. Its vice chairperson moved for the issuance of a subpoena to those who did not attend the hearing. Said motion was approved thereby the cause of petition. Standard Chartered Bank, petitioned for a TRO to direct the Senate Committee on Banks from 1. Proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to a Senate Resolution 2. Compelling the Banks officers to attend and testify before any further hearing called by the respondent Committee3.Enforcing any Hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch list

DATE: DECEMBER 27, 2007

Petitioner-Bank also prays that judgment be rendered annulling the subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to them and prohibit the Committee from compelling them to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to the Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of legislation?

THE COURTS RULING: Respondent has jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry although the subject matter involved is the very same subject matter pending in court. The respondent-committees action does not encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely on the courts. The petitioners reliance to the Bengzon case is misplaced to the extent that, in the case at bar, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon.

However, the similarity ends there. Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon was the courts determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The petitioners erred in alleging that the inquiry was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities. This fallacy is made more glaring at the conclusion of Sen. Enriles privilege speech urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.

Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

TITLE: NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOP VS. SP CITATION: 155 SCRA 421 G.R. NO. L-72492
FACTS: In 1985, the SP of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of NORECO II Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (LGC BP 337) grants the SP. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

DATE: NOVEMBER 5, 1987

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt?

THE COURTS RULING: There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.

The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body. WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25, 1985 requiring the attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation by the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued by the latter on October 29, 1985 directing herein petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish non- members for contempt. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers from enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent committee was made permanent. Petition was GRANTED.

TITLE: ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO CITATION: 87 PHIL 29 G.R. NO. L-3820

FACTS: The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.

DATE: JULY 18, 1950

It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

Hence, this petition on following grounds: a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.

b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person

ISSUE: Whether or not either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a member for contempt?

THE COURTS RULING: Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.

It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.

The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.

TITLE: GUDANI VS. SENGA CITATION: G.R. NO. 170165

FACTS: Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.

DATE: AUGUST 15, 2006

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent. However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that No AFP Personnel Shall Appear Before Any Congressional Or Senate Hearing Without Her Approval.

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with the time*-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A*rticles of+ W*ar+ 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive. The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that No AFP Personnel Shall Appear Before Any Congressional Or Senate Hearing Without Her Approval is unconstitutional?

THE COURTS RULING: Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commanderin-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that *t+he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under house arrest by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.

Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Judicial relief as remedy: The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts. Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all officers and soldiers in the active service of the *AFP+, and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

The Petition was dismissed.

TITLE: NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS INVESTIGATION CITATION: G.R. NO. 180643
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

DATE: MARCH 25, 2008

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

THE COURTS RULING: The communications are covered by executive privilege The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several jurisprudence cited provides the elements of presidential communications privilege: 1. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. 3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.